NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________

No. 2 2

- 1 5 2 1

________________

C H R I S T O P H E R B A I N B R I D G E ;

K E L L Y B A I N B R I D G E

, I n d i v i d u a l l y a n d a s h / w

,

Appellant s

v.

U

. S

. B A N K

, N

. A

. A S T R U S T E E F O R T H E C

- B A S S M O R T G A G E

L O A N T R U S T A S S E T

- B A C K C E R T I F I C A T E S S E R I E S 2 0 0 7

- C B 6 ;

O C W E N L O A N S E R V I C I N G L L C

, f / d / b / a A H M S I ; U D R E N L A W O F F I C E S

, P

. C

.

________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the M i d d l e District of Pennsylvania

(D. C. No. 3

- 1 6

- cv

- 0 0 4 1 1 )

District J udge: Honorable M a l a c h y E

. M a n n i o n

________________

Submitted under Third Circuit L

. A

. R

. 34.1(a )

on J a n u a r y 1 3

, 2 0 2 3

Before: J O R D A N

, P H I P P S and ROTH

, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : November 7, 2023 )

__________ _ _____

OPINI O N *

________________

* This di sposi ti on is not an opinion of the full C ourt a nd pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7

does not constitute binding prec edent.2

JORDAN

, Circuit Judge

C h r i s t o p h e r a n d K e l l y B a i n b r i d g e s u e d U

. S

. B a n k

, N

. A

. a n d O c w e n L o a n

S e r v i c i n g L L C

, a l l e g i n g v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)

a n d Penns ylvania’s Dragonetti Act. 15 U.S.C . § 1692, et seq

. ; 42 Pa. C o n s

. S t a t . § 8351

,

e t s e q

. T h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t t h e B a i n b r i d g e s

, a n d t h e y

n o w a p p e a l

. 1 T h e B a i n b r i d g e s a l s o c o n t e n d t h a t the Dis trict Court s h o u l d n o t h a v e r u l e d

t h a t t h e i r expert ’ s p r o p o s e d t e s t i m o n y w a s i n a d m i s s i b l e a n d s h o u l d h a v e c o m p e l l e d U

. S

.

B a n k a n d O c w e n t o d i v u l g e a t t o r n e y

- c l i e n t priv i l e g e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s

.

F o r t h e r e a s o n s t h a t f

o l l o w

, w e w i l l a f

f i r m

.

I. B A C K G R O U N D 2

U

. S

. B a n k i s a m o r t g a g e l e n d e r a n d O c w e n

, a l o a n s e r v i c e r

, a n d t h e y s u e d t h e

B a i n b r i d g e s f

o r f o r e c l o s u r e i n P e n n s y l v a n i a s t a t e c o u r t

. T h e B a i n b r i d g e s w o n t h a t r o u n d

.

T h e s t a t e c o u r t s a i d Ocwen’s sole witn ess did not kn ow when the Bainbridges began to

default on their paymen ts

, and t h e c o u r t e x p r e s s e d “serious concerns a s to whether all

pay me nts to [the prior loan servicer] on this loan were accounted for correctly.” ( J

. A

. a t

9 5 4 n

. 1

. ) Nonetheless, i t h e l d t h a t

, b a s e d o n t h e e v i d e n c e

, “ O c w e n b e l i e v e d i t h a d t a k e n

o v e r s e r v i c i n g o f a d e l i n q u e n t a c c o u n t [

. ] ” ( J

. A

. a t 9 5 4 n

. 1

. ) T h e B a i n b r i d g e s t h e m s e l v e s

,

a t l e a s t a t o n e p o i n t

, a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t t h e p r i m a r y p u r p o s e o f U

. S

. B a n k ’ s a n d O c w e n ’ s

1 The y c o n c e d e t h e i r F D C P A c l a i m s so we only consider the ir Dragone tti Act

clai m

. ( Rep ly B r. at 1

– 2 , 10

– 1 1 .)

