HomeRemarks and Releases – Asia Pacific Media Hub...Digital Press Briefing with Ambassador Bonnie Denise Jenkins, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security

# 									Digital Press Briefing with Ambassador Bonnie Denise Jenkins, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security							

Special Briefing

Ambassador Bonnie Denise Jenkins, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security

Asia Pacific Media Hub

April 23, 2024

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https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Audio_Digital-Press-Briefing-with-Ambassador-Bonnie-Denise-Jenkins-Under-Secretary-for-Arms-Control-and-International-Security.m4a

**MODERATOR:**  Greetings from the U.S. Department of State’s Asia Pacific Media Hub.  I would like to welcome journalists to today’s on-the-record briefing with Ambassador Bonnie Denise Jenkins, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security.  Under Secretary Jenkins will provide an update on the Australia-UK-U.S., or AUKUS, security partnership, including recent announcements, its role in regional security, opportunities for innovation, and our commitments to advancing the initiative.

And with that, let’s get started.  Under Secretary Jenkins, thank you so much for being with us today.  I’ll turn it over to you for your opening remarks.

**UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:**  Great, thank you so much for inviting me.  It’s really a great opportunity to speak about AUKUS and the great work that we’re trying to – as we are working to implement this amazing initiative.

So U.S., Australia, and UK are longstanding allies and partners committed to working together to actualize AUKUS and deepen our partnership.  These new authorities will allow for unparalleled levels of security cooperation between our governments and industries.  An endeavor of this size and scale will have challenges, but we will work trilaterally to overcome them together.  AUKUS is an example of demonstrating our firm commitment to our international partners and is a key line of effort in our Indo-Pacific strategies.

The initiative remains committed to the highest nuclear nonproliferation standard, and AUKUS maintains strong bilateral and multilateral support in all three countries.  We are committed to getting this done right.  We understand the importance of enhancing security standards to protect our sensitive technology as you break new frontiers on developing emerging technologies together.  And we collectively want to have a robust consultation with industry that’s important to complete before exemptions can take effect to maximize its potential and use.

We look forward to robust engagement in the weeks ahead with industry stakeholders after the trilateral partners have a chance to publish draft regulations for collaboration.  We see public input as vital and we will publish draft regulations for the exemptions soon.

So with that, I’ll turn it back over and I am open and ready for questions.

**MODERATOR:**  Thank you so much, Under Secretary.  We will now turn to the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  Our first question came in in advance from Kym Bergmann at the *Asia Pacific Defence Reporter* in Canberra, Australia.  Kym asks:  “I’m after a bit more fidelity on the U.S. $3 billion that Australia will transfer to the U.S. submarine industrial base.  Can you indicate how that figure was arrived at?”

**UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:**  Great, thank you for that question.  So the AUKUS security partnership collectively boosts each partner’s defense industrial bases and it strengthens submarine supply chains.  So the 3 billion in U.S.-dollar Australian contribution will uplift the U.S. submarine industrial base and provide enduring benefits to U.S. Virginia-class submarine construction and maintenance efforts.  So the contribution by Australia to the U.S. submarine industrial base will build on existing and planned U.S. efforts that will improve industrial base capability, will increase capacity, will – it’ll grow workforce and advance new manufacturing technologies.

So the important Australian contribution will directly support the necessary growth for our Virginia-class submarine production that will meet U.S. national needs as well as AUKUS requirements.  I hope that answers the question.

**MODERATOR:**  Thank you.  Our next question goes to Jinmyung Kim at the *Chosun Ilbo* in Seoul, Republic of Korea, who asks:  “About two weeks ago the AUKUS defense ministers said they would consider bringing Japan into Pillar II.  Also, the AUKUS partners are reportedly considering to add some more partners to Pillar II, including the ROK, Canada, and New Zealand.  What are the most important elements to be considered?  Where are we in terms of the expansion of AUKUS?”

**UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:**  Great, thanks for that question.  I know there’s a lot of interest in Pillar II of AUKUS.  And I just want to make a few points early on, because I know there’s a lot of interest.  So since the beginning of AUKUS, the President and trilateral leaders have been very clear in our intent to engage others in Pillar II advanced capability projects as we progress.

