Page 1 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

July 27, 2016

Congressional Committees

Defense Space Acquisitions: Too Early to Determine If Recent Changes Will Resolve 

Persistent Fragmentation in Management and Oversight

The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on space systems to provide critical capabilities that 

support military and other government operations, including but not limited to communications; 

missile warning; positioning, navigation, and timing; and intelligence information. The Air Force, 

specifically, the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC), develops and acquires most military 

space systems, and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) develops Intelligence 

Community (IC) space systems. These systems can be very challenging to develop and 

expensive to acquire and field.

We and others have reported for over two decades that fragmentation and overlap in DOD 

space acquisition management and oversight have contributed to program delays and 

cancellations, cost increases, and inefficient operations. For example, in 2012 we found that 

fragmented leadership contributed to a 10-year gap between the delivery of GPS satellites and 

user equipment. We also found that a lack of a government-wide authority hindered space 

situational awareness acquisition efforts.1 Similarly, last year, we testified that DOD continues to 

face challenges in aligning the delivery of space system segments, in part, because budgeting 

authority for the segments is spread across the military services. DOD lacks a single authority to 

ensure alignment of these segments.2 DOD has noted that space is becoming an increasingly

contested domain, resulting in greater threats to deployed military forces. The ability to 

effectively respond to these threats has increased the importance of focused leadership in 

national security space.

In Senate Report 114-49 accompanying S.1376, a bill for the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2016, the Senate Armed Services Committee included a provision for GAO 

to review the effectiveness of the current DOD space acquisition and oversight model and to 

evaluate what changes, if any, could be considered to improve the governance of space system 

acquisitions and operations. This report formally transmits information we provided in a briefing 

to the committee on May 17, 2016, to meet our reporting requirement (see enclosure I: DOD

Space Acquisition Management and Oversight, Information Presented to Congressional

Committees). This report addresses the following: (1) what organizations are responsible for 

DOD’s management and oversight of space system acquisitions; (2) what recommendations 

have been made for improvements to DOD’s management and oversight of space acquisitions 

over the last two decades, and what major changes have occurred in that time period; (3) what 

 1

GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and 

Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-342SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012).

2

GAO, Space Acquisitions: Some Programs Have Overcome Past Problems, but Challenges and Uncertainty Remain 

for the Future, GAO-15-492T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2015). 
Page 2 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight

persistent challenges, if any, has DOD experienced in its management and oversight of space 

acquisitions, and what changes could be considered for improvement?

To determine the organizations responsible for DOD’s management and oversight of space 

system acquisitions and to identify the stakeholders involved in current and planned national 

security space activities, we reviewed relevant DOD documentation and interviewed officials 

with space-related responsibilities from various organizations within the services, the Office of

the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), among 

others. To determine what changes have been made to improve management and oversight of 

space acquisitions, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of 17 experienced space industry 

professionals based on recommendations from current and retired DOD, industry, and 

congressional officials. We asked them about what they view as the most important 

recommendations and changes in defense space acquisitions over the last 20 years. From 

these interviews we identified four major studies on the topic of space management and 

oversight, analyzed the studies for recommendations made, and determined how many of those 

recommendations were adopted by DOD. We also analyzed applicable DOD directives and 

memos to determine changes in space-related organization and responsibilities. To assess 

persistent challenges that DOD has experienced in space acquisitions and changes that could 

be considered to mitigate them, we interviewed DOD officials and industry professionals. We 

also analyzed information from relevant studies and commissions. We then assessed the 

information gathered and sent our findings to the 17 experts we initially interviewed for their 

review and comment. 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2015 to July 2016 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

In summary, DOD space leadership responsibilities are fragmented among several 

organizations. We identified approximately 60 stakeholder organizations across DOD, the 

Executive Office of the President, the Intelligence Community, and civilian agencies. Of these, 

eight organizations, including SMC and NRO mentioned above, have space acquisition 

management responsibilities; eleven have oversight responsibilities; and six are involved in 

setting requirements for defense space programs. In October 2015, the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense designated the Secretary of the Air Force as the Principal DOD Space Advisor (PDSA). 

The PDSA, supported by an advisory body called the Defense Space Council (DSC), is 

responsible for promoting a unified approach to space issues, including acquisitions; overseeing

the entire DOD space portfolio, including all space policies, strategies, and plans across DOD; 

and serving as an independent advisor on all space matters to top DOD officials. PDSA officials

stated that the PDSA role is expected to have new responsibilities that will help it effectively 

consolidate space leadership. Some of these responsibilities include reviewing all service 

budgets for conformity with national security space policy, and giving independent assessments 

and recommendations to top DOD officials when there is no DSC consensus. However, it 

remains to be seen whether the PDSA will be effective in unifying space leadership and 

authority.

The organization of space acquisitions and oversight has been studied in depth over the last 20 

years; however, DOD has not made significant changes to space leadership that were

recommended by the four most relevant studies that we identified:
Page 3 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight

1. Report of the Commission to Assess US National Security Space Management and 

Organization; Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Chairman (2001)

2. Joint Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs, Defense Science 

Board and Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (2003) 

3. Leadership, Management, and Organization for National Security Space Report, Institute 

for Defense Analyses (2008) 

4. Report on Challenges and Recommendations for United States Overhead Architecture, 

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (2008)

These studies made 28 recommendations related to management and oversight of national 

security space (listed in enclosure II), which can be grouped into six categories:

• Space as a national security priority

• Unified leadership and authority

• Improved coordination between defense space entities

• Budget issues

• Planning

• Acquisition process

We found that DOD has made significant progress in one category—making space a national 

security priority—and limited progress in four others—coordination, budget, planning, and 

acquisition reform. In the remaining category—unified leadership and authority—DOD has not 

adopted a number of recommendations made in the studies, such as combining NRO and Air 

Force space acquisition functions into a unified organization or establishing an Under Secretary 

of Defense-level official with responsibility for planning and executing national security space 

programs. 

Some of the acquisition problems identified in past studies and GAO reports persist today, such 

as insufficient program manager empowerment and excessive reviews, which contribute to 

inefficiencies. Officials and experts we spoke with stated that the challenges are magnified in 

space programs because space technologies are frequently obsolete by the time they are 

deployed. The officials and experts also stated that DOD space acquisitions generally take too 

long due to fragmented leadership, a redundant oversight bureaucracy, and difficulty 

coordinating among numerous stakeholders. By contrast, the NRO’s processes appear more 

streamlined than DOD’s. For example, according to officials, NRO program managers are only 

two levels removed from the main acquisition decision maker. Many officials and experts stated 

that no one seems to be in charge of space acquisitions and many remain skeptical that the 

recently designated PDSA will have sufficient decision-making authority to address these 

concerns. However, others—including from the PDSA—stated a strong belief that the position

will be able to effectively consolidate fragmented leadership responsibilities. While it is too early 

to gauge whether the PDSA has sufficient authority to consolidate space leadership 

responsibilities, PDSA officials stated that they will develop metrics to help assess the

effectiveness of the PDSA role.

Based on our interviews with DOD officials and experts, we identified some suggested themes

for reform, some of which apply to DOD acquisitions broadly. They include: (1) streamlining 

reviews; (2) delegating more decision-making authority to lower levels; (3) increasing unity of 
Page 4 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight

national security space decisions between DOD and the NRO; (4) achieving lasting change that 

cannot be quickly undone and to allow time for the changes to work; and (5) providing sufficient 

acquisition, execution, and budget authority. We also identified and examined several potential 

approaches to reforming DOD space acquisitions that were suggested and supported by DOD 

and expert officials:

• No Further Changes: allow time for the newly established PDSA change to work.

• Defense Space Agency: combine the military space functions into one agency but leave 

the NRO unchanged.

• Space Acquisition Agency: combine SMC and NRO into one agency.

• Space Force: new military department for the space domain.

All four options have significant benefits and drawbacks. The final three options would likely 

result in significant short-term disruption to DOD’s space organizational structure, roles, and 

responsibilities. However, given the long-standing fragmentation in space leadership and 

consequent challenges faced by DOD in synchronizing its extensive space enterprise, 

proposals such as these might deserve a closer look if the new PDSA role does not prove 

effective.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We are not making recommendations in this report. We provided a draft of this report to DOD 

and NRO for comment. DOD provided us written comments (reprinted in enclosure III); NRO did 

not comment. DOD also provided technical comments that have been incorporated as 

appropriate.

In its written comments, DOD stated that it disagreed with GAO publishing the report at this time 

because it contains no new information on the reforms already adopted and states that it is too 

early to gauge whether these reforms are working. DOD also stated that identification of 

additional reforms for consideration before assessing the effectiveness of the existing reforms 

would be premature. Additionally, DOD stated that because the report focuses almost 

exclusively on enterprise-level governance processes and does not address the full scope of the 

stated questions regarding the Department’s space acquisition model, the report is retrospective 

and does not assess the effectiveness of current efforts intended to reduce fragmentation and 

overlap.

As our report shows, we found the most notable space system governance reform DOD has 

adopted in recent years is the October 2015 designation of the Secretary of the Air Force as the 

PDSA. Both DOD and we agree it is too early to assess the effectiveness of this change, but 

this fact should not preclude consideration of other potential reform alternatives, especially in 

light of DOD’s longstanding and generally unsuccessful track record of making effective and 

lasting improvements. For example, the Secretary of the Air Force was previously designated as 

the EA for Space in 2003 in order to unify space leadership; however, this role proved 

ineffective for several reasons, including insufficient authority and difficulty coordinating the 

numerous stakeholders. Our focus on enterprise-level governance in answering our research 

objectives is purposeful, as oversight and management of a wide range of space matters—

including requirements, budgeting, and operations—have direct and significant implications on 
Page 5 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight

the effectiveness of acquisition efforts. For example, DOD’s procurement of commercial satellite 

communications is fragmented and inefficient, partly due to a lack of central leadership. 

