350114

JPRS 81933

6 October 1982

«I*K^» --"l'

Worldwide Report

LAW OF THE SEA

No. 210

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REPRODUCED BY

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

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JPRS 81933

6 October 1982

WORLDWIDE REPORT

LAW OF THE SEA

No. 210

CONTENTS

ASIA

AUSTRALIA

Offshore Drilling Program Planned Near Barrow Island

(Bruce Jacques; THE AUSTRALIAN, 13 Aug 82) 1

Exmouth Plateau Oil Exploration Plan Dropped

(Bruce Jacques; THE AUSTRALIAN, 16 Aug 82) 2

INDIA

ONGC Plans Institute for Seabed Exploration

(PATRIOT, 15 Aug 82) 3

Offshore Mineral Exploration Intensified

(PATRIOT, 13 Aug 82) 4

SRI LANKA

Fisheries Threatened by Dynamiting

(B. C. Perera; THE ISLAND, 23 Aug 82) 5

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

MOZAMBIQUE

Briefs

Seized Fishing Boat's Crew Held 6

SENEGAL

Agreements With Foreign Countries Concerning Fishing

in National Waters

(LE SOLEIL, 12 Jul 82) 7

- a - [III - WW - 136]
WEST EUROPE

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Danish Court Ups Fines for FRG Boats Fishing Off Greenland

(Eichner-Larsen; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 30 Jun 82) 9

FRG, Denmark Nearing Cod War Over West Greenland Fisheries

(BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, various dates) 11

Greenland Leader: May Interrupt FRG Visit,

by Ole Schmidt Pedersen

Danish Prime Minister Sees 'Provocation',

by Lisbeth Knudsen

Denmark, FRG Reach Agreement on Greenland Cod Dispute

(BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 16 Sep 82) 14

Schmidt Recognizes Special Greenland Problems,

by Klaus Justesen

Paper Comments on Danish Negotiators, Editorial

Greenland Fishermen Express Worry, by Claus Kallerup

FRG Reactions to Agreement

Advisor Views Results, Consequences of LOS Conference

(Uwe Jenisch; AUSSENPOLITIK, No 3, 1982) 18

ICELAND

Schräm: Iceland Can Ban Salmon Fishing Beyond 200-Mile Zone

(MORGUNBLADID, 18 Jul 82) 41

SWEDEN

Paper Urges Government To Stand Firm Against USSR on

Limit in Baltic

(Editorial; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 25 Jul 82) 43

- b -
OFFSHORE DRILLING PROGRAM PLANNED NEAR BARROW ISLAND

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 13 Aug 82 p 9

[Article by Bruce Jacques]

AUSTRALIA

[Text] l A CONSORTIUM led by Oc-'

>Tridental Petroleum expects

k next month to embark on a

' large offshore drilling program in West Australian wat-

,. ers just off Barrow Island.

The group is committed to a

.three-year program involving

-14 wells, and although it is not

certain how many wells will be

; drilled in the first year, the

cost could top $40 million.

: Oxy is bringing in a rig from

'.. Singapore, the Maersk Valiant, which is expected to be

under tow this weekend, arrive

'.' on site later this month and be

' ready to spud by September 1.

r The Maersk Valiant is ä

;:: large jack-up style rig capable

>: of drilling in water • depths

1 from 5m to nearly 100m -just

< the sort of depth variation

Oxy expects to encounter in

its program.

The consortium, which includes the Bond group, Pelsart,

Ranger, Reading and Bates

and Texas Eastern, is budgeting for the all-up cost of the

1 program to be about $120,000 a

< day. The first few targets have

already been selected.

Oxy, as operator, is working

on the basis that the Barrow

Island field is not unique and

. similar reservoir conditions'

'exist elsewhere in the hydro-

, carbon province.

The Barrow field has about

26 different reservoirs and

I Oxy believes even small oil acl cumulations in the area could

V be economic.

I This is mainly because of the

} shallow water and the fact

\ that oil has been discovered at

t such depths. The prospect of

:

utilising some of the Barrow

|. Island infrastructure could

also help the economics of any

operation.

. In other drilling developments, the newly-formed Cluff

Oil (Pacific) Ltd, will today

begin a deep water seismic

survey in the offshore West-

- em Australian permit

WA171P in the north Perth

!, Basin.

i The survey will use the Eugene McDermott seismic vessel and will be followed a week

later by a shallow water survey using the vessel, Banksia.

.About 550km will be shot in

* the deep water and 100km in

the shallow water.- '

CSO: 5200/7556
EXMOUTH PLATEAU OIL EXPLORATION PLAN DROPPED

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 16 Aug 82 p 1

[Article by Bruce Jacques]

AUSTRALIA

[Text] THE Esso-BHP consortium

i! has dealt petroleum explora-

* tion a serious blow by pulling

| out of a $60 million drilling

{ program on the Exmouth

| Plateau because of a disa-

| greement with the West

; Australian Government.

i The partners relinquished

! both their Exmouth areas,

' WA-9 6P and WA-97P, when

| they failed to agree on permit

i terms after negotiating with

|the State Government for

I more than eight months.

j And Esso-BHP's action may

; lead to another consortium

|led by the Hudbay group

frelinquishing its Exmouth

^permits.

Reserves

| Already, groups led by both

| Woodside and Phillips have

| dropped expensive exploration programs on the Exmouth Plateau after failing

to find oil,

The depressed business cli-

\ mate will make it extremely

difficult for the State

Government to find another

consortium prepared to

spend as much money as

EssoandBHP.

The consortium was plann-

, 'ing a three or four well drils ling program costing at least

$60 million but it is understood the Government wan-

, ted the companies to stick

fclose to their original exploration plans.

When the Exmouth permits

were issued in the late 1970s

the plateau, off the northern

>coast, was regarded as the

country's last chance for a

•significant new oil strike to

replace dwindling Bass Strait

' reserves. 1

It was believed that if oil

!'was found on the plateau,

reservoirs would be big because of the large structures

in the area.

At the time, five consortiums made unprecedented

exploration commitments to

win the permits. Esso-BHP's

plan involved a 21-well

program to cost about $128

million.

The plateau has turned out

to be a deepwater exploration

^graveyard, with more than

j$200 million being spent on

i "dusters", or unproductive

holes.

' Esso-BHP drilled eight

wells in 1979 and 1980 and

costs increased to about $110

million, more than twice the

•budget.

Naturally, the consortium

: was reluctant to drill the B extra 13 wells envisaged in

' the original program, alI though it has since accumulated more seismic data in an

^attempt .to find potential

dwells.

)' The consortium believed it

had identified a few more

' areas worth drilling and that

Its revised three to four-well

program was reasonable in

view of Woodside and Phillips pulling out.

Precedent

Esso and BHP have other

large exploration commitments, notably a $160 million

- program in Bass Strait.

The ""State —Government

apparently conceded there

was a strong technical argu- -

ment for reducing the .program but felt that to release

the consortium from its origi-

, nal obligations while allowing

it to retain the area would set

a dangerous precedent. .

CSO: 5200/7556
INDIA

ONGC PIANS INSTITUTE FOR SEABED EXPLORATION

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 15 Aug 82 p 6

[Text]

j '" '""" ' / DEHRADUN, Aug 14 (PTI).

"THE Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) will se$

up an institute of engineering and* ocean technology to

(explore the sea-bed more/comprehensively for offshore

(oil.

? This was announced here

Hoday by the ONGC chairman Col

»S P Wahi after releasing a sneteial P and T stamp on oil exploration. ; '• ' .'

t Establishment of this institute

fwill provide necessary infrastructure for exploiting latent oil

potential in various basins of the

icountry, he said.

i Col Wahi said India has trefmendous oil potential in the Kri-

'shna-Godavari Basin, Cauvery

IBasin, Ganga Valley and in Raiasthan.

, Before the turn of the century, he said, the country will

be self-sufficient in oil which was

(Vital for the economy. He said

Hhe ONGC was working on a 20-

"iyear oil exploration and production plan for harnessing oil potential in the country.

*: Col Wahi said the Wyear accelerated oil exploration and

^development plan prepared by

the commission calls for a mas-

^sive effort for exploring oil from

s'the Womb of the earth. Ninety

Sper cent cost of the plan would

"be met by the internal resources

' of the commission, he added.

^ The commission, he said, had

;-so far trained about 28.0(H) per-

: 6onnel engaged in oil exploration

sand production. . - . > Col Wahi also laid emphasis on

^conservation of oil and development of alternate sources of

'energy both conventional and

Inon-conventional. ,

V The Institue of Drolling Technology, Institute of Reservoir 5 Studies, and the K D Malaviya

'Institute of Petroleum EXploraktion are at present under the

[commission.

CSO: 5200/7052
OFFSHORE MINERAL EXPLORATION INTENSIFIED

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 13 Aug 82 p 5

[Text]

INDIA

OALÖÜWA, Aug 14 <MS)~

Side by side •With intensified

search for minerals like copper,

nickel and eofcält ön land, . tile

Geological Survey of India is

turning its attention to off-shore

a-eseurees which, aeeefüaa to

it, ftiäy ultimately tuftl OUt ta

be the ffläifistay öf the future.

With thlfi ebjeet In View, the

GSI is currently engaged in getting a DO-Blitre long vessel.

"VfihWa Vliifty," Ittide lii West

Germany, converted and refitted

with modern equipment tö

undertake marine Surveys, According to ä Gil release here,

th& release said that the remodelled research vessel» whieh

would facilitate systeautie jteological and geophysical mapping

And exploralon_ ef g_eeiogieal"

^sources of the sea-bed-within

the exclusive economic zone of

rthe country, was expected ^ to go

tint« operation by the'end of

. Vast and varied mineral, *esources of ladia, the release

said can meet the yapldiy grow«

inl industries ef the country.

iiit the identified resources «I

certain minerals are not largo:

ihd eaaaet meet the »resent

;-«iemafld er the ever increasing

Requirements of a faist developing country.

fills deficiency is particularly

flotlceable ia aon-ferrous aad

«erne alloying metals dike ees»

per, nickel and cobalt. She

GSl*s programme for< sea*ea

• search - for resources are' draw»

up in this context, the release

aöded.

Scientific studies and exploration carried out on the eeeaü

floor resources of the earth have

brought out tiie presence of vast

mineral occurrences Which Can

r meet mankind^ demands; for

several yearn The recently at

' celerated work ' to supplement

; the rapidly declining iaad depoÜäw has reached a stage where

i such exploitation is feäslhle. It

According to. the release, tne

identification of tin-bearing: geo-

-logical formations in th« centi*

cental shelf areas and the discovery ef poiymetaliic manganese nodules on the ocean floor

i have sustained the efforts tö

Ilook for sneh deposite.

