# Tunisia - United States Department of State

- Taoufik Missaoui Major Taoufik Missaoui, with the Tunisian Public Order Brigade, was killed on March 6, 2020, when two men on a motorcycle approached the police post protecting the main pedestrian and VIP access point for the U.S. Embassy. Major Missaoui challenged the two men, directing them to move on. The passenger detonated a suicide vest, killing Major Missaoui.
- Tunisia HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Tunisia				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Tunisia																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Indigenous Peoples																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There was a significant increase during the year in arrests, detentions, and investigations of opposition politicians, journalists and other media figures, lawyers, and other perceived critics of the government in Tunisia.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government; arbitrary arrests or detentions; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners or detainees; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, or enforcement of or threat to enforce criminal libel laws to limit expression; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental and civil society organizations; restrictions on the right to leave the country; refoulement of refugees to a country where they would face torture or persecution; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption, both high-level and widespread; crimes involving violence or threats of violence against Black Tunisians and sub-Saharan Africans; laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults and the enforcement of those laws; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; and significant restrictions on workers’ freedom of association.The government took some credible steps to address impunity or reduce abuses, but human rights groups frequently asserted that investigations into abuses by police, security forces, and detention center officials lacked transparency and encountered long delays and procedural obstacles. High-profile investigations into former government officials, members of parliament, media figures, and businesspersons on corruption, conspiracy, and terrorism charges also lacked transparency.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year; however, prior criminal prosecutions of arbitrary killings continued.On June 9, the Ben Arous Court of Appeals set a September 22 trial date to review the case of 12 police officers whom a lower court convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to two years in prison for the death of Omar Laabidi, who drowned in 2018 allegedly due to police negligence. On September 22, the court postponed to December 8, at which point the court decided to schedule a new session to reexamine the medical report in addition to testimonies on February 16, 2024. Civil society and public reactions criticized the decision as insufficient and lacking police accountability and called the four-year delay in sentencing a sign of a dysfunctional judicial system.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The law prohibited such practices, but there were credible reports government officials employed them. The constitution prohibited “moral and physical torture,” and the penal code penalized the use of “violence” when used without just cause. Civil society organizations criticized the criminal code as insufficient to cover torture, asserting it was not in line with international standards.The National Police reportedly subjected detainees to harsh physical treatment, such as beatings, burning with cigarettes, and prolonged solitary confinement, according to firsthand accounts provided to national and international organizations. Several prominent local human rights activists decried the practice of what they referred to as torture, including electric shocks, mock executions, and suspension by the ankles in police stations and detention centers. The World Organization Against Torture (OMCT) reported 53 suspected cases of torture and ill-treatment in detention centers and prisons between January and June.The Ministry of Interior had three inspector general offices (one for the National Police, one for the National Guard, and a central inspectorate general reporting directly to the minister) that conducted administrative investigations into the different ministry structures. The inspector general offices could hold security agents accountable for abuses and could issue administrative reprimands even before the courts announced a final verdict in abuse cases. The Ministry of Interior adopted a police accountability policy and code of conduct in April. Ministry of Interior officials reported that security forces found culpable of violations, particularly against migrants, had received disciplinary action that included dismissal, reassignment, and transfer. Human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), however, criticized the government for failing to investigate abuse allegations and for the appearance of impunity for abusers.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prison and detention center conditions did not meet international standards, according to domestic and international observers such as the OMCT, principally due to gross overcrowding, poor infrastructure, and inadequate sanitary conditions.Abusive Physical Conditions: Prisons were grossly overcrowded and had inadequate sanitary conditions.Most prison buildings were originally constructed for industrial uses and converted later into detention facilities; as a result, they suffered from poor infrastructure, including substandard lighting, ventilation, sanitation, cooling, and heating. Health-care services available to inmates were inadequate. Very few prisons had an ambulance or medically equipped vehicle.Administration: Authorities conducted some investigations into allegations of mistreatment. The Ministry of Justice frequently did not make public its findings, and its internal investigations into prisoner abuse often lasted several months, in some cases more than a year.The government established a National Authority for the Prevention of Torture (INPT), an independent body, in 2013 to respond to allegations of torture and mistreatment. The INPT included 16 members who served staggered six-year terms and had the authority to visit any prison or detention center without prior notice and to document torture and mistreatment, request criminal and administrative investigations, and issue recommendations for measures to eradicate abuse and mistreatment.The INPT reported continued cooperation by government authorities and conducted several visits to civilians detained under the military and civilian courts’ purviews in various prisons and detention centers. Nevertheless, the INPT reported that authorities of Borj Alamri prison denied it access to prisoners on December 7, which it stated was in contravention of the government’s obligations under the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture.Independent Monitoring: The government granted prison access to some independent nongovernmental observers, including local and international human rights groups, NGOs, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture, the OMCT, the independent Tunisian Organization Against Torture, and the Tunisian Observatory of Freedoms. The Tunisian League of Human Rights could conduct unannounced prison visits and issue reports on conditions inside prisons. Other organizations were issued permits on a case-by-case basis, and the OMCT reported problems gaining access to prisoners for routine visits.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court, but there were reported incidents of arbitrary arrests and detentions, according to local and international rights groups. The country was under a state of emergency since a string of terrorist attacks in 2015, and human rights organizations expressed concern the government used its powers under a 1978 decree law on the state of emergency to place citizens under house arrest without providing these individuals access to the court orders that led to their arrest.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The law required police to obtain a warrant to arrest a suspect unless a crime was in progress, or the arrest was for a felony. Arresting officers had to inform detainees of their rights, immediately notify detainees’ families of the arrest, and make a complete record of the times and dates of such notifications. The maximum time of detention without charges for felonies was 48 hours, renewable once by a prosecutor’s order, for a maximum of four days. For misdemeanor offenses, the time limit was 48 hours, although this could be extended for an additional 24 hours by a prosecutor’s order. All extensions had to be justified in writing.Detainees had the right to representation by counsel and to request medical assistance immediately upon detention. The judicial police had to inform the detainee’s lawyer of all interrogations and interactions between the accused and witnesses or victims of the alleged offense. The judicial police had to allow the lawyer to be present unless the accused explicitly waived the right to a lawyer, or the lawyer did not arrive at the prearranged time of questioning. The only exception was for terrorism suspects, who could be held without access to counsel for the first 48 hours. The counterterrorism law allowed authorities to hold a suspect without charges for 15 days, with a judicial review after each five-day period. Media and civil society reported police failed at times to follow these regulations and, on occasion, detained persons arbitrarily.The government could assign a defense attorney in a criminal case even if the accused did not ask for one during the investigation. Legal representation was provided at government expense for indigent defendants if certain conditions were met. In felony cases, legal aid was also provided to citizens and foreigners. Legal aid was extended to administrative matters once a police investigation was completed, and the case went to court. The military code of justice gave detainees in military court the same right to legal counsel as described in the civilian penal code.The law permitted authorities to release accused persons on monetary or nonmonetary bail; however, pretrial release was rarely implemented. The bail system was largely nonfunctional due to a systemic lack of capacity to track accused persons and remand them to custody should they violate the terms of their release. Due to this lack of capacity, many judges were unwilling to implement pretrial release.Arbitrary Arrest: On February 1, President Saied extended the state of emergency to the end of the year. The extension allowed the president to prohibit strikes or demonstrations deemed to threaten public order, place under house arrest anyone whose “activities are deemed to endanger security,” and suspend associations on suspicion of participation in harmful acts. The presidency renewed the state of emergency for periods of one to 10 months continuously since 2015.From February to the end of the year, authorities investigated at least 21 perceived critics of the government on accusations of conspiracy, with at least 12 of those individuals arrested and accused of “plotting to attack the state.”Domestic and international organizations alleged that since July 2021, when President Saied suspended the 2014 constitution, at least 50 individuals were placed arbitrarily under house arrest, banned from travel, or both, including former government officials, a judge, and several former members of parliament. Authorities subsequently lifted travel bans on many of these individuals, but travel bans on those subject to formal judicial proceedings remained, according to media reports.On September 2, authorities placed Abdelkarim Harouni, senior Nahda party leader and head of the Shura Council, the party’s highest-ranking body, under 40 days’ house arrest without filing any criminal charges. On September 5, authorities formally arrested Harouni on corruption allegations. Nahda and other opposition parties criticized this restriction in the lead-up to Nahda’s planned October party elections.Pretrial Detention: The length of pretrial detention remained unpredictable and could last from one month to several years, principally due to lengthy criminal prosecution procedures, judicial inefficiency, and lack of capacity, according to local and international NGOs.In cases involving crimes related to national security, or for which the prison sentence could exceed five years, pretrial detention could last from six months to, in some rare cases, up to several years. In cases involving crimes for which the sentence could not exceed five years, the court could extend the initial six-month pretrial detention by only three months.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The law provided for an independent judiciary, but the government did not respect judicial independence and impartiality. Authorities referred one civilian case to a military court during the year, down from four referrals in 2022 and six in 2021. Military courts were presided over by civilian judges relying on the military code of justice.As of the end of the year, the government had not reinstated 57 judges dismissed by the president in 2022, despite a 2022 Administrative Court ruling overruling 49 of the dismissals and finding the firings improper. On June 1, the Association of Tunisian Magistrates (ATM) organized a sit-in to protest the dismissals. On August 29, President Saied omitted the 49 judges when reappointing more than 1,000 judges as part of an annual judicial rotation. On August 21, ATM President Anas Hamadi faced charges before the Kef First Instance Court of “obstruction to the freedom of work,” accusations linked to an ATM-organized strike and protest held in June 2022. Critics said the charges were intended to punish Hamadi for appealing the 2022 judicial dismissals. There were no further updates by year’s end.																Trial Procedures						The law provided for the right to a fair and public trial, but the judiciary did not always enforce this right, and local and international rights groups reported that authorities frequently did not follow the law on trial procedures. Defendants charged under the counterterrorism law were denied the right to be informed promptly of the charges against them and the right to a public trial, and in certain cases were denied the right to communicate with an attorney, according to international NGO reports. The counterterrorism law stated that in cases involving terrorism, judges could close hearings to the public, admit testimony from anonymous witnesses, and keep information on witnesses, victims, and any other relevant persons confidential, including from the accused and their legal counsel. In August, the African Court on Human and People’s Rights ordered the government to “eliminate all barriers” and allow four detained political prisoners access to their legal representatives and doctors and to inform the prisoners’ families and lawyers of the reasons for their detention, in response to a court case filed with the African Union court in Tanzania on behalf of the family members of the detainees.Military courts had authority to try cases involving members of the security or armed forces and civilians accused of national security crimes or of offenses such as insulting the president (as commander in chief of the armed forces) or other members of the military. Appeals of decisions made by the military courts involving civilians were heard by the Court of Cassation, the country’s highest court of appeal, and part of the civilian judiciary system. In January, the International Commission of Jurists assessed the trial of civilians before military courts was “incompatible with international standards, which require that the jurisdiction of military courts be exclusively restricted to cases involving members of the armed forces.”On March 2, the Military Court of Appeals sentenced former Karama party parliamentarian Rached Khiari, whom authorities arrested in August 2022, to six months’ imprisonment on charges of insulting the military and conspiracy against the state. Khiari was charged after he made allegations in April 2021 that the president received foreign funding to support his 2019 presidential election campaign. The court’s March 2 verdict followed an appeal by prosecutors after a January 2022 military court ruling that dismissed the conspiracy charges for lack of jurisdiction.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						From February until the end of the year, authorities arrested and detained more than 30 opposition politicians, lawyers, media figures, business owners, and other perceived critics of the government on a variety of charges, which civil society groups criticized as politically motivated; the majority remained in detention as of the end of the year. Between February 11 and 25, the Ministry of Interior’s counterterrorism brigade arrested 18 opposition politicians whom the government subsequently charged with “conspiracy against the state” under articles of the counterterrorism law and the penal code; charges included affiliation with a terrorist group, conspiracy against state security, and attempts to overthrow the government. Authorities released seven of the 18, including Chaima Issa and Lazhar Akremi, pending further investigation, while 11 of the 18, including Ghazi Chaouachi, Issam Chebbi, Abdelhamid Jelassi, Jaouhar Ben Mbarak, Khayam Turki, and Ridha Belhadj, remained in detention as of year’s end.In April, authorities arrested former Speaker of Parliament and opposition leader Rached Ghannouchi. He refused to be removed from his place of detention for questioning or attend trial, so on May 15 authorities sentenced him in absentia to one year in prison under Article 14 of the counterterrorism law, in connection with public remarks he made a year prior. The charges allegedly stemmed from a 2022 eulogy Ghannouchi delivered for a party member in which he said the deceased “did not fear a ruler or tyrant, he only feared God.” On June 9 authorities issued a warrant for Ghannouchi’s arrest on separate charges related to alleged violations of “state secrets.” On October 30, authorities sentenced Ghannouchi to 15 months’ imprisonment for a speech he made in February in which he allegedly implied that law enforcement was complicit in terrorism. By year’s end, the government was investigating Ghannouchi after alleging he facilitated the travel of Tunisians to fight in foreign conflict zones, which Ghannouchi denied. In May, more than 150 academics and other public figures around the world called for the release of Ghannouchi and all political prisoners in Tunisia.In September, detained opposition figure Jaouhar Ben Mbarak launched a 16-day hunger strike to protest his and other detentions and was subsequently joined by Ghannouchi. In October, Ghannouchi ended his three-day hunger strike while other detainees from across the opposition political spectrum joined the strike, according to media reports.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Not applicable.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										Both the previous and existing constitution prohibited such actions; however, under the renewed state of emergency, government agencies were granted the ability to access electronic devices without a court order. Judicial warrants were required for authorities to enter, search, or monitor private property such as homes. Local and international rights groups, however, reported that security agencies searched persons, homes, and NGO workspaces without judicial authorization. Human Rights Watch reported that on April 17, plainclothes officers arrested Rached Ghannouchi at his home and did not show an arrest warrant, according to one of his lawyers. Ghannouchi and Chaima Issa claimed their phones were searched extralegally while they were held in detention, according to media reports. According to Freedom House’s 2023 Freedom on the Net report, rights organizations documented a number of incidents in which citizens had their phones confiscated or searched by police without legal justifications.Local rights group Inkyfada reported that authorities confiscated the phones of opposition activists and accessed private messages between the activists and diplomats on WhatsApp, Telegram, and Signal. According to these reports, these messages were used by authorities to justify the February arrests and detentions of opposition activists on conspiracy charges.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The constitution and law provided for freedom of expression, including for the press and other media, but the government did not always respect that right. Continued enforcement of President Saied’s 2021 exceptional measures and decrees restricted freedom of expression. Journalists, activists, and politicians were sometimes prosecuted for speech critical of the president. NGOs noted an independent press and robust civil society contributed to an environment generally conducive to this freedom, but independent journalists raised increasing concerns about growing government restrictions on freedom of expression, including press freedom.Freedom of Expression: Public speech considered offensive to “public morals” or “public decency,” terms undefined in the law, continued to be treated as criminal acts. NGOs stated the penal code and military justice codes were used to target journalists, lawyers, and civil society activists for criticism of the president, the government, or security forces. The codes also criminalized speech causing “harm to the public order or public morals,” defamation, false allegations against members of an administrative or judicial authority, and attacks against the “dignity, reputation, or morale of the army.”On August 23, the Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Communication Technologies announced their intention to prosecute those found to have used online platforms to produce false news, rumors, or misleading information. The government continued to enforce a 2022 decree that criminalized the deliberate spread of “false or incorrect news” that could cause economic harm, punishable by a prison sentence of 10 years to life, and enforced a separate 2022 decree that regulated cybercrimes and misinformation. Civil society, international organizations, political figures, and independent journalists warned enforcement of both laws imperiled freedom of expression. According to the local rights NGO the Alliance for Security and Liberties, as of July, the government opened at least 20 criminal investigations under the cybercrime decree law, known as Decree Law 54, for conduct involving the exercise of freedom of expression.During the year, authorities prosecuted several individuals, including bloggers and journalists, for statements published online that were critical of security forces or the government. On July 17, the International Commission of Jurists issued a report calling on authorities to repeal the decrees and end all proceedings initiated to enforce their provisions.Activists expressed concern regarding government interference with media and the concentration of media ownership in the hands of a few political parties or families.Violence and Harassment: Violence and harassment against journalists continued, according to human rights organizations and independent journalists. Some individuals, including human rights and online activists, encountered online harassment, particularly for social media postings related to political matters or when mobilizing protests. In its annual report, issued in May, the National Union of Tunisian Journalists (SNJT) described the year as the most dangerous for journalists since the SNJT began reporting on this question in 2017. In July, Amnesty International reported more than 39 investigations or prosecutions of bloggers, journalists, and others on charges related to peaceful speech. A September SNJT report noted 295 verbal and physical attacks against journalists from May 2022 through August 2023.On May 13, media reported two police officers physically assaulted Siwar Amaydia, a journalist and member of the SNJT, as she reported outside a hospital in Gafsa. In a statement, the SNJT accused the police of targeting Amaydia because she was a journalist. At year’s end, there was no investigation into, or punishment for, this incident.On May 17, an appeals court sentenced Radio Mosaique FM journalist Khelifa Guesmi to five years’ imprisonment for “participating in the intentional disclosure of information related to interception operations” in violation of antiterrorism laws. Guesmi had published a story on the dismantling of a terrorist group in Kairouan. On September 3, authorities arrested Guesmi to serve out his sentence.On June 20, authorities detained radio journalist Zied Heni and transferred him to Aounina detention center for questioning, reportedly based on comments he made describing what actions would legally qualify as a crime against the president. Heni’s defense lawyers told media on June 21 they were initially denied access to their client. Authorities released Heni without charges on June 22.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: The government imposed restrictions on media outlets and sought criminal penalties against members of the media who published items deemed to defame government officials or impact national security. In April, private and foreign media were prohibited from covering the first session of the new parliament. Following criticism, journalists were granted accreditations with restrictions on their presence. On June 17, a judge banned radio and television outlets, but not print media, from reporting on two cases involving prominent opposition figures accused of conspiring against state security.On May 18, dozens of journalists gathered in front of the SNJT’s headquarters to protest what they described as laws to repress journalistic freedom. The protest followed a Tunis Court of Appeals decision on May 17 to increase from one to five years a jail term handed to journalist Khelifa Guesmi for “publishing classified information about the dismantling of a terrorist cell.”As of September, the Tunis headquarters of the Qatari news organization Al Jazeera remained closed, and its journalism licenses had not been renewed after security forces entered their offices in July 2021 and ordered staff to vacate the premises. According to Al Jazeera reporting at the time, security forces stated they were carrying out judicial instructions. By year’s end, Al Jazeera had not received a copy of the warrant or judicial instructions. Al Jazeera journalists continued to work from SNJT headquarters and reported on events across the country.Libel/Slander Laws: Civil society organizations expressed concern regarding the use of criminal libel laws to stifle freedom of expression. Media actors and activists asserted the law did not go far enough to protect freedom of expression and of the press.On March 31, judicial police questioned for a third time Monia Arfaoui, an editor for the daily newspaper Assabah, in relation to a complaint filed against her by the minister of religious affairs. Arfaoui criticized the minister for “mismanaging” public funds earmarked for facilitating participation in the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. In a statement, Arfaoui said authorities were attempting to intimidate her into silence and “spread a climate of fear” to deter journalistic criticism of government performance and state officials.National Security: Authorities cited laws to protect national security to arrest or punish critics of the government.On May 22, criminal investigators questioned and released Radio Mosaique FM journalists Haythem El Mekki and Elyes Gharbi pending further investigation in response to a complaint filed May 17 by a member of a police union, which accused Mekki and Gharbi of “defamation and the spreading of rumors that affect internal security.” The police union’s complaint was reportedly due to Mekki’s May 15 radio remarks calling on security forces to improve their recruitment standards after a May 9 terrorist attack at a Djerba synagogue.																