The e nhance ment o f p unishment raised the of fense alleg ed fr om a sec ond deg ree felony 1 to a first deg ree felony fo r t he purpose of punishment. The c urre nt code is cited f or conve nience

. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-05-00691- CR

Rub e n Ur r ut ia, App e lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF HAY S COUNTY , 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRI CT NO. CR-05- 256, , HO NORAB LE DONALD LEONARD, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
A p p e l l an tR o b e rtU r

r u t i a a p p e a l s h i s c o n v i c t i o nf

o r b u r g l ar y o f a h a b i t a t i o nw i th intent to commit an assault. See Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 30.02( a)( 1) (West 2003). Af ter the jury found appe llant guilty , the trial court found that appellant had previously been c onvicted of a felony

a s a ll e g e d an d a s s e s s e d p u n is h me n t a t th ir ty y e ar s ’ im

p r is onment. See Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 12.42(3)( b) (West Supp. 2005). 1

P oints of Error Appellant advance s three points of error. I n the first two, he challeng es t he lega l and fac tual sufficie ncy

of the e vidence to show that entry into the habitation was made with the intent2

to commit an assault. I n the third point of error, appellant contends that the prior felony conviction could not h av e been va lidly used to enha

nce punishment be cause the judg ment in the prior conviction did not assess punishment, which appe llant refe rs to as a “ sentenc e.”
Bac kgr ound The re cord shows that appellant Ur rutia and Rebe cca

Arroyo had lived toge ther for four y ear s and had a

three -y ear -old daug hter. The rec ord is not clear as to when or

why they separ ated, but on the date of off ense the y wer e living apar

t. Arroyo was staying with he r aunt, J uana Urrutia, the widow of a

ppellant’s brothe r. On Marc h 16, 2005, ab o u t 7 a.m., appellant tele phoned Ar roy o. They

argued and Arroyo “hungup” the tele phone seve ral times. At appr ox imately 7:30 a.m., appe llant arrive d at the home of Juana Urr

utia. He a ppear ed to have been dr inking. Appe llant w anted to take his three -y ear old da ug hter to his dwelling for a visit. Arroyo ref used, explaining that the child had bee n sick, and the wea ther wa s cold and ra iny

. They argued and a ppellant pulled Arr oy o’s hair. Juana Ur rutia wa s
awakened by

the ar g ument. She hear d appellant complaining that Arroyo “alwa y s wants her

way .” Arroyo responde d that appellant was “ac ting stupid.” J uana spoke to both parties, and she ag ree d that it was too cold and ra iny to take the ill child out into the weather

. She asked appellant t o leave he r h ou se . App e lla

nt l e ft say ingthat he wo uld

be ba c k and wo uld sh ow the m “ ho w s tup id h e c ou ld be.” L ater

in the morning , appellant

r e tu r n e d to the house, knoc ked on the door and bang ed
on the wi nd ow s. He did

no t c ome int o th e ho us e . A rr oyo ma de he r f ir st 9 11 te le ph on e c a ll at th is time. Offic er Ba

biser responde d to the call but appellant wa s no longe r at the r esidenc e. The office r3

unsucce ssfully

sear ched f

or appellant’ s pickup truck whic h had bee n descr ibed to him. Arroy o was instructed to ca ll 911 ag ain if appe llant returne d to the residenc e.

Ar ound 11 :10 a .m. that mo rn ing , a pp e lla nt re tur ne d to the ho us e . Ar

ro y o s aw h im

arr ive and c alled 911. Appe llant did not come to the open door of the residenc e, but took a lea d pipe from his pick-up truc k and smashed the windows on Arroyo’s car . Arroyo scre amed at him a s she spoke with the 911 oper ator. Appe llant w alked toward the house, but tur ned, walked to his truck and p l ac ed t h e le ad p i p e in t h e be d o f th e ve h i cl e. Arro y o cl o s edan d l o ck edt h e d o o r. I n s t ea d

o f l ea v i n g, appellant came to the doorwa y . J uana Urrutia rac ed with a c hair to re inforce the front door . Be fore sh e c ou ld g e t to the do or , a pp e lla nt k ic ke d in

the do or , e nte re d th e re sid e nc e and be g an a rguin g wi th Arroyo. The arg ument was recor ded on the 911 tape. Arroy o testified that appe llant knocked the phone out of he r hand. J uana g ot betwee n the y elling c ouple, trying to c alm appellant. Ar roy o stated that appellant sa id that “he wa s tired of he r” a nd “wa sn’t g oing to put up with her any more.” J uana Urrutia testified that she did not know what appellant was g oing to do, but he looked like he wa

nted to “g rab” Arroyo. She related that appe llant told Arroy o that she “w as g oing to ge t it,” and made sig ns with his hands under his throat like a knif e and other signs like shooting a gun. J uana a g ree d that appellant did not pu s h h er o u t o f the way or ac tually

assault Arr oy o. Arroyo said that appe llant never laid his hands on her. When the police of

fi ce rs ar rived, a ppellant was standingin the doorwa y . He wa s reluc tant to le ave but soon submitt ed to c ustody

. The police took photog raphs of the broke n door frame and the shattered windows of t he car, and rec overe d the l ead pipe from appe llant’s truck. No other we apons we re f

ound.4 Appellant off

ere d no evidenc e and r ested with the State.

