DIA Historical Research 

Support Branch

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

COMMITTED TO EXCELLENCE IN

DEFENSE OF THE NATION

50 YEARS
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Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 
Front Cover: Aerial view of the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center 

(DIAC) on Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling. Credit: DoD 

Back Cover: DIA counterintelligence personnel deployed in support of military 

operations (top left); DIA analysts at work (bottom left); DIA personnel conducting 

document exploitation (DOCEX) in Qatar (right). Credit: DoD
What is Military Intelligence? 3

Military Intelligence in United States History 7

Cold War Dilemmas 13

1960s: The Early Years 17

1970s: Years of Transition 23

1980s: DIA Comes of Age 29

 1990s: New Missions, New Adversaries 35

2000s: Years of Transformation 43

DIA’s Historic Role 47

Directors of DIA 51

The Patriots’ Memorial 52

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

COMMITTED TO EXCELLENCE IN

DEFENSE OF THE NATION

50 YEARS
2

DIA Personnel conduct weapons exploitation. Credit: DoD
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 3

Military intelligence is intelligence on 

any foreign military or military-related 

situation which is signifi cant to military 

policymaking or the planning and conduct 

of military activities. It is the product of 

gathering information about foreign military 

capabilities, intentions, plans, dispositions, 

and equipment; analyzing the contents 

of that information; and disseminating 

the fi ndings to decisionmakers, combat 

troops, and other recipients. 

Military intelligence appears in three 

basic forms: strategic, operational, and 

tactical. Strategic intelligence is intelligence 

that is required for the formulation of 

strategy, policy, and military plans and 

operations at national and theater levels. 

It involves a focus on overarching factors 

such as foreign geography, infrastructure, 

and force planning, or long-term trends 

such as the application of new tactics, 

techniques, and procedures or the 

development of new resources. It is an 

important tool in the effort to anticipate 

and counter threats throughout the world. 

Operational intelligence is intelligence that 

is required for planning and conducting 

campaigns and major operations to 

accomplish strategic objectives within 

theaters or operational areas. It assumes a 

different approach than strategic intelligence 

by focusing on narrower, but signifi cant, 

theater-oriented military responsibilities. 

Finally, tactical intelligence is intelligence 

that is required for planning and conducting 

tactical military operations at the local level. 

It concerns information about the enemy that 

is designed to help locate the enemy and 

decide which tactics, units, and weapons 

will most likely contribute to victory in an 

assigned area, and when properly applied, 

it can be a signifi cant force multiplier. 

The intelligence process services the need for 

all three types of intelligence. The fi rst step, 

information gathering, consists of collecting 

data and making it available for analysis. A 

common method of information gathering is 

the use of unclassifi ed “open sources” such 

as foreign websites, television, newspapers, 

radio, or openly published government 

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE?

What is
4WHAT IS MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

studies. Often, this open source intelligence 

OSINT provides such basic information as 

population statistics, military maneuvers, 

and political, social, and cultural trends. 

Open sources sometimes do not supply 

enough information, and other techniques 

are necessary. Analysis of aerial imagery 

is one commonly employed method. A 

great deal of information on a nation’s 

infrastructure, military bases, and even 

troop movements, can be gleaned 

from photo interpretation of detailed, 

high-altitude photography, also known 

as IMINT, or imagery intelligence. 

Human intelligence (HUMINT) involves 

the overt or covert use of human 

sources to gather information. Signals 

intelligence (SIGINT) involves collecting 

information by listening to enemy radio 

broadcasts and other electronic means 

of communication. Measurement and 

Signature Intelligence (MASINT) utilizes 

technical means to gather unique data 

other than SIGINT or IMINT on foreign 

targets. All of these disciplines provide 

vital intelligence that, when properly 

analyzed, can provide a significant 

benefi t to warfi ghters and policymakers.

The second step of the intelligence process is 

analysis. Intelligence analysts pull together 

information gathered from many sources 

to produce all-source, fi nished intelligence 

that involves local, national, and global 

issues that may infl uence foreign threats. 

They assess scientifi c, technical, tactical, 

diplomatic, military, organizational, or 

political changes in combination with 

factors such as geography, demographics, 

and industrial capabilities. The goal is 

to anticipate and respond to overseas 

During the Cold War, the Cobra Dane radar 

on Shemya Island in Alaska provided essential 

intelligence about Soviet strategic missile 

capabilities as well as early warning of a 

potential Soviet attack. DIA tasked the facility 

with collection operations during missile tests. 

It is still operational today. Credit: DoD
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 5

dangers as well as assess enemy 

capabilities, intentions, and vulnerabilities. 

The fi nished intelligence they produce can 

be either strategic, tactical, or operational.

The third step of the intelligence process 

is actually made up of two activities: 

production and dissemination. Once 

analysts have made their determinations, 

they compose fi nished intelligence reports 

for both military and civilian offi cials. 

Intelligence offi cers then disseminate these 

products to relevant decisionmakers, who 

decide on a detailed plan of action. One 

of the intelligence offi cer’s primary duties is 

to anticipate the needs of decisionmakers 

and react to specifi c requests for 

information. Intelligence offi cers often 

work very closely with policymakers and 

warfi ghters to anticipate information 

requirements and to more sharply hone the 

fi nished intelligence provided by analysts.

Much like the Cobra 

Dane radar, the Cobra 

Judy radar on the USNS 

Observation Island also 

provided the United States 

with key information on 

foreign ballistic missile 

development. The ship is 

operated by the Navy, but 

receives its intelligence 

requirements from DIA. 

Likewise, it still operates 

today. Credit: DoD
6

Photoreconnaissance technology underwent a rapid evolution during World 

War I, and proved its great worth on the battlefi eld. Credit: NARA
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 7

In U.S. history, military intelligence is an 

activity that stretches back to the colonial 

period. The scope and practice of military 

intelligence has expanded and contracted 

over time as need, resources, and 

intelligence philosophy have changed over 

the years. Nevertheless, military intelligence 

has played a dramatic role in many of 

the key moments in American history. 

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

The American military intelligence system 

during the Revolutionary War was an 

active and effective instrument that helped 

counterbalance British numerical and 

operational superiority. Indeed, good 

military intelligence was vital to the 

strategy of the American Continental Army. 

Throughout the war, George Washington, 

an experienced soldier who recognized 

the value of good intelligence reporting, 

spearheaded much of the colonists’ 

military intelligence effort. He established 

HUMINT networks in Boston, New York, 

and Philadelphia, which provided him 

with a great deal of knowledge about 

British troop dispositions and movements. 

Perhaps most famously, Washington 

exploited HUMINT on the poor disposition 

of Hessian troops in Trenton, New Jersey 

and launched a successful surprise attack 

on them in December 1776. Throughout 

the war, Washington proved to be an 

adept consumer of military intelligence.

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

Neither the Union nor the Confederacy was 

prepared for the intelligence demands of the 

Civil War, and at the outbreak of the war, 

neither side possessed a formal, centralized 

intelligence apparatus. Nevertheless, the 

intelligence practices of code breaking, 

covert surveillance, and denial and 

deception were vital during the confl ict. 

