[Cite as State v. Smith, 2020-Ohio-1492.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 108121 

 v. : 

 

DARRYL SMITH, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 16, 2020 

 

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case Nos. CR-17-620144-A and CR-18-630341-A 

 

Appearances: 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, Sean M. Kilbane, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Darryl Smith, pro se. 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J.: 

Darryl Smith (“Smith”), acting pro se, appeals from his guilty plea and 

associated prison sentence and assigns the following errors for our review: 

I. The trial court unlawfully arbitrarily revoked probation and 

criminally falsified court records and journal entries by denying 
defendant any hearing, did not cite any violation, did not assign 

counsel nor cite reasons for imposing 6 years prison sentence in 

violation of all due process procedure state laws, and the Sixth 

and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. 

II. The trial court unlawfully extracted coerced guilty pleas in both 

cases from a deaf, beaten, actually innocent defendant without 

providing hearing aids nor qualified unbiased deaf translators; 

and inappropriately dictates his guilty pleas and answers, in 

violation of Criminal Rule 11-C et. al. and controlling established 

laws; and contrary to the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. 

III. Prosecutorial intentional misconduct aided by the court et. al. in 

concealing arson videos and actual innocence evidence that 

aquits the defendant; — and the trial court denial of a valid 

timely filed post conviction petition; violated criminal statutory 

laws, and due process (and confrontation rights) as defined in 

the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. 

Constitution and Ohio Criminal Rule 16 and controlling laws. 

IV. The trial court erred in not granting defendant’s motion to 

dismissed based on no probable cause existed in case # CR18-

630341 contrary to due process requirements in the Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. 

V. The permitted arbitrary forfeiture of defendant’s truck and 

property by the trial court and the state with no forfeiture 

proceeding re: case # CR18-630341 violated Ohio statutory laws 

and was a denial of due process rights defined in the Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendments of U.S. Constitution. 

VI. The trial court violated Ohio statutory law in R.C. 2967.191 by 

denying 281 days jail time acreditation off sentence re: case # 

CR17-620144 as a means to extend punishment. 

Having reviewed the record and pertinent law, we affirm the trial 

court’s judgment. The apposite facts follow. 

On March 29, 2018, Smith pled guilty to various felonies in multiple 

cases including CR-17-620144. On April 30, 2018, the court sentenced Smith to six 
years in prison for attempted aggravated arson, a second-degree felony, in CR-17-

620144, suspended, to run concurrent to the prison terms in the other cases. The 

court also sentenced Smith to two years of community control sanctions in CR-17-

620144. Smith did not file a direct appeal in these cases. 

On June 30, 2018, Smith was arrested after engaging police in a highspeed chase. On July 10, 2018, Smith was indicted for failure to comply in violation 

of R.C. 2921.331(B), a third-degree felony, in CR-18-630341. On December 3, 2018, 

Smith pled guilty as charged, and on January 7, 2019, the court sentenced Smith to 

30 months in prison. The court also found Smith to be in violation of his community 

control sanctions in CR-17-620144. The court terminated Smith’s community 

control sanctions and ordered him to serve his original six-year prison sentence, to 

run consecutive to the 30-month prison sentence. Smith filed a timely appeal of the 

January 7, 2019 journal entries in CR-17-620144 and CR-18-630341. 

Community Control Sanctions Violation Hearing 

 In his first assigned error, Smith argues that the court failed to hold 

a “probation violation procedural hearing,” appoint counsel to represent him, serve 

him with “violation infractions,” and generally denied him his due process. 

At Smith’s plea hearing on December 3, 2018, he was represented by 

an attorney. The court asked Smith the following: “This plea is going to be a 

violation of your probation, do you understand?” Smith responded, “Very well.” 

The court continued: 
We’ll have — at the time of sentencing we’ll have a hearing with your 

probation officer * * * to see what we’re going to do. I could do a 

number of things. I could sentence you on the new case, sentence you 

on the old case, I could run the sentences together, I could run them 

one after another, or I could put you on probation in this case and keep 

you on probation in the other case. 

The court again asked Smith if he understood, to which Smith replied, 

“Yes, ma’am.” Smith then pled guilty to failure to comply. 

At the January 7, 2019 sentencing and community control sanctions 

violation hearing, Smith was again represented by the same attorney. The court 

found that Smith “has basically a 45-year prior criminal history dating back to the 

year 1974.” The court found Smith to be a community control sanctions, violator in 

CR-17-620144 and imposed “a term of incarceration of six years and in this case 

today, 630341, a term of incarceration of 30 months.” The court ordered this time 

to be served consecutively. 

