An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-48

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 5 August 2014

IN THE MATTER OF:

D.M.W. Forsyth County

No. 13 J 94

Appeal by mother and father from order entered 9 October 

2013 by Judge Denise S. Hartsfield in Forsyth County District

Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 July 2014.

Assistant County Attorney Theresa A. Boucher for Forsyth 

County Department of Social Services, appellee.

Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, by Murray C. Greason, 

III for Guardian ad litem.

Batch, Poore & Williams, PC, by Sydney Batch for appellantmother.

David A. Perez for appellant-father.

STEELMAN, Judge.

Where the trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact and 

findings supported by evidence in the record form a sufficient 

basis for its conclusions of law, the trial court did not err. 

Where the trial court properly found that a minor child was 
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neglected, it did not abuse its discretion in refusing to return 

the child to father’s home.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On 21 May 2013, the Forsyth County Department of Social 

Services (“DSS”) filed a juvenile petition alleging D.M.W. was a 

neglected juvenile in that she lived in an environment injurious 

to her welfare. Specifically, the petition alleged that D.M.W., 

a newborn, would reside in the home where her brother D.N. lived 

and was “seriously physically abused in April 2012 by other than 

accidental means.” The matter came on for hearing on 26 August 

2013. By order entered 9 October 2013, the trial court 

adjudicated D.M.W. a neglected juvenile. The trial court

granted legal custody of D.M.W. to DSS and sanctioned the 

placement of D.M.W. with her maternal grandmother and stepgrandfather.

Mother and father appeal.

II. Standard of Review

“The role of this Court in reviewing a trial court’s 

adjudication of neglect [] is to determine ‘(1) whether the 

findings of fact are supported by ‘clear and convincing 

evidence,’ and (2) whether the legal conclusions are supported 

by the findings of fact[.]’” In re T.H.T., 185 N.C. App. 337, 
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343, 648 S.E.2d 519, 523 (2007) (quoting In re Gleisner, 141 

N.C. App. 475, 480, 539 S.E.2d 362, 365 (2000)), aff’d as 

modified, 362 N.C. 446, 665 S.E.2d 54 (2008). “If such evidence 

exists, the findings of the trial court are binding on appeal, 

even if the evidence would support a finding to the contrary.” 

Id.

III. Findings of Fact

A. Father’s Arguments

In his first argument on appeal, father contends that the 

trial court erred in making certain findings of fact. We 

disagree.

The trial court made the following pertinent findings of 

fact:

10. On or about May 20, 2013, the Forsyth

County Department of Social Services 

received a report alleging [D.M.W.], age 3 

days to be a neglected juvenile as she lives 

in a home where another child has been 

subjected to physical abuse.

11. [D.M.W.] is the newborn infant child of 

[mother] and [father]. This child will 

reside in the home where her brother, [D.N.] 

lived and was seriously physically abused in 

April 2012 by other than accidental means. 

[D.N.] was examined by Dr. Meggan 

Goodpasture on April 30, 2012 at NC Baptist 

Hospital and diagnosed with:

 Two large subdural hematomas of mixed 

intensity believed to have occurred at 
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different times. The subdural hematoma 

on the left was more dense and believed 

to be more recent likely one week in 

age and the subdural hematoma on the 

right side of the child’s skull was 

less dense and believed to be likely 

weeks in age.

 Acute bleeding along the right 

occipital lobe; which was likely a 

subdural hematoma or potentially a 

rebleed secondary to a very large 

subdural hematoma or more consistent 

with repeat trauma.

 Bilateral retinal hemorrhages that were 

determined to be intraretinal.

 Five definite healing rib fractures 

(Left anterior healing rib fractures of 

the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th ribs and Left 

posterior healing rib fracture of the 

11th rib)[.]

12. Based upon the constellation of 

injuries, [D.N.] was diagnosed with abusive 

head trauma/child physical abuse. The 

injuries received by [D.N.] were of 

different ages and stages of healing.

13. The primary caregivers of [D.N.] were 

his mother, [mother] and her boyfriend, now 

husband, [father]. [Mother] worked outside 

of the home and [father] was [D.N.’s] 

primary caretaker while his mother worked. 

