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97–499 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–65] 

FUTURE OPTIONS FOR THE U.S. 

NUCLEAR DETERRENT—VIEWS 

FROM PROJECT ATOM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

NOVEMBER 3, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

DREW WALTER, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

MIKE GANCIO, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Blechman, Dr. Barry, Co–Founder, Stimson Center ............................................ 8 

Colby, Elbridge, Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow, Center for a New American 

Security ................................................................................................................. 6 

Mount, Dr. Adam, Independent Consultant .......................................................... 9 

Murdock, Dr. Clark A., Senior Advisor, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies ....................................................... 3 

Payne, Dr. Keith, Professor and Department Head, Graduate Department 

of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University .......................... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Blechman, Dr. Barry ........................................................................................ 75 

Colby, Elbridge ................................................................................................. 61 

Cooper, Hon. Jim .............................................................................................. 39 

Mount, Dr. Adam .............................................................................................. 91 

Murdock, Dr. Clark A. ...................................................................................... 40 

Payne, Dr. Keith ............................................................................................... 50 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 37 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Excerpts from ‘‘Project Atom: A Competitive Strategies Approach to Defining U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Posture for 2025–2050’’ ........................ 103 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Aguilar ........................................................................................................ 135 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 155 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 159 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 139 

(1) 

FUTURE OPTIONS FOR THE U.S. NUCLEAR 

DETERRENT—VIEWS FROM PROJECT ATOM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, November 3, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:29 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. Good afternoon. This subcommittee will come to 

order. 

Welcome to our hearing on ‘‘Future Options for the U.S. Nuclear 

Deterrent: Views from Project Atom.’’ 

For those who haven’t read it yet, Project Atom is a unique and 

very timely study on the future of the U.S. nuclear deterrence. It 

is unique because it brings together perspectives from across the 

policy and political spectrum to examine this most important of national security issues. 

Four different think tanks participated and had what appears to 

be a spirited debate of the critical issues. And Project Atom is timely because it is so sorely needed. As some of the materials for the 

study say, it helps fill, quote—‘‘the current deficit in the national 

security attention paid to the continued relevance and importance 

of the U.S. nuclear strategy and force posture,’’ close quote. 

This committee has been striving to correct this deficit as well. 

And we welcome Project Atom and its contributing authors in support of that cause. 

Chairman Thornberry’s nuclear deterrence week of hearings and 

classified briefings this summer was a step along that same path. 

This subcommittee will continue to work to inform Congress and 

the public on the requirements for a robust and credible nuclear 

deterrence long into the future. 

My hope is that Congress and the executive branch, particularly 

in the next administration, will take a hard look at Project Atom 

and what it is trying to tell us, because the bottom line is that the 

world is not standing still. We are not returning to the Cold War, 

but we are also not returning to the 1990s when so many people 

believed international peace and love would reign indefinitely. 

We need a clear-eyed view of the world’s other nuclear states and 

would-be nuclear states and what we must do to ensure nuclear deterrence holds and nonproliferation prevails. 
2 

† Excerpts from the Project Atom report can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 103. 

The full Project Atom report is available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS29/20151103/ 

104109/HHRG-114-AS29-20151103-SD001.pdf. 

In the short term, we need to focus on building a nuclear strategy, posture, and enterprise that is flexible and responsive. Our 

witnesses have lots of suggestions on that front and this committee 

has advanced legislation toward that goal. 

In the long term, I believe we need to rethink the logic behind 

a policy that keeps the United States indefinitely maintaining a 

nuclear capability we had in the 1990s. 

As other nations, Russia, China, North Korea, Pakistan, continue 

to research and deploy new nuclear capabilities over the coming 

decades, the logical question that we must ask is, will the nuclear 

deterrence capabilities the United States had in the 1990s be credible in 2040? 

Unless you believe global zero is going to happen any day now, 

and if you do then I have a bridge to sell you, we are going to have 

to reexamine that policy. A choice will be made on this front, not 

right now, but sometime in the coming years. In the meantime, we 

can discuss all of this with our panel of witnesses. 

Thank you all for being here today and contributing to the study. 

We know it takes a lot of time to prepare for these hearings and 

we really appreciate your commitment. 

The witnesses are Dr. Clark Murdock, senior adviser, Center for 

Strategic and International Studies; Dr. Keith Payne, professor and 

department head, Missouri State University; Mr. Elbridge Colby, 

Robert M. Gates senior fellow, Center for a New American Security; Dr. Barry Blechman, co-founder of the Stimson Center; and 

Dr. Adam Mount, independent consultant. 

With that, I will turn to my friend and colleague, the ranking 

member from Tennessee, for any statement he may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding 

this important hearing. And I look forward to the testimony of the 

witnesses and ask that my statement be inserted for the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

Mr. ROGERS. We will now ask each of our witnesses to make an 

opening statement, summarizing their prepared testimony, and ask 

to keep that to 4 or 5 minutes. 

Your written testimony will be, without objection, entered into 

the record. Also without objection, I want to enter into the record 

the full Project Atom report.† 

Mr. ROGERS. Without objection, so ordered. 

We have provided a copy of that report to each of the members 

and have a few available for others as well. 

Now, let us hear from the witnesses in this order. First, Dr. 

Murdock, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 
3 

STATEMENT OF DR. CLARK A. MURDOCK, SENIOR ADVISOR, 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Dr. MURDOCK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

very much, Ranking Member Cooper. It is a great opportunity to 

come here and talk about the Project Atom study. 

It was designed as a sort of blue-sky look into the future without 

constraints, policy constraints or strategy constraints, as to what 

kind of nuclear needs, what kind of strategy the United States 

should follow in the 2025 to 2050 timeframe. 

So as I said before, this was unconstrained either by current 

strategy, by which I mean reducing the role of nuclear weapons, as 

an example, or by current policy, which is no new nuclear capabilities, no new nuclear weapons. 

So we are out into the 2025 and beyond timeframe. The approach 

we took was a competitive strategies approach. This was funded by 

Smith Richardson [Foundation] in part because we took the competitive strategies approach to it. So I went out and recruited three 

independent think tank teams to participate in this. 

The first was headed by Keith Payne from the National Institute 

for Public Policy, Bridge Colby from the Center for a New American Security, and Barry Blechman from the Stimson Center. And 

each of them formed a small, analytic team that operated throughout and attended the working group, members, and then presented 

their views, defended their views. 

And then once that process was complete, then I stepped back 

and wrote what I thought was the right approach to take towards 

a nuclear strategy and its postured needs. And then I defended 

that in another working group meeting consisting of outside experts and the members of the various independent study think 

tank teams. 

So the approach was one of develop a common analytic framework, think through what are the requirements of that security environment, what kind of adversary strategies would be followed, 

what kind of technological possibilities would be open in the nuclear realm in the 2025 to 2050 timeframe, and then each of us 

took a separate look at what should be our strategy. 

My dynamic that I thought was most important were the dynamics that flowed essentially from U.S. conventional superiority. That 

is, in a world in which nations are seeking to deal and cope with 

a conventionally superior adversary, namely the United States in 

this case, would increase their reliance upon nuclear weapons as a 

way to deter us. 

And essentially, our conventional superiority, in a sense, lowers 

the nuclear threshold because it increases the incentives for other 

nations to resort to nuclear weapons as a way of trying to prevent 

our intervening in, say, regional adventurism that they might be 

following. 

So my belief is, is that in order to counter other nations’ potential interest in using nuclear weapons early in a conflict is that we 

need to develop a set of robust, discriminate nuclear options in 

order to be able to respond both proportionally and in kind to any 

possible use of a nuclear weapon against the United States and its 

allies. 
4 

I am concerned about the fact that we have a force structure 

largely and a posture largely determined by Cold War needs. The 

warheads are larger, many of them are less discriminate, many of 

them carry high collateral damage. And if confronted with the situation where an adversary used a special-effects, low-collateral 

weapon, nuclear weapon, against the United States or one of its allies, that we may be self-deterred from responding because we do 

not have a discriminate or a proportional or an in-kind response 

that is suitable to that use of a nuclear weapon. 

So one stress is on what kind of nuclear response options we 

have. We need to be able to deny the attractiveness of nuclear escalation to our potential adversaries. So we need a new set of capabilities in that area. 

Another area that I think is particularly important is to look at 

the requirements for extended deterrence. During the Cold War, 

the United States coupled its security to the security of our allies, 

both in the European theater and the Pacific theater. 

We tend to forget that during the height of the Cold War the 

United States had forward deployed 7,000 nuclear weapons in Europe during that time, so that when the Soviets looked at what 

would happen if they engaged in major conventional aggression, because we perceived, correctly so, that our conventional forces were 

inferior to the Warsaw Pact forces, they knew that a conflict would 

go nuclear because there were 7,000 nuclear weapons there. 

We also had a thousand nuclear weapons deployed on the Korean 

Peninsula because we wanted to protect the security of South 

Korea, and they wanted those nuclear weapons there because they 

knew that the presence of nuclear weapons on their territory would 

be credible in terms of potential adversaries. 

So I think another aspect of our force structure as we move forward, our nuclear force structure as we move forward, is the need 

to have rapidly deployable and rapidly deployed nuclear weapons 

that can be either deployed forward during peacetime or can be 

rapidly moved forward during a moment of crisis in order to provide the nuclear umbrella that we are talking about. 

So with those two comments, I will let the other think tanks 

speak for themselves and pass the floor to Dr. Payne. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Murdock can be found in the Appendix on page 40.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Payne, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DR. KEITH PAYNE, PROFESSOR AND DEPARTMENT HEAD, GRADUATE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND 

STRATEGIC STUDIES, MISSOURI STATE UNIVERSITY 

Dr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Cooper. It is an honor to be here. 

The assessment by my colleague Tom Scheber and myself is 

based on—— 

Mr. ROGERS. You need to turn your microphone on. 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes, sir. 

The assessment by my colleague Tom Scheber and myself is 

based on the proposition that the size and character of the U.S. nuclear force posture needs to be driven first and foremost by a realistic appraisal of international conditions and threats. That is a key 
5 

presumption because today’s international threat environment is 

extremely dynamic and challenging. 

The comforting assumption of a relatively benign new world 

order and a perpetual peace dividend has been overtaken by the reality of multiple, highly threatening developments, including new 

nuclear threats. And as Secretary of Defense Ash Carter recently 

noted, there is no apparent end in sight for these developments. 

Given this threatening and indeed surprising security environment, the United States must prepare its forces to deter foes and 

assure allies through many possible negative shifts in international 

relations, including the erosion of U.S. conventional superiority, at 

least in some key areas. 

We need to plan our deterrence and assurance strategies and capabilities according to these realities, not past unrealistic hopes 

and expectations. 

In this context, the proposition that the goal of nuclear disarmament should be the overarching driver of U.S. nuclear policies, 

I believe, is misguided and even dangerous. Why? Because nobody 

has offered even the vaguest credible outline of how to make nuclear disarmament a reality in an international system that is 

characterized by hostility, mistrust, and conflict. And no nuclear 

power has followed the U.S. lead in this regard. 

So what are the pertinent implications of these realities? The 

U.S. force posture must be sufficiently adaptable, flexible, and resilient to deter a variety of threats and foes in many possible contingencies now and in the future. 

As former STRATCOM [Strategic Command] Commander General Robert Kehler has observed rightly, and I quote—‘‘Surprise is 

a problem in a constantly changing world. In my view, the future 

requires adaptive and flexible U.S. capabilities to respond to unanticipated threats.’’ Precisely right. 

The U.S. must work to sustain or expand these force posture 

qualities: adaptability, flexibility, and resilience. That is the primary standard of adequacy we need to meet now and for the future. 

There are several steps that could be taken to increase the 

adaptability of U.S. forces, particularly including modernizing the 

U.S. nuclear triad and forward-based forces. Further deep reductions in U.S. nuclear forces, however, would likely instead undercut 

these very qualities that may be critical to being able to deter war 

and assure nervous allies. 

In addition, I should add that if you care about nonproliferation 

you must care about maintaining the capability and the credibility 

of the U.S. nuclear extended deterrent. The U.S. nuclear umbrella 

is the single most important nonproliferation tool that we have. 

In conclusion, U.S. forces must be able to adapt to an increasingly dangerous and unpredictable threat environment, not geared 

to past, set expectations of a benign new world order, enduring 

U.S. conventional force superiority, a never-ending peace dividend, 

or an overarching goal of nuclear disarmament. 

The now-apparent dangers of the post Cold War threat environment have come to many as a big surprise. For two decades, Western defense thinking in general has been geared to a new world 
6 

order in which nuclear weapons would play an ever-smaller role on 

the path to nuclear zero. 

General Breedlove, NATO’s [North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s] Supreme Allied Commander, recently acknowledged that for 

two decades the U.S. has treated Russia as a potential ally. That 

belief has been the backdrop for decades of deep U.S. nuclear reductions and a general lack of attention to U.S. nuclear forces. 

Now, however, as General Breedlove said further, we must readjust. The realities of contemporary threats now argue strongly in 

favor of modernizing U.S. nuclear forces and emphasizing their 

adaptability, not further reductions and greater rigidity. 

That is the primary takeaway from the assessment that my colleague Tom Scheber and I provided. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Payne can be found in the Appendix on page 50.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Dr. Payne. 

Mr. Colby, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ELBRIDGE COLBY, ROBERT M. GATES SENIOR 

FELLOW, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY 

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cooper, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting me to testify on the future of America’s nuclear deterrent. 

It is an honor to speak to you today on this matter of the greatest importance to our Nation’s security. 

We are entering a period of significant and possibly dramatic 

change in both the geopolitical and the military technological 

spheres. In brief, the United States is likely to confront more significant challenges to its interests from countries like China in 

Asia and Russia in and around Europe. 

At the same time, U.S. conventional military advantages over its 

plausible opponents will likely narrow. This will have major implications for U.S. defense strategy writ large, but also for our nuclear 

deterrent. Accordingly, the United States needs to adapt its nuclear 

policy and posture. 

What in particular should change? If the United States continues 

to want to extend deterrence effectively, as I believe it should, U.S. 

nuclear weapons need to do more than threaten unhindered devastation. Thus, while the ultimate source of U.S. deterrence should, 

of course, remain the threat of overwhelming destruction, the 

United States should also prepare for and make clear that it would, 

as appropriate, use its nuclear forces in more limited fashion for 

more focused effect. 

In particular, the United States should adapt its nuclear forces 

to be able to fight a limited nuclear war more effectively than its 

plausible adversaries. Such superiority would give the United 

States important and possibly crucial leverage to defend its interests in both peace and war. 

The U.S. nuclear force of today is not, however, optimally designed for this demanding set of criteria. To optimize its nuclear 

force, the United States should do the following. 

Invest appropriately in an improved nuclear command and control system such that U.S. nuclear forces can perform their mis-
7 

sions reliably under any plausible conditions and do so in sufficiently controlled and deliberate ways. 

Maintain the nuclear triad to ensure a resilient, redundant, and 

highly capable nuclear deterrent. 

In addition to fully funding the SSBN [ballistic missile submarine] replacement and replacing the Minuteman III, the United 

States should maintain and modernize its fleet of nuclear-armed 

bombers. This modernization effort is particularly important in 

light of the unique attack capabilities found in the bomber force, 

but also in the growing challenges to stealth and its ability to penetrate. This effort should include procuring the LRSB [Long-Range 

Strike Bomber] in sufficient numbers, maintaining the B–52H and 

B–2A, buying sufficient dual-capable F–35s for regional deterrence 

and assurance and acquiring the Long-Range Standoff [LRSO] option missile. 

The United States should also move in the direction of providing 

most or all of its nuclear forces with variable-yield warheads or 

weapons that can provide a variety of types of effects, such as electromagnetic pulse, different height of bursts, use at sea and so 

forth, so that the United States can more effectively tailor strikes 

from the full range of its available platforms. 

The United States should in particular focus on making the ballistic missile force more capable of discriminate strikes. The United 

States should accordingly render at least some portion of the Trident II D5 SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic missile] arsenal capable of lower-yield strikes, for instance by using primary-only 

warheads. 

The United States should also ensure that the LRSO is capable 

of discriminate employment by arming it with a variable-yield warhead. 

Given the proliferation of hardened and deeply buried targets, or 

HDBTs, earth penetration should be a special focus of long-term research and development and ultimately procurement. This is vital, 

I emphasize, both for deterrence and for stability. 

The size and composition of the nuclear force should be determined based on strategic considerations. Arms control should be 

pursued where and so it contributes to stability, but not for the 

sake of reductions. 

In closing, the world is changing in ways that dictate that U.S. 

nuclear policy and posture should also change. The United States 

should grasp the opportunity to make such changes while unfavorable trends are still nascent and susceptible to counteraction. I believe a modernization program along these lines would add to a favorable stability and ultimately to the kind of peace we and our allies justifiably seek. 

I look forward to any questions you might have. Thank you very 

much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Colby can be found in the Appendix on page 61.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Colby. 

Mr. Blechman, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Dr. Blechman, 

I apologize. 
8 

STATEMENT OF DR. BARRY BLECHMAN, CO–FOUNDER, 

STIMSON CENTER 

Dr. BLECHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cooper, members 

of the subcommittee. This is a good opportunity. 

I have a rather different view than my colleagues in this project 

and I will briefly summarize it. 

Now, in my view, U.S. security benefits by seeking to minimize 

the importance and roles of nuclear weapons in the perceptions and 

actions of foreign leaders. For the United States, nuclear weapons 

serve only to deter nuclear attacks on ourselves and on our allies. 

Maintaining U.S. conventional superiority is the key to U.S. security, and our nuclear weapon programs harm this by raising the 

prospect of false alternatives, such as being able to fight controlled 

nuclear wars, and by their direct effects on budgets and on the 

training of U.S. military personnel. 

So in summary, I believe the U.S. should work diplomatically to 

constrain nukes as circumstances permit, adopt policies and doctrines and work politically to strengthen the nuclear taboo and adjust force posture and modernization programs to reduce expenditures. 

Our security depends mainly on political leadership, on diplomacy, and on our economic instruments of power, private and public. And it also depends on our conventional superiority, which is 

due to the scale and longevity of our investments and advanced 

technologies and systems on the size of our forces and on the quality and training of our people. 

We can’t do everything with military force, but we can defeat any 

conventional threat we face currently. China and Russia are making advances, but I believe the U.S. should be able to maintain superiority if our citizens remain willing to allocate sufficient resources. And I would be happy to debate this point during the 

questions. 

Maintaining our technological and quantitative conventional edge 

should be our highest priority. And this will be hampered increasingly by the bow wave of nuclear spending that we are facing in 

the next decade. 

In my view, the primary goal of our nuclear policy should be the 

elimination of nuclear weapons from all nations. I recognize this is 

not going to be achieved until many, many political conflicts are resolved and may never be achieved, but it is certainly a goal that 

I think should be a vision that should be underneath our policies. 

Until elimination becomes feasible, if it ever does, the U.S. 

should, one, stress a firm commitment to nuclear retaliation for 

any nuclear attack, be clear that any nuclear attack on the U.S. 

or our ally will result in retaliation no matter how small the yield 

of the attack, no matter what the target might be or whatever the 

range of the launcher which was used to fire the weapon, but we 

should also make clear that this deterrent role is the only purpose 

of U.S. weapons. 

Deterrence, in my mind, depends not on nuclear capabilities, but 

on boots on the ground. If we are concerned about the possibility 

of Russian incursion in the Baltic states, we should and I believe 

we should greatly improve NATO’s presence on the ground in those 

countries so that the Russians never come to the misperception 
9 

that they can perform a fait accompli before NATO can respond to 

that. And there are ideas around to put the equipment, pre-deploy 

equipment, for U.S. armored brigades in those countries, and I 

strongly support those ideas as well as related things. 

So the implications of this policy for U.S. nuclear forces are, one, 

as the current generation ages out I believe we can reduce the 

number of our forces unilaterally. I think we should maintain a 

triad, but that could be reduced to perhaps 8 to 10 submarines, to 

2 Minuteman wings with only modest investments can be maintained viable until the 2040s. 

I believe we should put a high emphasis, high priority on the 

new bomber, primarily for its conventional role, but also for a nuclear role. I think we should phase out tactical nuclear weapons as 

their service lives expire, because there is nothing those weapons 

can accomplish that could not be accomplished by a long-range 

strategic bomber armed with a variable-yield weapon. 

And finally, I think we should divert the resources we save by 

making those reductions to our conventional capabilities, particularly command and control survivability, which I agree with Bridge 

on that, on continued R&D [research and development] on defenses, missile defenses, and deploying such defenses as the technologies mature, and on cyber and EW [electronic warfare] capabilities and on advanced conventional technologies. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Blechman can be found in the 

Appendix on page 75.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Dr. Blechman. 

Dr. Mount, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DR. ADAM MOUNT, INDEPENDENT 

CONSULTANT 

Dr. MOUNT. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Congressman Cooper, 

members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to 

discuss this with you today. 

The world that we are entering is indeed a period of strategic 

competition. However, this does not mean we are in a new Cold 

War. Today’s challenge is one of maintaining stability in regional 

contexts and defending the core interests of U.S. allies against limited, but persistent, encroachment. 

Both China and Russia are engaged in extensive programs to 

modernize their nuclear arsenals. But with a few important exceptions, both countries are replacing legacy systems that have 

reached the end of their service lives. Neither country plans to operate a submarine force capable of maintaining boats continually 

on station near our shores and neither plans to construct a low, observable bomber platform. For the foreseeable future, U.S. nuclear 

forces will remain markedly more capable. 

Recent calls to build new nuclear weapons and to deploy them 

closer to potential zones of conflict represent a dramatic departure 

from longstanding, bipartisan consensus nuclear policy. Since the 

1980s, Presidents of both parties have worked to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in our military planning, to gradually reduce our nuclear stockpile and to refrain from procuring new capabilities. 
10 

New nuclear weapons are unlikely to be effective instruments for 

deterrence or defense in this new era of hybrid conflict. Both Russia and China are likely to continue to pursue their objectives with 

operations that remain well below the threshold of war. Nuclear 

weapons, no matter what kind and no matter where they are stationed, cannot deter this kind of threat. They cannot help to roll 

back Russian occupation of Crimea or put a halt to Chinese land 

reclamation in the South China Sea. 

At the same time, it is far from certain that low-yield and special-effects nuclear weapons are necessary for deterrence or escalation control. The United States cannot be certain that these 

weapons will deter better than the strategic arsenal or that they 

will restrain an adversary from conducting further nuclear strikes. 

The enormous strategic and diplomatic costs of employing a tactical weapon make it unlikely that they would be utilized, which 

in turn decreases their utility as instruments of deterrence. China 

and Russia are already threatened by American superiority. New 

nuclear programs would likely cause them to accelerate their modernization efforts, contributing to what former Secretary of Defense 

Bill Perry recently warned is a new round in the nuclear arms 

race. 

For these reasons, imbalances should be addressed through 

verifiable arms control agreements. For this reason, the United 

States should press Russia to engage in negotiations, not only to 

limit existing nuclear systems, but also the procurement programs 

that each country finds most threatening. 

Initiating new nuclear procurement programs in the United 

States would also have serious effects on the national defense 

budget. If history is any precedent, Congress is unlikely to obligate 

funds for a hundred new bombers and 12 new Ohio-replacement 

submarines on top of numerous other outlays. 

Unexpected cuts to core systems of the triad will require changes 

in strategy and operations. At the same time, nuclear modernization plans also place significant pressure on other military priorities, especially in Navy shipbuilding and the F–35 program. 

Congress and the White House should seek prudent cuts to the 

modernization plans in advance so that the services can plan for 

the future. Specifically, Congress should require the Department of 

Defense [DOD] to generate studies that explain the need for a new 

cruise missile, examine the effect of moving to a force of 8 to 10 

ballistic missile submarines and to provide regular cost estimates 

of new spending on nuclear systems, especially the new LongRange Strike Bomber. 

Lastly, the costs of seeking new nuclear capabilities are not only 

monetary. Reneging on the U.S. commitment not to build new nuclear capabilities could stress a beleaguered nuclear nonproliferation treaty regime to the breaking point, and thereby deprive the 

United States of important tools to prevent the spread of nuclear 

weapons. 

At the same time, new procurement efforts would encourage the 

other countries to seek these capabilities. It is far safer to maintain 

that nuclear weapons are not an effective means of controlling escalation. 
11 

In conclusion, current and projected strategic conditions do not 

warrant major changes to longstanding nuclear force structure. It 

is critical to national security and the Nation’s standing in the 

world that the United States maintain its commitment not to seek 

new nuclear capabilities and to continue gradual negotiated reductions of its nuclear arsenal. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Mount can be found in the Appendix on page 91.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you, Dr. Mount. 

And I thank all of the witnesses. 

And I would like to recognize myself now for the first round of 

questions. 

As you heard me say in my opening statement, I am worried that 

the current U.S. nuclear strategy and posture is not suited to the 

world we are finding ourselves in during the 21st century. It seems 

to be based on what you might call the hopeful aspirations of the 

mid to late 20th century. 

Dr. Murdock, you served in the Clinton administration’s Department of Defense during those heady days. Your bio has pegged you 

as a long-range planner. So let me ask you, do you think the current nuclear strategy and posture keeps us secure for the long run? 

And if not, what do you suggest we change and what action should 

this committee take to get us back on the right track? 

Dr. MURDOCK. Thank you for the question. I have described myself as a long-range planner. It is one of the reasons why we put 

the horizon for Project Atom out to 2025 to 2050 because we have 

to think about systems that will take 10 to 15 years to develop, systems that will have lifetimes of 35 to 50 years. So you have to 

think in terms of a longer-range perspective. 

As I look into the deeper future, the longer-range future, I think 

that the risks of proliferation are higher. We are already dealing 

with potential near-term risks of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, but there are similar pressures in other regions of the 

world. And in a more highly proliferated world, I think we have to 

develop the kind of capabilities that can deter the kinds of nuclear 

employments that our adversaries may make against us. 

It means, in my mind, that we have to develop discriminate, lowyield, variable-yield, special-effects weapons so that we can respond 

in kind and respond proportionally to any potential use of a nuclear weapon against the United States or its allies. I think that 

this emphasis upon being able to respond proportionally and in 

kind is critical for deterrence during this time. 

As I said before in my statement, I worry about the prospect that 

if we are confronted with a limited nuclear use against us, that because of the character of our weapons, that we may be self-deterred 

from responding in kind because we would have to go too high up 

the escalatory ladder, use too large a yield bomb or missile or warhead, and it is important that we develop the robust set of options 

so that a President can respond proportionally and in kind to any 

use of a nuclear weapon against us. 

This is not saying that we have to go out and seek superiority. 

Right now we are in a position of inferiority when it comes to nonstrategic nuclear forces, otherwise known as tactical nuclear weap-
12 

ons. The Russians have somewhere between 2,000 and 4,000. I am 

sometimes not sure they even know how many they have. We have 

forward deployed approximately a couple of hundred, and very 

small inventories back here in the United States. 

So my feeling is that we do not have to address this quantitative 

superiority that the Russians have maintained in this class of systems, but I do believe we have to develop a range of options so that 

we can respond discriminately to any potential use of those tactical 

nuclear weapons by the Russians. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Dr. Payne, you were a primary author of George W. Bush’s administration in his Nuclear Posture Review. How has Russia as an 

actor on the world stage, in particular in nuclear affairs, changed 

since then? 

