alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### LaFayette F. Main *v.*Hibberd R. Norman, Administrator (Estate of Thomas B. Hewitt).

Maltbie, C. J., Brown, Jennings, Ells and Dickenson, Js.

Argued February 1

decided February 24, 1944.

*LaFayette F. Main,*pro se, the appellant (plaintiff).

*Richard L. Norman,*for the appellee (defendant).

Per Curiam,

This action is brought against the defendant as administrator of the estate of Thomas B. Hewitt. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff and “the estate of Thomas B. Hewitt” have ever since the latter’s death owned adjoining premises; that before his death, one-half of the fence on the line between the properties had been set to him to maintain; that, because of the defendant’s failure properly to maintain the portion of the fence set to Hewitt, the plaintiff, since Hewitt’s death, has been deprived of the income from his land and has lost a large number of sheep; and that on August 31, 1942, the plaintiff presented to the administrator a written claim for these damages which was disallowed. At the close of the evidence the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant and from the refusal to set it aside the plaintiff has appealed.

Hewitt died June 6, 1921. The plaintiff, in his testimony, admitted that the fence was in good order at *601that time. Under the undisputed evidence he offered, the loss of sheep occurred in 1925, and his claim for loss of use of his land was, by the allegations of the complaint, for a period subsequent to Hewitt’s death. Neither could afford the basis of a claim by the plaintiff against Hewitt’s estate or of a suit by him against the administrator as such. A demand for damages due to a neglect such as that alleged in this case constitutes a claim against the estate of a deceased landowner only if the neglect occurred in his lifetime. The only matters arising out of the acts of an administrator for which an action lies against him as such are those “growing out of moneys paid or services rendered for the estate.” General Statutes, § 5640. If the neglect in this case were that of the administrator, he could be sued only in his individual capacity, with the right on his part, should he be called upon to make payment, to claim a credit in his accounting to the Probate Court. *Hewitt*v. *Beattie,*106 Conn. 602, 612, 138 Atl. 795. All other considerations aside, the plaintiff, for these reasons, was not entitled to recover in this action and the trial court committed no error in refusing to set the verdict aside.

There is no error.
§ 430.38 Judicial review. ( a ) *Right to judicial review.* Any State dissatisfied with the Administrator's final determination on approvability of plan material (§ 430.18) or compliance with Federal requirements (§ 430.35) has a right to judicial review.
( b ) *Petition for review.* ( 1 ) The State must file a petition for review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the State is located, within 60 days after it is notified of the determination.
( 2 ) The clerk of the court will file a copy of the petition with the Administrator and the Administrator will file in the court the record of the proceedings on which the determination was based.
( c ) *Court action.* ( 1 ) The court is bound by the Administrator's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence.
( 2 ) The court has jurisdiction to affirm the Administrator's decision, to set it aside in whole or in part, or, for good cause, to remand the case for additional evidence.
( d ) *Response to remand.* ( 1 ) If the court remands the case, the Administrator may make new or modified findings of fact and may modify his or her previous determination.
( 2 ) The Administrator will certify to the court the transcript and record of the further proceedings.
( e ) *Review by the Supreme Court.* The judgment of the appeals court is subject to review by the U.S. Supreme Court upon certiorari or certification, as provided in 28 U.S.C. 1254.
HomeGuinea-Bissau National Day

# 									Guinea-Bissau National Day							

Press Statement

Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

September 24, 2021

On behalf of the United States Government and the American people, I congratulate the people of Guinea-Bissau on your Independence Day.

Since the United States and Guinea-Bissau first established diplomatic relations in 1975, our friendship has only grown stronger.  We are proud to have provided over 300,000 COVID-19 vaccine doses to the Bissau-Guinean people and are committed to our partnership with Guinea-Bissau in the service of advancing health security for all.  We look forward to expanding cooperation with Guinea-Bissau this year on our shared goals of guaranteeing peace and security, building economic prosperity, and strengthening democratic governance.

On this 48th anniversary of Guinea-Bissau’s founding, I wish the Bissau-Guinean people a happy Independence Day and a safe and prosperous year to come.

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#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Shelton Cleveland POWELL, Jr. v. EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH.

No. 61865.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 20, 1978.

In re: Shelton Cleveland Powell, Jr., applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of East Baton Rouge.