At the time of [D.N.’s] hospitalization, 

[mother] reported that the child’s only 

caretakers in addition to she and [father] 

were the maternal grandmother, [M.N.], who 

had watched the baby the weekend before his 

hospitalization, and her brother’s 

girlfriend, [S.R.] (whose last name she did 

not know at the time) who had cared for the 

baby in March 2012. [M.N.] was a retired 
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pediatric nurse who first noticed [D.N.’s] 

head growing larger and insisted that the 

mother take the child to the doctor.

. . . . 

22. [D.M.W.] is an infant child as was 

[D.N.] when he was seriously physically 

abused in the home.

. . . .

41. [Mother] reports that she suspects 

[S.R.] may have caused the injuries to 

[D.N.]. [Mother] reports that [S.R.] 

babysat with [D.N.] on two occasions which 

she definitively report [sic] were February 

2, 2012 and March 2, 2012. Dr. Goodpasture 

has indicated that [D.N.’s] subdural 

hematomas are difficult to date [and] could 

be as recent as one to two weeks old or up 

to two months old. In her expert opinion, 

there could have been multiple head traumas 

suffered by [D.N.]. Retinal hemorrhages 

although also difficult to date generally 

resolve within one month. In Dr. 

Goodpasture’s expert opinion, rib fractures 

are easier to date. The rib fractures of 

[D.N.] upon presentation to the hospital on 

April 26, 2012 were 2 to 4 weeks old. The 

rib fractures suffered by [D.N.] could not 

have occurred while he was in the care of 

[S.R.] on February 2, 2012 or March 2, 2012. 

To this day no one has come forward to 

accept the responsibility for the injuries 

that were caused to [D.N.] but it has been 

determined that [mother] and [her] husband 

were the primary caretakers. The Court is 

concerned for the safety of any child in the 

home as no one has accepted responsibility 

for the injuries that were caused to [D.N.] 

when he was three months old. [S.R.] could 

not have caused all of the injuries to the 

child.
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As an initial matter, we note that mother and father

challenge many of the trial court’s findings of fact as not 

being supported by competent evidence. However, we do not 

address all of the challenged findings of fact. See In re T.M., 

180 N.C. App. 539, 547, 638 S.E.2d 236, 240 (2006) (“[W]e agree 

that some of [the challenged findings] are not supported by 

evidence in the record. When, however, ample other findings of 

fact support an adjudication of neglect, erroneous findings 

unnecessary to the determination do not constitute reversible 

error.”).

Although father challenges findings of fact 10, 11, 12, and 

22, mother does not. Findings of fact 13 and 41 are not 

challenged by either mother or father and are deemed supported 

by competent evidence. See Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 

408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991).

Father contends that finding of fact 10 “seems to be a 

finding for which there is no basis in competent evidence.” We 

do not agree. Dr. Goodpasture testified that she was an 

attending and supervising physician in the newborn nursery at 

the time D.M.W. was born. The physician who provided care for 

D.M.W. was on Dr. Goodpasture’s team. Based upon her knowledge 

of D.N., Dr. Goodpasture recommended that the physician make a 
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child protective services report to DSS, and that report was 

made. Dr. Goodpasture testified that she had “significant 

concern for [D.M.W.’s] safety” if she were placed in the same 

environment where D.N. resided.

Father next challenges finding of fact 11. Father contends 

that “since [S.R.] and the maternal grandmother had access to 

[D.N.] during the time period in which he may have suffered 

these severe injuries, it was erroneous for the trial court to 

find [D.M.W.] would reside in the same home in which [D.N.]

lived when abused[.]” Father contends “there is no competent 

evidence to suggest that the potential perpetrators, [S.R.] or 

the maternal grandmother, resided in [mother and father’s] 

home.” Father also challenges finding of fact 22 on the same 

grounds. Father contends there is no competent evidence to show 

that D.N. was seriously physically abused in mother and father’s

home as S.R. or the maternal grandmother may have been the 

perpetrators of the abuse.

Father’s contentions are feckless.

The trial court found that mother and father were D.N.’s 

primary caretakers and that S.R. could not have caused all of 

the injuries to D.N. These findings are not challenged by 

mother or father on appeal. Moreover, mother and father both 
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testified that they did not believe the maternal grandmother 

hurt D.N. Mother and father intended to take D.M.W. home to 

live with them upon her discharge from the hospital. Thus, 

D.M.W. would have resided in the same home in which D.N. had 

lived. The trial court did not err in making these findings.

