GENERAL 

Hon. Hollis D. Garmon Opinion No. M-472 

District Attorney 

8th Judicial District Re: Whether the terms of the grand 

P. 0. Box 111 juries impaneled in the 8th 

Greenville, Texas 75401 Judicial District are concurrent with the District Court 

terms set forth in Art. 199, 

Subdiv. 8, V.C.S., or with the 

District Court terms set forth 

Dear Mr. Garmon: in Art. 199, Subdiv. 62, V.C.S. 

Your letter of August 27, 1969, requesting the opinion 

of this department concerning the referenced matter, states, in 

part, as follows: 

"Under Article 199, the law appears to be 

that the term of the Grand Jury is from January 

to July and July to January. However, conflicting statements are made under terms of Court 

for the 8th District, in particular Hunt County, 

wherein it shows the 8th District begins on the 

5th Monday after the 4th Monday, in January and 

the 6th Monday after the 4th Monday in August for 

8 weeks. 

"If the Court term and the Grand Jury term 

do not run concurrently, then it puts the District Attorney at a great disadvantage of having 

to hold grand jury session in one county while 

the term of Court is in session in another 

county. We need to get this matter resolved." 

A grand jury for each county within a judicial district 

may be impaneled at or during any term of the district court 

sitting therein. Art. 19.01, V.C.C.P. 

The 8th Judicial District is composed of the Counties 

of Rains, Hunt, Delta, and Hopkins. The 62nd Judicial District is 

-2353- 
Hon. Hollis D. Garmon, page 2 (M-472) 

composed of the Counties of Hunt, Delta, Hopkins, Franklin, and 

Lamar. Thus, both the 8th and the 62nd District Courts have 

concurrent jurisdiction in Hunt, Delta, and Hopkins Counties. 

Article 199, Subdivision 8, Vernon's Civil Statutes, 

sets forth the respective terms of the 8th District Court in 

Delta, Hopkins, Hunt, and Rains Counties as follows: 

"Delta County: On the first Monday in January 

and may continue three weeks: and on the second 

Monday in June and may continue until the business 

is disposed of. 

"Hopkins County: On the fourth Monday in 

January and may continue five weeks: on the fifteenth Monday after the fourth Monday in January 

and may continue up to and including the last 

Saturday preceding the second Monday in June: and 

on the fourth Monday in August and may continue six 

weeks. 

II 

. . . 

"Hunt County: On the fifth Monday after the 

fourth Monday in January and may continue eight 

weeks: and on the sixth Monday after the fourth 

Monday in August and may continue eight weeks. 

"Rains County: On the thirteenth Monday 

after the fourth Monday in January and may continue two weeks; and on the fourteenth Monday 

after the fourth Monday in August and may continue 

until the business is disposed of." 

However, Article 199, Subdivision 62, Section l(b), 

Vernon's Civil Statutes, setting forth the terms of the 62nd 

District Court in the three counties where it has concurrent 

jurisdiction with the 8th District Court, states: 

"There shall be two (2) terms of each District Court in each County of the district each 

year, one beginning on the first Monday in January 

and continuing until the convening of the next 

regular term, and the other beginning on the 

first Monday in July and continuing until the 

- 2354 - 
. . 

Hon. Hollis D. Garmon, page 3 (M-472) 

convening of the next regular term." (Emphasis 

added.) 

The above language, while not only stating the terms of 

the 62nd District Court in Hunt, Delta, and Hopkins Counties, also 

clearly brings the terms of the 8th District Court therein within 

its purview. It is thus apparent that Article 199, Subdivision 

8, enacted in 1939, and Article 199, Subdivision 62, enacted in 

1955, are inconsistent and contradictory as to the term of the 

8th District Court in Hunt, Delta, and Hopkins Counties and, 

consequently, as to when the 8th District Court may impanel 

grand juries in those counties. 

House Bill Number 857 (Acts 54th Leg. R.S. 1955, ch. 

473, p. 11981, which is Article 199, Subdivision 62, states in 

its caption that it is: 

"An Act to amend Subdivision 62 of Article 

199 of the Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, 

as amended so as to provide that Hopkins County 

shall be within the 62nd Judicial District; changing the terms of the District Courts of Hunt, Lamar, 

Delta, Franklin, and Hopkins Counties; providing for 

thejurisdiction of such Courts and the functions of 

the judges thereof: providing procedure for transfer of cases and proceedings; providing procedure 

for transferred cases and proceedings: providing 

for the exchange of benches and for judges to sit 

for each other; providing for district clerks and 

sheriffs to serve the Courts; validating and continuing all process issued or served before this 

Act takes effect: making such process returnable 

to the next term of the Court: validating the 

summoning of grand and petit juries under this 

Act; repealing all laws in conflict: and declaring 

an emergency." (Emphasis added.) 

Both from the language of the caption and the language 

of the Act itself, it appears the Legislature intended to set the 

terms of both the 8th and the 62nd District Courts in Hunt, Delta, 

and Hopkins Counties in addition to repealing all legislation inconsistent therewith, though the inconsistent provisions of 

Article 199, Subdivision 8, are not expressly repealed. 