Additionally, several major studies have advocated broad enterprise-level reorganizations, 

including centralized leadership and greater budgetary responsibilities, to resolve fragmented 

and overlapping leadership and improve acquisition performance, but DOD has generally shied 

away from such broad measures. Officials of the newly-established PDSA believe the new office 

will resolve these issues because its stated goal is to unify DOD space leadership; however, this 

change does not incorporate new budgetary and organizational authorities that DOD officials 

and experts say may prove necessary to overcome a history of insufficient centralized space 

leadership. We disagree the report is entirely retrospective, as a primary focus is to establish 

the current condition upon which future improvements might be made. But retrospect is 

valuable. Not duly considering what in the past has or has not happened and why carries the 

risk of repeating past mistakes of providing warfighters with delayed and/or reduced capabilities 

at increased cost.

- - - - -

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary 

of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Director of the NRO. This report will also be 

available at no charge on our website at http://www.gao.gov. 

Should you or your staff have questions concerning this report please reach call or email me at 

(202) 512-4841 or at chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this 

report are Rich Horiuchi, Assistant Director; Raj Chitikila; Emily Bond; Maricela Cherveny; 

Andrea Evans; Laura Hook; Jean McSween; Sarah Veale; and Alyssa Weir.

Cristina Chaplain

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management

Enclosures – 3
Page 6 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight

List of Committees

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Chairman

The Honorable Richard Durbin

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
DOD Space Acquisition 

Management and Oversight

Information Presented to Congressional 

Committees

Page 1 

Page 7 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight Enclosure I: DOD Space Acquisition Management and Oversight 

Information Presented to Congressional Committees 
Contents

• Introduction

• Objectives

• Scope and Methodology

• Summary

• Background

• Findings

Page 2 

Page 8 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Introduction

• DOD space systems provide critical capabilities that support military and other 

government operations, including communications; missile warning; positioning, 

navigation, and timing; and intelligence information. Military space systems are 

primarily developed and acquired by the Air Force, and intelligence community (IC) 

space systems by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). These systems can 

take a long time to develop and are expensive to acquire and field. For example, a 

single satellite can cost from $500 million to over $3 billion and the cost to launch the 

satellite can climb to well over $100 million. 

• We and others have reported for over two decades that fragmentation in DOD space 

acquisition management and oversight have contributed to program delays and 

cancellations, cost increases, and inefficient operations. We have also found that DOD 

weapon system acquisition processes are typically focused on individual programs 

rather than assessing investments collectively, as best practices recommend, and do 

not effectively integrate information from the requirements and budget processes.1

Figure 1 shows the effective integration of these processes.

Page 3 

1GAO, Weapon System Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Department’s Portfolio Management, GAO-15-466 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 27, 2015). 

Page 9 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Introduction (continued)

• We have found that the three processes are largely stove-piped in practice for DOD, resulting in 

most investment decisions being made on a piecemeal basis and limiting its opportunities to 

better leverage its resources and adjust to strategic changes.

Page 4 

Figure 1: Effective Portfolio Reviews Integrate Information from the Requirements, Acquisition, and Budget 

Communities

Page 10 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Introduction (continued)

• While this review primarily focuses on the processes by which space 

acquisitions are managed and overseen, we also discuss relevant 

requirements and budget process-related factors, given the closely 

interrelated nature of the three processes. Discussions about U.S. goals for 

space frequently include the civilian agencies such as the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) as well, but the scope of this review is 

limited to DOD and intelligence space systems. 

• In Senate Report 114-49 accompanying S.1376, a bill for the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, the committee noted that it 

has grown concerned by the disjointed nature of DOD space system 

acquisition and acquisition oversight. The report included a provision for us to 

assess the effectiveness of DOD’s space acquisition and oversight.

Page 5 

Page 11 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Objectives

This briefing addresses the following questions:

1. What organizations are responsible for DOD’s management 

and oversight of space system acquisitions?

2. What recommendations have been made for improvements to 

DOD’s management and oversight of space acquisitions over 

the last two decades, and what major changes have occurred 

in that time period?

3. What persistent challenges, if any, has DOD experienced in 

its management and oversight of space acquisitions, and 

what changes could be considered for improvement? 

Page 6 

Page 12 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Scope and Methodology (continued)

• To determine the organizations responsible for DOD’s management and oversight of space 

systems acquisitions, we obtained and reviewed relevant DOD documentation outlining various 

organizations’ roles and responsibilities in national security space activities and in current and 

planned DOD space efforts. In addition, we interviewed officials with space-related responsibilities 

from various organizations (listed at the end of the briefing) to obtain an overview of current 

defense space acquisitions and oversight and identify stakeholders. 

• To determine recommendations and changes that have been made to improve management and 

oversight of space acquisitions, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of 17 experienced space 

industry professionals based on recommendations from current and former DOD, congressional, 

and industry officials, and interviewed them on their opinions on what the most important 

recommendations and changes have been in the last 20 years. Based on these interviews, we 

identified four major studies on the topic of space management and oversight, and we analyzed 

these studies for their recommended changes and to determine how many of those 

recommendations were adopted by DOD, including identifying what changes were made to space 

acquisitions and oversight organizations. Most experts agreed that these were the most important 

studies on the topic; therefore, we did not attempt to duplicate the studies’ analyses. We 

reviewed other studies, including prior GAO reports, that assessed problems with past space 

acquisitions and management. We also analyzed applicable DOD directives and memorandums 

to determine changes in space-related organization authorities and responsibilities. 

Page 7 

Page 13 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Scope and Methodology (continued)

• To assess the persistent challenges DOD has experienced in space acquisitions and 

changes that could be considered, we interviewed the DOD officials and industry 

professionals described earlier and consolidated and synthesized information they 

shared. We also analyzed information from various relevant studies and commissions 

and prior GAO reports. We then assessed the information gathered and sent our 

findings to the 17 experts we interviewed for their review and comment. We defined 

modifiers (e.g., “many”) to quantify interviewees’ views as follows:

• “some” individuals represents 3 to 5 individuals,

• “many” individuals represents 6 to 10 individuals, and

• “most” individuals represents 11 to 17 individuals.

Page 8 

Page 14 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Summary

GAO found:

• DOD space leadership responsibilities are fragmented among several organizations. 

We identified approximately 60 stakeholder organizations involved in space 

acquisitions. There are eight organizations with space acquisition management 

responsibilities. While the Air Force has responsibility for most military space 

acquisitions, the other military services have their own space efforts as well. The NRO 

collaborates with DOD as it develops space systems for DOD and the IC. Oversight is 

spread across 11 offices within the Air Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD), the IC, and OMB. The Secretary of the Air Force, as the newly designated 

Principal DOD Space Advisor (PDSA), supported by an advisory body called the 

Defense Space Council, is responsible for promoting a unified approach to space 

issues, including acquisitions. Lastly, six DOD organizations from the services, U.S. 

Strategic Command, and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are involved in setting 

requirements for defense space programs.

• The organization of space acquisitions and oversight has been studied in depth over 

the last 20 years. We identified four studies as the most relevant; these studies made 

28 relevant recommendations, including that space be made a national security priority 

with unified leadership and decision-making authority, among other things. In general, 

DOD has not made significant changes to space leadership over the last two decades. 

PDSA officials stated that their organization has sufficient authorities and 

responsibilities to unify decision making across national security space; however, it is 

too early to evaluate the effectiveness of this change.

Page 9 

Page 15 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Summary (continued)

• Many of the leadership problems identified in past studies and GAO reports persist 

today. Officials and experts we spoke to stated that fragmented leadership in DOD 

space acquisitions has contributed to poor coordination and lengthy decision making. 

While these challenges are not limited to space-related acquisition efforts, officials and 

experts stated that the challenges are magnified in space programs because their 

technologies are frequently obsolete by the time systems are deployed. Program 

management and oversight weaknesses we have identified over the past decade 

further exacerbate the condition. Many officials and experts were skeptical that the 

recently designated PDSA has sufficient decision-making authority to address 

leadership concerns; however, many experts and DOD officials—including from the 

PDSA—stated a strong belief that the PDSA can effectively consolidate fragmented 

leadership responsibilities. Officials and experts suggested a variety of changes, such 

as consolidating military and NRO space acquisitions; however, many cautioned that 

such changes would result in significant short-term disruption to DOD’s space roles 

and responsibilities.

Page 10 

Page 16 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Background

• DOD spends $9 billion-$11 billion a year on non-intelligence space-related efforts. About 90 

percent of this funding is managed by the Air Force. Intelligence space program funding is 

classified. 

• For over 20 years, we and various groups have illustrated problems with the way national security 

space programs were planned for, acquired and managed. 

‒ In 1993, the House Appropriations Committee report accompanying the fiscal year 1994 defense appropriations bill noted a lack of a coherent management structure associated with 

national security space programs.2 

‒ In 1994, a GAO report found that space acquisition management responsibilities were fragmented among several organizations.3

‒ In 2001, a congressionally mandated commission report stated that the current interagency 

process was inadequate to address the number, range, and complexity of today’s space issues, and that the national security space organization and management at the time failed 

to reflect the growing importance of space to U.S. interests.4 

‒ In 2008, an independent panel report to Congress stated that “without significant 

improvements in the leadership and management of national security space programs, U.S. 

Space preeminence will erode to the extent that space ceases to provide a competitive 

national security advantage.”5 

‒ Similar findings have been reported by other groups including the RAND Corporation and the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Page 11

2H.R. Rep. No. 103-254 (1993). 3GAO, National Space Issues: Observations on Defense Space Programs and Activities, GAO-NSIAD-94-253 (Washington, D.C.: 

Aug. 16, 1994). 4Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, January 11, 2001. 5Institute for Defense 

Analyses, Leadership, Management, and Organization for National Security Space, July 2008. This report is generally referred to as the Allard Commission report. 

Page 17 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Background: Prior GAO Work

• Over a number of years we have conducted extensive reviews of DOD space acquisitions 

including launch vehicles, satellite systems, associated ground systems, and user 

terminals. From a program management perspective, we have generally found: 

‒ Over the last decade, DOD space system acquisitions have been characterized by 

the long-standing problem of program costs and schedules increasing significantly 

from original estimates.

‒ DOD’s long-standing difficulties on space acquisition programs included technical or 

design problems, as well as oversight and management weaknesses, such as a 

tendency to produce optimistic cost estimates.

‒ DOD space systems have encountered challenges and issues with synchronizing the 

delivery of satellites, ground control, and user system capabilities.

• We have made recommendations to improve the management of space systems 

acquisitions, such as adopting best practices including assuring that development 

programs’ critical technologies are mature and separating technology development from 

product development. DOD has, in general, concurred with our recommendations.

