United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 14, 2016 Decided January 17, 2017

No. 16-5047

A.N.S.W.E.R. COALITION (ACT NOW TO STOP WAR AND END 

RACISM),

APPELLANT

GRAYLAN SCOTT HAGLER, PASTOR, PLYMOUTH 

CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

W. RALPH BASHAM, IN OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR, U.S.

SECRET SERVICE AND SALLY JEWELL, SECRETARY, UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:05-cv-00071)

Mara Verheyden-Hilliard argued the cause for appellant. 

With her on the briefs was Carl L. Messineo.

Marina Utgoff Braswell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued 

the cause for appellee. With her on the brief was R. Craig 

Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.
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Before: SRINIVASAN, MILLETT and PILLARD, Circuit 

Judges.

PILLARD, Circuit Judge: On the occasion of a U.S. 

Presidential Inauguration, thousands of people gather along 

the sidewalks, parks, and plazas that line the Inaugural Parade 

route. On January 20th, the parade travels the 1.2-mile, 

sixteen-block portion of Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington,

D.C. that runs from the Capitol Building to the White 

House—a stretch sometimes referred to as America’s Main 

Street. The Inaugural Parade tradition dates back to April 30, 

1789, when George Washington was sworn in as the nation’s 

first President. See Joint Congressional Committee on 

Inaugural Ceremonies, Inaugural Parade, J.A. at 1236. With 

a new government forming and the public eye focused on the 

event, demonstrators also turn out on Inauguration Day to 

voice their dreams and demands. One of the great 

accomplishments of our Constitution is its guarantee of the 

people’s right to take to the streets to say what they think. 

The National Park Service is responsible for managing 

the open-air, traditional-public-forum spaces along the 

Inaugural Parade route. A 2008 Park Service regulation 

authorizes a priority permit setting aside a fraction of those 

spaces for identified Presidential Inaugural Committee uses 

on Inauguration Day. The priority permit allocates thirteen 

per cent of the footage alongside the parade route for ticketed 

spectator bleachers constructed and administered by the 

Inaugural Committee. One of the designated bleacher areas is 

on Freedom Plaza. Plaintiff-Appellant ANSWER (Act Now 

to Stop War and End Racism) Coalition contends that 

authorizing Freedom Plaza bleachers in the priority permit 

violates ANSWER’s First Amendment right to instead use the 

same space for a mass demonstration. Allocating that prime 

spot to ticketed bleachers, ANSWER asserts, 
3

unconstitutionally prefers the government’s message to its 

own.

The permit the Park Service regulation authorizes for the 

Inaugural Committee takes priority over any conflicting 

permit to demonstrate in the same space on Inauguration Day, 

but the ordinary permit system remains effective along most 

of the parade route. Seventy per cent of the footage 

immediately adjacent to the route remains available on a firstcome, first-served basis to individuals and permitted groups. 

ANSWER does not challenge the Park Service’s regulatory 

prerogative, consistent with the First Amendment, to exclude 

the public from some areas reserved for the Inaugural 

Committee, including areas exclusively for spectator 

bleachers. See Appellant Br. at 60. But ANSWER strongly 

prefers to demonstrate at Freedom Plaza because it is an open, 

elevated space that is easily visible from the Avenue and is 

historically associated with political protest. With its 

sightlines down the Avenue eastward toward the Capitol, 

Freedom Plaza is also, however, a salutary location for media 

staging and spectator seating. The Park Service thus included 

it within the fraction of the roadway-adjacent footage that the 

regulation assigns to the Inaugural Committee for such 

specified uses.

The Park Service regulation authorizing the priority 

permit, including the space on Freedom Plaza for the 

bleachers, is not a content- or viewpoint-based speech 

restriction, but a reasonable time, place, and manner 

regulation of the use of a public forum. It sets aside bleacher 

areas, including on Freedom Plaza, for the Inaugural 

Committee’s use as part of the package the rule reserves to 

the Committee as event organizer. The First Amendment 

requires that any reasonable, content-neutral regulation 

limiting expression along the parade route leave ample space 
4

available for peaceful demonstrations. The First Amendment 

does not, however, support ANSWER’s claim of a right to 

displace spectator bleachers with its own demonstration at 

Freedom Plaza. 

I. Background

ANSWER, a group that “engages in political organizing 

and activism in opposition to war and racism,” sought to 

engage in “expressive, free speech activities” on Freedom 

Plaza during the 2013 Presidential Inauguration. Decl. of 

Brian Becker ¶ 5 (Nov. 13, 2013), J.A. at 435; Suppl.

Pleading ¶ 1, A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Jewell, 153 F. Supp. 

3d 395 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 05-cv-71) (2016 A.N.S.W.E.R.). 

As soon as the Park Service started accepting permit 

applications to demonstrate on Inauguration Day 2013, 

ANSWER filed an application to use Freedom Plaza and its 

adjacent sidewalks. ANSWER’s permit application sought 

permission to use the space for a multimedia demonstration, 

with “[s]igns, placards, banners, stage, sound, bleachers, art 

installation, props, canopies, and other facilitative materials.” 

Attach. 1 to Suppl. Pleading at 2, ANSWER Application for 

2013 Inauguration, J.A. at 117. The Park Service informed 

ANSWER that it would be permitted to use only a 160-foot 

long by 35-foot wide portion of Freedom Plaza for its 

Inauguration Day demonstration because, pursuant to a 2008 

amendment to the Park Service’s regulations governing areas 

of the National Park system in the National Capital Region, 

most of the Plaza was reserved for the priority use of the 

Inaugural Committee. 

The 2008 amendment created a “regulatory priority use 

for limited, designated park areas for the P[residential] 

I[naugural] C[ommittee], the Armed Forces Inaugural 

Committee, and the Architect of the Capitol or the Joint 
5

Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies.” 73 Fed. 

