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35–113 PDF 2007

INTERNET SPYWARE (I-SPY) PREVENTION ACT 

OF 2007, AND THE SECURING AIRCRAFT COCKPITS AGAINST LASERS ACT OF 2007 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, 

AND HOMELAND SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON

H.R. 1525 and H.R. 1615 

MAY 1, 2007 

Serial No. 110–109 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

PERRY APELBAUM, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

JOSEPH GIBSON, Minority Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia, Chairman 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

BOBBY VASSAR, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL VOLKOV, Minority Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

MAY 1, 2007 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Page 

The Honorable Robert C. ‘‘Bobby’’ Scott, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, 

and Homeland Security ....................................................................................... 1 

The Honorable J. Randy Forbes, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security .......................................................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Viriginia 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11 

The Honorable Ric Keller, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Florida 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 14 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable J. Randy Forbes, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security ................................ 3 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Texas, and Member, Subcommittee on Crime, 

Terrorism, and Homeland Security, on H.R. 1525, the ‘‘Internet Spyware 

(I-SPY) Prevention Act of 2007’’ .......................................................................... 19 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Texas, and Member, Subcommittee on Crime, 

Terrorism, and Homeland Security, on H.R. 1615, the ‘‘Securing Aircraft 

Cockpits Against Lasers Act of 2007’’ ................................................................ 22 

H.R. 1525, the ‘‘Internet Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention Act of 2007’’ .................... 25 

H.R. 1615, the ‘‘Securing Aircraft Cockpits Against Lasers Act of 2007’’ ........... 30 

(1) 

INTERNET SPYWARE (I-SPY) PREVENTION 

ACT OF 2007, AND THE SECURING AIRCRAFT COCKPITS AGAINST LASERS ACT OF 

2007 

TUESDAY, MAY 1, 2007 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM,

AND HOMELAND SECURITY

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1 p.m., in Room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Robert Scott 

(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Scott, Waters, Johnson, Forbes, 

Gohmert, Coble, Chabot, and Lungren. 

Staff present: Bobby Vassar, Subcommittee Chief Counsel; 

Ameer Gopalani, Majority Counsel; Veronica Eligan, Professional 

Staff Member; Caroline Lynch, Minority Counsel; and Kelsey 

Whitlock, Minority Staff Assistant. 

Mr. SCOTT. The Subcommittee will now come to order. 

I am pleased to welcome you to today’s hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security. 

The first bill we will consider will be H.R. 1525, the ‘‘Internet 

Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention Act of 2007.’’ And the other bill is H.R. 

1615, the ‘‘Securing Aircraft Cockpits Against Lasers Act of 2007.’’ 

The first bill we consider, H.R. 1525, amends Title 18 of the U.S. 

Code to impose criminal penalties on those who use spyware to perpetrate identity theft and numerous other privacy intrusions on innocent Internet users. It provides resources and guidance to the 

Department of Justice for prosecuting these offenses. 

The House passed similar legislation in the 109th Congress, and 

we will be hearing from the chief sponsors of the prior and current 

legislation, Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren of California and Congressman Bob Goodlatte of Virginia. I would like to thank and commend them for developing and moving these bills on a bipartisan 

basis. 

I will introduce my entire statement in its entirety, but move on 

to H.R. 1615, Securing Aircraft Cockpits Against Lasers Act of 

2007. 

I would like to welcome our colleague, Congressman Ric Keller, 

who is a Member of the Judiciary Committee, as are Bob Goodlatte 

and Zoe Lofgren. Congressman Keller has been instrumental in 

2 

bringing attention to the issue of the danger of lasers composed on 

aircraft, and I look forward to his testimony. 

He introduced this bill in the 109th Congress, and I joined them 

in cosponsoring that bill and continue to support the legislation 

now. 

The purpose of this bill is to address the problems of individuals 

aiming lasers at cockpits of aircraft, particularly at the critical 

stages of takeoff and landing. This practice constitutes a threat to 

aviation security and passenger safety. It adds a section following 

18 USC Section 38 to impose criminal penalties upon any individual who knowingly aims their laser pointer at an aircraft within 

the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. 

It includes fines of up to $250,000 and imprisonment of up to 5 

years. And, again, I will introduce the entirety of my statement on 

that bill into the record. 

At this point I will call on my colleague from Virginia, the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. Forbes, for his statement. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will follow your lead. 

I know we have three very busy Members who are here to testify 

today. So with your permission, I will put the entirety of my statement in the record. 

But I do just want to thank you for holding this hearing and also 

thank Congresswoman Lofgren and Congressman Goodlatte for the 

work that they have done on H.R. 1525 and certainly recognize 

Congressman Keller’s commitment to aircraft safety and the work 

that he has done on 1615. 

I am proud to be a cosponsor of both these bills we are considering today, and I urge my colleagues to support them. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes follows:] 

3 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, AND RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE

ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY


Forbes-1.eps
4 


Forbes-2.eps
5 


Forbes-3.eps
6 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

I will now introduce our witnesses. 

The first witness will be the Honorable Zoe Lofgren, who has 

represented California’s 16th Congressional District since 1994. 

