IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN AND FOR KENT COUNTY

JEFFREY A. KNOTT, :

: C.A. No: K13C-05-006 RBY

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

DEBORAH A. COVERT, and : 

NATIONWIDE GENERAL INSURANCE :

COMPANY, a foreign corporation, :

:

Defendants. :

Submitted: November 20, 2014

Decided: January 15, 2015

Upon Consideration of Defendant Deborah A. Covert’s

Motion in Limine 

GRANTED 

ORDER

Jeffrey J. Clark, Esquire, Schmittinger & Rodriguez, P.A., Dover, Delaware for

Plaintiff. 

Robert W. Hartnett, Jr., Esquire, Law Offices of Chrissinger & Baumberger,

Wilmington, Delaware for Defendant Deborah A. Covert. 

Sean A. Dolan, Esquire, Law Office of Cynthia G. Beam, Newark, Delaware for

Defendant Nationwide General Insurance Company. 

Young, J.
Knott v. Covert, et. al.

C.A. No.: K13C-05-006 RBY

January 15, 2015 

2

SUMMARY

On September 20, 2011, Jeffrey Knott’s (“Plaintiff”) automobile was rearended by Deborah Covert’s (“Defendant Covert”) vehicle. On May 6, 2013, Plaintiff

filed a lawsuit against Defendant Covert and Nationwide General InsuranceCompany

(“Defendant Nationwide”), who was his insurer at the time of the accident. 

Defendant Covert claims that the cause of the rear-end accident was another

unnamed vehicle, which struck her automobile from behind, causing a domino effect.

Defendant Nationwide enlisted the services of William C. Camlin (“Camlin”) to

prepare an expert report regarding the accident. Camlin’s report disputes whether

Defendant Covert was indeed involved in a rear-end crash of her own. 

Defendant Covert moves to exclude this report, contending that it fails to meet

the admissibility requirements of D.R.E. 702. Specifically, Defendant Covert argues

Camlin’s report is formed upon lay and not expert opinion. Hence, Camlin’s report

is not of aid to the trier of fact. This is correct. Camlin’s report is based largely in

common sense, and the observations contained therein, are capable of formulation by

the lay expertise of the jury. Defendant Covert’s motion is GRANTED. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURES

The motion before the Court stems from an automobile accident between

Plaintiff and Defendant Covert, occurring on September 20, 2011. At the time of the

accident, Plaintiff was insured by Defendant Nationwide, which provided

uninsured/underinsured motorist protection. Plaintiff was driving in a rented vehicle

from Enterprise RAC Company of Baltimore, LLC (“Defendant Enterprise,” and

together with Covert, and Nationwide, “Defendants”). Plaintiff filed a Complaint
Knott v. Covert, et. al.

C.A. No.: K13C-05-006 RBY

January 15, 2015 

1

 Enterprise was added as a Defendant by Order dated August 12, 2013. 

2

 996 A.2d 1262, 1267 (Del. 2010). 

3

Id. 

3

against Defendants on May 6, 2013.1

In defense of the action, Defendant Covert claims she was struck from behind

by an unknown vehicle, causing her to rear-end the Plaintiff’s automobile. In support

of its defense, Defendant Nationwide retained Camlin to provide an expert report

regarding the incident. This report was issued on August 29, 2014. Defendant Covert

moves to exclude this report by her Motion in Limine. Plaintiff joins Defendant

Nationwide in opposing this Motion. 

DISCUSSION

By her Motion in Limine, Defendant Covert moves to exclude the expert report

of Camlin, Defendant Nationwide’s witness. Defendant Covert moves pursuant to

D.R.E. 702, arguing that Mr. Camlin’s opinion is neither scientific, technical, or

specialized, nor will it assist the trier of fact.

As a starting point, this Court recognizes the Delaware Supreme Court’s 

exposition in Perry v. Berkley regarding the proper role of a trial court in

contemplating D.R.E. 702 challenges: “the trial court acts as a gatekeeper” in

determining the admissibility of expert evidence.2 The Court further has “broad

latitude” in making such rulings.3 In Delaware, the analysis surrounding the

admission of expert testimony has been largely distilled from D.R.E. 702, and the
Knott v. Covert, et. al.

C.A. No.: K13C-05-006 RBY

January 15, 2015 

4

See M.G. Bancorp., Inc. v. LeBeau, 737 A.2d 513 (Del. 1999) (officially adopting

Daubert as the correct interpretation of D.R.E. 702).

5

In re Asbestos Litigation, 911 A.2d 1176, 1199 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006). 

6

Spencer v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 930 A.2d 881, 889-890 (Del. 2007). 

7

Spencer, 930 A.2d at 890 (excluding proffered expert testimony as the “expert opinions

were more commons sense than formulated opinions...expert testimony is [not] required to argue

to a jury that a pile of snow in a parking lot is going to melt”)(internal quotations omitted). 

8

 “if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue...” D.R.E. 702 (2001).