Dr. PAYNE. Well, we first saw evidence of a change in Russian 

behavior and Russian doctrine in 2008 where, according to senior 

Russian officials, Russia was ready to call a nuclear alert with 

their actions and operations against Georgia in 2008. 

We have more recently seen Russia back up its operations 

against Crimea and the occupation of Crimea with what President 

Putin himself said was a nuclear escalation threat. 

So what we have learned since those days of writing the 2001 

Nuclear Posture Review is that Russia has moved in a direction in 

some ways much harsher, particularly in terms of its potential use 

of nuclear weapons, than we anticipated at the time. 

We have seen the evolution of Russian doctrine, we have seen 

the evolution of Russian strategy and the evolution of Russian 

forces to where at this point I think you can honestly and quite 

fairly say that Russia has a nuclear first-use policy, a limited nuclear first-use policy, that is meant to backstop its territorial grabs 

in Central Europe and Southern Europe. 

And given that, it seems to me that we need to move in the direction that Clark just outlined, if only to be able to deter. I mean, 

I am not interested in being able to respond, per se, to a nuclear 

war, but we want to be able to deter the nuclear war in the first 

place. So we want to be able to deter the Russian Federation from 

believing it can get anything useful out of a first-nuclear-use 

threat. And in my opinion, that requires exactly the type of capabilities that Dr. Murdock was just describing. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 

And Mr. Colby, your testimony suggests that the U.S. should 

make its nuclear forces more flexible and create the ability to tailor 

nuclear strikes in a narrower fashion than available today. You 

mentioned low-yield warheads, tailored effects like EMP [electromagnetic pulse], earth penetration, et cetera. 

Compared to what our current strategic arsenals provide, how 

would these types of new capabilities provide increased deterrence 

toward adversaries, and why do we need them? 

Mr. COLBY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I would like to build on a 

previous comment which I generally agreed with. I think the basic 

problem here is that we are extending deterrence far and wide as 

part of our Nation’s grand strategy, and that includes countries 

like the Baltic States, like the Philippines, to some extent maybe 

Taiwan, countries very close to our potential adversaries and ad-
13 

versaries that have not only increasingly powerful conventional 

militaries, but also survivable nuclear forces. So whatever they do 

to us, to some extent they could hit us back very seriously. 

The problem is, as Clark and Keith described, is an adversary 

may think that he can escalate, especially if he creates favorable 

conditions on the ground, for instance through the use of little 

green men in the Baltics, and then use his conventional forces to 

create a favorable situation, such as a fait accompli, and then 

threaten to escalate to deescalate of some kind, basically say I dare 

you to come at me and go big, even just conventionally, but you are 

going to have to go big in such a way that it is going to look really 

escalatory and really dangerous. 

And if we do that, he may decide, you know, just to take one scenario, he may decide to use nuclear weapons in a very tailored, 

very limited way, specifically designed not only to hurt us militarily, but also to scare not only us, but all our allies in this endeavor. 

And the problem is that if we only have big response, you know, 

as Clark put it, we are very potentially going to be self-deterred, 

but also even if we executed it, the Russians, for instance, would 

have a way of responding in a very dramatic and catastrophic fashion. 

So far better for us and far better for deterrence if we have 

roughly proportionate, same order of magnitude ways of saying 

don’t think it is going to make sense for you to escalate to the nuclear level, even in this sort of clever escalate-to-deescalate way. 

We have a way of defeating that strategy. 

I mean, to put it kind of bluntly, an adversary is less likely to 

raise on you if he knows you have good cards. And I think that 

these kinds of capabilities are basically good cards. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great, thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes the ranking member for any questions 

he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, Dr. Murdock, I appreciate your leading a very provocative 

report. It is very helpful to get this discussion started. 

I was wondering first off when you picked three other think 

tanks, what points of view are left out? What think tanks or viewpoints could have or should have been included? 

Dr. MURDOCK. That is an interesting question, sir. What I was 

trying to do was to get what I refer to as think tanks that were 

representative across sort of the broad middle of the spectrum of 

opinion. There are many people in this town who are more conservative than Keith Payne. There are many people in this town who 

are more liberal than Barry Blechman. 

But I do know that first of all the two of them can be in the same 

room and talk to each other. That is not true of people that are further divided on the spectrum of opinion. And since I am holding a 

lot of working group meetings, I want to make sure that people can 

come in and talk to each other. 

So what I was looking to do was to bound the range of opinion 

to what I would say was the reasonable left and the reasonable 

right, although people may disagree in that kind of characteriza-
14 

tion, they may even themselves disagree on that characterization, 

and then find somebody who was a bit more centrist. 

I probably should have done a little bit more research on this because Bridge, who I did want to include because he is a member 

of the next generation of thinkers that are coming up and I do a 

lot of work on that level as well, that Bridge was probably a bit 

closer to where Keith was than he was to where Barry was. That 

is true. 

And it turned out that both of them were closer to—that I was 

closer to where both of them were than I was to Barry. 

But there are clearly—we bounded the middle of the spectrum of 

opinion with Keith Payne, that I did, with Keith Payne and Barry 

Blechman, that did not go further out onto the margins. 

Mr. COOPER. In the report, it seems that everybody agrees on 

keeping the triad. Everybody agrees on improving command and 

control. And most of you want basically every weapon in the arsenal that we don’t have, you know, with varying the yield and other 

criteria. 

So on the yield, on page 20 of your report, you talk about how 

the massive ordnance penetrator, the MOPs, at 30,000 pounds is 

about 20 times smaller than our smallest nuke. So presumably you 

want to fill that gap with something that would be proportionate 

and discriminate. 

Are there key points within that? Do we need a mid-way weapon? Do we need—what exactly are you looking at sub-kiloton? 

Dr. MURDOCK. I think it depends entirely, from my perspective, 

it depends a great deal on what we know about what the Russians 

are developing. We know that the Russians are doing experimentation in the very lower end of the nuclear yield. 

I personally believe that the deterrent impact of a nuclear weapon partially resides in its ability, you know, in terms of how much 

damage it can effect, the blast heat, the fragmentation that is associated with any weapon, but it is also a nuclear weapon. It has a 

radioactive signal. It indicates a willingness to break a threshold. 

Barry referred to the nuclear taboo that has essentially been in 

existence since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, so that there are those 

who believe that we can have a complete continuum from conventional to nuclear. 

I am happy to have a break between conventional weapons and 

nuclear weapons. Perhaps the Russians have developed a system 

that is somewhat larger than our largest conventional bomb and 

somewhat smaller than our smallest nuclear weapon. If that is the 

case and they feel that by using it under certain circumstances 

that they can go nuclear without threatening our spectrum of responses, that is something I want to be able to respond to in kind. 

So my belief is, is you design, you know—it is our adversaries, 

because of our conventional superiority, who are increasing their 

reliance upon nuclear weapons, who have been experimenting and 

developing nuclear capabilities that are more varied than ours. And 

I think that that is the principal driver of what kind of capabilities 

we need to have. 

Mr. COOPER. How do you define what is a new nuclear weapon 

as opposed to a refurb? 
15 

Dr. MURDOCK. Well, it is a little bit like angels dancing on the 

head of a pin. When you are talking about a life extension program 

where you replace many, many elements, the conventional elements that are part of the warhead, at what point do you have a 

new weapon? 

Well, if it is still the physics package, the nuclear portion of it 

is still within the range of what existed there, you know, people 

say, well, it is not a new weapon. 

I mean, my belief is is that when we are going into an environment where there is an increased risk of our potential adversaries 

breaking the nuclear threshold, I want a new weapon. I could say, 

well, we can adapt this particular weapon we have so it comes 

pretty close to it. 

I want to be able to convince our adversary we have already 

thought about what you want to do, we are developing new weapons to counter that, we are going to ensure that those weapons 

work to our stockpile stewardship system, and we are going to 

train with them and exercise with them so that it will be credible 

and our adversaries believe that if they use a nuclear weapon we 

will use one in response. 

You don’t do that by just saying it. I believe you have to do it 

by fielding the appropriate weapons, by practicing with them, by 

training with them so that our adversaries will understand if you 

go nuclear we are prepared to deal with that, too. 

Mr. COOPER. You used the analogy of angels dancing on the head 

of a pin. I assume you are not discounting the distinction between 

what is new and what is a refurbishment of an older weapon. 

Could we, using our existing stockpile, create enough sub-kiloton 

weapons or other special effects to achieve this? Or are we forced 

to create new weapons? 

Dr. MURDOCK. I am not familiar enough with the classified details of how variable our variable yields are. There are a number 

of ideas that are out there. For example, when you talk about a primary-only weapon where they use just the fissionable aspect of it 

and not the thermonuclear one, they have suggested that that is 

a way of varying the yield of some of the largest warheads that we 

have on ballistic missile defenses during that time. 

My belief is, is that when deterrence, when you are talking about 

deterring adversaries who are thinking about using nuclear weapons to deter you, you want to think about, well, what are the kind 

of capabilities I need to deter that? 

And a new weapon indicates to the adversary that we are serious 

about this, that we are designing a weapon to counter his potential 

use of a nuclear weapon against us. 

I personally don’t have an allergy against new nuclear weapons. 

So there is a reason why, as I look to the future of the kind of capabilities we need, I think of the prescription of no new weapons and 

no new nuclear capabilities as a self-defeating one. 

And so from a perspective of developing a deterrent that works, 

I don’t think we should be bound by those kind of rules. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the 

next rounds of questions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the ranking member. 
16 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. 

Lamborn, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing. 

And thank you all for being here and for your hard work. 

I would like to ask something to Dr. Clark Murdock, Dr. Keith 

Payne, and Mr. Elbridge Colby in particular. 

There was some talk that there was consideration of further unilateral cuts beyond what New START [Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty] called for. And I am not sure that that has died down or 

not, I hope it has. But should that kind of talk be resurrected, 

would you or any of the three of you advocate for further unilateral 

cuts on the part of the U.S. of our nuclear stockpile? 

Dr. PAYNE. I would not, sir. 

Mr. COLBY. I would not, sir. 

Dr. MURDOCK. No. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Given the open sources that have reported 

that there could be cheating by the Russians on the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty, does that call into question 

on the parts of you three gentlemen, again, our adherence to the 

New START Treaty? And my thought is that we are handicapping 

ourselves in some ways through New START. 

If it is reciprocated that is one thing, but if they are cheating in 

other areas, will it even be reciprocated? And should we continue 

handicapping ourselves? That is my question and I would like to 

get your perspective. 

Dr. MURDOCK. My belief is that each of the agreements that we 

have reached with the Russians are separate agreements and that 

we should abide by an agreement that we have reached with them 

on New START unless there is clear evidence that they are not 

abiding by that same agreement on New START. 

My belief is, is that I think there is pretty clear evidence that 

they have cheated on the INF Treaty, and I think that we have to 

think through how to respond to that in a way that is in the field 

of INF, and responds directly and proportionally, in some way, to 

the violation of that treaty. 

It is not something that we should ignore, nor that we should 

deny that it existed. 

I think we have to respond to it, but I would not respond to it 

by violating New START because, in part, that takes the onus off 

the Russians for violating arms control agreements that they have 

agreed to. 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes, sir, I don’t recommend withdrawing from the 

New START Treaty. I agree with Clark, we ought to look at these 

things individually. I do think that there are some options that we 

can take with regard to Russian violations of the INF Treaty, as 

you described, but withdrawing from the New START Treaty, I 

don’t believe is one of them we should exercise. 

But I will add that I think that it is possible that the Russians 

are not going to adhere to the New START Treaty. There have 

been a number of statements coming out of senior Russian officials 

setting, in a sense, the basis for not abiding by the New START 

Treaty limitations in 2018. 
17 

This is what they did with the INF Treaty in earlier parts of 

2007, for example, where recently the former Secretary of Defense 

mentioned that the Russians had talked to him and indicated they 

were interested in withdrawing from the INF Treaty. 

You do see Russian officials now sort of setting the same base 

for the New START Treaty. It doesn’t mean they are going to withdraw from it. Doesn’t mean that they are not going to abide by it. 

But I would at least keep in the back of my mind that they are 

now talking along those lines, and watch very carefully to see what 

they do. 

Mr. COLBY. I pretty much agree with Dr. Payne, sir. I would say 

I think Russian violations of INF are extremely serious and require 

really concerted action. I am actually somewhat mystified why the 

administration is not more alarmed by this sense. 

You know, I see arms control as a strategic tool, as a way that 

we can or may advance our interests in the world. And so if a country violates that, we can go back to not having it. But if you are 

committed to a world without nuclear weapons, you need to make 

sure that the treaties are sacrosanct. And yet, there doesn’t seem 

to be a lot of concern, which mystifies me. 

But it is very serious because of the military dimension. And 

there are, you know, when I spoke about these escalatory options, 

INF may give them potential there, so we really need to be putting 

pressure on them. I think at the very least we should be looking 

at R&D that is legal under the treaty, to see what our options are. 

Other kind of countervailing options should be looked at and talked 

about, at least in principle, openly. 

And ultimately, we should make sure that the Russians bear the 

costs and the diplomatic and political costs of their violations and 

misbehavior. 

At this time, I think, you know, we do benefit from New START 

in terms of predictability and some data exchange, that kind of 

thing. It is not, you know, it is not any kind of dramatic thing. And 

also it allows us to do the fundamental things that we need to do 

in terms of the modernization of our forces. 

But if, as Dr. Payne mentions, we do detect Russian noncompliance or circumvention, we should look at that very, very carefully. 

And the Russians should understand if they violate or circumvent 

treaties that we will be prepared to call them on that and respond. 

Mr. LAMBORN. All right. Thank you all. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Aguilar, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for being here, gentlemen. 

This one is for the group. 

And as it was mentioned in the Wolfsthal and Lewis, the Trillion 

Dollar Triad report, Dr. Mount, you mentioned that in your testimony a few times, and the cost estimate of a trillion dollars to upgrade our nuclear triad over the next 30 years. 

Based on this mind-boggling figure, how can we, regardless of 

the strategic argument, realistically talk about developing and deploying lower-yield weapons when clearly now and in the future 

some of these serious investments that we need to make, some seri-
18 

ous investments in our conventional capabilities, with finite dollars 

available to us, it is imperative that they be invested wisely. 

And I give you some credit because in your testimony you do talk 

about some of the financial implications as well. Can you expand 

on that? 

Dr. MOUNT. Yes, thank you for that, Congressman. I would be 

glad to. It is important to realize that there is a bound in these estimates, anywhere between $800 billion and $1.1 trillion, depending on what you include and how you include potential figures for 

cost growth. 

That having been said, I think it is important to realize that 

these funds are not likely to be appropriated in their entirety. And 

it is important to sort of plan ahead and allow the services to plan 

ahead and make sure they know what is coming so that they are 

not caught unawares with abrupt changes to nuclear force structure that are mandated by Congress. 

I think it is important for the White House and the services to 

sort of together cultivate a plan to bring these modernization plans 

under control. And I outlined a couple of ways to do that. 

It is important to realize that I think there are some areas where 

the modernization plans can be pared back without deleteriously 

impacting our ability to deter our adversaries or to respond to a 

wide range of conflicts. 

So these include the new cruise missile I think we should take 

a serious look at, and also the large number of submarines that we 

are planning to build. 

Now, that is not to say that we ought to throw the plans out the 

window. We will buy a new bomber, and we should. We will buy 

new submarines, and we should. And it is important to prioritize 

and protect appropriations for those systems that are critical to national deterrence and deterrence operations, while looking for areas 

that bring these modernization plans sort of back into the fold of 

reality. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Anyone else? 

Dr. BLECHMAN. I would just note that I think we are already seeing the effects of the greater burden of nuclear modernization on 

the budget. I noticed that in the $5 billion reduction that was necessitated by the budget agreement, there were substantial cuts in 

Army readiness, which is not a choice that I would make. 

I think far more important than the full extent of the nuclear 

modernization program is to ensure that our ground forces and 

other conventional forces are as ready and as capable as they 

might be. 

Mr. AGUILAR. I think the chairman would also convey that that 

reduction to readiness was a reduction of the increase to readiness, 

which a lot of other members advocated for as well. 

One additional point. Instead of—are any of you concerned about, 

you know, with the lower-yield weapon that we are discussing, you 

know, that this investment would give other countries more of a 

reason to invest in their own nuclear arsenals and maintaining this 

constant drumbeat of the arms race? 

And some of you allude to that in your testimony, but would anyone like to expand on their concerns with respect to that point? 

Mr. Colby and then Dr. Murdock. 
19 

Mr. COLBY. Sure. Thank you, Congressman, for your question. I 

think it is an important one. I mean, you know, in my statement 

I emphasize the need for change, but I also think that it is very 

important for the United States to appear and to act in a way that 

is responsible and kind of a good steward of its nuclear weapons. 

But I think, Congressman, the main, you know, the main challenge to U.S. interests and to stability really is not so much from 

a kind of mimicking of what we do, but of a potential opening of 

vulnerability. 

And I think the world is changing, our adversary, our potential 

adversaries, I should say, have been increasing their military budgets abundantly, both in the conventional and nuclear realm. 

And I think if we don’t respond, it is actually vulnerability creates an instability of its own. And that is what concerns me. 

There are other universes. There is the world of the 1990s in 

which the problem was different. So I would not always say that 

this is the right course of action. 

Dr. PAYNE. If I might go back to the cost question, just because 

I would like to add a point to that, and that is, the best study I 

have seen on cost has been done by CSBA [Center for Strategic and 

Budgetary Assessments], came out a few months ago. 

What that study said is that the budget for nuclear modernization and recapitalization will range from 3 to 4.9 percent of DOD’s 

budget, reaching a top of 4.9 percent in 2029. It then concluded 

that unless we talk about eliminating an entire leg of the triad, 

trying to find money in that budget is, and I quote—‘‘the hunt for 

small potatoes.’’ 

And every study that is represented in this assessment that Dr. 

Murdock led calls for maintaining the triad, not eliminating the 

triad. 

So I would suggest that, given the priority of nuclear deterrence 

and Secretary of Defense Ash Carter has said nuclear deterrence 

is DOD’s first priority, that those types of cost structures obviously 

have to be managed well, but given that it is DOD’s first priority 

to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, it seems to me that the 

recapitalization is not going to be too expensive. It is a matter of 

will and it is a matter of priorities. 

On the action/reaction question, sir, that you asked, the general 

notion, as you put it forward and as put forward frequently, is, if 

the United States goes forward with the type of capabilities that 

Bridge talked about or Clark talked about, that this might encourage, say, the Russian Federation to respond more in that direction 

as well. 

Let me—— 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman’s time has expired. I am going to 

have to—sorry. But I would ask you this. It is a very provocative 

question. Any of the witnesses that would be willing to provide us 

a response in writing, I would appreciate that for the record. That 

would be very helpful. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 135.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Let me try to keep us on schedule and go to Mr. 

Fleming, of Louisiana. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Apologies, Mr. Chairman. 
20 

Mr. ROGERS. I am sorry? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Apologies. 

Mr. ROGERS. No, you asked a good question. That is why I appreciate it. I would like everybody to respond to it. 

Mr. Fleming is recognized. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I am glad to hear, it is very interesting to hear that really 

a debate that is going on right in front of our eyes, the panel, of 

where we go with our nuclear deterrence. And I do appreciate the 

fact that it seems there is a consensus that we maintain our nuclear triad, and I certainly agree with that. We want to make our 

potential adversaries the most complex problem possible. That is 

how deterrence works. 

Dr. Payne, I have a question for you. How do long-range bombers 

factor into your call for greater adaptability and flexibility in our 

future nuclear posture? And could you explain why we need the 

new Long-Range Strike Bomber that will eventually replace portions of our current bomber force? 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes, I am very much in favor of both the new bomber 

and also the new cruise missile specifically because they contribute 

to the adaptability that I think is so important for deterrence. 

To go back and set the stage, if we don’t have a deterrent that 

can adapt to changing circumstances, we may have a deterrent 

that fails. And our most important priority is having a deterrent 

that does not fail to the extent that we can produce a deterrent 

that won’t fail. 

And having a bomber and the LRSO, the new cruise missile that 

would be with that bomber, allows the United States to be able to 

adapt to many different circumstances. It allows different options 

for the President to respond or to threaten to respond. It is just a 

key part of having an adaptable force structure. 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay, thank you. 

Mr. Colby and Dr. Murdock, can you give us a succinct and compelling case for why we need the Long-Range Strike Standoff weapon, the long-range bomber, which will replace our current airlaunched cruise missile? Do you believe this is an important capability, and why or why not? 

Mr. COLBY. I do, sir. And thank you for the question. I think at 

least two major factors. One is that stealth, which is the basis for 

the B–2 and low observability which will be the basis for the longrange penetrating bomber, are both, you know, it is a critical capability, but we don’t know the future of it. We know our adversaries 

are making a lot of progress in detection and targeting of these 

weapons. 

And even if we can still partially operate, there may be constraints on what we can do. So we want to have a backup option, 

we want to be able to penetrate, especially given the plenitude, the 

panoply of targets we may be going after. 

The second and related point is a cost-imposition point. We want 

our adversary to have to prepare for a weapon with a totally different trajectory. And this is as true in the conventional realm as 

it is in the nuclear realm. 

So I think, given the amounts we are talking about with the 

Long-Range Standoff option, it makes abundant sense. 
21 

And I also think, this is more of a rebuttal to some of the arguments that are out there, that this is not a destabilizing weapon. 

In fact, the United States traditional position was that cruise missiles were generally stabilizing. And we have been using conventional cruise missiles without incident, without somebody thinking 

it was the prelude to a nuclear attack, for 40 years. 

You know, obviously if we use them in certain ways that we 

would, probably wouldn’t do, we would want to be really careful 

about it. It would raise those kinds of questions. But I think that 

it is a bit of a canard. 

Dr. FLEMING. Yes, Mr. Colby, do you have a—— 

Dr. MURDOCK. I think you asked the question of me. Mr. Colby 

spoke first. 

Dr. FLEMING. Sorry, Dr. Murdock, yes. 

Dr. MURDOCK. That is all right. I fully agree—— 

Dr. FLEMING. I can’t see your nameplate so I am not sure who 

is who up there. Thank you. 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. MURDOCK. I fully agree and support the statements that Mr. 

Colby made at that time. I think the particular aspect is that it is 

a hedge against the failure of stealth. The B–52 has been our most 

reliable bomber platform for decades. It requires, it depends upon 

standoff weapons to survive, both conventionally and in nuclear 

mode. 

And to me, to give up the flexibility, as Keith Payne would refer 

to, of having a standoff missile, a standoff penetrating missile, it 

is easier to penetrate with a missile than it is with an aircraft during that time, plus they are a lot cheaper when you are talking 

about the number of missiles you need versus the number of platforms you might need to penetrate with, that it is affordable. 

And as Keith also pointed out, the CSBA study makes it clear, 30-, 35-year projection of $1.1 trillion sounds like a lot. Well, military capability is expensive. It costs, you know a billion dollars a 

year just simply to operate a carrier and that is not even talking 

about buying it, just to operate a carrier. So these capabilities are 

very expensive. 

But the issue, as the CSBA report points out, is, what is the priority of this? Can we afford to spend 5 percent of the U.S. defense 

budget on anything? Of course, we can. The question is, is that 5 

percent more important than other competing priorities? And I 

would argue, when you are talking about a foundational capability 

like our deterrent, which is the bedrock of national power, we can 

afford that. 

Dr. FLEMING. And I would agree. I mean, it is not only saving 

money through dividends, but it is saving lives through wars not 

fought. So I thank you. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Garamendi, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Chairman Rogers, thank you so very, very 

much. 

This is an extraordinarily important policy issue. It is a policy 

that we will be dealing with, I think, in the next—this year and 
22 

on into probably the next 5 years. But we will set in place, one way 

or another, an extraordinarily important process. 

We have heard from, what I would call, the advocates of a greater nuclear. I would like to have Dr. Blechman take about 31⁄2 of 

my 5 minutes and come back with your arguments as to what you 

have heard here. 

Dr. Blechman. 

If you can pull that microphone down in front of you. There you 

go. 

Dr. BLECHMAN. Yes, thank you. Well, my arguments are several 

fold. One, the idea that we can fight controlled nuclear wars is 

based on theology. It has never happened, no one knows what 

would happen once a nuclear weapon is used. And the notion that 

we can only match a nuclear weapon with a like kind of nuclear 

weapon is, to me, it is not based on any empirical fact, it is ideas. 

And they have their ideas and I have a different idea. 

For example, if there were, say, a conventional conflict in Estonia, that NATO had built up its conventional forces there, the Russians intervened nonetheless, there was a big conventional war, the 

Russians facing conventional defeat used a nuclear weapon, the 

U.S. could respond with a nuclear weapon delivered by a B–1 

bomber, which perhaps previously had been deployed to Europe, 

with a variable yield. And there is no reason to think, in my mind, 

that such a response would not be just as compelling as being able 

to respond with a tactical weapon delivered by a fighter jet. 

In fact, I would have doubts as to whether the current tactical 

fighters would be able to penetrate the Russian air defenses to deliver that weapon, and also that the European crews would be authorized by their governments to deliver those weapons. 

So I think we are much better off depending on our strategic 

forces. So that was a view shared by the former Air Force Chief 

of Staff General Schwartz, for example. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I thank you for that. I must say this is extraordinarily disturbing to me personally. I don’t know if any of us 

have actually seen a nuclear explosion. I suppose we have seen 

films of it. It seems to me that if we really want to deter a tactical 

nuclear option that Russia might deploy we simply say you use it 

and you are history; you use a nuclear weapon in any form, in any 

circumstance, and you are history, we could certainly do that. We 

have plenty of nuclear weapons and delivery systems to accomplish 

that goal. 

So if this is about deterrence, it seems to me a flat-out statement 

of our policy, use a nuclear weapon in a tactical mode or any other 

way and you are history, period, that is deterrence. I think that 

also happens to be the French view of it. 

So why do we need to build all these new nuclear weapons? Once 

you start that process, it seems to me that we head down a road 

that is not particularly safe in any way, shape, or form. 

Dr. Mount, would you like to take my remaining minute and 10 

seconds and respond to the arguments on the other side of the 

table, which would be the right-hand side of the table? 

Dr. MOUNT. I would be glad to. I don’t want to put words in my 

colleague’s mouth, but as I understand it the argument for new nu-
23 

clear capabilities is that a threat to utilize a large nuclear weapon 

in sort of a limited war scenario would be incredible. 

And I would dispute that, seriously. It is not clear to me that we 

would ever use a tactical nuclear weapon under any plausible circumstance. As Barry mentioned, delivering a tactical nuclear weapon through a tactical fighter has serious trouble. I don’t know that 

we would authorize it. We couldn’t be sure that it would reach its 

target in the right way. 

And most importantly, as you mentioned, any use of a nuclear 

weapon would have enormous diplomatic costs and it would give 

any President very serious pause. And the fact that we would incur 

such massive diplomatic and strategic costs, while plausibly not 

sort of having any outcome on the military situation on the ground, 

in turn, decreases the credibility of a threat to use one of these 

weapons. 