So to be very clear about this, we are not planning to expand cooperation of Pillar I, of course, which is focused on assisting Australia with the acquisition of conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines.  But the parties have developed principles and models for additional partner engagement in Pillar II projects.  And we will undertake consultations this year with potential partners regarding areas where they can contribute to and benefit from the work that we’re doing in Pillar II.

So we announced that Japan will be the first to be consulted, and we recognize Japan’s strength and the close bilateral defense partnerships with AUKUS countries, AUKUS partners, our continuing cooperation with Japan, and Pillar II advanced capability projects.  But we don’t have a timeline for Japan or any other country with which we are consulting about additional partnerships.  It is critical that we conduct a very deliberate process.  So these are discussions that we’re having, we’re going to be having with countries based on things that we think are important in terms of what additional partners can bring.

So we have developed principles and models for additional partner engagement.  We’ve identified collaboration opportunities and we will take into account factors such as technological Innovation, financing, industrial capacity, ability to adequately protect sensitive data and information, and impact on promoting peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

So those are some of the things I just wanted to note early on and just to re-emphasize that having partners in Pillar II is always something that we – that was considered by the leaders of all three countries – not for Pillar I but for Pillar II – and we are – we have some criteria that we’re looking at and we will be engaging countries.  We don’t have a timeframe in which we’re going to do it necessarily, but we hope to be able to make some advancements this year.  So I hope that’s helpful.

**MODERATOR:**  Great.  Our next question comes to us via the Q&A tab from Gordon Arthur at Defense News, who’s based in Christchurch, New Zealand.  Gordon asks:  “Apart from nuclear-powered submarines, can you provide some concrete examples of AUKUS Pillar II projects that are actually making concrete progress?”

**UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:**  Well, we are in – I mean, one of the things I want to highlight is we have a number of trilateral groups that are looking at all of the different technologies.  But I think most of you know the technologies include cyber and undersea and electronic warfare and artificial intelligence and quantum computing.  And we’re looking at all of those, and we have – we’ve done a – at a meeting that we had in April last year, we did some work on some UAVs and I think we did – there was another event that we did in Australia that we can get more information to you on.  And so we are actually having conversations and working together on some of these demonstrations that we can show that we are actually making some progress.

I should also note, of course, that a lot of this is in development when you talk about emerging technologies, as we have three countries working together.  One of the things we do want to do is find out where we have similarities, where there’s gaps in what we’re trying to do.

So these are things that we’re working on.  I should also point out that regarding Pillar II and even Pillar I for that matter, part of it’s going to be education; part of it’s going to be training individuals from all three countries going to different schools.  We’ve already started having conversations amongst universities of the three countries.  We’ve been able to train some of submarine individuals from Australia in U.S. schools.

So there’s a lot that’s happening in all of AUKUS in terms of the steps we’re making, in terms of implementing both Pillar I and Pillar II.

**MODERATOR:**  Okay, thank you.  Our next question goes to Paul Starick of *The Advertiser* in Adelaide, Australia.  Paul asked:  “Why is it in the United States’ strategic and industrial interest to have AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines built in Adelaide?  Is it because of capacity issues in the U.S. shipyards?  And what benefits will Adelaide nuclear-powered submarines bring to this industrial base?”

**UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:**  Thanks for that question.  And in terms of the location, that really is a – where the submarines are is really built on sovereign decisions that remain in Australia.  So I would have to refer that specific question to the Australian Government because that’s really a decision that was made by them in terms of where the best location would be for that.

**MODERATOR:**  Okay, our next question goes to Christine Rovoi of the Pacific Media Network based in Auckland, New Zealand.  Christine asks:  “Pacific leaders have warned against AUKUS and regional partners Australia and New Zealand joining AUKUS because the region says it wants a nuclear-free Pacific, and this trilateral agreement between Australia, the UK, and the U.S. goes against the Blue Pacific narrative.  AUKUS has not been discussed in the Pacific Islands Forum leaders meeting since it was signed in 2021.  Why hasn’t the U.S. fronted the Pacific leaders about AUKUS?  How can Washington – what can Washington do to quell the fears from the Pacific?”

**UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:**  Yes, we – thanks for the question.  And we – ever since we launched the AUKUS, we’ve been having conversations with many countries about the goal of AUKUS, what AUKUS is, what we’re trying to do with AUKUS.  I know I can say that I’ve had many conversations personally with a number of countries in the region, outside the region, on AUKUS and what the goal of AUKUS is.

So we want to keep doing that.  We want to keep having these conversations.  But I can certainly say that we have been – and not just the U.S. but also Australia has also been doing a lot of engagements within the region to explain what AUKUS is: the goals, the rationale, what we hope to achieve, and just regular updates on AUKUS.

We’ve also done it in terms of engagements with – in Pillar I and the IAEA.  Director General Grossi has come out with at least two reports on AUKUS and the relationships and the good conversations that he’s having with the trilateral partners.  So there’s been a lot of engagement on AUKUS and we are very open and we want to be very transparent about the goals of AUKUS for both Pillar I and Pillar II, and hopefully, If folks aren’t really seeing that, they will see that in the near future because we recognize the importance of transparency and making sure we get the correct information out there about what we’re trying to accomplish with this very important initiative.

**MODERATOR:**  Thank you.  Our next question goes to Rosie Lewis from *The Australian* based in Canberra, who asks:  “There’s been recent congressional reports suggesting the Virginia-class submarine production has been delayed by several years.  What does that mean for delivering Virginias to Australia in the early 2030s?  Is that still feasible?  Is there concern in Washington that giving those subs to Australia will undermine American security?”

**UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:**  What I can say is we are very – still very committed to the implementation of AUKUS to make sure that we are able to provide Australia with the nuclear-powered submarines.  That has not wavered.  Of course there’s been, as usual, concerns raised on the Hill about different aspects of AUKUS, though I can say that there’s strong bilateral bipartisan support for AUKUS overall, which is really good.  I mean, I testified in Congress at the House Foreign Affairs Committee in February and when there was a strong takeaway by me in terms of the bipartisan support.

So what I can certainly say is that we remain committed to AUKUS.  We remain committed to providing a nuclear-powered submarine to AUKUS.  We recognize that there’s things that we have to address here in the United States domestically in terms of concerns raised by the Hill, but we are very committed to fulfilling our obligations under the AUKUS agreement.

**MODERATOR:**  Next we have a question from the live queue.  We have Brandon How at InnovationAus in Canberra.  Brandon, you should be able to unmute yourself now.

**QUESTION:**  Thanks very much for giving me time for the question, and thanks very much for taking time to update us on AUKUS.  I just wanted to follow up on the questions about additional partners for AUKUS Pillar II.  I was just wondering, will the United States be – in order to additional partners to participate, will there need to be additional exemptions under the export administrations regulation, or ITAR, and do you expect similar reforms or exemptions would need to be made in Australia and the UK to enable additional AUKUS Pillar II partners?  Thanks.

**UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:**  Thanks for the question.  Right now we are working very closely with the UK and Australia.  All three countries are working very closely to ensure that we all have comparable export control regulations that will help to ensure the security of information and technology that will be shared amongst all three countries.  I can say that it’s been a lot of hard work that’s gone into this so far.  Ever since we had our NDAA passed late last year in the U.S., both Australia and the UK have been working very hard in terms of their own legislation that has to be adapted for AUKUS.  And we are very close to that point right now.  So that is going very well and we’re very happy with that process.  And we feel – we think that we’ll be able to get everything done in a – the next timeframe that is required in the next 120 days.

As for other partners, it’s hard; I can’t predict right now and I don’t want to get ahead of the process in terms of what might be required for other partners.  Of course this will be one of the things that will be looked at as we consider new partners, part of it in addition to things that I had listed early on that we’ll have to look at, issues like ITAR and what would need to happen to have successful new partners join AUKUS.

So what I can say is that it’s something that we will certainly be looking at, but I don’t have anything that I can really say at this point in terms of that because I don’t want to get ahead of the process.

**MODERATOR:**  Okay, we have another live question from Lewis Jackson with Reuters.  Lewis, you should be able to unmute yourself now.