Legal Su ff

iciency I n his first point of err or, appellant c halleng es the leg al suffic iency of the e vidence to s us ta in h is c on vi ction. I n d e te rm ini ngwh e the r t he e vid e nc e is l e g a lly

su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

a judgme nt of

conviction, we vie w the evide nce in the lig ht most favorable to the judgme nt, asking

w h e th e r an y r a ti o n a l tr ie r o f f a c t c o u ld h a v e f

o u n d b e y o n d a r e a s o n a

b le d o u b t a ll the essential elements of the offe nse cha rg ed. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 07 , 3 19 (1 97 9) ; J oh ns on v . S

tate , 23 S.W. 3d

1, 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ). Th e e vid e nc e vi ewed in th is lig ht, and a ll r e a so na

ble i n f e r e n c e s dr aw n t h e r e f

r o m , ar e e v a l u a t e d i n t h i s r e v i e w . T h e r e v i e w i n g c o u rt m u s t c o n s i d e r a ll evidenc e, rig htly

or w ro n g ly

admitted, which the trie r of f act wa s permitted to consider. See De wbe rry

v . S tate , 4 S.W. 3d

73 5, 74 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ); Thomas v. State, 753 S.W .2d 688, 69 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 88 ); Ga rc ia v . S tate , 9 19 S.W. 2d

37 0, 37 8 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ); Barnes

v . S tat e , 62 S.W .3d 288, 298 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. ref ’d). The stan dard of

revie w is the same for both direc t and circumstantial evidenc e ca ses. Gr e e n v . S tate , 8 4 0 S. W. 2 d

3 9 4 , 4 0 1 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1992).

The jury as the trier

of fa ct i s t h e j u d ge of the cre dibilit y of the witnesse s and the weig ht to be g iven their testimony , and m ay ac cept or rejec t all or any part of a

ny witness’s testimony

. Se e Sh ar

p v . S tate , 707 S.W .2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). The evide nce is not rende red insuff

icient bec ause t h e d ef

endant presented a

differ ent ver sion of the eve nts. Turro v. Sta te , 867 S.W .2d 43, 47-48 (Te x . Crim. App. 1993).I n 1999 “or an assault” was adde d to section 30.02(a) (1). See Ac t of May 26 , 1 99 9, 76 th 2 L e g ., R.S. , c h. 72 7, § 1 , 1 99 9 T e x. Ge n. L aws 33 36 . F or me rl y , the statut e on ly

re fe rr e d to “ wi th intent to commit a felony

or theft.” See Act of May 29, 1993, 73d L eg ., R.S., ch. 900, § 1.01, 1993 Tex. Gen. L aws 3586, 3633. The c urre nt code is cited f or conve nience . Appellant informs us that the third manne r of 3 committing an a ssault was omitted from the jury char g e by

ag ree ment of the pa

rties. 5 Ap pe lla nt w a s c ha

rg e d und e r pe na l c od e se c tio n 30 .0 2( a )( 1)

. Th is s tatut e pr ov ide s: A per son commits an offense if, without the ef fe ct i ve conse nt of the owne r, the person ( 1) ente rs a ha

bitation, o r a b u i l d ing ( or any portion of a building not then op e n to the pu

bli c ), wi th i nte nt t o c omm it a fe lony , th e ft , o r a

n a ssa ult ;
Te x. Pe n. Cod e Ann. 30 .0 2( a )( 1) (We st 2 00 3)

. Th e e le me nts of the burg lary

of fe ns e a lle g e d in

thi s 2

c a se are : ( 1) e ntr

y int o a hab it ati on; ( 2) wi tho ut t he e ff e c tiv e c on se nt o f t

he ow ne r; and

(3 ) w ith int e nt t o c omm it a

n a ssa ult . App e lla

nt c on c e de s th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

the fi rs t two elements of the char g ed off ense, but c halleng es the leg al evidentiar y sufficie ncy

underlying the third element — “ with intent to commit assault.”

