2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-20-2012

Marlene Ryder v. Terrence McCabe

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-1983

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Recommended Citation

"Marlene Ryder v. Terrence McCabe" (2012). 2012 Decisions. Paper 557.

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BLD-246 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-1983

___________

MARLENE RYDER,

Ethel-Mae Williams for the Witnessing of the Parse-Syntax-Grammer 

of the Vasalees Fraud-Documents

v. 

*TERRENCE J. MCCABE, ESQ.; 

MCCABE, WEISBERG AND CONWAY, P.C.; 

MARC S. WEISBERG, ESQ.; 

*EDWARD D. CONWAY, ESQ.; 

MARGARET GAIRO, ESQ.; 

EVERHOME MORTGAGE COMPANY

MARLENE RYDER,

 Appellant

 *(Amended pursuant to Clerk's Order dated 5/1/12)

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 12-cv-00179)

District Judge: Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter

____________________________________

Submitted on Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss the Appeal or for Summary Affirmance

August 2, 2012

Before: SCIRICA, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 20, 2012)

_________

OPINION

_________
2

PER CURIAM

Marlene Ryder appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss her 

complaint. Before us primarily is Appellees’ (Defendants below) motion to dismiss the 

appeal, also construed as a motion for summary affirmance.

1

 Because the appeal is 

properly before us, we decline to dismiss the appeal. However, for the reasons given in 

the Appellees’ motion, we find that the appeal presents no substantial question. We will 

therefore summarily affirm the District Court’s order, pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 

and I.O.P. 10.6.

2

Marlene Ryder filed an incomprehensible, seven-page complaint in the District 

Court. It appears that the subject matter of the complaint may be related to a mortgage 

foreclosure action that was filed in the state court. The Defendants filed motions to 

dismiss on three grounds: (1) the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted; (2) the complaint was barred by the Rooker-Feldman

 1 We address the remaining pending motions in footnote 4, infra.

doctrine; and (3) the 

District Court lacked jurisdiction at the time the complaint was filed because the Federal 

Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had exclusive jurisdiction over 

2 We may summarily affirm an order appealed from where it appears that no substantial 

question is presented. I.O.P. 10.6. “Before taking summary action, the court will afford 

the parties an opportunity to submit argument in support of or in opposition to such 

disposition if briefs on the merits have not already been filed.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Ryder has already filed her informal brief, and it does not address the District Court’s 
3

Ryder’s property. Ryder did not file an answer to the Motions to Dismiss. The District 

Court granted the Defendants’ motions, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. 

Ryder filed a timely notice of appeal.

3

We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of a District 

Court’s order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is plenary. Dique v. 

N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2010). To survive a motion to dismiss, a 

plaintiff must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The complaint must contain “factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s are] liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly

The District Court properly dismissed the complaint. 

, 550 

U.S. at 556 (2007)). 

Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. 

Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc.

 

reasons for dismissing her complaint. Furthermore, Appellees’ motion put her on notice 

of the reasons that her appeal was without merit, and Ryder has responded to that motion.

, 482 F.3d 247, 252-53 (3d Cir. 2007) (district court may 

enter final order dismissing complaint that fails to state a claim for relief where plaintiff 

has not requested leave to amend). As noted previously, the complaint is 

incomprehensible. The first page of the complaint contains the heading, “For the Claim 

3 Ryder has attached to her notice of appeal over 180 pages of documents. As these 

documents are not part of the District Court record, we do not consider them. In re 

Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.’s Application for Access to Sealed Transcripts, 913 F.2d 89, 96 

(3d Cir. 1990).
4

of the Violation of the False-Claims-Act of the evidence CIVIL COMPLAINT FOR 

FORECLOSURE-Void-Now-Time For the Plaintiff is with the Demanding of the trial by 

the Jury.” Ryder does not explain how the False Claims Act applies or how it was 

violated. Indeed, it is difficult to understand what, if any, claims Ryder intends to raise. 

Similarly, the syntax and grammar of the complaint make it difficult to understand 

whether Ryder is asserting any factual matter. Because the District Court properly 

dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, we need not reach the other 

arguments set forth in Appellees’ motion to dismiss.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that no substantial question is presented by 

this appeal. See I.O.P. 10.6. Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 

judgment.4

 4 Ryder’s “Motion for Emergency Injunction” is dismissed. “[U]nless an appeal be taken 

from the refusal or neglect of a lower tribunal to grant an injunction, our authority to 

grant injunctive relief must proceed from the so-called ‘All Writs’ Section of the Judicial 

Code, Section 262, 28 U.S.C.A. § 377, and may be exercised by us only as auxiliary to 

and strictly in aid of our appellate jurisdiction.” In re Philadelphia & Reading Coal & 

Iron Co., 103 F.2d 901, 903 (3d Cir. 1939); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 

21, 25 (1943) (authority of court of appeals to issue writs is restricted by statute to those 

cases in which writ is in aid of appellate jurisdiction). Because we are denying Ryder’s 

appeal, granting the motion for injunctive relief would not aid our jurisdiction. Ryder’s 

other outstanding motions are also denied. See Sewak v. I.N.S., 900 F.2d 667, 673 (3d 

Cir. 1990) (“As an appellate court we do not take testimony, hear evidence or determine 

disputed facts in the first instance. Instead, we rely upon a record developed in those fora 

that do take evidence and find facts.”).