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RUSSIAN STRATEGY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

OCTOBER 8, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

OCTOBER 8, 2015

Page 

RUSSIAN STRATEGY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS .................................................... 1 

Keane, General John M., USA (Ret.), Chairman, Institute for the Study 

of War and Former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army ......................................... 5 

Conley, Heather, Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic; 

Director, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies ... 14 

Sestanovich, Hon. Stephen, George F. Kennan Senior Fellow for Russian 

and Eurasian Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, Columbia University .. 24 

Jones, General James L., USMC (Ret.), Chairman, Brent Scowcroft Center 

on International Security, Atlantic Council, and Former National Security 

Advisor .................................................................................................................. 28 

(III) 

(1) 

RUSSIAN STRATEGY AND MILITARY 

OPERATIONS 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 8, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, 

Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, 

Lee, Reed, McCaskill, Manchin, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, 

Hirono, King, and Heinrich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, good morning. The Senate Armed Services Committee meets this morning to receive testimony on Russian 

Strategy and Military Operations, obviously a pretty important 

time to have this discussion. 

I’d like to thank our distinguished panel of witnesses for appearing before us today: General Jack Keane, of the Institute for the 

Study of War; General James Jones, of the Atlantic Council; Ms. 

Heather Conley, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Dr. Stephen Sestanovich, of the Council on Foreign Relations. A very distinguished panel. 

Last year, Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation 

of Crimea forced a recognition, for anyone who is not yet convinced, 

that we’re confronting a challenge that many had assumed was resigned to the history books, a strong militarily capable Russia that 

is hostile to our interests and our values, and seeks to challenge 

the international order that American leaders of both parties have 

sought to maintain since the end of World War II. 

Today, Russia continues to destabilize Ukraine and menace our 

NATO allies in Europe with aggressive military behavior. For more 

than a year, an overwhelming bipartisan majority in Congress, as 

well as many of the President’s top advisors, have warned that failure to offer greater support to Ukraine, especially defensive lethal 

assistance, would send a message of weakness that would invite 

the very aggression we seek to avoid. Unfortunately, this is what 

has happened. As the old saying goes, Mr. Putin’s appetite is growing with the eating. 

Now, in a profound echo of the Cold War, Russia has intervened 

militarily in Syria on behalf of the murderous regime of Bashar alAssad. Just consider how historically unprecedented this is. In all 

2 

of its Soviet and post-Soviet history, Russia never intervened overtly militarily beyond its so-called near abroad. Now Vladimir Putin 

is doing so, and it has become the latest disastrous turn in the 

Middle East as well as another humiliating setback for the United 

States. 

As in past crises, however, the White House is once again floundering. Just consider: A few weeks ago, the administration warned 

Russia not to send its forces to Syria. Russia did it anyway. The 

administration then tried to block Russia’s access to airspace en 

route to Syria. It failed. The consequence? U.S. defense officials 

rushed into talks with Russia’s military to, quote, ‘‘deconflict’’ in 

Syria. Our Secretary of State called Russia’s actions an, quote, ‘‘opportunity to cooperate’’ because we share, quote, ‘‘fundamental 

principles.’’ And President Obama acquiesced to his first formal 

meeting in 2 years with Vladimir Putin, undermining international 

efforts, post-Crimea, to isolate Russia, exactly as Putin desired. 

And how did Putin respond? By bombing U.S.-backed opposition 

groups in Syria. 

President Obama is fond of saying there is no military solution 

to this or any other crisis. This ignores the reality that there is a 

major military dimension to the problem. And it’s getting worse 

each day. It also ignores history. Most civil wars actually do end 

when one side wins and the other side loses. That is Putin’s military solution, and he is now imposing it with Russian airpower in 

an anti-American coalition of Syrian, Iranian, Hezbollah ground 

forces. We should expect Russian troops to take the field with 

them. We should also not be surprised if Putin expands his antiAmerican coalition’s operations into Iraq, where they have already 

established an intelligence partnership with Baghdad. 

However this conflict ends, it must not involve Vladimir Putin 

shoring up his partners, crushing ours, destroying our remaining 

credibility in the Middle East, and restoring Russia as a major 

power in this vital region, as Putin wants. We cannot shy away 

from confronting Russia in Syria, as Putin expects. His intervention has raised the costs and risks of greater U.S. involvement in 

Syria, but it has not negated the steps we must take. Indeed, it has 

made them more necessary, not least because Putin’s actions will 

influence every aspect of this conflict: the refugee crisis, the mass 

atrocities, and the growth of ISIL. 

As everyone from David Petraeus to Hillary Clinton has advocated, we must rally an international coalition to establish enclaves 

in Syria to protect civilians and our moderate partners, and do 

what is necessary to defend them. If Assad continues to barrelbomb civilians, we should destroy his air force’s ability to operate. 

And if Russia continues to attack our opposition partners, we must 

impose greater costs on Russia’s interests; for example, by striking 

meaningful Syrian regime targets. 

But, we should not confine our response to Syria. We must look 

to impose costs on Russia more broadly, including the provision of 

arms to Ukraine, the increase of targeted sanctions, and steps to 

deepen Russia’s international isolation. 

We must also recognize the growing challenge that Russia poses 

in other areas and domains. According to public reports, Russian 

actors are behind a growing and increasing blatant campaign of 

3 

cyberattacks against the United States, including the recent attack 

on the Joint Staff at the Department of Defense. Along the eastern 

flank of NATO, Russia is moving back into old military bases it 

abandoned long ago and deploying growing numbers of its modernized military forces, especially anti-access and area-denial weapons 

designed specifically to counter the United States in asymmetric 

ways. 

Russia’s challenge even extends to the Arctic region, where Russia is involved in a significant military buildup of its air, ground, 

and naval forces, and has recently conducted a series of massive 

military exercises. 

These are just some of the reasons why our military leaders, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have recently 

testified to this committee that Russia represents the greatest 

threat to the United—that the United States faces. Whether we 

agree with that assessment or not, it is a striking wake-up call 

about the threat Russia poses. And I believe it requires us to think 

far more seriously about an old mission that our defense establishment has focused less on in recent decades: deterrence. 

In response to the challenge that Russia poses in Europe and in 

the Middle East and in the Arctic, it is not that the United States 

has done nothing. The problem is, nothing we are doing appears to 

be deterring Russian aggression. None of us want a return to the 

Cold War, but we need to face the reality that we are dealing with 

a Russian ruler who wants exactly that. As such, we must revisit 

the question what it’ll take to deter the conflict and aggression 

while confronting a revisionist Russia. 

We look forward to the thoughts and recommendations from our 

distinguished witnesses on these questions. 

Senator Reed. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me first welcome the witnesses, thank them not only for 

their testimony but for their service to the Nation over so many 

years and in so many ways. 

This morning, our hearing focuses on developments in Russian 

strategy and military operations which are causing fundamental 

shifts in the security environment, not only in Europe, but in the 

Middle East, the Arctic, and elsewhere. The United States and its 

allies are facing an increasingly aggressive and revanchist Russia 

and a Putin regime that is willing to use all tools at its disposal, 

including its military power, to achieve its goals. 

Putin’s goals appear to be, first, regime survival in the face of 

Russia’s economic, political, and social decline; second, securing 

Russia’s periphery by pressuring its neighbors against integrating 

with the West; and third, exploiting opportunities to weaken Western unity by dividing member states within the EU and NATO 

against each other. Yet, Russia’s provocative and dangerous aggression often appears opportunistic and potentially harmful for its 

long-term interests. 

Last month, I had the opportunity to visit the Ukraine, where 

the nascent democratic government in Kyiv is struggling to defend 

its sovereignty against aggression from Russia and Russian-backed 

4 

separatists. Russia has demonstrated, in Crimea and in eastern 

Ukraine, its willingness to use military force to violate Ukraine’s 

territorial integrity and intimidate its neighbor. It is clear that 

President Putin sees a functioning democratic westward-oriented 

Ukraine as a threat to his regime’s survival domestically and to 

Russia’s broader regional security strategy. 

Recently, Russia has shifted its tactics in Ukraine from an emphasis on territorial gains to hybrid warfare and proxy forces to an 

expansion of his activities aimed at destabilizing the Ukrainian 

government and economy. This shift in Russian tactics is a result 

of several factors, including the determination of the Ukrainian 

forces and people to resist Russian aggression, international sanctions that are proving costly to Russia, the difficulty of disguising 

casualties from the Russian people, which is engendering some opposition within Russia, and, most recently, a possible desire by 

President Putin to shift the focus away from Ukraine and toward 

the conflict in Syria. Russian military operations in the Donbas 

have been a proving ground for its hybrid warfare technologies, 

which continue to evolve with increasing sophistication. 

The United States needs to be firm in its support of Ukraine, 

right now, or else the United States and NATO will have a bigger 

problem in the future. If Ukraine does not weather the current crisis, then Russia’s aggressive behavior will be repeated elsewhere, 

potentially threatening NATO members. The United States needs 

to act in concert with our allies to assist Ukraine. One immediate 

need is for the international community to press Russia not to support the illegitimate local elections called by the separatists which 

violate the specific terms of the Minsk agreement in Ukrainian 

law. The outcome of the local elections of the Donbas threaten to 

further undermine the prospects for negotiations as part of the 

Minsk peace process. I understand that just recently the elections 

in the conflict area have been postponed until February. The 

United States and its allies and partners must immediately agree 

on an approach that supports Ukrainian efforts to hold elections 

under Ukrainian law, pressures Russia to uphold the terms of the 

Minsk agreements, and makes clear that any separatist victors in 

sham elections will not be accepted in participants—as participants 

in future talks under Minsk. 

The United States and its partners should take other steps to 

counter Russian aggression in Ukraine, as well. Ukraine’s need for 

defensive weapons, including counter-artillery radars and anti-tank 

weapons, remains critical. Other action to help Ukraine include expanding the training in Ukraine of units of the Ministry of Defense, training Ukrainian forces at facilities outside Ukraine on key 

defensive weapon systems should a decision to be made to transfer 

those systems, and exploring options for developing Ukraine’s capability to produce domestically much needed weapons, such as antitank weapons and vehicles. 

In Syria, much as it did in Ukraine, Russia has hidden its true 

intentions, using the ruse of joining the fight against ISIL to provide a cover for Russia’s military intervention to prop up the Assad 

regime. Russians’ actions, however, increasingly expose their true 

objectives. Instead of focusing on targeting ISIL, Russian airstrikes 

have predominantly occurred in Homs and Hama, areas controlled 

5 

by moderate Syrian forces challenging the Assad regime. And yesterday, it was reported that Russian ships in the Caspian Sea 

launched missiles against a coalition of Syrian opposition forces 

that does not include ISIL. Russia is providing broader enabling 

support to the Assad regime’s forces against the moderate opposition. 

These Russian missile attacks and enabling support were apparently conducted in coordination with a new ground offensive by the 

Syrian army, Iran’s terrorist proxy, Hezbollah, and other Iranianaffiliated forces. This alignment of terrorists and their state sponsors is alarming. 

Russia’s open military intervention in a conflict well beyond its 

borders marks a significant departure from how Russia has operated in the past and suggests that President Putin may be attaching particular strategic importance to Russia’s access to bases in 

the overall relationship with Syria. And I hope our witnesses will 

provide their assessment of the strategic significance of Russia’s 

decision to deploy its military forces to Syria. 

Russia’s unilateral and belligerent efforts are not helpful to the 

efforts of the unified coalition of 60-plus countries fighting ISIL 

and create a dangerous risk of unintended consequences. President 

Putin has chosen not to join the international anti-ISIL coalition; 

instead, Putin has chosen to align with Iran and Hezbollah to attack Syria and is seeking to end the brutality of the Assad regime 

and establish a better Syria. Russians’ actions are likely to only 

prolong and further complicate this conflict. Russia appears to be 

seeking to keep Bashar Assad in office and maintain Syria as a client state. In addition, Russia, Iran, and Iraq have concluded an intelligence-sharing agreement, and Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi has 

suggested that Iraq would welcome Russian airstrikes against ISIL 

in Iraq, adding to the concerns over unintended consequences. Once 

again, the witnesses’ perspective on these issues would be absolutely critical. 

Finally, Russia is staking a claim in the Arctic, expanding its 

military presence, including coastal defense in the north to be able 

to control movements to a northern passage. Again, this is another 

area where your comments would be appreciated. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank the four witnesses. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

We’ll begin with you, General Keane, since you’re the oldest one 

here. 

[Laughter.] 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN M. KEANE, USA (RET.), CHAIRMAN, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND FORMER 

VICE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY 

General KEANE. Thank you, good morning. Chairman McCain, 

Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of the committee. 

I’m honored to be back testifying before this great committee who 

means so much to our national defense and security. 

It’s a privilege to be here with my panel colleagues, particularly 

General Jones, who I’ve served with in the Pentagon and have 

known for years. 

6 

Please refer to the maps that you have at your seat, provided by 

the Institute of War, which I will reference in my remarks. 

As to Russian strategy and military operations in Syria, establishing an out-of-region airbase in Syria that is isolated from the 

heartland of Russia in a war zone is quite unprecedented, particularly for a non-expeditionary military. You can see, on the map labeled ‘‘Russian Deployment to Syria,’’ the air-bridges routes over 

Iran and Iraq, and a sea-bridge route through the Black Sea. 

The airbase consists of combat aircraft, helicopters, drones, logistics, support infrastructure, and a battalion-plus of armor infantry, 

artillery, and air defense for protection of the base. Approximately 

2,000 to 3,000 personnel make up the base, which also houses a 

joint operations center consisting of Russian, Syrian, Iranian, and 

Hezbollah military personnel, largely now for targeting. 

While one can only speculate about the reason for this brazen 

military aggression, some realities in Syria are insightful. Look at 

the map labeled ‘‘Control of Terrain in Syria.’’ As you can see, the 

regime control area, in orange, which is now only about 20 percent 

of Syria. Note the opposition control area to the north and south, 

in yellow, as the regime is quite confined. Particularly in the north, 

with the fall of Idlib Province recently, the opposition force is beginning to encroach on the Alawite coastal enclave in Latakia Province, which represents Assad’s main political support. Not labeled 

on the map, in the gray zone, to the east of Homs and Damascus, 

in central Syria, ISIS seized Palmyra City, the famed ancient city, 

and a nearby regime airbase, opening up the east-west transportation corridor from Homs to the Iraq border. Syria is Russia’s foothold in the Middle East, and, as such, the Tartus Naval Base is 

a strategic asset. It seems apparent that Russia believed the Assad 

regime’s survival was in a more precarious position and needed to 

be propped up. As such, if you look at the map labeled ‘‘Russian 

Airstrikes,’’ you can see the focus of the airstrikes are against the 

opposition forces threatening the regime from the north in Idlib, 

Hama, and Homs Province. The moderate opposition forces, many 

trained by the CIA, and Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda affiliate, are 

the main focus with ISIS strikes at Raqqa and near Palmyra are 

far less significant. Russian cruise missiles were introduced yesterday, striking 11 targets in northern Syria, northwestern Syria, and 

northeastern Syria. The purpose, then, of the airstrikes are twofold. One is to stop the advance of the opposition forces threatening 

the regime. And, two, to begin to set conditions for a ground counteroffensive to retake lost territory, with the main effort in the 

north in southern Idlib and northern Hama Provinces. The Syrian 

army began limited ground operations yesterday in Idlib Province, 

obviously supported by Russian airpower. A supporting effort may 

also be launched to retake Palmyra and the military airbase if the 

regime can generate sufficient forces. 

Even more significant than Russia entering a civil war is their 

recent strategic alliance with Iran, which will impact every country 

in the region and further diminish U.S. influence and U.S. interests in the region. Russia has been leveraging this reality to their 

own advantage by entering into arms deals with Saudi Arabia, 

UAE, Kuwait, and Egypt. These countries purchasing Russian 

weapons are not primarily driven by the desire to have Russian 

7 

equipment, but by the harsh reality of the changing geopolitical 

landscape, and their desire to have a relationship with Russia has 

leverage against their strategic enemy: Iran. Russia is also in preliminary discussions to build nuclear powerplants in Saudi Arabia, 

Jordan, Egypt, and Tunisia. The relationship with Iran and its 

proxies matters to Russia because it provides them greater influence in the Middle East while also acting as a strategic buffer 

against radical Islam, a threat which is of great concern to Russia. 

Secondly, Russian strategy and military operations in Ukraine 

and Europe. Putin has put Russia on a path to be a world power 

with global influence. Most historical world powers have strong 

economies and strong militaries. Russia—the former Soviet Union 

was never prosperous, but certainly had a very strong military. 

Putin was on a path to do just that again with his military when 

the economy tanked. He was able to modernize his nuclear weapons, but left him with a conventional military that is still no match 

to the United States and NATO. But, about a third of his military 

are good units with some select excellent capabilities. This is a 

land-centric force with good combat aircraft, bombers, and submarines, and a limited power-projection navy with only one aircraft 

carrier. 

Russia’s strategy in Europe, I think, is influenced by the Napoleonic and Nazi invasions and the strategic buffer that existed in Europe as part of the Warsaw Pact protecting the heartland of Russia 

for almost 50 years. These buffer countries are now a part of 

NATO, which Putin sees as a security risk. 

After Putin lost his political stooge, Yanukovych, who he thought 

would stop the Ukraine movement to the West, he immediately annexed Crimea, correctly believing the Europeans and Americans 

would be stunned into compliance, thus recovering at home from 

the embarrassment of Yanukovych’s forced departure. Encouraged 

by their success, Putin moved on eastern Ukraine, introducing hybrid warfare, a combination of special operations forces and intelligence security officers to help create public unrest, then arm and 

organize that unrest into fighting units, and, when the host country army moves to put the movement down, bring in Russian-disguised conventional military to defeat the army. 

Russia’s use of military force in Ukraine is very revealing, as it 

relies heavily on drones to detect Ukrainian military units, with 

target information relayed immediately to artillery batteries and, 

within a few minutes, massive artillery is landing on a target, 

some with thermobaric shells creating a fire incendiary on the unit 

which is quite devastating. As such, the separatists, supported by 

Russian military, have consolidated Luhansk and Donetsk Provinces, but denied the land bridge to Mariupol. 

The political is more significant, because the Kyiv government 

has given up on any formal economic or, certainly, military alignment with Europe or NATO. Putin wants the Kyiv to fail and be 

replaced by a more friendly Russian government. Putin will continue the pressure. And see the map labeled ‘‘Current Proposed 

Russian Bases’’ with the two new permanent ground force bases 

that are under construction across from the Ukrainian border, 

the—obviously in Russia—and the airbase Putin has muscled into 

Belarus which is also now under construction. 

8 

So, what are U.S. options? U.S. strategy should be to assure our 

allies and friends, deter Russian aggression, defeat ISIS, and, long 

term, as a part of a global alliance, defeat radical Islam. Putin believes that European and American leadership is weak. Putin is 

counting on the U.S. fear of escalation and fear of confrontation to 

stop any thought of retaliation. Historically, aggression unanswered has led to more aggression. 

As to Syria options, recognize the anti-ISIS strategy in Iraq and 

Syria is failing. We are certain to lose the war unless there is 

major and comprehensive change to build an effective and decisive 

ground force in Syria while removing restrictions on the air campaign to dramatically increase airstrike effectiveness. We need to 

continue the U.S. policy to force Assad from power, but let’s be realistic. Understand that Russia, as Assad’s protector, will now play 

the decisive role. Putin has begun a proxy war with the United 

States when Russian combat aircraft struck continuously moderate 

rebel forces trained by the Central Intelligence Agency. This was 

no accident. Targets were provided by the Syrian regime, and they 

were accurate. How can the United States stand by and do nothing? 

United States military should have been given the mission to retaliate. Options likely to be considered, among many others: crater 

the al-Assad runway, establish free zones that are, essentially, nobomb zones as sanctuaries for refugees and U.S.-backed opposition 

groups, strike Assad’s helicopter fleet that is barrel-bombing its 

own people, just to name a few. 