CSO: 5200/7051
FISHERIES THREATENED BY DYNAMITING

Colombo THE ISLAND in English 23 Aug 82 p 3

[Article by B.C. Perera]

[Text]

SRI LANKA

Fisheries resources in the coastal

areas around Sri Lanka, as well as

those inland are threatened with

extinction due intensive unlawful

dynamiting offish, a report from the

National Aquatic Resources Agency

informed the Minister of Fisheries,

Mr. Festus Perera.

The NARA report pointed out

that the use of explosive for fishing

in coastal waters as in inland waters

had become a major threat to both

fish as well as plant life. The biggest

danger posed was the destruction to •

JShe fish habitats whichpromoted fish

breeding.

The Minister of Fisheries Mr.

Festus Perera, when asked about

this alarming situation pointed out

that the existing laws lacked "teeth"

to deal deterrently and adequately

with the problem, now reported to

be virtually out of control around

Sri Lanka. Mr. Perera said that he

would press for heavier

punishments with fines and

, mandatory jail sentences. He would

Be bringing inadequate legislation

to deal with the problem because of

the enormity of the problem now.

On the directives given by the

Fisheries Minister the NARA

launched a task force at

Trincomalee on the eastern coast

Where" the problem had become

serious. The task force included

officers from the Police, Navy and

the NARA. They have now

confirmed the alarming increase in

the use of dynamite for fishing. The

Task Force discovered in certain

areas over one hundred sticks of

dynamite.

Dr. Arthur C. Clarke, the well

known Science fiction writer, under

water explorer and the Chancellor

of the Moratuwa University had

also informed the NARA of the

danger of the extensive use of

dynamite for fishing. He has also

reported ofthe extensive destruction

of corals and other forms life in the

sea and inland water areas, due to

the use of explosives.

CSO: 5200/5677
MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

SEIZED FISHING BOAT'S CREW HELD—CAPE TOWN—An urgent attempt is being made

to secure the release of the 19 crew of the 44-ton Cape Town-owned fishing

boat Plumstead, who are in jail in Maputo after being found guilty of operating inside Mozambican territorial waters. Mr Hugo Prigge, owner of the

37-year-old vessel, which is based in Durban, said he had made urgent application to the Mozambican authorities for a visa to allow him to travel to

Maputo, where he intended appealing against the conviction. "As I understand

it, the Mozambican court officials based their findings on allegations that

the Plumstead had been noted operating in Mozambican waters 18 times, but

this is not true," he said. "The boat moved its operational base from Cape

Town to Durban only 10 months ago and this was the first time I had sent

it up the Natal North Coast. It has been operating mainly off the Natal

South Coast." [Excerpt] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 9 Sep 82 p 11]

CSO: 5200/5678
SENEGAL

AGREEMENTS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES CONCERNING FISHING IN NATIONAL WATERS

Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 12 Jul 82 /Supplement/

/Text?

Senegal has considerable fisheries resources but not, unfortunately, the

means to develop them exclusively. Consequently, in order to take fullest

advantage of them, it issues international fishing licenses pursuant to

agreements signed with European and African countries.

Industrialized countries having appropriate'technology but no fisheries resources are more than satisfied, especially since they profit in every case.

Having estimated the limitations to be respected so as to allow for reproduction of existing species, Senegal is endeavoring to make the most of usable resources not yet developed.

Fish, as is known, are not like other resources, and after two years, if

they do not die, they can migrate, as tuna has done. So by calling on foreigners to engage in fishing, we derive some profit, pending the time when

we shall be sufficiently equipped to do it ourselves. Fishing agreements

have been signed with the EEC, Spain, the Ivory Coast, and Guinea Bissau.

The latter two countries have not yet acted on the agreement; the first because it would be very costly for Ivorian boats to come and fish in Senegalese waters in view of the high price of gas-oil in Abidjan, and the second

owing to non-signature of the protocol.

Reduction in Licenses

The agreements just renegotiated with Spain and the EEC are particularly

characterized by reduction in the number of fishing licenses issued, following the increase in the number of Senegalese fishing boats. The authorities

are trying as best they can to equalize those numbers. But following denunciation of the agreement with Poland, problems are arising concerning exploitation of small pelagic species, since the Senegalese do not venture far offshore. In consequence the balance is now broken on that point.

For, with respect to each country signing an agreement with Senegal, determination is made of the tonnage of tuna boats, trawlers, or frozen tuna boats,
to be allowed to fish certain species, and the portion of the catch which

must be landed to permit local seafood processing industries to operate.

In the case of the EEC, for example, tuna boats totaling 3,000 gross tons

are required to land their catch, while trawlers of 2,150 gross tons are

based at Dakar. Community tuna boats with freezing equipment must in addition land 23,300 tons of tuna in Senegal, in contrast to trawlers with freezing facilities which fish all year without being required to land their catch.

Their total tonnage is 5»000.

The agreement signed with Spain concerns the same types of fishing. Awaiting authorization to fish under the agreement are k6 tuna boats with freezing facilities, totaling ^5,900 gross tons; 20 fresh fish trawlers totaling

6,400 tons; and probably 10 whalers.

Financial Compensation

Species concerned are essentially tuna, which is migratory; deep-water shrimp,

which are caught by few Senegalese boats; and dark hake, which Is-of no value

to Senegal since it is consumed only in Andalusia and not elsewhere in Spain.

Countries sighing fishing agreements pay financial compensation to Senegal,

in addition to providing technical assistance. In the case of the EEC, for

example, compensation is 2.5 billion for the two year period of the agreement. The EEC also participates in the research and training program, and

pays higher dues than those charged Senegalese nationals.

Spain pays 2.3 billion, participates in training and research, and provides

boats for training. In addition, a third of each boat's crew must be Senegalese maritime personnel.

This year's innovation consists in taking on board Senegalese observers to

verify types of fish caught, areas fished, tonnage, etc. Finally, the agreement objective is no longer signed. Instead,_complete renegotiation is conducted to obtain maximum profit fa.s published/.

Apart from licenses granted pursuant to fishing agreements signed with other

countries, domestic boats wishing to fish in Senegalese waters must also

be licensed. They must be as modern as possible: under 7 years old for

wooden and less than l^f years of age for iron hulls.

Only boats of over 1,500 gross tons are denied fishing authorization. This

decision was taken out of concern to protect local fishing industries, for

refrigerated boats, being fully equipped, do not need to use local infrastructures.

The preference of the Oceanographic and Marine Fisheries authorities, no

doubt, is for boats which ice their catch, and which supply national processing plants.

61^5

CS0: 5200/5672
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

DANISH COURT UPS FINES FOR FRG BOATS FISHING OFF GREENLAND

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 30 Jun 82 p 3

[Article by lb Eichner-Larsen]

[Text] Yesterday the Supreme Court imposed a fine and corresponding confiscations on two FRG shipmasters for illegal cod fishing off Greenland. Karl

Friedrich Egner, 53, öf Fischbach, was fined 200,000 kroner and 1.7 million

kroner in confiscation, while Karl Otto Erwin Behrmann, 36, of Cuxhaven, was

fined 250,000 kroner and 900,000 kroner in confiscation. Moreover, the shipmasters must bear the costs. The eases were brought before the Supreme Court

after the two lower courts had made diverging decisions with the aim of establishing uniform future guiding lines for fines and confiscations in such cases.

For that reason, the grounds of the decision are quite detailed.

In the Egner ease, the Supreme Court declares, among other things, that the

need to take into consideration the preservation of the fish stock in the

Greenland waters as well as the currency devaluation speak for an increase of.

the present level of fines. Further, "Counteracting; offences of this character must primarily be made through precautions directed against the person

profiting from the fisheries. The court considers 200,000 kroner a suitable

fine, taking into consideration, among other things, the size, capacity, and

equipment of the ship." Further, it says that due to the peculiar conditions

for the investigation and prosecution of illegal fishing, the demands must be

directed solely at the shipmaster concerned also in behalf of the shipping

company so that the company guarantees the fine and the confiscation before

the ship leaves Greenland. Under these circumstances, it is found that confiscation of the profit of the company may take place during the case. The

confiscation will be done according to the value of the illegal catch at the

time of seizure without deductions for an eventual processing. As the Naval

Fisheries Inspection and the Greenland authorities have authority to order the

foreign vessels to the nearest harbor for inspection, it is found that the

price should be fixed according to prices in Greenland's harbors.

It is further added in the Behrmann ease that the value of the equipment used

is to be confiscated at 200,000 kroner as Behrmann has acted in behalf of the

company. Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei, Ltd., has put up a guarantee for

the fine and confiscation of 2 million kroner of the ship "Heidelberg," of

2,556 gross register tons. Hanseatische Hochseefischerei has put up a
guarantee of 3 million kroner for Egner's ship, the "Geeste," of 3,576 gross

register tons. The Greenland High Court sentenced Egner to pay a fine of

500,000 kroner and 1,970,000 in confiscation, while the High Court of East

Denmark Ostre Landsret fined him 125,000 kroner and a confiscation of

1,043,000 kroner. Behrmann was fined 600,000 kroner and a confiscation of

equipment of 1.4 million kroner by the Greenland High Court. The High Court

of East Denmark fixed the fine at 125,000 kroner and the confiscation at

386,910 kroner, but rescinded the confiscation of the equipment as it was not

owned by the shipmaster.

9892

CSO: 5200/2087

10
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

FRG, DENMARK NEARING COD WAR OVER WEST GREENLAND FISHERIES

Greenland Leader: May Interrupt FRG Visit

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 31 Aug 82 p 1

[Article by Ole Schmidt Pedersen]

[Text] The cod war between Denmark and West Germany began in earnest yesterday

when the EC Commission gave its permission to the West Germans to catch the first

2,000 tons of cod off West Greenland.

"Politically,1 it is an unfortunate thing for the EC and West Germany to provoke

Greenland in the area of the, fishing policy. In so doing, they give Greenland

its last kick out of the EC," says Poul Torring, president of the Danxsh Association of Fish Processors and Fish Exporters.

Poul T0rring says, incidentally, that the decision by the EC Commission is based

on an extremely dubious interpretation of the present fishing regulations. He

says that the consequence must be for the Danish government to allow mackerel

fishing contrary to the EC quota.

Denmark has already lodged its protest against the decision by the EC Commission.

However, it is not conceivable that the supreme authority of the EC, the Councxl

of Ministers, will set aside the decision. The Council of Ministers has already

received a proposal from the EC Commission for a total West German quota of

10,000 tons off West Greenland.

The chairman of the local Greenland government, Jonathan Motzfeldt, stated after

an emergency meeting last night that if German trawlers arrive off the west coast

of Greenland, he will immediately cancel his visit to Federal Chancellor Helmuth

Schmidt.