She currently serves as Chair of the Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, 

and International Law. She also serves on the Homeland Security 

and House Administration Committees and serves as Chair of the 

California delegation Democratic Congressional Delegation. She 

has headed a number of technology initiatives, including the ERate, which provides affordable Internet access to schools, libraries 

and rural health centers. She has a B.A. from Stanford and a J.D. 

from the University of Santa Clara School of Law. 

Our next witness will be Congressman Bob Goodlatte. Congressman Goodlatte began his eighth term representing the 6th Congressional District of Virginia in 2007. He is co-chair of the bipartisan Congressional International Caucus, Chairman of the House 

Republican Higher Technology Working Group and co-chair of the 

Congressional International Anti-Piracy Caucus. He serves on the 

Judiciary Committee and is the ranking Republican on the Agriculture Committee. He is a graduate of Washington Lee University 

School of Law and has an undergraduate degree in Government 

from Bates College in Maine. 

Our final witness will be Congressman Ric Keller. He is the 

Ranking Member of the House Committee on Education and Labor’s Higher Education Subcommittee. He was re-elected in November 2006 to his fourth term. He represents the 8th District in Florida, which covers the greater Orlando area, where he grew up. He 

received his Bachelor’s degree from East Tennessee State University and his law degree from Vanderbilt. And I have the privilege 

of serving on two Committees with Mr. Keller. We both serve on 

the Education and Labor Committee as well as the Judiciary Committee. 

Each of the witnesses’ written statements will be made a part of 

the record in their entirety, and I would ask each of our witnesses 

to summarize his or her testimony in 5 minutes or less. 

I would recognize Mr. Gohmert as being present. If he has a 

statement, he was allowed to enter it into the record. But I would 

like to recognize his presence. 

At this time, Congresswoman Lofgren. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE ZOE LOFGREN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Forbes. 

I am very proud to have partnered with my colleague, Bob Goodlatte, on this legislation to combat spyware, as we have in previous 

Congresses. 

Spyware is actually becoming one of the biggest threats to consumers on the Internet, and it is one of the reasons why we have 

such an identity theft epidemic. Thieves use spyware to harvest 

personal information from unsuspecting Americans and they even 

7 

use spyware to track keystrokes an individual makes, including 

credit card and Social Security numbers. 

Spyware can also adversely affect the business community who 

have to spend money to block and remove it from their systems. 

Microsoft, in fact, has stated that spyware is ‘‘at least partially responsible for approximately one-half of all application crashes reported to them.’’ 

Experts estimate that as many as 80 percent to 90 percent of all 

personal computers contain some form of spyware. In 2004, 93 million Americans experienced a spyware-related problem. Consumers 

spent $2.6 billion last year trying to block spyware or remove it 

from their system. 

In short, spyware is a real problem that is endangering consumers, damaging businesses and creating millions of dollars in additional cost. 

H.R. 1525 is a bipartisan measure that identifies the truly unscrupulous acts associated with spyware and subjects them to 

criminal punishment. The bill is important because it focuses on 

behavior, not technology, and it targets the worst form of spyware 

without unduly burdening technological innovation. 

The bill also funds the attorney general to find and prosecute 

spyware offenders and phishing scam artists and it expresses the 

sense of Congress that the Department of Justice should pursue 

online phishing scams where criminals send fake e-mails to consumers on behalf of well-known companies. 

Phishing and spyware aren’t just inconvenient to consumers. 

They represent a threat to the vitality of the Internet. If you can’t 

trust the Internet, people will not use the Internet for commerce, 

and that is not a good thing. 

Focusing on bad actors and criminal conduct is very much preferable to an approach that criminalizes technology or imposes notice of consent requirements. Bad actors don’t comply with requirements and I think the Can-Spam Act of a few Congresses ago is 

evidence of the futility of pursuing that approach. 

The more notices Internet users receive, the less likely they are 

to pay attention to any of them; 75 percent of users don’t read 

agreements, privacy statements or disclaimers on the Internet. And 

in 2005, the Pew Internet and American Life Project proved this 

point. A diagnostic site included a clause in one of its agreements 

that promised $1,000 to the first person to write in and request the 

money. The agreement was downloaded more than 3,000 times before someone finally claimed the reward. 

We don’t want to over-regulate the user experience. We must 

avoid interfering with the increasingly seamless, intuitive and 

interactive online environment. Regulation of technology is almost 

always a bad idea because technology changes faster than Congress 

can legislate and what we attempt to regulate will morph into 

something else and render useless the regulatory scheme that we 

adapt. 

Legislation that attempts to control technology can also have the 

pernicious effect of chilling innovation by chilling investment by 

venture capital sectors into prohibited technological arenas. 1525 

avoids these pitfalls by focusing on bad conduct. It does not prevent 

existing or future State laws that prohibit spyware. The bill preVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:21 Sep 15, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CRIME\050107\35113.000 HJUD1 PsN: 35113
8 

empts only civil actions that are based on violations of this new 

Federal criminal law. It does not prevent a State from passing a 

similar law nor does it prevent any lawsuits that are premised on 

existing State laws. 

I am honored that this bill has strong support from some of the 

biggest names in technology, including Microsoft and Dell. It is also 

supported by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Center for Democracy and Technology and even the Distributing Computing Industry Association. 

