alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Editorial Note on Part 411
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 411 appear at 71 FR 9471, Feb. 24, 2006

§ 411.402 Indemnification of beneficiary. ( a ) *Conditions for indemnification.* If Medicare payment is precluded because the conditions of § 411.400(a)(2) are not met. Medicare indemnifies the beneficiary (and recovers from the provider, practitioner, or supplier), if the following conditions are met: ( 1 ) The beneficiary paid the provider, practitioner, or supplier some or all of the charges for the excluded services.
( 2 ) The beneficiary did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to know that the services were not covered.
( 3 ) The provider, practitioner, or supplier knew, or could reasonably have been expected to know that the services were not covered.
( 4 ) The beneficiary files a proper request for indemnification before the end of the sixth month after whichever of the following is later: ( i ) The month is which the beneficiary paid the provider, practitioner, or supplier.
( ii ) The month in which the intermediary or carrier notified the beneficiary (or someone on his or her behalf) that the beneficiary would not be liable for the services. For good cause shown by the beneficiary, the 6-month period may be extended.
( b ) Amount of indemnification. [1] The amount of indemnification is the total that the beneficiary paid the provider, practitioner, or supplier.
( c ) *Effect of indemnification.* The amount of indemnification is considered an overpayment to the provider, practitioner, or supplier, and as such is recoverable under this part or in accordance with other applicable provisions of law.
Footnotes -
411.402
[1] For services furnished before 1988, the indemnification amount was reduced by any deductible or coinsurance amounts that would have been applied if the services had been covered.
# C_2005315EN.01001001.xml

| 10.12.2005 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 315/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.12.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 315/10

---

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court, Ireland by order of that court of 30 July 2004 in Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty, Minister for the Environment, Ireland and the Attorney General and Motor Insurers' Bureau of Ireland

(Case C-356/05)

(2005/C 315/18)

Language of the case: English

Reference has been made to the Court of Justice of the European Communities by order of the High Court, Ireland of 30.07.2004, received at the Court Registry on 23.09.2005, for a preliminary ruling in the proceedings between Elaine Farrell and Alan Whitty, The Minister for the Environment, Ireland and the Attorney General and The Motor Insurers' Bureau of Ireland on the following questions:

| 1. | As of December 31st 1995 the date by which Ireland was obliged to implement the provisions of the Third Directive (1) in respect of passengers on vehicles other than motorcycles, did Article 1 of the Third Directive oblige Ireland to render insurance compulsory in respect of civil liability for injury to individuals travelling in that part of a motor vehicle not designed and constructed with seating accommodation for passengers? |
| --- | --- |

1.

As of December 31st 1995 the date by which Ireland was obliged to implement the provisions of the Third Directive (1) in respect of passengers on vehicles other than motorcycles, did Article 1 of the Third Directive oblige Ireland to render insurance compulsory in respect of civil liability for injury to individuals travelling in that part of a motor vehicle not designed and constructed with seating accommodation for passengers?

st

1

| 2. | If the answer to Question (1) is in the positive, does Article 1 of the Third Directive confer rights on individuals that may be relied upon directly before the national courts? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If the answer to Question (1) is in the positive, does Article 1 of the Third Directive confer rights on individuals that may be relied upon directly before the national courts?

---

(1)  Third Council Directive 90/232/EEC of 14 May 1990 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liabilty in respect of the use of motor vehicles, Official Journal L 129, 19/05/1990 P.0033-0035.

1

---
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-6903

KEITH JAMES SEARS,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

SUSAN WHITE,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever, III,

Chief District Judge. (5:14-hc-02230-D)

Submitted: October 20, 2015 Decided: October 23, 2015

Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Keith James Sears, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Keith James Sears seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition as an 

unauthorized, successive petition. The order is not appealable 

unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A 

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies 

relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is 

debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). 

