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63-876 PDF 2011

FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S 

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE 

BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL 

SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING 

OVERSIGHT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

Wednesday, January 26, 2011 

Serial No. 112-1 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Natural Resources 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

or 

Committee address: http://naturalresources.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

DOC HASTINGS, WA, Chairman 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, MA, Ranking Democrat Member 

Don Young, AK 

John J. Duncan, Jr., TN 

Louie Gohmert, TX 

Rob Bishop, UT 

Doug Lamborn, CO 

Robert J. Wittman, VA 

Paul C. Broun, GA 

John Fleming, LA 

Mike Coffman, CO 

Tom McClintock, CA 

Glenn Thompson, PA 

Jeff Denham, CA 

Dan Benishek, MI 

David Rivera, FL 

Jeff Duncan, SC 

Scott R. Tipton, CO 

Paul A. Gosar, AZ 

Rau ́l R. Labrador, ID 

Kristi L. Noem, SD 

Steve Southerland II, FL 

Bill Flores, TX 

Andy Harris, MD 

Jeffrey M. Landry, LA 

Charles J. ‘‘Chuck’’ Fleischmann, TN 

Jon Runyan, NJ 

Bill Johnson, OH 

Dale E. Kildee, MI 

Peter A. DeFazio, OR 

Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, AS 

Frank Pallone, Jr., NJ 

Grace F. Napolitano, CA 

Rush D. Holt, NJ 

Rau ́l M. Grijalva, AZ 

Madeleine Z. Bordallo, GU 

Jim Costa, CA 

Dan Boren, OK 

Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan, CNMI 

Martin Heinrich, NM 

Ben Ray Luja ́n, NM 

Donna M. Christensen, VI 

John P. Sarbanes, MD 

Betty Sutton, OH 

Niki Tsongas, MA 

Pedro R. Pierluisi, PR 

John Garamendi, CA 

Colleen W. Hanabusa, HI 

Todd Young, Chief of Staff 

Lisa Pittman, Chief Counsel 

Jeffrey Duncan, Democrat Staff Director 

Rick Healy, Democrat Chief Counsel 

(III) 

CONTENTS 

Page 

Hearing held on Wednesday, January 26, 2011 .................................................... 1 

Statement of Members: 

Flores, Hon. Bill, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, 

Prepared statement of .................................................................................. 52 

Hastings, Hon. Doc, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Washington .................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 3 

Holt, Hon. Rush D., a Representative in Congress from the State of 

New Jersey, Prepared statement of ............................................................ 69 

Landry, Hon. Jeffrey M., a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Louisiana, Prepared statement of ........................................................... 70 

Markey, Hon. Edward J., a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Massachusetts ........................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 5 

Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Virginia, Prepared statement of .............................................................. 70 

Statement of Witnesses: 

Graham, Hon. Bob, Senator, Co-Chairman, National Commission on the 

BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling ............................. 9 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 11 

Joint response to questions submitted for the record ............................ 71 

Reilly, Hon. William K., Former Administrator of the Environmental 

Protection Agency, and Co-Chairman, National Commission on the BP 

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling ................................... 7 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 11 

Joint response to questions submitted for the record ............................ 71 

Additional materials supplied: 

Wall Street Journal editorial ‘‘Gulf Political Spill’’ dated January 13, 

2011, submitted for the record ..................................................................... 66 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT HEARING ON THE FINAL REPORT 

OF THE PRESIDENT’S NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL 

SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING. 

Wednesday, January 26, 2011 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Natural Resources 

Washington, D.C. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:19 p.m., in Room 

1324, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Doc Hastings 

[Chairman of the Committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Hastings, Young, Bishop, Lamborn, 

Wittman, Fleming, Coffman, McClintock, Thompson, Denham, 

Benishek, Rivera, Duncan of South Carolina, Tipton, Gosar, 

Labrador, Southerland, Flores, Harris, Landry, Fleischmann, 

Runyan, Johnson, Markey, Pallone, Grijalva, Boren, Luja ́n, 

Christensen, Sarbanes, Tsongas, and Hanabusa. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. DOC HASTINGS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee on Natural Resources will come 

to order. 

The Committee is meeting today to hear testimony on the report 

by the President’s National Commission on the BP Deepwater 

Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. 

Under Committee Rule 4(f), any oral opening statements at 

hearings are limited to the Chairman and the Ranking Minority 

Member. This will allow us to hear from our witnesses sooner and 

help keep Members on their schedules. If other Members have 

statements, they can be included in the hearing record under 

unanimous consent. 

So I ask unanimous consent that all Members’ opening day statements be made a part of the hearing record if they are submitted 

to the Chief Clerk by 5:00 p.m. today. Hearing no objection, so 

ordered. 

We have two witnesses today, and I will make the formal introductions after our opening statements, but I am very pleased that 

they are here. They are spending all day on the Hill. The first part 

of the day was spent on the other side of the Capitol, and now they 

are here, and I will welcome them formally in a moment. 

2 

It has been 9 months since the horrific explosion and oil spill in 

the Gulf of Mexico that resulted in the death of 11 men and the 

burning and the sinking of the Deepwater Horizon. Since then, 

nearly 5 million barrels of oil spilled into the Gulf, resulting in the 

economic displacement of tens of thousands of fishermen, tourist 

workers, and people connected to the offshore energy industry. 

The oil spill was a terrible tragedy and the effects are still being 

felt today. As this Committee proceeds with its oversight duties, we 

must be mindful of how we respond because that response could 

significantly impact American energy policy in the future. The 

response to this event could be the difference between making 

offshore drilling the safest in the world or locking up our resources, 

putting more Americans out of work and further relying on foreign 

countries for our energy needs. 

It is because of these serious implications that I have stressed 

from day one the need to have all of the facts and information surrounding the cause of this incident before there is a rush to judgment or a rush to legislate. When President Obama announced 

that he was personally appointing an oil spill commission, many in 

Congress and around the country were deeply concerned with both 

the makeup and the mandate of the Commission. 

There were concerns that the President’s Commission didn’t have 

enough experts in engineering or experience in the oil and gas 

industry and that it was comprised of individuals who had dedicated a significant portion of their career to opposing oil and gas 

drilling. While understanding these concerns, I kept and am keeping an open mind on the recommendations of the President’s Commission. 

This is why this is the first scheduled Committee hearing in this 

Congress, and I am anxious to hear from the Co-Chairs. This 

report provides further insight into the accident and will be a factor in Congress’ discussions. However, even with the Commission’s 

report, we still don’t know precisely what caused the explosion or 

why the blowout preventer failed to work. Now, there will be additional reports from the joint Coast Guard-BOEM Marine Board 

hearings and the Chemical Safety Board hearings. And hopefully 

they will provide answers to these lingering questions among 

others. 

Through this uncertainty, what I do know for sure is that America needs American-made energy. We need to keep and create 

American jobs. And we need to mitigate America’s dependence on 

foreign energy that threatens potentially our national security. The 

oil spill, as I mentioned, was a terrible tragedy, but it should not 

be used as an excuse to further reduce America’s access to our 

energy resources. 

Some in Congress view this bill as an opportunity to shut down 

offshore drilling. To me, that is not a solution. That is giving up. 

Legislation aimed at this goal was introduced last year and will 

predictably be proposed again in this Congress—this despite the 

strong support among the American people for continued offshore 

energy productions. 

Republicans want to make offshore energy drilling the safest in 

the world. We believe in the need to make smart, effective reforms 

that are centered on improving safety, putting people back to work 

3 

and allowing responsible drilling to move forward. The right 

response to this bill is to focus on making drilling safe, not 

impossible. 

The importance of this Committee’s future work cannot be understated. Gas prices are steadily rising. Iran has assumed the presidency of OPEC, and rigs are leaving the Gulf for foreign countries 

like Cuba, Brazil and Mexico, taking American jobs with them. 

This isn’t speculation. It is happening. 

My colleagues from the Gulf can attest to the real economic pain 

being felt by people and businesses due to this Administration’s 

drilling moratorium. Production in the Gulf of Mexico has already 

fallen by more than 200,000 barrels per day, and it is predicted by 

the Energy Information Administration to fall by more than 

500,000 barrels per day by 2012. Every barrel that we don’t 

produce from the Gulf means more lost revenue to the Federal 

Government, more lost jobs, and an additional transfer of American 

wealth to hostile nations. 

I believe in American ingenuity, and I know that we can get this 

right. The answer is to address what went wrong and make smart 

reforms and allow drilling to resume. The stakes are too high to 

give up. Our economic competitiveness, American jobs, and 

national security are on the line. 

And with that, I recognize the distinguished Ranking Member. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Hastings follows:] 

Statement of The Honorable Doc Hastings, Chairman, 

Committee on Natural Resources 

It’s been nine months since the horrific explosion and oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico that resulted in the death of 11 men and the burning and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon rig. Since then nearly five million barrels of oil spilled into the Gulf; 

resulting in the economic displacement of tens of thousands of fishermen, tourism 

workers, and people connected to the offshore energy industry. 

The oil spill was a terrible tragedy and the effects are still being felt today. 

As this Committee proceeds with its oversight duties, we must be mindful of how 

we respond, because that response could significantly impact American energy policy in the future. The response to this event could be the difference between making 

offshore drilling the safest in the world . . . or locking-up up our resources, putting 

more Americans out of work, and further relying on foreign countries for our energy 

needs. 

It is because of these serious implications that I have stressed from day one the 

need to have all the facts and information surrounding the cause of this incident 

before there is a rush to judgment . . . or a rush to legislate. 

When President Obama announced that he was personally appointing an Oil Spill 

Commission, many in Congress and around the country were deeply concerned with 

both the make-up and mandate of the Commission. 

There were concerns that the President’s Commission didn’t have enough experts 

in engineering or experience in the oil and gas industry and that it was comprised 

of individuals who had dedicated a significant portion of their career to opposing oil 

and gas drilling. 

While understanding these concerns, I kept, and am keeping, an open mind on 

the recommendations of the President’s Commission. This is why it is the first 

scheduled Committee hearing of this Congress and I’m eager to hear from its CoChairs. 

This report provides further insight into the accident and will be a factor in Congress’ discussions. However, even with the Commission’s report, we still don’t know 

precisely what caused the explosion, or why the blowout preventer failed to work. 

Additional reports from the joint Coast Guard-BOEM Marine Board hearings and 

the Chemical Safety Board are forthcoming and I’m hopeful they will provide answers to some of the lingering questions. 

Through all this uncertainty, what I do know for sure is that America needs 

American-made energy. 

4 

We need to keep and create American jobs. 

And we need to mitigate America’s dependence on foreign energy that threatens 

our national security. 

The oil spill was a terrible tragedy, but it should not be used as an excuse to further reduce America’s access to our energy resources. Some in Congress view this 

spill as an opportunity to shut down offshore drilling. That is not a solution . . . that 

is giving up. 

Legislation aimed at this goal was introduced last year and will predictably be 

proposed again this Congress. This despite the strong support among the American 

people for continued offshore energy production. 

Republicans want to make offshore drilling the safest in the world. We believe in 

the need to make smart, effective reforms that are centered on improving safety, 

putting people back to work, and allowing responsible drilling to move forward. The 

right response to this spill is to focus on making drilling safe . . ., not making it impossible. 

