NUREG/CR-4310

SAND85-7247

RP

Printed November 1985

CONTRACTOR REPORT

Investigation of Potential FireRelated Damage to Safety-Related

Equipment in Nuclear Power Plants

John Wanless

NUS Corporation

2740 Sand Hill Road

Menlo Park, California 94025

Prepared by

Sandia National Laboratories

Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185 and Livermore, California 94550

for the United States Department of Energy

under Contract DE-AC04-76DP00789

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIiSSION

WASHINGTON, LIBRARY D.Q. 20655

STOP 555

Prepared for

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
NOTICE

This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United

States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their em- ployees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the

results of such use, of any information, apparatus product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such

third party would not infringe privately owned rights.

Available from

GPO Sales Program

Division of Technical Information and Document Control

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C. 20555

and

National Technical Information Service

Springfield, Virginia 22161
NUREG/CR-4310

SAND85-7247

RP

INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL

FIRE-RELATED DAMAGE TO SAFETY-RELATED

EQUIPMENT IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

John Wanless

NUS Corporation

2740 Sand Hill Road

Menlo Park, California, 94025

Printed: November 1985

Sandia Project Monitor: Dennis L. Berry

Prepared for

Sandia National Laboratories

Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185

Operated by

Sandia Corporation

for the

U. S. Department of Energy

Work performed under Sandia Contract No. 58-3430

Prepared for

Electrical Engineering Instrumentation and Control Branch

Division of Engineering Technology

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555

Under Memorandum of Understanding 40-550-75

NRC FIN No. A-10O

ABSTRACT

Based on a review of vendor information, fire damage reports.

equipment qualification and hydrogen burn test results, and

material properties, thirty-three types of equipment found in

nuclear power plants were ranked in terms of their potential

sensitivity to fire environments. The ranking considered both

the functional requirements and damage proneness of each

component. A further review of the seven top-ranked components

was performed, considering the relative prevalence and potential

safety significance of each. From this. relays and hand

switches dominate as first choices for fire damage testing with

logic equipment, power supplies, transmitters, and motor control

centers as future candidates.

iii/iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION 1

2.0 EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION AND FUNCTIONALITY

DETERMINATION 3

2.1 FWA/FSAR REVIEW AND EQUIPMENT LIST SUPPLEMENTATION 3

2.2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVIEW 5

2.3 VENDOR CONTACT 7

3.0 LITERATURE SEARCH 9

4.0 TEST DATA 19

4.1 NON-NUCLEAR TEST DATA 19

4.2 EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION TESTS 19

4.3 HYDROGEN BURN SURVIVABILITY 20

4.3.1 IDCOR - Equipment Survivability 20

4.3.2 EPRI Intermediate Scale Studies 23

4.3.3 EPRI Large Scale Tests 25

4.3.4 TVA (Fenwal) Tests 27

5.0 FUNCTIONALITY 29

6.0 MATERIALS OF CONSTRUCTION/VENDOR CONTACT 30

7.0 RELIABILITY DATA CHECK 32

8.0 EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONALITY/DAMAGEABILITY RANKING 33

8.1 EQUIPMENT RANKING EXAMPLE 49

8.2 EQUIPMENT SUMMARY RANKING 50

9.0 EQUIPMENT TEST RECOMMENDATIONS 51

9.1 GENERAL TEST RECOMMENDATIONS 51

9.2 HIGH SENSITIVITY TEST RECOMMENDATIONS 51

9.3 MEDIUM SENSITIVITY TEST REQUIREMENTS 53

9.4 MEDIUM LOW SENSITIVITY TEST REQUIREMENTS 54

9.5 LOW SENSITIVITY TEST REQUIREMENTS 55

V
LIST OF EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT

NUMBER

2-1

2-2

2-3

3-1

3-2

3-3

SAMPLE EQUIPMENT INFORMATION FORM

SAMPLE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

EXAMPLE LETTER

LITERATURE/EXPERT OPINION SEARCH

LER SUMMARY 1969 - 1984

LITERATURE SEARCH DOCUMENTS

PAGE

NUMBER

4

6

8

10

12

17

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE

NUMBER

4-1

4-2

4-3

4-4

6-1

8-1

8-2

8-3

IDCOR EQUIPMENT DATA

EPRI INTERMEDIATE SCALE HYDROGEN BURN EQUIPMENT DATA

EPRI LARGE SCALE HYDROGEN BURN EQUIPMENT DATA

TVA (FENWAL) HYDROGEN BURN EQUIPMENT DATA

VENDORS CONTACTED

EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONALITY/DAMAGEABILITY MATRIX

BASIS FOR EQUIPMENT MEASURE OF WORTH RANKINGS

MATRIX REFERENCES

PAGE

NUMBER

21

23

25

27

30

33

37

40

vi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

by

Dennis L. Berry

Sandia National Laboratories

Background

The Fire Protection Research Program at Sandia National

Laboratories is investigating for the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission the phenomena associated with the occurrence.

propagation, extinguishment, and control of fire in nuclear power

plants and the ability of equipment and operators to cope with

fire. Currently, the program emphasizes testing and analysis to

provide a data base for fire risk assessments. This data base is

needed, because probabilistic estimates of fire risk have

appeared quite large relative to other accidents threatening

nuclear power plants and because questions have arisen regarding

the completeness and accuracy of the fire risk assessment

results.

One topic which has received sparse treatment in fire risk

assessments is the damage threshold of equipment. Except for

assessing cable failures at an insulation autoignition

temperature, little effort has been made to address failure

mechanisms of equipment resulting from:

- high humidity conditions associated with suppression

activities

- high temperatures below autoignition limits

- highly corrosive vapors given off by cable fires or

gaseous suppression agents

The effects of high temperatures, corrosive vapors, high

humidities, and exposure durations have not been determined for

power plant safety equipment under fire conditions. As a result,

fire risk assessments lack a supporting technical basis and often

have been forced to make use of the sparse data that may be

available.

Discussion

To address the lack of damageability data, equipment will be

tested in the Fire Protection Research Program under the

reproducible conditions of a fire simulation test chamber.

However, because of the costs of testing and the large variety of

components found in power plant safety systems, initial testing

must focus on those pieces of equipment believed to be most

functionally intolerant and most damage prone. In addition the

EXEC-I
importance of equipment to plant safety must be considered.

NUS Corporation, under contract to Sandia National Laboratories,

developed a fire sensitivity ranking of thirty-three types of

equipment found in nuclear power plant safety systems. The ranking

process and its results are reported herein, representing a

collection of vendor information, fire damage reports, equipment

qualification and hydrogen burn survival test results, and material

property reviews. At Sandia's request, NUS ranked the equipment on

the basis of a relative overall numerical score which reflects the

functional tolerance and damageability of each equipment type, based

on all available information related to fire environments. The NUS

rankings were developed without consideration of relative safety

importance, consequences of failure, or testing costs. In addition,

because of a lack of test information, the rankings assigned only

10% of the maximum ranking score to the possible damaging effects of

smoke particles and corrosion, despite the fact that test data may

later show these effects to be important.

As a result of their ranking process, NUS identified the

following highest ranking components in terms of decreasing

potential sensitivity to fire:

Recorders

Logic Equipment

Controllers

Power Supplies

Meters

Relays (Solid State and Electrical/Mechanical)

Hand Switches

For these and several other equipment types, NUS has developed in

their report general guidelines for performing damageability testing.

Where available, NUS has also provided sample procedures from

operating nuclear power plants for calibrating and testing the

components.

As a further refinement of the NUS ranking, Sandia assessed the

above components in terms of:

- their prevalence in power plant safety systems

- their importance for automatic or manual operation of

front-line systems

- their potential for effecting the loss of a complete safety

function

Using the LaSalle Nuclear Power Plant as representative, Sandia*

* Review performed by Mark J. Jacobus, Adverse Environment

Safety Assessment Division 6447

EXEC-2
reviewed equipment qualification lists of safety equipment to

identify the number of components from the NUS ranking which are

installed both generally in the plant and in front-line systems.

The findings of this review, listed below, show a much higher

occurrence of relays and hand switches in front-line systems than

the other five components ranked above them as potentially more

fire sensitive.

Number in LaSalle

Total Number Front-Line Systems

Recorders 25 3

Logic Equipment 114 33

Controllers 93 1

Power Supplies 40 10

Meters 127 102

Relays 771 524

Hand Switches 446 322

For purposes of the above list, front-line systems included:

Auxiliary Power

Nuclear Pressure Relief

Reactor Recirculation

Control Rod Drive

Neutron Monitoring

Reactor Protection

Battery and Distribution

Residual Heat Removal (inc. service water)

Low Pressure Core Spray

High Pressure Core Spray

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling

Systems not considered front line included heating, ventilating,

and air conditioning systems; gas treatment, leak detection,

and drainage system&; and radiation monitoring, combustible gas

control, and instrument nitrogen systems.

Conclusions

On the basis of a systematic assessment by NUS of thirty-three

types of equipment found in nuclear power plants, a component

ranking has been developed in terms of potential sensitivity to

fire environments. The ranking has considered both the functional

requirements and damage proneness of each component type, using

vendor information, fire damage reports, equipment qualification

and hydrogen burn test results, and material property reviews.

Considering the relative prevalence and operational significance

of the seven top-ranked components in power plant systems, relays

and hand switches dominate as the first choices for fire damage

threshold testing. Next to these components, other likely

candidates for future testing include logic equipment, power

supplies, transmitters, and motor control centers.

EXEC-3

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The ability of fires to damage equipment is well known. The

potential damage caused by fires in nuclear plants has resulted

in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations which strive

to limit the damage to safety-related equipment caused by fires.

These regulations are. however, non-mechanistic in that there is

no attempt to quantify either the degree of functionality of

equipment subjected to fire effects or the level of fire effects

necessary to damage safety-related equipment. The purpose of this

investigation is to establish, from existing utility documents,

non-nuclear data sources, vendor data, and test reports, the

relative sensitivity of nuclear plant safety-related equipment to

fire damage mechanisms.

Tn order to define the fire-sensitive ranking of equipment, three

major tasks were performed - 1) Equipment Identification and

Functionality Determinations. 2) Literature Search and Vendor Data

Gathering, and 3) Equipment Ranking. A fourth task, Testing

Measurement Definition, was performed to ensure that the

anticipated degree of equipment fire susceptibility will be

measured by test and monitoring equipment during fire simulation

testing. This task was arbitrarily placed under the third major

task because it occurred during the latter stages of the project.

Subtasks necessary to complete the three major task objectives

are shown below:

Task 1) Equipment Identification and Functionality Determination

1) Fire Hazards Analysis Review

2) Final Safety Analysis Report Review

3) Supplementation of Equipment List Data using

Equipment Qualification Reports

4) Technical Specifications Review

5) P & ID Review

6) Functionality Determination from Technical

Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation

7) Vendor Contact to Obtain Catalog Information

Task 2) Literature Search and Vendor Data Gathering

1) Literature Search

2) NOMIS/FOMIS* Inquiry

3) Hydrogen Burn Tests Reports Review

4) Vendor Specification/Equipment Qualification

Reports Review

5) Materials of Construction Evaluation

*Nuclear Operations Maintenance Information Service and Fossil

Operations Maintenance Information Service - NUS Corporation

Services, which provide for an interchange of ideas among

utility operations and maintenance departments.

1
Task 3) Equipment Ranking

1) Measure of Worth Evaluation to Determine Dominant

Expected Failure Causes

2) Failure Data Comparison

3) Testing Measurements Definition

The results of each task are discussed below. The final matrix

used to determine the fire sensitivity is given in Table 8-i.

This matrix is the major end product of the project. It ranks

nuclear power plant equipment most likely to be damaged by fire

effects.

2
2.0 EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION AND FUNCTIONALITY DETERMINATION

In order to choose representative equipment for evaluation witb

respect to fire damage potential, equipment types and their

functions were obtained for four nuclear plants - one nonoperating

pressurized water reactor (PWR). one operating PWR, one operating

boiling water reactor (BWR). and one nonoperating BWR. In order

to preserve anonymity and because only representative information

was desired, the plants have been designated A, B. C. and D

respectively.

2,1 FHS/FSAR REVIEW AND EQUIPMENT LIST SUPPLEMENTATION

Since the goal of the project is to determine the fire

damageability of equipment and its effect on equipment

functionality the Fire Hazards Analysis (FEA) for each plant was

used to identify equipment necessary for safe plant shutdown

during fires. In accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(NRC) requirements, the nuclear plants -studies had submitted an

FHA which includes, to varying degree, the safety-related

equipment needed to safely shut down each plant in the event of

fire.