Pursuant to Crim.R. 32.3(A), “[t]he court shall not impose a prison 

term for violation of the conditions of a community control sanction * * * except 

after a hearing at which the defendant shall be present and apprised of the grounds 

on which the action is proposed.” A community control sanctions violation hearing 

is not akin to a criminal prosecution. Nevertheless, a defendant is entitled to the 

minimum due process protections, which include: 

(a) written notice of the claimed violations * * * ; (b) disclosure * * * of 

evidence against [the defendant]; (c) opportunity to be heard in person 

and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to 

confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses * * * ; (e) a “neutral and 

detached” hearing * * * ; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders 
as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking [community 

control sanctions]. 

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). 

“A trial court’s decision finding a violation of community control 

[sanctions] will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. 

Hayes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87642, 2006-Ohio-5924, ¶ 11. 

Upon review of the record, we find that the court held community 

control sanctions violation hearings on December 3, 2018 and January 7, 2019; 

Smith was present and represented by counsel at these hearings; Smith was properly 

notified of the charges against him; Smith acknowledged on the record that his guilty 

plea to failure to comply necessarily resulted in a violation of his community control 

sanctions; and the court made a finding that Smith violated his community control 

sanctions. Accordingly, we find that Smith suffered no due process deprivation 

regarding his community control sanctions violation, and his first assigned error is 

overruled. 

Guilty Plea 

In his second assigned error, Smith argues that the court violated 

Crim.R. 11 when accepting his guilty plea. We note that Smith’s December 3, 2018 

guilty plea is the only plea Smith appealed in this case. Smith did not appeal from 

his March 29, 2018 guilty plea, and that plea is not before us for review. 

“When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be 

made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points 
renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States 

Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.” State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 

600 N.E.2d 450 (1996). 

To ensure that a plea to a felony charge is knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily entered into, a trial court must follow the dictates of Crim.R. 

11(C)(2). This provision provides that the court must address 

defendants personally and (1) determine that they understand the 

nature of the charges against them and of the maximum penalty 

involved, (2) inform them of and determine that they understand the 

effect of a plea of guilty or no contest and that the court may proceed 

with judgment and sentence, and (3) inform them of and determine 

that they understand the constitutional rights that they are giving up 

by entering into their plea. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) - (c). 

State v. Gunter, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105275, 2017-Ohio-7247, ¶ 19. 

Courts must substantially comply with the nonconstitutional 

notifications and determinations required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b). State v. 

Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 14-17. Furthermore, 

“a defendant must show prejudice before a plea will be vacated for a trial court’s 

error involving Crim.R. 11(C) procedure when nonconstitutional aspects of the 

colloquy are at issue.” Id. at ¶ 17. 

Turning to the constitutional rights within Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), 

“strict, or literal, compliance” is required by courts accepting a guilty plea. Id. at ¶ 

18. “However, failure to [literally comply] will not necessarily invalidate a plea. The 

underlying purpose, from the defendant’s perspective, of Crim.R. 11(C) is to convey 

to the defendant certain information so that he can make a voluntary and intelligent 
decision whether to plead guilty.” State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479-480, 423 

N.E.2d 115 (1981). 

This court conducts a de novo review to determine whether the trial 

court accepted a plea in compliance with Crim.R. 11(C). State v. Cardwell, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 92796, 2009-Ohio-6827, ¶ 26, citing State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 

86, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977). “We are required to review the totality of the 

circumstances and determine whether the plea hearing was in compliance with 

Crim.R. 11(C).” State v. Schmick, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95210, 2011-Ohio-2263, ¶ 

6. 

Smith argues that the trial court failed to consider his disabilities 

when accepting his plea. Smith lists his disabilities as follows: “severe hearing 

impaired”; “severely vision impaired permanently”; and “severe permanent 

concussion disorders of P.C.S. and C.T.E.” According to Smith, these “disability 

injury afflictions” are the “direct intentional result of senseless multiple savage 

beatings during arrest * * * by 2 deputy sheriffs and jail guards in the notorious 

Cuyahoga County Jail.” 

Although somewhat unclear from his pro se appellate brief, Smith 

also appears to argue that his plea must be vacated because his resulting prison 

sentence was too harsh. For example, Smith argues that “no brain dead idiot would 
stupidly make a ‘plea agreement’ to a maximum1 consecutive 8 1⁄2 years sentence at 

age 67 that is an effective real actual death sentence.” 

Upon review of the December 3, 2018 plea hearing, we find that the 

court advised Smith that he would be pleading guilty to “failure to comply with an 

order or a signal of a police officer pursuant to Revised Code Section 2921.331(B).” 