Also, advise Russia that the United States and the coalition will 

conduct air operations anytime, anywhere in Syria, and the Russians should stay out of our way if they want to avoid confrontation. Unfortunately, United States aircraft are rarely flying now 

against ISIS targets in Syria, and focusing their efforts in Iraq. 

If we continue to wring our hands and continue to be dominated 

by fears and opposed to instilling fear, then Russian aggression will 

not just advance in the Middle East, it will, with certainty, escalate 

in the Baltics and in eastern Europe. 

As to Ukraine and Europe’s options, recognize further that Russia is not finished in Ukraine, as the new military bases across the 

border suggest. There is still time to expand the United States 

military training of Ukraine battalions, which is an effective program, and provide, finally, defensive weapons and capabilities that 

would definitely make a difference, such as anti-tank missiles, nonmissile air defense to counter the drones, counterfire radar to detect the artillery, download intelligence from all source capabilities, 

et cetera. 

The Atlantic Resolve, the name for the U.S.-NATO rotational 

troop deployments to the Baltics, Poland, Romania, and Hungary, 

are helpful but a small deterrence to Russian aggression. Russian 

aggression has already begun in the Baltics—that is, it’s pounding 

the Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltics with continuous 

propaganda to create unrest and to foment a split with the nation’s 

majority, coupled with continuous airspace violations that obviously are harassing the host governments. 

Department of Defense must reevaluate its stationing plan for 

the combatant commands, in view of a revisionist and aggressive 

9 

Russia. The Pacific is the largest combatant command, with over 

400,000 troops, while Europe is considerably smaller and less than 

adequate, now down to around 50,000. The assumptions that drove 

the downsizing of the United States military positions in Europe 

have obviously changed, and we need a relook. 

In conclusion, Russia is clearly challenging U.S. influence and interests in the Middle East as the dominant outside regional country while also seeking to challenge NATO in eastern Europe and 

possibly NATO’s very existence. Our allies in both regions must be 

convinced that the United States stand behind them. Now is the 

time for a firm hand, but the United States should not close off 

communications with Russia and continue to pursue opportunities 

where there is mutual interest. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Keane follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENERAL JOHN M. KEANE

Chairman McCain, ranking member Reed, distinguished members of the committee, am honored to be back testifying today on Russia and the crisis in Syria and 

the Ukraine. It’s a privilege to be here with my panel colleagues, particularly General Jones, who I served with in the Pentagon and have known for years. Please 

refer to the maps provided by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) which I will 

reference in my remarks. 

1. RUSSIAN STRATEGY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SYRIA: 

Russia began air strikes in Syria about a week ago after rapidly establishing a 

forward operating air base at Al Assad airfield in Latakia province, some 36 miles 

north of their Naval base at Tartous. Establishing an out of region air base, that 

is isolated from the heartland of Russia, in a war zone, is quite unprecedented, particularly for a non expeditionary military. 

To establish and sustain this airbase you can see on the map labeled ‘Russian Deployment to Syria’, the air bridge routes over Iran and Iraq and the sea bridge route 

through the Black Sea taking approximately 4 days to transit. The air base consists 

of combat aircraft, helicopters, drones, logistics support infrastructure, and a battalion plus of armor, infantry, artillery and air defense for protection of the base. 

Approximately 2K to 3K personnel make up the base which also houses a joint operations center consisting of Russian, Syrian, Iranian and Hezbollah military personnel. 

While one can only speculate about the reason for this brazen military aggression 

some realities in Syria are insightful. After 4 years of civil war the Syrian military, 

numbers about 125K down from a high of 220K. The Army is beset with low morale, 

desertion and equipment problems with the Air Force losing about 1 to 2 aircraft 

per month due to combat or accident. During the last year the opposition force has 

gained steadily on the regime forces with some gains operationally significant. 

Please look at the map labeled ‘Control of Terrain in Syria’ and you can see the 

regime control area in orange which is now only about 20% of Syria. Note the opposition control area to the north and south of the orange as the regime is quite confined. Particularly in the north with the fall of Idlib province recently, the opposition force is beginning to encroach on the Alawite coastal enclave in Latakia province which represents Assad’s main political support. In the last several months 

there has been some erosion of this Alawite support. To the east of Homs and Damascus in central Syria ISIS seized Palmyra city and a nearby regime airbase opening up the east-west transportation corridor from Homs to the Iraq border. We at 

ISW suspect that the Iranians who are in Syria in far greater number than the Russians (7K to 100 plus) and have very good situational awareness, raised the alarm 

to the Russians during multiple visits to Moscow by Iranian Revolutionary Guard 

Corps (IRGC) leaders to include a much reported visit by Qasem Soleimani. 

Russia has a 60 plus year relationship with Syria dating back to post WWII as 

the former Soviet Union. Syria is Russia’s foothold in the Middle East (M.E.) and 

as such the Tartous Naval base is a strategic asset that is much valued. It seems 

apparent that Russia believed the Assad regime survival was in a more precarious 

position and needed to be propped up. As such if you look at the map labeled ‘Russian Airstrikes in Syria’, you can see the focus of the airstrikes are against the oppoVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:12 Aug 02, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\DOCS\15-78.CON WILDA
10 

sition forces threatening the regime from the north in Idlib, Hama and Homs province. The moderate opposition forces, many trained by the CIA and Jabhat al-Nusra, 

an AQ affiliate, are the main focus with the ISIS targets at Raqqah and near Palmyra are far less significant and likely mere ‘window dressing’ for the exaggerated 

narrative that ISIS is the major reason for the Russian presence. Russian cruise 

missiles were introduced yesterday striking 11 targets in western and eastern Syria. 

The purpose then of the airstrikes are twofold: one to stop the advance of the opposition forces threatening the regime and two to begin to set conditions for a 

ground counter-offensive to retake lost territory with the main effort in the north 

in southern Idlib province and northern Hama province. Syrian Army limited 

ground shaping operations began in Idlib province yesterday supported by Russian 

air. A supporting effort may be launched to retake Palmyra and the military airbase 

if the regime can generate sufficient forces. Recapturing the ancient city would be 

a PR victory for Syria and Russia. The counter offensive would likely be jointly 

planned by Syria and Iranian generals and consist of the Army, the National Defense Force, which are local militias, some actually led and most advised by the 

IRGC, and the Hezbollah and Iraqi Shia militia. Of course Russia and Syria air 

power will play a large role in supporting the ground offensive. 

Even more significant than Russia entering the Syria civil war is their recent 

strategic alliance with Iran which will impact every country in the region and further diminish U.S. influence and U.S. interests in the region. 

Russia certainly recognizes that the M.E. is experiencing one of the most tumultuous periods in its history with the old order challenged by the aspirational goals 

of the Arab Spring, Islamic terrorists taking advantage of the political and social 

upheaval and Iran using proxies to gain influence in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and 

Yemen. Furthermore, Russia observed, probably somewhat in disbelief, as the U.S. 

abandoned Mubarak in Egypt, abandoned Iraq and retreated from Yemen and Libya 

as part of an unstated policy to disengage from the M.E. to avoid the strategic mistake of another M.E. protracted war. For a year now, Russia has been leveraging 

this reality to their own advantage by entering into arms deals with Saudi Arabia, 

UAE, Kuwait and Egypt. Also, there are Russian counter terrorism experts advising 

the Egyptian military in their fight against ISIS. A country the U.S. had a mil to 

mil relationship with for 35 years. These countries purchasing Russian weapons 

who normally buy U.S. and European weapons are not driven by the desire to have 

Russian equipment but by the harsh reality of the changing geopolitical landscape 

and their desire to have a relationship with Russia as leverage against their strategic enemy, Iran. Iraq is also purchasing Russian weapons as the promised U.S. 

flow of weapons has been slow to nonexistent at times and have recently welcomed 

Russian generals and their staff to join their coordination center in Baghdad to 

share intelligence with the Iraq Army, the IRGC and the Iraq Shia militia. Russia 

is also in preliminary discussion to build nuclear power plants in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and Tunisia, with all their inherent problems of corruption, fraud, criminality to say nothing of the major security challenge of nuclear power plants. The 

relationship with Iran and its proxies matters to Russia because it provides them 

greater influence in the M.E. while also acting as a strategic buffer to their south 

against radical Islam, a threat which is of great concern to them now in southern 

Russia. 

2. RUSSIAN STRATEGY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN UKRAINE/EUROPE: 

Vladimir Putin came to power after the economic, political and social chaos of the 

1990’s following the collapse of the Soviet Union and ending the decade with their 

own military in shambles and suffering the public humiliation of his Serbian ally, 

Milosevic, not only losing all 4 wars he fought but being bombed into oblivion by 

the Americans in a 78 day air campaign. 

Putin certainly shaped, in part, by these events and his life as a KGB officer 

tightens internal security and control, crushes the Chechens, represses political opposition, takes control of the media, and puts Russia on a path to be a world power 

with global influence. Most historical world powers have strong economies and 

strong militaries, Russia, the former Soviet Union was never prosperous but certainly had a strong military. Putin was on a path to do just that again with his 

military when the economy tanked, leaving him with a military that is no match 

to the U.S. and NATO but with about 1/3rd good units with some select excellent 

capabilities. This is a land centric force with good combat aircraft, bombers, submarines, and a limited power projection Navy with only one aircraft carrier. 

Russia’s strategy in Europe is influenced by the Napoleonic and Nazi invasions 

and the strategic buffer that existed in eastern Europe as part of the Warsaw Pact, 

11 

protecting the heartland of Russia for almost 50 years. These buffer countries are 

now a part of NATO, which Putin sees as a security risk. 

As such Putin saw Ukraine, which is a food breadbasket for Russia, being threatened by the desire of many Ukrainians to politically, economically and militarily 

align with the European Union and potentially NATO. After Putin lost his political 

stooge, Yanukovych who he thought would stop the Ukraine movement to the West, 

he immediately annexed Crimea, correctly believing the Europeans and Americans 

would be stunned into compliance, thus recovering at home from the embarrassment 

of Yanukovych’s departure. Encouraged by success, Putin moved on eastern Ukraine 

introducing hybrid warfare, a combination of SOF and intell officers to help create 

popular unrest, organize sympathizers into fighting units and when the host country 

Army moves to put down the movement, bring in Russian disguised conventional 

military to defeat the Army. 

Russia’s use of military force in Ukraine is very revealing as it relies heavily on 

drones to detect Ukrainian military units with target information relayed to artillery batteries and within a few minutes, massive artillery is landing on the target, 

some with thermobaric shells creating a fire incendiary on the unit, which is quite 

devastating. As such, the separatists supported by Russian military have consolidated Luhansk and Donetsk provinces but denied the land bridge to Mariupol. 

The political result is more significant because the Kiev government has given up 

on any economic or certainly military alignment with Europe or NATO. Putin wants 

the Kiev government to fail and be replaced by a more friendly Russian government. 

Putin will continue the pressure, see the map labeled ‘Current/Proposed Russian 

Bases Near Ukraine,’ with the two new permanent ground force bases that are 

under construction across from the Ukrainian border in Russia and the air base 

Putin is building in Belarus. 

3. U.S. OPTIONS

• Overall: 

U.S. strategy should be to assure our allies and friends, deter Russian aggression 

and defeat ISIS initially and, long term, as a part of a global alliance to defeat radical Islam. Putin believes that European and American leadership is weak and has 

consistently out-maneuvered and out bluffed the U.S. and its allies. Putin is counting on the U.S. fear of escalation and fear of confrontation to stop any thought of 

retaliation. Aggression unanswered, historically, has led to more aggression. 

• Syria Options:

- Recognize the anti ISIS strategy in Iraq and Syria is failing and we are certain 

to lose the war unless there is major and comprehensive change to build an effective and decisive ground force in Syria and Iraq while removing restrictions 

on the air campaign to dramatically increase airstrike capability. Continue U.S. 

policy to force Assad from power, but understand that Russia, as Assad’s protector will now play a decisive role.

- Deter: Putin has begun a proxy war with the U.S. when Russian combat aircraft 

struck, continuously, moderate rebel forces trained by the CIA. This was no accident, targets were provided by the Syrian regime and they were accurate. How 

can the U.S. stand by and do nothing? U.S. military should have been given the 

mission to retaliate. Options likely to be considered among others: crater the Al 

Assad runway, establish free zones that are sanctuaries for refugees, strike 

Assad’s helicopter fleet that is barrel bombing, just to name a few.

- Deter: Advise Russia that the U.S. and the coalition will conduct air operations 

anytime, anywhere in Syria and that they should stay out of our way if they 

want to avoid confrontation. Believe U.S. aircraft are rarely flying now against 

ISIS targets in Syria.

- If we continue to wring our hands and continue to be dominated by fear and 

opposed to instilling fear, the Russian aggression will not just advance in the 

M.E. but most likely it will escalate in the Baltics and eastern Europe. 

• Ukraine / Europe Options:

- Deter: Recognize further that Russia is not finished in Ukraine as the new military bases across the border suggest. There is still time in addition to the U.S. 

military, training Ukraine battalions, which is an effective program and providing non-lethal aid, to provide defensive weapons and capabilities that would 

definitely make a difference. Such as: anti tank missiles, non-missile air defense 

to counter the drones, counter fire radar to detect the artillery, downloaded intelligence from U.S. all source capabilities etc

12 

- Deter: The Atlantic Resolve U.S./NATO rotational troop deployments to the Baltics, Poland, Romania and Hungary are a helpful but a small deterrence to Russian aggression. Russia is pounding the Russian speaking minorities in the Baltics with continuous propaganda to create unrest and to foment a split with the 

nation’s majority. Department of Defense must re-evaluate its stationing plan 

for the Combatant Commands in view of a revisionist and aggressive Russia. 

The Pacific is the largest Combatant Command with over 400K troops while Europe is considerably smaller and less than adequate with about 50K. (The Cold 

War stationing in Europe was approximately 600K). 

Larger force commitments permit larger unit rotational deployments and a permanent base structure in the Baltics and eastern Europe. All deployed forces assigned to bases in central Europe no longer makes sense. Obviously, NATO must 

adjust its priorities as well as the U.S. 

In conclusion, Russia is clearly challenging U.S. influence and interest in the M.E. 

as the dominant outside regional country while also seeking to challenge NATO in 

eastern Europe and possibly its very existence. While at times this demands a firm 

hand the U.S. should not close off communications with Russia but continue to pursue opportunities when there is mutual self interest. Such an interest is radical 

Islam. Russia was and is consumed with radical Islam and its threat which is the 

primary reason for the war in Afghanistan and prior to 9/11 it fought two major 

battles with the Chechens. The U.S. and Russia could partner on this issue as both 

countries have the most experience and could help organize together a global alliance. Another area is partnering on nuclear power plant development and security 

in the M.E. to the economic benefit of the M.E. while controlling uranium enrichment and plant security. Clearly Russia and the U.S. are in a renewed strategic 

competitive relationship which still has opportunities for positive engagement for 

mutual benefit. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 


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Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Ms. Conley. 

STATEMENT OF HEATHER CONLEY, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT 

FOR EUROPE, EURASIA, AND THE ARCTIC; DIRECTOR, EUROPE PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Ms. CONLEY. Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, members of the 

committee, thank you so much. It is a privilege to speak to you this 

morning, as well as join with my fellow panelists to discuss the 

evolving nature of Russia’s growing military threat, which geographically stretches from the Kola Peninsula in the Arctic to the 

Mediterranean coast of Syria. 

In my view, the Kremlin is reconstructing a 21st century version 

of the Iron Curtain. As General Keane mentioned, they’re recreating a strategic buffer which is designed to achieve a new grand 

international bargain with the West, a Yalta 2.0, if you will, that 

assures a Russian sphere of influence in Europe and the Middle 

East. This curtain, like its 20th century predecessor, seeks to block 

the perceived contagion of democracy and reform while returning 

Russia to internationally recognized great-power status. This curtain is designed to do several things: deny military access to the 

West through the construction of new, and the revitalization of 

former, Russian military bases. It is designed to ensure the continuous exercising of air, land, and sea capabilities at full combat 

readiness. It rapidly mobilizes substantial Russian forces in a very 

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nomic and political tactics which are at its disposal. And, finally, 

it employs an extremely effective counter-factual strategic communications campaign. 

Now, this 21st century curtain also has a built-in Kremlin-controlled thermostat. President Putin can turn up the heat when and 

where he wants, as he’s done in eastern Ukraine; and when it is 

needed, he can turn down the heat, as we’re seeing right now. And 

then he can shift to a different portion of this curtain, as he is 

doing in Syria. The West will continue to react to the Kremlin’s actions rather than proactively shape and deter them. 

Russia’s military modernization in the Arctic is the perfect example of how this new curtain, or, as I suggest in a new CSIS report, 

an ‘‘ice curtain,’’ has been constructed. Russia has held three major 

military exercises in the Arctic over the last 24 months. The first 

exercise was part of a larger Zapad 2013 military exercise, which 

focused on Russia’s western military district, and it demonstrated 

a more streamlined command structure, more efficient tactical 

units, and the ability to deploy a large-scale complex military operation coordinated with other areas of operation. This exercise fully 

demonstrated that Russia has a much larger spatial definition of 

its theater of operations, which extends from the Arctic to the 

Black Sea. 

The second exercise, in September of 2014, was the largest postSoviet military exercises that we have seen. It was held in the Russian far east, and it was preceded by a snap military exercise. 

Vostok 2014 involved over 100,000 servicemen and demonstrated a 

complex display of air, maritime, and land components. And this 

exercise was partly conducted on new military bases in the Russian 

Arctic, New Siberian Islands, and Wrangel Island, which some believe simulated an exercise to repel U.S. and NATO forces. 

And then, finally, in March of this year we saw the third and 

most culminating exercise, which was a snap military exercise in 

the Arctic which consisted of 45,000 Russian forces, 15 submarines, 

and 41 warships at full combat readiness. We did not know that 

they were going to do this. 

So, this extraordinary exercise tempo, the threefold increase in 

Russian air incursions over the Arctic, Baltic, and North Seas over 

the past 12 months, as well as Russia’s announcement that will— 

it will have a total of 14 operational airfields in the Russian Arctic 

by the end of this year, 50 airfields by 2020, and a 30-percent increase in Russian special forces deployed to the Arctic, all underscore that the Arctic is becoming a major theater of operations for 

Russia. The Arctic region has now been included in Russia’s 

amended military doctrine, as of December of last year, and in its 

new maritime doctrine, which was just released in July. And it is 

under a new command, the Russian Northern Fleet United Strategic Command for the Arctic. 

Now, the conclusions that we draw from Russia’s military behavior is that it is increasingly able to project significant anti-access, 

anti-denial capabilities in the Arctic, the north Atlantic, and, increasingly, the north Pacific, which demonstrates the ability to rapidly deploy both conventional and unconventional forces. What is 

perhaps the most disturbing has been Russia’s focus on enhancing 

its nuclear deterrent in the Arctic, where it has simulated massive 

16 

retaliatory attacks in the Barents Sea. Our Norwegian and British 

allies—and I know, Senator McCain, you were recently in the region—have witnessed a surge in Russian submarine activity in the 

north Atlantic. 

So, let me just very briefly describe the remaining geographic 

contours of this 21st century curtain. The curtain proceeds from 

the Arctic, south to the Finnish-Russian border. Russia has returned to an abandoned military base 50 kilometers from the Finnish border, where the 1st Russian Infantry Brigade has arrived 

with 3,000 soldiers anticipated. The curtain proceeds to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, home of the Russian Baltic Fleet, 

where vessels from the fleet have delivered fighter jets and 

Asconder missile launchers capable of launching both conventional 

and nuclear missiles. Russia has recently installed new S–400 missile batteries and has increased its force presence. 