Page 12 

Page 18 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Background – Prior GAO work (continued)

• We have also tied acquisition problems to leadership challenges. Generally, DOD’s culture has been resistant 

to changes in acquisition approaches and fragmented responsibilities in DOD space programs have made it 

difficult to implement new processes and coordinate and deliver interdependent systems. 

• In reviewing the condition of the space portfolio in 1994, for instance, we reported that strong management at a 

high level within the Executive Office of the President appeared essential to address launch requirements, 

ensure interagency coordination, cooperation and elimination of duplication, and maintain program and funding 

stability.6 This report also found that space acquisition management responsibilities were fragmented among 

several organizations. We did not make recommendations in that report.

• In 2012, we again reported that fragmented leadership and a lack of a single authority in overseeing the 

acquisition of space programs had created challenges for optimally acquiring, developing, and deploying new 

space systems.7 This fragmentation is problematic not only because of a lack of coordination that has led to 

delays in fielding systems, but also because no one person or organization is held accountable for balancing 

government-wide needs against wants, resolving conflicts and ensuring coordination among the many 

organizations involved with space acquisitions, and ensuring that resources are directed where they are most 

needed. We proposed that OMB assess whether a government-wide space council or separate organization 

should be established that would have greater authority for setting priorities than individual departments and 

agencies, and responsibility for strategic planning. DOD acknowledged the need for a clearer space and 

acquisition structure; however, OMB did not concur that changes were needed.

Page 13 

6GAO-NSIAD-94-253. 7GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, 

GAO-12-342SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012).

Page 19 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Background – Prior GAO work (continued)

• Examples of leadership challenges cited in our 2012 report:

• A 10-year gap between the delivery of GPS satellites and user equipment that could take 

advantage of new capabilities that was partially the result of fragmented leadership;

• The cancellation of the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 

(NPOESS), which attempted to converge defense and civil environmental monitoring requirements 

and avoid duplication through a tri-agency program office but faltered in part because there was no 

single authority to adjudicate conflicts or set priorities; 

• The Space Radar program, which was intended to be a joint effort between DOD and the IC, but 

faced significant affordability issues, along with leadership and management challenges that 

eventually contributed to the program’s cancellation; and 

• A 2011 report which found that space situational awareness acquisition efforts experienced 

challenges due to a lack of government-wide authority. Space situational awareness efforts are 

designed to mitigate threats to U.S. space systems via a variety of space- and ground-based 

sensors and systems that detect, track, and characterize space objects and space-related events, 

and forecast which assets may be at risk.

Page 14 

Page 20 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Background – Prior GAO work (continued)

• In 2015, we testified that leadership challenges could, for example, hinder DOD’s efforts to examine options for 

acquisition efficiencies.8 

• For example, historically, DOD has procured commercial satellite communications services to augment 

military capacity and it has become increasingly reliant on these services to support ongoing military 

operations. DOD is looking for ways to better streamline procurements of these services, but according to 

DOD officials, it has had difficulty adhering to past policies that required centralized procurement, 

especially during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, when efficiency was not a priority. 

• Similarly, DOD was still unable to align the delivery of space system segments in part because control 

over budget formulation and execution for the segments is spread across the military services and DOD 

lacks a single authority to ensure programs are funded in a manner that aligns their deliveries. As 

programs continue to face challenges in aligning components, the warfighter cannot take advantage of full 

system capabilities, and the large investments into these programs are not fully exploited. 

• We have also conducted work on interagency coordination more broadly. In 2005, we identified challenges that 

cut across various federal agencies.9 We identified practices which include, among other things:

‒ Defining and articulating a common outcome;

‒ Establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies to achieve the outcome;

‒ Agreeing upon agency roles and responsibilities; and

‒ Reinforcing agency accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports.

• In 2012 we further elaborated on key considerations for implementing interagency collaborative mechanisms, 

such as clarifying roles and responsibilities and bridging organizational cultures.10

Page 15 

8GAO, Space Acquisitions: Some Programs Have Overcome Past Problems, but Challenges and Uncertainty Remain for the Future, GAO-15-492T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 

29, 2015). 9GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 

21, 2005). 10GAO, Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency Collaborative Mechanisms, GAO-12-1022 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2012). 

Page 21 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Background – how space is different from 

other acquisition areas

DOD space systems are acquired under the same acquisition policies as other weapons 

systems.11 However, there are some ways that space systems are different from other 

acquisitions: 

• Space has more programs of joint interest than other areas, and includes varied 

stakeholders, such as civil agencies and multiple services.

• According to officials, in developing space systems, “you have one shot to get it right”; once a satellite is launched, if there are problems it is essentially impossible to change 

the hardware, and software changes may not be an option.

• Space programs typically use cutting-edge technologies that have to withstand the harsh space environment, as well as meet DOD requirements for survivability. These 

are rarely available on the commercial market and must be developed by DOD.

• With space programs, there are various segments—satellites, ground control systems, and user equipment—that rely on each other for the full system to work. These are often developed under separate programs, and the development timelines often do not 

match up so they are not all available when needed. 

• Additionally, each of these segments has historically been expensive, costing billions of 

dollars to build and launch satellites or field ground systems and user terminals. For example, the Air Force is modernizing the GPS segments at great expense: over $500 

million each for eight GPS III satellites, close to $4 billion for the next generation operational control system, and $1.64 billion for designing the first increment of user 

terminal cards. Consequently, it can be difficult to get buy-in to recapitalize large systems. 

Page 16 

11DOD Directive 5000.01, “The Defense Acquisition System” (2007) and DOD Instruction 5000.02, “Operation of the Defense Acquisition System” dated 

January 7, 2015, direct the Defense Acquisition System and provide governing policies. 

Page 22 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Background – military and intelligence space 

programs

Space programs are generally divided into either military or intelligence-funded 

programs.

• Title 10 and Title 50 establish different authorities and responsibilities for the DOD and IC 

agencies such as the NRO.

‒ DOD has both Title 10 (armed services) and Title 50 (intelligence) authorities. 

According to officials, most DOD space acquisitions follow DOD acquisition policies and funding processes. 

‒ NRO space acquisitions utilize Title 50 authorities, and according to NRO, follow IC acquisition policies and funding processes.

• Military intelligence programs (MIP) are funded through DOD, and national intelligence 

programs (NIP) are funded through the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

(ODNI).

‒ The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has oversight over the NIP 

and the MIP, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has NIP jurisdiction. They share this jurisdiction for the MIP with the Senate and House Armed Services 

Committees. 

‒ According to NRO, most NRO programs are NIP-funded; a small number of NRO 

programs are jointly MIP-NIP funded and these follow NRO’s acquisition processes. 

Page 17 

Page 23 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 1: DOD Space Acquisitions 

Management and Oversight Are Fragmented 

with Many Organizations Having Significant 

Responsibilities

Page 18 

Page 24 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 1: DOD Space Acquisitions, Management, and Oversight Are 

Fragmented Across Approximately 60 Stakeholders12

DOD

Office of the Secretary of Defense

• Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

 - Assistant Secretary of Defense, Acquisition

 - Assistant Secretary of Defense, Research & Engineering

 - Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Space, Strategic, & Intel Systems 

 - Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, C3, Cyber, & Business Systems

 - Performance Assessments & Root Cause Analyses

• Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

• Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

 - Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Space Policy

• Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer

• Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 

• Director, Operational Test and Evaluation

• Chief Information Officer

 - Defense Information Systems Agency

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Secretary of the Air Force/ Principal DOD Space Advisor

• Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisition

- Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Directorate of Space Programs

- Program Executive Officer, Space

• Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force (Space)/Director, PDSA Staff

• Air Force Cost Analysis Agency

• Air Force Materiel Command

- Air Force Research Laboratory 

• Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency 

- Air Force Technical Applications Center

• Air Force Space Command

- Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center

- 14th Air Force 

Secretary of the Army

• Army Space and Missile Defense Command

- Program Executive Office, Missiles and Space

- Army Research Laboratory

DOD (continued)

Secretary of the Navy

• Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition

- Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

- Naval Research Laboratory

- Program Executive Office, Space Systems

- Office of Naval Research

U.S. Marine Corps, Plans, Policies and Operations

U.S. Strategic Command

• Joint Functional Component Command for Space

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center

Missile Defense Agency

Executive Office of the President

Office of Management and Budget

Office of Science and Technology Policy

National Security Council

Intelligence Community

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Central Intelligence Agency

National Air and Space Intelligence Center

Defense Intelligence Agency

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

National Reconnaissance Office

National Security Agency

Civilian Community

Department of Commerce: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Department of Energy: Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National 

Laboratories

Department of State

Department of Transportation: Federal Aviation Administration

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Page 19 

12Stakeholders are organizations that have a role and responsibility in defense space acquisition management or oversight, or are customers or users of 

defense space programs. 

Page 25 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 1: Eight Organizations Have Space Acquisition 

Management Responsibilities

Air Force is the lead service for the vast majority of military space acquisitions, with two 

organizations having management responsibilities

• As mentioned earlier, the Air Force executes approximately 90 percent of military space funding.

• Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), SAF/AQ, provides guidance and oversight on matters 

pertaining to the formulation, review, approval, and execution of acquisition plans, policies, programs, and 

budgets.

• Serves as the Service Acquisition Executive for Air Force space and non-space acquisitions. Reviews 

Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) at all acquisition milestones, including prior to review and 

final decisions when the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

(USD(AT&L)) is the milestone decision authority.13

• Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) is the Air Force acquisition center that develops, acquires, fields, and 

sustains military space systems. 

• The Air Force Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Space is responsible for all acquisition programs at 

SMC and is typically delegated milestone decision authority for applicable non-MDAPs.

• Major SMC Missions include: military satellite communications; space superiority systems; positioning, 

navigation, and timing; launch; remote sensing. 

• SMC returns the completed acquisition to AFSPC and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) for their 

use. 

Page 20 

13A Major Defense Acquisition Program is a program that is not a highly sensitive classified program and that is designated by the milestone decision authority or 

is estimated to require, for all planned increments, eventual total expenditure for research, development, test and evaluation of more than $480 million, or 

procurement of more than $2.79 billion (fiscal year 2014 constant dollars).