Internet Freedom						The government generally did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet, although there were some obstacles to access, limits on content, and abuses of user rights, according to Freedom House. The NGO reported government authorities and various other entities sometimes sought the removal of online content. Citizens continued to actively use social media platforms to organize social movements and peaceful protests; however, according to Freedom House, online self-censorship increased since July 2021, as both journalists and internet users sought to avoid retaliation for certain kinds of speech, particularly any criticism of the president, security forces, or government bodies.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The constitution and law provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association. The government limited freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The law provided for the right of peaceful assembly and the government generally did respect it. Political opposition groups, rights organizations, unions, and other organizations held peaceful protests throughout the year. While security forces largely refrained from suppressing major antigovernment gatherings, the government invoked the state of emergency to allow the president to prohibit demonstrations deemed to threaten public order.On March 5, approximately 500 protesters defied a protest ban and rallied in central Tunis to demonstrate against the president and demand the release of prominent opposition figures held in government detention. On March 2, authorities had denied their request to protest, stating some leaders of the group organizing the protest, the opposition National Salvation Front, were suspected of plotting against state security. Police warned the protesters that their march was not legal but did not stop them from breaking through police barriers and advancing on a central street.						Freedom of Association						The law provided for the right of freedom of association, but the government did not always respect it, particularly regarding restrictions on political and religious associations (see section 3, Political Parties and Political Participation). Religious minority groups reported administrative delays and lack of government response regarding processing of association applications; some of the applications dated as far back as 2017.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights. The government continued to enforce travel bans for certain individuals with pending legal cases against them.Foreign Travel: The law required that authorities promptly inform those affected by travel bans or who had their passports seized of the reasons for these decisions. In addition, by law the affected individuals had the right to challenge the decision, and the law set a maximum of 14 months during which travel could be restricted before requiring another court order. Human rights groups noted authorities did not consistently apply the law and that security forces did not always respect court decisions to reverse travel restrictions.Civil society groups reported the Ministry of Interior continued to use an informal travel ban list known as the “S17 watch list” requiring additional screening at border checkpoints for certain individuals’ international travel. There were no official statistics on the number of names on the list. The government took no action to acknowledge 2018 and 2020 rulings by the Administrative Court of Tunis that the list had no legal basis.Throughout the year, several former members of parliament and politicians publicly reported they were prevented from traveling abroad based on the president’s “exceptional measures,” despite the lack of a legal case against them. These included former member of parliament Zied Ghanney, who told media that he learned of a travel ban against him, without any legal justification, when he attempted to depart from the Tunis airport on July 9.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government sometimes cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern. As of September, there were more than 9,000 refugees and asylum seekers registered with UNHCR in the country. On August 13, the government reported it had moved hundreds of migrants and asylum seekers to shelters in Tatouine and Medenine with the help of the Tunisian Red Crescent.Access to Asylum: The law did not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status by the government, and there was no national asylum system in the country. Domestic and international organizations criticized the lack of resources and support provided to refugees and asylum seekers. Authorities allowed UNHCR to conduct registration and international refugee status determinations. UNHCR reported the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries coordinated with it, despite the absence of a domestic legal framework. UNHCR received international asylum claims, registered asylum seekers, conducted refugee status determination, and provided documentation. Civil society groups reported that some individuals registered as international refugees or asylum seekers by UNHCR still faced government mistreatment, including detention and expulsion.Refoulement: In July, human rights and international organizations reported Tunisian authorities forcibly detained, transported, and expelled hundreds of sub-Saharan migrants to the country’s borders with Libya and Algeria with limited access to shelter, food, or water, introducing a risk of refoulement. Mixed migration flows in North Africa, including Tunisia, made distinguishing among economic migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers difficult absent individual screening, which did not happen, according to human rights groups and UN agencies. On July 6, the International Organization for Migration and UNHCR released a joint statement expressing concern regarding the safety and well-being of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers in the country. On July 18, UN experts urged Tunisian authorities to take urgent measures to stop collective expulsions and protect the human rights of all migrants, noting “deporting migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers without conducting an individual and objective risk assessment of their exposure to human rights violations upon return amounts to refoulement, prohibited under international human rights law.”Abuse of Refugees and Asylum Seekers: On July 19, Human Rights Watch reported on abuses against migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers by law enforcement that included “beatings, use of excessive force, some cases of torture, arbitrary arrests and detention, collective expulsions, dangerous actions at sea, forced evictions, and theft of money and belongings.” The report was based on interviews with 24 victims. A Sudanese refugee reported that he was beaten and given electric shocks by police at a Tunis police station before his transfer to Mornaguia prison. On August 10, the Tunisian and Libyan ministers of interior announced a joint agreement to share responsibility for providing shelter to migrants stranded at their border. The Tunisian Red Crescent remained the only organization authorized to provide aid at the Libya border.Freedom of Movement: The government did not always respect the right to freedom of movement for refugees and asylum seekers, which reportedly led some to limit their own movements in public.Employment: The government did not impose restrictions on refugees’ ability to work after their status as a refugee became official; however, a legal framework guaranteeing refugees’ right to work did not exist. Refugees and asylum seekers were required to obtain validation by the Ministry of Employment and Vocational Training to obtain formal employment. In practice, employers were wary of employing foreigners, including registered refugees and asylum seekers.Access to Basic Services: The national government provided for access to public services, including education and health care, for official-status refugees. Regional and local authorities, however, did not always respect these rights and limited refugees’ access to public services, particularly following rising discrimination against Black Tunisians and sub-Saharan migrants during the year.Durable Solutions: The government did not accept refugees for resettlement nor offer naturalization to refugees residing in the country. Nevertheless, the government did assist refugees’ and migrants’ voluntary returns to their homes.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The constitution provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage, but this right was tightly circumscribed by the president’s consolidation of power in the executive branch since 2021, leading to what NGOs and international observers described as widespread voter apathy toward legislative elections and the political process more broadly.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: On January 29, approximately 11 percent of eligible voters voted in runoff elections for the first chamber of parliament, the Assembly of Representatives of the People, following a first round in December 2022.The Carter Center conducted a limited observation and while it did not note any major irregularities on election day during the second round, the center emphasized in a February 1 statement that “Tunisia’s faint voter participation – about 11 percent in both rounds – marks a low point in its democratic transition, which was derailed when the president took control of all levers of power in July 2021.” The center also maintained that the historically low turnout reaffirmed the need for a “national dialogue to reset the country’s stalled democratic transition.” On December 24, a first round of local elections was held as the first step towards electing the second chamber of parliament, the National Council of Regions and Districts.Political Parties and Political Participation: Many political parties boycotted the January legislative elections as well as the December elections for the second chamber of parliament, citing procedural concerns leading up to the elections and a ban on political parties campaigning for candidates under the electoral law. Some opposition political parties called for early presidential elections, arguing the low January turnout showed a lack of support for the president and his government. In February, authorities arrested numerous prominent political opposition figures and other perceived critics of the government; civil society organizations criticized these arrests as politically motivated.On April 18, Tunis police closed the headquarters of both Nahda and the Tunisia Will Movement parties, which hosted activities of the National Salvation Front, an opposition coalition cofounded by Nahda. According to reports from local and international NGOs, authorities banned Nahda meetings from being held in its offices across the country. Authorities arrested and detained most of Nahda’s current and former senior leadership still in the country, including Saied Ferjani, Adhelkarim Harouni, and Ali Laarayedh. Local and international rights groups claimed that arrests and detentions of opposition leaders representing other political parties were also politically motivated, including the arrests of Riadh Mouakher, Walid Jalled, Jawher Ben Mbarek, Ghazi Chaoachi, Ridha Belhaj, and Issam Chebbi. In September, authorities arrested three political opposition figures affiliated with the Nahda party, in the lead-up to the party’s planned October congress.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: The electoral law introduced by the president in 2022 removed the quota system introduced in 2014 to boost gender parity in the legislature. The 2022 electoral law also required candidates to run as individuals rather than as members of a party list, which observers said could negatively affect women candidates. Only 15 percent of candidates elected to the legislature in January were women compared to more than 30 percent between 2014 and 2018.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government generally did not implement the law effectively, and local and international rights groups reported enforcement of anti-corruption laws was often politicized and used to crack down on dissent rather than corruption. In public statements throughout the year, President Saied said rooting out official corruption was a core government priority, but media reported numerous cases of government corruption, particularly of police seeking bribes from citizens. In August 2021, authorities closed the National Authority for the Fight Against Corruption, which led anti-corruption efforts since 2011.Corruption: The government did not have an anti-corruption strategy. During the year some members of parliament were charged and detained based on corruption allegations. On August 2, President Saied told media that the government needed to “dismantle the system of corruption” in society as part of a “war to liberate the homeland.” Despite frequent vows by the president to crack down on corrupt officials, opposition parties and civil society groups claimed he used an anti-corruption agenda to arbitrarily detain political opponents. On April 6, the president said in a public address that the country’s economic problems were caused by corruption and that the government would work to recoup money “stolen” by corrupt officials.For additional information about corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						A variety of domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. These organizations reported government officials rarely were cooperative and responsive to their views.Retribution against Human Rights Defenders: There were numerous reports of threats and violence against human rights defenders. According to Front Line Defenders’ Global Analysis 2022 report, released on April 4, the government misused counterterrorism, national security, cybercrime, and other criminal legislation to suppress and punish the work of defenders protecting a wide range of human rights. On February 21, Mahdi Jelassi, Wael Naouar, Nawres Douzi, Asrar Ben Jouira, Seif Ayadi, and Khalil Zeghidi were prosecuted for “inciting disobedience and insulting a public official” following a protest they organized in July 2022 against the constitutional referendum.The United Nations or Other International Bodies: In April, the government postponed an official visit by the UN special rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers. By year’s end, authorities had yet to reschedule the visit.Government Human Rights Bodies: The government’s primary agency to investigate human rights abuses and combat threats to human rights was the Ministry of Justice. Human rights organizations contended the ministry failed to pursue or adequately investigate alleged human rights abuses. Within the Office of the President, the High Committee for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was charged with monitoring human rights and advising the president on related topics. The committee did not issue any public reports during the year, and it was not possible to ascertain its efficacy. The independent INPT responded to allegations of torture and mistreatment.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: The law broadly defined violence against women as “any restriction denying women equality in the civil, political, economic, social, or cultural domains.” The law criminalized rape (including of men). Violence against women in the country was widespread and systemic, according to women’s rights organizations. Legal, cultural, and social norms often resulted in underreporting of crimes and inadequate law enforcement response in cases of violence against women, with officers often either refusing to take complaints or, if the perpetrator was a spouse, pressuring the victims to reconcile privately with the offender rather than take legal action.The government did not systematically track the number of rape cases. Civil society representatives reported few rape cases resulted in conviction. Rape remained a taboo subject, and cultural pressures, including the criminalization of sex outside of marriage, often dissuaded survivors from reporting sexual assault. There were no government-run public education programs on domestic violence, including rape. Survivors could seek services at any of two dozen social centers throughout the country, in addition to five centers – one managed by the government and four by civil society organizations – dedicated to survivors of gender-based violence.Laws prohibiting domestic violence provided penalties for assault committed by a spouse or family member that were double those of an unrelated individual for the same crime, but enforcement was rare, and domestic violence remained a serious problem. The law allowed women to seek restraining orders against their abusers without filing a criminal case or filing for divorce.The Ministry of Women, Family, and Senior Citizens monitored complaints of domestic violence. The ministry also worked with civil society to increase awareness of the law and help civil society connect women, including women with disabilities, to support services. The ministry did not keep statistics on cases involving women with disabilities. The ministry operated a national hotline for survivors of family violence. The National Observatory for Violence Against Women operated a hotline to provide referrals and assistance to survivors. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs developed a digital platform with resources for assistance, and increased follow-up and intervention on behalf of survivors.The Ministry of Interior operated 127 specialized units in police stations throughout the country tasked with investigating crimes of violence against women. The Ministry of Justice tracked gender-based violence cases, gathering information on cases in each court but did not make such information public. Both ministries worked with civil society to increase local awareness of the laws, according to local NGOs.Discrimination: The constitution and law explicitly prohibited discrimination based on gender and the government generally enforced this prohibition.Women faced legal as well as societal barriers to their economic and political participation. For example, one of the 57 judges fired by the president in 2022 was a woman judge who had details about her private life leaked online, including accusations of adultery, which was a crime in the country, and as a result was compelled by the investigative judge to take a virginity test to prove her innocence and avoid being the subject of damaging reputational slander. The Personal Status Code contained provisions that limited women’s rights by not granting the same rights to men and women in parental responsibilities, failing to recognize legal rights of single mothers and of children born out of wedlock, and making distinctions on inheritance for men and women.Sharia inheritance provisions in some instances provided men with a larger share of an inheritance. Non-Muslim women and their Muslim husbands could not inherit from each other unless they sought a legal judgment based on the rights enshrined in the constitution. The government considered all children of those marriages to be Muslim and forbade those children from inheriting from their mothers. Spouses could, however, freely give up to one-third of their estate to whomever they designated in their will.The labor code specifically prohibited employment of women in jobs deemed hazardous such as those found in industrial settings. The law explicitly required equal pay for equal work, and the government generally enforced it through fines. Societal, legal, and cultural barriers significantly reduced women’s participation in the formal labor force, particularly in managerial positions.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities, according to local civil society organizations. Women had access to free abortions and contraceptives available at public medical centers; however, sexual and reproductive health services were unevenly available in the country, especially in remote rural areas, and insufficiently resourced and integrated into the national health-care system. Parental or guardian consent was required for girls younger than 18 to receive sexual and reproductive health services. There were some discriminatory gender and sociocultural norms associated with women receiving sexual and reproductive health services, particularly for single women and youth. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) individuals reported problems accessing health services due to gender identity that did not conform to legal identity documents. The government provided access to sexual and reproductive health services for survivors of sexual violence through the Ministry of Justice, although services were often delayed due to a lack of effective government coordination and streamlined support for survivors. Emergency contraception and postexposure prophylaxis were available without a prescription or charge and as part of the clinical management of rape.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The law prohibited all forms of racial discrimination, including “all distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference based on race, color, origin, heritage, or all other forms of racial obstruction, obstacle, or deprivation of rights and liberties or their exercise.” The law penalized acts of racial discrimination with up to three years in prison and a substantial fine for individuals and a larger fine for a legal entity such as a company. There were no reports of prosecutions for violations of antidiscrimination laws.Despite the law, persons of color – including Black Tunisians and foreign nationals – experienced widespread poverty, limited access to higher education, and limited job opportunities, and their situation worsened during the year, a trend that local and international NGOs attributed in particular to racist rhetoric and violence from the president and other officials. Black Tunisians were largely absent from politics and media despite making up approximately 10 to 15 percent of the population, according to local rights organizations. Both structural and interpersonal racism created inequalities that marginalized persons of color from public services. Black Tunisians also reported being subjected to verbal abuse and physical violence and being identified as foreign migrants. Media reported some foreign nationals, often from sub-Saharan Africa, also faced widespread racial discrimination with no institutional framework for the protection and reception of migrants, limited employment opportunities that often forced them into the informal market, and harassment and degrading treatment in communities exacerbated by deteriorating economic conditions and public perceptions that migrants were taking resources away from citizens.In February, President Saied described migrants as “Hordes of illegal immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa...with all the violence, crime and unacceptable practices that entails.” He referred to an influx of migrants as a “criminal conspiracy” to change the country’s demographics through “successive waves of irregular migration.” Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, UN Watch, and other international organizations condemned Saied’s statements as “racist” and constituting an incitement to violence. Following his remarks, local and international NGOs documented a surge in violent assaults, robberies, and vandalism against migrants by citizens, arbitrary evictions by landlords, and job terminations by employers. On May 22, seven assailants armed with knives attacked 19 sub-Saharan Africans in Sfax, resulting in the death of a Benin national. Authorities arrested three of the attackers, who remained in detention at year’s end.In July, human rights and international organizations reported authorities forcibly detained, transported, and expelled hundreds of sub-Saharan migrants, including at least six asylum seekers, to the country’s borders with Libya and Algeria with limited access to shelter, food, or water. Human Rights Watch interviewed some of the migrants, who alleged several of those transported had died from heat exhaustion and starvation in the military buffer zone between the country and Libya.																																				Indigenous Peoples										The Indigenous Amazigh (Berber) population faced social, legal, employment, and economic discrimination, according to regional media. The government rejected their efforts to register as a political party, according to the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. Many Amazigh were unable to register their first names in municipal civil registries because they were not Arab names.																																				Children										Child Abuse: The law criminalized child abuse and the government enforced the law. Civil society organizations reported child abuse was widespread, occurring predominantly in homes and schools. The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Women, Family, Children and Seniors, supported by civil society, conducted public education and awareness-raising campaigns on the harmful effects of corporal punishment and domestic violence.Sexual relations with a child younger than age 16 was considered rape in all cases, and the perpetrator was subject to 20 years in prison with the possibility of a life sentence if there were aggravating circumstances, such as incest or the use of violence. The government enforced this law.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The minimum age for marriage was 18, but the courts could, in certain situations, authorize the marriage of persons younger than 18 upon the request and approval of both parents.Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law prohibited commercial sexual exploitation, sale, grooming, and using children for commercial exploitation, including child sex trafficking and pornography, and the government enforced the law. Some children were vulnerable to sex trafficking, especially girls and those experiencing homelessness or working informally, according to rights organizations. Civil society and international organizations reported the continued presence of child sexual abuse materials online, including sexual images and videos. The Internet Watch Foundation and government continued to operate a portal where individuals could anonymously report child sexual abuse claims.																																				