Both sides, for example, employed covert 

communications and mail interception to 

spy on each other’s troops. HUMINT also 

remained an extremely important discipline 

for gathering intelligence on the enemy. 

Even Abraham Lincoln had his own HUMINT 

UNITED STATES HISTORY

Military Intelligence in
8MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN U.S. HISTORY

network. The war also encouraged 

a full range of covert paramilitary, 

psychological, and political action. Finally, 

it ushered in the widespread use of another 

innovation in U.S. intelligence operations: 

aerial reconnaissance. The Union made 

extensive and successful use of observation 

balloons, while the Confederacy’s attempts 

were less successful. When the war ended, 

however, many policymakers allowed the 

intelligence system to atrophy, believing 

it to be useful only in time of war.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

The United States went to war with Spain 

in 1898 after the battleship USS Maine

blew up while in harbor in Cuba. U.S. 

decisionmakers set out three tasks for its 

small Army and Navy intelligence staffs: 

1) Observe the movements of a Spanish 

fl eet being sent to the Caribbean; 2) 

Monitor another Spanish fl eet on its 

way to the Philippines; 3) Maintain 

liaison with Cuban insurgents in order 

to have up-to-date information Spanish 

military dispositions on the island. U.S. 

naval intelligence offi cers set up a large 

international network of intelligence agents 

that provided up-to-date HUMINT on the 

location of the respective Spanish fl eets. 

At the same time, Army intelligence in 

Cuba gave U.S. forces a clearer picture of 

Spanish strengths and weaknesses on the 

island, which allowed U.S. planners to fi ght 

to their strengths and Spain’s weaknesses. 

Intelligence operations had once again 

proven their value as a force multiplier, 

but even so, aside from the military 

attaché system and the Offi ce of Naval 

Intelligence (ONI), the U.S. government 

still did not maintain a large complex, allsource peacetime intelligence apparatus.

WORLD WAR I

The American declaration of war against 

Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1917 

brought an infusion of personnel and 

resources that the military intelligence 

community sorely lacked. General 

John J. Pershing, commander of the 

American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in 

France, established an effective theater 

intelligence center for collection, analysis, 

and dissemination of information. Aerial 

reconnaissance reached new levels of 

sophistication during World War I, and 
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 9

the practice was exploited particularly 

well by the Americans, British, and 

French. Also, a U.S. Army Signal Corps 

provided direction-fi nding and interception 

equipment, and it manned radio listening 

posts that furnished information about 

enemy plans. Indeed, the unprecedented 

technological advances during World 

War I, extensive use of HUMINT, and 

exceptional strides in communications 

allowed military intelligence to make 

important contributions to the Allied 

victory. Nevertheless, after hostilities 

concluded, the U.S. only retained a 

fraction of what it invested during the war.

WORLD WAR II

The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl 

Harbor came as a tremendous shock to 

the United States. The failure to predict 

or provide warning of the attack was one 

of the twentieth century’s most signifi cant 

intelligence failures, and clarifi ed the 

need for an effective military intelligence 

system, even in peacetime. In the wake 

of the attack, both the Army and Navy 

made improvements that streamlined their 

processing and dissemination capabilities. 

They also set up theater and national-level 

joint intelligence centers to coordinate their 

efforts. In Europe, American and British 

intelligence set up clandestine operations 

Both sides in World War I used aerial 

reconnaissance to map the enemy trench 

system. German trenches in Artois, France 

are on the right side and bottom of the photo. 

Opposing British trenches are on the left, and 

No Man’s Land is in between. Credit: NARA
10MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN U.S. HISTORY

behind enemy lines, mapped supply 

drop zones for Allied pilots, set up safe 

houses for escaped POWs, helped train 

resistance fi ghters in guerilla warfare, 

and provided intelligence reports to Allied 

headquarters. Aerial reconnaissance was 

also extensively employed. In the Pacifi c, 

Army and Navy intelligence exploited 

captured documents, mapped unknown 

islands, deployed reconnaissance units 

to gather tactical intelligence, and set 

up SIGINT stations across the theater to 

intercept Japanese radio signals. World 

War II forced policymakers to recognize 

the value of an effi cient, professional 

military intelligence apparatus, even 

in peacetime. But even so, efforts to 

establish a unifi ed military intelligence 

establishment languished after the war.

The USS Shaw explodes after being 

attacked by Japanese warplanes in Pearl 

Harbor. The failure to warn of the Japanese 

attack was one of the greatest intelligence 

blunders in U.S. history. Credit: NARA
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years of Commitment to Excellence 11
12

The U2 “Dragon Lady” high altitude reconnaissance aircraft has been a mainstay of 

American intelligence gathering since the 1950s. It provides everything from imagery 

intelligence (IMINT) to intercepted signals intelligence (SIGINT). Credit: DoD
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 13

As successful as it was in World War II, 

the U.S. military intelligence structure 

faced serious dilemmas in the post-war 

period. As Cold War tensions with the 

Soviet Union escalated, the amount of 

resources dedicated to intelligence collection 

declined in the immediate post-war years. 

Military budget cuts in the wake of the 

war meant that the Army, Navy, and Air 

Force all lost many capabilities. Although 

policymakers recognized the need for 

accurate, timely military intelligence, it 

was not until well into the Korean War 

(1950-1953) that the necessary resources 

were once again funneled into building 

up a viable, sustainable intelligence 

establishment in the Department of Defense.

Still, several overlapping problems existed 

in the military intelligence system after the 

Korean War. All three Services separately 

collected, produced, and disseminated 

information. Moreover, each Service’s 

foreign attaché reported separately to their 

ambassadors and to their host nation’s 

militaries. The result was a duplicative, 

costly, and often ineffective system in 

which the Services provided sometimes 

confl icting foreign intelligence estimates. 

This problem bred other dilemmas. If the 

Services could not agree on foreign military 

intelligence estimates, how could the U.S. 

design its own forces to meet foreign threats? 

This problem came to a head twice in the 

1950s. In the earlier part of the decade, 

the Air Force estimated that the Soviet 

Union had a much larger bomber force 

than the U.S., a situation that potentially 

weakened U.S. nuclear deterrence. The Air 

Force used this argument, which was later 

disproven by U-2 reconnaissance fl ights, 

to lobby for a much larger bomber fl eet. 

Similarly, the Air Force argued later in the 

decade that a “missile gap” had opened 

as the Soviets seemed to produce far more 

strategic nuclear missiles than the U.S. None 

of the other Services, nor the CIA, agreed 

with the Air Force. The argument was later 

rendered moot when intelligence generated 

by the CIA’s “Corona” satellite program

proved that there was no such missile gap.

DILEMMAS

Cold War
14COLD WAR DILEMMAS
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 15

Even so, it was clear that steps needed 

to be taken to remedy these problems.

