U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

59–010 

" ! SENATE 

114TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

REPORT

2016

114–296 

Calendar No. 552 

AMENDING THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT 

OF 2002 TO BUILD PARTNERSHIPS TO 

PREVENT VIOLENCE BY EXTREMISTS 

R E P O R T 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

TO ACCOMPANY

S. 2522 

JULY 11, 2016.—Ordered to be printed 


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(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

BEN SASSE, Nebraska 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

CHRISTOPHER R. HIXON, Staff Director 

GABRIELLE D’ADAMO SINGER, Chief Counsel 

ELIZABETH MCWHORTER, Senior Professional Staff Member 

GABRIELLE A. BATKIN, Minority Staff Director 

JOHN P. KILVINGTON, Minority Deputy Staff Director 

MARY BETH SCHULTZ, Minority Chief Counsel 

HARLAN C. GEER, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 


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Calendar No. 552 

114TH CONGRESS SENATE REPORT " ! 2d Session 114–296 

AMENDING THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002 TO 

BUILD PARTNERSHIPS TO PREVENT VIOLENCE BY EXTREMISTS 

JULY 11, 2016.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. JOHNSON, from the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany S. 2522] 

The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

to which was referred the bill (S. 2522) to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to build partnerships to prevent violence by extremists, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon 

with an amendment in the nature of a substitute and recommends 

that the bill, as amended, do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

I. Purpose and Summary .................................................................................. 1 

II. Background and Need for the Legislation ................................................... 2 

III. Legislative History ......................................................................................... 8 

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis .......................................................................... 8 

V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact .................................................................. 9 

VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate ................................................ 10 

VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ........................... 11 

I. PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

The purpose of S. 2522 is to establish the Office for Partnerships 

Against Violent Extremism within the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS or ‘‘the Department’’). The bill requires the DHS 

Secretary to designate, as head of the new office, an Assistant Secretary who will coordinate the Department’s domestic countering 

violent extremism (CVE) efforts. The bill also facilitates oversight 

of the Department’s CVE efforts by defining previously-ambiguous 

language and requiring the DHS Secretary to report to Congress on 

the Department’s domestic CVE strategy and evaluation metrics. 


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1Memorandum from Hon. Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Def., to Gen. Dick Myers, 

Paul Wolfowitz, Gen. Pete Pace, & Doug Feith 2 (Oct. 16, 2003), available at http:// 

www.globalsecurity.org/ jhtml/jframe.html# http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/library/ policy/dod/d20031016sdmemo.pdf. 2Factsheet: A Comprehensive U.S. Government Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, 

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ publications/ US%20 Government%20 

Approach%20to%20CVE-Fact%20Sheetl0.pdf (last visited June 29, 2016). 3 Id. 

4Memorandum from Hon. Jeh Johnson, Secretary, Dept of Homeland Sec., to DHS Senior 

Leadership 1 (Sept. 28, 2015), available at: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 

Secretary%20Johnson’s%20Building%20Community%20Partnerships%20Memol1.pdf. 5 Id.; Threats to the Homeland: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental 

Affairs, 114th Cong. 10 (2015) (statement of Hon. Jeh Johnson, Secretary, Dep’t of Homeland 

Sec.) [hereinafter Threats to the Homeland]. 6Oversight and Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act: The Balance between National 

Security, Privacy and Civil Liberties: Hearing before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 

2 (2016) (statement of Matthew Olsen, Former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center), available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05-10- 

16%20Olsen%20Testimony.pdf. 7 Inside the Mind of ISIS: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental 

Affairs, 114th Cong. 3 (2016) (statement of Hedieh Mirahmadi, President, World Org. for Res. 

Dev. & Edu. (WORDE)), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/ download/testimonymirahmadi-2016-01-20 [hereinafter Inside the Mind of ISIS]. 8 Communications between Dep’t of Homeland Sec. staff and S. Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs Comm. staff (June 28, 2016). 

II. BACKGROUND AND THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION

As early as 2003, national security officials have differentiated 

between ‘‘trying to stop terrorists’’ and a ‘‘long-range plan’’ to encourage locals to counter violent extremism.1 CVE involves building 

awareness, counter-narrative measures, and interventions to prevent all forms of terrorism.2 CVE does not include ‘‘disruptive actions which focus on stopping acts of terrorism by those who have 

already subscribed to violence.’’ 3

In September 2015, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson recognized domestic CVE as a key mission of the Department.4 He attributed the 

importance of this mission to a global terrorist threat, which he described to this Committee one month later as evolving to exploit 

the Internet to ‘‘publicly recruit and inspire individuals to conduct 

attacks within their own homelands.’’ 5 As a result, ‘‘lone actors or 

insular groups—often self-directed or inspired by overseas groups, 

like ISIS—pose the most serious threat to carry out attacks here.’’ 6

Hedieh Mirahmadi, President of the World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE), testified before the 

Committee regarding the far-reaching, negative impacts these domestic terrorist attacks have on social cohesion: 

Domestic terror attacks are creating fault lines in our 

societies that will only lead to more violence, if they are 

not repaired. The separation of Muslims from non-Muslims 

feeds into the bifurcated worldview of the terrorists who 

say—it is us vs. them—the West against Islam. A comprehensive prevention agenda therefore must include programs that prevent that divide—so that there is only an 