The FRA equipment lists contain system, tag number, and type of

equipment without significant details about the manufacturer/model

number, physical characteristics, or functional characteristics of

the equipment. In order to obtain the missing data, other utility

documents were queried. These documents included equipment

qualification (EQ) reports, final safety analysis reports (FSAR),

instrument lists, piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID). and

other equipment identifying documents as necessary.

The results of the equipment identification process were compiled.

A total of 219 major items were identified. In addition, about

one-third of the major items had associated support equipment

which was listed. A sample form is shown in Exhibit 2-1. The

equipment information for plant D is summary in nature. The plant

D data was obtained during the visit to the utility, because the

FHA contained insufficient information to allow for completion of

the system, tag number, and equipment type parameters. A safetyrelated equipment list supplemented plant D equipment data.

For the three plants having detailed FHA information, the FHA

equipment parameters were supplemented by other data. In all

three cases, only major equipment items were identified in the

FHAs. Supporting equipment (see Exhibit 2-1) for plant A was

determined through an instrument list and P&ID review. Supporting

equipment for the other three plants (B, C. D) was-not identified,

but, since the major equipment types and manufacturers were

similar among all fur plants, supporting equipment was assumed to

be similar. Cost. scheduler and project scope constraints also

limited the search for supporting equipment.

3
SAMPLE EQUIPMENT INFORMATION FORM

System: Shutdown Cooling

Tag Numbers:

Equipment Type:

Description:

Manufacturer:

2HV 9316

Temperature Control Valve

ITT

Model No:

Rating:

Size:

Weight:

Qual. Temp:

Press:

Hum:

Op. Time:

V621 UHE U9VALZZ

250 psid, 400 deg F

Safety Function:

Cold Shutdown

Operational

Success Criteria:

Operating Time:

Support Equipment:

Regulates Shutdown Cooling flow through to Low Pressure

Safety Injection header.

ZSH/L (NAMCO EA170-11302), Solenoid (ASCO HT-8316 65),

Switch (MSC), Hand Controller (Foxboro 235 SM), E/I

Converter (Foxboro 2AO-V2I), E/P Positioner

(HD/C P51AI00).

Vendor Information:

References:

Failure Mechanisms:

Inst. Index

Loss of Power

Location:

EXHIBIT 2-1

4
The supporting equipment review performed by NUS onsite personnel

identified a large number of the panel-mounted and small

electrical/electronic devices expected to be most susceptible to

fire effects (see Section 8.0). In contrast, a review of the supporting equipment as determined from the equipment identification

forms generated by utilities was not found to be as comprehensive

for the major items. Since P & ID's don't contain information

such as relays which control major items, indicating lights for

position of major items, cable types which provide power and

control functions to major items. etc., these types of supporting

equipment were not listed on the equipment identification forms.

The instrument indexes and equipment lists reviewed also do not

have detailed information on supporting equipment. Therefore.

much of the supporting equipment was inferred from the type of

devices normally used in nuclear plants per NUS experience.

EQ reports and FSAR information were used to provide the operating

time, shutdown, safety function, and qualification parameters

listed on the Equipment Information Forms (see Exhibit 2-i). The

Data Bank (EQDB) provided manufacturer/model number and equipment

thermal and humidity withstand capability in the form of EQ test

parameters and environmental specifications. THe Nuclear News

Buyer's Guide was used to identify representative manufacturers/

model numbers where necessary.

2.2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVIEW

The functionality aspects of equipment were determined through a

review of the Technical Specifications (TS) for plant A and a

review of EQ reports and FSARs for the other plants. The

functional requirements, as stated in the TS, were used to

identify the necessary safety operations for the equipment and,

sometimes, the duration of required operability. A sample TS is

shown in Exhibit 2.2.

The TS and corresponding plant procedures define the appropriate

tests and test frequencies to ensure that the safety function for

the equipment is accomplished. By reviewing the TS/procedures,

the important functionality aspects of equipment items were

determined and recorded in tables. Only one set of TS was

reviewed, since the functional success criteria and limiting

conditions for operation (LCO) are similar for all nuclear

plants. Also, the Standardized Technical Specifications used by

NRC to review applications for plant operating licenses have

nearly identical approaches to success criteria and limiting

conditions for operation (LCO) when viewed from an

equipmentspecific basis. For example, although valve stroke time

may vary from about 10 to 60 seconds, valve operational success

(as noted in TS) is measured by a change of state. The stroke

time is mainly a function of equipment design rather than TS

requirements. For example a Limitorque valve operator of a given

size can be expected to perform as a function of design rather

than requirement.

5
SAMPLE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

FLOW PATHS - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.2 At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall

be OPERABLE:

a. The flow path from the boric acid tanks via a boric acid transfer pump

and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

b. Two flow paths from the refueling water storage tank via charging

pumps to the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.0

ACTION:

With only one of the above required boron injection flow paths to the Reactor

Coolant System OPERABLE, restore at least two boron injection flow paths to the

Reactor Coolant System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT

STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1% delta k/k

at 200OF within the next 6 hours; restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE

status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.2 At least two of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated

OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that the temperature of the heat

traced portion of the flow path from the boric acid tanks is greater

than or equal to (65) 0 F when it is a required water source.

b. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power

operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed,

or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

c. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by verifying that each

automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on

a __ test signal.

d. At least once per 18 months by verifying that the flow path required

by Specification 3.1.2.2.a delivers at least _ gpm to the Reactor

Coolant System.

# Only one boron injection flow path is required to be OPERABLE whenever the

temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to

(275)°F.

EXHIBIT 2-2

6

W-STS
Exhibit 2-2 is a sample page from the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications (I-STS). Item C under the title

"Surveillance Requirements" shows the ki-STS success criteria of

"...actuates to its correct position...° This level of detail is

consistent throughout the TS for any plant. Equipment specification parameters, such as valve stroke time, valve operator torque

output, tripping of valve operation internal limit switches, etc.,

must be determined from equipment specifications, rather than TS.

2.3 VENDOR CONTACT

Vendor contact was initiated as soon as the manufacturer and model

number of the equipment was determined. The inclusion of this

subtask in Major Task No. I was because of the long lead time expected for the return of vendor information. The results of the

vendor contact will be discussed in Section 6.0. A sample vendor

contact letter is shown in Exhibit 2-3.

7
EXAMPLE LETTER

CD-RC-84-407

-53, CCKP-'~w*-( IKX"September 12, 1984

3oy Manufacturing Co.

338 S. Broadway

P.O. Box 413C

New Philadelphia, OH 44663

ATTN: Mr. Rod Furniss

Dear Sir:

I am requesting information from your company concerning the

following equipment:

Joy Pans, Ventilation Exhaust

Models: SP-302060 SE

SF-2944B SER

This equipment is presently installed as safety related equipment

within operating or near term completion nuclear power plants.

The reason for this request is to assist the Sandia National

Laboratory* and the Nuclear Regulatory Comission in evaluating

fire related damage mechanisms to equipment and components which

perform safety functions during operations of nuclear power

facilities.

The specific information is the materials used in construction

for:

Fan Assembly A Casing

Bearings, Motor Manufacturer and Model Number

Additionally, any sales or product descriptive materials or

brochures, as well as any special fire retardancy tests performed

would be appreciated.

If you have any questions concerning this request or require

additional information, please do not hesitate to call me at 813-

796-2264, 8 a.m. until 5 p.m. EDT.

Cordially yours.

Allan E. Winters

Principal Engineer

Project Task Manager

/Id

*Reference: Sandia National Laboratory/NUS Corporation

Contract No. 58-3430; Sandia Project

Manager: Mr. Dennis Berry, Albuquerque, N.M.

EXHIBIT 2-3

8
3.0 LITERATURE SEARCH

In order to identify damage mechanisms caused by actual fires, a

literature search and expert opinion survey were performed.

Numerous sources of data were queried without much beneficial information uncovered. Most of the fire reports are concerned with

total loss of life and property. Practically no information exists on the d of equipment function loss. The reports

merely identify what failed. In addition, with the exception of a

Duke Power report and a Consolidated Edison report, no indication

of the nature of the equipment which successfully functioned

during fires was identified. (Summaries of the literature/expert

opinion search are shown in Exhibit 3.1)

A review of License Event Reports (LER's) was performed and summarized as shown in Exhibit 3.2. Note that each separate

paragraph is a direct quote from LER summaries with plant identifiers deleted.

Public Document Reference (PDR), NUS Library, and NUS Licensing

Information (LIS) literature sources were used for the literature

search. Data bases were queried for fire, fire damage, smoke,

smoke damage, heat, and heat damage keywords. A list of potentially useful documents was ordered through the PDR. A detailed

list is shown in Exhibit 3-3.

In addition to the documents reviewed (see Exhibit 3-3), a few

other documents were obtained and reviewed which contained little

or no relevant information. Included in this category are:

Proceedings from the International Symposiums on Combustion (1961

- 1976), Fire and Materials Magazines (1980 - 1983). The Nuclear

Experience Data File was also reviewed for pertinent data on fire

damage, but the data file was found to be redundant to the License

Event Reports and EPRI NP-3179.

9
EXHIBIT 3.1

Literature/Expert Opinion Search

McDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida - Using VSM (microfilm)

equipment, searched for Mil Specs and accident reports. Querried

areas included fire, fire damage, fire retardancy, smoke, smoke

damage, heat, damage reports. No information relative to project

found.

Society of Fire Prevention, Boston, MA - Via telephone conversation,

asked the society for any relative information related to project. No

information available.

General Telephone Company (GTE), Tampa, Florida, GTE Regional Loss

Prevention Unit - GTE has not had many fires within its operating

equipment during the last seven years. GTE related that they have had

computer and relay failures due to Halon Suppression System actuation

during testing. Further details were not available as a contractor is

responsible for clean-up and no formal report of any detail is filed.

Yankee Rowe Power Plant (YRPP), Mr. E. Sawyer, Fire Prevention Engineer - Mr. Sawyer is YRPP's Fire Prevention Engineer. He is

presently completing his doctoral thesis on 'Equipment Damage Due to

Activation of Fire Suppression Systems.' He indicated that he was not

aware of any available information related to this project. He is addressing NRC Inspection and Enforcement Notice 83-41, mActuation of

Fire Suppression System Causing Inoperability of Safety-Related

Equipment" but did not have, as yet, any information that would be of

value to the project.

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), Atlanta, GA - Various

calls were placed to INPO to no avail. Personnel did not seem to know

who would be the contact for any information or if information would

be available for disclosure to an outside agency.

American Nuclear Insurers (ANI), Mr. M. Ferranti - Mr. Ferranti did

not know of any investigations performed to the detail required. He

also indicated that any ANI reports would be proprietary. ANI has a

computer data bank but there is no "level of damage' keyword.

Florida State Fire Marshall, Mr. J. Martinez - Mr. Martinez indicated

that Florida State fire reports are not detailed enough to be used in

the project. The fire reports published by the Fire Marshall's office

for industrial facilities primarily deal with arson origination or

code violations.

University of Maryland, Dean of Fire Prevention Engineering, Dr. Bryan

-Dr. Bryan was not aware of any type of information related to the

project. He did not know of any reports or organizations having

pertinent reports. He said that, normally, fire investigations deal

with the fire cause. Equipment that was presumed damaged was

replaced. He did indicate the EPRI may have completed some work, but

was not sure what it was.

10
EXHIBIT 3.1 Continued

Factory Mutual Insurance, Mr. R. Brendal - Factory Mutual does not

have any detailed information on fire damage. Factory Mutual

primarily reviews and investigates fire causes related to their

insurance and inspects for code and policy violations which may reduce

insurance claims.

Factory Mutual Research, Mr. G. Weldon - Mr. Weldon was unaware of any

information pertaining to the project. He indicated that Factory

Mutual Research performs research in fire propagation, suppression,

retardancy, and consumer product safety, and not fire damage per se.

National Fire Prevention Agency, NFPA Nuclear and Fossil Power

Plan/Industrial Fire Prevention Engineer, Mr. Anderson - Mr. Anderson

was not aware of any information but did suggest calling the NFPA

Library. A literature list was sent by the library and reviewed by

NUS. Literature was ordered as follows:

1) Hazardous Chemical Reactions Pub. No. 419M

2) Set of Fire Complications Pub. No. SET-55

3) Flash Point Index - 9th Ed. Pub. No. SPP-51

4) Surface Burning - Building Material Pub. No. 255

5) Flammable and Combustible Liquids Pub. No. 321

6) Properties of Flammable Liquids Pub. No. 325M

7) Test-Smoke Generated by Solid Materials Pub. 258

No pertinent data was found in any of the above publications.

11
EXHIBIT 3-2

LER SUMMARY 1969 TO 1984

(Note: Each paragraph below is a separate quote from the published LER summaries with plant identifiers deleted.