2 A protracted an d complex pr ocedu ral hi story prec ed ed t his disput e. Because we

write primari ly fo r the parti es, we discuss the facts a nd proceedi ngs only to the extent

necessary to re solve this matter.3

l a w s u i t w a s t o r e c o v e r a l o a n t h a t t h o s e entities b e l i e v e d w a s d u e

. ( J

. A

. a t 5 2 3 : 4

– 9

,

5 2 4 : 2 1

– 5 2 5 : 1 6

, 5 9 0 : 1 0

– 1 5

. )

A f t e r t h e i r w i n i n t h e f

o r e c l o s u r e a c t i o n

, t h e B a i n b r i d g e s t u r n e d t h e t a b l e s o n U

. S

.

B a n k a n d O c w e n a n d s u e d t h e m f o r w r o n g f u l u s e o f c i v i l p r o c e e d i n g s

, i n v o k i n g

Penns ylvania’s Dragonetti Act

. T he D r a g o n e t t i A c t h o l ds a part y l i a b l e w h en

, in f i l i n g o r

co nt in u i n g a l aw s u it

, t h a t p a r t y a c te d “ in a grossly neg li gent mann er o r without pro bable

cause and primarily ” for an improper purpose

. 4 2 P a

. C o n s

. S t a t

. § 8 3 5 1 ( a )

. A c c o r d i n g

t o t h e B a i n b r i d g e s

, U

. S

. B a n k a n d O c w e n k n e w o r s h o u l d h a v e k n o w n t h a t t h e

f o r e c l o s u r e a c t i o n l a c k e d evidenc e

, a n d s u i n g “ t o c o l l e c t m o n i e s w h i c h w e r e n o t o w e d ” i s

a n i m p r o p e r p ur p os e

. ( D i s t

. C t

. D o c k e t 9 9 a t 9

. )

A s n o t e d e a r l i e r

, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r u l e d for U

. S

. B a nk an d O c w e n o n s u m m a r y

j u d g m e n t

, s a y i n g t h e B a i n b r i d ge s “ have produced no evidence that the foreclosure acti on

was filed for any other pu rpose than to foreclose on the property

. ” ( J

. A

. a t 1 0 7

. ) T hat

w as en ou gh t o d e f

e a t th e D r a go n e tt i A c t cl ai m

.

O n a p p eal

, th e B a in b r i dg e s fa u lt t he D i s t ri ct C ou rt for f ai l in g to i n f

e r i m p r o pe r

p u r pos e f ro m g r o s s n e g l i g e nc e an d l a ck o f pr o ba b le ca u se

. T h ey a ls o c o nt e n d t hat t he

D i s t ri c t C ou r t a b u se d i t s d i s c r e ti on i n d is c o v er y

. F i rs t

, t h e y s a y

, t h e C o u rt s h o u l d h a v e

p i e r c e d U

. S

. B a n k ’ s a n d O c w e n ’ s a t t o r n e y

- c l i en t pr i v i l e g e u n d er th e c ri me

- f ra ud

e x c e p t io n a n d s o p er m it t e d d i s c ov er y c o n c e r n i n g i m p r o pe r pu r pos e

. S e c o n d

, t h e y a r g u e

t h a t t h e C o u r t s h o u l d h a v e a l l o w e d t h e i r e x p e r t t o t e s t i f y a b o u t t h e s t a n d a r d o f c a r e i n

m o r t g a g e f

o r e c l o s u r e s

.4

II. D ISCUSSION 3

A. U

. S

. B a n k a n d O c w e n a r e n o t l ia b le u n d e r t h e D r a g o n e t t i A c t because

no r e a s o n a b l e j u r y c o u l d f i n d t h a t t h e f

o r f e i t u r e s u i t w a s f

i l e d f o r a n

improper purpose

.

P e n n s y l v a n i a ’ s D r a g o n e t t i A c t t a r g e t s t h e i m p r o p e r u s e o f c i v i l p r o c e e d i n g s

.

McNeil v. Jorda n

, 894 A.2d 1260 , 1274 ( P a. 2006 )

. T o p r e v a i l

, a D r a g o n e t t i A c t p l a i n t i f f

b e a r s t h e “ h e a v y b u r d e n ” o f s h o w i n g b y a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e

d e f e n d a n t l a c k e d p r o b a b l e c a u s e o r a c t e d w i t h g r o s s n e g l i g e n c e i n b r i n g i n g o r c o n t i n u i n g

t h e u n d e r l yi n g c a s e a n d t h a t t he p r o c e e d i n g s w e r e i n i t i at e d o r c o n t i n u e d f or a n i m p r o p er

p u r p o s e

. U.S. Expre ss Lines Ltd. v. Higgins , 281 F.3d 383, 394 (3d Cir. 2002) ; 4 2 P a

.