When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. 

at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that 

Sears has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, although 

we grant Sears’ motions for leave to amend his informal brief to 

add documentation and to amend his motion for a certificate of 

appealability, we deny Sears’ motions for a certificate of 
3

appealability and for the appointment of counsel, deny leave to 

proceed on appeal in forma pauperis, and dismiss this appeal. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
# C_2005217EN.01002602.xml

| 3.9.2005 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 217/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.9.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 217/26

---

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Hessisches Finanzgericht by order of that court of 14 April 2005 in Turbon International GmbH — as universal successor in title to Kores Nordic Deutschland GmbH v Oberfinanzdirektion Koblenz — Zoll- und Verbrauchsteuerabteilung

(Case C-250/05)

(2005/C 217/52)

Language of the case: German

Reference has been made to the Court of Justice of the European Communities by order of the Hessisches Finanzgericht of 14 April 2005, received at the Court Registry on 15 June 2005, for a preliminary ruling in the proceedings between Turbon International GmbH — as universal successor in title to Kores Nordic Deutschland GmbH and Oberfinanzdirektion Koblenz — Zoll- und Verbrauchsteuerabteilung — on the following question:

In the judgment of 7 February 2002 in Case C-276/00 (1) it was held that Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 (2) of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1734/96 (3) of 9 September 1996, had to be interpreted as meaning that an ink-cartridge without integrated print head, consisting of plastic casing, foam, a metal screen, seals, tape seal, labels, ink and packing material, which, as regards both the cartridge and the ink, could only be used in a printer with the same characteristics as Epson Stylus Colour ink-jet printers, was to be classified under subheading 3215 90 80 of the Combined Nomenclature.

1

2

3

Contrary to that ruling, should not the ink-cartridge described above in fact be classified as a part or accessory of a printer under CN heading 8473 because the mechanical and electronic functioning of the printer is dependent upon the presence of a cartridge of that kind?

---

(1)  [2002] ECR I-1389.

1

(2)  OJ 1987 L 256, p. 1.

2

(3)  OJ 1996 L 238, p. 1.

3

---
Order entered May 28, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-14-00822-CR

ANTWON CARTER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 296-81511-2013

ORDER

The Court REINSTATES the appeal.

On April 29, 2015, we ordered the trial court to make findings regarding why appellant’s 

brief has not been filed. We ADOPT the findings that: (1) after appellant was convicted, the 

trial court appointed Stephanie Hudson to represent appellant; (2) unbeknownst to the trial court, 

the Indigent Defense Offices of Collin County thereafter appointed Sam Rosenstein to represent 

appellant; (3) Mr. Rosenstein believed Ms. Hudson was representing appellant, and Ms. Hudson 

never received notification of her appointment as appellant’s attorney; (4) Mr. Rosenstein is 

closing is law practice; and (5) Stephanie Hudson is now appointed to represent appellant.

We note that although Mr. Rosenstein’s name is on the front cover of the clerk’s record, 

this Court has David Waddill, who was appellant’s trial counsel and signed the notice of appeal, 
listed as appellate counsel. Therefore, it does not appear that either Mr. Rosenstein or Ms. 

Hudson has received notices from this Court regarding the appeal. Nor does it appear that Mr. 

Waddill, despite being sent correspondence from this Court regarding the appeal, ever 

communicated to the Court that he is no longer representing appellant.

Accordingly, we DIRECT the Clerk of this Court to list Stephanie Hudson as appellant’s 

attorney of record in place of David Waddill.

We ORDER appellant to file his brief within FORTY-FIVE DAYS of the date of this 

order.

We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order to Stephanie Hudson and to the 

Collin County District Attorney’s Office.

/s/ LANA MYERS 

JUSTICE
**EXHIBIT
      32.1**





**CERTIFICATION**





*Pursuant
      to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002*





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Auto Underwriters of America, Inc.
      (the
“Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2006 as filed
      with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),
      Dean Antonis, as Principal Executive Officer of the Company hereby certifies,
      pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of his knowledge, that:





(1)
            the
                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section
                15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
            the
                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
                Company.





/s/
                Dean AntonisDean
                AntonisPresident
                (Principal Executive Officer)Date: November
                20, 2006











This
      certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for
      purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
      amended.
No. 99-553.