Reg. 67,739, 67,740 (Nov. 17, 2008). Referring to Freedom 

Plaza by its Park Service designation as part of “Pennsylvania 

Avenue, National Historic Park,” the regulation states:

In connection with Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies 

the following areas are reserved for priority use as set 

forth in this paragraph. . . . 

(B) Portions of Pennsylvania Avenue, National 

Historic Park and Sherman Park . . . for the exclusive 

use of the Presidential Inaugural Committee on 

Inaugural Day for: 

(1) Ticketed bleachers viewing and access areas, 

except that members of the public may use a 

ticketed bleacher seat that has not been claimed by 

the ticket holder 10 minutes before the Inaugural

Parade is scheduled to pass the bleacher’s block;

(2) Portable toilets, except that they will be 

available to the public;

(3) Television and radio media and Armed Forces 

Inaugural Committee parade support structures; 

(4) The area in front of the John A. Wilson 

Building for the District of Columbia reviewing 

stand;

(5) Viewing areas designated for individuals with 

disabilities, except that they will be available to any 

disabled persons.

36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B) (2016). Maps separately 

identifying the areas allocated to each of the uses authorized 
6

in subsections (1) through (5) accompany the regulation. See 

id. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(E).

The regulation leaves open to the public, including 

demonstrators, 70 per cent of the footage on Pennsylvania 

Avenue abutting the Inaugural Parade route. Id.; 73 Fed. Reg. 

at 67,741. Of the 30 per cent that is not open to the public, 

the regulation designates 13 per cent for Inaugural Committee 

bleachers. See id. The Inaugural Committee, which comes 

into being after the presidential election and is responsible for 

organizing, planning, and executing “most of the inaugural 

celebration activities,” decides how tickets for bleacher seats 

will be distributed. See Audrey Celeste Crane-Hirsch, 

Congressional Research Service, The Presidential 

Inauguration: Basic Facts and Information at 5 (Jan. 9, 

2013); 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,742.

In this appeal, ANSWER challenges the regulation’s 

allocation of most of Freedom Plaza to the priority permit

instead of to the public under the “generally applicable 

permitting regulations, governed by a ‘first-come first-served’ 

system of priority.” Suppl. Pleading ¶ 14. ANSWER argues 

that the Park Service’s promulgation and application of 

subsection (B)(1), the portion of the priority-permit regulation

authorizing bleacher seating on Freedom Plaza, constitutes 

“identity-based, viewpoint-based and/or content-based 

discrimination,” in violation of the First Amendment and the 

Equal Protection Clause. Id. ¶ 21; see generally Compl., 

2016 A.N.S.W.E.R., 153 F. Supp. 3d 395 (No. 05-cv-71). 

ANSWER contends that the regulation authorizing spectator

bleachers on the Plaza is an unconstitutional content-based 

restraint of dissent in favor of pro-government speech. Suppl. 

Pleading ¶ 22; Appellant Br. at 42. 
7

This case presents a controversy likely to arise every four 

years. ANSWER has protested both Republican and 

Democratic inaugurations and has been granted a permit to 

demonstrate on a portion of Freedom Plaza for the imminent 

2017 Inauguration. See Decl. of Brian Becker ¶ 9, J.A. at 

436; ANSWER Coalition, Permits Secured for Jan. 20 Mass 

Protest at the Inauguration!, (Jan. 5, 2017), 

http://www.answercoalition.org/permits_secured_for_jan_20_

mass_protest_at_the_inauguration; National Park Service, 

National Mall First Amendment Permit Applications (Jan. 4, 

2017), https://www.nps.gov/aboutus/foia/upload/NAMA_

InaugurationPermitRequests_01-04-17.pdf. ANSWER does 

not challenge the priority permit’s allocation of space on any 

day other than Inauguration Day. ANSWER seeks a 

declaration that subsection (B)(1) is unconstitutional, and an 

injunction barring its enforcement.

The National Park Service, on behalf of itself and its

parent agency the United States Department of the Interior, 

defends the challenged subsection on two alternative grounds. 

The Park Service’s second defense, which we hold 

determinative here, is that the provision is a reasonable and 

content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation of a public 

forum. The priority permit, the Park Service asserts, is 

narrowly tailored to the government’s significant interest in 

conducting a public Inaugural ceremony. See Gov’t Br. at 39-

40. The Park Service also argues that any speech that occurs 

in the Inaugural Committee’s bleachers would be government 

speech not subject to the First Amendment’s restrictions. 

Because we conclude that the challenged regulatory 

subsection is a content-neutral time, place, and manner 

restriction, we do not reach the government speech question.
8

A. Earlier Cases Challenging Park Service 

Regulations in the Nation’s Capital

Political protestors and the Park Service have been here 

before. In Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 

1997), we enjoined a Park Service permit to President 

William Jefferson Clinton’s 1997 Inaugural that displaced all 

demonstrator permits along the entire Inaugural Parade route, 

and that did so not only during the parade, but for several 

months leading up to Inauguration Day. The Park Service in 

that case lacked the regulatory support it invokes today. It 

instead sought to preempt first-in-time permitted 

demonstrators by issuing itself a “blocking permit” for the 

“entire length of Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks for a fivemonth period.” Id. at 1458-59. The Service then

compounded the constitutional flaw of that sweeping

prohibition by stating that it would not in practice exclude all 

demonstrations from the sidewalks, but only those whose 

message was “inconsistent” with the government’s intended 

use. See id. at 1457-59.

We held in Mahoney that the Park Service’s viewpointbased exclusion of disfavored demonstrators violated the First 

Amendment. We took pains to dispel any suggestion that the 

“government can never control the use of segments of its own 

property against actual inconsistent usage by persons 

attempting First Amendment expression.” Id. at 1458. The 

constitutional violation there was the government’s attempt to 

“suppress opposing viewpoints” by excluding only disfavored 

demonstrators, and by taking the space out of general public 

use for several months. Id. at 1456. We held that the 

government may not “by fiat take a public forum out of the 

protection of the First Amendment” and purport to completely 

exclude all demonstrators as a ruse to exclude only those 

“citizens whose views it fears or dislikes.” Id. at 1457, 1459. 
9

The Park Service’s regulatory authority has not always 

been as constrained as it is today. In A Quaker Action Grp. v. 