Antisemitism										The country’s Jewish population numbered an estimated 1,500 persons. On May 9, a member of the National Guard opened fire near the main synagogue on the island of Djerba during the Lag b’Omer festival, an annual Jewish pilgrimage, killing two civilians and three security officers and wounding eight persons. Authorities declined to address publicly the antisemitic nature of the attack, instead characterizing it as “criminal.” On October 17, hundreds of pro-Palestinian protesters overran and set fire to a nonoperational synagogue shrine in El Hamma, a town outside the city of Gabes, in response to the Israel-Hamas conflict, according to media reports. Human rights organizations reported allegations of antisemitic harassment of Jews by law enforcement officers. For further information on incidents in the country of antisemitism, whether or not those incidents were motivated by religion, and for reporting on the ability of Jews to exercise freedom of religion or belief, please see the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: The law criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults. Convictions for same-sex sexual conduct between adults carried up to a three-year prison sentence. According to NGOs, authorities occasionally used the law to detain and question persons concerning their sexual activities and sexual orientation, reportedly at times based on appearance alone.NGOs reported in some instances, LGBTQI+ individuals were targeted under the penal code article criminalizing “infringement of morality or public morals.” Conviction carried a penalty of six months’ imprisonment and a fine. The vague language of the penal code, as well as the lack of a legal definition of public morality, allowed police wide discretion on what constituted a morality or public morals crime.Human rights groups reported an increase in arrests of LGBTQI+ individuals, as well as an increase in cases of societal harassment. Allegations included reports some police labor unions harassed and endangered LGBTQI+ activists by posting their home addresses or pictures online and engaging in online hate speech. Perpetrators faced no repercussions for these activities.Violence and Harassment: Police and other government agents perpetrated and tolerated violence against LGBTQI+ individuals or those reporting such abuse, according to NGO Damj Association. LGBTQI+ individuals faced societal discrimination and violence, including threats of death and rape and societal stigma. Fear of prosecution discouraged individuals from reporting violence and threats. Authorities and medical officials continued the practice of forced anal examinations, particularly for gay men, in purported attempts to gather evidence of same-sex sexual activity. Human rights organizations widely criticized the procedures as invasive, humiliating, and with no scientific value, but there was no prohibition under the law. According to NGO Lawyers without Borders, police forced an individual to undergo an anal examination after an accusation of homosexuality.Discrimination: The law did not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics, and did not recognize LGBTQI+ individuals, couples, or their families. LGBTQI+ persons reported discrimination and harassment when seeking employment, health services, education, community interactions, and interactions from police based on their identity.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: There was no legal option for individuals to change their gender markers on official documents or to express a nonbinary gender identity. Transgender and intersex individuals maintained the gender marker assigned at birth on their official documents, even after any transition or a medical intervention was undertaken. Civil society groups reported LGBTQI+ individuals were vulnerable to violence, harassment, and discrimination from society and government actors due to the lack of legal protections.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: Forced so-called conversion therapy practices were not banned, but were also not practiced, according to local rights groups.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: Activists and media reported police harassed, arbitrarily detained, assaulted, and threatened LGBTQI+ protesters during the year. Some of those subjected to abuse were also denied access to legal counsel.On January 18, police arrested Hamza Nasri, an LGBTQI+ activist, at a peaceful protest in Tunis for “insulting a police officer” and “committing an immoral act in public,” both punishable by up to six months’ imprisonment, according to Human Rights Watch. Nasri reported that he was held for three days in a detention center, after which authorities provisionally released him, pending a trial date.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Persons with disabilities had access to education, employment, health services, and transportation, but not on an equal basis with others due to infrastructure deficiencies, limited availability of services, and lack of public information. Since 1991 the law required all new public buildings to be accessible to persons with physical disabilities, and the government generally enforced the law. Persons with physical disabilities did not have access to most buildings built before 1991, and there were no reports of government plans to retrofit older buildings to make them accessible. The government did not provide for information and communications to be accessible for persons with disabilities.The Ministry of Social Affairs was charged with protecting the rights of persons with disabilities. The government issued cards to persons with disabilities for benefits such as unrestricted parking, free and priority medical services, free and preferential seating on public transportation, and consumer discounts. In general, public buses and trains were ill-suited and not easily accessible to persons with disabilities. The government provided tax incentives to companies to encourage the hiring of persons with physical disabilities.There were approximately 320 Special Education Centers in the country, including 310 schools for children with disabilities, one higher education school, and one vocational training institution. At least five of the schools for children with disabilities were dedicated solely to blind pupils. Most of these centers were administered by associations and funded primarily by the government.There were limited education options or public-sector accommodations for persons with hearing or vision disabilities. There were no schools for children with hearing disabilities, and Ibsar Association, an NGO promoting rights for persons with disabilities, estimated more than 90 percent of persons with hearing disabilities were illiterate. The government provided hearing aids to persons with hearing disabilities.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for the right of workers to organize, form, and join unions and to bargain collectively. The law allowed workers to protest or strike, provided they gave 10 days’ advance notice to their federations and received Ministry of Interior approval. Union leadership normally approved the decision to hold a strike; however, strikes not authorized by union leadership occurred periodically.The right to strike extended to civil servants, except for workers in essential services “whose interruption would endanger the lives, safety, or health of all or a section of the population.” The government did not explicitly define all essential services, but the national army, magistrates, internal security forces, and customs did not have the right to strike. Authorities largely respected the right to strike in public enterprises and services.The law prohibited antiunion discrimination by employers and retribution against strikers. The government enforced applicable laws through arrests, fines, and business closures. Penalties for violations were commensurate with those under other laws involving denial of civil rights and were regularly applied against violators. The constitution also provided for freedom of peaceful assembly and demonstration. On February 1, authorities arrested Anis Kaabi, Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) secretary general of the highway workers’ union, after Kaabi led a scheduled tollbooth workers strike on January 30. On January 31, President Saied said in a public address that “those who persist in blocking roads cannot remain outside the circle of accountability and punishment.” In a February 1 statement, the UGTT called for Kaabi’s release, stating his arrest was a violation of union rights. On February 19, authorities ordered Esther Lynch, General Secretary of the European Trade Union Confederation, to depart the country after she participated in a UGTT-organized rally to protest Kaabi’s arrest and the country’s economic situation on February 18. Kaabi remained in pretrial detention on charges of “harming public authority” at the end of the year.On November 20, authorities arrested UGTT Sfax Secretary General Youssef al-Aouedni and three labor officials from the Kerkennah Transport Union on charges of obstructing shipping between Sfax and Kerkennah, sparking demonstrations in Sfax. Two days later, UGTT Spokesman Sami Tahri said the Sfax First Instance Court had released two of the labor union officials and handed down one-month suspended prison sentences for two others.Conciliation panels with equal representation from labor and management settled many labor disputes. In other cases, representatives from the Ministry of Social Affairs, the UGTT, and the Tunisian Union for Industry, Commerce, and Handicrafts formed tripartite regional commissions to arbitrate disputes. Observers generally considered the tripartite commissions effective. Representatives from smaller rival labor unions, namely the General Confederation of Tunisian Labor and the Union of Tunisian Workers, complained their organizations were ignored and excluded from the tripartite commissions. They claimed a previous minister of social affairs, who was also a former UGTT leader, drafted a decree law explicitly aimed at excluding the smaller unions from social dialogue. The smaller unions accused the UGTT of denying the rights of laborers to freely choose the union best representing their interests.UGTT representatives alleged some private-sector businesses targeted union leaders and fired them once they led strikes or made demands on behalf of the labor force. The UGTT alleged other antiunion practices by private-sector employers, including firing union activists and employing temporary workers to deter unionization. In certain industries, including textiles, hotels, and construction, temporary workers accounted for a majority of the workforce, a practice reportedly aimed at minimizing the risk of union-related disruptions of business.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/ .																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The labor code provided for a range of administratively determined minimum wages; the minimum wages were above the poverty income level. The law set a maximum standard 48-hour workweek for manual work in the industrial and agricultural sectors and required one 24-hour rest period per week. For administrative jobs in the private and public sectors, the workweek was 40 hours with 125 percent premium pay for overtime. The law prohibited excessive compulsory overtime. Employees were statutorily awarded 18 to 23 days of paid vacation annually based on years of service. The Domestic Workers Law mandated a minimum wage, a workweek not to exceed 48 hours, and a weekly rest day. The law also required recruiting domestic workers through accredited employment offices under fixed-term or open-ended contracts. Violators could be punished with one to three months’ imprisonment and a fine.Occupational Safety and Health: Occupational safety and health (OSH) standards were appropriate for key industries in the country, including energy, agriculture and food processing, car parts, electronics, and chemicals. Responsibility for identifying unsafe situations remained with OSH experts and not the worker.Special government regulations controlled employment in hazardous occupations, such as mining, petroleum engineering, and construction. Workers were free to remove themselves from dangerous situations without jeopardizing their employment, and they could take legal action against employers that retaliated against them for exercising this right.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: Ministry of Social Affairs labor inspectors were responsible for enforcing wage, hour, and OSH regulations in the workplace; however, the number of inspectors was insufficient to enforce compliance. The government did not adequately enforce the minimum wage law, particularly in nonunionized sectors of the economy, according to labor rights organizations. Prohibitions against excessive compulsory overtime were rarely enforced.Although there was no standard practice for reporting labor code abuses, workers had the right to report these abuses to regional labor inspectors, who sometimes applied penalties against violators and had authority to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions. Penalties for violations were less than those under other laws involving denial of civil rights. Working conditions and standards generally were better in export-oriented firms, which were mostly foreign owned, than in firms producing exclusively for the domestic market, according to media reports.The informal sector made up 35.5 percent of the economy and employed 58.8 percent of the labor market in 2022. The government did not enforce labor laws in this sector, but occasionally labor inspectors coordinated spot checks with the UGTT and the Ministry of Education to monitor potential cases of child labor and informal hiring in formal businesses.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Indigenous Peoples																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs																								Tunisia
- Business Opportunities in Cybersecurity and Cloud Computing in Tunisia register by April 29, 2024May 6, 12:00 p.m. EST / 9:00 a.m. PST via WebExHosts: U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia Joey Hood and Tunisian Minister of Communication Technologies Nizar Ben Neji.Date and Time: Monday, May 6, 2024 &#8212; 12:00 p.m. EST / 9:00 a.m. PSTDescription: Join U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia Joey Hood and Tunisian Minister of Communication Technologies Ben Neji to learn about investment opportunities in cybersecurity and cloud computing in Tunisia.Tunisia has made the development of its digital economy one of its top priorities for the coming years, which stands to offer significant commercial opportunities for information and communication technologies (ICT) providers, especially in the cloud and cybersecurity sectors. The government&#8217;s recognition of the importance of digital transformation and the associated risks has led to the implementation of initiatives to enhance cybersecurity measures and promote cloud adoption. The establishment of the national agency for cybersecurity (ANSC) through the cybersecurity decree-law, for example, is meant to provide a regulatory framework for security governance policies, training programs, and the certification of cloud providers. This sets the stage for the growth of Tunisia’s cloud and cybersecurity sectors.The country is preparing to launch its first cloud computing project and create a national data storage space. The ANSC&#8217;s certification of cloud providers, including the G-cloud and N-cloud labels, presents opportunities for cloud service providers to cater to government agencies and state-essential organizations.The increased adoption of digital platforms in Tunisia, while offering long-term success and enhanced connectivity, also brings digital threats, necessitating robust cloud security and cybersecurity solutions. The demand for secure data storage and the need to align the supply chain with rising digital demand may create opportunities for the installation of advanced software-based security infrastructure. Efforts to promote intelligent automation and improved consumer experiences further contribute to the growth prospects of Tunisia’s cybersecurity sector.We look forward to welcoming any U.S. firms interested in learning more to this Direct Line Program webinar.Please register by April 29, 2024.						Tags																					Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs																								Tunisia
- Tunisia National Day Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the United States, I would like to extend my congratulations as Tunisia marks its National Day on March 20.Building on over 200 years of friendship, the United States deeply values its strategic partnership with Tunisia. Our cooperation is critical to promoting economic opportunity and advancing regional stability. We will continue to firmly stand by the Tunisian people as they strive for inclusive economic development. The United States remains committed to working with the Tunisian people to achieve these shared goals of prosperity, security, and respect for fundamental freedoms.
- Tunisia HomeReportsBureau of CounterterrorismCountry Reports on Terrorism 2022&#8230;Tunisia				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							Country Reports on Terrorism 2022: Tunisia																																					Bureau of Counterterrorism																																																																																																				 In this section																																												Tunisia																																												Tunisia				Overview:  Counterterrorism (CT) and border security continued to be a top priority of the Government of Tunisia in 2022.  The risk of terrorist activity remained elevated, exacerbated by sustained Libyan instability.  However, no notable terrorist attacks occurred in 2022.  Tunisia continued to professionalize its security apparatus in partnership with the United States.  Its commitment to joint Ministries of Interior (MOI) and Defense (MOD) CT operations steadily degraded Violent Extremist Organization capacity within the country.  However, the Government of Tunisia misused terrorism-related charges to arrest and prosecute individuals for expression and peaceful activism.  Tunisia demonstrated consistent security force readiness and carried out CT operations throughout the year.  It continued implementation of a national preventing/countering violent extremism strategy and freezing of terrorist assets, and it demonstrated improvements in CT crisis response, coordination, and investigation.2022 Terrorist Incidents:  There were no terrorist incidents of note in 2022.Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:  There were no major changes to CT legislation in 2022.Overall, the Government of Tunisia’s (GOT’s) CT efforts continued to demonstrate advances in successful CT operations and improved coordination between MOI and MOD security elements.  There was cooperation with Embassy Tunis on investigations, prosecutions, and prevention of terrorist activity aimed at U.S. interests in Tunisia and beyond.The Tunisian National Counterterrorism Commission (CNLCT) worked on revising the National Counterterrorism Strategy through a consultative process with ministries and civil society organization stakeholders.  The strategy is meant to include Tunisian civil society and multiple government agencies in countering violent extremism.  CNLCT presented it to the presidency for approval in the fall, and it remained under review at year’s end.The GOT had specific capabilities to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks against soft targets, such as hotels, stadia, tourist resorts, and cultural sites, in line with UN Security Council resolution 2341’s call for UN member states to improve efforts to protect critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks.  Safeguarding tourist zones remained a GOT emphasis, with work continuing in the context of the G-7+7 Tourist and Cultural Sites Protection project group.Border security remained a top GOT priority in 2022 owing to continued Libyan instability.  The Tunisian Armed Forces, along with the MOI’s National Guard, successfully employed U.S.-funded patrol craft, vehicles, and weapons in joint operations throughout 2022.  The second phase of the southern electronic border surveillance system, a joint Tunisian-U.S.-German project launched in 2016, was completed in March.  The maritime coastal surveillance system continued to provide full coverage along the entire Tunisian coast.  As part of interdiction and border security support efforts, the United States provided training in advanced travel document examination.Regarding the repatriation and reintegration of Tunisians from foreign conflict zones, namely fighters and associated family members, Tunisia did not repatriate any such nationals in 2022.  Tunisia’s ability to reintegrate such individuals remained very limited.  The GOT had limited prosecutorial, prison, and social services-related capacity necessary for rehabilitation and reintegration efforts.Significant CT-related law enforcement actions against terrorists and terrorist groups reported publicly included the following:Between January 1 and April 1, the MOI announced that 148 terrorist cells were identified and dismantled.  One of the terrorism-linked arrests was a March 16 operation dismantling an ISIS-affiliated cell in the Libyan-Tunisian border region of Tataouine.  According to the MOI, the group manufactured IEDs and recruited youth in the region.On January 10 the MOI arrested a 22-year-old woman returning from Syria.  Investigations revealed that her partner was a known terrorist who had recently been arrested for planning terrorist operations targeting senior government officials.The GOT conducted two significant operations in September that led to multiple arrests, the deaths of wanted terrorists, and the seizure of weapons and IEDs.  The first was along the Algeria-Tunisia border, the second along the Libyan-Tunisian border.  The MOI reported that the targets of the operation along the Algeria-Tunisia border were allegedly part of the ISIS-affiliated Jund al-Khilafah Brigade.  These counterterrorism raids reflected the persistent terrorist threat in the region and along Tunisia’s southern and western borders and highlighted the efficacy of U.S. assistance in improving capacity and interagency cooperation among MOI and MOD forces, both of which are engaged in CT operations.Tunisia has been under a state of emergency since 2015, and President Saied continued to extend it.  Human rights organizations have criticized the repeated extensions for giving the executive extraordinary powers that limit judicial transparency and due process.  Human rights organizations also have objected to the counterterrorism law for its vague definition of terrorism, the broad leeway it gives judges to admit testimony by anonymous witnesses, and the way it can be misused to prosecute individuals for exercising their freedom of expression. The National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists has criticized what it characterizes as a pattern of Tunisian authorities’ misusing CT laws to intimidate journalists and activists.For example, on March 18, the National Guard’s Counterterrorism Unit detained and interrogated Radio Mosaïque FM journalist Khelifa Guesmi, charging him under the country’s CT law for publishing and refusing to reveal his sources for a story covering the dismantling of a terrorist group in Kairouan.  The CT Unit also interrogated Mosaïque journalist Amal Manai and editor Houcine Dabbabi in the same case; Guesmi later was sentenced to one year in prison.The National Police, the National Guard, and the military continued to benefit from U.S.-provided capacity building assistance, including training focused on investigative skills, interagency cooperation, and tactical skills; embedded mentors within the National Guard and National Police antiterrorism units; and train-the-trainer courses.  The National Guard, the National Police, and members of civil society were trained on community policing techniques, and U.S. assistance rehabilitated and refurbished buildings for community police stations.  Additional assistance included the completion of a National Guard operations room and the renovation of CT judicial facilities.  The first of six tethered aerostat systems were delivered to the National Guard in late 2022, which will provide a long-endurance tactical surveillance capability for a more secure western border.The GOT continued to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement authorities to prevent acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens or interests in the country; however, owing to significant and troubling democratic backsliding and concerns over the use of CT units to target government critics and other political figures, broader cooperation at times remained challenging and inefficient.Countering the Financing of Terrorism:  Tunisia is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, and its FIU, the Tunisian Financial Analysis Committee, is a member of the Egmont Group.In 2022 the CNLCT monitored numerous individuals, organizations, and entities with ties to terrorist organizations and made periodic updates to the frozen assets list.  In October the CNLCT froze the funds and assets of 26 Tunisians suspected of links to terrorists.  As of December 6, the list included 57 individuals, organizations, and entities with ties to terror groups whose assets were frozen.Countering Violent Extremism:  Tunisia remained committed to preventing radicalization to violence through youth and educational programs coordinated among its ministries and civil society organizations.  The U.S. Agency for International Development’s MA3AN program (“Together” in Arabic) — a 7-year, $60 million youth resilience and community empowerment program, worked with the CNLCT and local and national stakeholders to develop the National Counterterrorism Strategy.  The complementary Solutions to Violent Extremism program worked with local governorates to analyze drivers and dynamics of violent extremism and develop methodologies for countering violent extremism.  In 2022 the Tunisian Scouts expanded their CT Bureau-funded Scouts Impact CVE program to export their CVE merit badge concept to national scouting organizations in Morocco, Algeria, and Libya.  International and Regional Cooperation:  Tunisia is a board member for the International Institute of Justice and Rule of Law, participated in Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS events, and is a recipient country for CVE assistance from the Global Community Engagement and Resiliency Fund.  The MOI agreed to second a representative to a multinational platform focused on battlefield evidence for use in prosecution of foreign fighters.																												    							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- Assistant Secretary Witkowsky’s Travel to Libya and Tunisia Office of the SpokespersonAssistant Secretary for Conflict and Stabilization Operations Anne A. Witkowsky visited Tripoli, Libya, accompanied by U.S. Special Envoy to Libya Ambassador Richard Norland on October 10.The Assistant Secretary met with the Presidential Council and other Libyan officials to welcome continued input and engagement from Libyan partners as progress continues on the implementation of the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability in Libya. She conveyed the United States’ condolences on the devastation wrought by dam failures and flooding in Derna and reiterated that the United States stands with the Libyan people in confronting this tragedy.The Assistant Secretary reinforced continued U.S. support for Libyan institutions and individuals in their work towards peace, prosperity, and democratic representation for all Libyans. She encouraged progress toward stability and national reconciliation, including through the participation of women and other groups historically underrepresented or marginalized, as integral elements of the development and peacebuilding process.Assistant Secretary Witkowsky continued the dialogue on the United States’ longstanding security and development partnership with Libya in Tunis, Tunisia on October 11, where she met with representatives of the United Nations and other organizations operating in Libya to foster information sharing and support for our efforts there. For further information, follow @StateCSO on Twitter or contact CSOPublicAffairs1@state.gov.