The curtain then transitions from ice to steel on the PolishBelarusian border, where President Putin has just ordered Russian 

officials to construct, with its Belarusian counterparts, a new military base in Belarus. This is the first time a newly constructed 

military base will be outside of Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This base will station SU–27 fighters. 

The curtain, of course, extends fully to Ukraine, where Russia 

has an estimated 29,000 soldiers in occupied Crimea, a substantially increased Baltic Sea fleet, which it plans to augment with 30 

additional vessels by 2020. 

The curtain then continues, going, of course, as General Keane 

explained, through eastern Ukraine and extremely capable forces 

on the Russian-Ukrainian border, in fact, commencing construction 

of new installations that will potentially contain significant munitions ordnance facilities. 

Ukraine, of course, we move to Transnistria and Moldova, where 

there are 1500 troops—Russian troops stationed as peacekeepers. 

And, of course, from Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, we have 

Russian military presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. And, in 

fact, the Russians have been pushing out this territory. They are 

100 kilometers from the main Georgian highway that would divide 

Georgia. So, they’re increasing their territorial gains. And, as we’ve 

seen extensive—this curtain continues, then, to Armenia, where 

Russia is further augmenting its forces, and then, as we know, 

from—to Syria. 

So, how can the U.S. and NATO respond to this new curtain of 

ice and steel? I’d like to commend the committee. The National Defense Authorization Act is a really great point of departure. And I 

commend the bipartisan resolve to seek to assess these challenges 

and identify critical gaps. For far too long, we’ve discounted Russia’s military capabilities and did not take their threats and pronouncements seriously. We can no longer afford that luxury. 

But, simply assessing the problem is woefully insufficient. Painful budget and force-posture decisions must now be taken. We cannot reset this challenge away, and we cannot get back to business 

as usual. The West has forgotten how to conduct effective deterrence in the Modern Age against a sophisticated adversary. Deterrence is as effective as the credibility on which it stands. 

17 

The United States immediately and positively responded to requests for U.S. forces to be sent to the Baltic states, Poland, and 

Romania, when requested last spring without pondering the decision for months. The strong bipartisan support for the European 

Reassurance Initiative was another important signal of U.S. resolve. This act strengthened U.S. and NATO’s Article 5 credibility, 

but these actions were viewed as temporary measures to change 

President Putin’s behavior in Ukraine. This has not achieved its 

objectives, and now we need a more durable deterrence posture. 

U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, accompanied by significant air and maritime components, must increase their presence on NATO’s northern and eastern flanks. The 

U.S. should seriously consider sending a third combat brigade to 

Europe to reinforce both flanks while strongly encouraging our European allies to increase their force presence, as well. 

NATO must initiate the pre-positioning of military equipment in 

the region, not simply for exercise purposes only, and immediately 

address identified shortcomings in secure communications and infrastructure needs that were identified during Operation Atlantic 

Resolve this year, as well as continue to increase the number of regional exercise. We must ensure rapid deployability. And that is 

where we are lacking. 

It is time, to echo General Keane’s comments, for a comprehensive review of U.S. force posture in Europe for the next 5 to 10 

years. It is for this reason that the outcome of next year’s NATO 

summit in Warsaw is absolutely critical. If NATO simply decides 

to review the decisions it reached at its last summit, the alliance 

will have failed to address its most significant security challenge 

since the end of the Cold War. The summit must launch a longterm strategic adaptation to what will be a long-term and highly 

destabilizing challenge. 

Mr. Chairman, on one final note and a word of caution, as much 

as the U.S. and NATO must do more to deter future Russian military aggression, we must also be fully cognizant of the devastating 

impact of Russian influence inside NATO that inhibit allies from 

taking collective action against Russia. As Russia dominates the 

media, financial, and energy markets of some of our NATO allies, 

we will find NATO collectively less able to respond. This requires 

as much policy attention by the U.S. and NATO as it does to militarily deter the Kremlin. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Conley follows:] 

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Senator MCCAIN. Ambassador Sestanovich, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN SESTANOVICH, GEORGE F. 

KENNAN SENIOR FELLOW FOR RUSSIAN AND EURASIAN 

STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, COLUMBIA 

UNIVERSITY 

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, 

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to join 

your discussion today. 


15-78_conley_7.eps
25 

Let me organize just some brief introductory remarks by picking 

up on two comments on Russia by General Dunford, the new distinguished Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who, in his confirmation 

testimony to you this summer, described Russian behavior as 

‘‘alarming.’’ I completely agree with this. I also disagree with the 

other thing he said, which was that Russia is an existential threat 

to the United States. And let me explain why I disagree. 

First, when we talk about an existential threat, we mislead ourselves. No matter how alarmed we are by Russia’s current behavior, we use the term ‘‘existential threat’’ only because of its large 

strategic nuclear arsenal. And that’s a potential threat whether 

Russia’s relations with us are good or bad, or whether Russia’s behavior is reckless or wise. Russia has acted recklessly of late, but 

that has not really increased the existential threat General 

Dunford spoke of. 

Second, this language misleads Russians. It feeds a public mood 

in Russia that honestly borders on national hysteria. These days, 

Russian officials routinely say things about the United States that 

are bizarre and incomprehensible. Unfortunately, hearing that we 

see Russia as an existential threat—pretty extreme language, after 

all—tells many Russians that our countries are on a collision 

course toward war, and that we have accepted that idea. I urge the 

members of this committee to take a different approach, to challenge responsible Russians to see how strange and counterproductive their country’s policies looks to the outside world, not to 

make ourselves look equally strange. 

Now, I said I agree that Russian behavior is alarming. It’s really 

alarming. And we need to appreciate that—not only that it is 

alarming, but that it doesn’t come out of nowhere. This is not 

something that has just happened in the past year or two. 

First—a few quick points on this—Russian actions in the Middle 

East and in Ukraine reflect the doubling and more of their defense 

budget in the past 10 years 50-percent increase just since the end 

of the financial crisis, in the past 5 years. This program of modernization is still unfolding, and the biggest procurement projects 

are ahead. As Russia’s capabilities have increased, so has its antiWestern rhetoric. The official military doctrine of Russia identifies 

both NATO and the United States as threats to Russia. 

Secondly, Russian actions reflect the new nationalism of Russian 

public opinion. The seizure of Crimea and continuing attempts to 

fragment eastern Ukraine have given this nationalist mood an 

angrier, more embattled tone. Russian decisionmakers feel they 

can count on public support for more assertive displays of national 

power. They have to worry, of course, about casualties. And I think 

we should assume that they are just as worried, and maybe more 

worried, about casualties in Syria than they have been in Ukraine. 

But, so far, that concern has not restrained their conduct. Putin’s 

popularity is largely intact. 

Third, Russian actions are a response, as President Obama and 

as General Keane has noted, to the weakness of the Assad regime 

in Syria, Russia’s oldest and now only real ally in the region. President Putin has made clear, as he has in Ukraine, that he is prepared to make a significant military commitment to save embattled 

clients, no matter how shaky and illegitimate their position is. And 

26 

he acts this way, in part, because circumstances allow it. In Syria, 

several years of policy confusion by the United States and Europe 

have encouraged him. Had the United States imposed a no-fly zone 

in Syria 3 years ago, there would be no Russian intervention today. 

Fourth, Secretary Carter may well be right that Russian policy 

is doomed to fail. I’m—I think this is entirely possible. But, in the 

course of failing, it may do a great deal of damage, both in Syria 

and beyond. It should, therefore, be a goal of the United States and 

its allies to limit and eventually reverse Russia’s intervention. Continued confusion, merely calling on Russia to join the coalition 

against ISIS, will not achieve this end. 

Fifth, anyone responsible for the national security of the United 

States, like the members of this committee, should worry about 

where Russia’s reckless behavior will lead next. There are many 

areas in which one could expect troublemaking. We should not, by 

any means, conclude that we face an endless, never-cresting wave 

of Russian activism. To my mind, what Putin is doing now in Syria 

probably reduces the risks of near-term military provocations in 

Europe, especially against our NATO allies. If I were a Baltic Defense Minister, I’d actually be sleeping slightly better these days. 

But, we have to remember that most of us have been wrong in 

anticipating Russian actions in the past couple of years. Just when 

we thought Putin had finally realized he had acted foolishly, he 

then acted even more foolishly. Today, the ingredients of some future confrontation may already be coming together. After what 

we’ve seen of Russian behavior, we can’t afford to be unprepared. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, let me close as I 

began, by urging realism about the problems that Russian policy 

creates without making those problems worse than they have to be. 

Many Russians understand that President Putin is damaging his 

own country’s security as well as others. They should hear from us 

and from you. They should be able to speak up against his actions. 

They should understand that the United States will protect itself, 

its allies, and its interests. They should also understand that there 

can be a place for them in this effort if they want it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to our discussion. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Sestanovich follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY STEPHEN SESTANOVICH

Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to join your discussion today on Russian policy in 

Europe and the Middle East, especially actions taken by Russian military units in 

Syria in the last few days. These Russian steps are not only unprecedented in the 

post-Cold War era, they have few antecedents in the Cold War itself. They call for 

careful analysis and an equally careful policy response. 

Members of this committee surely remember how General Joe Dunford, the new 

JCS Chairman, described Russian policy in his confirmation testimony. ‘‘Alarming,’’ 

he called it, and I completely agree. I don’t, however, agree with the other thing 

General Dunford said. He described Russia as an ‘‘existential threat’’ to the United 

States. 

Let me explain why I disagree. 

First, in using this language we mislead ourselves. No matter how alarmed we 

are by Russia’s current behavior, we use the term ‘‘existential threat’’ only because 

of its large strategic nuclear arsenal. Its many nuclear weapon are a potential 

threat whether our relations with Russia are good or bad, whether Russian behavior 

is reckless or wise. Russia has acted recklessly of late, but that has not really increased the ‘‘existential threat’’ General Dunford spoke of. 

27 

The Council on Foreign Relations takes no institutional positions on policy issues 

and has no affiliation with the United States Government. All statements of fact 

and expressions of opinion contained herein are the sole responsibility of the author. 

Second, this language also misleads the Russians. It feeds a public mood in Russia that borders on national hysteria. These days senior Russian officials often say 

things about the United States that are bizarre and incomprehensible. Unfortunately, hearing that we see Russia as an ‘‘existential threat’’—pretty extreme language, after all—tells many Russians that our countries are on a collision course 

to war. Worse, it is understood by some to mean that America’s leaders are preparing for this future conflict. I urge the members of this Committee to take a different approach—to challenge responsible Russians to see how strange their country’s policy looks to the outside world, not to make ourselves seem equally strange. 

Now, a few words about Russian policy itself. As I have said, it is both alarming 

and strange. We need to appreciate just how alarming it is, but we should not think 

it comes out of nowhere. 

First, Russian actions in the Middle East reflect the doubling (and more) of their 

defense budget in the past 10 years. This program of modernization is still unfolding; the biggest procurement projects are ahead. As Russia’s capabilities have increased, so has its anti-Western rhetoric. The official military doctrine adopted late 

last year identifies both NATO and the United States as threats to Russia. 

Second, Russian actions reflect the new nationalism of Russian public opinion. 

The seizure of Crimea and continuing attempts to fragment eastern Ukraine have 

given this nationalist mood an angrier, more embattled tone. Russian decision-makers surely feel they can count on popular support for more assertive displays of national power, but they cannot be any surer of this than we can. There are in fact 

reasons to believe that Russian leaders worry about operations that might bring casualties down the road. (How else to explain the steadfast lying about the presence 

of Russian military personnel in Ukraine or the claim that in Syria only ‘‘volunteers’’ will take part in ground operations?) 

Third, Russia’s actions are a response, as President Obama has noted, to the 

weakness of the Assad regime in Syria, Russia’s oldest (and now only) real ally in 

the region. As President Putin has made clear in Ukraine, he is prepared to make 

a significant military commitment to save embattled clients, no matter how shaky 

and illegitimate their position. But Putin acts this way in part because he thinks 

circumstances allow it. In Syria, several years of policy confusion by the United 

States and Europe have encouraged him. Had the United States imposed a no-fly 

zone in Syria three years ago, there would be no Russian intervention today. 

Fourth, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter may well be right that Russian policy 

is ‘‘doomed to fail.’’ But even in the course of failing it may do a great deal of damage, both in Syria and beyond. It should therefore be a goal of the United States 

and its allies to limit Russia’s intervention. Continued confusion— including calls 

for Russia to focus its actions on defeating ISIS—will not achieve this aim. 

Fifth, anyone responsible for the national security of the United States—and I 

certainly include the members of this Committee—should worry about where Russia’s reckless behavior will lead next. We should not by any means conclude that 

we face an endless, never-cresting wave of activism. If anything, what Putin is doing 

now in Syria probably reduces the risk of near-term military provocations in Europe, especially against our NATO allies. (If I were a Baltic defense minister, I’d 

be sleeping slightly better these days.) But we have to remember that most of us 

have been wrong in anticipating Russian actions of the past couple of years. Just 

when we thought Putin had finally realized that he had acted foolishly, he acted 

even more foolishly. Today the ingredients of some future confrontation may already 

be coming together. After what we’ve seen of Russian behavior, we can’t afford to 

be unprepared. 

Mr. Chairman, let me close as I began—by urging realism about the problems 

Russian policy creates without making those problems worse than they have to be. 

Many Russians understand that President Putin is damaging his own country’s security as well as others. They should hear from us—and from you. They should understand that the United States will protect itself, its allies, and its interests. They 

should also understand that there can be a place for them in this effort if they want 

it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to our discussion. 

Senator MCCAIN. General Jones. 

28 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC (RET.), 

CHAIRMAN, BRENT SCOWCROFT CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, AND FORMER 

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR 

General JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, members of the committee. Thank you for convening this important 

hearing at this very challenging and consequential juncture in 

America’s relations with Russia and in world affairs, in general. 

We are all witnessing the most recent and dangerous developments in Syria, where Mr. Putin, under the guise of fighting ISIL, 

is using force to advance his highly cynical campaign to prop up 

Bashar al-Assad. This action is merely the latest in a pattern of behavior emanating from Moscow that we had hoped ended with the 

Cold War. Unfortunately, as I came to learn during my tenure as 

National Security Advisor, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact was 

an outcome that was neither cheered nor welcomed nor accepted by 

the current Russian President. 

I’ve submitted a full written statement covering three areas that 

will hopefully be of help to the committee. The first is my view of 

Mr. Putin’s primary motivations and goals. The second regards his 

strategy. And the third addresses some thoughts regarding what 

the United States and our allies could consider doing in response. 

Mr. Chairman, in 2009, as National Security Advisor, I attended 

a breakfast meeting in Moscow between the then-Prime Minister 

Putin and our President. I left that meeting convinced of three 

things: first, that Mr. Putin will always be a product of his upbringing in the KGB; second, that he believes deeply that Russia 

was humiliated by the conclusion of the Cold War, and is wholeheartedly committed to righting what he sees as an historic injustice, the collapse of the Soviet Union; third, he clearly believes that 

NATO is a great evil and that his interests are best served by 

weakening the Transatlantic Alliance and destabilizing his western 

periphery. 

These three views are reflected not only in Russia’s revanchist 

foreign policy and adventures abroad, but also in the country’s lack 

of political and economic evolution during his tenure as President, 

all quite similar to Cold War behavior and priorities. During President Medvedev’s tenure, we genuinely hoped that he aimed to integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic ark and was the kind of partner with whom we could work to achieve common goals. Upon returning to the presidency, President Putin reversed much of the 

progress we made during the Medvedev presidency, and is now taking Russia down a very different path. 

The Russian President has proven he remains a cynical Cold 

War hero, needing an enemy to make himself look good and deeply 

nostalgic for a Moscow-centric sphere of influence. His strategic objective is to reassert Russian power and prestige on his terms without regard to international principles and norms. He is willing to 

use force to achieve his objectives, including overturning internationally recognized boundaries and disregarding state sovereignty illustrated by the illegal annexation of the Crimea in 

2014. 

Despite an anemic economy debilitated by low oil prices, cronyism, and corruption, and now in a full recession, he is nonetheVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:12 Aug 02, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\DOCS\15-78.CON WILDA
29 

less consolidating his power effectively. He continues to subvert 

human rights, clamp down on media and free expression, fosters an 

environment of hostility for what is left of his political opposition, 

and takes intentionally stabilizing actions abroad, all the while operating a robust propaganda machine at home and abroad to make 

it appear that he is doing none of those things. 

As outlined in my full statement, to pursue his ambitions he is 

employing a broad toolkit composed of major military, energy, and 

political elements. A very high priority for Mr. Putin, despite enormous domestic problems, is strengthening and modernizing the 

Russian military to reassert power on the world stage. United 

States military leaders fear that the extensive new capabilities 

President Putin is accumulating are being used to pursue an antiaccess area-denial strategy against NATO, particularly in the Baltic Sea regions from Kaliningrad in the Black Sea region, from 

Russia’s buildup in the Crimea, now in Syria from its deployment 

of anti-aircraft capabilities, and the naval bombardment from the 

Caspian. 

There was growing concern within the alliance that President 

Putin is using a series of capability deployments in these sensitive 

areas to raise the risk, or perceived risk, of U.S. or coalition military action in these regions. We see this in Syria, where Russia’s 

deployments are geared not towards fighting the Islamic State of 

Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), but rather towards protecting the regime of Assad. I believe that the Russian President’s deployment 

of combat aircraft and sophisticated air defenses, which are not 

needed to fight ISIS, are intended to deter the United States-led 

coalition from establishing a no-fly zone in northern Syria. 

Russian military exercises, some conducted on very short notice 

and as discussed by the other witnesses, also pose a significant 

cause for concern. Major military maneuvers in the Arctic, joined 

with China in naval drills near our Japanese allies, and held 

major—and major exercises, which included tens of thousands of 

troops, on NATO’s eastern flank. Indeed, in March of 2015, Russia 

held an exercise intended to simulate the invasion of Denmark and 

the Baltic states. In some cases, the guise of training has been used 

to mask long-term Russian troop deployments, such as in Syria last 

month and in eastern Ukraine, where the United States European 

Command has estimated there may be as many as 12,000 Russian 

troops. Russia’s use of so-called ‘‘volunteers,’’ or ‘‘little green men,’’ 

which ostensibly offer Moscow plausible deniability, is another element of the Kremlin’s so-called ‘‘hybrid warfare’’ tactic. We have 

been alerted by Moscow that such volunteers may find their way 

to Syria very soon. There have also—we have—there have also— 

we have also seen the deployment of more aggressive and more capable Russian naval forces. 

Finally, there are increasing reports that Russian military aircraft are violating NATO airspace with their transponders turned 

off, raising the risk of civilian aircraft accidents while violating the 

sovereignty of our treaty allies. NATO intercepted some 400 Russian aircraft flying over Europe in 2014. A number suggest that 

2015 will exceed that total. And, of course, just this week, Russia 

violated the sovereign airspace of our Turkish allies. 

30 

There is another weapon that Mr. Putin has been utilizing to satisfy his ambitions for quite some time, and that is energy, energy 

by seeking to maintain European dependence on Russian gas and 

use it as a lever to—for manipulation. The members of this committee understand that Mr. Putin’s incursion in the Crimea is, 

among other things, about exercising political power through the 

control of energy and about brandishing the threat of energy scarcity to intimidate and manipulate vulnerable populations. Fortunately, Europe is now awakening to the threat and is investing in 

redundancies, gas storage hubs, and interconnectors that reduce 

Russia’s ability to hold countries hostage. 

Thirdly, President Putin is working hard to sow division within 

the western alliance and undercut the cohesion of the Euro-Atlantic ark of economic and security cooperation. He has built links to 

European party leaders on the far right and far left in order to foster close relationships at the political and financial levels, and 

made a habit of sustaining old and corrupt alliances, such as with 

Syrian President Assad. Just this week, President Assad noted the 

importance of the Russia, Iran, Iraq alliance that’s sustaining his 

regime. 