A p e rs on c omm its a ssa

ult if he : (1) intentionally , knowing ly , or re cklessly cause s bodily

injury to another inc luding the per son’s spouse; ( 2 ) i n t e n t i o n a l l y o r

kn o w i n g l y t h r e a t e n s an o t h e r w i t h i m m i n e n tb o d i l y i n j u r y, including the person’ s spouse; or (3) intentionally

or knowing ly

cause s p hy s ic al contac t with another whe n the per son kno w s o r s h o u ld r e a s o n a b ly b e li e v e th a t th e o th e r w il l r e g ar d th e c ontact as offe nsive or provoc ative.
Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 22.01 ( West S upp. 2005). 36 I ntent, as an e ssential element of burg lary , must be proved by the S t at e b ey o n d a
rea sonable doubt and ma

y not be left simply

to speculation and sur

mise. Se e Mc Ge e v . S

tate , 923 S.W. 2d 60 5, 60 8 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 95 , n o p e t.) . T he g ist of burg lary is e ntr y wi th the re quisite i ntent. Al e

x an de r v . S

tate , 87 3 S. W.2 d 7 93 , 7 95 (T e x. Ap p. —B e a umo nt 1 99 4, pe t.
re f’ d) . Inte nt t o c omm it a fe lony , th e ft , o r a

n a ssa ult mus t e xist a t the tim e of

the e ntr y or the re is no offe nse under

section 30.02(a )(1)

. Se e De Va ug hn v . S tate , 749 S.W .2d 62, 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 88 ); In Re J

.L.H. , 5 8 S
. W
. 3 d

2 4 2 , 2 4 9 ( T e x. A p p . — E l P a s o 2 0 0 1 , n o p e t.) ; Moo re v. S tate , 54 S.W. 3d 52 9, 53 9 (T e x. Ap p. —F or t Worth 20 01 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; se e als o LaPo int v . S tate , 750 S.W .2d 180, 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Once the unlawf ul entry is made wit h t h e requisit e intent, the crime is complete d reg ardle ss of whethe r the intende d felony theft, or a

n assa u l t i s at t em pted or
occur s. J ac ob v . S tate , 8 92 S.W. 2d

90 5, 90 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ); Fo rd v . S tate , 632 S.W .2d 15 1, 15 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 82 ); Mo or e , 5 4 S. W.3 d at 53 8; W ill iam s v . S

tate , 997 S.W .2d 415, 418 (T e x. Ap p. —B e a

umo nt 1 99 9, no pe t.) ; Ro dr igu e z v . S tate , 793 S.W .2d 744, 745 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, no pet.).

Th e jur y is e xclu siv e ly e mpo we re d to de te rm ine the iss ue of int e nt i n a

burg lary tr ia l. McG ee , 923 S.W .2d at 608. Thus, intent a s alleg ed is a fac t issue for the jury

. Mo or e , 54 S.W .3d at 539. Proof of a

culpable me ntal state g ener ally relies upon c ircumstan t i al ev i dence

. Dillon v. Sta te , 574 S.W .2d 92, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Since mental culpability is of such a nature that it must be inferre d from circumstance s under which the prohibi ted act occur red, the trier of f

act may infer intent f

rom any fac ts in evidenc e which te nd to prove the e x istence of such intent. Skillern v. Sta te , 890 S.W .2d 849, 880 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, pet. ref’d). I n fac t, the jury may infer intent7

from the a cts, words, a

nd conduct of

the ac cused, Du es v . S

tate , 6 34 S.W. 2d

30 4, 30 5 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 85 ); Mo or e , 54 S.W .3d at 539, and a l l ci rc u m s t an ces sur rounding the ac ts and conduc t eng ag ed in by

the ac cused. Se e Pa na mo re v . S tate , 853 S.W .2d 741, 74 5 (T ex . Ap p . — Corpus Christi 1993, pet. ref’d). The fact of brea king and entering a habitation or building is alway s strong evidenc e of some ba d or evil intent in a prose cution for bur g lary

. Se e Pe rk ins v . S tate , 489 S.W .2d 91 7, 91 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 73 ); Gr e e r v . S tate , 437 S.W .2d 558, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). Appellant stresse s that

th e e v id e n c e s h o w s that he committed no assault af ter he broke

and e nte re d th e ho me of Juan a Ur rutia

. As e arl ie r o bs e rv e d, the a c tua l c omm iss ion of an a ssa ult is not a pre requisite to the commission of a bu rgl ary as alleg ed her e. Jacob , 892 S.W .2d at 909; Mo or e , 5 4 S. W.2 d at 53 8; Gu tie rre z v . S tate , 666 S.W. 2d 24 8, 25 0 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 1 98 4, pe t. ref ’d). The State was not require d to prove the elements of an assault offense under se ction 22.01 of the pe nal code

.