- 2023 Secretary’s Award for Global Anti-Racism Champions  Office of the SpokespersonTomorrow, August 9, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken will give the first annual Secretary’s Global Anti-Racism Champions Awards.  This group of global civil society leaders has courageously advanced the human rights of members of marginalized racial, ethnic, and Indigenous communities and combatted systemic racism, discrimination, and xenophobia worldwide.  The 2023 awardees are:Kari Guajajara – BrazilKari Guajajara is an Indigenous leader from the Brazilian Amazon who serves as the legal advisor for Indigenous representative organizations.  She is a trained lawyer specializing in promoting Indigenous Peoples’ rights, combating gender-based violence and protecting the environment.  Kari is native from the Araribóia Indigenous land and belongs to the Guajajara-Tenetehára People, who have been suffering extensive losses of their traditional territories, devastating losses of life, and disruptions of tradition due to contact with non-Indigenous groups.Oswaldo Bilbao Lobatón &#8211; PeruOswaldo Bilbao Lobatón, an Afro-Peruvian activist, has spent more than four decades fighting for the recognition and rights for Afro-Peruvians, one of Peru’s least visible and most disadvantaged populations.  He was part of the committee that organized the first meeting of Black communities in Peru in 1992, bringing together for the first time in its history more than 100 Afro-Peruvian representatives from around the country.  He is currently a member of the International Coalition for the Defense, Conservation, Protection of Territories, Environment, Land Use, and Climate Change of Afro-descendant Peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean.Rani Yan Yan – BangladeshRani Yan Yan is an indigenous human rights defender and women’s rights activist who has brought international attention to the plight of her community in the Chittagong Hill Tracts region of Bangladesh.  As a leader from the Chakma Circle, Yan Yan actively advocates for vulnerable populations facing government-sponsored discrimination, land grabbing, violence and the adverse effects of climate change.  As a direct result of Yan Yan&#8217;s activism, the international community has gained new awareness of the violence committed against indigenous peoples’ communities and minority groups in Bangladesh. Throughout her career, Yan Yan has advised domestic and international organizations on climate resiliency and gender equality, researched the political participation of indigenous women, and mentored youth activists on diversity and social inclusion.  Yan Yan has emerged as a fearless voice and outspoken advocate for equal rights and justice, despite facing immense discrimination and even violence.Saadia Mosbah – TunisiaSaadia Mosbah is a Tunisian activist who has dedicated her life to fighting racial discrimination and prejudice, as well as defending the rights of Black Tunisians.  In 2013, after several unsuccessful attempts to launch an association that fights racial discrimination during President Ben Ali’s rule, she finally established Mnemty, “My Dream,” an association that endeavors to raise awareness about the value of diversity and importance of equality, to denounce racism in public spaces, ensure legal protection for all, elevate the profile of the Black population in the cultural sphere, and promote socio-economic development in predominantly black communities.  Saadia’s activism, alongside that of several human rights activists, contributed to the adoption of the law in Tunisia criminalizing racial discrimination on October 9, 2018.   For Mosbah, the law is an achievement, but incomplete, as it lacks a universal declaration that denounces all forms of discrimination irrespective of religion, language, or skin color.Sarswati Nepali – NepalSarswati Nepali is an acclaimed social activist and President of the Dalit Society Development Forum, and a lifelong defender of the human rights of marginalized castes, the disabled, and the poor.  For over twenty years, Sarswati has demonstrated sustained leadership in advancing the human rights of members of the most marginalized ethnic communities in Nepal.  Born into a Dalit – or so called “untouchable” caste – family in Nepal’s underdeveloped far-western region, Sarswati played a crucial role in Dalit social justice movements to acquire land rights, gain access to education, and obtain equal justice from the courts. Sarswati’s decades of advocacy on behalf of those in the most need and her demonstrated success in attaining justice and providing a voice to the marginalized are a model of courage in the pursuit of dignity and human rights. Victorina Luca – MoldovaVictorina Luca, human rights lawyer and founder of the Roma Awareness Foundation, has been a champion of racial equity in Moldova for more than fifteen years.  She has lent her expertise to international organizations, including the United Nations, World Bank, and Council of Europe, as an expert in the inclusion of marginalized people.  Ms. Luca operates Radio Patrin Moldova, which broadcasts the proud language and culture of Moldovan Roma to audiences all over the world.  She has studied at the Free University of Moldova, Sweden’s Lund University, and Central European University.  She speaks Romani, Romanian, Russian, and English, and lives with her son in Chisinau.For more details about the event, click here.
- Department Press Briefing – July 26, 2023 Vedant Patel, Principal Deputy Spokesperson													HomeDepartment Press Briefing – July 26, 2023				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – July 26, 2023																																																					July 26, 2023																																																																																																				Article Index																									NIGERISRAEL/PALESTINIAN TERRITORIESCAMBODIADEPARTMENTGEORGIAAFGHANISTANPALESTINIAN TERRITORIESALGERIA/TUNISIAGEORGIARUSSIA/UKRAINEBANGLADESHCHINAPAKISTAN/RUSSIADEPARTMENTNORTH KOREA																													1:16 p.m. EDTMR PATEL: Good afternoon, everybody. I have one very – actually, I don’t have anything at the top. I don’t know why I said that. So happy to dive right in.As the only person in this row, go ahead, Daphne.QUESTION: If I could start with Niger.MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: Are you concerned that the events that are happening in Niger violate – would violate U.S. law barring aid to coup regimes at all? And is that why you’re avoiding coup language and statements on this?MR PATEL: So this is an evolving situation, and the situation remains incredibly fluid, and thus it’s too soon to characterize the nature of ongoing developments. What I can say is a couple things.First, we are closely monitoring the situation and are in close communication with our embassy in Niger. What I can also share is that the embassy has conducted a full accountability for all official personnel and family members. But these events continue to evolve. As such, we’ve also publicly advised U.S. citizens to limit unnecessary movement and avoid some of the affected areas until further notice as the situation develops.But broadly, let me just reiterate, since you asked – we are gravely concerned about the developments in Niger. We strongly support the democratically elected president, President Bazoum, and we condemn in the strongest terms any efforts to seize power by force and disrupt the constitutional order. We also call for the immediate release of President Bazoum and respect for the rule of law and public safety.QUESTION: Are you concerned this might have an impact on security assistance to Niger going forward, though?MR PATEL: Again, I think this is just – it is still an evolving situation and I don’t want to speculate or be speculative about this as it unfolds.QUESTION: And has the State Department had any contact with President Bazoum or the Nigerien military?MR PATEL: I don’t have any calls or engagements to read out.All right. Said, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. The Palestinian issue. Yesterday Israeli settlers, aided by soldiers, apparently, went into the homes of Palestinians in al-Abid and a couple of other places too, but I don’t have it, and basically stole goods and things from there and threw them out. My question to you is this happens, of course, day in and day out. This is not just one incident. But absent any kind of judicial recourse for the Palestinians, especially with the new – these new judicial reforms and so on, would you support the Palestinians going into the ICC or other international bodies for seeking justice?MR PATEL: Said, you’ve heard me previously say that we have not viewed the ICC as the appropriate mechanism for some of these deliberations. Our position has been very clear. We believe that Israelis and Palestinians equally deserve to live safely, securely, and deserve to enjoy equal measures of freedom, justice, dignity, and prosperity. We also remain deeply concerned about the level of violence in the West Bank, and condemn all extremist violence.We also, Said, are troubled by rising reports of settler violence. Such violence has led to at least four Palestinian communities evacuating their villages. Our viewpoint is that accountability and justice should be pursued with equal rigor in all cases of extremist violence, and we expect the Israeli Government to ensure full accountability for those responsible for such attacks, including legal action and restitution for lost homes and property, as appropriate.QUESTION: Do you have any evidence that the Israelis have done this in the past, that there was actually accountability? People that committed these crimes were held accountable, restitution was paid? Because I fail to see it. I’ve never seen it. So – and absent these – this judicial recourse or accountability recourse and so on, what should the Palestinians do to protect their property, to ensure that they are not being ethnically cleansed or children being abruptly arrested and so on? What are they to do?MR PATEL: Said, we have been incredibly clear about our concern about the levels of violence and the increasing levels of violence in the West Bank, and we’ve condemned all extremist violence. I’m not here to offer some kind of metric or assessment on efforts to ensure full accountability and to hold those responsible accountable. But we’ve been very clear that that is what we expect of the Israeli Government.QUESTION: And one last thing.MR PATEL: Uh-huh.QUESTION: There are many reports that predict either the imminent collapse of the Palestinian Authority or the Palestinian Authority losing any kind of legitimacy or ability to conduct itself. Are you aware of these reports, and what is the United States doing in terms of to aid the PA?MR PATEL: Said, I’m not aware nor would I speak to any of these specific reports. What I can just say is that we believe very clearly, and you’ve heard me say this before, that we are incredibly committed to a two-state solution. And of course part of that is engagement with the Palestinian authorities about issues that are important to this whole conversation, and ensuring that appropriate humanitarian assistance and aid can flow appropriately. And we will continue to support the Palestinian people.You have seen, over the course of Secretary Blinken’s travels, the President’s travels to the region, us talk about how important direct engagement with the PA and the Palestinian people is – how important it is. We’ve also done – ensured to take steps to announce steps to deepen our support for the Palestinian people as well.Leon, coming back to the front. Go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah, I’m sorry, I &#8212;MR PATEL: No, no, no, you’re all good.QUESTION: There was no two-minute warning, so &#8212;MR PATEL: Uh-oh.QUESTION: &#8212; I missed the beginning. So I assume you’ve talked about Niger and all that &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; so I’m not going to go back, obviously, there since I missed it. Just a question on Cambodia, maybe.MR PATEL: Mm-hmm.QUESTION: Do you have any reaction to the fact that Hun Sen, the prime minister, is resigning and appointed his son as the new leader of the – Cambodia? How does the United States view that?MR PATEL: So the department put out a statement earlier in the week, Leon, and we continue to be troubled that the elections were neither free nor fair. These elections on July 23rd and the Cambodian authorities’ pattern of threats and harassment against the political opposition throughout the electoral process denied the Cambodian people a voice as well as a choice in determining the future of their country. We’re going to continue to monitor any developments post-election. We’ll do – we’ll do so carefully. We also understand that Cambodia’s new cabinet will be sworn in in late August.As the Cambodian People’s Party forms a new government, authorities have an opportunity to improve the country’s international standing, including restoring genuine multiparty democracy, ending politically motivated trials, and reversing convictions of government critics and allowing independent media to reopen and function without interference.QUESTION: But specifically on the new – on the fact that his son is going to take over the government there?MR PATEL: I think I was pretty – pretty clear, Leon, in &#8212;QUESTION: Are you ready to work with him regardless?MR PATEL: &#8212; in that – I think we were incredibly clear that we were troubled by these elections and we have not found them free nor fair, and certainly the way that they were conducted denied the Cambodian people a voice and a choice in determining the future of their own country. Julia, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. I just wanted to ask if you had any updates to share regarding the Rob Malley House Foreign Affairs request. We’ve seen reports that the State Department reached an agreement with them to have a briefing behind closed doors this week, perhaps even today. I was wondering if you could share a status update with that.MR PATEL: We continue to be in communication with Congress and be in communication about their requests for additional information and briefings on this matter, including correspondence with the House Foreign Affairs Committee. We anticipate that we’ll be providing them additional briefings shortly, but I don’t have any other specific updates to offer on that.QUESTION: Thank you. And then I – shifting gears a bit.MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: On Georgia, I was wondering if you could comment on the accusations from the Georgian Government that U.S. embassy staff in Tbilisi participate in lobbying activities on behalf of the former imprisoned president. And how do hostile incidences impact the U.S.-Georgia relations?MR PATEL: Sure. So to be – and I want to be incredibly clear about this: The U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi has never engaged in lobbying on behalf of former Georgian President Saakashvili. The embassy meets with a wide variety of people and organizations, as do our embassies and consulates across the world. While I certainly would not get into the specifics of private diplomatic meetings, we can confirm again that the embassy has never engaged in lobbying on behalf of the former Georgian president.Go ahead.QUESTION: So according to a previous statement from the State Department today, the U.S. officials will meet Taliban representatives in Doha this week. I was wondering if you could have any further details in this meeting, and does this meeting in Doha indicate any change in the U.S. position towards Taliban?MR PATEL: I don’t have any additional details to offer beyond what was laid out in the media note that we shared indicating travel for Special Representative Tom West and Rina Amiri, but also know this does not indicate any change in policy of the United States. We have been very clear that we will engage with the Taliban appropriately when it is our interest – in our interest to do so. This does not – this is not intended to mean any kind of indication of recognition or any kind of indication of normalization or legitimacy of the Taliban. The comments I made yesterday very clearly about our continued concerns about backsliding in Afghanistan, the egregious human rights abuses that the Taliban is undertaking, their marginalization of Afghan women and girls – all of those things and many others continue to be of immense concern to the United States.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Your people, on the – on the military level and also on diplomatic level – they met with the Peshmerga forces in Kurdistan region about the process of reforming the Kurdistan region, then including the recent meeting between (inaudible) and also Peshmerga coordination meeting. Then the question is that have you gave any deadline to the Ministry of Peshmerga to come up with a solid result for their reform? And the second: What will be the next step that the U.S. will take against the Peshmerga forces if they are not meeting – if they are not meeting the goals that you set with them before the annual review in September this year?MR PATEL: I’m going to have to get back to you on that. I don’t have any updates to offer at the moment.QUESTION: It’s expected that President Erdogan will visit Baghdad next week, and then they are discussing two main issues – three main issues. One of them is water conflict between Iraq and Türkiye, and also the other one is oil exporting. (Inaudible) that you were engaged with both Ankara and Baghdad on the oil exporting, the (inaudible) oil exporting. Then are you still engaging on this? What’s your engagement on that? And what do you expect on this visit when President Erdogan meet with the Russian &#8212;MR PATEL: Sure. So I’m just not going to get into the specifics of diplomatic conversations and engagements that we’ve had, either with our Turkish or Iraqi partners. And as it relates to the visit itself, I would let those two countries speak about what they intend to discuss. I don’t have &#8212;QUESTION: With regard to the oil exporting stoppage from the Kurdistan region (inaudible)? This is the fourth month, and do you have still engagement with both countries on this matter?MR PATEL: I just don’t have anything additional to share on that at the moment.Go ahead, yeah.QUESTION: Circling back to Said’s questions on the Palestinian question.MR PATEL: Sure, yeah.QUESTION: Fatah and Hamas leaders met today in Türkiye. I was just wondering, is that something that you guys were tracking? Have you spoken to your contacts in Fatah – sorry – about the contents of that meeting? And then separately, but staying in the region, Algeria and Tunisia facing devastating wildfires. Are there any plans to send aid over there?MR PATEL: Sure. So first, let me take your first question. Echoing what I said to Said is that we continue to remain absolutely committed to a two-state solution, and we continue to stress that any Palestinian Government must unambiguously and explicitly commit to nonviolence, recognition of the state of Israel, acceptance of previous agreements and obligations between the parties, and peaceful negotiations. And the U.S. rejects terrorism in all its forms, and we’ve been very clear that Hamas remains a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization. In terms of the wildfires, we are continuing monitoring the situation, and of course are operating in close coordination with allies and partners in the region. I don’t have anything to preview in terms of any potential aid or the provision of such, but we’ll continue to monitor the situation closely and engage as any requests come in.Yeah, Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Vedant. I have a couple questions on Ukraine, but (inaudible) Georgia.MR PATEL: I’m sure you do.QUESTION: Can you expand a little bit on what’s your assessment on why – what motivates them to go after the U.S. embassy? Any assessment on &#8212;MR PATEL: I am not going to offer a psychological assessment up here on why they choose to say anything one way or the other. What I want to just reiterate again, as I said answering Julia’s question, is that the embassy in Tbilisi has never engaged in lobbying on behalf of the former Georgian president.QUESTION: It’s also part of a larger campaign that we have noticed lately; they go after critics, reporters who ask questions about Georgia. I was just wondering if this causes any cracks in your relationship, or potential it might cause any cracks in your relationship.MR PATEL: I’m just not going to speculate on that, Alex. Again, as it relates to the crux of your question, we have never engaged in lobbying on behalf of the former Georgian president.QUESTION: On Ukraine. You guys are back to UNESCO. Yesterday the Secretary made a statement about that; congratulations. Now that you raise your flags, I’m just wondering if you think that Russia deserves to be in UNESCO, given everything it has done, most recently last weekend in Odesa.MR PATEL: So Alex, whether entry into UNESCO or not ultimately is not just a singularity, a decision for the United States; it would be up to the entirety of the organization. So I will not speculate on that or give any additional thoughts there.But to your point, Alex, yes, it is absolutely – it was concerning last weekend, it continues to be concerning, that in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative we saw within days and hours attacks on Ukrainian ports, attacks on Ukrainian grain infrastructure, continued efforts to target civilians and civilian infrastructure – efforts that we see as very black and white that are ultimately weaponizing food, which we have been very clear that the back – Black Sea Grain Initiative has been an important tool for the world in an effort to get grain to the countries and places that it needs to.QUESTION: Did you guys take part at today’s NATO-Ukraine Council meeting?MR PATEL: Today’s what?QUESTION: NATO-Ukraine Council meeting today. It was &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m not sure what U.S. representation there was. I am sure there was, but I can – we can check and get specifics for you.QUESTION: Okay. Thanks so much. My final on Ukraine: Yesterday there was another announcement of U.S. military aid. We still did not see ATACMS nor F-16s. As Secretary rightfully keeps saying that if Russia stops the war, there will be no war. But there are also critics saying that if Ukraine obtains F-16s and ATACMS there will be no war, there will be peace. Do you have any reason to explain why would you not provide Ukraine with those weapons that might be essential to stop this war?MR PATEL: So over the course of this entire war through the Department of Defense contact group process and other mechanisms, we have offered the types of military assistance that we feel is best suited for the various states of this conflict. I will note that the U.S. is the world’s leading provider of arms and equipment to Ukraine and will continue to use the wide range of tools available to support Ukraine’s armed forces as they defend Russia’s aggression. I will also note that we are going to continue to take steps to do all that we can to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, including launching new joint efforts with our partners to train Ukraine’s pilots on F-16s, as we announced a couple months ago. We will support a joint effort with allies and partners to train them on fourth generation fighter aircraft, including F-16s, to further and strengthen the capabilities of the Ukrainian Air Force.