alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-50691 Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee v. ARMANDO RAMIREZ-MARTINEZ Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 2:05-CR-872-ALL Before WIENER, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * The attorney appointed to represent Defendant-Appellant Armando Ramirez-Martinez (Ramirez) has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Andersv. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Ramirez has not filed a response. Although counsel suggests that Ramirez may have a no nfrivolous claim ofineffective assistance ofcounsel, the record is insufficiently developed to all ow consideration of that claim at this juncture. Such a claim generally “cannot be resolved on direc t appeal when the claim has not been United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D August 19, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 06-50691

2 raised before the district court since noopportunity existed to develop the record on the merits ofthe allegations.” U nited Statesv. Cantwell , 470 F.3d 1087, 1091 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our independent review of the record and counsel’s brief discloses no nonfrivolous issue for appeal . Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR . R. 42.2.
#### § 137.88 May the Secretary reduce the amount of funds required under Title V to pay for Federal functions, including Federal pay costs, Federal employee retirement benefits, automated data processing, technical assistance, and monitoring of activities under the Act?

No, the Secretary may not reduce the amount of funds required under Title V to pay for Federal functions, including Federal pay costs, Federal employee retirement benefits, automated data processing, technical assistance, and monitoring of activities under the Act.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF WALL STREET DELI, INC. FOR THE YEAR ENDED JUNE 27, 1998
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-27-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JUN-29-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-27-1998
<CASH>                                         409,044
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,804,634
<ALLOWANCES>                                   485,198
<INVENTORY>                                    583,405
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,457,955
<PP&E>                                      35,994,045
<DEPRECIATION>                              22,973,956
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              19,862,808
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        7,146,084
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       170,740
<OTHER-SE>                                  12,545,984
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                19,862,808
<SALES>                                     63,780,406
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            63,780,406
<CGS>                                       57,573,789
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               57,573,789
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               485,198
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             226,795
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (3,842,430)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (3,842,430)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                (3,842,430)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (1.24)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (1.24)
        

</TABLE>
#### Angel PEDROSO and Simeon Sanchez, Appellants, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 79-282.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Nov. 13, 1979.

Weiner, Robbins & Tunkey and Alan S. Ross, Miami, for appellants.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Anthony C. Musto, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before HENDRY, HUBBART and SCHWARTZ, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See *Webb v. State,*373 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); *Evans v. State,*368 So.2d 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); *State v. Hetland,*366 So.2d 831 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); *State v. Stevens,*354 So.2d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), and *Skelton v. State,*349 So.2d 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
Exhibit
23.2








CONSENT
OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM





The Board
of Directors


Alfacell
Corporation:





We
consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements (Nos.
333-112865 and 333-136678) on Form S-3 and (Nos. 33-81308, 333-110074 and
333-112866) on Form S-8 of Alfacell Corporation of our report dated November 4,
2002, with respect to the related statements of operations, stockholders' equity
(deficiency), and cash flows of Alfacell Corporation for the period from August
24, 1981 (date of inception) to July 31, 2002, which report appears in the July
31, 2009 annual report on Form 10-K of Alfacell Corporation. Our report dated
November 4, 2002, as it relates to the financial statements for the period from
August 24, 1981 (date of inception) to July 31, 2002, is based on the report of
other auditors who have ceased operations as to the amounts included therein for
the period from August 24, 1981 (date of inception) to July 31,
1992.





Our
report dated November 4, 2002 contains an explanatory paragraph that states that
the Company has suffered recurring losses from operations, has a working capital
deficit and has limited liquid resources which raise substantial doubt about its
ability to continue as a going concern. The financial statements do not include
any adjustments that might result from the outcome of that
uncertainty.





/s/
      KPMG LLP
              
              Short
      Hills, New Jersey
              November
      13, 2009
#### Jerry West GRAHAM, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 81-787.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 16, 1982.

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and Beth C. Weitzner, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Joel D. Rosen-blatt, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before HENDRY, SCHWARTZ and JOR-GENSON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The judgment below is affirmed without prejudice to the filing of a Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 motion to credit the defendant with time previously served in jail as a condition of the probation which was revoked in the present proceeding and while awaiting disposition of the probation violation charge. Since the record is uncertain as to whether full allowance for these periods has already been given, the issue should be initially addressed as a factual matter in the trial court. *Clinton v. State,*389 So.2d 1082 (Fla.3d DCA 1980).
#### Lyons *v.*Board of Commissioners of the County of Perry.

