The

Letort Papers

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from you.
Letort Paper

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES IN IRAQ, 

2003-09:

A CASE OF OPERATIONAL SURPRISE

AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE

Andrew Smith

April 2011

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

expressed in a private academic capacity. They neither represent, 

nor are endorsed by, the Australian Army, the Australian Department of Defence, or the Commonwealth of Australia. They 

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report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.
ii

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ISBN 1-58487-488-0
iii

FOREWORD

“Surprise” is a familiar term in military writings: 

the achievement of tactical surprise has such obvious 

benefi ts that it is enshrined in the military doctrine of 

most nations. Surprises that emerge in tactics, however, can also operate at the strategic and operational 

levels. These surprises are particularly dangerous, 

because they can test the relevance and adaptability 

of military forces and the “institutional” defense establishments that create, develop, and sustain them. 

A military establishment that is too slow to recognize 

and respond to such surprises places its nation’s interests at grave risk. In the bipolar strategic environment of the Cold War, deep knowledge of a known 

adversary reduced the likelihood of such surprises. 

The same is not true now. This monograph thus 

comes at an important time, as Western nations contemplate major reductions in defense spending with 

consequent limitations on force structure. The range 

of enemy capabilities that a force will be able to match, 

qualitatively and quantitatively, will become smaller; 

hence the potential for operational and strategic surprise will increase. 

In this monograph, Brigadier Andrew Smith uses 

the improvised explosive device threat as it manifested itself in Iraq between 2003 and 2009 as a case study 

of such a surprise and how defense establishments 

responded to it. He argues that, although tactical in 

itself, this threat posed an operational and strategic 

threat in a modern “war of discretion” that demanded institutional responses from both the U.S. and 

Australian institutional militaries, including major 

equipment, training, and budgetary changes within 
iv

time frames that circumvented the normal peacetime 

force development cycles of those countries. There are 

disappointments in the way both countries met this 

challenge. A key conclusion from this analysis is the 

critical role of strategic leadership in recognizing the 

scale of surprise and in forcing the necessary institutional response. At a time when budgets will not allow surprise to be addressed by maintaining large and 

technically diverse forces at high readiness, the ability 

to recognize and respond adroitly to operational and 

strategic surprise may be a critical requirement for a 

modern defense establishment.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute 
v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ANDREW SMITH is a Brigadier in the Australian 

Army. He is currently assigned as the Director of the 

Combined Planning Group within the Headquarters 

of United States Central Command. In that capacity, he directs a team of international offi cers from 30 

countries in the preparation of strategic-level political-military analyses and assessments. As a regular 

military offi cer with over 30 years of experience, Brigadier Smith has commanded army units and formations up to brigade level and has served a number of 

operational tours, including several in which he was 

responsible for dealing with the threat of improvised 

explosive devices. In a staff capacity, he has extensive 

experience in the force development fi eld. He has also 

served as an instructor at the U.S. Army Command 

and General Staff College. Brigadier Smith’s research 

interests include institutional responses to unconventional security threats and weapons law, and he has 

published journal articles on those subjects. Brigadier 

Smith holds a B.A. with Honours in English, a Master 

of Defence Studies, and a Ph.D. in Politics.
vi
SUMMARY

The threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 

that has emerged in confl icts in Iraq and Afghanistan 

since 2003 is a contemporary example of conventional 

militaries being confronted with a tactical surprise 

with operational—if not strategic—implications. 

Those implications can necessitate “institutional” responses to avoid strategic defeat in what, for many 

countries, are “wars of discretion.” Operational surprise, as defi ned in this examination, differs from 

strategic shocks as described by Nathan Freier, and 

the necessary responses are distinct from the military 

adaptations considered by John Nagl. The paper contends that the 6-year evolution of the IED experience 

from 2003 until 2009 constitutes a complete cycle of 

surprise and response, of which the most signifi cant 

part is the institutional response. A case study of this 

experience illustrates how conventional military establishments recognize and respond to such surprises, 

with a particular focus on the experience, respectively, 

of the U.S. and Australian defense establishments. 

This case study reveals that institutional response is 

triggered by recognition of the surprise, which then 

cues organizational, equipment, training and doctrine, research and development, industrial, funding/

budgetary, and policy actions. 

Because the IED problem has mostly been a phenomenon of the land environment, this examination 

tends to emphasize the responses of armies, but the 

lessons have more general application. This paper contends that both the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 

and the Australian Defence Organisation (ADO) could 

have responded quicker than they did: contemporary 

defense establishments, it seems, may not cope well 

vii
viii

with such surprises. Despite this, the DoD demonstrated impressive agility in its response, especially 

for such a large organization, while the ADO was curiously slow to make the necessary institutional adaptations. In both cases, the role of senior leadership was 

key to mobilizing an effective response. In a fi scally 

constrained future that lacks the certainty of bipolar, 

state-on-state threats, the ability to recognize and respond quickly to operational and strategic surprise 

may be the decisive characteristic of national defense 

establishments.
1

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES IN IRAQ, 

2003-09:

A CASE OF OPERATIONAL SURPRISE

AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, nations have found themselves confronted with unexpected threats that place 

them at a fatal military disadvantage. These situations 

are an extension of the more general military notion 

of surprise—a familiar military term that is enshrined 

as a principle of war in the military doctrine of many 

countries.1

 Sometimes the source of these surprises is 

the application of a completely new technology; more 

often, it is a change in tactics or behavior. German 

submarine operations in World War I and World War 

II are an example. Even in World War I, submarines 

were not new and Germany’s possession of them not 

a secret, but their use in the Atlantic shipping lanes 

threatened the Allies’ strategic supply lines and their 

ability to sustain a war effort.2

To avoid defeat, agile responses are needed to negate the disadvantage imposed by a new threat or capability. Returning to the example of the World War 

II Atlantic submarine menace, this involved the adoption of escorted convoy tactics,3

 increases to aerial 

maritime patrol coverage, improvements to detection 

technologies such as sonar and radar, the development 

of the acoustic homing torpedo, and the increased capacity of the shipbuilding industry to compensate for 

losses.4

 Signifi cantly, not all of these responses were 

purely military: industrial mobilization, for example, 

could be considered a national response.
2

Nations and their military establishments have 

shown differing levels of agility in responding to 

these surprises. Before an entity can respond, however, it must recognize that it has been surprised; that 

is, it must understand that familiar capabilities and accustomed reactions may not secure success. With that 

realization, the entity can begin to address the challenges of deciding how to respond, and of organizing 

and executing that response.

Nations use their military power for political reasons. In democracies, government decisions to commit and sustain military forces depend on judgments 

that, among other things, their employment has suffi cient popular support. This is particularly important 

in wars of discretion—those confl icts in which governments have some choice in whether, and to what 

extent, they become and remain involved.5

 In such 

confl icts, popular support can be a volatile commodity and may decline if the population believes that 

the cost of military involvement is too great for the 

benefi ts in prospect, especially in terms of casualties, 

or that a costly commitment is dragging on without a 

reasonable prospect of successful resolution. If a lack 

of popular support, and consequently of political will, 

leads to the withdrawal of military forces before a confl ict is satisfactorily won, the outcome could amount 

to strategic defeat without suffering decisive tactical defeat. High casualties and long duration could 

therefore constitute a defeat-threshold for a modern 

military, especially one wielded by a democracy, by 

prompting decisions to terminate its involvement in a 

confl ict.6 If this proposition is accepted, then it follows 

that military surprises can threaten strategic defeat 

if they cannot be overcome before they cause casualties above or prolong a military commitment beyond 
3

the national tolerance for those things. The ability to 

respond to surprises in an agile and effective way is 

always critical to military success. In an environment 

in which political support for military commitment is 

fragile, that ability takes on a special importance for 

modern democracies. 

This Letort Paper argues that the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that has emerged in 

confl icts in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 is a contemporary example of conventional militaries being 

confronted with a tactical surprise with operational—

if not strategic—implications, necessitating “institutional” responses to avoid strategic defeat. The manuscript contends that this 6-year evolution, from 2003 

until 2009, constitutes a complete cycle of surprise and 

response. A case study of this experience illustrates 

how conventional military establishments recognize 

and respond to such surprises, with a particular focus 

on the experience, respectively, of the U.S. and Australian defense establishments. Because the IED problem manifests itself mostly in the land environment, 

that examination tends to emphasize the responses of 

armies, but the lessons have a more general application. The paper will contend that both the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Australian Defence 

Organisation (ADO) could have responded quicker 

than they did. Despite this, the DoD demonstrated 

impressive agility in its response, especially for such a 

large organization, while the ADO was slower to begin making the institutional adaptations it eventually 

found necessary.
4

OPERATIONAL SURPRISE AND RESPONSE

Surprise is a familiar concept in the theory of 

warfare. Achieving it is set as a key objective in most 

countries’ doctrines. “It [surprise] lies more or less 

at the foundation of all undertakings. . . .”7

 Surprise 

is seen most frequently at the tactical level, but operational and strategic surprises also occur. Recent 

writings have posited a similar concept of strategicshock to describe an unanticipated turn of events that 

renders previous strategic planning obsolete or irrelevant: the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 

and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) 

are examples of these events.8 Determining the level 

of surprise (tactical, operational, or strategic), or the 

demarcation between surprise and shock, could be 

the subject of its own debate: for the purposes of this 

paper, surprise is considered to function at the level at 

which it compels a response. Tactical surprise has tactical consequences and necessitates a tactical response 

that is within the remit of the tactical commander.9

Operational surprise threatens operational vulnerabilities and requires a response beyond the resources 

of the tactical commander. Operational responses can 

include a redistribution of forces within the theater, 

the release and employment of theater reserves, and 

other decisions within the remit of the operational 

commander. They may also necessitate reaching back 

into strategic resources and capabilities. In the latter 

situations, surprise begins to impinge on the strategic 

level, requiring a strategic response. 

A surprise and its successful response constitute 

a cycle that begins when the surprise emerges, putting the surprised force at a disadvantage by negating 

some aspect of its capability. The cycle continues as 
5

the surprised force responds: if it does so successfully, 

it nullifi es that disadvantage and regains its previous 

relative capability. At the operational and strategic 

levels, the response itself is a complex activity that 

consists of:

• Recognition, whereby the surprised force becomes aware that it has been surprised and 

must devise a response.

• Tactical response, by which tactical commanders respond as best they can with the means 

available to them. The impact of surprise will 

tend to be obvious at the tactical level, and any 

competent tactical commander will attempt to 

respond. For this reason, tactical responses are 

not analyzed deeply here.

• Institutional response, which engages (potentially) the full resources of the national military organization to respond comprehensively. 

This can involve a partial transformation of the 

force. Elements of the institutional response include:

— Organization. This can include changes to 

force structure, such as the establishment of 

new units or agencies.

— Equipment. This includes the identifi cation 

and supply of different equipment to support 

new capabilities.

— Training and doctrine. At the institutional 

level, this involves developing new training 

and doctrine to address the threat posed by 

the surprise and delivering this systematically 

through the routine “raise, train, and, sustain” 

process of the national defense apparatus. This 

is particularly important when the threat posed 

by the surprise is assessed to be an enduring 
6

feature of the security environment rather than 

an aberration.

— Research and development (R&D). National 

R&D capacity may need to be engaged to develop technological solutions to surprises, or to 

conduct the operational analysis (OA) needed 

to devise improved tactics, techniques, and 

procedures.

— Industry. Manufacture of unanticipated quantities of special equipment or of consumable 

supplies may require the development of new 

industrial capacity or the direction of existing 

capacity contrary to normal market infl uences.

— Funding. The allocation of unobligated funding may be necessary to support the response 

elements identifi ed above, especially for such 

equipment acquisitions and operating costs.

— Policy. All of the foregoing can constitute a policy response if their implementation involves 

a de facto departure from existing policy. This 

response may be stated explicitly in published 

policy pronouncements, or it can be implicit in 

the redirection of force structure, equipment, or 

funding priorities. In the latter situation a policy 

response might evolve incrementally, through 

a series of pragmatic management decisions by 

military leaders, defense offi cials, and industry 

leaders, rather than through a single conscious 

decision of a government.

THE CONTEMPORARY IED EXPERIENCE

IEDs are not new. The use of unattended explosive 

devices of one sort or another was a common feature 

of 20th century warfare. Terrorist bombs have been 
7

a reality since the 17th century.10 IEDs have been a 

particular feature of insurgencies since the mid-20th 

century.11 Landmines were a standard feature of conventional warfare, in both practice and doctrine, from 

World War II until an arms limitation process began 

in the 1990s.12 The British, U.S., and Australian Armies 

confronted these explosive hazards, in the form of nuisance landmines,13 booby traps, and true IEDs, in their 

operational experiences of Vietnam and Northern Ireland from the 1960s. More recently, British and U.S. 

forces encountered minefi elds in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, while Australia contributed military 

experts to humanitarian demining efforts in various 

parts of the world consistently since the late-1980s.14

Modern militaries that did not face these threats directly had full visibility of their existence and their effects on other countries’ forces. 