11
Danish Prime Minister Sees 'Provocation'

Copenhagen BEELINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 1 Sep 82 p 7

[Article by Lisbeth Knudsen]

[Text] The Danish government is seeking to force West Germany to agree to a solution through negotiations to the cod war off West Greenland, but the government

has finalized instructions for the Danish fisheries inspection vessels for actions

if the West German government fails to keep the German fishermen away from the

area. The fisheries inspection vessels are already in Greenland waters.

"It looks like a provocation," the prime minister said yesterday after the approval

by the EC Commission of West German fishing off West Greenland yesterday morning.

The Danish government finds the decision legally untenable on concrete points and

yesterday afternoon sent another note of protest to the West German_federal chancellor and minister of fisheries as well as another one to the EC Commission.

"We now expect that the Germans will not start fishing in the area. However, we

have worked out instructions for the inspector of fisheries, but it would not be

reasonable for me to make any statements as to what may happen if it comes to the

worst," the prime minister says.

After receiving the report on the approval by the EC Commission of West German cod

fishing of 2,000 tons off West Greenland, the Danish government was yesterday in

contact with the EC Commission and with the local Greenland government. At a meeting of ministers, it was, subsequently, decided to work out still another note of

protest, containing detailed written grounds for the protest, to the West German

government and the federal chancellor as well as a note of protest to the EC Commission.

The Danish government protests against the approval of the fishing on the basis of

a proposal from the EC Commission which has not yet been approved by the Council of

Ministers. The Danish government, furthermore, protests against the application of

the so-called 'roll-over arrangement' as an argument for the approval. The arrangement implies that agreements from previous years be temporarily extended when no

new agreements have been made. The government draws attention to the fact that the

West Germans have not been fishing cod off West Greenland since 1978. "Under these

circumstances, one can hardly claim that it is a question of rights as a result of

a roll-over arrangement," Anker J0rgensen says.

To the EC Commission, the Danish government will protest against the fact that a

single commissioner on duty signed the approval for the West German government. In

the opinion of the Danish government, the decision could at the earliest be made at

the next meeting of the EC Commission to be held on 8 September. However, the

government is of the opinion that the decision cannot be made by the EC Commission

alone but ought to await a meeting of the Council of Ministers to be held on 21

September. "The decision ought to have awaited a legal solution or a total clarification of the future fishing policy of the EC," says Anker Jargensen.

12
After the meeting of ministers, Minister for Greenland Affairs Tove Idndbo Larsen

stressed that Greenland has been approved as a so-called preferential status country

within the EC, and that the decision by the EC Commission, therefore, is the more

open to criticism.

Minister of Fisheries Karl Hjortnaes says that the decision by the EC Commission

following the government's position is illegal. He states that there are Danish

inspection vessels in the Greenland waters if West Germany decides to allow its

fishermen to proceed to West Greenland, and that it will probably take the West

German fishermen 2 days to reach the area.

7262

CSO: 5200/2121

13
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

DENMARK,' FRG REACH AGREEMENT ON GREENLAND COD DISPUTE

Schmidt Recognizes Special Greenland Problems

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Sep 82 Sect III p 5

[Article by Klaus Justesen]

[Text] The new Danish minister of foreign affairs, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, is

getting high marks for his initial performance on the international political

scene. Especially the West Germans have given expression to their recognition

of the Danish minister's efforts during the difficult fishery negotiations late

last Tuesday.

High-ranking German sources tell EERLINGSKE TIDENDE that they were both impressed

and astonished that the new minister had managed to acquaint himself so soon

with the details of a most complicated and circumstantial issue. Also the

Danish minister's skill as a negotiator was praised.

At a cabinet meeting yesterday, the German government approved of the agreement.

At the said meeting, Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt stressed that the German

government appreciated Greenland's special problems. This statement supports the

understanding that it is an implicit part of the agreement that, in the upcoming

negotiations of association for Greenland with the EC, West Germany will support

Greenland's wishes for a preferential status.

High-ranking Danish sources yesterday expressed their great satisfaction with

the result of the prolonged negotiations. A few of them thus admitted that the

result was better than they had dared hope for beforehand. From the Danish side,

it was recognized that West Germany held many trump cards.

At the same time, the Danish sources warn that the dispute has not yet been

finally solved. Such a solution may only be found when the EC Commission anew

submits a proposal for the total quantity of cod to be fished off West Greenland

and its distribution. West Germany has, so far, been granted 5,000 tons but

will, undoubtedly, demand more when the temporary agreement expires in early

November.

It is, at the same time, certain that the EG will now drop its legal proceedings

against Denmark. The spokesman for the West German government, Klaus Boiling,

stated yesterday that there, simply, is no longer any basis for the two

14
cases. Also the German government guarantee of indemnity for damage to the

fishing tackle of German trawlers in case of capture has been dropped.

The next step will be a move from the EC Commission in Brussels. Denmark adheres

to the demand that no more than a total of 62,000 tons of cod may be caught off

West Greenland. West Germany wants a larger quantity. However, judging from the

positive spirit prevailing during the meeting last Tuesday, it seems that a

compromise is within reach.

Paper Comments on Danish Negotiators

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Sep 82 p 8

[Editorial: "The Cod Peace"]

[Text] Karl Hjortnaes talks like a flatfish with both corners of its mouth on the

same side of its head, and the results become accordingly. From one corner of

his mouth, the former minister of fisheries says that the new minister of foreign

affairs has sold out Greenland's fishery interests since,, as a novice, he slipped

on the polished floors of the international arena. And, from the other corner

of his mouth, he utters, with a gurgling noise, that Ellemann-Jensen is certainly

not to take the credit for the solution to the cod war which he brought home with

him from Bonn, for it was an inheritance from the former government—it was the

compromise arranged by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Kjeld Olesen. If he is

right in making the latter claim, and that is, of course, possible, the former

government must, in his opinion, also have been in the process of selling out

Greenland's interests, and, then, only its departure prevented it from disavowing its minister of fisheries itself.

The essential thing, however, is that the cod war between Denmark and Greenland

has been called off on a reasonable basis and with the full support of the

Greenland home rule government. The German high-sea fleet will, in the course of

the coming 6 weeks, be permitted to catch a bit of the cod quota which the Greenlanders themselves have not been able to catch this year. This obligingness does

not cost the Greenland home rule government anything, and it will not harm the

fish stock. It will not prejudice subsequent fishery agreements, but it will

result in some degree of relaxation prior to the coming negotiations on the

joint fishery policy. The legal proceedings brought by the West German government against Denmark before the EC court of justice will be dropped, and the

evaluation on the part of the experts of advisable and permissible fishing will be

taken up for renewed consideration. And, by way of obligingness on the part of

the West Germans toward Greenland, the West German government has promised to take

a positive attitude toward the question of special arrangements for Greenland

once it withdraws from the EC. This is not a promise which will cost the West

Germans anything today, but it, nevertheless, is of value.

If the main lines of this compromise were arranged by the former minister of

foreign affairs during his talks last week with Under Secretary Wischnewski,

Kjeld Olesen is welcome to his share of the credit. The government had been

maneuvered into an entirely untenable position by its minister of fisheries, who

15
stuck so stubbornly to his lonely corner on the polished floors as if he had

pitch under the soles of his shoes. It was necessary for mobility to be recreated

in the policy of the government, and if Kjeld Olesen did arrange the disavouwal of

Karl Hjortnses which Uffe Ellemann-Jensen came to carry out, it is an unusual but

beneficial expression of continuity in the Danish foreign policy.

Greenland Fishermen Express Worry

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Sep 82 Sect Ipl

[Article by Claus Kallerup]

[Text] They Fear an Invasion by Foreign Fishing Fleets

The Association of Greenland Deep-Sea Fishermen completely disagree with the

evaluation by Emil Johansen, member of the local Greenland government, that allowing West German fishing of 5,000 tons of cod off Greenland's west coast will not

lead to any invasion by foreign fishing fleets in pursuit of cod off West Greenland.

"With the agreement entered into, the Greenland waters have been thrown open to

fishing which, in the opinion of the Association of Greenland Deep-Sea Fishermen,

will start a landslide of wishes and demands from abroad on the Greenland fish

resources,"it says in a statement from the Association of Greenland Deep-Sea

Fishermen.

The statement goes on ,to say: "Greenland has achieved nothing really through the

present agreement but, in the opinion of the Association of Greenland Deep-Sea

Fishermen, has lost its possibilities, in the long run, to base the country's

existence and economy on Greenland's present main industry, the fishing industry."

The association goes on to say: "In the present 'cod case,' West Germany has

acted in a very provocative manner and has clearly demonstrated how rich industrial

countries are, at any time, ready to oppress the weak nations, just for the sake

of their own gains."

Comments from the Organization of Greenland Fishermen, Sealers and Whalers, the

KNAPK, do not indicate either that they are confident that the agreement will

not go beyond the quota of 5,000 tons, as agreed upon now.

Karl Olsen, chief of the secretariat of the KNAPK, tells BERLINGSKE TIDENDE:

"This arrangement will start a landslide; in support of their demand for fishing

off West Greenland, the West Germans have cited historical rights. Now they have

got their permission. What will then hold back other nations which have previously been fishing sporadically off West Greenland? We are convinced that the West

Germans will not stop at the 5,000 tons once they have got started."

On the Greenland radio yesterday, Lars Emil Johansen, member of the local Greenland government, defended the agreement by stating that, due to climatic conditions, the Greenland fishing fleet has not been able to use up its own quota, and,

16
therefore, there was no longer any basis for the argument to hold back the West

Germans.

"An agreement based on the fact that the Greenland fishing has been poor is, in

no way, something to be happy about. But we have limited the damage which would

otherwise have happened," Lars Emil Johansen said, having in mind the, West German

demand for an increase in the total cod quota from 62,000 tons to 75,000 tons.

For the rest, the political comments on the agreement are subdued. However, the

following derisive comment was made by the extremist Inuit Ataqatigiit La radical

youth group]: "The local government has been barking like a leading sledge dog

but is now whimpering like a puppy."

FRG Reactions to Agreement

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Sep 82 Sect I p 1

[Text] From the reactions in Bonn it appeared last Wednesday that the compromise

recently arranged with Denmark on the much disputed cod fishing off West Greenland

is in West Germany regarded as a West German victory.

The Danes do not agree with this evaluation, as appeared from Klaus Justesen's

report on the events in Bonn last Tuesday night.

7262

CSO: 5200/2122

17
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

ADVISOR VIEWS RESULTS, CONSEQUENCES OF LOS CONFERENCE

Hamburg AUSSENPOLITIK in German No 3 1982 pp 243-262 !