C o n s

. S t a t

. § § 8 3 5 1 ( a )

, 8 3 5 4 ; Mi

- Lor, Inc. v. DiPentino , 654 A.2d 1156, 115 7

– 5 8 (Pa.

Super. C t

. 1995)

. T h e p l a i n ti ff m u s t a l s o s h o w th at h e w o n th e u n d e r l y i n g c a se a nd w a s

d am a g e d b y i t s i ni t i at io n o r co n t i n ua t io n

. 4 2 P a

. C o n s

. S t a t

. § 8 3 5 4 ( 2 )

, ( 5 )

.

A D r a g o n e t t i A c t d e f

e n d a n t e s t a b l i s h e s p r o b a b l e c a u s e i f h e demonstrates t h a t h e

“ ‘ reason a bly believe [ d ] ’ in the facts on whic h [ h i s l a w s u i t w a s ] based an d in the viability

o f the legal theor y under which it [ w a s ] brought

. ” Gentz ler v. Atle e

, 660 A.2d 1378

,

1382 ( P a

. S u p e r

. C t

. 1995 ) ( q u o t ing 4 2 P a

. C o n s

. S t a t

. § 8352 )

. A d e f e n d a n t i s g r o s s l y

n e g l i g e n t i f h e l a c k s e v e n “ slight diligen ce or care, ” o r b e h a v e s “ i n reckless disr egard o f a

3 The Di st rict Co urt had dive rsity j urisdiction under 28 U.S .C. § 1332

. It also had

juris diction over the FDCPA claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction

over the state law claims und er 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). W e have jurisd ictio n pursuant t o 28

U.S .C

. § 1291

. We revie w a grant o f summary judgment de novo

, “ view [ ing ] t he facts in

a light most favorable to th e no nmovin g party” to dete r mine whether “there a re no

genu ine issues of mater i al fact and the movant is ent itled to jud gment as a matter of l aw. ”

AT & T Corp. v. JM C Telecom, LLC , 470 F.3d 525, 530 (3d Cir. 2006 )

. A dispute is

“ ‘genuine’ ... if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)

.5

legal d uty and of the consequences to another party [

. ] ” Hart v. O ’ Malley

, 78 1 A.2d

1211, 1218 ( P a

. S u p e r

. C t

. 2001)

.

E v e n i f a d e f

e n d a n t l a c k e d p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o f i l e t h e u n d e r l y i n g l a w s u i t o r act e d

w i t h g r o s s n e g l i g e n c e

, h e w i l l not be l i a b l e u n d e r the D r a g o n e t t i A c t u n l e s s h e a l s o

b r o u g h t o r c o n t i n u e d t h e s u i t f o r a n i m p r o p e r p u r p o s e

. S e e Broadwater v. Sentner

, 725

A.2d 779, 784 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) ( a n a l y z in g i m p ro p e r p u r po se a f t e r d e c i d i ng l a ck of

p ro b ab l e c a u se

. )

. S e c t i o n 8 3 5 4

, e n t i t le d “ B u r d en of p r o of ” l i st s “ probable cause ”

s e p ar a te l y f

r om i m p ro p er p u r p o s e

. I d

. a t ( 3 )

- ( 4 )

. 4

A n i m p r o p e r p u r p o s e i s o n e o t h e r t h a n “ s e c u r i n g t h e

... a d j u d i c a t i o n o f t h e c l a i m

o n w h i c h ” t h e l a w s u i t i s b a s e d

. 4 2 P a

. C o n s

. S t a t

. § 8 3 5 4 ( 4 )

. F o r e x am p le

, a p a r t y c an

cl ai m t o s u e f

o r d e fa m a ti on wh en t h ei r p r i m ar y p u r po se i s s e c u r i n g the d ef e n d an t ’s

s i l e n ce

. S e e Bannar v. Miller

, 701 A.2d 2 42, 2 4 5

, 24 9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997 ) ( d e f a m a ti on

a c ti on “ b r ou g ht for an improper purpose, namely to prevent appellee s from exerc ising

their r i ghts under the First Amendment ” )

.