The importance of this Committee’s future work cannot be understated. Gas 

prices are steadily rising, . . . Iran has assumed the Presidency of OPEC, . . . and rigs 

are leaving the Gulf for foreign countries—like Cuba, Brazil and Mexico—taking 

American jobs with them. This isn’t speculation . . . it’s happening. 

My colleagues from the Gulf can attest to the real economic pain being felt by 

people and businesses due to this Administration’s drilling moratorium. 

Production in the Gulf of Mexico has already fallen by more than 200,000 barrels 

per day, and is predicted by the Energy Information Administration to fall by more 

than 500,000 barrels per day by 2012. 

Every barrel we don’t produce from the Gulf means more lost revenue to the federal government, more lost jobs, and an additional transfer of American wealth to 

hostile nations. 

I believe in American ingenuity and I know we can get this right. The answer 

is to address what went wrong, make smart reforms and allow drilling to resume. 

The stakes are too high to give up. Our economic competitiveness, American jobs 

and natural security are on the line. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. ED MARKEY, A REPRESENTATIVE 

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS 

Mr. MARKEY. I thank the Chairman very much, and we thank 

you. 

And on behalf of the Democratic Members of the Committee, 

please accept our sincere congratulations on your appointment as 

Chairman. 

We, on this side of the aisle, look forward to a productive 

working relationship with you and with the majority, occasionally 

punctuated by knockdown drag-out fights over issues that we all 

care about deeply. 

While I applaud the Chairman for holding this hearing today, I 

am also deeply saddened that this hearing is necessary. Industry 

and Federal regulators assured the American public that a disaster 

like the BP Deepwater Horizon spill could not happen. The events 

of last April and the subsequent investigations have demonstrated 

that those assurances were worthless. The American people are left 

to count the economic and environmental costs and 11 families are 

left without their loved ones. 

It is vital to our Nation’s energy future that we examine the 

causes of this tragedy with clear eyes, assess the lessons to be 

learned with open minds, and commit ourselves to fundamental 

reform with firm resolve. 

In the testimony submitted for this hearing, the Commission CoChairmen—and we thank you both so much for your service to our 

country—point out that ‘‘the United States has the highest 

reported rate of fatalities per hours worked in offshore oil and gas 

drilling among its international peers.’’ 

5 

Mr. Chairman, that shocking statistic does not mean that BP or 

Transocean or Halliburton operate unsafely. It means that the 

entire American offshore oil and gas industry operates unsafely 

compared to its international peers. 

To quote from our witnesses again: ‘‘The central lesson to be 

drawn from the catastrophe is that no less than an overhauling of 

both current industry practices and government oversight is now 

required.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, this is not a time for half measures or tinkering 

around the edges. This is a time for bold reforms. The lives lost 

and the damage done as a result of this tragedy require nothing 

short of fundamental change in the way we conduct the business 

of offshore oil and gas development and production. 

I am proud that Democrats in the House took a major step toward such an overhaul by passing the Consolidated Land, Energy 

and Aquatic Resources Act in the last Congress, known as the 

CLEAR Act. The legislation included many of the recommendations 

contained in the Commission’s report. 

While my colleagues on the Republican side may not have liked 

all that was in that legislation, it is my hope that now the Commission has made many of the same recommendations, that we can 

work together in a bipartisan effort to craft new legislation. 

To that end, I have joined with Ranking Members Waxman and 

Rahall, Miller and Johnson, along with Energy Ranking Member 

Rush Holt and other Members to introduce new legislation combining the best elements of the CLEAR Act with recommendations 

from the Commission. We welcome review of that legislation by the 

Commission and by our colleagues on both sides of the aisle. 

If we are shortsighted and complacent, today’s hearing will be an 

end. If we are visionary and engaged, today’s hearing is only the 

beginning of having America have the safest and most productive 

oil and natural gas industry. That should be our goal. And that is 

the goal I think every American should be aiming to achieve in any 

legislation we pass. 

In closing, again, let me offer my sincere gratitude to Senator 

Graham; to you, Administrator Reilly; and to all of the Commission 

members and the staff for their Herculean effort and their 

willingness to take on this investigation and their dedication to 

completing it in such a short period of time and with such 

thoroughness. 

This Committee and the American people are in your debt, and 

I thank you for your efforts. And I thank the Chairman for extending me those few extra seconds. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Markey follows:] 

Statement of The Honorable Edward J. Markey, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Natural Resources 

Thank you Chairman Hastings and on behalf of the Democratic members of the 

Committee, please accept our sincere congratulations on your appointment as 

Chairman. We on this side of the aisle look forward to a productive working 

relationship—punctuated by knock-down, drag-out fights over issues we all care 

about deeply. 

While I applaud the Chairman for holding this hearing today, I am also deeply 

saddened that this hearing is necessary. Industry and federal regulators assured the 

American public that a disaster like the BP Deepwater Horizon spill could not 

happen. 

6 

The events of last April and the subsequent investigations have demonstrated 

that those assurances were worthless. The American people are left to count the economic and environmental costs and eleven families are left without their loved ones. 

It is vital to our nation’s energy future that we examine the causes of this tragedy 

with clear eyes, assess the lessons to be learned with open minds, and commit ourselves to fundamental reform with firm resolve. 

In the testimony submitted for this hearing, the Commission Co-Chairmen point 

out that, ‘‘the United States has the highest reported rate of fatalities per hours 

worked in offshore oil and gas drilling among its international peers.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, that shocking statistic does not mean that BP or Transocean or 

Halliburton operate unsafely; it means that the entire American offshore oil and gas 

industry operates unsafely, compared to its international peers. 

To quote from our witnesses again, ‘‘the central lesson to be drawn from the catastrophe is that no less than an overhauling of both current industry practices and 

government oversight is now required.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, this is not a time for half measures or tinkering around the edges; 

this is a time for bold reforms. The lives lost and the damage done as a result of 

this tragedy require nothing short of fundamental change in the way we conduct 

the business of offshore oil and gas development and production. 

I am proud that Democrats in the House took a major step toward such an overhaul by passing the Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act in the 

last Congress. Known as the CLEAR Act, that legislation included many of the recommendations contained in the Commission’s report. 

While my colleagues on the Republican side opposed that effort, it is my hope 

that, now that the Commission has made many of the same recommendations, we 

can work together in a bipartisan effort to craft new legislation. To that end, I have 

joined Ranking Members Waxman, Rahall, Miller, and Johnson, along with Energy 

Subcommittee Ranking Member Holt and other Members, to introduce new legislation combining the best elements of the CLEAR Act with recommendations from the 

Commission. We welcome review of our legislation by the Commission and by our 

colleagues on both sides of the aisle. 

If we are shortsighted and complacent, today’s hearing will be an end. If we are 

visionary and engaged, today’s hearing is only the beginning. 

In closing, let me offer my sincere gratitude to Senator Graham, Mr. Reilly, and 

all the Commission members and staff for their willingness to take on this investigation and their dedication in completing it so thoroughly. This committee and the 

American people are in your debt. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

And I thank the gentleman for his opening comments. I, too, look 

forward to working with you. And I want to welcome the two witnesses here today. I know that since this event happened and since 

the appointment of the Commission, there is a lot of work done by 

both of you. 

The Honorable Bill Reilly is a former Administrator of the EPA 

and, of course, on the Hill people do remember the Florida Senator, 

Bob Graham, and former Governor, if I am not mistaken, of the 

State of Florida. So certainly there is expertise. 

So, with that, I would just remind you that under Committee 

rules, you have 5 minutes for your oral testimony. However, your 

full statement will appear in the record. 

You note that over here, we have these little boxes that have 

green lights, yellow lights and red lights. When the red light comes 

on, you know you are at 5 minutes. When the yellow light is on, 

you are up to 4.5 minutes and you have 30 seconds. 

With that, we will allow both of you to testify and then we will 

open up to questions to an eager Committee that wants to talk. 

So, with that, I will first introduce Mr. Reilly. Mr. Reilly, you are 

on. 

7 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM K. REILLY, 

FORMER ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL 

PROTECTION AGENCY, CO-CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND 

OFFSHORE DRILLING 

Mr. REILLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Markey, members of the Committee, it is a privilege and an honor 

for us to appear before you as it has been for us to serve on this 

Commission, particularly for me to serve with my distinguished 

friend and long time, long time friend and colleague, Bob Graham. 

I will make a brief statement and ask that my testimony be included in the record. 

I want to begin by saying that with respect to oil and gas, we 

need the resource. It is vital to the economy, to our mobility, to our 

way of life. It is itself, the oil and gas industry, a significant contributor to productivity, to jobs, to our GDP and to avoiding even 

more necessity to import from the international oil market. 

This Commission believes that we can develop offshore oil and 

gas resources safely; we can do it in the deep water, and I would 

signal that the deep water is where it is. That is where the industry has been going and will be going in an even more significant 

way in the years to come. 

But the country’s confidence in offshore oil and gas development 

has been shattered. The Commission determined that the government and industry both were characterized by an aura of complacency. That has attracted a good deal of attention and some 

criticism. I would just say very briefly that, as I learned from Tony 

Hayward, the CEO of BP, the week after I took office as Commission Co-Chairman, when you learn from him that there is effectively no subsea containment technology or capability, when you 

look at response plans that talk about protecting walruses in the 

Gulf of Mexico, when you see the wholly inadequate response technology that has not evolved since I oversaw it 20 years before in 

Prince William Sound, and when you see that there have been 79 

instances of loss of well control between 1996 and 2009 in the Gulf 

and that we have, as was mentioned, a fatality rate that is 5 times 

that of the North Sea in a much more punishing environment—and 

then finally that you have key omnipresent contractors who are 

deeply implicated in the bad decisions that contributed to the high 

risk that we uncovered—you have to conclude both that there was 

an aura of complacency—and so many industry leaders have said, 

which I would have said myself, we didn’t think this was possible, 

and we didn’t think this could happen—but also that contractors 

who have supplied faulty cement to a BP rig or who have failed to 

detect gas rising in the drill pipe on a BP rig, it is inconceivable 

given their presence in all of the oceans in the world where oil and 

gas are developed, it is inconceivable to us that this would only 

have been confined to one company, to a rogue company, which was 

my own conviction, my own premise starting out. 

So we did conclude this is a systemic problem that has been 

characterized by an atmosphere of complacency. 

I want to signal one more thing and that is the history of the 

budget of the government regulatory agency of which we are quite 

hard, we are quite critical of its effectiveness, its capability, its lack 

8 

of professionalism, to carry out the assignment that the law gives 

it to monitor and control and regulate this industry. The budget for 

MMS, the predecessor to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), has gone down 20 

percent since 1984, while offshore oil and gas production has 

tripled. 

So to address these issues, we have three principal proposals: 

First is for a safety authority within the Interior Department 

entirely walled off from political interference with a Director 

appointed for a term much like the FBI Director and adequately 

resourced and budgeted, provided for. 