So I would seriously question whether they are needed in specific 

circumstances. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Chairman, I will take another 30 seconds. 

It just seems to me that we really need to have a continuing and 

a full debate on this issue because we will be making decisions this 

year and on into the future, in fact we are doing so today with the 

Long-Range Strike Bomber and the cruise missile that goes presumably with it. 

That is all part of this process, and it will lead us down a path 

that we need to understand what the implications of that path are. 

And the gentlemen here are certainly important in elucidating that 

path. 

I thank you for the additional 40 seconds. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. 

Franks, for 15—for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. For 15 minutes, that would be perfect. 

Mr. ROGERS. You would like 15, though. 

Mr. FRANKS. That is perfect, Mr. Chairman. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. FRANKS. Gentlemen, thank you for being here. This is a discussion of profound gravity. And I find myself with the persuasion 

of the gentlemen, the first three on my left, simply because I believe it is important to be able to meet a potential enemy with 

whatever options may be necessary. And they do get a vote in the 

equation. 

So Dr. Blechman, your recommended strategy makes a basic assumption that U.S. conventional military superiority will continue 

indefinitely. And I hope you are correct. 

On the other hand, Mr. Colby’s recommended strategy is based 

on an assumption that U.S. conventional superiority may not continue and that it is eroding fast in places like maritime Asia. And 

I think that reports and intelligence that I see seems to be on his 

side of the ledger, to say the least. 

If it turns out Mr. Colby is correct, doesn’t that make your recommended strategy and posture somewhat invalid? 

Dr. BLECHMAN. Yes, sir, you are correct. If the U.S. does not 

maintain conventional superiority, then we would have to look at 

alternative strategies. 
24 

However, for my sins, I have worked on defense issues in Washington for 51 years now, and I have seen threats inflated at least 

three times over that period. Yes, Russia is making some progress, 

much less than China. And yes, China is making substantial 

progress. 

But if you look at Chinese technological capabilities or the size 

of their forces, it doesn’t compare to what the U.S. already has publicly and what we are building for the future. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, perhaps it is a situation at this point where, 

you know, just the leadership posture is responsible for some of the 

issues in the Ukraine and Crimea. But it seems to me like they are 

handling themselves, at least strategically, pretty wisely. 

And it seems to me that you are recommending cuts in the U.S. 

nuclear force would be difficult if not impossible to reverse in the 

face of a growing peer threat. 

And if you are wrong, I think we are imposing a limited response 

in U.S. nuclear capability. I think it is a dangerous direction to go 

in. 

Mr. Murdock, part of your recommended strategy of structuring 

accordingly our deterrence and extended deterrence, you outlined 

both of these SDF [strategic deterrent force] and EDF [extended 

deterrent force]. And I wanted to draw your attention to your table 

on page 20 and the last category of massive ordnance penetrator 

being carried aboard a B–2A and a B–52H. 

I know that this—part of the penetration capabilities is simply 

the velocity and the inertia involved. And given that these two 

platforms have wildly different airspeeds, can you help me understand that? 

And I am hoping to get one more question in quickly here, if it 

is possible. 

Dr. MURDOCK. The purpose of the chart was to show the relative 

destructive power of nuclear and conventional warheads largely on 

the nuclear side. But I included the largest conventional weapon in 

there so that the reader would recognize that the range is very 

great among nuclear weapons, but there is also quite a significant 

gap between nuclear weapons and the largest of conventional 

weapons. 

Mr. FRANKS. Yes, it makes—— 

Dr. MURDOCK. In my mind, they are not substitutable. Politically, they are really not substitutable, but just even in the conventional fragmentation they are not. 

Mr. FRANKS. I think that is extremely reasonable and couldn’t 

agree with you more. 

Dr. Colby, you mentioned, if I heard it right, that some of the different ways or some of the mid-range where you can incrementally 

escalate could include things of an EMP nature. And can you help 

us understand that a little bit better? 

Mr. COLBY. Sure. Thanks, sir. Well, I think if we are talking 

about the adversary, EMP can be used in a very destructive way 

to basically negate or really undermine the U.S. ability to project 

power through destruction of electronics, space assets, and et 

cetera. So an EMP scenario is one that we do need to think very 

seriously about. 

Mr. FRANKS. Do you have any suggestions? 
25 

Mr. COLBY. Well, sir, I think in this kind of context, you know, 

proportionality, you know, I don’t think we should tie ourselves to 

being precisely proportionate, but having those kinds of responses 

to be able to demonstrate to a potential adversary that he can’t 

make a move and leave us in a place where we don’t have a sensible way to respond is a recommendation. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, I think the man makes a very important point. 

I am sorry? 

He makes a very important point and I think it is important that 

we don’t maintain the kind of grid that is so vulnerable that it invites that scenario. So thank you very much. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Bridenstine, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Every day I am in Congress I am surprised, most recently by Mr. 

Garamendi, my good friend from California, who I have high regard for, who I think is a great thinker, although we might not always agree, if very often at all. I don’t know. 

But you know, his declaratory policy of if you use a nuclear 

weapon you are history, it is very Reaganesque and I am impressed 

by that. And I would—I say that very complimentary. 

What I would like to discuss are some of the things that we have 

in common. The ranking member mentioned that the command and 

control element seemed to be an issue where there is a lot of commonality, which is very important for us because where there is 

commonality we can start looking at budgets, at policy, at programs that we can put together. 

And when you look at the command and control, it seems like everybody is in agreement that we need resiliency, that we need survivability. 

You know, we have, you know, a space-based architecture for 

command and control that would be survivable and resilient. There 

is an AOA [analysis of alternatives] that has been in the Pentagon 

now for a long time. We have been trying to get that from the Pentagon. It has been very difficult getting it. 

But I wanted to draw on a statement from Mr. Colby. You recommend that the United States develop, quote—‘‘more resilient 

space assets, more terrestrial and air-breathing platforms for 

C4ISR [command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance] and more modular and disaggregated architecture.’’ 

I think I would agree with all of that assessment. Can you describe specific investments you would support? And do we need a 

layered architecture to back up the current system? 

Mr. COLBY. Well, thank you, Congressman. You know, I think 

this is actually a really important focus. I think it is one that 

crosses the aisle because it is vital for the survivability issue and 

it is also increasingly in jeopardy because of not just intent on the 

part of our potential adversaries, but the nature of technological 

change in the space, counter-space, cyber domain, and so forth. 

I think disaggregating the architecture is one thing, making our 

space capabilities more survivable. But also potential things like 
26 

air-breathing, unmanned aerial systems or airborne platforms that 

can do relay so that if your space assets are vulnerable, as they 

may inevitably be to some degree, to some earnest ASAT [antisatellite weapon] attack, then we have other options. 

Also, you know, we can look at a wide variety of different options. I don’t have a particular set of A, B, C, D in terms of recommendations. 

But actually, it is funny you mentioned something I am thinking 

about right now, so it is good to hear because I will redouble in my 

efforts to think it through. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Well, thank you. 

Dr. Blechman, one of the things I am interested in that you recommended is that the United States develop low-cost space-launch 

capabilities to help with reconstitution. Can you describe how this 

committee might be helpful in those low-cost, what are the investments that might be necessary to get low-cost, space-launch capabilities? 

Dr. BLECHMAN. Well, I think this is an area where our commercial, where our private sector can make the largest contribution. 

And we are seeing increasing competition for developing spacelaunch capabilities in the private sector. And this committee can 

encourage the Air Force and the Department of Defense to open 

competition for launching satellites. 

There has been some limitations placed on that in the past. And 

things are changing a little bit, but they can be encouraged to move 

more quickly so that these companies have the incentives to invest 

their own funds and to push their technologies as fast as they can. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So in my last minute, I have a provocative 

question that might make my colleague from California upset with 

me. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Who will give me 15 seconds? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. The Comprehensive [Nuclear] Test-Ban Treaty 

is something that Secretary Kerry has been pushing for the Senate 

to ratify historically. And I think there are very challenging implications if we were to go that direction. 

And I was wondering if I could hear from Mr. Colby, Dr. 

Murdock, and Dr. Payne. I have got 30 seconds remaining, so 

maybe I can take that for the record. 

But Dr. Murdock, would you be willing to take that question? 

The implications if we go forward with a Comprehensive Test-Ban 

Treaty, and instead of testing we rely on, I guess, computer models? 

Dr. MURDOCK. Well, the computer model that you refer to, a 

science-based stockpile stewardship program, it has actually greatly enhanced our understanding of how nuclear weapons actually 

function. 

And while there was a considerable amount of controversy at the 

outset of that program, there is very little controversy now that in 

the scientific community when it comes to our ability to certify 

whether nuclear weapons will work. 

There is a question in terms of my bias, my recommendation for 

developing new capabilities and new weapons with those that you 

will be departing from the experiential record of previous nuclear 
27 

weapons and that will raise a question, again, the issue of, do you 

need to test a weapon in order to be sure that it works? 

Nuclear weapons have been employed twice; one of them had 

been tested before and one of them had not, and they both worked. 

Now we are in an age of considerably greater sophistication than 

the first two nuclear weapons and so I think as we go into the 2025 

and beyond, the issue of developing and having confidence in the 

reliability of nuclear weapons that you develop to deal with new security challenges would make, in my mind, ratifying the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty now unwise. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

Thank you very much. 

Dr. Blechman, you suggest that we allow several hundred U.S. 

tactical nuclear weapons we have, our B61 nuclear bombs, to simply age out and go away, that we shouldn’t modernize them. 

But it is openly discussed that Russia has many thousands of 

tactical and nuclear weapons, landmines and air defense missiles, 

artillery shells and many other types. 

We eliminated our other forms of tactical nuclear weapons in the 

1990s, but Russia didn’t follow suit. And now Russia is violating 

the INF Treaty with ground-launched cruise missiles. 

So isn’t your proposal simply unilateral nuclear disarmament by 

the United States, something we tried in the 1990s and have direct 

evidence that it didn’t work? 

Dr. BLECHMAN. Well, let me say first that I do think we need to 

respond strongly to the Russian violation of the INF Treaty, not by 

doing anything to violate the START agreement, but I think it is 

essential that they be held to account to treaties that they are parties do. 

On the question of eliminating the tactical weapons, I don’t believe that the European allies are likely to authorize their crews to 

be the first ones to deliver a nuclear weapon in the event the Russians use a nuclear weapon in a conflict in Eastern Europe. I think 

we can get ourselves in a terrible political bind in such a situation. 

Now, I believe we should depend on our strategic forces, our 

long-range bomber, and I certainly support the new long-range 

bomber as a very high priority, and we can deliver the B61 bomb 

which has a variable yield with the long-range bomber perhaps 

based forward in Europe, but not necessarily, and be much more 

confident that, one, it would penetrate the Russian air defenses 

and, two, that the political decision would be made in that situation. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. You also suggested eliminating one-third of 

our ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] and eliminating two 

SSBNs, which means we cannot sustain our continuous at-sea deterrence. With Russia totally uninterested in following such reductions, aren’t those dangerous positions? 

Dr. BLECHMAN. I don’t believe so. I think that we have more than 

enough weapons to deter a Russian attack on the United States or 

on any of our allies. I think we can go down to, I don’t know what 

the number is, 1,200, 1,000, weapons and still have more than 

enough destructive capability that the Russians would be crazy to 

attack us or our allies. 
28 

I think deterrence depends lots more on demonstration of political will and leadership and on the conventional forces and the 

knowledge of the adversary that if they take a threatened action 

they will confront American military forces and allied military 

forces on the ground. That is what I think deterrence depends on. 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. 

Dr. Payne, the final report of the Perry-Schlesinger commission 

on the strategic posture of the United States stated, quote—‘‘Working with partners in the intelligence community, the laboratories 

should be in a position to advise national leadership on foreign nuclear weapons’ activities bearing on the interests of the United 

States and its allies. In short, the commission recommends that the 

laboratories be allowed to design, simulate and experimentally assess foreign nuclear weapons designs for the purposes of defense 

analysis,’’ close quote. 

Why, in your opinion, is this important? 

Dr. PAYNE. Sir, it is important because—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Your microphone. 

Dr. PAYNE. It is important because we need to know what types 

of capabilities other folks may be developing. And if our labs don’t 

have the ability to try and replicate designs and look at those capabilities, we may not be very familiar with the type of capability 

that Russia is deploying or China is deploying. And ignorance at 

that level could be profoundly dangerous. 

So I think it is extremely important that our labs be able to have 

that capability to go look at foreign systems, see how they are designed, understand those foreign systems in every way possible so 

that we are smart about what our opponents have and not dumb. 

Mr. ROGERS. Anybody else have any thoughts as to why that is 

important or not important? 

Let the record reflect, no. 

I now turn to the ranking member for any final questions he may 

have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is a fascinating and terrifying debate and words like ‘‘discriminate’’ and ‘‘proportional’’ sound so good and they are used in this 

debate to possibly have a whole new class of weapons that we 

thought we had discarded decades ago. 

And it certainly gives you an advantage over the others who 

could then be alleged to favor indiscriminate and disproportional 

responses. 

But I wonder, in a nuclear exchange, how good are we at knowing what in fact has happened? Like could an adversary think a 

low-yield weapon that we are so proud of because it was discriminate and proportional was in fact a dud? And how do you know? 

And I know there are seismic detectors and there are lots of ways 

to kind of tell. But in the panic of war, the fog of war, who really 

knows, and the world’s fate could hang in the balance. 

So when Mr. Colby advocates switching out D5s for primary-only 

missiles or, you know, dialing these things down to variable yield 

so presumably we get in Mr. Murdock’s sweet spot of between 

MOPs and, you know .3 kiloton, like, that is—I don’t know, how 

do people know this? 
29 

Dr. PAYNE. I think, as you said, sir, the fog of war does not allow 

us to promise what you are going to know or not know. The question, though, in my mind is, does that mean that you don’t prepare 

to have the type of options that Clark and Bridge have suggested? 

Because if you don’t prepare to have those types of options, it is 

a self-fulfilling prophecy. All you are going to have are the type of 

large nuclear options that cause potentially much more damage 

than anybody would think reasonable under a circumstance. 

And again, I am not talking about the employment of nuclear 

weapons, I am talking about the importance of having those capabilities to deter the opponent. 

You know, Churchill said, no matter how mature you are in your 

sophistication, every now and then you should take the enemy into 

account. And let me just suggest, if you take the enemy into account in this very discussion, what we know from a number of open 

Russian sources, I am not saying anything here that isn’t available 

in the Russian press, is that the Russian military has said they are 

going in the direction, they have gone in the direction that both 

Bridge and Clark have talked about, because they see that as a 

way of getting under the horizon of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. 

This isn’t us just coming up with this stuff. The Russians have 

said that that is the kind of deterrent they want to have because 

it beats our deterrent strategy. 

And so what we are suggesting is we want the capabilities to fill 

in the blanks, not because we want to use them, but we want to 

make sure that the Russians know that use is not an option for 

them, so that deterrence works. 

That is the argument that you have heard from this left side of 

the table, from your perspective. 

Mr. COOPER. Preparation is a very seductive argument. And I as 

a Boy Scout, an Eagle Scout, am all for being prepared. But capability can translate into survival, it can also translate into temptation. You know, you build a series of perfect hammers, then you are 

going to use that hammer and every problem will start looking like 

a nail. 

And it is interesting how many times Russia has come up in the 

discussion, because in terms of population Pakistan is now larger 

and may be a less predictable nuclear power, but we like to demonize; Dr. Blechman pointed out three times in his career, we have 

exaggerated the capabilities of different enemy categories. 

It is really important we get this right. 

Mr. COLBY. If I—— 

Mr. COOPER. Yes. 

Mr. COLBY. Could I comment, Congressman? Because I think it 

is a very important question. And honestly, I think it is a—I mean, 

look, these are horrible weapons that could kill untold numbers of 

people. I mean, they are the absolute catastrophic weapon and so 

they need to be treated with the utmost seriousness. 

And I certainly don’t come here and recommend this lightly. But 

I think and I particularly say I don’t think we should be thinking 

about escalation control or escalation dominance. We are thinking 

about an inherently risky and potentially catastrophic endeavor. 

But as Dr. Payne points out, we don’t really have a choice. 
30 

At a grand strategic level, we extend deterrence to countries 

around the world, over 30 countries, including ones where we are 

conventionally vulnerable to a nuclear-armed adversary with serious conventional forces that he can use very rapidly and who has 

evinced the willingness to use them. 

And so we have to have a way to fight wars and defend these 

countries in ways that are not suicidal. And with respect, Congressman, I think the problem with that strategy that your declaratory policy is, first of all, it is not credible, the guy is not going 

to believe it and it may even invite a challenge because he really 

won’t believe that we will follow through on it and it will be a way 

to puncture our credibility. 

And I am struck by a famous example that was in Fred Kempe’s 

book on ‘‘Berlin 1961’’ where there is actually a debate in the central committee of the communist party in Moscow about the percentage of probability of whether nuclear war would result if they 

pushed the ball forward in Berlin. 

And Mikoyan, the defense minister, was saying it is 10 percent, 

we shouldn’t do it. And Khrushchev says, no, it is something more 

like 5 percent so we can do it. So people gamble even under the 

nuclear shadow. 

And I think that if an adversary can say, hey, I can see a way 

where, yes, I am going to take risk on, but I am going to be willing 

to do it anyway, the Arabs, the Egyptians and the Syrians invaded 

Israel in 1973, which they knew was very dangerous potentially, 

but they did. And so I think what I say to you, Congressman Cooper, is absolutely, we need to be restrained, we need to be serious, 

we need to be sober about this. 

But I think that if, you know, the problem here is not that we 

are going to invent these and use them. I think the problem here 

is that we are potentially leaving open gaps that create vulnerabilities that can actually spur the ambition of people like Vladimir 

Putin. 

Dr. MOUNT. Congressman, if I might comment. I think it is exactly right to say that we ought to prepare for this new era of strategic competition. I think that it is vital to do so. But I think in 

shifting the bounds of this competition into the nuclear domain, 

you legitimize Vladimir Putin’s reckless movement of nuclear capabilities and his sort of—and his very reckless risk-taking. 

I think it is vital that the United States and its allies prepare 

to counter these hybrid strategies in the domain where they started, so we prepare robust, layered, conventional responses so that 

we can combat these strategies with strategies of our own that actually have a plausible chance of stopping this kind of aggression 

on the ground where it starts. 

I think we have every interest in maintaining a resolute and unified response to Russian aggression at those levels and no interest 

at all in allowing Russia to shift the game to the strategic area 

where he is more capable, relatively more capable. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, we need to make sure we don’t mistake nationalist bluster for serious intent, and when you are leading a nation that is declining in population, has a problem with alcoholism, 

you have to use extraordinary measures to try to be popular in a 

country like that. 
31 

I am in no way defending Mr. Putin. But it is so important that 

we get this right. A copycat approach, a monkey-see, monkey-do 

approach could well be what they are most interested in when so 

often we have been on the short end of asymmetric warfare. 

It seems to me that the ideal response is not a proportional one, 

but a hugely worse one, but nonlethal. You know, it is amazing 

what the capabilities of the militaries are and the capabilities of 

warfighting, not just nuclear-nuclear. 

So I hope that we will be able to explore these issues. I appreciate Dr. Murdock leading this very interesting study and getting 

the debate going again because it has been too long since we have 

had one like this. And it is very important that the members of this 

committee and the Congress be more versed in these issues. 

And the final point would be, Dr. Blechman’s, we have heard a 

lot of hawkish comments today. But as the National Journal reminds us today, we are about to pass a defense bill that uses payfors that are, quote—‘‘almost universally regarded as gimmicky.’’ 

That is a real sign of a national strength. That is a real sign of 

commitment. 

And everybody talks tough, but you have got to be able to pay 

the bills. And when we are borrowing so much of this money from 

China to do this, it has a certain ironic touch. 

So Dr. Murdock’s entirely right. We can pay for this if we have 

the will to do it. It is a very small percentage of our defense budget. But we haven’t been paying for our defense budget. And it goes 

without saying what our NATO allies have done to shirk their responsibilities. You know, they enjoy our umbrella, but they don’t 

want to pay the bills either. 

So we have serious issues in the West of willpower and determination. And I hope that debates like this can not only focus on 

the technical, military aspects, but also the social aspects that are 

required to have a genuinely strong defense. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California for a final set of questions. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And once again, thank you for this extraordinarily important discussion and debate which will go on for a long time. 

My concern here is that the advocates of advancing our nuclear 

forces basically put us down a path where we would be developing 

multiple delivery systems and multiple weapons on those systems, 

all of which would enable us to engage in a limited nuclear war. 

And I think that is exactly where this would go, presumably for the 

purposes of deterrence. 

Now, if that is where we want to go to be able to wage a limited 

nuclear war, then we will make those investments. 

On the other hand, if our goal is deterrence, that is to not have 

anybody use a nuclear weapon, either in a tactical way or in a strategic way, which is a kind of a, in my mind, a foolish dichotomy, 

but nonetheless if that is our goal, then is there another way of 

achieving it? And I guess I laid out another way of achieving it. 

You use a weapon, then you are history. I mean, that is a deterrence. 
32 

Are we willing to do it? Which Mr. Colby suggested perhaps we 

would not be. Well, time will tell. Hopefully, we will not have to 

pass time to find out if there is going to be a moment of truth. 

But it just seems to me extremely dangerous to accept the path 

that we will create new delivery and new weapons for the purposes 

of engaging in a limited nuclear war, which I think the three of you 

are suggesting we should be prepared to do. 

On the other hand, there is the—what seems to have almost 

been forgotten is that we have made extraordinary progress in limiting nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that we have gone from 

several tens of thousands to significantly less than that, probably 

less than 10,000. 

Yes, Russia does have a lot of tactical nuclear weapons. But is 

there a possibility that they would use them in Estonia? Now, if 

NATO decides to invade Russia, that is another matter. Would 

Russia use it in that case? Well, I am sure they would. But then 

why are we invading Russia? Well, why is NATO invading Russia? 

Or maybe it is China and Russia going at this, I don’t know. 

But it just seems to me that we need to be very, very thoughtful 

here before we accept the policy that the United States is going to 

develop a series of tactical nuclear weapons for the purposes of engaging in a limited nuclear war. 

All right. Is that really what we want to do? And is there such 

a thing as a limited nuclear war? I think there isn’t. 

Now, it may be that the first nuclear war is limited, but the next 

one and the next one and the next one? 

There has been a policy for some years now that nuclear weapons are off the table for war. They are on the table for deterrence 

for sure. And I think that is good and I think they ought to be 

there. Now, what does it take for us to maintain a reasonable deterrence? 

So I would like to see this in two—I see it in two different ways. 

One, advocacy for the ability of the United States to create the ability to engage in a limited nuclear war presumably for deterrence 

of a limited nuclear war. And the other is the traditional deterrence that we have had for more than 50 years. 

I am deeply concerned that this nation would lead us and the 

world down the path that we would develop the capability to engage in a limited nuclear war. I don’t want us to go there. I think 

it is extremely dangerous. 

So with that, I yield back and—— 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

And I thank the witnesses for being here, for a very thoughtprovoking hearing. It has been very worthwhile. 

I would remind you that we are going to leave the record open 

for 10 days for members who couldn’t be here, to get their questions submitted to you. And I would ask you to respond to those 

in writing in a timely fashion if you could. 

With that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

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RESPONSES TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. AGUILAR 

Dr. PAYNE. For decades, one of the common assumptions apparent in the U.S. 

public debate about nuclear weapons and policy has been that U.S. acquisition of 

a particular type of nuclear capability would serve only to inspire other states to 

do likewise. The typical claim based on this assumption is that the U.S. acquisition 

of a nuclear capability ultimately will lead nuclear-armed states to further expand 

their nuclear arsenals and inspire nuclear proliferation. In U.S. academic jargon, 

this thesis has come to be known as the ‘‘action-reaction’’ theory of the arms race, 

i.e., the U.S. acts, and others react similarly. It suggests that the U.S. ought not 

to move forward with new capabilities because doing so will harm U.S. security by 

initiating an ‘‘action-reaction’’ cycle of nuclear weapons that would not otherwise 

take place. Corresponding is the frequent claim that if the United States does not 

acquire a nuclear capability, others will refrain from doing so as well. This thesis 

has become accepted wisdom in many quarters in the United States. It posits a 

seemingly logical and obvious connection between U.S. actions and others’ reactions. 

The problem with this thesis, however, is that the actual facts of the history of the 

Cold War and subsequent history point in a different direction. The now-declassified 

(previously Top Secret) Cold War study, History of the Strategic Arms Competition: 

1945–1972, Part 1, by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office concludes as follows: ‘‘No consistent pattern can be found. That is the first important 

generalization to emerge from the history. The facts will not support the proposition 

that either the Soviet Union or the United States developed strategic forces only in 

direct immediate reaction to each other. . . . No sweeping generalizations about action-reaction cycles or inexorable Soviet designs or the momentum of science and 

technology can survive detailed examination of the sequence of events.’’ Despite this 

finding, the notion of an inexorable ‘‘action-reaction’’ U.S.-led nuclear arms race 

cycle has continued to dominate U.S. public policy debate. More recent available evidence similarly does not support the contention that U.S. acquisition of nuclear capabilities inspires nuclear proliferation. In fact, to the extent that there are identifiable linkages, it appears that: 1) some proliferant states seek WMD capabilities in 

response to superior U.S. conventional military capabilities, not U.S. nuclear capabilities; and, 2) that maintenance of a credible U.S. nuclear ‘‘extended deterrent’’ is 

a key to successful non-proliferation because it helps to assure some non-nuclear allies and friends of their security and thus reduces their incentives to seek their own 

independent nuclear capabilities. Maintaining a credible U.S. extended nuclear deterrent makes a tremendous contribution to nuclear nonproliferation. Finally, to 

suggest that a U.S. move toward the acquisition of ‘‘low-yield’’ weapons would inspire others to do so ignores the reported, decades-old Russian drive to acquire precisely such capabilities. In short, the United States cannot inspire Russia to move 

in that direction, because, according to available open information, Russia already 

has moved in that direction. And, in general, the Russian and Chinese nuclear modernization programs appear to precede by many years the Obama Administration’s 

fledgling nuclear modernization efforts. At this point, the United States cannot 

credibly be charged with leading an arms race. In short, the ‘‘action-reaction’’ thesis 

does not survive historical analysis in general; nor does the corresponding current 

characterization of prospective U.S. nuclear programs as inspiring a new ‘‘arms 

race.’’ [See page 19.] 