[No. 20,468.

Filed April 7, 1905.

Rehearing denied June 22, 1905.]

Statutes.—Construction.-—Officers.—Salary.—The act of 1903 (Acts 1903, p. 140), providing for the payment of salaries to certain officers from and after January 1, 1900, applies to the whole of a sheriff’s term commencing January 1, 1901; and ending January 1, 1903, and also to all that part of the same sheriff’s previous' term after January 1, 1900.

*198From Perry Circuit Court; *C. W.*Cook, Judge..

Action by Thomas J. Lyons against the Board of Commissioners of the County of Perry. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.

*Reversed.*

*John W. Ewing*and *Sol. H. Esarey,*for appellant.

*Oscar C. Minor, John T. Patrick*and *Philip Zoercher,*for appellee.

Monks, J.

Appellant was elected sheriff of Perry county at the November election of 1898, and entered upon the discharge of his duties January 1, 1899, and served as such sheriff for one term of two years. At the November election, 1900, he was elected sheriff of said county for a second term of two years, and entered upon the discharge of his duties for said second term on January 1, 1901, and served for two years, serving, by virtue of said two elections, four years, ending January 1, 1903. The fees earned by him during each of said terms, and collected and paid into the county treasury, were not sufficient to pay his salary in full for each of said terms, respectively, and this action was brought under section one of the act of 1903 (Acts 1903, p. 140), to recover the balance unpaid for each of said terms.

The questions presented in this case are the same as those in *Board, etc.,*v. *Lindeman*(1905), *ante,*186, and in *Hargis*v. *Board, etc.*(1905), *ante,*194, and upon the authority of said cases this case must be reversed, for the reason that appellant is entitled to the benefit of section one of said act of 1903, for all of his second term, and for that part of his first term from January 1, 1900, to January 1, 1901.

Judgment reversed, with instructions to overrule appellee’s demurrer to the complaint, and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
#### Roosevelt SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. WW-462.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Aug. 11, 1981.

Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, and Margaret Good, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Gregory C. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Roosevelt Smith appeals a condition of his probation requiring him to pay court costs, contending that the trial court erred in setting an amount of $300 over his objection without any determination of the actual costs incurred. We interpret Section 27.-56, Florida Statutes (1979), to require that costs imposed be shown to be the actual costs, rather than set at an arbitrary figure. Accordingly, this condition of Smith’s probation is set aside pending remand of the cause for a hearing to determine the actual amount of costs incurred.

BOOTH, SHAW and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
MEMORANDUM 

DATE: December 1, 2014

TO: Carbon Power Plan for Existing Power Plants; Docket Id: OAR–2013-0602

FROM: U.S. EPA Region 7 

SUBJECT: September 10, 2014, Meeting Regarding Proposed Carbon Power Plan for 

Existing Power Plants

SUMMARY

 Speaker - Karl Brooks (8-10 minutes of remarks/5 minute Q&A)

 Attendees – 20 people - Greater Kansas City Federal Executive Board (list not available)

 The board meets monthly

 Goals

o Provide a basic understanding of the Clean Power Plan

o Ask for their cooperation in promoting the climate change and health effects messages 

within their sphere of influence

o Leverage the strengths of our federal organization to make a more powerful impact in the 

communities in our four states.

EPA ATTENDEES –

 Karl Brooks, Regional Administrator, and Kathleen Fenton, Office of Public Affairs
#### STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. David F. SPEARMAN, Appellee.

No. 78-520.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Dec. 13, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 26, 1979.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Robert J. Landry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant.

Edward D. Foreman, St. Petersburg, for appellee.

BOARDMAN, Judge.

Appellee/defendant David F. Spearman was charged by information with burglary. He filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 3.190(c)(4) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. The relevant, undisputed facts are as follows. Appellee knocked on the front door of the residence of Sam Dunson. Dunson opened the door, and appellee struck Dunson in the forehead. Appellee’s hand and arm entered the residence when he struck Dunson.

After a hearing the trial court found that there were no disputed material facts; that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that appellee went to Dunson’s residence with the intent to commit an assault, and that there was an entry into the enclosed structure by appellee’s hand and arm. The trial judge then found appellee’s actions could be construed to be a burglary with intent to commit an assault. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the legislature did not intend this to be a burglary and granted the motion to dismiss.

Section 810.02(1), Florida Statutes (1977), provides: “ ‘Burglary’ means entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance *776with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain.” A structure is defined in Section 810.011(1) as “any building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage thereof.”