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant. If I could go to Bangladesh media report, the ministry of foreign affairs summoned the heads of 13 foreign missions, including the United States, United Kingdom, and the EU, for their recent condemning of the recent attack on the Dhaka-17 by election independent candidate. And earlier, July 20th, they summon even resident coordinator. So you were urging for free, fair and election and all the Western allies and the development partner, they’re urging free, fair election, but government is doing the other way around. They’re summon diplomats in Dhaka. So what is your comment and what is your reaction on that?MR PATEL: So we’ve been clear that political violence has not place in a democracy and that the U.S. favors no political party. We support Bangladesh’s goal of holding a free, fair, and peaceful election. And I will note, though, that we’ve always emphasized the importance of the United States and Bangladesh working together to achieve Bangladesh’s goal of free and fair elections. It’s an important aspect of our bilateral relationship. And we believe that free and fair elections are a shared priority, and many Bangladeshi Government officials, including the prime minister, have themselves said that it is their goal.Go ahead.QUESTION: So TikTok is set to be launching an e-commerce platform in the U.S. to sell goods made in China, and I’m wondering if you have any comments on that?MR PATEL: I don’t. That really doesn’t fall into the purview of the State Department, the provision of whether an app and its follow-on products related to it are available for consumption in the United States or not. What I can say is from the State Department’s point of view, we’ve been clear – at least as it relates to TikTok – that they are not available or sanctioned to be used on State Department and U.S. Government devices. And so I would just leave it at that.Go ahead.QUESTION: On China as well, do you have any updates on the operations of the State Department’s China House? And has anyone been chosen or replaced Rick Waters as its head?MR PATEL: I have no personnel updates to announce for you, but of course our team in China House continues to be working directly with bureaus across the department to work on issues related to, of course, the PRC and the nexus of issues between the PRC and other regions of the world. It’s something, of course, that ties into Secretary Blinken’s modernization agenda for the department, and we believe an important avenue to continue doing important work related to this department’s China policy.Julia.QUESTION: Any comment on – I’m sorry – on the dismissal of Foreign Minister Qin Gang?MR PATEL: I spoke about this yesterday.QUESTION: Yes. I mean, any new developments now that &#8212;MR PATEL: No new developments. I will just reiterate what I said to your colleagues yesterday, that it is up to – which I think you were here, Said &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah, I was. I’m just saying &#8212;MR PATEL: &#8212; so I don’t know why. (Laughter).QUESTION: &#8212; that things have changed.MR PATEL: Have they?QUESTION: Yes. I mean, the &#8212;MR PATEL: Okay. I’m not sure about that. As I said yesterday, it is up to the PRC to decide who their foreign minister is. Secretary Blinken also spoke to this at his press conference in Tonga. He has known Foreign Minister Wang Yi for a long time and has the opportunity – has had the opportunity to engage with him over a number of instances, including most recently in Jakarta and in Beijing before that. We think it is important for us to continue to maintain open lines and open channels of communications with PRC officials.Julia, and I’ll come back to you, Leon. Go ahead.QUESTION: I wanted to ask about reports that the Pakistani foreign minister spoke with Sergey Lavrov about the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Is that something the State Department’s aware of and are there any updates on that front?MR PATEL: I will leave it to those two countries to read out any calls or engagements that they might have had. What I can share is that Secretary Blinken – and I believe I spoke a little bit about this yesterday – had the opportunity to speak with Foreign Minister Bhutto Zardari as well. They spoke earlier in the week and they of course discussed a number of issues that I talked about yesterday: a commitment to the people of Pakistan, highlighting the economic success of Pakistan, how that remains a top priority for the United States. They also of course discussed the destabilizing effects of Russia’s war in Ukraine and how that is a shared priority for the United States and Pakistan, and of course food security and Russia’s weaponization of grain in the context of all that of course continues to be a top priority for us as well.QUESTION: And quickly, any predictions for the U.S. Women’s National Team match tonight?MR PATEL: I feel like if I make a prediction and it doesn’t go well, you guys are going to come back to me tomorrow, but I think they’re going to win. I think this is a phenomenal team. If you watched the match earlier in the week, I think they – just the – had amazing performance against Vietnam, and so looking forward to catching it later this evening. So I think they’re going to do great.Leon.QUESTION: Maybe the Secretary will give them some luck since &#8212;MR PATEL: Well, he had the opportunity – some of you probably saw – he had the opportunity to speak with them briefly yesterday, so I know we’re all really excited about that.QUESTION: Vedant, I – obviously we talked about this yesterday, but I would be remiss if I didn’t ask, if it hasn’t been asked already, just an update on two cases, the one of Trevor Reed and Travis King.MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: On Trevor Reed, do we know anything more about the circumstances to which it happened and what his health condition is right now?MR PATEL: I don’t have any other updates on this, Leon, out of privacy concerns. I spoke a great deal about this yesterday but don’t have any other updates, and out of private concerns we really won’t have any additional information to share.QUESTION: And on Travis King, any communication or something from the North Koreans?MR PATEL: No updates or news to share or anything to read out. What I will just reiterate again is what I said yesterday, is that his well-being and getting as much information as we possible about his status and well-being continues to be a top priority for the United States.Did you have your hand up?QUESTION: No, (inaudible).MR PATEL: Okay. All right, one – then we’ll &#8212;QUESTION: Will you brief the House Foreign Affairs in Congress about Rob Malley this week?MR PATEL: Julia asked that question a couple minutes ago, so we’re going to leave it at that.QUESTION: Okay, and then is there any &#8212;MR PATEL: Thanks, everybody. We’re going to wrap. Thank you.(The briefing was concluded at 1:43 p.m.)						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Algeria																								Bangladesh																								Cambodia																								China																								Georgia																								Israel																								Niger																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Tunisia																								Ukraine
- Tunisia HomeReportsBureau of Economic and Business Affairs2023 Investment Climate Statements&#8230;Tunisia				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Investment Climate Statements: Tunisia																																																																																												 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment																																																									Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment																																																																											Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment																																																																											Other Investment Policy Reviews																																																																											Business Facilitation																																																																											Outward Investment																																																																																	2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties																															3. Legal Regime																																																									Transparency of the Regulatory System																																																																											International Regulatory Considerations																																																																											Legal System and Judicial Independence																																																																											Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment																																																																											Competition and Antitrust Laws																																																																											Expropriation and Compensation																																																																											Dispute Settlement																																																																			ICSID Convention and New York Convention																																																								Investor-State Dispute Settlement																																																								International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts																																																																																																																		Bankruptcy Regulations																																																																																	4. Industrial Policies																																																									Investment Incentives																																																																											Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation																																																																											Performance and Data Localization Requirements																																																																																	5. Protection of Property Rights																																																									Real Property																																																																											Intellectual Property Rights																																																																																	6. Financial Sector																																																									Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment																																																																											Money and Banking System																																																																											Foreign Exchange and Remittances																																																																			Foreign Exchange																																																								Remittance Policies																																																																																																																		Sovereign Wealth Funds																																																																																	7. State-Owned Enterprises																																																									Privatization Program																																																																																	8. Responsible Business Conduct																																																									Additional Resources																																																																											Climate Issues																																																																																	9. Corruption																																																									Resources to Report Corruption																																																																																	10. Political and Security Environment																															11. Labor Policies and Practices																															12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Other Investment Insurance or Development Finance Programs																															13. Foreign Direct Investment Statistics																															14. Contact for More Information																																																					EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				In 2022, Tunisia’s economy continued to be heavily impacted by the effects of Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine. Despite a slow recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, Tunisia’s GDP grew by only 2.4 percent in 2022 after 3.1 percent growth in 2021, and a record contraction of 8.8 percent in 2020. The country still faces high unemployment, high inflation, and rising levels of public debt, in addition to shortages of food products, medicines, and energy commodities due to the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.On July 25, 2021, citing widespread protests and political paralysis, President Saied took “exceptional measures” under Article 80 of the 2014 constitution to dismiss the prime minister, freeze parliament’s activities for 30 days, and lift the immunity of members of parliament. On August 23, 2021, Saied announced an indefinite extension of the “exceptional measures” period and on September 22, 2021, he issued a decree granting the president certain executive, legislative, and judiciary powers and authority to rule by decree. On September 29, 2021 Saied named Najla Bouden Romdhane as prime minister, and on October 11, she formed a government.In a July 25, 2022, referendum, 94.6 percent of voters approved a new constitution, much of which President Saied personally drafted. The constitution concentrates powers in the presidency, removes checks and balances on the executive, weakens the parliament, and gives the president enhanced authorities over the judiciary and the legislature.Elections for the first chamber of Parliament, the Assembly of People’s Representatives, were held in December 2022 with a turnout of 11.4 percent.  Elections for the second chamber, the National Council of Regions and Districts, have not been announced (as of April 2023). International and domestic observers assessed that December 2022 parliamentary elections were technically well-administered but lacked legitimacy and fell short of international standards.Before the pandemic and President Saied’s decisions on July 25, 2021, successive governments had advanced some much-needed structural reforms in an effort to improve Tunisia’s business climate, including an improved bankruptcy law, investment code, an initial “negative list,” a law enabling public-private partnerships, and a supplemental law designed to improve the investment climate. The Government of Tunisia (GOT) encouraged entrepreneurship through the passage of the Start-Up Act in June 2018. The GOT passed a new budget law in January 2019 that ensures greater budgetary transparency and makes the public aware of government investment projects over a three-year period. These reforms are intended to help Tunisia attract both foreign and domestic investment.Nevertheless, substantial bureaucratic barriers to investment remain and additional economic reforms have yet to be achieved. State-owned enterprises play a large role in Tunisia’s economy, and some sectors are not open to foreign investment. The informal sector, estimated at 40 to 60 percent of the overall economy, remains problematic, as legitimate businesses are forced to compete with smuggled goods. Due to a growing budget deficit, the GOT sought international lending support in 2022. In October 2022, the GOT and the IMF reached a staff-level agreement on economic policies and reforms to be supported by a new 48-month Extended Fund Facility (EFF) of $1.9 billion. However, final approval has yet to occur as of April 2023.Tunisia’s strengths include its proximity to Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East; preferential or free-trade agreements with the EU and much of Africa; an educated workforce; and a strong interest in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). Sectors such as agribusiness, aerospace, infrastructure, renewable energy (notably green hydrogen), telecommunication technologies, and services remain promising. The decline in the value of the dinar over recent years has strengthened investment and export activity in the electronic component manufacturing and textile sectors.Since 2011, the United States has provided more than $500 million in economic growth-related assistance, in addition to loan guarantees in 2012, 2014, and 2016 that enabled the GOT to borrow nearly $1.5 billion at low interest rates.Table 1: Key Metrics and RankingsMeasureYearIndex/RankWebsite AddressTI Corruption Perceptions Index202285 of 180http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview  Global Innovation Index202273 of 132https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator  U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions)2021USD 241https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheetWorld Bank GNI per capita2021USD 3,540http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD  																																					1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment						    																																																Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment										The GOT has made efforts to improve the business climate and attract FDI. The GOT prioritizes attracting and retaining investment, particularly in the underdeveloped interior regions, and reducing unemployment by providing tax breaks, subsidizing social security fee contributions for new hires, and offering investment bonuses. However, government policies have not always yielded the anticipated flow of foreign investment in the country, and political developments have had a mitigating effect. More than 3,740 foreign companies currently operate in Tunisia, and the government has historically encouraged export-oriented FDI in key sectors such as call centers, electronics, aerospace and aeronautics, automotive parts, textile and apparel, leather and shoes, agro-food, and other light manufacturing. In 2022, the sectors that attracted the most FDI were electrical and electronic (28.4 percent), energy (22 percent), services (19 percent), mechanical (8.7 percent), plastic (6.1 percent) and agro-food (4.7 percent). Inadequate infrastructure in the interior regions results in the concentration of foreign investment in the capital city of Tunis and its suburbs (53 percent), the northern coastal region (29.5 percent), the eastern coastal region (11.3 percent), and the northwest region (3.6 percent). Interior western and southern regions attracted only 1.6 percent of foreign investment despite special tax incentives for those regions.The Tunisian Parliament passed an Investment Law (#2016-71) in September 2016 that went into effect April 1, 2017, to encourage the responsible regulation of investments. The law provided for the creation of three major institutions:The High Investment Council, whose mission is to implement legislative reforms set out in the investment law and decide on incentives for projects of national importance (defined as investment projects of more than 50 million dinars ($16.1 million) and 500 jobs).The Tunisian Investment Authority, whose mission is to manage investment projects of more than 15 million dinars ($4.8 million) and up to 50 million dinars ($16.1 million). Investment projects of less than 15 million dinars ($4.8 million) are managed by the Agency for Promotion of Industry and Innovation (APII).The Tunisian Investment Fund, which funds foreign investment incentive packages.These institutions were all launched in 2017. However, the Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA) continues to be Tunisia’s principal agency to promote foreign investment. FIPA is a one-stop shop for foreign investors. It provides information on investment opportunities, advice on the appropriate conditions for success, assistance and support during the creation and implementation of the project, and contact facilitation and advocacy with other government authorities.Under the 2016 Investment Law (article 7), foreign investors have the same rights and obligations as Tunisian investors. Tunisia encourages dialogue with investors through FIPA offices throughout the country.																																				Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment										Foreign investment is classified into two categories:“Offshore” investment is defined as commercial entities in which foreign capital accounts for at least 66 percent of equity, and at least 70 percent of the production is destined for the export market. However, investments in some sectors can be classified as “offshore” with lower foreign equity shares. In June 2022, the Ministry of Agriculture began to allow full foreign equity ownership in the capital of agricultural companies; however, foreign investors cannot own agricultural land even when the investment is still classified as “offshore” if they meet the export threshold.“Onshore” investment caps foreign equity participation at a maximum of 49 percent in most non-industrial projects. “Onshore” industrial investment may have 100 percent foreign equity, subject to government approval.Pursuant to the 2016 Investment Law (article 4), a list of sectors outlining which investment categories are subject to government authorization (the “negative list”) was set by decree no. 417 of May 11, 2018. The sectors include natural resources; construction materials; land, sea, and air transport; banking, finance, and insurance; hazardous and polluting industries; health; education; and telecommunications. The decree specified the deadline to respond to authorization requests for most government agencies and fixed a deadline of 60 days for all other government decision-making bodies not specifically mentioned in the decree. The decree went into effect on July 1, 2018.In April 2022, the government adopted presidential decree #2022-317, which eliminated government authorization requirements for 27 business activities in various sectors, about 10 percent of the total authorization categories.  The decree allows foreign and local investors to open businesses under conditions detailed in books of specifications without waiting for a government license.  The action is meant to revive an economy heavily impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and boost investment in sectors such as tourism, transportation, finance, and renewable energy.For example, government authorizations are no longer required for business ventures such as the opening of shopping malls and supermarkets, operation of certain aircraft for tourism and leisure activities, management of financial portfolios by non-resident companies, organization of sporting events, cement manufacturing, self-production of electricity from renewable energies under one megawatt, import and marketing of films, sale and distribution of tobacco and alcohol, and import of used clothes. There is no clear timeline for when authorization requirements may be removed for additional sectors.																																				Other Investment Policy Reviews										The WTO completed a Trade Policy Review for Tunisia in July 2016. The report is available here:  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp441_e.htm .The OECD completed an Investment Policy Review for Tunisia in November 2012. The report is available here:  http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/tunisia-investmentpolicyreview-oecd.htm .The list of Tunisia’s environmental conflicts on Environmental Justice Atlas is available at  https://ejatlas.org/country/tunisia 																																				Business Facilitation										In May 2019, the Tunisian Parliament adopted law 2019-47, a cross-cutting law that impacts legislation across all sectors. The law is designed to improve the country’s business climate. The law simplified the process of creating a business, permitted new methods of finance, improved regulations for corporate governance, and provided the private sector the right to operate a project under the framework of a public-private partnership (PPP).This legislation and previous investment laws are all referenced on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) website:  https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/country-navigator/221/tunisia .The Agency for Promotion of Industry and Innovation (APII) and the Tunisia Investment Authority (TIA) are the focal point for business registration. Online project declaration for industry or service sector projects for both domestic and foreign investment is available at:  www.tunisieindustrie.nat.tn/en/doc.asp?mcat=16&amp;mrub=122 .The 2019 new online TIA platform allows potential investors to electronically declare the creation, extension, and renewal of all types of investment projects. The platform also allows investors to incorporate new businesses, request special permits, and apply for investment and tax incentives:  https://www.tia.gov.tn/ .APII has attempted to simplify the business registration process by creating a one-stop shop that offers registration of legal papers with the tax office, court clerk, official Tunisian gazette, and customs. This one-stop shop also houses consultants from the Investment Promotion Agency, Ministry of Employment, National Social Security Authority (CNSS), postal service, Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Trade and Export Development. Registration may face delays as some agencies may have longer internal processes. Prior to registration, a business must first initiate an online declaration of intent, to which APII provides a notification of receipt within 24 hours.For agriculture and fisheries, business registration information can be found on the Agricultural Investment Promotion Agency’s (APIA) website:  www.apia.com.tn . In February 2022, APIA announced the establishment of a 100 percent online investment declaration service for Tunisian and foreign investors in agricultural projects. The online service provides investors with an electronic investment declaration certificate (in PDF format) authenticated by a QR code. The service is accessible through “Espace Promoteur”   (apia.com.tn) In the tourism industry, companies must register with the National Office for Tourism at:  http://www.tourisme.gov.tn/en/investing/administrative-services.html .The central points of contact for established foreign investors and companies are the Tunisian Investment Authority (TIA):  https://www.tia.gov.tn/en  and the Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA):  http://www.investintunisia.tn .																																				