Morton, 516 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Quaker Action IV) 

and Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d 1273 (D.C. 

Cir. 1972), for example, this Court reviewed challenges to a 

Park Service regulation that required a permit for any public 

gathering in National Park areas, but “excepted” events 

sponsored or co-sponsored by the Park Service (“NPS 

events”) and provided that events to which the Service chose 

to lend its sponsorship “may preempt any such areas to the 

exclusion of other public gatherings.” Quaker Action IV, 516 

F.2d at 737 (App.) (citing 36 C.F.R. §§ 50.19(a)(5), (b)). The 

regulation contained no “expressed standards for selection of 

‘NPS events.’” Quaker Action IV, 516 F.2d at 728. We noted 

that because such unconstrained discretion in the 

administration of a public permitting regulation invited

discriminatory enforcement, it was “patently inconsistent with 

the Constitution.” Women Strike for Peace, 472 F.2d at 1290

(opinion of Wright, J.); Quaker Action IV, 516 F.2d at 728. 

In response to that litigation, the Park Service 

promulgated a regulation establishing National Celebration 

Events that “occur at the same time and location” every year,

46 Fed. Reg. 55,959, 55,960 (Nov. 13, 1981)—or in the case 

of Inauguration Day, quadrenially, 45 Fed. Reg. 84,997, 

84,997 (Dec. 24, 1980). The events continued to receive 

priority use of designated areas, but the Park Service’s 

discretion was constrained by the limitation of space afforded 

and the specification of the events in the Federal Register. 46 

Fed. Reg. at 55,960.
10

B. ANSWER’s Initial Complaint, Preceding the 

Challenged 2008 Regulation

ANSWER initiated this case in 2005, after President 

George W. Bush’s second Inauguration, when it filed a

complaint challenging the National Park Service’s sincefurther-amended regulatory approach. Since 1980, the Park 

Service’s regulations have designated the White House 

sidewalk and portions of Lafayette Park for the “exclusive use 

of the Inaugural Committee on Inauguration Day.” 36 C.F.R. 

§ 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(A); 45 Fed. Reg. at 84,997-98. When 

ANSWER brought this case in 2005, all other areas 

immediately adjacent to the Inaugural Parade route, including 

Freedom Plaza, were open to the public for use by individuals 

or groups who obtain Park Service special-event or

demonstration permits on a first-come, first-served basis. See

36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(i) (2004). The Inaugural Committee 

did not then have a regulatory priority permit to use Freedom 

Plaza. Instead, on an ad hoc basis before the one-year permit 

application period opened, the Park Service granted a permit

to the second Bush Inaugural Committee for “the entire length 

of the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks (plus additional 

areas).” See A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Kempthorne, 537 F. 

Supp. 2d 183, 187 (D.D.C. 2008) (2008 A.N.S.W.E.R.).

ANSWER’s initial complaint included three counts. It

challenged: the Park Service’s ad hoc deviation from the

Service’s general permitting regulation in favor of the 

Inaugural Committee (Count I); the ban on sign supports

(rods or sticks on which handheld signs could be held aloft) 

(Count II); and the ad hoc permit’s broad exclusion of 

protestors from vast portions of Pennsylvania Avenue (Count 

III). See 2016 A.N.S.W.E.R., 153 F. Supp. 3d at 402. The

parties cross-moved for partial summary judgment on Count 

I, and the district court ruled in ANSWER’s favor that the 
11

Park Service unconstitutionally failed to follow its own 

generally applicable permitting regulations. See 2008 

A.N.S.W.E.R., 537 F. Supp. 2d at 206. The court reasoned 

that the Park Service’s departure from the regulations’

procedural requirements in order to give special treatment to 

the Inaugural Committee worked “an abridgement of 

communication” against other permit seekers. Id. at 199

(quoting Quaker Action IV, 516 F.2d at 727). The Park 

Service did not appeal that adverse decision, but responded by 

promulgating the 2008 amended regulation, including the 

priority permitting provision for bleachers at Freedom Plaza 

now before us.

C. ANSWER’s Supplemental Pleading Adding its 

Claim Against the 2008 Rule’s Grant of Bleacher 

Space to the Inaugural Committee 

On December 7, 2011, ANSWER applied for a permit to 

demonstrate on Freedom Plaza and its adjacent sidewalks

during the 2013 Inauguration. The Park Service then filed an

application that invoked the priority permit regulation on 

behalf of the Inaugural Committee. In accordance with the 

2008 regulation, the priority permit included “designated 

portions of Freedom Plaza” specifically for “bleachers for 

viewing during the Inaugural Parade.” Letter from Robbin 

Owen, Division of Permits Management, to Brian Becker, 

ANSWER Coalition National Coordinator (Jan. 4, 2012), J.A. 

at 687; Inaugural Committee Permit Application for 2013 

Inauguration at 4, J.A. at 598. As set forth above, the Park 

Service’s regulatory priority displaced ANSWER’s first-intime-application for all but a fraction of Freedom Plaza 160 

feet deep, with 35 feet abutting Pennsylvania Avenue. 

ANSWER then supplemented its complaint to add Count IV 

challenging subsection (B)(1) of the regulation as “identity-
12

based, viewpoint-based and/or content-based discrimination 

in violation of the First Amendment.” Suppl. Pleading ¶ 21.

The Park Service informed ANSWER that after the 

Presidential election and formation of the Inaugural 

Committee, some eleven months in the future, ANSWER 

might discuss with that Committee whether it would be 

willing to accommodate ANSWER’s planned protest on its

regulatory priority portion of Freedom Plaza. ANSWER also 

could apply to demonstrate at other locations abutting the 

route, including John Marshall Park, another park area on 

Pennsylvania Avenue. See 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(E) 

(Maps 1-2).