So, before us is emerging one of the premier strategic challenges 

of the post-Cold War period, and that is doing what we can do to 

counter President Putin’s retrograde ambitions in favor of the 

peaceful and progressive order of the transatlantic community that 

the world had envisioned at the opening of the 21st century. 

In the face of the strategic environment I’ve described, I believe 

the United States should lead the alliance in developing a threepronged approach that includes economic, political, and security 

components: 

First, in the economic realm, to underline Mr. Putin’s use of energy as a political weapon, the United States should support the 

European Union’s development of an energy, telecommunications, 

and transportation infrastructure corridor along a north-south axis 

from the Baltic to the Adriatic. My full statement provides greater 

details on this major strategic initiative, and I ask permission to 

submit for the record a comprehensive plan for doing so. 

Senator MCCAIN. Without objection. 

General JONES. I have a copy of the plan right here. 

Senator MCCAIN. Without objection. 

General JONES. There is much we can do, and must do, to support the development of this critical infrastructure to complete Europe and counter Mr. Putin’s use of energy as a weapon. So, I 

would ask your permission, Mr. Chairman, to make the report a 

part of the hearing record. 

Senator MCCAIN. Without objection. 

General JONES. Thank you. 

I recommend the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership to promote transatlantic growth, prosperity, and security making the alliance resilient and certainly more unified. And we should 

maintain U.S./EU sanctions imposed in response to Russia’s illegal 

actions in the Ukraine. These sanctions may not have altered 

Putin’s strategic calculus in the Ukraine, but they have raised a 

cost to his actions and left Russia partially economically isolated. 

31 

Secondly, politically, a central tenet of United States strategy for 

countering Russia should be to strengthen transatlantic solidarity 

and cooperation. American leadership in this effort will be crucial 

in fostering a common vision for the alliance in the face of new and 

more challenging operating environments. This should be accompanied by a comprehensive public diplomacy campaign spotlighting 

the values that make the transatlantic community unique and conducive to human development: free and open markets, respect for 

human rights and democratic governance, respect for the rule of 

law—values that stand today in stark contrast to Mr. Putin’s Russia. 

Part of that effort must be to reaffirm NATO’s open-door policy. 

At next year’s summit in Warsaw, NATO should admit Montenegro, assuming it has met all political and military commitments. 

Doing so would counter Russia’s growing influence in the Balkans 

and send a powerful signal that the vision of a united Europe 

whole and free remains viable. A similar effort should be made by 

Washington to unlock the tragic political conflict within the alliance that has prevented Macedonia from taking its rightful place 

as a NATO member. 

Third, the security mission. We must enhance NATO force presence in an eastern Europe to include American forces. This will be 

controversial, because some allies now fear provoking Russia, 

which will require careful diplomacy. Given Russia’s aggressive exercises and troop positioning on NATO’s eastern flank, I believe we 

run a greater risk of conflict by not increasing NATO’s presence in 

central and eastern Europe. NATO, Mr. Chairman, must become 

more proactive, more agile within the alliance in order to prevent 

future conflict. I applaud the efforts of the United States Congress to fund the President’s $1 billion initiative to enhance the presence of United States rotational forces, air 

policing, and infrastructure in central eastern and southeast Europe. This appropriation should continue, given the ongoing Russian threat to our allies, but United States political leaders should 

also press our allies to continue their own contributions to NATO’s 

readiness action plan. The next summit in Warsaw will be critical 

to the future of the alliance. 

I’ve offered additional suggestions in my full statement. They include making resilience a core task of NATO to complement the 

NATO’s—the alliance’s current core task of collective defense, cooperative security, and crisis management, enhancing NATO’s cybersecurity capabilities and responsibilities, empowering the Supreme 

Allied Commander to conduct rapid troop deployment in response 

to Russia’s reliance on strategic surprise and hybrid warfare, and 

providing robust and well-targeted assistance to the Ukraine. 

I support the administration’s recent decisions on long-range 

counter-battery radars to Ukraine. I believe we should take additional measures, such as providing the anti-tank missiles, communications, and intelligence support, training in counter-electronic 

warfare capabilities that have been requested by Kyiv and are in 

the 2016 NDAA. 

With the committee’s permission, I would like to submit two 

items for the hearing record containing proposals by the Atlantic 

Council for steps the U.S. Government could consider in responding 

32 

to President Putin’s actions to assist our friends and allies in eastern Europe. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, and members of the committee, let 

me close by saying that we have all been deeply disappointed by 

Russia’s actions in Syria, the Ukraine, and in eastern Europe, and 

the negative effect these actions have had on our bilateral relationship. I believe these actions merit careful considerations of the 

tough response that all of us have outlined. 

Having said that, President Putin will not be in power forever. 

There will be a Russia beyond him. The United States and our allies should continue to make clear to the Russian people that we 

believe that Russia has its rightful place in a united Europe whole 

and free and at peace, provided that Russia is willing to respect the 

sovereignty and the free will of its neighbors, demonstrate a commitment to democracy and human rights, and respect the rules of 

the road in the international system. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify before you today, and I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of General Jones follows:] 

PREPARED TESTIMONY BY GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC (RET.) 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee, thank 

you for convening this important hearing at this very challenging and consequential 

juncture in America’s relations with Russia, and in world affairs. 

We have all witnessed the most recent and dangerous developments in Syria 

where Mr. Putin, under the guise of fighting ISIL, is using force to advance his 

highly cynical campaign to prop up Bashar al-Assad. This action is merely the latest 

in a pattern of behavior emanating from Moscow that we had hoped ended with the 

Cold War. Unfortunately, as I came to learn during my tenure as National Security 

Advisor, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact was an outcome neither cheered nor 

accepted by the current Russian president. 

I would like to share with the committee my thoughts on three dimensions of the 

situation before us. First, I will describe my view of Mr. Putin’s primary motivations, which go a long way toward explaining his actions in the Middle East, Europe, and Ukraine; second, I will touch on the strategy he is employing to achieve 

his objectives; and third I will conclude by sharing my own recommendations for 

steps that the United States and our allies should consider in response to Mr. 

Putin’s activities. 

PUTIN’S WORLD VIEW AND DOMESTIC SITUATION

In 2009, I attended a breakfast meeting between President Obama and President 

Putin. I left that breakfast convinced of three things: first, Mr. Putin is a product 

of his upbringing in the KGB; second, he believes deeply that Russia was humiliated 

by the conclusion of the Cold War and is wholeheartedly committed to ’righting’ 

what he sees an historic injustice, the collapse of the Soviet Union. Third, he clearly 

believes that NATO is a great evil and that his interests are best served by weakening the transatlantic alliance and destabilizing his western periphery. These three 

views are reflected not only in Russia’s revanchist foreign policy, but also in the 

country’s lack of political and economic evolution under his tenure as President. 

As national security advisor, we worked hard with President Obama and the Russian President at that time, Mr. Medvedev, on advancing the United States–Russia 

relationship to a new paradigm. I genuinely believed that President Medvedev 

aimed to integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic arc and was the kind of partner 

with whom we could achieve common goals. We made important progress including 

the START II treaty; convincing Russia to withhold its delivery of S–300 surface to 

air missiles to Iran during a key period of time; and achieving their cooperation on 

a range of non-traditional security challenges on regional matters such as Afghanistan and transnational crime. Unfortunately, upon returning to the Kremlin, President Putin reversed much of the modest progress we made during the Medvedev 

33 

presidency, and moved Russia down a very different path, away from Euro-Atlantic 

integration of his predecessor. 

President Putin has proven he remains a cynical cold warrior, deeply nostalgic for 

a Russian-centric sphere of influence. In addition, Russia’s recent military involvement in Syria and increased cooperation with Iran, combined with greater political 

engagement across the Middle East, indicates Mr. Putin is upping its effort to increase Russian influence in that region as well. 

Mr. Putin’s strategic objective is equally clear: to reassert Russian power and 

prestige on his terms. International principles and norms of behavior are not in his 

calculus. He is willing to use force to achieve his objectives, including overturning 

internationally recognized boundaries and disregarding state sovereignty, illustrated 

by the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. 

Given his ambitions and actions, Mr. Putin is far more interested in modernizing 

his military than reforming Russia’s dysfunctional and corrupt political and economic systems. Low oil prices and western sanctions have negatively impacted the 

country’s already fetid business environment and placed great strain on the Russian 

economy. 

While Mr. Putin’s poll numbers ostensibly remain quite high in Russia, particularly after the annexation of Crimea—it is difficult to know if these numbers are 

credible given the lack of civil society, free media, political opposition and independent institutions in Russia. But for now he is consolidating power effectively. 

It remains to be seen if his popularity can survive the kind of significant economic 

downturn which Russia is experiencing. The country is now in full recession for the 

first time in six years. The World Bank forecasts Russia’s economy will shrink by 

3.8 percent in 2015. 

Russia’s political system and human rights situation has also degraded during 

Mr. Putin’s return to the Kremlin. The Russian state actively persecutes homosexuals, has clamped down on media and free expression, has fostered an environment of hostility to what is left of the political opposition and free media, and operates a robust propaganda machine. 

PUTIN’S INTERNATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND MODUS OPERANDI

Russia’s aggressiveness abroad is not only a means of diverting attention from his 

domestic shortcomings; it emanates naturally from President Putin’s world view and 

his desire to project power and influence. In my view, Putin aims to restore Russia 

as a major player in the international system; to leverage Russia’s strengths and 

enemies’ perceived weaknesses to his advantage; to harness a resurgent nationalism 

for his adventures; to sow division within the transatlantic alliance and on a larger 

scale, disrupt international order. 

Military Action 

Strengthening and modernizing the Russian military has been central to Mr. 

Putin’s ambition of reasserting Russian power on the world stage. Russia is presently halfway through a ten-year, $700 billion defense modernization initiative that 

is projected to result in the acquisition of 1,100 helicopters, 100 ships (including 24 

submarines), 2,300 tanks, and 2,000 artillery pieces. While President Putin has 

looked to protect the military from budget cuts due to low oil prices, there are signs 

the modernization process may be forced to move at a slower pace. 

Even so, United States military leaders fear these new capabilities are being used 

to pursue an anti-access/area denial strategy against NATO, particularly in the Baltic Sea region from Kaliningrad; in the Black Sea region from Russia’s buildup in 

Crimea; and now in Syria from its deployment of anti-aircraft capabilities. There is 

growing concern within the alliance that Putin is using a series of capability deployments in these sensitive areas to raise the risk, or perceived risk of United States 

or coalition military action in these regions. We see this in Syria, where Russia’s 

deployments are geared not toward fighting ISIL but rather toward protecting the 

murderous regime of Bashar al-Assad. I believe that the Russian President’s deployment of combat aircraft and sophisticated air defenses – which are not needed to 

fight ISIS—are intended to deter the United States-led coalition from establishing 

a no-fly zone in northern Syria. 

In addition to investments in Russian military equipment, large-scale Russian 

military exercises, some conducted on very short notice are a cause for concern. Russia has held major exercises in the Arctic, joined with China in naval drills near 

our Japanese allies, and held major exercises which included tens of thousands of 

troops on NATO’s eastern flank. Indeed, in March 2015, Russia held an exercise intended to simulate the invasion of Denmark and the Baltic states. 

34 

In some cases, exercises have been used to mask long-term Russian troop deployments, such as in Syria last month and in Eastern Ukraine, where United States 

European command has estimated there may be as many as 12,000–Russian troops. 

Russia’s use of so-called ‘volunteers’ or little green men – which ostensibly offer 

Moscow plausible deniability – is another element of the Kremlin’s so-called ‘hybrid 

warfare tactics.’ We have been alerted by Moscow that such ‘volunteers’ may find 

their way to Syria very soon. 

There is real concern among allies in northeast Europe that a snap exercise could 

be used as the pretext for Russian forces to suddenly conduct a small-scale incursion 

into NATO territory that would create a fait accompli, or risk all-out war with Moscow. This would be a direct challenge to Article V of the Washington treaty, and 

potentially end the principle of collective defense which is the very heart of NATO’s 

founding treaty. Given the growing anti-access capabilities described above, that 

cost could be high indeed if we and our allies are unprepared for such an outcome. 

There have also seen the deployment of more aggressive and more capable Russian naval forces. As stated by the Commander of United States Naval Forces Europe, the Russians are constructing an ‘‘arc of steel from the Arctic to the Mediterranean. Starting with their new Arctic bases, to Leningrad in the Baltic and Crimea 

in the Black Sea, Russia has introduced advanced air defense, cruise missile systems and new platforms.’’ As evidenced by recent Russian naval activity, Mr. Putin 

is focusing his naval capability on addressing the perceived advantages of NATO navies. He is signaling to us that the maritime domain is contested. 

Finally, there are increasing reports that Russian military aircraft are violating 

NATO airspace with their transponders off, raising the risk of civilian aircraft accidents while violating the sovereignty of our treaty allies. NATO intercepted some 

400 Russian aircraft flying over Europe in 2014 and numbers suggest that 2015 will 

exceed that total. And of course, just this week we saw Russia violate the airspace 

of our Turkish allies. 

Russia’s advanced cyber capabilities are also a source of grave concern for the 

United States and its allies. We have seen Russia employ its impressive cyber capabilities against Estonia, a treaty ally. We must be alert to Moscow’s willingness to 

use this tool to achieve its political goals. 

Energy Action 

Mr. Putin’s strategy does not rely on military power alone. He seeks to maintain 

European dependence on Russian gas and continues to use that dependence as a 

weapon; he deftly applies a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy to undermine Europe’s cohesion. We see this in particular through the Nord-Stream pipeline, which connects 

Russia directly to Europe while bypassing Ukraine. Also in Russia’s gas pricing tactics which reward its friends and punishes its opponents. The members of this committee understand that Mr. Putin’s incursion in the Crimea is, among other things, 

about exercising political power through the control of energy, and about brandishing the threat of energy scarcity to intimidate and manipulate vulnerable populations. The greater the gap between global supply and demand, the more destructive the energy weapon will become. 

While Russian troops occupy a sovereign country, including a major port, to stop 

Ukraine from receiving energy imports, Mr. Putin’s rubles are being spent on campaigns to stop natural gas development in central Europe—all with a mind towards 

creating scarcity, dependence, and vulnerability among countries who are U.S. 

friends, allies, and trading partners. 

Fortunately, Europe is awakening to the threat and is investing in redundancies, 

gas storage hubs, and interconnectors that reduce Russia’s ability to hold countries 

hostage. 

Political Action 

An important part of Russia’s foreign policy is to sow division within the western 

alliance and to undercut the cohesion of the Euro-Atlantic arc of economic and security cooperation. Moscow actively courts EU countries that are economically weak 

or dependent on trade with Russia in hopes of fracturing unity. This past summer 

Putin unsuccessfully wooed the newly elected Syriza government in Greece in the 

midst of ongoing discussions with the Eurozone over its economic rescue package 

in hopes of convincing Athens to vote against EU sanctions on Russia. 

Russia has also built links to European party leaders on the far right and far left 

in order to foster close relationships at the political and financial levels, such as 

with the National Front in France. Mr. Putin has made a habit of sustaining old 

and corrupt alliances (such as with Syrian President Assad or Belarussian President 

Lukashenko). Just this week, President Assad noted the importance of the RussiaIran-Iraq alliance at sustaining his regime. 

35 

State-controlled media outlets spread untruths primarily with the intent to undermine western diplomacy and messaging, mask Russia’s aggressive intentions, and 

plant seeds of doubt within western publics. Russian television parrots the government’s narrative that Russia is under attack from Ukrainian ‘fascists,’ a hostile 

NATO, and ISIL. The Russian government deliberately lies about Russia’s activities 

in Ukraine and denies it has forces there, despite visual proof to the contrary. It 

has also obfuscated the role of Russian-backed rebels in downing Malaysian airlines 

flight 17, and has outrageously blocked a UN tribunal to get the facts. Let’s not forget that 298 souls lost their lives in this unconscionable tragedy. Yet Russia thumbs 

its nose at the international community by blocking simple fact finding – a stunning 

example of how out of touch its behavior is with international norms and standards 

of justice. More recently, Russian has lied about the fact that Russian the air force 

is currently bombing United States-backed opposition groups in Syria, claiming instead that they are striking at ISIS despite evidence to the contrary. 

Actionable Recommendations for Countering Russian Aggression 

In the face of the strategic environment I have described, I believe the United 

States should lead its allies in developing a three-pronged approach that includes 

economic, political, and security components. 

Economic considerations: 

Invest in North-South Energy Infrastructure in Europe: To undermine Putin’s use 

of energy as a political weapon, the United States should support the EU’s development of energy, tele-communications, and transportation infrastructure along a 

North-South axis from the Baltic to the Adriatic Sea. This North-South corridor 

would constitute the most strategically viable alternative to Russia’s regional abuse 

of current energy supplies and supply routes; foster greater cohesion among Central 

and East European states; undermine Russia’s monopoly on energy pricing; and severely inhibit its ability to use energy as a weapon. Along with my Polish colleague 

Pawel Olechnowicz, CEO of the Grupa Lotus, I have co-chaired an Atlantic Council 

report exploring this issue in greater detail. It includes a set of recommendation receiving strong support in Europe and the United States. There is much we can and 

must do to support the development of this critical infrastructure. I would ask your 

permission to make the report a part of the hearing record. 

TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership): Energy security is instrumental for a transatlantic growth, prosperity, and security. The same can be 

said of successfully concluding TTIP. Europe and the United States have the largest 

trading partnership in the world. Strengthening it serves our mutual interests and 

reaffirms the centrality of the transatlantic alliance in the 21st century. TTIP also 

affords the U.S. a unique opportunity to author the rulebook and roadmap for 21st 

century advanced economies, which would stand in stark contrast with Russia’s reliance upon crony capitalism. 

Maintain U.S.-EU Sanctions: The sanctions regime that was implemented in response to Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine may not have altered Putin’s strategic 

calculus in Ukraine, but they have raised a cost to his actions and left Russia economically isolated. The United States and EU should maintain Russian sanctions 

until full military and political implementation of the Minsk II agreement has been 

secured in Ukraine, and should also be prepared to increase sanctions if Minsk II 

isn’t fully implemented (Moscow must be made aware that its support for rebels will 

incur increasingly costly penalties). Furthermore, Russia’s full implementation of 

the Minsk II agreement shouldn’t necessarily result in ‘business as usual’ either; 

Crimea-related sanctions should remain in place until Russian forces evacuate the 

Crimean peninsula and return it to Ukraine. 

Political Considerations: 

Maintain transatlantic solidarity: A central tenet of a United States strategy for 

countering Russia should be to strengthen transatlantic solidarity and cooperation. 

American leadership in this effort will be crucial and fostering a common vision for 

the alliance in the face of a new and more challenging operating environment 

A second component of our political strategy should be a comprehensive public diplomacy campaign spotlighting the values that make the transatlantic community 

unique and conducive to human development: free and open markets; respect for 

human rights and democratic governance; and respect for the rule of law—values 

that stand in stark contrast to Putin’s Russia. 

A key source of Russia’s influence is its predation of fragile governments and the 

exercise of corrupt practices. The United States must continue to support ongoing 

political reforms in Europe, particularly in countries on the NATO/EU periphery 

36 

such as Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, and the Balkan states that are currently seeking closer association with Euro-Atlantic institutions. 

Reaffirm NATO’s open door policy: NATO must prevent Russia from shutting its 

long-standing ‘open door’ membership policy. At next year’s NATO summit in Warsaw, NATO should admit Montenegro (assuming it has met all political and military 

commitments). Doing so would counter Russia’s growing influence in the Balkans 

and send a powerful signal that the vision of a united Europe, whole and free, remains viable. A similar effort should be made by Washington to unlock the tragic 

political conflict within the alliance that has prevented Macedonia from taking its 

rightful place as a NATO member. 