#### Corcoran et al. *v.*Croixland Properties Limited Partnership.

C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
The Honorable Jerry W. Cavaneau, United States Magistrate Judge for the

1

Eastern District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by

consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 98-2164

___________

Willie James Henderson, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of * [UNPUBLISHED]

Social Security, *

*

Appellee, *

*

State of Arkansas, *

*

Defendant. *

___________

 Submitted: November 4, 1998

 Filed: November 17, 1998

___________

Before WOLLMAN, HANSEN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Willie James Henderson appeals the district court&s dismissal of his action

1

against the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Henderson, acting pro se and in
-2-

forma pauperis, filed a complaint naming the Secretary as the only defendant.

This court reviews de novo the district court&s dismissal of a complaint for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See

United States v. Dico, Inc., 136 F.3d 572, 575 (8th Cir. 1998). To the extent this

lawsuit seeks review of a disability claim currently pending before the Social Security

Administration (SSA) we agree with the district court that Henderson had not

exhausted his administrative remedies, as evidence submitted by the SSA showed that

Henderson’s request for reconsideration was pending when he filed this action. See 20

C.F.R. § 416.1400(a) (1998) (listing steps of administrative review leading to final

decision). Even assuming that Henderson is attempting to bring an action for a

disability claim other than the one addressed by the Commissioner, he failed to show

that he exhausted his remedies with the SSA. Accordingly, his complaint was properly

dismissed. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (claimant may seek judicial review only after final

decision by Commissioner following hearing); Rowden v. Warden, 89 F.3d 536, 537-

38 (8th Cir. 1996) (court must dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if plaintiff

fails to exhaust administrative remedies without cause); Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590,

593 (8th Cir. 1993) (plaintiff must allege elements necessary for subject matter

jurisdiction).

Consistent with exhaustion principles, however, we modify the dismissal to be

without prejudice. Cf. Calico Trailer Mfg. Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, No.

97-3355, 1998 WL 569128, at *2 (8th Cir. Sept. 9, 1998); Seniority Research Group

v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 976 F.2d 1185, 1189 (8th Cir. 1992).

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THE  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION   EXTRACTED  FROM  THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET, CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS,  CONSOLIDATED
STATEMENTS OF STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY,  CONSOLIDATED  STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS, AND
THE NOTES THERETO, WHICH MAY BE FOUND ON PAGES F-1 THROUGH F-13 OF THE COMPANY'S
FORM 10-KSB FOR THE PERIOD  ENDED  DECEMBER  31,  1998,  AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         11,517
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               11,517
<PP&E>                                         0
<DEPRECIATION>                                 964
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 11,517
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          12,988
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    50,000
<COMMON>                                       3,158,162
<OTHER-SE>                                     (3,209,633)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   (1,471)
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               (4,068)
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               39,263
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (43,331)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (43,331)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (43,331)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (0.05)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (0.05)
        


</TABLE>
# C_2006131EN.01002902.xml

| 3.6.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 131/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.6.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 131/29

---

Action brought on 28 February 2006 — Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic

(Case C-119/06)

(2006/C 131/53)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: X. Lewis, acting as Agent, and M. Mollica, Avvocato)

Applicant:

Defendant: Italian Republic

Defendant:

Form of order sought

| — | A Declaration that, as the region of Tuscany and the Tuscan Aziende Sanitarie (public health authorities) concluded the regional framework agreement for the supply of healthcare transport services on 11 October 1999 with the Confederazione delle Misericordie d'Italia, ANPAS — the Tuscan regional committee and the Croce Rossa Italiana — Tuscan division, and subsequently extended that framework agreement by means of a memorandum of understanding on 28 March 2003 and, finally, in April 2004, on the basis of Regional Decision No 379 of 19 April 2004, concluded a new regional framework agreement maintaining the relationship with the above-mentioned organisations and entrusting the administration of the services in question to them for the period from January 2004 to December 2008, the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Council Directive 92/50/EEC (1) of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts and, in particular, Articles 11, 15 and 17 thereof. |
| --- | --- |