The bill has had broad support in past Congresses. In the last 

Congress, the floor vote was 395 to 1. So what we are doing here 

today is important for consumers, for businesses and for the future 

of our high tech economy. 

I am grateful to my colleague, Mr. Goodlatte, for his leadership 

in this Congress and in past Congresses. 

And I note, as we begin the legislative process, we are certainly 

very open to any improvement or tweaking that might be necessary, but we also think this is a very solid effort. 

And I thank the Committee for your attention and yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lofgren follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ZOE LOFGREN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Forbes, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to speak before you today on the growing 

threat to Internet users and Internet commerce posed by spyware and phishing 

scams, and on the way that the Internet Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention Act of 2007 

will counter that threat. 

Spyware is a serious and growing problem for American consumers and businesses. Thieves are using spyware to harvest personal information such as Social 

Security numbers and credit card numbers for use in a variety of criminal enterprises. Although the definition of spyware is a moving target, the FTC loosely defines the term as software that ‘‘aids in gathering information about a person or organization without their knowledge and which may send such information to another entity without the consumer’s consent, or asserts control over a computer 

without the consumer’s knowledge.’’ The Anti-Spyware Coalition offers a slightly different definition of spyware as ‘‘technologies deployed without the appropriate user 

consent and/or implemented in ways that impair user control,’’ including: 

• Material changes that affect user experience, privacy, or system security; 

• Use of system resources, including what programs are installed on computers; 

and/or 

• Collection, use, and distribution of personal or other sensitive information. 

Two of the most serious forms of spyware are ‘‘keystroke loggers’’ that capture 

every key typed on a particular computer, allowing cyber-criminals to gain access 

to credit card accounts and other personal information, and programs that hijack 

users’ system settings. 

Nine out of every ten Internet users have modified their online behavior out of 

fear of falling victim to spyware. Indeed, consumers spent $2.6 billion last year trying to block or remove spyware from their computers. But consumers are seldom 

successful at completely eliminating spyware from their systems. Recent studies estimate that 80 percent of computers are infected with some form of spyware and 

89 percent of consumers are unaware of that fact. 93 million American adults experienced a spyware-related problem in 2004. As broadband reaches American communities that have less experience with the online world, the number of victims of 

spyware will almost certainly increase. 

Spyware is as much a problem for technology companies and other businesses as 

it is for individuals. Microsoft analysts have reported that spyware is at least partially responsible for about one-half of all the application crashes that are reported 

to them. Spyware is also threat to the Internet as a whole. Just this February, a 

massive denial-of-service attack targeted DNS root servers, including one maintained by the Department of Defense. Although the source of the ultimately unsucVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:21 Sep 15, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\CRIME\050107\35113.000 HJUD1 PsN: 35113
9 

cessful attack was unclear, hijacked computers are often turned into ‘‘zombies’’ that 

participate in denial-of-service attacks without the knowledge of their users. 

As the Judiciary committee has noted in the past, there is no ‘‘silver bullet’’ for 

ending spyware. Instead, we must rely on a multi-pronged approach that involves 

greater consumer awareness, the use of available technological countermeasures, 

and an effective criminal enforcement strategy. The legislation you are considering 

today is a crucial component of this last prong. That is why I was pleased to work 

once again with Representative Goodlatte to introduce the I-SPY Prevention Act. 

The Act imposes significant criminal penalties for the most serious and prevalent 

criminal activities that employ spyware. For example, the Act would impose a prison 

sentence of up to 5 years for use of spyware in furtherance of another Federal crime. 

The Act also imposes up to a 2-year sentence for hacking into a computer and altering its security settings or obtaining personal information with the intent to defraud 

or injure the person or damage a computer. 

The Act also assists the Department of Justice in enforcing these new provisions. The legislation authorizes $10 million in funding for fiscal years 2008 through 2011 

for prosecutions to deter the use of spyware as well as ‘‘phishing’’ scams. Phishing 

scams involve criminals using websites or e-mail addresses that mimic those of wellknown and legitimate businesses to deceive Internet users into revealing personal 

information that can be used to defraud them. 

The central feature of the Act is that it targets bad actors and bad behavior without unduly restricting innovation in the online universe. As the Judiciary committee 

and other entities have noted, one of the greatest difficulties in solving the spyware 

problem is that many legitimate and beneficial tools for making a user’s Internet 

experience more enjoyable and productive are technologically indistinguishable from 

spyware that is used to harm users and computers. For example, an Internet ‘‘cookie’’ can be used to store detailed information about a user’s preferences when visiting a much-frequented website. But the same technology can be used by identity 

thieves to track and store personal and financial information. The appropriate legislative target is not the cookie itself, but the criminals who use it for illegal purposes. 

The I-SPY Prevention Act is a measured and careful approach to combating spyware 

that captures this distinction. 