Security considerations: 

Enhance NATO force presence in Central Europe: The United States should rally 

allies around a permanent NATO force presence in Central and Eastern Europe, to 

include American forces. This will be controversial because some allies fear provocation of Russia, which will require careful American diplomacy. Given Russia’s aggressive exercises and troop positioning on NATO’s eastern flank, I believe we run 

a greater risk of conflict by NOT increasing NATO’s presence in Central and Eastern Europe. 

Maintain funding for the European Reassurance Initiative: I applaud the efforts of the U.S. Congress to fund the President’s $1 billion initiative to enhance the presence of U.S. rotational forces, air policing, and infrastructure in Central, Eastern, 

and Southeast Europe. This appropriation should continue, given the ongoing Russian threat to our allies, but United States political leaders should also press our 

allies to continue their own contributions to NATO’s Readiness Action Plan. 

Make Resilience a core task of NATO: A key element of Russia’s strategy is the 

use of strategic surprise and hybrid threats to take advantage of weak states. Adding resilience as a core task would complement NATO’s current core tasks of collective defense, cooperative security, and crisis management. An important component 

of building greater resilience should be enhancing NATO’s cybersecurity capabilities 

and responsibilities. 

Provide security assistance to Ukraine: I support the Administration’s recent decision to send long-range counter-battery radars to Ukraine and believe we should 

take additional measures, such as providing the anti-tank missiles, intelligence support, training and counter-electronic warfare capabilities that have been requested 

by Kiev and mandated by the 2016 NDAA. 

Empower the SACEUR to make rapid troop deployments: Russia’s reliance on strategic surprise and hybrid warfare, illustrated by the seizure of Crimea, poses acute 

risks for our NATO allies such as the Baltic States. They in turn fear a Russian 

snap exercise that could potentially result in encroachment on their territorial sovereignty. To counter this threat, NATO must empower the SACEUR to employ his 

best military judgment and order rapid troop deployments in the interest of Alliance 

security. 

With the Committee’s permission, I would like to submit two items for the hearing record containing proposals by the Atlantic Council for steps the United States 

government should consider in responding to President Putin’s actions and assisting 

our friends and allies in eastern Europe. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and members of the committee, let me 

close by saying that I have been deeply disappointed by Russia’s actions in Syria, 

Ukraine, and Eastern Europe, and the negative effect these actions have had on the 

United States–Russian relationship. I believe these actions merit the tough response 

I have outlined. 

Having said that, President Putin will not be in power forever. There will be a 

Russia beyond him. The United States and its allies should continue to make clear 

to the Russian people that they believe Russia has its rightful place in a united Europe, whole, free, and at peace, provided that Russia is willing to respect the sovereignty and free will of its neighbors, demonstrate a commitment to democracy and 

human rights, and respect the rules of the road in the international system. 

Thank you for allowing me to testify before you today. I look forward to answering 

any questions you may have. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I thank you. 

And I thank the witnesses. 

After the Russian general knocked on the door of our embassy 

to notify us that we had an hour notice that Russian airstrikes 

would begin in Syria, the President said he wasn’t going to engage 

in a proxy war. Secretary Kerry said this was an opportunity. And 

37 

our Secretary of Defense said that this was, quote, ‘‘unprofessional.’’ And, in response—and, of course, deconfliction is our 

hot—top priority. Obviously, that hasn’t happened. And now 

we’re—the United States is rerouting its flights to avoid Russian 

warplanes, not the opposite. 

I’m curious what kind of signal that sends. And, far more importantly, this cruise missile strike, I think, has dimensions and significance that may be, in a short time, lost on us, because I think 

it is a seminal event when a country launches cruise missiles from 

900 miles away on a target that—on targets that are the people 

that we have supported, trained, and equipped, and sent in to 

fight. 

So, I guess my question is—two. One, what is the overall significance of this latest Russian escalation? And what does it—signal 

does it send to anybody that we would train, equip, and send into 

combat that we’re going to sit by and watch them slaughtered by 

the Russians? 

General Keane? 

General KEANE. Yeah. Mr. Chairman, the introduction of the 

cruise missiles is a—is testimony to the loss of precision-guided 

munitions and missile technology advantage that we’ve had for 25 

years. For some time now, the Chinese missile development strategy, the Iranian missile development strategy, and what Russia is 

doing also with missiles and precision-guided munitions, have literally caught up to the technological advantage that we’ve had. 

And certainly this is the first manifestation of it. We are the country that used cruise missiles on our adversaries, and certainly Russians have had this capability, and they’re obviously using it. So, 

we have to understand that, that that technological advantage that 

we’ve had is gone. And it’s in countries that we’re in competition 

with; that is, Iran, China, and Russia. 

In terms of the provocation, you know, I’m absolutely convinced 

that Russia—you know, the psychological bully that they are with 

a national chip on their shoulder since the collapse of the Soviet 

Union in ’91, I believe they are absolutely convinced they can have 

their way with us. And this campaign that they’re doing in Syria 

was certainly calculated with that thought in mind. When you 

think about it, this is—as I said in my opening line, it’s unprecedented for them to move this distance, establish an airbase in another country that, for their purposes, is isolated and vulnerable, 

from a military perspective. But, they established this base with 

confidence that they will be able to control the airspace that they 

want to use, that the United States will not impede any of their 

air operations and their support for ground operations. And they 

calculated that, and I—and it turned out to be the case. 

Not only have they done that, but much as we’re doing in China, 

who is building airbases in archipelagos in the South China Sea, 

as opposed to flying over those bases and—because they’re international waters, we’re avoiding them. So, right now, air operations 

in Iraq is avoidance operations. We have an enemy, called the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), but we’re now—that enemy, 

called ISIS in Syria, because of Russian control of the airspace and 

desire to fly wherever they want, when they want, we’re avoiding 

that. And what we should have said right from the outset is that, 

38 

‘‘We’re going to fly our airplanes wherever we want, when we want, 

and what you should do’’—— 

Senator MCCAIN. And what’s your—— 

General KEANE.—‘‘is avoid that, or else face confrontation,’’ and 

put our foot down. 

Senator MCCAIN. And what—— 

General KEANE. And we’re doing the opposite. And I think they 

recognize that. 

Senator MCCAIN. And what is your response when, as I received 

just last night from—on one of the television shows, ‘‘That means 

you want war with Russia, Senator McCain.’’ Do you want war 

with Russia, General Keane? 

General KEANE. Of course not. But, I think there are prudent actions that you can take to discourage an ally. If we—the other calculation that Russia has made, and it’s been manifested as a result 

of the red line in Syria, the annexation of Crimea, the movement 

into Ukraine, and a sort of deniability that he gives his adversaries 

by the kinds of deceptive ways he uses military force—I mean, I 

believe his calculation—and it’s a correct one—is that we get paralyzed by the fear of escalation and by the fear of confrontation. And 

he understands that. And he uses that to his advantage. And he’s 

going to continue to do it. 

And I’m absolutely convinced—I disagree with the Ambassador— 

I don’t believe the Syria operation in any way, shape, or form will 

hold him back for exerting his national interests in the Baltics and 

eastern Europe and breaking down the strategic buffer that he 

clearly wants to have. And he will use this—I’m convinced of it— 

as a platform and foundation for more aggression against that buffer in eastern Europe. And he—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Ms. Conley. 

General KEANE.—will do it because he knows he can and because 

he knows he will get away with it. 

Senator MCCAIN. Ms. Conley. 

Ms. CONLEY. I think President Putin has now clearly said that 

there will be no international regime change, based on his understanding of the Libya operation in 2011, where the U.N. Security 

Council basically, in his view, gave a green light to changing regime. He is a status quo power, and the power he is the most concerned about, as Ambassador Sestanovich said, is his own power 

and maintaining his own power. But, that also projects to other 

powers. And so, I think right now this is his strongest message. 

He is also sending a clear message to President Obama that he 

is not a regional power, he is a global power, and he has extensive 

reach. And I think, again, the cruise missiles demonstrate. 

We’re also seeing where Russia’s military modernization and its 

significant increases in its defense spending has paid off. It can 

move quickly, and it does have sophisticated weaponry that it can 

use. And I think we’re seeing that. And for countries that are quite 

interested in purchasing Russian equipment, this is also a benefit 

of seeing the level of sophistication that it has and will be willing 

to sell. 

Mr. Putin acknowledges strength, and he exploits weakness. And 

our Syrian policy has been a demonstration of lack of resolve and 

weakness, of which he has been able to exploit. Now, there—in 

39 

some ways, in talking to some of my Polish and central European 

colleagues, you know, they’re advocating, ‘‘Please, send two Russian 

divisions to Syria. Get the heat off of my border and bog Syria— 

bog the Russians down in Syria.’’ But, this—he can move very 

quickly, and he can turn the temperature up when he needs, and 

temperature down. And this is where we are constantly reacting to 

his agenda. We’re getting out of his way. We have not set a strategic framework to say, ‘‘These are what our rules’’—— 

And I would just finally say, last year President Putin, in his address to the Valdai Discussion Club, his speech was entitled ‘‘The 

World Order: New Rules or a Game Without Rules?’’ His rules. 

This is Putin’s rules. And he’s making us work with his game. And 

I think we have to return to our rules, which were established at 

the end of the second World War, international legal norms. And 

that’s what we have to get back to. 

Senator MCCAIN. Ambassador? 

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Thank you, Senator. 

You know, I think General Keane is right about something very 

important, and that is, this is a kind of situation that we didn’t 

face in the Cold War. Because, in the Cold War, there was a kind 

of constraint on Russian—Soviet activity, because they—as you 

say, General—feared escalation. Since the Cold War, American use 

of military power has actually been almost entirely free of a fear 

of Russian interference. And what Putin has done is change that. 

He’s said, ‘‘You cannot act independently anymore without worrying about my actions.’’ And he’s been the first mover in this case. 

I don’t think the difference is so much a technological one as a political one. He has backfooted us by taking the first action and saying, ‘‘You deconflict with me.’’ Obviously, our preference would be 

for him to think he had to deconflict with us. So, that—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Classic example of this is the air operations. 

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. That is a very big change. We now 

are being told by the Russians, ‘‘We’re going to be free to act independently without being checked by you.’’ That’s—that is not only 

something we haven’t experienced since the end of the Cold War, 

it really is a change, even from the Cold War itself. 

But, I think we should not forget what some of our advantages 

are here. I think our discussion has been very bilateral, as though 

it’s us against the Russians, forgetting—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Could I—I’m way—— 

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Yeah. 

Chairman MCCAIN.—over my time. 

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Yeah. 

Senator MCCAIN. If you could—— 

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. I just want to—I—let me finish the 

thought. 

Senator MCCAIN. Okay, sure. 

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. We have, in Europe and in the Middle East, an array of states that want to work with us, and who, 

working with us, can actually check the Russians and limit this 

kind of independent action. One of the big things about our passive 

Syria policy over the past several years is that we’ve not done anything in the way of coalition management to create a block of 

states that would keep the Russians out. 

40 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

General Jones, could you hold your answer? Because I’m way 

over time, and—— 

Senator REED. No, go ahead. 

Senator MCCAIN. All right, please go ahead, General Jones. 

General JONES. Very quickly. 

I think we’ve been off balance in Syria since Assad violated the 

red lines and used chemical and biological weapons on his own people. The penalty for that should have been quick and decisive. 

Many people advocated—I was one of them—that a no-fly zone and 

a safety zone for refugees be created in Syria. And it went along 

with international cooperation. 

I think where we are now is that Putin is basically offering a 

trade, ‘‘Assad stays in power and then we’ll take care of ISIL.’’ And 

I think that’s really what it boils down to. I think we should consider really elevating NATO in this, an emergency meeting of the 

North Atlantic Council, to shore up and demonstrate the alliance’s 

resolve, not only for eastern Europe, but also in the current Middle 

Eastern problem. 

Thank you. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General Jones, in your testimony, you touched very, I think, 

insightfully on the whole issue of energy policy. We have a very 

contentious and confrontational Russia right now at $50 a barrel 

in oil. If it swings back to $100 a barrel, we could be in real dire 

straits. So, that raises a huge issue, which I don’t think that we’re 

going to settle here at this panel, but we should be thinking strategically, in terms of, How do we, in the world market, maintain a 

lower price of oil? Because that’s what, basically, will take away a 

lot of his ability to be confrontational. Is that fair? 

General JONES. Senator Reed, I really believe in this and the fact 

that the United States still does not have a strategic energy policy, 

I—there isn’t one that I can find anywhere that’s written, either 

classified or unclassified. This is a—an asset in our quiver that is 

incredible, in terms of future potential. And the sooner, I think, 

that we understand that energy security is a vital part of our toolkit, in terms of deciding what we’re going to do and not going to 

do in the rest of the world, I don’t think we fully grasp how the 

energy situation has changed the power balance in the world. 

Mr. Putin relied on that. He—it’s now—he’s paid an economic 

price for it. I think there are ways in which, with United States 

leadership, particularly with Europe, that we can continue to help 

our friends and allies wean themselves off of their dependence on 

Russian energy, which is—will continue to create his economic isolation. 

Senator REED. Let me ask you another question, General Jones. 

As the National Security Advisor, I assume you wrestled with this 

issue, which is: Many of the proposals, in terms of countering the 

Assad regime, would require overt attacks against Assad’s forces. 

Do we have the legal authority to do that? Most of what we’ve 

done, legally, has been under the AUMF, which has been in effect 

for more than a decade. But, do—are there legal problems that the 

41 

President would confront if he, in fact, decided he was going to 

take more dramatic action? 

General JONES. In direct confrontation—— 

Senator REED. With Syria. 

General JONES. I’m sure there are. 

Senator REED. Yeah. 

General JONES. I’m sure there are. 

Senator REED. So, the—— 

General JONES. But, those—but, that’s—that doesn’t mean we 

shouldn’t confront them and resolve them. 

Senator REED. I absolutely—— 

General JONES. Yeah. 

Senator REED.—agree. 

General JONES. Right. 

Senator REED. I think that, in many cases, the debates—assumes 

that these are policy issues alone, that they can be done by decision—— 

General JONES. Right. 

Senator REED.—immediately, where, in fact, there are—I think 

we have to be very careful. I know Senator McCain has been extraordinarily eloquent about the issues involving legal authorities 

and they can use—when we can use them, how do they constrain 

us, how do they enable us. But, let me thank you. 

I’ll—finally, and I will ask for a quick response, and I’ll ask the 

Ambassador and then I’ll—anyone else wants to chime in. The decisive ability to change the facts on the ground in Syria is somehow 

ground forces, in my view. I don’t think airpower alone, by any 

side, is going to decisively sort of settle the issue. When it comes 

to the Russian engagement, they have several options, but the 

three primary options would be to rely on the Syrian forces that 

are there with their air support; second, to use Russian advisors, 

command-and-control apparatus, but not troops, with their airpower; and a third would be, as—there’s been some suggestions of 

Russian formations, et cetera. 

Mr. Ambassador, just your comments on those options. Would 

they be used? Is there something we’re missing? 

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Senator, to work through those in exactly the order you suggest, hoping not to get to number three, but 

for Russian officials already to be mentioning volunteers suggests 

to me we should worry that that’s already entrain, and that their 

analysis is, they can’t succeed without it. If that’s what it takes to 

succeed, I think there could be some deployments, and maybe not 

too far down the road. 

Senator REED. Any other comments by the panelists? Ms. 

Conley? General Keane? 

General KEANE. Yeah. I think they’re going to wait a little bit. 

They know full well that IRGC is with Syrian army units. They 

know that the IRGC is leading, in some cases, the local militia, but, 

in all cases, advising them. And they also know that there’s about 

7,000 Hezbollah and about 3,000 Iraqi Shi’a militia that are being 

returned from Iraq. They were there in greater numbers at one 

time or another. Russian doesn’t—Russia doesn’t have a clue 

whether this ground force is going to be effective or not. And I 

think they’re going to wait to see if they have to inject something. 

42 

And then if they do, I think they would go through an escalation 

of advisors and other things before they would actually put direct 

combats. 

Listen, Putin is no fool, here. He’s got Afghanistan in his rearview mirror, 10 years—a 10-year commitment that really hurt his 

country and lost confidence of his people in the national decision 

authority, et cetera. So, I think they will be guarded about their 

introduction of significant combat forces. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d—first of all, I really appreciate the very blunt answers we’re 

getting here. And we’ve been getting them in this committee for 

quite a while now. We had—not just General Dunford, but others— 

Clapper—coming in and making statements that I think are really 

pretty courageous and talking about the seriousness that we’re facing right now. 

When the Ambassador mentioned—and I was prepared to ask 

this question before, because I’m reading from the Council of Foreign Relations now that you had disagreed with General Dunford 

in this respect. And I noticed three nervous people while you were 

saying that. I’d like to have each one respond as to whether or not 

you agree with the statement of General Dunford, in terms of the 

existential seriousness of this. 

Senator MCCAIN. Ladies first. 

Ms. CONLEY. Thank you. Well, I—what I understood is, General 

Dunford’s statement was that Russia is the only power that can 

wipe the United States off the planet with its nuclear arsenal. 

Senator INHOFE. Let me interrupt you to—— 

Ms. CONLEY. Yeah. 

Senator INHOFE.—say what he said to this committee. It was— 

and this is a quote—he said, ‘‘Russia presents the greatest threat 

to our national security.’’ 

Ms. CONLEY. And I think, based on their ability and as well as 

the focus that we have seen over the last several years on strengthening and modernizing their nuclear strategic deterrent and their 

nuclear submarine forces. And I think, also, because we have seen, 

over the last several years, beginning in 2008 with the Russian invasion of Georgia, that the Kremlin is fully able and willing to use 

military means to accomplish its political objectives. It is not—you 

know, it does not believe it will be prevented. Now, that’s within 

its own neighborhood. 

So, I think that is why the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

is very concerned about Russian activities and aggression and their 

willingness to use their—— 

Senator INHOFE. And you—— 

Ms. CONLEY.—force. 

Senator INHOFE.—you agree with him. 

Ms. CONLEY. I do agree with him. And I think yesterday’s display 

of the cruise missiles reinforces exactly what General Dunford was 

saying. 

Senator INHOFE. Do you agree, General Jones? 

General JONES. I do agree with that. 

43 

Senator INHOFE. Let me tell you a concern that I had. This was 

in yesterday’s Politico. It was talking about—Captain Jeff Davis 

told reporters the United States has a good awareness about the 

skies over—has begun routing—rerouting its airstrikes so they’ll 

pass clear of the Russians. He said that we have taken some actions to ensure the safe separation of aircraft. 

I look at that, that they are dictating what we’re doing with our 

aircraft in making those determinations while we’re sitting back 

and doing what is the most effective way to respond to them. Do 

you—am I wrong? 

General KEANE. Well, it certainly appears that way. And, listen, 

we have full visibility of the airspace and also these airfields that 

are in Syria. We have very sophisticated radars for this purpose. 

Actually, a little bit better than the Russians. And we can actually 

track an airplane taking off from any airfield in Syria, and follow 

that airplane. So, we have positive control, in the sense of where 

are the Russian airplanes and what are—where are our airplanes? 

So, the idea that, to avoid some kind of air conflict, that we would 

stop or curtail our operations against ISIS, which we’ve said we 

were going to defeat, makes no sense to me. 

Senator INHOFE. Have you ever seen this in your long career in 

the military before? Of us responding—— 

General KEANE. No, I have not. I can’t recall anything like it. 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah. 

Just briefly on the Ukraine situation, do you think that this lull 

that we’re experiencing right now might be due to the fact that 

they are—as we’ve pointed out, the military is strong, but they’re 

in a weakened position, financially, economically, that maybe they 

can’t—they’re not able to do it? And the reason I’m asking that— 

I was over there when they had their parliamentary elections, and 

they—for the first time in 96 years, there’s not one Communist in 

their Parliament. And I think that’s very significant, and I would 

look for him to stop the lull and get back in. Do you think that the 

lull is going to last a while? Or do you think—— 

General KEANE. You’re talking about in Russian military modernization? 

Senator INHOFE. Uh-huh. 