Page 26 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 1: Eight Organizations Have Space 

Acquisition Management Responsibilities (continued)

Five Army and Navy organizations also have military space acquisition management 

responsibilities 

Department of the Army

• Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC)/Army Forces Strategic Command (ARSTRAT) conducts 

space and missile defense operations and provides planning, integration, control and coordination of Army 

forces and capabilities in support of U.S. Strategic Command missions. 

• PEO for Missiles and Space provides overall guidance for the development and acquisition of Army space 

systems. 

Department of the Navy 

• Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN RD&A) establishes policies 

and procedures and manages the Navy’s research, development, and acquisition activities. Serves as the Navy 

Acquisition Executive and carries out all Navy space acquisition functions including any joint space acquisition 

functions in cooperation with the PDSA and advises the PDSA on Navy space architectures.

• Navy PEO Space Systems acquires, develops, integrates, tests, launches, and provides operational support for 

some DOD space systems, and coordinates Navy space research, development, and acquisition activities for 

transition to programs of record. 

• Office of Naval Research directs science and technology (S&T) and research initiatives to meet the warfighters’ 

requirements.

Page 21 

Page 27 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 1: Eight Organizations Have Space 

Acquisition Management Responsibilities (continued)

Finally, the NRO develops, fields, and operates space programs for DOD and the IC

• NRO is responsible for research and development, acquisition, launch, deployment, and 

operation of overhead reconnaissance systems and data-processing facilities to collect 

intelligence to support national and DOD missions. 

• The NRO conducts its own acquisitions for space-based capabilities for the IC and also 

participates in joint acquisitions with the Air Force/SMC. 

• The NRO is a defense agency under the authority and direction of Under Secretary of Defense 

for Intelligence (USD(I)) and is also part of the IC, subject to DNI oversight. The Director of the 

NRO (DNRO) reports to the USD(I) and DNI. 

• NRO receives intelligence requirements that are NIP-funded from the Intelligence Community 

Capability Requirements (ICCR) process and intelligence requirements that are MIP-funded from 

DOD’s Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process which then 

informs the capability documents and needs statements. 

Page 22 

Page 28 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 1: Eleven Organizations Have Space 

Oversight Responsibilities

Principal DOD Space Advisor (PDSA)

• The PDSA was formerly the Executive Agent (EA) for Space, which was responsible for coordinating with 

various DOD stakeholders and providing consensus recommendations on DOD space programs. In an October, 

2015 memorandum the Deputy Secretary of Defense noted that space is becoming an increasingly contested 

domain with potential adversaries that may pose threats to deployed military forces. To address this and unify 

the diffuse and competing voices in defense space programs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense re-designated 

the EA for Space as the PDSA citing the EA for Space’s difficulty in achieving DOD consensus because of the 

complexity of space issues and the broad range of stakeholders’ perspectives, and the need to strengthen its 

leadership and authorities. 

• The Secretary of the Air Force performs the PDSA duties, supported by the PDSA Staff office, whose Director is 

also the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space. DOD is currently defining PDSA roles and 

responsibilities in a directive due in the summer of 2016.

• According to the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s memo, the PDSA will oversee the entire DOD space portfolio 

including all space policies, strategies, plans, and architecture assessment across DOD space; serve as an 

independent advisor on all space matters to top DOD officials; review all service budgets for conformity with 

national security space policy; chair the Defense Space Council (DSC), a high-level forum for resolving defense 

space issues; and conduct an annual Space Strategic Posture Review (SPR). The SPR assesses the strengths 

and weaknesses of the DOD’s space portfolio and delivers prioritized programmatic choices for space 

capabilities to the Deputy Secretary's Management Action Group (DMAG) and Secretary of Defense.

• According to PDSA officials, the PDSA began submitting an annual Space Budget Report to Congress in 2016, 

and will oversee implementation of the newly established Major Force Program for Space (MFP-12) in 2017.14 

The annual Space Budget Report to Congress will be based on the virtual MFP until the MFP-12 is finalized. 

Page 23 

14A Major Force Program is an aggregate of lines of funding in the annual Presidential Budget Request categorized by function or objective. Congress 

directed the establishment of an MFP for national security space programs in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-

92, § 1601 (2015). DOD is beginning implementing MFP-12 in 2016 for the fiscal year 2018 budget submission.

Page 29 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 1: Eleven Organizations Have Space 

Oversight Responsibilities (continued)

Defense Space Council (DSC)

• DSC serves as the principal advisory forum on all 

Defense space matters, and is chaired by the PDSA. 

The purpose of the DSC is to inform, develop, 

coordinate, recommend, and resolve all defense 

space issues and provide unified strategic guidance 

for defense space systems and programs.15

• While DSC meetings can result in consensus 

decisions by members, it is an advisory body and has 

no enforcement authority. 

• The PDSA can also provide views to top DOD officials 

in cases where the DSC cannot arrive at a 

consensus. 

• Members are senior representatives of the 

organizations listed below at the Assistant Secretary, 

Deputy Under Secretary, senior Military officer, or 

equivalent-level: 

• USD(AT&L)

• Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))

• USD(I)

• Joint Staff

• STRATCOM 

• Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 

(CAPE) 

• DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO)

• NRO 

• DOD Office of General Counsel

• Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/ Chief 

Financial Officer (USD(C)/CFO)

• Under Secretaries of the Military Departments

• Chiefs of Staff of the Services

• New members have been added to ensure all major 

DOD space stakeholders are represented, they 

include:

• Missile Defense Agency

• Defense Information Systems Agency

• Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

Page 24 

15DOD is developing an updated DSC charter that will further detail its duties and expanded membership.

Page 30 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 1: Eleven Organizations Have Space Oversight 

Responsibilities (continued)

7 OSD organizations have oversight responsibilities

USD(AT&L) 

• Chairs the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) and serves as the 

Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) with overall responsibility for 

overseeing the performance of the DOD acquisition system. The 

DAE also acts as the Milestone Decision Authority on all MDAPs 

unless delegated to another official. Serves as the OSD focal point in 

coordination with other OSD stakeholders who have space programs 

and capabilities.

• Space, Strategic, & Intelligence Systems office: Primary 

advisor to the USD(AT&L) on all issues associated with the 

DOD end-to-end Space and Intelligence infrastructure and is 

the lead for DOD space and intelligence acquisition oversight.

• C3, Cyber, & Business Systems office: Functional and 

acquisition oversight of all critical war fighting 

communications, command and control, and cyberspace 

capabilities in DOD. Leads the development and 

implementation of Department-wide communications, 

command and control, cyberspace architecture, and strategic 

approaches; and synchronizes these capabilities.

• Performance Assessments & Root Cause Analyses office: 

Conducts performance assessments or root cause analyses 

of all MDAPs periodically or when requested by the Secretary 

of Defense, USD(AT&L), the Secretary of a military 

department, or the head of a Defense Agency.

USD(I) 

• Exercises planning, policy, and strategic oversight of all defense 

intelligence-related space matters and intelligence-related agencies 

such as the NRO. 

USD(P) 

• Formulates national security and defense policy including spacerelated policy, and integrates and oversees these policies and plans 

to achieve national security objectives. Supports DOD and national 

leadership by leading change to implement DOD Strategic Guidance 

and National Security Space Strategy. 

DOD CIO 

• Specifically for DOD space, the CIO provides oversight and drafts 

policy, strategies, and guidance for positioning, navigation and timing 

(PNT) programs including PNT architecture and requirements, and 

also satellite communications. 

CAPE 

• Responsible for independent cost estimates, program evaluation, and 

analysis for all MDAPs, and establishes guidance for and oversees 

conduct of Analysis of Alternatives (AOA).16

Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)

• Provides independent assessments to the Secretary of Defense and 

USD(AT&L) on operational and live fire test and evaluation of DOD 

MDAPs; confirms operational effectiveness and suitability of defense 

systems for combat use.

USD(C)/CFO

• Directs the formulation and execution of DOD budgets, administers 

and provides analysis and recommendations on the budgeting and 

execution phases.

Page 25 

16An analysis of alternatives (AOA) is a key analysis in the DOD acquisition process that compares the operational effectiveness, suitability, and 

lifecycle costs of solutions to satisfy documented capability needs.

Page 31 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 1: Eleven Organizations Have Space 

Oversight Responsibilities (continued)

The Assistant DNI for Acquisition, Technology, and Facilities (ADNI(AT&F)), along 

with USD(AT&L), has oversight over NRO acquisitions

• ADNI(AT&F) and USD(AT&L) have joint Milestone Decision Authority on wholly or 

majority NIP-funded acquisition programs.

• For majority or wholly NIP-funded NRO programs, ADNI(AT&F) and the 

USD(AT&L) can delegate Milestone Decision Authority to the DNRO.

• For majority or wholly MIP-funded NRO programs, USD(AT&L) is the Milestone 

Decision Authority and can delegate to the DNRO with Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence participation.

• According to officials, both the IC and DOD requirements processes feed into NRO’s 

activities, and NRO acquisition processes are generally similar to DOD’s—for example, 

MIP-funded and NIP-funded major acquisitions both go through acquisition boards for 

review. 

Page 26 

Page 32 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 1: Eleven Organizations Have Space 

Oversight Responsibilities (continued)

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

• Provides Executive Branch oversight of space programs by ensuring that the President’s 

priorities—described in the National Space Policy17—are reflected in what the departments and 

agencies are pursuing. 

• For example, every fall OMB engages in space program reviews, where it analyzes major space 

programs and suggests changes. 

Page 27 

17Executive Office of the President, National Space Policy of the United States of America, (June 28, 2010)

Page 33 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 1: Six DOD Organizations Are Involved in 

Setting Requirements for Space Programs

• Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) acquires, operates, and supports space programs in its mission of organizing, 

training, and equipping personnel. AFSPC with STRATCOM generates requirements specifying the capabilities needed 

for the mission. The requirements go through DOD’s JCIDS requirements development process before an acquisition 

program of record is created.

• Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC)/Army Forces Strategic Command (ARSTRAT) is the 

Army’s proponent for all space-related functions and is responsible for developing Army space requirements.

• Chief of Naval Operations provides requirements for Navy space systems and space-related strategies and 

operations, and provides space strategies, plans, capability needs, and interoperability requirements in coordination 

with the ASN RD&A to the PDSA for review, coordination, and integration into the National Security Space Plan.