During normal plant operation, a control operator observed the

"water spray" light for the 2A standby gas treatment train (SBGT)

energized. The 2A SBGT fire detection had initiated a water deluge

wetting the 2A SBGT filter.

When temperature switches TS5 and TS6 were removed for testing, it

was noticed that condensate had formed in the switches and the

switch junction box. A previous resistance reading across switch

TS5, which was one third full of water, was 40K ohms. The source

of condensation could not be found. Switches were replaced and

sealed.

During normal operation, while hydrotesting the recently installed

fire sprinkler system in reactor building, a gasket in a flow

switch in a water line failed and water sprayed into 125 VDC

starter racks for RCIC and RHR. One of the auxiliary contacts on

starter for RCIC-MO-131 shorted and valve automatically opened.

RCIC system was declared inoperable to repair shorted contact.

Redundant emergency core cooling systems were operable, thus this

event presented no adverse consequences from standpoint of public

health & safety.

Fire sprinklers were hydrotested. As a result, a contact shorted

in RCIC starter rack. Gasket and flow switch were reinstalled.

Starter racks were cleaned and dried. Contact was replaced and

correct operations of RCIC-MO-131 verified. Waterproofing of

affected electrical equipment is being investigated.

It was discovered that an inadvertent actuation of the fire service

deluge system resulted in damage to auxiliary building ventilation

exhaust filter AHFL-2A in excess of two-thousand ($2,000) dollars.

Auxiliary building ventilation was shifted to AHFL-2B at 1300.

This is the first occurrence of this type reported. The cause of

this event is attributed to personnel error. The inadvertent

actuation occurred while attempting to reset a fire service panel

alarm. Post replacement testing is scheduled.

Water seeped into the local actuation switch of fire protection

water spray for charcoal filter associated with control room

pressurization fans. This caused actuation of the fire spray

system and lockout of the fans. The spray was valved off, but the

fans would not reset until the local control box was drained and

dried out.

Water in control cabinet shorted the auto start relay contact

causing auto start block alarm. Water removed and cabinet dried.

Required surveillance completed satisfactorily and the Diesel

Generator demonstrated operable. The seams betweeen ceiling and U2

and U3 Diesel Generator Room vent, ductwork, have been sealed with

RTV to prevent recurrence.

12
EXHIBIT 3-2 (Continued)

LER SUMMARY 1969 TO 1984

With Unit 1 at steady state power of 2272 MWT, Unit 2 transformer

fire protection preoperational test on 2C startup transformer was

being performed when arc occurred around the phase 2 230KV bushing.

230KV bus C overcurrent relay on phase 2 tripped instantaneously

causing deenergization of startup transformers iC & 2C. Exact

cause of arc is not clearly understood although water spray from

deluge system was major factor. One nozzle on deluge system was

wetting phase 2 and phase 3 bushings and wind was blowing.

A fire occurred inside a temporary storage shed, in a warehouse

storage area. A total of 14 valves were damaged in varying

degrees. Electrical short in one of light fixtures in shed.

Controller and circuit breaker assembly were destroyed by fire.

The equipment in question was Allis Chalmers 600-208 V motor

control center. Cause was failure of contacts on the breaker

assembly due to improper maintenance and handling. Corrective

action involved training of plant personnel in proper maintenance &

installation.

During normal operation an annuciator signal was received on a high

pressure coolant injection (HPCI) valve overload/loss of control

power. During investigation, a fire was found in BMCC6 for 23

MOVl6. Initiated fire procedures and de-energized valve breaker.

HPCI temporarily inoperative. Open manually 23 MOVl6, restoring

HPCI. Apparent Overload. Still being investigated.

During normal operation the A160/480 volt, dry type, transformer

feeding 480 volt essential bus IA, failed and caught fire.

Interruptible instrument power BUS 1C lost power and the main

turbine generator tripped. The reactor was manually scrammed. The

dry type ITE 4160/480 volt shorted turn-to-turn in one phase of the

low voltage windings. Resulting fire extinguished by plant

personnel using portable fire extinguishers. Transformer replaced

in kind.

Near the end of the weekly thirty-minute run time of the turbine

emergency oil pump, a fire alarm was received from the battery

room. The plastic tops of two cells of "A" station battery were on

fire and were extinguished by a short burst from a C02

extinguisher. At no time did the battery lose power or give any

indication of problems. The damage was contained to the top of the

cell jars and does not appear to have hurt the cell internals. No

electrolyte was lost. The cause of the fire appears to have been

resistance heating of a strap-to-cell terminal connection during

the heavy D.C. load of the emergency oil pump. All other

connections were inspected and tested. Adequate capacity of 58

cells was verified and the battery was returned to service. New

cells were ordered.

13
EXHIBIT 3-2 (Continued)

LER SUMMARY 1969 to 1984

With the plant in hot standby, a fire occurred in the "A" charging

pump controller located in motor control center MCC 22-1E (B51)

which is powered from 480V emergency BUS 22E. The fire was

extinguished when MCC B51 was deenergized. The deenergization of

B51 and its feeder to regulated instrument AC BUS IAC-I resulted in

the fire from electrical arcing of the controller to bus

connection. Text is unclear about further details.

Fire in "A" charging pump controller resulted from arcing of supply lead to one of the bayonet fittings connecting the controller to

BUS B51. Problems have been previously experienced with the G.E.

type lC7700 relay.

Transformer fire protection deluge system operation caused water to

short out transformer and electrical protective circuits. Caused

turbine lockout and scram. Reactor pressure peaked but one relief

valve did not open. Similar malfunction of relief valve at this

reactor occurred previously.

Leaking rainwater shorted deluge system. Target Rock relief valve

malfunctioned caused by leak in bellows assembly.

During daily SRM operability check, SRM detector could not be

withdrawn from the core. Investigation revealed that 18 relays in

the SRM/IRM detector drive relay cabinet had suffered fire damage.

Damaged relays and associated wiring were replaced and system was

tested. One similar occurrence with this relay type was previously

reported.

Apparent overheat and failure of coil of a GE type CR 120 relay

caused flammable plastic contact retainer clips to catch fire. The

fire was self-extinguishing.

Damage to portion of plant protection logic resulted from a partial

short circuit in K-31 relay for residual heat removal (RHR)shutdown

cooling isolation valve MO-10-18 which caused relay to overheat.

The plastic contact arm retainer ignited and a minor fire

communicated to adjoining relays. It was extinguished. Unit

shutdown. No previous occurrence.

GE CR120A industrial control relay coil failed. Affected relays

and equipment replaced and tested. No additional details provided.

Fire occurred in the motor control center in the auxiliary

building. The fire was extinguished utilizing C02 and dry

chemicals. Cause was misaligned stabs resulting in electrical

arcing subsequently igniting vertical insulating barrier. No

further details provided.

14
EXHIBIT 3-2 (Continued)

LER SUMMARY 1969 to 1984

Misaligned stab assemblies connected to breaker associated with

pump starter caused electrical arc to develop which subsequently

ignited vertical insulating barrier.

Spurious fire protection system deluge actuation occurred in north

cable riser area of control building. Cause unknown. No fire or

smoke observed in area. No corrective action planned.

Deluge spray system inadvertently activated. Caused by accidental

tripping of manual trip level. Fire watch established. Design

change implemented.

Smoke detector panel failed to operate. Caused by water entering

panel from concrete drilling operation. Work instructions revised

to ensure fire alarm panels adequately protected.

Sprinkler system that protects diesel generator G-002 spuriously

initiated leaving actuation fire detection sys inoperable until

reset. Cause unknown. Firewatch established.

Fire observed in fire detection instrumentation panel 1FP3. Panel

de-energized and several fire detectors rendered inoperable.

Caused by failure of panel alarm buzzer relay. Relay replaced.

Fire detection system trouble alarms could not be cleared & EFA

zones 63 and 64 declared inoperable. Caused by corrosion due to

water leakage into data gathering panel. Failed components

replaced.

Ionization smoke detector failed channel functional test. Caused

by deterioration of integral printed circuitry due to boric acid

deposits in Honeywell detector type TC 100A.

Pilot valve failure in fixed water spray system resulted in control

room alarm. Caused by leakage past pilot valve seat due to

corrosion and settling of pilot valve seat by fixed water spray

system leakage. Corrosion removed.

Fire detection alarms & master solenoid relay found inoperable.

Caused by defective wiring & moisture. Wiring changed & detector

dried.

During normal operation, while hyrotesting reactor building fire

sprinkler system gasket in a water line flow switch failed and

water sprayed into 125 volt DC starter racks for reactor core

isolation cooling.

15
EXHIBIT 3-2 (Continued)

LER SUMMARY 1969 to 1984

While securing a diesel generator from control room,

caught on fire. Cause undertermined. Relays were

recalibrated, and checked.

two relays

replaced,

Both control room pressurization fans were inoperable. Caused by

water seepage into a fire protection system switch resulting in

actuation of fire spray system and lockout of the fans.

16
EXHIBIT 3-3

LITERATURE SEARCH DOCUMENTS

1) Letter from A. C. Thies, Duke Power Company, to F. E. Kruesi,

US Atomic Energy Commission, with attached report "1B2 Reactor

Coolant Pump Motor Oil Leak and Fire, December 30, 1972,"

dated January 26, 1973.

2) Letter from W. F. Conway, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power

Corporation, to T. A. Ippolito, US Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, dated March 14, 1980, (transformer fire).

3) Letter from A. C. Thies, Duke Power Company, to A. Giambusso,

US Atomic Energy Commission, with attached report "Oconee

Nuclear Station, March 6, 1973, lAl Reactor Coolant Pump Oil

Fire Incident Report,* dated May 4, 1973.

4) Letter from W. E. Caldwell, Consolidated Edison Company of

New York, to P. A. Morris, US Atomic Energy Commission, with

attached report "Indian Point Primary Auxiliary Building and

Equipment," dated December 6, 1971.

5) Letter from J. P. O'Reilley, US Atomic Energy Commission, to

W. W. Lapsley, Consolidated Edison Company of New York, dated

January 19, 1972. (cable repair inspection.)

6) Letter from W. J. Caldwell, Jr., Consolidated Edison Company

of New York, to J. P. O'Reilly, US Atomic Energy Commission,

not dated. (restoration plan test results)

7) Letter from B. B. Stephenson, Commonwealth Edison Company,

Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station, to A. Giambusso, US Atomic

Energy Commission, dated March 16, 1973. (hydrogen burn)

8) Letter from F. A. Palmer, Commonwealth Edison Company, QuadCities Nuclear Power Station, to J. F. O'Leary, US Atomic

Energy Commission, dated July 24, 1972. (cable tray fire)

9) Cain, C. et al. Interim Report entitled "Program for Sampling,

Analysis, and Cleanup of Residue on Affected Structures,

Systems, and Components, dated May 22, 1975. (TVA Brown's

Ferry fire)

17
EXHIBIT 3-3 (continued)

10) Beland, B., "Examination of Electrical Conductors Following a

Fire, "Departmenty of Electrical Engineering, University of

Sherbrooke.

11) Robinson, J. N. and Rau Jr., C. A. "Analyzing Failures - Some

Advice and Examples, "Mechanical Engineering, July, 1984.

12) Dungan, K. W., and Lorenz, M. S., "Nuclear-Power-Plant FireLoss Data, "Professional Loss Control, Inc., prepared for

Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI Report No. NP-3179,

July, 1983.

13) Telephone Conversations

persons/organizations:

with the following

Name Organization Date

E. Sawyer

D. Perspacker

M. Ferrante

J. Martinez

Dr. Bryan

R. Brendal

G. Weldon

J. Anderson

J. Kestler

Society of Fire Protection

Yankee Rowe

GTE Florida

INPO

American Nuclear Insurers

Florida State Fire Marshall

Univ. of Md. Fire Prevention Dean

Factory Mutual Insurance

Factory Mutual Insurance

NFPA

Eastern Airlines

Bay Area Rapid Transit

June 13, 1984

June 12, 1984

June 13, 1984

June 12, 1984

June 11, 1984

June 7, 1984

June 6, 1984

June 6, 1984

June 6, 1984

June 6, 1984

June 13, 1984

July 5, 1984

18
4.0 TEST DATA

Two sets of nuclear related test data were evaluated to determine

temperature and moisture susceptibility of equipment during fire

incidents - Equipment Qualification (EQ) and Hydrogen Burn Survivability Test Reports. Another source. (i.e.. non-nuclear test

data) obtained from a literature search, provided little data.

The non-nuclear literature was not evaluated further. Both sets

of nuclear related tests have been performed to assess equipment

performance under high temperature. The EQ tests were performed

in a steam environment, the hydrogen burn survivability tests used

steam to heat up the test vessels to above ambient temperatures.