**QUESTION:**  Oh, fantastic.  Thanks.  So a couple of quick ones.  So first, there’s been a lot of concerns raised in the U.S., in Australia, even in Japan about sort of the level of their sophistication when it comes to cyber security and how that could be a barrier to being involved in Pillar II.  I mean, is this something you’re thinking about?  Is this something being discussed?  Do you expect it to be a topic of discussion when those talks begin later this year?

And then just to, I suppose, reiterate a point you made just earlier, but do you see any chance that there could be a further delay after this 120-day timeline regarding the State Department trade exemptions?

**UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:**  Great, thanks for the question.  Kind of what I was saying before, when we look at additional partners and which partners may come on board, we will be looking at a total panoply of issues.  It includes the things that I had already mentioned in terms of what we’re going to be looking at with specific countries and what they can bring to the table, what gaps they can fill, what are their areas of expertise.  But we’ve also been looking at what I said about how does it – what do we need to do in terms of potential exemptions, levels of sophistication.  These are all like – as you had said, these are all things we’re going to be looking at.  And so as I said, it’s going to be an issue that all three countries will be discussing.  We’ll be discussing that with the potential country that can come on board.  So these are all things that we’ll look at, and thanks for that because that is one of the things we will be looking at as well.

As far as the next 120 days, what I can say is, I mean, it’s hard to put in words how much we’ve gotten done.  I mean, a process that normally takes six to 12 months we’ve been able to get done – get a lot done in the first 120 days.  And that includes new legislation in the U.S., new legislation in the UK, new legislation in Australia.  There were weekly meetings.  There were –flying between London and Canberra and D.C.  There’s been working groups.  It’s been a lot of work and we’ve been able to get a lot done, and I do appreciate all that the UK and Australia have done in terms of actually putting forth legislation and getting – and working toward to get the legislation approved and implemented as we’re doing in the U.S.

So it’s hard to explain how much work has happened, but the fact that we were able to get so much done in the first 120 days and we’re hoping to get something out to our industries so that they can look at that, because we need to have industry input on any changes of legislation, because if it’s going to be successful we need to hear from them – that’s the next step.  But I don’t want to say I guarantee, but I can say we feel pretty good based on what we’ve accomplished already that we can probably make the next 120 days.

**MODERATOR:**  Thank you.  Our next question comes from Chan Thul Prak at Kiripost in Cambodia, who asks:  “How do you respond to past remarks by Cambodian leaders that AUKUS is a threat to the region, that it is a dangerous arms race?  This has been a concern by Cambodia, which is a close ally with China.  Cambodia objected to the coming of nuclear-powered submarines to the region.”  Over.

**UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:**  Well, a couple things.  As we’ve said several times, we are focused on safety and freedom of navigation and those things in the Indo-Pacific, and those are a fundamental reason why we are engaged on these issues and doing this trilateral.  As I said, one of the things we want to do is be very transparent and talking with countries in the region to hear their concerns, to be – and for us – and I say here again I thank Australia because they’ve been very good at this – explaining to countries in the region about why we’re doing this.  And it’s not at all to create a problem.  We’re trying to help to – help the safety and security of the region and countries, and that Australia is not going to develop a nuclear weapon; as I said, they’re going to have a nuclear-powered submarine, which is allowed under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

So we’re not creating new nuclear weapons.  We’re not creating new nuclear states by doing this.  And so I just want to just be – just want to make that very clear, and this is something that we’re going to keep talking to countries in the region because we know there’s also some incorrect information out there about the purpose of AUKUS and what we’re trying to do.  And it’s very important that countries understand that this is not to create a race, to create any kind of arms races.  As I said, nuclear-powered submarines are allowed under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and Australia is not going to become a nuclear weapons state and they’re not going to be able to use the nuclear-powered submarines to develop a nuclear weapon either because if they tried to do that, the whole submarine would not work anymore.

So these are things that we want to make very clear to countries.  And lastly, I just want to highlight, as I said earlier, the great work that we’re doing with the International Atomic Energy Agency to make sure that we are doing everything to have the highest nonproliferation standards in what we’re trying to do.