Outward Investment										The GOT does not incentivize outward investment, and capital transfer abroad is tightly controlled by the Central Bank.																																												2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties						    																						Tunisia has signed 62 bilateral investment treaties, of which 39 are in force: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/213/tunisia The 2002 Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) between Tunisia and the United States remains active. A meeting of the Bilateral Trade and Investment Council in May 2021 helped promote engagement and cooperative reform efforts. A Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between Tunisia and the United States entered into force in 1993, and a bilateral agreement on avoidance of double taxation has been effective since January 1990.In December 2019, Tunisia’s Ministry of Finance issued public note no. 27/2019 to assist foreign companies, including those from the United States, to use bilateral taxation treaties to avoid double taxation, penalties, or extra taxes imposed on companies residing in privileged tax territories, such as the State of Delaware.Tunisia and the United States signed an Intergovernmental Agreement on the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), which went into force in September 2019. FATCA requires foreign financial institutions to report to the IRS information about financial accounts held by U.S. taxpayers, or by foreign entities in which U.S. taxpayers hold a substantial ownership interest.Tunisia has multilateral and bilateral trade agreements with approximately 127 countries, including its neighbors, Libya, and Algeria. Tunisia acceded to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in July 2018, ratified the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement in July 2020, and is seeking membership into the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In January 2008, Tunisia’s Association Agreement with the EU went into effect. The agreement eliminated tariffs on all manufactured goods with few exceptions, such as passenger cars, which are still imported by Tunisia through an annual quota system established in 1995. Agricultural products are also subject to customs duties and/or quotas, and services are excluded from the agreement. Tunisia and the EU are negotiating a full-fledged free-trade agreement, but it has not yet been concluded. In addition, Tunisia is a signatory to the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which offers private sector political risk insurance. Tunisia is a member of the World Trade Organization and maintains bilateral agreements with Turkey and the member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), as well as a multilateral agreement with other Arab League states.In 2013, the Tunisian Parliament adopted the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.In 2018, Tunisia signed the OECD inclusive framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) and joined the October 2021 Two-Pillar Solution to address the tax challenges arising from digitalization of the economy. More information is available at:  About &#8211; OECD BEPS .In April 2020, the OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes rated Tunisia “Largely Compliant” on the standard of exchange of information on request (EOIR).  https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/fr/taxation/global-forum-on-transparency-and-exchange-of-information-for-tax-purposes-tunisia-2020-second-round_fdeb6766-en 																																		3. Legal Regime						    																																																Transparency of the Regulatory System										In a July 25, 2022 referendum, 94.6 percent of voters approved a new constitution, much of which the president personally drafted. The constitution concentrates powers in the presidency, removes checks and balances on the executive, weakens the parliament, and gives the president enhanced authorities over the judiciary and the legislature.International and domestic observers assessed that December 2022 parliamentary elections were well-administered technically but lacked legitimacy and fell short of international standards. The elections were marred by low turnout (approximately 11 percent), and the introduction in September 2022 of an electoral law that eliminated quotas for women and youth, resulting in lower women’s representation. President Saied was elected in 2019 in the country’s second democratic presidential election, and official election observers generally agreed the 2019 election had no widespread fraud, violence, or attempts to undermine the credibility of the results.On July 25, 2021 citing widespread protests and political paralysis, President Saied invoked Article 80 of the country’s 2014 constitution and took “exceptional measures” to dismiss the prime minister, freeze parliament’s activities for 30 days, and lift immunity for members of parliament. On August 23, 2021 President Saied announced an indefinite extension of the “exceptional measures” period, and on September 22, 2021 issued a decree granting himself certain executive, legislative, and judicial powers, and the authority to rule by decree, subject to rights guaranteed in the 2014 constitution. On September 29, 2021 President Saied named Najla Bouden Romdhane as prime minister, and on October 11, 2021 she formed a government composed of 24 ministers and one secretary of state.After adoption, all laws, decrees, and regulations are published on the website of the Official Gazette and enforced by the Government at the national level. The Government has historically taken few proactive steps to raise public awareness of the public consultation period for new draft laws and decrees. Civil society, NGOs, and political parties have pushed for increased transparency and inclusiveness in rulemaking. Business associations, chambers of commerce, unions, and political parties reviewed the 2016 Investment Law prior to final adoption.In January 2019, the Tunisian Parliament passed the Organic Budget Law, which is a foundational law defining the parameters for the government’s annual budgeting process. The law aims to bring the budget process in line with principles expressed in the 2014 constitution by enlarging Parliament’s role in the budgetary process and strengthening the financial autonomy of the legislative and judiciary branches.  The law requires the government to organize its budget by policy objective, detail budget projections over a three-year timeframe, and revise its accounting system to ensure greater transparency.Due to the freezing of the Tunisian Parliament as of July 25, 2021, Tunisia’s budget laws for 2022 and 2023 were passed directly through presidential decrees.In May 2020, the government adopted decree no. 2020-316, establishing simplified conditions and procedures for granting project concessions and their monitoring based on a new public-private partnership (PPP) approach. The decree aims to further promote investment by young entrepreneurs (under the age of 35) and projects of all sizes, including those less than 15 million dinars ($4.85 million).Not all accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are in line with international standards. Publicly listed companies adhere to national accounting norms.Prior to July 25, 2021 the Parliament had oversight authority over the GOT but could not ensure that all administrative processes are followed. Following the exceptional measures implemented by President Saied on July 25, 2021 suspending Parliament, the Council of Ministers led by President Saied and at times, Prime Minister Bouden, have deliberated and approved decree laws. On March 30, 2022 President Saied issued a decree formally dissolving the Parliament. Elections for the first chamber of Parliament, the Assembly of People’s Representatives were held in December 2022.  Elections for the second chamber, the National Council of Regions and Districts have not been announced as of April 2023.The World Bank  Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance  for Tunisia are available here:  http://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/tunisia .Tunisia is a member of the Open Government Partnership, a multilateral initiative that aims to secure concrete commitments from governments to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen governance:  http://www.opengovpartnership.org/country/tunisia .Prior to July 25, 2021 most of Tunisia’s public finances and debt obligations were debated and voted on by the Parliament. Since July 25, 2021 the Council of Ministers has discussed and approved Tunisia’s finances.In general, Tunisia promotes companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure to facilitate transparency but does not require it.																																				International Regulatory Considerations										As part of its negotiations toward a comprehensive free-trade agreement with the EU, the GOT is considering incorporating a number of EU standards in its domestic regulations.Tunisia became a member of the WTO in 1995 and is required to notify the WTO regarding draft technical regulations on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). However, in October 2018 the Ministry of Commerce released a circular that temporarily restricted the import of certain goods without going through the WTO notification process, which negatively impacted some business operations without forewarning.In October 2022, Tunisia implemented a new control system on imports of consumer goods mandating that, in order to acquire an import license for certain products, the importer must provide several documents, including: an invoice from the exporting factory, a certificate from an official authority in the exporter’s country attesting to the factory’s legal status, proof of product trademark, and documents affirming the product’s safety and quality. Imports of raw materials, semi-finished products, equipment and spare parts for industries, services, and handicrafts are exempted. The list of affected products includes: fragrances, cosmetics, underwear, shoes, household appliances, vegetables and fruits, spices, flour, chocolate, and non-alcoholic drinks.In February 2017, Tunisia domestically ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and presented its instrument of ratification to the WTO in July 2020 for all categories A, B, and C. However, Tunisia has yet to communicate indicative and definitive dates under category B and is overdue in submitting notifications related to technical assistance requirements and support and information on assistance and capacity building (Article 22.3). Tunisia has also yet to submit two transparency notifications related to: (1) import, export, and transit procedures, contact information of enquiry points, (Article 1.4) and (2) contact points for customs cooperation (Article 12.2.2).																																				Legal System and Judicial Independence										The Tunisian legal system is secular and based on the French Napoleonic code and meets EU standards. While the 2022 Tunisian constitution mandates an independent judiciary, it gives the president enhanced authorities over the judiciary and the legislature. Citing corruption in the judiciary, on February 12, 2022 Saied dissolved the Supreme Judicial Council, the highest judicial authority responsible for judicial assignments and enforcing ethical standards and discipline and replaced it with a temporary council. Tunisia has a written commercial law but does not have specialized commercial courts. Regulations or enforcement actions can be appealed at the Court of Appeals.																																				Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment										The 2016 Investment Law directs tax incentives towards regional development promotion, technology and high value-added products, research and development (R&amp;D), innovation, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and the education, transport, health, culture, and environmental protection sectors. Foreign investors can apply for government incentives online through the Tunisian Investment Authority (TIA) website:  https://www.tia.gov.tn/en .The primary one-stop-shop webpage for investors looking for relevant laws and regulations is hosted at the Investment and Innovation Promotion Agency website,  http://www.tunisieindustrie.nat.tn/en/doc.asp?mcat=12&amp;mrub=209 . The 2016 Investment Law (article 15) calls for the creation of an Investor&#8217;s Unique Point of Contact within the ministry in charge of investment to assist new and existing investors to launch and expand their projects.In addition, the Parliament adopted a number of economic reforms since 2015, including laws concerning renewable energy, competition, public-private partnerships (PPP), bankruptcy, and the independence of the Central Bank of Tunisia, as well as the Start-Up Act to promote the creation of new businesses and entrepreneurship.																																				Competition and Antitrust Laws										The 2015 Competition Law established a government-appointed Competition Council to reduce government intervention in the economy and promote competition based on supply and demand. This law voided previous agreements that fixed prices, limited free competition, or restricted the entry of new companies as well as those that controlled production, distribution, investment, technical progress, or supply centers. While the law ensures free pricing of most products and services, there are a few protected items, such as bread, sugar, milk, water, and electricity, for which the GOT can still intervene in pricing. Moreover, in exceptional cases of large increases or collapses in prices, such as sharp price increases of surgical masks, sanitizer, and disinfection products during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ministry of Trade and Export Development reserved the right to regulate prices for a period of up to six months. Furthermore, the ministry imposed a price cap for poultry products and eggs in 2022, and bananas and apples in 2023, in an attempt to control the inflation in food prices but provoked rolling shortages in goods whose real costs exceeded the government’s preset prices for the public. The ministry can also intervene in some other sectors to ensure free and fair competition. However, the Competition Council can make exceptions to its anti-trust policies if it deems it necessary for overall technical or economic progress.The Competition Council also has the power to investigate competition-inhibiting cases and make recommendations to the Ministry of Trade and Export Development upon the Ministry’s request. Competition Council rulings can range from ordering temporary closures of a business to penalties and fines which could amount to a maximum of 10 percent of business revenue.																																				Expropriation and Compensation										There are no outstanding expropriation cases involving U.S. interests. The 2016 Investment Law (article 8) states that investors’ property may not be expropriated except in cases of public interest. Expropriation, if carried out, must comply with legal procedures, be executed without discrimination on the basis of nationality, and provide fair and equitable compensation. U.S. investments in Tunisia are protected by international law as stipulated in the U.S.-Tunisia Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). According to Article III of the BIT, the GOT reserves the right to expropriate or nationalize investments for the public good, in a non-discriminatory manner, and upon advance compensation of the full value of the expropriated investment. The treaty grants the right to prompt review by the relevant Tunisian authorities of conformity with the principles of international law. When compensation is granted to Tunisian or foreign companies whose investments suffer losses owing to events such as war, armed conflict, revolution, state of national emergency, civil disturbance, etc., U.S. companies are accorded “the most favorable treatment in regard to any measures adopted in relation to such losses.”On October 19, 2022, the GOT issued decree law no. 2022-65, which aims to reduce expropriation and compensation delays. The decree stipulates the creation of an ad hoc government commission that will negotiate directly with owners the value and compensation terms of expropriated properties. The decree also creates administrative committees within all governorates to expedite expropriation procedures at the regional level.																																				Dispute Settlement																										ICSID Convention and New York Convention						Tunisia is a member of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and is a signatory to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.						Investor-State Dispute Settlement						U.S. investments in Tunisia are protected by international law as stipulated in the U.S.-Tunisia Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). The BIT stipulates that procedures shall allow an investor to take a dispute with a party directly to binding third-party arbitration.Disputes involving U.S. persons are relatively rare. Over the past 10 years, there were three dispute cases involving U.S. investors and all were settled. U.S. firms have generally been successful in seeking redress through the Tunisian judicial system.The Tunisian Code of Civil and Commercial Procedures allows for the enforcement of foreign court decisions under certain circumstances, such as arbitration.There is no pattern of significant investment disputes or discrimination involving U.S. or other foreign investors. However, some foreign and local investors currently face difficulties receiving payment for supplied goods and services with state-owned companies due to the government’s fiscal challenges.						International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts						The Tunisian Arbitration Code brought into effect by Law 93-42 of April 26, 1993, governs arbitration in Tunisia. Certain provisions within the code are based on the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model law. Tunisia has several domestic dispute resolution venues. The best known is the Tunis Center for Conciliation and Arbitration. When an arbitral tribunal does not adhere to the rules governing the process, either party can apply to the national courts for relief. Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, an arbitral tribunal may, on the request of one of the parties, order any interim measure that it deems appropriate.																										Bankruptcy Regulations										Parliament adopted in April 2016 a new bankruptcy law that replaced Chapter IV of the Commerce Law and the Recovery of Companies in Economic Difficulties Law. These two laws had duplicative and cumbersome processes for business rescue and exit and gave creditors a marginal role. The 2016 law increases incentives for failed companies to undergo liquidation by limiting state collection privileges. The improved bankruptcy procedures are intended to decrease the number of non-performing loans and facilitate access of new firms to bank lending.																																												4. Industrial Policies						    																																																Investment Incentives										Preferential status is usually linked to the percentage of foreign corporate ownership, percentage of production for the export market, and investment location. The 2016 Investment Law provides investors with a broad range of incentives linked to increased added value, performance and competitiveness, use of new technologies, regional development, environmental protection, and high employability.To incentivize the employment of new university graduates, the GOT assumes the employer’s portion of social security costs (16 percent of salary) for the first seven years of the investment, with an extension of up to 10 years in the interior regions. Investments with high job-creation potential may benefit from the purchase of state-owned land at the price of one Tunisian dinar ($0.32) per square meter. Investors who purchase companies in financial distress may also benefit from tax breaks and social security assistance. These advantages are determined on a case-by-case basis.Further benefits are available for offshore investments, such as tax exemptions on profits and reinvested revenues, duty-free import of capital goods with no local equivalents, and full tax and duty exemption on raw materials, semi-finished goods, and services necessary for operation.On March 9, 2017, the GOT adopted decree no. 2017-389 on financial incentives to investment in priority sectors, economic performance areas, and regional development. Investors have to declare their projects through the regional APII offices to receive incentives. Investors can also request incentives online through the Tunisian Investment Authority (TIA) website:  https://www.tia.gov.tn/en .																																				Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation										Tunisia has free-trade zones, officially known as “Parcs d’Activités Economiques,” in Bizerte and Zarzis. While the land is state-owned, a private company manages the free-trade zones. They enjoy adequate public utilities and fiber-optic connectivity. Companies established in the free-trade zones are exempt from taxes and customs duties and benefit from unrestricted foreign exchange transactions, as well as limited duty-free entry into Tunisia of inputs for transformation and re-export. Factories operate as bonded warehouses and have their own assigned customs personnel.For example, companies in Bizerte’s free-trade zone may rent space for three Euros ($3.20) per square meter annually – a level unchanged since 1996 – plus a low service fee. Long-term renewable leases, up to 25 years, are subject to a negotiable 3 percent escalation clause. Expatriate personnel are allowed duty-free entry of personal vehicles. During the first year of operations, companies within the zone must export 100 percent of their production. Each following year, the company may sell domestically up to 30 percent of the previous year’s total volume of production, subject to local customs duties and taxes. Lease termination has not been a problem, and all companies that desired to depart the zone reportedly did so successfully.																																				Performance and Data Localization Requirements										Foreign resident companies face restrictions related to the employment and compensation of expatriate employees. The 2016 Investment Law limits the percentage of expatriate employees per company to 30 percent of the total work force (excluding oil and gas companies) for the first three years and to 10 percent starting in the fourth year. There are somewhat lengthy renewal procedures for annual work and residence permits, and the GOT has announced its intention to ease them in the future. Although rarely enforced, legislation limits the validity of expatriate work permits to two years.Central Bank regulations impose administrative burdens on companies seeking to pay for temporary expatriate technical assistance from local revenue. For example, before it receives authorization to transfer payment from its operations in Tunisia, a foreign resident company that utilizes a foreign accountant must document that the service is necessary, fairly valued, and unavailable in Tunisia. This regulation hinders a foreign resident company’s ability to pay for services performed abroad.The host government does not follow “forced localization,” but encourages the use of domestic content.There are no requirements for foreign information technology (IT) providers to turn over source code that is protected by the intellectual property law; however, they are required to inform the Ministry of Communication Technologies and Digital Economy about encrypted equipment.Public companies and institutions are prohibited by the Ministry of Communication Technologies from freely transmitting and storing personal data outside of the country.Private and public institutions must comply with the recommendations of the National Authority for Personal Data Protection (INPDP) when handling personal data, even if it is business-related. The National Institute of Office Automation and Micro-computing (INBMI) enforces the rules on local data storage.Until recently, performance requirements were generally limited to investment in the petroleum sector. Now, such requirements are in force in sectors such as telecommunications and for private sector infrastructure projects on a case-by-case basis. These requirements tend to be specific to the concession or operating agreement (e.g., drilling a certain number of wells, or producing a certain amount of electricity).																																												5. Protection of Property Rights						    																																																Real Property										Secured interests in property are enforced in Tunisia. Mortgages and liens are in common use, and the recording system is reliable.Foreign and/or non-resident investors are allowed to lease any type of land but can only acquire non-agricultural land.A large portion of privately held land, especially agriculture land, has no clear title, and the government is investing a great deal of effort to encourage people to clear and register their properties. For the past 10 years, it has been estimated that privately-held land accounts for approximately 45 percent of all land.Properties legally purchased must be duly registered to ensure they remain the property of their actual owners, even if they have been unoccupied for a long time.																																				Intellectual Property Rights										Tunisia is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and signatory to the United Nations Agreement on the Protection of Patents and Trademarks. The agency responsible for patents and trademarks is the National Institute for Standardization and Industrial Property (INNORPI &#8212; Institut National de la Normalisation et de la Propriété Industrielle). Tunisia also is party to the Madrid Protocol for the International Registration of Marks. Foreign patents and trademarks should be registered with INNORPI.Tunisia&#8217;s patent and trademark laws are designed to protect owners duly registered in Tunisia. In the area of patents, foreign businesses are guaranteed treatment equal to that offered to Tunisian nationals. Tunisia updated its legislation to meet the requirements of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).Copyright protection is the responsibility of the Tunisian Copyright Protection Organization (OTDAV &#8212; Office Tunisien des Droits d ́Auteurs et des Droits Voisins), which also represents foreign copyright organizations.The 2009 Intellectual Property Law greatly expanded the scope of protections.  