Failures of equipment in either type of test could be the result

of either heat or moisture effects or both.

4.1 NON-NUCLEAR TEST DATA

A search for non-nuclear test data which addressed the sensitivity

of equipment located in mild environments, i.e., not subjected to

high temperature and steam environments, was conducted through the

literature contained in standard reference indexes. Few citations

of fire-related damage to equipment were found. All published

reports referred to either complete destruction of equipment or to

financial loss, with the exceptions noted in the following

paragraph.

Three promising non-nuclear citation titles were found however -1)

"Electronic Vulnerability to Fire Related Carbon Fibers," 2) "Small

Scale Laboratory Flammability Tests of Electronic Components," and

3) "Testing of Telecommunication Equipment." The first citation

described tests performed on stereo amplifiers which showed the

potential for carbon fibers to cause erroneous signals in

electronic equipment. Soot, however, did not cause erroneous

signals. The test was performed to study the effects of aircraft

cable fires. The second citation merely discussed the flammability

of electronic conponents without discussing the susceptibility of

the components to external fire sources. The third citation was an

oral technical presentation without any published record.

4.2 EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION TESTS

An unpublished EPRI report on sealing methods employed to exclude

moisture during EQ tests indicated moisture sensitivity for a few

devices. Summaries of EQ experience along with indications of

potential thermal and moisture sensitivities were published by NRC

in Inspection and Enforcement (IE) Notices 81-29, 82-52, and 83-72.

Other IE Bulletins (IEB) and Notices (IEN) which identified

potential sensitivities were: IEB 84-01, IEN 82-04, IEN 82-13,

IEN 84-20, and IEN 84-47. These documents along with engineering

judgment applied to EQ test reports of qualified equipment were

factored into the Functionality/Damageability Matrix of Section

8.0.

19
In addition, the EPRI Equipment Qualification Data Bank (EQDB) was

queried for thermal test parameters of equipment qualified for

harsh environments, i.e., equipment located inside containment or

equipment subjected to elevated temperature because of steam line

breaks. Equipment which passed EQ tests at elevated temperatures

were judged more resistant to high temperatures and moisture than

equipment not subjected to EQ tests unless other data (see Section

4.3) indicated a potential weakness.

4.3 HYDROGEN BURN SURVIVABILITY

The equipment listed in Tables 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4 has either

been analyzed for potential hydrogen burn failures or tested in

actual hydrogen burns. Summaries of the failures predicted to occur or which have occurred are given below. A short description

of the test conditions in each test is also included. Note that

all equipment in the hydrogen burn tests below is Class IE

qualified for LOCA conditions. The limiting operating temperatures were obtained from the test data, other EQ tests, EQDB

values and/or manufacturer's data. The temperatures are predicted

not actual levels of operability in high temperature environments.

Equipment located outside the containment in the auxiliary building or secondary containment is often identical to that located

inside containment because the environments in the latter two

areas is often nearly as severe as inside containment. Also many

utilities make no distinction in specifying equipment located inside containment and outside containment.

Some of the equipment listed in the functionality matrix of Table

8-1 is located in control or electrical rooms and, therefore, not

qualified to LOCA environments because, Regulatory Guide 1.89does

not require that equipment located in mild environments be tested.

Such equipment should be more likely to experience failures during

fire conditions. Despite the fact that some equipment may be

relatively more sensitive to fire, the failure modes occurring in

the hydrogen burn test for the qualified equipment are indicative

of failure modes for all equipment in a fire because hot and wet

environments occur during both hydrogen burn tests and fires.

However, it should be noted that successful operation during

hydrogen burn tests does not imply successful operation in nuclear

plant fires, although the relative sensitivity is addressed.

4.3.1 IDCOR - Eguipment Survivability

The IDCOR (Industry Degraded Core Rulemaking), effort is an industry program to resolve questions raised by the TMI-2 incident.

One purpose of IDCOR was to analytically evaluate the effects of

hydrogen burn on the ability of safety-related equipment to

perform. The assumptions included the specification of bounding

temperature and pressure environments inside reactor containment

buildings caused by hydrogen burn. Four nuclear plants (Zion,

Sequoyah, Peach Bottom, and Grand Gulf) were used as reference

plants. Computer codes, i.e., HEATING-5 for equipment response

and MAPP for environment definition, were used to determine

20
whether equipment could survive the predicted environments. Maximum conditions were calculated to be from 22 psia to 149 psia and

from 220 F to 560 F depending on location of the equipment in the

plant and the postulated accident sequence causing the release of

hydrogen.

Table 4-1 is a list of equipment evaluated by IDCOR. The equipment predicted to fail is marked by an asterisk (*). All other

equipment was predicted to survive the hydrogen burn environment.

The survivability was generally predicted by calculating the maximum temperature rise of each equipment type using HEATING-5 and

comparing the calculated rise to existing equipment qualification

test data. In some cases, comparison of the temperature rise to

equipment material heat resistance properties or analyses of time

lag (insulation) properties of materials of construction were used

to determine survivability.

21
Table 4-1

IDCOR Equipment Data

Size

Model No. (Approx.)

Weight Limiting

Equipment Type (Approx.) operating Temp.

Check Valve

Motor Operator

Thermocouple

Solenoid Valve

Level Transmitter

Motor Operator

* Fan Motor

* Pressure Transmitter

Solenoid Valve

Motor Operator

Level Transmitter

PUMP

Solenoid Valve

* Connectors

Electrical Penetration

Solenoid Valve

Level Transmitter

Motor Operator

* Electrical Penetration

Manufacturer

Not Given

Limitorque

Not Given

Target Rock

Barton

Limitorque

Westinghouse

Fisher & Porter

Asco

Limitorque

Barton

Bingham

Automatic Valve Co.

Burndy

GE

Asco

Rosemount

Limitorque

(Reliance Motor)

Westinghouse

(Okonite & Rockbestos Cables)

SMB-2

77J-001

764

SMB-I

Frame 200

(200 HP)

Class F

50 EP1041

BCXA-N

LB-831654

SMB-000

763

AVC-C5450

Hylink-SYV

Series 100

HTX8320A20

1152

SB-1-40

Modular

Type B13

46"x18"x16*

24"x9"x18"

8"x8"x3"

40"xl8*xl6"

300 lbs 350~400*F

300

15

250

lbs

lbs

lbs

385-435" F

380-420OF

350-400OF

325*F WCAP-7829)

290OF

6*x5"x2"

24*xl8"x15"

8" x8w"x3"

3"xl~xl"

24"xl2"x12

6*x5*x2l

5"x5%x7"

40"xl8wxl6"

10

120

15

1

500

10

5

250

lbs

lbs

lbs

330OF

350-400*F

380-420"F

340OF

3380F

900OF

330OF

3500F

350-400OF

lb

lbs

lbs

lbs

lbs

24"x12"xl2" 500 lbs 340OF

* Equipment predicted by CLASIX analysis to fail.

Data from "IDCOR Task 17-Equipment Survivability in a Degraded Core Environment"

NOTE: No testing performed - all analysis using CLASIX Code.
4.3.2 EPRI Intermediate Scale Studies

The EPRI Intermediate Scale Equipment Surviability experiments were

performed to assess the ability of safety-related equipment to

perform when subjected to hydrogen burn in relatively small rooms.

The test vessel used was a cylindrical tank, 17 feet high and 7

feet in diameter. The m4ximum internal air temperature in the

equipment specimens installed in the vessel was 572 F. The maximum

pressure inside the vessel was 49 psia. All Intermediate Scale

tests used steam to preheat the vessel to 160 F prior to hydrogen

ignition and water was sprayed inside the vessel during some tests.

Table 4-2 lists the equipment tested in this program. All

equipment performed before and after the tests, however, some

anomalies occurred during and shortly after the last and more

severe test. The test engineer reported no indication of operation

from the Limitorque limit switch contacts during the test, although

the NAMCO limit switch indicated that the motor operator did

function. Subsequent to the test, electrical arcing was observed

at the Limitorque operator when the vessel was opened and the motor

operator was energized. A few hours later, the arcing disappeared

and the motor operator functioned properly.

The equipment in the test vessel was partially disassembled in a

few minutes after the arcing disappeared. About one quart of water

drained from the Limitorque operator upon disassembly. The Conax

thermocouple connection head also had significant amounts of water

inside. No electrical abnormality for the thermocouple was observed

however. Trace amounts of water were found in the Asco solenoid

valve, the Weed RTD connection head, and the Foxboro connection

box. No water was found in the NAMCO limit switch or the Foxboro

electronics enclosure.

There was no scorching, charring, or other thermal damage to the

equipment observed. All anomalies including the failure of a cable

to pass a post-burn electrical test were attributed to moisture

intrusion. Preheating the vessel with steam and the use of water

sprays in the test chamber contributed to the water found in the

equipment. The O-rings used to seal the Foxboro transmitter and

Weed RTD were effective. The flat gasket seals used to otherwise

seal the equipment were only marginally effective at best.

Equipment having drains which allowed no collection of water inside

the equipment functioned properly. The Asco solenoid valve and the

Foxboro transmitter connection box showed signs of water intrusion,

but only trace amounts of condensation remained inside the

equipment.

23
Table 4-2

EPRI Intermediate Scale

Hydrogen Burn Equipment Data

Equipment Type

Motor Operator

Pressure Transmitter

Solenoid Valve

Limit Switch

Thermocouple

Resistance Temp. Detector

Hydrogen Ignitor

Assembly-Box, Xfmr,

Glow Plug

Thermocouples

Manufacturer

Limi torque

Foxboro

Asco

Namco Controls

Conax Corporation

Weed Instruments

GM Glow Plug

Xfmr. mfgr. unknown

Model No.

SMB- 000-2

NE13DM

NP831654E

EA180-11302

Dual Type E

IB5D/611

AC-7G

Size

(Approx.)

Inches

24"x18"x15"

15"x12"x6"

6"x6"x3"

6"x3"x3"

12"x2"x2"

18"x3"x3"

8"x8"x6"

Weight

(Approx.)

120 lbs

30 lbs

5 lbs

10 lbs

15 lbs

15 lbs

25 lbs

Predicted

Limiting

Operating Temp.

350/4000F

3500F

300°F

400/4500F

400°F

400/450°F

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Studies in

Fabricated

by Acurex

Data extracted from EPRI Report No. NP-2953 - June, 1983 "Hydrogen Combustion and Control

Intermediate Scale."
4.3.3 EPRI Large Scale Tests

The EPRI Large Scale tests were performed at the Nevada Test Site

in a large spherical dewar, 52 feet in diameter. The maximum

equipment temperature was 480 F. The vessel was preheated to 160

F and water sprays were used in the Intermediate Scale tests.

One difference between the Large Scale Tests and the Intermediate

Scale Tests was that during the Large Scale Tests the equipment

lead wires were enclosed in pressure tight hose rather than in

flexible conduit as in the Intermediate Scale Tests. However,

even though the hose was pressure tight water nevertheless

intruded through equipment or fitting openings and collected in

the equipment. Although this water collection problem was corrected through various means during the course of the test series,

the indication is that water intrusion is a problem during hot and

wet conditions.

Table 4-3 lists the equipment tested. The equipment with asterisks (*) experienced some failures/anomalies during the tests.

The failures were attributed to multiple severe burn environments

and water intrusion. The duration of the burn is short for

hydrogen burns but the phenomenon of equipment temperature rise

and moisture intrusion is anticipated to occur in other fire

testing. Most of the data from the tests remain unpublished and

therefore, only visual inspection results and assumed failure

mechanisms can be given.

Although much of the equipment experienced anomalies or failures

during the test series, many of the equipment types functioned

during six or more severe tests. The first five tests of the

series were scoping tests. Tests 7 through 15 are considered

severe. Table 4-3 contains a breakdown of components which failed

to function during three or more severe tests. These components

are marked with two asterisks (** A single asterisk (*) denotes

failure in one test.

Preliminary data review seemed to indicate that the Veritrak

transmitter is sensitive to high temperatures, while the NAMCO

limit switch appeared to be sensitive to moisture intrusion. The

Limitorque motor operator and Foxboro pressure transmitter were

sensitive to water collection as shown by their successful opera- tion subsequent to the corrective actions mentioned above. Comments by personnel involved in equipment qualification testing confirmed the sensitivity of some of the equipment to water

intrusion.

The hydrogen burn data is germaine to potential fire damage to

equipment because the environment produced by a hydrogen burn is a

hot, wet environment which is typical of that produced by a fire

with water suppression. The heat and moisture phenomena are expected to be similar to that experienced in a nuclear plant fire,

although the pressure effects of a hydrogen burn are not expected during fires. It is recognized that the long duration and lower

25
Table 4-3

EPRI Large Scale Hydrogen Burn Equipment Data

Equipment Type Manufacturer Model No.