The court informed Smith that this offense was a third-degree felony “punishable by 

a possible prison term of from 9 to 12, 18, 24, 30, to 36 months in prison * * *.” The 

court reviewed with Smith all of the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading 

guilty. 

The court paid special attention to Smith’s hearing impairment by 

having the attorneys speak louder and stand closer to Smith and repeating things so 

Smith understood them. The court also reminded Smith that his guilty plea was a 

violation of his community control sanctions. We find no constitutional or 

nonconstitutional violations of Smith’s Crim.R. 11 rights. Furthermore, Smith failed 

to show any prejudice resulting from allegations that his rights were violated. 

Accordingly, Smith’s second assigned error is overruled. 

Exculpatory Evidence 

In his third assigned error, Smith argues that there is “compelling 

irrefutable exculpatory evidence of actual innocence that all 12 jurors on any jury 

 1 Neither Smith’s six-year sentence nor his 30-month sentence is the maximum 

prison sentence allowed under R.C. 2929.14 for second- and third-degree felonies, 

respectively. 
anywhere would instantly return unanimous not guilty verdicts on acquitting Smith 

of all arsons within 2 minutes.” 

As stated earlier in this opinion, Smith appeals two January 7, 2019 

journal entries. The first entry in CR-17-620144 finds that Smith violated his 

community control sanctions, terminates these community control sanctions, and 

orders Smith to serve his six-year suspended prison sentence. The second journal 

entry in CR-18-630341 sentences Smith to 30 months in prison for failure to comply 

and runs this sentence consecutive to the six years in prison in CR-17-620144. 

Neither journal entry concerns exculpatory evidence. Furthermore, 

Smith does not reference where in the trial court record he raised the issue of 

exculpatory evidence, not to mention where in the record the trial court allegedly 

erred. See App.R. 12(A)(2) (“The court may disregard an assignment of error 

presented for review if the party raising it fails to identify in the record the error on 

which the assignment of error is based * * *.”). 

Accordingly, Smith’s third assigned error is overruled. 

Motion to Dismiss 

In Smith’s fourth assigned error, he argues that the court erred in not 

granting his motion to dismiss in CR-18-630341. Our review of the docket shows 

that Smith filed a motion to dismiss on August 1, 2018. However, before the trial 

court ruled on Smith’s motion, he pled guilty as indicted. “When a defendant enters 

a plea of guilty, he waives all appealable errors that might have occurred unless the 
errors precluded the defendant from entering a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent 

plea.” State v. Korecky, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108328, 2020-Ohio-797, ¶ 16. 

Upon review, we find that Smith waived any arguments regarding his 

motion to dismiss by entering a valid guilty plea in CR-18-630341. As such, his 

fourth assigned error is overruled. 

Forfeiture 

In Smith’s fifth assigned error, he challenges the “arbitrary forfeiture 

of [his] truck and property.” However, in Smith’s pro se appellate brief he argues 

that “no court has ever issued any forfeiture order against Smith’s truck during the 

3 months Smith has remained in jail.” The state, in its appellate brief, argues that 

“[t]here is no evidence in the record that the vehicle was destroyed.” Our review of 

the record fails to identify an order or journal entry from the trial court forfeiting 

Smith’s truck or any other property. Accordingly, there does not appear to be an 

error for Smith to appeal regarding forfeiture, and his fifth assigned error is 

overruled. 

Jail-Time Credit 

In Smith’s sixth and final assigned error, he argues that “[t]he trial 

court violated * * * R.C. 2967.191 by denying 281 days jail[-]time [credit in] CR-17-

620144.” Our review of the record shows that Smith filed a motion for jail-time 

credit on January 14, 2019, and the court granted this motion on September 10, 

2019. On appeal, the state argues that this issue is moot. We agree with the state, 
because Smith has already been afforded the relief he is requesting. Accordingly, 

Smith’s sixth assigned error is overruled. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having 

been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for 

execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, JUDGE 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, A.J., and 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR 
KEY WORDS 

Community control sanctions violation hearing; guilty plea; App.R. 12(A)(2); 

exculpatory evidence; forfeiture; motion to dismiss; jail-time credit. 

Pro se defendant’s convictions for violating community control sanctions and 

failure to comply affirmed. The court held a proper hearing on the community 

control sanctions violations and defendant’s guilty plea. The court properly applied 

jail-time credit. The remainder of defendant’s assigned errors were waived when 

he pled guilty or were unsupported by the record.