[Article by Uwe Jenisch: "Law of the Sea Convention—Consequences, A

German Viewpoint"]

[Text] The new Convention on the Law of the Sea [LOS]

was adopted on 30 April 1982 in New York. Following 9

years of discussions, the Third LOS Conference of the

United Nations was concluded, the new treaty system will

change economic and geographic relationships in the world

in a manner which may only be compared to the age of

colonialization. Dr Uwe Jenisch of the Ministry of

conomics and Transportation of the Land of SchleswigHolstein, who took part in the conference sessions as an

advisor of the German LOS delegation, also participated

in the final session in New York. He followed and

analyzed all developmental stages of the LOS Conference

in this periodical in a uniquely continuous and complete

manner. Now he is taking a'clook at the problems of the

implementation and the realization of the new convention.

There is not doubt that the formal signing of the

convention in December 1982 in Caracas will receive a

qualified majority; subsequently the treaty will be known

by the brief title of Caracas Convention. Nevertheless,

141 yes-votes in New York are opposed by 21 important

states which are not willing to join the consensus but

are expected to provide 60 percent of the UN budget.

Among them are, from the "conference group of the five,"

the big Western industrial states—"the United States,

the United Kingdom and the FRG. As a matter of fact,

because they are in the majority, the developing countries

more or less succeeded in getting their way with respect

to all items and procedures for the future regulation.

For many countries the result are disadvantageous and will

lead to serious consequences. The contents of the

convention includes a division into zones and a

nationalization of the ocean's resources by setting up

coastal waters, economic zones and continental-r shelf

18
zones. Such a division leaves almost nothing for a

country like the FRG. With the establishment of the UN

Seabed Authority, deep-sea mining is functionally

entering the new economic world order. It is a model

decision in favor of new worldwide economic organization

and administration structures. For the first time the

United Nations will be given an instrument, in the form

of the Seabed Authority, to control supranational tasks

and to function as a commercial enterprise. Because of

the existing majority, Western industrial states—the FRG

was again included—were not able to get any liberal

positions adopted, the only positive expectations relate

to the preparatory investment protection for so-called

pioneer investments for deep-sea mining which are made

before the convention becomes effective. It concerns

the recognition of exploration and mining areas in favor

of those countries which are currently the first ones

to enter the threshold of deep-sea mining, and among

them is also the FRG.

1. Adoption of Convention on 30 April 1982

On Friday 30 April 1982, at the seat of the United Nations in New York, the

Third UN Law of the Sea Conference was concluded with the adoptioncöf a new

LOS Convention under the energetic leadership of the conference president

Koh (Singapore).1During 9 years of negotiations, requiring 11 sessions

and a total of 93 weeks—the 11th session lasted from 8 March to 30 April

1982—approximately 160 states were arguing over a new law of the sea, which

is now seeking universal recognition. It is called the Convention on the

Law of the Sea, contains approximately 320 articles,29 appendices and 5

resolutions, combining in one convention a total package of all marine

products and all areas of the seas—in other words, 70 percent of the

earth's surface.

During the final session, 120 states voted in favor of the adoption of the

convention, among them were almost all of the developing countries and

11 industrial countries (Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, Ireland, Sweden,

France, Japan, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada and New Zealand). The

United States, Israel, Venezuela and Turkey voted against it for various

reasons. Seventeen Eastern and Western industrial countries abstained.

They were: Belgium, Bulgaria, White Russia, the CSSR, the GDR, the FRG,

Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain,

Thailand, the Ukraine, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. The voting

pattern shows that the EC states did not vote uniformly. The overwhelming

numerical majority of those in favor must not hide the fact that 21

important states, which represent 60 percent of the UN budget, were not

willing to join the consensus. It is therefore unlikely that the result of

the vote will sustain a permanent regulation.

It also reduces the chances for solidifying the convention content, either

as a whole or in part, while it is in the process of being shaped into a

common law.

19
According to the timetable of August 1981,3 t1ie adoption of the convention

at the end of the 11th session had been preceded by 3 weeks of informal

negotiations which dealt with U.S. requests for changes4in deep-sea mining.

On 2 April 1982, the Collegium (the conference president and the committee

chairmen) submitted a memorandum5which already contained the essential

elements of the later proposal. It was followed, on 7 April 1982, by the

consensus procedure,6during which the transition to the formal procedure

was accomplished. As a consequence, formal proposals for changes could be

submitted until 14 April 1982 to be voted upon later. Thirty-one proposals

were made,7but they were no longer considered seriously. On 23 April 1982

the collegium submitted a second memorandum" with minor changes and on the

same day the conference decided that all efforts had been exhausted to reach

a general consensus. According to the rules of the procedure this procedural

step was necessary to enter the phase of voting. Although the decision

was again made in the consensus procedure—i.e., without a vote—Belgium,

France, the FRG, Italy, Japan, the Unit-d Kingdom and the United States

declared in vain that in their opinion not all possibilities of negotiation

had been exhausted.10On 26 April 1982 there was to be a vote on the proposed

changes, but the conference president succeeded in persuading all but three

petitioners to forego a vote.11This waiver in conjunction with all the

other proposals concerning the deep-sea regime also took care of the AmericanGerman proposals for deep-sea mining,12

a proposal by Zaire concerning

user rights for fishing in neighboring economic zones,

13

a proposal for

registering and licensing procedures for warships passing through foreign

coastal waters14and the proposal for establishing a Common Heritage Fund.15

Two proposals were voted down,. one submitted by Spain16 concerning straits

and one by Turkey1on the proviso clause.

18 On 29 April 1982 the conference president submitted his third memorandum,x

which contains additional improvements for the authority's own mining

company—called "Enterprise"—and he appealed to all participants to accept

by consensus his proposals contained in his three memoranda as well as the

convention draft. The United States, however, insisted on a vote by roll

call,19which followed on 30 April 1982.

According to the internal procedural regulations of the LOS Conference

(rule 39)20the ratification of the convention marks the end of the

substantial negotiations. The mandate of the UN General Assembly of 16

November 1973 "...to adopt a convention..." (Resolution 3067 XXVIII) has

been fulfilled. In agreement with rule 39, which specifies a qualified

two-third majority for the adoption of the convention, 130 yes-votes met

this requirement. The conference had been planning for a long time to

consider the possibility of adoption by consensus, as an exception to rule

39__as is apparent from the footnotes to articles 309 and 310 in the

convention draft—but on the basis of the above-mentioned petition by the

United States it reverted to the ratification by vote.

The vote led to complex results. There is still no final text of the

convention but only a package of different documents and diverse corr

The convention text alone is the combination of five documents.2In

addition there are five resolutions listed below which, without being

of the convention, are still inseparably connected with it.2/i

20
—Resolution I on the establishment of a preparatory commission for the

Seabed Authority and the LOS Court (Documents L 94 and L 132/Add 1);

—Resolution II on the preparatory investment protection for pioneer

activities in seabed mining (Documents L 132/Add 1 and Cor 1 as well as

L 141/Add 1);

—Resolution III on the rights and interests of territories that are not

yet independent (Document L 94);

—Resolution IV on the rights of recognized national freedom movements

(Document L 132/Add 1);

—Finally, there is a fifth resolution which was submitted by Peru in the

name of the Group of 77 and which contains recommendations on the development

of national sea exploration, technology and service programs for developing

countries.23

Resolutions (decisions) are usually political resolutions by international

organizations and conferences. As a rule there is no implementation clause,

a ratification by national parliaments is dispensable, rights and duties

for states do not apply until the signature indicates ratification, and

thus they become a valud international law for the signatory states.

The four resolutions are in part analogous to sections in the convention,

which refers on various occassions to the resolutions; for instance, in

article 308, section 4 and 5 with respect to the validity of the decree

for deep-sea mining, in article 1 until the part dealing with participation

rights, in article 305 and appendix IX also concerning participation rights

and In articles 156, section 3, and 319, section 3, with respect to the

observer status for freedom movements.

2. Timetable for Realization of Convention

At the present time it is not possible to predict whether the front will

remain Of those countries who rejected the convention or abstained from

voting. Whereas the Western industrial countries rejected the consensus

for reasons of general dissatisfaction with the deep-sea regulations, the

East bloc countries based their abstention on the alleged disadvantagesofor

the Soviet sea-bed mining consortium as. contained in the preliminary

investment protection (cf. 4.2)—not a very convincing argument.

The near future will show whether a carrying majority of states will produce

the political will for this law of the sea, which can only be realized in

peace. As a result, all governments will have to face the question of

examining their own interests in the seas, of taking stock and evaluating

the situation, which in spite of 9 years of negotiations has to date not

been done sufficiently—at least no in the FRG—especially when the long-term

political and economic effect is taken into consideration of this conference

of the century which will change the economic and geographic relationships

of the world in a manner which at best is comparable to the age of

colonialization.

21
For the time being—for procedural reasons—it is still a long way anyway

until the convention can be implemented. The adoptionoof the text in New

York only marks the end of the diplomatic negotiations on international

law.

2.1 Editorial Committee

The large number of documents which still contain open questions and unclear

passages now need to be summarized by the editorial committee and put in

legible form in the languages for UN negotiations and documents. An example

for the unreadiness of the texts, among other things, is the fact that the

German delegation has not succeeded to date to establish the correct

designation of the seat of the LOS Court, which according to available

information is to be located in Hamburg; the reason is Soviet resistance.

The work of the editorial committee requires an additional five weeks of

negotiations from 13 July to 13 August 1982 in Geneva. On 22 September 1982

the Plenary Session of the LOS Conference will reconvene in New York for

3 days as a continuation of the 11th session to authorize the work of the

editorial committee. Subsequently convention texts ready for signatures,

including the final act, will be prepared in the UN languages. It is

expected that this year's General Assembly of the United Nations will

conclude the conference on the basis of a report by Conference President

Koh and charge the secretary-general with the preparations for the signing

of the final act and the convention.

2.2 Signing of the Final Act in Caracas

Between 6 and 10 December 1982, the ceremonial signing of.the final act is

to take place in Caracas, the capital of Venezuela which voted against the

convention. The final act, the contents of which has not yet been negotiated,

is—apart from the contents and text of the convention—the ceremonial

final conclusion to the diplomatic negotiations on international law, in

other words, it is the formal ratification of the convention by signing the

final act. The contents of the final act will essentially consist of a

procedural inventory of the conference history, in other words, a listing

of the sessions, dates, participating states and a presentation of

conference organizations. It does not provide any legally binding effects.