• Commandant of the Marine Corps also provides requirements for space systems. The Marine Corps is primarily an 

end-user of space capabilities and is involved in the space-system acquisition process through establishing 

requirements. The Marine Corps focuses primarily on user equipment such as satellite communications (SATCOM) 

terminals and PNT enabled systems. 

• STRATCOM is the primary command supported by defense space capabilities and is one of nine unified combatant 

commands that assesses and establishes the warfighter capabilities and needs. STRATCOM generates the majority of 

space mission requirements. The capabilities are then validated and prioritized through the JCIDS or ICCR processes 

leading to the drafting of requirements documents.

• JCS is mainly involved in reviewing operational requirements—what effects the requirements will have on joint militaryintelligence operations and what capabilities DOD will need—including validating the requirements through the JCIDS 

and/or the ICCR processes. 

Page 28 

Page 34 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 2: DOD Has Generally Not Made 

Significant Changes to Space Leadership 

over the Past Two Decades; Impacts of 

Recent Changes Remain to Be Seen

Page 29 

Page 35 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 2: Several Studies Since 2001 Have Recommended Changes, 

but DOD Has Made Limited Progress Addressing Many of These 

Recommendations, and It Is Too Early To Assess Progress on Some 

Changes

• As discussed in the next few slides, four generally recognized studies and 

commissions in the last two decades have recommended 28 changes to the 

defense space community to improve acquisition and management outcomes.

• DOD has made progress in some areas in the below categories, such as 

making space a national security priority and improving coordination among 

defense space entities, but has made limited progress in addressing many of 

the 28 recommendations.

Page 30 

Recommendation 

Category

Space as a 

national 

security 

priority

Unified 

leadership 

and 

authority

Improved 

coordination 

between space 

entities

Budget 

issues

Planning Acquisition 

process

Progress made

◓



Source: GAO analysis of data from four studies on defense space management. | GAO-16-592R

Some progress made

Significant progress made

 ◓ ◓ ◓ ◓ To be 

determined

Figure 2: Summary of Progress Made Towards Study Recommendations

Page 36 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 2: Influential Studies on Leadership

• In discussions with experts in the field, we identified four studies that were generally 

accepted as the most comprehensive and influential: 

o Report of the Commission to Assess US National Security Space Management and 

Organization; Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Chairman, 2001 (also called the Space 

Commission or Rumsfeld Commission).

o Joint Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs, Defense 

Science Board and Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 2003 (referred to here as 

the DSB Report).

o Leadership, Management, and Organization for National Security Space Report, 

Institute for Defense Analyses, 2008 (also called the Allard Commission).

o Report on Challenges and Recommendations for United States Overhead 

Architecture, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 2008 (referred to 

here as the HPSCI Report).

Page 31 

Page 37 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 2: Influential Studies on Leadership 

(continued)

The studies’ scopes were broad, looking at a wide variety of issues in space including but not limited 

to acquisitions. In general, these reports made 28 recommendations related to management, 

oversight, and acquisitions in the defense space community that we grouped into the following six 

categories:

• Space as a national security priority: the studies highlighted the importance of space to national security and suggested it be made a national security priority with the attention of 

leadership. 

• Unified leadership and authority: the studies made numerous statements on the importance of high-level, unified leadership and authority over space programs, including establishing new offices and positions to improve space leadership. 

• Improved coordination between defense space entities: the studies noted the importance of close working relationships between DOD and the IC and recommended methods to 

increase coordination. 

• Budget issues: the studies made recommendations toward improving budgetary insight and 

accountability for space programs, and in one case, for consolidating control over the budget formulation and execution process. 

• Planning: the studies made recommendations aimed at developing high-level plans, architectures, and strategies that would guide government-wide space priorities.

• Acquisition process: some of the studies made detailed recommendations on how to 

improve the acquisition process for space programs. 

Page 32 

Page 38 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 2: Status of Study Recommendations – 

Space as a National Security Priority

DOD, Congress, and the executive branch have made significant progress on the 

recommendations related to establishing space as a national security priority. 

• In recent years, space has become a more visible national security issue. 

‒ The two most recent National Space Policies (2006 and 2010) identified free access to and 

use of space as a vital national security interest, reemphasized the foundational 

contributions of space capabilities in supporting overall U.S. interests, and established 

overarching national policy for the conduct of U.S. space activities. 

‒ Increased insight into international counterspace threats has highlighted the importance of space-based capabilities and the potential impacts of losing them.

‒ According to DOD, space is now the only standing topic in DOD’s annual Strategic Portfolio Review process, whereas before it was only included occasionally.18

‒ DOD’s 2016 budget submission added over $5 billion in new investments in space. Recent 

public comments from high level DOD officials have also shown this increased emphasis on space protection.

‒ Also in 2015, DOD re-designated the EA for Space role as the Principal DOD Space Advisor, 

with the goal of giving that position a higher profile within the department.

‒ The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a few provisions 

highlighting the importance of space, including directing DOD to establish a major force program for national security space programs and establish a Principal DOD Space Control Advisor.

Page 33 

18At the direction of Deputy Secretary of Defense, CAPE conducts annual strategic portfolio reviews for select portfolios or issue areas to inform budget 

decisions. The topics covered vary from year-to-year depending on what issues the Deputy Secretary of Defense identifies as important.

Page 39 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 2: Status of Study Recommendations – 

Unified Leadership

DOD has not adopted many recommendations related to unified leadership and authority; it is 

too early to tell whether recent changes will be effective.

• The studies recommended a number of ways to improve leadership and decision-making 

authority in the defense space community, including establishing a high-level office with 

responsibility for planning and execution of national security space programs, led by an Under 

Secretary of Defense-level official. Another recommendation suggested combining functions of 

the NRO and Air Force space acquisitions into a unified organization. Changes have been made, 

with some but not all in response to the studies. 

• In response to the 2001 Space Commission, the Secretary of the Air Force was designated as the 

DOD Executive Agent for Space in June 2003, and was given milestone decision authority for 

space programs; this role was delegated to the Under Secretary of the Air Force who was dualhatted as EA for Space and Director of the NRO.19

‒ However, the EA for Space role was not given control over the budget, and its roles as both 

milestone decision authority and as Director of the NRO were rescinded in 2005 after only a 

few years, thus limiting its ability to be a coordinating body for space activities. 

‒ Some experts have noted that this dual-hatted role may not have been successful because it 

was too much responsibility for a single person. Others have noted that the EA for Space 

was never given either the full authority needed to make the dual-hatted role successful or 

the time to bridge the cultural divide between the Air Force and NRO. 

Page 34 

19The Director of the NRO was dual-hatted with an Air Force position (generally Secretary of the Air Force, Undersecretary of the Air Force, or Assistant Secretary of the 

Air Force) from its founding in 1961 through 2005. For much of this time the Director was not acknowledged because the NRO was a classified organization until 1992.

Page 40 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 2: Status of Study Recommendations – 

Unified Leadership (continued)

• In 2004, the Undersecretary of the Air Force/Director of the NRO established the 

National Security Space Office (NSSO) to assist in integrating space activities. The 

NSSO combined the functions of the National Security Space Architect (NSSA) with 

the National Security Space Integration directorate (NSSI).20 The NSSO was 

disestablished in 2010 and its staff reassigned to the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air 

Force. 

• In 2010, the Defense Space Council was created to serve as the principal advisory 

forum for all defense space matters. While this body appears to be a useful forum for 

discussing space issues, it has little enforcement authority and has a mainly advisory 

and consensus-building role.

• The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration 

(ASD(NII)) served as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of 

Defense on non-intelligence space matters until the position was disestablished in 

2012, and its responsibilities transferred to the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO) 

and USD(AT&L). 

Page 35 

20The NSSA, was created in 1998 by the Secretary of Defense and combined architecture responsibilities from the IC with those of the DOD Space 

Architect. The NSSA was responsible for developing architectures across the range of mission areas for DOD and the IC.

Page 41 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 2: Status of Study Recommendations – 

Unified Leadership (continued) • More recently, in October 2015, DOD re-designated the EA for Space role as the Principal DOD 

Space Advisor. 

• According to PDSA officials, the PDSA has additional responsibilities and authorities compared to 

the EA for Space as described earlier. In addition, according to PDSA officials, more 

responsibilities are to be detailed in a charter which is under development. Officials described 

some of the significant changes that are planned for inclusion in the new charter:

‒ Authority to submit budget issue papers on the president’s budget, as OSD staff offices do, 

which are based on analysis done under the SPR process. 

‒ Review budget submissions of every entity with responsibilities for space capability 

development and assess compliance with National Security Council (NSC)-approved plans 

and departmental policy. 

‒ Assess enterprise architectures. 

‒ The PDSA can now nominate issues, give independent assessments, and make 

recommendations to top DOD officials, including the Deputy Secretary's Management Action 

Group (DMAG), JROC and DAB, especially when there is no DSC consensus on space 

issues and programs.21 According to PDSA officials, this is a new authority compared to the 

EA for Space which did not have a formal process to share independent assessments and 

could only present DSC decisions where the members reached consensus. Now, there is a 

process for the PDSA to share updates and assessments quarterly to the DMAG. 

Page 36 

21The DMAG is a DOD forum comprised of top DOD officials that provides advice and assistance to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. It is co-chaired by the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chiefs of the Military Services, and DOD Principal 

Staff Assistants holding standing invitations. 

Page 42 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 2: Status of Study Recommendations – 

Unified Leadership (continued)

• PDSA officials believe the move to the PDSA will consolidate leadership in space and 

address the issue of fragmented leadership responsibilities; however, it remains to be 

seen whether the changes will be effective. 

‒ For example, PDSA officials and experts stated that the PDSA’s new role includes 

greater authority because it now has the ability to voice opinions to the DMAG. 

However, we have reported that the DMAG primarily addresses issues on an ad hoc basis and that most investment decisions get made on a piecemeal basis 

within the acquisition, requirements, and budget processes. 

‒ A PDSA official stated that a lack control over budget execution will be an 

advantage rather than a hindrance, allowing their office to serve as a "neutral referee."

‒ In addition, some stakeholders stated that the current status quo of a more diffuse authority structure allows them to provide input into many aspects of space acquisitions management and oversight. 

‒ Many DOD officials and experts expressed skepticism, stating that the PDSA 

change is merely a cosmetic one.