Writ denied. Since the detainer has been withdrawn, the matter is moot.
Editorial Note on Part 431
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 431 appear at 75 FR 48852, Aug. 11, 2010.

§ 431.231 Reinstating services. ( a ) The agency may reinstate services if a beneficiary requests a hearing not more than 10 days after the date of action.
( b ) The reinstated services must continue until a hearing decision unless, at the hearing, it is determined that the sole issue is one of Federal or State law or policy.
( c ) The agency must reinstate and continue services until a decision is rendered after a hearing if— ( 1 ) Action is taken without the advance notice required under § 431.211 or § 431.214 of this subpart;
( 2 ) The beneficiary requests a hearing within 10 days from the date that the individual receives the notice of action. The date on which the notice is received is considered to be 5 days after the date on the notice, unless the beneficiary shows that he or she did not receive the notice within the 5-day period; and
( 3 ) The agency determines that the action resulted from other than the application of Federal or State law or policy.
( d ) [Reserved]
[44 FR 17932, Mar. 29, 1979, as amended at 78 FR 42302, July 15, 2013; 89 FR 22866, Apr. 2, 2024]
Home2021 Certificates of Competency for Nominees to be Chiefs of Mission...Dogu, Laura Farnsworth – Honduras – November 2021

# 									Dogu, Laura Farnsworth – Honduras – November 2021							

Certificate of Competency

November 12, 2021

UNITED STATES SENATE

SUBJECT: Ambassadorial Nomination: Certificate of Demonstrated Competence — Foreign Service Act, Section 304(a)(4)

POST:                  Republic of Honduras

CANDIDATE:     Laura Farnsworth Dogu

Laura Farnsworth Dogu is the Foreign Policy Advisor to the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.  Previously she served at the FBI as the Deputy Director of the Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell, an interagency group of law enforcement, diplomatic, military and the intelligence experts responsible for the recovery of U.S. persons held hostage abroad.  Ms. Dogu was the Ambassador of the United States to Nicaragua from 2015-2018, responsible for the bilateral relationship during a time of violent civic unrest.  Earlier, she served as Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S. Embassy Mexico City where she managed the many different facets of the complex U.S.-Mexico relationship, one that involves nearly every agency of the U.S. government.  Ms. Dogu is a career member of the U.S. Foreign Service with the rank of Career Minister.  Her extensive diplomatic experience, demonstrated leadership abilities and expert knowledge of regional affairs make her a well-qualified candidate to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Honduras.

Other overseas assignments include the U.S. Consulate General in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, and the U.S. embassies in Turkey, Egypt and El Salvador.  Washington assignments at the Department of State included Deputy Executive Director of the Bureau of Consular Affairs, and Operations Center Watch Officer.  Ms. Dogu received an M.S. from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in Washington, D.C., and an MBA, BBA and B.A. from Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.  The recipient of numerous honors, including a Presidential Merit Award and the James A. Baker III and C. Howard Wilkins Jr. Award for Outstanding Deputy Chief of Mission, Dogu speaks Spanish, Turkish and Arabic.

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#### Domenica MECCA, Appellee, v. Domenick C. PAUL, Appellant.

No. 227.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Feb. 4, 1935.

Fenton, Wing& Morse, of Rutland, Vt., for appellant.

Edwin W. Lawrence and Lawrence, Stafford & O’Brien, all of Rutland, Vt., for appellee.

Before L. HAND, SWAN, and CHASE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Judgment affirmed.
#### Alice BANKSTON, etc. v. Morris J. ST. ANGELO.

No. 63815.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 16, 1979.

In re Morris J. St. Angelo applying for writ of prohibition and certiorari. Parish of St. Tammany.

Writ denied. See LSA-C.C.P. Art. 2592, as amended by Art. 130 of 1974.
#### The State, ex rel. Grace, *v.*Howard, Treasurer.

*Schools*— Creation *of new district by county board*— Remonstrance *—Section 4736, General Code.*

(No. 16685

Decided June 22, 1920.)

In Mandamus.

*Messrs. Marshall &*Fraser, for relator.

*Messrs. Graves &*Stahl, for respondent.

It is hereby ordered and adjudged that the demurrer to the petition be sustained, the court being of the opinion that the phrase “territory affected” used in Section 4736, General Code, applies to the territory of the old school district, embracing both the newly created district and the territory outside thereof.

And plaintiff not desiring to further plead, it is hereby ordered and adjudged that the petition of the plaintiff be dismissed.