2.3 Signing of Convention

As soon as the final act has been signed, the states also have the option of

signing the convention which,,in accordance with article 305, will be

available for signing for a period of 24 months in the Venezualan Ministry

of Foreign Affairs or at the UN headquarters. Following this 24-month

period, the right to join later remains unrestricted according to article

307. The signing makes the text official. From that moment on the binding

effect is restricted to the rule that signatory states are not permitted to

undertake anything that might endanger or even make impossible the later

implementation of the treaty. During the signing of the final act and the

convention there are also opportunities to submit formal interpretation

22
Statements, which are now being prepared in all capitals. As a matter of

principle and in accordance with article 309, legally stronger proviso

clauses are not permitted. Agreements are regularly quoted according to the

date of signing. It is the reason why this convention is later to be

called Caracas Convention.

2.4 Ratification and Implementation

According to article 306, the convention requires the ratification by national

parliaments or appropriate organs. The significance of the ratification-Ms

the formal declaration of the state toward the other.treaty partners that

it is legally bound by the agreement. In other words, the ratification is

the final conclusion to the negotiations of the treaty.

The preparatory commission will begin its work of preparing for the

implementation as early as 60 to 90 days after the 50th state has signed the

convention (cf. 4.1 below). It could be the case as early as the end of

1983.

According to article 309, the convention will go into effect 1 year following

the 60th ratificationor declaration of consent and it will become international law between the treaty partners. From that moment on the organs of

the convention, in other words, the Seabed Authority and the LOS Court must

be in operation. It is predicted that the point in time will be somewhere

between 2 and 5 years from now. States that do not ratify the agreement are

not bound by it, unless over a long period of time the treaty content or

parts of it attain universal common-law acceptance.

3. Contents of New LOS Convention

The comprehensive and detailed changes which will be the result of the new

Law of the Sea have been discussed here regularly and extensively. The

following section will therefore be limited to a quick evaluation of the

entire convention with special emphasis on the final negotiation results.

The main characteristic of the Law of the Sea is the large variety of

geographical and functional changes. In contrast to the old LOS convention

of 1958, which always regulated only separate aspects of the Law of the

Sea, the new convention includes every use of the sea for all areas of

the sea; it is contained in one treaty, designed to be effective worldwide.

The existing, old Law of the Sea will be integrated into the newly created

agreement. The concept of the 200-nautical-mile economic zone or the deepsea regime are now creations of this kind, whereas the coastal expansion

to 12 nautical miles can already be justified today by referring to its as

common law.

Law of Sea Zones

With respect to geographic-territorial aspects the division of the oceans

into zones is in the foreground: 12-rnautical-mile-wide coastal waters are

within the national territory of coastal countries; 200-nautical-mile-wide

23
exclusive economic zones and the continental-shelf zones that reach beyond

it—in some instances they can be extended to the edge of the deep sea—lead

to the nationalization of the economically most valuable and most easily

attainable resources (fish, petroleum, natural gas, minerals), including

massive privileges in ocean exploration and environmental protection; with

respect to economic zones a small change was made during the 11th session

when a British proposal was adopted, which called for weakening the

requirement of removing unused installations (article 60, section 3).25

Traffic rithts for civilian and military navigation, however, remain free.

In the view of traditional seagoing nations from East and West, military

exercises, maneuvers and similar activities in foreign economic zones also

remain permissible.

Clear LOS dividing lines exist only for seaward borders of coastal waters

and economic zones but not for continental-shelf zones, which according to

article 76 can extend to 350 nautical miles for shelves that are more than

200 nautical miles wide or (alternately) if the lines extend 100 nautical

miles seaward, it can cover a depth of 2,500 meters and in case of submarine

mountains it can go further seaward. The details are to be settled by a

continental-shelf border commission. The border between overlapping

neighbors or opposite sea zones "are to be established," according to

articles 74 and 83, "through agreements based on international law,... to

find a just solution."

It is difficult to imagine how this practice is to lead to satisfactory

results, considering the latitude of measures and disputes about sea areas

and resources, unless the negotiating partners are öf good will and ready

to agree on a compromise solution.

A complicated law dealing with straits subdivides the more than 100 straits

in the world into five different categories and according to article 38 the

right of passage for all kinds of ships, planes and cargo—which includes

also military vehicles—is only granted freely in the case of so-called

transit straits. With respect to the Malacca Strait, which is navigationally

particularly difficult, the neighbors and the most important shipping

countries (except for the Soviet Union) agreed to stay at least 3.5 meters

from the shore.26The formal proposal by 30 states, led by Romania, to

require registration and permission for the passage of warships through

foreign coastal waters for security reasons developed into a key question

during the 11th session, and the conference could have failed because of it.

The United States and the Soviet Union and their respective alliance

partners made it very clear that in case of such a clause they would not

join the convention under any circumstances; the remaining maritime nations

emphasized the fact that the generous expansion of the coastal waters would

have to be "reimbursed" at any rate by granting free passage. The 30

states withdrew their proposal before "the final vote.

In spite of the fact that traffic rights are being maintained, the division

of the oceans can no longer be stopped, according to the economic zone

regulation, 10 states of the :world receive 54 percent of all economic

zones,

28

a group of approximately 90 states, depending on geographic

24
conditions, receives only small sea areas of varying sizes, but 55

geographically disadvantaged and inland states, among them are both German

states, receive practically nothing.

Functionally it is therefore noticeable that states with long coastlines

that have their own sea areas and own resources are favored in an unbearable

fashion at the expense of the community of states, whereas, on the other

hand, a large group of "landlocked countries" will be cut off permanently

from the blessigs of the oceans. New conflicts about sea areas and

resources among the haves and between the haves and the have-nots have

practically been preprogramed by the new Law of the Sea. The Falkland

War as well as the Agean conflict are the first current examples. Additional

conflicts are feasible; for instance, in the Caribbean, in the East Asian

peripheral seas as well as the European peripheral seas.

3.2 Deep-Sea Regime

The mineral resources of the deep seas outside the limits of national

jurisdictions, particularly cobalt, nickel, iron, manganese nodules

containing manganese, will be under the jurisdiction of the UN Seabed

Authority in Jamaica, while the use of the water areas in this international zone remains free.

Functionally the new Law of the Sea means the beginning of the new economic

world order, which for the first time might be realized sectoral in the

area of deep-sea mining and be binding through international law. During

the final negotiations in New York in Spring 1982, the United States and

several industrial countries did not succeed in realizing their goal, which

was to liberalize substantially the economic plan and bureaucratic set-up

of the deep-sea regime; it is marked by price and quantity regulations and

rights, the monetary and technological transfer and the voting rights

dominance of the developing countries. Only a few items of the package

of requests for changes, which was submitted jointly by the United States,

the FRG, Italy, Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, and Japan,2° were

adopted. As a consequence,.according to article 161, section la, the United

States is now getting a guaranteed seat (as the biggest consumer state) in

the 36-member Council of the Seabed Authority. According to article 155,

section 3, the revision conference now needs a three-fourth instead of a

two-third majority to make a binding decision. As a result, later fundamental changes about the deep-sea regime can become binding for the FRG even

without its approval. Nevertheless, the text has been improved insofar

as so-called "pioneer investors" in seabed mining are given guaranteed

rights even before the implementation of the convention (cf. below, 4.2).

In article 151, section 4 and in article 162, section 2n, the moratorium

for the mining of raw materials other than manganese nodules has been

limited to a period of 3 years, with the consequence,:that exploitation

remains "free" unless implementing regulations are issued within 3 years.

25
. 3l Terrestrial raw material producers who could suffer from deep-sea mining

are getting more rights for codetermination in article 164, section Land

financial compensation options in article 171f. Essentially unchanged are

the regulations for technology transfer,£financial contributions and

application and licensing procedures.

How soon the technologically demanding seabed mining will be worthwhile

financially, will depend on price levels and the availability of terrestrial

depositories. The earliest possible date will be no sooner than the early

or middle 1990's before any kind of deep-sea mining worth mentioning is

expected. Consequently, the deep-sea discussion which burdened and

dominated the conference in an almost unbearable manner is for the time

being nothing more than a model decision in favor of new global economic

organization and administration structures, including considerable financial

burdens that are placed on the states in the form of contributions, and

initial estimates for the FRG are frighteningly high. The deep-sea regime

is a historic decision insofar as the United Nations for the first time

has an instrument in its hands which, in the form of the Seabed Authority,

is given supranational control tasks and, as an enterprise, has commercial

functions—a totally new phenomon in the international system.

Proof of the correctness of this solution is left to the obscurity of the

future. Already now the justified desire among developing countries for

a bigger share of te- use of the seas appears to have failed because of the

territorialization of coastal water zones in favor of a few states with long

coastlines and because of the bureaucratization of deep-sea utilization

through international law. The search for alternate organizational forms

of deep-sea mining -will-have to continue, at least in the circles of the

industrial states, including the Soviet Union.

3.3 Transit Rights/Environmental Protection/Settling of Disputes

Among the positive results of the conference are the establishment of transit

rights for landlocked states and regulations concerning the pollution of

oceans—which are certainly considered sensible by Germany—as well as legal

settlements of disputes with the help of obligatory, appropriate legal and

arbitration procedures.

In part X of the convention, landlocked states without access to the sea

have for the first time an internationally established claim to transit

rights for all transportation routes, the modalities of which are to be

negotiated separately for each case with thettransit state.

Environmental protection of oceans, which today is already regulated through

a number of sectoral and regional conventions and which is in better shape

than terrestrial environmental protection, is affected by 45 articles in

part XII, receiving a progresive framework legislation, which is geared to

uniform worldwide standards of purity and contains step-by-step rules for

intervention and control. Especially pollution resultant from shipping is

regulated in detail. Control and implementation regulations of coastal

states against environmental violators of the shipping industry are

increased and expanded over a wider area in a moderate and appropriate manner.

26
Unfortunately it was not possible to come up with, a similarly structured and

well-balanced regulation on scientific exploration of oceans, which must

precede any sensible utilization:of the sea and which would have been intthe

interest of all mankind. According to part XIII, exploration rights for

economic and continental-shelf zones are almost exclusively the prerogative

of the coastal states.

In part XV the regulation on international legal settlements of disputes

which—as is wellOknown—has to date been highly incomplete and nonbinding,

has for the first time been given an institution, the International LOS Court

in Hamburg, which under certain circumstances has obligatory jurisdiction

over decisions on important disputes over rights on the seas, for instance,

in the area of traffic rights and deep-sea rights. Economically interesting

areas, for instance, border disputes over, dividing lines on the seas* fishing

and exploration rights and disputes involving military craft are unfortunately

outside the obligatory legal dispute regulation. It was possible, however,

to close this gap partially through obligatory or at least voluntary

arbitration and mediation procedures. More could not be accomplished,

considering the current degree of integration of the community of nations.