The e vidence shows that appellant arg ued with Rebec ca Arroyo over the telephone
on the morning in question. Shortly afte r that he a

ppear ed at Juana Urr

utia’s home and c ontinued his argument with Arroyo and pulled her hair. Although the a rg ument cente red on A rroyo’s re fusal to l e t a pp e lla nt t a ke the ir sic k da

ug hte r fo r a vis it, the argume nt a pp e are d b ro a de r. Juan a

Ur rutia tol d appellan t to le a v e h e r h o me . L a te r in th e mo r n in g , a p p e ll an t r e tu

r n e d , kn o c k e d o n th e d o o r and “bang ed” on the window ca using A rroyo to call 911. Still later that morning, a ppellant made a

nother visit t o the Urr

utia home. This time he broug ht a lead pipe and broke out the windows in Arroyo’s
car . Appellant then kicke d in the locked door of t he Urrutia’s house while Arroyo was a g ain ca lling 911. The tele phone wa s knocked from Arroyo’s hand, althoug h she may have “ hung up” bef

ore heI n Ma rg ra v es v . S tate , 34 S.W. 3d 91 2, 91 9 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ), the c ourt he ld t hat in 4 a suff iciency revie w, the jury ’s i n fe re n ce of intent is affor ded more defe renc e than the e vidence supporting pr oof of c onduct. 8 did so. Appellant ac costed Ar roy o and Juana Urr

utia stepped be tw ee n them. She related that appellant appear ed to g rab for Arroy o and made hand si g ns indicating a knife cutting a t hroat a nd the ns h o o ti n g a

g u n . Ju an a

r e p o rte d th a t a p p e ll an t t o ld

A r r o y o th a t h e w a s g o in g to g e t A r r oy o. There was also testimony appellant told Arroyo that he was “tired of her” and “w as not g oing to put up with her a

ny more.” Appellant off

ere d no evidenc e, but arg ues t hat he had not assaulted any one, and that at the time he ha d no wea

pons on his person. I t is the ex clusive prove nce of the jury to rec oncile any conflict in the e vidence

. W e stb ro ok v . S tate , 29 S.W .3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We c on c lud e , v ie wi ngthe e vid e nc e in the lig ht mos t fa vo ra ble to t he jur y ’s ve rd ic t, that any ratio na l tr ie r of fa c t c ou ld have fo un d be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t a ll the e sse nti a l e le me nts of the burg lary

char g ed including the eleme nt of “with intent to commit an assault.” 4

F actual Suf

fi ciency F or the same re a so ns art ic ulate d a bo ve , a pp e lla nt con ten ds that th e e vid e nc e is fac tually insufficient to support the jury ’s ver dict. A fa ctual suff iciency re v i ew be g ins with the presumption that the evidence supporting the conviction was leg ally sufficie nt. Se e Cle wis v . S tate , 92 2 S. W.2 d 1 26 , 1 29 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ). To de te rm ine if the e vid e nc e is f a c tua lly su ff ic ie nt,
we mus t r e vie w the e vid e nc e in a ne utr a l lig ht an d re so lve wh e the r e vid e nc e su pp or tin g g uil t is so
weak that the ver dict is clear ly wrong and manife stly

unjust or whether

the evidenc e contr ary

to theAl le g a tio ns of prio r c on vic tio ns fo r t he e nh anc e me nt o f p un ish me nt a re no t se pa

rate 5 “counts.” A “count” i s an allega tion charg ing a

distinct offense. Sq ua re v . S tate , 167 S.W .2d 192, 19 3- 94 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 42 ); se e als o To ml in v . S tate , 722 S.W .2d 702, 706-07 (Tex

. Crim. App. 19 87 ) ( c on c ur

ri ngop .) ; Bran c h v . S

tate , 44 5 S.W. 2d 75 6, 76 0 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 69 ); Steward v. Sta te , 4 22 S.W. 2d

73 3, 73 5 n .1 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 68 ); Be c k v . S tate , 420 S.W .2 d 7 2 5 , 727 n.1 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 67 ); Pi tts v . S tate , 742 S.W .2d 420, 422 n.1 (Tex. A pp.—Dallas 1987, no pet.).
9 verdic t is so st rongthat the burden of proof has not be en met. Zun iga v . S tate , 144 S.W .3d 477, 484 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ). I n a pp lyingthi s te st, we con sid e r a ll the e vid e nc e , r ig htl y or wr on g ly admitted. Cam ar ill o v . S tate , 8 2 S. W .3 d 52 9, 53 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 02 , n o p e t.) . App e llate courts should be on guard not to substitute their own judg ments in the se matters f or that of the tr ier of fa ct. Sa nte lla n v . S

tate , 939 S.W .2d 155, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997), but a r eviewingcourt may disag ree with the result to preve nt a manife st injust ice. J oh ns on v . S

tate , 23 S.W.2 d 1 , 9 (T e x. Cr im. App. 2000). Wit hout r eiterating the evidenc e and apply ing the Zuniga ho ldi ng , w e fi nd no me ri t in appellant’s c laim of fac tual insufficienc y conce rning the intent to commit an assault. Giving the jury ’s ver dict its due defe renc e, and viewed in a neutral light, the proof of g uilt is not weak a nd the verdic t is not unjust, nor i s the evidenc e contr ary to the verdic t so strong a s to prevent the a pplication of the prope r burde n of proof