W h e t h e r a d e f

e n d a n t a c t e d p r i m a r i l y f

o r a n i m p r o p e r p u r p o s e i s a q u e s t i o n o f f a c t

.

S e e R e s t a t e m e n t ( S e c o n d ) o f T o r t s § 6 7 3 ( 2 ) ( b ) ( “ In an action for malicious prosecution

... the jury determines

... whether the d efendant acte d primarily for a purpose other than

that of bringing an offender to justice

. ” )

.

4 S e c t i o n 8 3 5 4 d o es not mention “g r os s n e g l i g e n ce

. ” B ut t he Bain bridges concede

that improper purpose is always nece ssary

. ( See Opening Br. at 1 8 ( “ Even if a party

lacked probabl e cause or acted with gross negligence in filing a sui t, that party is not

l iab le u nder the Drag onet ti Act unless the suit also was filed for an improper purpose

. ” ).)6

T h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t “ th e defe ndants brought the foreclosure action

for the prima ry purpose of fore clo sing on the Bainbridges’ property and to recou p monies

owed o n t heir loan [

, ] ” w h i c h “ c o n s t i t u t e s a n a d j u d i c a t i o n o f t h e c l a i m o n w h i c h t h e

p r o c e e d i n g s were based

. ” ( J

. A

. a t 107

. ) A t d e p o si ti on

, b o t h B a i n b r i d g e s a d m i t te d th at

U

. S

. B a n k a nd O c w e n d i d n o t b ri n g th e s u i t to harass o r f o r s o me m o t i v e o t h er t h a n

r e c o u p i n g m o n e y t h o u g h t t o b e d u e

. ( J

. A

. a t 5 2 3 : 4

– 9

, 5 2 4 : 2 1

- 5 2 5 : 1 6

, 5 9 0 : 1 0

– 1 5

. ) T h e

s t at e j u d ge p r e s i d i ng o v e r t he f o re c l os u re a c t io n a l s o f

o u n d

, b a s e d o n t h e e v i d e n c e

, t ha t

“ O c w e n b e l i e v e d i t h a d t a k e n o v e r s e r v i c i n g o f a d e l i n q u e n t a c c o u n t

. ” ( J

. A

. a t 9 5 4 n

. 1

. )

D e s p i t e a l l o f t h a t

, t h e B a i n b r i d g e s a r g u e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t e v a l u a t e

w h e t h e r U

. S

. B a n k a n d O c w e n l a c k e d p r o b a b l e c a u s e o r a c t e d w i t h g r o s s n e g l i g e n c e i n

b r i n g i n g a n d c o n t i n u i n g t h e f o r e c l o s u r e a c t i o n

. ( O p e n i n g B r

. a t 1 9

– 2 0

. ) B u t t h e C o u r t

d i d n o t h a v e t o u n d e r t a k e t h a t a n a l y s i s b e c a u s e

, a s t h e B a i n b r i d g e s c o n c e d e ( O p e n i n g B r

.

a t 1 8 )

, a D r a g o n e t t i A c t p l a i n t i f f m u s t a l w a y s s h o w i m p r o p e r p u r p o s e t o s u c c e e d

.

B e c a u s e n o r e a s o n a b l e j u r y c o u l d f i n d th at U

. S

. B a n k an d O c w e n h a d a n i m p r o p e r

p u r p o s e

, t h e B a i n b r i d g e s c a n n ot s u c c e e d o n t h ei r D r a g o n e t t i A c t c l ai m

.

T h e B a i n b r i d g e s a l s o s a y t ha t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s h o u l d h a v e inferred i m p r o p e r

p u r p o s e f r o m U

. S

. B a n k ’ s a n d O c w e n ’ s g r o s s n e g l i g e n c e o r l a c k o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e

. 5

5 T he B ain br idges for feit ed their gross negligence and probabl e cau se argument s

to the extent they rel y on th e continuation of the foreclo sure suit

. Before the Dis tri ct

C ourt, th e Bai n b ri dge s argue d only that U.S. Bank and Ocwen lacked probabl e cause an d

wer e gross ly ne gli gent in filing the fore closure action

. ( See D ist. Ct. Docket 99 at 4

, 8 .)