In the years leading up to the 2003 Iraq War, Western military establishments began to acknowledge a 

probable shift in the nature of the confl icts they would 

encounter in the future, and a need to adapt in anticipation of that shift. Debate in professional journals 

began to recognize the impact of factors such as urbanization, the rise of nonstate actors and the dominance of the United States and its wealthier Western 

allies in conventional military operations. Well before 

the emergence of the dangerous insurgencies in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, military thinkers expected adversaries on future battlefi elds to present asymmetric 

threats that would negate that dominance.15 Despite 

this apparent intellectual readiness to accept that new 

problems might be lurking, as well as experience that 

showed that things like IEDs were within the repertoire of potential adversaries, neither the U.S., Australian, nor United Kingdom (UK) militaries commenced 
8

operations in Iraq in 2003 with a mature counter-IED 

(CIED) capability; nor, apparently, did they anticipate 

the emergence of a signifi cant IED threat. In the U.S. 

case, this has been criticized formally:

DoD was aware of the threat posed by mines and 

improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in low-intensity 

confl icts and of the availability of mine-resistant vehicles years before insurgent actions began in Iraq in 

2003. Yet DoD did not develop requirements for, fund, 

or acquire MRAP (mine resistant ambush-protected)-

type vehicles for low-intensity confl icts that involved 

mines and IEDs. As a result, the Department entered 

into operations in Iraq without having taken available 

steps to acquire technology to mitigate the known 

mine and IED risk to soldiers and Marines.16

DATA SOURCES

For sound reasons of operational security, most 

national defense organizations limit the public release 

of information on current operations. This complicates 

open-source research into emerging operational phenomena, such as the contemporary IED experience. 

Key sources of data on IED casualties are U.S. DoD 

media releases.17 These announce fatalities among personnel assigned to operations, including, in most cases, the cause of death. These data have been collected 

and processed for Iraq for the period May 1, 2003, the 

end of major combat operations, until June 30, 2008. 

This data set provides attributable information on the 

cause of U.S. fatalities, but has certain limitations that 

must be acknowledged:

• It is limited to U.S. DoD personnel and does 

not include contractors or personnel from other 

Coalition countries.
9

• It relates to fatalities only: details of nonfatal 

casualties are not disclosed. Conclusions about 

the effectiveness of IEDs and countermeasures 

could therefore be distorted if fatalities are not 

proportional to nonfatal incidents.

• The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) stopped disclosing the cause of death of its combat fatalities in 2004.18 USMC IED fatalities in Iraq are, 

therefore, underreported from that point on, 

introducing unreliability in the data if those 

fatalities are not proportional to those suffered 

by the other U.S. services.

The restriction of the Defenselink data to U.S. fatalities only is not a signifi cant defect for the purposes 

of this paper, which examines only U.S. and Australian behavior specifi cally, and good data are available 

on fatalities from Australia.19 Finally, the reliability of 

the Defenselink fi gures is supported by the fact that 

they are generally consistent with summary statistics 

available occasionally from offi cial sources, such as 

Congressional Research Service reports,20 and detailed 

statistics available from unoffi cial sources, such as the 

“Iraq Coalition Casualty Count.”21 Other data sources 

include statements by offi cials, reported in the media 

or in U.S. and Australian government media releases 

and transcripts, and governmental reports, such as 

Congressional or Parliamentary Committee proceedings.

U.S. EXPERIENCE IN IRAQ

President George W. Bush’s “Mission Accomplished” declaration on board the USS Abraham Lincoln on May 1, 2003, has come to symbolize the end 
10

of the shock-and-awe maneuver phase of the current 

Iraq confl ict, in which the forces of the United States 

and its allies enjoyed a swift and predictable victory 

against the conventional forces of Iraq, suffering relatively few casualties.22 The insurgency that was to 

develop in the succeeding months, however, would 

soon cause a steady climb in the U.S. casualty toll 

and belie the “Mission Accomplished” assertion. The 

United States has maintained over 100,000 personnel 

on the ground in Iraq (who are therefore subject to IED 

hazards) through early 2010. The unquestioned U.S. 

leadership role in the Coalition in Iraq, combined with 

the administration’s political equities in that confl ict, 

effectively limited its discretion in the size of its commitment, or in the degree of risk it must accept—as the 

Coalition leaders, U.S. forces had to do the business in 

Iraq, and were therefore exposed to adversaries’ offensive tactics. 

The fi rst reported U.S. IED fatality in Iraq after 

“Mission Accomplished” occurred on June 28, 2003.23

The monthly total of IED fatalities climbed steadily 

from then. In August and September 2003, IEDs were 

responsible for more U.S. combat fatalities than the 

combined totals for direct fi re weapons (small arms 

and rocket-propelled grenades [RPGs]) and indirect 

fi re, the methods that had, historically, caused the 

majority of battle casualties. Figure 1 illustrates the 

increase in IED fatalities and the reversal in fatality 

cause trends that occurred over this period (that is, 

IEDs went from a minor to the major cause of fatalities). By late-2003, monthly IED fatalities were double 

those of direct and indirect fi re weapons. To adapt the 

language of epidemiology, this period (October 2003) 

can be identifi ed as the index event of the IED surprise: that is, the point at which it is possible to prove 
11

empirically that a new phenomenon is at work on the 

battlefi eld, and from which the development of, and 

response to, that phenomenon can be measured.24

When monthly U.S. IED fatalities are charted out 

over the entire sample period (until June 2008), IED 

fatalities are seen to continue to increase over the next 

year, with signifi cant spikes associated with major 

insurgent offensives up until 2007 (Figure 2).25 From 

late-2007, U.S. IED fatalities began a sustained decline 

until, by mid-2008, monthly totals had returned to 

mid-2003 levels. Over the course of this evolution, the 

IED threat exposed a number of gaps in the capabilities 

of Coalition forces in Iraq, ranging from intelligence 

processes, through detection methods and protective 

technologies, to the medical capacity to treat injuries.26

Figure 1. U.S. Battle Fatalities in Iraq by Cause, 

May-December 2003.27
12

Figure 2. Monthly U.S. IED Fatalities in Iraq, May 

2003-September 2008.28

One of the most signifi cant aspects of the growth 

in U.S. IED fatalities in Iraq is that it was incurred over 

a sustained period by a military that was, by most 

quantitative and qualitative measures, among the best 

in the world. Despite this superiority, the U.S. Defense establishment, collectively, took years to bring 

the threat under control. This fact is perhaps the most 

stunning evidence of the level of surprise involved.29

The above-mentioned point notwithstanding, before drawing any conclusions about the effectiveness 

of U.S. CIED measures as a reason for the eventual 

decline in IED fatalities, it must be acknowledged that 

IEDs were a weapon employed in the context of an 

insurgency. Consequently, variations in IED incident 

rates, and hence fatalities, can be attributed to changes 

in the intensity of the insurgency overall and the effectiveness of U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts 

generally, as well as changes in the effectiveness of 

CIED measures specifi cally. Changes in capability and 

tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) designed 

to work across all aspects of the insurgency (such as 
13

improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR] capacity and better intelligence fusion), 

would be expected to yield signifi cant results against 

its weapon of choice.

THE U.S. RESPONSE 

Recognition. 

The U.S. response to the new IED problem in Iraq 

began quickly. The propensity of tactical commanders to recognize and respond quickly to new threats, 

within their means, was demonstrated and will not be 

discussed further.30 Recognition at higher levels also 

came early. Evidence of this is found in the emphatic 

language used by Commander of U.S. Central Command General John Abizaid in a memorandum sent 

to his strategic superiors (Secretary of Defense Donald 

Rumsfeld and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

General Richard Myers) in October 2003. Abizaid 

described a need for a “Manhattan-like project” to 

address the IED problem.31 The comparison with the 

Manhattan Project is signifi cant: the U.S. project to develop a useful nuclear weapon in World War II is a 

benchmark for scale, cost, complexity, and urgency in 

a military undertaking, one that needed to harness the 

full depth of the U.S. scientifi c and industrial capacity.32 Clearly, Abizaid saw in the IED problem a surprise of strategic proportions.

Institutional Response. 

The U.S. Defense establishment’s response to Abizaid’s request is evidence of recognition, at the strategic level, of a signifi cant new problem needing an 
14

institutional response. As that response evolved, it 

demonstrated all the elements noted above.

Organizational. 

The DoD’s initial response was organizational: 

the immediate formation by the U.S. Army of an ad 

hoc task force of 12 personnel (an organization—the 

Army IED Task Force), located in Washington, DC, to 

study and attempt to address the IED problem.33 This 

response was repeated over the ensuing years as the 

IED problem grew. In July 2004, the Army Task Force 

was upgraded to a Joint Integrated Process team (under Army leadership), moving the IED response into 

the Joint arena.34 In June 2005, the U.S. CIED apparatus was upgraded again into the Joint IED Defeat Task 

Force (JIEDD TF), under a specifi c DoD Directive, to 

further improve coordination of the DoD’s efforts.35

The status of the JIEDD TF was further elevated in December 2005 by the appointment of retired four-star 

General Montgomery “Monty” Meigs as its Director.36

Meigs’ selection was signifi cant in its own right. Some 

years previously, he had published a treatise on the 

scientifi c response to the submarine threats of World 

War II, in which he explained the evolution of a solution that, he concluded, consisted of optimized equipment and doctrine developed by close cooperation between the R&D community and operators.37 With this 

background, Meigs brought with him a sophisticated 

understanding of how urgent capability development 

efforts need to be coordinated.38 The JIEDD TF’s title 

was upgraded to the Joint IED Defeat Organization

(JIEDDO) in January 2006 by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England,39 and fi nally the new Organization was codifi ed by the issue of a specifi c Direc-
15

tive in February of that year.40 This entire evolution, 

from the fi rst U.S. IED fatality to the establishment of 

a statutory organization under four-star leadership, 

had taken 2.5 years (a few months less from the “index 

event” of October 2003).

Figure 3 maps these major milestones in the development of the U.S. CIED apparatus against fatality 

fi gures over time. This indicates a correlation between 

signifi cant spikes in fatalities and progressive escalations in the resourcing and profi le of CIED efforts. 

Figure 3 suggests that the U.S. Defense establishment 

was highly responsive to indications of a worsening 

problem and increased efforts to address it until it was 

brought under satisfactory control.

Figure 3. Selected U.S. and Australian Institutional 

Responses.
16

Another level of organizational response to the 

IED surprise is refl ected in the U.S. Army Engineer 

Branch’s adoption of a modular force structure approach in the period 2005-08.41 The Modular Engineer 

Force had been under development for some time, but 

the emergence of the IED threat led to the inclusion 

of specifi c unit roles and structures, in particular the 

Route Clearance Company, with specialized equipment and a focus on clearing IEDs and other explosive hazards from roads and infrastructure. Activation of these units was accelerated in response to the 

IED threat, with several being raised by mid-2006.42

Measured from the index event in late-2003, this represents an organizational and force structure response 

cycle of less than 3 years.

Equipment. 

At the operational and strategic levels, the U.S. 

equipment response to the IED surprise in Iraq was 

broad, ranging from improved body armor for personnel to quantitative and qualitative improvements 

in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 

capabilities. The greatest emphasis was in the areas of 

physical protection against IED effects, especially in 

the form of protected vehicles, and in prevention of 

IED detonations through the use of specialized electronic countermeasures (ECM). The need to make signifi cant acquisitions of new equipment, much of it not 

previously held in DoD inventories, supports the contention that the DoD was surprised by the emergence 

of the IED threat.
17

Vehicles. 

Almost from the beginning of the Iraqi IED problem, media reports characterized the devices as 

roadside bombs because of their use predominantly 

against Coalition vehicles. An early response to the 

problem was to employ vehicles with armored protection to increase personnel survivability against IED effects. This was particularly necessary for soft-skinned 

general purpose vehicles, in which the majority of 

movement was undertaken and which are essential 

for the effi cient conduct of routine functions such as 

personnel transportation, administrative movement, 

and logistic resupply. Initially, U.S. forces in Iraq had 

few general purpose vehicles with armored protection 

and even fewer vehicles that were optimized for the 

conduct of CIED activities.