Father also challenges the subparagraphs of finding of fact 

11. He contends that Dr. Goodpasture’s testimony does not 

support the specificity of the injuries sustained by D.N. as set 

forth in the order. We agree that some of the language used in 

the subparagraphs was not identical to that used by Dr. 

Goodpasture in her testimony. However, we disagree that her 

testimony does not support the specific injuries set forth in 

the finding. Dr. Goodpasture testified in great detail about 

D.N.’s injuries. Dr. Goodpasture testified that D.N. was 

diagnosed with five rib fractures. The fractures were on the 

left fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and eleventh ribs. She 

further testified that D.N. had large subdural hemorrhages on 

both sides of the brain that required surgical intervention, and 

retinal hemorrhages in both eyes.

Father further contends that finding of fact 12 is not 

supported by competent evidence. Again, we disagree. Dr. 

Goodpasture testified that “[i]n the absence of any accidental 
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mechanism to explain the[] injuries in a three month old with 

serious and severe bilateral subdural hemorrhages, bilateral 

retinal hemorrhages and five rib fractures, . . . the injuries 

were consistent with child physical abuse.” Dr. Goodpasture 

also gave detailed testimony about the possible ages and stage 

of healing of the various injuries to D.N.

These arguments are without merit.

B. Mother’s Arguments

Mother contends that the trial court failed to make 

sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion that 

D.M.W. was a neglected juvenile. Mother contends that the trial 

court “cut and pasted the allegations in the juvenile petition 

and statements from the DSS court summary into its adjudicatory 

order[,]” and failed to make independent findings of fact from 

the evidence presented at the hearing. Mother further contends 

that since the trial court failed to make independent findings 

of fact, “this Court cannot determine whether the trial court 

performed its duty to determine whether the allegations were 

proven by clear, cogent and convincing evidence.” We disagree.

Although the language in some of the findings does 

correspond to the allegations in the juvenile petition, we 

conclude that findings of fact 10, 11, 12, 13, 22, and 41 are 
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supported by competent evidence. Moreover, these findings of 

fact are sufficiently specific to allow this Court to review the 

trial court’s decision to adjudicate D.M.W. neglected.

This argument is without merit.

IV. Neglected Juvenile

Finally, with regard to the adjudication of neglect, mother 

and father each contend that the trial court erred in finding 

and concluding that D.M.W. was neglected where the court relied 

solely on the past abuse of D.N. We disagree.

The Juvenile Code defines a neglected juvenile as:

A juvenile who does not receive proper care, 

supervision, or discipline from the 

juvenile’s parent, guardian, custodian, or 

caretaker; or who has been abandoned; or who 

is not provided necessary medical care; or 

who is not provided necessary remedial care; 

or who lives in an environment injurious to 

the juvenile’s welfare; or who has been 

placed for care or adoption in violation of 

law. In determining whether a juvenile is a 

neglected juvenile, it is relevant whether 

that juvenile lives in a home where another 

juvenile has died as a result of suspected 

abuse or neglect or lives in a home where 

another juvenile has been subjected to abuse 

or neglect by an adult who regularly lives 

in the home.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2013) (emphasis added).

“We are aware that while the abuse of a child in the home 

is clearly relevant in determining whether another child is 
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neglected, the statute ‘does not require the removal of all 

other children from the home once a child has . . . been 

subjected to . . . severe physical abuse.’” In re McLean, 135 

N.C. App. 387, 395, 521 S.E.2d 121, 126 (1999) (quoting In re 

Nicholson, 114 N.C. App. 91, 94, 440 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1994)). 

“[T]he statute ‘affords the trial judge some discretion in 

determining the weight to be given such evidence,’ and allows 

the trial court some discretion in determining whether children 

are at risk for a particular kind of harm given their age and 

the environment in which they reside.” Id. 