‘‘us’’ against the terrorists.7

Building awareness 

As early as 2008, DHS pioneered Federal efforts to build community awareness of the terrorist threat and violent extremist recruitment.8 The next year, DHS started ‘‘developing case studies of 


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9 Homeland Threats and Agency Responses: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & 

Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 12–13 (2012) (citing Hon. Janet Napolitano’s, Secretary, 

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Responses to Questions for the Record on file with HSGAC staff) (explaining that by 2012, the Department had done over 75 case studies and assessments on homegrown violent extremist activities and potential material support activities in the United 

States—including an in-depth study that looks at common behaviors associated with 62 cases 

of Al Qaeda-inspired violent extremists) [hereinafter Homeland Threats and Agency Responses]; 

Nine Years After 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland: Hearing Before the 

S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (citing Hon. Janet 

Napolitano’s, Secretary, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Responses to Questions for the Record on file 

with HSGAC staff) [hereinafter Nine Years After 9/11]. 10Threats to the Homeland 10, 15, 25 (statement of Hon. Jeh Johnson, Secretary, Dep’t of 

Homeland Sec., and Hon. James B. Comey, Director, FBI, Hon. Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director, 

NCTC); Naureen Chowdhury Fink & Jack Barclay, Mastering the Narrative: Counterterrorism 

Strategic Communication and the United Nations, Center on Global Counterterrorism 6 (Feb. 

2013), http://globalcenter.org/ wp-content/ uploads /2013/03/ Feb2013 l CTlStratComm.pdf. 11 Jerome P. Bjelopera, Cong. Research Serv., R42553, Countering Violent Extremism in the 

United States 1 (2014). 12Threats to the Homeland (statement of Hon. Jeh Johnson, Secretary, Dep’t of Homeland 

Sec.). 13Lone Wolf Report, Southern Poverty Law Center 4, 8–9 (Feb. 11, 2015), available at https:// 

www.splcenter.org/ sites/ default/ files/d6_legacy_files/ downloads/ publication/ 

lone_wolf_special_report_0.pdf [hereinafter Lone Wolf Report]; Inside the Mind of ISIS 41–42 

(explaining social sciences research that associates lone wolves with a higher likelihood of mental illness). 14Lone Wolf Report at 4, 8. 15The Impact of ISIS on the Homeland and Refugee Resettlement: Hearing Before S. Comm. 

on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 113 (2015) (statement of Peter Bergen, 

Director, National Security Studies Program, New America Foundation). 16See generally, The Ideology of ISIS: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2016); Terrorism Gone Viral: Attack in Garland, Texas and Beyond: Hearing Before H. Homeland Sec. Comm., 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Michael B. 

Steinbach, Assistant Director, FBI); The Rise of Radicalization: Is the U.S. Government Failing 

to Counter International and Domestic Terrorism?: Hearing Before H. Homeland Sec. Comm., 

114th Cong. 20–21 (2015) (statement of J. Richard Cohen, President, Southern Poverty Law 

Center) [hereinafter The Rise of Radicalization]; see also Lorenzo Vidino & Seamus Hughes, 

Continued 

homegrown violent extremists to identify indicators of 

radicalization.’’ 9

The challenges facing domestic law enforcement include discerning when freedom of speech and expression cross into criminal 

activity; examining a broad pool of suspects and an evolving, decentralized threat; and trying to prevent a growing number of simple, 

opportunistic attacks.10 Domestic law enforcement strategies to 

prevent terrorism largely focus on stopping the operational aspects 

of violent terrorist plots.11 The problem with solely focusing on 

stopping terrorists operationally is that, as attacks increase in 

number, they are also increasingly difficult for domestic law enforcement to detect and disrupt.12

From 2009 to 2015, 74 percent of terrorist attacks in the United 

States were conducted by lone wolves—individuals who carry out 

a terrorist attack entirely on their own.13 That total rose to 90 percent when counting incidents involving one or two perpetrators.14

As Peter Bergen, the Director of the New America Foundation’s 

National Security Studies Program, told this Committee in November, ‘‘every person who’s been killed by a jihadi terrorist in this 

country since 9/11 has been killed by an American citizen or resident. ’’ 15

Examples of recent terrorist attacks include those in 2009 in Little Rock, Arkansas and Ft. Hood, Texas; the shooting at a Sikh 

temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin in 2012; the 2013 bombings at the 

Boston Marathon in Boston, Massachusetts and shootings in Chattanooga, Tennessee; shootings in Garland, Texas, Charleston, 

South Carolina, and San Bernardino, California in 2015; and the 

attack in Orlando, Florida in 2016.16 Homegrown terrorist attacks 


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ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa, The George Washington Univ., Program on Extremism 7 (Dec. 2015), https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/ cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/ 

ISIS%20in%20America%20-%20Full%20Report.pdf; Deadly Attacks Since 9/11, International Security, http://securitydata.newamerica.net/extremists/deadly-attacks.html (last visited June 24, 

2016). 17The Rise of Radicalization at 20–21 (statement of J. Richard Cohen, President, Southern 

Poverty Law Center). 18Michael J. Williams, Ph.D., John G. Horgan, Ph.D., & Williams P. Evans, Ph.D., Evaluation 

of a Multi-Faceted, U.S. Community-Based, Muslim-Led CVE Program, National Criminal Justice Reference Service 8 (June 2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf. 19Staff of S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong., Violent Islamist 

Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat, (Comm. Print, May 8, 2008), 

available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/IslamistReport.pdf. 20 Inside the Mind of ISIS at 16, 67 (statements of Dr. Jessica Stern, Research Professor, 

Pardee School for Global Studies, Boston Uni., and Dr. Bernard Haykel, Director, The Institute 

of Transregional Studies, and Professor of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton Univ.) (explaining 

that parents think kids are safe online and a description of ISIS luring kids from online discussions to play its own version of Grand Theft Auto the video game). 21 Id. at 5 (statement of Hedieh Mirahmadi, President, World Org. for Res. Dev. & Edu. 