Initial efforts to increase the number of protected 

vehicles available were, in effect, a tactical response, 

whereby deployed units improvised so-called hillbilly armor onto their vehicles using whatever methods were available.43 Offi cial attempts to increase the 

number of protected vehicles resorted to existing 

solutions for the most common soft-skinned vehicle, 

the ubiquitous high-mobility multipurpose wheeled 

vehicle (HMMWV). The requirement for signifi cant 

numbers of additional protected vehicles, as well as 

add-on armor kits (Armor Survivability Kits [ASKs]) 

to provide protection for existing HMMWVs, was 

passed by U.S. Central Command to the DoD in late2003. In response, the U.S. Army initiated contracts to 

produce additional vehicles and ASKs, which began 

to fl ow into the theater in November 2003.44 Demands 

for protected vehicles continued to emanate from the 

theater over the following years. By July 2005, Cen-
18

tral Command’s requirement for 9,727 up-armored 

HMMWVs for Iraq had been met.45 In all, a total of 

30,000 additional protected HMMWVs (either factorybuilt or fi tted with ASKs) are now available to the U.S. 

Armed Forces.46

Even when armored, however, the protection offered by the HMMWV was inadequate and a need for 

a better protected vehicle was soon identifi ed. This 

was prompted, in part, by the appearance of a more 

lethal type of IED in Iraq, using explosively formed 

projectile (EFP) technology.47 Deployed forces made 

an initial request for 1,169 vehicles in June 2005. The 

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle 

program was initiated in November 2006 to provide 

a solution to this requirement.48 MRAP orders increased, progressively, to more than 25,000, of which 

15,000 had been delivered into the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters by January 2010, at a cost of over U.S. 

$22 billion.49 An unprecedented personal focus from 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates since May 2007 has 

seen the program expanded and enormous priority 

given to funding, procuring, and delivering the vehicles to troops.50 The MRAP fl eet now encompasses 

5 vehicle types, including a lighter-weight variant, the 

MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle (MATV), to meet mobility 

requirements identifi ed through operational experience in Afghanistan.51

An interesting illustration of the surprise that the 

IED problem presented the United States from an 

equipment perspective is presented by the Interim 

Vehicle-Mounted Mine Detection (IVMMD) Project. 

This was a small project initiated in the late-1990s to 

provide an interim capability for U.S. Army combat 

engineers to deal with mine threats along routes.52 The 

equipment solution eventually devised consisted of 
19

a set of specialist vehicles, of South African design, 

capable of deploying detection technologies along 

a road, and dealing with any mines detected, from 

within vehicles that would provide the operators with 

excellent protection against explosive effects. As the 

name implies, the project was intended to provide an 

interim capability, involving a small fl eet of only 10 

systems, awaiting the development of a more permanent capability as part of the U.S. Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) project.53 Ironically, by late-2003, the 

FCS requirement (intended to replace, eventually, all 

combat vehicles in the U.S. Army) did not include a 

capability like the IVMMD, making the latter an orphan legacy capability that was limited to the initial 

tiny fl eet.54 The U.S. Army’s deliberate capability development process, in other words, did not anticipate 

a threat of the sort that IVMMD was meant to address; 

at least, it did not see any urgency in the need to counter such a threat. The IVMMD fl eet was deployed to 

Iraq in late-2003 in response to an operational requirement emanating from the theater as a result of the 

growing IED threat along routes (roadside bombs). 

Although not optimized for dealing with IEDs (it was 

a countermine system), this use of the IVMMD was an 

example of the deployment of the closest thing available to deal with a surprise.55

The MRAP solution demonstrates one characteristic that recurs across other aspects of the IED response: 

it is not new. The key element of the solution—the vehicles’ v-shaped hull, designed to dissipate explosive 

forces before they penetrate the crew space—was well 

known, having been developed to a high state of maturity by the South Africans more than 20 years before.56 A number of vehicles with this design feature 

were commercially available prior to 2003, and were 
20

even represented in the IVMMD fl eet. Any assessment 

of the adequacy of U.S. responsiveness in adopting 

this solution must take account of this fact.

A prominent feature of the MRAP program is the 

personal involvement of Secretary of Defense Robert 

Gates. Shortly after assuming offi ce in December 2006, 

Gates interceded to accelerate the program massively, 

directing that, “the MRAP program should be considered the highest priority Department of Defense acquisition program” and creating special management 

arrangements for it.57 He has remained engaged with 

the project ever since and has been a driving force behind not only the procurement of the vehicles, but their 

rushed delivery into the fi eld. Gates has directed unprecedented efforts to get the new equipment to users 

in theater rapidly, including the employment of scarce 

and expensive air transport to move vehicles virtually 

directly from manufacturing facilities to operational 

areas. Gates’s background is signifi cant: as a civilian 

and a newcomer to the most senior executive role in 

DoD, he had few equities in the established response. 

More importantly, recently he had been a member of 

President Bush’s Iraq Study Group, which undertook 

a review of the U.S. campaign in Iraq. He therefore 

came with an independent but well-informed perspective, which should have enabled him to recognize 

the strategic vulnerability exposed by the IED problem and the urgency of addressing it.58 It is possible 

that, through his experience in the Iraq Study Group, 

he brought an agenda in relation to Iraq, which may 

have included the CIED problem. 
21

Electronic Countermeasures. 

Most countries tend to group ECM among the 

highly classifi ed capabilities referred to, collectively, 

as electronic warfare (EW). In the emerging jargon for 

this equipment, one acronym encountered frequently 

is CREW (counter radio-controlled IED electronic warfare). 59 Because of its high classifi cation level, opensource data on the acquisition and fi elding of CREW 

equipment in response to the IED threat is sparse. 

There is evidence, however, that the United States has 

made major investments in this equipment and in organizational and doctrinal structures needed to keep 

its complex programming up to date with the rapidly 

changing electronic environment.60 The scale and pace 

of the U.S. response is indicated by the rate of generational change in the equipment solutions used, the 

fi rst being early Warlock systems procured under the 

CREW-1 specifi cation, which were fi elded in Iraq before the end of 2003.61 This had evolved to the CREW 

2.1 (second generation) specifi cation by mid-2007, 

with that equipment entering service in Iraq by April 

2008. This represents a complete cycle from fi rst- to 

second-generation equipment fl eets, with associated 

supporting capabilities, of 5 years. This represents 

rapid progress when compared with the priority that 

the U.S. Army had applied historically to ground EW 

equipment in peacetime procurement.62 Operational 

effectiveness of CREW systems in Iraq reveals a similarly impressive achievement, with the proportion of 

U.S. casualties caused by radio-controlled IEDs declining signifi cantly over an 18-month period from 

mid-2006 until late-2007.63

Like the MRAPs’ V-shaped hulls, the concept of 

ECM as a counter-IED capability was not new. British 

forces had been employing it in Northern Ireland for 
22

almost 20 years, and the U.S. Navy had possessed a 

limited capability, called Acorn, since the 1990s . In 

fact, a number of Acorn systems were deployed to Afghanistan in 2002 in response to the early emergence 

of RCIEDs there.64

Training and Doctrine. 

U.S. forces began to modify training in response 

to IEDs and explosive hazards in Iraq well before the 

end of 2003. Units encountering the IED hazard in theater began to adapt their own TTPs, an example of the 

tactical response that would be expected of units in 

contact. This effort was reinforced at the tactical level 

by adapting an existing structure that was already 

available—the Mine and Explosive Ordnance Information Coordination Center (MEOICC) that had deployed as part of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).65

The MEOICC’s initial deployment was a normal, 

doctrinal measure to address the hazards from explosive remnants of war (ERW), usually in the form of 

landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXOs), that are 

encountered after conventional military operations. 

The MEOICC’s Explosive Hazard Awareness Team 

(EHAT) evolved over the course of its deployment, 

gradually increasing its emphasis on IEDs. 

Institutional training responses were fi rst demonstrated by modifi cations to training for deploying elements—in the fi rst instance, this involved 

the use of training developed by the EHAT in Iraq, 

which by early-2004 began to make its way into predeployment training delivered in the United States 

for units deploying as part of the OIF-2 rotation.66

Further training, in dedicated IED training lanes, was 

also delivered to units arriving in the theater as part 
23

of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration processes. Formal changes to doctrine and to the 

structure of the U.S. Army’s training establishments 

took a little longer, but had begun to emerge in 2004. 

For example, the U.S. Army Engineer School’s Counter Mine/Counter Booby-Trap Center, itself created 

only in January 2002, was renamed the Counter Explosive Hazards Center in early-2004, in response to 

the new IED threat.67 Refl ecting the energetic debate 

on professional issues normal in the U.S. military, articles on the IED threat and responses to it also began 

to proliferate in U.S. military journals from early-2004.

The doctrinal response also began in 2003, with the 

establishment of the Asymmetric Warfare Group, an 

Army initiative, to study emerging aspects of the insurgency. Doctrine also began to be overhauled from 

2004, with doctrinal structural arrangements being 

examined and adjusted, where necessary, to optimize 

the force for the CIED fi ght. An example is the traditional division of responsibility between U.S. Army 

Engineers and Ordnance Corps personnel in the fi eld 

of Explosive Ordnance Disposal. This division was 

reviewed in response to the shortage of personnel 

available to deal with IED hazards, leading to the development of new skill sets within the Engineers.68 In 

summary, the institutional response to the doctrinal 

and training challenges of the IED threat was well underway in the U.S. Army by mid-2004, approximately 

8 months after the index event. 

Research and Development. 

The U.S. R&D response to the IED threat began almost immediately, perhaps refl ecting a U.S. military 

predilection for technological solutions to problems. 
24

From an early stage, however, pundits and practitioners alike warned that a technological “silver bullet” 

for the IED problem would be elusive at best, and that 

the forces in contact could not afford to wait for it. 

Nevertheless, technology was part of the answer and 

the U.S. R&D establishment began to be harnessed 

from an early stage, as refl ected by General Abizaid’s 

use of the Manhattan Project analogy to communicate 

a sense of the problem’s R&D dimension. Technological responses were pursued across the spectrum of 

CIED measures, including detection, protection, IED 

defeat in the form of ECM and remote disposal, and 

prevention in the form of the technical exploitation 

of evidence to enable proactive network attack. Much 

R&D was also devoted to technical ISR enhancements 

to support all CIED measures. As understanding of 

the IED threat spread, individuals and organizations 

began the R&D of solutions independently.69

Institutionally, the importance of R&D was refl ected in the structure of the JIEDDO and the bodies that 

preceded it, all of which incorporated an element with 

R&D responsibilities. In the JIEDDO, this is the JIEDD 

Lab Board, which “coordinates, synchronizes, and 

sponsors mid- and long-term research, development, 

science, and technology that contribute to countering 

the IED threat.”70

The evidence suggests that the IED threat constituted a less dangerous surprise to the U.S. R&D capacity than it did in other areas. There is little indication 

that capacity was inadequate, qualitatively or quantitatively, and in need of expansion. Rather, available 

capacity needed to be redirected, but this does not appear to have come at the expense of other R&D priorities.
25

Industrial. 

The U.S. industrial response to the IED threat is 

best demonstrated by the effort to fi eld rapidly large 

numbers of protected vehicles. As discussed, this 

manifested itself initially in orders for large numbers 

of ASKs for HMMWVs, then matured into the MRAP 

effort. At fi rst, the United States had minimal capacity 

to produce the necessary armor kits or vehicles and industrial capacity needed to expand signifi cantly. One 

company, Force Protection Inc., had obtained licenses 

to produce a limited number of mine-protected Buffalo vehicles for the IVMMD project, but the design 

of the vehicle’s V-shaped hull was based on South 

African research. High-performance steel for MRAP 

armor was a particular shortfall. Initially, U.S. capacity to produce this domestically was very limited, 

and supplies for MRAP production needed to be deconfl icted with other Defense projects.71 Some steel 

needed to be imported, involving a waiver of normal 

policy on the use of foreign materials.72 In response to 

the demand created by the MRAP orders, the four U.S. 

steel mills capable eventually of producing such steel 

made “capital investments and process improvements 

that enabled a 100 percent increase (in) . . . production capacity.”73 This is evidence of the U.S. industrial 

base adjusting to the unexpected demand for a new 

military platform. The initial paucity of the industrial 

base is also demonstrated by the need to spread procurement over a number of manufacturers and vehicle 

types, including overseas suppliers. This led to a diversifi ed fl eet that signifi cantly complicates the logistical sustainment of the capability, a situation normally 

avoided in deliberate procurement decisions. In this 

case, the urgency of the requirement left the DoD with 
26

no option—further evidence of the degree to which 

the U.S. military industrial base was surprised.74

Funding. 