. Zuniga , 144 S.W .3d at 484. The sec ond point of err or is overr uled. I n his third point of error, a ppellant contends that the “ evidenc e is insufficient [at the penalty stag e of the trial] to prove an enha nceme nt count beca

u s e t h e certified orig inal of the 5 [ ] judgme nt lacked a

sentenc e and c alled into question documents from T.D .C.J . [Tex as De partment of Cri mi n a l Ju s ti c e ] w h ic h s h o w e d th a t ‘ s e n te n c e ’ w a s late r w r itte n in b y s o me o n e o th e r than theI t w ou ld h a ve be e n b e tte r p ra c tic e to h a ve a lle g e d e a c h p ri or c on vic tio n in

a se pa rate 6 enhanc ement par ag raph of the indictment, even if one conviction is alleg ed as a spare in the event of the fa ilure of pr oof of the othe r convic tion or convictions. 10 trial judg e.” A

ppell an t ap pare ntly

uses “se ntence ” as sy

nony mous with assessment of pena lty or punishment itself.

The State re sponds that there w as no trial objection by appellant and any err or wa s waived f or the purpose s of appe al. Ib arra v . S tate , 11 S.W .3d 1 8 9 , 1 9 7 (Tex . Crim. App. 1999). A claim re g ardingthe suffic iency of the e vidence need not be prese rved f or re view at the tr ial level

an d is n o t w a iv e d b y th e f a il u r e to do so. Ra nki n v . S tate , 46 S.W .2d 899, 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 01 ); Pr oc tor

v . S tate , 967 S.W .2d 840, 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Appellant’s c halleng e to the le g a l s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e r e g ar d i n g t h e p r i o r c o n v i c t i o nu s e d

f o r e n h an c e m e n ti s pr op e rl y befor e us for

revie w. The bu rgl ary

indictment alleg ed thre e prior f elony convictions for e nhance ment of punis hme nt. Enha

nc e me nt p ara g ra

phIa lle g e d tw o pri or c on vic tio ns , w hic h o c c ur re d o n th e same date ( J anu ar y 2 2 , 1 9 8 7 ), only one of w hich could be use d to establish a habitual cr iminal status be c a us e of the se qu e nti a l r e qu ir e me nts of se c tio n 1 2. 42 (d ). Te x. Pe n. Cod e Ann. 12 .4 2( d) (We st Sup p. 20 05 ). Th e fi rs t of the se tw o p ri or c on vic tio ns wa s f

or the fe lony

of fe ns e of a g g ra vate d a ssa ult in cause no. CR-86-310 in the 22nd J udicial District Court of Ha y s County . The sec ond prior fe lony
c on vic tio n a lle g e d in

the same pa

ra g ra phwa s f or po sse ssi on of a pr oh ibi te d we a po n in c a us e no . CR

8 6

- 3 1 7 i nt h e 2 2 n d

J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c tC o u rto f H ays C o u n t y. 6 Enhanc ement par agra p h I I of the indictment alleg ed a pr ior felony conviction for delivery of a c ontrolled subs t an ce o ccurring on October 21, 1988, in cause no. 89-06-0889 in theT h i s s t at u t e provide s: “I f it be shown on the tria l of a sec ond deg ree felony that the 7 de fe nd ant h a s b e e n o nc e be fo re c on vic te d of a fe lony , o n c on vic tio n h e sh a ll b e punis he d f or a fi rs t deg ree felony .” The prior conviction must be a “fina l” one. Se e J or da n v . S tate , 36 S.W .3d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). 11 District Court of Guada lupe County . The e nhance ment alleg ations made c lear that the State soug ht to punish appellant as a ha bitual criminal. At the p e n a lt

y s ta g e o f th e tr ia l, a

p p e ll an t e n te r e d a p le a o f “ n o t tr u e ” to the enhanc ement alleg ations. The State wa s unable to prove the prior c onvictio n alleg ed in enha

nceme nt pa ra g ra phI I . T he fi ng e rp ri nt e xpe rt wa s una ble to ma tc h a pp e lla nt’ s k no wn fi ng e rp ri nts wi th t

ho se in t he pe n p a c ke t r e latin g to t hat c on vic tio n. F ur

the r, be cause of

so me a pp are nt p ro ble ms w ith documents, the trial c ourt dec lined to assess a ha bitual criminal pena lty

base d “o n t h at kind of messed-up de al.”