* Pressure Transmitter Barton 763

* Pressure Transmitter Foxboro NE1IGH

* Pressure Transmitter Rosemount 1153GD

** Pressure Transmitter Veritrak 32XXI

* Pressure Transmitter Barton 764

* Pressure Transmitter Foxboro NE13DM

Pressure Transmitter Rosemount 1153DB5

** Pressure Transmitter Veritrak 76

* Motor Operator Limitorque SMB-000-10

Solenoid Valve Asco NP8316 65E

Solenoid Valve Valcor V70900-21-3

* Limit Switch Namco EA-180-11303

* Limit Switch Allen-Bradley 802T ATP

Ignitor Tayco

** Ignitor GM

Motor Reliance MTR-PWR

* Containment Penetration Westinghouse l2X3MOD

Containment Penetration Conax Low Voltage

Resistance Temp. Detector Minco S8810

Resistance Temp. Detector Rosemount 186-29-1

Resistance Temp. Detector RDF 21204

Manufacturer/Model No/Operability Data from *EPRI Quick Look

Tests" by G. E. Sliter, dated December 19, 1983.

* Anomaly/Failure in single test

SAnomaly/Failure in more than one test

Size

(Approx.)

8"x8"x3*

15"xl2fx6

5 x5*x7"

l2*x4wx4l

S"'x8"x3"

l5"xl2"x6

5"x5lx7l

12"x4"x4w

24"xl8lx5

6*x5lx2"

8"W4x4'

6"x3"x3'

3"x3"x4"

l8"x3wx3l

18lx3"x3*

18lx3*x3*

Report on

Weight

(Approx.)

15 lbs

" 30 lbs

5 lbs

15 lbs

15 lbs

S 30 lbs

5 lbs

15 lbs

120 lbs

10 lbs

15 lbs

10 lbs

10 lbs

15 lbs

15 lbs

15 lbs

EPRI Hydrogen

Predicted

Limiting

Operating Temp.

380-420*F

300-370°F

350°F

Unknown

380-420OF

300-370*F

350OF

Unknown

350-400OF

330°F

400-450OF

2480F

330-350OF

340°F

340-375OF

250*F

325-340*F

420OF

Burn Equipment
temperature produced by the burning of non-gaseous combustibles in

a nuclear plant can produce different phenomena than hydrogen

burning. However, the failure mechanisms from an equipment

perspective are thought to be similar. Essentially no data exists

on the severity or duration of fires and the time-related performance of equipment. Sensitivity to heat does not appear to be as

large a problem as moisture intrusion, as long as semiconductor

components are not overly affected by high temperatures. Both

Foxboro and Rosemount transmitters contain semiconductors - Foxboro has discrete components, Rosemount uses integrated circuits.

Both transmitters functioned well in severe hydrogen burns.

4.3.4 TVA (Fenwall Tests and Analyses

These tests were performed in a spherical vessel about six feet in

diameter (a small scale when compared to the EPRI tests.) Maximum equipment internal air temperature was about 230 F. Maximum

Vessel pressure was about 78 psia.

Table 4-4 indicates the equipment tested (five items) by a plus

(+). The other equipment was analyzed (four items - not tested)

by a utility sponsor of the tests (Mississippi Power and Light)

based on the test results. All equipment functioned as designed

during the tests.

27
Table 4-4

TVA (FENWAL) Hydrogen Burn Equipment Data

Equipment Type

Containment Penetrations

+ Hydrogen Igniter Assembly

Pressure Transmitter

+ Pressure Transmitter

hi

0 Pressure Switch

Radiation Monitor

Motor Operator

+ Solenoid Valve

+ Limit Switch

+ Regulator

Manufacturer

Westinghouse

Not Given

Rosemount

Barton

Pressure Controls

Victoreen

Model No.

1153

A-17

Size

(Approx.)

24"xl8"x18"

8"x8"x6"

9"x5"x5"

8"xS"x3"

8"x8"x4"

Weight

(Approx.)

500 lbs

25 lbs

15 lbs

30 lbs

15 lbs

10 lbs

10 lbs

10 lbs

Limiting

Operating Temp.

3000 0 F for 20 min. (test)

340°F (equip. qual.)

3500 F (equip. qual.)

380-420°F (equip. equal.)

600°F

350°F (equip. qual.)

200°F

3300F

300°F (equip. qual.)

Asco

Namco

Fischer

6"x5"x2"

8"x4 x3"

6"X6"X3"

+ Equipment tested - all others analyzed.

Data from MP&L letter to H. R. Denton of NRC on the subject of "Report on Equipment Survivability for a

Hydrogen Generation Evaluation," dated January 19, 1982. Additional data from the "Quarterly Progress Report

for the TVA Hydrogen Combustion Program" to NRC, dated December 15, 1980.
5.0 FUNCTIONALITY

The Technical Specifications (TS) for Plant A were reviewed for

important safety functions. The results of that review were

recorded in tables. The tabular information, in turn, was used

to identify plant procedures which determined equipment testing

requirements in compliance with the Technical Specifications.

By this process, the relationship between procedures and the

functional requirements necessary for plant safety can be

related to equipment testing requirements.

It is important to note that the safety functional requirements

of the TS are written from the perspective of what is necessary

to accomplish, for example, safe shutdown. Equipment is

selected to achieve the required functions. These safety

functions may vary in requirement, although identical equipment

may be specified to accomplish all similar functions.

Equipment performance assessments, therefore, can be based on

how well the equipment performance is maintained in terms of

minimum manufacturer guarantees or specifications rather than

TS. If minimum manufacturer specifications are maintained, the

TS requirements should be addressed. Because of the enveloping

of TS by manufacturer specifications, nuclear plants base their

periodic surveillance testing on manufacturer data, while

ensuring that such testing addresses TS requirements.

Only one plants's TS were reviewed because most of the safety

functions are generic when viewed from equipment performance

aspects. As mentioned above, equipment success criteria can be

thought of as independent of system function for specific kinds

of equipment. For example, although TS valve stroke time may

vary due to different system functional requirements, causing

different speed requirements' for specific valve operators, the

success criteria is how well the valve operator performs when

compared to manufacturer specifications. If the stroke time is

equal to or better than the manufacturer-specified maximum

stroke time. the equipment success from system function through

proper application of manufacturer specifications, allows for a

single set of TS to be generically applicable for all general

types of equipment addressed in the TS.

The plant procedures identified during the TS functional review

have been factored into equipment test requirements discussed

in Section 9:0

29
6.0 MATERIALS OF CONSTRUCTION/VENDOR CONTACT

Vendor data was collected from approximately 40 vendors (some large

corporations have many vendor companies within them). The list of

vendors is shown in Table 6-1. Materials data was sketchy except

for some publicly available equipment qualification reports and

vendor outline drawings which specified general materials of

construction. Some vendors offered to sell materials information.

These vendors would not supply any data beyond catalog information.

The factors mentioned above caused potential damageability

sensitivity to be judged on manufacturer environment specifications

and on thermal/moisture test data. Where materials data was

obtained, an assessment of material susceptibility to fire effects

was performed and the results were factored into the

functionality/damageability matrix shown in section 8.0.

30
TABLE 6-1

VENDORS CONTACTED

G & D

Gould (GNB)

Solidstate Controls (SCI)

Conax

Raychem

Samuel Moore

Joy Manufacturing

Crosby

Wiegand (Chromalox)

Namco

Siemans-Allis (Allis Chalmers)

Allen-Bradley

ITE Imperial (Gould ITE)

Cutler-Hammer (Eaton)

Louis Allis

Reliance

Barksdale

Static-O-Ring

ITT Barton

Ingersol-Rand

Crane Deming

Goulds

Byron Jackson (Borg-Warner)

Rockbestos (Cerro)

Electroswitch

Target Rock

Automatic Switch Company (Asco)

Weed Instruments

Fenwal

Buchanan

Brown Boveri (ITE)

Foxboro

Rosemount

Westinghouse

General Electric

Bailey Controls

Struthers-Dunn

Velan

Borg-Warner

John Crane

Limitorque

Love Controls

Leeds and Northrup

Amerace (Agastat)

31
7.0 RELIABILITY DATA CHECK

The purpose of reliability data checking was to identify any

reported failure modes which could be expected to be exacerbated by

fire effects. It was assumed that sensitivity to heat, moisture,

corrosive vapors, and particulates would be identified in

reliability data sources as penalty factors applied to failure

rates in normal environments.

Three reliability data sources were reviewed - IEEE 500-1984

"Reliability Data for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,* MIL-HDBK217C "Reliability Data, and NPRD-2 "Nonelectronic Parts Reliability Data." Some sensitivities to temperature, moisture, and corrosive

vapors were identified, but the stated sensitivities are

qualitative in nature and, therefore, the environmental

sensitivities data did not substantially alter the rankings of

Section 8.0.

IEEE 500 - 1984 initially appeared to have the most pertinent

environmental factors information. Penalty factor tables were

included in the standard. However, the high temperature and high

humidity penalty factors given in IEEE 500 are questionable. The

penalty factors tables often did not correspond to the failure rate

data given. The identifiers given in the environmental data table

did not, in many cases, match the equipment failure rate

identifiers. This lack of correspondence is probably due to

editorial errors.

In addition, the IEEE 500 penalty factors are applied differently

for different groupings of equipment. For example, the high

temperature penalty factor for induction motors is a "loss of life"

factor and cannot be evaluated as a short term factor, such as that

experienced during a fire. Induction motor transient capability

during thermal excursions is excellent based on other IEEE standard

testing methods (IEEE - 275, for example). On the other hand, the

thermal penalty factor for a level controller is five times less

than that of an induction motor and the considerations for

establishing the penalty factor are unstated. Equipment

specifications for sensitive devices, such as level controllers,

are quite stringent concerning high temperature environments of

even a transient nature. This and other similar examples of the

disparity between penalty factors and the lack of correspondence

mentioned above, made the use of this data source questionable.

Therefore, IEEE 500 data was not factored into the

Functionality/Damageability Matrix of Section 8.0.

Unlike IEEE 500, no penalty factors were given in the other two

references. Some qualitative failure modes were discussed and the

frequency of failure mode occurrence was given for a few small

components. To the extent possible, the qualitative data was

incorporated into the Section 8.0 matrix. Most of the data

reinforced the preliminary conclusions listed in the matrix,

therefore, the reliability references were used as confirmatory

information and are not specifically listed as Section 8.0 matrix

references.

32
8.0 EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONALITY/DAMAGEABILITY RANKING

Table 8-1 is the resulting equipment functionality/damageability

rankings matrix for the equipment/equipment properties identified

in Sections 1.0 through 7.0. The basis for making the selections

is given in Table 8-2. Matrix references are recorded in Table 8-

3.

The general process for determining the relative scores for equipment rankings was to conceptually identify what characteristics of

equipment were likely to be affected by fire characteristics

(heat, moisture, particulates or corrosive vapors). These effects

of fires were determined to be dominant failure mechanisms for

failures in any postulated fire. After identifying the failure

mechanisms, the characteristics of equipment which would render it

susceptible to the effects were assumed.

Engineering judgment was used to determine these 'Functionality" characteristics which would be most likely to be affected by the

mechanisms. The engineering judgment was enhanced by the fire

data documented in Sections 2.0 through 7.0. The-enhancement was

light, however, since little data on function degradation was

obtained.

The ranking scale was chosen after an extensive discussion of the

relative importance of equipment/damage mechanism parameters. The

ranking scale is comprehensive in that it covers all the identified equipment from nuclear plant equipment reviews (Section

1.0) and all the effects noted in Sections 3.0 through 7.0. The

ranking criteria is relative because more dominant mechanism effects and more sensitive equipment produce a greater score (more

likely to either fail or cause failures) and the subcategories

have a similar structure witkr more dominant/sensitive parameters

producing larger scores.

It should be noted that the ranking is based on inferred

functionality and damageability of equipment from manufacturer's

specifications, materials of construction, thermal/moisture test

data, and most common location of the equipment in the nuclear

plant. The ranking is not meant to be absolute, but relative. A

few hundredths difference among components implies the same expected sensitivity to fire effects.

The ranking scale of 0 to 1.0 is a measure of worth percentage

scale with 0 indicating no susceptibility to fire damage and 1.0

indicating highly sensitive equipment susceptible to virtually instantaneous failure because of any fire/suppression phenomena.

Since all equipment has some degree of protection from damage

caused by fires and resulting suppression, no equipment had a 1.0

score in the measure of worth rankings.