The allocation of funding specifi cally to address 

the IED threat is a useful metric for the scale of the 

U.S. response to it, although diffi cult to track accurately over the entire period since 2003, due to the diverse 

application of funds. Prior to the emergence of the 

threat, virtually no funding was allocated specifi cally 

to it.75 The fi rst institutional response, the U.S. Army’s 

small IED Task Force, was initially funded in late2003, with U.S. $20 million from the Army’s budget.76

Specifi c appropriations began in 2004, with U.S. $100 

million.77 Since its creation, the JIEDDO has had its 

own funding line, with a base budget of U.S. $500 million in fi scal years 2008 and 2009, but also including 

signifi cant supplemental appropriations that brought 

the total budget to U.S. $4.4 billion in 2009. By late2008, JIEDDO had spent about U.S. $16 billion.78 This 

must be added to the funds allocated to specifi c CIED 

programs, such as the MRAP, which totaled U.S. $22.7 

billion by mid-2009.79

The funding allocated by the United States to 

CIED measures is impressive, but two aspects are particularly relevant to this analysis. First, the funding 

was not obligated in 2003, a clear indication that the 

IED threat was not anticipated. Second, there are indications that the JIEDDO’s budget will be rolled into 

DoD’s baseline funding, with responsibility for development and procurement of specifi c equipment, such 

as ECM jammers, migrating to parent Services.80 This 

would indicate a maturing of the response, insofar as 

it becomes part of DoD’s business as usual, without 
27

requiring a custom-made organization to manage it. 

This is a strong indication that, for the U.S. DoD, the 

IED surprise response cycle is closing.

Policy.

An implicit U.S. policy response can be detected in 

the establishment and robust funding of the JIEDDO 

from 2005. This is reinforced explicitly in the 2006 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which recognizes 

surprise as an enduring characteristic of the contemporary security environment and cites the creation of 

JIEDDO as an example of DoD’s agility in support of 

operations.81 The 2006 QDR is overshadowed, however, by the policy response that has evolved since 

the appointment of Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense. Gates's public statements since early-2007 are 

evidence of a conscious decision to elevate the priority 

of CIED capability development over existing conventional capability requirements. The relative fortunes 

of the MRAP program and the F-22 Raptor Project 

under Gates's incumbency are a materiel refl ection of 

this policy shift, which is also articulated concisely in 

the 2010 QDR and in the offi cial statements accompanying the Fiscal Year 2010 Budget submissions.82

Summary Assessment.

The evidence suggests that the emergence of the 

IED threat in Iraq was a dangerous surprise for the U.S. 

military, necessitating a response of national proportions with military, industrial, scientifi c, and budgetary dimensions. That response is still evolving more 

than 6 years after the index event. Recognition of the 

surprise was reasonably prompt, but initially the DoD 
28

attempted to cope with the problem by adapting existing resources, structures and processes, in addition to 

tactical responses. A coordinated national response to 

the threat, with its attendant management structures, 

took approximately 2.5 years to develop. Even then, 

key aspects of the DoD response, such as the MRAP 

requirement, were not triggered until much later and 

were infl uenced heavily by external perspectives, such 

as that brought by a new Secretary of Defense. Indeed, 

Congress was openly critical of the U.S. Army’s slowness in addressing the troops’ IED protection needs.83

Once the strategic leadership was provided, the DoD 

began to respond more adroitly: for example, it adopted nonstandard and relatively risky procurement 

strategies for necessary equipment. The appearance 

of a deliberate policy shift in favor of CIED capabilities in public documents coincided with this change in 

strategic leadership.

There are indications that the U.S. response cycle 

is now closing. Measures to deal with IED threats 

are increasingly seen as business as usual, with their 

management moving toward more normal organizational and budgetary arrangements, such as baseline 

funding, while the attendant military capabilities are 

fi nding their place in everyday doctrine, training, 

and equipment fl eets. This cycle has occurred in the 

context of a war of discretion, in which U.S. national 

survival was not threatened. U.S. military casualties 

in that war, although appalling and the highest since 

Vietnam, have also been historically low (a tiny fraction of those incurred in Vietnam). This may have prolonged the U.S. response cycle, compared with what 

may have been possible against a threat of national 

extinction or even higher casualties. Given the political importance of success in Iraq, it is hard to conceive 
29

a lack of urgency. Accordingly, the U.S. response suggests that: recognition of surprise by senior leaders, 

and their effective engagement in dealing with it, is 

a major determinant of the speed of institutional response;84 conventional defense establishments may 

not be good at responding to strategic surprises in 

wars of discretion, and special arrangements may be 

necessary to kick start an agile response; and, depending on the effectiveness of senior leadership, it may 

take the United States about 5-6 years to respond completely to a strategic military surprise during a war of 

discretion.

THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE IN IRAQ

Australia’s involvement in the current Iraq confl ict 

was small in comparison with that of the United States. 

It began with Special Forces and air operations during 

the invasion of April-May 2003 prior to the emergence 

of the IED threat, then shrank to a number of niche 

contributions except for the period April 2005–June 

2008, when a mounted battle group was deployed 

to the British-led region in Iraq’s south.85 Australian 

troops on the ground in Iraq never exceeded 800, and 

many of these spent most of their time inside secure 

bases with limited exposure to IED hazards.86 The 

only remaining Australian military presence is a detachment providing security to Australia’s diplomatic 

mission, the SECDET, and two individuals seconded 

to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq. At 

the time of the writing of this manuscript, Australian 

forces have suffered no combat fatalities in Iraq, but a 

number of personnel have been wounded. The most 

signifi cant injuries were from IED attacks.87
30

Throughout Australia's involvement in Iraq, its 

military contributions have been characterized by a 

high degree of discretion and selectivity as to their 

size, capabilities, location, duties, and timing. With the 

exception of the Overwatch Battle Group in the south, 

most missions allowed Australians to avoid exposure 

to high IED risks.88 The largest number of exposed personnel, members of the battle group, operated in an 

area that experienced very low levels of IED activity, 

compared with the most dangerous areas where large 

numbers of U.S. forces operated, such as the Sunni Triangle. The relatively small and discretionary nature of 

Australia’s commitments allowed the maintenance 

of high levels of force protection for most personnel, 

such as the almost exclusive use of protected vehicles 

for ground movement after 2003. 

THE AUSTRALIAN RESPONSE

Little information on Australia’s initial response to 

the IED threat in Iraq is available from open sources. 

Given the limited exposure of most personnel to such 

risks until mid-2005, it is likely that tactical responses 

were adequate for much of that time and operational 

security concerns would preclude the publication of 

those responses in detail. Institutional responses became visible later, giving the false impression that 

Australia had been doing little about the threat until 

then. 

Recognition.

It is diffi cult to identify the point at which the ADO 

recognized that it had been surprised by the IED threat 

in Iraq. Recognition may have been complicated or de-
31

layed by the small number of Australians in Iraq when 

the threat emerged, most of whom had little exposure 

to IED hazards.89 Tactical responses probably occurred 

immediately, consistent with normal military behavior, but those responses would have little visibility in 

open sources. Recognition that the Baghdad environment remained dangerous into mid-2003 is indicated 

by the decision to equip the SECDET with armored 

vehicles—an unusual means of diplomatic transport—

but such would have been a reasonable response to 

a small arms threat as well as IEDs. References to the 

IED threat to Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel do not appear in offi cial statements until 2004, although they have been frequent since 2006. While it is 

diffi cult to discern the point at which Australia recognized that the IED threat in Iraq constituted a strategic 

or operational surprise demanding an appropriate response, it is reasonable to conclude that such recognition was considerably slower than that of the United 

States and did not occur before 2005.

Institutional Response.

Just as Australian recognition of the IED surprise 

was slow, so was the institutional response to it. That 

response is described below, using the same criteria as 

for the United States.

Organizational.

The ADO’s fi rst publicly visible organizational 

change in response to the IED threat occurred in February 2005, when a team of six specialists deployed 

to Baghdad to participate in the U.S.-led Combined 

Explosives Exploitation Cell, a technical intelligence 
32

organization established in late-2003 to do technical 

exploitation of evidence from IED incidents in order 

to cue action against insurgent IED cells.90 A secondary purpose for the CEXC contribution was to bring 

advanced IED exploitation skills back to Australia.91

The ADO appears to have maintained that commitment until Australian troops withdrew fi nally in 2009. 

Subsequent changes occurred in early-2006, with the 

establishment of the ADF’s Counter IED Task Force 

(CIEDTF) under a one-star commander. This was 

followed almost immediately by the establishment, 

within the Army, of an Explosive Hazards Centre 

(ExHC), responsible for the delivery of IED-specifi c 

training.92 No further organizational changes were evident publicly during the period of ADF deployments 

to Iraq. While it is obvious that IED threats have heavily infl uenced the task-organization of ADF elements 

deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan,93 there has been no 

evidence of any long-term force structure changes to 

deployable ADF elements to address that threat until the establishment of an Army Explosive Ordnance 

Disposal (EOD) Squadron in late-2010 (well after the 

ADF had left Iraq).94 Organizationally, the ADF has 

largely made do with existing structures in response 

to the IED threat.

The ADF’s most signifi cant organizational changes 

in response to the IED threat occurred after the appointment of Air Chief Marshall “Angus” Houston as 

Chief of Defence Force (CDF) in mid-2005; the CIEDTF 

was raised at his direction.95 CDF sources also reveal 

more frequent public references to the IED threat after 

Houston’s appointment, even prior to the ADF’s fi rst 

IED fatality, in Afghanistan in October 2007. Reporting of IED incidents affecting ADF elements has often 

included reference to the CIEDTF as evidence of the 
33

ADF’s efforts to counter the threat. This suggests a 

higher awareness of the IED threat coinciding with a 

change in CDF—a noteworthy possibility, given the 

new perspective that Houston brought to the situation. 

Equipment.

The ADO’s most signifi cant response to the IED 

threat, in terms of equipment, is the inclusion of protected vehicles in all combat elements deploying to 

Iraq and their almost exclusive use for movement outside the wire since 2004. The most obvious example of 

this has been the use of the Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicle (PMV), which fi rst deployed with the 

AMTG in April 2005 to perform the same role as the 

U.S. MRAP. Unlike the MRAP, the PMV was not newly acquired in response to the IED threat; its procurement had been underway since at least 1994 as part 

of a land force capability requirement for “defence of 

Australia” scenarios.96 The materiel solution to that 

requirement—the Bushmaster—had been selected in 

1999 but had not entered service fully when the AMTG 

requirement arose. PMVs were rushed into use in Iraq 

ahead of the deliberate introduction-into-service (IIS) 

schedule. This involved some risk, as logistic sustainment systems were not mature and personnel were 

not experienced in the vehicles’ employment. Readiness to take that risk shows some agility in response to 

surprise. The ready availability of a materiel solution 

could also be evidence of sound force development 

processes that had anticipated the threat; equally, it 

could be serendipitous, like the Bushmaster, which 

was developed for another purpose. Although precise 

fi gures are not publicly available, the photographic 
34

and budgetary record suggests that the number of 

PMVs deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan rose steadily 

over the next few years, and that they have undergone 

rapid improvements in response to new requirements 

identifi ed on operations.97 Additional PMVs are also 

being procured to meet other vehicle requirements, 

suggesting that the need for protection is now appreciated much more widely than previously, perhaps 

due to the IED experience.98

While the employment of the PMV, especially by 

units not normally issued with them, suggests some 

adaptation in response to surprise, it does not compare with the U.S. MRAP program in the level of ministerial push, procedural innovation, or new funding 

required. Australia simply did not need to initiate a 

proportionate industrial response from a cold start, as 

the United States did. It is uncertain whether Australia would have been capable of doing so. It is more 

likely that, in the absence of the Bushmaster, it would 

have sought to acquire an alternative vehicle overseas. 

Given the tight world market for such vehicles, this 

would probably have delayed or severely constrained 

ADF contributions to Iraq.

Other Australian equipment responses to the 

IED threat are diffi cult to discern, although there is 

evidence of signifi cant funding for other CIED equipment requirements from 2007 onward.99 It must be presumed that ECM and other best-practice capabilities 

employed by other nations have been fi elded by the 

ADF.100 Defence has attracted some criticism over the 

slow fi elding of CIED equipment, although this has 

largely been inspired by fatal incidents in Afghanistan 

since 2007, rather than in Iraq.101
35

Training and Doctrine.

