United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 28, 2021*

Decided April 28, 2021

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 20-2996 

LASANDRA NORMAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

CITY OF LAKE STATION, et al. 

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Indiana, 

Hammond Division.

No. 2:18CV209-PPS\JEM

Philip P. Simon, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

Two police officers from Lake Station, Indiana, arrested Lasandra Norman for 

driving under the influence. As relevant to this appeal, Norman sued the officers and 

the City of Lake Station, alleging that the officers used excessive force during the 

baseless arrest. After the defendants failed to respond to Norman’s complaint, the clerk 

of court entered a default first against the City, then later the officers. But before the 

court entered judgment, the defendants moved to set aside their defaults and to dismiss 

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 20-2996 Page 2 

the complaint. The court vacated the default and dismissed nearly all of Norman’s 

claims, but it allowed her to replead the claim that the officers used excessive force 

when handcuffing her. The court then dismissed her second amended complaint for 

failing to state a claim. On appeal Norman challenges the decisions to vacate the 

defaults and to dismiss the excessive-force claim. We affirm. 

In her earlier complaints, Norman alleged that, in December 2017, Lake Station 

police officers Troy Allen and Kevin McCann pulled her over on suspicion of drunk 

driving with her teenaged daughter in the car. She was given a breathalyzer test, and 

Allen, who is male, performed a pat-down search. One of the officers then put her in 

handcuffs so forcefully that she was injured, and she was taken into custody. Norman 

was charged, and, after a bench trial, a state circuit judge found her guilty of operating a 

vehicle while intoxicated and endangering a minor. 

Norman sued the officers and the City in May 2018, alleging multiple 

constitutional violations related to her arrest and prosecution. Neither the City nor the 

officers appeared or responded to the complaint within the time required. On Norman’s 

motion, the clerk of court entered default under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) 

against Lake Station in December 2018, and, in August 2019, the court ordered Norman

to submit evidence of her damages to support the entry of a judgment. The same 

month, the clerk entered a Rule 55(a) default against the two officers. The next day,

attorneys appeared on behalf of Lake Station and the officers and moved to set aside the 

entries of default based on the City’s inadvertent failure to distribute legal mail to the 

proper parties and the existence of meritorious defenses to the claims. See FED. R. CIV. P.

55(c). The district court granted the motion and ordered the defendants to respond to 

the complaint; they did so by moving to dismiss. 

The court granted the defendants’ motion. First, it concluded that claims about 

the validity of Norman’s arrest and prosecution would undermine her conviction for 

driving under the influence and were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 

The court also found that Norman did not state a constitutional violation by alleging 

that she was searched by a male officer. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 232 

(2011). And finally, the court determined that Norman failed to state a claim for 

municipal liability against Lake Station. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 

436 U.S. 658, 691–95 (1978). The district court granted Norman leave to replead only her 

excessive-force claim based on forceful handcuffing. 
No. 20-2996 Page 3 

After some procedural fumbles, Norman filed her second amended complaint. In 

the one-paragraph pleading, she alleged that Allen “felt and grabbed on [her] female 

body parts searching her” and performed “degrading acts” like “sticking a device in her 

mouth [and] repeating to her blow and blow harder into said device.” Norman also 

alleged that she was double-locked in handcuffs for a total of about an hour while being 

transported to the police station and later to jail. On the defendants’ motion, the district 

court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, concluding that nothing Norman alleged 

suggested this was anything other than a routine arrest. 

Norman appeals and first contends that the court should not have overturned

the entry of default against the defendants. We review a district court’s decision to set 

aside an entry of default for abuse of discretion. VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Ill. 

Trading Co., 811 F.3d 247, 255 (7th Cir. 2016). As a preliminary matter, we emphasize (as 

the district court did) that this case involves only an entry of default, see FED. R. CIV. P.

55(a), not a default judgment, see FED R. CIV. P. 55(b). VLM Food Trading Int’l Inc., 

811 F.3d at 255 (explaining this two-step process). A district court may set aside an entry 

of default for good cause, see FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c), which we have explained can mean 

failing to respond to a summons or complaint through inadvertence (rather than 

willfully ignoring pending litigation). Cracco v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 630–31 

(7th Cir. 2009). The party seeking to set aside the entry of default must also show quick 

action to correct the error and present a meritorious defense to the complaint, meaning

“more than bare legal conclusions . . . but less than a definitive showing that the defense 

will prevail.” Parker v. Scheck Mech. Corp., 772 F.3d 502, 505 (7th Cir. 2014). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it set aside the entry of 

default. The defendants submitted an affidavit from the Lake Station employee

responsible for sorting legal mail. She explained that the complaint and summonses 

were received but never delivered to the proper officials. The court reasonably found 

that the City had made a general mistake but had not engaged in any willful avoidance. 

The court also noted that, once made aware of the case by the entry of default against 

the officers, the defendants obtained counsel, filed appearances, and moved to vacate 

the default in less than two weeks, satisfying the prompt-action requirement. And 

finally, the court reasonably determined that the defendants had identified plausible 

defenses to the complaint: that many of Norman’s claims were untenable because of her

conviction for drunk driving and that, while Norman described unpleasant behavior by 

the officers, she did not allege facts that amounted to constitutional violations.
No. 20-2996 Page 4 

Norman also argues that the district court erred by dismissing her claim of 

excessive force by the arresting officers for their use of handcuffs. The court granted her 

leave to replead this claim with more details about any injuries or lasting harm from the 

handcuffs. Because “facts or admissions from an earlier complaint that are not included 

in a later complaint cannot be considered on a motion to dismiss,” we look only to 

Norman’s second amended complaint. Scott v. Chuhak & Tecson, P.C., 725 F.3d 772, 

782–83 (7th Cir. 2013). Norman alleges that she was double-locked in handcuffs with 

her hands behind her back for 40 minutes, then again for 20 minutes. She says nothing 

about pain or even discomfort. Therefore, Norman failed to state a claim for excessive 

force. See Stainback v. Dixon, 569 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 2009). Norman also reprised her 

claim that Allen searched her in an offensive manner, but here too her sparse allegations 

fall short of stating a claim. Although it refers to a “sexual assault,” Norman’s

complaint states simply that Allen “felt and grabbed on” her while “searching” her. A 

full search of the person is permitted during a lawful arrest, United States v. Robinson, 

414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973), and Norman’s description does not put Allen on notice of why

she believed that he conducted the search in an unreasonable manner. See Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

Norman does not raise any cogent arguments against the dismissal of the other 

claims she asserted in her initial pleadings, so any challenge is waived. See Lee v. Ne. Ill. 

Reg’l Commuter R.R. Corp., 912 F.3d 1049, 1054 (7th Cir. 2019). 

AFFIRMED