3.4 Joining Rights (Participation)

Following many years of discussions, the conference also reached a consensus

on joining and participation rights for states, for independently administered

associate states, for dependent territories, for Namibia, for recognized

national freedom movements and for international organizations.-5 The

East-bloc states and the "group of 77" maintained until the very end the

connection between joining rights for international organizations, as

7

for

instance the EC, and joining rights for freedom movements.

Joining Rights According to Article 305

In the final version of article 305, the LOS convention will be open for

signing to several categories of states and to international organizations.

Every state has the right to sign and also-^-listed separately as a special

case—Namibia, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia,33which

has already participated in the LOS Conference since 1980 with full voting]

rights. The acceptance of the special case of Namibia also applies to

Namibia's membership rights in the Preparatory Commission3^ and is in

correspondence with the new article 1 bis, which declares the convention

applicable for mutatis mutandis for all nonstate signatories of the

convention; in this manner a complete equalization with those states which

are eligible to join is expressly avoided.

Furthermore, the right to join is also granted to independently administered

associate states and territories which, although they lack complete

independence, have jurisdiction over areas subject to the Law of the Sea.

27
Finally international organizations are listed. Their right to sign the

convention is in accordance with the eight articles in appendix IX which,

as is the case with all appendices, is an integral component of the

convention. This "EC clause" defines international interstate organizations

to which member states assigned internal and external LOS "functions,

including the right to conclude international agreements. The organization

can sign with its own name if a majority of the member states have given

their signatures. At the time of Signing it must indicate the competency

to which it is legally empowered; it presupposes delicate internal

negotiations within the EC, which will have to establish whether it will be

-elegated to carry out any of these functions and specifically which LOS

competencies it will be entitled to assume in the territorial zones of its

member states. As long as the organization adopts the right and duties of

the convention, it is not obligated to discriminate in its internal regime

(for instance, in the so-called EC sea) between citizens of its member

states, even if not all of the member states should have ratified the

convention.36The membership of the organization is neutral with respect

to the voting right for departments of the LOS convention and it is not

included in the 60 ratifications required for putting the convention into

effect.

Dependent Territories

For the remaining colonial territories, the convention text wanted to reserve

rights to resources in a transitional provision exclusively favoring the

population of these territories. This idea of protecting the interests of

the population is now the subject of Resolution III37—and thus it has been

excluded from the convention. The resolution states that in the case of

sovereignty conflicts over these territories, consultations with UN

cooperation are urgently stipulated to protect the maritime interests of

the inhabitants.

Recognized Freedom Movements

The goal of the developing.countries of granting to freedom movements full

rights to join the LOS convention failed due to the resistance from the

industrial countries. The resulting compromise in Resolution IV38 provides

the right to sign "as an observer" only for the final act, not the actual

convention and it only applies to freedom movements which participated in

the conference. They are SWAPO, the ANC, the PLO and the Pan Africanist

Congress (PAC). In addition, the freedom movements receive observer status

in the Preparatory Commission39 and the Assembly of the Seabed Authority

and in other convention departments; furthermore, according to article 319,

section 31, as observers they receive all reports and documents. Until the

end Israel opposed these efforts^1to use the LOS Conference as a vehicle

for upgrading the freedom movements and for this reason it voted against

the convention.

4. Instruments for Transitional Period

4.1 Preparatory Commission/Prepcom Resolution I

28
Thfeittansitional period—which will last several years—until the LOS

convention goes into effect following the deposition of the 60th ratification document on one hand and the agreement on the preparatory investment

protection for starting seabed operations on the other hand, necessitates

the establishment of a Preparatory Commission. Its tasks will be the

preparation of personnel, functional and organizational aspects of the 11,1!

Seabed Authority and the LOS Court as well as processing the first

applications by pioneer investors. The most important task in this connection

is the preparation of international rules and regulations for the

application and licensing system of seabed mining (so-called security law).

The departure point for the convultations on a preparatory commission was a

resolution draft by the conference president from the 10th session^ (for

lack of time it could not be discussed at that time). During the 11th

session the "working group of 21,"*3 the nuclear group of the First Committee

under the chairmanship of Engo (Cameroon) as well as the plenary group of

the conference discussed the proposal in detail. In his first memorandum

of 2 April 1982, 5the president repeated a slightly changed version of his

proposal from the 10th session, at which time he was supported by the "group

of 77" and the East bloc. The five Western industrial countries submitted

on 13 April 1982 proposals for changing the entire deep-sea system, which

also contained, among other things, changes for the resolution draft of

the Preparatory Commission,^6but on 26 April 1982 it was withdrawn. With

minor additions and linguistic revisions by the editorial committee^' the

decision on the establishment of the Preparatory Commission was adopted

as Resolution I by the known majority.

Contents of Resolution for the Establishment of the Preparatory Commission

The Preparatory Commission for the Seabed Authority and the LOS Court will

convene for the first time between 60 and 90 days following the 50th

ratification of the convention (item 1^°). The commission consists of

representatives of the states that signed the convention (item 2). The

signing of the final act, which the industrial countries would have

preferred for membership, only entitles to observer status in the

Preparatory Commission. Therefore whoever wants to take part in the

commission, has to decide in favor of singing the convention. The

commission chooses its chairman (item 3); it has its own legal body (item 6)

and can appoint subcommittees (item 7 and 8), among them special committees

for the preparation of "Enterprise" and for dealing with the problem of

those developing countries which as land producers might be affected

unfavorably through deep-sea mining when it comes to their ability to

compete (item 9). Normally the commission meets at the seat of the Seabed

Authority—which is Jamaica (item 12)--and the UN Secretariat makes

available the services of the secretariat (item 15).

The tasks of the commission are specified in detail (item 5):

a. Preparation of the first session of the Assembly and the Council of the

Seabed Authority;

29
b. preparation of the procedural regulations for Assembly and Council;

c. proposal for the first budget;

d. proposal for the relationship to other international organizations;

e. recommendations for the secretariat of the authority;

f. studies on the preparation of the headquarters of the authority;

g. preparation of the legal regulations (secondary rules) for the authority;

h. implementation of the system for preliminary investment protection

(pip system);

i. studies on developing countries that are particularly affected

economically, including the establishment of a compensation fund. 50

The disputed question as to what constitutes a majority whenever the

Preparatory Commission is to make decisions, has been solved temporarily

by referring (item 4) to the procedural regulations of the LOS Conference,

but it is hardly practicable; one need only remember the cumbersome

wrestlling of the LOS Conference. Wiht this in mind, the Soviet Union51

demanded—particularly with respect to the important secondary rules—that

the commission must decide by consensus; but later it withdrew this proposal.

The Western industrial countries demanded52 that the voting system of the

Council of the Seabed Authority (varying majority depending on the subject

to be voted on, in accordance with article 161, 162) be transferred to the

Preparatory Commission to bring to bear the weight and experience of mining

countries on the formulation of the legal regulations. This proposal took

care of itself when it was withdrawn during the plenary session on 26 April

1982. Thus, as far as the decisionmaking process of the Preparatory

Commission is concerned, in the end the majority of it's members—in

correspondence with the LOS Conference—decides, and these decisions can

only be cahnged later by consensus in the.Council of the Seabed Authority—

in other words, all 36 council members have the veto right.

The financing of the Preparatory Commission is supplied by the regular UN

budget—in other words, not by the signatory states of the convention (item

14). In the fall of 1982 difficult fiscal deliberations are expected in

the UN, because approximately 60 percent of the UN budget is represented

by states that did not ratify the convention.

With respect to the preparation of the LOS Court, the Preparatory Commission

must put together a report with recommendations (item 10). The tasks of the

Preparatory Commission end with the end of the first session of the Seabed

Authority; its tasks will then be transferred to the Seabed Authority.

Thus, the construction and mandate of the Preparatory Commission fully

reflect the wishes of the developing countries. The industrial countries did

not succeed in having their wish granted, according to which mining

30
countries would be assured an appropriate level of influence. Membership

and voting rights are arranged in such a manner that the industrial

countries are forced to sign and ratify the convention, while the developing

countries on the basis of their numerical superiority can dominate the

Preparatory Commission; the East bloc—like all the other states—has a

veto right on important decisions.

4.2 Preparatory Investment Protection (Pip/Tpi System)

The preparatory investment protection for so-called pioneer investments in

deep-sea mining, which are made before the convention goes into effect, was

among the open questions of the 11th session. The issue is the preliminary

international recognition of large-area exploration and mining territories

in favor of the states or firms and consortia which are currently the first

ones entering the threshold of realizing manganese-nodule mining. Until

the convention goest into effect, the preparatory investment protection

requires a kind of "protection procedure" to guarantee exploration and

exploitation rights in "one's own" fields. The implementation-of this

procedure is to be in the hands of the Preparatory Commission, the rights

and duties of which are the object of discussion for a separate resolution.

This topic was developed during the 11th session and became known under the

English abbreviation of "pip" (preparatory.investment protection) or—less

common—"tpi" (treatment of preparatory investment5) and was one of the

focal points of the conference, because a pip solution acceptable to all

sides would, on one hand, permit an uninterrupted continuation of deep-sea^

work by interested states and consortia—thus incorporating national interim

legislations in an international regulation—and, on the other hand, permit

a workable registration procedure preceding, the implementation of the

extraordinarily complicated part of the convention dealing with deep-sea.

mining. Furthermore, a contributing factor may also have been the hope of

many conference participants—including some of the developing countries—

that a pip system which would satisfy the industrial countries would result

in a more flexible attitude on the part of the United States.

The pip system, the justification of which was expressly emphasized by

Engo, chairman of the First Committee,55must, among other things, solve

problems that are in part based on the north-south relationship:

—The relationship of the convention to the national interim laws and to

the planned reciprocal agreements of the deep-sea mining states;

—modalities of transfer from the pip system to the convention;

—validity of convention principles on production limits, technology transfer

and financial burdens for the pip phase;

—definition of pioneer investors, taking into consideration the interests

of developing countries and of "Enterprise."

31
On the Procedure of the Pip Negotiations

All departments and state groups of the 11th LOS session were occupied with

the preparatory investment protection. The information given below

provides an overview on the progress of the negotiations. A presentation

of the contents of the different proposals and positions will have to be

reserved for later treatment because of the great number and the size of

the documents and because of the confidentiality of some of the negotiations. A decisive factor is the result of the resolution text outlined

below, which was adopted by the conference on 30 April 1982.