General KEANE. Yeah. 

Senator INHOFE. No. No, I’m talking about what’s happening 

right now with the aggressive nature of Putin in the Ukraine. It’s 

slowed down a little bit now. Do you think that it’s because they 

don’t—— 

General KEANE. Yes. I—my sense of it is, that is just a pause. 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah. 

General KEANE. You know, politically, I believe he achieved what 

he wanted, and that is this government that was anti-Russian, to 

a sense, has turned its head away from the thought that it would 

be economically integrated into Europe or militarily integrated. He 

sort of—he has accomplished that. But, the fact that he’s building 

those two bases there, Senator, tells you that he has not given up 

on—— 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah 

General KEANE.—more activity in eastern Ukraine. 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah. Yeah. 

44 

Lastly, the—you made the comment, Ms. Conley, that—and, as 

you know, we—as all of you know, we just passed our defense authorization bill. There’s been a veto threat on parts of this. And 

this very much concerns us. You had said something to—during 

your statement. I don’t think it was in your public—your published 

statement. But, you said you are very supportive of what we’re trying to do with the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). 

Would you be specific as to what is really in there that you approve 

of and that you are enthusiastic about? 

Ms. CONLEY. Thank you, Senator. 

And, just to your previous question, I think Mr. Putin is dialing 

it down in Ukraine because he would like the European Union to 

lift sanctions, and they have to make that decision in the next couple of months. So, I think he’s trying to reduce that—— 

Senator INHOFE. NDAA. 

Ms. CONLEY. On the NDAA, specifically, there is an amendment 

that speaks about looking at the Arctic and seeing the strategic picture of the Arctic, assessing and making those assessments of what 

the capability gaps are. I think it is time—we have studied this 

issue, and there are pile and piles of studies, but we now have to 

look at this region more strategically. And within the NDAA, there 

is a specific discussion about how to look at the Arctic. I think it’s 

also—in the NDAA, there’s also discussion about Poland and east— 

and looking at increasing our force posture. These are exactly the 

strong signals that we need to send, and I thank the committee for 

their thoughtfulness on trying to get at this problem. 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah, well, it’s—help us get it through. 

Thank you. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator King. 

Senator KING. Thank you, to the panel. This has been very 

thought-provoking and very helpful. 

I do—I share your concerns about the Arctic and what’s going on 

there strategically. I’m going to defer to my colleague from Alaska, 

who I—will—am quite confident will discuss that issue in some detail. 

Senator SULLIVAN. You’re correct. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KING. I’ve—yeah, I’m a mindreader. I don’t—— 

Let’s talk about Syria for a minute. It seems to me, if you boil 

it down to its most essential element, Putin wants Assad in more 

than we want him out. He’s willing to make a commitment that we 

haven’t been willing to make over the past 2 or 3 years. Our policy 

has been a—benign neglect is too strong a term, but it’s been a 

kind of—go slow, hope that momentum would eventually push him 

out. And apparently there was some progress being made this summer, and Putin decided he was going to reverse that. And we’re 

faced with a decision of, How important is it for us to get rid of 

Assad? And is it worth risking a war? 

I have this historical dilemma of whether this is the Sudetenland 

of 1938 or Sarajevo in 1914. I’m not sure it’s worth starting World 

War III over Assad. The Archduke is long forgotten, and, at some 

point, Assad will be, as well. But, that’s the strategic dilemma, is, 

What is our real interest? 

45 

Now, I do think—and, General Keane, you mentioned—I think it 

was very significant—that Russia does have a legitimate serious 

fear about ISIL and about Islamic jihadism. Perhaps that’s an opportunity for us to make common cause with them, just as we did 

on the chemical weapons issue. And countries ultimately only act 

in their own interest. And this is a place where we do have a coincidence of interest, and perhaps that’s an area that we can focus 

upon, separate from the issue of Assad. 

Finally, Ms. Conley, I was fascinated by your discussion of Iron 

Curtain 2.0. It seems to me what we’re talking about here today 

is Containment 2.0. We’re talking about a strategy of, What do we 

do with Russia? Is it expansionist or is it—is this historic Russian 

paranoia, going back to Napoleon and Hitler, and feelings of threat 

from the West? Are they trying to build a defensive perimeter, or 

are they—do they want to ultimately control France and England 

and the United States? How do you—what is it they want? 

General JONES. I’ll take a stab at that. The—I think, deep in 

the—as I mentioned in my remarks, deep in Mr. Putin’s thought 

process is, he wants to correct what he sees as a—an injustice with 

regard to the—how the Cold War ended. He wants his borders 

and—— 

Senator KING. But, does that mean he wants to take control 

of—— 

General JONES. No. 

Senator KING.—Poland again, for example? 

General JONES. No. But, I think that it does mean that he will 

push his borders away from Russia. He wants a—he wants peripheral states, as much as possible. And he’s consumed—I honestly believe he’s consumed by this idea that we are his natural enemies. 

I mean, he—he is the type—he—I define his leadership as a negative type of leadership, in the sense that people like him need an 

enemy to make themselves look good. And it’s like the—— 

Senator KING. Well, clearly that’s what he’s doing politically. 

General JONES. Exactly. And—— 

Senator KING. Take the people’s mind off the lousy Russian—— 

General JONES. Exactly. 

Senator KING.—economy. 

General JONES. So—but, he’s been successful, because we—he’s 

moving faster than we can act, than we’ve acted. NATO, General 

Breedlove, has done some very innovative things, within certain 

constraints that he faces, in terms of the organization and how 

NATO makes decisions. But, I think Mr. Putin will pay attention 

when he sees decisive action. Now, what form that’s going to take, 

we’re going to have to wait and see. But, he’s—I—he’s going to continue to do this—to exhibit this kind of behavior until he’s confronted with a—— 

Senator KING. I’ve always thought of Russian foreign policy as 

like a thief in a hotel that tries every door until he finds one that’s 

open. And, as long as their doors are closed, as long as NATO exists and is vigorous and represents a line, that’s the policy that I 

think you’re recommending. 

General JONES. Exactly. But, he has not seen that yet, so until 

we demonstrate that—and American leadership is absolutely esVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:12 Aug 02, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\DOCS\15-78.CON WILDA
46 

sential in creating the conditions that will show that all doors are 

securely locked and that he can’t—— 

Senator KING. But, I think it’s awfully important, as you pointed 

out, the first—it was interesting, your first point was economic. 

General JONES. Exactly. 

Senator KING. That was what ultimately brought about the decline of the Soviet Union, and that also is what can undermine this 

new expansion. 

General JONES. Exactly. 

Ms. CONLEY. Senator King, I think every great power must have 

a sphere of influence, and Mr. Putin is doing it by force. 

Regarding NATO, he would seek to undermine—if he can put a— 

you know, just a—run a train through NATO credibility, that’s the 

best thing he could do. He wants NATO to collapse. How do you 

get to a new bargain is if—you know, the Warsaw Pact disintegrated, NATO survived. The only way you get to a new European 

security architecture, and the only way you get this grand bargain, 

where, ‘‘This is yours and I’ll let you keep that,’’ is, you have to undermine the credibility of the NATO alliance. So, if he can divide 

the alliance, if he can put—if he can provoke a government for taking actions that other NATO allies won’t support because—sort of 

the Georgia scenario—you provoke until there’s an action, and then 

you blame the victim for doing that. That’s the Ukraine scenario, 

as well. This divides the alliance. He believes that there’s a 

civilizational challenge here, that the great Russian civilization has 

to fight against the decadence of the West. 

And so, there is a slight ideological component to this, so it’s not 

about invading Poland. It’s so eroding America and NATO’s credibility that it just sort of dissolves on its own. And therefore, Russia 

can exert its own influence and its own power, and it’s demonstrating that it, in itself, is a superior model of development. 

General KEANE. You know, piling onto that, I totally agree. This 

is not the occupation of his strategic buffer on his border. The burden of that, you know, is something that he doesn’t want. This is 

about fragmenting the NATO alliance. I clearly think it’s a strategic issue for them. I think they’re going to probe to see how they 

can best do that, politically and militarily. They already know that 

Portugal, Spain, and Canadians are doubtful participants. I think 

they’re going to—they will use the Baltics, likely as the best vehicle 

because of the Russian minority population there. You have— 

you’ve got to believe there’s people like Jim and myself that are sitting around Putin and throwing the question on the table, ‘‘Will 

Angela Merkel really respond to an incursion in the Baltics with 

the little green men and put her infantry in there to thrust them 

out?’’ I mean, that’s—I don’t know the answer to that. And just the 

fact that that question is there gives them some leverage. So, I 

think that’s what this is really about. 

The second thing, in reference to, How could we cooperate with 

Russia?—I thought we had a lost opportunity, post-9/11, because of 

Russia’s experience with radical Islam. Putin was the first guy that 

called the President of the United States, you know, based on what 

happened here. And this is someplace where we could truly work 

to cooperate. They have huge experience with radical Islam. They 

obviously have great concerns about it. We’ve been involved in it 

47 

now for 15 years ourselves. We actually were involved in it years 

before that, but we never responded. 

So, this is an area where I believe we need a global alliance to 

deal with it, and I think this is an area where the United States 

and Russia could exercise some leadership together to put together 

that alliance. 

Senator KING. And I believe Russia is prepared to do that. At 

least they’ve indicated over the summer that they are. 

Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. Ambassador, do you want to chime in here? 

You—— 

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Let me just add one thing to this picture of Putin’s view of Europe, because I do think he imagines that 

he can, with a combination of assets, be the dominant power in Europe, because, above all, Europe is divided, unable to act in a way 

that just—he has expressed his contempt for. But, I don’t think we 

should underestimate the lessons that he’s learned over the past 

couple of years. He has been surprised by the way in which the 

United States and Europe have responded to the Ukraine crisis. He 

expected this to go much more easily for him. And it has been a 

chastening experience. 

Senator MCCAIN. Wow. I don’t think the Ukrainians believe that. 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. General Keane, to what extent did this surprise 

action by Russia in Syria represent an intelligence failure? 

General KEANE. Well, I don’t know, myself, what we do know 

and what the President has been told. Just seeing the reaction, certainly, of the National Command Authority, it appears, by every indication, that, you know, we didn’t have much forewarning of this, 

you know, other than when he started to deceptively bring his airplanes in. You know, he flew his fighters in underneath his large 

cargo aircraft so they wouldn’t be picked up on radar, and then he 

was—it was obvious that he was constructing something at the 

base. I think the first signs that I believe we knew something were 

physical signs that something was changing at the airbase. I don’t 

know that for a fact, because I’m not privileged to have those classified briefings anymore. 

Senator WICKER. Not—General Jones, it’s not comforting about 

our intelligence capability there, is it? 

General JONES. I think we were surprised by that. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much. 

Let me say that, as outrageous as Mr. Putin’s actions have been 

in Syria, there’s one thing you can say for him. He’s standing by 

his only friend in the region. And so, let me ask you this, General 

Keane. To the extent that Mr. Putin and the people around him are 

looking at the Baltic states, what signals are they looking for about 

the decisions this administration is about to make with regard to 

Afghanistan? And what will that say about our resolve to stand by 

people who’ve taken our side in very important areas of the world? 

General KEANE. Yeah. That’s a great question. I think this is one 

of Putin’s major points that he’s making strategically, is that he’s— 

he will stand by his friends and his allies, and he’s willing to put 

muscle to that to accomplish that. And I think—I suspect Putin 

48 

was somewhat in disbelief to watch America abandon Mubarak in 

Egypt, to watch America abandon Iraq, to watch America retreat 

from Yemen, and to watch America retreat from Libya. And he has 

a different playbook entirely from that. And here comes Afghanistan, as you just mentioned. I think we’re going to make this decision: a force level that will not be that effective in helping to maintain security and stability in Afghanistan and will further put the 

country at risk. That will be read by Putin as another sign of 

America arbitrarily making decisions about the conditions of a war 

zone and, because we no longer want to be in it, moving away from 

it despite those conditions. Certainly, our allies have all seen this 

track record of retreat and withdrawal, and obviously it has to give 

them concerns. 

You know as well as I do that anybody that talks to people in 

the Middle East region—there is not a country in the Middle East 

who we have a relationship with who has—who doesn’t have 

doubts about America, in terms of its reliability and its trustworthiness to back them up in times of peril. That is a fact, and 

it’s indisputable. I haven’t talked to a Baltic leader, but I’m certain 

they have some issues with it. I also know, though, that they truly 

appreciate the forward positioning of troops and airpower in their 

country, because that is a positive sign. 

Senator WICKER. General Jones, those are pretty strong words by 

General Keane. Would you care to follow up on those? 

General JONES. I don’t think there’s any doubt that, in the areas 

that we deal with, particularly in the Middle East, that our reliability factor has suffered a serious blow over the last few years. 

Wasn’t intended that way. I—you know, I thought that the announcement of a pivot towards Asia was a mistake to announce it 

that way, because when you pivot toward something, you’re pivoting away from something, and the Arabs took it quite differently 

than what, perhaps, we intended. 

Senator WICKER. You know, I don’t remember being a part of 

that decision as a Member of Congress for the last 21 years. 

Let me see if I can sneak a question in for Ms. Conley. It seems 

to me, as an advocate—as a strong advocate of Radio Free Europe 

and Radio Liberty, that the Russians have been eating our lunch 

lately when it comes to the information war. How important is 

this? And do you agree with my assessment? 

Ms. CONLEY. Senator, I fully agree with your assessment. Unfortunately, the tools that were successful during the Cold War— 

Radio Free Europe, Voice of America—are no longer the tools that 

are going to be able to penetrate an incredibly and sophisticated 

strategic communications campaign. I was in Bulgaria, 3 weeks 

ago, where Russian oligarchs and firms have basically purchased 

every media outlet in Bulgaria. There is no ability to penetrate 

that. And they’re not listening to Voice of America. When you go 

into eastern Estonia, to Narva, they are only listening to Russian 

media, and they’re given a completely different universe that 

they’re living in. We have seen the efficiency of Russian trolls and 

tweeting incorrect information that’s happening in the United 

States that can, you know, cause concern. We are not able, at this 

moment, to counter this campaign, but we need to employ a much 

more effective strategy. 

49 

I don’t know if it’s government propaganda, but I think it’s a 

very sophisticated plan that works with social media outlets, those 

that are still open in Russia, although they’re very few, and they’re 

blocked repeatedly. But, we must work much harder at focusing on 

European public opinion, which is quite negative, as well as in Russia. 

But, this is the great challenge of our time, and we really don’t 

have an effective answer. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Cotton. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. 

I want to return to a point that General Keane was discussing 

earlier. The Pentagon confirmed, yesterday, that American pilots 

are now being told to alter their routes to get out of the way of 

Russian aircraft. In your long career, you said you can’t recall a 

time in which that’s happened. Does that apply to the entire military? Can you recall a time in which any American troop has ever 

been told to change his action to avoid an enemy? 

General KEANE. I don’t have a direct reference for it. There probably is something along those lines, but I don’t—in modern warfare, since the United States has had global responsibility, I don’t 

have a reference for it. 

Senator COTTON. General Jones, you have a long and distinguished career, as well. Can you recall a time in which—told American troops to avoid an enemy? 

General JONES. No. 

Senator COTTON. I certainly haven’t served as long as you two 

have, but I can’t recall receiving or giving such an order, either. 

America doesn’t avoid our enemies. 

General Keane, you also said that Vladimir Putin is no dummy. 

He recalls the experience of Afghanistan when they lost thousands 

of lives and it made the Soviet leadership very unpopular with the 

Russian people. The key part of—one key part of Afghanistan was 

United States active intervention in providing billions of dollars 

worth of weapons and support to various Afghan fighting forces. Is 

that correct? 

General KEANE. Yes, most definitely. 

Senator COTTON. Is there any reason to think that Vladimir 

Putin is going to repeat the experience in Syria that the Soviet 

Union had in Afghanistan if there’s not that kind of peer competitor there to help check through active intervention? 

General KEANE. The—in reference to what—what actions are you 

speaking to that he would take? 

Senator COTTON. I am actually speaking of U.S. actions. We all 

know what Ronald Reagan did in Afghanistan in the Cold War. Is 

Vladimir Putin apt to face the same kind of quagmire that Soviets 

faced in Afghanistan in the—given the complete lack of action of 

the United States in Syria? 

General KEANE. Yeah, right. The—clearly, what we have done in 

Syria, one, on the side to support the opposition forces, in my judgment, from the beginning, has been totally and completely inadequate. And we have had very competent people on President 

Obama’s national security team that were advocating a much more 

robust strategy, as far back as 2012. Others advocating it before 

50 

that. And the administration has never moved. What they did 

move is covertly dealing with the Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA)-trained force to provide them with some weapons capability. 

But, that is not sufficient, and we—despite all of that—think of 

this—despite all of that, because of the weaknesses of the Syrian 

regime—that army’s down to about 120,000 from 220-plus, desertions, broken equipment, using one or two aircraft a day—one or 

two aircraft a month, morale low, many of the conscripts that they 

should be bringing into the service are the young men that are fleeing into Europe as part of the refugees—so, there’s real problems 

there. Despite our faulty programs, the opposition forces, to include 

the al-Qaeda, have been able to put this regime still in jeopardy 

for the second time. And, unfortunately, what’s going to take place 

now, I think, is, Putin is going to be successful in supporting the 

Syrian—to push back on many of these gains. And I don’t think 

we’re going to do anything more than what we are doing to help 

the opposition forces. Those decisions have been made. I don’t believe the President’s going to take any action, you know, to protect 

them, which he could, by establishing free zones for them, and certainly some other actions that he could take to protect them, as I 

mentioned in my statement. 

So, I think we are where we are, in terms of U.S. support. And, 

as it pertains to the rest of Syria, we don’t have a strategy to defeat ISIS in Syria. It doesn’t exist. 

Senator COTTON. I, regrettably, agree about our policy in Syria. 

Ambassador Sestanovich, in your statement, point five, you say 

that, ‘‘We should all worry about where Russia’s reckless behavior 

will lead next. Most of us have been wrong in anticipating Russian 

actions in the past couple of years.’’ I would agree with that, as 

well. So, I would have a question for the panel about the future, 

given what General Keane just said. 

My son has reached the age at which we play a game commonly 

known as ‘‘Peek-a-boo.’’ In my household, I refer to it as ‘‘Surprised-by-Putin.’’ It’s amusing when a 5-month-old is repeatedly 

surprised by the same action over and over again in close succession. It’s very dangerous when a President is. So, what’s the next 

surprise that Vladimir Putin is going to spring on the United 

States in the West? 

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Tough question, Senator. 

I think we may discover, as some of the other panelists have 

said, that there’s another round of Russian policy in Ukraine. I 

think right now they’re unsure of how to handle this crisis, but 

they have not written off their investment there. I would certainly 

pay attention to that. 

If you ask about crises in the Middle East emanating from Syria, 

you know, I’d look to the spillover to other countries that have been 

very worried about what is going to happen and have not gotten 

a lot of help from us. The fact that Turkish airspace was violated 

over the weekend is a warning by the Russians, but it’s not the 

only way in which this could spill over. Syria, unfortunately, has 

got a lot of neighbors in the Middle East, and Russian policy is 

going to prolong this civil war. 

I’d just put one little extra piece on the board for you to look at 

if you have General Keane’s maps in front of you. One country that 

51 

is not on the map here is Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is the country off 

whose coast the Russians fired those cruise missiles. It’s been able 

to sustain its independence over a long period of time, but it’s in 

play. It’s not the only—it’s not the biggest prize here. It’s not the— 

it’s not likely to be sucked into the war. But, the Russians move 

on a lot of different fronts, and their aim is, as many of the panelists have said, to restore influence over other countries of the 

former Soviet Union. Watch that space. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Chairman. 

I want to thank all of you for being here today. 

General Keane, you said that aggression unanswered, you fear, 

leads to more aggression. 