(WORDE)), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/testimony-mirahmadi-2016-01-20. 22Jihad 2.0: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th 

Cong. 63 (2015) (statement of Peter Bergen, Director, National Security Studies Program, New 

America Foundation) [hereinafter Jihad 2.0]. 23 Inside the Mind of ISIS at 11, 15, 32 (statements of Dr. Jessica Stern, Research Professor, 

Pardee School for Global Studies, Boston Uni., and Dr. Bernard Haykel, Director, The Institute 

of Transregional Studies, and Professor of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton Univ.). 

involving self-radicalized individuals are not solely the result of 

ISIS or Al Qaeda-inspired extremism. For example, Dylann Roof, 

the suspect in the 2015 mass shooting in Charleston, South Carolina, appears to have become self-radicalized according to the manifesto he published online.17 The Department’s CVE partnerships 

are the result of broader government and civil society collaboration 

to better identify the radicalization retrospectively in each of these 

cases and prevent similar terrorist attacks.18

In 2008, Committee staff published a report titled Violent 

Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist 

Threat warning about the increased frequency with which United 

States-based militants are active online.19 Eight years later, the 

Committee heard from experts that the Government needs to do 

more to teach parents about online threats their children face.20 To 

illustrate these threats, Hedieh Mirahmadi described a systemic 

problem of youth exposure to Internet predators, saying that ‘‘many 

young people are either unaware or ignore the long-term consequences of inappropriate uses of social media and . . . run the 

risk of being recruited by an Internet predator—whether that’s a 

pedophile or a terrorist.’’ 21

Counter-narrative measures 

At the Committee’s 2015 hearing on the use of social media by 

terrorists, Peter Bergen testified on the importance of amplifying 

a positive message rather than trying to attack or eliminate the 

negative message put forward by terrorist groups like ISIS.22 In 

2016, further testimony before the Committee on the topic of messaging revealed that foreign fighters are often motivated to avenge 

the oppressed as a result of ISIS’s focus on a narrative of victimization, humiliation, and ultimately, redemption.23 To address this, 

Dr. Jessica Stern, a Research Professor at Boston University’s 

Pardee School of Global Studies, testified that any counter-narrative should offer vulnerable individuals ‘‘another way to be heVerDate Sep 11 2014 02:43 Jul 14, 2016 Jkt 059010 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR296.XXX SR296

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24 Id. at 31–33 (statement of Dr. Jessica Stern, Research Professor, Pardee School for Global 

Studies, Boston U.). 25Jihad 2.0 at 31 (statement of Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies). 26Factsheet: A Comprehensive U.S. Government Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, 

DHS https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 

US%20Government%20Approach%20to%20CVE-Fact%20Sheetl0.pdf (last visited June 29, 

2016). 27 America’s Insatiable Demand For Drugs: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Homeland Sec. 

& Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Cheryl Healton, Dean, New York University). 28 Id. 29Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Empowering Local Partners 

to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (Aug. 3, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 

the-press-office/2011/08/03/empowering-local-partners-prevent-violent-extremism-united-states. 30Press Release: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: The White 

House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism (Feb 18, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 

the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism. 31 Naureen Chowdhury Fink & Jack Barclay, Mastering the Narrative: Counterterrorism Strategic Communication and the United Nations, Center on Global Counterterrorism 6 (Feb. 2013), 

http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Feb2013lCTlStrat&Comm.pdf. 32 Jerome P. Bjelopera, supra note 11, at 29. 33 Id. at 17. 

roes,’’ and should avoid feeding a narrative of ISIS as the redeeming champion that defends humiliated victims.24

Also at the Committee’s social media hearing, Daveed 

Gartenstein-Ross, a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of 

Democracies, testified that ‘‘the interconnectivity of the Internet 

. . . suddenly makes someone who is alone a part of a group.’’ 25

To counter the social appeal of terrorist narratives, the Department’s CVE measures promote integrated and resilient communities that are aware of threats and better equipped to expose the 

lies and manipulations of a foreign terrorist organization that 

hopes to exploit vulnerable individuals for a narrow violent agenda.26 Dr. Healton, who previously served as President and Chief 

Executive Officer of Legacy, the leading Foundation dedicated to tobacco control, highlighted a successful example of youth changing 

behavior after a national campaign exposed how the tobacco industry was lying to its customers in a hearing on countering the demand for drugs.27 Dr. Healton testified that youth were energized 

by a grassroots campaign in the days before social media.28

Interventions 

In August 2011, the Administration released a strategy entitled 

‘‘Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the 

United States.’’ 29 The Administration describes this as both a 

strategy to ‘‘prevent’’ and a policy to ‘‘counter’’ violent extremism 

domestically.30 This strategy expresses a willingness to consider 

new and innovative preventive tools that can address the evolving 

nature of terrorism better than traditional Federal counterterrorism functions.31