It is well established that the unqualified use of the word “enter” in a burglary statute does not confine its applicability to intrusion of the whole body but includes insertion of any part of the body or of an instrument designed to effect the contemplated crime. *State v. Whitaker,*275 S.W.2d 316 (Mo.1955); *Commonwealth v. Myers,*223 Pa.Super. 75, 297 A.2d 151 (1972); *Foster v. State,*220 So.2d 406 (Fla.3d DCA 1969); 13 Am.Jur.2d *Burglary*§ 10 (1964). The legislature is presumed to recognize the meaning of the terms it employs. Furthermore, appellee’s entire body intruded into the curtilage of Dunson’s residence.

In view of the plain language of the statute, it cannot be said that the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt.

REVERSED and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

GRIMES, C. J., and SCHEB, J., concur.
Zimbra Page 1of2


### Zimbra rmaguire@norwoodma.gov

Fwd: Norwood Airport, Request for Release ofSurplus Property for NonAeronautical Use
From 

### :Russ Maguire <rmaguire@norwoodma.gov> Subject: 

### Fwd: Norwood Airport, Request for Release of Surplus Property for Non-Aeronautical Use To 

### :mary walsh <mary.walsh@faa.gov> Bee :Thomas Joseph Wynne <tomwynnere@norwoodlight.com>, Mark Ryan <

### mryan@norwoodma.gov> Good morning Mary, 

### Fri, Jun 14, 2013 09:58AM

Since I plan to meet with you at 11 a .m. this morning on an unrelated matter (Brox paving) , I also wanted to forward to your attention an e- mail message sent one month ago to Barry Hammer
. My understanding is that Barry no longer works in compliance, though I had hoped to hear back from him

--as noted in the forwarded message , below

--before his move . To date , I ' ve not received anything from FAA on this surplus property release request , other than Barry ' s assurances by phone that the town of Norwood did not need a release
. When we meet today, I ' ll bring my copy of the request for release of surplus property packet that had originally been sent to Barry back in March 2012
. As noted in the e- mail below, my hope is that FAA will provide us with a written record of decision on this matter as soon as possible
. Thanks very much
. See you soon . Russ

----- Forwarded Message

--- -- From: "Russ Maguire " <rmaguire@norwoodma
. gov> To : "barry hammer" <barry
. hammer@faa.gov> Sent : Wednesday, May 15 , 2013 2 : 30 : 22 PM Subject : Norwood Airport , Request for Release of Surplus Property for Non

- Aeronautical Use Good afternoon Barry, In March 2012 , on behalf of the Norwood Airport Commission, I had submitted a formal request for release of surplus airport property for non- aeronautical land use . This was relative to a small tract of land separated from the airport proper by wetlands , fencing and private interests
. Since then, we ' ve had https://ncs.norwoodma.gov /h/printmessage?id=24040&tz=America!New _York 4/26/2015Zimbra Page 2 of2
several phone conversations regarding this request , the most recent being a few weeks ago . Apparently, FAA considered this request last year but deemed that it did not require a release
. In our most recent conversation, you indicated that FAA documentation to this effect had already been sent to the Town of Norwood, perhaps to the wrong department in the Town, and that you ' d try to track down this paperwork and re- send a copy to my attention
. Since we have yet to receive this documentation , I wanted to perhaps check back on its status , and confirm our mailing address as : 125 Access Road Attn : Airport Manager ' s Office Norwood, MA 02062 Thanks Barry
. Russ
Russ Maguire , Manager Norwood Memorial Airport
Russ Maguire , Manager Norwood Memorial Airport

https://ncs.norwoodma.gov/h/printmessage?id=24040&tz=America/New _York 4/26/2015
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

February 28, 2017

No. 04

- 16

- 00782

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF C.R

- A.A.,

Appellant

From the 216th Judicial District Court, Kerr County, Texas

Trial Court No. 15189A

Honorable N. Keith Williams, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

The brief of appellee W.R.B. was due February 22, 2017, but it has not been filed. We

order the brief must be filed by March 6, 2017, or the appeal will be submitted without a brief

from W.R.B.

_________________________________ Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 28th day of February, 2017

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Lomax ROUBION and Elleaner Eveque.

No. 65054.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 4, 1979.

In re State of Louisiana, through the District Attorney, Harry F. Connick, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Orleans Parish. No. 268-142 “D”.

