J-A09026-16

2016 PA Super 253

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JASON ROBERT RANDOLPH

Appellant No. 1246 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 14, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0000594-2013

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*

OPINION BY JENKINS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2016

Jason Randolph appeals from his aggregate judgment of sentence of 

51⁄2-11 years’ imprisonment for possession with intent to deliver a controlled 

substance, possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug 

paraphernalia and possession of an instrument of crime.1 Randolph 

contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress all 

evidence that Corporal Brett Hanlon of the State Police seized from a box 

welded to his motor vehicle following a traffic stop on Interstate 80. 

Although Corporal Hanlon obtained valid consent from Randolph to 

search the vehicle at the scene of the traffic stop, and although the corporal 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), (a)(16) and (a)(32), and 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a), 

respectively.
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correctly decided to apply for a warrant to search the box, the application 

failed to establish probable cause that the box would contain contraband or 

evidence of crime. Therefore, we vacate Randolph’s judgment of sentence 

and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

On March 7, 2013, Randolph was arrested following a traffic stop on 

Interstate 80 and the execution of the search warrant for the box welded to 

his motor vehicle. The trial court held a suppression hearing and 

subsequently entered an order denying Randolph’s motion to suppress. The 

case proceeded to trial, and a jury found Randolph guilty of all charges. 

On June 14, 2015, the trial court imposed sentence. On June 20, 

2015, Randolph filed a notice of appeal. Both Randolph and the trial court 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Randolph raises three issues in this appeal:

1. Did the suppression court err in holding that the 

Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence that [Randolph’s] 

consent to search was not the product of duress and coercion?

2. Did the suppression court err in finding that the search 

warrant for [Randolph’s] vehicle contained sufficient probable 

cause to justify its issuance?

3. Did the trial court err in permitting the Commonwealth to 

present hearsay testimony from a trooper in testifying about 

reports from other troopers that discussed the fingerprint and 

cell phone analysis?

Brief For Appellant, at 4.
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Preliminarily, we address a jurisdictional issue. On June 24, 2015 --

after Randolph filed his notice of appeal but within ten days after imposition 

of sentence -- the Commonwealth filed a motion to modify Randolph’s 

sentence. On September 18, 2015, the trial court denied the 

Commonwealth’s motion. In this Court, the Commonwealth has moved to 

quash Randolph’s appeal as premature due to the filing of the 

Commonwealth’s motion to modify sentence within ten days after imposition 

of sentence. 

We deny the Commonwealth’s motion to quash. Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) 

provides: “A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 

determination but before the entry of an appealable order shall be treated as 

filed after such entry and on the day thereof.” Rule 905(a)(5) applies where 

a criminal defendant files an appeal followed by the Commonwealth’s filing 

of a timely motion to modify sentence. Comment, Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; 

Darlington, Pennsylvania Appellate Practice, § 905:3. Pursuant to Rule 

905(a)(5), we treat Randolph’s appeal as timely filed after entry of the order 

denying the Commonwealth’s motion to modify. 

In his first two arguments on appeal, Randolph objects to the denial of 

his motion to suppress. In an appeal from the denial of a motion to 

suppress,

[our] standard of review ... is limited to determining whether the 

suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record 

and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the 
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suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record 

as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, [the appellate court is] bound by 

[those] findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal 

conclusions are erroneous. Where ... the appeal of the 

determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of 

legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not 

binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if 

the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. 

Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to [] 

plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa.2010).

Corporal Hanlon was the lone witness at Randolph’s suppression 

hearing, and the Commonwealth also submitted a videotape of the traffic 

stop into evidence. The trial court’s findings of fact are consistent with 

Corporal Hanlon’s testimony and the videotape. 

Corporal Hanlon, a state trooper for 18 years, was assigned to the 

Bureau of Emergency Special Operations in the K-9 unit. On the morning of 

March 7, 2013, Corporal Hanlon’s patrol vehicle was parked on I-80. A K-9 

dog, Draco, accompanied the corporal in his patrol vehicle. Suppression 

Hearing (“SH”), at 11-12.

At approximately 10:30 a.m., Randolph drove his Chrysler Town & 

Country minivan past the corporal’s parked patrol cruiser on I-80. Corporal 

Hanlon initiated a traffic stop because the minivan’s windows contained an 

illegal tint and because he could not see the registration on the license plate. 

The driver parked the vehicle very close to the fog line. Corporal Hanlon 
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referred to this as “white lining”, a technique he has observed drug 

traffickers use to expedite the traffic stop by discouraging the police officer 

from approaching the driver side of the vehicle.

Randolph was driving the van along with one passenger. Corporal 

Hanlon requested Randolph’s license, registration, and insurance and 

returned to his patrol cruiser with these documents. SH, at 14-18.

Corporal Hanlon ran Randolph’s information and found that he had a 

prior drug trafficking conviction. After about twenty minutes, the corporal 

returned to Randolph’s vehicle and directed him to exit the van. The 

corporal observed that there were no rear seats in the van. While he 

explained the Vehicle Code violations to Randolph, a second trooper, Trooper 

Rowland, operating a marked patrol cruiser, arrived on scene and joined the 

conversation. Corporal Hanlon advised Randolph that he was issuing a 

written warning and told Randolph that he was free to leave. SH, at 19, 22.

Moments later, however, Corporal Hanlon asked whether he could ask 

Randolph additional questions about his trip. The corporal did not tell 

Randolph that he did not have to answer any further questions. Randolph 

told the corporal that he and his wife had just moved from South Carolina to 

New Jersey, which was why there were no seats in his van. He said that she 

had just had a baby, and that he was travelling from Newark, New Jersey to 

Columbus, Ohio to visit a family member in the hospital. He added that his 

aunt’s grandmother was in a car accident and was hospitalized with a broken 
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leg. When he repeated his account, however, he said that that he was going 

to visit his aunt instead of his aunt’s grandmother. Randolph stated he had 

no luggage in the van and did not plan on staying the night in Columbus, 

even though it was a 16-hour round trip. When asked, Randolph could not 

name the hospital in Columbus that he was visiting. Trooper Hanlon found it 

strange that Randolph was traveling far away from home without his wife or 

their baby. Randolph admitted that he had a prior drug-related conviction. 

Trooper SH, at 23-28.

During this conversation, Trooper Rowland approached the passenger 

in the minivan and questioned him. The passenger claimed to be from New 

York, which Corporal Hanlon found strange because Randolph was from 

South Carolina. SH, at 23-28.

Corporal Hanlon asked Randolph for consent to search the minivan, 

and Randolph consented. Both Defendant and the passenger were patted 

down and asked to stand in front of the vehicle. The K-9, Draco, searched 

the vehicle but did not alert to anything. Corporal Hanlon and Trooper 

Rowland then searched the vehicle. Corporal Hanlon saw no luggage in the 

minivan, but he heard multiple cell phones ringing and seized the cell 

phones. When he checked between the driver and passenger seats, he 

observed a steel box extending downward from the floor that was welded to 

the vehicle. The box did not match the remainder of the undercarriage. 

Suspecting that the box contained drugs, Trooper Hanlon questioned 
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Randolph about the box, and Randolph’s demeanor immediately became 

defensive. The corporal impounded the vehicle and obtained a warrant to 

search the compartment. SH, at 28-35.

It took considerable effort to open the compartment, which was only 

accessible through a door underneath the passenger seat of the minivan. 

The door was battery powered and could only be opened by removing the 

passenger door and applying power through wires connected to the door. 

The corporal managed to open the compartment by attaching alligator clips 

to the door and applying power. Inside the compartment were 550 grams of 

cocaine and a digital scale. SH, at 35-39.

Preliminarily, Randolph does not dispute that the initial traffic stop was 

legal. Nor could he, because the evidence demonstrates that Corporal 

Hanlon had probable cause to believe that Randolph violated the Vehicle 

Code by driving with tinted windows. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 4524(e)(1) (“no 

person shall drive any motor vehicle with any sun screening device or other 

material which does not permit a person to see or view the inside of the 

vehicle through the windshield, side wing or side window of the vehicle”).

We conclude that Randolph’s consent to search his vehicle was valid, 

because the traffic stop had become a mere encounter by the time Corporal 

Hanlon obtained Randolph’s consent, and because Randolph’s consent was 

voluntary. 
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Mere encounter. The Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution both 

protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; 

Pa. Const. art. I, § 8; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 

(1973); Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 738 A.2d 427, 433 (Pa.1999). A 

search conducted without a warrant is constitutionally impermissible unless 

an established exception applies. Commonwealth v. Slaton, 608 A.2d 5, 

8–9 (Pa.1992). A consensual search is one such exception, and the central 

inquiries in consensual search cases entail assessment of the constitutional 

validity of the citizen/police encounter giving rise to the consent, and the 

voluntariness of the consent given. Cleckley, 738 A.2d at 433. To establish 

a valid consensual search, the Commonwealth must first prove that the 

individual consented during a legal police interaction. Commonwealth v. 

Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 889 (Pa.2000). Where the interaction is lawful, the 

voluntariness of the consent becomes the exclusive focus. Id.;

Commonwealth v. Acosta, 815 A.2d 1078, 1083 (Pa.Super.2003) (en 

banc ).

Pennsylvania case law recognizes three categories of interaction 

between police officers and citizens. The first is a “mere encounter,” which 

need not be supported by any level of suspicion. Acosta, 815 A.2d at 1082.

The second is an “investigative detention,” which must be supported by 

reasonable suspicion. Id. This interaction “subjects a suspect to a stop and 
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a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to 

constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest.” Commonwealth v. 

Phinn, 761 A.2d 176, 181 (Pa.Super.2000). The third category, a “custodial 

detention,” must be supported by probable cause. Id. “The police have 

probable cause where the facts and circumstances within the officer’s 

knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the 

belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Commonwealth v. 

Hernandez, 935 A.2d 1275, 1284 (Pa.2007).

In Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884 (2000), our Supreme 

Court analyzed when a police interdiction can devolve into a mere encounter 

following a traffic stop where police continue to question an individual after 

the reason for the traffic stop has concluded. The Court ruled that after 

police finish processing a traffic infraction, the determination of whether a 

continuing interdiction constitutes a mere encounter or a constitutional 

seizure centers upon whether the individual would objectively believe that he 

was free to end the encounter and refuse a request to answer questions. 

The Court adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances approach and articulated 

a non-exclusive list of factors to be used in making this assessment. These 

factors include 1) the presence or absence of police excesses; 2) whether 

there was physical contact; 3) whether police directed the citizen's 

movements; 4) police demeanor and manner of expression; 5) the location 

and time of the interdiction; 6) the content of the questions and statements; 
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7) the existence and character of the initial investigative detention, including 

its degree of coerciveness; 8) “the degree to which the transition between 

the traffic stop/investigative detention and the subsequent encounter can be 

viewed as seamless, ... thus suggesting to a citizen that his movements may 

remain subject to police restraint,” Id. at 898; and 9) whether there was an 

express admonition to the effect that the citizen-subject is free to depart, 

which “is a potent, objective factor.” Id. at 899. With regard to the last two 

factors, Strickler observed:

The degree to which the transition between the traffic 

stop/investigative detention and the subsequent encounter can 

be viewed as seamless ... thus suggesting to a citizen that his 

movements may remain subject to police restraint, is a pertinent 

factor ... ‘[F]ew motorists would feel free ... to leave the scene of

a traffic stop without being told they might do so.’ While 

recognizing ... that the admonition to a motorist that he is free to 

leave is not a constitutional imperative, the presence or absence 

of such a clear, identified endpoint to the lawful seizure remains 

a significant, salient factor in the totality assessment.

Id. at 898-99.

In this case, the trial court held that the traffic stop had devolved into 

a mere encounter when Corporal Hanlon told Randolph that he was free to 

leave. Corporal Hanlon’s questions to Randolph after telling him that he 

was free to leave took place during a mere encounter, not a detention. The 

trial court reasoned:

The interaction occurred in the mid-morning. Corporal Hanlon 

did not have sirens on his vehicle. The initial investigative 

detention described by Corporal Hanlon was not coercive in 

nature and the interaction between the Corporal and [Randolph] 

was calm and cordial. There was no physical contact prior to 
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consent for the search being given and [Randolph’s] movements 

were minimally directed in that he was asked to step out of the 

vehicle to the rear to receive the warning. [Randolph] was given 

a written warning and told that he was free to leave. It was only 

after both were headed toward their vehicles that Corporal 

Hanlon again spoke to [Randolph].

Pa.R.A.P. 1925 Opinion, at 5. We agree with this analysis. See 

Commonwealth v. By, 812 A.2d 1250, 1258 (Pa.Super.2002) (following 

valid traffic stop at night, and after telling defendant he was free to leave, 

officer’s continued questioning took place during mere encounter, where 

officer spoke casually and non-threateningly to passengers, stood on the 

passenger's side of the vehicle instead of near driver's door or in front of the 

vehicle, and had no contact with defendant before telling him that he was 

free to leave).2

____________________________________________

2 Had the interaction between Corporal Hanlon and Randolph not devolved 

into a mere encounter, Corporal Hanlon would have needed reasonable 

suspicion to continue questioning Randolph after telling him that he was free 

to leave. We note, by way of dicta, that the circumstances of this case 

provided Trooper Hanlon with reasonable suspicion to continue questioning 

Randolph. 

During a traffic stop, an officer may develop reasonable suspicion to detain 

the vehicle occupants for further investigation. We have defined “reasonable 

suspicion” as follows:

[T]he officer must articulate specific observations which, in 

conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from these 

observations, led him reasonably to conclude, in light of his 

experience, that criminal activity was afoot ... In order to 

determine whether the police officer had reasonable suspicion, 

the totality of the circumstances must be considered. In making 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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(Footnote Continued) _______________________

this determination, we must give due weight ... to the specific 

reasonable inferences [the police officer] is entitled to draw from 

the facts in light of his experience. Also, the totality of the 

circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an examination 

of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather, 

even a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may 

warrant further investigation by the police officer.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 917 A.2d 848, 852 (Pa.Super.2007) (citations 

omitted). The officer “may ask the detainee a moderate number of 

questions” during a traffic stop “to determine his identity and to try to obtain 

information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.” Berkemer v. 

McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984). “[I]f there is a legitimate stop for a 

traffic violation ... additional suspicion may arise before the initial stop’s 

purpose has been fulfilled; then, detention may be permissible to investigate 

the new suspicions.” Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 115 n.5 

(Pa.2008). Even innocent factors, viewed together, may create reasonable 

suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. See Commonwealth v. Caban, 60 

A.3d 120, 129-30 (Pa.Super.2012) (following valid traffic stop for speeding, 

officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify continued 

detention of driver and passenger; driver acted nervously, car was owned by 

third party not present in vehicle, answers provided by driver and passenger 

to basic questions regarding their destination were inconsistent, and various 

masking agents, including air fresheners, canisters of perfume, and bottle of 

odor eliminator, were present in vehicle).

Corporal Hanlon observed several factors that gave him reasonable suspicion 

to believe that criminal activity was afoot. Randolph parked very close to 

the fog line, which Corporal Hanlon testified was a technique used by drug 

traffickers to discourage officers from approaching the driver side of the 

vehicle. Although Randolph was driving from Newark to Columbus, there 

were no suitcases or back seats in the vehicle, an odd circumstance for such 

a long trip. In addition, Randolph had a prior drug trafficking conviction. 

This combination of factors provided reasonable suspicion to detain Randolph 

and continue an investigation into possible criminal wrongdoing. See 

Caban, 60 A.3d at 129-30.

We also note that decisions from other jurisdictions indicate that a prior 

conviction, by itself, does not create reasonable suspicion. See, e.g.,

United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243 (4th Cir.2011) (defendant's 

“criminal record” not sufficient basis for stop, even with generalized 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Consent.3 The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving that the 

defendant consented to a warrantless search. See Commonwealth v. 

Acosta, 815 A.2d 1078, 1083 (Pa.Super.2003) (en banc). To establish a 

voluntary consensual search, the Commonwealth must prove “that a consent 

is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice—not the result 

of duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will overborne—under the 

totality of the circumstances.” Strickler, 757 A.2d at 901.

There is no shortage of decisions relating to consent. A convenient 

starting point is two decisions issued on the same date by our Supreme 

Court: Strickler and Commonwealth v. Freeman, 757 A.2d 903 

(Pa.2000).

In Strickler, a police officer observed a car parked along a country 

road. Two men were standing near the car and appeared to be urinating. 

After questioning the men and verifying the documentation for the vehicle 

and the driver, the officer returned the documents to the driver. At that 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

conclusory assertion defendant presently “under investigation”). Here, 

however, there were other suspicious details in addition to Randolph’s prior 

conviction.

3 As a threshold matter, when, as here, the defendant is accused of a 

possessory crime, he must establish a legally cognizable expectation of 

privacy in the area searched. Caban, 60 A.3d at 126. In this case, the 

record demonstrates that Randolph was the registered owner of the vehicle 

that was the subject of the search. Accordingly, Randolph had a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the areas of the vehicle that Corporal Hanlon and 

Trooper Rowland searched.
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time, the officer informed Strickler that it was not appropriate to stop along 

the road and urinate on someone’s property. The officer began walking back 

to his cruiser when he turned and asked Strickler if there was anything 

illegal in the vehicle. When Strickler stated that there was not, the officer 

requested Strickler’s consent to search the vehicle. The officer told Strickler 

that he was free to withhold his consent. Strickler consented to the search, 

which disclosed a marijuana smoking pipe. 

Applying the nine-factor test delineated above, our Supreme Court 

held that Strickler’s consent was voluntary, even though the officer never 

expressly told Strickler that he was free to leave following the initial lawful 

detention. Strickler, 757 A.2d at 900. The Court opined: “[T]he officer did 

not touch Strickler or direct his movements; there is no evidence of any use 

of coercive language or tone by the officer. We also deem significant the 

arresting officer’s admonition to Strickler that he was not required to 

consent to the search.” Id. at 900 (emphasis added). Thus, the officer’s 

admonition that Strickler could refuse consent outweighed the officer’s 

failure to expressly advise the defendant that he was free to leave following 

the initial detention. Id. at 901-02.

In Freeman, a state trooper stopped Freeman for making improper 

lane changes in what appeared to be a “cat and mouse” game with another 

car on the highway. Freeman denied having any problem with the other car. 
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The trooper gave Freeman a written warning and advised that she was free 

to leave, but the events that followed

were inconsistent with [the trooper’s] statement to Freeman that 

she was free to leave ...: [the trooper] returned to Freeman’s 

vehicle; questioned her about the second vehicle; pointed out 

the inconsistent statements from the vehicle’s occupants when 

she denied traveling with that vehicle; and, ultimately and most 

significantly, asked her to step out of the vehicle prior to the 

request for consent. Such directive constituted a greater show of 

authority than had previously been made (other than the 

physical stop of Freeman’s vehicle itself).

Id. at 907. The Supreme Court held that these events constituted an invalid 

seizure, because the trooper had no reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity: “Even if Freeman’s answer to the trooper’s question, contradicting 

as it did the information given by the occupants of the other car, could 

arguably be viewed as evasive behavior,” the trooper had no more than an 

“unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ of criminal activity.” Id. at 908.

As a result, Freeman’s consent was invalid, mandating suppression of 

the fruits of the resulting search: 

The detention that preceded Freeman’s consent to search was 

unlawful, and Freeman’s consent, even if voluntarily given, will 

not justify the otherwise illegal search unless the Commonwealth 

can demonstrate that Freeman’s consent was an independent act 

of free will and not the product of the illegal detention ... Here, 

although we do not view the trooper’s actions as flagrant, the 

record does not establish the necessary break in the sequence of 

events that would isolate Freeman’s consent from the prior 

coercive interaction. To the contrary, the evidence supports the 

conclusion that the trooper’s initiation of a second seizure and 

receipt of Freeman’s consent were integrally connected. 

Id. at 909.
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In the wake of Strickler and Freeman, this Court has issued many 

decisions relating to the issue of consent during traffic stops. In some, we 

held that the totality of circumstances proved voluntary consent;4in others, 

we determined that consent was involuntary.5

____________________________________________

4 See Caban, 60 A.3d at 131-32 (vehicle passenger’s consent to search of 

vehicle that was owned by his father and driven by his friend was voluntary, 

where there was no evidence of police abuses, aggressive tactics, physical 

contact, or use of physical restraints any time during the detention, 

passenger was advised that he was free to leave, passenger initially refused 

consent to search, and officer accepted refusal without argument but merely 

explained that passenger could either consent or wait for drug-sniffing dog 

to arrive); Commonwealth v. Kemp, 961 A.2d 1247, 1261 

(Pa.Super.2008) (following valid investigatory stop, defendant voluntarily 

consented to search of vehicle, even though investigating officer did not 

inform defendant that he could refuse to consent to search; there was no 

excessive police conduct, no physical contact occurred between police and 

defendant, officer did not display his weapon, officer’s order to defendant’s 

companion to exit car was necessitated by fact that companion was not 

licensed driver and had to move out of driver’s seat, defendant did not lack 

maturity or sophistication and was not intellectually incapable of exercising 

free will, and character of initial investigative detention, the traffic stop, was 

routine); Commonwealth v. Bell, 871 A.2d 267, 274 (Pa.Super.2005) (en 

banc) (defendant voluntarily consented to warrantless search of vehicle, 

where defendant understood all of his rights, detective informed defendant 

that police knew he was there to deliver drugs and that officer observed 

defendant put package on floor of car, detective invited defendant to 

cooperate, detective did not coerce defendant into making statement with 

threats or actions, defendant, having waived his right to remain silent and to 

an attorney, admitted having an ounce of cocaine for delivery to female at 

particular location, defendant signed consent form that detective read to him 

while defendant appeared to read along, and before signing consent form, 

defendant confirmed that he spoke English and was not under influence of 

drugs or alcohol); By, 812 A.2d at 1258 (following valid traffic stop at night, 

officer obtained defendant’s consent to search vehicle through non-coercive 

means; although two other officers were present, officer spoke casually and 

non-threateningly, told defendant he was free to leave, did not restrain 

defendant’s movement by use or threat of force, asked defendant if he could 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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(Footnote Continued) _______________________

search vehicle, and reminded defendant that he was free to leave prior to 

obtaining consent); cf. Commonwealth v. Reid, 811 A.2d 530, 548 

(Pa.2002) (defendant’s consent to search his jacket, boots, motel room, and 

truck, during consensual encounter at police barracks that involved 

questioning about deaths of defendant’s estranged wife and stepdaughter, 

was voluntary, where, inter alia, trooper read consent form to defendant 

explaining his right to refuse search and defendant signed form).

5 See Commonwealth v. Tam Thanh Nguyen, 116 A.3d 657, 669 

(Pa.Super.2015) (driver’s consent to search vehicle vitiated by taint of illegal 

continued investigatory detention of driver and defendant following 

conclusion of traffic stop that was not justified by reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity; driver consented to search only moments after state 

trooper re-initiated contact with defendant after advising that driver was free 

to leave, no intervening circumstances diminished coercive atmosphere of 

illegal detention or otherwise justified search, and at time of consent, vehicle 

was surrounded by two troopers and trooper had just repeated questions 

regarding driver’s excessive nervous and apologetic demeanor); 

Commonwealth v. Moyer, 954 A.2d 659, 668-69 (Pa.Super.2008) (en 

banc) (defendant’s consent held involuntary following investigatory stop that 

itself was not justified by reasonable suspicion; officer reintroduced 

questioning after returning defendant’s documents and telling him he was 

free, defendant walked from rear of car to car door when officer stopped him 

again, there was no precise end to traffic stop, two armed and uniformed 

police officers stood near defendant, who was alone and isolated outside car 

at night on rural, unlit road when he was asked if he would answer 

questions, police had activated flashing lights and directed bright white 

police spotlight at car, defendant was not informed that he did not have to 

answer further questions, officer told defendant results of his criminal history 

check and accused him of past drug activity, and defendant was asked if 

there were controlled substances or paraphernalia in his car or on his 

person); Commonwealth v. Acosta, 815 A.2d 1078, 1085-87 

(Pa.Super.2003) (en banc) (consent held involuntary despite prior valid stop 

for suspended license plate, where officer withheld defendant’s vehicular 

documentation, other officers and marked police cars were present with 

flashing lights in close proximity to defendant, and officer never expressly 

informed defendant that he was free to leave or that he was free not to 

consent to search of vehicle).
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Relying on Freeman, Nyugen and Moyer, Randolph argues that it 

was improper for Corporal Hanlon to re-initiate questioning after advising 

Randolph that he was free to leave. Each of these decisions held that the 

defendant’s consent was invalid, because the officer continued to question 

the defendant despite lacking reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant 

further and despite advising the defendant that he was free to leave. 

In Freeman, Nyugen and Moyer, the interactions between the 

defendants and officers did not transform into mere encounters. As a result, 

the officers needed (but lacked) reasonable suspicion to continue 

questioning the defendants. Here, in contrast, Corporal Hanlon’s interaction 

with Randolph had become a mere encounter, making further questioning 

permissible. The evidence demonstrates that during this mere encounter, 

Randolph gave voluntary consent to search his vehicle. The encounter took 

place in an open location on a public highway in broad daylight. The 

questioning was not exceedingly long, and the corporal’s questioning was 

not repetitive or deceptive in any way. There were no police abuses or 

aggressive tactics. Nor did the officers use threatening demeanor, physical 

contact or physical restraints anytime during the detention. 

For these reasons, Randolph’s first argument is devoid of merit.

In his second issue on appeal, Randolph argues that Corporal Hanlon’s 

search warrant application failed to establish probable cause to search the 

box welded to the undercarriage of Randolph’s vehicle. We agree.
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The Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution each require that search warrants be supported by probable 

cause. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 899 (Pa.1991)

“Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the affiant’s 

knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are 

sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief 

that a search should be conducted.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 292 A.2d 

352, 357 (Pa.1972).

In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the United States Supreme 

Court established the “totality of the circumstances” test for determining 

whether a request for a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment is 

supported by probable cause. In Commonwealth v. Gray, 503 A.2d 921 

(Pa.1986), our Supreme Court adopted the totality of the circumstances test 

for purposes of making and reviewing probable cause determinations under 

Article I, Section 8. Gray described this test as follows:

Pursuant to the ‘totality of the circumstances’ test set forth by 

the United States Supreme Court in Gates, the task of an 

issuing authority is simply to make a practical, common-sense 

decision whether, given all of the circumstances set forth in the 

affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of 

knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a 

fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 

found in a particular place.... It is the duty of a court reviewing 

an issuing authority’s probable cause determination to ensure 

that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that 

probable cause existed. In so doing, the reviewing court must 

accord deference to the issuing authority’s probable cause 

determination, and must view the information offered to 
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establish probable cause in a common-sense, non-technical 

manner.

* * *

[Further,] a reviewing court [is] not to conduct a de novo review 

of the issuing authority’s probable cause determination, but [is] 

simply to determine whether or not there is substantial evidence 

in the record supporting the decision to issue the warrant.

Commonwealth v. Torres, 764 A.2d 532, 537–38, 540 (Pa.2001). “A 

grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts towards warrants ... is 

inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for searches 

conducted pursuant to a warrant; courts should not invalidate warrants by 

interpreting affidavits in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, 

manner.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 236; see also United States v. Leon, 468 

U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (“Reasonable minds frequently may differ on the 

question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause, and we 

have thus concluded that the preference for warrants is most appropriately 

effectuated by according ‘great deference’ to a magistrate’s determination”).