*Demurrer sustained. Petition dismissed.*

Nichols, C. J., Jones, Matthias, Johnson, Wanamaker, Robinson and Merrell, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 32
                                                             ----------

               CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                      AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                  PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
                     THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

            In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB
of Touchstone Applied Science Associates, Inc. (the "Company"),
for the quarter ended April 30, 2005, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Andrew L. Simon, President, Chief Executive
Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Touchstone Applied
Science Associates, Inc., to the best of my knowledge, that:

            1.	The Report fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934; and
            2.	The information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.


Dated:  June 14, 2005

                                         By: /s/ ANDREW L. SIMON
                                             --------------------------
                                             Andrew L. Simon,
                                             President, Chief Executive
                                             Officer and Chief
                                             Financial Officer



A signed original of this written statement required by Section
906 has been provided to Touchstone Applied Science Associates,
Inc. and will be retained by Touchstone Applied Science
Associates, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
# C_2005193EN.01002302.xml

| 6.8.2005 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 193/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.8.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 193/23

---

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

of 31 May 2005

in Case T-284/02 Triantafyllia Dionyssopoulou v Council of the European Union (1)

1

(Officials - Promotion - Article 45 of the Staff Regulations - Consideration of comparative merits - Taking into account of the actual duties performed during the reference period - Taking into account of age and seniority - Action for annulment - Action for compensation)

(2005/C 193/36)

Language of the case: French

In Case T-284/02: Triantafyllia Dionyssopoulou, a former official of the Council of the European Union, residing in Brussels (Belgium), represented by J. Martin, lawyer, against Council of the European Union (Agents: M. Sims and F. Anton) — application, firstly, for annulment of the decision not to promote the applicant to Grade C2 in the 2001 promotion procedure and, secondly, for compensation for the damage allegedly suffered by the applicant as a result of that decision — the Court of First Instance (First Chamber), composed of J.D. Cooke, President, R. García-Valdecasas and I. Labucka, Judges; I. Natsinas, Administrator, for the Registrar, gave a judgment on 31 May 2005, in which it:

| 1. | Dismisses the application; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the application;

| 2. | Orders the parties to bear their own costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the parties to bear their own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 289 of 23.11.2002.

1

---
Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed March 22, 2012.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

____________

NO. 14-11-00589-CR

____________

JOHN BALLARD, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 179th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1283921

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The trial court convicted appellant of assault on a public servant. Appellant

entered a plea of true to two enhancement paragraphs alleged in the indictment. On July 

5, 2011, the trial court sentenced appellant to confinement for twenty-five years in the 

Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant filed a 

timely notice of appeal.

Appellant’s appointed counsel filed a brief in which he concludes the appeal is 

wholly frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of 
2

the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced. See 

High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).

A copy of counsel’s brief was delivered to appellant. Appellant was advised of the 

right to examine the appellate record and file a pro se response. See Stafford v. State, 813 

S.W.2d 503, 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). As of this date, more than sixty days has 

passed, and no pro se response has been filed.

We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief and agree the appeal is 

wholly frivolous and without merit. Further, we find no reversible error in the record. 

We are not to address the merits of each claim raised in an Anders brief or a pro se response 

when we have determined there are no arguable grounds for review. See Bledsoe v. State, 

178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Jamison and McCally.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
#### Melanie Diane WHITE, Appellant, v. Wallace M. WHITE, Appellee.

No. V-18.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Jan. 28, 1975.

John S. Winnie, Winnie & Winnie, Gainesville, for appellant.

Selig I. Goldin, Goldin & Turner, Gainesville, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant has raised several points on appeal but our examination of the record reveals record of much of the testimony and many of the proceedings in the trial court which are necessary to an adequate review are absent therefrom.

The law is well settled that an appellate court may not properly consider a case unless the record, by one of the methods provided by the Florida Appellate Rules, reveals all evidence and proceedings which were before the trial court which are material to a resolution of the points on appeal. (Merritt v. Williams, Fla.App. 1st 1974, 295 So.2d 310 and cases therein-cited.)

The law is equally well settled that the findings and judgment of the trial court come to us clothed with a presumption of correctness and may not be disturbed upon appeal in the absence of a record demonstrating errors of law. (Merritt v. Williams, supra, and authorities there cited.)