Th e State of

fe re d th e c e rt if

ie d p e n p a c ke t pe rt a ini ngto both c on vic tio ns a lle g e d in enhanc ement par ag raph I , evidenc e of matching fing erpr ints, an d t h e certified judg ments of
c on vic tio n f

ro m th e dis tr ic t c le rk

of Ha y s Coun ty , in ord e r to pr ov e the va lid ity of the c on vic tio ns . Two prior misdemea

nor convic tions were a lso shown as a pa rt of appe llant’s criminal re cord. At the conc lusion of the penalty stag e, the tria l court announc ed that the punishm ent
wo uld be e nh anc e d “ fr om t

he se c on d d e g re e to a fi rs t de g re e ” and fi xed the pe na lty a t thi rt y y e ars ’ imprisonment. See Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 12.42( 3)(b) (West Supp. 2005). 7

I t is ob vio us tha

t th e tr ia l co urt us ed on ly on e of the pr ior c on vic tio ns a lle g e d in enhanc ement par ag raph I , but it did not de signate which one. The parties did not see k clar ification. The re cital i n t h e j u dg ment simply ref lects that the trial c ourt found as “ true” the alleg ations of12

enhanc ement par ag raph I , which contained allegations as t o two prior convictions. The judgme nt did not rectify

the conf usion. Appellant in his evidentiary challeng e take s no note of this situation, but claims that the pr ior c on vic tio n ( un ide nti fi e d) us e d f or e nh anc e me nt w a s n ot prop e rl y pr ov e n. No rm a lly , it
wo uld ma tte r a s to wh ic h pr ior c on vic tio n wa s us e d. He re , ho we ve r, the e vid e nc e re latin g to b oth convictions suffe r fr om the same imperf ections cla imed by

appellant. We shall assume f or our dispositi on of this cause that the t rial court utiliz ed the first prior c onviction alleg ed for ag g ravated assault. The State ha s the burden of proof be y ond a re asonable dou b t t o es tablish prior convictions alleg ed for

enhanc ement of punishment. Sa nd e rs v . S tate , 6 9 S. W. 3 d

6 9 0 , 6 9 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —T e xar

ka na 20 02 , p e t. d ism ’d , unti me ly fi le d) ; W ill iam s v . S

tate , 8 9 9 S
. W
. 2 d 1 3 , 1 4 ( T e x. Ap p . — S an An t o n i o 1 9 9 5 , n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g Ex pa rteAu gu sta , 639 S.W .2d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)). This burden includes demonstrating that any prior convic tion is final. J or da n v . S tate , 36 S.W .3d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

We s ha ll e xami ne the e vid e nc e at th e pe na lty sta g e of the tr ia l. As no te d, the State int ro du c e d th e pe n p a c ke t ( State ’s e xhibi t 7) re latin g to b oth pr ior c on vi cti on s a lle g e d in enhanc ement par ag raph I . The pe n packe t contained c ertified c opies o f t he judg ments in eac h
c on vic tio n r e fl e c tin g c on c ur re nt s e nte nc e s o f t

wo y e ars ’ i mpr iso nme nt i n e a c h c a se . T he se jud g me nts a lso re fl e c te d th a t pu nis hme nt w a s a sse sse d in

e a c h c a se in a c c or da

nc e wi th a ple a b a rg a in ag ree ment. The pen packe t reg ardingthese 1987 c onvictions included appe llant’s inmate number, his ph o to g r a

p h an d a c o p y o f h is f

in g e r p r in ts ta k e n a t th e p r is o n s y s te m. T h e s e f in g e r p rints wereThe body of ea ch judg ment contains other re fer ence s such as “ on this day set forth a

bove,” 8 “def endant a ppear ed with above named attorney ,” “w as ar raig ned on the of

fense shown above , and enter ed a plea as shown above,” and “the defe ndant is f ound g uilty of the offe nse as set for th above, and which of

fense was c ommitt ed on the date shown above.” The body of these judgme nts do not themselves set out the requisites of a judg ment. See Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt . 4 2. 01 (We st Supp. 2005). All r eliance is on the preliminary rec itals, like all eg g s in one basket. The form of the body of a judg ment as used here become s a “r ubber stamp” available for use in any case and under 13 ma tc he d w ithhis kn ow n f ing e rp ri nts . T he State a lso int ro du c e d copi es of

the same jud g me nts
c e rt if ie d b y the dis tr ic t c le rk of Hay s County (S tate ’s e xhibi ts 2 1 a

nd 22 ). Th e se e xhibi ts a lso included a c ommitm ent orde r in ea ch ca se re flec t i ng appellant wa s imprisoned in the Texas Depa rtment of C o rrections “for a ter m of (2) two to run c oncurr ently ” with the other numbere d
cause . The wor d “y ear s” i s missing i n the commi tment order s. I n State’s exhibit 21 relating to the prior convic tion for ag g ravated assault (ca use no. CR-86-310) t here is a certified copy of a written plea ba rg ain ag ree ment “for

2 y ear s” “to run c oncurr ently with CR-86-317” sig ned by appellant a

nd his trial counsel.