Once the election was over and the new Inaugural 

Committee was formed, ANSWER diligently sought to 

coordinate with the Committee regarding the possibility of 

using more space on Freedom Plaza. After meeting with 

ANSWER, the Inaugural Committee told ANSWER that it 

intended to use its entire allocated space on Freedom Plaza. 

Having failed to persuade the Committee to cede its bleacher 

space at Freedom Plaza, ANSWER would have to resort to 

space elsewhere along the parade route. 

Several months after the 2013 Inauguration, the parties 

cross-moved for summary judgment as to Counts II, III and 

IV. The district court granted judgment to the Park Service.

2016 A.N.S.W.E.R., 153 F. Supp. 3d at 400-01. On Count II, 

the court held that the ban on sign supports was narrowly 

tailored to ensuring safety and managing pedestrian traffic at 

the Inauguration, id. at 417, a decision ANSWER did not 

appeal. On Counts III and IV, the court conducted a two-step 

analysis. It first assumed that bleachers were authorized as an 

expressive activity or venue for expression, and decided 

that—like the parades and orations elsewhere in the priority-
13

permitted Inauguration areas—bleacher speech constitutes 

government speech not subject to First Amendment scrutiny 

for content or viewpoint. Id. at 410-13. 

The district court acknowledged that, although the 

government may express its own viewpoint in a public forum,

any regulatory restriction on private expression in the forum 

remains subject to constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 413-14

(citing Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 

Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015)). The court therefore next

analyzed the regulation’s effect on demonstrators under 

intermediate scrutiny, holding it narrowly tailored to the 

government’s significant interest in planning and executing 

the Inaugural Ceremony and Parade. Id. at 415. The court 

determined that the regulation’s incidental restrictions on 

speech are no greater than necessary to serve the 

government’s significant interest and that it leaves sufficient 

alternative channels for communication, as it designates only 

a modest portion of the Inaugural Parade route for the 

Inaugural Committee’s use. Id. at 415.

II. Analysis

ANSWER appeals the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment on Counts III and IV in the Park Service’s favor, 

pressing its challenge to the Park Service’s regulation both on 

its face and as applied in the 2013 Inauguration permitting 

cycle to give the Inaugural Committee’s permit priority at

Freedom Plaza. We review the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment de novo. See Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 

1145, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

The regulation designates areas of priority use along the 

Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalk. That space, including 

Freedom Plaza, is a quintessential public forum. See 
14

Mahoney, 105 F.3d at 1457. Its importance to public dialogue 

is acute on Inauguration Day. See id. at 1458. 

The constitutionality of regulation of public forums 

depends first on whether the regulation is content based. 

Content-based regulations are “presumptively 

unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government 

proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling 

state interests.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 

2226 (2015). Second, because traditional public forums are 

vital places for speech, even a content-neutral public-forum 

regulation is subjected to additional First Amendment 

scrutiny to determine whether it is a reasonable time, place, 

and manner restriction “narrowly tailored to serve a 

significant governmental interest” that “leave[s] open ample 

alternative channels for communication.” Ward v. Rock 

Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); see also Perry 

Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 

(1983).

A. The Regulation Is Not A Content-Based Speech 

Restriction Subject to Strict First Amendment

Scrutiny

1. The Regulation is Facially Content Neutral. To 

be subject to evaluation under the more lenient, 

“intermediate” scrutiny applicable to time, place, and manner 

regulations, a rule must not itself be content based, see Reed,

135 S. Ct. at 2228, and must be “justified without reference to 

the content of the regulated speech,” Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 

“Government regulation of speech is content based if a law 

applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or 

the idea or message expressed.” Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227.

Facial distinctions based on message, whether they regulate 

the speech’s subject matter, function, or purpose, are content 
15

based and so subject to strict scrutiny. Id. Meanwhile, “laws 

that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without 

reference to the ideas or views expressed are in most instances 

content neutral.” Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 

512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994).

The challenged regulation is content neutral on its face. 

It authorizes the Inaugural Committee to construct and 

administer “[t]icketed bleachers viewing and access areas,” 

along with space for disabled spectators, media, toilets, and 

the District of Columbia’s reviewing stand. 36 C.F.R. 

§ 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(1); see id. §§ 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(2)-(5).

Contrary to the district court’s background assumption, the 

regulatory priority granted to the Inaugural Committee by 

subsection (B)(1) to provide spectator bleachers turns not on 

the content of any speech, but on the desirability of providing

to the Inaugural Committee as the event organizer a limited 

amount of reserved seating for ticketed spectators. 

Subsection (B)(1)’s provision for bleachers at Freedom 

Plaza is “not a ‘regulation of speech,’” but a “regulation of the 

places where some speech may occur.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 

U.S. 703, 719 (2000). The Colorado statute in Hill made it 

unlawful to knowingly approach within eight feet of another 

person, without consent, “for the purpose of passing a leaflet 

or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, 

education, or counseling with such other person” within 100 

feet of the entrance to any health care facility. Id. at 707. The 

Court held the Colorado law was not viewpoint based, but 

that it imposed a reasonable time, place, and manner 

restriction on knowingly approaching, for specified purposes,

patients entering the clinics. Id. at 725-26. There was no 

evidence in Hill that Colorado enacted its law “because of 

disagreement with” the message of the regulated speech: The 

regulation applied “equally to all demonstrators, regardless of 
16

viewpoint, and the statutory language ma[de] no reference to 

the content of the speech.” Id. at 719.