However, the accompanying Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) 

ensured that traditional national security or law enforcement agencies will lead the programs and activities outlined in the strategy.32

Moreover, the SIP ‘‘does not outline mechanisms for law enforcement to refer radicalizing individuals for community intervention.’’ 33 As such, the CVE strategy and SIP support training society to recognize radicalization, but offer no recommendations on 


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34 Id. 35 Nine Years After 9/11 (statement of Michael E. Leiter, Director, National Counterterrorism 

Center). 36Michael J. Williams, Ph.D., John G. Horgan, Ph.D., & Williams P. Evans, Ph.D., Evaluation 

of a Multi-Faceted, U.S. Community-Based, Muslim-Led CVE Program, National Criminal Justice Reference Service 8–9 (June 2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf. 37 Id. at 54. 38Williams et al, The Critical Role of Friends in Networks for Countering Violent Extremism: 

Toward a Theory of Vicarious Help-Seeking, 8 Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political 

Aggression 49–50 (2016), available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/ 

19434472.2015.1101147. 39 Inside the Mind of ISIS at 2 (Hedieh Mirahmadi, President, World Org. for Res. Dev. & 

Edu. (WORDE)). 40 Johnson supra note 4, at 1. 41Press Release, Dept. of Homeland Sec., Secretary Jeh Johnson on DHS’s New Office for 

Community Partnerships (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/09/28/statement-secretary-jeh-c-johnson-dhs%E2%80%99s-new-office-community-partnerships#. 

how to cope with a radicalized individual unless that individual 

‘‘mobilizes and becomes a terrorism suspect.’’ 34

Moreover, according to a National Institute of Justice funded 

evaluation of a ‘‘multi-faceted, U.S. community-based, Muslim-led 

CVE program,’’ the Government CVE strategy of ‘‘centralized coordination and decentralized execution’’ 35 has led to a grass-roots 

‘‘lack of basic awareness and information regarding appropriate responses to the warning signs of radicalization’’ that impedes efforts 

to seek help ‘‘when an acquaintance, friend, or loved one appears 

to be on a path toward violent extremism.’’ 36 This same evaluation, 

together with a separate study by the same researchers, made valuable findings that could help the Department ensure funding is 

awarded to the most effective community-led CVE programs possible. It found that peers are best positioned to notice radical 

changes in a friend’s baseline behavior.37 While approaching a 

third-party goes against the grain, peers were willing to do so, but 

more likely to directly talk to a friend that showed signs of supporting violent extremism then to approach law enforcement.38

Importantly, a CVE-engaged network of community, government, 

nonprofit, and religious community actors is critical to communityled interventions. That network necessarily includes law enforcement so that if, or when, the line to criminal activity is crossed, 

civilian service providers know who to call. For example, in a study 

of lone wolf terrorist attacks that occurred after the attacks on September 11, 2001, 76 percent of perpetrators broadcasted their intentions prior to an attack, often more than once.39 CVE engagements should inform communities that any such open threat of 

criminal intent should be referred to law enforcement. Law enforcement can build collaborative partnerships with communities by 

keeping them aware of local threats and educating civilians about 

the legal limitations of law enforcement interventions when no 

crime has been committed. 

Office of Partnerships Against Violent Extremism 

Until recently, DHS’s CVE efforts were ‘‘scattered across a number of components, lack[ed] specific goals, and [resulted in] tangible 

measures of success in pursuit of those goals.’’ 40 In September 

2015, Secretary Johnson announced the creation of the Office of 

Community Partnerships, which would serve as the Department’s 

new CVE office.41 To reflect the Committee’s agreement that the 

Department’s CVE efforts should be coordinated in one office, and 

to codify the responsibilities of that office, S. 2522 creates the ‘‘OfVerDate Sep 11 2014 02:43 Jul 14, 2016 Jkt 059010 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR296.XXX SR296

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42 Homeland Threats and Agency Responses (citing Hon. Janet Napolitano’s, Secretary, Dept. 

of Homeland Sec., Responses to Questions for the Record on file with HSGAC staff); Understanding the Homeland Threat Landscape—Considerations for the 112th Congress: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 5 (2011) (statement of Hon. Janet Napolitano, 

Secretary, Dept. of Homeland Sec.). 43 Id. 44 Inside the Mind of ISIS (statements of Lorenzo Vidino, Director, Program on Extremism, 

The George Washington Univ., and Hedieh Mirahmadi, President, World Org. for Res. Dev. & 

Edu. (WORDE)) (explaining that approximately 40 percent of those arrested for ISIS-related 

Continued 

fice of Partnerships Against Violent Extremism’’ (or the ‘‘Office’’) 

within DHS. The name of the office clarifies the shared mission of 

government and civilian CVE providers: to prevent harm by building social cohesion through the development of partnerships between different levels of the government and with community leaders, religious communities, civic groups, and non-profit organizations. 