The industrial countries of the "conference group of five" (the United

States, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, the FRG) agreed at the beginning

of the 11th session to prepare a joint pip proposal, which began on the

basis of a list of topics submitted by Germany. Following difficult

negotiations among the five mining states, initially four industrial

countries (without France) submitted a proposal56 which was introduced in

the First Committee and in the "work group of 21"; Belgium, Italy and the

Netherlands added their support. Additional resolution drafts came fromtr.e

the "group of 77V5and from a group of smaller Western industrial countries,

the "group of 19."58France developed additional concepts with respect to

how national pioneer investors could support the authority-owned "Enterprise"

by assisting with the personnel during its formation.59From the discussion

on these papers the conference president developed his own ideas in his

memorandum of 2 April 1982.60 The presidential paper was subsequently the

subject of internal negotiations by the Western industrial nations among

themselves and with the Soviet Union, after it had become clear that the

Soviet Union also considered itself a member of the circle of pioneer

investors. On 13 April 1982 (the final day for submitting formal proposals

for changes) the "conference group of five," with the support of Italy and

Belgium, presented its ideas on the deep-sea regime and especially also on

the pip system;61they were later discussed by a small negotiation group

under the chairmanship of President Koh. Joint EC presentations on these

questions were not possible.

At the same time the Soviet Union unexpectedly passed its own national

interim law 62on deep-sea mining; thus, it followed the example of the

United States, the FRG, France and the United Kingdon. India was the first

member of the developing countries which succeeded in gaining recognition

as a pioneer investor during the negotiations on 16 April 1982 by pointing

to its past exploration accomplishments. In addition to the international

deep-sea mining consortia headquartered in the United States:

—Kennecott Consortium (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Japan);

—Ocean Management Associates, OMA (United States, Belgium, Italy);

—Ocean Management Incorporated, OMI (United States, Canada, FRG, Japan);

—Ocean Minerals Company, OMCO (United States, Netherlands);

32
—Association Francaise pour 1'Etude et la Recherche des Nodules, AFERNOD

(France);

—Deep Ocean Minerals Association, DOMA (Japan);

—Soviet Consortium;

—Indian Consortium.

63 All these eight consortia are interested in a preliminary investment

protection and in the reservation of their own exploration fields. Their

fields are in the Clarion-Clipperton belt between Hawai and Mexico. The

only exception is the Indian field, which is located in the Indian Ocean.

Furthermore, a circle of possible additional applicants includes the

People's Republic of China and Brazil.

The eight pinoeer investors mentioned above are listed by the name of their

home states in the proposal that was presented and accepted by the

president at the end of the 11th session and which also contains two

guaranteed mining fields for "Enterprise," only one of them, however, is to

be financed by the industrial countries.""

Contents of Pip Regulation

States which belong to the circle of pioneer investors and signed the

convention have the right (item 2" ) to be registered with the Preparatory

Commission as pioneer investors for manganese-nodule mining (but not for

other seabed reserves),.if certain objective criteria are met(item 2).

The definition of the exclusive group of pioneer investors named (item la)

the four states—France, Japan, India and the Soviet Union—with state

organized seabed mining. In addition there is the category of seabed

mining organized by the private economy, the four consortia, the members

of which are located in the eight states of Belgium, Canada, the FRG, Italy,

Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. Both

categories must have invested at least $30 million before 1 January 1983,

which has to be verified by the applicant as a "certifying state." In

the case of the international consortia it is sufficient if one of the

signatory states makes the application (item 2). ; Furthermore, any

developing country can be considered a pioneer investor belatedly, as long

as $30 million have been invested by 1 January 1985. For international

co-sortia a specific rule:is in effect (item 4), according to which the

individual partners have no claim for registration, but they have only one

claim to a joint registration. (Consequently there will not be a "German

field.") A change in nationality of the consortia and their partners,

however, is permissible (item 10).

This complicated formula was necessary to win the seabed-mining ambitions

of all interested parties for one uniform pip system. Nevertheless, it is

expected that there will be considerable criticism, because it discriminates

against states in many different ways: Among the absurdities is the fact that

33
the Soviet Union and India, who have only been involved in minimal deep1-

sea activities, have the good luck of being treated as equals with other

investors. Japan is even getting its own field in addition to its

cooperation in an international consortium. Seven states, without Japan,

who are partners of the four U.S. consortia have to share four mining

fields. Smaller industrial countries, for instance, the GDR or Sweden,

are excluded from the very beginning from the role of pioneer investors.

Because of relzxed conditions for developing countries—who can invest

until 1985—they can join the circle of pioneer investors later, in case

the quantity restrictions on deep-sea systems permit it.

The proposed pioneer area, for which confidential exploration data—that

are to be treated as such—have to be submitted to the Preparatory

Commission, must not exceed 150,000 square kilometers. After a few years,

the applicant is obligated to return step-by-;step 50 percent of the explored

areas, so that it can later be used by the authority (item le). The

proposed area must be large enough for two mining fields (estimated size

between 30,000 and 35,000 square kilometers) of equal value; the commission

will reserve one of them for the Seabed Authority, according to the so-called

bahkingosystem, and the other one will automatically be awarded to the

applicant (item 3b) within a period of 45 days. Every applicant can only

claim one pioneer area (item 4) .

In case of territorially overlapping fields of competing applicants, a binding

UNCITRAL arbitration procedure will intervene (Item 5). For this purpose the

coordinates of the proposed fields must be registered before 1 January 1983

with the certifying state. Among themselves, all pioneer investors enjoy the

same rank. Details of the dividing procedure are reserved for the

reciprocal agreement among the pioneer states which must be concluded

during the next few months.

According to the so-called split contract system, which is a replica of the

convention, the allocation of a pioneer area (item 3b) entitles first of all

only to "pioneer activities" (item 6), which means targeted exploration

activities including test mining, but it does not mean commercial mining.

For production at a later date, a production permit (item 9a) is required

which will be issued by the Seabed Authority through the normal application

procedure in accordance with the convention (item 8a); applications can be

made no sooner than 6 months following the implementation of the convention,

when all home states of the consortia must have ratified the convention

(item 8c). This ratification requirement is intentional.

In opposition to the wishes of the industrial countries, a production

licensing procedure will be established within the framework of production

quantity limitations of article 151, which is coupled to the rate of increase

of nickel consumption.68If the remaining objective prerequisites have

been fulfilled, the permit will be granted automatically within 30 days

(items 9a and b). If there is an indication that the production quantity

limit will be exceeded by several applicants and the applicants cannot agree

among themselves how to divide the area, the Seabed Authority will make the

final decision in accordance with appendix III (item 9g). It is important

34
that at the time of production permits pioneer investors have priority over

all other applicants. An exception, however, is made for "Enterprise,"

which receives two mining fields at the outset, but its general preferential

treatment—when compared to other applicants—does not set in until all

pioneer investors have received their production permits (item 9a). The

second "Enterprise" mining field was not included in the text until the

final moments of the negotiations.

The registration fee is $500,000 and is divided into two equal amounts,

half for the registration and the other half ofr the later production permit

(item 7a). In addition there is a fixed annual levey of $1 million (item 7b).

In the interest of a speedy expansion of "Enterprise," pioneer investors are

obligated to explore the area reserved for "Enterprise" against later

reimbursement of their expenses (including interest) and they must provide

training assistance and technology transfer in accordance with the regulations

of the convention (item 12a). The requirement of granting financial

assistance to "Enterprise" is not directed at the investors but their

certifying states (item 12b). It means that the Preparatory Commission is

assuming a kind of a trustee role for the "Enterprise," as long as it has

not yet been established. The authority on its part is obligated to

respect the rights and duties which are granted by the pip system (item

13) until the pip system is replaced by the implementation of the

convention (item 14; so-called security of tenure). Section 5 of article

308,69, which was inserted later, provides permanence to the decisions of

the Preparatory Commission.

As a result, it can be ascertained that the pip system contains an exploration and a mining field guarantee for pioneer investors for one field each,

if the applying states sign and ratify the convention. The text demands

that the production quantity limits be observed and establishes the

Preparatory Commission as the licensing authority. Furthermore the text

promotes the expansion of "Enterprise" due to the reservation of fields,

technology transfer and training assistance and thus realizes the parallel

system already during the pip phase.

In other words, it is the preliminary application of the.convention; the

only difference is that pioneer investors, In contrast to later applicants,

have a guaranteed option with respect to the beginning of production, in

case the state ratifies the convention.

Therefore the criticism voiced by the developing countries misses the mark

by calling the pip system an "interim convention" and saying that it makes

the convention itself superfluous by sanctioning national legislations and

the planned reciprocal agreement, the object of which is to be the guarantee

of national fields. The role of the certifying states—in other words, the

national element in the convention—has been reduced to information and

guarantee duties toward the Programming Commission.

35
The economic significance is the fact that the first generation of deepsea enterprises could work under the full utilization of the production

quantity for the restoof this century. The effect of the production quantity

limit, which was placed in the convention text jointly by the developing

countries and terrestrial mining producers like Canada and Australia will

have the effect of an exclusion of other parties interested in mining in

addition to the recognized pioneer investors, because according to all the

information available, article 151 will only allow six to eight mining

units. Therefore, for the time being, the exploitable fields of the

"common heritage of mankind" have been distributed. The trend toward

dividing the oceans has reached the deep sea.

Summary

In summation, the state of the new LOS order represents a challenge for

every state to develop its own active ocean policy which is oriented

toward the possibilities and dnagers of the new Law of the Sea and makes

the best of a bungled situation. National rights of accessibility to ocean

resources and free traffic and user rights are just as important as the

interest in guaranteeing peace on the seas. It is expected that the

conclusion of the LOS negotiations in New York will not end international

LOS discussions, but it will be a departure point for a variety of

international, regional and bilateral negotiations. The first example

of these continuing negotiations should be the planned reciprocal agreement

of industrial countries interested in deep-sea mining—so-called like-minded

states. Another example for the regionalization of the oceans could be

provided by the EC ocean which=-in case Spain and Portugal should join the

EC—would make a large, interconnected ocean area in the northeast

Atlantic available to the general application, procedure of European

agreements, which are marked by freedom of movement, freedom of settlement

and a ban on discrimination and which offer equal opportunities for member

states of the EC also with respect to the utilization of the sea.

FOOTNOTES

1. Protocol of the final sessions fromtthe document series A/Con 62/SR

176 to 182 (as far as they are available to date); cf. "United Nations

Press Releast" SEA/494, 30 April 1982 (Round-up Session).

2. AH article references äreabased on the convention draft A/Conf 62/L

78 28 August 1981, unless indicated otherwise.

3. A/Conf 62/114, 24 August 1981

4. Statement by President Reagan on 29 January 1982;: U.S. position paper,

24 February 1982 ("Approaches to Major Problems in Part XI of the Draft

Convention on the Law of the Sea^)and U.S. Book of Amendments, March

1982 ("The U.S. Proposals for Amendment to the Draft Convention of the

Law of the Sea"); A/Conf 62/L 121, 13 April 1982 (United States and

six Western industrial countries).

36
5. A/Conf 62/L 93 and Corr 1, 2 April 1982.