We recommend that industry establish a safety institute. The 

high-risk industries that have had catastrophes have learned from 

them: The chemical industry after Bhopal with Responsible Care®

and the nuclear industry after Three Mile Island with the Institute 

for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). Those should be focused on 

best practice and should bring up the game for everybody and 

allow the best companies to have some means of ensuring that one 

laggard company, one bad performer does not bring everybody 

down and cause all their rigs to be shut down in the Gulf, as was 

the case last summer. 

Finally, I just want to signal the international dimensions of our 

issue. If you look at a map of the Gulf of Mexico, the United States 

has sovereign jurisdiction over far less than all of it. We now know 

Mexico intends to go into deep water in two years, Cuba within the 

next year or two, and we need some kind of international understanding or treaty with respect to the standards that will apply to 

those activities. 

We also need it in the Arctic, where Russia is intending to go 

into its Arctic waters with BP and Rosneft. Canada. Denmark has 

already begun, and Greenland last summer. We need the same 

kind of attention on the part of our State Department to ensure 

that the Arctic waters are given the kind of special protection that 

they deserve. We make a number of recommendations particularly 

relevant to science and the science that is needed to pursue oil and 

gas development in those very different waters with all of the high 

risks that special storm action, fog and deep cold entail. 

Well, those are some of the principal recommendations I wanted 

to cover, Mr. Chairman. I would only say that they are relatively 

modest in my view, in terms, both of money, certainly in terms of 

bureaucracy and disruption. To reorganize the Interior Department 

will not take much in the way of money. To budget adequately the 

BOEMRE, it will take some, but it is relatively small in lieu of 

both the huge cost of the accident we just experienced and the 

overall revenues that the United States receives from offshore oil 

and gas development leases and royalties. I think it is money that 

would be well invested, and we look forward to your questions and 

recognize that from the point of view of the Commission, we are 

just about done. So it really is over to you. 

Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Reilly. I appreciate very much 

your testimony. 

Senator Graham, you are on. 

9 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BOB GRAHAM, SENATOR, 

CO-CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING 

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Markey and other members of this Committee. 

And I know many of you are commencing your service in Congress, and let me extend my congratulations. You are beginning a 

journey which will have immense gratification and personal pleasure. I congratulate you and wish you well in your service. 

Mr. Chairman, our Commission was established in May of last 

year. We were given three responsibilities: First was to determine 

the cause of the Deepwater Horizon explosion; second, to evaluate 

the response to that disaster; and third to advise the Nation about 

future energy exploration, particularly in the offshore environment. 

On January 11th, we submitted our report, called ‘‘Deep Water: 

The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling.’’ We had 

been initially subject to some criticism. One was that we lacked 

independence. In the course of our investigation, we were able to 

make just about everybody mad at us. From time to time, the industry was mad, and the White House was mad. Maybe this Committee escaped that. I believe we established the fact that we were 

looking at this from the perspective of the American people’s interest and none other. 

Second, there was some criticism that we weren’t competent to 

carry out this task. It would be immodest to try to defend our competency. I would just submit our report, its findings and recommendations, and you can evaluate whether you think that we 

had the skills, both among the seven commissioners and in an excellent staff led by Mr. Richard Lazarus, who gave us tremendous 

support throughout this endeavor. 

I would like to make one general comment before I turn to the 

two areas that I am particularly going to discuss, and that is that 

there is a difference in the offshore of the Gulf from what we knnw 

well, which is onshore oil and gas production. Onshore oil and gas 

production is a combination of drilling on privately owned land and 

public land. All of the drilling in the Gulf of Mexico is on publicly 

owned land, land which belongs to the people of the United States 

of America. 

So I think the way to look at this is not just as a regulator, a 

government regulating a private enterprise going about its private 

business. We also are in the role of a landlord. We have an obligation to protect this asset that belongs to all of the people of America and to be able to continue to draw upon it for a variety of purposes. Yes, energy, but also it is a major source of American seafood, and it is one of our major tourist areas, just to mention three 

of the benefits that we derive from the Gulf. So are we fulfilling 

our responsibility to be a prudent landlord? 

I am going to discuss the area of response and containment and 

then the issue of, where do we go from here in terms of restoration 

of the Gulf? 

My good friend, Bill Reilly, has already mentioned that the 

response to this event was, to say the least, very disappointing. 

Although there were some respondents who acted quickly, some heroically, the Commission concluded that neither BP nor the Federal 

10 

Government was prepared to conduct an effective response. There 

was a failure to plan in advance for such an event, a failure to coordinate, particularly between Federal agencies and State and local 

officials. In addition, neither the industry nor the Federal Government had invested in the research to understand in an anticipatory 

way what we would be facing if we had such an event as the 

Macondo blowout. 

Much of the technology that we were able to bring to this problem was the same technology that had been used 20 years earlier 

in the Exxon Valdez, which is to say there was almost no technological advances taken as a result of the experience of Exxon 

Valdez. 

We have made a number of recommendations on response and 

containment, including that the Department of the Interior, in consultation with other agencies, should develop a more rigorous set 

of requirements for industry response plans. No more polar bears 

or walruses in the response plans for the Gulf of Mexico. 

The EPA and the Coast Guard should involve State and local 

governments as significant players; the Congress should provide 

adequate and sustained funding for oil spills, including and particularly research into how to mitigate oil spills; and the industry 

should fund a private organization to develop, adopt and enforce 

standards of excellence to assure continuous improvement in the 

technology for oil spill response. 

The second area is restoration. The day before this event was 

April 19, 2010. If we define our goal as being to restore the Gulf 

to the condition that it was in on April 19th, we have missed an 

enormous opportunity. Frankly, the Gulf on April 19th was a 

degraded area. It had suffered from decades of misuse and most 

dramatically shown by the marshes of Louisiana, which have been 

receding at a rate of over one football field every 30 minutes. 

We felt that this was a chance to begin a major process of restoring this very important part of our Nation. We have recommended 

that 80 percent of the fines and penalties that we anticipate will 

be assessed under the Clean Water Act be directed at Gulf restoration. That will require your approval. Only Congress can make that 

commitment of those fines and penalties. But we believe that it 

would be money well spent. 

We recognize that it will require a significant amount of time, 

probably in the range of 20 to 30 years, to complete an effective 

restoration. We believe that these funds would be the basis of a 

major down payment toward that objective. 

I would like to conclude my remarks—and I got the signal, Mr. 

Chairman—that drilling is inherently risky. We can never reduce 

it to zero. But we believe the steps that we have recommended will 

substantially reduce the probabilities of a repeat Macondo and, 

should that happen, will significantly enhance our capacity to 

restrain its consequences. 

Mr. Chairman, I will submit my full report. I appreciate your 

willingness to receive it. I look forward to responding to your 

questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Reilly and Senator Graham 

follows:] 

11 

Statement of The Honorable Bob Graham and The Honorable William 

Reilly, Co-Chairmen, National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon 

Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 

I. Introduction 

Chairman Hastings, Ranking Member Markey, and members of the Committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the National Commission 

on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. 

The explosion that tore through the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig last April 20, 

as the rig’s crew completed drilling the exploratory Macondo well deep under the 

waters of the Gulf of Mexico, began a human, economic, and environmental disaster. 

Eleven crew members died, and others were seriously injured, as fire engulfed 

and ultimately destroyed the rig. And, although the nation would not know the full 

scope of the disaster for weeks, the first of more than four million barrels of oil 

began gushing uncontrolled into the Gulf—threatening livelihoods, the health of 

Gulf coast residents and of those responding to the spill, precious habitats, and even 

a unique way of life. A treasured American landscape, already battered and degraded from years of mismanagement, faced yet another blow as the oil spread and 

washed ashore. Five years after Hurricane Katrina, the nation was again transfixed, 

seemingly helpless, as this new tragedy unfolded in the Gulf. The costs from this 

one industrial accident are not yet fully counted, but it is already clear that the impacts on the region’s natural systems and people were enormous, and that economic 

losses total tens of billions of dollars. 

On May 22, 2010, President Barack Obama announced the creation of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (the 

‘‘Commission’’): an independent, nonpartisan entity, directed to provide thorough 

analysis and impartial judgment. The President charged the Commission to determine the causes of the disaster, and to improve the country’s ability to respond to 

spills, and to recommend reforms to make offshore energy production safer. And the 

President said we were to follow the facts wherever they led. 

This Commission report (the ‘‘Report’’), which we ask be made part of the hearing 

record in its entirety, is the result of an intense six-month effort to fulfill the President’s charge. As a result of our investigation, we conclude: 

• The explosive loss of the Macondo well could have been prevented. 

• The immediate causes of the Macondo well blowout can be traced to a series 

of identifiable mistakes made by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean that reveal 

such systematic failures in risk management that they place in doubt the 

safety culture of the entire industry. 

• Deepwater energy exploration and production, particularly at the frontiers of 

experience, involve risks for which neither industry nor government has been 

adequately prepared, but for which they can and must be prepared in the 

future. 

• To assure human safety and environmental protection, regulatory oversight 

of leasing, energy exploration, and production require reforms even beyond 

those significant reforms already initiated since the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Fundamental reform will be needed in both the structure of those in 

charge of regulatory oversight and their internal decision-making process to 

ensure their political autonomy, technical expertise, and their full consideration of environmental protection concerns. 

• Because regulatory oversight alone will not be sufficient to ensure adequate 

safety, the oil and gas industry will need to take its own, unilateral steps to 

increase dramatically safety throughout the industry, including self-policing 

mechanisms that supplement governmental enforcement. 

• The technology, laws and regulations, and practices for containing, responding to, and cleaning up spills lag behind the real risks associated with deepwater drilling into large, high-pressure reservoirs of oil and gas located far 

offshore and thousands of feet below the ocean’s surface. Government must 

close the existing gap and industry must support rather than resist that 

effort. 

• Scientific understanding of environmental conditions in sensitive environments in deep Gulf waters, along the region’s coastal habitats, and in areas 

proposed for more drilling, such as the Arctic, is inadequate. The same is true 

of the human and natural impacts of oil spills. 

We reach these conclusions, and make necessary recommendations, in a constructive spirit: we aim to promote changes that will make American offshore energy exploration and production far safer, today and in the future. 

12 

II. The Root Causes of the Explosion 

The Commission examined in great detail what went wrong on the rig itself. Our 

investigative staff uncovered a wealth of specific information that greatly enhances 

our understanding of the factors that led to the explosion. The results of that investigation are described in detail in Chapter 4 of the Report. The separate report of 

the chief counsel, to be published soon, will offer the fullest account yet of what happened on the rig and why. There are recurring themes of missed warning signals, 

failure to share information, and a general lack of appreciation for the risks involved. In the view of the Commission, these findings highlight the importance of 

organizational culture and a consistent commitment to safety by industry, from the 

highest management levels on down. 

To summarize, the Macondo blowout happened because a number of separate risk 

factors, oversights, and outright mistakes combined to overwhelm the safeguards— 

promised by both government and by private industry—to prevent just such an 

event from happening. But most of the mistakes and oversights at Macondo can be 

traced back to a single overarching failure—a failure of management by BP, Halliburton and Transocean. Set out below are what Commission investigative staff determined were ‘‘key facts.’’ 

