UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ ANTONE LAMANDINGO KNOX, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. TOMMY SHARP, Warden, Respondent - Appellee. No. 20-7016 (D.C. No. 6:19-CV -00052-RAW-KEW) (E.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER DENYING CERTIFIC ATE OF APPEALABILITY *

________________ _________________ Before HARTZ , BALDOCK , and CARSON , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Applicant Antone Lamandin go Knox, a pro se litigant in the custody of the Oklahoma Department of Co rrections (ODC), requests a certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge the denial by the United States District C ourt for the Eastern District of Oklahoma of his application for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (requiring COA fo r state prisoner to appeal); Dulworth v. Jones , 496 F.3d 1133, 1135 (10th Cir. 2 007) (“[A] state prisoner seeking to appeal the denial of habeas relief in a § 2241 proceeding must obtain a COA to appeal.”). Because no

* This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppe l. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### July 20, 2020 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 reasonable jurist could debate the correctness of the district court’s decision, we deny a COA and dismiss the appeal. A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This standard requires “a demonstration that . . . includes showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should ha ve been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (interna l quotation marks omitted). In other words, the applicant must show that the district court’s resolution of the constitutional claim was either “debatable or wrong.” Id. Both Applicant’s application in district court and his brief in this court are virtually incomprehensible. The district cour t went well beyond its duty to construe the pro se pleadings liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and read the application as: (1) arguing that Applicant was improperly charge d by the prison with possessing a contraband cellphone ; (2) arguing that he is being illegally restrained; and (3) “complaining about his medications, inju ries resulting from a stabbing, [denial of] program participation, [denial of] legal re search assistance, [denial of] free speech, [denial of] equal protection, [] his placement in the disciplinary unit or H-Unit,” and the handling of grievances unrelated to his cellph one misconduct. R. at 128. The district court properly rejected the first claim becau se the misconduct charge was dismissed, no disciplinary action was taken, and consequen tly there was no effect on the execution of Applicant’s sentence. See Haugh v. Booker , 210 F.3d 1147, 1149 (10th Cir. 2000) (a3 § 2241 application attacks “the execution of a sentence . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). It likewise properly rejected the second claim because Applicant failed to allege how his sentence was being executed unconstitutionally. And it properly rejected the third set of claims because they had to be presented in a civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not a habeas action, since they concern the conditions of confinement. See McIntosh v. U. S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 812 (10t h Cir. 1997) (“A habeas corpus proceeding attacks the fact or duratio n of a prisoner’s confinement and seeks the remedy of immediate release or a shortened period of confinem ent. In contrast, a civil rights action attacks the conditions of the pr isoner’s confinement an d requests monetary compensation for such conditi ons.” (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted)). From what we can decipher in Applicant’s appellate br ief, he presents no reasoned challenge to the rulings by the district cour t and has apparently abandoned many of the issues he raised below. See United States v. Abdenbi , 361 F.3d 1282, 1289 (10th Cir. 2004) (“The failure to raise an issu e in an opening brief waives that issue.”). Also, it appears that Applicant may be raising in this court some issues not raised below. To the extent he does so, we d ecline to review them. See Rhine v. Boone , 182 F.3d 1153, 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e will generally not consid er issues raised on appeal that were not first presented to the district court.”).4 No reasonable jurist could debate the co rrectness of the district court’s disposition of Applicant’s application.
We DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal.

Entered for the Court

Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge