NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.
CHRISTOPHER CLAY ROMAN

TUTTLE, AKA Sarahsong,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 19

- 50191
D.C. No. 2:18

- cr - 00722

- PA

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 16, 2021 * *
Before: GRABER, R. NELSON, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges. Christopher Clay Roman

- Tuttle appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 300

- month sentence and three conditions of supervised release imposed following his guilty

- plea conviction for ad vertising child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) and (e) . We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAR 25 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 19

- 50191

§ 1291 . W e affirm in part , and vacate and remand in part.
Tuttle contends that the 300

- month sentence is substantively unreasonable
because it creates an unwarranted sentencing disparity and fails to account for the allegedly flawed child pornography Guideline and his mitigating circumstances

. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The below

- Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including the seriousness of the offense and the need to protect the public. See
Gall , 552 U. S. at 51

. Whatever the merits of Tuttle’s criticism of the child pornography Guideline

— a criticism that Tuttle did not raise to the district court

— the district court did not impose a sentence within the range dictated by that
Guideline. Moreover , the rec ord reflects that the court considered Tuttle’s mitigating arguments, as well as his sentencing disparity arguments, and was not persuaded that they warranted a lower sentence

. Tuttle also challenges the residency restriction imposed in special condition
16

. The district court did not plainly err in imposing this condition. See United States v. Wolf Child , 699 F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012) (if counsel does not object to a supervised release condition in the district court, this court reviews the condition for plain error). The residency restriction is reasonably related to the goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, and public protection, and does not involve a3 19

- 50191

greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary in Tuttle’s case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Moreover, Tuttle has not provided support for his assertion that he will be unable to find compliant housing upon his release. See Wolf Child , 699 F.3d at 1095 (to prevail on plain error review, appellant must show the alleged
error af fected his substantial rights). Finally, Tuttle challenges two conditions of supervised release on the ground that they are unconstitutionally vague

. As the government concedes, t his c ourt has previously determined that s tandard c ondition 14 is unconstitu tionally vague. See United States v. Magdirila , 962 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2020). The government further concedes that, in this case, special c ondition 13 is impermissibly vague as

to which “victims” the district court intended to include in the condition

. 1 See
United States v. Evans , 883 F.3d 1154, 11 60 (9th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, we
vacate standard condition 14 and special condition 13 , and remand for the district

court to strike or modify the conditions

. See Magdirila , 962 F.3d at 1159. AFFIRMED in part; VACATED and REMANDED in part.

1 The parties appear to dispute whether the victim or victims need to be identified by name to remedy the condition. We do not reach t his issue

. See United States v. Ped , 943 F.3d 427, 434 (9th Cir. 2019) (the district court is better suited to craft appropriate supervised release conditions on remand ).