‒ However, PDSA officials noted that the PDSA change has only been in place for 

seven months and has not yet completed a full presidential budget cycle. They 

stated that it will take time to realize the benefits of this change.

Page 37 

Page 43 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 2: Status of Study Recommendations – 

Coordination between Defense Space Entities

The Air Force and NRO have made some progress on improving coordination. However, it 

remains to be seen if the PDSA can serve as an overall DOD-wide focal point for interagency 

coordination with authority to make decisions, as recommended by the studies. 

• Air Force and NRO officials we spoke with noted numerous opportunities in requirements and program development for 

interaction and joint decision-making, including on joint requirements, and through working groups and program 

meetings. 

• For example, NRO participates in the DSC, quarterly meetings with the National Security Agency and National 

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and technical working groups. The DNRO meets with National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration and Air Force senior leadership at various summits. 

• DNRO coordinates with various DOD National Security Space (NSS) stakeholders on policy and strategy that 

affects overhead reconnaissance or space activities; ensures the Secretary of Defense and DNI are informed on 

all important NRO activities; advises the PDSA and the DSC on reconnaissance matters in order to generate 

greater synchronization for NSS programs and planning; and ensures NRO activities are integrated within the 

DOD.

• In October 2015 the DOD and the IC opened the new Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center (JICSpOC) 

to develop joint approaches to operating in a contested space environment. 

• According to the Air Force, Air Force Space Command, with input from the NRO, has developed a Space Enterprise 

Vision, which is aimed at coordinating planning for space systems across stakeholder agencies. 

• DOD has undertaken efforts to support and sustain its space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities, and coordinates 

with the IC and various civil agencies on sharing data among various SSA sensors.

• In addition, all space stakeholders have an opportunity to discuss space–related issues at meetings of the Defense 

Space Council chaired by the PDSA. 

Page 38 

Page 44 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 2: Status of Study Recommendations – 

Budget

Some progress has been made in changing the way DOD accounts for space program 

funding; however, there remains a lack of a unified organization or position with authority for 

defining and formulating the defense space budget, as recommended by one of the studies.

• The Allard Commission recommended a strong executive to set resource priorities and formulate 

and execute budgets for national security space.

• A virtual Major Force Program (MFP) to track space funding was established in response to the 

2001 Space Commission.22

‒ The virtual MFP has benefits in consolidating space funding in a more visible way. However, 

determining what is in the virtual MFP is flexible, and it may not include all space-related 

programs such as terminals.

‒ The 2016 NDAA directed DOD to make this virtual MFP into a firm MFP, which DOD officials 

expect will begin in the next few years. According to CAPE, this change will likely not make a 

significant difference in the way the MFP is managed, but others have noted that it 

demonstrates DOD’s commitment to space programs. 

• While not a result of a study recommendation, in the fiscal year 2016 President’s Budget request, 

a new appropriation category was introduced: Space Procurement Air Force. This new category 

took most space programs out of the Missile Procurement category, and may help track space 

programs more clearly. 

Page 39 

22A “virtual” MFP, such as the one for space programs, is an aggregation of program funding lines into a group as a way to track funding for space 

programs. 

Page 45 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 2: Status of Study Recommendations – 

Planning

Some progress has been made toward recommendations related to developing high-level 

plans to guide priorities in the defense space community; however, these plans may not be 

enforceable. 

• In 2011, DOD and ODNI published a National Security Space Strategy, as recommended by the 

Allard Commission, which gave guidance on a path forward for space capabilities, but it does not 

go as far as the study recommended in establishing lines of authority and delineating priorities. 

• The Commander of Air Force Space Command, in coordination with the Director of the NRO, has 

developed a Space Enterprise Vision that is aimed at coordinating planning for space systems 

across stakeholder agencies. The document, however, is classified at high levels, potentially 

limiting its visibility. In addition, the enforceability of this document at levels above AFSPC and 

NRO is still to be determined. 

• The PDSA’s office plans to conduct architecture planning. However, the Space Commission 

recommended that these large planning decisions be made by an office or person at the OSD 

level. In addition, PDSA officials acknowledged they may not have sufficient resources to carry 

out this task. 

• Some of the PDSA’s new duties may contribute to improved planning, such as leading the 

annual Space SPR, as well as its plans to review the budget submissions of every entity with responsibilities for space capability development and assess compliance with NSC-approved plans and departmental policy. 

Page 40 

Page 46 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 2: Status of Study Recommendations – 

Acquisition Process

Changes have been made to the acquisition process for space programs, but problems persist.

• One of the studies recommended certain changes to the acquisition process and workforce 

including conducting more effective independent cost estimates, developing a more robust systems 

engineering process, and clearly defining program manager responsibilities. 

• There have been several general acquisition reform efforts since the reports, including the Weapon 

Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, changes made to DOD acquisition guidance, and the 

Better Buying Power initiatives by USD(AT&L), which seek to strengthen acquisitions through the 

use of best practices.23 

• However, our work has shown that many acquisition problems still exist despite reform efforts. 

• In addition, DOD has made some changes to acquisition processes in recent years that have the 

potential to impact space programs. Among others, 

‒ In November 2013 the DOD Instruction 5000.02 on acquisition was changed to formally allow satellite programs to combine two major program milestones, B and C, which mark the 

beginning of the development and production phases, respectively, to allow for streamlining of the process. While GAO has not assessed the effects of this change, we previously reported 

that committing a program to production without a substantive development phase may 

increase cost and schedule risks.

‒ The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2016 directed DOD to shift milestone 

decision authority to the service level for some programs. It is too early to tell the extent to which this change will affect space programs. 

Page 41 

23Pub. L. No. 111-23. 

Page 47 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 3: Fragmented Leadership Has 

Contributed to Poor Coordination and 

Lengthy Decision Making; Experts Cited 

Some Options for Further Consideration

Page 42 

Page 48 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 3: GAO, DOD, and Experts Have Noted 

Several Persistent Challenges

DOD’s oversight review bureaucracy contributes to acquisitions inefficiencies generally.

• In 2005, we reported that DOD program managers believe they are not sufficiently empowered to execute their 

programs and that, because much remains outside their span of control, they cannot be held accountable.24 We heard 

similar sentiments from DOD officials and experts during our interviews.

• 2011 and 2012 studies by the Defense Science Board and Defense Business Board (DBB), respectively, also 

highlighted the challenge of redundant reviews, with one study saying DOD has a “checkers checking checkers” 

system, which contributes to inefficiencies.

• The DBB report noted a fundamental problem that decisions are made in three separate “stovepipes”: 

requirements, acquisition, and budgets. Each of these stovepipes is a multi-layered, heavily bureaucratic series of 

sequential and oftentimes uncoordinated processes. The three stovepipes do not operate on the same timelines, 

do not utilize common documentation, and often create situations resulting in conflicting decisions.

• We have also reported that DOD’s processes operate in a highly fragmented manner, with little portfolio 

management or planning that would help DOD more effectively leverage its weapon system investments.25

• In 2015, GAO examined DOD’s weapon system acquisition processes and found that the department’s review 

process—conducted in serial at each level—was inefficient for unclassified programs.26

• We found that DOD reviews for some programs included up to 56 organizations at 8 levels above the program 

office. Most program managers felt that these reviews were generally not of high value to the end result.

• DOD has taken some steps to streamline reviews, such as pilot testing a more streamlined process and using electronic 

tools to track progress of reviews, but those efforts have been limited in scope. USD(AT&L) issued an updated Better 

Buying Power initiative in 2015 that, among other things, aimed to streamline reviews, but more time is needed to 

determine results.

Page 43 

24GAO, Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers Needed to Improve Outcomes, GAO-06-110 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2005). 25GAO-15-466. 26GAO, Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline Its Decision-Making Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies, GAO-15-192 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24, 2015).

Page 49 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 3: Space Programs Experience Same 

Issue of Too Much Bureaucracy

We heard corroborating sentiments from DOD and expert space officials.

• Takes a minimum of 3 years to develop an acquisition strategy, issue a request for proposal, conduct source 

selection, and award a contract. By then technologies and requirements can be obsolete. For example, 

• One contractor told us that it took over a year for the Air Force to develop a request for proposal for a lowdollar, $2 million study.

• OUSD(AT&L) officials emphasized that the 5000.02 acquisition policy is very tailorable and that programs can 

take advantage of its flexibility to follow the steps that make sense for them. However, Air Force officials said 

that this does not play out in practice and that oversight entities are reluctant to waive or change steps out of 

fear that they will be blamed later. For example, officials told us that:

• USD(AT&L) sometimes asks for quick follow-ups to expedite a decision; however, Air Force space officials 

told us that the AT&L organization interprets every meeting with the Under Secretary as a formal defense 

acquisition board meeting, requiring three prior readiness meetings each time; 

• OSD staff are rigid and have a hard time letting disagreements with the program go through. Several 

program managers told us that it takes them longer to tailor or waive something than to just incorporate it. 

• A common complaint was that OSD staff frequently exceeded their responsibilities, for example, sometimes 

rewriting acquisition strategies, or acting as shadow program managers and second-guessing program 

contracting decisions based on their individual experience, instead of verifying compliance against DOD policy.

Page 44 

Page 50 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Objective 3: Delays Affect Space Acquisition 

Programs 

Lengthy decision making magnifies challenges in space.

• Space programs are inherently joint and have a large set of stakeholders, further encumbering the acquisitions 

and requirements processes. One senior official referred to a "cacophony of voices" and resulting requirements 

creep that affects most military space programs. As a result, it is very difficult to gain consensus. For example, 

• The defense weather satellite AOA process took over 2 years to be completed—including about a year for 

DOD reviews after the study team completed its analysis. The head of Air Force Space Command 

remarked that this was an overly long process for a satellite that is fairly simple compared to other satellite 

programs. CAPE officials stated that the AOA took the appropriate length of time and that DOD works to 

balance the need for comprehensive analysis with timelines for decisions. They also stated that decision 

briefings can precede the final report—which takes time to produce—by several months.

• Delays can contribute to undesirable effects in space acquisitions. For example, 

• Space programs are typically high dollar, low volume acquisitions, and these are frequently obsolete by 

the time systems are deployed because threats and technologies change rapidly; this in turn reinforces a 

tendency to overload program requirements. 