Near the end of his Presidency, Dwight 

Eisenhower worried that because of the 

untenable state of military intelligence, 

he would bequeath what he called a 

“legacy of ashes” to his successor, John 

F. Kennedy. He appointed a Joint Study 

Group under the leadership of Lyman 

Kirkpatrick to study ways to effectively 

organize the nation’s military intelligence 

activities. A month before Eisenhower 

left offi ce, the Joint Study Group’s 

report landed on his desk. In short, it 

recommended a sweeping reorganization 

that would result in the establishment 

of a single intelligence organization 

for the Department of Defense.

U.S. Marines scale a sea wall at Inchon in North 

Korea on September 15, 1950. The Korean War 

exposed many defi ciencies in the U.S. military 

intelligence and spurred the growth of a large, 

but relatively uncoordinated military intelligence 

system. Credit: Naval Historical Center
16

This photograph taken by a U-2 reconnaissance plane on October 14, 1962, 

revealed the presence of Soviet ballistic missiles on Cuba. The U-2’s fl ight path that 

day was selected because DIA analysts believed that ballistic missiles were being 

installed in this region. Credit: DIA Historical Research Support Branch
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 17

When Kennedy took offi ce, his Secretary 

of Defense, Robert McNamara acted on 

the Joint Study Group’s recommendation. 

He ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 

to submit to him a concept for a single 

Defense Intelligence Agency that would 

integrate the military intelligence efforts 

of all DoD elements. After months of 

study and deliberation with McNamara, 

the JCS submitted their plan. 

The organization laid out by the JCS 

would report to the Secretary of Defense 

through the JCS as a unifi ed body of 

military intelligence and counterintelligence 

entities. The separate Services would 

no longer act as a loose confederation 

of independently operating groups. 

This new Defense Intelligence Agency 

would adopt the mission of managing 

the collection, processing, analysis, and 

dissemination of military intelligence. 

Other objectives in the plan included more 

effi ciently allocating scarce intelligence 

resources and eliminating redundant 

facilities, organizations, and tasks.

THE EARLY YEARS

1960s: 

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara approved 

DIA’s Activation Plan on September 29, 1961.

Credit: DIA Historical Research Support Branch
181960s: THE EARLY YEARS

With some modifi cations, McNamara 

approved the concept given to him by 

the JCS, and established the Defense 

Intelligence Agency on 1 August 1961, 

though it would not become offi cially 

operational until that fall. McNamara 

selected Air Force Lieutenant General 

Joseph F. Carroll to set up and lead 

the new Agency. On 1 October, 

1961, DIA began operations with a 

handful of employees in borrowed 

offi ce space in the Pentagon.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH CARROLL, 

DIA’S FIRST DIRECTOR

Joseph Carroll was born in 1910 and earned a law 

degree from Loyola University in Chicago in 1940. 

The same year, he joined the FBI and spent the World 

War II years solving bank robberies and kidnapping 

cases, eventually rising to the position of Special 

Assistant to the Director, J. Edgar Hoover. In 1948, he 

went on active duty with the Air Force at the rank of 

Brigadier General, eventually rising to the post of Deputy 

Director General for Security, where he formulated 

security and counterintelligence policy for the Air Force. He eventually received a 

promotion to Lieutenant General and became Inspector General for the USAF. 

Carroll came to McNamara’s attention because of several successful leak 

investigations completed by the general and his reputation as an honest broker. 

When McNamara made it clear that he wanted Carroll to lead the new DIA, Carroll 

was reluctant to do so because he had no experience managing an entire agency 

and little experience in foreign intelligence. McNamara brushed aside Carroll’s 

concerns and appointed him Director Designate, DIA, in August 1961. He would 

retire in 1969 and remains to this day the longest-serving DIA Director.
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 19

Only a year later, in October 1962, the 

agency faced what would become the 

gravest crisis of the Cold War when the 

Soviet Union secretly placed nuclearcapable ballistic missiles in Cuba. DIA’s 

analysts played a key role in the discovery 

of the missiles, noting that the placement of 

Soviet surface-to-air missile sites mirrored 

those around ballistic missile bases in the 

Soviet Union. Together with the Air Force, 

they lobbied the National Security Council 

for renewed U-2 fl ights over Cuba. The 

next fl ight — one pass over Pinar del Rio 

province on 14 October — revealed the 

ballistic missiles to be precisely where 

DIA’s analysts thought they would be. For 

the remainder of the crisis, DIA supplied 

constant intelligence updates to the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense 

McNamara. Months after the crisis 

subsided, DIA’s John Hughes went on 

national television to brief the nation on 

the harrowing events of that October. 

At the same time, the Services continued 

to transfer many intelligence functions 

and resources to DIA. In late 1962, DIA 

established the Defense Intelligence School 

(today’s National Defense Intelligence 

In February 1963, DIA’s John Hughes provided an 

unprecedented televised briefi ng to the nation on the events 

surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis the previous October. 

Credit: DIA Historical Research Support Branch
20

College). In early 1963, it activated 

a new Production Center at Arlington 

Hall Station in northern Virginia. In 

1964, it established the Defense Attaché 

System to centrally manage the far-fl ung 

military attaches around the world. The 

agency also added such functions as a 

Dissemination Center, a Scientifi c and 

Technical Intelligence Directorate, and 

it assumed the staff support functions 

of the J-2 (Intelligence), Joint Staff.

DIA’s production and analysis facility opened in dilapidated buildings at Arlington Hall 

Station in northern Virginia in 1963. Credit: DIA Historical Research Support Branch

1960s: THE EARLY YEARS
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 21

But the 1960s would be trying years 

for the agency. The Services, concerned 

that DIA’s intelligence would not be 

responsive to their particular requirements, 

resisted DIA’s attempts to establish itself 

as DoD’s central military intelligence 

organization. During the Vietnam War 

(1965-1973), DIA’s intelligence reporting 

on such important issues as the strategic 

bombing of North Vietnam and the size 

of enemy ground forces was discounted 

by many in the Services and elsewhere. 

In 1968, DIA’s analysts, along with 

the rest of the Intelligence Community, 

failed to successfully predict the Soviet 

Union’s invasion of Czechoslovakia. 

Other foreign intelligence challenges, 

such as the growth of China’s atomic 

bomb program, the Six Day War between 

Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Israel, and 

North Korea’s seizure of the intelligence 

vessel USS Pueblo, strained DIA’s ability to 

handle major issues even as its efforts at 

organization and consolidation continued. 

By the end of the decade, the Agency 

was facing sustained calls for major 

reform or even its outright dissolution.

U.S. Army soldiers move to 

a staging area to conduct 

a search and destroy 

operation outside of Cu Chi, 

South Vietnam in 1966. 

The heavy demands of the 

Vietnam War and unclear 

lines of authority created 

many problems for the 

young Defense Intelligence 

Agency. Credit: NARA
22

A U.S. warplane intercepts a Soviet “Backfi re” bomber over the North Pacifi c. In the 1970s, 

the Backfi re was the object of an intense debate between DIA and CIA analysts over whether 

or not the Soviets would use it to strike the continental United States. Credit: DoD
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 23

DIA faced diffi cult transitional years in the 

early 1970s. Sweeping manpower cuts 

between 1968 and 1975 reduced the 

agency’s workforce by thirty-one percent, a 

situation that led to sharp mission reductions 

and broad organizational restructuring. 