Key Facts: The investigation team identified several key human errors, engineering mistakes and management failures including: 

• A flawed design for the cement slurry used to seal the bottom of the well, 

which was developed without adequate engineering review or operator supervision; 

• A ‘‘negative pressure test,’’ conducted to evaluate the cement seal at the bottom of the well, identified a cementing failure but was incorrectly judged a 

success because of insufficiently rigorous test procedures and inadequate 

training of key personnel; 

• Flawed procedures for securing the well that called for unnecessarily removing drilling mud from the wellbore. If left in place, that drilling mud would 

have helped prevent hydrocarbons from entering the well and causing the 

blowout; 

• Apparent inattention to key initial signals of the impending blowout; and 

• An ineffective response to the blowout once it began, including but not limited 

to a failure of the rig’s blowout preventer to close off the well. 

Key Findings: The ‘‘key facts’’ led investigators to make the following ‘‘key 

findings’’: 

• Errors and misjudgments by at least three companies—BP, Halliburton and 

Transocean—contributed to the disaster. 

• Management failures included: 

Æ Inadequate training of key personnel. 

Æ Inadequate management of numerous late-stage well design decisions. 

Æ Poor communication within and between the companies involved. 

Æ Inadequate risk evaluation and risk mitigation measures. 

• The disaster could have been prevented. Notably, workers on the rig incorrectly interpreted clear warning signs of a hydrocarbon influx during the negative pressure test. If recognized, those warning signs would have allowed 

them to shut in the well before the blowout began. 

• Government regulations did not address several key causes of the blowout, 

and regulators lacked the resources or technical expertise to address others. 

• Whether purposeful or not, many of the risk-enhancing decisions that BP, 

Halliburton, and Transocean made saved those companies significant time 

(and money). 

The Commission’s investigation concludes that these failures were preventable. 

Errors and misjudgments by at least three companies—BP, Halliburton and 

Transocean—contributed to the disaster. Federal regulations did not address many 

of the key issues. For example, no regulation specified basic procedures for the negative pressure test used to evaluate the cement seal or minimum criteria for test success. The chapter also notes that, ’’ . . . whether purposeful or not, many of the decisions that BP, Halliburton, and Transocean made that increased the risk of the 

Macondo blowout clearly saved those companies significant time (and money).’’ 

Attached to this testimony is a table that sets out decisions that increased risk 

at Macondo, while potentially saving time. 

III. Regulatory Oversight and the Need for Reform 

Regulatory Oversight 

The responsibilities assigned to the Minerals Management Services (MMS) in an 

effort to regulate the offshore oil and gas industry have created conflicts of interest 

13 

and have been subject to pressure from political and industry interests. MMS was 

not only responsible for offshore leasing and resource management; it also collected 

and disbursed revenues from offshore leasing, conducted environmental reviews, reviewed plans and issued permits, conducted audits and inspections, and enforced 

safety and environmental regulations. 

Over the course of many years, political pressure generated by a demand for lease 

revenues and industry pressure to expand access and expedite permit approvals and 

other regulatory processes often combined to push MMS to elevate revenue and permitting goals over safety and environmental goals. As a result, the safety of U.S. 

offshore workers has suffered. The United States has the highest reported rate of 

fatalities per hours worked in offshore oil and gas drilling among its international 

peers (the U.K., Norway, Canada, and Australia) but has the lowest reporting of injuries. This striking contrast suggests a significant under-reporting of injuries in the 

United States. 

These problems were compounded by an outdated organizational structure, a 

chronic shortage of resources, a lack of sufficient technological expertise, and the inherent difficulty of coordinating effectively with all of the other government agencies 

that have had statutory responsibility for some aspect of offshore oil and gas activities. Besides MMS, the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and 

Homeland Security, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) were involved 

in some aspect of the industry and its many-faceted facilities and operations, from 

workers on production platforms to pipelines, helicopters, drilling rigs, and supply 

vessels. 

Reorganization Needed 

To remedy this conflict of interest, Congress should create an independent agency 

with enforcement authority to oversee all aspects of offshore drilling safety (operational and occupational) as well as the structural and operational integrity of all 

offshore energy production facilities, including both oil and gas production and renewable energy production. The roles and responsibilities of BOEMRE should be 

separated into three entities with clearly defined statutory authorities. 

(1) The Offshore Safety Authority would have primary statutory responsibility 

for overseeing the structural and operational integrity of all offshore energyrelated facilities and activities, including both oil and gas offshore drilling 

and renewable energy facilities. Congress should enact an organic act to establish its authorities and responsibilities, consolidating the various responsibilities now under the OCSLA, the Pipeline Safety Act, and Coast Guard 

authorizations. This should include responsibility for all workers in energy 

related offshore activities. 

(2) The Leasing and Environmental Science Office would be charged with fostering environmentally responsible and efficient development of the Outer 

Continental Shelf, and would act as the leasing and resource manager for 

conventional renewable energy and other mineral resources on the OCS. 

The Office would also be responsible for conducting reviews under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 

(3) The Office of Natural Resources Revenue would be responsible for revenue 

collection and auditing. 

Congress should review and consider amending where necessary the governing 

statutes for all agencies involved in offshore activities to be consistent with the responsibilities functionally assigned to those agencies. The safety-related responsibilities of the new offshore safety agency should be included in a separate statute. 

Since the Commission issued its final report on January 11th, Secretary of the 

Interior Ken Salazar has already announced changes in the organization within Interior that reflect many of the Commission’s recommendations. Other Commission 

recommendations will require congressional action, especially those recommendations that seek to promote the independence of the Offshore Safety Authority from 

politics. For instance, the Commission recommends that the head of the Safety Authority be appointed to a fixed term that cuts across any one Presidential Administration, a change that can be accomplished most effectively only by statute. 

Regulation to Better Manage Risk 

The Commission also recommends a more comprehensive overhaul of both the 

leasing program and the regulatory policies and institutions used to oversee the 

safety and environmental protection of offshore activities. The goals must be to reduce and manage risk more effectively, using strategies that can keep pace with a 

technologically complex and rapidly evolving industry, particularly in high-risk and 

frontier areas, and to secure the resources needed to execute the leasing function 

14 

and provide adequate regulatory oversight. To accomplish these goals the Commission offers the following three recommendations: 

• The DOI should promulgate prescriptive safety and pollution-prevention 

standards that are developed and selected in consultation with international 

regulatory peers and that are at least as rigorous as the leasing terms and 

regulatory requirements of peer oil-producing nations. 

• The Department of the Interior (DOI) should develop a proactive, risk-based 

performance approach specific to individual facilities, operations, and environments, similar to the ‘‘safety case’’ approach in the North Sea which requires 

drilling rigs to be certified and have safety management obligations separate 

and apart from the operator. 

• Working with the International Regulators’ Forum and other organizations, 

Congress and the DOI should identify those drilling, production, and emergency-response standards that best protect offshore workers and the environment, and initiate new standards and revisions to fill gaps and correct deficiencies. These standards should be applied throughout the Gulf of Mexico, 

in the Arctic, and globally wherever the international industry operates. 

Standards should be updated at least every five years, as under the formal 

review process of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). 

(See below for expansion on the development of international regulations.) 

BOEMRE currently relies heavily on prescriptive regulations incorporating a 

number of industry technical standards. Prescriptive regulations must be the basis 

of an effective regulatory system, but given the many variables in deepwater drilling, prescriptive rules can never cover all cases. The federal agency responsible for 

offshore activity must have a regulatory approach that integrates more sophisticated 

risk assessment and risk management practices into its oversight of energy developers operating offshore. The focus should shift from prescriptive regulations covering only the operator to a foundation of augmented prescriptive regulations, including those relating to well design and integrity, supplemented by a proactive, 

risk-based performance approach that is specific to individual facilities (production 

platforms and drilling rigs), operations, and environments. Both the operator and 

the drilling rig owners would have a legal duty to assess and manage the risks of 

a specific activity by engaging all contractors and subcontractors in a coordinated 

safety management system. 

To ensure that Interior has the ability to provide adequate leasing capabilities 

and regulatory oversight for the increasingly complex energy-related activities being 

undertaken on the OCS, budgets for these new offices as well as existing agencies 

should come directly from fees paid by the offshore industry, akin to how fees 

charged to the telecommunications industry pay for the expenses of the Federal 

Communications Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Office of 

Pipeline Safety which are essentially fully funded by such regulated industry payments. Through this mechanism, Congress, through legislation, and DOI, through 

lease provisions, could expressly oblige lessees to fund the regulation necessary to 

allow for private industry access to the energy resources on the OCS, including renewables. 

IV. Environmental Review 

As part of its inquiry into the existing regulatory structure for offshore drilling, 

the Commission reviewed existing mechanisms for protecting the environment. In 

its work on this question, the Commission focused on two issues: (1) the application 

of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirements to the offshore leasing 

process and (2) the need for better science and greater interagency consultation to 

improve decision-making related to management of offshore resources. 

NEPA 

Based on the Commission’s review of leasing and permitting processes in the Gulf 

of Mexico before the Deepwater Horizon incident, the Commission concluded that 

the breakdown of the environmental review process for OCS activities was systemic 

and that Interior’s historical approach to the application of NEPA requirements for 

offshore oil and gas activities needs significant revision. In particular, the application of tiering, use of categorical exclusions, the practice of area-wide leasing, and 

failure to develop formal NEPA guidance all contributed to this breakdown. The 

Commission recommends that the Council on Environmental Quality and the Department of the Interior revise and strengthen the NEPA policies, practices, and 

procedures to improve the level of environmental analysis, transparency, and consistency at all stages of the OCS planning, leasing, exploration, and development 

process. 

15 

Improved Interagency Consultation and Environmental Science 

Under OCSLA, it is up to the Secretary of the Interior to choose the proper balance between environmental protection and resource development. In making leasing decisions, the Secretary is required to solicit and consider suggestions from any 

interested agency, but he or she is not required to respond to the comments or accord them any particular weight. Similar issues arise at the individual lease sale 

stage and at the development and production plan stage. As a result, NOAA—the 

nation’s ocean agency with the most expertise in marine science and the management of living marine resources—effectively has the same limited role as the general public in the decisions on selecting where and when to lease portions of the 

OCS. The Commission recommends a more robust and formal interagency consultation process in which NOAA, in particular, is provided a heightened role, but ultimate decision-making authority is retained at DOI. The Commission further recommends the creation of an Office of Environmental Science, led by a Chief Environmental Scientist, with specified responsibilities in conducting all NEPA reviews, 

coordinating other environmental reviews, and whose expert judgment on environmental protection concerns would be accorded significant weight in leasing decisionmaking. 

V. Reforming Industry Safety Practices 

Changing Business As Usual 

Without effective government oversight, the offshore oil and gas industry will not 

adequately reduce the risk of accidents, nor prepare effectively to respond in emergencies. However, government oversight alone cannot reduce those risks to the fullest extent possible. Government oversight must be accompanied by the oil and gas 

industry’s internal reinvention: sweeping reforms that accomplish no less than a 

fundamental transformation of its safety culture. 

Even the most inherently risky industry can be made much safer, given the right 

incentives and disciplined systems, sustained by committed leadership and effective 

training. The critical common element is an unwavering commitment to safety at 

the top of an organization: the CEO and board of directors. 

Industry Self-Policing as a Supplement to Government Regulation 

One of the key responsibilities of government is to regulate—to direct the behavior of individuals and institutions according to rules. Many businesses and business 

groups are involved in internal standard setting, evaluation, and other activities 

that constitute self-policing or self-regulation. But even in industries with strong 

self-policing, government also needs to be strongly present, providing oversight and/ 

or additional regulatory control—responsibilities that cannot be abdicated if public 

safety, health, and welfare are to be protected. 

Industry-standard setting and self-policing organizations are widespread in the 

United States and in most industrialized nations—typically for operations marked 

by technical complexity, such as the chemical, nuclear power, civil aviation, and oil 

and gas industries, where government oversight is also present. These processes coexist where there are relatively limited numbers of people with the requisite expertise and experience, making it hard for government to be able to rely solely on its 

own personnel (especially when government cannot compete with private-sector salaries for those experts). Support for standard setting and self-policing also arises in 

industries whose reputations depend on the performance of each company, and 

where significant revenues are at stake. However, industry self-policing is not a substitute for government but serves as an important supplement to government oversight. 

After Three Mile Island, the nuclear power industry established the Institute of 

Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), a nonprofit organization with the ambitious mission ‘‘to promote the highest levels of safety and reliability—to promote excellence— 

in the operation of commercial nuclear power plants.’’ The oil and gas industry, like 

the nuclear power industry, has both the substantial economic resources and the 

necessary economic incentive to make it happen. INPO was formed because doing 

so was in the industry’s self-interest. As the Deepwater Horizon disaster made unambiguously clear, the entire industry’s reputation, and perhaps its viability, ultimately turn on its lowest-performing members. If any one company is involved in 

an accident with widespread and potentially enormous costs, like those that followed 

the Macondo blowout, everyone in the industry—companies and employees—suffers, 

as do regional economies and the nation as a whole. No one, in industry or in government, can afford a repeat of the Macondo explosion and spill. 

Like the nuclear power industry in 1979, the nation’s oil and gas industry needs 

now to embrace the potential for an industry safety institute to supplement government oversight of industry operations. To be credible, any industry-created safety 

16 

institute would need to have complete command of technical expertise available 

through industry sources—and complete freedom from any suggestion that its operations are compromised by multiple other interests and agendas. As a consensusbased organization, the American Petroleum Institute (API) is culturally ill-suited 

to drive a safety revolution in the industry. For this reason, it is essential that the 

safety enterprise operate apart from the API. API’s longstanding role as an industry 

lobbyist and policy advocate—with an established record of opposing reform and 

modernization of safety regulations—renders it inappropriate to serve a self-policing 

function. 

The INPO experience makes clear that any successful oil and gas industry safety 

institute would require in the first instance strong board-level support from CEOs 

and boards of directors of companies for a rigorous inspection and auditing function. 

Such audits would need to be aimed at assessing companies’ safety cultures and encouraging learning about implementation of enhanced practices. The inspection and 

auditing function would need to be conducted by safety institute staff, complemented by experts seconded from industry companies. There would also need to 

be a commitment to share findings about safety records and best practices within 

the industry, aggregate data, and analyze performance trends, shortcomings, and 

needs for further research and development. Accountability could be enhanced by 

a requirement that companies report their audit scores to their boards of directors 

and insurance companies. 

The industry’s safety institute could facilitate a smooth transition to a regulatory 

regime based on systems safety engineering and improved coordination among operators and contractors—the principles of the U.K.’s ‘‘safety case’’ that shifts responsibility for maintaining safe operations at all times to the operators themselves. It 

should drive continuous improvement in standards and practices by incorporating 

the highest standards achieved globally. 

The industry also needs to benchmark safety and environmental practice rules 

against recognized global best practices. The Safety and Environmental Management Program Recommended Practice 75 (API RP 75) developed in 1993 by the API 

and incorporated by reference in the Department of the Interior’s new workplace 

safety rules, adopted in October 2010, is a reasonable starting point. 

VI. Response and Containment 

As part of its charge from President Obama, the Commission looked at the effectiveness of the response to the spill. There were remarkable instances of dedication 

and heroism by individuals involved in the rescue and cleanup. Much was done 

well—and thanks to a combination of good luck and hard work, the worst-case scenarios did not all come to pass. But it is impossible to argue that the industry or 

the government was prepared for a disaster of the magnitude of the Deepwater 

Horizon oil spill. Twenty years after the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska, the same 

blunt response technologies—booms, dispersants, and skimmers—were used, to limited effect. On-the-ground shortcomings in the joint public-private response to an 

overwhelming spill like that resulting from the blowout of the Macondo well are now 

evident, and demand public and private investment. So do the weaknesses in local, 

state, and federal coordination revealed by the emergency. 

Neither BP nor the federal government was prepared to conduct an effective response to a spill of the magnitude and complexity of the Deepwater Horizon disaster. 

Three critical issues or gaps existed in the government’s response capacity: (1) the 

failure to plan effectively for a large-scale, difficult-to-contain spill in the deepwater 

environment; (2) the difficulty of coordinating with state and local government officials to deliver an effective response; and (3) a lack of information and understanding concerning the efficacy of specific response measures, such as dispersants 

or berms. Moreover, the technology available for cleaning up oil spills had improved 

only incrementally since 1990. The technologies and methods available to cap or 

control a failed well in the extreme conditions thousands of feet below the sea were 

also inadequate. Although BP was able to develop new source-control technologies 

in a compressed timeframe, and the government was able to develop an effective 

oversight structure, the containment effort would have benefitted from prior preparation and contingency planning. 

Improved Oil Spill Response Planning 

The Department of the Interior should create a rigorous, transparent, and meaningful oil spill risk analysis and planning process for the development and implementation of better oil spill response. Several steps are needed for implementation: 

• Interior should review and revise its regulations and guidance for industry oil 

spill response plans. The revised process should ensure that all critical information and spill scenarios are addressed in the plans. 

17 

• In addition to Interior, other agencies with relevant scientific and operational 

expertise should play a role in evaluating spill response plans to verify that 

operators can conduct the operations detailed in their plans. Specifically, oil 

spill response plans, including source-control measures, should be subject to 

interagency review and approval by the Coast Guard, EPA, and NOAA. Other 

parts of the federal government, such as Department of Energy national laboratories that possess relevant scientific expertise, could be consulted. Plans 

should also be made available for a public comment period prior to final approval and response plans should be made available to the public following 

their approval. • Interior should incorporate the ‘‘worst-case scenario’’ calculations from industry oil spill response plans into NEPA documents and other environmental 

analyses or reviews. 

Spills of National Significance 

The Gulf oil spill presented an unprecedented challenge to the response capability 

of both government and industry. Though the National Contingency Plan permitted 

the government to designate the spill as one of ‘‘national significance,’’ this designation did not trigger any procedures other than allowing the government to name a 

National Incident Commander. 

EPA and the Coast Guard should establish distinct plans and procedures for responding to a ‘‘Spill of National Significance.’’ Specifically, EPA should amend or 

issue new guidance on the National Contingency Plan to: • Increase government oversight of the responsible party, based on the National 

Contingency Plan’s requirement that the government ‘‘direct’’ the response 

where a spill poses a substantial threat to public health or welfare. • Augment the National Response Team and Regional Response Team structures to establish additional frameworks for providing interagency scientific 

and policymaking expertise during a spill. Further, EPA, NOAA, and the 

Coast Guard should develop procedures to facilitate review and input from 

the scientific community—for example, by encouraging disclosure of underlying methodologies and data. • Create a communications protocol that accounts for participation by high-level 

officials who may be less familiar with the National Contingency Plan structure and create a communications center within the National Incident Command—separate from the joint information center established in partnership 

with the responsible party—to help transmit consistent and complete information to the public. 

Strengthening State and Local Involvement 

The response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster showed that state and local elected officials had not been adequately involved in oil spill contingency planning, 

though career responders in state government had participated extensively. Unfamiliarity with, and lack of trust in, the federal response manifested itself in competing state structures and attempts to control response operations that undercut 

the efficiency of the response overall. 

EPA and the Coast Guard should bolster state and local involvement in oil spill 

contingency planning and training and create a mechanism for local involvement in 

spill planning and response similar to the Regional Citizens’ Advisory Councils mandated by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. 

In addition, a mechanism should be created for ongoing local involvement in spill 

planning and response in the Gulf. In the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Congress mandated citizens’ councils for Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet. In the Gulf, such 

a council should broadly represent the citizens’ interests in the area, such as fishing 

and tourism, and possibly include representation from oil and gas workers as exofficio, non-voting members. 

Research and Development for Improved Response 

The technology available for cleaning up oil spills has improved only incrementally since 1990. Federal research and development programs in this area are underfunded: In fact, Congress has never appropriated even half the full amount authorized by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 for oil spill research and development. 

Specifically, Congress should provide mandatory funding (i.e. funding not subject 

to the annual appropriations process) at a level equal to or greater than the amount 

authorized by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 to increase federal funding for oil spill 

response research by agencies such as Interior, the Coast Guard, EPA, and NOAA. 

In addition, Congress and the Administration should encourage private investment 

in response technology more broadly, including through public-private partnerships 

and a tax credit for research and development in this area. 

18 

Dispersants 

Prior to the blowout, the federal government had not adequately planned for the 

use of dispersants to address such a large and sustained oil spill, and did not have 

sufficient research on the long-term effects of dispersants and dispersed oil to guide 

its decision-making. 

EPA should update and periodically review its dispersant testing protocols for 

product listing or pre-approval, and modify the pre-approval process to include temporal duration, spatial reach, and volume of the spill. EPA should update its dispersant testing protocols and require more comprehensive testing prior to listing or 

pre-approving dispersant products. The Coast Guard and EPA should modify preapprovals of dispersant use under the National Contingency Plan to establish procedures for further consultation based on the temporal duration, spatial reach, or volume of the spill and volume of dispersants that responders are seeking to apply. 

EPA and NOAA should conduct and encourage further research on dispersants. 

Containment 

The most obvious, immediately consequential, and plainly frustrating shortcoming 

of the oil spill response set in motion by the events of April 20, 2010 was the simple 

inability—of BP, of the federal government, or of any other potential intervener— 

to contain the flow of oil from the damaged Macondo well. 

At the time of the blowout on April 20, the U.S. government was unprepared to 

oversee a deepwater source-control effort. Once the Secretary of Energy’s science 

team, the U.S. Geological Survey, the national laboratories, and other sources of scientific expertise became involved, the government was able to substantively supervise BP’s decision-making, forcing the company to fully consider contingencies and 

justify its chosen path. 

The National Response Team should develop and maintain expertise within the 

Federal government to oversee source-control efforts. The National Response Team 

should create an interagency group—including representation from the Department 

of the Interior, Coast Guard, and the Department of Energy and its national laboratories—to develop and maintain expertise in source control, potentially through 

public-private partnerships. 

Industry’s Spill Preparedness 

Beyond attempting to close the blowout preventer stack, no proven options for 

rapid source control in deepwater existed when the blowout occurred. The Department of the Interior should require offshore operators to provide detailed plans for 

source control as part of their oil spill response plans and applications for permits 

to drill. 