Granted.
Editorial Note on Part 422
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 422 appear at 70 FR 4741, Jan. 28, 2005.

§ 422.662 Request for hearing. ( a ) *Method and place for filing a request.* ( 1 ) A request for a hearing must be made in writing and filed by an authorized official of the contract applicant or MA organization that was the party to the determination under the appeal.
( 2 ) The request for the hearing must be filed in accordance with the requirements specified in the notice.
( b ) *Time for filing a request.* A request for a hearing must be filed within 15 calendar days after the receipt of the notice of the contract determination or intermediate sanction.
( c ) *Parties to a hearing.* The parties to a hearing must be— ( 1 ) The parties described in § 422.660;
( 2 ) At the discretion of the hearing officer, any interested parties who make a showing that their rights may be prejudiced by the decision to be rendered at the hearing; and
( 3 ) CMS.
[63 FR 35113, June 26, 1998, as amended at 65 FR 40332, June 29, 2000; 72 FR 68724, Dec. 5, 2007; 75 FR 19813, Apr. 15, 2010]
#### Robert A. HOAG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 53561.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 17, 1979.

Jack O. Johnson, Public Defender and David S. Bergdoll, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and William I. Munsey, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *See McCreary v. State,*371 So.2d 1024 (Fla., 1979).

ENGLAND, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, SUNDBERG, HATCHETT and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>  5
<LEGEND>   This schedule contains summary financial information extracted
           from the Consolidated Balance Sheet and Consolidated Statement of
           Income included in the Company's Form 10-K for the period ended
           December 31, 1997 and is qualified in its entirety by reference to
           such Financial Statements.
</LEGEND> 
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000 
       
<S>                                           <C>
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                             Dec-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                Jan-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                  Dec-31-1997
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                 12-MOS
<CASH>                                            4,559
<SECURITIES>                                      4,973
<RECEIVABLES>                                     7,612
<ALLOWANCES>                                        138
<INVENTORY>                                       5,113
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 23,433
<PP&E>                                            5,373
<DEPRECIATION>                                    2,687
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   26,119
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                             3,601
<BONDS>                                               0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                 0
<PREFERRED>                                           0
<COMMON>                                             10
<OTHER-SE>                                       22,508
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     26,119
<SALES>                                          44,859
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 44,859
<CGS>                                            21,510
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    21,510
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 14,083
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                      0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                    0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   9,790
<INCOME-TAX>                                      3,720
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               6,070
<DISCONTINUED>                                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                       0
<CHANGES>                                             0
<NET-INCOME>                                      6,070
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     $0.63
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     $0.62
        

</TABLE>
# CA2006128EN.01000101.xml

| 1.6.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CA 128/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.6.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CA 128/1

---

NOTICE OF RECRUITMENT

NOTICE OF RECRUITMENT

(2006/C 128 A/01)

We are looking for a well educated and experienced professional with experience as a manager and knowledge of education and training to head our Secretariat based in Bramshill, Hampshire, United Kingdom

DIRECTOR

CEPOL, a body of the European Communities, train senior police officers from the European Union. The Secretariat headed by the Director, deals with educational, administrative, financial and logistical support. The establishment of the Secretariat is 22 staff members.

The post holder will be responsible for providing support and advice to the Chair and members of the Governing Board and committees. He/she will supervise the preparation of the Annual Work Programme, of the Annual Budget and of the Annual Report. He/she will negotiate cooperation agreements and represent CEPOL in appropriate EU policing and educational forums.

Since the EU Staff Regulations apply, applicants inter alia must be a national of one of the Member States of the EU and must have thorough knowledge of one of the languages of the Communities and satisfactory knowledge of a second language of the Communities. Furthermore, successful applicants will be required to undergo local security clearance.

inter alia

For further information and application pack, visit our web site www.cepol.net. Enquiries should be made by e-mail only please to: janos.fehervary@bmi.gv.at

| CEPOL SECRETARIAT |
| --- |
| CEPOL House, Bramshill, Hook, Hampshire, RG27 0JW, United Kingdom |
| Telephone (44-1256) 60 26 68, fax (44-1256) 60 29 96 |
| Homepage: www.cepol.net |

CEPOL SECRETARIAT

CEPOL SECRETARIAT

CEPOL House, Bramshill, Hook, Hampshire, RG27 0JW, United Kingdom

Telephone (44-1256) 60 26 68, fax (44-1256) 60 29 96

Homepage: www.cepol.net

---