Problems created by manpower reductions 

were compounded by the major advances 

in collection technology, which geometrically 

increased the amount of raw data that 

analysts were required to process. 

To try to overcome these problems, the 

Department of Defense embarked on a 

series of reorganizations involving DIA 

that would take throughout the decade. In 

1970, DoD created the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense (Intelligence) (ASD/I) to supervise 

Defense intelligence programs and to 

provide the principal point for coordination 

with the Director of Central Intelligence as 

well as other intelligence offi cials outside 

DoD. President Nixon also reorganized 

the national Intelligence Community and 

designated DIA’s Director as the program 

manager for a newly established General 

Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), 

a budget and management program 

that coordinated defense intelligence 

as a whole. In 1972, DIA also began 

putting more emphasis on exploiting 

technology for intelligence analysis and 

processing. It began developing networked 

computerized intelligence databases 

and modernizing the National Military 

Intelligence Center in the Pentagon.

Despite the U.S. drawdown in the Southeast 

Asia in the early 1970s, collecting, 

processing, and disseminating military 

intelligence on the region remained one 

of DIA’s central responsibilities. In 1970, 

it coordinated intelligence collection and 

analysis in support of the Son Tay prison 

camp raid to rescue American POWs. 

The raid did not succeed in rescuing any 

prisoners, but it did demonstrate DIA’s 

ability to supply timely, cogent tactical 

intelligence support to combat forces. In 

January 1973, the agency managed the 

setup of the Defense Attaché Offi ce (DAO) in 

Saigon and had responsibility for furnishing 

YEARS OF TRANSITION

1970s: 
24

employees to the DAO’s intelligence 

branch. Nearly all of the 87 intelligence 

analysts that deployed to the DAO Saigon 

in the early and mid-1970s were from 

DIA. Five of the agency’s employees, 

Celeste Brown, Vivienne Clark, Dorothy 

Curtiss, Joan Prey, and Doris Watkins, 

were killed evacuating Vietnamese orphans 

when their transport plane crashed 

during Operation BABYLIFT in 1975. 

Other global challenges continued to 

proliferate. Civil wars in Jordan and 

Nigeria, the emergence of the Palestine 

Liberation Organization, and massive 

shipyard riots in Gdansk, Poland required 

the agency’s attention. The civil war 

in Angola expanded into a proxy war 

between Eastern and Western bloc 

nations, which required DIA to provide 

policymakers with constantly updated 

information on Soviet intentions in 

southern Africa. DIA’s knowledge of Soviet 

military capabilities became particularly 

important when the U.S.S.R. threatened 

to intervene in the Yom Kippur War on 

the Middle East, the closest the world had 

come to a war between the superpowers 

since the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Perhaps the agency’s most important 

mission during this period was evaluating 

the Soviet Union’s strategic nuclear and 

conventional capabilities. In the 1970s, 

the Soviets achieved rough parity with U.S. 

nuclear forces, but questions remained 

about the exact capabilities of these 

forces and the Soviets’ intentions with 

them. DIA’s analysts made a variety of 

major discoveries that aided the U.S. 

understanding of Soviet forces. The agency 

also contributed a great deal of key 

Operation BABYLIFT was initiated to evacuate Vietnamese orphans to the United 

States during the collapse of South Vietnam. Five DIA employees died during 

1970s: YEARS OF TRANSITION

the operation. Credit: National Archives and Records Administration
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years of Commitment to Excellence 25
26

analysis that revised many conclusions in 

the ever important National Intelligence 

Estimates. Finally, DIA also managed 

many of the collection and analysis tasks 

associated with monitoring the AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) and Strategic 

Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) agreements.

These contributions began earning DIA, 

an agency that had struggled so much 

in the 1960s, a better reputation and 

greater infl uence in intelligence debates. 

The other major factor in improving 

the agency’s products and reputation 

in the 1970s was a series of internal 

reorganizations that streamlined the 

intelligence production cycle and sped up 

The Soviet Mil Mi-24/HIND attack helicopter was a part of a massive Soviet conventional 

and strategic weapons buildup in the 1970s that occupied much of DIA’s attention. 

This is a HIND-A, the fi rst model produced by the Soviet Union. Credit: DoD

1970s: YEARS OF TRANSITION
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 27

support for the SecDef, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, and the Unifi ed and Specifi ed 

Commands. Moreover, in 1979, President 

Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order 

12036, which restructured the Intelligence 

Community and better outlined DIA’s 

national and departmental responsibilities. 

Nevertheless, DIA’s intelligence 

requirements continued to expand, a 

situation that sometimes led to failures, 

despite the analysts’ best efforts. For 

example, at the end of the decade, DIA 

personnel and the rest of the Intelligence 

Community had failed to predict the fall of 

the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion 

of Afghanistan. In other areas, however, 

the agency had more success, passing 

timely intelligence to decisionmakers on the 

expansion of state-sponsored terrorism in 

the Middle East and Africa, the Vietnamese 

invasion of Cambodia, the China-Vietnam 

border war, and the Sandinista takeover 

of Nicaragua. Its ability to provide 

this intelligence alongside the ongoing 

intelligence demands against Soviet 

targets demonstrated that the agency 

had turned a corner by decade’s end.
28

U.S. artillery fi res at targets on Grenada during Operation URGENT FURY in October 1983. This 

operation marked the fi rst time since the Son Tay raid in 1970 that DIA was ordered to supply tailored 

operational and tactical intelligence to combat forces. It revealed important weaknesses in the agency’s 

ability to support combat operations during at the tactical and operational levels. Credit: DoD
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 29

In April 1981, DIA broke ground for the 

Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) 

at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, 

DC. When it opened in 1984, the DIAC 

not only gave the agency a new, modern, 

and permanent home, it also improved the 

agency’s work by collocating nearly all of 

DIA’s disparate directorates under one roof, 

allowing for better information sharing and 

more rapid output of intelligence products. 

The event was symbolic of DIA’s arrival 

as a key member of the U.S. Intelligence 

Community. Over the course of the 1980s, 

the agency would participate in every major 

foreign intelligence challenge and expand 

the range of its capabilities to serve both 

senior policymakers and fi eld commanders 

alike as it pressed the concept of intelligence 

as a “force multiplier in crises.” 

Early in the decade, DIA began taking 

steps to provide better operational and 

tactical intelligence to theater- and 

command-level U.S. troops by improving 

its intelligence databases and worldwide 

communications systems. The fi rst major 

test of this new level of support to military 

operations arrived in 1983, when U.S. 

DIA COMES OF AGE

1980s: 

Construction of the Defense 

Intelligence Analysis Center began 

in 1981. Credit: DIA Historical 

Research Support Branch
30

forces invaded the island of Grenada to 

topple the communist government there 

and rescue American medical students. 