Fr om this evidence, a

ppella nt a r g u e s th e r e is a

q u e s tion a s to the punishment assessed. Appellant urg es that the c opies of the judg ments cer tified by the district cler

k fail t o ref

lect that any punis hme nt w a s a sse sse d in e ith e r c a se . T he fo rm

of jud g me nt us e d in e a c h c a se re qu ir e d c e rt a in
re c ita ls t o p re c e de the bo dy of the jud g me nt itse lf . In th e jud g me nt f

or m us e d, the re c ita ls w e re to be ente red in c erta in desig nated br acke ts such as “Date of J udg ment,” “Judge Presiding,” “Plea,” etc. I n the bra cket de signated “Punishment and Place of Con fi n em ent” in each judg ment, the ty ped phrase “Te x as De pt. of C orre ctions” appears without any indication of the ter m assessed. The body of e a c h ju dg me nt whic h s ho uld c on tr ol f ur nis he s n o a id. Th e y

me re ly re fl e c t “ and

the de fe nd ant i s punished in acc ordanc e with the ter ms set forth above .” 8any

circ umstances. No one a dvance s the thoug ht that “T.W.” was a n attempt to write the wor d “two.” 9 14 Appellant ac knowledg es that the c ertified copies of the judgme nts in the pen pa cket (State’s e x hibit 17) contain in the rec itals and in the appropr iate bra cket f or puni s hment the handwr itten “2 y ear s T.W.” Appellant claims this interlineation i n ink is in conflict with the copie s of sa me jud g m e n t c e rt i f

i e d b y t h e d i s t r i c t c l e r

k w h i c h i n t h e a

p p r o p r i a t e b r a c k e t s d o n o t a s s e ss a punishment. Appellant contends that the r ecor d does not show who “T.W.” wa s, but it was not the trial judg e. He ur g es that if the regularity of the judg ments was esta blished by

the introduction of 9 the pen pa cket, the State unrave led t he presumption of reg ularity by its int roduction of other

copies of the jud g me nts c e rt if

ie d by th e di st ric t c le rk . App e lla nt c on c e de s th a t th e c omm itm e nts in evidenc e purport to show a term of two y ear ’s confine ment in e ach c ase, a nd that a commitment may be evide nce of a “sentence ” because it is g ener ally presumed that a commit ment is based on a proper judgme nt. Se e Lam be rt v . S tate , 779 S.W .2d 512, 513 (Tex. App.—Austin 198 9 , no pet.). B ut appellant ur g es that this presumption only arises in the a

bsence of a showingto t h e contrary
. Id

. Ap pe lla nt u rg e s th a t th e c on tr ary

ha s b e e n s ho wn

he re . We ob se rv e that th e re wa s n o o bje c tio n to the admissibilit y

of any of the e vidence on the gro u n d s n o w urg ed. The re is only appellant’ s challeng e to the s ufficie ncy of t he evide nce to pr ove the pr ior felony convictions, or at lea st one of them. The standa rd of r eview f

or leg al suffic iency

challeng es at the punishment stag e is the
same a s discussed in the first point of er ror, e x cept that h er e t h e t ri al court wa s the judg e of the
cre dibilit y

of the witnesse s and the weig ht to be g iven the evide nce. Se e Sh ar p , 707 S.W .2d at 614.Al tho ug h n ot e vid e nc e , w e ob se rv e that a pp e lla nt’ s tr ial c ouns e l to ld t

he tr ia l c ourt

in 10 argument at the conc lusion of the penalty stag e that both pr ior felony conviction sentenc es “a re f or two y ear s, the minimum punishment that w as applicable in the re.” The prosec utor likewise told the tr ia l c ourt in argume nt that “ he [ap pe lla nt] g ot tw o y e ars in t

hat c a se ” (t

he pr ior a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult conviction). 15 The trial court may acc ept or re ject any of the e vidence prese nted, and may resolve, a s the trier of fac t, a ll conflicts in the evidenc e. Se e Mi ra nd a v . S tate , 813 S.W .2d 724, 733-34 (Te x . App.—San Antonio 1991, pet. ref

’d). More over, this Court must consider all evidenc e admitted which the trier of fa ct was pe rmitted to consider. De wbe rry , 4 S.W .3d at 740.