Other legislative approaches revolve around notice-and-consent procedures that 

require computer users to be notified and either ‘‘opt in’’ or ‘‘opt out’’ of installing 

code at the time of installation. Ensuring user consent is critical, as is implicit in 

the term ‘‘authorized access’’ contained in the I-SPY Act and in existing Section 

1030. In my view, however, a notice-and-consent approach is ill-advised for three 

reasons. First, bad actors—the criminals we should be most concerned about—are unlikely 

to comply with that requirement. As we learned with the CAN-SPAM Act, legislatively mandating a certain approach is a far cry from ensuring that others comply 

with it. Thus, legitimate uses of technology will be burdened by notice-and-consent 

requirements while bad actors will most likely ignore them. 

Second, the more notices and warnings that Internet users see, the less likely 

they are to pay attention to any single one. In 2005, the Pew Internet & American 

Life Project proved this point. A diagnostic site included a clause in one of its user 

agreements that promised $1,000 to the first person to write in and request the 

money. The agreement was downloaded more than 3,000 times before someone finally read the fine print and claimed the reward. Additionally, a Pew survey found 

that 73 percent of Internet users said that they do not always read user agreements, 

privacy statements, or other disclaimers before downloading or installing programs. 

Finally, and most importantly, we must take care not to legislate the online user 

experience. Internet users have come to expect and demand a seamless, intuitive, 

and interactive experience with their online environment. Those expectations have 

led to the development of social networking and bookmarking sites, ‘‘wikis,’’ and an 

explosion in user-generated content. Users are interacting with the Internet in a 

way that allows them to shape and control their online experience to a degree that, 

until recently, would have been unimaginable. This has been a tremendous boon to 

both consumers and the American economy. It would be unwise and unfortunate if 

we were to interfere with the continued evolution of the Internet through overbroad 

regulation. 

The I-SPY Prevention Act avoids these pitfalls by focusing attention and resources 

where they are needed most, on criminal enterprises that harm Internet users and 

Internet commerce. That is why the Act also expresses the sense of Congress that 

the Department of Justice should use the Act to prosecute vigorously those who use 

spyware to commit crimes and those that conduct phishing scams. 

Finally, I wish to clarify the Act’s provision addressing state civil actions. Some 

people have construed § 1030A(c) as a bar on any civil action premised on conduct 

10 

that violates the Act. That construction is incorrect. The Act merely states that violation of the Act itself cannot supply the basis for a state civil action. This provision 

is necessary because some States permit tort claims based on the violation of Federal criminal statutes. Were we to allow the Act to serve as the basis for tort claims 

in multiple jurisdictions, we would wind up with multiple and inconsistent statecourt interpretations of the Act. Because much of the power and promise of the 

Internet comes from its ability to transcend geographic and political boundaries, we 

must avoid miring Internet commerce in potentially inconsistent state applications 

of Federal law. Section 1030A(c) ensures that this does not happen. At the same 

time, that provision does not preempt state-court cases based on independent statelaw causes of action. Nor does it preempt actions of any kind in Federal court. 

In closing, I simply note that a very broad coalition of high technology industries, 

commercial organizations, and public interest groups have come together to support 

this legislation. The breadth of the support for this bill extends to the House itself. 

When Representative Goodlatte and I brought this legislation to the floor in the 

past two Congresses it passed by an overwhelming majority. Indeed, the floor vote 

in the 109th Congress was 395–1. That support was there for a reason. Spyware 

is a serious and growing problem and the I-SPY Prevention Act is the right way 

to fight it. 

I applaud the subcommittee for once again focusing on this very important piece 

of legislation. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Goodlatte? 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE BOB GOODLATTE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF 

VIRIGINIA 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Chairman Scott and Ranking Member Forbes and the other Members of the Subcommittee for allowing me to testify at this important hearing. My full written testimony has been submitted for the record. 

And I am very pleased to join with my colleague from California, 

representative Zoe Lofgren, with whom I have worked on many 

Internet-and technology-related issues, in the reintroduction of 

H.R. 1525, the Internet Spyware, or I-SPY, Prevention Act. 

This bipartisan legislation will impose tough criminal penalties 

on those that use software for nefarious purposes without imposing 

a broad regulatory regime on legitimate online businesses. I believe 

that this targeted approach is the best way to combat spyware. 

The continued growth of the Internet has brought tremendous 

enhancements to our quality of life, from advances in the delivery 

of healthcare to the ability of consumers to instantaneously conduct 

transactions online. Increasingly, consumers want a fast connection 

to the Internet and want the delivery of online services to be seamless and online service providers have invested significant resources to develop software to make their services as safe, reliable, 

and fast as possible. 

However, the Internet will never reach its full potential until 

consumers feel safe to conduct transactions online. One enormous 

hurdle to consumer confidence in the Internet is the purveyance of 

spyware. Unfortunately, similar types of software to what legitimate businesses use to deliver new and innovative services can 

also be used by bad actors to break into computers, steal personal 

information and commit identity theft and other crimes. 

The term ‘‘spyware’’ is used to describe software that criminals 

use to secretly crack into computers to conduct nefarious activities 

such as altering a user’s security settings, collecting personal information to steal a user’s identity or committing other crimes. 

11 

A recent study done by the National Cybersecurity Alliance revealed that over 90 percent of consumers had some form of 

spyware on their computers and most consumers were not aware 

of it. With the interstate nature of the Internet, Congress clearly 

has a role to play in both punishing those that use software to commit online crimes and preventing the continuing erosion of consumer confidence in the Internet. 