The operation was known as URGENT 

FURY. A DIA task force provided detailed 

tactical intelligence to combat troops in the 

operation, and URGENT FURY revealed 

important lessons in how a national-level 

intelligence agency could quickly provide 

timely, fi ne-grain intelligence that was 

tailored to the specifi c needs of consumers 

on the “sharp end” of the spear.

That same year, DIA established the 

Central America Joint Intelligence Team 

(CAJIT). CAJIT was the country’s fi rst 

national-level intelligence “fusion center.” 

Its mission was to support policymakers, 

U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), 

and most importantly, the Government of 

El Salvador, with strategic, operational, 

and tactical intelligence designed 

to defeat El Salvador’s communist 

insurgency. It was made up of analysts 

from across the Intelligence Community, 

and it used powerful databases and 

improved communications technology 

to quickly analyze and disseminate 

intelligence used in U.S. support of the 

Salvadoran military as a way to improve 

its operations against the insurgents. The 

organization was extremely effective, 

and enabled the Salvadorans to beat 

back the insurgents that threatened 

to defeat it early in the decade.

Meanwhile, the agency continued to 

provide intelligence that was essential to 

understanding and defeating the Soviet 

Union. It maintained its contributions to the 

vaunted National Intelligence Estimates 

and developed new information about the 

weaknesses of the Soviet economy, which 

President Ronald Reagan would use in 

succeeding years to put that nation under 

increasing pressure. It also continued to 

provide key support to the arms control 

verifi cation process, particularly SALT, 

and later, the Intermediate Nuclear 

Forces (INF) Treaty, and the Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

The agency also began taking on a 

signifi cant and expanded counterterrorism 

mission in the 1980s. After increased 

attacks against Americans in the mid1980s and a more aggressive response 

demanded by the White House, DIA 

1980s: DIA COMES OF AGE
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 31

SOVIET MILITARY POWER

In 1981, DIA issued the fi rst in a series of 

unclassifi ed publications on the strengths 

and capabilities of Soviet military forces. 

The publication, entitled Soviet Military 

Power arrived in an environment of intense 

political and diplomatic negotiations over 

the placement of Pershing II nuclear missiles 

and ground-launched nuclear cruise missiles 

in Western Europe. Secretary of Defense 

Caspar Weinberger ordered DIA to produce 

it as a way to illustrate the nature and 

scope of the Soviet threat to the West.

First published by DIA in 1981, the booklet 

publicly revealed for the fi rst time the Department 

of Defense’s extensive knowledge of Soviet 

military resource allocation, strategic and 

tactical military capabilities, and research 

and development efforts. It was a lavish 

production, and included dozens of color 

photographs and paintings depicting Soviet 

hardware. It was republished in 1983 and updated every year after until 1991. The 

Soviets thought less of it than did U.S. government offi cials, however. The newspaper 

Izvestia characterized the fi rst edition, which was 99 pages long, as “99 pages of lies.”
32

created its fi rst all-source fusion cell 

for terrorism analysis. The agency 

supported the military’s counterterrorism 

operations in response to such events as 

the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 and the 

cruise ship Achille Lauro, and after the 

bombing of the La Belle discotheque in 

Berlin, a club frequented by American 

servicemen. DIA’s counterterrorism 

efforts in this period earned the agency 

its fi rst Joint Military Unit Award.

Other world crises continued to fl are 

up as well. As the Iran-Iraq War spilled 

into the Persian Gulf, the agency’s 

intelligence support to U.S. forces in the 

Gulf intensifi ed. DIA was a key player 

in Operation EARNEST WILL, the effort 

to protect international shipping in the 

Persian Gulf. It provided targeting data on 

Iranian surface-to-air and surface-to-surface 

missile batteries and intelligence on Iraqi 

air power capabilities. This information 

was vital for U.S. retaliatory strikes on 

Iranian oil platforms and in the aftermath 

of the Iraqi attack on the USS Stark.

By the middle of the decade, DIA was 

fully engaged in collection and analysis 

efforts for events around the globe. The 

agency kept a close watch on unrest in 

the Philippines and the Soviet imbroglio in 

Afghanistan. The “Toyota War” between 

Libya and Chad and turmoil in Haiti added 

to DIA’s heavy production workload, as 

did unrest in other parts of Latin America, 

Somalia, Ethiopia, Burma, and Pakistan. 

Organizational adjustments allowed DIA 

to continue its high tempo of operations. 

During this period, the GoldwaterNichols Defense Reorganization Act 

designated DIA a “combat support 

agency,” which made its activities subject 

to the review of the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff and assigned DIA 

responsibilities in providing supporting 

operational capabilities to the combatant 

commanders. DIA also established its 

Operational Intelligence Crisis Center 

(OICC), which served as the primary 

vehicle for coordinating analytic support 

during crises. The agency also moved 

and renovated the National Military 

Intelligence Center (NMIC), collocating 

it with the National Military Command 

1980s: DIA COMES OF AGE
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 33

Center (NMCC), a move that 

encouraged the fusion of military 

operations with national-level 

intelligence production.

These changes paid off near the 

end of the decade. Operation JUST 

CAUSE, the U.S. invasion of Panama 

in 1989, was a dramatic success in 

part because of the timely, accurate, 

and tailored intelligence provided 

by DIA to policymakers, operational 

planners, and combat forces on the 

ground. The agency also provided 

threat data on hot spots in the Middle 

East, Eastern Europe, and Asia while 

continuing to produce intelligence on 

the soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan 

and the Tiananmen Square incident 

in China. Counterproliferation, 

counternarcotics, and counterterrorism remained critical intelligence 

issues at the end of the decade.

Army Rangers drop into Panama during Operation JUST 

CAUSE in December 1989. DIA’s efforts to improve its 

all-source intelligence support to military operations paid 

major dividends during this operation. Credit: DoD
34

DIA supported U.S. efforts to capture Somali warlords during Operation 

RESTORE Hope from 1992-1994. Credit: CT Snow
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 35

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end 

of the Cold War brought major challenges 

to the U.S. Intelligence Community. 

National security policy, focused on 

containing the spread of communism for 

nearly fi ve decades, was fundamentally 

altered, compelling DIA to examine its 

priorities in the new era. Drastic cuts in 

funding and personnel, part of the “Peace 

Dividend,” forced DIA to restructure its 

directorates in order to operate more 

effi ciently and with fewer resources.

This period of reevaluation and restructuring 

in the Intelligence Community as a whole 

began after the fall of communism in Eastern 

Europe. DIA’s analysts kept careful watch 

over the political events roiling the region, 

but the fall of the Berlin Wall came as an 

NEW MISSIONS, 

NEW ADVERSARIES

1990s: 

The fall of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and 

the rise of a nascent democratic government in 

Russia forced a basic reevaluation of DIA’s roles and 

priorities in the 1990s. Credit: www.kremlin.ru
36

understandable surprise — even 

the participants in Eastern Europe 

were surprised when it happened. 

Nevertheless, in the larger context of 

the Cold War, it was clear to everyone 

that the Warsaw Pact was no longer a 

threat, and the Soviet Union’s days were 

numbered. Like the rest of the Intelligence 

Community, DIA’s analysts successfully 

forecast the decline and fall of the 

U.S.S.R. in the second half of 1991.