The regulation at issue here is even more clearly content 

neutral, because it makes no reference at all to speech, let 

alone the content of speech. It simply provides for permitting 

of spectator bleachers and a cluster of non-speech functions 

on Freedom Plaza in service of the Inaugural celebration, and 

it only indirectly regulates where demonstrations may occur

by displacing them from that spot. Any displaced speakers’ 

content is irrelevant: Nothing in the regulation would prohibit 

a ticketholder to the Inaugural Committee’s bleacher area 

from publicly endorsing ANSWER’s message. See McCullen 

v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014) (regulation 

excluding people from a 35-foot buffer zone outside clinics

where abortions are performed did not “draw content-based 

distinctions on its face”). The record contains no evidence 

that the Park Service would have pared back the scope of the 

priority permit at Freedom Plaza if demonstrators with a 

message more to the government’s liking had asked. Cf. 

Mahoney, 105 F.3d at 1455-56; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 

U.S. 377, 391 (1992); Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 

U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 

272-73 (1951). And the regulation provides a rule under 

which non-ticketholders may occupy bleacher seats if they 

remain unclaimed ten minutes before the Inaugural Parade is 

scheduled to pass. 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(1). 

Inaugural Committees are entitled to the priority permit, on 

behalf of any President-elect, no matter the views of the 

Committee or President-elect. The regulation also equally 

excludes anyone who might elbow into the reserved area, 

regardless of whether she or he wishes to protest, show 

support, or simply get a better view. Here, the regulatory 

preference for “[t]icketed bleachers viewing and access areas”

draws no content distinction. 
17

2. The Regulation is Justified Without Reference to 

the Content of Speech. The facially neutral regulation is 

also “justified without reference to the content” of any 

potential speaker’s alternative use of the Plaza space and was 

not adopted “because of disagreement with the message” of 

any anticipated expression on Inauguration Day. See Reed, 

135 S. Ct. at 2227; see also United States v. O’Brien, 391 

U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The inquiry into regulatory purpose

ensures that a facially neutral regulation affecting speech is 

not designed to suppress content the government disfavors. 

By its nature, a restriction on use of a public forum is bound 

to curtail some speech. But a “regulation that serves purposes 

unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even 

if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but 

not others.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.

The function of the challenged provision, subsection 

(B)(1), is to provide “viewing and access areas.” 36 C.F.R. 

§ 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(1). The governmental purpose is 

unrelated to the content of expression. There is no evidence 

in the record that the regulation was adopted because of any 

disagreement with ANSWER’s—or any demonstrators’—

message, nor any evidence of desire generally to suppress 

dissent or otherwise discriminate with regard to content. The 

regulation is therefore content neutral. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 

2227; see also O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 

ANSWER argues that the regulation is content based 

because it restricts ANSWER demonstrating at Freedom 

Plaza while favoring the incoming administration’s 

supporters. See Appellant Br. at 6, 42. ANSWER’s 

admittedly viewpoint-based reason for seeking access to the 

Plaza does not, however, make any rule that stands in its way 

content based. The regulation excludes ANSWER from 

portions of Freedom Plaza not because it seeks to 
18

demonstrate, nor due to the content of the message ANSWER 

wishes to communicate, but to ensure some premium space 

for “[t]icketed bleachers viewing and access areas” as part of 

the event package reserved for the Inaugural Committee. 36 

C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(1). The Park Service’s provision 

for the Inaugural Committee to construct its bleachers, even 

as 70 per cent of the Inaugural route remains available for 

demonstration permits, is no more content based than the 

unchallenged provisions reserving areas for portable toilets, 

media stands, or viewing areas for individuals with 

disabilities. See id. §§ 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(2), (3), (5). 

We see no record evidence suggesting that the 

government intended the bleacher area to be a conduit for 

communicating any content to the public, that the government 

controls the content of spectator expression in the bleachers, 

or that the public will perceive the government to be speaking 

via the bleachers. See Appellant Br. at 36. But see 2016 

A.N.S.W.E.R., 153 F. Supp. 3d at 412-13 (concluding 

otherwise). The regulation makes no suggestion that the 

purpose of the Freedom Plaza bleacher seating is 

communicative. The bleachers are for ticketed spectators to 

view the parade. The Final Rule’s only reference to control of 

the bleachers’ use is that “[t]raditionally, each P[residential] 

I[naugural] C[ommittee] decides how, and to whom, to 

distribute P[residential] I[naugural] C[ommittee] bleacher seat 

tickets.” 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,742. 

ANSWER’s contrary characterization is unpersuasive. It 

casts subsection (B)(1) as an impermissible content-based 

effort to provide supporters of the administration an enhanced 

“visible presence” on Inauguration Day to the exclusion of 

ANSWER, an avowed government critic. See Appellant Br. 

at 42-43. ANSWER quotes the Park Service’s counsel in the 

district court contending that the Inaugural Committee “wants 
19

to be able to provide a presence” for ticketholders along the 

Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks. Appellant Br. at 42 (quoting 

Tr. of Mot. Hr’g at 10). ANSWER takes that comment out of 

context. The Service there acknowledged that the sidewalk 

adjoining the Inaugural Parade route is valuable both for 

expression by demonstrating parties seeking a “visible 

presence” (such as ANSWER), and for those wishing to 

reserve choice viewing areas (such as the Park Service on the 

Committee’s behalf). ANSWER’s desire to demonstrate at 

Freedom Plaza—an undeniably expressive use—does not 

render the Park Service’s intended use expressive. Cf.

O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. 

The regulation itself is agnostic as to whether the persons 

to be seated will even be supporters of, or chosen by, the 

incoming president, let alone whether they will express 

themselves in any particular way. Consistent with the rule, 

President Obama’s 2009 Inaugural Committee, for example, 

offered some of its bleacher seats at a nominal price to any 

member of the public. See Gone in 60 Seconds, Politico (Jan. 

10, 2009), http://www.politico.com/story/2009/01/gone-in-60-

seconds-inaugural-parade-tickets-017310 (noting publicly 

available Inaugural Committee tickets for 2009 Inauguration 

sold out in under one minute). And the rule itself contains a 

10-minute release provision that allows any member of the 

public to occupy a ticketed seat for free if the ticketholder has 

not claimed it ten minutes before the parade passes. 36 C.F.R. 