Appellate courts may not substitute their factual judgments for those for the trier of facts. (Merritt v. Williams, supra, and cases there cited.)

One of the issues relates to custody of the minor child of the parties. We note that the final judgment entered by the *609learned trial judge provides that the minor child “is hereby removed from the custody of both the husband and the wife and is committed to the custody of the Division of Family Services for placement in a suitable foster home *until otherivise ordered by the court.”*(Emphasis added) All courts, trial courts and appellate courts alike, must be ever mindful of the welfare of defenseless minor children, particularly those of tender years. We are confident that the trial judge will award custody of the child of the parties to this cause to a suitable relative should one be available and make application by appropriate pleading for such custody. (See Van Meter v. Murphy, Fla.App. 1st 1973, 287 So.2d 740 and In re: Interest of R. J. C., Fla.App. 1st 1974, 300 So.2d 54)

The record before us having failed to demonstrate prejudicial error, the final judgment appealed is

Affirmed.

RAWLS, C. J., and BOYER and McCORD, JJ., concur.
**EXHIBIT
        16**
 
 **SUMMARY
        OF OFFICER AND DIRECTOR COMPENSATION**
 
 
 Except
        for the Employment Agreement in Exhibit 6 of this report, the Company does
        not
        have any written contractual compensation arrangements with any of its employees
        or directors, including Executive Officers.
 
 During
        2007, the Company’s Chief Executive and Principal Financial Officers (the
        Company’s “Named Executive Officers”) are scheduled to receive the following
        compensation from the Company:
 
 Compensation
                  Arrangement
              
              2007
                  Scheduled AmountBase
                  salary
              
              $
                  256,100 (CEO); $92,400 (PFO)401(k)
                  matching contributions
              
              5,400
                  (maximum)Section
                  125 plan matching contributions(1)
              
              450
                  (maximum)Management
                  bonus
              
              will
                  be determined at year-endPet
                  health benefits(1)
              
              500
                  (maximum)Family
                  medical benefits(1)
              
              will
                  depend on future eventsTravel
                  expense reimbursement(2)
              
              8,000
                  (CEO); 2,000 (PFO)
 
 
 During
        2007, the Company’s Directors are scheduled to receive the following
        compensation from the Company:
 
 Compensation
                  Arrangement
              
              Ernst
                  Hoyer
              
              Barbara
                  Payne
              
              James
                  BeesonBase
              
              $
              21,000
              
              $
              21,000
              
              $
              18,375Executive
                  Committee
              
              
              4,000
              
              
              -Audit
                  Committee Chairman
              
              
              2,000
              
              
              -Travel
                  Expense Reimbursement(2)
              
              
              500
              
              
              700
              
              
              500
 
 (1)
        CEO
        and PFO participate on the same basis as other eligible employees.
 (2)
        Estimated 2007 travel expenses on behalf of UTMD business. The Company
        reimburses its employees and directors for authorized business
        expenses.
#### Frankie CLEMENTS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 74-1625.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 14, 1975.

*45Frankie Clements, in pro. per.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Lance R. Stelzer, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and HAV-ERFIELD and NATHAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Frankie Clements was tried by a jury, convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced on June 23, 1973, to life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. At trial he was represented by a special assistant public defender. Clements’ conviction was affirmed on appeal. *Clements v. State,*Fla.App.1973, 284 So.2d 700. On his appeal he was represented by counsel. On October 25, 1974, the trial court denied Clements’ motion to vacate judgment and sentence pursuant to Rule 3.850, RCrP, 34 F.S.A. On Clements’ appeal from the trial court’s order denying the motion pursuant to the Rule, this court temporarily relinquished jurisdiction to the trial court for the appointment of counsel in the event of Clements’ insolvency. Counsel having been appointed by the trial court, this appeal ensued.

Clements contends that he was prejudiced by being denied counsel at his preliminary hearing. Assuming that he was without counsel at the preliminary hearing, the record does not reflect Clements suffered any prejudice. If Clements was prejudiced at the preliminary hearing, this ground should have been raised on his direct appeal. Relief from a judgment of conviction under Rule 3.850 is not proper where the ground raised was presented on appeal or was properly presentable thereon. *Reinard v. State,*Fla.App.1972, 267 So.2d 88; *Koedatich v. State,*Fla.App.1974, 287 So.2d 738; *Jenkins v. State,*Fla.App.1972, 267 So.2d 886.

Affirmed.