Dr. BLECHMAN. I believe that the Russians have set a strategic trap for us and 

we are blindly falling into it. The Russians’ emphasis on nuclear weapons and nuclear war-fighting is the result of their conventional weakness. Despite their ongoing modernization program (now being cut back due to their economic problems), 

they are well behind the U.S. and its allies in advanced conventional technologies— 

from ISR to precision munitions to stealthy platforms to robotics, etc etc. They 

therefore emphasize nuclear weapons, to deter conventional warfare, just as NATO 

did in the 1950s and 1960s when it was in a similar position vis a vis the Soviet 

Union. But nuclear weapons are terrible weapons for fighting wars, regardless of 

their yield. Too many have to be used to defeat dispersed armored formations, and 

their use complicates communications, surveillance, guidance, etc—not only by the 

enemy, but by the side that uses them, as well. Instead of diverting resources to 
136 

nuclear forces, the U.S. and its allies should be exploring even more advanced conventional technologies to ensure we maintain our current advantages, as well as 

maintaining the high readiness of our forces. To my mind, the line between conventional and nuclear warfare should be kept as bright as possible. The U.S. should 

be clear it would respond to any nuclear use against its forces or its allies, no matter the yield of the weapons used, no matter the launch platform (long-range or 

short-range), with a devastating retaliatory nuclear response—not necessarily on 

the battlefield (which would mainly kill civilians in allied nations) but against military targets in Russia itself. [See page 19.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

NOVEMBER 3, 2015 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. Please explain why you believe the United States needs an accurate, 

lower-yield nuclear option? Is there a ‘‘gap’’ in U.S. capability between our lowestyield nuclear weapons and our largest conventional weapons? How might Russia or 

another nuclear adversary exploit this in a crisis? In your opinion, does the U.S. 

having these types of capabilities make the use of a nuclear weapon—by either side 

in a crisis—more likely or less likely? Why? 

Dr. MURDOCK. The principal role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attacks against the United States and its allies. Deterring discriminate attacks at the 

lower end of the nuclear continuum depends critically on the United States having 

nuclear response options that are proportional to how an adversary might employ 

nuclear weapons against the United States and its allies. If the United States were 

only capable of disproportionate, high-collateral-damage retaliatory attacks, an adversary could believe that that the United States would be ‘‘self-deterred’’ and would 

not respond-in-kind to a nuclear attack. Having credible nuclear response options 

across the nuclear continuum raises the nuclear threshold because it reduces the 

likelihood that an adversary will resort to nuclear weapons in the first place. There 

is a capability ‘‘gap’’ between our lowest-yield nuclear weapons and our largest conventional weapons. While the smallest variant of the B61 bomb is ‘‘only’’ 0.3 kt, that 

is still 20 times (21.5) more powerful than the largest-yield conventional weapon 

(the 30,000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrator [MOP]). The B61–3/4 is slated to 

be replaced by the B61–12, which is also a variable-yield weapon with options that 

are not yet known. The ‘‘life-extension’’ program for the B61 bomb will likely result 

in a weapon that has at least two kiloton-or-smaller variations, but aside from 

greater accuracy, no additional ‘‘special effects’’ such as enhanced-radiation, earthpenetration, or low radiation, all of which appear to be in active development in 

Russia (and elsewhere). The United States is simply not preparing to counter how 

its potential adversaries are (or may be) preparing to counter its conventional superiority. Russia has explicitly adopted a first-use declaratory policy for its nuclear 

weapons as part of its ‘‘escalate-to-de-escalate’’ strategy that envisions employing a 

nuclear weapon to extricate itself from a conventional conflict that it is losing. By 

having discriminate, proportionate nuclear response options, the United States denies its potential adversaries the attractiveness of ‘‘going nuclear’’ and, in effect, 

makes it less likely that the nuclear threshold will be breached. 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Payne, Dr. Murdock, and Mr. Colby, you each come to this problem from somewhat different strategic perspectives and assessments of the future 

strategic and threat environment, yet you all basically agree on the broad future 

contours of the best U.S. nuclear force. Does this consensus reflect a broader developing consensus among experts in the field? If so, what does this tell us? 

Dr. MURDOCK. As several senior-level DOD officials have observed, U.S. nuclear 

weapons were our ‘‘first offset’’ as the U.S, and NATO coped with the conventional 

threat posed by the Warsaw Pact. Today, other nations (such as Russia) are increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons or seeking nuclear weapons (such as Iran) to 

‘‘offset’’ or ‘‘counter’’ U.S. conventional superiority. For those of us in the policy community who take this dynamic interaction seriously, I do believe there is a growing 

consensus that the United States needs to develop and deploy new nuclear capabilities to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent in the 21st 

century. A nuclear posture designed for the Cold War threat of the 1980s is almost, 

by definition, not the right nuclear posture for 2025–2050. However, I would not 

characterize this view as representing ‘‘a broader developing consensus among experts in the field.’’ Nuclear issues have always been controversial and hotly debated 

in the American policy community, even during the height of the Cold War. There 

are those who believe, as President Obama stated in his 2013 Berlin speech, that 

the United States will never be ‘‘truly secure’’ as long as nuclear weapons exist. 

Since I believe nuclear weapons will always exist, unless mankind invents a more 

lethal and effective instrument of destruction that makes them obsolete, I prefer to 

focus on increasing the safety and security of Americans in the nuclear era rather 

than on the fruitless (in my opinion) pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons. 

In my judgment, which I believe is increasingly shared by those who believe (as I 
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do) that the prospects of a highly proliferated world consisting of fifteen and more 

nuclear powers are increasing, the United States needs a nuclear strategy, policy 

and posture designed for these challenging times, not those in an increasingly distant past. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are the strategy and reforms you propose responsible and prudent 

or would they too greatly lower the bar to nuclear use, and perhaps even incentivize 

use of nuclear weapons? Why isn’t what you propose simply too dangerous? 

How do you specifically see these capabilities as giving the United States the ability to deter an opponent’s attempt to use nuclear capabilities in a limited fashion? 

Dr. MURDOCK. The danger to be deterred is the employment of a nuclear weapon 

against the United States and its allies. Much as it did during the 1950s when it 

was opposed by the conventionally-superior Warsaw Pact, the United States and 

NATO deliberately did not adopt a no-first-use (NFU) policy with respect to nuclear 

weapons and, while remaining ambiguous about precisely what circumstances under 

which it would resort to the employment of nuclear weapons, relied upon its nuclear 

forces to deter major conventional aggression by the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. At the 

height of the Cold War, the United States deployed about 7,000 nuclear weapons 

(often referred to as ‘‘tactical nuclear weapons’’ or TNWs) in NATO-Europe, which 

ensured that the Soviets knew that any major war in Europe would ‘‘go nuclear.’’ 

While this had the effect of lowering the nuclear threshold, it was ‘‘responsible and 

prudent’’ to do so, because it deterred major aggression in Europe and helped keep 

the Cold War cold. Today, our potential adversaries are exploring how nuclear 

weapons could help them cope with the challenge of U.S. conventional superiority. 

Russia’s military doctrine has already embraced the first-use of nuclear weapons to 

prevent losing a conventional conflict with a conventionally-superior adversary (the 

so-called ‘‘escalate-to-de-escalate’’ strategy). It would be imprudent and irresponsible 

for us not to consider how to counter this strategy. Developing and deploying discriminate nuclear capabilities raises the nuclear threshold because it reduces the 

attractiveness of nuclear escalation to our potential adversaries. The so-called ‘‘correlation of forces’’ has changed since the height of the Cold War, and our nuclear 

strategy, policy and posture must adapt to new strategic realities. Not doing so, in 

my view, is not only irresponsible, it raises nuclear risks and is potentially dangerous. 

Mr. ROGERS. This subcommittee has spent a lot of time focused on the need for 

a responsive U.S. nuclear infrastructure. The administration seems to largely agree 

with us but has been glacially slow in implementing actions to fix it. Do you believe 

we need a nuclear infrastructure and enterprise that can quickly respond to geopolitical changes or technical failures in the stockpile? How should we define ‘‘responsiveness’’ of our nuclear enterprise going forward? What metrics should we use 

to measure responsiveness? Does a responsive infrastructure contribute to deterrence of potential adversaries? 

Dr. MURDOCK. The need for a ‘‘responsive’’ nuclear infrastructure has been highlighted ever since it was named as one of the ‘‘legs’’ of the ‘‘New Triad’’ depicted 

in the 2001–2 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Although the term ‘‘New Triad’’ did 

not survive the passage of time, recognition that a responsive infrastructure is a 

critical enabler of a safe, secure, reliable and effective nuclear deterrent has survived. As I have advocated elsewhere (e.g., in QFRs 1–3) [preceding answers], I believe that the United States must develop and deploy new nuclear capabilities that 

are bettered suited for the strategic realities of the 21st century. This will not be 

possible without a healthy infrastructure capable of developing and producing new 

nuclear weapons. While it is the capabilities themselves, plus, of course, the will to 

use them if circumstances require it, that deter our adversaries, maintaining the 

necessary infrastructure for developing, acquiring and sustaining nuclear capabilities is necessary enabler. While defining the technical requirements of a ‘‘responsive’’ nuclear infrastructure is beyond my expertise, the recommendations contained 

in Project Atom are predicated on the assumption that the U.S. does, in fact, sustain 

the nuclear complex which, in turn, designs, develops and produces U.S. nuclear capabilities that are the foundation of nuclear deterrence. 

Mr. ROGERS. Project Atom had an overarching constraint that the force postures 

the teams recommended must be possible within ‘‘approximately $35 billion per year 

in constant 2013 dollars, comprising 4 to 5 percent of the defense budget.’’ Do you 

believe your recommendations meet this constraint? Do you believe 4, 5, or 6 percent of the defense budget is an appropriate amount to be spending on nuclear deterrence, which DOD says is the nation’s ‘‘highest priority defense mission’’? 
141 

1Todd Harrison and Evan Braden Montgomery, The Cost of U.S. Nuclear Forces: From BCA 

to Bow Wave and Beyond (August 2015), Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. 

Dr. MURDOCK. In a report issued after Project Atom was released,1 Todd Harrison 

and Evan Braden Montgomery conclude that even with the ‘‘bow wave’’ spending 

of $12–13 billion per year during the 2020s for nuclear maintenance and 

sustainment, nuclear spending will ‘‘at most’’ account for only 5 percent of total defense spending. At this level of spending, they conclude that the U.S. nuclear program is not ‘‘unaffordable’’ and that ‘‘In the end, what the United States can or cannot afford depends on the priorities set by policymakers,’’ making the issue a ‘‘matter of strategy rather than cost.’’ I agree completely with this statement. Moreover, 

I do not believe that the ‘‘appropriate amount to be spending on nuclear deterrence’’ 

should be linked to a level of spending (such as 4, 5, or 6 percent) of the defense 

budget, but should be determined by the nature of the strategic environment and 

the role and value of U.S. nuclear weapons in that strategic context. I believe that 

the ‘‘overarching constraint’’ set by the Project Atom study the 2025–2050 nuclear 

posture should be possible within ‘‘approximately $35 billion per year in constant 

2013 dollars, comprising 4 to 5 percent of the defense budget’’ is both reasonable 

and achievable. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Final Report of the Perry-Schlesinger commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States stated that, ‘‘Working with partners in the intelligence community, the laboratories should be in a position to advise national leadership on foreign nuclear weapons activities bearing on the interests of the United 

States and its allies. In short, the commission recommends that the laboratories be 

allowed to design, simulate, and experimentally assess foreign nuclear weapon designs for the purposes of defensive analysis.’’ A. Why, in your opinion, is this important? Do you support this effort? B. The Department of Energy is approximately 10 

months late in submitting to Congress an annual report on how it will implement 

such a program. How important do you think it is that the Department promptly 

begin to implement this program? 

Dr. MURDOCK. While I believe that the tracking and assessment of foreign nuclear 

weapons activity is primarily the responsibility of the intelligence community, I 

think that the laboratories have an important role to play, both from an intelligence 

perspective and as part of defense planning. Having a clear and technically competent understanding of non-U.S. nuclear weapon activity is critical for effective policymaking, intelligence analysis and weapons development and procurement. While 

I do not follow this issue closely and do not consider myself a subject-matter expert 

(SME) in this area, I support the Perry-Schlesinger recommendation and believe it 

should be implemented. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please explain why you believe the United States needs an accurate, 

lower-yield nuclear option? Is there a ‘‘gap’’ in U.S. capability between our lowestyield nuclear weapons and our largest conventional weapons? How might Russia or 

another nuclear adversary exploit this in a crisis? In your opinion, does the U.S. 

having these types of capabilities make the use of a nuclear weapon—by either side 

in a crisis—more likely or less likely? Why? 

Dr. PAYNE. The current condition, in my opinion, is highly destabilizing—in part 

because of a ‘‘gap’’ in U.S. capabilities as perceived by Moscow. This gap is illustrated by the self-described Russian nuclear strategy of ‘‘escalating to de-escalate.’’ 

This strategy, as described by Moscow, in fact, is a nuclear first-use strategy, and 

would be used in situations in which Russia would threaten to employ, or employ 

a limited number of low-yield nuclear weapons. The apparent paucity of credible, 

low-yield U.S. nuclear options with which to deter such actions is a capability gap 

that, I believe, should be corrected. In short, Russia has a nuclear first-use strategy 

and a near monopoly in the associated relatively-limited tactical nuclear capabilities. Moving to correct that gap would be a stabilizing U.S. step. Flexible U.S. nuclear options, including an accurate, low-yield U.S. weapon could contribute to stability by helping to counter Russian nuclear strategy and deter Russian nuclear first 

use in a regional crisis. An accurate, low-yield U.S. weapon could be particularly 

helpful in this regard because Russian leaders appear now to expect that Russia 

would be able to employ accurate, low-yield tactical nuclear weapons in a crisis 

without triggering a large-scale U.S. nuclear response via central U.S. strategic systems. That Russian confidence appears to be based on the expectation that Russian 

employment of tactical nuclear weapons with relatively limited effects would not be 

sufficiently provocative and destructive to trigger a large-scale U.S. strategic nuclear 

response because U.S. leaders would be paralyzed by fear of subsequent Russian nuclear escalation. Russia appears to base this first-use strategy, at least in part, on 

the relative lack of available U.S. limited, tactical nuclear options. For deterrence 
142 

purposes, whether this Russian expectation seems reasonable to U.S. leaders is far 

less relevant than is the apparent Russian confidence in that expectation. This situation reflects a potentially critical gap in U.S. deterrent capabilities as perceived by 

Russian leaders and codified in reported Russian strategy. U.S. tactical nuclear capabilities that are relatively limited and discriminate could help fill that gap and 

deter Russia’s first-use nuclear strategy. Movement in this direction by the United 

States would not be a matter of thoughtlessly mimicking Russian tactical nuclear 

deployments; rather it would be a step to counter Russian nuclear strategy in terms 

that are pertinent to Russian strategy and Russian leaders. The continuation of the 

current gap in U.S. capabilities, as apparently perceived by Russia, will likely validate Russian confidence in its tactical nuclear first-use strategy. Russia has been 

adamant that it will not give up its tactical nuclear capabilities, presumably because 

they are essential to its nuclear first-use strategy. Consequently, closing this gap 

via a renewed U.S. focus on forward-based tactical systems and accurate, low-yield 

nuclear options on a U.S. missile may well be critical to counter this Russian strategy and for U.S. efforts to deter nuclear war in a future crisis with Russia. 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Payne, Dr. Murdock, and Mr. Colby, you each come to this problem from somewhat different strategic perspectives and assessments of the future 

strategic and threat environment, yet you all basically agree on the broad future 

contours of the best U.S. nuclear force. Does this consensus reflect a broader developing consensus among experts in the field? If so, what does this tell us? 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes, it appears that a policy consensus is developing in support of 

modernizing the U.S. nuclear triad and U.S. forward-deployed nuclear capabilities. 

An increasingly broad spectrum of expert opinion recognizes that this modernization 

is now necessary because the realities of the contemporary threat environment are 

far from the optimistic post-Cold War expectations of a new and benign world order. 

A relatively broad and bipartisan consensus is developing that U.S. military capabilities, including nuclear, must adjust to the new realities of the post-Cold War era, 

including an aggressive, expansionist Russian grand strategy that is backed by coercive nuclear threats and an aggressive, expansionist Chinese grand strategy. Given 

the extraordinary costs of completely redesigning a new U.S. nuclear force for the 

twenty-first century, the modernization of the existing force posture seems to be the 

more affordable option for which a broad consensus of support is forming. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are the strategy and reforms you propose responsible and prudent 

or would they too greatly lower the bar to nuclear use, and perhaps even incentivize 

use of nuclear weapons? Why isn’t what you propose simply too dangerous? 

How do you specifically see these capabilities as giving the United States the ability to deter an opponent’s attempt to use nuclear capabilities in a limited fashion? 

Dr. PAYNE. The strategy and reforms my colleagues and I propose are highly prudent. They would, I believe, be much more likely to raise ‘‘the bar to nuclear use’’ 

than lower it. They would likely reduce the incentives for tactical nuclear first use, 

as perceived by Russia and others. The reason why I believe this to be the case is 

presented in my answer to Question 7, which is repeated below. 

The current condition, in my opinion, is highly destabilizing—in part because of 

a ‘‘gap’’ in U.S. capabilities as perceived by Moscow. This gap is illustrated by the 

self-described Russian nuclear strategy of ‘‘escalating to de-escalate.’’ This strategy, 

as described by Moscow, in fact, is a nuclear first-use strategy, and would be used 

in situations in which Russia would threaten to employ, or employ a limited number 

of low-yield nuclear weapons. The apparent paucity of credible, low-yield U.S. nuclear options with which to deter such actions is a capability gap that, I believe, 

should be corrected. In short, Russia has a nuclear first-use strategy and a near monopoly in the associated relatively-limited tactical nuclear capabilities. Moving to 

correct that gap would be a stabilizing U.S. step. Flexible U.S. nuclear options, including an accurate, low-yield U.S. weapon could contribute to stability by helping 

to counter Russian nuclear strategy and deter Russian nuclear first use in a regional crisis. An accurate, low-yield U.S. weapon could be particularly helpful in this 

regard because Russian leaders appear now to expect that Russia would be able to 

employ accurate, low-yield tactical nuclear weapons in a crisis without triggering a 

large-scale U.S. nuclear response via central U.S. strategic systems. That Russian 

confidence appears to be based on the expectation that Russian employment of tactical nuclear weapons with relatively limited effects would not be sufficiently provocative and destructive to trigger a large-scale U.S. strategic nuclear response because 

U.S. leaders would be paralyzed by fear of subsequent Russian nuclear escalation. 

Russia appears to base this first-use strategy, at least in part, on the relative lack 

of available U.S. limited, tactical nuclear options. For deterrence purposes, whether 

this Russian expectation seems reasonable to U.S. leaders is far less relevant than 

is the apparent Russian confidence in that expectation. This situation reflects a potentially critical gap in U.S. deterrent capabilities as perceived by Russian leaders 
143 

and codified in reported Russian strategy. U.S. tactical nuclear capabilities that are 

relatively limited and discriminate could help fill that gap and deter Russia’s firstuse nuclear strategy. Movement in this direction by the United States would not be 

a matter of thoughtlessly mimicking Russian tactical nuclear deployments; rather 

it would be a step to counter Russian nuclear strategy in terms that are pertinent 

to Russian strategy and Russian leaders. The continuation of the current gap in 

U.S. capabilities, as apparently perceived by Russia, will likely validate Russian 

confidence in its tactical nuclear first-use strategy. Russia has been adamant that 

it will not give up its tactical nuclear capabilities, presumably because they are essential to its nuclear first-use strategy. Consequently, closing this gap via a renewed 

U.S. focus on forward-based tactical systems and accurate, low-yield nuclear options 

on a U.S. missile may well be critical to counter this Russian strategy and for U.S. 

efforts to deter nuclear war in a future crisis with Russia. 

Mr. ROGERS. Should we have a U.S. deterrence strategy based on a declaratory 

policy of ‘‘You use a nuclear weapon against us or our allies, and you are history!?’’ 

Would such a policy—and a force structure designed to carry it out—increase or decrease the deterrence provided by our nuclear capabilities? Would it lead to more 

security and stability or less? 

Dr. PAYNE. A U.S. nuclear threat that says to an opponent ‘‘you are history’’ may 

sound robust, but it essentially would recreate the long-since rejected ‘‘Massive Retaliation’’ policy of the 1950s. ‘‘Massive Retaliation’’ should not be revived at this 

point as declaratory policy because it would, I believe, undermine U.S. deterrence 

goals, decrease stability and increase the potential for nuclear first use by a determined opponent. There are two fundamental reasons why such a U.S. deterrence 

policy has, for over four decades, been rejected by every Democratic and Republican 

administration. 

First, the indiscriminate nuclear destruction of an opponent’s population would be 

a gross violation of the Just War Doctrine and international law. This may seem 

to some to be a tangential matter when the subject is nuclear deterrence; but it 

rightly is taken seriously by leaders and military planners. Republican and Democratic administrations have agreed for decades that the U.S. should not intentionally engage in or base its planning on such indiscriminate nuclear targeting policies. The Obama administration’s most recent unclassified nuclear employment policy continues this long-standing rejection of such deterrence strategies. 

Second, an indiscriminate ‘‘you are history’’ declaratory policy would likely be insufficiently credible to deter effectively in many plausible circumstances. The United 

States can make nuclear threat declarations for deterrence purposes. But, the critical deterrence point is not whether the United States makes a nuclear threat that 

sounds robust to U.S. leaders, but whether U.S. threat declarations are judged by 

opponents to be credible enough to deter, i.e., do opponents actually believe the 

threat? If not, U.S. deterrence strategies cannot work by design. 

To claim that U.S. nuclear deterrence goals can now be supported adequately by 

an old ‘‘Massive Retaliation’’-type nuclear threat is to presume that opponents will 

believe that the U.S. would actually employ it as threatened. Yet, since the 1960s 

every U.S. administration has concluded, rightly in my opinion, that such a threat 

is unlikely to be credible to opponents in many plausible circumstances in which the 

U.S. nuclear deterrent must be effective—particularly including the extension of nuclear deterrence for allies, i.e., the U.S. ‘‘nuclear umbrella.’’ The fundamental concern is that nuclear-armed opponents simply will not believe that the U.S. would 

execute such a massive nuclear strike unless U.S. cities had first been attacked 

massively because to do so would likely result in a massive nuclear reply against 

U.S. cities—a move no U.S. president would make. Thus, such a threat has been 

deemed incredible for many U.S. deterrence objectives. 

In short, the credibility of a ‘‘Massive Retaliation’’ deterrence threat may be limited to a single type of nuclear threat to the United States. Yet a much broader 

spectrum of nuclear threats must be deterred, such as the use of tactical nuclear 

weapons against U.S. allies. To deter the many plausible nuclear threats that are 

short of a massive nuclear attack against U.S. cities, the U.S. has long judged that 

more limited and more flexible U.S. response options would be more credible, and 

thus more deterring. This is why U.S. force posture ‘‘flexibility’’ has long been considered a key ingredient for U.S. deterrence strategies. 

Consequently, an alternative to ‘‘Massive Retaliation,’’ known as a policy of ‘‘Flexible Response,’’ was initiated by Secretary of Defense McNamara in the 1960’s and 

codified in policy by Defense Secretary Schlesinger in 1974. It has had bipartisan 

support and rightly remains a fundamental element of reported U.S. policy. The 

basic point of Flexible Response is that the United States must have more diverse 

threat options than simply telling an opponent that ‘‘you are history’’ because such 

a threat may, in many important cases, lack the credibility necessary for effective 
144 

1 John Gordon, Under Secretary of Energy for Security and Administrator, National Nuclear 

Security Administration, Department of Energy, Prepared Statement for the Senate Armed 

Services, February 14, 2002, pp. 2, 5. 

deterrence. The goal of having diverse options below a ‘‘Massive Retaliation’’ threshold is to strengthen the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and reduce the prospects for war. This approach seems particularly critical in the context of Russian 

nuclear strategy which emphasizes limited nuclear threats against U.S. allies and 

the employment of nuclear weapons in regional war, as discussed in my answers 

to Questions 7 and 9. 

Mr. ROGERS. This subcommittee has spent a lot of time focused on the need for 

a responsive U.S. nuclear infrastructure. The administration seems to largely agree 

with us but has been glacially slow in implementing actions to fix it. Do you believe 

we need a nuclear infrastructure and enterprise that can quickly respond to geopolitical changes or technical failures in the stockpile? How should we define ‘‘responsiveness’’ of our nuclear enterprise going forward? What metrics should we use 

to measure responsiveness? Does a responsive infrastructure contribute to deterrence of potential adversaries? 

Dr. PAYNE. A responsive infrastructure, if achieved, could make a critical contribution to U.S. deterrence goals. It is particularly important in the contemporary 

highly-dynamic threat environment. A responsive infrastructure would help the 

United States to adjust its force posture in a timely way to challenging political or 

technical developments. Such developments could, for example, include the rapid appearance of an unforeseen political or technical threat that would demand a corresponding adjustment in U.S. deterrence capabilities. The lack of a responsive infrastructure leaves the U.S. little able to respond in a timely way to such potential 

developments and, as a result, may contribute to the apparent attractiveness of an 

opponent’s ‘‘breakout’’ strategy. Such a strategy could appear particularly attractive 

to an opponent in certain situations, such as if a reliability problem in one or more 

legs of the U.S. triad occurs and cannot be corrected promptly. Deterrence is destabilized to the extent that an opponent sees a breakout strategy as a potentially viable option. 

The standard of useful responsiveness is not fixed; it is determined by several factors—the most important of which is the character of the threat environment, political and technical. In the past, the National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) has had metrics for its responsiveness to be able to address unexpected 

problems. For example, in the early 2000s, NNSA reportedly set the goal of being 

able to design and develop a new type of nuclear warhead within five years.1 Such 

metrics may provide useful measures against which to posture the nuclear infrastructure. It is not apparent if the NNSA has specific responsiveness metrics at this 

time. 

Given the highly-dynamic contemporary threat environment and the diverse spectrum of threats, a responsive infrastructure should be considered a key component 

of U.S. deterrence capabilities. 

Mr. ROGERS. You describe ‘‘adaptability’’ as the fundamental characteristic of your 

recommended nuclear strategy and posture. You define adaptability as ‘‘the combination of flexibility and resilience.’’ Why is adaptability your #1 requirement in 

a force structure? What are some actions we could take that increase adaptability 

in our nuclear force? What actions would you say decrease adaptability? Should we 

avoid actions that are irreversible—or at least very, very difficult to reverse? 

Dr. PAYNE. Adaptability is the combination of the flexibility and resilience of the 

U.S. force posture (including infrastructure) and planning. Flexibility includes U.S. 

possession of a diversity of threat options; resilience includes the survivability or 

U.S. forces against the spectrum of threats and the ability to reconstitute U.S. forces 

in a timely manner. Some commentators recently have suggested that U.S. nuclear 

force posture flexibility should be avoided—labeling it a ‘‘Cold War’’ and ‘‘war-fighting’’ concept. This position reflects a complete misunderstanding of the value of 

adaptability as a U.S. force posture attribute to meet deterrence requirements in the 

21st century. Adaptability, including flexibility is, in my opinion, the single most important metric for measuring the adequacy of U.S. forces for the deterrence of foes 

and the assurance of allies. The value of U.S. force posture adaptability is particularly apparent in its potential contribution to the credible deterrence of an opponent’s threats of nuclear escalation. The effectiveness of U.S. deterrence strategies 

to prevent war resides in their credibility, and nuclear deterrent threats that are 

rigid and narrow, vice flexible, are unlikely to be credible in many circumstances. 

Deterrent threats must be adaptable to the opponent and the contingency at hand 

and not structured rigidly as if for a single type of opponent and single type of crisis. In a highly-dynamic threat environment such as exists today, the U.S. require-
145 

ments to deter foes and assure allies are diverse and can shift rapidly, and the 

credibility of U.S. deterrent threats may correspondingly depend on U.S. capabilities 

and planning that are sufficiently adaptable to shift as necessary to deter. As noted 

in the answer to question 10 above, a return to the rigidity of the U.S. ‘‘Massive 

Retaliation’’ deterrent threat would be destabilizing in those plausible cases wherein 

such a deterrent threat would simply lack credibility. 