The minimum fine for counterfeiting is 10,000 Tunisian dinars (approximately USD 3,250), and copyright protection is valid for the holder’s lifetime. Customs agents have the authority to seize suspected counterfeit goods immediately.  Tunisia’s 2022 constitution enshrined intellectual property protection in article 29.If customs officials suspect a copyright violation, they are permitted to inspect and seize suspected goods. For products utilizing foreign trademarks registered at INNORPI, the Customs Code empowers customs agents to enforce intellectual property rights (IPR) throughout the country. Tunisian copyright law applies to literary works, art, scientific works, new technologies, and digital works. Its application and enforcement, however, have not always been consistent with foreign commercial expectations. Print, audio, and video media are particularly susceptible to copyright infringement in Tunisia. Smuggling of illegal items takes place through Tunisia’s porous borders. The prevalence of, and trade in, counterfeit and pirated goods remains a concern and illegal internet protocol television (IPTV) streaming services is an emerging trend.In 2015, the GOT issued a decree defining registration and arbitration procedures for trade and service marks and establishing a national trademark registry. The new decree contained provisions governing the registration of trademarks under the Madrid Protocol and included improvements such as the extension of the deadline for opposition to the registration of trademarks, as well as the electronic filing of applications for trademarks registration.In March 2020, the Tunisian Parliament approved the government’s request for Tunisia to host the headquarters of the Pan-African Intellectual Property Body (PAIPO). Tunisia is waiting for at least 14 African countries to ratify the formation of PAIPO in order for it to enter into force.The registration of pharmaceutical drugs in Tunisia requires that the product is both registered and marketed in the country of origin. In 2005, Tunisia removed its restriction on pharmaceutical imports where there are similar generic products manufactured locally.Tunisia has yet to ratify the 2006 Singapore Treaty on the law of trademarks which aims to further harmonize the registration procedures for trademarks.In February 2023, Tunisia ratified the Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement on the international protection of appellations of origin and geographical indications.Resources for Rights Holders Aisha Y. Salem-HoweyIntellectual Property Attaché for the Middle East and North AfricaU.S. Patent and Trademark OfficeU.S. Department of Commerce Aisha.Salem-Howey@trade.gov AmCham Tunisia:  http://www.amchamtunisia.org.tn/ Attorneys list:  https://tn.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/local-resources-of-u-s-citizens/attorneys/For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local intellectual property offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at  http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ .																																												6. Financial Sector						    																																																Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment										Tunisia’s financial system is dominated by its banking sector, with banks accounting for roughly 85 percent of financing in Tunisia. The GOT’s overreliance on bank financing impedes economic growth and stronger job creation. Equity capitalization is relatively small; Tunisia’s stock market provided 16.4 percent of corporate financing in 202 according to the Financial Market Council annual report. Other mechanisms, such as bonds and microfinance, contribute marginally to the overall economy.Created in 1969, the Bourse de Tunis (Tunis stock exchange) listed 82 companies as of December 2022. Market capitalization increased by 3.3 percent to $7.7 billion (18 percent of GDP) in 2022. Financial institutions still dominate market capitalization with a share of 33.4 percent. Foreign transactions generated a net outflow of $113 million in 2022, and their share of market capitalization declined to 20.9 percent in 2022 versus 23.1 percent in 2021; only a small share of foreign capitalization is floating. During the last five years, the exchange’s regulatory and accounting systems have been brought more in line with international standards, including compliance and investor protections. The exchange is supervised and regulated by the state-run Capital Market Board. Most major global accounting firms are represented in Tunisia. Firms listed on the stock exchange must publish semiannual corporate reports audited by a certified public accountant. Accompanying accounting requirements exceed what many Tunisian firms can, or are willing to, undertake. GOT tax incentives attempt to encourage companies to list on the stock exchange. Newly listed companies that offer a 30 percent capital share to the public receive a five-year tax reduction on profits. In addition, individual investors receive tax deductions for equity investment in the market. Capital gains are tax-free when held by the investor for two years. Listing on the stock exchange helps ensure transparent financial statements, whereby the public sharing of certified financial statements has generally discouraged the introduction of more companies on the stock exchange.Foreign investors are permitted to purchase shares in resident (onshore) firms only through authorized Tunisian brokers or through established mutual funds. To trade, non-resident (offshore) brokers require a Tunisian intermediary and may only service non-Tunisian customers. Tunisian brokerage firms may have foreign participation, as long as that participation is less than 50 percent. Foreign investment of up to 50 percent of a listed firm’s capital does not require authorization.																																				Money and Banking System										According to the Central Bank of Tunisia (CBT) annual report on banking supervision published in December 2022, Tunisia hosts 30 banks, of which 23 are onshore and seven are offshore. Onshore banks include three Islamic banks, two microcredit and SME financing banks, and 18 commercial universal banks.Domestic credit to the private sector provided by banks stood at 73 percent of GDP in 2021. According to the World Bank, this level is higher than the MENA region average of 56.7 percent. Eighty-six percent of banks are located in the coastal regions, with about 40.2 percent in the greater Tunis area alone. The number of bank accounts has increased by 3 percent over the last five years to reach 9.8 million accounts at the end of 2021, of which 5 million are savings accounts.Tunisia’s banking system activity is mainly within the 23 onshore banks, which accounted for 92.7 percent of total assets, 94.8 percent of loans, and 97 percent of deposits in 2021. The onshore banks offer identical services targeting Tunisia’s larger corporations. Meanwhile, SMEs and individuals often have difficulty accessing bank capital due to high collateral requirements.The CBT report noted that in 2021, overall lending totaled $32.5 billion, an increase of 4.7 percent compared to a 5 percent increase in 2020. Loans to professionals were driven mainly by the increase in commitments of public enterprises, which rose by $1.28 billion in 2021 (6.2 percent increase). Loans to the private sector increased by only 4 percent in 2021. These credits benefited mostly industry, trade, real estate development and tourism sectors.Foreign banks are permitted to open branches and establish operations in Tunisia under the offshore regime and are subject to the supervision of the Central Bank.Government regulations control lending rates. This prevents banks from pricing their loan portfolios appropriately and incentivizes bankers to restrict the provision of credit. Competition among Tunisia’s many banks has the effect of lowering observed interest rates; however, banks often place conditions on loans that impose far higher costs on borrowers than interest rates alone. These non-interest costs may include collateral requirements that come in the form of liens on real estate. Often, collateral must equal or exceed the value of the loan principal. Collateral requirements are high because banks face regulatory difficulties in collecting collateral, thereby adding to costs. According to the CBT banking supervision report, nonperforming loans (NPLs) were at 13.1 percent of all bank loans in 2021, mostly in the agriculture (28 percent) and tourism (35.5 percent) sectors.Beyond the banks and stock exchange, few effective financing mechanisms are available in the Tunisian economy. A true bond market does not exist, and government debt sold to financial institutions is not re-traded on a formal, transparent secondary market. Private equity remains a niche element in the Tunisian financial system. Firms experience challenges raising sufficient capital, sourcing their transactions, and selling their stakes in successful investments once they mature. The microfinance market remains underexploited, but profitable for microfinance institutions with non-governmental organization Enda Inter-Arabe the dominant lender in the field.The GOT recognizes two categories of financial service activity: banking (e.g., deposits, loans, payments and exchange operations, and acquisition of operating capital) and investment services (reception, transmission, order execution, and portfolio management). Non-resident financial service providers must present initial minimum capital (fully paid up at subscription) of 25 million Tunisian dinars ($8 million) for a bank, 10 million dinars ($3.2 million) for a non-bank financial institution, 7.5 million dinars ($2.4 million) for an investment company, and 250,000 dinars ($80,500) for a portfolio management company.																																				Foreign Exchange and Remittances																										Foreign Exchange						The Tunisian Dinar can only be traded within Tunisia, and it is illegal to move dinars out of the country.  The dinar is convertible for current account transactions (export-import operations, remittances of investment capital, earnings, loan or lease payments, royalties, etc.).  Central Bank authorization is required for some foreign exchange operations.  For imports, Tunisian law prohibits the release of hard currency from Tunisia as payment prior to the presentation of documents establishing that the merchandise has been shipped to Tunisia. In 2022, the dinar depreciated 10 percent against the dollar and appreciated one percent against the Euro.Non-residents are exempt from most exchange regulations.  Under foreign currency regulations, non-resident companies are defined as having:Non-resident individuals who own at least 66 percent of the company’s capital, andCapital fully financed by imported foreign currency.Foreign investors may transfer funds at any time and without prior authorization.  This applies to principal as well as dividends or interest capital.  The procedures for repatriation are complex, however, and within the discretion of the Central Bank.  The difficulty in the repatriation of capital and dividends is one of the most frequent complaints of foreign investors in Tunisia.There are no limits to the amount of foreign currency that visitors can bring to Tunisia to exchange into local currency.  However, amounts exceeding the equivalent of 25,000 dinars ($8,000) must be declared to customs at the port of entry.  Non-residents must also report foreign currency imports if they wish to re-export or deposit more than 5,000 dinars ($1,660).  Tunisian customs authorities may require currency exchange receipts on exit from the country.						Remittance Policies						In January 2022, the GOT presented a plan for economic reforms to the IMF that included a relaxation of the foreign exchange code, admitting that it constitutes a hurdle for investors. So far, there is no timeline on when the amendment to the code will be implemented.Tunisia’s 2016 Investment Law enshrines the right of foreign investors to transfer abroad funds in foreign currency with minimal interference from the Central Bank.  Ministerial decree no. 417 of May 2018 states that the Central Bank of Tunisia must decide on foreign currency remittance requests within 90 days. In case of no response, the investor may contact the Higher Investment Authority, which will give final approval within 30 days.																										Sovereign Wealth Funds										By decree no. 85-2011, the GOT established a sovereign wealth fund, “Caisse des Depots et des Consignations&#8221; (CDC), to boost private sector investment and promote small and medium enterprise (SME) development. It is a state-owned investment entity responsible for independently managing a portion of the state&#8217;s financial assets. The CDC was set up with support from the French CDC and the Moroccan CDG (Caisse des Depots et de Gestion) and became operational in early 2012. The original impetus for the creation of the CDC was to manage assets confiscated from the former ruling family as independently as possible to serve the public interest. More information is available about the CDC at  www.cdc.tn . As of December 2021, CDC had 9.7 billion dinars ($3.12 billion) in assets and 428 million dinars ($137.8 million) in capital.All CDC investments are made locally, with the objective of boosting investments in the interior regions and promoting SME development.The CDC is governed by a supervisory committee composed of representatives from different ministries and chaired by the Minister of Finance.																																												7. State-Owned Enterprises						    																						There are 111 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and public institutions in Tunisia per the Ministry of Finance’s most recent (December 2022) report on public enterprises. SOEs are still prominent throughout the economy but are heavily indebted. Per the Tunisian Ministry of Finance report on transfers and guarantees to SOEs, total transfers reached $2.8 billion in 2022 with $390 million dedicated to payroll. Annual budgetary transfers amounted to 9.3 percent of GDP in 2022, with significant amounts directed to three SOEs in the form of subsidies for cereals, fuel, and electricity.Many SOEs compete with the private sector, in industries such as telecommunications, banking, and insurance, while others hold monopolies in sectors considered sensitive by the government, such as railroad, transportation, water and electricity distribution, and port logistics. Importation of basic food staples and strategic items such as cereals, rice, sugar, and edible oil also remains under SOE control.The GOT appoints senior management officials to SOEs, who report directly to the ministries responsible for the companies’ sector of operation. SOE boards of directors include representatives from various ministries and personnel from the company itself. Similar to private companies, the law requires SOEs to publish independently audited annual reports, regardless of whether corporate capital is publicly traded on the stock market.The GOT encourages SOEs to adhere to OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance, but adherence is not enforced. Investment banks and credit agencies tend to associate SOEs with the government and consider them as having the same risk profile for lending purposes.In February 2023, a new decree law aimed at improving SOE governance was approved by the government, but it has yet to be ratified by the president as of April 2023.																										Privatization Program										The GOT allows foreign participation in its privatization program. A significant share of Tunisia’s FDI in recent years has come from the privatization of state-owned or state-controlled enterprises. Privatization has occurred in many sectors, such as telecommunications, banking, insurance, manufacturing, and fuel distribution, among others.In 2011, the GOT confiscated the assets of the former regime. The list of assets involved every major economic sector. According to the Commission to Investigate Corruption and Malfeasance, a court order is required to determine the ultimate handling of frozen assets.Because court actions frequently take years – and with the government facing immediate budgetary needs – the GOT allowed privatization bids for shares in Ooredoo (a foreign telecommunications company of which 30 percent of shares were confiscated from the previous regime), Ennakl, Alpha Ford, and City Cars (car distribution), Goulette Shipping Cruise (cruise terminal management), Airport VIP Service (business lounge management), and Banque de Tunisie and Zitouna Bank (banking). The government is expected to sell some of its stakes in state-owned banks; however, no clear plan has been adopted or communicated so far due to fierce opposition by labor unions.																																												8. Responsible Business Conduct						    																						Tunisia adopted law no. 35 in June 2018 to encourage Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The law requires companies to allocate a portion of their budgets to finance CSR projects such as those in sustainable development, green economy, and youth employment. According to the law, an organization in charge of monitoring CSR projects will be created to ensure that the projects comply with the principles of good governance and sustainable development. Tunisia is an adherent to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.Since 1989, the public sector has been subject to a government procurement law that requires labor, environmental, and other impact studies for large procurement projects. All public institutions are subject to audits by the Court of Auditors (Cour des Comptes).The Tunisian Central Bank issued a circular in 2011 setting guidelines for sound and prudent business management and guaranteeing and safeguarding the interests of shareholders, creditors, depositors and staff. The circular also established policies on recruitment, appointment, and remuneration, as well as dissemination of information to shareholders, depositors, market counterparts, regulators, and the general public.In January 2019, the High Committee for Administrative and Financial Control (HCCAF) under the Presidency of the Government, published a guide on best practices for improved governance of public enterprises and establishments.In May 2019, the Parliament adopted law no. 2019-47, which introduced in Chapter 5 a set of articles designed to improve corporate governance and increase transparency. For example, the new legislation required that all companies listed on Tunisia’s stock exchange have on their board of directors at least two independent members, and separate individuals serving as the chairman of the board and the chief executive officer.In March 2022, President Saied issued decrees regarding the creation of “community companies” and the penal reconciliation program that will help fund them. The intention is for community companies to be established by private communities in marginalized areas of the country to help with infrastructure development and job creation. Community companies will receive funding from financial penalties paid by businesspeople found guilty of economic and financial crimes, and they will receive amnesty in return.The national point of contact for OECD for Multinational Enterprises guidelines is:Ministry of Economy and PlanningCentre Urbain Nord1082 TunisTel: +216 7055 6600Fax: +216 7179 9069Email:  boc.mdici@tunisia.gov.tn Tunisia has not yet joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). However, in June 2012, former Prime Minister Hammadi Jebali announced the GOT’s decision to implement the EITI. In June 2016, Tunisia officially began publicizing all documents pertaining to oil agreements signed in Tunisia, including permits and operating benefits governed by specific agreements and annexes dating to 1960. Tunisia participated in the eighth world conference of the EITI in Paris, France, in 2019.Per Tunisia’s 2022 constitution, projects related to commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals are subject to Parliamentary approval.																										Additional Resources										Department of StateCountry Reports on Human Rights Practices ( https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/)Trafficking in Persons Report ( https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/)Guidance on Implementing the &#8220;UN Guiding Principles&#8221; for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities ( https://www.state.gov/key-topics-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/due-diligence-guidance/)U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises ( https://www.state.gov/u-s-national-contact-point-for-the-oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises/)Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory ( https://www.state.gov/xinjiang-supply-chain-business-advisory/)Department of the TreasuryOFAC Recent Actions ( https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions )Department of LaborFindings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ( https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings  )List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ( https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods )Sweat &amp; Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World ( https://www.dol.gov/general/apps/ilab )Comply Chain ( https://www.dol.gov/ilab/complychain/ )																																				Climate Issues										Tunisia updated its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the Paris Climate Accord in September 2021 with a commitment to reduce its carbon emissions by 45 percent by 2030, compared with 2010 levels. Tunisia’s first NDC submission in 2015 called for a reduction of carbon emissions across all sectors by 41 percent and production of 35 percent of the country’s electricity from renewable sources, both by 2030. Tunisia’s new plan requires the mobilization of approximately $19.3 billion ($14.3 billion for mitigation, $4.3 billion for adaptation, and $0.7 billion for capacity building), largely from international donors and private financing.The energy sector accounts for 58 percent of the country&#8217;s greenhouse gas emissions, requiring the largest share of investment. The updated NDC also covers other sectors such as industrial processes, agriculture, forestry, other land use (AFOLU), and waste.Tunisia’s 2022 Finance Law included several articles to support business financing for the green economy and sustainable development, establish tax relief for electric cars, reduce customs duties on the import of solar panels, and increase the tax rate to support domestic environmental protection.Tunisia ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, the Kyoto Protocol in 2003, and Paris Agreement in 2017.Tunisia’s Initial Communication (2001) under the UNFCCC ( https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/summary.pdf )Tunisia’s second national communication as part of the UNFCCC (2013) (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/tunnc2.pdf)Tunisia’s 2015 NDCs ( https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Tunisia%20First/INDC-Tunisia-English%20Version.pdf )Tunisia’s third national communication as part of the UNFCCC (2017) (https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Synthese%20Ang%20Finalise%20Tunisia.pdf)Tunisia’s 2018 Climate Risk Profile (USAID) (https://www.climatelinks.org/resources/climate-risk-profile-tunisia)Tunisia’s 2021 NDCs (https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Tunisia%20First/INDC- Tunisia-English%20Version.pdf)																																												9. Corruption						    																						Most U.S. firms involved in the Tunisian market do not identify corruption as a primary obstacle to foreign direct investment. However, some have reported that routine procedures for doing business (customs, transportation, and some bureaucratic paperwork) are sometimes tainted by corrupt practices. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2022 gave Tunisia a score of 40 out of 100 and a rank of 85 among 180 countries, falling from a rank of 70 in 2021. Regionally, Tunisia is ranked 8 for transparency among MENA countries and first in North Africa, ahead of Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, and Libya.Polls indicated that most citizens viewed widespread corruption as a key hindrance to effective government. President Saied has consistently stated that ending corruption and prosecuting corrupt businesspeople and others is one of his top priorities. Since July 25, 2021, some members of parliament were charged and detained based on corruption allegations. In June 2022, President Saied dismissed 57 judges based on allegations of corruption and other charges.  Civil society largely criticized these dismissals as politically-motivated.  In February 2023, the Tunisian government arrested several politicians, journalists, and businesspeople based on allegations of conspiracy against the state and for alleged financial crimes.  