And, General Jones, I believe you talked about how we need to 

increase our NATO presence in eastern Europe, among many of the 

things that you discussed, and that there’s a greater risk by not increasing U.S.-NATO presence, versus those who want to say, ‘‘Let’s 

not incite Russia.’’ If you look at what we—what has happened 

without us, I guess, doing anything to incite Russia, it’s been pretty 

astounding. 

So, with the tremendous military experience between both of 

you—General Keane, General Jones—I mean, it’s incredible what 

you’ve done for the country—I wanted to ask you—if we stay the 

course, if we stay where we are, which is, as I see it, really no response, that we are letting them kind of take their course as to 

what they’re doing both in Ukraine, where, yes, we have economic 

sanctions, but we certainly haven’t provided any military support 

for the Ukrainians—if we don’t increase NATO presence, if we 

don’t take some actions and we let Russia pretty much own the airspace in these areas, what do you think—what is the thing that 

worries you most and keeps you up at night, that if we stay the 

course of where we are now, which seems to be letting the Russians take whatever action they want to take at any time? 

General JONES. I think it’s possibly the beginning of the end of 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I think it’s that serious. 

We just can’t sit back and let this happen. 

In 2004 or 2005, we started withdrawing a lot of our forces from 

Europe. Some of us had some serious discussions with the thenSecretary of Defense about the tradeoff of doing that. Our belief, 

when I was in Europe, was that, yes, you could reduce some of the 

infrastructure and some of the forces, but it should be balanced by 

rotational forces elsewhere in eastern Europe, particularly in Bulgaria and Romania, where we—where those countries helped build 

bases that would accommodate rotational forces, and then, because 

of the demands on our troop strengths in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

they were never really used. Happily, now we are starting to see 

those bases being used. And I would strongly suggest that—you 

know, the old adage ‘‘a virtual presence is actual absence’’ is absolutely correct. And we need to bolster our presence, and NATO 

needs to show itself as an alliance of 28 countries that really adheres to what it says and what it’s for. And it should become more 

proactive as a way of dissuading other engagements. Sitting back 

and being reactive and then debating it for 6 months, hoping for 

52 

100-percent consensus among 28 countries, is not a formula for success with Vladimir Putin. 

Senator AYOTTE. General Keane? 

General KEANE. Yes. Clearly, the United States has been the 

dominant country in the Middle East that’s outside the region—our 

own self-interests, obviously—economic, stability and security of 

the region. And we’ve been willing to take action to ensure that 

stability and security. 

Enter Russia. Russia, with this alliance with Iran, cannot be understated, in terms of its strategic significance. It’s going to have 

profound impact on the region. Every country in the region will be 

impacted by it and will be making adjustments to the new geopolitical landscape that Iran and Russia are creating for us. These 

are allies of ours that are being impacted by it. Why? Because of 

their concern about their strategic enemy: Iran. And, as a result of 

that, they have to leverage their relationship with Russia. So, our 

influence—listen, we’re still a major player in the Middle East. I’m 

not suggesting we’re not. But, I am suggesting we have diminished, 

in the last number of years. And with this alliance, this will be an 

accelerant to actually reduce our influence more considerably. So, 

that’s number one. 

Number—you’re going to make a comment? 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, I actually also wanted you to speak—in 

the context of this alliance between Iran and Russia, how does this 

deal play into it? Does it play into it at all? 

General KEANE. Well, obviously Russia supported the deal as 

much as the United States did. They saw it in their interest to do 

so. Certainly, Iran’s behavior for the last 35 years should have been 

on the table as a condition for the deal, but it was removed. 

The other thing—I totally agree with General Jones—I think, 

strategically, it—the objective in Europe is the NATO alliance. And 

I think we’re likely to see its unraveling, to be frank about it. Have 

you seen these surveys that they published about European countries, their willingness to defend themselves, and a majority of the 

people are unwilling to do that? What does that tell you? Much less 

collectively come to the aid of another country that is burdened by 

Russian aggression. The—strategically, he will break that alliance, 

and he’s not going to have to take much military action to do it, 

in my judgment. And that is going to be a tragedy. 

This requires U.S. leadership. And I think Jim laid out some 

careful points that we could exercise strategically, but we have to 

lead, and we have to have the resolve to do that. 

General JONES. Could I just piggyback on that? 

I just want to emphasize the fact that, although we’re talking 

about NATO as a military alliance, there is a military component 

to what we can do to restore NATO, but the economic strategy is 

also very important, and the political strategy. So, I think it’s three 

things that have to come together to have a—an effective strategy 

to deal with the—Mr. Putin’s Russia as it is today. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Donnelly. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks, to all the witnesses. 

53 

General Keane, I’d like to ask you this, first, but, you know, 

throw it open to everybody. So, we lead, and we put in no-fly zones, 

and we tell them, ‘‘End the barrel bombs,’’ and that, ‘‘If you do, 

we’ll crater the runways.’’ What do you think Putin’s response will 

be? And it’s—you know, there’s obviously no guarantees, but, you 

know, How do you think that will—where do you think he goes 

then? 

General KEANE. I don’t know. He has a range of options. Obviously, he can escalate right along with us if he chooses to. But, I 

think it’s that. It—when you focus on that, in terms of ‘‘What is 

his escalation response?’’—is the thing that paralyzed us from taking action. I mean, I think—I do believe there’s prudent things, you 

know, that can be done. 

Senator DONNELLY. Do those seem—they seem like prudent—you 

know, we’ve been talking about a no-fly zone for a while here, ending the barrel bombs, which the Chairman has talked about repeatedly. Those seem like prudent steps to take, to me. 

General KEANE. Yeah, they’re not easy, though, and let’s—— 

Senator DONNELLY. Right. 

General KEANE. Let me tell you why. Obviously, with Putin’s airpower there, and enforcing a no-fly/no-bomb zone is more challenging now. In the south, it—and to enforce a no-fly zone, you actually have to have someone on the ground to also protect that 

zone from infiltration from the regime or, actually, Jabhat alNusra. So, in the south, we can put together a—I prefer to call it 

a free zone, where the moderates would be protected there, and we 

would be able to bring refugees in as a sanctuary. And the reason 

for that is, we have an effective ground force there in the Free Syrian Army. In the north, where we truly want to do it, and where 

the Turks have interest in it as well, it’s much more challenging. 

And this is the reason. We don’t have the density of moderate 

forces there that we have in the south. And Jabhat al-Nusra would 

likely infiltrate it or overtly attack it. 

Senator DONNELLY. Well, maybe a better term on my part would 

have been a safe zone, where they don’t get barrel-bombed from the 

sky, where things like that—— 

General KEANE. Well, that’s what I call a free zone. But, we— 

the south, I think we can achieve it. In the north, it’s challenging, 

and I’m not confident that we would have the same results. And 

it certainly risks escalation. 

Senator DONNELLY. Do you—I’m sorry. 

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. I’ll give you a—I’ll give you a firmer 

answer, actually, than General Keane. I think if you get—if you 

have—if you convey that the United States and its allies in the region are going to take serious military action, you will get a serious 

Russian diplomatic response. That is, for the first time, Putin will 

start saying, ‘‘You know, we need to talk about the future of the 

Syrian regime’’ in a way that has not been true until now. I think 

the Russians have not felt that they have to take seriously what 

we say about the future of Syria, because we’re not playing. 

If you want to play in this game, you have to be prepared to put 

some assets on the table. And I don’t think we can expect to affect 

the political equation until the Russians think that there’s a—that 

the military risks to them are greater than they calculate. 

54 

Senator DONNELLY. And do you think if there is that pushback and then you combine it with time and you combine it with $40- 

a-barrel oil, is there a window for Putin to be doing these things 

where in—2 years from now, if we push back during that time, and 

hold firm, that, at some point, he just says, ‘‘Enough,’’ you know, 

‘‘We’ll try to cooperate and get this done together?’’ Because at 

some point he looks at—do you think he sees financial difficulties 

down the road for him, as well? 

General? 

General KEANE. Oh, yes, absolutely. I mean, his financial reserves are depleting rather dramatically. If the economy stays the 

way it is, certainly that’s going to have some—you know, some impact on him. But, I still believe that Putin’s view is much larger 

than just a couple of years, in terms of what he portends, strategically, for himself. 

But, let me just add to your other point. If we establish free 

zones, you know, for moderate opposition forces, but also sanctuaries for refugees, that gets world-opinion support rather dramatically. If Putin is going to attack that, then world opinion is 

definitely against him. You take this issue right off the table, in 

terms of why he’s in Syria. And if you’re doing that, and contributing to the migration that’s taken place by your aggressive military actions, then world opinion will have some rather, I think, significant impact on him. 

General JONES. If I could, it’s—we have a model in 1991 in Iraq, 

where we not only partitioned the north and the south, but we 

cratered the runways, we were able to get Saddam’s air force completely grounded. But, what we also did was, by creating those 

zones, particularly in the north, we avoided a significant refugee 

problem. And I think that a mistake was made, back on the redline 

days, when we didn’t do that as a response to his using chemical 

weapons. I believe that Europe would not have been suffering the 

refugee problem that they have now, and I think—I completely 

agree with General Keane that, if you tie it to the safety of—and 

security of innocent civilians, and you take—make it a big enough 

chunk in the country—I think that that is a powerful argument to 

do that. And I agree that it’s harder in the north and that that’s 

something we should look at in the south. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. Both—you agree, Ms. Conley and Ambassador, 

with that assessment? 

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. I certainly do. And I think you’d see 

some impact in Putin’s behavior sooner than 2 years from now. 

Putin doesn’t fold his tent lightly, and he’s not going to admit 

quickly that this entire operation has been a fiasco for him. But, 

if there’s pushback, he will not necessarily just continue plunging 

forward. 

Senator DONNELLY. Wasn’t thinking that he’d wait 2 years, but, 

in his mind, at all points, you’d have to think is, ‘‘What’s my currency balance at the moment?’’ as well. 

Senator MCCAIN. Ms. Conley? 

Ms. CONLEY. Well, in many ways, though, a lot of this adventurism is because the domestic situation is continuing to deteriorate. Russian inflation is very high. He’s having to tell the 

55 

oligarchs that they can’t quite get as much funding. And they’re in 

desperate straits. The sanctions and the low energy prices have 

had impact. 

But, remember, he’s created the national narrative that he’s— 

Russia is encircled by enemies. And he controls the media space, 

and he’s created a warlike environment. So, I think there’s probably a little more longevity here, even if the economic situation 

continues to fundamentally deteriorate. I think his vulnerability, as 

we saw in Ukraine, is casualties. So, if you do make the military 

cost higher, that he can’t cover up—and they’ve done a masterful 

job of suppressing—even the mothers of Russian soldiers are now 

foreign agents because they were talking about the disappearance 

of their sons in Ukraine. That is a vulnerability. But, his control 

over his media space is—so, this can go on for a long time. But, 

we can make the calculation—the risk higher for him. And I think, 

if he does run into strength, he responds to that strength and adjusts. 

I recall—and, Senator McCain, you know this much better. This 

was during the Russia-Georgian conflict when we had to fly back— 

Georgian soldiers back to Georgia. And, you know, a C–5A coming 

in, and it’s, you know, ‘‘Don’t do this.’’ And we said, ‘‘Get out of our 

way.’’ And they responded to that. But, we have to be very strong 

in what we’re going to do. And I know you remember those days 

very well. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Ernst. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you, Ms. Conley and gentlemen, for being here today, and 

your service to our country. 

For General Jones and General Keane, last week I had voiced my 

concerns regarding the new intelligence-sharing agreement between Iraq, Russia, Iran, and Assad’s Syria. And, like all events in 

Iraq, it seems, according to Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert 

Work, this agreement caught the administration by surprise. You 

know, hello. However, I’m not surprised, considering the Iranian 

influence in Iraq seems to have really eclipsed our own as the Iraqi 

government continues on its trajectory towards a very sectarian, 

noninclusive government and our administration has a lack of decisiveness in that region when it comes to fighting ISIS. 

So, considering the efforts of all of our men and women in uniform and the billions of American taxpayer dollars that have been 

put into Iraq, supporting the Iraqi people and the Iraqi government, I am troubled that the Iraqi government has entered into 

this information-sharing agreement. And they did this without consultation to the United States. So, I do think this puts our intelligence professionals at risk, and our country at a greater risk. 

And so, if you could maybe talk a little bit about what those risks 

might be to the American public and why we should or should not 

have—or why they should or should have not entered into this information-sharing agreement. 

General KEANE. Well, Congresswoman—I mean, Senator, thank 

you, and thank you for your military service—— 

Senator ERNST. Thank you. 

General KEANE.—and your leadership. 

56 

You know, the—when you think about Iraq, we not only lack sufficient resources in trying to assist the indigenous forces there, I 

also think, politically, we’re not doing nearly what we should have 

been doing, because you cannot have success in Iraq without Sunni 

participation—— 

Senator ERNST. Right. 

General KEANE.—in a significant way. And it has cost Maliki’s 

ineptness and—the nefarious character that he is, that excluded 

the Sunnis politically from participation. And I know everybody 

knows this answer, but what are we doing to assist that? You 

know, one of the things we—one of the things we’ve been advocating is, we need a three-star military headquarters there, with 

the Ambassador, that interacts routinely with Prime Minister 

Abadi for political reasons, as well as military reasons, similar to 

way Ryan Crocker and General Dave Petraeus did with Maliki before. And it’s not something to be taken lightly, because it is the 

political decision to include the Sunnis that becomes the lynchpin 

for success of the indigenous force. You’re never going to be able 

to succeed until their participation is there. You can actually clear 

Ramadi. Let’s assume we clear Ramadi next week with predominant Shi’a militia forces and some degree of Iraqi army. What is 

going to keep ISIS out of Ramadi is Sunnis, Sunnis who are armed 

and trained and have the resolve to stay there, just as it will be 

in Mosul. 

Senator ERNST. So, General—— 

General KEANE. That participation is totally dependent on a political inclusion of the Sunnis. So, the fact that Abadi is making 

this deal—and I think it portends a statement he’s not making 

publicly, that the United States is not supporting him in a way 

that he needs, and the Iranians are, the Russians will be, and I 

think he’s making a shift, right before our eyes, without making 

any public pronouncements about his loss of confidence in the 

United States. 

Senator ERNST. So, General Keane, basically the lack of diplomatic participation by our administration, as well as militarily, has 

led to this information-sharing agreement, would you agree? 

General KEANE. I think it has. I mean, Prime Minister Abadi 

came to this country for his first visit with the President of the 

United States, and he left, essentially, with nothing more than 

what he already had. And that was his first visit. He had a shopping list of what he wanted. Four weeks later, he’s in Moscow, and 

he’s cutting an arms deal with Russia. The deal has already been 

done. Now, he doesn’t want to buy Russian stuff, he wants American equipment. He can’t even get the American equipment on time 

in the numbers he wants for the deals he already has with the 

United States. That’s how frustrated they are with just supporting 

him on the decisions we’ve already made, much less additional support. 

So, if you’re facing an enemy that’s breathing down on your country and occupies one-third of your country, and you’re challenged 

to retake that territory and evict them, and you’re comforted by the 

fact that the United States is coming to your aid, but that aid is 

so shallow—you can understand what he’s doing. He wants to protect the sovereignty of his country. And if he—if Iran’s going to be 

57 

the helper or if Russian’s going to be the helper, he’s probably 

going to take it. 

Senator ERNST. He’s going to take it. 

And I’m sorry, I know I’m running out of time, but, General 

Jones, if you would comment, just very briefly. Do you believe that 

now with this intelligence agreement sharing arrangement that 

Iran and Russia will be able to exploit intelligence that we have 

had and gathered in Iraq? 

General JONES. Oh, I think that deal is probably not in our best 

interest. 

Senator ERNST. Okay, thank you. That’s excellent. I appreciate 

it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

This is really a valuable panel. We’ve got great witnesses, and 

have shared with us information about a very grave foreign policy 

time in our country. It’s unbelievable that we’re drifting without a 

kind of a strategy to seriously deal with Russia or the whole Middle East. Somehow I think a Nixon-Kissinger, we’d be in better 

shape today. 

Ambassador Sestanovich, George Kennan has been mentioned. I 

see you’re the George Kennan scholar. Do you think that it is appropriate for the United States at this time to see—to take action 

to establish a more long-term strategy for the Middle East that 

would extend over decades, not just reacting to one event after another, one that our allies around the world could join with us on? 

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. I have the greatest respect for George 

Kennan, but, actually, at the time, he was trying to develop a 

strategy that would be good even for a couple of years. And if we 

had a strategy that was good for a couple of years, we’d be way 

ahead of where we are now. So, let’s not think decades. Sometimes 

long-termism can be a trap. Let’s try to think about how to get our 

act together in a way that does us some good in the—— 

Senator SESSIONS. What about—— 

Ambassador SESTANOVICH.—short and middle term. 

But, let me—— 

Senator SESSIONS. But an—— 

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. I—but, if I could answer your—— 

Senator SESSIONS.—agreement to agree on—— 

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Yeah. Look, the main thing that the 

Russians have always thought about us in relation to them is that 

we have allies and that they didn’t, and that they are all by themselves. This, of course, feeds a lot of insecurity on their part, but 

it is a genuine advantage for us. That advantage is at risk of being 

lost. I mean, we can squander this huge asset. And so, I would suggest that the place to start in thinking about a strategy that will 

be effective over the next couple of years or the next couple of decades is how to leverage this advantage that we have built up over 

half a century. And it’s not—for reasons that the generals have 

mentioned, not easy to do at this point, because there are a lot of 

doubts about our strategic good sense and our staying power. But, 

these are still assets that are latent and can be recovered if we are 

at all serious about it. 

58 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, General Jones, you were our Supreme 

Allied Commander in Europe. You were there for a long time. I visited you and value your judgment. But, are you positive we could 

face the end of NATO? A European official of great experience said 

the refugee crisis could—is the greatest threat to the EU since 

World War II. He was panicked. A person you could trust, a man 

of judgment. 

Well, so we’re in Estonia and they wanted more American troops. 

We had 160-—-40, I believe, or—but, I don’t know—a company, I 

believe. And so, I asked you all, Well, how much were they spending on their defense budget? Little Estonia, right up there next to 

the border. And, of course, they were sincerely saying they were 

going to get to 2 percent. Well, we’re at 3.6. Germany’s hardly over 

1 percent of their defense. And you made that—General Jones, you 

mentioned the poll. That was stunning to me. I mean, I wondered—I asked the Estonians, ‘‘Why doesn’t—why don’t Germany 

or France put a company in here? It would be less expensive for 

them than for us.’’ It’s their backyard. But, apparently, that—is it 

a—— 

So, I’m very frustrated about that. I think they’re not carrying 

their share of the load. I think they need to do it. But, their lack 

of will is so palpable, it seems to me that, if we don’t lead and don’t 

step up, they’re not going—they’ll just try to negotiate their way 

and not take any real serious action. 

I’ve gone a bit in circles. Do you have any thoughts about the 

problem of Europe’s will and how we can help fix that? And is it 

hopeful? 

General JONES. At the NATO summit in 2002, the 19 countries 

that made up NATO at that time agreed unanimously that 2 percent of their gross domestic product would be provided for national 

defense. That soon became a floor. And very few of them actually 

did that, despite the pledges. 

Ongoing in NATO right now is a reaffirmation of the fact that 

we need that—everybody needs to chip in that 2 percent. And I— 

and some countries are actually doing better. But, the—to Ms. 

Conley’s admonition that the next Warsaw summit, next year, is 

critical, in many respects, not only in what NATO stands for, what 

it does, how it does it, but how it’s funded, and the commitments 

that NATO members make now, with 28, should be universally 

agreed to and should absolutely be supported. 