Given the serious nature of the violent extremism threat to the 

homeland, the bill elevates the head of the Office to an Assistant 

Secretary position to help ensure that the position has appropriate 

stature and influence. In an effort to improve the transparency of 

the Department’s CVE efforts, the Assistant Secretary will develop 

a strategy and annually report to Congress. Transparency is critical to building the trust necessary to accomplish the Office’s stated 

purpose of partnering with communities to prevent violent extremism. In addition, the new Office will create a national digital engagement strategy, or a national campaign, to build awareness of 

threats among communities at risk and better equip them to expose the lies and manipulations of a foreign terrorist organization 

that hopes to exploit vulnerable individuals for a narrow violent 

agenda. This is a continuation of the Department’s longstanding efforts to inform communities and state and local law enforcement on 

common behaviors that could indicate a developing terrorist attack.42

S. 2522 requires the new Office to issue a report that includes 

an evaluation of the use of Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) 

and State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) grants to support 

community-led CVE efforts and whether such grants are effectively 

used to counter violent extremism. It also prohibits the award of 

UASI or SHSP grants to any group that has funded domestic terrorism or international terrorism. 

The Office should develop Federal guidance to facilitate the creation of community-led intervention and prevention options, as well 

as build awareness of those options and the Federal support available. Based on recent lessons learned from current CVE programs, 

it should develop training curriculum that outlines how to approach a peer who might be radicalizing and develop guidance for 

when and how a peer should involve third parties.43

This legislation prioritizes CVE partnerships with civil society 

groups and communities. It also codifies coordination with the Department’s Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties whenever the 

Department engages communities at risk for radicalization and recruitment for violent extremist activities to ensure that the Department’s CVE activities fully respect the privacy, civil rights, and 

civil liberties of all persons. 

As the Committee has learned, ‘‘no family is immune from the 

radicalization threat.’’ 44 Therefore, S. 2522 makes clear that comVerDate Sep 11 2014 02:43 Jul 14, 2016 Jkt 059010 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR296.XXX SR296

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crimes in the United States were people who had not grown up practicing Islam, but who were 

converts); ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa at 7 (explaining that 40 percent is a statistically significant number as it is nearly double the percentage within the broader American 

Muslim population). 

munities at risk for radicalization shall not be defined or identified 

solely by the community’s race, religious affinity, or ethnicity. 

III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Ranking Member Tom Carper introduced S. 2522 on February 9, 

2016, which was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs. The Committee considered S. 2522 at a 

business meeting on February 10, 2016. 

Chairman Ron Johnson offered one amendment in the nature of 

a substitute. The amendment makes technical changes, strikes language establishing a new CVE grant program, and requires an 

evaluation of the use and effectiveness of UASI and SHSP grants 

awarded to community-led CVE efforts. The substitute amendment 

also provides definitions for the terms ‘‘Administrator,’’ ‘‘Assistant 

Secretary,’’ ‘‘Domestic Terrorism; International Terrorism,’’ and 

‘‘Radicalization.’’ Finally, the substitute amendment prohibits the 

use of UASI or SHSP grants to support any group that has funded 

domestic terrorism or international terrorism. 

The Committee adopted the amendment and ordered the bill, as 

amended, reported favorably, both by voice vote. Senators present 

for both the vote on the amendment and the vote on the bill were: 

Johnson, McCain, Portman, Paul, Lankford, Ayotte, Ernst, Sasse, 

Carper, McCaskill, Tester, Baldwin, Heitkamp, Booker, and Peters. 

IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE BILL, AS REPORTED

Section 1. Authorization of the Office for Partnerships Against Violent Extremism of the Department of Homeland Security 

Subsection (a) of S. 2522 amends the Homeland Security Act of 

2002 and is divided into two further subsections. 

Subsection (a) (1) of S. 2522 amends Title XIII of the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002 by inserting a new section 802, which establishes the Office in DHS. 

The new section 802 is divided into seven subsections. These subsections establish the Office and its leadership, define the Office’s 

responsibilities, require DHS to develop a strategy to counter violent extremism, and impose periodic reporting and review requirements upon the Office. 

Subsection (a) defines ‘‘Administrator,’’ ‘‘Assistant Secretary,’’ 

‘‘countering violent extremism,’’ ‘‘domestic terrorism,’’ ‘‘international terrorism,’’ ‘‘radicalization,’’ and ‘‘violent extremism.’’ 

Subsection (b) establishes the Office. Subsection (c) states that 

the Secretary shall designate an Assistant Secretary for Partnerships Against Violent Extremism who will report directly to the 

Secretary. Subsection (d) states that the Secretary shall designate 

a career Deputy Assistant Secretary for Partnerships Against Violent Extremism, and is authorized to assign or hire permanent 

staff to the Office. 

Subsection (e) describes the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary for Partnerships Against Violent Extremism. These responsibilities include leading DHS CVE efforts to partner with commuVerDate Sep 11 2014 02:43 Jul 14, 2016 Jkt 059010 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR296.XXX SR296

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nities and civil society groups; ensuring all such activities respect 

privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties; and assessing methods used 

by violent extremists to recruit persons and disseminate propaganda. The Office is also responsible for developing a digital engagement strategy; serving as the primary DHS coordinator with 

other Federal CVE efforts; providing CVE-relevant guidance to the 

Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency regarding the use of UASI and SHSP grants; and expanding philanthropic support for domestic CVE efforts. The Office may not consider a community to be at risk for radicalization and recruitment 

solely on the basis of race, religious affiliation, or ethnicity. 