The investigations remain ongoing.Recent government efforts made in the name of combatting corruption include: assurances that price controls on staple and basic food products are respected; combatting price gouging; hoarding, and monopolistic practices; enhancement of commercial competition in the domestic market; arrests of allegedly corrupt businessmen and officials; and harmonization of Tunisian corruption laws with those of the European Union.The 2014 constitution required those holding high government offices to declare assets “as provided by law.” In 2018, Parliament adopted the Assets Declaration Law, identifying 35 categories of public officials required to declare their assets upon being elected or appointed and upon leaving office. By law, the National Authority for the Combat Against Corruption (INLUCC) was then responsible for publishing the lists of assets of these individuals on its website. In addition, the law requires other individuals in specified professions that have a public role to declare their assets to the INLUCC, although this information is not made public. This provision applies to journalists, media figures, civil society leaders, political party leaders, and union officials. The law also enumerates a “gift” policy, defines measures to avoid conflicts of interest, and stipulates the sanctions that apply in cases of illicit enrichment. In 2019, Tunisia&#8217;s newly elected government officials declared their assets, including the 217 Members of Parliament. The declaration of assets was also made in September 2020 and again in October 2021, when new governments took office.  It is not yet clear if new Members of Parliament will abide by this same requirement as security personnel ordered the closure of INLUCC’s headquarters in August 2021. Beside the declaration of assets by the new cabinet on October 15, 2021, INLUCC’s offices have remained closed and its work paused.  INLUCC’s regional offices have been closed since January 1, 2022. The government has not given a reason for the ongoing closure and has not announced plans for the creation of an alternative anticorruption institution.In February 2017, Parliament passed law no. 2017-10 on corruption reporting and whistleblower protection. The legislation was a significant step in the fight against corruption, as it establishes the mechanisms, conditions, and procedures for denouncing corruption. Article 17 of the law provides protection for whistleblowers, and any act of reprisal against them is considered a punishable crime. For public servants, the law also guarantees the protection of whistleblowers against possible retaliation from their superiors. In September 2017, the GOT established the Independent Access to Information Commission.  This authority was prescribed in the 2016 Access to Information Law to proactively encourage government agencies to comply with the new law and to adjudicate complaints against the government for failing to comply with the law. Following the passage of the access to information and whistleblower protection laws, the government initiated an anti-corruption campaign led by then prime minister Youssef Chahed.  A series of arrests and investigations targeted well-known businesspersons, politicians, journalists, police officers, and customs officials.  Preliminary charges included embezzlement, fraud, and taking bribes but there was minimal progress made on those investigations. In August 2021, the GOT closed the National Authority to Combat Corruption (INLUCC, which led anticorruption efforts in the country since 2011).  The 2022 constitution does not include reference to INLUCC or any anticorruption body.Tunisia&#8217;s penal code devotes 11 articles to defining and classifying corruption and assigns corresponding penalties (including fines and imprisonment). Several other regulations also address broader concepts of corruption. Detailed information on the application of these laws and their effectiveness in combating corruption is not publicly available, and there are no GOT statistics specific to corruption. The Independent Commission to Investigate Corruption handled corruption complaints from 1987 to 2011. The commission referred five percent of cases to the Ministry of Justice. In 2012, the commission was replaced by the National Authority to Combat Corruption (INLUCC), which had the authority to forward corruption cases to the Ministry of Justice, give opinions on legislative and regulatory anti-corruption efforts, propose policies and collect data on corruption, and facilitate contact between anti-corruption efforts in the government and civil society. Tunisia’s 2014 constitution stipulated that INLUCC is a temporary institution, and that Parliament must appoint members to a permanent Institute for Good Governance and Anticorruption.  Parliament did not make substantive progress toward establishing this permanent institution prior to July 25, 2021. Prime Minister Fakhfakh resigned on July 15, 2020, following allegations of a conflict of interest involving his partial ownership of companies that received government contracts.  In apparent retaliation for his ouster, Fakhfakh (as “caretaker” prime minister) dismissed then INLUCC president Chawki Tabib on August 24, 2020, replacing him with Imed Boukhris, a former judge.During a March 16, 2019 press conference, then INLUCC president Chawki Tabib said that it takes 7-10 years on average for corruption cases to be processed in the judicial system. In 2018, the Tunisian Financial Analysis Committee (CTAF), which operates under the auspices of the Central Bank as a financial intelligence unit, announced that it froze approximately 200 million dinars ($70 million) linked to suspected money-laundering transactions. In 2021, the committee received approximately 420 reports of suspicious transactions related to corruption and illicit financial flows.Since 1989, a comprehensive law designed to regulate each phase of public procurement has governed the public sector. The GOT also established the Higher Commission on Public Procurement (HAICOP) to supervise the tender and award process for major government contracts. The government publicly supports a policy of transparency. Public tenders require bidders to provide a sworn statement that they have not and will not, either by themselves or through a third party, make any promises or give gifts with a view to influencing the outcome of the tender and realization of the project. Starting September 2018, the government imposed by decree that all public procurement operations be conducted electronically via a bidding platform called Tunisia Online E-Procurement System (TUNEPS). Despite the law, competition on government tenders appears susceptible to corrupt behavior. Pursuant to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the U.S. Government requires that American companies requesting U.S. Government advocacy certify that they do not participate in corrupt practices.																										Resources to Report Corruption										Contact at a &#8220;watchdog&#8221; organization:Wajdi BelloumiPresidentI WATCH Tunisia14 Rue d’Irak 1002 Lafayette, Tunisia+ 216 71 844 226 contact@iwatch.tn 																																												10. Political and Security Environment						    																						President Kais Saied was elected in the aftermath of presidential and parliamentary elections held in September and October 2019, the country&#8217;s first elections since its post-revolution constitution was ratified in 2014, which were widely regarded as well-executed and credible.  The transition of power was smooth and without incident, following a clear procedure outlined by the 2014 constitution.In the 12 years since the revolution, Tunisia has made progress in the areas of civil society and rights-based reforms, however, several civil society organizations expressed concern in 2022 over the government’s arbitrary arrests, the independence of the judiciary, restrictions on freedom of speech and media, and government corruption.Economic indicators continue to worsen and have been a major driver of frequent protests.  Public opinion polls consistently indicate that poor economic conditions and persistently high unemployment fuel public discontent with the political class.Opposition groups and civil society are able to protest freely and security forces have largely practiced restraint.In February 2023, following public remarks by President Saied in which he alleged there was a conspiracy to change the demographics of Tunisia, there was an increase in anti-foreigner rhetoric on social media and an increase in actions targeting those of perceived sub-Saharan African descent.Terrorist groups continue to operate in the mountains of Western Tunisia and developments in Libya continue to affect the security situation along the Tunisian-Libyan border. Extremist groups, including ISIS affiliates, operate and recruit in the country’s interior, particularly in disadvantaged regions. Tunisia has been under a State of Emergency since November 24, 2015, following two major terrorist attacks that targeted tourism destinations. Under the state of emergency, security forces have more authority to maintain civil order, enabling the government to focus on combating terrorism. Despite COVID-19 and economic challenges that affect national resources, Tunisia continues to demonstrate consistent security force readiness to combat security threats. There have been no terrorist attacks targeting tourists or other western interests since June 2015. Extremist elements continue to target police and military forces in suspected &#8220;lone wolf&#8221; attacks, including in front of the U.S. Embassy on March 6, 2020, and more recently in November 2021 at the Ministry of Interior in downtown Tunis. Travelers are urged to visit  www.travel.state.gov for the latest travel alerts and warnings regarding Tunisia.																																		11. Labor Policies and Practices						    																						According to National Institute of Statistics (INS) 2022 figures, Tunisia has a labor force of 3.5 million, 29 percent of which are women and 71 percent men. The number of unemployed in 2022 reached 624,600 people. The official 2022 unemployment rate was 15.2 percent (representing the unemployment rate for the fourth quarter of 2022). In 2022, unemployment rates per region were 30 percent in the northwest, 25 percent in the southwest, 22.1 percent in the center-west, 23.4 percent in southeast, and 15.8 percent in Greater Tunis. Professionals, such as IT engineers, doctors, professors, and pilots continue to seek employment abroad. Tunisian interlocuters maintain that around 70 percent of Tunisian young professionals seek employment in other countries after graduation. Aside from employment options abroad, bureaucracy and frustrations with corruption are additional drivers of migration, according to a 2018 survey by the Tunisian Association of Grandes Ecoles. An INS study estimated that 44.8 percent of the Tunisian workforce is employed in the parallel economy, including 11.8 percent in agriculture and fisheries.Over the past two decades, the structure of the workforce remained relatively stable, and as of the last quarter of 2022, it stood at 14 percent in agriculture and fishing, 33 percent in industry, and 53 percent in commerce and services. Tunisia has developed its industrial sector and created low-skilled employment, although several manufacturers struggle to find qualified technical workers. Tunisian law provides workers with the right to organize, form and join unions, and bargain collectively. The law prohibits anti-union discrimination by employers and retribution against strikers. The government generally enforces applicable laws.Currently, four national labor confederations operate in Tunisia. The oldest and largest is the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT &#8212; Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens). The others are the General Confederation of Tunisian Workers (CGTT &#8212; Confederation Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens), the Tunisian Labor Union (UTT &#8212; Union Tunisienne du Travail), created in May 2011, and the Tunisian Labor Organization (OTT &#8212; Organisation Tunisienne du Travail), created in August 2013. However, based on the criteria established by the Ministry of Social Affairs in 2018, only UGTT can negotiate with the government on behalf of all Tunisian workers within the National Council of Social Dialogue, which has drawn criticism from other labor federations. UGTT claims about one third of the salaried labor force as members, although more are covered under UGTT-negotiated contracts. Wages and working conditions are established through triennial collective bargaining agreements between the UGTT, the national employers’ association (UTICA &#8212; Union Tunisienne de l’Industrie, du Commerce, et de l&#8217;Artisanat), and the GOT. These tripartite agreements set industry standards and generally apply to about 80 percent of the private sector labor force, regardless of whether individual companies are unionized. The regional tripartite commissions also arbitrate labor disputes. Employees have strong legal protections against dismissal. According to the labor code, employer bankruptcy is not a just cause for termination of an employee contract. Dismissal of an employee for economic considerations requires notification to the regional labor inspectorate for review and concurrence.In January 2022, UGTT and UTICA signed an agreement to increase wages in the private sector in 2022, 2023, and 2024. This agreement includes an increase in the Guaranteed Minimum Wage (SMIG) and in allowances/benefits. This convention implements the agreement signed on September 19, 2018 between the two organizations.																																		12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Other Investment Insurance or Development Finance Programs						    																						The Development Finance Corporation (DFC) provides financing for private development projects. Created by the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act of 2018, the DFC consolidated the former Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and Development Credit Authority (DCA) of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In addition to the capabilities of OPIC and DCA, the DFC has an investment cap of $60 billion, more than double that of OPIC, and new financial tools. DFC investment products include equity financing, technical assistance, and loans (including currency loans, credit guarantees, and insurance). To expand partnership opportunities with international investors and prioritize low-middle and low-income countries (as defined by the World Bank), U.S. investors are not required but &#8220;preferred&#8221; and encouraged.Outside of energy infrastructure projects in Europe and Eurasia, high income countries generally do not qualify for DFC support.  OPIC was active in Tunisia since 1963 and executed several investments and debt transactions.  From the prior OPIC portfolio in Tunisia, the DFC currently has a $50-million credit-guarantee facility with local banks to increase access to finance for small and medium-sized enterprises. In 2022, the DFC issued $55 million in two credit guarantee facilities with Tunisian financial institutions to expand lending to small businesses in underserved regions.																																		13. Foreign Direct Investment Statistics						    																						Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in TunisiaHost Country Statistical source*USG or international statistical sourceUSG or International Source of Data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, OtherEconomic DataYearAmountYearAmountHost Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD)202146,654*202146,690www.worldbank.org/en/countryForeign Direct InvestmentHost Country Statistical source*USG or international statistical sourceUSG or international Source of data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, OtherU.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions)2021348.5**2021241BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions)N/AN/A202147BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP202141.4**202171.9%UNCTAD data available athttps://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report   *Source: Tunisia’s National Institute for Statistics (INS).**Source: Tunisia’s Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA) year-end December 2021 data, published in 2022.Note: FIPA, which is the host country statistical source for FDI stock, does not track the stock of foreign investment in energy and uses statistics that have been constant since 2010.Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDIDirect Investment from/in Tunisia in 2022 (Excluding Energy)From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions)Inward Direct InvestmentOutward Direct Investment**Total Inward555100%Total OutwardN/AN/A**France #120035.9%Qatar #293.7716.9%Italy #37513.5%Germany #470.712.7%Switzerland #517.753.2%&#8220;0&#8221; reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000.*Source: Tunisia’s Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA) year-end December 2022 data, published in January 2023.** Outward Direct Investment is yet to be published by the Tunisian Central Bank.Tunisia was not covered by the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS).																																		14. Contact for More Information						    																						Embassy Tunis Commercial SectionCommercial OfficerU.S. Embassy Tunis, Tunisia TunisCommercial@state.gov 																										    							View report by:																				Albania											Algeria											Andorra											Angola											Antigua and Barbuda											Argentina											Armenia											Australia											Austria											Azerbaijan											The Bahamas											Bahrain											Bangladesh											Barbados											Belarus											Belgium											Belize											Benin											Bolivia											Bosnia and Herzegovina											Botswana											Brazil											Brunei											Bulgaria											Burkina Faso											Burma											Burundi											Cabo Verde											Cambodia											Cameroon											Canada											Chile											China											Colombia											Costa Rica											Côte d’Ivoire											Croatia											Cyprus											Czechia											Democratic Republic of the Congo											Denmark											Djibouti											Dominica											Dominican Republic											Ecuador											Egypt											El Salvador											Equatorial Guinea											Eritrea											Estonia											Eswatini											Ethiopia											Fiji											Finland											France and Monaco											The Gambia											Gabon											Georgia											Germany											Ghana											Greece											Grenada											Guatemala											Guinea											Guyana											Honduras											Haiti											Hong Kong											Hungary											Iceland											India											Indonesia											Iraq											Ireland											Israel											Italy											Jamaica											Japan											Jordan											Kazakhstan											Kenya											Kosovo											Kyrgyz Republic											Laos											Latvia											Lebanon											Lesotho											Liberia											Libya											Lithuania											Luxembourg											Macau											Madagascar											Malawi											Malaysia											Maldives											Mali											Malta											Marshall Islands											Mauritania											Mauritius											Mexico											Micronesia											Moldova											Mongolia											Montenegro											Morocco											Mozambique											Namibia											Netherlands											Nepal											New Zealand											Nicaragua											Niger											Nigeria											North Macedonia											Norway											Oman											Pakistan											Palau											Panama											Papua New Guinea											Paraguay											Peru											Philippines											Poland											Portugal											Qatar											Republic of the Congo											Romania											Rwanda											Saint Kitts and Nevis											Saint Lucia											Saint Vincent and the Grenadines											Samoa											Sao Tome and Principe											Saudi Arabia											Senegal											Serbia											Seychelles											Sierra Leone											Singapore											Slovakia											Slovenia											Somalia											South Africa											South Korea											South Sudan											Spain											Sri Lanka											Suriname											Sweden											Switzerland											Taiwan											Tajikistan											Tanzania											Thailand											Timor-Leste											Togo											Trinidad and Tobago											Tunisia											Türkiye											United Arab Emirates											Uganda											Ukraine											United Kingdom											Uruguay											Uzbekistan											Vietnam											West Bank and Gaza											Zambia											Zimbabwe															Build A Custom Report																						On This Page				search													>																										EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment																																							Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment																																																						Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment																																																						Other Investment Policy Reviews																																																						Business Facilitation																																																						Outward Investment																																																			2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties																3. Legal Regime																																							Transparency of the Regulatory System																																																						International Regulatory Considerations																																																						Legal System and Judicial Independence																																																						Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment																																																						Competition and Antitrust Laws																																																						Expropriation and Compensation																																																						Dispute Settlement																																																				ICSID Convention and New York Convention																																												Investor-State Dispute Settlement																																												International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts																																																																																				Bankruptcy Regulations																																																			4. Industrial Policies																																							Investment Incentives																																																						Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation																																																						Performance and Data Localization Requirements																																																			5. Protection of Property Rights																																							Real Property																																																						Intellectual Property Rights																																																			6. Financial Sector																																							Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment																																																						Money and Banking System																																																						Foreign Exchange and Remittances																																																				Foreign Exchange																																												Remittance Policies																																																																																				Sovereign Wealth Funds																																																			7. State-Owned Enterprises																																							Privatization Program																																																			8. Responsible Business Conduct																																							Additional Resources																																																						Climate Issues																																																			9. Corruption																																							Resources to Report Corruption																																																			10. Political and Security Environment																11. Labor Policies and Practices																12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Other Investment Insurance or Development Finance Programs																13. Foreign Direct Investment Statistics																14. Contact for More Information																						Tags																					Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs																								Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs																								Tunisia
- Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Sison’s Travel to Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Tunisia, and Türkiye Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Michele Sison will travel to Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Tunisia, and Türkiye July 11-28 for meetings with counterparts and UN officials to reinforce the U.S. commitment to collaborating on common global challenges.Assistant Secretary Sison will travel to Nairobi, Kenya, July 13-15, Dodoma, Tanzania, July 16-17, and Abuja, Nigeria, July 18-19. The Assistant Secretary will then travel to Pretoria, South Africa, July 20-21, Cairo, Egypt, July 22-24, Tunis, Tunisia, July 25-26, and Ankara, Türkiye, July 27-28.Throughout her travel, the Assistant Secretary will discuss areas of shared multilateral interest, including reforming the UN, advancing the Sustainable Development Goals, improving the safety and security of peacekeepers, and tackling transnational challenges, including food insecurity, climate change, and global health. Assistant Secretary Sison will also advocate for the U.S. candidate for the International Court of Justice, Sarah Cleveland.For updates, follow @State_IO on Twitter.