These plans should demonstrate that an operator’s containment technology is immediately deployable and effective. In applications for permits to drill, the Interior 

should require operators to provide a specific source-control analysis for each well. 

As with oil spill response plans, source-control plans should be reviewed and approved by agencies with relevant expertise, including the Interior and the Coast 

Guard. 

Improved Capability for Accurate Flow Rate Estimates 

Early flow rate estimates were highly variable and difficult to determine accurately. However, the understated estimates of the amount of oil spilling appear to 

have impeded planning for and analysis of source-control efforts like the cofferdam 

and especially the top kill. 

The National Response Team should develop and maintain expertise within the 

federal government to obtain accurate estimates of flow rate or spill volume early 

in a source-control effort. The National Response Team should create an interagency 

group—including representation from Interior, the Coast Guard, the national laboratories, and NOAA—to develop and maintain expertise in estimating flow rates 

and spill volumes. In addition, EPA should amend the National Contingency Plan 

to create a protocol for the government to obtain accurate estimates of flow rate or 

spill volume from the outset of a spill. This protocol should require the responsible 

party to provide all data necessary to estimate flow rate or spill volume. 

More Robust Well Design and Approval Process 

Among the problems that complicated the Macondo well-containment effort was 

a lack of reliable diagnostic tools and concerns about the well’s integrity. The Department of the Interior should require offshore operators seeking its approval of 

proposed well design to demonstrate that: 

• Well components, including blowout preventer stacks, are equipped with sensors or other tools to obtain accurate diagnostic information—for example, regarding pressures and the position of blowout preventer rams. 

19 

• Wells are designed to mitigate risks to well integrity during post-blowout containment efforts. 

Industry Responsibilities for Containment and Response 

Industry’s responsibilities extend to efforts to contain any big spills as quickly as 

possible and to mitigate the harm caused by spills through effective response efforts. 

Both government, which must be capable of taking charge of those efforts, and industry were woefully unprepared to contain or respond to a deepwater well blowout 

like that at Macondo. All parties lacked adequate contingency planning, and neither 

had invested sufficiently in research, development, and demonstration to improve 

containment or response technology. 

From now on, the oil and gas industry needs to combine its commitment to transform its safety culture with adequate resources for containment and response. 

Large-scale rescue, response, and containment capabilities need to be developed and 

demonstrated—including equipment, procedures, and logistics—and enabled by extensive training, including full-scale field exercises and international cooperation. 

To that end, at least two industry spill containment initiatives have emerged that 

build on ideas and equipment that were deployed in response to the Macondo blowout and spill. The nonprofit Marine Well Containment Company was created in July 

2010 by four of the major, integrated oil and gas companies. The second spill containment initiative is being coordinated by Helix Energy Solutions Group, which 

played a role in the Macondo well containment efforts. 

Yet neither the Marine Well Containment Company’s planned capabilities nor 

Helix’s go past 10,000 feet despite the fact that current drilling technology extends 

beyond this depth. Also it seems that neither is structured to ensure the long-term 

ability to innovate and adapt over time to the next frontiers and technologies. What 

resources, if any, either initiative will dedicate to research and development going 

forward is unclear. 

The primary long-term goal of a spill containment company or consortia should 

be to ensure that an appropriate containment system is readily available to contain 

quickly spills in the Gulf of Mexico with the best available technology. Any spill containment company or consortia should ensure that it remains focused on this goal, 

even when doing so potentially conflicts with the short-term interests of its founding 

companies, in the case of MWCC, or the parent company, in the case of Helix. An 

independent advisory board, with representatives from industry, the federal government, state and local governments, and environmental groups could help keep any 

spill containment initiative focused on innovative, adaptive, effective spill response 

over the long term. 

VII. Financial Responsibility 

Oil spills cause a range of harms, including personal, economic and environmental 

injuries, to individuals and ecosystems. The Oil Pollution Act makes the party responsible for a spill liable for compensating those who suffered as a result of the 

spill—through human health and property damage, lost profits, and other personal 

and economic injuries—and for restoring injured natural resources. The Act also 

provides an opportunity to make claims for compensation from a dedicated Oil Spill 

Liability Trust Fund. The Oil Pollution Act, however, imposes limits on both the 

amount for which the responsible party is liable, and the amount of compensation 

available through the trust fund. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon spill, BP (a responsible party) has placed $20 billion in escrow to compensate private individuals and businesses through the independent Gulf Coast Claims Facility. But if a 

less well capitalized company had caused the spill, neither a multi-billion dollar 

compensation fund nor the funds necessary to restore injured resources, would likely 

have been available. 

Liability for damages from spills from offshore facilities is capped under the Oil Pollution Act at $75 million, unless it can be shown that the responsible party was 

guilty of gross negligence or willful misconduct, violated a federal safety regulation, 

or failed to report the incident or cooperate with removal activities, in which case 

there is no limit on damages. Claims up to $1 billion for certain damages can be 

made to, and paid out of, the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, which is currently supported by an 8-cent per-barrel tax on domestic and imported oil. 

The Oil Pollution Act also requires responsible parties to ‘‘establish and maintain 

evidence of financial responsibility,’’ generally based on a ‘‘worst-case discharge’’ estimate. In the case of offshore facilities, necessary financial responsibility ranges 

from $35 million to $150 million. 

Inadequacy of Current System 

There are two main problems with the current liability cap and financial responsibility dollar amounts. First, the relatively modest liability cap and financial responVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Mar 14, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 L:\DOCS\63876.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
20 

sibility requirements provide little incentive for oil companies to improve safety 

practices. Second, as noted, if an oil company with more limited financial means 

than BP had caused the Deepwater Horizon spill, that company might well have declared bankruptcy long before paying fully for all damages. In the case of a large 

spill, the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund would likely not provide sufficient backup. 

Thus, a significant portion of the injuries caused to individuals and natural resources, as well as government response costs, could go uncompensated. 

Any discussion of increasing liability caps and financial responsibility requirements must balance two competing public policy concerns: first, the goal of ensuring 

that the risk of major spills is minimized, and in the event of a spill, victims are 

fully compensated; and second, that increased caps and financial responsibility requirements do not drive competent independent oil companies out of the market. A 

realistic policy solution also requires an understanding of the host of complex economic impacts that could result from increases to liability caps and financial responsibility requirements. 

Options for Reform 

As this Committee and others in Congress consider options for addressing these 

problems, the Commission recommends that first, Congress significantly increase 

the liability cap and financial responsibility requirements for offshore facilities. To 

address both the incentive and compensation concerns noted above, Congress should 

significantly raise the liability cap. Financial responsibility limits should also be increased, because if an oil company does not have adequate resources to pay for a 

spill, the application of increased liability has little effect. Should a company go 

bankrupt before fully compensating for a spill, its liability is effectively capped. If, 

however, the level of liability imposed and the level of financial responsibility required are set to levels that bear some relationship to potential damages, firms will 

have greater incentives to maximize prevention and minimize potential risk of oil 

spills and also have the financial means to ensure that victims of spills do not go 

uncompensated. 

Second, the Commission recommends that Congress increase the limit on per-incident payouts from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. If liability and financial responsibility limits are not set at a level that will ensure payment of all damages 

for spills, then another source of funding will be required to ensure full compensation. The federal government could cover additional compensation costs, but this approach requires the taxpayer to foot the bill. Therefore, Congress should raise the 

Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund per-incident limit. Raising the Oil Spill Liability Trust 

Fund’s per-incident limit will require the Fund to grow through an increase of the 

per-barrel tax on domestic and imported oil production. An alternative would be to 

increase the Trust Fund through a surcharge by mandatory provisions in drilling 

leases triggered in the event that there are inadequate sums available in the Fund. 

Third, the Commission recommends that the Department of the Interior enhance 

auditing and evaluation of the risk of offshore drilling activities by individual participants (operator, driller, other service companies). The Department of the Interior, insurance underwriters, or other independent entities should evaluate and 

monitor the risk of offshore drilling activities to promote enhanced risk management 

in offshore operations and to discourage unqualified companies from remaining in 

the market. 

The Interior Department currently determines financial responsibility levels 

based on potential worst-case discharges, as required by the Oil Pollution Act. Although the agency’s analysis to some degree accounts for the risk associated with 

individual drilling activities, it does not fully account for the range of factors that 

could affect the cost of a spill, and thus the level of financial responsibility that 

should be required. Interior should analyze a host of specific, risk-related criteria 

when determining financial responsibility limits applicable to a particular company, 

including, but not limited to: geological and environmental considerations, the applicant’s experience and expertise, and applicable risk management plans. This increased scrutiny would provide an additional guard against unqualified companies 

entering the offshore drilling market. 

VIII. Spill Impacts and Gulf Restoration 

Even before the highly visible damages caused by the spill became clear, many 

crucial Gulf economic and ecological resources—fisheries, transportation, tourism— 

faced long-term threats. First, more than 2,300 square miles of coastal wetlands— 

an area larger than the State of Delaware—have been lost to the Gulf since the 

United States raised the massive levees along the lower Mississippi River after the 

devastating Great Flood of 1927. Exceptionally powerful hurricanes, always a threat 

to the region, struck the coast in 2005 (Katrina and Rita) and 2008 (Gustav and 

21 

Ike), causing even more wetland loss. Second, low-oxygen bottom waters were in the 

process of forming a massive ‘‘dead zone’’ extending up to 7,700 square miles during 

the summer of 2010. Referred to as hypoxia, this phenomenon has intensified and 

expanded since the early 1970s as a result of nutrient pollution, mainly from Midwestern agriculture. And finally, the Deepwater Horizon disaster made matters 

worse: 11 rig workers killed in the explosion and 17 injured; many thousands of people exposed to contaminated waters, coasts, beaches, and seafood; thousands out of 

work; birds and sea animals killed and significant habitats damaged or destroyed. 

The Commission’s investigation made plain that existing authorities are not adequate to redress these significant harms and ensure restoration of the Gulf. 

Human Health Impacts 

The National Contingency Plan overlooks the need to respond to widespread concerns about human health impacts. For smaller oil spills, the response effort is generally carried out by trained oil spill response technicians, but given the scale of the 

response to the Deepwater Horizon spill and the need to enlist thousands of previously untrained individuals to clean the waters and coastline, many response 

workers were not screened for pre-existing conditions. This lack of basic medical information, which could have been collected if a short medical questionnaire had 

been distributed, limits the ability to draw accurate conclusions regarding long-term 

physical health impacts. EPA should amend the National Contingency Plan to add 

distinct procedures to address human health impacts during a Spill of National Significance. Spills of this magnitude necessarily require a significant clean-up effort, 

potentially exposing workers to toxic compounds in oil and dispersants. 

Consumer Confidence 

Images of spewing oil and oiled beaches in newspapers and on television set the 

stage for public concern regarding the safety of Gulf seafood. Additional factors contributed to the lingering impression that the public could not trust government assurances that the seafood was safe: the unprecedented volumes of dispersants used, 

confusion over the flow rate and fate of the oil, frustration about the government’s 

relationship with BP in spill cleanup, and lawsuits filed by fishermen contesting the 

government’s assurance of seafood safety. The economic blow to the Gulf region associated with this loss of consumer confidence is sizable. BP gave Louisiana and 

Florida $68 million for seafood testing and marketing, as well as money to assess 

impacts on tourism and fund promotional activities. As of early December 2010, BP 

was considering a similar request from Alabama. 