However, as Congress considers legislation in this area, I believe 

that four overarching principles should guide the development of 

any software legislation. First, we must punish the bad actors 

while protecting legitimate online companies. Second, we must not 

over-regulate but rather encourage innovative new services and the 

growth of the Internet. Third, we must not stifle the free market 

interactions between consumers and service providers. And, fourth, 

we must target the behavior, not the technology. 

The I-SPY Prevention Act would impose criminal penalties on 

the most egregious behaviors associated with spyware. Specifically, 

this legislation would impose up to a 5-year prison sentence on 

anyone who uses spyware to intentionally break into a computer 

and uses that software in furtherance of another Federal crime. 

In addition, it would impose up to a 2-year prison sentence on 

anyone who uses spyware to intentionally break into a computer, 

and either alter the computer’s security settings or obtain personal 

information with the intent to defraud or injure a person or with 

the intent to damage a computer. 

By imposing stiff penalties on these bad actors, this legislation 

will help deter the use of spyware and will thus help protect consumers from these aggressive attacks. 

Enforcement is crucial in combating spyware. The I-SPY Prevention Act authorizes $10 million for fiscal years 2008 through 2011 

to be devoted to prosecutions involving spyware, phishing and 

pharming scams. 

Phishing scams occur when criminals send fake e-mail messages 

to consumers on behalf of famous companies and request account 

information that is later used to conduct criminal activities. 

Pharming, an even more nefarious practice, occurs when hackers 

redirect Internet traffic to fake sites in order to steal personal information, such as credit card numbers, passwords and account information. 

In summary, this I-SPY Prevention Act is a targeted approach 

that protects consumers by imposing stiff penalties on the truly 

bad actors while protecting the ability of legitimate online companies to develop new and exciting products and services for consumers. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Goodlatte follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BOB GOODLATTE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA

Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Forbes, and members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for inviting me to testify at this important hearing. 

I was pleased to join with my colleague from California, Representative Zoe 

Lofgren, to reintroduce H.R. 1525, the ‘‘Internet Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention Act.’’ 

This bi-partisan legislation will impose tough criminal penalties on those that use 

12 

software for nefarious purposes, without imposing a broad regulatory regime on legitimate online businesses. I believe that this targeted approach is the best way to 

combat spyware. 

The continued growth of the Internet has brought tremendous enhancements to 

our quality of life—from advances in the delivery of health care, to the ability of 

consumers to seamlessly and instantaneously conduct transactions online. Increasingly, consumers want a fast connection to the Internet and want the delivery of 

online services to be seamless, and online service providers have invested significant 

resources to develop software to make their services as safe, reliable and fast as possible. 

However, the Internet will never reach its full potential until consumers feel safe 

to conduct transactions online. One enormous hurdle to consumer confidence in the 

Internet is the purveyance of spyware. Unfortunately, similar types of software to 

what legitimate businesses use to deliver new and innovative services can also be 

used by bad actors to break into computers, steal personal information and commit 

identity theft and other crimes. 

Spyware is software that provides a tool for criminals to secretly crack into computers to conduct nefarious activities, such as altering a user’s security settings, collecting personal information to steal a user’s identity, or to commit other crimes. 

A recent study done by the National CyberSecurity Alliance revealed that over 90% 

of consumers had some form of spyware on their computers and most consumers 

were not aware of it. With the interstate nature of the Internet, Congress clearly 

has a role to play in punishing those that use software to commit online crimes and 

thus prevent the continuing erosion of consumer confidence in the Internet. 

However, as Congress considers legislation in this area I believe that four overarching principles should guide the development of any spyware legislation. First, 

we must punish the bad actors, while protecting legitimate online companies. Second, we must not over-regulate, but rather encourage innovative new services and 

the growth of the Internet. Third, we must not stifle the free market. Fourth, we 

must target the behavior, not the technology. 

The I-SPY Prevention Act would impose criminal penalties on the most egregious 

behaviors associated with spyware. Specifically, this legislation would impose up to 

a five-year prison sentence on anyone who uses software to intentionally break into 

a computer and uses that software in furtherance of another federal crime. In addition, it would impose up to a two year prison sentence on anyone who uses spyware 

to intentionally break into a computer and either alter the computer’s security settings or obtain personal information with the intent to defraud or injure a person 

or with the intent to damage a computer. By imposing stiff penalties on these bad 

actors, this legislation will help deter the use of spyware, and will thus help protect 

consumers from these aggressive attacks. 

Enforcement is also crucial in combating spyware. The I-SPY Prevention Act authorizes $10 million for fiscal years 2008 through 2011, to be devoted to prosecutions involving spyware, phishing and pharming scams, and expresses the sense of 

Congress that the Department of Justice should vigorously enforce the laws against 

these crimes. Phishing scams occur when criminals send fake e-mail messages to 

consumers on behalf of famous companies and request account information that is 

later used to conduct criminal activities. Pharming scams occur when hackers redirect Internet traffic to fake sites in order to steal personal information such as 

credit card numbers, passwords and account information. This form of online fraud 

is particularly egregious because it is not as easily discernable by consumers. With 

pharming scams, innocent Internet users simply type the domain name into their 

web browsers, and the signal is re-routed to the devious website. 