The ranking basis was initially broken down into functionality and

damageability categories. The relative importance of the

categories was set at 40 percent and 60 percent respectively be33
cause damageability was viewed as a direct and active effect, as

opposed to the indirect functionality which is a secondary

phenomenon only. Functionality loss is caused by a breakdown or

an absence of damageability protection. For example, a meter

could fail because of moisture damage to internal mechanisms

caused by a seal failure. The internal moisture is a direct

effect of fire suppression, the functional failure is an indirect

effect of the seal failure.

For the functionality category, the measure of worth was established by assessing the relative importance of the ranking

factors. Accuracy and complexity were viewed as having equal

importance because the margin of error for each category is small

when compared to the sensitivity category.

For the accuracy subcategory. the more accurate the specification,

the harder it is to achieve and maintain the specification. Also,

the accuracy normally can be affected quite easily by external

phenomena and, hence, electrical tolerances/specifications are

tight. The complexity subcategory is used to evaluate the number

of parts or outputs. The larger the number of components or

outputs, the more chance for failure.

It should be noted that the hydrogen burn data (Reference 14 in

Table 8-1). used to rank certain components in Table 8-1 may

reflect shorter durations and lower temperatures than those

produced by the burning of nongaseous combustibles in power

plants. However, essentially no other data exists which can be

used to relate the performance of equipment in the hot, wet

environments produced by a fire with water suppression. Despite

this limitation, the equipment failure mechanisms observed under

hydrogen burn conditions are thought to be similar to those which

would occur during a conventional fire. It should be recognized,

though that actual fire environment testing of equipment may

produce failure mechanisms and damage sensitivities that differ

from those observed during hydrogen burn test conditions and

reflected under the "Hi Temp" column in Table 8-1.

34
Table 8-1

Equipment Functionability/Damageability Matrix

EQUIPMENT

TYPE

Cables,

Accuracy

(REPS)

not-3i '

Complexity

(REFS)

Sensitivity

(REFS)

mi n 13,

ParticuHiTemp Moisture* lates

(REFS) (REFS) (REFS)

Corrosive

Vapors

(REFS)

TOTAL

Nft vi 1 ~t vii ft vi~ nfl I ft ~'i~ "i'

Ln

(33, (33,

Cables, 1E .08(33) 0(33) .10(33) 0 14) 0 14) 0(33) 0(33) .18

Fans 0(34) 0034) 0(34) 0(34) .05(34) 0(34) 0(34) .05

(22, (22,

pumps 0(22) 0(22) 1 0(22) 0 14) 0 14) 0(22) 0(22) 0

Solenoid (22, (22,

Valves 0(22) .03(22) .02(22) .30 14) .04 14) 0(22) 0(22) .34

Temperature (19,

Switches .12(19) .06(19) 0(19) .18(19) .07 2) 0(19) 0(19) .41

(19,

T/C and RTD's .15(19) 0(19) .10(19) 0(19) .08 14) 0(19) 0(19) .33

(15,

MCC's 0(15) .10(15) 0(15) .27(15)1 .10 2) .01(15) .01(15) .49

Heaters 0(36) 0(36) 0(36) 0(36) .02(36) 0(36) 0(36) .02

Switchgear 0(16) .10(16) 0(16) .27(16) .10(16) .01 .01(16) .49

(28, (28,

Power Trans. 0(28) .02(28) 0(28) .17 26) .05 2) .02(28) 0(28) .26

(25, (25,

Control Trans. 0 (2) .02(25) 0(25) .17 26) .08 2) .02(25) 0(25) .29

Batteries 0(18) .01(18) 0(18) .30(18) .10418) 0(1S) .03(18) .44

Battery Chargers/

Inverters .05(17) .12(17) 0(17) .23(17) .08(17) 0(17) .01(17) .49

Distribution (20, (20, (20,

Panels 0(20) .05(20) 0(20) .23(20) .05 2) .03 9) .02 10) .38

Recorders .15 (3) .15 (3) .05 (3) .30 (3) .10 (3) .02 (3) .02 (3) .79

Controllers .15 (4) .15 (4) .09 (4) .18 L4) .10 (4) .02 (4) .02 (4) .71

Power Supplies .08 (5) .15 (5) .07 (5) .235) .10 (5) .02 (5) .02 (5) .67

Logic Equip. .15 (1) .15 (1) .10 (1) .23 (1) .10(1.2) .02 (1) .02 (1) .77

* USNRC Information Notice entitled *Actuation of Fire Suppression System Causing Inoperability of Safety-Related

Equipment" (with AEOD Case Study CA02) and the LER's given in the LER Sunnary of Exhibit 3-1, indicate

damageability of switches, starters, relays, panels (MCCs switchgear), and panel-mounted equipment (such as

recorders, controllers, power supplies, and logic equipment). These references were considered when

establishing the moisture damage susceptibility of the equipment. Specific sensitivity based on the references are shown in the matrix.
Table 8-1 (Continued)

Equipment Functionability/Damageability Matrix

EQUIPMENT

TYPE

Indicating

Liohts

Accuracy

(REFS)

0(21)

Complexity

(REFS)

.01(21)

Sensitivity

(REFS)

0(21)

HiTemp Moisture*

(REFS) (REFS)

(21,

.26(21) .10 2)

Particulates

(REFS)

Corrosive

Vapors

(REFS)

TOTAL

0(21) 0(21) .37

0%

Meters .12 (6) .10 (6) .07 (6) .23 (6) .05 (6) .03 (6) .01 (6) .61

Hand Switches/ (11, (11, (11,

Pushbuttons 0(11) .08(11) .23 12) .10()11 .02 12) .02 12) .50

Gauges .12(31) .03(31) .05(31) 0(31) 0(31) 0031) 0(31) .20

Electro/Mech. (8,

Relays/Contactors 0 (8) .06 (8) .06 (8) .23(8,9) .20(8E2) .02(8.9) .02 10) .59

solid State

Relays 0 (7) .06 (7) .09 (7) .23 (7) .20 (7) .01 (7) .01 .7 .60

Position/Limit (29,

Switches 0(29) .03(29) 0(29) .02(29) .17 14) .02(29) .02(29) .26

Valve Operators/ (30, (30,

Positioners 0(30) .15(30) 0(30) .03 14) .05 14) .02(30) .02(30) .25

Transmitters

(Press, Level, (13, (13,

and Flow) .15(13) .10(13) .10(13) .08 14) .07 14) 0(13) 0(13) .50

(24,

Pressure Switches .12(24) .03(24) .05(24) 0(24) .13 2) 0(24) 1 0(24) .33

(26, (26,

Motors (open) 0(26) .03(26) 0(26) .12 14) .13 2) 0(26) 0(26) .28

(26,

Motors (enclosed) 0(26) .03(26) 0(26) .12 14) .02(26) 0(26) 0(26) .17

Valves 0(35) .02(35) 0(35) 0(35) 0(35) 5) 0) 0(35) .02

Terminal Blocks 0(32) 0(32) .03(32) .03(32) .08(32) .02(32) .02(32) .18
TABLE 8-2

BASIS FOR EQUIPMENT

MEASURE OF WORTH RANKINGS

FUNCTIONALITY

(.40)

Accuracy (.15 max)

Binary and > + 10% 0

Non-specific or binary

Output is D-C with minimum

ripple reqt. .05

< + 10% and > + 2%

Non-specific .08

< + 2%

Extremely accurate (± 1/2%) .15

Very accurate (± 1%) .12

Accurate (± 2%) .10

Complexity (.15 max)

Low Complexity

no moving parts/i moving part/

simple single output and few

pieces 0

2-5 movements/parts, req'd to

function/single simple output and

few pieces .03 - .06

Medium Complexity

5 or more movements/parts/positions

and simple binary output .08 - .10

5 or more movements/parts/positions

and simple variable output .10 - .12

High Complexity

Many interrelated movements/parts/

positions with multiple variable

outputs .15

37
TABLE 8-2

BASIS FOR EQUIPMENT MEASURE OF WORTH RANKINGS

(Continued)

Sensitivity (.10 max)

High voltage or current

> 125 VDC or 110 VAC + high current

(over 10 amp)

> 125 VDC or 110 VAC + relatively low

current (> 1 amp)

Medium voltage or current

< 125 VDC or 110 VAC and > 25 VDC or

12 VAC + relatively low current

(> 1 amp)

Low voltage or current

: 25 VDC or 12 VAC + milliamp current

0

.01 - .03

.05 - .07

.08 - .10

Damageability

(.60)

High Temperature (.35 max)

Temperature Insensitive

Spec data or EQ data with temps

above 300OF or no organic parts

Spec data or EQ data above 200 0 F or high

temperature devices with few organic

parts

Spec data or EQ near 200OF but with

many organic parts

Temperature Medium Sensitivity

Spec data between 140OF and 200OF

Temperature Sensitive

Spec data at 140OF or below

Spec data for ambient (75-100 0 F)

0

.01 - .07

.08 - .11

.12 - .18

.19 - .23

.24 - .35

38
TABLE 8-2

BASIS FOR EQUIPMENT

MEASURE OF WORTH RANKINGS

(Continued)

Moisture (.20 max)

Moisture/Spray resistant

Sealed devices or devices which

can operate submerged

NEMA 4 (watertight) devices or devices

which may be spray cleaned

Unsealed devices which can withstand

normal humidity and have some type of

enclosure

Sensitive to spray only.

Devices subject to dripping or having

open contact points

Sensitive to both humidity and spray.

Devices subject to corrosion by humid

environments or requiring heaters to

exclude moisture

Particulates

Devices with protected movable contacts

or devices with no contacts

Devices with movable contacts, exposed

terminals, unprotected contacts, or

very small physical tolerances

Corrosive Vapors

AC devices with no exposed live electrical

parts

DC devices with exposed live parts or

sensitive movable metallic components

0

.02 - .05

.07 - .08

.10 - .15

.16 - .20

0

.01 - .03

0

.01 - .02

39
TABLE 8-3

MATRIX REFERENCES

(1) Bailey Controls

Bailey Controls

Foxboro Company

Rosemount

(2) AEOD/C402

(3) Leeds & Northrup

Bailey Controls

Love Controls

(4) Bailey Controls

Love Controls

(5) Foxboro Company

Rosemount

Bailey Controls

(6) Bailey Controls

Foxboro Company

General Electric

(7) Struthers-Dunn

Westinghouse

(8) Struthers-Dunn

Cutler-Hammer

Electroswitch

General Electric

Allen Bradley

Product Specification E92-750; 1983.

General Catalog, pp 80-107, 1982

Technical Information, 2AI-180, 2AI-170,

2AI-140, 2AP-180, 2AP-140, 2AP-100, 2A0-

113; 1973-1977.

Product Data Sheet 2368; 1983.

NRC Case Study on Operating Experience

Related to Moisture Intrusion in

Electrical Equipment at Commercial

Reactors; 1984.

CO.6215-FL, CO.7002-DS, and CO.7003-DS

Publications; 1980, 1981.

General Catalog, pp 148-155; 1982.

Bulletin 9462; 1983.

General Catalog, pp 48-68; 1982.

Bulletins 9472, 9466, 9478, 9473, 9453,

9465; 1981-1983.

Technical Information 2AR-102; 1977.

Product Data Sheet 2491; 1983.

General Catalog pp 141-143; 1982.

General Catalog, pp 175-178; 1982.

Product Specifications PSS 9-7C1 A; 1980. "Switchboard Instruments" Catalog.

Relay Catalog pp 89-94; no date.

Catalog Sections 8221, 8540, 8610; no

date.

Relay Catalog; no date

Industrial Control Catalog, pp. 123-135;

1983-1984 (information only).

"Auxiliary Relays for Power Industry

Applications, no date.

General Catalog Section 7210, pp 1-4,

Section 7211, p. 3; 1982-1984.

Bulletin 705, 709, 715; 1969-1971.

40
TABLE 8-3 (Continued)

MATRIX REFERENCES

(9) EPRI NP-3179 Nuclear-Power-Plant

Data, p. 54, July 1983.

Fire-Loss

IE Information

Notice 82-13

IE Information

Notice 84-20

Letter from

W.F. Conway

(10)

"Failure of General Electric Type HFA

Relays;" May 10, 1982.

"Service Life of Relays in Safety-Related

Systems," March 21, 1984.

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation

to T. A. Ippolito, US Nuclear Regulatory

Commission dated March 14, 1980 regarding

a transformer fire.

Interim Report on TVA Brown's Ferry Fire

"Program for sampling, Analysis, and

Cleanup of Residue on Affected

Structures, Systems, and Components;"

November, 1975.

General Section DB 25-100 pp. 2-8,

Section 15-121, p.4, and Section 15-123,

p. 3; no date.

General Catalog Section 34-251, pp. 2-8,

no date.

General Catalog Section 7152, pp. 1-3,

Section 7153, p. 1, Section 7154, p. 1,

and Section 7156, p. 401; 1974-1976.

Series 20 and 40 Digest "Instrument and

Control Switches;" no date.