They never argue d that there wa s gross negligenc e or a lack of p r obable c ause in

c ont inui ng th e action. Freeman v. Pitts burgh Glass Works , LLC

, 709 F.3d 240, 2 49 (3d

Cir. 2013) ( “We general ly refuse to consider issues that the parties have no t raise d

below

. ” )7

( O p e n i n g B r

. a t 1 9

– 2 0

. ) A l t hough Pennsylvania courts have written that an improper

pur pose may be inferred from a lack of probable cause, the y have hesit ated to m a k e t h a t

inference without at le ast so me evidence of impro per purpose. See, e.g.

, Gentz ler

, 660

A.2d a t 1385 ( dec lining to dismiss the claim where “ [ p l a i n t i f f ] alleged facts of improper

purpose, namely to harass or maliciously injure [ p l a i n t i f f ]

, and unnecessarily to delay and

increase the cost o f litigation”); Broa dwater , 725 A.2 d a t 785 ( findi ng a genu ine issue of

fact as to whether the lawyer brought th e underlying action for personal financial gain i n

a d d i t i o n t o his client’s interests); Mill er v. Penns ylvania R.R. Co

. , 8 9 A.2d 809, 813 (Pa.

1952) (“It is highly significant that no atte mpt is mad e to show malic e e xcept by

inference because of alle ged lack of probable cause. It is true t hat such an inference of

the existence of malice is permi ssib le, bu t it has rarely been sufficient unaided by some

showing of private motive.”).

A c c o r d i n g l y

, w e w i l l a f

f i r m t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ’ s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t U

. S

. B a n k a n d

O c w e n a r e n o t l i a b l e u n d e r t h e D r a g o n e t t i A c t

.

Judge Roth would v ac ate and remand to the District Court to determine w h e t h e r

t h e B a i n b r i d g e s d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t U.S. Bank and Ocwen w e r e g r o s s l y n e g l i g e n t o r

l a c k e d p r o b a b l e c a u s e i n b r i n g i n g t h e foreclosure a c t i o n

, whether U.S. Bank and Ocwen

h a d a n i m p r o p e r p u r p o s e i n c o n t i n u i n g

, an d n o t m e r e l y f i l i n g

, t h e a c t i o n

, and wheth er it

sh ould in fe r im proper purpose from want of p robable cause

. But we will affirm be cause

a Dragonetti A ct plaintiff must always sho w improper purpose

. And

, as we ’ ve already

n oted, the Ba inbridges have forfeited any argumen t about the continuation of the su it.

Finally

, Pennsylvania Courts hesitate to make th e improper purp ose inference wi thou t

some e vidence the reof

.8

B. T h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n p r e s e r v i n g U

. S

. B a n k ’ s a n d O c w e n ’ s a t t o r n e y

- c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e

. 6

B e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

, t h e B a i n b r i d g e s a r g u e d t h a t t h e p r i v i l e g e o u g h t t o b e

p i e r c e d b e c a u s e U

. S

. B a n k a n d O c w e n r e l i e d on the advice of counsel as an affirmative

defense

. ( S u p p

. A p p

. a t 2 6

– 2 7

. ) A t t o r n e y

- c l i e n t p ri v i l e g e is w a i v e d w h e n “ the client

asserts a cl aim or defense, and atte mpts to pr ove t hat claim or defense by disclosing or

describing an attorney client communication.” Rhone

- Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home

Indem

. Co.

, 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir. 1994)

. H o w e v e r, “ [ a ] d vice is not in issue merely

because it is relevant [

. ] ” I d

. T h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o r r e c t l y c o n c l u d e d t h a t U

. S

. B a n k a n d

O c w e n d i d n o t a t t e mp t to pr ov e a c l ai m o r d e f en se b y d i s cl os in g or d e s c r i b i ng a p r ot e c t e d

co mm u n ic a tio n

. ( J

. A

. a t 7 9

– 8 1 ; s e e a l s o D i s t

. C t

. D o c k e t 3 9 a t 6

– 8 ( l i s t in g U

. S

. B a nk

a n d O c w e n ’ s af

f ir ma ti v e d e fe n se s )

. ) A n d t h e B a i n b r i d g es d i d n o t a s s e r t o t he rw i se

. I n

t h e i r b ri e f

, t h e y c i t e t he s t a n d a r d f o r “ a d v i c e of co u n se l ” w a i v e r b u t d o n o t de m o ns t ra te

how U

. S

. B a n k a n d O c w e n w a i v e d t h e p r i v i l e g e

. ( S u p p

. A p p

. a t 2 6

– 2 7

. ) I n s h o r t

, t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t a b u se i t s d i s c r e t i on i n p r e s e r v i n g U

. S

. B a n k a n d O c w e n ’ s a t t o r n e y

c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e

.