There are numerous steps that will strengthen adaptability, including for example, modernizing the triad with its diversity of platforms, adding U.S. advanced conventional force capabilities (e.g., CPGS), modernizing forward-based systems and increasing the responsiveness of the U.S. infrastructure. Adaptability is degraded by 

eliminating diverse U.S. options and capabilities in ways that are essentially irreversible. Unfortunately, U.S. strategic arms control policy often embraces the 

‘‘irreversibility’’ of reductions as a measure of success. That is a realistic perspective 

only in the context of an essentially fixed and predictable threat environment in 

which it can be known that the capabilities eliminated will never again be of critical 

value. That is not the contemporary threat environment. 

I should add that adaptability has been stressed by DOD officials as increasingly 

important for military capabilities in general. This is because of the significant expense of developing a new military weapons system which is expected to remain in 

service for decades. This, coupled with a highly dynamic environment and diverse 

threats, makes adaptability a prudent and effective approach to maintaining needed 

U.S. deterrence capabilities and U.S. military capabilities in general. 

Mr. ROGERS. Project Atom had an overarching constraint that the force postures the teams recommended must be possible within ‘‘approximately $35 billion per year 

in constant 2013 dollars, comprising 4 to 5 percent of the defense budget.’’ Do you 

believe your recommendations meet this constraint? Do you believe 4, 5, or 6 percent of the defense budget is an appropriate amount to be spending on nuclear deterrence, which DOD says is the nation’s ‘‘highest priority defense mission’’? 

Dr. PAYNE. My colleagues and my recommendations in the base case of Project 

Atom fit within the budget constraints designated in the study. The study also includes a case wherein we were asked to think outside those budget constraints. In 

general, the level of spending for the deterrence of foes and assurance of allies cannot reasonably be determined by identifying a fixed percentage of the DOD budget. 

A review of funding for U.S. strategic nuclear capabilities shows the cyclic nature 

of funding requirements. A large outlay was required in the early 1960s to create 

what became known as the nuclear triad. In the 1980s, another significant outlay 

was needed to modernize the aging triad. At present, we are facing a situation similar to that of the 1980s—although with a much smaller U.S. force posture. The existing triad has been life-extended and modernization is again needed. As noted in 

my answer to question #12, employing adaptability as a metric can help control 

costs and develop a nuclear force for deterrence and assurance that is relevant for 

the dynamic threat environment of the twenty-first century. 

Identifying the most effective deterrence strategy cannot be done prudently on the 

basis of first defining the percentage of the DOD budget that will be devoted to this 

priority goal—budgets should follow strategy and strategic priorities, they should 

not be the driving factor. Rather, the character of the threat environment and the 

priority of various defense programs are the basic determinants of the appropriate 

budget share. This is a key point because ensuring effective nuclear deterrence has 

been identified as the highest defense priority by senior U.S. officials and the corresponding requirements for deterrence can shift dramatically depending on the 

threat environment. This prioritization is a reflection of severe emerging threats, including developments in Russia’s foreign policy, nuclear doctrine and forces, and the 

basic fact that the deterrence of nuclear war must be considered an enduring priority goal. Indeed, if nuclear deterrence fails dramatically, many other U.S. goals 

and capabilities become irrelevant. Correspondingly, within broad margins, U.S. capabilities intended to deter severe threats warrant whatever budget commitment is 

needed to provide and sustain the capabilities judged critical to support that goal. 

Indeed, it is extremely fortunate that the goals of nuclear deterrence and assurance 

may be adequately supported at this point by a nuclear modernization program that 

demands such a modest percentage of the DOD budget—reportedly under 5 percent 

annually per current nuclear modernization plans through 2030. But, at the end of 

the day, that budget percentage should not be considered fixed because it must shift 

according to the threat environment and the continuing priority need for effective 

nuclear deterrence and assurance. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why do we need a stand-off cruise missile like the LRSO if we will 

also have a penetrating bomber and a nuclear gravity bomb in the B61? 

Dr. PAYNE. In general, a multiplicity of platforms and threat options contributes 

to the adaptability of the U.S. deterrent, which may be extremely important for 
146 

credible deterrence in a highly-dynamic threat environment as discussed in the answers to questions 10 and 12 above. Correspondingly, the United States needs a 

stand-off cruise missile like the LRSO to preserve and strengthen the flexibility and 

resilience of the U.S. deterrent in plausible circumstances. Stand-off weapons, for 

example, may be critical, now and in the future, to support a credible deterrent 

threat if enemy air defenses would essentially preclude the potential of U.S. bombers to threaten penetration to critical targets for deterrence purposes. In such circumstances, and others, stand-off cruise missiles could help ensure the effectiveness 

of the U.S. deterrent threat. In their absence, the bomber leg of the U.S. triad could 

be effectively shut down as a credible deterrent instrument. Such a condition would, 

in my opinion, be destabilizing because the bombers offer unique and important options for deterrence purposes. Specifically, the LRSO would provide a U.S. standoff capability that adds to the inherent flexibility of the bomber capabilities and are 

accurate, discriminate, and, for an opponent, unpredictable in its route of flight. 

Given the long expected operational lifetime of a new U.S. strategic bomber, it 

would be highly imprudent to assume that LRSO is redundant because the bomber 

itself will be able to penetrate with gravity bombs throughout that lifetime in all 

potentially important contingencies. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Final Report of the Perry-Schlesinger commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States stated that, ‘‘Working with partners in the intelligence community, the laboratories should be in a position to advise national leadership on foreign nuclear weapons activities bearing on the interests of the United 

States and its allies. In short, the commission recommends that the laboratories be 

allowed to design, simulate, and experimentally assess foreign nuclear weapon designs for the purposes of defensive analysis.’’ A. Why, in your opinion, is this important? Do you support this effort? B. The Department of Energy is approximately 10 

months late in submitting to Congress an annual report on how it will implement 

such a program. How important do you think it is that the Department promptly 

begin to implement this program? 

Dr. PAYNE. I strongly support this effort because a critical ingredient of any effective deterrence strategy is an understanding of opponents’ goals, intentions, determination and capabilities. Ignorance, misperceptions and misunderstandings of opponents are the basic reasons why deterrence strategies fail and wars take place 

that otherwise might have been deterred. This U.S. understanding of opponents 

seems particularly important with regard to opponents’ nuclear capabilities because 

we must make our nuclear deterrence strategies as effective as possible. The ability 

of the U.S. national laboratories to understand foreign nuclear weapon designs, and 

thus foreign nuclear capabilities, is critical to understanding opponents’ capabilities 

and intentions, and thus to establishing the most effective deterrence strategies possible. In addition, according to open reports by subject matter experts, design and 

development skills at the national laboratories have been atrophying as the result 

of no new development efforts for nuclear warheads. Having the design teams at 

the national laboratories design, assess, and analyze foreign nuclear capabilities 

would help maintain a skilled nuclear development workforce for the United States. 

This could be of great value in the future. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please explain why you believe the United States needs an accurate, 

lower-yield nuclear option? Is there a ‘‘gap’’ in U.S. capability between our lowestyield nuclear weapons and our largest conventional weapons? How might Russia or 

another nuclear adversary exploit this in a crisis? In your opinion, does the U.S. 

having these types of capabilities make the use of a nuclear weapon—by either side 

in a crisis—more likely or less likely? Why? 

Mr. COLBY. The United States greatly benefits from having nuclear weapons that 

can be used relatively discriminately and with some potential for the control or manipulation of escalation (although such control can never be assured). 

The ultimate deterrent threat of nuclear weapons lies in their capacity to wreak 

the most grievous, swift, and sure destruction upon an adversary, largely irrespective of the state or result of the sub-nuclear contest. Yet the execution of such a 

threat would be an act of the most brutal violence, an act that could only be justified—and likely would (and should) only be seriously considered—under the most 

extreme circumstances. Perhaps more to the point, such strikes would very plausibly call forth the matching response of an adversary possessed of nuclear weapons 

himself. The direct threat of nuclear attack against an adversary’s urban infrastructure is therefore of only partial credibility, and of little credibility in situations short 

of the catastrophic. 

This is a particular problem for the United States, which extends nuclear deterrence to several dozen allies. This extension of its ‘‘nuclear umbrella’’ means that 

the United States pledges to use nuclear weapons in situations that are very grave 

for its ally but not necessarily for itself. Washington extends its nuclear deterrent 
147 

1For the author’s fuller description of his conception of this problem, see Elbridge Colby, ‘‘Preparing for Limited War,’’ The National Interest (November/December 2015), 11–22. NB: Given 

the relatively limited space available in these answers, references to the author’s additional 

work in this and ensuing footnotes are provided in case the reader is interested in the author’s 

further elaboration of the points raised. 2For a fuller description of the author’s logic for such a posture, see Elbridge Colby, ‘‘Reconciling Stability and Deterrence’’ in Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations, ed. by Elbridge Colby and Michael Gerson (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2013), 

47–83. 

in this fashion because it sees substantial stability, nonproliferation, and political 

benefits arising from bringing friendly states within its defensive envelope, and sees 

nuclear weapons as unique instruments of deterrence, particularly against the most 

serious forms of attack. Yet if large-scale nuclear strikes were the only options the 

United States possessed to respond to such attacks, this would mean that any nuclear use on behalf of an ally or for any important but still partial interest against 

the likes of Russia or China would immediately and directly raise the question of 

whether the United States should sacrifice New York for Tallinn, Los Angeles for 

Tokyo, or Washington for Warsaw. 

This problem is particularly and increasingly important because potential U.S. adversaries such as Russia and China have survivable nuclear weapons of their own 

as well as sophisticated conventional forces. At root, the problem proceeds from the 

reality that the United States cannot realistically hope to destroy or eliminate the 

nuclear forces of these major power adversaries without running too great a risk of 

incurring a massive nuclear attack. We therefore must find ways of prevailing over 

these formidable potential opponents (even in limited terms) while inducing them 

to avoid using or at least to restrain their use of their nuclear arsenals. This is especially hard because these states appear to be planning to be able to employ their 

militaries against the United States—or, more specifically, its exposed allies and 

partners—in order to create and exploit political and military circumstances in 

which Washington may be unwilling to run the risks and incur the costs necessary 

to respond effectively. In brief, they hope to shift the burden of escalation onto the 

United States through the use of nuclear weapons, conventional forces, or both, in 

the hopes that the United States will ultimately decide to end the conflict on terms 

favorable to them.1

This is not merely a theoretical challenge. Russia appears to be developing or refining a nuclear strategy modeled around precisely this logic. In the event of conflict 

with the West, Moscow appears to plan to have the option to ‘‘escalate to deescalate’’ 

the war by using nuclear weapons in limited ways designed to spook the West into 

halting the fight in a manner tantamount to acceding to the Kremlin’s demands. 

The United States therefore needs ways of making its nuclear weapons relevant 

and effective as deterrents in situations short of those touching on its own survival 

yet in which its adversaries can inflict the most terrible harm upon it. How can the 

United States square this circle? The answer—albeit an inherently imperfect one— 

lies in a nuclear strategy that enables limited, graduated, and deliberate escalation. 

This strategy should be designed to demonstrate the determined U.S. will to respond to major attacks, including nuclear ones, against its allies and farther interests; impose targeted but increasingly severe harm on an opponent; and at the same 

time evidence the willingness to allow a tolerable de-escalation. Such a strategy of 

intelligent and focused escalation stands the best chance of demonstrating to an adversary that the United States has the ability and will to impose increasingly searing costs on him without launching a massive strike that could well amount to suicide.2

To pursue such a strategy, the United States needs limited nuclear options—that 

is, options designed to allow the use of nuclear weapons in ways that exploit the 

fear of but do not necessarily lead to general nuclear war. Such limitation of nuclear 

strikes can come in many forms—including the target type selected, the location of 

the target, the destructiveness of the weapons, and the number of weapons used, 

to name a few. The United States should therefore develop strategies, capabilities, 

and plans for the use of nuclear weapons in limited fashion, including ones suited 

for the emerging military-technological era, which means updating and modernizing 

our nuclear posture and architecture. 

The role of such limited nuclear options, it is important to emphasize, is not to 

encourage nuclear use, let alone general nuclear war. Rather, it is to enable the 

United States to be able to gain the deterrent and stability benefits of nuclear weapons in such a way that their employment does not necessarily result in utter destruction. Possessing such an ability is vital because, if nuclear weapons cannot be 

used in any situations short of the cataclysmic, enterprising and risk-acceptant adversaries may well seek to gain advantage by raising the stakes against Washington 
148 

3For an elaboration of this logic in the NATO-Russia context, see Elbridge A. Colby and Jonathan F. Solomon, ‘‘Facing Russia: Conventional Defence and Deterrence in Europe,’’ Survival, 

(December 2015/January 2016), 21–50. 

and daring us to respond massively. For instance, Russia might seek to establish 

a fait accompli in Eastern Europe and then employ limited nuclear strikes to compel 

the West to back down. Or China might try something similar in the Western Pacific with respect to the territory of U.S. allies. Without comparable capabilities, the 

United States could be left without a rational and effective riposte to such a strategy. 

How, some will ask, would such a strategy not devolve into a nuclear tit-for-tat? 

Ideally, it would not because the United States would be better at limited nuclear 

war than its potential adversaries. Possessed of superior capacity for discrimination, 

control, and the infliction of harm in a nuclear war, the United States should have 

greater leverage over its potential adversaries, which will be the ones left forced to 

choose between de-escalation and a nuclear strike that will call forth a most devastating response. This is particularly relevant with respect to China, over which 

the United States still enjoys substantial advantages in these attributes. 

But what about Russia, over which the United States does not enjoy such advantages, or a more formidably nuclear-armed China? How would such a strategy end 

or at least deescalate a war with an opponent over which the United States does 

not have meaningful nuclear leverage? 

Much of the answer lies in the fielding of non-nuclear forces that can prevent the 

adversary from making gains, particularly easily and quickly, that can then be protected by nuclear escalation. If adversaries cannot take territory or valued things— 

or very much of them—from the United States and its allies, then a strategy of 

using limited nuclear attacks to force a war termination in place will yield them 

little or nothing.3

More broadly, however, we must bear in mind that no one knows how assuredly 

to control a limited nuclear war, and that it is widely understood that the attempt 

to control such a war could only ever be a highly uncertain and always combustible 

thing. Both sides in such a contest would have every incentive to find ways to avoid 

large-scale, let alone total, destruction. Accordingly everyone, even the most risk-tolerant gamblers, should be exceedingly reluctant to embark on such a course, and 

be particularly loathe to press a limited nuclear war too far. The Russians and Chinese both know this, as do we. 

Thus, a nation should only embark on employment of such a perilous strategy 

that would risk its annihilation if it thinks it has dramatic advantages in the capability to conduct a limited nuclear war, if it perceives its adversary as basically 

bluffing over the issue at hand, or if the adversary has crossed a fundamental redline. The United States can prevent the Russians or Chinese from thinking any of 

these is the case if it has serious limited nuclear options, makes clear its resolve 

to defend its allies, and avoids crossing a redline that would prompt Moscow or Beijing to employ nuclear weapons to vindicate its most vital interests. 

It must be admitted that the posture advocated here sounds extremely dangerous—and that its actual execution surely would be. But if the United States is 

resolved to continue its traditional extended deterrence and forward engagement approach, this is the most appropriate strategy to effectively deter aggression against 

U.S. allies and thereby promote stability and a tolerable peace. If we recall that war 

is generally a product of one side’s perception of vulnerability or opportunity, this 

posture would diminish the likelihood of conflict by demonstrating to potential U.S. 

adversaries that any attempt to exploit through arms perceived U.S. weaknesses or 

deficit of resolve would invariably result in failure or the most painful loss. 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Payne, Dr. Murdock, and Mr. Colby, you each come to this problem from somewhat different strategic perspectives and assessments of the future 

strategic and threat environment, yet you all basically agree on the broad future 

contours of the best U.S. nuclear force. Does this consensus reflect a broader developing consensus among experts in the field? If so, what does this tell us? 

Mr. COLBY. Defense experts are increasingly coalescing around the recognition of 

the emergence of a more adversarial international political environment, particularly exhibited by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, and of a more contested 

military-technological landscape. Among defense specialists who believe the United 

States should maintain its traditional international position, this is leading to a 

sense that the United States needs to redouble its efforts to maintain its military 

edge. 
149 

4For the author’s critique of the feasibility and advisability of nuclear abolition, see Elbridge 

Colby, ‘‘World Order Critique of Nuclear Abolition,’’ in the forthcoming Global Nuclear Disarmament Strategic, Political, and Regional Perspectives, ed. by Nik Hynek and Michael Smetana 

(London, UK: Routledge, 2016). 5For a fuller argument for this point, see Elbridge Colby, ‘‘Why Nuclear Deterrence is Still 

Relevant,’’ in Thinking About Deterrence: Enduring Questions in a Time of Rising Powers, Rogue 

Regimes, and Terrorism, ed. by Adam Lowther (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 

2013), 51–74. 6See Elbridge Colby, ‘‘Asia Goes Nuclear,’’ The National Interest (January/February 2015), 28– 

37. 

In the nuclear realm, this appears to be leading to a growing consensus that disarmament is decreasingly credible and relevant.4 Substantial consensus appears to 

have formed supporting the modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, albeit with 

debate about the advisability of how or whether to modernize certain elements. 

While affordability is an issue, the general view increasingly appears to view this 

as more of a challenge of how best to manage concentrated costs in the 2020s rather 

than as an issue of the basic ability to pay for the systems as such. 

With respect to more discriminate nuclear capabilities, most nuclear specialists 

recognize that the United States maintains such capabilities today and believe that 

the country should retain some capability for discriminate use going forward. Debate tends to center around how much discrimination and tailoring are required and 

how much investment is needed to address military-technological challenges posed 

by potential adversaries. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are the strategy and reforms you propose responsible and prudent 

or would they too greatly lower the bar to nuclear use, and perhaps even incentivize 

use of nuclear weapons? Why isn’t what you propose simply too dangerous? 

How do you specifically see these capabilities as giving the United States the ability to deter an opponent’s attempt to use nuclear capabilities in a limited fashion? 

Mr. COLBY. There is a long-recognized inherent paradox in the reality that the 

most effective way to prevent war on acceptable terms is to be well-prepared to fight 

it. The Romans, for instance, captured this in their dictum that ‘‘if you wish for 

peace, prepare for war.’’ It is this simple but compelling logic that underpins the 

longstanding consensus in the United States that the nation should field a peerless 

military, one that can fight and prevail not only in wars touching on our own particular concerns but also in those impinging upon the vital interests of our many 

allies and partners. 

If U.S. and allied conventional forces could reasonably be expected to perform this 

daunting task at acceptable cost and risk over the long-term, then we would be 

bound to seriously consider relegating nuclear weapons to a relatively marginal role 

in our national security posture. This is not, however, a responsible expectation in 

light of the nature of the emerging international geopolitical and military-technological environments. 

Politically, we continue to have fundamental disagreements with nations possessed of the most serious kinds of military capability—disagreements that could 

worsen and even result in war.5 In light of this reality that war is possible, the 

United States needs a meaningful and effective defense policy and posture to deal 

with the formidable militaries these nations are developing. 

This policy and posture must include a nuclear component because of the actual 

and latent military strength—both nuclear and conventional—of these potential adversaries. Russia, for instance, is thinking of ways to use nuclear weapons in discriminate and pointed ways to terminate a conflict with the United States and 

NATO on terms it prefers. China, meanwhile, may over the longer term gain conventional advantage in areas touching on the vital interests of U.S. allies, leading 

the United States to want to rely more on its nuclear forces for extended deterrence.6 Finally, North Korea is also developing a larger and more sophisticated nuclear force potentially capable of surviving U.S. attacks and being employed in a targeted and iterated fashion against U.S. and allied targets. 

These adversary strategies all raise the chances that, in the event of conflict, the 

United States would feel impelled to consider use of nuclear weapons—either in response to adversary employment or in order to ‘‘escalate to deescalate’’ a conventional conflict the United States and its allies were losing. If the United States only 

had totalistic options for employing nuclear weapons in such circumstances, or even 

if it lacked sufficient confidence in the precision with which it could deliver limited 

strikes, it might find itself without a sensible way of responding to very clever— 

but also very plausible—adversary strategies. 

For instance, Moscow might think that it could establish a conventional fait 

acccompli in NATO territory and then threaten to use or actually employ nuclear 

weapons in a limited way to try to frighten the West into backing down. Or China 
150 

7For a fuller exploration of this logic, see Colby, ‘‘Preparing for Limited War.’’ 

might seek to seize the territory of U.S. allies in the Western Pacific using conventional forces, block U.S. attempts to intervene, and then dare the United States to 

resort to nuclear weapons. In both cases, the adversary would seek to push the onus 

of escalation onto the United States. Left only with large-scale nuclear options, this 

burden would seem even heavier than it would already be—and perhaps too heavy.7

In such a case, the United States and its allies might determine that concession 

would be a more prudent course than deliberate escalation. 

To avoid this disastrous outcome, the United States should arm itself with capabilities and strategies, including limited nuclear options, to respond appropriately 

to any such attempts on the part of its potential opponents. By demonstrating that 

the United States cannot realistically be left without effective recourse to adversary 

strategies, such strength should help deter potential adversaries from embarking 

upon such challenges in the first place. 

This is because, while it may be true that wars sometimes happen because of accident, it is far more common that they result because at least one side believes that 

it has a strategy that can work. Thus, the best way to dissuade an opponent from 

embarking on military action is to persuade him that such an endeavor will result 

in outright defeat or, at least, will result in costs and risks out of proportion to 

whatever gains he might win. This is precisely the logic of having tailorable nuclear 

options, which demonstrate to potential U.S. opponents that the United States cannot be forced to choose between capitulation and catastrophic escalation. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why doesn’t the existing U.S. nuclear force have sufficient capacity 

for discrimination? Why do we need to change from today’s posture, platforms, and 

arsenal? How do you specifically see these capabilities as giving the United States 

the ability to deter an opponent’s attempt to use nuclear capabilities in a limited 

fashion? 

Mr. COLBY. The current U.S. nuclear force has substantial elements of discrimination, including variable yield weapons, and the ability to deliver such weapons in 

a relatively controlled fashion with relatively tailored effects. But these capabilities 

are relatively modest and in key respects are declining in effectiveness and relevance in light of the evolving military-technological environment and particularly 

the improving military power of potential adversaries. The U.S. posture for flexible 

nuclear use thus needs to be updated. 

Specifically, greater variability of effects (particularly yield) should be introduced 

into the U.S. weapons arsenal; U.S. nuclear forces should be equipped to penetrate 

increasingly sophisticated adversary air defense networks; and the aging U.S. nuclear-related command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) system should be modernized to support limited 

nuclear operations. 

The ideal U.S. posture should allow the President to order nuclear strikes to conform to specific requirements with very high confidence that such strikes will penetrate and achieve the desired effect. That is, the President should be able to command that strikes hit a certain target or set of targets with a particular (especially 

lower) level of destructiveness, with particular types of effects, and should have very 

high confidence that the attacks will result in the kinds of results anticipated. Lacking confidence that such strikes will penetrate enemy defenses or that they will 

have the desired effect upon penetration, the United States may feel compelled to 

launch larger strikes in order to achieve even rather limited effects—potentially undermining or even negating the purpose of having capabilities for discriminate attack. 

Accordingly, and particularly in light of advances in potential adversary air defenses, the United States would benefit from having more capacity for discriminate 

strikes across the force, including the ballistic missile force. Thus the United States 

should equip some portion of the Trident II D5 SLBM force for lower-yield attack, 

and should ensure that the future airborne leg of the Triad can deliver lower-yield 

strikes as well as strikes of varying effect from multiple platforms, including via 

gravity bombs and the long-range standoff missile (LRSO). Such a multiplicity of 

attack options should give more optionality for attack typologies and also give higher confidence that such strikes would penetrate and take place as planned. This 

should give the United States greater leverage in ‘‘manipulating risk’’ or matching 

and blunting an adversary’s ability to do so. 

At the same time, the United States should ensure that its aging C4ISR capabilities are modernized and optimized to enable support to limited nuclear operations 

through crucial functions such as ISR, battle damage assessment, command and 

control, and communications both with friendly forces and an adversary. 
151 

8See, for instance, the study by leading experts from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary 

Assessments on costs of nuclear forces, Todd Harrison and Evan Branden Montgomery, ‘‘The 

Cost of U.S. Nuclear Forces: From BCA to Bow Wave and Beyond?’’ (Center for Strategic and 

Budgetary Assessments, 2015), 33. 

Mr. ROGERS. This subcommittee has spent a lot of time focused on the need for 

a responsive U.S. nuclear infrastructure. The administration seems to largely agree 

with us but has been glacially slow in implementing actions to fix it. Do you believe 

we need a nuclear infrastructure and enterprise that can quickly respond to geopolitical changes or technical failures in the stockpile? How should we define ‘‘responsiveness’’ of our nuclear enterprise going forward? What metrics should we use 

to measure responsiveness? Does a responsive infrastructure contribute to deterrence of potential adversaries? 

Mr. COLBY. A responsive nuclear infrastructure and enterprise able to meet the 

country’s national strategic requirements are vital for the nation’s deterrent and 

thus for our national security. Responsiveness should be defined as the capability, 

capacity, and agility to turn over the stockpile roughly every ten years and to respond to emerging threats over the medium term. 

Mr. ROGERS. Project Atom had an overarching constraint that the force postures 

the teams recommended must be possible within ‘‘approximately $35 billion per year 

in constant 2013 dollars, comprising 4 to 5 percent of the defense budget.’’ Do you 

believe your recommendations meet this constraint? Do you believe 4, 5, or 6 percent of the defense budget is an appropriate amount to be spending on nuclear deterrence, which DOD says is the nation’s ‘‘highest priority defense mission’’? 

Mr. COLBY. I did not perform the budgetary analysis required to answer this question. In my report, I supported the replacement, modernization, or sustainment of 

the nuclear Triad, the associated warheads, and the nuclear command and control 

system and related components. This modernization effort has been budgeted to consume less than five percent of the defense budget over the next few decades, which 

I believe is a more than reasonable price to pay for the cornerstone of the nation 

and our allies’ security.8 The additional expenditures stemming from my emphasis 

on discrimination, control, and flexibility in the nuclear force would, I assess, cost 

a relatively small additional amount compared to the total cost of nuclear forces. 

This is because such capacities are often largely resident in existing warheads, modern C4ISR systems, and contemporary delivery platforms. Fuller exploitation of 

these capabilities would be more a matter of developing latent capabilities rather 

than of initiating wholly new programs or pursuing revolutionary technologies, 

which are commonly culprits behind cost overruns. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why do we need a stand-off cruise missile like the LRSO if we will 

also have a penetrating bomber and a nuclear gravity bomb in the B61? 