The I-SPY Prevention Act is a targeted approach that protects consumers by imposing stiff penalties on the truly bad actors, while protecting the ability of legitimate companies to develop new and exciting products and services online for consumers. 

The I-SPY Prevention Act also avoids excessive regulation and its repercussions, 

including the increased likelihood that an overly regulatory approach focusing on 

technology would have unintended consequences that could discourage both consumer use of the Internet as well as the creation of new and exciting technologies 

and services on the Internet. By encouraging innovation, the I-SPY Prevention Act 

will help ensure that consumers have access to cutting-edge products and services 

at lower prices. 

In addition, the approach of the I-SPY Prevention Act does not interfere with the 

free market principle that a business should be free to react to consumer demand 

by providing consumers with easy access to the Internet’s wealth of information and 

convenience. Increasingly, consumers want a seamless interaction with the Internet, 

and we must be careful to not interfere with businesses’ abilities to respond to this 

13 

consumer demand with innovative services. The I-SPY Prevention Act will help ensure that consumers, not the federal government, define what their interaction with 

the Internet looks like. 

Finally, by going after the criminal behavior associated with the use of spyware, 

the I-SPY Prevention Act recognizes that not all software is spyware and that the 

crime does not lie in the technology itself, but rather in actually using the technology for nefarious purposes. People commit crimes, not software. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee. I look 

forward to answering any questions you may have. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Goodlatte. 

Mr. Keller? 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE RIC KELLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA 

Mr. KELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member Forbes. It is also good to see my colleagues, Congressmen 

Gohmert and Coble and Lungren. 

Aiming a laser beam into the cockpit of an airplane is a clear and 

present danger to the safety of all of those onboard the aircraft. 

This legislation is simple and straightforward. It makes it illegal 

to knowingly aim a laser pointer at an aircraft. Those who intentionally engage in such misconduct shall be fined or imprisoned not 

more than 5 years or both in the discretion of the judge. 

This legislation was unanimously approved by all Democrats and 

Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee in the last Congress. It was then approved by the full House on a voice vote and 

the Senate also approved the legislation by unanimous consent 

after slightly amending the legislation to provide for limited exceptions by the Department of Defense and FAA, which we have included this time. 

The problems caused by laser beam pranksters are more widespread than one might think. According to the Congressional Research Service and the Federal Aviation Administration, there have 

been over 500 incidences reported since 1990 where pilots have 

been disoriented or temporarily blinded by laser exposure. There 

have been 90 incidences in 2005 alone, according to the FAA. 

These easily available laser pointers, like the one I purchased 

here for $12 at Staples earlier today, have enough power to cause 

vision problems in pilots from a distance of two miles. 

I will demonstrate by looking at Mr. Sensenbrenner’s portrait, 

and if you look at his face, you will see a laser beam right there, 

which has enough power to go almost two miles. I do this not merely for illustration purposes, but just because it is fun to poke fun 

at Mr. Sensenbrenner. I assume I will be subject to some sort of 

a voodoo-type penalty later. 

But it is only a matter of time before one of these laser beam 

pranksters ends up killing over 200 people in a commercial airline 

crash. Surprisingly, there is currently no Federal statute on the 

books making it illegal to shine a laser beam into an aircraft’s cockpit unless one attempts to use the Patriot Act to claim that an action was a terrorist act or other act of violence against a mass 

transportation system. 

So far, none of the more than 500 incidents involving flight crew 

exposure to lasers have been linked to terrorism. Rather, it is often 

the case of pranksters making stupid choices to put pilots and their 

14 

passengers at risk of dying. It is imperative that we send a message to the public that flight security is a serious issue. These acts 

of mischief will not be tolerated. 

I wanted to learn what it was like to be inside an aircraft cockpit 

hit by a laser beam, so I spoke with Lieutenant Barry Smith from 

my hometown of Orlando, Florida, who was actually in the cockpit 

of a helicopter that was hit by a laser beam. 

Lieutenant Smith is with the Seminole County Sheriff’s Office. 

He and his partner were in a police helicopter searching for burglary suspects at night in a suburb of Orlando when a red laser 

beam hit the aircraft twice. Lieutenant Smith said the Plexiglas 

windshield of the helicopter spread out the light to be the size of 

a basketball. It shocked them. They were flying near a large tower 

with a red light and they mistakenly thought they may have flown 

too close to the tower, so they jerked the helicopter back and they 

became disoriented. 

That is when they realized that they weren’t near the tower at 

all. Then Lieutenant Smith began to worry that the light could 

have come from a laser site on a rifle. He wondered if they were 

about to be shot out of the sky. He told me, ‘‘It scared the heck out 

of us.’’ In reality, it was a 31-year-old man with a small, pen-sized 

laser light standing in his backyard. 

Currently, a handful of State legislatures, including Florida, 

have taken steps to address this matter. Governor Bush signed a 

bill into law making it illegal to focus the beam of a laser light at 

an aircraft. However, Federal legislation is needed because aircrafts travel across State lines and airports such as Ronald Reagan 

National Airport are located near State borders. 

This legislation before us is needed to ensure the safety of pilots 

and passengers in all situations. 