• Two experts referred to a vicious cycle of high launch costs, too many requirements, ever increasing 

mission assurance expectations, cumbersome contracting and accounting requirements, implicitly steering 

acquisitions to a few, large contractors who have the resources to keep up with everything. 

• PDSA officials noted that, given the increasingly contested space environment, DOD must move space 

acquisitions beyond just cost, schedule, and performance considerations and work to enhance space mission 

assurance, including defensive operations and resilience. However, as we have noted for many years, matching 

needs and resources prior to product development is key to delivering capability when needed.27

Page 45 

27GAO, Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to Better Weapon System Outcomes, GAO-01-288 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2001); Defense 

Acquisitions: Fundamental Changes are Needed to Improve Weapon Program Outcomes, GAO-08-1159T (Washington, D.C.: Sep. 25, 2008); GPS: Actions Needed to Address 

Ground System Development Problems and User Equipment Production Readiness, GAO-15-657 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2015).

Page 51 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 3: NRO’s Processes Appear More 

Streamlined 

By contrast, the NRO’s processes appear more streamlined than DOD’s, but the 

agency is not subject to the same constraints.

• According to NRO officials, the NRO’s Director has significant authority over 

acquisitions, budget, and requirements decisions, and NRO program managers are 

normally just two review levels removed from the Director.

• However, some officials noted that the NRO’s mission is more focused than that of 

military space, and that this may be a key reason the NRO is able to have more 

streamlined processes. 

• In addition, NRO officials stated that their agency’s acquisitions are not subject to 

certain statutory requirements that apply to military systems, such as demonstrating 

compliance with the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996—a law aimed at improving the 

government’s performance in IT management, which require time and documentation 

to address.28

• Some officials cautioned that it is not clear whether NRO acquisitions achieve better 

outcomes than those of DOD.

Page 46 

28Pub. L. No. 104-106, Div. E. (1996); as amended and codified in 40 U.S.C §§ 11101-11703. The law, initially titled the Information Technology 

Management Reform Act, was subsequently renamed the Clinger-Cohen Act in Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 808 (1996).

Page 52 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 3: Space Acquisition Leadership Has 

Been Fragmented

Fragmented space acquisition leadership means that “no one is in charge.”

• As discussed earlier, military space oversight responsibilities are dispersed among 7 OSD 

organizations. As one organization’s officials put it, for NIP-funded space programs, the DNRO 

reports to the DNI; however, for MIP-funded space programs, the DNRO has to coordinate with 

several OSD entities in addition to the Air Force and other services or agencies as appropriate. 

Many experts remarked that “no one is in charge” for space acquisitions.

• We reported in 2015 that DOD’s procurement of commercial SATCOM is fragmented and 

inefficient, with some components purchasing their own SATCOM and paying higher prices 

than they would have through the department primary procurement vehicle.29

• Many interviewees remarked that USD(AT&L) is the only real decision-making authority for 

space-related topics; however, some senior officials reported that this can have unexpected 

effects, such as the Under Secretary having to make broader space architecture decisions, which 

are larger issues that fall outside his responsibility. Officials noted that such decisions fall to the 

Under Secretary by default because there is no space-specific authority. 

• Officials and experts generally stated that, because space lacks strong, central leadership, no 

single organization has been responsible for long-term planning and architectures for space, and 

to the extent it is being done it is focused on mission areas such as SATCOM and PNT and not at 

an enterprise level. 

Page 47 

29GAO-15-459.

Page 53 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 3: Too Early to Gauge Effectiveness of 

Recent Changes to Space Leadership

• Air Force Space Command is pushing for a more holistic view and an enterprise architecture; however, officials 

told us that this is because the current commander of AFSPC is filling a void, not that AFSPC has or should 

have this responsibility. Officials stated a concern that these efforts may lapse after a change in leadership. 

• There are some good examples of cooperation: 

• As previously discussed, DOD and NRO are working to improve national security space information 

sharing through the JICSpOC initiative. 

• DOD has taken steps to enhance military-IC information sharing and cooperation for better space situational awareness (SSA). 

• However, many interviewees expressed concern that collaboration and cooperation initiatives may lapse after 

any changes of personnel in leadership positions. Our prior work has shown that without some kind of 

coordinating body or positions in place, it is possible that a change in leadership could affect coordination.30 

• PDSA officials stated that they believe their organization, although new, will effectively consolidate space 

leadership responsibilities. However, it is too early to determine whether the PDSA will have sufficient authority 

or staff for this role. Many DOD officials were unconvinced that the move is significant beyond a change in name 

from the EA for Space. Some officials thought the PDSA authority may be better placed in OSD so that the 

position is not perceived as service-centric. 

• Notably, many DOD officials and experts expressed a belief that PDSA can be effective in the new role, 

particularly citing the current Secretary of the Air Force’s commitment to space, and suggested that sufficient 

time be given to allow the change to work. In addition, PDSA officials stated that the increased threat 

environment described earlier along with a need for greater mission assurance is already having a unifying 

effect on management and oversight, and noted that they will develop metrics that will help gauge their 

effectiveness compared to the EA for Space.

Page 48 

30GAO-12-1022; GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and

Information Sharing, GAO-09-904SP (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 2009)

Page 54 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 3: Key Principles for Change Cited by 

Experts 

• Based on our interviews with DOD officials and experts, we identified some suggested themes for 

reform, some of which apply to DOD acquisitions broadly: 

• Streamline reviews. 

• Delegate more decision-making authority to lower levels.

• Increase unity of NSS decisions between DOD and the NRO. 

• Achieve lasting change that cannot be quickly undone and to allow time for the changes to 

work.

• Provide sufficient acquisition, execution, and budget authority. 

• Officials and experts voiced some concerns:

• Any big changes would greatly disrupt DOD’s organization. 

• Some recommendations, such as more closely integrating NRO into DOD, may disrupt 

NRO’s relative efficiency. 

• Changes beyond organizational structure may also be needed. Experts cited weaknesses such 

as difficulty in training and retention of the acquisition workforce and an over-reliance on support 

contractors that they believe also need to be addressed. 

Page 49 

Page 55 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 3: Four Selected Proposals for Change

• We examined several potential approaches to reforming DOD space acquisitions 

that were suggested by DOD and expert officials and selected four for analysis. 

We provided our analysis to experts for their review and comment and most 

experts generally agreed with it:31

• No Further Changes: allow time for the recent PDSA change to work.

• Defense Space Agency: combine military space functions into one agency but leave NRO unchanged.

• Space Acquisition Agency: combine SMC and NRO.

• Space Force: New military department for the space domain.

• Except for the first option, the other three would likely involve significant shortterm disruption to DOD’s space organizational structure, roles, and 

responsibilities. However, given the long-standing fragmentation in space 

leadership and consequent challenges faced by DOD in synchronizing its 

extensive space enterprise, proposals such as these that may entail disruptive 

changes may nevertheless deserve a closer look if the PDSA does not prove 

effective.

Page 50 

31Some experts favored a fifth option: a return to having the Under Secretary of the Air Force dual-hatted as the Director of the NRO with milestone decision 

authority for space programs.

Page 56 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 3: Four Selected Proposals for Change 

(continued)

Page 51 

Proposed change and 

selected features

Benefits Drawbacks

No Further Changes

• Allow time for the PDSA change to 

be implemented

• No further organizational changes

 

• Minimize organizational cost associated 

with disrupting existing reporting 

structures, authorities, and budgets

• Allow DOD time to implement changes to 

streamline review processes and delegate 

authorities

 

• Many are skeptical that PDSA change will be 

effective and believe the change is more or 

less a semantic one

• If PDSA proves no more effective than EA for 

Space, fragmented leadership and poor unity 

of space effort will continue

Defense Space Agency

• Institute a USD(Space) for 

consolidated oversight of military 

space

• Combine space acquisition and 

operations functions from the 

military agencies into one 

organization

• NRO would remain a separate 

organization

 

• Provide a single leadership organization 

for military space activities

• Greater unity of military space acquisitions 

and operations

• Avoid disrupting NRO’s mission and 

purpose

• Would not require changes to IC 

organization

• Focused OSD oversight of military space 

policies and execution

 

• Would not consolidate all NSS activities

• Would disrupt DOD’s space organizational 

structure, roles, and responsibilities in the 

short-term

• Would require legislation

Page 57 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Finding 3: Four Selected Proposals for Change 

(continued) 

Page 52 

Proposed change and 

selected features

Benefits Drawbacks

Space Acquisition Agency

• Institute a USD(Space & 

Intelligence) for consolidated 

oversight of national security 

space

• Combine SMC and NRO; SAA 

would report to USD(S&I)

 

• Consolidate acquisition functions

• Provide for greater synergistic 

utilization of limited pool of space 

professionals

• Would allow more coherent approach 

to managing common industrial base 

partners

 

• Would require changes to IC chains of command

• New organization would require time and resources 

to stand up

• Would disrupt DOD’s space organizational structure, 

roles, and responsibilities in the short-term

• Would require legislation

Space Force

• A new military department under 

a civilian secretary

• Absorb all DOD and NRO space 

acquisitions and operations 

functions

• No change to OSD offices, or, 

institute USD(S&I)

 

• Consolidate NSS activities

• Would be very difficult to undo

• Space would be accorded greatest 

visibility and attention

 

• Would require increased budget to stand up a 

separate military department

• Would not necessarily address length of DOD review 

processes

• May require clarification of Congressional oversight, 

currently dispersed among several Committees

• Would disrupt DOD’s space organizational structure, 

roles, and responsibilities in the short-term

• Would require legislation

Page 58 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
List of Organizations We Interviewed

Page 53 

Page 59 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
List of Organizations We Interviewed

We obtained information from officials at: 

• Office of the Secretary of Defense:

‒ Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation, Washington, D.C.

‒ Chief Information Officer, Alexandria, VA 

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 

Washington, D.C. 

‒ Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 

Space, Strategic, & Intelligence 

Systems, Washington, D.C. 

‒ Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, C3, Cyber, & Business Systems, 

Washington, D.C. 

‒ Performance Assessment and Root 

Cause Analysis, Washington, D.C. 

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy, Washington, D.C. 

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence, Washington, D.C.

• Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. 

• Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 

Huntsville, AL

• Space and Naval Warfare Systems 

Command, San Diego, CA

• U.S. Strategic Command, Omaha, NE 

• Intelligence Community

‒ National Reconnaissance Office, 

Chantilly, VA 

• Executive Office of the President

‒ Office of Management and Budget, 

Washington, D.C. 

Page 54 

Page 60 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
List of Organizations We Interviewed 

(continued)

• Air Force

‒ Air Force Space Command, Colorado 

Springs, CO 

• Commander of Air Force Space 

Command 

• Directorate of Plans and 

Requirements 

‒ Space and Missile Systems Center, Los 

Angeles, CA

• Commander of Space and Missile 

Systems Center

• Launch Systems Enterprise 

Directorate 

• Remote Sensing Systems 

Directorate 

• Global Positioning Systems 

Directorate 

‒ Principal DOD Space Advisor, 

Washington, D.C. 

‒ Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 

(Acquisition), Washington, D.C. 

Page 55 

Page 61 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight
Enclosure II: Recommendations Related to Improving Management and Oversight of National 

Security Space Programs

Page 62 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight

The reports we identified as the most relevant to national security space oversight and 

management made 28 recommendations related to management, oversight and acquisitions in 

the defense space community. We listed the relevant recommendations below for each report. 

We grouped the recommendations into the following six categories:

• space as a national security priority,

• unified leadership and authority,

• improved coordination between defense space entities,

• budget issues,

• planning, and

• acquisition process.

The categories for each recommendation are listed in parentheses after the recommendation in 

the list below.

Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management 

and Organization; Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Chairman; 2001 (relevant recommendations)

1. The President should consider establishing space as a national security priority. (Space 

as a national security priority)

2. The President should consider the appointment of a Presidential Space Advisory Group 

to provide independent advice on developing and employing new space capabilities.

(Unified leadership and authority)

3. The President should direct that a Senior Interagency Group for Space be established 

and staffed within the National Security Council structure. (Coordination)

4. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence should meet regularly 

to address national security space policy, objectives and issues. (Coordination)

5. An Under Secretary of Defense for Space, Intelligence and Information should be 

established. (Unified leadership and authority)

6. The Air Force should realign headquarters and field commands to more effectively 

organize, train and equip for prompt and sustained space operations. Air Force Space 

Command (AFSPC) should be assigned responsibility for providing the resources to 

execute space research, development, acquisition and operations, under the command 

of a four-star general. The Army and Navy would still establish requirements and 

develop and deploy space systems unique to each Service. Amend Title 10 U.S.C. to 

assign the Air Force responsibility to organize, train and equip for prompt and sustained 

offensive and defensive air and space operations. In addition, the Secretary of Defense 

should designate the Air Force as Executive Agent for Space within the Department of 

Defense. (Unified leadership and authority)
Page 63 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight

7. Assign the Under Secretary of the Air Force as the Director of the National 

Reconnaissance Office. Designate the Under Secretary as the Air Force Acquisition 

Executive for Space. (Unified leadership and authority)

8. The Secretary of Defense should establish a Major Force Program for Space. (Budget)

Leadership, Management, and Organization for National Security Space Report, Institute 

for Defense Analyses, 2008

9. The President should establish and lead the execution of a National Space Strategy that 

assures U.S. space preeminence, integrates the various participants, establishes lines of 

authority and accountability, and delineates priorities. To implement the strategy, the 

President should reestablish the National Space Council, chaired by the National 

Security Advisor, with the authority to assign roles and responsibilities and to adjudicate 

disputes over requirements and resources. (Space as a national security priority, Unified 

leadership and authority, Planning)

10. Establish a National Security Space Authority (NSSA). The Director of NSSA should be 

assigned the rank of Under Secretary of Defense for Space in addition to being 

designated the Deputy Director of National Intelligence (DDNI) for Space, reporting to 

the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The Director, 

NSSA will be the Executive Agent for Space and the NSS acquisition authority. The 

director will also be responsible for defining and formulating the Major Force Program-12 

Budget, be the focal point for interagency coordination on national security space (NSS)

matters, and be the single authority with responsibility and accountability for the planning 

and execution of the NSS program. Analytical and technical support from a National 

Security Space Office-like organization augmented with Intelligence Community 

expertise will be required to execute this responsibility effectively. (Unified leadership 

and authority, Planning, Coordination, Budget)

11. Create a National Security Space Organization (NSSO). Assign the NSSO the functions 

currently assigned to the National Reconnaissance Office, the Air Force Space and 

Missile Systems Center, the Air Force Research Laboratories Space Vehicles 

Directorate, the operational functions of the of Air Force Space Command, and other 

Service organizations now providing space capability. The merged organization will 

report to NSSA for policy, requirements, and acquisition and AFSPC for organization, 

training, and equipping responsibilities. Spacecraft command, control, and data 

acquisition operations as well as launch will be the responsibility of National Security 

Space Organization. (Unified leadership and authority, Planning)

12. Change Air Force and intelligence community (IC) human resource management 

policies for space acquisition professionals in order to emphasize technical competence, 

experience, and continuity. Establish a career education, training, and experience path 

for the development of engineers and managers who are space acquisition 

professionals. Establish as the norm that space project management personnel be in a 

given position for sufficient time to maximize project success—four years or more—

without adverse effect upon an individual’s career. Support should be given to the 

current Space Cadre management and training program being implemented by the 
Page 64 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight

Services, as exemplified by the Air Force through AFSPC and Air Education and 

Training Command. (Acquisition process)

Joint Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs, Defense Science 

Board and Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 2003 (relevant recommendations)

13. The Under Secretary of the Air Force/Director National Reconnaissance Office 

(USecAF/DNRO) should establish mission success as the guiding principle in all space 

systems acquisition. This requires incorporation of the principle in policy statements, 

leadership actions, and contractual provisions and incentives. (Acquisition process)

14. The Secretary of Defense should establish the same authority for the USecAF for the 

Department of Defense (DOD) space programs as the DNRO has for implementing the 

National Reconnaissance Program budget. (Unified leadership and authority, Budget)

15. To ensure realistic budgets and cost estimates, the USecAF/DNRO should:

a. Direct that space acquisition programs be budgeted to a most probable (80/20) 

cost, with a 20-25 percent management reserve for development programs 

included within this cost; also direct that reserves are not to be used for new 

requirements;

b. Direct that source selections evaluate contractor cost credibility and use the 

estimate as a measure of their technical understanding;

c. Conduct more effective independent cost estimates and program assessments 

and incorporate the results into the program budget and plan; and 

d. Implement independent senior advisory reviews at critical acquisition milestones 

with experienced, respected outsiders. (Acquisition process)

16. The USecAF/DNRO should compete space system acquisitions only when clearly in the 

best interest of the government (e.g., new mission capability, major new technology, or 

poor incumbent performance). When a competition occurs and a nonincumbent is the 

winner, the loss of investment in the losing incumbent must be reflected in the program 

budget and plan. In addition, provisions must be made to assure continuity between the 

legacy system and the new system. (Acquisition process)

17. The USecAF/DNRO should, through policy and leadership action, clearly define the 

responsibility, authority, and accountability for program managers, recognizing the 

criticality of program managers to the success of their programs. In selecting managers, 

acquisition experience must be a prerequisite. (Acquisition process)

18. USecAF/DNRO should develop a robust systems engineering capability to support 

program initiation and development. Specifically, USecAF/DNRO should

a. Reestablish organic government systems engineering capability by selecting 

appropriate people from within government, hiring to acquire needed capabilities, 

and implementing training programs; and 

b. In the near term, ensure full utilization of the combined capabilities of 

government, Federally Funded Research and Development Center, and systems 
Page 65 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight

engineering and technical assistance system engineering resources. (Acquisition 

process)

19. The USecAF/DNRO should require program managers to identify and report potential 

problems early. 

a. Program managers should establish early warning metrics and report problems 

up the management chain for timely corrective action. 

b. Severe and prominent penalties should follow any attempt to suppress problem 

reporting. (Acquisition process)

20. The USecAF/DNRO should demand that national security space contractors 

a. Account for the quality of their program implementation and for mission success, 

b. Identify proven management and engineering practices and ensure they are 

being utilized, and 

c. Account for the early identification and open discussion of problems in their 

program. (Acquisition process)

Report on Challenges and Recommendations for United States Overhead Architecture, 

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 2008 (relevant recommendations) 

Overhead Architecture/Roadmap:

21. The DNI and Secretary of Defense should develop a common architecture for all spacerelated systems (imagery, signals, communications, etc.) that supports prioritized 

national and military needs and takes into consideration budget constraints. 

Organizations proposing new satellites should demonstrate how their proposals fit into 

the architecture. (Unified leadership and authority, Planning, Coordination)

22. The DNI and Secretary of Defense should agree to the architecture and related funding 

decisions. The Secretary of Defense’s agreement ensures that the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 

and Logistics both agree with the strategy. (Unified leadership and authority, Planning, 

Coordination)

23. The Office of Management and Budget should carefully consider what space programs it 

recommends for funding until both the DNI and Secretary of Defense agree on an 

architecture. (Unified leadership and authority, Planning, Coordination, Budget)

Authorities: 

24. The executive branch should review and, as appropriate, recommend changes to the 

law and other authorities that clarify the DNI’s role with respect to jointly funded 

programs. (Unified leadership and authority)

25. OMB should consider more closely what programs it decides to fund through the 

National Intelligence Program and the Military Intelligence Program. (Budget)

Program management:
Page 66 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight

26. Acquisition organizations should embrace acquisition reform that develops and 

maintains qualified government acquisition personnel while reducing dependence on 

systems engineering/technical assistance contractors. (Acquisition process)

27. The DDNI for Acquisition should mandate that sufficient margin is built into overall 

program cost during initiation of a complex program. The DDNI/Acquisition should 

review the track record of Intelligence Community independent cost estimates to 

determine if they have been providing adequate margin or if the risk assessment 

methodology needs to be adjusted. (Acquisition process)

28. The DDNI/Acquisition should mandate longer tours for acquisition personnel supporting 

high priority, multi-year projects. If rotations are necessary, program offices should 

provide sufficient time for overlap and transition of responsibility. (Acquisition process)
Enclosure III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 67 GAO-16-592R DOD Space Acquisition and Oversight

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