DIA’s defi ning mission of the 1990s arrived 

early in the decade, when the Iraqi Army 

under Saddam Hussein invaded and 

occupied Kuwait in August 1990. DIA 

set up a 24-hour crisis management cell 

designed to tailor national-level intelligence 

support for coalition forces assembled 

to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait. At the 

beginning of Operation DESERT STORM, 

2,000 agency personnel participated in 

the intelligence effort. The Joint Intelligence 

Center (JIC) that DIA established in the 

Pentagon to integrate and coordinate 

intelligence produced by various 

agencies was the locus of this work.

As the U.S. and Coalition military buildup 

proceeded in 1990/’91, DIA dispatched 

more than 100 employees into the Kuwaiti 

theater, the fi rst time that DIA staff had 

deployed to a war zone since 1975. 

The agency also deployed 11 National 

Intelligence Support Teams overseas. 

The intelligence they produced and 

disseminated was key to the overwhelming 

coalition victory. Colin Powell, Chairman 

of the JCS during DESERT STORM, noted 

after hostilities that no combat commander 

had ever received more benefi t from as 

full and complete a view of an adversary 

as U.S. and Coalition commanders 

did prior to and during the confl ict.

1990s: NEW MISSIONS, NEW ADVERSARIES
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 37

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

SUPPORT TEAMS

National Intelligence Support Teams 

(NISTS) are small communications 

teams made up of members of 

various Intelligence Community 

agencies. They use highly specialized 

mobile communications equipment 

to provide quick-turnaround, allsource, national-level support 

from the Intelligence Community to 

deployed commanders during crisis or 

contingency operations. In the 1980s, 

Intelligence Community Agencies separately developed individual support teams such as 

DIA’s National Military Intelligence Support Team (NMIST) and other small, deployable 

groups. In 1992, DIA, CIA, and NSA agreed to combine and deploy their individual 

team members in NISTS. These NISTS are managed and supported by DIA, and currently, 

their operations are run out of the Defense Intelligence Operations Center (DIOC). 

Using the resources of the larger Intelligence Community, NISTS allow deployed military 

commanders to transmit and receive time-sensitive requests for information, indications 

and warning of enemy activity, immediate access to national computer databases, and 

other advantages that are not readily available at the tactical or operational level during 

crisis scenarios. They play an essential role in breaking down the barriers between 

deployed forces and intelligence agencies in Washington, DC, and allow intelligence 

agencies to better tailor their intelligence to the operational and tactical needs of U.S. 

forces in harm’s way. Over the last two decades, they have deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, 

Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and many other nations across the globe.
38

DIA, however, could not escape ongoing 

resource reductions, which forced 

the agency make internal changes. 

To compensate for these reductions, 

the agency emphasized improved 

management of intelligence production 

DoD-wide. This new emphasis enhanced 

fl exibility, helped maintain extensive 

cooperation with the Combatant Command 

and Service intelligence organizations, 

and reduced management overhead. The 

agency established the Department of 

Defense Intelligence Production Program 

(DoDIPP), which federated intelligence 

production and set forth a systematic 

program for avoiding overlap and 

duplication. This program was aided by 

the dramatic advances in communications 

technology in the 1990s. Just as 

collaboration was becoming ever more 

essential, the Intelligence Community 

was developing tools to ease the fl ow 

of information across secure networks.

DIA’s restructuring early in the decade and 

the experience provided by Operation 

DESERT STORM prepared the agency for 

other challenges as well. Organization 

reforms and intelligence threats during the 

opening years of the decade resulted in an 

unprecedented level of integration between 

DIA, the Services, and the Combatant 

Commands. The agency also added new 

elements, when the Missile and Space 

Intelligence Center (MSIC) in Huntsville, 

Alabama and the Armed Forces Medical 

Intelligence Center (AFMIC, today’s 

National Center for Medical Intelligence 

– NCMI) in Fort Detrick, Maryland, which 

were both long associated with the Army, 

came under DIA management in 1992.

During Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT 

STORM, DIA provided all-source intelligence 

to Coalition forces in the Gulf region. This 

intelligence assisted them by locating and 

targeting Iraqi assets before they had a chance to 

become a threat to friendly troops. Credit: DoD

1990s: NEW MISSIONS, NEW ADVERSARIES
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 39
40

DIA’s mission as a Combat Support Agency 

took greater and greater precedence 

over the 1990s. While it was still 

called upon to supply strategic foreign 

intelligence assessments, its analysts 

became more directly engaged in support 

to military operations than ever before. 

The shift toward “smart,” precisionguided munitions, for example, required 

the agency to increase and improve 

its targeting functions and capabilities. 

Measurement and Signatures intelligence, 

or MASINT, which was technically-derived 

data other than imagery or signals 

intelligence, began placing greater 

emphasis on fulfi lling the rapid-turnaround 

requirements of the soldier in the fi eld. 

Analysis expanded into geographic 

hotspots that did not traditionally receive 

much attention. In the 1990s, DIA surged 

to provide intelligence support to U.S. and 

United Nations forces in places such as 

Somalia, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, 

and Kosovo. DIA also provided ongoing 

support to the monitoring of Iraq for border 

and no-fl y zone violations, and it provided 

targeting intelligence during Operations 

such as DESERT FOX in 1998. In short, the 

DIA supported a variety 

of intelligence efforts in 

the former Yugoslavia, 

including investigation of 

war crimes. Credit: DoD

1990s: NEW MISSIONS, NEW ADVERSARIES
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 41

decade was characterized by expansion 

into new tasks that were heavily oriented 

toward support to military operations.

The emergence of globalized radical 

Islamic movements such as al-Qaida 

in the 1990s also sharpened DIA’s 

counterterrorism efforts, which had been 

ongoing since the 1980s. In 1996, 

after the bombing of the Khobar Towers 

apartment complex in Saudi Arabia, 

the agency created the Transnational 

Warfare group, which contained the 

Offi ce for Counterterrorism Analysis. As 

this organization continued to develop, 

al-Qaida struck the U.S. embassies in 

Tanzania and Kenya; DIA supported the 

military strikes in response to these attacks.

The attack on the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia spurred organizational changes in DIA that placed more 

emphasis on transnational threats and global terrorism. It would be another fi ve years, however, before 

the agency made global terrorism one of its top priorities. Credit: DIA Historical Research Support Branch
42

In Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, DIA provided strategic, operational, and 

tactical intelligence to troops on the ground, who worked with local Afghan forces 

to battle the Taliban. Credit: DIA Historical Research Support Branch
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 43

Major transformation in the Intelligence 

Community had been in progress since the 

1990s, but the new millennium brought 

even more varied trials to the Intelligence 

Community. The largest of these was the 

unprecedented challenge of the Global 

War on Terror (GWOT), which began 

with the terrorist attacks of 11 September 

2001, ushered in a new era of integration 

and cooperation in military intelligence. 