Australia’s training and doctrine response to the 

IED surprise has been generally tactical, with most 

emphasis on the pre-deployment training of forces 

deploying into the theater, culminating in elaborate 

Mission Rehearsal Exercises. The fi rst institutional 

training response visible publicly is the commencement of Explosive Hazard Awareness and Protection 

Trainer (EHAPT) courses within the Army’s Training 

Command in July 2008, the fi rst new CIED training 

delivered as part of the ADF’s normal raise-train-andsustain processes.102

The ADO’s doctrine has yet to demonstrate much 

publicly discernible change in response to the IED 

challenge. Similarly, articles and debate on IEDs in the 

various professional journals have been limited. They 

were virtually nonexistent before 2005 and sparse until 2008.103 While not publicly available for security reasons, presumably doctrine has existed to support the 

EHAPT since 2008. Given that the IED threat emerged 

in 2003, the ADO’s institutional training and doctrine 

responses appear slow. 

Research and Development.

There is little evidence of a major shift in Australia’s 

R&D efforts in response to the IED threat, although 

Defence’s relatively exclusive expertise in such areas 

as explosive technology and ECM would suggest that 

the Department’s R&D agencies are heavily involved 

in such work.104 The absence of major budgetary changes or organizational shifts within the Defence Science 

and Technology Organisation (DSTO) would suggest 

that it is absorbing additional work within existing re-
36

sources and, consequently, that the R&D response has 

not reached strategic proportions.

Industrial.

Australia’s response to the IED threat has not 

had a signifi cant industrial dimension. Although the 

emergence of the threat has led to orders for additional Bushmaster vehicles, these have not demanded any 

signifi cant expansion in industrial capacity.105

Funding.

Defence required additional funding in response 

to the IED threat, some of it in the form of budget supplementation for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 

under no-win, no-loss arrangements. While impossible to isolate in the published budget data, it is likely 

that the operating costs of IED-related requirements, 

especially PMVs, have added signifi cantly to the level 

of operational supplementation. Further IED costs 

have been absorbed within Defence’s normal budget, 

with inevitable impacts on other priorities: this includes AU$40 million approved specifi cally for CIED 

equipment in 2009-10. This equipment is for Operation 

SLIPPER (Afghanistan), and therefore not in response 

to the IED threat in Iraq, but is signifi cant as one of 

the few published examples of expenditure on CIED 

requirements. It is also signifi cant that this was an additional budget measure, outside the deliberate budget process, supporting the assessment of surprise.106

The IED threat has also contributed to other unforeseen requirements, such as urgent enhancements to 

PMVs.107 In the 2010 budget, specifi c provision for 

CIED funding appeared for the fi rst time as part of a 

AU$1.1 Billion package of force protection enhancements.108 Given the diversity of funding arrangements, 
37

it is diffi cult to attribute accurately specifi c amounts to 

all Australian CIED efforts, but the funding impacts of 

the surprise are signifi cant in Australian terms.109

Policy.

There is little evidence of a policy dimension in 

Australia’s response to the IED threat before 2010. With 

the exception of the funding decisions of unforeseen 

expenditures, IEDs seem to have caused no changes 

to the direction of existing Defence policy. The 2009 

Defence White Paper makes no mention of IEDs, nor of 

the notion of surprise as it is considered here. 

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES

The starkest difference between the U.S. and Australian handling of the IED threat in Iraq is the time 

taken to recognize the surprise and initiate an institutional response. As Figure 3 indicates, the fi rst indication of an Australian institutional response—the 

deployment of the CEXC contingent—came a full 15 

months later than that of the United States, despite 

having troops deployed to the same theater, at the 

same time, and with access to the same threat data. 

An equivalent response, the creation of a dedicated 

task force to begin dealing with the problem, took 

Australia 28 months longer than the United States. 

Continuing through to the implementation of an institutional training response, Australia took a full 5 years 

from the emergence of the IED threat in mid-2003 to 

the delivery of the fi rst EHAPT course, and this was 

after substantial combat forces had been withdrawn 

from Iraq. Compared with the 30 to 36 months that the 

United States took to perform the same actions, Aus-
38

tralia’s institutional response to the IED threat seems 

remarkably slow. 

U.S. and Australian responses also manifested 

themselves differently in terms of the balance between 

the elements of the institutional response. The U.S. reaction featured signifi cant material acquisitions, with 

major industrial and funding implications. In comparison, Australia’s response emphasized organizational 

and training measures. 

Given the relative sizes of the U.S. and Australian 

defense organizations, the slowness of the Australian 

response is counterintuitive: a small organization 

should be more agile than a larger one. Other factors 

must account for the relative speed of each country’s 

reaction. The different balance between the elements 

of institutional response must also be explained. The 

reasons for these things lie in: 

• the timing of leadership changes;

• the perceptions of the threat to respective national interests and equities, including the 

number of personnel at risk; and,

• judgments as to the adequacy of existing response options.

Leadership Changes.

The signifi cance of strategic leadership changes 

lies in the extent to which they bring fresh perspectives to the problem and reduce affi nities with existing 

solutions. In both the United States and Australia, the 

changes that most characterize the overall response 

were initiated by a newly appointed strategic leader, respectively, Secretary of Defense Gates with the 

MRAP Program, and Chief of Defence Force Houston 

with the CIEDTF. In both cases, institutional respons-
39

es were already underway when the new leader arrived, but their direction changed signifi cantly once 

that person became familiar with the problem. Both 

individuals were also new to the organizational problem space: Gates was an intelligence specialist, and 

his recent experience in the Iraq Study Group gave 

him excellent threshold knowledge of the problems in 

Iraq, but he was not a Defense insider. Houston was 

an Air Force offi cer looking at a land force problem 

that hitherto had only been addressed by land operations experts. As such, it is possible that neither was 

infl uenced by orthodoxies—born of conventional doctrine and traditional TTPs and structures—that limited 

conceptualization of the problem and its appropriate 

response. Similarly, neither had preexisting personal 

equities in the way the land force contribution in Iraq 

had evolved. This may have allowed more freedom to 

consider alternatives. 

In both the U.S. and Australian cases, it is signifi -

cant that institutional responses had commenced prior 

to the appointment of the new leader, but they had not 

yet adopted their decisive characteristic, especially in 

terms of scale. This suggests that recognition of surprise is not dependent on a fresh perspective in the 

fi rst instance, but a new outlook or especially acute 

powers of insight may assist realization of its full extent or implications, and consequently, the identifi cation of the right response.110 Firm conclusions to this 

effect are impossible without detailed knowledge of 

the decisionmaking process followed by each country, but the personal impact of new strategic leaders 

in both countries suggests that leadership has an important role in the comprehensive appreciation of surprise and is therefore a key determinant of the tempo 

of the institutional response cycle. 
40

A change in leadership does not explain why Australia’s initial institutional response, the deployment 

of the CEXC contingent, lagged the U.S. formation of 

the Army IED Task Force by 15 months. The justifi cation for such a measure was the same in October 2003 

as it was in February 2005. 

National Interests and Equities.

The United States led the invasion of Iraq and was 

the undisputed leader of the Coalition fi ghting the 

insurgency until 2009. That leadership role, and the 

political necessity of guaranteeing success in the confl ict, meant that it could neither avoid any aspect of 

the fi ght nor stint on the resources it must commit. Although not a war of national survival, for the United 

States the Iraqi insurgency has been much less a war 

of discretion than for most of its Coalition partners. 

Thus, the United States could not reduce its exposure 

to threats such as IEDs, raising the urgency of fi nding an effective response to them. The mounting U.S. 

casualty fi gures reinforce this point. By comparison, 

Australia had far less at stake in Iraq, and consequentially, enjoyed broad discretion in the size and nature 

of its commitment. This allowed Australia to mitigate 

risk substantially and largely explains the complete 

absence of Australian IED fatalities. Consequently, 

an institutional response had no urgency for Australia initially. Although unsatisfying intellectually, this 

explanation may partly explain Australia’s slow response. A corollary conclusion, however, is that the 

delayed response meant that Australian troops began 

to benefi t from improved CIED measures 15 months 

later than they might have—a disappointing refl ection 

on Australia’s Defence establishment. 
41

Adequacy of Existing Capabilities.

Another factor driving the urgency of a response 

to a capability-based surprise might be the size of the 

capability gap created. Such gaps have quantitative 

and qualitative dimensions. A quantitative gap exists 

when the surprised force possesses the elements of the 

necessary response, but not enough of them. A qualitative one exists when the surprised force is outclassed 

by the adversary’s new capability, without necessarily 

being outnumbered. In the U.S. case, the absence of a 

capability like the MRAP constituted a large qualitative gap, while the size of the force exposed to IED 

hazards automatically meant that the gap was also 

huge quantitatively. This capability gap manifested itself immediately in the scale of casualties suffered by 

the United States. The United States thus confronted a 

major problem, necessitating an urgent response. 

By comparison, Australia had a much smaller force 

exposed, especially when the threat fi rst emerged; it 

could minimize its exposure to that threat by being 

highly selective about the size of forces deployed, the 

roles they performed, and the timing of commitments; 

and in the PMV it had on hand a solution to the most 

pressing equipment defi ciency, in suffi cient quantities 

for the forces it needed to deploy. These factors shrank 

the capability gap and therefore reduced the urgency 

of an institutional response, but they do not explain 

fully why its initiation was delayed until 2005-06, 

when the factors that demanded it had existed since 

late-2003. 
42

COUNTERVAILING ASSESSMENTS

As with any assessment based on a small sample of 

cases, fi rm conclusions on cause and effect are risky. In 

the interests of balance, it is important to consider alternative interpretations. Three of these are discussed 

below. 

Conventional Thinking.

While a conventional military background could 

inhibit the recognition of surprise or limit response 

options by creating narrow orthodox perspectives, 

that effect is not demonstrated consistently. General John Abizaid, whose Manhattan Project memo 

sparked the U.S. institutional response, saw almost 

immediately that he had a game-changing problem: 

Abizaid was a career soldier from an infantry background, as was Australia’s previous Defence chief. A 

number of key innovators had similarly conventional 

backgrounds. While it seems clear that leadership is a 

critical requirement for agile responses to surprise, it 

is less certain, based on the two examples considered, 

that a conventional background necessarily leads to 

leadership orthodoxies that impede agile responses, 

especially at the military level.

Adequate Agility.

While Australia’s recognition of operational surprise and its consequent institutional response seem 

worryingly slow, they pass an empirical test of adequacy in that Australia suffered no fatalities and very 

few casualties in Iraq from IEDs. Indeed, the institutional response was well under way before the fi rst 
43

IED fatality in Afghanistan.111 By these measures, the 

ADO could be assessed as adequately responsive. 

Such an assessment, however, would need to discount 

luck as a factor in Australia’s fatality-free record. This 

seems unreasonable, given that Coalition partners operating similar equipment in Iraq in the same areas at 

the same time suffered catastrophic IED attacks. There 

is no doubt that the training, TTPs, and equipment of 

the ADF elements were major factors in their success, 

but most of these fall into the tactical-response category. Judgments about the adequacy of the ADO’s institutional CIED response in Iraq need to be tempered 

with reasonable skepticism. 

Flexible Force Structure.

In Iraq, both U.S. and Australian forces needed protected mobility in the form of a purpose-built armored 

truck that neither had fi elded previously. To do so, the 

United States needed to embark on a massive coldstart acquisition program to equip its forces with the 

MRAP: Australia did not, instead accelerating slightly 

the fi elding of the PMV, which was already in the acquisition pipeline. This could be argued, optimistically, as a demonstration of the prescience of Australia’s 

force development process and the inherent fl exibility of its force structure. Given that the PMV was acquired to meet a very different requirement, however, 

it could be interpreted equally as luck. Nevertheless, 

the Australian response passes another empirical, and 

comparative, test of adequacy in the fact that the Al 

Mutthana Task Group (AMTG) deployed to Al Mutthana, Iraq, in 2005 with its PMVs, while U.S. troops 

in Iraq waited a further 2 years for their equivalent. 
44

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Failure to Anticipate and the Risk of Overreaction.

Military professional literature and defense documents show that both the United States and Australia 

had begun to contemplate threats like IEDs well before the invasion of Iraq. With the exception of dedicated management structures, such as JIEDDO and 

the CIEDTF, virtually all elements of the response that 

eventually manifested itself existed before 2003. It 

could be said that, by not pursuing a CIED capability 

in anticipation of the IED threat, both countries chose 

to be surprised by it. Such a course, however, would 

have brought its own risks. 