NP-3095 "Generic Qualification of Rotary

Hand Switches," May, 1983.

Product Data Sheet 2260; 1978.

(11) Westinghouse

Westinghouse

General Electric

Electroswitch

(12) EPRI

(13) Rosemount

Rosemount Qualification Report E8300040,

Pressure Transmitters Rosemount

1153 Series D, Rev A;" May, 1983.

Model

41
TABLE 8-3 (Continued)

MATRIX REFERENCES

(13) Rosemount

Rosemount

Rosemount

Foxboro

Foxboro

Foxboro

Foxboro

Foxboro

ITT Barton

ITT Barton

Qualification Report D8400102 "...

Pressure Transmitter Model 1154;" May,

1984.

Qualification Report 108025 "...Pressure

Transmitters Rosemount Model 1153 Series

B, Rev B;" February, 1981.

Industrial Customer Catalog; April, 1983.

Price Sheets 9-lBl, 9-1B2, 9-1B3, 9-lCl,

9-lZl, 9-1Z9; September, 1978.

Product Specification PSS-2A-lClD "EI3DM

Series d/p Cell Transmitters;" 1980.

Product Specification PSS-9-lBlA "NEll

and NE13 Series Nuclear Electronic

Presure Transmitters;" 1981.

Instructions Model E1lGM Transmitter,

Model E1lGH Transmitter; 1971.

"Environmental Test Report Summaries of

Foxboro Products;" no date.

"Models 763 and 764, Electronic

Transmitters Qualification Test Report

Summary;" no date.

Product Bulletins 763-1 and 764-1; 1982.

Hydrogen Burn Survivability Test Data -

See Section 4.2.

"Value Line Mark 2 Motor Control Center

Instructions;" April, 1978.

"Marq 21 Motor Control Centers;" no date.

"Motor Control Center - Series 5600

Instructions, Specifications, Design and

Application Guides," 1973.

(14)

(15) Siemens-Allis

Siemens-Allis

ITE Imperial

Westinghouse

ITE Imperial

General Catalog - Application

Section 8260 pp. 2-4; no date.

Data

IB-6.10-1 "Series 9600 - Motor Control

Center"

42
TABLE 8-3 (Continued)

MATRIX REFERENCES

(15) General Electric

General Electric

(16) General Electric

General Electric

Gould ITE

(17) Solidstate Controls, Inc. (SCI)

C & D Batteries

(Allied Chemical)

C & D Batteries

(18) C & D Batteries

Gould

GNB Batteries

(19) Transamerica

Delaval (Barksdale)

Buy Log; October, 1979.

General Catalog Section 2040, pp. 1-2;

1969.

GET-6600D "Power/Vac Metalclad Switchgear

Application Guide;" 1984.

General Catalog - Section 6771 pp. 1-4;

1977.

Bulletin 10.2-1D "...Low Voltage Metal

Enclosed Switchgear...;" no date.

Product Data Bulleting BCS, 1981.

"Auto Reg...ARR Series Float Chargers;"

no date.

"Factory Procedure" pp. 1-4; April 1976.

12-800 "Stationary Battery Installation

and Operating Instructions;" Letter from

F. M. Wagner, C & D Batteries, to A. E.

Winters, NUS, dated September 4, 1984.

"Stationary Battery Installation and

Operating Instructions;" no date.

Materials of Construction; 1984.

Bulletin No. 690310-K "Temperature

Switches: 1979.

Transamerica

Delaval(Barksdale)

Transamerica

Delaval(Barksdale)

Weed Instruments

Fenwal

Bulletin No. 790112-A

Temperature

Switch;" 1981.

Bulletin No. 801215

Temperature

Switches;" 1980.

Temperature Measurement

Catalog; no date.

Catalog 790; no date.

"Econ-O-Temp

"Solid State

and Control

43
TABLE 8-3 (Continued)

MATRIX REFERENCES

(19) Wyant, F. J. and

Minor, E. E.

(20) General Electric

(21) Cutler-Hammer

(22) ASCO

ASCO

Target Rock

(23) Belden

(24) Transamerica

Delaval (Barksdale)

Transamerica

Delaval (Barksdale)

Static-O-Ring

Pressure Switch

Company

ITT Barton

Salazar, E.

(25) Square D

(26) Fink, D. G. and

Beaty, H. W.

NUREG/CR-3597-SAND 84-0938 "Equipment

Qualification Methodology Research: Tests

of RTD's;" September, 1984.

Buy Log, October, 1979.

Industrial Control Catalog, pp. 145-200;

1983-1984.

Catalog No. NP-l with supplementary pages

"3 and 4 Way Solenoid Vavles," 1978.

Certificates of Compliance Nos. VE2926R4

and VE3239RI; no dates.

General Catalog; 1983.

"Electronic Wire and Cable;" 1983.

Bulletin 730701-F, "Pressure Switches;"

1979.

Bulletin 680631-D "How to Select a

Pressure Switch for Your Application;" no

date.

"Model Number System - How It Works;" 1975

Product/Bulletins 580-0/580-1, 581-0/581-

1, 583-0/583-1 "...Differential Pressure

Indicating Switches for Nuclear SafetyRelated Inside/Outside Containment

Applications;" 1980.

NUREG/CR-3630-SAND83-2652 "Equipment

Qualification Methodology Research: Tests

of Pressure Switches;" March, 1984.

Digest 160; 1980.

"Standard Handbook for Electrical

Engineers," pp 10-41 to 10-44; 1978.

44
TABLE 8-3 (Continued)

MATRIX REFERENCES

(27) General Electric GEP387A "Kinamatic Buyer's Guide;" 1978.

General Electric "Tri Clad Buyer's Guide;" no date.

General Electric General Catalog Section 336, pp. 101-104,

Section 334, pp. 9 and 11; 1974 and 1976.

General Electric GEP-675 "Large A. C. Motors-Prices and

Specifications, 1983.

Westinghouse Application Data 3170, pp. 1-8; 1971.

Westinghouse Descriptive Bulletins 3310-1 and 3310-2;

1970 and 1971.

Reliance Electric Test Report Excerpt, no date.

(Joy Manufacturing)

Bienko, W. J. and "Qualification Test of a Fan and Motor

Stiffler, W. G. Designed for Service in Nuclear

Containment;" Presented at 10th

Electrical Insulation Conference (IEEE);

1971.

Reliance Electric Industrial Motor Catalog - Condensed

Edition; 1982-1983.

Siemans-Allis Nos. 2093B 1017-1 and 2093B 1040-1, no

dates.

(28) General Electric Buy Log pp. 208-212, 1979.

Brown Boveri (ITE) Bulletin 5.1.1-1B "Dry-Type

Transformers;" no date.

(29) NAMCO Qualification Test Reports for Models EA

180, EA 170, EA 750; 1978 and 1981.

Cutler-Hammer Industrial Control Catalog, pp. 204-226;

1983-1984.

NAMCO General Catalog; 1979.

(30) Limitorque Corp. Bulletin SMBl-82B "Type SMB Instruction

and Maintenance Manual;" 1982.

Limitorque Corp. Bulletin SMBl-170 "Limitorque Valve

Controls - Type SMB Instruction and

Maintenance Manual;" 1977.

45
TABLE 8-3 (Continued)

MATRIX REFERENCES

(30) Limitorque Corp.

Limitorque Corp.

(31)

(32)

Target Rock Corp.

Foxboro/Jordan

(Electrodyne)

Foxboro

Crosby

Westinghouse

Buchanan(Amerace)

Craft, C. M.

Bulletin 871 "Type SMB Valve Controls;"

1971

"IEEE 323 and IEEE 382 Nuclear

Qualification Data for Safety-Related

Service," November, 1977.

"Electrically Positioned Control Valves;"

no date.

Bulletin J-530 "TN-2 Series Rotary

Actuator;" no date.

"Instructions for Model 69TA Transducer,"

1971.

"Quality Gages, Precision Gages, Chemical

Seals;" no date.

General Catalog "Modular Terminal Blocks

Type TBA;" no date.

"Seismic and Radiation Tested Terminal

Blocks;" February, 1981.

NUREG/CR-3418-SAND 83-1617 "Screening

Tests of Terminal Block Performance in a

Simulated LOCA Environment;" August,

1984.

"Electronic Wire and Cable;" 1983.

(Franklin Research Report F-C4033-3)

"Tests of Raychem Thermofit Insulation

Systems...;" 1975.

"Qualification of Firewall III Class 1E

Electric Cables;" November, 1979.

RSS-3-021 "Firewall III Specification;"

1973.

RSS-6-005 "Firewall EP Specification;"

(Cerro) 1971.

(33) Belden

Raychem

Rockbestos Company

(Cerro)

Rockbestos Company

(Cerro)

Rockbestos Company

46
(33) Rockbestos Comapi

(Cerro)

Rockbestos Compai

(Cerro)

Samuel Moore

(34)

(35)

Joy Manufacturin

Velan

Anchor/Darling

Crosby

Borg Warner

Target Rock

John Crane

John Crane

(36) Chromalox (Edwin

L. Wiegand)

Chromolox (Edwin

L. Wiegand)

(37) Ingersoll-Rand

Crane Deming

Goulds Pumps

Byron Jackson

(Borg Warner)

TABLE 8-3 (Continued)

MATRIX REFERENCES

ny (Franklin Research Center Reporet FC3192) "Qualification Tests of Electrical

Cables under Simulated Reactor

Containment Conditions;" December, 1971.

ny "Pyrotrol III Radiation and Post-Accident

Environmental Test Results;" 1971.

"Dekorad Wire Specification Summaries;"

no date.

3 Fan Construction Features; no date.

Engineering Data, no date.

Outline Drawings/Experience Data; no

date.

"0" Ring Seat Design Data; no date.

Nuclear Valve Division Material Data; no

date.

"Self Contained Pressure Regulating

Valves;" no date.

Catalog 70-14 "Mechanical Shaft Seals;"

no date.

Bulletin No p-392-1 "Valve Stem

Packings;" no date.

"Industrial Heating Products;" no date.

"Immersion Elements;" no date.

"The APKD/C Vertical Can Pumps...;" 1978.

Bulletin 4500 Section 40L "Sump Pumps;"

no date.

Bulletin 725.1 "Model 3196 ANSI Standard

Dimension Process Pumps;" January, 1980.

Bulletin No. 123 "A Single Source for Your

Complete Line of Reliable Pumps;" no

date.

47
The sensitivity subcategory was viewed as less important than the

previously mentioned subcategories because some variation in

voltage or current can usually be tolerated. This subcategory is

different from accuracy in that accuracy is an ultimate measure of

the functional worth (throughput) where sensitivity is an inherent

internal characteristic of the device itself. Accuracy is measured

in deviation from the desired result. Sensitivity is the strength

of the desired result. Stronger (higher power) outputs can

tolerate more interference from external effects than weaker

outputs.

For the damageability category, subcategories were ranked by

dominant failure causes which have been reported as a result of

fires. Since practically no reports of particulate or corrosive

damage have been reported (except for soot cleanup and pitting of

metals because of HCL), these two items were given low maximum

scores with respect to thermal and moisture effects. In most fire

reports, failures because of high temperature predominate over all

other types of failures. Heat appears to be the major stress

imposed during fires. Although moisture is not as dominant a

failure stress as heat, recent NRC documents have indicated that

moisture causes failures during normal operation and that fire

suppression system actuation can cause equipment failures. Since

moisture failures can occur, but few reports of actual failures

relating to fire/suppression have been reported, the moisture

subcategory was allocated a rather high maximum score, but lower

than the high temperature subcategory.

The rankings were developed without consideration of relative

safety importance of equipment or consequences of failure,

size/weight, or cost considerations. Once the equipment was

identified as being safety-related as determined by the FHA/FSAR/TS

review, the equipment was assessed for functionality and

damageability and incorporated into the matrix. All the equipment

recorded in the matrix has been confirmed as being needed for safe

shutdown by virtue of either its direct appearance in an FRA, or

its functional connection (electrical/instrument loop) to FHAspecified equipment. The magnitude and duration of the fire was not

considered, since the fire intensity and duration is an input

variable to the planned equipment fire tests.

It is recognized that the potential size and duration of the fire

varies throughout the plant and that more sensitive equipment may

be better protected from large fires. This implication confirms

that more sensitive equipment is, in fact, more prone to fire

damage. It is the degree of fire sensitivity that will be

established during the testing phase.

48
8.1 EQUIPMENT RANKING EXAMPLE

As an example, for electro-mechanical relays, the references in

Table 8-3 item 8 and 9 were reviewed for the measure of worth

parameters as described in Table 8-2. A zero (0) was assigned for

the ACCURACY category because relay output is binary (on or off).