In the present case, the trial court found that D.M.W.

would reside in the home where D.N. had lived and was physically 

abused; that D.M.W. was an infant just as D.N. was at the time 

he was injured; that mother and father were the primary 

caretakers of D.N.; that no one had accepted responsibility for 

D.N.’s injuries; and that the court was concerned for the safety 

of any child in the home since no one had accepted 

responsibility for D.N.’s injuries. These findings demonstrate 

that the trial court weighed and assessed the evidence, and 

concluded that D.M.W. would be at risk if allowed to reside with 

mother and father. We hold that the findings of fact support 

the conclusion that D.M.W. was neglected.
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This argument is without merit.

Mother and father next challenge the dispositional portion 

of the trial court’s order. They contend that the trial court 

erred in conducting a dispositional hearing in which no 

testimony was taken and where the trial court based its findings 

of fact on court reports and statements made by counsel. Mother 

and father contend the trial court delegated its duty as the 

finder of fact by incorporating the reports as its findings of 

fact. These arguments are without merit.

The dispositional hearing following an 

abuse, neglect, or dependency adjudication 

may be informal and the court may consider 

written reports or other evidence concerning 

the needs of the juvenile. In dispositional 

hearings, trial courts may properly consider 

all written reports and materials submitted 

in connection with said proceedings. Thus, 

at a dispositional hearing, [a] trial court 

may consider written reports and make 

findings based on these reports so long as 

it does not broadly incorporate these 

written reports from outside sources as its 

findings of fact.

In re J.N.S., 207 N.C. App. 670, 679, 704 S.E.2d 511, 517 (2010) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted). “Evidence heard or 

introduced throughout the adjudicatory stage, as well as any 

additional evidence, may be considered by the court during the 

dispositional stage.” In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 613, 

543 S.E.2d 906, 910 (2001).
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In this case, the trial court considered the written 

reports, incorporated the written reports, and made findings 

based upon the reports. The trial court also made other 

findings based on the evidence presented during the adjudication 

stage. The trial court did not broadly incorporate the facts in 

the reports as its only findings of fact, nor did it use the 

reports as a substitute for its own independent review. 

Therefore, the trial court did not err in conducting the 

disposition hearing and entering the disposition order.

Mother also contends that the trial court ignored its oral 

ruling as evidenced by the written order. Specifically, mother

contends that the judge said she was not going to make drug 

testing mandatory; however, in the written order, mother and 

father are ordered to submit to drug screens, and if they do not 

submit then the missed drug screen would be considered a 

positive test. We disagree with mother’s contention since our 

review indicates that the trial court’s written order does not 

differ in substance from its oral rendering in open court. See 

In re Brim, 139 N.C. App. 733, 739, 535 S.E.2d 367, 370 (2000) 

(finding the trial court did not err where the written order 

later entered did not differ in substance from the order 

announced in open court).
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Mother further contends the trial court’s directive that 

mother and father be more forthcoming with the court as to how 

D.N. was abused is inappropriate and should not be permissible. 

Again, we disagree. In this case, the trial court was concerned

about D.M.W.’s safety based upon the injuries D.N. sustained and 

the lack of an explanation as to how D.N. was injured. 

Accordingly, we conclude it was not inappropriate for the trial 

court to seek further explanation about this matter. 

Lastly, father contends the trial court abused its 

discretion at disposition in granting continuing legal custody 

of D.M.W. to DSS and not placing her back in father’s home. We 

disagree. 

“The district court has broad discretion to fashion a 

disposition from the prescribed alternatives in N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 7B-903(a), based upon the best interests of the child.” In re 

B.W., 190 N.C. App. 328, 336, 665 S.E.2d 462, 467 (2008) 

(citation omitted). “We review a dispositional order only for 

abuse of discretion.” Id. “A trial court may be reversed for 

abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its actions are 

‘manifestly unsupported by reason.’” Davis v. Davis, 360 N.C. 

518, 523, 631 S.E.2d 114, 118 (2006) (quoting Clark v. Clark, 

301 N.C. 123, 129, 271 S.E.2d 58, 63 (1980)). 
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Here, the trial court was authorized to place D.M.W. in the 

custody of DSS and not return her to father. See N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 7B-903(a)(2)(b) (2013). Given the evidence before the 

court, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

decision not to return D.M.W. to father. 

AFFIRMED.

Judges McGEE and ERVIN concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).