Mr. COLBY. The nation would greatly benefit from having a standoff cruise missile 

replacement in the LRSO for two main reasons. First, we cannot be sure of the penetration capability of low-observable aircraft in light of advancing adversary air defenses. This means we would be ill-advised to place all our bomber leg eggs in the 

basket of the long-range penetrating bomber, as important and promising as that 

program is. Instead, a standoff penetrating nuclear-armed munition will give us 

much greater assurance that the United States can attack targets throughout an 

adversary’s territory, and can do so discriminately. It is therefore highly important 

that the LRSO be mounted with a warhead capable of variable yield settings. 

Second, investment in a standoff munition is likely to be an asset from a cost competition point of view. That is, adversaries will have their air defense challenge significantly complicated by the need to defend not only against low-observable bombers but also standoff munitions with different characteristics, concepts of operations, 

and signatures. Given the central importance of airpower to our nation’s way of war, 

burdening adversaries’ air defense problems as much as possible in a cost-competitive way is an important objective for the United States. 

More broadly, we must maintain considerable humility about the nature of technological change in the coming decades. Given the absolutely central importance to 

our nation’s security and geopolitical posture of fielding a nuclear force able to respond reliably and also capable of conducting limited operations, we are well-served 

by erring on the side of redundancy. If the LRSO program threatened to break the 

back of the defense budget, we might come to a different judgment. But it will not. 

The weapon appears to build on an established concept—the standoff penetrating 

missile—and carries that forward, adapting it to a new technological era. Such a 

program can both benefit and draw from comparable conventional programs—and 

may sensibly include a conventional variant itself. It therefore seems well worth the 

investment required. 
152 

Mr. ROGERS. The Final Report of the Perry-Schlesinger commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States stated that, ‘‘Working with partners in the intelligence community, the laboratories should be in a position to advise national leadership on foreign nuclear weapons activities bearing on the interests of the United 

States and its allies. In short, the commission recommends that the laboratories be 

allowed to design, simulate, and experimentally assess foreign nuclear weapon designs for the purposes of defensive analysis.’’ A. Why, in your opinion, is this important? Do you support this effort? B. The Department of Energy is approximately 10 

months late in submitting to Congress an annual report on how it will implement 

such a program. How important do you think it is that the Department promptly 

begin to implement this program? 

Mr. COLBY. I firmly support this effort. While I have not made a special study 

of this problem, the United States requires a solid understanding of what adversaries may be doing with their nuclear forces, including the effects produced by 

their weapons. The United States should be prepared for the potential that an adversary may seek to use nuclear weapons not simply in well-understood but also in 

surprising or unconventional ways—for instance with very little kinetic effect—that 

could nonetheless have gravely negative implications for U.S. forces or interests. 

The United States is highly unlikely to be adequately prepared without allowing the 

national laboratories to conduct design efforts for the purpose of defensive analysis. 

It is therefore very important for the Department to begin promptly to implement 

this program. 

Mr. ROGERS. During the hearing you indicated that you think that the United 

States could respond to a limited Russian nuclear strike with a comparable strike 

of its own using a strategic bomber—and that this response would be ‘‘just as compelling as being able to respond with a tactical weapon delivered by a fighter jet.’’ 

Does this indicate that you think a limited nuclear war is possible? If so, what implications does this have for U.S. nuclear force planning? If not, why do you think 

such a response would be prudent or advisable? 

Dr. BLECHMAN. If Russia were to carry out a limited nuclear strike it would be 

essential for the U.S. and, if in Europe, NATO to respond in kind. If the U.S. did 

not respond it might encourage Russian leaders to believe they could regain territory once part of the Soviet Union through nuclear coercion and, when necessary, 

use. I believe that any use of nuclear weapons would carry with it a grave risk of 

continuing escalation—the normal fog of war would multiplied many times on a nuclear battlefield. Even so, I support the NATO policy of deterring, and, if necessary 

responding to, nuclear use with its own nuclear forces. 

The question is whether such a response should be made with tactical weapons 

pre-deployed in Europe. Maintaining such a capability will require significant expenditures at a time when security budgets face many competing needs. Moreover, 

it is hard for me to believe that the German, Belgian, or Dutch governments would 

permit their crews and aircraft to respond to a Russian nuclear use—presumably 

in Eastern Europe, with nuclear weapons now stored on their territory. Indeed, 

their fighters would have a hard time penetrating Russian air defenses. Far preferable in my view, would be to deploy U.S. nuclear-armed B–2 bombers to bases in 

Europe during the crisis that led up to the conflict, both to signal to the Russians 

that we are prepared for a nuclear exchange and, if necessary, to conduct nuclear 

strikes in response to the Russian first use. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please describe what response you would recommend if Russia carries out, in a regional confrontation with the U.S. in, say, the Baltics, their ‘‘escalate-to-deescalate’’ doctrine and used a single, low-yield nuclear weapon? If the U.S. 

responds with increased conventional forces, what response do you recommend if 

Russia continued to use discriminate, low-yield nuclear strikes on such U.S. forces 

as they deploy? Should we respond in a conventional-only fashion, a limited nuclear 

fashion, or with a large and comprehensive nuclear retaliation? 

Dr. BLECHMAN. First, I believe it is essential to strengthen NATO’s capabilities 

in the Baltic nations and adjoining countries so that Russian leaders do not 

misperceive an opportunity to carry out a quick and successful strike. This strengthening should include rapid implementation of the European Very High Readiness 

Taskforce and the stationing of advanced elements and equipment in Poland, the 

deployment of equipment for one U.S. armored brigade in each of the Baltic states 

and the rotational deployments of battalions from those brigades to exercise with 

local forces, the deployment of the divisional headquarters and support forces to fill 

out the division in Poland, the rotational deployment of U.S. fighter squadrons to 

the Baltic nations, Poland, and Romania, and the stationing of necessary Air Force 

support units for those squadrons in those countries. 

Second, if despite these pre-deployments, a conflict were to break out in the region 

and the Russians, facing conventional defeat utilized one or more nuclear weapons 
153 

in conformance with their stated doctrine, I believe the U.S./NATO should respond 

with the same number of weapons against Russian military targets in the battle 

zone. As nuclear weapons are not particularly effective war-fighting weapons, hopefully, the two sides would come to their senses after only a few had been used and 

negotiate an end to the conflict. If the Russians continued to use nuclear weapons 

after the U.S./NATO had responded in kind, I would recommend that we consider 

striking military targets in Russia itself, recognizing this would raise the danger of 

a Russian strike against the U.S. 

Mr. ROGERS. This subcommittee has spent a lot of time focused on the need for 

a responsive U.S. nuclear infrastructure. The administration seems to largely agree 

with us but has been glacially slow in implementing actions to fix it. Do you believe 

we need a nuclear infrastructure and enterprise that can quickly respond to geopolitical changes or technical failures in the stockpile? How should we define ‘‘responsiveness’’ of our nuclear enterprise going forward? What metrics should we use 

to measure responsiveness? Does a responsive infrastructure contribute to deterrence of potential adversaries? 

Dr. BLECHMAN. I disagree with the premise of the question. The administration 

has been modernizing the nuclear infrastructure across the board, in line with the 

requirements agreed to by the secretaries of defense and energy at the end of the 

second George W. Bush administration. The apparently ‘‘glacial’’ pace has more to 

do with the underestimates of the time and money required to implement the plan 

made at the time it was put together than any reluctance on the part of the current 

administration to carry out the plan. 

Personally, I believe the plan is too far-reaching. Given the planned size of U.S. 

nuclear forces under the START agreement, and the possibility of further reductions 

in the future, I believe that several elements of the infrastructure modernization 

plan could be modified and reduced in cost. 

The responsiveness of the infrastructure depends on the resources allotted to it. 

If there were a change in the geo-political environment well beyond the changes we 

have seen already, it would be possible to modernize and expand the infrastructure 

rapidly by throwing resources at it—just as we did in the Manhattan Project. Personally, I don’t see any need for such actions now or in the future, but it would be 

possible. 

I have never seen any evidence that adversaries pay any attention to the infrastructure in the context of deterrence. Leaders of all nations believe the U.S. is a 

very wealthy and resourceful country that will do whatever is necessary to ensure 

its security. 

Mr. ROGERS. Project Atom had an overarching constraint that the force postures the teams recommended must be possible within ‘‘approximately $35 billion per year 

in constant 2013 dollars, comprising 4 to 5 percent of the defense budget.’’ Do you 

believe your recommendations meet this constraint? Do you believe 4, 5, or 6 percent of the defense budget is an appropriate amount to be spending on nuclear deterrence, which DOD says is the nation’s ‘‘highest priority defense mission’’? 

Dr. BLECHMAN. The nuclear force posture I recommend could be implemented and 

maintained for less than $35 billion per year, freeing resource for more pressing 

needs, such as modernizing conventional forces and maintaining a high state of conventional readiness. That is not the case, I believe, for the force postures recommended by my colleagues in Project Atom nor for the nuclear modernization 

plans now being pursued by the Department of Defense which will like reach or exceed $50 billion per year in the 2020s if fully implemented on the schedules now 

contemplated. 

Nuclear deterrence is certainly a high priority defense mission, but there are 

many other needs to ensure our security. It is imperative to replace the aging fighter force at a rapid pace, to maintain a ship-building budget adequate to stem further reductions in the size of the navy, and to avoid reductions in ground forces 

greater than those already planned, as well as to modernize the Army’s helicopter 

fleet. In addition, we should be spending more, not less as now planned, on advanced research and development of new technologies so that we can maintain our 

conventional advantages over potential enemies. We also should be allocating greater resources to homeland security, the FBI, and to the State Department—all crucial in the fight against terrorism. These needs are far more important than the 

rapid, cross-the-board modernization now planned for the nuclear forces. 

Mr. ROGERS. During the hearing you stated, ‘‘If the U.S. does not maintain conventional superiority, then we’d have to look at alternative strategies.’’ Can you 

elaborate on what is meant by alternative strategies? 

A. Considering the widespread employment and increasingly effective nature of 

the anti-access/area-denial platforms fielded by potential adversaries, particularly 

China, aimed solely at degrading U.S. conventional superiority in local spheres of 
154 

influence, such as the Taiwan Straits, how does this trend affect your proposed recommendations for U.S. nuclear force structure and posture given your assumption 

of U.S. conventional superiority through 2050? If U.S. conventional forces are unable to operate, thus unable to deter, in certain areas, do the policies you recommend in Project Atom change? 

Dr. BLECHMAN. An alternative defense strategy would be to return to the Eisenhower Administration of massive retaliation, building larger strategic nuclear forces 

and threatening their use if our or our allies’ vital national interests are threatened. 

This should be coupled with an all-out effort to develop boost-phase missile defenses, 

probably involving massive satellite constellations equipped with laser weapons. I’d 

hasten to add that this would be a very dangerous world—remember the several 

Berlin confrontations in the 1950s, as well as confrontations with China over the 

Offshore Islands, etc. 

With regard to ‘‘A’’, I believe the anti-access/area-denial capabilities of our potential adversaries have been exaggerated in the public literature. They are certainly 

working on them, but Russia is nowhere near such technical capabilities and China 

has a long way to go. Locating, targeting, and hitting an aircraft carrier in a warfighting configuration (i.e., emissions limited) is not nearly as easy as some make 

out, and there are other many other systems that could be used to defend allies in 

regions close to China. Needless to say, China’s capabilities will improve over time, 

even if far more slowly than many postulate. The way to respond, in my view, is 

NOT to allocate additional resources to nuclear forces but, rather, to invest in advanced capabilities—such as ISR, EW, cyber, lasers, and space defense—that can 

enable us to maintain our conventional superiority. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Final Report of the Perry-Schlesinger commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States stated that, ‘‘Working with partners in the intelligence community, the laboratories should be in a position to advise national leadership on foreign nuclear weapons activities bearing on the interests of the United 

States and its allies. In short, the commission recommends that the laboratories be 

allowed to design, simulate, and experimentally assess foreign nuclear weapon designs for the purposes of defensive analysis.’’ A. Why, in your opinion, is this important? Do you support this effort? B. The Department of Energy is approximately 10 

months late in submitting to Congress an annual report on how it will implement 

such a program. How important do you think it is that the Department promptly 

begin to implement this program? 

Dr. BLECHMAN. I’m sorry, but I’m not sufficiently familiar with warhead designs 

or the capabilities of our laboratories to answer this question. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please describe what response you would recommend if Russia carries out, in a regional confrontation with the U.S. in, say, the Baltics, their ‘‘escalate-to-deescalate’’ doctrine and used a single, low-yield nuclear weapon? If the U.S. 

responds with increased conventional forces, what response do you recommend if 

Russia continued to use discriminate, low-yield nuclear strikes on such U.S. forces 

as they deploy? Should we respond in a conventional-only fashion, a limited nuclear 

fashion, or with a large and comprehensive nuclear retaliation? 

Dr. MOUNT. Any decision to employ a nuclear weapon would depend substantially 

on the circumstances. A nonlethal demonstration blast is a very different circumstance than a large strike that produces mass casualties. Properly calibrating 

the U.S. response will depend on a great deal of information about the initial 

strike—including location, target, military casualties, civilian casualties, yield, delivery vehicle, and other factors. In any event, the United States has strong reasons 

to refrain from nuclear use. The need to favorably resolve the conflict at hand, the 

desire to preserve a reputation that will serve the United States in future crises, 

and the enduring U.S. interest in the stability of the international system may in 

some circumstances favor a solely conventional response. First, nuclear retaliation 

could harm the ability of U.S. policymakers to prevail in the conflict at hand by 

damaging alliance cohesion, diluting international opprobrium, and complicate the 

maneuver of U.S. forces. Because a nuclear strike would be an inefficient and ineffective means of defending allied territory, a conventional response may be a better 

means of prevailing in the conflict at hand. Secondly, the United States would not 

want to suggest to other states that they could force a nuclear response from Washington at will. Thirdly, the United States has a deep interest in a world where nuclear weapons remain confined to the margins of international interaction. Developing and using low-yield nuclear weapons would make it more likely that other 

countries followed suit. In many circumstances, these reasons in favor of restraint 

may be outweighed by reasons in favor of nuclear use. At each step in the escalation 

ladder, the U.S. president will attempt to prevent a wider nuclear exchange. It is 

not clear—and there may be no way of knowing—whether retaliation or restraint 

is likelier to precipitate a nuclear war. The regrettable fact is that follow-on nuclear 
155 

use will remain a possibility whether or not the United States retaliates with nuclear weapons. In short, there is no simple or automatic answer to the question of 

nuclear retaliation. The decision should weigh all U.S. interests at stake, including 

the long-term U.S. interest in a world where nuclear proliferation and use is rare 

and stigmatized. Given these interests in nuclear restraint, retaliation should certainly be authorized as a last resort, when the leadership is has a reasonable certainty that nuclear use is strictly necessary to secure vital national security interests. 

Mr. ROGERS. During the hearing you warned against ‘‘shifting the bounds of this 

competition into the nuclear domain,’’ because ‘‘you legitimize Vladimir Putin’s reckless movement of nuclear capabilities and his sort of—and his very reckless risktaking.’’ You suggest we counter Russia’s hybrid strategy with conventional strategies of our own. An old maxim occurs to me here: ‘‘the enemy gets a vote.’’ What 

happens if Mr. Putin votes and is not deterred by our conventional or hybrid 

counter-moves, and carries out his ‘‘escalate-to-deescalate’’ strategy? Where does 

that leave us? 

Dr. MOUNT. It is certainly true that Mr. Putin gets a vote in strategic competition. 

However, the United States also gets a vote about the domain in which that competition takes place—and we ought to cast in a way that advantages our interests. 

In recent years, Russia has repeatedly made destabilizing and irresponsible statements regarding its nuclear arsenal. At tense moments, it has threatened to alert 

its forces and to deploy them close to NATO territory. However, U.S. and NATO responses should continue to emphasize the strength of our conventional deterrent. 

Russian rhetorical strategy hopes to provoke a nuclear response from the United 

States in order to shift the competition from the conventional level (where Russia 

is weak) to the nuclear level (where Russian capabilities are relatively more developed). If the United States takes the bait and deploys new systems closer to Russian 

territory, it will only legitimate Putin’s gamble and provoke further nuclear 

brinksmanship, including arms racing behavior. This would create a divide in the 

alliance between countries that favor a nuclear response and those that do not, distracting attention from the difficult task of formulating a robust package of steps 

to promote conventional deterrence. Furthermore, it would dilute international disapproval of Russia’s nuclear brinksmanship, creating new problems for U.S. diplomats who are attempting to hold together an ailing nonproliferation regime. Russia’s strategy is specifically designed to cover aggression at the subconventional 

level by generating friction at the nuclear level. U.S. nuclear forces cannot deter 

paramilitary operations, low-level cyber operations, or other hybrid actions designed 

to destabilize the countries that form NATO’s eastern borders. The United States 

should continue its current policy for confronting Russian hostility—by 

prepositioning equipment, training allied militaries, and improving readiness to ensure that NATO can defend itself if challenged. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. What do you view as the greatest risks to strategic stability? 

Dr. MURDOCK. While there is little consensus on how to define ‘‘strategic stability,’’ most would agree that strategic stability is desirable, particularly for status 

quo powers like the United States. In my most recent work (as yet unpublished), 

I’ve characterized the current and near-term security environment as ‘‘Growing 

Great Power Competition in an Age of Rising Disorder.’’ In my assessment, the 

three greatest near-term threats to international order and stability are Russia, 

China and Islamic Extremism, with the latter taking two forms: as a state-like actor 

threatening regional stability and as an ideological movement that conducts and inspires terrorism. Nuclear-armed regional ‘‘rogue’’ states (such as North Korea today 

and perhaps Iran in the future) also pose significant challenges to stability, both 

global and regional. While nuclear terrorism has been elevated by some as the top 

‘‘nuclear danger,’’ I believe that the risks to strategic stability from nuclear-armed 

states is rising and constitute the ‘‘greatest’’ risk, in part because the effort involved 

in non-state actors’ acquisition of a nuclear device is both harder than initially 

thought and getting harder because of improved nuclear material security. 

Mr. COOPER. What do you view as the greatest risks to strategic stability? 

Dr. PAYNE. The greatest risks to contemporary strategic stability are the expansionist goals, nuclear doctrines and growing nuclear capabilities of states hostile to 

the United States and allies, as discussed in Question 7 above. In particular, the 

nuclear doctrines of key states suggest the belief that their threats of nuclear employment or actual nuclear employment are viable options in support of expansionist 

foreign policies designed to enlarge their respective areas of geopolitical dominance. 
156 

9For a fuller description of my understanding of ‘‘strategic stability,’’ see Colby, ‘‘Reconciling 

Stability and Deterrence.’’ 

I believe that Russia and China seek to use nuclear coercive threats and their significantly growing nuclear arsenals to support expansionist foreign policies that are 

intended to destroy the geopolitical structures in place in Europe and Asia since the 

end of World War II. These Russian and Chinese goals and means place key U.S. 

allies and interests in increasingly vulnerable and risky positions, and create the 

prospects for regional crises that could escalate to nuclear war in the absence of a 

strong U.S. deterrent. In short, I believe the greatest threats to stability stem from 

the prospects that Russia and/or China will overreach in their respective expansionism and use of nuclear coercion in the belief that the United States and allies 

will concede to their threats and military activities. The greatest risks to stability 

follow from these Russian and Chinese goals and the apparent fact that both intend 

to support those goals with coercive nuclear threats. The large expenditures Russia 

and China have been devoting to developing and deploying new nuclear forces underscores the apparent high value they place on these capabilities. 

Mr. COOPER. What do you view as the greatest risks to strategic stability? 

Mr. COLBY. I understand strategic stability to be a situation in which, between 

two states possessed of survivable large-scale nuclear forces, neither side has an incentive to use nuclear weapons except for vindication of its vital interests.9 That is, 

unlike some conceptions of strategic stability, I am as concerned about specifying 

the conditions under which nuclear use would be appropriate as those under which 

they would not. This is because, for strategic stability to be a constructive concept, 

it must capture the positive elements of the so-called ‘‘nuclear revolution’’—those 

that promote peace and stability—while seeking to minimize or eliminate the essentially ancillary or accidental reasons that states might employ nuclear weapons. 

Without serving both masters, carrying through on such a conception risks focusing 

too much on narrowing the legitimate uses of nuclear weapons to the extent that 

major sub-nuclear aggression could become increasingly ‘‘thinkable’’—which would 

itself be the most likely route to nuclear use. 

In a ‘‘strategically stable’’ situation, the presence of nuclear weapons would effectively deter war, aggression, and coercion, but the weapons themselves would only 

be used for these purposes rather than for essentially peripheral or accidental reasons. We should want a situation in which both we and those nations with which 

we are in a relationship of strategic stability—essentially Russia and China—would 

only use nuclear weapons because we really wanted to telegraph to the other side 

that it had crossed a most fundamental red line—and not for any other reason. 

I therefore see threats to strategic stability arising from two sides. On one side 

are the very real and increasingly serious risks that certain capabilities, postures, 

and actions of one or both sides might result in miscalculation, accident, 

misperception and emotion leading to nuclear escalation that nobody really seeks. 

These are the kinds of peripheral or accidental reasons to use nuclear weapons that 

we should want to eliminate or at least minimize as a potential cause of employment. 

Because of the rapidly evolving military-technological environment and the unfortunately growing possibility of conflict between the United States and China or Russia, I am increasingly worried about the potential for such factors to lead to unnecessary nuclear use. In particular, I fear that the evolution of military technology 

and national military postures pose a rising possibility of generating misperception, 

misunderstanding, or undue anxieties on the part of one or more of these states 

with respect to their core capabilities or valued assets to such a degree that such 

concerns could lead to the fearful side using nuclear weapons without the other side 

understanding that its actions would generate such a response. 

For instance, I am concerned that the introduction of new technologies and capabilities into domains such as cyberspace and space/counterspace could cause one or 

more of these states to worry about the effectiveness and reliability of its/their nuclear command and control systems, which might impel it/them to consider using 

nuclear weapons earlier in a conflict—even if the other side did not intend to undermine this vital capability. Likewise, I fear that the United States and these other 

states do not share common perceptions of what is and what is not escalatory—including which targets are considered of particular value and which are not—which 

could also lead to this kind of essentially unnecessary or accidental nuclear employment. 

Because of these concerns, I believe that governmental (especially) and non-governmental efforts to understand, develop, and shape U.S., Russian, and Chinese perceptions of these risks, and to minimize each state’s reasons for nuclear use while 

protecting U.S.—and, to the degree obligatory—other states’ interests is an increas-
157 

ingly valuable exercise. Ideally, each of these states should think of using its nuclear forces only to vindicate its truly vital interests—and not for ‘‘use or lose’’ or 

other such solely military-operational reasons. 

I also worry, however, about the risks to the other side of the strategic stability 

balancing equation. For instance, I am worried that nuclear weapons will be so 

marginalized in national—particularly U.S.—policy that an adversary may unduly 

discount the probability of U.S. use in the event the United States is seriously challenged. As crucial as it is to minimize the chances that nuclear weapons will be used 

for less than fundamental reasons, it is equally critical to reinforce the perception 

that nuclear weapons could very well be used on behalf of precisely such fundamental reasons. If adversaries—particularly U.S. adversaries—do not fully understand or believe this, then we run the risk that they are more likely to do things 

more inimical to U.S. interests, things that could well lead to war and indeed nuclear war. Thus if we do not adequately foreshadow our will to use nuclear weapons 

in the face of acts that gravely threaten our vital interests, we risk courting the very 

circumstances we seek to avoid by sidelining nuclear weapons in our national policies. 

For this reason, I believe that we should shift our discussion of and policies regarding nuclear weapons away from a focus on ‘‘reducing’’ their role and on actively 

pursuing a world without nuclear weapons. These stances, coupled with much of the 

discourse about nuclear weapons in and around the U.S. government, telegraph— 

sometimes quite strongly—to friend and foe that the United States might balk at 

using nuclear weapons, even in the ‘‘extreme circumstances’’ the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report rightly set as the only conditions under which the United States 

would contemplate such employment. Instead, the United States should concentrate 

on ‘‘minimizing’’ its reliance on nuclear weapons and talk about the importance of 

promoting ‘‘stability’’ and responsible stewardship of such destructive weapons—objectives that are consistent with the equally important emphasis the United States 

should give to telegraphing its will and capability to use nuclear weapons if sufficiently provoked. Under this rubric, capabilities, such as those for discriminate use, 

that indicate the U.S. resolve and ability to use nuclear weapons can thus contribute to rather than detract from stability. 

Mr. COOPER. Former Vice-Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Winnefeld 

noted in a June 2015 hearing before our subcommittee that ‘‘I would say that it is 

very important that the Russians understand that far from being deescalatory, first 

use of nuclear weapons in a conflict like that, it risks uncontrolled escalation . . . it 

is almost impossible to completely predict what the outcome would be of such a use 

of nuclear weapons, however small.’’ What are the odds that we could control escalation? And what are the risks of using a small nuclear weapon to ‘‘de-escalate’’ a 

conflict? And what are the risks of introducing more ‘‘usable’’ weapon into the nuclear deterrent? 

Dr. BLECHMAN. Any use of any nuclear weapon, no matter how small, would raise 

grave risks of uncontrolled escalation. The ‘‘fog of war,’’ present in any conflict, 

would be multiplied many times if nuclear weapons were used because of their effects on sensors and communications. In addition, it’s hard to understand how the 

two sides would bring the conflict to a close. If Russia initiated nuclear use, NATO 

would almost certainly feel compelled to respond in kind. Perhaps the two sides 

would come to their senses at that point, but it’s just as compelling to assume that 

the Russians might try again, this time escalating against new types of targets. We 

recently simulated a conflict in Estonia in which the Russian side used two nuclear 

weapons against NATO military targets and NATO responded with two weapons of 

its own against Russian military targets, all on Estonian territory. We assumed that 

the war ended at that point. Even such a small conflict (4 weapons total) resulted 

in roughly 100,000 fatalities, 70 percent of which were civilians, and the destruction 

of one-half of Estonia’s GDP. Nuclear weapons are not particularly effective weapons against military targets; precision conventional munitions are. Nukes are good 

for one thing—destroying large areas and killing everything within the area. On the 

other hand, I do not believe that introducing lower yield or more accurate weapons 

(‘‘more usable’’) makes nuclear use any more likely. A decision to use a nuclear 

weapon would be such a historic and difficult one, because of the risks of escalation, 

that questions about yield etc pale in comparison. 

Mr. COOPER. What do you view as the greatest risks to strategic stability? 

Dr. BLECHMAN. Currently, I believe the greatest risks to strategic stability come 

from the irresponsible statements and nuclear threats of Russian leaders, and from 

the provocative behavior of their nuclear-capable aircraft, ships, and submarines. 

During the Cold War, military commanders on the two sides worked out arrangements to avoid inadvertent accidents or provocations by their forces. The Russians 

now seem to be deliberately violating those agreements and risking clashes—using 
158 

this bravado to cover up their conventional inferiority. In response, some government officials and so-called ‘‘experts’’ in NATO countries are urging that the alliance 

reemphasize its tactical nuclear posture and even move tactical nuclear weapons 

farther to the East. Any such action only plays into the Russians’ game. The more 

effective NATO action would be to strengthen its conventional capabilities to 

promptly defend the Baltic states and other member nations east of Germany, and 

to provide Ukraine with the means to defend itself from further Russian aggression. 