But, I do believe that our engagement in this 21st century is— 

got to be different than the 20th century engagement. We cannot 

just have military responses alone anymore. If you don’t tie in economic development, governance, and rule of law in a more comprehensive, whole-of—you know, whole-of-nations involvement, and 

you don’t show people that there’s a better future for them at the 

end of whatever conflict they’re going through, you’re going to lose 

them, and you’re going to create refugees all over the world. And 

if you like what’s happening in the Middle East right now, we’re 

going to love what’s going to happen in Africa in another 10 years, 

when Nigeria collapses or another big country goes under. 

So, this is a very difficult, dangerous time, where weakness is 

not something that we should show, because people draw—people 

like Mr. Putin will draw the long—wrong conclusions. 

59 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Senator McCain. And I appreciate the comments—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator—— 

Senator SESSIONS.—for a zone for people—refugees. I think that’s 

got to be done. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator from the Arctic. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank the panel, this really incredible experience 

here, but also great insights. 

Ms. Conley, I want to thank you, particular, not only for your 

testimony, your outstanding work on the Arctic. As my friend from 

Maine said, I am going to focus on the Arctic here. 

In terms of the—you mentioned the NDAA, and I appreciate you 

mentioning that, because, you know, what we are really reacting 

to, as a Congress, to get serious—that’s a requirement for no plan, 

actually, for the Arctic—was our current Arctic strategy, which you 

may have seen. This is DOD product, 13 pages, half of them are 

pictures. Climate change is mentioned six times; Russia once, in a 

footnote. It’s not a serious strategy. So, what we’re trying to do is 

get serious and have the Department of Defense get serious on 

that. So, thank you for mentioning it. 

Also, in your testimony, you know, I think it’s—appreciate all 

the—you talked about the massive Russian military buildup, which 

also includes—you didn’t mention it in your testimony—four new 

brigade combat teams (BCT), and, as you mentioned, a new brigade 

headquarters for the military—Russia—Arctic military—40 icebreakers, and more to come; some of those are nuclear powered. We 

have two. One is broken. So—— 

But, in terms of the three military exercises you mentioned, they 

didn’t get a lot of press in the United States. Do you view those 

as provocative, in terms of what the Russians were doing, Ms. 

Conley? 

Ms. CONLEY. I view the last one, the March 2015, because it was 

a snap exercise at full combat readiness. We need to get the Russians back to the rules that the OSCE—of transparency, 45-day notification over a certain level—because this is where misunderstandings and accidents happen. So, that, to me, was provocative 

and unprovoked, although—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. And we were pretty unaware of that. 

Ms. CONLEY. We certainly were unaware of that. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Let me ask you—I’d like the panel to take a 

look at this map. It kind of goes through what you were talking 

about in your testimony. The red is the Russians and recent buildups. If you look in the right-hand corner, though, of that map, 

there’s two blue dots. Those are two U.S. brigade combat teams. 

They’re the only Arctic-trained American warriors that we have in 

the Active Duty forces. One of them is the 425. It’s a brigade combat team in the Army. It’s the only airborne BCT in the entire 

Asia-Pacific or the Arctic. The Department of Defense wants to, essentially, shut that down. 

So, the Russians are building up dramatically. We’re not even— 

you know, there are some people saying, ‘‘Hey, we’ve got to stand 

60 

up. We can’t be provocative.’’ We’re not even being provocative. 

We’re just folding, in terms of Arctic forces. 

In light of what the Russians are doing and a theme of this hearing about signaling—we’ve signaled weakness, Putin exploits weakness, his appetite grows after each meal—what do you think Vladimir Putin would think of the United States removing its only airborne BCT Arctic capability and really cutting our Arctic forces in 

half? 

Ms. CONLEY. I think, Senator, that they view them very similar 

to, as General Jones said, that they viewed our reductions in Europe. We are leaving. We are leaving the playing field. I agree with 

you completely. We do not have much of a U.S. security architecture in the Arctic, other than our missile defense at Fort 

Greely—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. Right. Do you think that he’ll see this as more 

weakness and possibly look to exploit it in other ways? 

Ms. CONLEY. Well, I mean, we have told the Russians that they 

are our partners in the Arctic, and that would be true in the case 

of the Arctic Council. But, on the military component, we have not 

fully addressed and understood the dramatic shifts over the last 12 

to 24 months that have occurred—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. Yeah. 

Ms. CONLEY.—in militarization—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. But, you think there’s a—we need to relook 

at that, given what’s happening. 

Ms. CONLEY. Oh, absolutely. And I said—it’s not just for the Arctic’s sake, although important changes are happening. We have to 

look at this at a broader theater. And that’s what the first military 

exercise signaled—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. Yeah. 

Ms. CONLEY.—that they’re integrating theaters. So, what happens in the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Barents Sea, and the 

Arctic—it’s a continuation of operations. So, we have to look at it 

holistically, not only the land component, as you rightly note, but 

also I’m particularly concerned, and what our allies—our Norwegian and British allies are very concerned—is the maritime component. Senator King was—the North Atlantic is becoming a much 

more active—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. Yeah. 

Ms. CONLEY.—theater in maritime, as well as air. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Let me ask—for General Jones and General 

Keane—you know, I’ve had the opportunity to train a lot in cold 

weather at Bridgeport and up in Alaska. Can infantry troops, say, 

based at Camp Pendleton or based at Fort Benning, go to the Arctic, operate in the mountains in 30-below-zero, in extreme cold, extreme winter climate? Can they do that easily, or do they—do you 

need troops to be able to acclimatize to that? 

General JONES. You need special training, and you need—but, to 

the bigger strategic point: Since 1945, the United States has recognized that if you’re not present where you need to be present, and 

you’re absent, you create a vacuum. And vacuums are usually filled 

by people that don’t have the—don’t share your same interests. 

And, you know, I used the term ‘‘virtual presence is actual absence,’’ but actual absence means you’re creating vacuums. And the 

61 

United States, if it desires to be a globally significant power by the 

year 2050, needs to think about strategically what we’re going to 

do to avoid increasing the number of vacuums that we’re creating 

around the world. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

General Keane? 

General KEANE. Yeah, Senator, thanks for your military service. 

I spent 4 years in Alaska as a company commander, paratrooper, 

jumping all over the place, and, you know, on different glaciers, et 

cetera. It was quite an experience. Yes, I mean, it—the acclimatization, the special equipment, everything that you need to operate in 

minus-30, minus-40-degree temperatures routinely, the toughness 

of the soldiers themselves to operate in an environment like that, 

that’s why we have forces there, for that very reason. Parachute 

forces have a strategic capability. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Yeah. 

General KEANE. And that’s why they’re a value to us, to this day. 

Because you can seize an airfield with them very quickly and then 

bring in a lot of other things to help them out. 

But, what this—what is happening here—and I hope the other 

Senators understand—is, the budget control authority and sequestration is driving the force structure of the Army down to World 

War II—pre-World War II numbers. So, the force structure peaked 

in fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan at 570-, and we couldn’t fight 

those wars at this numbers simultaneously. We actually had to do 

it sequentially. And that’s lost on a lot of people. We’re at 490-, 

going to 450-, and the budget control authority and sequestration 

will take the Army to 420-. I was with the Chief of Staff and his 

four-stars just the other day, dealing with this very subject. And 

the question was asked, Why are we doing this? And he has no 

choice but to take brigades out of his force structure because of 

what the budget control authority is doing to him. Now, he does 

have the choice which brigades. And there is an argument and a 

tradeoff that he’s trying to make. This was done in conjunction 

with the Pacific theater commander and where he also wanted his 

forces, not just the Army. So, that is an issue. 

But, let me just say that we have a Democratic President and a 

Republican House of Representatives and a Republican Senate. 

And both of these entities are underwriting sequestration and the 

decapping of military capabilities and putting this country at a 

greater security risk than it needs to. And we’ve got to stop it. I 

mean, we’ve got to stop this, and stop this freefall of military capability. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr.—Mr. Chairman, may I ask— 

indulge one final question? This is an important topic to me. 

Strategically, do you think it’s a mistake to be taking our only 

airborne BCT out of the Arctic, given what we—this panel has been 

discussing for the last 3 hours, in terms of a massive increase with 

regard to what Putin is doing and how we are getting rid of the 

only Arctic warriors we have? I’ll just ask all the members. You can 

just say yes or no if you think it’s a strategic mistake. 

Ms. CONLEY. I think we have to retain the current assets that 

we have in theater and look at how we can best augment to be able 

to rapidly respond and deploy, if necessary. 

62 

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. General Keane is absolutely right 

about the budget. 

Senator SULLIVAN. General Jones? General Keane? 

General JONES. Sorry. I agree with that. 

General KEANE. Yes. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Senator REED [presiding]. Thank you. 

Senator Hirono, on behalf of the Chairman, let me recognize you. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you very much. 

And I thank all of the panel members. 

General Keane, thank you for once again pointing out the importance of taking responsible action to eliminate sequester on both 

the defense and nondefense side. This committee, of all committees, 

I think, fully understands the negative impact of sequestration on 

our military. 

General Keane, you had mentioned, in response to Senator 

Reed’s question about whether or not—some of the suggested actions that you put into your testimony raises the issue of whether 

or not we ought to be having a debate on a new Authorized Use 

of Military Force. And I think you acknowledged that some of the 

suggestions probably would warrant that. 

Do the other panel members also agree? And, if so, should we not 

be beginning the debate on a new AUMF with regard to Syria? 

Anyone? Do you think we don’t need a new AUMF? 

General JONES. Yes. 

Senator HIRONO. We should begin the debate now? We—okay. 

Because we haven’t done that. And that may be one of the reasons 

that we are having such a difficult time, in terms of our strategy 

in Syria. 

In the Financial Times op-ed last Sunday, Dr. Brzezinski stated 

that it is time for—and I’m quoting him—‘‘strategic boldness,’’ end 

quote, calling on the United States to persuade—to persuade—so 

far, persuasion hasn’t worked very well—persuade Moscow to act 

with us in stabilizing Syria and encouraging engagement by China. 

And I’d like to ask the panel members, you know, What are your 

thoughts on a cooperative role between the United States and Russia, realizing that Russia—Putin is no fool, as one of you said, that, 

I think, he is as concerned—he must have some concerns about potential for mission creep for them in Syria, and them getting 

bogged down. So, you know, what are the conditions that would foster a discussion about a cooperative—cooperation between the 

United States and Russia, and the potential role of China in seeking stability in the Middle East? 

I ask any of the panel members to—— 

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. I did not know what Zbig Brzezinski 

meant in that piece about bringing in China, so you’ll have to ask 

him. But, I think the answer to your question, more broadly, is an 

easy one. The United States is not going to be able to have any 

meaningful cooperative—or discussion with Russia about cooperation unless it has its own thought-out strategy and is willing to 

bring some assets to the discussion, and act on its own if it can’t 

cooperate. The administration has been very interested in cooperating, but it has pursued this discussion as though you could get 

63 

the Russians to cooperate with you as a substitute for American action. And I think that has been a strategic mistake. The only way 

to really get a serious discussion with the Russians is to begin by 

thinking through what matters to us and what we are prepared to 

do, and then telling them. And then you can have a conversation. 

But, to just think of cooperation as a substitute for any independent action is a loser. 

Senator HIRONO. Do the other panelists agree with that assessment? 

Ms. CONLEY. I would just say, I think that moment of trying to 

think cooperatively expired a long time ago. And, to agree with 

Ambassador Sestanovich, at this point, it’s—we have no strategy at 

what we’re clear about and willing to enforce. So, the strategic cooperation is whether we go along with Mr. Putin or whether we 

don’t. 

General JONES. I would agree that you have to—you—we have 

to take some action that clearly shows that—that establishes a motivation for President Putin to want to sit down and talk about it. 

But, I think that—I think there’s been too much talk and not 

enough action on our side. 

General KEANE. Yeah, I totally agree. You know, Mr. Brzezinski, 

in that article, also talked about retaliation against the regime, as 

you recall in the article, as a result of their attacking, you know, 

our surrogate forces. And certainly that’s an innovative thought. I 

don’t know what—the merits of that, in bringing China into it. I 

do know that contributing—that Putin understanding our resolve 

and our commitment, judged by our actions and not by our rhetoric, will make a difference, in terms of pushing him to more 

thoughtful diplomatic action. It has the opportunity to do that. It 

also has the risk that it will not result in that. And it could result 

in military escalation. But, if that is the only lever that we’re concerned about, is military escalation, it leaves us with this—the 

emptiness of the status quo. And that’s where we are. 

Senator HIRONO. And when you say ‘‘action,’’ you’re talking about 

military action. That’s what all of you are—— 

General KEANE. Well, I think we should approach him with everything that we have, in terms of putting pressure on him, but I 

do think we’re out of time, given the military aggression that he 

is using, and he’s been using for a number of years now, that we 

have to push back on that. 

Senator HIRONO. And—— 

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. I would just add one—to the question 

about whether it’s only military action we’re talking about. I think 

an effective strategy is going to have to be one that brings together 

other countries in the region. And that’s a political process. Those 

other countries are going to want to know what we are prepared 

to do. But, to begin with, to—the first kind of cooperation that has 

to be established for us to have any credibility in conversation with 

the Russians is with our own friends. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Senator REED. On behalf of the Chairman, Senator Tillis, please. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Ambassador Sestanovich, I had a discussion with a diplomat earlier this week who seemed to share the view that the Russian inVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:12 Aug 02, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\DOCS\15-78.CON WILDA
64 

cursion is doomed to fail. But, I don’t really understand that. They 

try to use, as a rationale behind that, as to some $200 billion in 

reserves that they have to spend. What they’re doing right now, 

relatively speaking, seems to be low cost. We don’t seem to be discussing other partners that are already active in Syria and in the 

way of Iran and an Iranian nuclear deal that promises to free up 

assets and to allow that economy to create currency that could become, in my opinion—I want to validate this—a very material part 

of what Russia ultimately does in Syria. What are your thoughts 

on that? 

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Well, I wouldn’t say the main cost 

that President Putin faces is an economic one or—and when people 

say that he is about—doomed to fail, I assume what they really 

mean is that the civil war will actually become more intense and 

that the Assad regime will be short of the kind of intervention that 

Putin is surely hoping he doesn’t have to launch—would be further 

weakened. 

Senator TILLIS. With—I think, in terms of high confidence—in 

the chart up there—in terms of high-confidence strikes being almost four-to-one for opposition targets, versus ISIS targets, 

wouldn’t that seem to suggest that they get that and they’re going 

to do everything they can to stamp out the opposition to make it 

less likely that a credible civil war could break out? 

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Yeah, I think that it’s possible that 

they will have some near-term advantages—I mean, successes. 

Senator TILLIS. And, General Jones, do you have something to 

say on that? 

General JONES. I—it’s a little hard to predict, but I think, in the 

short term, you’re going to see some tactical successes, but there’ll 

be adjustments on the battlefield. I’m unconvinced that the victory 

through airpower alone is going to achieve success in either Syria 

or Iraq. 

General KEANE. The other dimension here is, you cannot underestimate the resolve of the Syrian people, in terms of what has 

happened to them these last 4 years, and their determination. 

When you think about it, they went up against a military machine 

that has all modern weapons, and they stood up against it with 

very little weaponry themselves. I mean, what has kept this in 

their fight is their absolute determination and will to change their 

country so that their families and communities can have a better 

life. And they’re willing to die for it. And that resolve is still there. 

So, that is not going away. They will be able to push back. But, 

the civil war is not going away. 

Senator TILLIS. And, to both General Keane and General Jones, 

I had another discussion with a diplomat who said that the White 

House’s passive posture was not really what they wanted, that 

they’re acting on the recommendations of the folks in the Pentagon. 

Does that seem credible to you, given where you are? Do you believe that the strategy that we have, which—erasing red lines and 

taking a passive position in a number of areas around the globe 

where we should be probably showing a little bit more assertion— 

does that seem logical that that would be the recommendations out 

of the Pentagon to the President? 

65 

General KEANE. Well, first of all—Jim and I are very familiar 

with this—the Pentagon does not make policy. National Command 

Authority makes policy. They certainly contribute to it. So, that’s 

number one. 

Senator TILLIS. But—— 

General KEANE. And I will say this—— 

Senator TILLIS. But, General Keane, could you imagine that they 

would be making their—the recommendations—I understand 

where the policy occurs, but they would be—recommendations that 

would lead the administration to this—the current policy, such as 

it is? 

General KEANE. What happened here is—I think is very different 

than the process that we’re—that many of us are used to experience when a President has made a decision that it’s in his national 

interest to use military force to accomplish political objectives. He 

sort of—that is sort of stated to the Department of Defense, in 

terms of what his goals are, and then they would put together a 

campaign that would have various options and risk associated with 

it. 

What happened on dealing with this issue, the—not only was the 

goal stated in terms of ‘‘defeat ISIS,’’ but then the Pentagon was 

told many things in terms of what the parameters for that operation would be. And that is very different. In other words, ‘‘I don’t 

want any civilians killed whatsoever.’’ And many people pushed 

back on that and said, ‘‘That’s impossible, Mr. President.’’ But, the 

rules of engagement are so restrictive that we cannot conduct effective air operations to the degree that we know we can and keep 

people safe. ‘‘I don’t want any boots on the ground.’’ ‘‘But, can we 

put advisors down to help the units to—we need to train units 

and’’—‘‘No.’’ So, those kind of restrictions are something I think 

most of us have not seen in our past, and how you make a policy 

and then provide the military instrument with a campaign plan 

and options associated with it. It’s very different than our—what 

our experience is. 

Senator TILLIS. Senator Reed, if I may ask just one other—— 

Senator REED. Please. 

Senator TILLIS.—question. 

And, you know, I think it’s startling to hear someone who was 

formerly in command of NATO to say that it’s at risk of dismantling. I think that that’s a message that should be loud—heard loud 

and clear. 

But, General Jones, you said something else that I’m personally 

very interested in, and it has to do with a highly effective nonlethal 

economic weapon that we’re just keeping in the holster, and that 

has to do with aggressive energy policy, whether it’s preventing the 

transportation cost of oil to go down through the Keystone Pipeline, 

whether it’s preventing extraction of deposits that we have that can 

be economically extracted, whether it’s preventing the long-term 

price of energy futures to be influenced by our ability and our resolve to extract through other methods, like hydraulic fracturing. 

Have we gotten in right on any measure, in terms of using energy 

policy to confront Russia’s aggression? 

General JONES. Senator, I do not believe that the United States 

has a strategic energy policy that anyone could read. And it’s a litVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:12 Aug 02, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\DOCS\15-78.CON WILDA
66 

tle bit because of the way the Department of Energy was formed. 

Years and years ago, the Department of Energy was really the Department of Nuclear Energy. And in many ways, it still is. 

I’m of the opinion that we have a great Secretary of Energy and 

a great Deputy. And I believe it would be wise for the President 

to designate the Secretary of Energy as the focal point for all energy, from coal to wind and everything in between, and that energy 

is now—energy security—international security—it’s an international issue, and you—and because the United States has been 

able to, through its technology, and mostly its private sector, develop an astounding capability and capacity for energy for the future, in addition to our partners in Canada and also Mexico, that 

has changed the perception of what the American priorities are in 

the Middle East, for example. You know, the Middle East believes 

that energy is—energy for a security deal over the last 40 years is 

no longer viable, because we have our own energy. And, in fact, 

when you hear people talking about energy independence, I wince 

at that, because it does say, ‘‘We’ve got ours. You’re on your own.’’ 

But, our energy good fortune can be used, and should be used, in 

the global playing field for developing countries and also as a response to what Mr. Putin is doing, and particularly in central and 

Eastern Europe. 

And this plan that we’re going to enter into the record today is 

a plan that will wean 14 nations off of Russian—from dependence 

on Russian energy. That’s a staggering—if this works, this is a 

staggering response, an elegant response also, and an economic response, to Mr. Putin’s actions. 

Senator TILLIS. I look forward to seeing that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Tillis. 

In behalf of Chairman McCain, let me thank you all for extraordinary insightful testimony and for your commitment and dedication to the country over so many years. 

Thank you. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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