Prior to the 11 September attacks, DIA was 

taking steps to ramp up its counterterrorism 

efforts. After the USS Cole was attacked by 

al-Qaida suicide bombers in October 2000, 

it reorganized its previous counterterrorism 

offi ce into the Joint Terrorism Analysis Center 

(JTAC). After the 11 September attacks, the 

JTAC mission was expanded and sharpened, 

and the organization was christened the 

Joint Intelligence Task Force-Combating 

Terrorism (JITF-CT). JITF-CT remains at the 

center of DIA’s anti-terrorism efforts today.

In the months after the attacks, the U.S. 

and its Coalition partners embarked on 

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, toppling 

the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Antiterrorist initiatives took place in other 

parts of the world as well, including in 

the Philippines and the Horn of Africa. 

In March 2003, the United States and 

Coalition forces also launched Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM, the effort to remove 

Saddam Hussein from power and install 

a new democratic government in Iraq. 

In all of these operations, DIA provided 

intelligence on enemy troop dispositions, 

weaponry, and damage assessments. The 

agency also assisted with locating high 

value targets and with offering assessments 

of insurgent capabilities, intentions, and 

potential. DIA produced fi ne-grain tactical 

and operational intelligence for combat 

forces as well as strategic estimative 

products for policy and decisionmakers. 

The agency also established and 

supported the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), an 

interagency body tasked with searching 

Iraq for weapons of mass destruction.

YEARS OF TRANSFORMATION

2000s:
44

DIA’s workforce has not remained behind 

in the United States while U.S. military 

forces deploy forward. For the past 

decade DIA has deployed thousands of 

personnel forward to support warfi ghting 

operations with a variety of tasks, including 

collection, analysis, processing, and 

communications. The agency has also 

incorporated the intelligence staffs of the 

Combatant Commands, further breaking 

down the barriers between national and 

theater-level intelligence and making it 

possible to cooperate even more closely 

to produce intelligence that responds to 

the needs of individual warfi ghting units.

DIA’s work is not limited to just antiterrorism 

and counterinsugency, however. In 

addition to its protracted commitments 

in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, the 

agency monitors North Korean missile 

launches and tracks the development 

of Iran’s nuclear program. It is also 

heavily engaged in supporting efforts 

to counter the proliferation of weapons 

A DIA analyst at the JIOCEUR Analytic Center (or 

JAC) in Molesworth, United Kingdom briefs a pilot 

prior to takeoff. JIOCEUR is the Joint Intelligence 

Operations Center Europe. Credit: DoD

2000s: YEARS OF TRANSFORMATION
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 45

of mass destruction, interdict narcotics 

traffi cking, conduct global information 

operations, and assess foreign military 

capabilities in space and cyber-space.

In 2004 and 2005, DIA also provided an 

unprecedented level of support to foreign 

and domestic humanitarian missions. 

Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, 

the response to the Asian tsunami 

disaster in December 2004, utilized 

DIA assets to located hospitals and to 

effi ciently direct humanitarian assistance 

to the hardest-hit locations. DIA also 

participated in Joint Task Force Katrina, 

which mobilized to assist recovery 

efforts after Hurricane Katrina hit 

New Orleans in September 2005. 

More recently, the agency has assisted 

federal law enforcement organizations 

with homeland security operations. For 

example, the agency has lent sensors to 

border protection personnel, who have 

used it to seize millions of dollars in 

narcotics and detect thousands of illegal 

entry attempts. It has also worked with 

homeland security agencies to conduct 

underwater surveys to improve port and 

harbor security and install sensors that can 

detect threats on land or sea. Elements 

of the agency also played an important 

role in recovery efforts after the Haitian 

earthquake in 2010. The National Center 

for Medical Intelligence called attention 

to possible disease outbreaks in the 

wake of the quake, other health risks to 

humanitarian missions, and, in partnership 

with other agencies, described the location 

and condition of important emergency care 

facilities in Haiti after the disaster struck.

The agency’s experiences in the 1990s 

as well as the organization improvements 

made to cope with the direct threat posed 

by transnational terrorist groups such as 

al-Qaida have enabled the agency to 

provide enhanced tactical, operational, 

and strategic intelligence support to 

initiatives around the globe. Today, agency 

personnel are deployed to theaters around 

the world in support of military commands 

and operations against terrorists, 

and in support of counterproliferation 

efforts, counternarcotics missions, 

and military force analysis.
U.S. Air Force bombers attack an airfi eld near Phuc Yen outside of Hanoi, North Vietnam in 1967. 

DIA provided targeting options and bomb damage assessments for attacks such as this one. Credit: DoD

46
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 47

As DIA prepares to celebrate its 50th 

anniversary on October 1, 2011, the 

agency can look back over fi ve decades 

of evolution and fi nd a much different 

institution than it was when fi rst established. 

At fi rst unpopular among some policymakers 

and military leaders, it suffered early 

setbacks that are sometimes common in 

new agencies. Though it took time for the 

DIA to grow into its role as a manager 

and supplier of all-source intelligence, the 

agency slowly became a key component 

of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 

fi rst by supplying intelligence to senior 

policymakers and later, expanding to 

provide intelligence to warfi ghters in 

the fi eld. Today, its work is essential to 

maintaining U.S. national security.

DIA’s contributions in this regard have 

been instrumental in shaping many of the 

signifi cant events in U.S. history. From the 

fi rst major challenges it faced during the 

Cuban Missile Crisis to the current perils 

presented by global terrorist movements 

and arms proliferation, DIA has played 

a key role in collecting, analyzing, and 

producing intelligence used to defend the 

United States from foreign aggression. 

In doing so, it has also served as an 

effective force multiplier, allowing U.S. 

military leaders to project power that 

is greater than the sum of its parts.

DIA has transformed as the nature of 

national security threats has changed and 

the needs of the U.S. military have evolved. 

During the Cold War, it was faced with 

a more or less traditional threat from the 

Soviet Union and its allies. In response, DIA 

efforts focused on defeating state-sponsored 

militaries that adhered to informal, but 

generally accepted and conventional modes 

of conduct. Moreover, for over 20 years, its 

main emphasis was on providing strategic, 

basic, and warning intelligence to nationallevel policymakers and military leaders.

Today, the unconventional, organic nature 

of global, transnational terrorism and 

insurgency has meant that Agency personnel 

have had to adjust to new challenges, 

building a more agile organization to 

HISTORIC ROLE

DIA’s
48DIA’S HISTORIC ROLE

Human intelligence remains essential for combating insurgencies and terrorist organizations. 

Deployed DIA intelligence analysts collaborate with collectors and their colleagues in the U.S. to 

exploit raw HUMINT reports and expand their knowledge of insurgent groups. Credit: DoD

A U.S. F-14 monitors a Soviet Balzam-class 

intelligence collection vessel off the East Coast 

of the United States, 1983. Credit: DoD
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 49

provide intelligence warnings and to pass 

information quickly to combat forces. 

The last three decades have witnessed a 

transformation of DIA into an organization 

that focuses on direct intelligence support 

to both policymakers and the warfi ghter 

by becoming forward-leaning, proactive, 

and heavily deployed with combat forces. 