Mr. COOPER. Do you believe we need to forward-deploy additional nuclear weapons? Why/why not? 

Dr. BLECHMAN. I do not think we need to deploy additional nuclear weapons overseas and, in fact, think we should permit the weapons we now deploy in Europe 

to live out their natural lifetimes (about ten more years) and then withdraw and 

dismantle them. When Soviet armored forces threatened NATO on the intra-German border, stationing U.S. nuclear warheads in Germany and other NATO members made some sense to add credibility to the Alliance’s then-first use policy. Now, 

however, that any Russian aggression would take place far to the East of Germany, 

it is unrealistic to believe that the countries in which these U.S. warheads are stationed would permit their aircraft and crews to deliver nuclear strikes in a war with 

Russia. Moreover, the aircraft planned to deliver them would have a difficult time 

penetrating Russian air defenses. Deterrence of Russian nuclear use and, if necessary, response to any such use can be carried out by U.S. strategic forces far more 

effectively than by the handful of U.S. tactical weapons now in Europe. If a crisis 

were to break out threatening a war involving Russia and a member of NATO, U.S. 

B–2 bombers armed with nuclear weapons could be stationed in Europe as a signal 

to Russia not to consider initiating a nuclear conflict and, if necessary, to be used 

in response to a Russian attack. Forward-deploying nuclear weapons in the Pacific 

would be particularly counter-productive as it would be viewed as extremely provocative by China and make diplomatic solutions to the conflicts in that region virtually impossible. 

Mr. COOPER. What are the benefits for the United States of ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty? 

Dr. BLECHMAN. China has stated repeatedly that it would ratify the CTBT if the 

U.S. does it first. As China has had only a fraction of the nuclear tests than the 

U.S., and has never tested the warhead now being deployed on its new ICBMs, it 

would be a real advantage to the U.S. to place an obstacle in the way of further 

nuclear tests by China. Further, if the U.S. and China were to ratify the Treaty, 

it would put additional pressure on the six additional states necessary for the treaty 

to enter into force—placing a permanent ban on further nuclear developments. This 

would reinforce the taboo on nuclear use and make the world a far safer place. 

Mr. COOPER. Former Vice-Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Winnefeld 

noted in a June 2015 hearing before our subcommittee that ‘‘I would say that it is 

very important that the Russians understand that far from being deescalatory, first 

use of nuclear weapons in a conflict like that, it risks uncontrolled escalation . . . it 

is almost impossible to completely predict what the outcome would be of such a use 

of nuclear weapons, however small.’’ What are the odds that we could control escalation? And what are the risks of using a small nuclear weapon to ‘‘de-escalate’’ a 

conflict? And what are the risks of introducing more ‘‘usable’’ weapon into the nuclear deterrent? 

Dr. MOUNT. In June, Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work warned Russia that, 

‘‘anyone who thinks they can control escalation through the use of nuclear weapons 

is literally playing with fire.’’ This applies to the U.S. defense planners as well, who 

have long understood that nuclear escalation is unpredictable and hazardous and 

should be employed only as a last resort. Russia developed this policy of escalateto-deescalate as a means of compensating for conventional inferiority (like we did 

with President Eisenhower’s New Look policy in the 1950s)—the United States has 

a far stronger hand at the conventional level and as a result has less need to resort 

to highly risky nuclear gambits. The introduction of new ‘‘usable’’ weapons holds tremendous risks. They would demonstrate to the rest of the world that even with our 

enormous advantage in conventional forces, we feel that it is necessary to procure 

usable nuclear forces. Nonnuclear countries would feel emboldened to seek nuclear 

weapons, while nuclear countries would race to make their forces more usable. Work 

continued by saying, ‘‘escalation is escalation, and nuclear use would be the ultimate 

escalation.’’ There is scant evidence that either we or the Russians would understand a ‘‘tactical’’ nuclear strike any differently from one delivered by other means. 

For this reason, it is not clear that any nuclear weapon is more or less usable than 

another: any use of a nuclear weapon would hold enormous risks and would provide 

no assurance that it would have a positive or calculable effect on a crisis. 

Mr. COOPER. What do you view as the greatest risks to strategic stability? 
159 

Dr. MOUNT. Almost by definition, the greatest risk to strategic stability is the belief that nuclear deterrence can be denied, circumvented, or overcome. There are 

many examples of this today. The urge to conduct a nuclear or nonnuclear preventive strike against an enemy’s arsenal, the development of nonnuclear weapons that 

threaten nuclear systems (including cyber and hypersonics), refusals to accept mutual vulnerability, development of new nuclear capabilities, and the belief that nuclear escalation can be controlled—each of these trends to a greater or lesser extent 

undermines nuclear deterrence to the detriment of strategic stability. Strategic stability between nuclear powers depends on a willingness to accept vulnerability; refusal to do so does not increase a country’s security but only increases the risk that 

a nuclear weapon will be used. 

Mr. COOPER. Do you believe we need to forward-deploy additional nuclear weapons? Why/why not? 

Dr. MOUNT. Absolutely not. The United States currently possesses an ability to 

strike any point on earth at short notice with a variety of warhead yields. Forward 

deployment of nuclear weapons, whether in Asia or in Europe, would not enhance 

this capability. The political signal it would send to our allies in either region would 

be that conventional deterrence and defense is impossible and it would alienate allies like in both regions who are skeptical of the utility of nuclear weapons. Instead, 

new deployments to either region would almost certainly provoke reciprocal steps 

from adversaries, which would in turn be seen as threats to the United States. The 

United States should not send the signal that it believes its strategic capabilities 

are incredible as threats and require enhancement: instead, we should maintain 

that nuclear weapons are not useful tools for the resolution of political disputes and 

resolutely demonstrate our ability to defend against any attack with conventional 

means. ? 

Mr. COOPER. What are the benefits for the United States of ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty? 

Dr. MOUNT. Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is critical to national security over the long term. The United States has a very strong interest in 

minimizing the influence of nuclear weapons and to prevent the spread of nuclear 

technology around the world. Ratifying the CTBT would decrease the likelihood that 

U.S. adversaries would develop new capabilities and make it almost certain that the 

international community would detect and punish any clandestine nuclear test. The 

International Monitoring System requires that the CTBT enter into force in order 

to proceed to complete, test, and validate its extensive network of monitoring stations and laboratories, 282 of which are currently in place—84% of the total system. 

With 337 facilities planned in 89 countries, the IMS is truly a wonder of the modern 

world and an indispensable tool in the effort to prevent the world’s most dangerous 

weapons from being used against the U.S. homeland or the U.S. Armed Forces. 

Moreover, ratification of the CTBT would strengthen the U.S. commitment to the 

global nuclear nonproliferation regime at a time when it is highly vulnerable. Every 

year, the NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship program yields new knowledge about the 

physics of nuclear explosions, a program which is unmatched anywhere in the 

world. In this way, ratifying the CTBT would help to lock in the American advantage in nuclear technology, preventing other countries from developing efficient and 

miniaturized warheads. By any measure, the CTBT is in the American interest. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Your plans all assume constant funding of 4–5% of the defense 

budget over the next 30 years. Uncertain fiscal times beg the question: what would 

you do with less? How would your plans change with 10%, 30%, or 50% less funding? Asked another way, what is the least important part of your nuclear posture? 

Dr. MURDOCK. As I have indicated in QFR #5, I believe that 4–5% of the defense 

budget to sustain and modernize a safe, secure, reliable and effective nuclear deterrence is certainly affordable, and as, in the words of former Secretary of Defense 

Hagel, the nation’s ‘‘highest priority defense mission’’ should be adequately sourced. 

In my opinion, the defense budget would have to be cut well below the Budget Control Act caps before I would consider reducing the U.S. nuclear budget significantly 

below the $35 billion per year in 2013 dollars level assumed in the Project Atom 

study effort. That having been said and in the spirit of being responsive, not all elements of the current nuclear posture (SLBMs, ICBMs, dual-capable bombers and 

tactical aircraft) are of equal value in my opinion. Since the United States must retain an assured retaliation capability, the survivability of U.S. nuclear forces is a 

key requirement. Currently, the U.S. relies on SLBMs to meet this need, but there 

are alternatives such as mobile ICBMs, an option that I believe should be explored, 
160 

in part because replacing the SLBM ‘‘leg’’ consumes over 60 percent of the nuclear 

modernization budget. ICBMs provide both stability (by raising the bar for any preemptive attack) and a hedge against possible SLBM vulnerability, plus the nearterm cost of sustaining ICBMs is low. The U.S. Air Force is already committed to 

a new fleet of penetrating bombers for conventional attack missions, and making it 

nuclear-capable is relatively inexpensive, in part because the B61 bomb life extension is well under way. I think it is critical that the Air Force plans for making 

F–35A nuclear capable be implemented, since I believe that the risks of a highlyproliferated world are increasing, which will increase the need for forward-deployed 

U.S. nuclear weapons. While cost considerations should be a factor in determining 

what the future U.S. nuclear posture should be, I repeat what I said before—the 

U.S. needs a safe, secure, reliable and effective nuclear force and can afford to pay 

the price for it at levels of defense spending anywhere near the current budget. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What role do conventional strike capabilities play in U.S. deterrence and extended deterrence? What are our allies’ expectations about the weapons 

with which we will respond in the event that mutual defense is necessary? 

Dr. MURDOCK. U.S. conventional precision strike capabilities are critical to how 

this nation conducts military operations and are a key contributor to the margin of 

military superiority that the United States currently possesses. However, when it 

comes to the deterrence of nuclear attacks against the United States and its allies, 

I do not believe that U.S. conventional strike capabilities play much of a role, if any. 

It is the threat of nuclear retaliation that deters nuclear attacks. In the event that 

an ally under the ‘‘U.S. nuclear umbrella’’ was attacked with a nuclear weapon by 

a regional adversary, that ally would be disappointed if the United States responded 

with a conventional-only attack. The principal, but not sole, purpose of U.S. nuclear 

weapons is to deter nuclear attacks against the U.S. and its allies. U.S. conventional 

strikes, in my view, do not figure in this equation, although they may increase the 

need for U.S. nuclear deterrence—to counter U.S. conventional superiority (particularly in precision strike), potential adversaries will increase their reliance on nuclear weapons to ‘‘offset’’ the U.S. conventional advantage, which, in turn, makes it 

necessary for the United States to increase the credibility and effectiveness of its 

nuclear deterrent. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Current policy states that the United States will respond in exceptional circumstances to non-nuclear attacks with nuclear weapons. Should the 

United States adopt a ‘‘no first use’’ policy, which would deemphasize the role that 

nuclear weapons play in our overall strategic posture? Would it help or hurt our 

interactions with other nuclear weapons states? 

Dr. MURDOCK. The United States has always maintained a policy of ‘‘strategic ambiguity’’ with respect to the precise circumstances under which the President would 

authorize the employment of a U.S. nuclear weapon. This made sense during the 

Cold War, when our deterrent posture in NATO clearly implied that we would use 

a nuclear weapon in response to major Soviet conventional aggression; and it makes 

sense today, even though U.S. conventional superiority makes it unlikely that the 

United States would be the first to employ a nuclear weapon in a non-nuclear conflict. No one can predict with great confidence what future contingencies might be 

so stressful, urgent and existential in nature that a President might contemplate 

employing a nuclear weapon. Moreover, those circumstances are so exceptional that 

what we say during peacetime about what our policy would be under those circumstances has little foundation in past history. In a fundamental sense, we really 

don’t know what a future President would or should do in that unprecedented situation. Conflicts between nuclear-armed states will always have a ‘‘nuclear shadow’’ 

over them, which, as far as I am concerned, makes ‘‘strategic ambiguity’’ both prescriptive (as a policy recommendation) and descriptive (as a description of the circumstances in which a nuclear weapon might be employed). 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What importance do our NATO allies place in the presence of 

forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe? Would they be satisfied with the nuclear force structure we currently offer our Asian allies? 

Dr. MURDOCK. I believe that the importance of forward-deployed U.S. nuclear 

weapons has been undervalued both today and during the Cold War. At the height 

of the Cold War, the United States had about 7,000 nuclear weapons deployed in 

NATO-Europe and 3,000 nuclear weapons deployed in the Pacific theater, including 

almost 1,000 weapons on the Korean peninsula. The physical presence of these nuclear weapons ensured that a major war would ‘‘go nuclear’’ and possibly involve nuclear attacks on the homelands of the Communist aggressors without directly involving the American homeland. The ‘‘coupling’’ of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and 

the security of our allies worked. Russia’s aggressive behavior toward Ukraine (including the illegal seizure of Crimea) and North Korea’s ascension to the world’s 

‘‘nuclear club’’ has raised nuclear anxieties both in Europe, particularly in the 
161 

‘‘frontline states’’ on Russia’s border, and in Asia. I quote from my Project Atom report: When security anxieties are acute, ‘‘reassurance’’ or ‘‘assurance’’ is most reliably provided by credible extended deterrence—if the adversaries of American allies 

are deterred, the allies will be assured. Deterring regional adversaries from ‘‘going 

nuclear’’ requires credible nuclear responses to their nuclear attack options. Forward deploying a robust set of discriminate nuclear response options conveys the 

message that the United States will ‘‘respond in kind’’ and proportionately to nuclear attacks on its allies. The credibility of that message is reinforced because the 

U.S. homeland would not be engaged in the U.S. response to a nuclear attack on 

a regional ally, which leaves the burden on the regional aggressor to escalate to the 

level of ‘‘homeland exchanges.’’ The price, however, for this more credible U.S. ‘‘nuclear umbrella,’’ is likely to the ally’s willingness to host U.S. nuclear weapons. This 

is what will constitute ‘‘nuclear burden sharing’’ in 2025–2050. An Asan Institute 

public opinion poll taken at the same time that a U.S. B–2 overflew Seoul indicated 

that over half of the Japanese public wanted U.S. nuclear weapons re-deployed to 

South Korea and, failing that, would want their own nuclear weapon. If security circumstances should worsen as the competition between the great powers intensifies, 

I expect that none of our allies ‘‘will be satisfied with the nuclear force structure 

we currently offer our Asian allies.’’ 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How would you recommend the United States structure our 

forces to respond to Russia’s nuclear deescalation policy? How could the United 

States respond without developing new tactical nuclear capabilities? 

Dr. MURDOCK. In my Project Atom report, I made the following argument: In ‘‘the 

second nuclear age,’’ potential U.S. adversaries are thinking through how they 

might actually employ a nuclear weapon, both early in a conflict and in a discriminate manner, to get the United States to ‘‘back off’’ in a conflict. U.S. nuclear forces 

were designed for a global conflict involving the exchange of thousands of high-yield 

weapons, not limited exchanges of low-yield weapons. Since most U.S. nuclear response options are large, ‘‘dirty,’’ and inflict significant collateral damage, the 

United States might be ‘‘self-deterred’’ and not respond ‘‘in kind’’ to discriminate nuclear attacks. U.S. conventional superiority establishes escalation control for the 

United States at the conventional level and causes its adversaries to think about 

breaking the nuclear threshold. The United States needs discriminate nuclear options at all rungs of the escalation ladder to make that option unattractive as well. 

Russia’s ‘‘nuclear deescalation policy’’ envisions that Russia will employ a nuclear 

weapons (that is, nuclear escalation) in order to de-escalate a conflict with a conventionally-superior adversary. I believe that a credible and effective deterrent to this 

policy is a robust set of discriminate options so that the United States can ‘‘respond 

in kind’’ and proportionately to any Russian employment of a nuclear weapons. I 

believe this means developing new nuclear capabilities because the Russian are 

known to be developing and procuring nuclear weapons that are not in the current 

U.S. nuclear inventory. While I have never liked the term ‘‘tactical nuclear weapon’’ 

because any use of a nuclear weapon will have strategic consequences, I believe that 

an effective and credible response to Russia’s ‘‘nuclear deescalation policy’’ will require that the United States develop ‘‘new tactical nuclear capabilities.’’ Doing so 

will communicate to the Russians that we are preparing for this contingency and 

are ready to respond with a proportionate nuclear response to any Russian nuclear 

attack. This will strengthen the U.S. nuclear deterrent; failing to do so will weaken 

it. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Your plans all assume constant funding of 4–5% of the defense 

budget over the next 30 years. Uncertain fiscal times beg the question: what would 

you do with less? How would your plans change with 10%, 30%, or 50% less funding? Asked another way, what is the least important part of your nuclear posture? 

Dr. PAYNE. Part of my response to Question 13 also is pertinent in response to 

this question and thus is repeated here. Identifying the most effective deterrence 

strategy cannot be done prudently on the basis of first defining the percentage of 

the DOD budget that will be devoted to this priority goal—budgets should follow 

strategy and strategic priorities, they should not be the driving factor. Rather, the 

character of the threat environment and the priority of various defense programs 

are the basic determinants of the appropriate budget share. This is a key point because ensuring effective nuclear deterrence has been identified as the highest defense priority by senior U.S. officials and the corresponding requirements for deterrence can shift dramatically depending on the threat environment. This 

prioritization is a reflection of severe emerging threats, including developments in 

Russia’s foreign policy, nuclear doctrine and forces, and the basic fact that the deterrence of nuclear war must be considered an enduring priority goal. Indeed, if nuclear deterrence fails dramatically, many other U.S. goals and capabilities become 

irrelevant. Correspondingly, within broad margins, U.S. capabilities intended to 
162 

deter severe threats warrant whatever budget commitment is needed to provide and 

sustain the capabilities judged critical to support that goal. Indeed, it is extremely 

fortunate that the goals of nuclear deterrence and assurance may be adequately 

supported at this point by a nuclear modernization program that demands such a 

modest percentage of the DOD budget—reportedly under 5 percent annually per 

current nuclear modernization plans through 2030. But, at the end of the day, that 

budget percentage should not be considered fixed because it must shift according to 

the threat environment and the continuing priority need for effective nuclear deterrence and assurance. 

My recommendation for dealing with any unavoidable budget cuts follows from 

my basic conclusion that the most important metric for the adequacy of the U.S. 

nuclear posture is its flexibility and resilience. Consequently, if cost reductions must 

be taken from the already small fraction of the DOD budget devoted to U.S. nuclear 

capabilities, reductions should be done so as to preserve as much as possible the 

flexibility and resilience of the U.S. nuclear posture. Thus, for example, in my view, 

sustaining the nuclear triad, forward-based DCA and a diversity of threat options 

would be priorities in any necessary budget reductions because those capabilities 

contribute significantly to U.S. adaptability. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What role do conventional strike capabilities play in U.S. deterrence and extended deterrence? What are our allies’ expectations about the weapons 

with which we will respond in the event that mutual defense is necessary? 

Dr. PAYNE. Conventional strategic threat options are an important ingredient in 

a flexible U.S. deterrent force posture. Indeed, one of my recommendations is for 

greater U.S. emphasis on CPGS threat options. Depending on the case, optimal deterrence strategies may take advantage of U.S. non-military threats, conventional 

force threats, nuclear threats, or a combination of these. The importance of U.S. conventional threats in any particular contingency will depend on the unique details 

of that contingency. But, in some plausible cases U.S. conventional deterrent threats 

may be sufficiently credible and lethal to support U.S. deterrence goals. In those 

cases, it will be fully reasonable for the United States to rely on conventional capabilities to support its deterrence goals. It should be noted, however, that in those 

cases wherein conventional forces are adequate for the immediate deterrence task, 

U.S. nuclear capabilities may remain critical to deter a nuclear-armed opponent (or 

an opponent armed with chemical or biological weapons) from escalating to WMD 

use as the means of overcoming U.S. conventional threats. Relying on U.S. conventional threats for deterrence may have the unintended consequence of leading opponents to plan increasingly on employing WMD capabilities as the most likely means 

of overcoming U.S. conventional-based deterrence strategies. Russia certainly appears to have moved in that doctrinal direction. Consequently, even in those cases 

where U.S. conventional forces are deemed adequate for immediate deterrence purposes, U.S. nuclear deterrent capabilities may be critical to control an opponent’s 

escalation to WMD use as the means to trump U.S. conventional capabilities. 

Key U.S. allies expect and rely on the United States to provide the combination 

of deterrent threats necessary to preserve their security. This includes the full spectrum of U.S. capabilities. This approach can be clearly seen in the most recent open 

NATO strategy document, which by consensus calls for a combination of nuclear and 

conventional capabilities for deterrence. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Current policy states that the United States will respond in exceptional circumstances to non-nuclear attacks with nuclear weapons. Should the 

United States adopt a ‘‘no first use’’ policy, which would deemphasize the role that 

nuclear weapons play in our overall strategic posture? Would it help or hurt our 

interactions with other nuclear weapons states? 

Dr. PAYNE. The United States should not adopt a ‘‘no first use’’ declaratory policy. 

Doing so would contribute to opponents’ possible perceptions, encouraged by such 

a U.S. policy declaration, that they could use chemical or biological weapons against 

the United States and allies without fear of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Given public 

reports that some prospective foes retain chemical and/or biological weapons (CBW), 

effectively undermining the U.S. nuclear deterrent of opponents’ CBW would be imprudent in the extreme. Indeed, it should be noted that U.S. leaders stated openly 

in the past that the United States was able to go forward with the international 

conventions against CBW specifically because the United States would retain nuclear weapons to deter CBW threats. A ‘‘no first use’’ policy would destroy that logic. 

Adopting a ‘‘no first use’’ policy also would undermine U.S. assurance goals for 

many key allies who rightly consider themselves vulnerable to their opponents’ conventionally superior forces. Such a U.S. declaratory policy would essentially tell opponents that the U.S. nuclear deterrent does not apply to their prospective use of 

overwhelming conventional force against our allies, or their use of CBW against our 

allies. That is why I consider a ‘‘no first use’’ policy to be highly destabilizing in 
163 

some cases, and also why many of our allies have warned against U.S. adoption of 

such a policy. I should add that there is no evidence whatsoever that a U.S. ‘‘no 

first use’’ policy would promote good will and benign behavior by opponents that 

might mitigate these problems. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What importance do our NATO allies place in the presence of 

forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe? Would they be satisfied with the nuclear force structure we currently offer our Asian allies? 

Dr. PAYNE. NATO allies are somewhat divided in opinion regarding the value of 

U.S. forward-based nuclear systems (FBS)—with the division generally following understandable geographical lines. In particular, those NATO members that neighbor 

Russia and were former members of the Warsaw Pact, and those NATO members 

that were located within the Cold War borders of the Soviet Union, appear to place 

great significance on the deterrence and assurance value of U.S. FBS. In fact, these 

countries have recently been the target of numerous nuclear threats from Russian 

leaders. There is considerable evidence from open leadership comments in these 

cases that these NATO members do not believe that they can be assured adequately 

by U.S. central strategic nuclear systems alone. It should be noted that there also 

appears to be increasing concern shown by Asian allies, particularly including South 

Korea, about U.S. reliance on central strategic nuclear systems alone for deterrence 

and their assurance. Public opinion polling in South Korea, for example, has revealed considerable popular support for the return of U.S. nuclear forces to South 

Korea. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How would you recommend the United States structure our 

forces to respond to Russia’s nuclear deescalation policy? How could the United 

States respond without developing new tactical nuclear capabilities? 

Dr. PAYNE. The Russian nuclear ‘‘de-escalation’’ strategy is, in reality, a nuclear 

first-use strategy. And, as discussed in Questions 7 and 9 above, the premise underlying this strategy is that Russia could threaten to employ, or in fact employ nuclear 

weapons in a limited, discriminate fashion without triggering a U.S. strategic nuclear response. The U.S. would, in effect, be expected to be deterred from responding 

in a forceful way to a severe Russian regional provocation, and would, instead, concede to Russian limited nuclear threats or limited nuclear use for fear of further 

Russian nuclear escalation. If so, U.S. and NATO deterrence strategies would have 

failed. U.S. leaders may find this an unreasonable expectation on the part of Moscow, but Russian leaders appear increasingly confident and have openly applied this 

strategy to its military occupation of Crimea. 

I believe that there are two main requirements to address this dangerous and destabilizing Russian nuclear first-use strategy. First, NATO and U.S. conventional 

capabilities need to be sufficiently robust in front-line areas to deny Russia the possibility of presenting the U.S. and NATO with a fait accompli following a rapid advance into NATO or other neighboring territories. In effect, NATO needs to counter 

President Putin’s claim that Russian troops could be in five NATO capitals within 

two days. 

Second, U.S. and NATO nuclear capabilities need to be able to deny Moscow any 

confidence that the United States would have so few local nuclear options that limited Russian nuclear employment would essentially be followed by U.S. and NATO 

conciliation. Sustaining U.S. FBS and flexible nuclear threat options would likely 

be an important contribution to this goal: Western reliance on central strategic nuclear systems and conventional forces for deterrence in the region could simply confirm the apparent Russian expectation that its nuclear threats or employment would 

defeat a Western conventional defense and operate below the Western strategic nuclear deterrence threshold. I have not concluded at this point that ‘‘new’’ Western 

tactical nuclear weapons are necessary for this purpose. Matching the B–61 modernization program with forward-deployment of the F–35 may provide much of the 

needed flexibility and deterrent effect. There are other potential deployment options 

for a nuclear-capable F–35 that also could help address this problem without developing new U.S. tactical capabilities, as could adapting a number of U.S. missile warheads for a highly-discriminate, low-yield option. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Your plans all assume constant funding of 4–5% of the defense 

budget over the next 30 years. Uncertain fiscal times beg the question: what would 

you do with less? How would your plans change with 10%, 30%, or 50% less funding? Asked another way, what is the least important part of your nuclear posture? 

Mr. COLBY. The amount of spending allocated to nuclear forces and their associated capabilities, such as command and control, represent a relatively modest proportion of total national spending on defense—generally considered to be around five 
164 

10See Harrison and Montgomery, ‘‘The Cost of U.S. Nuclear Forces: From BCA to Bow Wave 

and Beyond?’’ 33. 11For a similar view, see Andrew Krepinevich, ‘‘Strategy in a Time of Austerity,’’ Foreign Affairs (November/December 2012), 58–69. 12 It is important to note that conventional forces can prompt nuclear use, however, particularly if they are used to pursue ‘‘total’’ objectives such as regime change or territorial conquest. 

Conventional-only strategies therefore, unless appropriately limited, can also drive nuclear use. 13 As Nitze put it: ‘‘We have been working hard for a long period of time, for many, many 

years, to get closer balance in the conventional field. In fact, that goes back all the way to my 

personal experience in 1949, when we began this effort to improve the conventional balance and 

reduce our reliance upon nuclear weapons. We tried and tried and tried.’’ Testimony of Paul H. 

Nitze to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 28, 1988, available in The INF 

Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), 311. 14See, inter alia, ‘‘Japan Balks at Limits on U.S. Nukes,’’ The Japan Times, September 15, 

2009 and George Perkovich, Do Unto Others: Toward a Defensible Nuclear Doctrine (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), 2 and 21. 

percent or less of the defense budget over the coming decades.10 Given the cornerstone importance of U.S. nuclear forces for our security and that of our allies, this 

is a very reasonable amount to spend on their modernization and maintenance. 