In future spills, however, there is no guarantee that a responsible party will have 

the means or the inclination to compensate such losses. Such indirect financial 

harms are currently not compensable under the Oil Pollution Act. Nevertheless, 

losses in consumer confidence are real and Congress, federal agencies, and responsible parties should consider ways to restore consumer confidence in the aftermath 

of a Spill of National Significance. 

The Commission recommends that Congress, federal agencies, and responsible 

parties take steps to restore consumer confidence in the aftermath of a Spill of National Significance. 

Lack of Sustained Funding for Gulf Restoration 

A lack of sustained and predictable funding, together with failed project coordination and long-term planning, has resulted in incomplete and often ineffective efforts 

to restore the Gulf’s natural environment. No funding source currently exists to support regional restoration efforts. While cost estimates of Gulf restoration vary 

widely, according to testimony before the Commission, fully restoring the Gulf will 

require $15 billion–$20 billion, or a minimum of $500 million per year, over 30 

years. A number of different sources currently provide funding to individual states 

for restoration, however none of these sources provides funds for Gulf-wide coastal 

and marine restoration, and none is sufficient to support the sustained effort required. Most policymakers agree that without a reliable source of long-term funding, 

it will be impossible to achieve restoration in the Gulf. 

Several Gulf States and the federal government have filed or are expected to file 

suit against BP and other companies involved in the spill, which will likely create 

opportunities to direct new restoration funds to the region. In some cases, congressional action will be required to ensure that funds are directed to this purpose. The 

Commission recommends that 80 percent of any Clean Water Act penalties and 

fines be directed to Gulf restoration. Should such penalties and fines not be directed 

to the Gulf, Congress should consider other mechanisms for a dedicated funding 

stream not subject to annual appropriations. Although such mechanisms face hurdles, the fact remains that resources are needed if progress on coastal restoration 

is to continue. Inaction is a prescription for further degradation. Should CWA penVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Mar 14, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 L:\DOCS\63876.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
22 

alties not be redirected to Gulf restoration, Congress should consider other mechanisms for a dedicated funding stream not subject to annual appropriations. 

Decision-making Body for Expediting Work 

In order for funding to be most efficiently directed at long-term restoration, a decision-making body is needed that has authority to set binding priorities and criteria 

for project funding. The Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task Force is now in 

place, as recommended by the September 2010 report on restoration from Secretary 

of the Navy Ray Mabus to the President, and subsequently established by Presidential Executive Order. According to the Executive Order, the job of the Task Force 

is to begin coordinating the different restoration projects being undertaken by various jurisdictions in the Gulf, coordinating related science activities and engaging 

stakeholders. However, as many in Congress and the Administration have suggested, the Task Force lacks some features necessary to effectively direct long-term 

restoration efforts in the Gulf—most importantly the ability to set binding goals and 

priorities. 

The Commission recommends that Congress establish a joint state-federal Gulf 

Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council. The Council should implement a restoration 

strategy for the region that is compatible with existing state restoration goals. Experience in major restoration endeavors, including those in the Gulf, has shown that, 

absent binding goals to drive the process, restoration projects are insufficiently 

funded, focused, or coordinated. Therefore, the restoration strategy should set shortand long-term goals with binding criteria for selecting projects for funding. Key criteria should include national significance; contribution to achieving ecosystem resilience; and the extent to which national policies—such as those related to flood control, oil and gas development, agriculture, and navigation—directly contributed to 

the environmental problem. Congress should also ensure that the priorities and decisions of the Council are informed by input from a Citizens Advisory Council that 

represents diverse stakeholders. 

Restoration Rooted in Science 

Finally, but essentially, restoration decisions must be rooted in science. An approach that draws heavily on information and advice from scientists will result in 

project selection and funding allocations that are more likely to lead to an effective 

region-wide restoration strategy. Such an approach will also advance transparency 

in decision-making and enhance credibility with the public. 

The Commission accordingly recommends the establishment of a Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Science and Technology Program that would address these 

issues in three ways: (1) by creating a scientific research and analysis program, supported by the restoration fund, that is designed to support the design of scientifically sound restoration projects; (2) by creating a science panel to evaluate individual projects for technical effectiveness and consistency with the comprehensive 

strategy; and (3) by supporting adaptive management plans based on monitoring of 

outcomes scaled both to the strategy itself and to the individual projects or categories of projects included in it. 

Managing Ocean Resources 

The Commission recommends that as a part of management and restoration efforts in the marine environment, greater attention should be given to new tools for 

managing ocean resources, including monitoring systems and spatial planning. Marine scientists have emerged from the Deepwater Horizon incident with more precise 

questions to investigate, as well as a better sense of monitoring needs in the Gulf 

of Mexico, which because of its multiple uses and economic value should be a national priority. To that end, the National Ocean Council, which the President initiated in July 2010, should work with the responsible federal agencies, industry and 

the scientific community to expand the Gulf of Mexico Integrated Ocean Observing 

System, including the installation and maintenance of an in situ network of instruments deployed on selected production platforms. Participation in this system by industry should be regarded as a reasonable part of doing business in nation’s waters. 

Coastal and marine spatial planning has the potential to improve overall efficiency and reduce conflicts among ocean users. Congress should fund grants for the 

development of regional planning bodies at the amount requested by the President 

in the fiscal year 2011 budget submitted to Congress. Ocean management should 

also include more strategically sited Marine Protected Areas, including but not limited to National Marine Sanctuaries, which can be used as ‘‘mitigation banks’’ to 

help offset harm to the marine environment. Given the economic and cultural importance of fishing in the Gulf region—and the importance of Gulf seafood to the 

rest of the country—scientifically valid measures, such as catch share programs, 

23 

should be adopted to prevent overfishing and ensure the continuity of robust fisheries. 

IX. The Future of Offshore Drilling 

The central lesson to be drawn from the catastrophe is that no less than an overhauling of both current industry practices and government oversight is now required. The changes necessary will be transformative in their depth and breadth, 

requiring an unbending commitment to safety by government and industry to displace a culture of complacency. Drilling in deepwater, however, does not have to be 

abandoned. It can be done safely. That is one of the central messages of the Commission’s final report. The Commission’s recommendations are intended to do for the 

offshore oil and gas industry what new policies and practices have done for other 

high risk industries after their disasters. The Commission believes that the potential for such a transformation to ensure productive, safe, and responsible offshore 

drilling is significant, and provides reason for optimism even in the wake of a disaster. 

The significance of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, however, is broader than just 

its relevance to the future of offshore drilling. The disaster signals the need to consider the broader context of the nation’s patterns of energy production and use, now 

and in the future—the elements of America’s energy policy. The explosion at the 

Macondo well and the ensuing enormous spill—particularly jarring events because 

of the belief they could never happen—force a reexamination of many widely held 

assumptions about how to reconcile the risks and benefits of offshore drilling, and 

a candid reassessment of the nation’s policies for the development of a valuable resource. They also support a broader reexamination of the nation’s overall energy 

policy. 

Important decisions about whether, when, where, and how to engage in offshore 

drilling should be made in the context of a national energy policy that is shaped 

by economic, security, pace of technology, safety, and environmental concerns. Offshore drilling will certainly be an important part of any such policy, but its relative 

importance today will not, and should not, be the same a half-century from now. 

The nation must begin a transition to a cleaner, more energy-efficient future. Otherwise, its security and well-being will be increasingly dependent on diminishing supplies of nonrenewable resources and on supplies from foreign sources. 

Drilling for oil in the Gulf of Mexico, however, is not solely a matter for U.S. consideration. Both Mexico and Cuba have expressed interest in deepwater drilling in 

the Gulf in the near future. Potential sites are close enough to the United States— 

Cuba’s mainland lies only 90 miles from Florida’s coast and the contemplated wells 

only 50 miles—that if an accident like the Deepwater Horizon spill occurs, fisheries, 

coastal tourism, and other valuable U.S. natural resources could be put at great 

risk. It is in our country’s national interest to negotiate now with these neighbors 

to agree on a common, rigorous set of standards, a system for regulatory oversight, 

and operator adherence to an effective safety culture, along with protocols to cooperate on containment and response strategies in case of a spill. 

Frontier Areas 

Our Commission also examined prospects in so called ‘‘frontier areas.’’ On December 1, in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon experience, Interior Secretary Ken 

Salazar announced that the Administration would not proceed with drilling in areas 

where there are ‘‘no active leases’’ during the next five-year leasing plan. As a result, exploration and production in certain frontier areas—the eastern Gulf and off 

of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts—are deferred. The Secretary also indicated that 

plans for 2011 drilling in Alaska’s Beaufort Sea would be subjected to additional environmental assessments. 

The major interest in offshore Alaska reflects the likelihood of finding significant 

new sources of oil there. The Chukchi and Beaufort Sea off Alaska’s north coast 

rank behind only the Gulf of Mexico in estimated domestic resources. But finding 

and producing those potentially important supplies of oil offshore Arctic Alaska requires the utmost care, given the special challenges for oil spill response and containment, and heightened risks associated with this frontier, especially its extreme 

cold, extended seasons of darkness, hurricane-strength storms, and pervasive fog— 

all affecting access and working conditions—and the extraordinary richness of its 

ecosystems and the subsistence native communities dependent upon their protection. To deal with these serious concerns about Arctic oil spill response, containment 

and the heightened environmental stakes the Commission recommends three approaches before the Department of the Interior makes a determination that drilling 

in a particular area is appropriate. First, the Department should ensure that the 

containment and response plans proposed by industry are adequate for each stage 

24 

of development and that the underlying financial and technical capabilities have 

been satisfactorily demonstrated in the Arctic. Second, the Coast Guard and the oil 

companies operating in the Arctic should carefully delineate their respective responsibilities in the event of an accident—including search and rescue—and then must 

build and deploy the necessary capabilities. Third, Congress should provide the 

resources to establish Coast Guard capabilities in the Arctic, based on the Guard’s 

review of gaps in its capacity. 

The Arctic is shared by multiple countries, many of which are considering or conducting oil and gas exploration and development. The extreme weather conditions 

and infrastructure difficulties are not unique to the U.S. Arctic. Damages caused by 

an oil spill in one part of the Arctic may not be limited to the waters of the country 

where it occurred. As a result, the Commission recommends that strong international standards related to Arctic oil and gas activities be established among all 

the countries of the Arctic. Such standards would require cooperation and coordination of policies and resources. 

Bringing the potentially large oil resources of the Arctic outer continental shelf 

into production safely will require an especially delicate balancing of economic, 

human, environmental, and technological factors. Both industry and government 

will have to demonstrate standards and a level of performance higher than they 

have ever achieved before. 

Creating and implementing a national energy policy will require enormous political effort and leadership—but it would do much to direct the nation toward a 

sounder economy and a safer and more sustainable environment in the decades to 

come. Given Americans’ consumption of oil, finding and producing additional domestic supplies will be required in coming years, no matter what sensible and effective 

efforts are made to reduce demand—in response to economic, trade, and security 

considerations, and the rising challenge of climate change. 