Compared with other areas of government spending, defense budgets are large, but they are fi nite, especially in nominal peacetime. Judgments on investment in expensive, long-term capability projects must 

be made carefully because, once made, these commitments severely limit discretion to pursue other capabilities for years. Expensive capability projects, however, 

tend to be those that address the worst threats, those 

that threaten national survival. They secure the ability 

to win wars of necessity, rather than wars of discretion. Failure to make timely investment decisions can 

lead to capability gaps that cannot be made up in time 

to meet rising threats—leading to calamitous strategic 

vulnerability in the future.112 On the other hand, failure to win today’s wars, even if they do not threaten 

national survival, can lead to the fall of governments 

and the slow erosion of our agreeable way of life.

The dilemma facing modern militaries, therefore, 

is to balance their efforts and investment between the 

capabilities needed to win today’s wars and those es-
45

sential to win tomorrow’s. As the cost of high-end military capabilities rises, these judgments are becoming 

more critical and more diffi cult. Secretary of Defense 

Gates's decisions to channel funding into the MRAP 

program, while severely restricting the scope of the 

F-22 Raptor fi ghter acquisition, is a case in point. 

Overinvestment in an acute capability gap that proves 

to be an aberration, however debilitating at the time, 

could leave a nation fatally exposed in a cataclysmic 

state-on-state contest. Failing to address the gap and 

losing the war, however small, could bring down the 

government in the near term. This dilemma is a major 

theme in contemporary defense policy and academic 

literature.113

This suggests that, in an era when warfare may be 

dominated by “small,” intra-state confl icts and insurgencies, national defense establishments could be best 

served by maintaining those capabilities needed to 

defend against threats to national survival and optimizing their ability to respond to dangerous surprises 

as they arise.114

The Focusing Power of Casualties.

A striking feature of the U.S. experience is the way 

the escalating institutional responses in the building 

of the JIEDDO closely followed signifi cant spikes in 

IED fatalities, and their cumulative growth. In Australia’s case, with no fatalities in Iraq, the proximate 

stimuli for institutional responses are harder to determine. Australia appears to have watched the mounting U.S. deaths for some time before deciding that the 

IED phenomenon was not an isolated aberration and 

required an institutional response. This suggests that 

casualties, and especially fatalities, concentrate the 
46

minds of defense leaders and politicians and may be 

the decisive metric by which the adequacy of evolving responses is gauged. This is not counterintuitive, 

but it poses the risk that a nation that is able to avoid 

casualties by a combination of selective participation 

and luck could delude itself as to the enduring nature 

of a surprise threat and therefore miss an opportunity 

to develop its response, leaving itself open to further, 

more serious, surprise in the future.

SUBSEQUENT EXPERIENCE—AFGHANISTAN

IEDs have been endemic in Afghanistan for more 

than 20 years.115 Their use against Coalition forces has 

been increasing since 2006, and they have been the 

principal cause of fatalities for some time.116 To meet 

this threat, the United States is increasing the fl ow of 

MRAPs to troops in Afghanistan and has commenced 

deliveries of MATVs.117 To encourage Coalition participation in the International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF), the United States is providing MRAPs to its 

Coalition partners.118 This indicates that both the United States and its partners have again been surprised 

by the IED threat. 

Given the recent experience in Iraq, a second surprise is diffi cult to explain: intuitively, a technique that 

had proven so useful in one contemporary insurgency 

should have been expected to appear in another, especially a technique that is well known, due to its high 

media profi le, and one that is relatively simple, technically speaking. While the shortage of MRAPs is evidence of surprise, it does not necessarily indicate slow 

recognition of that surprise: rather, it signifi es the extent of the materiel shortfall, in that the U.S. industrial 

base has been unable so far to deliver the total number 
47

of vehicles required to support operations in both Iraq 

and Afghanistan; Iraq has had priority. The current 

draw down in Iraq may alleviate this problem.119

Australia’s experience in Afghanistan differs from 

that in Iraq in several ways. Compared with Iraq, in 

Afghanistan the ADF operates in more dangerous 

areas, with far less discretion to avoid IED hazards. 

Unlike in Iraq, in Afghanistan Australia has suffered 

fatalities, IEDs being the principal cause. In public announcements about casualties, the ADF emphasizes 

its signifi cant CIED efforts, drawing attention to measures such as the CIEDTF. 120 To the ADF’s credit, much 

of this was in place before the fi rst fatality. Evidence of 

unanticipated requirements, however, lies in the need 

to seek additional funding for new CIED measures 

after fatalities began to be suffered.121 While these requirements may not have completely blindsided the 

ADF, they are evidence of operational surprise in so 

far as the ADF was unable to meet those needs from 

its force-in-being, even after 3 years at war. The U.S. 

and Australian experience in Afghanistan suggests, 

therefore, that both countries still see the IED threat as 

an aberration, to be responded to when it arises, rather 

than as a likely feature of the counterinsurgency battle 

space, to be anticipated and prepared for. The next 

war will demonstrate whether this is true.122

CONCLUSIONS

Surprise is an essential part of military operations; 

defense professionals will always seek ways to infl ict 

it on their adversaries, and to recover quickly when 

surprised themselves. When fi ghting the current insurgency in Iraq, the Coalition suffered an operational, 

if not strategic, surprise in the form of the IED threat 
48

that emerged in the second half of 2003. To deal with 

that surprise, both the United States and Australia 

needed to make institutional responses in a cycle that 

took at least 6 years. The subsequent impact of IEDs in 

Afghanistan suggests, in fact, that the response is still 

incomplete.

To constitute an operational surprise, a threat 

based on a specifi c technique or capability need not 

be completely novel, but merely unanticipated and 

unanswerable without recourse to operational-level 

capacities and resources and some change to institutional behavior. IEDs are not new, nor are the principal measures used to deal with them—protected 

vehicles, disposal techniques, ISR, ECM, intelligence 

fusion, etc.—yet neither the United States nor Australia was prepared for the threat that arose in Iraq. In 

Australia’s case, the considerable discretion it enjoyed 

in the size and nature of its Iraq involvement appears 

to have signifi cantly reduced the urgency of an institutional response, and may have delayed the recognition of surprise in the fi rst instance.

Given their scale and complexity, institutional responses to operational surprises can be time consuming to implement. To minimize their impact, it is critical that surprises be recognized quickly and responses 

initiated swiftly, especially for those in contact. Strategic leaders have a crucial role in the recognition 

of operational surprise and in directing institutional 

responses. Professional orthodoxies, limited perspectives, and equities in the status quo can delay these 

decisions, impacting responsiveness. It may take the 

appointment of new leadership to achieve the necessary impetus in the recovery. For both the United 

States and Australia, a comprehensive response to the 

IED surprise took some years to evolve and then only 
49

after changes in senior leadership. In Australia’s case, 

there was an inexplicable delay of 15 months before 

the fi rst institutional adaptation was made. Although 

this delay did not appear to contribute to casualties, 

it is a disturbing refl ection on the ADO’s agility. This 

is not to say that the ADO was not responding to the 

situation at hand, but perhaps that it was not contemplating how that situation might deteriorate without a 

timely and bold response. 

Many predict that the international security environment over the next few decades will be dominated 

by irregular warfare in intrastate confl icts and insurgencies. In such an environment, adversaries will 

seek asymmetric advantages over conventional forces 

by confronting them with unanticipated threats. If 

this proves true, further dangerous surprises can be 

expected unless the new threats are predicted and 

prepared for. The range of potential surprises is very 

broad, however, and it is unlikely that every candidate threat will eventuate. Attempting to address every possible surprise in advance could consume a nation’s defense budget, yet amount to little more than 

“dancing at shadows” while important conventional 

capabilities deteriorate through underinvestment. In 

such an environment, there is a strong case for relying on institutional agility to respond to surprises, by 

recognizing and recovering from them quickly. This 

is risky, but there may be little alternative. To mitigate the risk, national defense establishments should 

pursue ways to optimize their responsiveness to surprises. A good fi rst step would be to support senior 

leaders with the processes needed to recognize and 

respond to operational surprises when they arise.
50

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from fi ndarticles.com/p/articles/mi_6712/is_49_240/ai_n31181737/.

Miles, Donna, “’Herculean Work’ Drives MRAP Production, Procurement, Offi cials Say,” Armed Forces Press Service, 

July 20, 2007, available from www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.

aspx?id=46790.

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle Program, 

available from www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/

mrap-proc.htm.

National Institute of Allergy and Infections, Glossary, available from science.education.nih.gov/supplements/nih1/diseases/other/

glossary/act1-gloss3.htm.
57

“New Bushmaster vehicles to be deployed to Iraq,” Army 

Guide, April 19, 2005, available from www.army-guide.com/eng/article/article.php?forumID=111&topicID=87.

Oates, Michael L., Statement before the House Armed Services 

Committee Subcommittees on Air and Land Forces and Seapower 

and Expeditionary Forces, U.S. House Of Representatives, Protecting The Force From The Improvised Explosive Device, 2nd Sess., 111th 

Cong., March 17, 2010, available from armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/

JOINTALSP031710/Oates_Testimony031710.pdf.

Raddatz, Martha and Mike Cerre, “Soldiers Must Rely on 

‘Hillbilly Armor’ for Protection,” ABC News, December 8, 2004, 

available from abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=312959.

Results in Brief: Marine Corps Implementation of the Urgent 

Universal Needs Process for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles, DoD Inspector General Report No. D-2009-030 (Project No. 

D2008-D000AE-0174.000), December 8, 2008, available from www.

dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/fy09/09-030%20RIB.pdf.

Sadowski, Robert A., Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 

Organization: Anomaly or Future Roadmap, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army 

War College, 2008, available from www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?

AD=ADA479728&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.

Thales Australia Corporate Profi le, available from www.thalesgroup.com/assets/0/95/389/392/ac110ae0-8ea1-4ee0-a77d-4eefdf9c878e.pdf?LangType=2057.

The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, Report of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the 

Armed Services, Washington, DC, 2008, available from armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/Reports/JIEDDOReportNov2008.pdf.

Tillman, Barrett, “Fear and Loathing in the Post-Naval Era,” 

Proceedings Magazine, United States Navy Institute, June 2009, 

available from www.USNI.org/magazines/proceedings/.

Urbina, Alex, “Route Clearance Vehicle Repair Parts Sustainment Transition—From CLS to Organic,” U.S. Army Acqui-
58

sition Support Center AL&T (Acquisition, Logistics & Technology) 

Online Monthly, July 2008, available from www.usaasc.info/alt_online/printer_friendly.cfm?iid=0808.

ENDNOTES

1. See, for example, Zvi Lanir, “The Principles of War and 

Military Thinking,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1, 

March 1993, pp. 1-17.

2. For a thoughtful analysis of the U.S. response to the Atlantic submarine threat in World War II, see Robert A. Sadowski, 

Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization: Anomaly or 

Future Roadmap, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008, available from www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA479728&Locati

on=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.

3. These were not new, having been used in World War I.

4. Peter Kemp, “Securing the Sealanes,” History of the Second 

World War, No. 49, BPC Publishing, 1972, pp. 1345-1353; R.W 

Thompson, “Embattled Island,” History of the Second World War, 

No. 62, Somertown, TN: BPC Publishing, 1972, pp. 1712-1725, 

1720. See also Robert Sadowski, 2008. 

5. For example, confl icts in which national survival is not immediately threatened or a treaty obligation is not invoked. 

6. Robert G. K. Thompson, “Regular Armies and Insurgency,” in Ronald Haycock, ed., Regular Armies and Insurgency,

London, UK: Croom Held, 1979, p. 10; David Kilcullen, Complex 

Warfi ghting, Future Land Operating Concept Paper, Australian 

Army, 2004, p. 5, available from www.quantico.usmc.mil/download.

aspx?Path=./Uploads/Files/SVG_complex_warfi ghting.pdf.

7. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Rapaport, ed., London, UK: 

Penguin, 1968, p. 269.

8. Nathan Freier, Known Unknowns: Unconventional “Strategic Shocks” in Defense Strategy Development, Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008.
59

9. See John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, IL: University 

of Chicago Press, 2002, pp. 192-193.

10. See Antonia Fraser, The Gunpowder Plot, London, UK: 

Phoenix, 2002.

11. Eric Ouellet, “Ambushes, IED and COIN: The French Experience,” Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring 2008, pp. 

7-24.

12. Culminating in the “Ottawa Treaty,” banning anti-personnel landmines and booby traps, in the late 1990s.

13. “Nuisance” use of landmines can be differentiated from 

their conventional use in deliberately designed and laid minefi elds, 

the mandatory marking and recording of which was intended to 

create an obvious obstacle and to prevent them from becoming a 

hazard to noncombatants.

14. While a member of an Australian Army contingent to a 

UN humanitarian demining training mission in Pakistan in late1989, this author was involved in instructing Afghan refugees on 

the hazards of explosive booby traps that would nowadays be 

called IEDs.