§ 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(1); 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,741. The set-aside 

of viewing areas on Freedom Plaza “open to members of the 

public who have disabilities” also reflects the rule’s premise 

that spectators are present to watch, rather than to engage in 

some kind of loyalty performance. 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,741; 

see also 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(5); id.

§ 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(E) (Map 8). The decision by the Park 

Service to grant the Inaugural Committee space to provide 
20

viewing areas was neither expressly nor implicitly 

conditioned on the ticketholders communicating anything on 

Inauguration Day. The mere possibility that a priority permit 

might be susceptible of such use does not make it a contentbased regulation of speech. Cf. Turner, 512 U.S. at 652 

(“Appellants’ ability to hypothesize a content-based purpose 

for [the law at issue] rests on little more than speculation and 

does not cast doubt upon the content-neutral character of [the 

law].”).

Content-neutral regulatory line-drawing may incidentally 

burden speech without running afoul of the First Amendment. 

See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Turner, 512 U.S. at 643. In 

Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 

U.S. 540 (1983), for instance, the Supreme Court upheld 

statutory authorization for veterans’ organizations to use tax 

exempt contributions for lobbying purposes while other 

nonprofits lacked authority to do the same. The line drawn 

between veterans’ groups and other nonprofits reflected the 

country’s “long standing policy of compensating veterans for 

their past contributions.” Id. at 551. The Park Service’s 

priority permit for the Inaugural Committee planning a 

“national celebration event” reflects a similarly wellestablished policy of enabling a public ceremony to recognize 

the start of a new presidential administration. See 36 C.F.R. 

§ 7.96(g)(1)(iii). The Park Service’s regulation, including

subsection (B)(1) authorizing bleachers at Freedom Plaza, is 

no more content based than the line drawn between veterans’ 

groups and other nonprofits that the Court upheld in Regan, or 

the restrictions on leafletting and handbilling sustained in 

Hill. 

Finally, this case is easily distinguished from the contentbased enforcement scheme that we invalidated in Mahoney. 

The Christian Defense Coalition sought permission in 1997
21

for its members “to stand on the sidewalk and peacefully note 

their dissent” as the Inaugural Parade passed, but were told 

that its members would be subject to arrest if they picketed at 

any point alongside Pennsylvania Avenue. 105 F.3d at 1455-

56. The Park Service in Mahoney issued to itself a permit for 

the entirety of Pennsylvania Avenue for several months, thus

displacing all permits to demonstrate anywhere along the 

Inaugural Parade route. 105 F.3d at 1457-58. The 

government’s putative, content-neutral justification was to 

prevent demonstrators’ “physical intrusion” into the Inaugural 

event. Id. at 1458. But the government’s proffered 

justification was revealed to be pretextual when the Park 

Service “conceded that if appellants were carrying no signs 

or, indeed, if they were carrying signs favorable to the 

administration whose second Inaugural was being celebrated, 

their ‘physical intrusion’ would be welcomed.” Id. Here, 

there is no hint of any such content-based purpose by the Park 

Service to pick and choose among demonstrators based on 

their messages.

ANSWER contends that the Obama Inaugural Committee 

in 2012 conducted a “political vetting” to decide whether to 

invite ANSWER to share some of the Plaza space included in 

the Committee’s permit, and that the Committee 

unconstitutionally concluded “on the basis of viewpoint that 

ANSWER had ‘competing interests’ for expression along the 

parade route.” Appellant Br. at 62. The First Amendment 

presumptively bans political vetting as a condition of access 

to a public forum, but the fleeting assertion in ANSWER’s 

brief that a past Inaugural Committee engaged in “vetting” 

fails for several overlapping reasons to raise an issue of fact 

material to the claim ANSWER pleaded and litigated here.

First, the “vetting” contention is vague and conclusory, 

resting on a single statement that unidentified members of the 

Inaugural Committee asked unidentified ANSWER 
22

representatives “about our goals, messaging, and how we do 

outreach and organize.” Decl. of Brian Becker ¶ 33, J.A. at 

443. Second, it is unclear how the “vetting” contention 

relates to this case as ANSWER has framed it. The Inaugural 

Committee, the putative vetter, is not a defendant; the vetting 

of which ANSWER complains does not help to show the 

asserted constitutional defect in the regulatory subsection 

(B)(1) that ANSWER challenges; and ANSWER has no 

evidence that vetting is likely to recur such that it could be 

redressable by the declaratory and injunctive relief ANSWER 

seeks. 

We conclude that the regulation is content neutral and is 

justified without reference to the content of regulated speech. 

Having determined that the regulation is facially content 

neutral and justified without reference to the content of 

expression, we have no occasion to rely on any notion that the 

regulations involve government speech of the kind described 

in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009), and 

Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 

S. Ct. 2239 (2015). The public forum analysis suffices.

B. The Priority Permit for the Inaugural 

Committee Is a Reasonable Time, Place, and 

Manner Restriction

Because the regulation is content neutral, any incidental 

effect it has on speech is subject to the intermediate scrutiny

that governs time, place, and manner restrictions. Ward, 491 

U.S. at 791. To survive such scrutiny, the regulation must be 

“narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 

interest” and “leave open ample alternative channels for 

communication of the information.” Id.; Henderson v. Lujan, 

964 F.2d 1179, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
23

1. The Regulation Serves a Significant Governmental 

Interest. The regulation is directed to the government’s 

significant interest in facilitating the President-elect’s public 

Inaugural ceremony. See Gov’t Br. at 39-40. The date of the 

Presidential transition is mandated by the Constitution, see

U.S. Const. amend XX, § 1, and its attendant celebration is 

contemplated in federal legislation, see Presidential Inaugural 

Ceremonies Act, Pub. L. No. 84-986, 70 Stat. 1049, 1049 § 1 

(1956), codified at 36 U.S.C. § 501(2). For its part, 

ANSWER does not contest the Inauguration’s importance as a 

national celebration. See Appellant Br. at 48 (“The public 

Inaugural Parade is deeply rooted in the American 

tradition . . . .”); 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,739. Nor does it argue 

that the governmental interest in giving a committee control 

over some public space to organize an open-air, public 

Inaugural ceremony is insignificant. Rather, ANSWER 

argues that the government cannot show that the regulation is 

narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See Appellant Br. at 

47. 