The applicable rule of construction has been stated as 

- 2355 - 
Hon. Hollis D. Garmon, page 4 (M-472) 

follows: 

"(W)here irreconcilably conflicting acts are 

passed at the same time, or where parts or sections 

of the same act are in irreconcilable conflict, the 

act or provision later in position prevails as the 

latest expression of the legislative will, and repeals the other in so far as there is irreconcilable conflict." 53 Tex.Jur.2d 150, Statutes, Sec. 

101. 

In discussing the law of implied repeal, the Supreme 

Court of Texas, in State v. Easley, 404 S.W.2d 296 (Tex.Sup. 

19661, recently stated at page 300 that: 

"The rule of law applicable is stated in the 

case of Commercial Credit Co., Inc. v. American 

Mfg. Co. et al. (Tex.Civ.App., 19411, 155 S.W.2d 

834, 839, writ refused, as follows: 

"'We are not unaware of the general rule of 

law in this State which holds that repeals by implication are not favored. But as early as Rogers 

v. Watrous, 8 Tex. 62, 58 Am.Dec. 100, and by 

numerous cases on down to recent dates, it was 

announced that subsequent statutes revising the 

subject matter of former ones, and evidently intended as a substitute for them, although containing no express words to that effect, must 

operate to repeal those going before. This rule 

was followed by the Commission of Appeals in 

First Nat. Bank v. Lee County Cotton Oil Co., 

274 S.W. 127, where the authorities are collated 

over a period of seventy-five years. See also 

Meek v. Wheeler County, 135 Tex. 454, 125 S.W.Zd 

331, approved by the Supreme Court, 135 Tex. 454, 

144 S.W.2d 885.' See also Gaddis v. Terrell, Land 

Commissioner, 101 Tex. 574, 110 S.W. 429 (19081." 

In view of the foregoing authorities, it will be seen 

that in case of repugnancy between two provisions of a statute, 

whether or not the earlier of the provisions has been expressly 

repealed, the more recent provision of the statute must be 

given effect as being the true intendment of the Legislature. 

-2356- 
Hon. Hollis D. Garmon, page 5 (M-472) 

The legislative intent in this matter can also be ascertained by noting some of the provisions of Subdivisions 8 and 

62 of Article 199, which indicate that the two Subdivisions are 

very much interrelated. See, e.~., the last paragraph of Subdivision 8 and Sections l(c), l(e), 2, 4, and 7 of Subdivision 

62 of that Article, all of which advert extensively to the concurrent jurisdiction of the two District Courts and provide for 

the interaction and exchange of various forms of judicial machinery 

between them. 

As the statutory conflict in this matter relates only 

to the grand jury terms of the 8th District Court in Hunt, 

Delta! and Hopkins Counties, the grand jury term of the 8th 

District Court in Rains County remains as provided in Subdivision 8 of Article 199. However, it should be noted that 

the terms of the District Court in Rains County, as set forth 

in Subdivision 8, are not consecutive as required by law. Article 

1919, Vernon's Civil Statutes, provides, in part, that: 

"All district courts in this State . . . 

whenever and however created, shall hold at least 

two (2) terms of court oer vear in each countv 

Therefore, it is the opinion of this department that: 

(1) The terms of the grand juries of the 8th Judicial 

District impaneled in Hunt, Delta, and Hopkins Counties shall be 

two each, respectively; that is, one term beginning on the first 

Monday in January and continuing until the convening of the next 

regular term, and the other term beginning on the first Monday 

in July and continuing until the convening of the next regular 

term: and 

(2) The terms of the grand jury of the 8th Judicial 

District impaneled in Rains County shall be two; that is, one 

term beginning on the-thirteenth Monday after the fourth Monday 

in January and continuing until the convening of the next regular 

term, and the other term beginning on the fourteenth Monday after 

- 2357 - 
Hon. Hollis D. Garmon, page 6 (M-472) 

the fourth Monday in August and continuing until the convening 

of the next regular term. 

SUMMARY 

The terms of grand juries of the 8th Judicial 

District impaneled in the Counties of Hunt, Delta, 

and Hopkins shall be concurrent with the terms of 

the District Courts sitting in said counties, such 

terms being set forth in Article 199, Subdivision 

62, Section l(b), Vernon's Civil Statutes. The 

terms of the grand juries of the 8th Judicial 

District impaneled in Rains County shall be concurrent with the terms of the 8th District Court 

in Rains County, such terms being set forth in 

Article 199, Subdivision 8, Vernon's Civil Statutes, 

and being modified as to their continuity by Article 

1919, Vernon's Civil Statutes. 

C. MARTIN 

General of Texas 

Prepared by Austin C. Bray, Jr. 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Kerns Taylor, Chairman 

George Kelton, Vice-Chairman 

Howard Fender 

James McCoy 

James Quick 

Alfred Walker 

MEADE F. GRIFFIN 

Staff Legal Assistant 

HAWTHORNE PHILLIPS 

Executive Assistant 

NOLA WHITE 

First Assistant 

- 2358 -