I also want to recognize and thank Congresswoman Waters and 

Congressman Johnson for showing up to this hearing. I didn’t see 

you earlier. I am pleased that so many of you have come out to listen to what we have to say, and I appreciate your support in the 

past of this legislation and hopefully we can support it again tomorrow. 

I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Keller follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RIC KELLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Aiming a laser beam into the cockpit of an airplane is a clear and present danger 

to the safety of all those onboard the aircraft. 

This legislation is simple and straightforward. It makes it illegal to knowingly 

aim a laser pointer at an aircraft. Those who intentionally engage in such misconduct, shall be fined or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, in the discretion of the judge. 

This legislation was unanimously approved by all Democrats and Republicans on 

the House Judiciary Committee in the last Congress. It then was approved by the 

full House on a voice vote, and the Senate also approved the legislation by unanimous consent, after slightly amending the legislation to provide for limited exceptions by the Department of Defense and FAA. 

The problems caused by laser beam pranksters are more widespread than one 

might think. According to the Congressional Research Service and the Federal Aviation Administration, there have been over 500 incidents reported since 1990 where 

pilots have been disoriented or temporarily blinded by laser exposure. 

15 

These easily available pen-sized laser pointers, like the one I purchased here for 

$12 at the House of Representatives Office Supply Store, have enough power to 

cause vision problems in pilots from a distance of two miles. 

It’s only a matter of time before one of these laser beam pranksters ends up killing over 200 people in a commercial airline crash. 

Surprisingly, there is currently no federal statute on the books making it illegal 

to shine a laser beam into an aircraft’s cockpit, unless one attempts to use the Patriot Act to claim that the action was a ‘‘terrorist attack or other attack of violence 

against a mass transportation system.’’ 

So far, none of the more than 500 incidents involving flight crew exposure to lasers have been linked to terrorism. Rather, it’s often a case of pranksters making 

stupid choices to put pilots and their passengers at risk of dying. It is imperative 

that we send a message to the public that flight security is a serious issue. These 

acts of mischief will not be tolerated. 

I wanted to learn what it was like to be in an aircraft cockpit hit by a laser beam, 

so I spoke with Lieutenant Barry Smith from my hometown of Orlando, Florida, 

who was actually in the cockpit of a helicopter that was hit with a laser beam. 

Lieutenant Smith is with the Seminole County Sheriff’s Office. He and his partner 

were in a police helicopter searching for burglary suspects at night in a suburb of 

Orlando, when a red laser beam hit the aircraft twice. Lieutenant Smith said the 

Plexiglas windshield of the helicopter spread out the light to be the size of a basketball. It shocked them. They were flying near a large tower with a red light, and they 

mistakenly thought they may have flown too close to the tower. They were disoriented and they immediately jerked the helicopter back. 

When they realized that they weren’t near the tower, Lieutenant Smith began to 

worry that the light could have come from a laser site on a rifle. He wondered if 

they were about to be shot out of they sky? He told me, ‘‘It scared the heck out of 

us.’’ 

In reality, it was a 31-year-old man, with a small, pen-sized laser light, standing 

in his yard. 

Currently, a handful of state legislatures, including Florida’s, are taking appropriate steps to address this matter. For example, on June 8, 2005, Governor Jeb 

Bush of Florida signed into law a bill making it illegal for any person to focus the 

beam of a laser lighting device at an aircraft. However, federal legislation is needed 

because aircrafts cross state lines and airports such as Ronald Reagan National Airport are located near state borders. 

Clearly, this legislation before us is needed to ensure the safety of pilots and passengers in all situations, and I urge my colleagues to vote ‘‘Yes’’ on the legislation. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much, Mr. Keller. 

And I thank all of our witnesses. 

At this time we will respond to questions. And I will reserve 

questions at this point and yield to my colleague from Virginia. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, I think these three experts have exhausted this area so much, I have no additional questions. 

But just, once again, thank them for their hard work in these 

areas. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. If the gentleman will yield, except that the gentleman from Florida hasn’t been bipartisan, and I don’t believe he 

would get any objection from the Democratic side if he did the 

same thing with Former Chairman Brooks. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I was going to ask for the laser so we could do 

that, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCOTT. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentlelady from California? 

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I think that it is pretty straightforward and it certainly is well-understood. I just have no questions, and I am very supportive, and I would just ask that we just 

move with it. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Gohmert? 

16 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I might scare you 

and may make you want to rethink your positions, but I am in 

agreement with you. 

But I do have a couple of questions for Mr. Goodlatte and Ms. 

Lofgren. 

On the bill, I don’t have Section 1030. Do you know offhand what 

the definition of ‘‘protected computer’’ is? 

Because obviously that is an extremely important or integral 

part of this. It is referenced in Section 1030 and I apologize for not 

already having that, but I thought maybe if you had it handy. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. I don’t have it right in front of me, but I am reliably informed that it is a very broad definition of protected—it is 

almost any computer. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, we can check on that. We want to make 

sure that it doesn’t require some specific type of anti-spyware or 

something—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. No, no, nothing like that. 

Ms. LOFGREN. No, no, no. 

Mr. GOHMERT.—in order to be protected. 