15. See Ian Wing, “Australian Defence 2048 —An Alternative 

Future,” Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 132, September-October 1998, pp. 3-11; Michael Evans and Alan Ryan, From Breitenfeld to Baghdad: Perspectives on Combined Arms Warfare, Land Warfare Studies Centre Working Paper No. 122, July 2003; Kilcullen; 

Charles Krulac, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the ThreeBlock War,” Marine Corps Gazette, January 1999, pp. 18-22. 

16. Results in Brief: Marine Corps Implementation of the Urgent 

Universal Needs Process for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles, DoD Inspector General Report No. D-2009-030 (Project No. 

D2008-D000AE-0174.000), December 8, 2008, available from www.

dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/fy09/09-030%20RIB.pdf.

17. Defenselink, Available from www.defenselink.mil/releases/.
60

18. This is not explained by any specifi c policy statement, but 

was detected in the course of research on Ibid.

19. As of March 10, 2010, the ADF had suffered no IED fatalities in Iraq. U.S. deaths constitute the vast majority of Coalition fatalities and are therefore a signifi cant sample. The other 

limitations of this data set require an assumption that U.S. IED 

fatalities are proportional to nonfatal IED incidents and that, by 

extension, IED fatalities at any time refl ect the general trend in the 

IED problem confronting U.S. forces at that time. If unsound, this 

assumption could lead to an overestimation of the infl uence of 

IED fatalities on institutional behaviors’, although any potential 

overestimation is compensated for somewhat by the known underreporting of USMC IED fatalities. 

20. For example, Clay Wilson, Congressional Research Service 

Report for Congress: Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and 

Afghanistan: Effects and Countermeasures, Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, August 28, 2007.

21. Available from icasualties.org/oif/CasualtyTrends.aspx.

22. Bush never used the words “Mission Accomplished,” but 

his speech has since been identifi ed by that term, which appeared 

on a banner displayed behind him on the USS Abraham Lincoln as 

he was speaking.

23. This was caused by an incident in Baghdad on June 

26, 2003, available from www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.

aspx?releaseid=5499. Andrew Cockburn cites an unexploded ordnance incident in Baghdad on May 26, 2003, as a probable IED, 

but this cannot be confi rmed from Defenselink. See Cockburn, 

Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall and Catastrophic Legacy, New York: Simon 

& Schuster, 2007, p. 200.

24. In epidemiology, the index case is defi ned as the First disease case in an epidemic within a population, Washington, DC: National Institute of Allergy and Infections, Glossary, available from 

science.education.nih.gov/supplements/nih1/diseases/other/glossary/

act1-gloss3.htm.

25. See also Cockburn, pp. 200-202.
61

26. These include the hitherto arcane area of blast lung injuries, the treatment of which runs contrary to conventional emergency medical practice. Colonel (Dr.) Stephan Rudzki, presentation to a Regional Conference of the International Association of 

Bomb Technicians and Investigators (Region VII), Canberra, Australia, December 2004.

27. Defenselink.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid, p. 200.

30. Evidence of this lies in the rapid adaptation of U.S. deployed Mine and Explosive Ordnance Information Coordination 

Center [MEOICC] from an organization concerned mainly with 

traditional explosive hazards (landmines and unexploded ordnance [UXOs]) to one focused on the IED problem, and in the creation of a dedicated tactical grouping to deal with IEDs, “Task 

Force Right of Way,” before the end of October 2003. See William Blaylock and Dorian D’Aria, “Mine and Explosive Ordnance 

Information Coordination Center Operations in Iraq,” Engineer, 

Vol. 34, No. 1, January-March 2004, Fort Leonard Wood, MO, 

U.S. Army Engineer School, 2004, pp. 33-35, available from www.

wood.army.mil/ENGRMAG/PDFs%20for%20Jan-Mar%2004/Blaylock-D’Aria.pdf. Further evidence lies in the conduct as early 10 

September 2003 of dedicated counter-IED operations such as the 

4th Infantry Division’s Operation Ivy Focus. Major General Raymond Odierno, Media Teleconference from Tikrit, Iraq, October 

27, 2003, transcript available from www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/

transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3064.

31. John Barry, Michael Hastings, and Evan Thomas, “Iraq’s 

Real WMD,” Newsweek, March 27, 2006, available from www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-13987448_ITM. The analogy with the Manhattan Project is widely attributed to an unpublished memo sent by Abizaid to then Defense Under-Secretary 

Paul Wolfowitz.

32. See Sadowski, p. 6.
33. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization,

Report of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the 

Armed Services, Washington, DC: 2008, p. 15, available from 

armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/Reports/JIEDDOReportNov2008.pdf; 

James Lovelace and Joseph Votel, “The Asymmetric Warfare 

Group: Closing the Capability Gaps,” Army, Association of the 

United States Army, March 2005, pp. 29-34.

34. This was directed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 

Wolfowitz. See Ibid.

35. DoD Directive 2000.19D, June 27, 2005.

36. DoD News Release No 1260-05, December 5, 2005, available 

from www.defenselink.mil/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=9137.

37. Montgomery C. Meigs, Slide Rules and Submarines: American Scientists and Subsurface Warfare in World War II, Honolulu, HI: 

University Press of the Pacifi c, 1990. See also Sadowski, pp. 6-12.

38. Meigs’s 1982 doctoral thesis was on the Manhattan Project. Sadowski, p. 17.

39. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, January 18, 2006, available from www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/

html/200019.htm.

40. DoD Directive 2000.19E (superseded Directive 2000.19D), 

February 14, 2006.

41. “Engineer Doctrine Update,” Engineer, Vol. 38, JanuaryMarch 2008, pp. 34-41, available from www.wood.army.mil/ENGRMAG/PDFs%20for%20Jan-Mar%2008/Doctrine%20Update.pdf.

42. Major General Randal Castro, “Clear the Way,” Engineer,

U.S. Army Engineer School, April-June 2006, pp. 3, 4-11.

43. Martha Raddatz and Mike Cerre, “Soldiers Must Rely on 

“Hillbilly Armor’ for Protection,” ABC News, December 8, 2004, 

available from abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=312959. Improvised 

armor installations were commonplace on vehicles observed by 

this author in Iraq in January 2004.

62
63

44. “CENTCOM up-armored Humvee requirements being 

met,” Army News Service, February 6, 2004, available from www.

globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/02/mil-040206-usa02.

htm. 

45. Army Posture Statement 2008, available from www.army.

mil/aps/08/information_papers/prepare/Up-Armored_High-Mobility_

Multipurpose_Wheeled_Vehicle.html.

46. DoD Press Briefi ng with Press Secretary Geoff Morrell 

from the Pentagon, December 9, 2008, transcript available from 

www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/.

47. Nathan Hodge, “U.S. moves to counter threat from more 

lethal roadside bombs,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 44, Issue 8, 

London, UK: Jane’s Information Group, February 21, 2007, p. 5.

48. Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle Program, available from www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/

ground/mrap-proc.htm. For general background on the MRAP, see 

Andrew Feickert, Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, Washington, DC: Library 

of Congress, August 3, 2009.

49. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, DoD News Briefi ng on 

the Release of the Financial Year 2010 Defense Budget, Washington, 

DC: February 1, 2010; Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) 

Vehicle Program.

50. Donna Miles, “‘Herculean Work’ Drives MRAP Production, Procurement, Offi cials Say,” Armed Forces Press Service, 

July 20, 2007, available from www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.

aspx?id=46790.

51. Donna Borak, “Pentagon Launches New Competition 

for MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles for use in Afghanistan,” Orlando 

Sentinel, December 9, 2008, available from orlandosentinel.com/

business/nationworld/sns-ap-pentagon-mrap-contract,0,1532057.story; 

and Feickert, pp. 2-3.
64

52. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-34.2, Combined Arms Breaching Operations, Annex E, Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2000.

53. Sandra Erwin, “Bomb-Detection Technology Useful for 

Countermine Ops,” National Defense, March 1, 2001, available 

from www.allbusiness.com/public-administration/national-securityinternational/760046-1.html.

54. Issues Facing the Army’s Future Combat Systems Program, Report of the United States General Accounting Offi ce, Washington, 

DC: U.S. General Accounting Offi ce, August 13, 2003, available 

from www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/gao/d031010r.

pdf.

55. Alex Urbina, “Route Clearance Vehicle Repair Parts 

Sustainment Transition—From CLS to Organic,” U.S. Army 

Acquisition Support Center AL&T (Acquisition, Logistics & Technology) Online Monthly, July 2008, available from www.usaasc.info/

alt_online/printer_friendly.cfm?iid=0808.

56. The Casspir mine-protected vehicle, featuring a v-shaped 

hull, entered service in South Africa in 1979. Ben Goodlad, “South 

Africa gears up for major MRAP production,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 30, 2008, p. 16. Other sources state that the Buffel vehicle, 

also with a V-shaped hull, entered service in 1978.

57. Feickert, p. 2.

58. Gates resigned from the Iraq Study Group Panel in November 2006 after he was nominated to be the next Secretary of 

Defense. The Group’s Report, released in December 2006, makes 

only a few references to IEDs, but the context suggests that they 

were considered in detail. James A. Baker et al., The Iraq Study 

Group Report, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 

2006.

59. Nicholas Merrett and Tamir Eshel, “Next Generation Jammers,” Asia-Pacifi c Defence Reporter, January 2008, pp. 50-54.

60. Ibid.
65

61. “Counter Remote Control Improvised Explosive Device 

(RCIED) Electronic Warfare (CREW),” GlobalSecurity.org, available from www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/crew-2.

htm. The U.S. Army admitted to having minimal capability in the 

theater in August 2003. By January 2005, there 1,496 systems deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. See Francis Harvey and General 

Peter Schoomaker, U.S. Army Posture Statement 2005, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Department of the Army, February 2005, available from 

www.army.mil/aps/05/index.html.

62. As evidenced by the fact that the U.S. Army’s Electronic 

Warfare Division was only raised within its Operations, Mobilization and Readiness Directorate in 2006. John Ohab, Technology, 

Threats Accelerate Army Focus on Ground Electronic Warfare, Armed 

Forces Press Service, available from www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=53379. 

63. Merrett and Eshel, p. 50.

64. Rick Atkinson, “Left of Boom: The Struggle to Defeat Roadside Bombs,” (Part 1: “The IE Problem is Getting out of Control: 

We've Got to Stop the Bleeding”), The Washington Post, September 

30, 2007, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2007/09/29/AR2007092900751.html?sid=ST2007092900754.

65. Blaylock and D’Aria, pp. 34-5.

66. Ibid, p. 35.

67. Robert Baker and Dorian D’Aria, “Countering IEDs and 

Explosive Hazards,” Engineer,” January-March 2005, pp. 32-35; 

U.S. Army Engineer School, available from www.wood.army.mil/

ENGRMAG/PDFs%20for%20Jan-Mar%2005/Baker-D’Aria.pdf.

68. Lieutenant Colonel Craig Jolly, “EOD and Engineers 

“Close the Gap’,” Engineer, January-March 2005, pp. 40-55. U.S. 

Army Engineer School, 2005, available from www.wood.army.mil/

ENGRMAG/PDFs%20for%20Jan-Mar%2005/Jolly.pdf. 

69. See Committee on Defeating Improvised Explosive Devices et al., Countering the Threat Of Improvised Explosive Devices: Ba-
66

sic Research Opportunities, Washington, DC: National Academy of 

Sciences, 2007, available from www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_

id=11953&page=R1.

70. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Enclosure 2, 

p. 15.

71. In 2007, there were only two U.S. steel mills capable of 

producing the necessary steel. By October 2009, there were four. 

Jim Cooney, Vice President Business Development of Force Protection Inc., Tampa, FL: Headquarters U.S. Central Command, 

October 20, 2009; Michael J. Sullivan, Testimony Before the House 

Armed Services Committee, Defense Acquisition Reform Panel, 

Defense Acquisitions: Rapid Acquisition of MRAP Vehicles, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce, October 8, 2009, 

p. 9, available from www.gao.gov/new.items/d10155t.pdf.

72. Ibid., p. 4. Also see Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 

Supplement; Restriction on Acquisition of Specialty Metals (DFARS 

Case 2008-D003), Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 

29, 2009, available from www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/dfars/changenotice/2009/20090729/E9-17967.htm.

73. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Restriction on Acquisition of Specialty Metals (DFARS Case 2008-D003).

74. Feickert; Sullivan, p. 8.

75. CIED capabilities, such as the IED disposal function within EOD units, were funded as part of each Services’ baseline but 

had no special visibility and did not attract signifi cant funds (in 

U.S. terms).