—

A Declaration that, as the region of Tuscany and the Tuscan Aziende Sanitarie (public health authorities) concluded the regional framework agreement for the supply of healthcare transport services on 11 October 1999 with the Confederazione delle Misericordie d'Italia, ANPAS — the Tuscan regional committee and the Croce Rossa Italiana — Tuscan division, and subsequently extended that framework agreement by means of a memorandum of understanding on 28 March 2003 and, finally, in April 2004, on the basis of Regional Decision No 379 of 19 April 2004, concluded a new regional framework agreement maintaining the relationship with the above-mentioned organisations and entrusting the administration of the services in question to them for the period from January 2004 to December 2008, the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Council Directive 92/50/EEC (1) of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts and, in particular, Articles 11, 15 and 17 thereof.

1

| — | An order that the Italian Republic should pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

An order that the Italian Republic should pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Commission maintains that the above-mentioned agreements delegating the supply of services in question constitute public service contracts which were awarded directly, without recourse to any form of tendering procedure, and thus in breach of Community law on public contracts.

---

(1)  OJ L 209 of 24/07/1992, p. 1.

1

---
EXHIBIT 10.12


 


First Amendment


 


to “Manufacturing and Supply Agreement”


 


This
First Amendment is dated May 8, 2002, and is made between Cubist
Pharmaceuticals Inc (“Cubist”), and ACS Dobfar (“ACSD”), who are parties to a
Manufacturing and Supply Agreement, dated September 30, 2001 (the “Agreement”);


 


Cubist
and ACSD hereby agree that Section 5.3 (“Purchase Forecasts”) of the
Agreement shall be removed in its entirety and shall be replaced with the
following:


 


5.3
Purchase Forecasts


 


Initially
within thirty (30) days following NDA Approval of Product, and continuing for
the remaining duration of the Agreement, Cubist shall provide to ACSD, within
the first fifteen (15) business days of each quarter, on a quarterly basis, a
rolling forecast for orders of Product with respect to the four (4) quarters
following the then current quarter (Purchase Forecast).  Cubist shall be obligated to purchase at
least eighty percent (80%) of the amount of Product forecast for the first
quarter of any Purchase Forecast, and shall execute a binding purchase order to
that effect.  The forecast for the
remaining three (3) quarters of any Purchase Forecast shall be
non-binding.


 


 




	
  Cubist Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

  	
   

  	
  ACS Dobfar

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  By: 

  	
   /s/
  Christopher Guiffre

  	
   

  	
  By:

  	
   /s/
  Falciani Marco

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Name: 

  	
  Christopher
  Guiffre

  	
   

  	
  Name: 

  	
  Falciani
  Marco

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Title: 

  	
  General
  Counsel

  	
   

  	
  Title: 

  	
  The
  President

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Date: 

  	
  May 8,
  2002

  	
   

  	
  Date: 

  	
  May 21,
  2002
U.S.B. HOLDING CO., INC.
                                  SUBSIDIARIES

                                   EXHIBIT 21

                                December 31, 2004


Union State Bank
100 Dutch Hill Road
Orangeburg, New York 10962

U.S.B. Financial Services, Inc. (subsidiary of Union State Bank)
100 Dutch Hill Road
Orangeburg, New York 10962

Dutch Hill Realty Corp. (subsidiary of Union State Bank)
100 Dutch Hill Road
Orangeburg, New York 10962

USB Delaware Inc. (subsidiary of Union State Bank)
300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1227
Wilmington, Delaware 19801

TPNZ Preferred Funding Corporation (subsidiary of USB Delaware Inc.)
100 Dutch Hill Road
Orangeburg, New York 10962

Union State Capital Trust I
100 Dutch Hill Road
Orangeburg, New York 10962

Union State Statutory Trust II
100 Dutch Hill Road
Orangeburg, New York 10962

USB Statutory Trust III
100 Dutch Hill Road
Orangeburg, New York 10962

Union State Statutory Trust IV
100 Dutch Hill Road
Orangeburg, New York 10962

Ad Con, Inc.
100 Dutch Hill Road
Orangeburg, New York 10962
#### P. W. B., a child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-976.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 1, 1974.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.