I nv i ew i n g all the e vid e nc e a t th e pe na lty sta g e of the tr ia l in

the lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to the j udg ment in the instant case, w e conc lude that any rational trier

of fa ct could have found bey ond a re asonable doubt that the prior fe lony conviction for a g g ravat ed as s au l t alleg ed for enhanc ement of punishment was a final convic tion assessing two ( 2) y ear s’ imprisonment as the p e n a l t y. 10 Despite the state d point of err or, some of a p p el l an t ’s ar g ument attempts to make a collater al attac k upon the two prior f elony co n v i ct i o ns discussed as be ing void be cause of the discrepa ncies in the e x hibits. A prior conviction that is a lleg ed in a later offe nse for enhanc ement of punishment may

be attac ked if it is void or if it is t ainted by a constit utional defe ct. Galloway v. Sta te , 5 78 S.W. 2d

14 2, 14 3 ( Te x. Cr im A

pp . 1 97 8) ; W

i l so n v . Stat e , 44 S. W. 3 d

6 0 2 , 6 0 5 ( T e x. App.—For

t Worth 2001, pet. ref’d) . An appe llant who poses a collater al attack on an ag ree d prior conviction has the bur den to show that t h e p ri o r conviction is void and not merely voidable. See Pr esto n v . S

tate , 6 6 7 S
. W
. 2 d 3 3 1 , 3 3 3 -3 4 (T ex . Ap p . — C o rp u s C h ri s t i 1 9 8 4 , n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g Ex pa rte Guzman , 5 89 S.W. 2d

46 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 79 )) . A n e rr or in the jud g me nt or se nte nc e wh ic h isSee Act of Ma y 29, 1983, 68th L eg ., R.S. ch. 558, 1983 Tex. Gen. L aws 3237, 3244, since 11 amende d. The c urre nt code pr ovides for a simil ar of

fense as a state jail felony

. See Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 31.03(e )(4) (D) ( West S upp. 2005). 16 su bje c t to re fo rm a tio n d oe s n ot re nd e r the pr ior c on vic tio n a lle g e d vo id, and it is no t su sc e pti ble to collater al attack and will not vitiate the use of the c onviction for enha nceme nt purposes. Preston , 66 7 S.W .2 d at 33 3-34; se e als o B ar ne s v . S tate , 6 35 S.W. 2d

13 9, 14 2 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t Di s t
. ] 1 9 8 2 , n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g Bo wle s v . S tate , 5 50 S.W. 2d

84 , 87 (Tex

. Cr im

. Ap p. 19 77 ). Thus , infirmities in a prior convic tion, such as insufficie ncy of t h e ev i d en ce or irre g ularities in the judgme nt and sente nce, ma y not be ra ised by

collater al attac k. See G alloway , 578 S.W .2d at 143. Appellant’s r eliance upon Mc Gi nn is v . S tate , 746 S
. W.2d 479 (Tex. C rim. App. 1988), is misplaced. Mc Gi nn is is d ist inguis ha ble on the fact s and

the law. Th e pr os e c uti on in Mc Gi nn is wa s und e r a

fo rm e r v e rs ion of sect io n 31.0 3 o f t he pe na l c od e pr ov idi ngthat th e ft is a felony of the third deg ree if the value o f t h e p roperty is less than $750 and the a ccuse d has bee n previously

convicted two or

more times of a

ny grade of theft. The prior misdemeanor the ft 11 convictions alleg ed in Mc Gi nn is wer e jurisdictional e lements of the third deg ree felony , and we re not a lleg ations for enhanc ement of punishment. See L ackey v. S tate , 8 8 1 S. W. 2 d

4 1 2 , 4 1 8 ( T e x. Ap p . — Da l l as 1 9 9 4 , p et
. re f’ d ) ( ci t i n g Ga nt v . S tate , 6 06 S.W. 2d

86 7, 86 9 n .2 , 8 71 n. 9 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1980)). I

n Mc Gi nn is , the State, in attempting to pro v e t h e t wo prior misdemea nor theft convictions for jurisdictional purposes, offe red certifie d copies of the judgme nt and sentenc e in one of the c onvictions, making a prima fa cie showingof the va lidity of the c onvicti o n . T h i s showing was undone by

the State’s introduction of a cer tified copy

of the in fo rm at i on underlying the prior conviction which wa s essentially blank in pertinent parts. The Mc Gi nn is c ourt he ld t hat th e State17

failed to sustain i ts burden of proof as to the t hird degree felony befor e the court on appeal. Id . 746 S.W .2d 482. The third point of er ror is over

ruled. All of appe llant’s contentions havingbeen ove rruled, the judgme nt is affirmed.

J ohn F. Onion, Jr., J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pury ear and Onion * Affir med Filed: June 16, 2006 Do No t Pu

bli sh

Be fore J ohn F. Oni on, J r., Presiding J udg e (r etired) , Court of Criminal Appeals, sitting by * assig nment. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.003(b) ( West 1998).