Ms. LOFGREN. If you are connected. 

Mr. GOHMERT. And then I am curious, in subsection C of 1030- 

A, ‘‘No person may bring a civil action under the laws of any State 

if such action is premised in whole or in part upon the defendants 

violating this section.’’ 

And I am just curious, I like the bill, but I am curious about the 

purpose of adding a civil bar to litigation. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Here is the intent on that. There was concern that 

we were creating a litigation bonanza in 50 States. And there are 

State laws, you know, if there is an alleged violation of the State 

law, this doesn’t do anything about that. You can bring an action 

under State law just as you can today. 

But we didn’t want to create a State law action premised on this 

Federal law, and that is basically what we said in this section. You 

can bring a Federal action under the Federal law, but we don’t 

want to create a new State cause of action under the Federal law. 

Mr. GOHMERT. So, that was my question. Is this also going to be 

able to be interpreted as barring any Federal action in Federal 

court? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. No. 

Ms. LOFGREN. No. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Because I know people in America don’t like frivolous lawsuits and that kind of thing, don’t like to clutter the courts, 

but it sure seems like if people that are invading peoples’ computers and their privacy were subject to civil liability of some kind 

in somebody’s court, that it might have a deterrent effect. 

Ms. LOFGREN. The point of this is to bring Federal action in Federal court under Federal law. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Okay. 

Ms. LOFGREN. And I think this section actually accomplishes 

that. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Okay. That sounds good. And I will check on the 

definition in 1030 of protected computer. 

I appreciate all of your work in getting this to this point. Thank 

you very much. 

17 

I yield back. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Georgia? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have no questions. I would just simply like to say that the legislation appears to be forthright and directed toward issues that 

need to be addressed, and I support both bills 100 percent. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

The gentleman from North Carolina? 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As the distinguished Ranking Member, your colleague from Virginia, said when he conferred expert witness status upon our three 

witnesses, I remember, Mr. Chairman, that when you start examining expert witnesses, the examiner may end up looking foolish. 

So I will not assume that risk. 

And I yield back. 

Good to have you all with us, by the way. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

The gentleman from California? 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I just wanted to ask Ms. Lofgren and Mr. Goodlatte this, and 

that is much of the time when we deal with legislation in the area 

of rapidly expanding and changing technology, the technology outstrips our attempt to try and put reasonable regulation on it. 

How have you tried to deal with that issue here? In other words, 

is our definition of spyware and phishing or activities that are 

similar to that inclusive enough such that we won’t be able to—we 

will be here in another year or two trying to redo it because the 

technology has outstripped our effort to try to get at what we all 

agree is a practice that ought to be dealt with severely? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. If I might, Mr. Lungren, that is a very good 

point, and it is in fact the hallmark of this legislation. 

There is another version of legislation going through another 

Committee that addresses spyware from a much more regulatory 

approach, and while there are many commendable things in that 

legislation, one of the things that concerns us is that we could have 

the effect of stifling technology and being frankly out of date before 

it is even put into effect, unless we just go after the action and the 

intent, which is what this legislation does. 

It goes after the bad actors. The definition of spyware is one that 

I think is a very encompassing one. Phishing and pharming are 

much more specific activities, but they are an ongoing problem on 

the Internet and they, plus the broader definition of spyware, I 

think would give this legislation, if it became law, give law enforcement the ability to go after people who have committed crimes 

without stifling technology on the Internet or without the problem 

of the technology moving on, as you say, and leaving this legislation irrelevant. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I would just add, on page 2 of the bill, starting at 

line 9, it really defines the conduct, and it is really intend to engage in various fraud that is being prohibited in the computer environment. And we have done that, as Mr. Goodlatte has said, for a 

18 

reason, not to get into regulation of existing technology not understanding what might be next. 

As the gentleman knows, I represent Silicon Valley in the Congress and the technology community, at least as they have expressed it to me, much prefers this approach to the heavy regulatory approach that is being pursued in another Committee. 

Mr. LUNGREN. And a second question, and that is: Some would 

say there are legitimate commercial uses of someone collecting information. If I go to a Web site repeatedly to purchase something, 

for instance, the Web site entity, the company that owns the Web 

site, might collect information about my buying preferences. Now, 

I may not like that, but I don’t think that rises to the level of a 

crime. 

Are we making sure that we differentiate between that and this 

kind of activity? 

Ms. LOFGREN. Certainly. I mean, cookies are not phishing or 

pharming, and they actually, I mean, there are things you can do 

if you don’t want to have cookies logged into your computer memory. 

But if you look again to the definition, there is an intent definition to defraud, injure, cause damage, to impair the security protection, that really don’t relate to the technology provisions that essentially allow the Web to function in its—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. And that is your intent, very much, in this legislation, to differentiate between that. 

Ms. LOFGREN. That is correct. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. 

If there are no further questions, we will adjourn the hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, 

TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY, ON H.R. 1525, THE ‘‘INTERNET SPYWARE (ISPY) PREVENTION ACT OF 2007’’ 


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PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, 

TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY, ON H.R. 1615, THE ‘‘SECURING AIRCRAFT

COCKPITS AGAINST LASERS ACT OF 2007’’ 


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