4

U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

4

D.R.E. 702 provides in relevant part that a witness may testify as an expert, “if

scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue...” The focus of this first tier

of analysis has been characterized as a “relevancy” requirement – meaning that the

“evidence ha[s] a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry” or, more

succinctly, whether the evidence “fit[s].”5 Included in this inquiry is the distinction

between testimony which is“common sense,” and that which “provide[s]...additional

understanding of the issues of fact confronting the jury.”6 Courts have held that when

the jury is equally competent to form an opinion about the ultimate fact issues or the

expert’s testimony is within the common knowledge of the jury, the trial court should

exclude the expert testimony.7

Defendant Covert argues that Camlin’s report provides nothing beyond what

a lay juror could discern. Defendant Covert cites only the introductory part of D.R.E.

7028, though the Court recognizes also the question of the “reliability” of an expert’s
Knott v. Covert, et. al.

C.A. No.: K13C-05-006 RBY

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 D.R.E. 702 (2001); see also Price v. Blood Bank of Delaware, Inc., 790 A2d. 1203,

1210 (Del. 2002) (“D.R.E. 702 imposes a special obligation upon the trial judge to ensure that

any and all scientific testimony...is not only relevant, but reliable”)(emphasis added)(internal

quotations omitted); Ward, 847 A.2d at 376 (“[b]oiled down to its essence, Daubert requires the

Court to answer two fundamental questions before admitting expert testimony: (1) is the

testimony relevant?; and (2) is the testimony reliable?”) (emphasis added). 

10 The Court notes that Delaware’s D.R.E. 702 standard includes a second level of expert

admissibility analysis, “reliability,” which the Delaware Supreme Court in Spencer has

articulated as including a multi-pronged test: “(1) whether scientific theory or technique can be

(and has been) tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and

publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error and the existence and maintenance of

standards controlling the technique’s operation; and (4) whether the technique is generally

accepted.” 930 A.2d at 888-889 (internal quotations omitted); see also Ward, 847 A.2d at 376

(“[b]oiled down to its essence, Daubert requires the Court to answer two fundamental questions

before admitting expert testimony: (1) is the testimony relevant?; and (2) is the testimony

reliable?”) (emphasis added). Holding that Camlin’s report fails the first level of analysis, the

Court does not proceed with the second, multi-step inquiry. 

11 Defendant Covert’s Motion in Limine, at ¶4. 

5

opinion:

a witness qualified as an expert...may testify...in the form of an opinion or

otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the

testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the

witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the

case.9,10

According to Defendant Covert, Camlin’s report is based upon the “statements

and depositions of Plaintiff and Defendant Covert,” “the photographs of Plaintiff’s

and Defendant Covert’s vehicles,” and “the accident report.”11 From these materials,

Camlin observed “a slight scuff mark in the approximate center of the rear bumper

with slight scratches on the leading edge of the rear bumper in the ara of the meeting
Knott v. Covert, et. al.

C.A. No.: K13C-05-006 RBY

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12 Id.,at ¶5. 

13 930 A.2d 881 (Del. 2007). 

14 Id., at 890 (“expert testimony is [not] required to argue to a jury that a pile of snow in a

parking lot is going to melt”). 

15 Ward, 847 A.2d at 378. 

16 In re Asbestos, 911 A.2d at 1199. 

6

for the trunk lid.”

12 Camlin further concluded that the damage to the rear bumper

could not have been caused by vehicular impact, as claimed by Plaintiff. It is

Defendant Covert’s position that these observations are not “scientific, technical

and/or specialized,” and could easily be grasped by a lay jury. As such, the testimony

is not instructive. 

Defendant Covert’s point is well taken. In Spencer v. Wal-Mart Stores East,

LP,13 as in the case at bar, the purported expert testimony of the witness, was more

in line with “common sense” than expertise.14 Camlin’s note regarding the location

of the scuff mark on the rear of the car is something “within the common knowledge

of the jury,” and further something the jury is “equally competent to form an opinion

about.”15The jury, like Camlin, is capable of reviewing the materials, for example: the

photographs, to determine the position of the scuff mark. Bereft of “helpfulness,”

Camlin’s opinion cannot be said to “assist the trier of fact to understand the issue or

to determine a fact in issue” as required by D.R.E. 702.16 Stated simply, Camlin’s

report fails the relevancy test of the admissibility analysis..

CONCLUSION

The admissibility of an expert opinion rests, first, on a determination that it
Knott v. Covert, et. al.

C.A. No.: K13C-05-006 RBY

January 15, 2015 

7

is scientific, and beyond the jury’s ability to formulate on its own. Camlin’s

conclusions in his report are essentially common sense, and well within the jury’s

ability to determine. As such, the report is neither helpful nor relevant. Defendant

Covert’s Motion in Limine is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 /s/ Robert B. Young 

 J.

RBY/lmc

oc: Prothonotary

cc: Counsel 

Opinion Distribution

File