A COMPT.FXTTY of .06 was assigned for complexity because there are

approximately 4 major movable parts in relays (two or more

contacts, coil mechanism core, timer, etc.) and output is simple.

A value of 0.06 was chosen for the SENSITIVITY since

electromechanical relays operate in the medium voltage and current

range - all electromechanical relays have about 1 amp output at

110 VAC or 125 VDC.

The data in references 8 and 9 indicated a low thermal withstand

capability of about 140OF as shown in manufacturer's data. The

item 9 reference data especially I&E Information Notice 84-20

showed some thermal sensitivity due to short lives of relays attributed to accelerated thermal aging. A value of .23 was,

therefore. assigned to the HIGH TEMPERATURE category. The moisture sensitivity of electromechanical relays was determined to be

high (0.2) because most relays are not hermetically sealed and

have open contact points. The item 2 reference contains evidence

that con- tactors and devices with unsealed contacts are

susceptible to moisture damage. PARTICULATE and CORROSIVE VAPOR

susceptibility is based on the criteria of exposed, movable

contacts and were scored .02 and .02 respectively.

49
8.2 EQUIPMENT SUMMARY RANKING

In order of decreasing potential sensitivity to fire effects, the

equipment ranking is as follows:

Sensitivity

Level_ Equipment Tyve Total Score

-----------------------------------------------------------

Recorders .79

Logic Equipment .77

Controllers .71

HIGH Power Supplies .67

Meters .61

Solid State Relays .60

Electro Mechanical Relays/Contractors .59

Hand Switches/Pushbuttons .50

Transmitters (Press, Level, Flow) .50

Battery Chargers/Inverters .49

MED. HIGH Motor Control Centers .49

Switchgear .49

Batteries .44

Temperature Switches .41

Distribution Panels .38

Indicating Lights .37

Solenoid Valves .34

Thermocouples and Resistance Temp Detectors .33

Non-Class 1E Cables .33

Pressure Switches .33

MED. LOW Control Transformers .29

Motors (open) .28

Position/Limit Switches .26

Power Transformers .26

Valve Positioners/Opeators .25

Gauges .20

Terminal Blocks .18

Class 1E Cables .17

Motors (enclosed) .17

Fans .05

LOW Heaters .02

Valves .02

Pumps .00

A score differential of between .07 and .10 is needed to discern any

differences among component types. Levels of sensitivity can be

segregated into high, medium to high, low to medium, and low

categories as indicated in the table above. The categories can be

sub-divided in this manner, since the scores are relative indicators

of fire sensitivity rather than absolute indicators.

50
9.0 EQUIPMENT TEST RECOMMENDATIONS

9.1 GENERAL TEST RECOMMENDATIONS

The test specimen parameters measured during exposure to f irerelated environments should be recorded for the duration of the

testing. The variation of the input/output signals with time is

crucial in determining the damage mechanism.

Internal temperature of the test specimen should be measured and

recorded. Temperature sensitive lables of differing ratings should

be used as a minimum. If possible, a mineral-insulated, metal

sheathed thermocouple should measure internal equipment

temperature caused by the fire enviroments. Internal temperature

should be recorded.

Litmus paper or another acid/base indicator should be placed inside

equipment to indicate whether corrosive vapor intrudes into the

test specimen.

9.2 HIGH SENSITIVITY TEST RECOMMENDATIONS

The high potential sensitivity category equipment (See Section 8.1)

is composed of devices which have testers specifically designed to

assess the device performance. Relay testers and instrument test

sets appropriate to the fire test specimens should be used to

monitor equipment functional performance.

Since the test sets are sensitive in their own right, it will be

difficult to monitor equipment performance during testing.

However, if continuous monitoring during fire testing is desired,

the cables and connectors used to transfer signals from the test

specimen to the test set must be capable of performing in the fire

environment. In order to ensure test set cable/connector integrity mechanical protection must be provided. The cable connector

interface should be coated with fire retardant mastic. In

addition, shrink-tube should be fitted around the cable/connector

interface. Metallic steel conduit or pressure hose should be used

to enclose the test set cable. If possible, sealing material

should be applied at the connector/equipment interfaces. RTV may

be used for this purpose.

In order to assess the physical damage caused by the

fire/suppression effects, additional post-test exploratory

measurements should be performed. In particular, contact

resistance measurements should be made across any contacts showing

visual signs of pitting, corrosion, or warping. Representative

contact resistance measurements may be made across multipin

connector interfaces.

51
Spring tension measurements of relay contacts and recorder meter

pointers should be made to determine closing force required for

relays and indicator pointer spring tension. The pen tension for

recorders should be likewise measured. The spring tension values

for these instruments are likely to be very small. Sensitive

tension measuring devices should be used.

Where gaskets and O-rings have been employed by manufactureres to

seal the equipment, the seals should be tested to determine tensile

strength and elongation. Melting of thermoplastic materials of

construction should be determined by visual inspection. Light

intensity through recorder/meter faceplates should be measured

using a light meter.

Equipment bearings for high sensitivity equipment are likely to be

constructed of a hard, thermoplastic material (nylon, delrin,

teflon, etc.). Degradation of thermoplastic bearings can be

determined by either increased torque requirements to mechanically

move an active component or by an increase in the amount of play

between the active component and the bearing surface. It is,

therefore, prudent to empirically assess the bearing surface

condition by manually actuating the active device during the fire

tests, if possible.

Since damage is often not quantifiable in absolute terms, it is

necessary that at.least two specimens are purchased for each device

to be evaluated. The only way to characterize the damage imposed

on devices subjected to adverse condition is to compare a post-test

device to a new device. Pre-test equivalency of the specimens

should be ascertained to the extent possible. Spare organic parts

should be purchased in sufficient numbers to allow for destructive

testing, such as tensile strength. Spare organic parts will allow

for refurbishment of devices subsequent to fire testing.

Refurbishment can characterize the degree of reversibility of the

damage caused by fire effects.

52
9.3 MEDIUM SENSITIVITY TEST REQUIREMENTS

The medium high sensitivity equipment (See Section 8.1) for the

most part, consists of physically large equipment which is difficult to test. Some of the equipment (transmitters, hand

switches, pushbuttons, and temperature switches) are small and can

be easily tested, however, Motor Control Centers, Switchgear and

Battery Chargers/Inverters, although physically large, have some

high sensitivity components included within the larger equipment.

Transmitters can be evaluated through electrical connection of the

device, simulated process inputs, and output measurement. Organics

within transmitters should be evaluated by comparison of tensile

strength and elongation. Moisture intrusion effects can be

determined by contact resistance measurements. Contact resistance

measurements are especially important for the input/output

terminals of the transmitter. Unlike high sensitivity devices, it

is not necessary to protect transmitter interfaces beyond

manufacturer-specified installation practices.

Spring tension and contact resistance tests should be used to

evaluate hand switches, pushbuttons, and temperature switches.

Tensile and elongation measurements are not required for these

devices.

53
9.4 MEDIUM LOW SENSITIVITY TEST REQUIREMENTS

The medium low category contains both small and large equipment

types. Distribution panels, power transformers, and some motors

are large devices. Distribution panel sub-components are included

in the high and medium high categories with the sole exception of

indicating lights which are included in this (medium low) category.

Control transformers have similar electrical characteristics to

power transformers and similar sensitivity characteristics. Test

results for transformers are expected to be likewise, similar.

Small motors also share similar characteristics with larger motors.

Most of the medium low equipment requires only 110/480 VAC power

input. Function can only be determined by loss of input.

Thermocouples/RTD's output signal strengths are low, but no

voltage input is required. Loss of function can be measured by

output interrruption. Percent error or accuracy can also be used to

verify function if specifications and appropriate test sets are

used.

Solenoid valves, gauges, and pressure switches require process air

inputs. Limit switches require external actuation during and

immediately after testing to determine functionality.

Organic material parameters should be measured for the following

equipment components:

Solenoid Valve Gaskets

Thermocouple/RTD Gaskets

Non-Class 1E Cable Insulation

Pressure Switch Gaskets and Diaphragms

Position/Limit Switch Gaskets

Class lE Cable Insulation

Post-test contact resistance and spring tension measurements should

be made for the following:

Pressure Switches

Position/Limit Switches

Gauges (spring tension only)

Non-Class IE Cables

Class 1E Cables

Terminal Blocks

Insulation resistance tests should be made for the following:

Non-Class 1E Cables

Class 1E Cables

54
Ammeter measurements (made during the tests) should

for the following:

be recorded

Indicating Lights Solenoid Valves

Control Transformers

Motors

Power Transformers

9.5 LOW SENSITIVITY TEST REQUIREMENTS

Since all low sensitivity equipment is made of metal with organics

limited to bearings and gaskets, organic tensile and elongation

measurements are the only necessary tests.

55
DISTRIBUTION:

U. S. Government Printing Office

Receiving Branch (Attn: NRC Stock)

8610 Cherry Lane

Laurel, M.D. 20707

225 copies for RP

Collin A. Lewis

Impell Corporation

350 Lennon Lane

Walnut Creek, CA 94598

Professional Loss Control, Inc.

Attn: Kenneth Dungan, PE

P.O. Box 446

Oak Ridge, TN 37830

Electric Power Research Institute

Nuclear Power Division

Attn: Joseph Matte III

3412 Hillview Ave

Palo Alto, CA 94304

Dr. Ulrich Heinz Schneider

Gesamthochschule Kassel

Universitat des Landes Hessen

FB 14, Postfach 101380

3500 Kassel, FRG

Dr. Heinz-Willi Brenig

Gesellschaft fur Reaktorsicherheit

Schwertnergasse I

D-5000 Koln 1, FRG

Mr. Liemersdorf

Gesellschaft fur Reaktorsicherheit

Schwertnergasse I

D-5000 Koln 1, FRG

Centre Scientifique et Technique du

Batiment

Station de Recherche

Attn: Xavier Bodart

84, avenue Jean-Jaures-Champs-sur-Marne

77428 Marne-La-Vallee Cedex 2

France

Societe Bertin & Cie

BP No 3

Attn: Serge Galant

78373 Plaisir Cedex

France

6400

6410

6440

6442

6444

6446

6447

6449

8024

3141

3151

A.

J.

D.

W.

L.

L.

D.

K.

P.

C.

W.

W.

W.

A.

A.

D.

L.

L.

D.

W.

M.

L.

Snyder

Hickman

Dahlgren

von Riesemann

Buxton

Bonzon

Berry (20)

Bergeron

Dean

Ostrander (5)

Garner

Dr. Dietmar Hosser

Koning und Heunisch

Letzter Hasenpfach 21

6000 Frankfurt/Main 70, FRG

NUPEC

No. 2 Akiyama Building

Attn: Toshihiko Sekine

6-2, 3-Chome, Toranomon

Minatoku, Tokyo 105

Japan

56
NRC FORM 335 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1 REPORT NUMBER (Ass,ge dbv TIDCý Ada Vol No. ifan~y)

12.841 NRCM 1 102. NUREG/CR-4 310 30 1.3202 BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET SAND85-7247

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 3 LEAVE BLANK

INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL FIRE-RELATED

DAMAGE TO SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT IN NUCLEAR

POWER PLANTS 4 DATE REPORT COMPLETED

MONTH YEAR

B. AUTHOR(SI

6 DATE REPORT ISSUED

John Wanless MONTH YEAR

November 1985 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS (Include Zs Code/ 8. PROJECT/TASKIWORK UNIT NUMBER

NUS Corporation

Menlo Park, CA Under Contract to: 9 FIN OR GRANT NUMBER

Sandia National Laboratories

Albuquerque, NM 87185 A1010

10. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS (locludeZ~p Code) 11a. TYPE OF REPORT

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research bPEIODCOVRED____________

Washington, DC 20555

12 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

13. ABSTRACT (200 words or !ess)

Based on a review of vendor information, fire damage reports, equipment

qualification and hydrogen burn test results, and material properties,

thirty-three types of equipment found in nuclear power plants were ranked

in terms of their potential sensitivity to fire environments. The

ranking considered both the functional requirements and damage proneness

of each component. A further review of the seven top-ranked components

was performed, considering the relative prevalence and potential safety

significance of each. From this, relays and hand switches dominate as

first choices for fire damage testing with logic equipment, power

supplies, transmitters, and motor control centers as future candidates.

14 DOCUMENT ANALYSIS - a. KEYWORDSIDESCRIPTORS

b IDENTIFIERS/OPEN-ENDED TERMS

IS AVAILABILITY 15. AVAILABILITY

STATEMENT

NTIS

GPO Sales

'6 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

7T7,Z pge)

Unclassified

(Town rport/

Unclassified

17 NUMBER OF PAGES

65

18 PRICE

* U.S. Government Printing Office 1985-676-049/21019


DC205