The reason the Park Service created a priority permit 

regulation is to facilitate a public “Inauguration celebration 

for a newly elected President.” Gov’t Br. at 39; 73 Fed. Reg. 

at 67,739 (describing Inauguration as “a national celebration 

event for the benefit of all citizens”); 36 C.F.R. 

§§ 7.96(g)(1)(iii), (4)(ii) (designating Inauguration as 

National Celebration Event). To achieve that goal, the 

regulation creates a “regulatory priority use for limited, 

designated park areas for the P[residential] I[naugural] 

C[ommittee], the Armed Forces Inaugural Committee, and the 

Architect of the Capitol or the Joint Congressional Committee 

on Inaugural Ceremonies, entities whose role in the Inaugural 

has traditionally necessitated such use.” 73 Fed. Reg. at 

67,740. That regulatory priority makes sense. Congress put 

the Inaugural Committee “in charge of the Presidential 
24

inaugural ceremony and functions and activities connected 

with the ceremony.” 70 Stat. at 1049 § 1, codified at 36 

U.S.C. § 501(1). To support that role, the Act allows the 

Secretary of the Interior to “grant to the Inaugural Committee 

a permit to use [federal land] during the inaugural period.” 

Id. § 503. 

The Park Service’s designation of space for reserved

seating is a reasonable component of a priority permit for a 

public Inaugural celebration. Part of organizing the 

Inauguration is providing seating for spectators; the Inaugural 

Committee’s regulatory priority allows just that. See 36

C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(B)(1); see also Inaugural Committee 

Permit Application for 2013 Inauguration at 4, J.A. at 598 

(“For all proposed bleacher space, we will be placing 

bleachers for viewing during the Inaugural Parade on January 

21st.”). The Park Service also asserts a more particular 

interest in facilitating the Inaugural Committee’s fundraising 

efforts by allowing it to sell bleacher tickets, see Gov’t Br. at 

40-41, but we neither find record support for such an interest 

nor do we believe it material to the validity of the Park 

Service rule under the First Amendment.

2. The Regulation is Narrowly Tailored to the 

Governmental Interest. In order to satisfy the requirement 

that the regulation be narrowly tailored to the government’s 

significant interest, the government must show “a close fit 

between ends and means.” McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2534. We 

must satisfy ourselves that the regulation “promotes a 

substantial government interest that would be achieved less 

effectively absent the regulation.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799. 

The regulation “need not be the least restrictive or least 

intrusive means of serving the government’s interests,” but it 

“must not ‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary 

to further the government’s legitimate interests.’” McCullen, 
25

134 S. Ct. at 2535 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799); see also 

Ward, 491 U.S. at 797 (“[R]estrictions on the time, place, or 

manner of protected speech are not invalid ‘simply because 

there is some imaginable alternative that might be less 

burdensome on speech.’” (quoting United States v. Albertini, 

472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)); cf. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative 

Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984) (declining under a 

time, place, and manner analysis to “judge how much 

protection of park lands is wise and how that level of 

conservation is to be attained”).

The government has cleared this hurdle. The Park 

Service’s regulation sets aside 13 per cent of the parade route 

along Pennsylvania Avenue for Inaugural Committee 

bleachers, including the bleachers on Freedom Plaza. It 

leaves open 70 per cent of the route for the public. The total 

of the ticketed bleacher area under the current rule is 

substantially reduced from the amount of space the bleachers 

have occupied in the past. See 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,741 (noting 

current regulation reduces bleacher area to 24 bleachers from 

49 bleachers in 2005); id. (“[T]he final rule substantially 

increases the park areas available to the public and 

demonstrators.”); cf. Mahoney, 105 F.3d at 1458-59 (doubting 

that Park Service permit blocking demonstrators from entire 

parade route for five-month period satisfies narrow tailoring). 

No doubt there are significantly more spectators who wish to 

attend the Inauguration than these bleachers can 

accommodate. The reservation of limited space along the 

parade route for bleachers as part of the event package 

afforded to the Inaugural Committee allows the Committee to 

offer a moderate number of seats to ticketed spectators, while 

also leaving most “front row” space along Pennsylvania 

Avenue available to others, including demonstrators. 
26

We are also satisfied that the governmental interest 

would be “achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” 

Ward, 491 U.S. at 799. ANSWER contends that the 

Constitution requires that ticketed bleacher space be limited to 

what the Inaugural Committee might be able to obtain in a 

first-come, first-served public permit application process. 

Suppl. Pleading ¶¶ 14-15, 17; Appellant Br. at 48, 58; 

Appellant Reply Br. at 30. That process, however, opens 

eleven months before the election of the incoming president 

has even occurred, when no Inaugural planning committee

exists to submit such an application. This regulation is a 

practical and reasonable response to that problem. 

ANSWER’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. 

First, ANSWER argues that the government has not met its 

burden because it fails to show that Inaugural ceremonies 

would be cancelled absent the regulation. See Appellant Br. 

at 48-49. ANSWER also argues that the regulation is not 

narrowly tailored because in 2009, pursuant to a settlement 

with the Park Service, ANSWER was able to use part of the 

area on Freedom Plaza that the regulation allocates to the 

Inaugural Committee’s bleachers and the Inaugural ceremony 

still happened. Appellant Br. at 49. Otherwise valid 

restrictions arising from conflicting uses need not be struck 

down, however, “merely because the government has for a 

time stayed its hand.” Henderson, 964 F.2d at 1183. The

narrow tailoring requirement is not a “least intrusive” or 

“least restrictive” means test. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798.