“A police officer’s experience may fairly be regarded as a relevant 

factor in determining probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 

A.2d 928, 935 (Pa.2009). An officer, however, cannot simply reference 

“training and experience abstract from an explanation of their specific 

application to the circumstances at hand.” Id. “A court cannot simply 

conclude that probable cause existed based upon nothing more than the 

number of years an officer has spent on the force. Rather, the officer must 
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demonstrate a nexus between his experience and the search, arrest, or 

seizure of evidence.” Id. Indeed, a factor becomes relevant only because it 

has some connection to the issue at hand.6 Id.

In this case, after obtaining Randolph’s valid consent to search his 

vehicle, Corporal Hanlon searched the vehicle and discovered the box welded 

to the undercarriage. Corporal Hanlon then applied for a search warrant to 

open the box. His affidavit of probable cause referenced details that we 

have discussed above, such as the absence of rear seats, Randolph’s 

inconsistent statements about whom he was visiting in the Columbus, Ohio 

____________________________________________

6 We also find persuasive Professor LaFave’s analysis that a police officer 

must do more to establish his level of experience than make a cursory 

assertion of its existence and relevance:

[T]he probable cause determination must ultimately be made by 

a judicial officer, who is not an ‘expert’ in matters of law 

enforcement, and ... consequently it is incumbent upon the 

arresting or searching officer to explain the nature of his 

expertise or experience and how it bears upon the facts which 

prompted the officer to arrest or search. For example, if an 

officer at a hearing on a motion to suppress were to say that he 

made the arrest because he saw what he as an expert 

recognized as a marijuana cigarette, this is not a showing of 

probable cause. Under the probable cause standard, it must ‘be 

possible to explain and justify the arrest to an objective third 

party,’ and this is not accomplished by a general claim of 

expertise. On the other hand, if the officer testifies fully 

concerning his prior experience with marijuana cigarettes and 

explains in detail just how it is possible to distinguish such a

cigarette from other hand-rolled cigarettes, this testimony 

cannot be disregarded by the judge simply because it involves 

expertise not shared by the judge.

LaFave, 2 Search & Seizure § 3.2(c) (5th ed. 2015).
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hospital, and his inability to name the hospital. The affidavit also included a 

detail not mentioned during the suppression hearing: the passenger in the 

vehicle told Trooper Rowland that they were going to Cleveland, Ohio, not 

Columbus. 

Corporal Hanlon then described the search of Randolph’s vehicle as 

follows:

I ... initiated a canine search of the vehicle with [c]anine ‘Draco’. 

During the search, Draco increased his breathing around the 

driver’s seat floor area, but did not indicate. I then initiated a 

hand search of the vehicle with Tpr. Rowland. During the 

search, we located multiple cell phones[,] one of which was 

ringing, [but] no luggage to indicate a long trip. I then looked at 

the undercarriage of the vehicle and observed an aftermarket 

modification between the floor (sic) that did not match the 

remainder of the undercarriage. Based on my training and 

experience[,] I recognized this modification to be a hidden 

compartment commonly used to transport guns, drugs and U.S. 

currency. I related this information to Randolph and noticed a 

drastic change in attitude ... Canine Draco is trained and certified 

by the Pennsylvania State Police to detect the odors of cocaine, 

heroin, marijuana and methamphetamines.

SH, Commonwealth Exhibit 3. 

We recognize that we have a duty to examine search warrant 

applications through the lens of common sense and not in the manner of 

grudging, hypertechnical perfectionists. But even when construed in this 

light, we still conclude that the trooper’s affidavit did not establish probable 

cause to search the box. 

The Commonwealth asserts that the following factors created probable 

cause: (1) the absence of seats and luggage in the vehicle, (2) the discovery 
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of multiple cell phones, one of which was ringing, (3) Randolph’s inconsistent 

accounts of whom he was visiting in Columbus, (4) his inability to name the 

hospital he was driving to in Columbus, (5) the passenger’s claim that they 

were driving to Cleveland instead of Columbus, and (6) the hidden 

compartment welded to the undercarriage of the vehicle, which Trooper 

Hanlon claimed was a common device for transporting drugs, weapons and 

money. We cannot fault Corporal Hanlon for finding these facts suspicious, 

but they did not give rise to probable cause. 

Corporal Hanlon’s averments relating to the hidden compartment were 

insufficient for two reasons. First, the police dog, Draco, did not alert when 

it sniffed the area in which Corporal Hanlon subsequently discovered the 

compartment. While this alone did not defeat probable cause,7 neither did it 

elevate the likelihood that the corporal would find contraband or evidence of 

crime in the hidden compartment. Torres, 764 A.2d at 537. Second, 

Corporal Hanlon failed to explain how his “training and experience” led him 

to recognize that the compartment was “commonly used to transport guns, 

drugs and U.S. currency.” He neglected to list what classes he has attended 

or certifications he has received on this subject, the number or type of cases 

he has participated in where officers discovered hidden compartments 

____________________________________________

7 Commonwealth v. Brown, 924 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Pa.Super.2007) 

(trained dog’s failure to alert “is but one factor to be considered in adjudging 

whether the totality of the circumstances establishes probable cause”).
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containing drugs or weapons, or even how long he has been a law 

enforcement officer. Thus, his claim of “knowledge and experience” was an 

empty phrase that failed to tilt the scales toward probable cause. 