Subsection (f) requires the Secretary of DHS to submit, within 90 

days of enactment, a comprehensive CVE strategy to the appropriate congressional committees. The strategy shall address DHS’s 

community and digital engagement efforts; interagency cooperation; privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections; evaluation 

metrics; a violent extremism threat assessment; and CVE goals. 

The strategy shall facilitate oversight and transparency of DHS’s 

research on violent extremism; relevant nondiscrimination policies; 

community engagement and partnerships; support for non-DHS 

partners; and the dissemination of training, resources, and threat 

assessments. Within 90 days of the submission of the strategy described above, the Secretary shall submit to the same committees 

an implementation plan with an integrated master schedule and 

cost estimate for included activities and programs. 

Subsection (g) requires the Assistant Secretary for Partnerships 

Against Violent Extremism to submit an annual report of the Department’s and the Office’s activities to counter violent extremism; 

a summary of civil rights and civil liberties protections; an evaluation of the use and effectiveness of UASI and SHSP grants to support efforts of local communities in the United States to counter 

violent extremism; and a description of how the Office has incorporated lessons learned. The first such annual report is due on 

April 1, 2017. 

Subsection (h) requires the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties within DHS to conduct a review of the Office to ensure that 

privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are respected. This review 

shall be made publicly available on the DHS website. 

Subsection (a)(2) of S. 2522 amends Title XX of the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002 to prohibit using UASI and SHSP funds to 

support any organization or group which has knowingly or recklessly funded domestic terrorism or international terrorism. 

Subsection (b) of S. 2522 includes technical and conforming 

amendments to the table of contents of the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002. 

Subsection (c) of S. 2522 sunsets Subsection (a) (1) of S. 2522 and 

Subsection (b) of S. 2522. 

V. EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT

Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of 

the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has considered 

the regulatory impact of this bill and determined that the bill will 

have no regulatory impact within the meaning of the rules. The 

Committee agrees with the Congressional Budget Office’s statement that the bill contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 


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mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

(UMRA) and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments. 

VI. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

MAY 17, 2016. 

Hon. RON JOHNSON, 

Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 2522, a bill to amend the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002 to build partnerships to prevent violence by extremists. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Aurora Swanson. 

Sincerely, 

KEITH HALL. 

Enclosure. 

S. 2522—A bill to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to 

build partnerships to prevent violence by extremists 

S. 2522 would establish an Office for Partnership Against Violent 

Extremism within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to 

develop and implement a strategy to coordinate efforts throughout 

all levels of government and private industry to counter violent extremism. CBO estimates that implementing the legislation would 

have no significant effect on the federal budget over the 2017–2021 

period because DHS is already performing those activities under 

current law. 

Enacting S. 2522 would not affect direct spending or revenues; 

therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. CBO also estimates that enacting the bill would not increase net direct spending 

or on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods 

beginning in 2027. 

Under current law, DHS established the Office of Community 

Partnerships (OCP) in 2015 to counter violent extremism in communities throughout the United States. In fiscal year 2016, $3 million was provided for OCP and DHS expects to spend similar 

amounts ($3.5 million) each year thereafter for OCP’s activities. 

Those activities (which are similar to provisions in the bill) include: 

• Forming a task force to coordinate efforts to counter violent extremism with federal and nonfederal partners in communities throughout the United States, 

• Providing technical assistance and support to communities 

to counter violent extremism, and 

• Sharing information about the risks of violent extremism 

in communities, and establishing infrastructure to share lessons learned, best practices, and feedback on the findings of 

the task force. 

S. 2522 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would 

impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments. 


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The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Aurora Swanson. The 

estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant 

Director for Budget Analysis. 

VII. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by S. 2522 as 

reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted 

is enclosed in brackets, new matter is printed in italic, and existing 

law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): 

HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE VIII—COORDINATION WITH NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES; INSPECTOR GENERAL; 

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE; COAST 

GUARD; GENERAL PROVISIONS 

* * * * * * * 

Subtitle A—Coordination with Non-Federal 

Entities 

* * * * * * * 

Sec. 802. Office for Partnerships Against Violent Extremism. 

SEC. 802. OFFICE FOR PARTNERSHIPS AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM. 

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

(1) ADMINISTRATOR.—The term ‘Administrator’ means the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

(2) ASSISTANT SECRETARY.—The term ‘Assistant Secretary’ 

means the Assistant Secretary for Partnerships Against Violent 

Extremism designated under subsection (c). 

(3) COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM.—The term ‘countering 

violent extremism’ means proactive and relevant actions to 

counter recruitment, radicalization, and mobilization to violence and to address the immediate factors that lead to violent 

extremism and radicalization. 

(4) DOMESTIC TERRORISM; INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.—The 

terms ‘domestic terrorism’ and ‘international terrorism’ have the 

meanings given those terms in section 2331 of title 18, United 

States Code. 

(5) RADICALIZATION.—The term ‘radicalization’ means the 

process by which an individual chooses to facilitate or commit 

domestic terrorism or international terrorism. 