76. Atkinson.

77. Ibid.

78. Marina Malenic, “JIEDDO To Fold Funding Request in 

FY “10 Base Budget,” Defense Daily, December 12, 2008, available 

from fi ndarticles.com/p/articles/mi_6712/is_49_240/ai_n31181737/.

79. Sullivan, p. 1.
67

80. Lieutenant General Tom Metz (Director, JIEDDO), quoted 

in Malenic.

81. Quadrennial Defence Review 2006, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of Defense, 2006, pp. vi, 33, 63-64.

82. There are a total of 12 references to IEDs and CIED capabilities in the 2010 QDR, compared with three in the 2006 document. Both the QDR and the Budget statements refer explicitly to 

the policy of giving priority to the capabilities needed for current 

confl icts over those needed for potential confl icts in the future. 

Quadrennial Defense Review 2010, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2010; and Undersecretary of Defense (Policy) 

Michele Flournoy, DoD News Briefi ng with Undersecretary Flournoy 

and Vice Admiral Stanley, Washington1 February 1, 2010.

83. “I remain concerned about the Army’s slow reaction to the 

theater’s urgent request for vehicles that provide better protection 

against Improvised Explosive Devices . . . “ Senator Carl Levin, 

Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee, letter to Secretary 

Robert M. Gates, June 19, 2007, available from pogoblog.typepad.

com/pogo/fi les/sen_levin_to_sen_biden_sen_levin_to_secdef_archive.

pdf.

84. This is similar to Nagl’s observations on the signifi cance of 

“The Man” (the senior leader) in military innovation. The difference lies in the level at which Gates was operating, in comparison 

with Nagl’s two examples (Templar and Westmoreland): Gates 

was operating at a national political (strategic) level and commanding a national response, while Templar and Westmoreland 

were operating at theater/operational levels and were responsible for “theater’ responses. Nagl, pp. 196-198, 201-204.

85. The number of troops reported offi cially as committed to 

Operation CATALYST, which covered Australia’s post-confl ict 

involvement in Iraq (from mid-2003 until July 2009) also included personnel deployed outside Iraq on ships and as part of Air 

Force detachments. The largest group inside Iraq was the battle 

group in the south, originally known as the Al Mutthana Task 

Group (AMTG) and later as the Overwatch Battle Group (West) 

(OBG[W]). The battle group and an associated training team had 
68

a combined strength of about 500. The next largest group was 

the Security Detachment (SECDET) for the Australian Embassy 

in Baghdad, with a maximum strength of about 120 personnel. 

Other elements included a national command element, an air traffi c control team, medical teams, training teams, and individual 

offi cers embedded in Coalition headquarters.

86. Australians required to conduct combat operations or otherwise face signifi cant exposure to IED hazards were members of 

the AMTG or OBG(W), the SECDET, and personnel assigned to 

the Combined Explosives Exploitation Centre (CEXC).

87. Two ADF fatalities on Operation CATALYST were caused 

by a training accident in Kuwait and a self-infl icted gunshot 

wound. A third ex-ADF member serving in the Royal Air Force 

was killed when his aircraft was shot down.

88. Only the battle group’s mission required it to provide security over an extensive area or to respond “outside the area” at 

times of high risk.

89. When the threat emerged in mid-2003, Australian troops 

in-country consisted of only about 130 personnel, most of whom 

(with the exception of the SECDET) worked within secure U.S. 

bases and had little exposure to IEDs. This situation continued 

into 2004. 

90. Senator Robert Hill, “Explosive Specialists Return Home 

from Iraq,” Ministerial Media Release No. 138/2005, September 3, 2005, available from www.minister.defence.gov.au/HillTpl.

cfm?CurrentId=5076. 

91. Personal Conversation with General Peter Cosgrove, Australian Chief of Defence Force, Canberra, June 14, 2005. 

92. Establishment of the ExHC was approved by the Army on 

July 27, 2005, but it was not offi cially established until February 

17, 2006. Andrew Hetherington, “Centre open day a blast,” Army, 

Vol. 11, No. 38, March 2006, available from www.defence.gov.au/

news/armynews/editions/1138/topstories/story10.htm.

93. For example, the inclusion of explosive detection dogs, 

EOD detachments, and protected vehicles at much higher levels 

than normal.
69

94. “New unit meets demand,” Army, Ed. 1248, November 11, 

2010, p. 11. 

95. “Ensuring safety across the globe,” Defence Magazine, Australian Department of Defence, May-June 2007, available from 

www.defence.gov.au/defencemagazine/editions/200705/groups/ops.

htm.

96. The 1994 Defence White Paper, Defending Australia, refers 

to the forthcoming acquisition of “a lightly armoured transport 

vehicle . . . to provide mobility to infantry brigades.” This was to 

support the “defeat of incursions on Australian territory.” Defending Australia, Canberra, Australia, Department of Defence, 1994, 

pp. 30, 50. This was the genesis of Project Land 116 (Project “Bushranger”), which has led to the procurement of the PMV.

97. Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements 2009-10: Defence 

Portfolio, Canberra, Australia: Commonwealth of Australia, 2009, 

p. 125.

98. In addition to the 444 PMVs acquired under Projects Land 

116 and the Enhanced Land Force for combat units, such as infantry battalions, 293 PMVs are being procured under Project Land 

121 (“Overlander”) for more general land transport requirements. 

Ibid. 

99. For example, AU$60 million in unforecasted funding for 

CIED equipment was provided in early 2009. “Chief Of Defence 

Force Media Round Table: Question And Answer Session,” Canberra, Australia, July 21, 2009, available from www.defence.gov.au/

media/SpeechTpl.cfm?CurrentId=9297.

100. These include improved body armor and EOD robots.

101. The most signifi cant example is media commentary relating to the wounding of Sergeant Michael Lyddiard, who lost an 

eye and an arm while attempting a render-safe procedure on an 

IED in Afghanistan in November 2007. Media commentary drew 

attention to alleged Government decisions to cancel acquisition 

of equipment that might have enabled him to avoid injury. Ian 

McPhedran and Mark Todd, “Digger lost eye, arm in Afghanistan 

blast,” The Australian, November 6, 2007, available from www.
70

news.com.au/national/digger-lost-eye-arm-in-afghanistan-blast/storye6frfkvr-1111114807687. Defence formally refuted the suggestion 

that tardiness in fi elding equipment contributed to Lyddiard’s injuries and referred to its “comprehensive systems and procedure”’ 

for protecting troops against IEDs. “Defence Response to Article 

by Mark Dodd ‘Canberra Cancelled Robot Unit for Bombs’,” On 

the Record, November 6, 2007, Canberra, Australia, Department 

of Defence, available from www.defence.gov.au/on_the_record/letters07.htm0.

102. Lieutenant Colonel Dave Rye, “School of Military Engineering: Training for the Future,” Australian Sapper 2008, Sydney, 

Australia: Head of Corps, Royal Australian Engineers, 2008, p. 6.

103. A survey of articles published in The Australian Defence 

Force Journal from 2001 to 2009, and The Australian Army Journal from 2003 to 2009 reveals only a few incidental references to 

IEDs during those periods, in the context of other topics. Journals 

pitched more at tactical-level interests, such as military branchspecifi c magazines, have more IED content from around 2008—

this may be attributable to the accumulation of experience from 

Afghanistan from 2006 onward. See Australian Sapper 2008. Over 

the entire period, there is limited coverage of IEDs in Service 

Newspapers, and then generally in the context of general-interest 

articles about deployed elements, such as the CEXC contingents. 

The emergence of CIED efforts as a growth industry and “fl avor 

of the month” may also have stimulated some discussion from 

agencies seeking to “get involved.” See “Countering Improvised 

Explosive Devices: The Air Power Contribution,” Pathfi nder (Air 

Power Development Centre Bulletin) No. 94, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra, Australia, 2008.

104. These would include the Defence Science and Technology Organization (DSTO) and Land Engineering Agency (LEA).

105. These include an additional 143 PMVs ordered in 2007 

for the Australian Army’s Enhanced Land Force (ELF) initiative 

and a further 39 vehicles ordered by the Netherlands since 2006 

to support its forces in Afghanistan. While the ELF order cannot 

be attributed directly to the IED threat, the Netherlands’ requirement can, albeit the threat in Afghanistan and not in Iraq. “Australia Orders 143 More Mine-Resistant Bushmaster Vehicles,” 
71

Defense Industry Daily, June 5, 2007, available from www.defenseindustrydaily.com/australia-orders-143-more-mineresistant-bushmastervehicles-03349/; and “Dutch Choose Bushmaster IMVs for Afghan 

Mission, Defense Industry Daily, August 23, 2009, available from 

www.defenseindustrydaily.com/dutch-spend-eur-25m-on-bushmasterimvs-for-afghan-mission-updated-02487/. The manufacturer, Thales 

Australia, has stated that these orders will be met from its existing 

production capacity (“Australia Orders 143 More Mine-Resistant 

Bushmaster Vehicles”), while stating elsewhere that it is undertaking some expansion in the capacity of its Bendigo production 

facility. Thales Australia Corporate Profi le, p. 10, available from 

www.thalesgroup.com/assets/0/95/389/392/ac110ae0-8ea1-4ee0-a77d4eefdf9c878e.pdf?LangType=2057. This would suggest that any industrial expansion is not in proportion to the U.S. response.

106. Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements 2009-10: Defence 

Portfolio, p. 21.

107. Ibid, p. 125.

108. Senator John Faulkner, New Measures to Protect Our Troops, 

Ministerial Release No. 043/2010, May 11, 2010, available from 

www.minister.defence.gov.au/Faulknertpl.cfm?CurrentId=10275.

109. Ibid. In 2010, the Government stated that funding for 

force protection measures totaled AU$1.4 billion to the end of fi scal year 2012-2013. Much of this contributed to CIED capabilities.

110. Akin to Clausewitz’s concept of coup d’oeil, a special level 

of insight which he saw as key to effective strategic decisionmaking. Clausewitz, pp. 141, 143. 

111. If SGT Andrew Russell’s death from a mine incident in 

2002 is discounted.

112. See Seth Cropsey, “The U.S. Navy in Distress,” Strategic 

Analysis, Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, Vol. 34, No. 

1, January 2010, pp. 35-45; Barrett Tillman, “Fear and Loathing 

in the Post-Naval Era,” Proceedings Magazine, United States Navy 

Institute, June 2009, available from www.USNI.org/magazines/proceedings/.
72

113. See, for example, Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper; 

also Cropsey, 2010; and Tillman. 

114. This has been characterized by the U.S. Army in particular as an “era of persistent confl ict.” See U.S. Army Posture Statement 2008, available from www.army.mil/aps/08/strategic_context/

strategic_context.html.

115. IEDs were employed against Soviet forces in the 1980s. 

While deployed on a UN mission in Pakistan in 1989-90, this author participated in the debriefi ng of an Afghan humanitarian 

demining team in which an IED discovered in Afghanistan was 

described in detail. 

116. Lieutenant General Michael L. Oates, Director, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, Statement before 

the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittees on Air and 

Land Forces and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, U.S. House 

Of Representatives, Protecting The Force From The Improvised Explosive Device, 2nd Sess., 111th Cong., March 17, 2010, available 

from armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/JOINTALSP031710/Oates_Testimony031710.pdf.

117. Robert M. Gates, Testimony to U.S. Senate Committee on 

Armed Services, February 2, 2010, available from armed-services.

senate.gov/Transcripts/2010/02%20February/10-04%20-%202-2-10.

pdf.

118. Robert M. Gates, Press Conference in Istanbul, February 

5, 2010, available from Defenselink.

119. Ibid.

120. See Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, RTF Soldier Killed 

in Roadside Bomb Attack, Media Conference October 9, 2007, Canberra, Australia: Coordination and Public Affairs, Department 

of Defence, 2007; and ADF Prepared for Improvised Explosive Device Threat, Canberra, Australia: Defence Media Liaison, June 29, 

2006, available from www.defence.gov.au/media/DepartmentalTpl.

cfm?CurrentId=5774.

121. Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements 2009-10: Defence 

Portfolio, p. 21. See also Ministerial Release No. 043/2010.
73

122. The signifi cant outcomes of the Australia-U.S. Ministerial (AUSMIN) talks of October 2010 included an agreement to 

cooperate on IED countermeasures. This was couched in the context of operations in Afghanistan, suggesting that the strategic response to the IED threat in that country is still evolving. AUSMIN 

2010Joint Communiqué, Melbourne, 8 November, Stephen Smith 

(Minister for Defence website), 2010, available from www.minister.

defence.gov.au/SmithStatementstpl.cfm?CurrentId=11039.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

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