Thompson, 985 A.2d at 935 (officer’s claim of “knowledge and experience” 

does not give rise to probable cause without “explanation of their specific 

application to the circumstances at hand”). 

Nor did discovery of the hidden compartment establish probable cause 

when viewed in conjunction with the other five facts observed by Corporal 

Hanlon. Collectively, these details indicate that Randolph and the other 

vehicle occupant were taking a lengthy road trip without luggage or seats in 

the rear of the vehicle, but with multiple cell phones in their possession; that 

they gave inconsistent accounts about their travel plans and destination; 

and that the vehicle had a hidden compartment -- an unusual set of 

circumstances, but not enough for a search warrant, because they did not 

create a “fair probability” that contraband or evidence of crime would be 

found inside the hidden compartment. Torres, 764 A.2d at 537. Had 

Corporal Hanlon augmented these facts by describing his “knowledge and 

experience” vis-à-vis hidden vehicle compartments (or other details that he 

found suspicious), his affidavit might well have furnished probable cause. 

This subject matter, however, was missing from the affidavit, and we must 

judge this affidavit by what it includes, not by what potentially helpful 

information it omits.
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Judge Platt’s concurring and dissenting statement contends that our 

“focus on the level of detail in the recitation of Corporal Hanlon’s training, 

knowledge and experience misses the big picture and reweighs the evidence 

before the suppression court.” Concurring and Dissenting Statement, at 2. 

Judge Platt further asserts that Corporal Hanlon’s experience “may be 

regarded as a relevant factor” under Thompson, but that he was not 

“required to demonstrate a fact-specific nexus between his experience and 

probable cause for the search.” Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). 

Judge Platt obviously is correct that Thompson calls experience “a

relevant factor” (as opposed to “the relevant factor” or “the only relevant 

factor”). Thompson, 985 A.2d at 935. And because experience is only “a 

relevant factor,” there may be occasions where experience is not critical to 

the probable cause calculus. For example, had Draco alerted to the area in 

which Corporal Hanlon subsequently discovered the compartment, we doubt 

that it would have been necessary for Trooper Hanlon to describe his 

experience. But Draco did not alert, so in the “big picture” of this case, 

Corporal Hanlon’s experience was essential to tip the balance from mere 

suspicion to probable cause. What knowledge, training or experience did 

Corporal Hanlon have that reasonably indicated that the hidden 

compartment was used to store criminal contraband? His affidavit did not 

say – and due to this omission, his affidavit only gave rise to suspicion of 

criminal activity but not probable cause.
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During oral argument, the Commonwealth suggested that even if the 

search warrant was deficient, Corporal Hanlon still had the right to open the 

hidden compartment by virtue of Randolph’s verbal consent to search the 

vehicle. We do not agree that Randolph’s consent extended this far. We 

have held that general consent to search a vehicle extends to closed, but 

readily opened, containers discovered inside the car. Commonwealth v. 

Yedinak, 676 A.2d 1217, 1220 (Pa.Super.1996). Conceivably, general 

consent might also permit opening a closed container by unscrewing several 

screws from its cover without causing structural damage. See United 

States v. Saucedo, 688 F.3d 863, 866-68 (7th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). 

Conversely, we do not think it reasonable to conclude that Randolph’s 

consent extended to a hidden compartment that he kept locked and 

concealed from view and which Corporal Hanlon could open only by 

removing the passenger door and applying power through wires connected 

to the door. Cf. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251-52 (1991) (“it is 

very likely unreasonable to think that a suspect, by consenting to the search 

of his trunk, has agreed to the breaking open of a locked briefcase within the 

trunk”).
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Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred by denying Randolph’s 

motion to suppress.8

Judgment of sentence reversed; case remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion; Commonwealth’s motion to quash 

appeal denied; jurisdiction relinquished.

President Judge Emeritus Ford Elliott joins the opinion.

Judge Platt files a concurring/dissenting statement.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/16/2016

____________________________________________

8

 In view of this decision, we find it unnecessary to review Randolph’s final 

issue on appeal, an argument that the trial court erred in permitting the 

Commonwealth to present hearsay testimony from Corporal Hanlon 

concerning reports from other troopers relating to forensic analysis of cell 

phones seized from Randolph’s vehicle.