(6) VIOLENT EXTREMISM.—The term ‘violent extremism’ means 

international or domestic terrorism. 

(b) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is in the Department an Office for 

Partnerships Against Violent Extremism. 

(c) HEAD OF OFFICE.—The Office for Partnerships Against Violent 

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ships Against Violent Extremism, who shall be designated by the 

Secretary and report directly to the Secretary. 

(d) DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY; ASSIGNMENT OF PER- SONNEL.—The Secretary shall— 

(1) designate a career Deputy Assistant Secretary for Partnerships Against Violent Extremism; and 

(2) assign or hire, as appropriate, permanent staff to the Office for Partnerships Against Violent Extremism. 

(e) RESPONSIBILITIES.— (1) IN GENERAL.—The Assistant Secretary shall be responsible 

for the following: 

(A) Leading the efforts of the Department to counter violent extremism across all the components and offices of the 

Department that conduct strategic and supportive efforts to 

counter violent extremism. Such efforts shall include the 

following: 

(i) Partnering with communities to address 

vulnerabilities that can be exploited by violent extremists in the United States and explore potential remedies 

for Government and non-government institutions. 

(ii) Working with civil society groups and communities to counter violent extremist propaganda, messaging, or recruitment. 

(iii) In coordination with the Office for Civil Rights 

and Civil Liberties of the Department, managing the 

outreach and engagement efforts of the Department directed toward communities at risk for radicalization 

and recruitment for violent extremist activities. 

(iv) Ensuring relevant information, research, and 

products inform efforts to counter violent extremism. 

(v) Developing and maintaining Department-wide 

strategy, plans, policies, and programs to counter violent extremism. Such plans shall, at a minimum, address each of the following: 

(I) The Department’s plan to leverage new and 

existing Internet and other technologies and social 

media platforms to improve non-government efforts 

to counter violent extremism, as well as the best 

practices and lessons learned from other Federal, 

State, local, tribal, territorial, and foreign partners 

engaged in similar counter-messaging efforts. 

(II) The Department’s countering violent extremism-related engagement efforts. 

(III) The use of cooperative agreements with 

State, local, tribal, territorial, and other Federal 

departments and agencies responsible for efforts 

relating to countering violent extremism. 

(vi) Coordinating with the Office for Civil Rights and 

Civil Liberties of the Department to ensure all of the 

activities of the Department related to countering violent extremism fully respect the privacy, civil rights, 

and civil liberties of all persons. 

(vii) In coordination with the Under Secretary for 

Science and Technology and in consultation with the 

Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, identiVerDate Sep 11 2014 02:43 Jul 14, 2016 Jkt 059010 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6603 E:\HR\OC\SR296.XXX SR296

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fying and recommending new empirical research and 

analysis requirements to ensure the dissemination of 

information and methods for Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial countering violent extremism practitioners, officials, law enforcement personnel, and nongovernmental partners to utilize such research and 

analysis. 

(viii) Assessing the methods used by violent extremists to disseminate propaganda and messaging to communities at risk for recruitment by violent extremists. 

(B) Developing a digital engagement strategy that expands the outreach efforts of the Department to counter violent extremist messaging by— 

(i) exploring ways to utilize relevant Internet and 

other technologies and social media platforms; and 

(ii) maximizing other resources available to the Department. 

(C) Serving as the primary representative of the Department in coordinating countering violent extremism efforts 

with other Federal departments and agencies and non-governmental organizations. 

(D) Serving as the primary Department-level representative in coordinating with the Department of State on international countering violent extremism issues. 

(E) In coordination with the Administrator, providing 

guidance regarding the use of grants made to State, local, 

and tribal governments under sections 2003 and 2004 

under the allowable uses guidelines related to countering 

violent extremism. 

(F) Developing a plan to expand philanthropic support 

for domestic efforts related to countering violent extremism, 

including by identifying viable community projects and 

needs for possible philanthropic support. 

(2) COMMUNITIES AT RISK.—For purposes of this subsection, 

the term ‘communities at risk’ shall not include a community 

that is determined to be at risk solely on the basis of race, religious affiliation, or ethnicity. 

(f) STRATEGY TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED

STATES.— 

(1) STRATEGY.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this section, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the 

Senate, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, 

and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives a comprehensive Department strategy to counter violent extremism in the United States. 

(2) CONTENTS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy required under 

paragraph (1) shall, at a minimum, address each of the following: 

(A) The Department’s digital engagement effort, including a plan to leverage new and existing Internet, digital, 

and other technologies and social media platforms to 

counter violent extremism, as well as the best practices and 

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ritorial, nongovernmental, and foreign partners engaged in 

similar counter-messaging activities. 

(B) The Department’s countering violent extremism-related engagement and outreach activities. 

(C) The use of cooperative agreements with State, local, 

tribal, territorial, and other Federal departments and agencies responsible for activities relating to countering violent 

extremism. 

(D) Ensuring all activities related to countering violent 

extremism adhere to relevant Department and applicable 

Department of Justice guidance regarding privacy, civil 

rights, and civil liberties, including safeguards against discrimination. 

(E) The development of qualitative and quantitative outcome-based metrics to evaluate the Department’s programs 

and policies to counter violent extremism. 

(F) An analysis of the homeland security risk posed by 

violent extremism based on the threat environment and empirical data assessing terrorist activities and incidents, and 

violent extremist propaganda, messaging, or recruitment. 