Next, ANSWER argues that Freedom Plaza has unique 

symbolic and historic characteristics that merit special 

analysis. See Appellant Br. at 4, 40-41. There may well be 

circumstances in which the Plaza’s admittedly salutary 

aspects and symbolic value could be relevant to a time, place, 

and manner analysis. But ANSWER cites no case in which 
27

the quality of particular public-forum space means that the 

First Amendment places it out of reach of any exclusive event 

permit. Two reasons support the contrary conclusion. For 

one, ANSWER is not necessarily entitled to its favored place 

for expression. “[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee 

the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places 

or in any manner that may be desired.” Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y

for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981). For 

instance, in White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 

746 F.2d 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1984), we upheld a prohibition 

against protestors standing still with signs in the center 

portion of the White House sidewalk, despite the plaintiff’s 

contention that the center portion is “particularly 

evocative . . . for symbolic protest.” Id. at 1534-38. 

A second flaw is ANSWER’s failure to distinguish the 

Freedom Plaza bleachers from other historically significant 

areas, including the White House sidewalk and Lafayette 

Park. See 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(A). Those areas are 

similarly “controlled by the Inaugural Committee through a 

reserved ticket system.” 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,741. And those 

areas have historic and symbolic importance. See Quaker 

Action IV, 516 F.2d at 725 (“[T]he White House sidewalk, 

Lafayette Park, and the Ellipse constitute a unique situs for 

the exercise of First Amendment rights.”); Women Strike for 

Peace, 472 F.2d at 1287 (opinion of Wright, J.) (“There is an 

unmistakable symbolic significance in demonstrating close to 

the White House or on the Capitol grounds . . . .”). Aside 

from alluding to “unique ceremonial and security issues” 

associated with the Presidential reviewing stands, ANSWER 

does not provide a principle for drawing a constitutional line 

between ticketed access to Lafayette Square and ticketed 

access to bleachers at Freedom Plaza. Appellant Br. at 60.
28

Finally, ANSWER asserts that Freedom Plaza has unique 

physical characteristics that make it more hospitable for 

public demonstrations than other available areas such as John 

Marshall Park. See Appellant Br. at 41, 56. ANSWER 

rejects John Marshall Park as unable to accommodate 

“sizeable bleachers, stage or sound platforms.” Decl. of Brian 

Becker ¶ 39, J.A. at 445. That argument cuts both ways. 

Freedom Plaza also offers a particularly desirable vantage 

point for spectators and media. It was thus reasonable for the 

Park Service to include space on a Plaza that can 

accommodate such activities within the package of areas 

covered by the priority permit. 

3. The Regulation Leaves Ample Alternative 

Channels for Expression. To stand as a reasonable time, 

place, or manner restriction, the priority permit regulation 

must also leave open ample alternative channels for 

communication. See Boardley v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 615 

F.3d 508, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2010). ANSWER disagrees that 

demonstrators have adequate access, principally by framing 

the issue as whether alternative channels remain at Freedom 

Plaza itself. See Appellant Br. at 54; Appellant Reply Br. at 

27-28. The relevant question here, however, as ANSWER 

itself comes close to acknowledging, is whether ANSWER 

retains channels for expression at the Inaugural Parade. See

Appellant Br. at 25 (“[T]he object of proper analysis is the 

Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks and parklands on 

Inauguration Day . . . .”). As ANSWER described its 

objections in 2005, for example, it wished to express its 

opposition to “the war policies of the Bush administration,”

Compl. at 3-4, and it then anticipated that it would 

demonstrate “at the next [2009] Presidential Inauguration,”

Id. ¶ 85. In 2013, ANSWER similarly sought to “engage in 

expressive, free speech activities in connection with the 

January 20, 2013 Presidential Inauguration and related 
29

parade.” Suppl. Pleading ¶ 1. ANSWER criticizes 

governmental policies, and its Inaugural demonstrations are

“directed at parade participants” including “the 

Administration members and [the] President in the parade.” 

Compl. ¶¶ 46, 60. ANSWER has not persuaded us that the 

relevant forum here is limited to Freedom Plaza, such that 

alternative channels alongside the celebration and parade that 

are directly visible to its target audiences are inadequate.

 The 2008 regulation is dramatically narrower than the 

permit we invalidated in Mahoney. There, the Park Service 

“issued itself a permit not for a limited segment of the 

Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks . . . but for the entire length 

of Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks for a five-month period.” 

105 F.3d at 1458; see also 2008 A.N.S.W.E.R., 537 F. Supp. 

2d at 187 (invalidating Inaugural Committee permit for the 

parade route “from the National Capital Area, 3rd Street to 

17th Street including sidewalks on both sides of the street”); 

and see Women Strike for Peace, 472 F.2d at 1293 (opinion of 

Wright, J.) (government “may not preempt the entire Ellipse

when only a partial preemption would fully vindicate its 

interest”). As described above, the current regulation sets 

aside 13 per cent of the Inaugural Parade route along 

Pennsylvania Avenue for Inaugural Committee bleachers. 73 

Fed. Reg. at 67,741. Another 17 per cent is prioritized for 

other logistical purposes, including media. See Tr. of Mot. 

Hr’g at 11. Seventy per cent of the portion of Pennsylvania 

Avenue abutting the parade route is available for members of 

the public, including groups with permits to demonstrate. 73 

Fed. Reg. at 67,741. By excluding from the priority permit

“certain park areas that have been allocated to the 

[Committee] in past Inaugural Parades,” the 2008 regulation

“substantially increases the park areas available to the public 

and demonstrators.” 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,741. We decline to 

establish where on the continuum—between Mahoney’s total 
30

exclusion of protestors for several months and the current 

regulation’s allocation of 70 per cent of the Parade route’s

sidewalks to the public—the government’s priority allocation 

of space becomes reasonable. We simply hold that this 

regulation is content neutral, reasonable, and provides ample 

alternative channels for communication. 

* * *

We accordingly affirm the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment to the Park Service. 

So ordered.