6. A/Conf 62/Sr 167, 14 April 1982.

7. A/Conf 62/L 96 till L 126, 13 April 1982.

8. A/Conf 62/L 132 and Corr 1 in addition to L 132 Add 1 and Corr 1, 23

April 1982.

9. Rules of Procedure A/Conf 62/30/Rev 3, New York, 1981, Rule 37.

10. A/Conf 62/Sr 174, 28 April 1982.

11. A/Conf 62/Sr 175, 28 April 1982.

12. Cf. footnote 3.

13. Zaire, A/Conf 62/L 197, 13 April 1982, ef. also Romania A/Conf 62/WS

24, 24 May 1982.

14. 30 states, A/Conf 62/L 117, 13 April 1982.

15. Lesotho, A/Conf 62/L 115, 13 April 1982.

16. Spain, A/Conf 62/L 109, 13 April 1982; cf. also A/Conf 62/Sr 176,

6 May 1982.

17. Turkey, A/Conf 62/L 120, 13 April 1982; cf. also A/Conf 62/Sr 176,

6 May 1982.

18. A/Conf 62/L 141 and Add 1, 29 April 1982.

19. Cf. A/Conf 62/Sr 181, 5 May 1982.

20. Cf. footnote 9.

21. Draft Convention, A/Conf 62/1 78, 28 August 1981 and Corr 1-8, A/Conf

62/1 93, 2 April 1982 and Corr 1, 5 April 1982. A/Conf 62/L 132

Add 1, 22 April 1982. A/Conf 62/L 137, 26 April 1982. A/Conf 62/L

141 Add 1, 28 April 1981.

22. A/Conf 62/L 93, item 6, 2 April 1982 and A/Conf 62/SR 181, p 2,

5 May 1982.

23. A/Conf 62/L 127, 13 April 1982, and A/Conf 62/120, 7 May 1982; does

not contain financial obligations, but needs ratification by UN

General Assembly.

24. Cf. A/Conf 62/SR 180, 5 May 1982.

37
25. United Kingdom, C 2/lnformal Meeting//66, 16 March 1982 and A/Conf

62/L 93; cf. French counterproposal A/Conf 62/L 106, which was withdrawn.

26. Malacca Straits, A/Conf 62/L 145 and Add 108, 29 April 1982.

27. Romania and 29 additional states, A/Conf 62/L 117, 15 April 1982; cf

also A/Conf 62/SR, 6 May 1982.

28. Cf. UN Doc E/Conf 71/3, New York, 1981.

29. A/Conf 62/L 121 and 122, 13 April 1982.

30. Cf. details: A/Conf 62/L 93. A/Conf 62/L 132 Add 1. A/Conf 62/L 141

Add 1. A/Conf 62/L 142 Add 1.

31. Cf. Preliminary report of the Secretary-General A/Conf 62/L 84, 2

March 1982 and Add 1, 16 March 1982.

32. Summarizing presentation in president's report: A/Conf 62/L 86,

26 March 1982.

33. A/Conf 62/L 137, 26 April 1982; cf. British objection in A/Conf 62/SR

176, 6 May 1982.

34. Resolution 1, item 2.

35. Appendix IX, A/Conf 62/1 93, 2 April 1982.

36. Cf. A/Conf 62/L 93 Appendix IX, art 4, sec 6, which contained a

discrimination ordinance which was later taken out, however, when

Belgium objected (A/Conf 62/L 119), cf. A/Conf 62/L 132 Add 1.

37. A/Conf 62/L 94, 2 April 1982.

38. A/Conf 62/L 132 Add 1; cf. Precursor: A/Conf 62/L 94, 2 April 1982.

39. Cf. Resolution I, item 2.

40. Cf. art 156, sec 3.

41. A/Conf 62/SR 177, 6 May 1982.

42. WG 21/lnformal Meeting 17, 26 August 1981.

43. A/Conf 62/C 1/L 30, 29 March 1982.

44. A/Conf 62/SR 158-166.

45. A/Conf 62/L 94, 2 April 1982.

38
46. A/Conf 62/L 121, 13 April 1982.

47. A/Conf 62/L 132 Add 1, 22 April 1982 and L 142 Add 1, 29 April 1982.

48. Item numbers refer to the resolution:text in documents A/Conf 62/L

94 and L 142 Add 1.

49. A/Conf 62/L 121, 13 April 1982, p 17.

50. Cf. WG 21/lnformal Paper 23, 26 March 1982.

51. Soviet Union A/Conf 62/L 125, 13 April 1982.

52. A/Conf 62/L 121, 13 April 1982.

53. Resolution I, A/Conf 62/L 94 supplemented through L 132 Add 1, 22

April 1982.

54. TPIC/1, 8 March 1982, with reference to the background of the pip

proposals; cf. also Jenisch: "Bridging the Gap for Seabed Mining" in

"San Diego Law Review No 18, 1981, pp 409-413.

55. A/Conf 62/C 1/L 30, 29 March 1982.

56. TPIC/2, 15 March 1982.

57. TPIC/3, 19 March 1982 supported by Soviet Union; cf. also A/Conf

62/L 116, 13 April 1982.

58. TPIC/5, 25 March 1982.

59. TPIC/4, 22 March 1982.

60. A/Conf 62/L 94, 2 April 1982; cf. also A/Conf 62/C 1/L 30, 29 March

1982.

61. A/Conf 62/L 122, 13 April 1982.

62. Soviet note, 18 April 1982, unpublished working paper; cf. also

TPIC/6, 6 April 1982.

63. Comparable contrast of all consortia in "Seabed Mineral Resource

Development," New York, 1982, ST/ESA 107, Add 1, 1 April 1982.

64. People's Republic ,of China, TPIC/7, 19 April 1982; cf. also Letter of

the FRG Delegation, A/Conf 62/L 151, 7 May 1982.

65. A/Conf 62/L 132/Add 1, 22 April o982 and L 141/Add 1, 28 April 1982.

66. Cf. Appendix IV, Statute of the Enterprise, art 11, sec 3.

39
67. Item numbers refer to documents A/Conf 62/L 132 Add 1 and L 141

Add 1.

68. In this respect the delicate question arises whether there will even

be an increase in nickel consumption during the period specified for

ascertaining the permissible production quantities in the world; cf.

details in art 151, sec 2b.

69. Cf. A/Conf 62 C 1/L 30, 29 March 1982, p 6, and A/Conf 62/L 93,

2 April 1982, p 3.

8991

CSO: 5200/2117

40
ICELAND

SCHEAM: ICELAND CAN BAN SALMON FISHING BEYOND 200-MILE ZONE

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 18 Jul 82 p 48

[Article: "Iceland Can Ban Salmon Fishing beyond 200-mile Zone"]

[Text] It is stated, among other things, in Article 66

of the Law of the Sea Treaty drawn up last April, that

home countries are responsible for the welfare of salmon

runs that breed in their rivers.and that these countries

may set maximum catches for those salmon runs that leave

their rivers for the ocean, pursuant to discussions with the

. countries fishing the runs. . According to this article,

Iceland has the right to limit the catches of Icelandic

salmon taken by other countries outside Iceland's 200-mile

zone. This would be grounds to ban fishing.the runs

entirely, if this were allowed, although the article in

question speaks only.of catch limits. These facts came to

light in an article published by Professor Dr.. Gunnar G.

Schräm in MORGUNBLADID yesterday.

It is also stated in the article that the reservation.is made in this area

that there be discussions with other countries fishing Icelandic salmon on

conditions for catch limitations. Dr. Schräm.says in his article: "There is

nothing in Article 66 on preconceptions with regard to limited catches. The

clause can scarcely be interpreted in any other manner than that Iceland can

set catch sizes unilaterally since there was no intention that other :'

countries would have a veto power in this area and nothing about this in the

text of the agreement."

In Dr. Schram's view this clause is extremely important for countries considering their salmon runs to.be.endangered due to overfishing by other

countries. On the other hand, achieving catch limitations may prove

difficult since it will have to be proven what proportion of Icelandic salmon

is caught by:foreign fishing ships. That will only be achieved through

careful research.

It is also mentioned in the article that another treaty article contains a

clause to the effect that if salmon enter the economic jurisdiction of another

country that country shall cooperate with the home country of the salmon on

41
necessary protection and administrative measures to maintain the salmon runs.

Iceland could request that the Faroese Islands take part in carrying out

those protection measures thought necessary to protect the Icelandic salmon

runs against.overfishing. The Faroese could not.refuse.since the agreement

directly-requires them to do this, said Dr. Schräm.

The Law of. the Sea Treaty has still not been ratified but Denmark (and

through Denmark the Faroese Islands) has approved it and will sign in a few

months. "Thus they have, at the very.least, a moral obligation.to carry out

the provisions of the treaty," said Dr. Sehram in his article.

9857

CSO: 5200/2100

42
SWEDEN

PAPER URGES GOVERNMENT TO STAND FIRM AGAINST USSR ON LIMIT IN BALTIC

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 25 Jul 82 p 2

[Editorial: "Border in the Sea"]

[Text] Sweden's border with the USSR in the Baltic has become a special .:

election theme since the Swedish political debate is now focusing on Gotland.

Statements and denials about proposals and bids are now crossing each other.

The leaders of the Moderate Coalition Party, Adelsohn and Bohman, both criticized the government during their visits at fishing villages in Gotland and

at the west coast on Friday.

The division of the continental shelf and fishing in the Baltic has to be

made between the two countries—there is agreement in this respect. But

the Soviet Union claims that the dividing line shall be drawn between the

Swedish mainland and the Baltic countries, not counting Gotland. This is

an unreasonable point of view, without support in public international law.

The dispute has now lasted almost 13 years. During negotiations between

Sweden and the Soviet Union this year in January there was obviously a discussion about drawing a border that would mean Sweden giving up smaller parts

of the controversial area. It would instead finally be possible to draw

up a definite border for fishing and the continental shelf. The Soviets

did not agree to this. The people on Gotland lashed out as did the moderates.

Foreign Minister Ola Ullsten now denies that the government has presented

a proposal for a compromise. But he hints that something might have happened

at the official level.

This is not a nice way to arrange for the retreat. Maybe there has never

been a "proposal," but there have been discussions anyway. It seems unbelievable that officials would operate on their own.

The government simply got no answer from the Soviet Union and it has found

the domestic criticism against concessions too strong. Therefore the negotiation table is now clean, according to Ullsten. That means that Sweden stands

by the middle line between Gotland and the Baltic coast.

It is urgent to find a solution to the dispute. But fishing in the Baltic

is especially important for Sweden onw that the North Sea is closed. And

the public international law is on Sweden's side. Therefore, the Swedish

government must have as much ice in the stomach as the Soviet government.

9662

CSO: 3107/36 END

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