**MODERATOR:**  Okay, next we have questions from Dileepa Fonseka at BusinessDesk in New Zealand, who asks:  “Is AUKUS Pillar II considered to be a military alliance?  And what benefits will AUKUS Pillar II potentially deliver members beyond what they might already get from Five Eyes membership?”

**UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:**  Well, I think the thing about it is these are emerging technologies in Pillar II.  I mean, these are things that are developing, so that it’s a very exciting prospect to think the three countries and other countries who might be involved will be developing new technologies together that could be interoperable and connected.  And so it’s not only having the three countries who can use their knowledge and experience from the military and also from academia and from industry, who are all going to be part of this, working together to develop new technologies that can be interoperable.

And so of course there’s the military side of it, but there’s also academia.  As I said, we’re going to be – we have universities amongst the three countries who are already starting to work together.  We’re talking to our young people about it because AUKUS is going to be a 70-, 80-year process, so the next two generations working on it.  So it’s really going to be government, industry, academia, military all working together on these new technologies.

So yeah, you can see part of it’s military, but part of it is also a lot more in terms of what we’re going to be able to do in terms of students who are in STEM who can get involved in this kind of work.  So, and then of course we can bring in more countries that can also benefit from that.  They can also share in that and they can also be part of this interoperability that we have.  And so it will build on whatever existing relationships that are out there amongst the countries who are part of it.

**MODERATOR:**  Okay, I think we have time for one more question.  We have Colin Clark from *Breaking Defense* in Sydney, Australia, in the live queue.  Colin, you should be able to unmute yourself now.

**QUESTION:**  Hopefully that worked.

**MODERATOR:**  We can hear you.

**UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:**  Yes.

**QUESTION:**  Excellent.  So there was three point something billion in the House supplemental that just passed for submarine industrial base.  And my question is:  Is this effectively moving the Australian money into U.S. coffers, or is this new money for the U.S. submarine industrial base?

**UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:**  Yeah, I believe – and I will check, but I believe that’s new money.  I don’t – I think that’s new money that’s going into the industrial base.  I can check on that and get back to you, but I think it’s new money.  That’s my understanding.

**MODERATOR:**  All right, thank you.  And now, Under Secretary Jenkins, if you have any closing remarks, I’ll turn it back to you.

**UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:**  Well, first of all, just thank you for hosting this.  Thank you for everyone who’s asking questions or just listening.  I know a bulk of the questions at this point are really about new partners, which is actually a very exciting part of where we are now.

I guess there’s just a couple points.  One is that – I said this already – all the work that’s already gone into this, I mean, it’s hard to say – as I said already, to say in here how much has been done by all three countries.  And that’s one of the innovative things about AUKUS, is that we have been able to move in the direction that over 80 percent of technology and everything that we can now share amongst all three countries that we – much more than we could before, once everything is done.  And that’s exciting in terms of what we’re able to do.

I think we still have to, of course, do a few more things, but I think we’re feeling pretty good that we’ll be able to get this done in the 240 days, which, as I said, is so much faster than we could normally do anything like this, and the amount of openness in terms of technology that we have between the three countries is important.

Second of all, we want to continue to be transparent.  We want to continue to talk to countries about this.  I know there’s still concerns from different aspects of AUKUS that people have and countries have.  But the best way to get through some of that is to have these kind of conversations and to continue to talk through it and answer questions about it and to be as transparent as we can be, both in this kind of forum but also in forums like the International Atomic Energy Agency, where we are working very closely with them.

So just thank you very much for taking part in this, and that we look forward to having more conversations with anyone who wants to know more about what AUKUS is doing and where we’re heading in the future.  So thank you.

**MODERATOR:**  Thank you so much, Under Secretary Jenkins.  That brings us to the end of our time today.  I’m sorry we couldn’t get to all questions.  Thank you so much to everyone who asked questions, and huge thanks to Under Secretary Jenkins for joining us.

We will provide a transcript of this briefing to participating journalists as soon as it is available.  We’d also love to hear your feedback.  You can contact us at any time at AsiaPacMedia@state.gov.  Thanks again for your participation, and we hope you can join us for another briefing soon.  Take care.

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