For this reason, should the defense budget decline or other needs become more 

pressing, I would recommend protecting expenditures on nuclear forces and sacrificing investments in other areas of our military that serve more discretionary or 

elective rather than essential interests. That is, in such circumstances, we should 

not make a ‘‘haircut’’ across the defense budget. Rather, we should prioritize maintaining spending on those forces that are most important to our fundamental interests, such as nuclear forces, long-range strike and surveillance, and counter-terrorism capabilities, and decrease expenditures on less vital capabilities such as 

those oriented to stabilization and counterinsurgency operations or that have limited value in a more contested anti-access/area denial environment.11

If the defense budget were to decline to a point at which decisions about which 

elements of the nuclear forces were to be retained became necessary, I would recommend maintaining the Triad and existing warhead plans but reducing the total 

numbers procured and/or altering their deployment schedules to reduce costs. It is 

important to note, in this respect, that proposals to remove a leg of the Triad may 

not even end up saving significant sums of money. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What role do conventional strike capabilities play in U.S. deterrence and extended deterrence? What are our allies’ expectations about the weapons 

with which we will respond in the event that mutual defense is necessary? 

Mr. COLBY. Conventional forces play an elemental role in our deterrence and extended deterrence strategies. Fundamentally, we reasonably seek to rely when possible and prudent on conventional forces to deter adversary attack and coercion 

against ourselves and our allies. We can do so both through the outright threat of 

defeat—so-called deterrence by denial—as well as the threat of punishment through 

the use of conventional forces—so-called deterrence by cost-imposition. Using conventional forces for these functions is, of course, preferable because one of the most 

compelling ways to try to keep a conflict from escalating to the nuclear level is by 

refraining from using our own nuclear weapons.12

This effort to rely on conventional forces for deterrence and defense is well-understood and a long-term aspiration of U.S. policy. Paul Nitze remarked during the INF 

hearings in 1988 that the first conversation he heard in government about replacing 

some degree of U.S. reliance on its nuclear arsenal with augmented conventional 

forces took place in 1949.13

The issue today is not that conventional forces’ role is underestimated in U.S. defense posture, planning, and policy—but rather that nuclear forces’ role is. Indeed, 

not a few prominent policy leaders and government officials openly or privately express the view that the United States should not respond to adversary nuclear use 

with a nuclear strike of its own—let alone in the face of large-scale conventional 

attack that the United States and its allies cannot successfully repel. 

It is for this reason that a significant number of U.S. allies—particularly those 

that feel imperiled—privately and sometimes publicly plead or insist that the 

United States make clearer that it would use nuclear weapons if these allies were 

sufficiently attacked—and not only in cases of nuclear attack. It is well known, for 

instance, that Japan and South Korea strongly opposed efforts within the Obama 

Administration for the United States to adopt a ‘‘no first use’’ posture.14 Similar 

views are common elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific as well as in Eastern Europe and 

other parts of the NATO Alliance more concerned about the threat from Russia. 

It should be noted that, as in our own system, there are often differing views 

within allied governments and publics on extended nuclear deterrence and the con-
165 

15The United States quickly abandoned its nearly two centuries-old insistence on the protection of neutral shipping at the beginning of World War II in favor of pursuit of unrestricted 

submarine warfare. See, for instance, Joel Ira Holwitt, ‘‘Execute against Japan’’: The U.S. Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University 

Press, 2013). 

ditions under which the United States should use nuclear weapons. Generally 

speaking, ministries of defense and security-conscious political leaderships tend to 

be more concerned about maintaining the salience of nuclear weapons in U.S. extended deterrence, while ministries of foreign affairs (especially disarmament bureaus) and disarmament-focused political leaderships tend to be more focused on 

minimizing their role. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Current policy states that the United States will respond in exceptional circumstances to non-nuclear attacks with nuclear weapons. Should the 

United States adopt a ‘‘no first use’’ policy, which would deemphasize the role that 

nuclear weapons play in our overall strategic posture? Would it help or hurt our 

interactions with other nuclear weapons states? 

Mr. COLBY. The United States should not adopt a ‘‘no first use’’ policy regarding 

nuclear weapons. Such a posture would be ill-advised for several reasons, especially 

in an era when our conventional military advantages are being challenged and in 

many respects are eroding. 

First, the United States benefits from the deterrent power of the possibility that 

it may use nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances not involving nuclear attack. 

Potential adversaries must calculate that the United States might well use nuclear 

weapons even if they find ways to do great damage to us, our allies, or our interests 

without resorting to nuclear weapons themselves. This means that adversaries can 

never hope to ‘‘outwit’’ U.S. nuclear deterrence and therefore adds to their caution 

in challenging the important interests of the United States. It is largely for this reason that many U.S. allies, particularly those that feel more threatened, tend strongly to oppose U.S. adoption of a ‘‘no first use’’ pledge. 

Second, the benefits of a ‘‘no first use’’ policy are not outweighed by its costs and 

risks. It is true that such a policy can strengthen an adversary’s confidence that a 

war with the United States that it agrees to keep conventional is unlikely to go nuclear. This can reduce ‘‘use or lose’’ and instability pressures in the midst of a war. 

Yet this is not a dramatically different perception than is currently the case: the 

United States consistently gives the impression that it will only use nuclear weapons under ‘‘extreme circumstances’’ and has never employed them since 1945 despite 

being involved in several major conflicts. Adversaries very likely understand that 

the United States will only seriously consider employing nuclear weapons under 

such ‘‘extreme’’ conditions. 

There is a deeper problem with such a pledge, however. A ‘‘no first use’’ pledge 

can never be verified or enforced. Any state pledging a ‘‘no first use’’ policy—including the United States—can, therefore, always change its mind and renege on such 

a promise in the midst of a conflict.15 This means that an adversary, knowing this, 

may simply discount the value and scope of the ‘‘no first use’’ policy, in which case 

serious questions arise about the purpose and significance of the policy. What is the 

point of such a policy if an adversary acts as if it is irrelevant? 

Or, worse, an adversary may actually believe the policy and judge it sufficiently 

necessary or attractive in the midst of a war to take steps that compromise the most 

important interests of the United States or its allies without resorting to nuclear 

weapons. In such an eventuality, the United States will likely be pressed—including 

by its allies whose vital interests are the most likely to be at stake—to use nuclear 

weapons. In other words, an opponent that actually takes such a pledge at face 

value may be incentivized to create the very conditions that would provoke nuclear 

weapons use by the United States. 

Thus a ‘‘no first use’’ policy is likely either to be, at best, of marginal value or, 

at worst, to encourage the very conditions likely to prompt U.S. nuclear weapons 

employment. Accordingly, the United States should instead maintain ambiguity 

about the conditions under which it would use nuclear weapons, but emphasize that 

such a step would only be considered under ‘‘extreme circumstances’’ that impinge 

on the vital interests of itself or its allies. Thus U.S. adversaries and allies alike 

will continue to understand that the United States would only employ such terrible 

weapons under the most severe challenge, but that an adversary can never hope to 

‘‘end run’’ U.S. restraint with respect to its nuclear forces to take advantage of the 

United States or its allies. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What importance do our NATO allies place in the presence of 

forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe? Would they be satisfied with the nuclear force structure we currently offer our Asian allies? 
166 

16 NATO, Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (May 20, 2012). 17For further development of these recommendations and the underlying problems they seek 

to address, see Colby and Solomon, ‘‘Facing Russia: Conventional Defence and Deterrence in Europe.’’ 18For further development of this proposal, see Elbridge Colby, ‘‘Step Up to Stand Down: The 

United States, NATO, and Dissuading Russian Aggression,’’ Foreign Affairs, August 13, 2015, 

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/poland/2015-08-13/step-stand-down. 

Mr. COLBY. Given the size of and the diversity of perspectives among memberstates within the Atlantic Alliance, there is substantial variation within NATO regarding the value of U.S. nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe. On the 

whole, member-states farther to the east that perceive themselves as more under 

threat, particularly from Russia, tend to place greater value on these weapons than 

those farther west. Moreover, there tends to be a divide within European governments and populaces, with ministries of defense and security-conscious political 

leaderships emphasizing the importance of such weapons, and ministries of foreign 

affairs (especially their disarmament bureaus) and disarmament-minded political 

leaderships underlining their demerits. This disagreement resulted in the somewhat 

mixed message about these weapons reflected in the 2012 NATO Deterrence and 

Defense Posture Review, which affirmed that NATO is ‘‘a nuclear alliance’’ but referred to the forward-deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons only in the context of 

expressing a willingness to reduce them in the context of mutual reductions with 

Russia.16

On the whole, however, it is worth observing that member-states have agreed that 

U.S. nuclear weapons should continue to be forward-deployed in Europe, testifying 

to their value. Moreover, calls for withdrawing these weapons have quieted and 

have fallen in credibility in light of Russia’s threatening behavior and rhetoric since 

early 2014. 

U.S. allies that perceive themselves as threatened by Russia have made it clear 

that they would not judge a force posture that the United States has pursued in 

Asia as attractive. While much of the value of U.S. forward-deployed weapons is 

symbolic, this symbolism is nonetheless important as it gives concrete evidence of 

the nuclear link between the United States and NATO/Europe and demonstrates 

the collective involvement of the Alliance member-states in the nuclear mission. Indeed, in point of fact, key U.S. allies in Asia, particularly in South Korea and Japan, 

are increasingly questioning the suitability of the U.S. model of extended nuclear 

deterrence in their region. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How would you recommend the United States structure our 

forces to respond to Russia’s nuclear deescalation policy? How could the United 

States respond without developing new tactical nuclear capabilities? 

Mr. COLBY. While I strongly recommend that the United States modernize and 

adapt its nuclear forces to enable discriminate and relatively controlled employment, 

this is by no means the only important step needed to deal with Russia’s de-escalation and broader military strategy. The nuclear element is the coup de grace of 

Moscow’s strategy—but it only makes sense if Russia can use it to terminate a conflict to reap gains. To do this, Moscow needs conventional and irregular forces able 

to gain positions which can then be locked in through a nuclear ‘‘escalate to deescalate’’ strategy. 

To deal with this problem, the United States and NATO as a whole should focus 

on substantially strengthening their conventional military posture in Eastern Europe, including by forward-deploying more substantial forces in the Baltic States 

and Poland, strengthening Allied forces’ ability to more effectively contest Russian 

anti-access/area denial capabilities, and enabling U.S. surge and reinforcement 

forces.17 It is worth emphasizing that at least some of these recommended steps, 

particularly the substantial reinforcement of the Baltic states, could be coupled with 

arms control proposals to Moscow.18 At the same time, eastern NATO memberstates should focus on strengthening civil order capabilities to make it more difficult 

for Russia to create or exploit local conditions through the use of ‘‘little green men,’’ 

disinformation, and the like. 

Together, a discriminate nuclear posture, a more formidable conventional deterrent, and improved civil capabilities will present Moscow with a less inviting target 

than is the case today, and will accordingly make NATO safer. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Your plans all assume constant funding of 4–5% of the defense 

budget over the next 30 years. Uncertain fiscal times beg the question: what would 

you do with less? How would your plans change with 10%, 30%, or 50% less funding? Asked another way, what is the least important part of your nuclear posture? 

Dr. BLECHMAN. The minimal deterrent that I advocate would not require more 

than 3 percent of the defense budget. By reducing the submarine buy to 8 or 10 
167 

boats, reducing the ICBM force from 400 to 300 missiles, making the minor improvements necessary to keep Minuteman effective into the 2040s, rather than replacing it with a new missile, withdrawing the tactical weapons from Europe and 

dismantling them, and cutting back current plans to modernize the nuclear infrastructure, I believe we can save a considerable amount of money that could be used 

to maintain the readiness and effectiveness of our conventional forces, and to invest 

in advanced technologies that can assure our continued conventional superiority. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What role do conventional strike capabilities play in U.S. deterrence and extended deterrence? What are our allies’ expectations about the weapons 

with which we will respond in the event that mutual defense is necessary? 

Dr. BLECHMAN. U.S. conventional strike capabilities are the central element in 

both our deterrent posture and in our capabilities to protect our allies from attacks—both in their perceptions and in fact. Although the allies see U.S. strategic 

nuclear forces as essential to deter nuclear attacks, they understand the primary 

threats to their security will come from conventional forces and the ability of their 

armed forces, combined with those of the U.S., to respond effectively to any such 

attack dissuades potential adversaries from even contemplating such actions. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Current policy states that the United States will respond in exceptional circumstances to non-nuclear attacks with nuclear weapons. Should the 

United States adopt a ‘‘no first use’’ policy, which would deemphasize the role that 

nuclear weapons play in our overall strategic posture? Would it help or hurt our 

interactions with other nuclear weapons states? 

Dr. BLECHMAN. Personally, I don’t believe that doctrinal statements are nearly as 

important as the actual capabilities and behavior of nations. Nonetheless, I believe 

the U.S. should adopt a policy that states that the only role of our nuclear weapons 

is to deter and, if necessary, to respond to a nuclear attack on ourselves or our allies. I believe this would strengthen our hand non-nuclear states and the Non-proliferation Treaty and would have no real effect on relations with nuclear weapon 

states. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What importance do our NATO allies place in the presence of 

forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe? Would they be satisfied with the nuclear force structure we currently offer our Asian allies? 

Dr. BLECHMAN. Prior to the Russian seizure of Crimea and intervention in Eastern Ukraine, many NATO allies were beginning to urge the removal of U.S. tactical 

nuclear weapons from Europe. Since then, however, and particularly in view of Russian threats and provocative military behavior in northern Europe, the members of 

NATO east of Germany, have put new emphasis on the need to maintain and even 

strengthen NATO’s tactical nuclear posture. This is irrational in my view, as these 

weapons serve no military purpose, would be unlikely to be used in any conflict (as 

the host nations—Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, and Italy—would have to authorize their aircraft crews to deliver them), and their deterrent effect is negligible 

compared to that provided by U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Still, one should expect 

considerable attention to be paid to these weapons at the NATO meeting in Warsaw 

in May and steps taken to re-energize attention paid to exercises and planning for 

these weapons. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How would you recommend the United States structure our 

forces to respond to Russia’s nuclear deescalation policy? How could the United 

States respond without developing new tactical nuclear capabilities? 

Dr. BLECHMAN. The United States should make clear that any nuclear use—whatever the launching vehicle, range of the weapon, or it yield—will be met with an 

at least comparable nuclear response from U.S. strategic (long-range) nuclear forces. 

There is no need, in my view, to match Russian tactical forces when our strategic 

capabilities are far greater than necessary to completely destroy Russia and thereby 

deter any nuclear attack. If desirable, during a crisis in Europe that seemed to be 

leading to a conflict, the U.S. could deploy nuclear capable of long-range bombers 

to bases in Europe to signal the Russians that we were prepared for such a conflict 

and that they should not consider any nuclear use. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Former Secretary of Defense Perry and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Andrew Weber recently wrote an op-ed calling on the president 

to cancel the planned acquisition of the Long-Range Standoff weapon, because it 

would be destabilizing. Do you believe this weapon is needed? Why or why not? 

Dr. BLECHMAN. I believe the U.S. should give a high priority to developing and 

rapidly producing the new long-range stealthy, penetrating bomber. This alone 

should ensure the ability of the bomber leg of the triad to carry out its mission for 

years to come. Although I don’t see why developing the LRSO would be ‘‘destabilizing,’’ I simply do not see a need for it at present. Moreover, given the huge cost 

of the nuclear modernization program already underway, the LRSO is an 

unaffordable luxury. I would keep this program in a very small research program 
168 

until such time, if ever, the DOD determines that even the new bomber is unable 

to penetrate Russian air defenses. If that is the case already, then we should not 

be developing a penetrating bomber. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Would you favor continuing to press for potential nuclear weapons reductions negotiations with Russia, even though Russia is not in compliance 

with its INF Treaty obligations? Why or why not? 

Dr. BLECHMAN. I would continue to press Russia to comply with the INF Treaty 

by not conducting any further tests of the missile that apparently violated its term 

and, particularly, by not deploying any of those missiles. If the Russians do not violate the treaty again, I would press for renewed negotiations to reduce nuclear 

arms—to cover both long-range and shorter range weapons. We lived for many years 

with a clear Russian violation of the ABM Treaty and still continued to negotiate 

with them to reduce nuclear forces, to both sides benefit. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Your plans all assume constant funding of 4–5% of the defense 

budget over the next 30 years. Uncertain fiscal times beg the question: what would 

you do with less? How would your plans change with 10%, 30%, or 50% less funding? Asked another way, what is the least important part of your nuclear posture? 

Dr. MOUNT. That funding for the current nuclear modernization program will be 

cut from its requested levels approaches a certainty. The overwhelming trend in 

Major Defense Acquisition Programs over the last several decades is that the military services do not receive appropriations to fund the requested number of units. 

Such was the fate of the Zumwalt destroyer, the Comanche helicopter, the B–2 

stealth bomber, the Seawolf attack submarine, and several other programs. In all 

likelihood, this pattern will repeat itself in the Ohio Replacement Program, the 

Long Range Strike Bomber, and for other Air Force procurement programs. To expect otherwise in a period of intense fiscal pressure is simply unrealistic. As a result, the United States should accept that the current modernization plans are 

unsustainable and pare them back. Only prudent cuts that are planned in advance 

can ensure that U.S. Strategic Command can plan and execute a rational strategy 

for nuclear deterrence. If the United States does not review and limit current plans 

at an early date, it is likely that the services will be forced to hurriedly modify nuclear targeting plans and operational concepts in order to keep up with cuts imposed 

by the U.S. Congress. In short, nuclear strategy would be heavily influenced by 

whichever program happens to face cost overruns, a circumstance which is certainly 

not in the national interest. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Dr. Mount, I fear that future U.S. nuclear posture, especially 

with the recommendations in this report that the U.S. develop new tactical nuclear 

capabilities, rather than deter the small number of states who fear U.S. conventional dominance will instead push a much larger number of states to seek nuclear 

weapons which they see as militarily useful. Can you speak about the current state 

of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and what the strategic environment might 

look like if current non-weapons states begin to withdraw from the NPT, due in part 

to a perceived non-commitment to disarmament? 

Dr. MOUNT. I share your concern. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 

stands at a critical and precarious juncture. A number of countries—many of which 

are allies—are seriously concerned that the United States is not living up to its commitment under Article VI of the treaty to make concerted progress toward a world 

without nuclear weapons. Whether or not one believes that this goal is useful or viable in the foreseeable future, the centrality of the Nonproliferation Treaty to the stability of the international system requires that the United States makes credible efforts in this direction. There are a number of steps that the United States can take 

in this regard without dropping below the aggregate strategic warhead limits of the 

New START treaty. For example, the national laboratories could renovate facilities 

to meet Safeguards By Design (SBD) standards and construct new facilities in a 

way that facilitates international inspection. The Departments of Energy, Defense, 

and State can compile datasets on nuclear materials and weapons and lodge this 

data in encrypted form with the IAEA or with allies or can selectively release this 

data publicly. And the Department of Defense can limit the numbers and types of 

dual-capable weapons systems. In these ways, the United States can show that it 

is working towards a verifiable nuclear disarmament treaty without dismantling 

warheads. In addition, the United States can and should continue to press Russia 

to make further verifiable reductions in both countries’ stockpiles. The international 

movement on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons has garnered global interest in a ban on nuclear weapons. If successful, a ban treaty might well undermine the Nonproliferation Treaty, as many countries would come to see a ban 

as an alternative forum for governing the nuclear world. At worst, this could precipitate the withdrawal of countries from the NPT, who believe that the nuclear 

weapons states’ (NWS) abrogation of their commitments to disarm thereby relieves 
169 

non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) of their obligations not to proliferate. If this 

came to pass, it would seriously damage the longstanding U.S. effort to prevent the 

spread of nuclear weapons. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What role do conventional strike capabilities play in U.S. deterrence and extended deterrence? What are our allies’ expectations about the weapons 

with which we will respond in the event that mutual defense is necessary? 

Dr. MOUNT. Nuclear weapons are poor instruments for defense. In the event a 

U.S. ally faces subconventional efforts to destabilize their government or an invasion from regular forces, the United States and the ally would hope and expect to 

resist that invasion with conventional forces. At the nuclear level, we would face a 

choice between employing a nuclear weapon against enemy troops on allied territory 

(which would likely cause widespread casualties of allied civilians) or to engage in 

a countervalue strike against the enemy homeland (which would expand the geographic scope of the engagement, thereby increasing the risk to neighboring states 

and to the U.S. homeland). As a result, U.S. allies have a right to expect and a responsibility to assist the United States in planning and prepositioning forces for a 

conventional defense of their territory. Though this might incur serious human and 

financial costs, these almost certainly pale in comparison to the increased risk of 

nuclear exchange if we succumb to the idea that reliance on nuclear weapons is necessary and sufficient to defend our allies. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Current policy states that the United States will respond in exceptional circumstances to non-nuclear attacks with nuclear weapons. Should the 

United States adopt a ‘‘no first use’’ policy, which would deemphasize the role that 

nuclear weapons play in our overall strategic posture? Would it help or hurt our 

interactions with other nuclear weapons states? 

Dr. MOUNT. I believe the United States could safely adopt a ‘‘no first use’’ policy 

without deleteriously affecting our ability to maintain deterrence. The only circumstances in which the United States would contemplate the first use of nuclear 

weapons are if a close ally faced an existential threat that could not be halted with 

conventional means. Given the military capabilities of the U.S. and its allies, this 

possibility is remote. If faced with an invasion, nuclear first use would be a desperate gambit with little hope that it could preserve the territorial integrity of an 

ally at acceptable cost. Neither a strike on allied territory nor one on enemy territory would be likely to compel an aggressor to cease an ongoing military option that 

stood a good chance of succeeding. The doubtful success of such a strike makes its 

execution less likely, which in turn decreases its deterrent utility. By issuing a commitment to abstain from first use of nuclear weapons, the United States would modestly stabilize any militarized dispute with a regional nuclear power and lower the 

risk of nuclear war. If necessary, a ‘‘no first use’’ policy could be revised later as 

conditions require. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What importance do our NATO allies place in the presence of 

forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe? Would they be satisfied with the nuclear force structure we currently offer our Asian allies? 

Dr. MOUNT. According to consistent reports in the unclassified press, the United 

States currently deploys about 180 B61 gravity bombs at a handful of bases located 

in select NATO countries. These forces reportedly operate a very low level of readiness and would take several weeks to activate, arm, and deploy. In any event, it 

is doubtful that a U.S. president would choose provide release authorization to an 

allied pilot in a tactical aircraft when several more prompt and survivable options 

exist in the U.S. force. If the weapons are not likely to be used, their power to assure allies and deter adversaries is correspondingly diminished. Moreover, Washington observers often overlook the differences of opinion within NATO regarding 

the presence of U.S nuclear weapons in Europe. A number of U.S. allies have voiced 

skepticism about the NATO nuclear mission and have suggested that the weapons 

be removed. As a result, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons is a low-level but 

unnecessary irritant to the alliance. As NATO states agreed in the Wales Summit 

Declaration of September, 2014, ‘‘The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of 

the Allies’’ (as opposed to nonstrategic nuclear forces). The weapons are a relic of 

the Cold War, when the United States faced an imminent threat of invasion by a 

numerically superior Soviet force. Today, the weapons serve little purpose. The 180 

weapons could be removed without deleterious effect to the U.S. deterrent posture 

or to allied cohesion. As a result, the B61 Life Extension Program and the program 

to create nuclear-capable variant of the F–35 Lightning II are simply not worth the 

expense, which could better be directed to ensuring that the services can adequately 

fund programs that are critical to deterrence operations. 
170 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How would you recommend the United States structure our 

forces to respond to Russia’s nuclear deescalation policy? How could the United 

States respond without developing new tactical nuclear capabilities? 

Dr. MOUNT. Russia’s policy of nuclear ‘‘deescalation’’ is intended as a means of offsetting American conventional superiority. By issuing incredible nuclear threats, 

Russia’s leadership hopes to deter the United States from bringing the superior 

power of its armed forces to bear. Developing, deploying, or using tactical nuclear 

capabilities would only prove to Russia that it could successfully shift the strategic 

competition onto more advantageous grounds, and encourage it to behave more recklessly at the nuclear level. The United States should disabuse Russia of the notion 

that its irresponsible rhetoric can alter our resolve to defend our allies with conventional power and reverse any gains that Russia hopes to secure. With the time, attention, and resources it would take to build new nuclear capabilities, the United 

States and its allies should rededicate themselves to improving conventional deterrence. U.S. officials should consistently maintain that the use of nuclear weapons 

can never be deescalatory and reiterate the commitment to defend the territorial integrity of our allies in any eventuality. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Former Secretary of Defense Perry and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Andrew Weber recently wrote an op-ed calling on the president 

to cancel the planned acquisition of the Long-Range Standoff weapon, because it 

would be destabilizing. Do you believe this weapon is needed? Why or why not? 

Dr. MOUNT. I do not believe the Long-Range Standoff weapon is a necessary system for the maintenance of nuclear deterrence or for the assurance of our allies. It 

will be a major challenge to fund nuclear modernization. To protect core systems, 

we should minimize expenses on extraneous ones. By the time the LRSO is ready 

to come online, we should already have a next-generation penetrating bomber that 

can deliver similar yields from locations in theater. Additionally, the Joint Air-toSurface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM–ER) recently entered service and 

is sufficient to hold most targets at risk; those targets that require a nuclear yield 

are held at risk with ballistic nuclear missiles, launched from land or from sea. Furthermore, information released to the public suggests that the program runs the 

risk of violating a longstanding pledge of presidents from both parties not to procure 

new nuclear capabilities. To the extent that the LRSO improves upon the ALCM’s 

range, stealth, and accuracy, it would reverse this policy. This, in turn, would cause 

tension with certain allies and further damage to the nonproliferation regime. In 

short, the system is simply not required and not worth the diplomatic or fiscal costs 

of developing it. We should retain the option to procure the system in the future 

but cancel the current program. Making these kinds of difficult decisions is necessary to keep from falling into a new nuclear arms race. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Would you favor continuing to press for potential nuclear weapons reductions negotiations with Russia, even though Russia is not in compliance 

with its INF Treaty obligations? Why or why not? 

Dr. MOUNT. Yes. The Russian violation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty 

is a serious challenge to the arms control regime. It should make us highly skeptical 

of Russia’s ability to negotiate in good faith on arms control. The United States 

should undertake a whole-of-government approach to ensure that Russia does not 

realize strategic gains from its violation. However, Russia is rigorously and consistently abiding by the terms of the New START agreement. Recently, the two sides 

exchanged their 10,000th notification as required under the terms of the treaty. 

These notifications are a major source of information on the Russian nuclear arsenal 

and help to stabilize the relationship even when other lines of communication are 

endangered by poor relations. Furthermore, the United States retains very real concerns over the size and structure of the Russian nuclear arsenal. An agreement that 

limits the number and variety of Russia’s tactical nuclear systems or places greater 

constraints on deployed strategic systems could very well be in the national interest. 

Though the Russians have so far refused the Obama administration’s offers to negotiate along these lines, the offer should remain on the table. Throughout the Cold 

War, U.S. presidents of both parties continued to press the Soviet Union to engage 

in mutual verifiable arms reductions and these efforts helped to promote deterrence 

and stabilize an acrimonious relationship. As we move into a period of increased 

geopolitical competition, arms control becomes more important, not less. Arms control is not a reward for a stable world; it is a means of building one. 

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