The Intelligence Community as a whole 

has become more integrated to deal 

with the new threat and more oriented 

toward support to military operations and 

homeland defense to defeat that threat. 

DIA has been a major part of this 

unifi cation of effort. The agency 

has more than 16,000 military and 

civilian employees deployed around 

the world to support a wide range of 

military operations. It has increased its 

investment in HUMINT and technical 

collection capabilities to further improve 

its surveillance and warning functions. 

The multi-dimensional nature of twentyfi rst century threats means that the 

Agency must be prepared for rapid 

changes in an unpredictable and 

unstable global environment.
50

LTG Burgess speaks at the ribbon cutting ceremony for DIA’s Joint Use Intelligence Analysis 

Facility (JUIAF), Charlottesville, VA. Credit: DIA Directorate for Congressional & Public Affairs 
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 51

DIRECTORS OF DIA 

LT GEN JOSEPH F. CARROLL, USAF

1961-1969

LTG DONALD V. BENNETT, USA

1969-1972

VADM VINCENT P. DE POIX, USN

1972-1974

LTG DANIEL O. GRAHAM, USA

1974-1975

LTG SAMUEL V. WILSON, USA

1976-1977

LT GEN EUGENE TIGHE, JR., USAF

1976 (Acting), 1977-1981

LTG JAMES A. WILLIAMS, USA

1981-1985

LT GEN LEONARD H. PERROOTS, USAF

1985-1988

LTG HARRY SOYSTER, USA

1988-1991

MR. DENNIS M. NAGY

1991 (Acting)

LT GEN JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR. USAF

1991-1995

LT GEN KENNETH A. MINIHAN, USAF

1995-1996

LTG PATRICK M. HUGHES, USA

1996-1999

VADM THOMAS R. WILSON, USN

1999-2002

VADM LOWELL E. JACOBY, USN

2002-2005

LTG MICHAEL D. MAPLES, USA

2005-2009

LTG RONALD L. BURGESS, JR., USA

2009-Present
52DIA’S HISTORIC ROLE

The Patriots’ Memorial honors the 

twenty-one Defense Intelligence Agency 

employees who died in the service of the 

United States. It is located in the Defense 

Intelligence Analysis Center on Bolling 

Air Force Base in Washington, DC. The 

memorial commemorates the profound 

individual sacrifi ces made on behalf of 

the United States by DIA employees and 

acts as a reminder of the selfl essness, 

dedication, and courage required to 

confront national challenges now and in 

THE PATRIOTS’ MEMORIAL
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 53

the future. DIA Director Lt Gen Leonard 

Perroots dedicated the memorial on 

December 14, 1988.

The stories behind the names in the 

memorial are themselves monuments to 

the bravery of those who served in harm’s 

way. Major Robert Perry was the Army 

Assistant Attaché in Amman, Jordan in 

1970. He was killed when fi ghting broke 

out between the Jordanian army and 

Palestinian refugees who had taken shelter 

in Amman. In June, a Palestinian gunman 

shot Perry through the front door of his 

house in front of his wife and children. 

After the incident, the United States 

considered sending troops to Jordan on a 

contingency operation to quell the violence, 

but the fi ghting subsided a few days later.

In April 1975, a U.S. Air Force C-5A 

Galaxy transport plane carrying 250 

Vietnam War orphans crashed outside 

of Saigon, killing 100 of the children 

and many others. Among the dead were 

fi ve female employees of the Defense 

Attaché Offi ce in Saigon — Celeste 

Brown, Vivienne Clark, Dorothy Curtiss, 

Joan Prey, and Doris Watkins — who 

assisted in tending the children. After 

takeoff, the plane’s cargo doors blew 

off, damaging the hydraulic lines in the 

tail. The pilot attempted an emergency 

landing, but the aircraft crashed two 

miles short of the runway, crushing 

the cargo deck of the aircraft.

On September 20, 1984, Chief Warrant 

Offi cers Robert Prescott and Kenneth 

Welch (USA) were killed when a suicide 

bomber from the terrorist group Islamic 

Jihad detonated a car bomb outside the 

U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. The 

bomb killed at least 18 others as well. 

The embassy had only been open six 

weeks after the previous one was blown 

up in April 1983, killing 61 people.

DIA also lost seven employees to the 

September 11th terrorist attacks on 

the Pentagon. Rosa Chapa, Sandra 

Foster, Robert Hymel, Shelley Marshall, 

Patricia Mickley, Charles Sabin, and 

Karl Teepe died in the attack. It was the 

fi rst time that DIA employees were killed 

in the line of duty in the United States, 

and was the single greatest loss of life 

in one day in the agency’s history.
54DIA’S HISTORIC ROLE

MAJOR ROBERT P. PERRY, USA

Assistant Army Attaché, Jordan

10 June 1970

CELESTE M. BROWN

Defense Attaché Offi ce, Saigon

4 April 1975

VIVIENNE A. CLARK

Defense Attaché Offi ce, Saigon

4 April 1975

DOROTHY M. CURTISS

Defense Attaché Offi ce, Saigon

4 April 1975

JOAN K. PREY

Defense Attaché Offi ce, Saigon

4 April 1975

DORIS J. WATKINS

Defense Attaché Offi ce, Saigon

4 April 1975

COLONEL CHARLES R. RAY, USA

Assistant Army Attaché, Paris

18 January 1982

CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER

ROBERT W. PRESCOTT, USA

Defense Attaché Offi ce, Guatemala

21 January 1984

CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER

KENNETH D. WELCH, USA

Defense Attaché Offi ce, Beirut

20 September 1984

PETTY OFFICER FIRST CLASS

MICHAEL R. WAGNER, USN

Defense Attaché Offi ce, Beirut

20 September 1984

CAPTAIN WILLIAM E. NORDEEN, USN

Defense and Naval Attaché, Greece

28 June 1988

JUDITH GOLDENBERG

Defense Attaché Offi ce, Cairo

15 July 1996

STAFF SERGEANT 

KENNETH R. HOBSON II, USA

Defense Attaché Offi ce, Nairobi

7 August 1998

TO THOSE WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES FOR THEIR COUNTRY
Defense Intelligence Agency: 50 Years Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation 55

MASTER SERGEANT

WILLIAM W. BULTMEIER, USA, (RET)

Defense Attaché Offi ce, Niamey

23 December 2000

ROSA M. CHAPA

Offi ce of the Comptroller

11 September 2001

SANDRA N. FOSTER

Offi ce of the Comptroller

11 September 2001

ROBERT J. HYMEL

Offi ce of the Comptroller

11 September 2001

SHELLEY A. MARSHALL

Offi ce of the Comptroller

11 September 2001

PATRICIA E. MICKLEY

Offi ce of the Comptroller

11 September 2001

CHARLES E. SABIN

Offi ce of the Comptroller

11 September 2001

KARL W. TEEPE

Offi ce of the Comptroller

11 September 2001

DIA erected a memorial to the 

seven agency employees who lost 

their lives in the terrorist attacks of 

11 September 2001. Credit: DoD


Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation

PCN 21577