T h e B a i n b r i d g e s a l s o a s s e r t a c r i m e

- f r a u d t h e o r y t o p i e r c e t h e p r i v i l e g e

. ( O p e n i n g

B r

. a t 2 5

– 2 8

. ) B e c a u s e t h e y b r i n g i t u p f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e o n a p p e a l

, h o w e v e r

, t h e y h a v e

f o r f e i t e d t h a t a r g u m e n t

. Freeman v. Pitt s burgh Glass Wo rks , LLC

, 709 F.3d 240, 2 49 (3d

Cir. 2013) ( “We general ly refuse to consider issues that the parties have no t raise d

below

. ” )

.

6 W e r e v i e w d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e w a i v e r o f a t t o r n e y

- c l i e n t privi lege f o r a b u s e

o f d i s c r e t i o n

. Livingstone v. N. Belle Vernon Borough , 91 F. 3d 515, 524 (3d Cir. 1996)

.9

C. T h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n d e n y i n g a d m i s s i o n o f

t h e B a i n b r i d g e s ’ e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y

. 7

A n e x p e r t c a n n o t u s u r p th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ’ s r o l e b y t e s t i f y i n g regarding t he

g o v e r n i n g l aw o r o f

f e r i n g l e g a l o p i n i o n s

. Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt , 455 F.3d

195, 217 (3d Cir. 2006) ( c i t i n g F e d

. R

. E v i d

. 7 0 4 )

. T h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t h e r e d e t e r m i n e d

t h a t t h e B a i n b r i d g e ’ s e x p e r t r e p o r t d i d n o t e x p l a i n “ a n y i n d u s t r y p o l i c i e s

, c u s t o m s o r

p r a c t i c e s r e l a t i v e t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s ’ c a s e [

. ] ” ( J

. A

. a t 8 9

. ) I n s t e a d

, i t w a s “ a l e g a l b r i e f i n

s u p p o r t o f p l a i n t i f

f s ’ D r a g o n e t t i c l a i m

. ” ( J

. A

. a t 8 9

. ) T h e B a i n b r i d g e s co n c e d e t h a t “ t h e

c o u r t w a s c o r r e c t t o s t r i k e t e s t i m o n y r e g a r d i n g c o n cl u s i on s o f l a w [

. ] ” ( O p e n i n g B r

. a t

2 8

. ) T h e y a r g u e o n l y t h a t t h e e x p e r t “ w a s p r e p a r e d t o t e s t i f y ” r e g a r d i n g i n d u s t r y

s t a n d a r d s o f c a r e

. ( O p e n i n g B r

. a t 2 8

– 2 9

. ) B u t a r e a s o n a b l e r e a d i n g o f t h e e x p e r t r e p o r t

a l l o w s t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t i t d i d n o t a r g u e f o r a n indu stry s t a n d a r d o f care, n o r d i d i t

a p p l y i n d u s t r y s t a n d a r d s t o t h e f a c t s

. I n s t e a d

, i t e x p l o r e d t h e c a s e ’ s h i s t o r y

, d e s c r i b e d

D r a g o n e t t i A c t a n d P e n n s y l v a n i a mortgage l a w

, a n d a p p l i e d t h e l a w t o t h e f a c t s

. T h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e e x p e r t ’ s p r o p o s e d

t e s t i m o n y i n v a d e d t h e p r o v i n c e o f t h e c o u r t a n d w a s t h e r e f o r e i n a d m i s s i b l e

.

III. C O N C L U S I O N

F o r t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s

, w e w i l l a f f i r m

.

7 W e r e v i e w d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y f o r a b u s e o f

d i s c r e t i o n

. United States v. Gibbs , 190 F.3d 188, 211 (3d Cir. 1999)

.