(G) Information on the Department’s near-term, midterm, and long-term risk-based goals for countering violent 

extremism, reflecting the risk analysis conducted under 

subparagraph (F). 

(3) STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS.—In drafting the strategy required under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall consider including the following: 

(A) Departmental efforts to undertake research to improve 

the Department’s understanding of the risk of violent extremism and to identify ways to improve countering violent extremism activities and programs, including outreach, training, and information sharing programs. 

(B) The Department’s nondiscrimination policies as they 

relate to countering violent extremism. 

(C) Departmental efforts to help promote community engagement and partnerships to counter violent extremism in 

furtherance of the strategy. 

(D) Departmental efforts to help increase support for programs and initiatives to counter violent extremism of other 

Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, 

and foreign partners that are in furtherance of the strategy, 

and which adhere to all relevant constitutional, legal, and 

privacy protections. 

(E) Departmental efforts to disseminate to local law enforcement agencies and the general public information on 

resources, such as training guidance, workshop reports, 

and the violent extremist threat, through multiple platforms, including the development of a dedicated webpage, 

and information regarding the effectiveness of those efforts. 

(F) Departmental efforts to use cooperative agreements 

with State, local, tribal, territorial, and other Federal departments and agencies responsible for efforts relating to 

countering violent extremism, and information regarding 

the effectiveness of those efforts. 


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(G) Information on oversight mechanisms and protections 

to ensure that activities and programs undertaken pursuant to the strategy adhere to all relevant constitutional, 

legal, and privacy protections. 

(H) Departmental efforts to conduct oversight of all countering violent extremism training and training materials 

and other resources developed or funded by the Department. 

(I) Departmental efforts to foster transparency by making, to the extent practicable, all regulations, guidance, documents, policies, and training materials publicly available, 

including through any webpage developed under subparagraph (E). 

(4) STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date 

on which the Secretary submits the strategy required under 

paragraph (1), the Secretary shall submit to the Committee 

on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the 

Senate, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, the 

Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the 

House of Representatives an implementation plan for each 

of the components and offices of the Department with responsibilities under the strategy. 

(B) CONTENTS.—The implementation plan required 

under subparagraph (A) shall include an integrated master 

schedule and cost estimate for activities and programs contained in the implementation plan, with specificity on how 

each such activity and program aligns with near-term, 

mid-term, and long-term goals specified in the strategy required under paragraph (1). 

(g) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than April 1, 2017, and annually 

thereafter, the Assistant Secretary shall submit to Congress an annual report on the Office for Partnerships Against Violent Extremism, which shall include the following: 

(1) A description of the status of the programs and policies 

of the Department for countering violent extremism in the 

United States. 

(2) A description of the efforts of the Office for Partnerships 

Against Violent Extremism to cooperate with and provide assistance to other Federal departments and agencies. 

(3) Qualitative and quantitative metrics for evaluating the 

success of such programs and policies and the steps taken to 

evaluate the success of such programs and policies. 

(4) An accounting of— 

(A) grants and cooperative agreements awarded by the 

Department to counter violent extremism; and 

(B) all training specifically aimed at countering violent 

extremism sponsored by the Department. 

(5) An analysis of how the Department’s activities to counter 

violent extremism correspond and adapt to the threat environment. 

(6) A summary of how civil rights and civil liberties are protected in the Department’s activities to counter violent extremism. 


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(7) An evaluation of the use of section 2003 and section 2004 

grants and cooperative agreements awarded to support efforts of 

local communities in the United States to counter violent extremism, including information on the effectiveness of such grants 

and cooperative agreements in countering violent extremism. 

(8) A description of how the Office for Partnerships Against 

Violent Extremism incorporated lessons learned from the countering violent extremism programs and policies of foreign, State, 

local, tribal, and territorial governments and stakeholder communities. 

(h) ANNUAL REVIEW.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this section, and every year thereafter, the Office for Civil 

Rights and Civil Liberties of the Department shall— 

(1) conduct a review of the Office for Partnerships Against 

Violent Extremism activities to ensure that all of the activities 

of the Office related to countering violent extremism respect the 

privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of all persons; and 

(2) make publicly available on the website of the Department 

a report containing the results of the review conducted under 

paragraph (1).; and 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE XX—HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS 

* * * * * * * 

Subtitle A—Grants to States and High-Risk Urban 

Areas 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 2008. USE OF FUNDS. 

a) * * * 

(b) LIMITATIONS ON USE OF FUNDS.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Funds provided under section 2003 or 2004 

may not be used— 

(A) To supplant State or local funds, except that 

northing in this paragraph shall prohibit the use of grant 

funds provided to a State or high-risk urban area for otherwise permissible uses under subsection (a) on the basis 

that a State or high-risk urban area has previously used 

State or local funds to support the same or similar uses; 

[or] 

(B) For any State or local government cost-sharing 

contributionø.¿;or 

(C) to support any organization or group which has 

knowingly or recklessly funded domestic terrorism or international terrorism (as those terms are defined in section 

2331 of title 18, United States Code) or organization or 

group known to engage in or recruit to such activities, as 

determined by the Assistant Secretary for Partnerships 

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istrator and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies. 

* * * * * * * 

Æ 


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