The extent to which offshore drilling contributes to augmenting that domestic supply depends on rebuilding public faith in existing offshore energy exploration and 

production. We have proposed a series of recommendations that will enable the 

country and the oil and gas industry to move forward on this one critical element 

of U.S. energy policy: continuing, safe, responsible offshore oil drilling to meet our 

nation’s energy demands over the next decade and beyond. Our message is clear: 

both government and industry must make dramatic changes to establish the high 

level of safety in drilling operations on the outer continental shelf that the American 

public has the right to expect and to demand. It is now incumbent upon the Congress, the executive branch, and the oil and gas industry to take the necessary 

steps. 


63876.001.eps
25 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

And I thank both of you. For the record, it was not me that 

cleared my throat that you responded to. But nevertheless, I appreciate that. 

Mr. GRAHAM. The message was clear. 

The CHAIRMAN. I did want both of you to finish your remarks, 

and I allowed that, but we do want to try to stay as closely as we 

can. 

I just have an observation and a question that I want to ask both 

of you. Right from the get-go, when this event happened and I was 

asked to respond, I said something on the order: Number one, we 

need to stop the leak; number two, we need to hold BP accountable; 

and number three, we need to make sure that the restoration can 

get that part of the country back to normalcy, however you describe 

that. 

I have been saying that right from day one. You have spent a 

great deal of time on it in your report. Your testimony talked about 

what should be done in the future, and I alluded to this in my 

opening statement. I would like you both to respond to it. We still 

don’t know what caused the explosion, unless I missed something, 

and we don’t know how or why the BOP malfunctioned, if that was 

the case. And I would like both of you to respond to that, and is 

there maybe a time in the future when you are going to answer 

that, or do we wait for other reports to come in before we draw conclusions? Whoever wants to go first. I would like both of you to respond to that. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, what we know is that the event occurred, and 

we know a great deal about why the event occurred. We have identified in our report nine instances, nine human decisions that were 

made in the hours before the Macondo explosion, which we think 

were the precipitating cause of this immediate event. 

It is true that no one at this point has had the benefit of the full 

forensic examination of the blowout preventer. It is at a NASA facility in New Orleans being closely examined. But what we do 

know is that it didn’t perform as it should have. If it had been able 

to perform at an optimal level, it is questionable whether that 

would have avoided the explosion because the gas had already gotten beyond the blowout preventer at the time that it would have 

gone into effect. 

So I believe that our report adequately, accurately, comprehensively addresses both the immediate cause and then the context in 

which that occurred, which was a long period in which government 

had done a very inadequate job of regulation, at which the industry 

had fallen into this culture of complacency, and where the consequences have been an enormous economic and environmental 

cost to the people of the United States. 

Mr. REILLY. I would just add, Mr. Chairman, we know enough. 

We know what happened. We know that the negative pressure test, 

which was supposed to determine whether cementing had effectively sealed off the well; we know that inconsistent information 

came from the kill line and the drill pipe. And the good news was 

accepted that while the conflicting information was rejected in the 

drill pipe itself, indicating that had not been a seal, the cementing 

had failed. We know that. We know that as gas did rise in the drill 

26 

pipe, it was not noticed, although we have the documentation of 

the instrumentation, the record that should have been recognized 

by a professional monitoring that instrumentation to indicate that 

gas was coming up the riser. It was not recognized until it was too 

late. So we know those things. Those are a couple of examples. 

A number of decisions were made by people who are not alive, 

and we cannot but speculate on how they came to make some of 

those decisions or to have missed some of the information that they 

did have. 

And if you look at page 125 of our report, we list about nine decisions, seven of which had the corollary benefit of saving time. No 

doubt they were identified as more efficient ways to proceed, but 

there were alternatives to most of them, and they weren’t chosen. 

So the immediate proximate cause was a series of bad decisions, 

very hard to understand decisions on the day of April 20th and 

leading up to it with respect to Halliburton’s supply of cement 

which failed three of its own tests and nine tests that were subjected to by our Commission by Chevron’s laboratory for testing cement. So we do know those things. And I am quite confident that 

we have established the facts here. 

The CHAIRMAN. Since my time is running out, I would just make 

this observation. What you have alluded to, both of you, is the fact 

that somewhere along the line, there is human error; something 

wasn’t read. We heard that in testimony, frankly, from the industry when they were here shortly after. They said, we don’t know 

what happened, but we suspect that this is going to be the case. 

And that you have confirmed. 

But we still don’t know what mechanically or whatever else 

broke down, and I just wanted to thank you for responding to that. 

Mr. Markey. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

Thank you for this report. This report is a blistering, scalding indictment of the practices engaged in by the industry and by regulators that created the conditions that made this accident possible. 

My question to you is if your recommendations are not adopted or 

provisions similar to those which you recommend, do you think we 

run the risk of repeating that catastrophe once again in the waters 

of the United States? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes. As I said, even if all of the recommendations 

were adopted, no one could issue an insurance policy that there 

would be no repetition. 

But I could issue an insurance policy that the likelihood of a repetition and the consequences of the repetition will be significantly 

less if these recommendations are adopted. 

One of the things that characterizes these recommendations is 

they are not from outer space. Most of them are from the North 

Sea, a place which has a more punishing environment than the 

Gulf of Mexico, yet has a dramatically different record in terms of 

fatalities. We believe that some of the experience there—and ironically, the same companies that are operating in the Gulf are operating under those standards in the North Sea. So it is not a mystery or a new set of standards for those companies themselves. 

And as I said in my report, I am concerned that if we don’t act, 

if we are timorous and if we have an enhanced likelihood similar 

27 

to the Macondo, that we are all going to be pointed at as to why 

we were unable to recognize and why we were unwilling to act in 

the public interest. 

Mr. MARKEY. Do you agree, Mr. Reilly? 

Mr. REILLY. I do agree. And I would add that this is a very dynamic industry, which has transformed itself in the last 25 years 

as it has moved from shallow water into deep water, which is a 

much more high-risk environment. It has not adapted its own risk 

protections, its management systems adequately to either prevent 

or to respond to a problem of this sort. 

And I will tell you one of the things that—well, it is reassuring 

that BOEMRE has issued new prescriptive regulations to try to 

govern a lot of the activities that would take place in the future, 

and that gives us some encouragement. Frankly speaking, we don’t 

consider that agency as it is now staffed, formed, trained and compensated adequate to the task that they have; and that if it is not 

strengthened, I suspect that we will again see an incongruity grow 

between the sophistication of the industry and its dynamism and 

the failure of inspectors even to understand some of the basic technologies to stay on top of it. 

Mr. MARKEY. Let me follow up on that then because you have 

recommendations here that can be implemented administratively 

by the Obama Administration, but there are other recommendations here that really need congressional action so that we change 

the laws. Do you think it would be wise for us not to act legislatively to give that authority to the government so that they can 

change business as usual? Would we be running a risk if we did 

not pass legislation? 

Mr. REILLY. I think you would be running a big risk. There are 

two crucial moves that I believe the Congress has to take. One is 

to reorganize the Interior Department, simply to ensure that leasing revenue concerns of the sort that animated the agency over several administrations and three MMS Directors testified to before 

our Commission, that those no longer infect safety and environment regulation. And the way to do that is statutorily, the way to 

do it on any kind of sustainable basis, by creating a walled-off regulator within the Department of the Interior with a term appointment for the Director. 

And the second, the second requirement—and the first doesn’t 

cost anything—the second requirement is to adequately fund the 

BOEMRE to carry out the responsibilities that it has. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you. 

Just to note here, BP had 760 OSHA fines—versus one for 

ExxonMobil—so we can understand that there is something fundamentally wrong here that a company like that was allowed to 

continue to operate. 

Senator Graham, your recommendation on legislation? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, I would agree with those two points, and 

then the third is the one I made relative to restoration, that only 

Congress can designate a portion of these fines and penalties for 

the specific purpose of restoration, which we think, in terms of the 

national interest in this region of America, the fact that many of 

the problems that have led to the degradation of the Gulf of Mexico 

28 

had the Federal Government at least as a partner if not the primary indicted figure. 

Mr. MARKEY. And can I just say very quickly, some people say, 

well, it is just BP and that the other actors didn’t play a role, including the government, that the other companies didn’t play a 

role; true or not true? 

Mr. GRAHAM. In the area of response, it was not just BP that was 

incapable. If this same thing had happened on virtually any of the 

rigs in the Gulf, we would have had the same response because we 

had the inadequate, unplanned-for capabilities that made this such 

an unnecessarily significant impact on the economy and the environment of the Gulf of Mexico. 

Mr. MARKEY. I thank you both for your service. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Young of Alaska. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses. 

Mr. Chairman, I have reviewed the report, and I have also reviewed the members of the Commission. And I have statements 

from every one of the members of the Commission that do not support offshore drilling, including the two witnesses before us. 

And that concerns me because I cannot figure out how this can 

be a report that was supposed to look for the cause is now trying 

to ask us to pass legislation when their basic goal is against offshore development. In your statement you said you were for it; you 

know the importance. But one gentleman said we can establish 75 

years as the goal for independence. To meet that goal, we would 

have to reduce domestic production, not increase it. 

I am just questioning the Commission and the sincerity of really 

seeking a solution to a needed commodity, which is oil. 

Now, I personally have another question because of this Administration. From either one of you, from the technical perspective, 

what makes drilling in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico so different? 

And are these conditions typical of the other areas of the U.S. 

OCS? What is different between the Gulf and Alaska? 

Mr. REILLY. Well, the difference between the Gulf and Alaska is 

the deep water that we are involved with in the Gulf, 5,000—we 

are going to 10,000 feet. Three rigs have been commissioned that 

will take—— 

Mr. YOUNG. That I know and I appreciate your answer. I appreciate your answer. 

But as I read your report, your position on Arctic drilling with 

the President is, in fact, we have to step forward with caution; we 

have to make sure it can’t be done too rapidly, et cetera, et cetera. 

But it is 150 feet versus 2,000 some odd feet or, excuse me, 

20,000 feet, 18,000 feet. And I am worried about this country. We 

are going to spend about $400 billion again to buy our oil. And this 

Commission—the make up of this Commission, they are all against 

the development of offshore drilling and onshore, by the way. Some 

on the Commission voted against opening ANWR; 39 billion barrels 

were 74 miles from the pipeline. 

We are facing bankruptcy because we have not been able to develop our fossil fuels. And yet the Commission, the majority of 

them, in fact all of them, their intent is not to have fossil fuels. 

And I think that is inappropriate. 

29 

Now, last, if I can suggest one thing, Mr. Chairman, we have 

drilled in the Gulf about 42,000 wells, including 2,500 deepwater 

wells. No where do you report in your report or suggest why that 

was successful. We have had one big spill since Santa Barbara. 

Now, how do you answer that? Was there any credit given for what 

was done before and for those who did it? Question. Answer. 

Mr. REILLY. Well, I referred to 79 losses of well control. I think 

many of those contributed to accidents and several contributed to 

fatalities. That is the record that we have for the Gulf, and it is 

not a pretty one. 

Mr. YOUNG. How many spills? How many spills? 

Mr. REILLY. I don’t know how many spills were associated with 

those, but if you look at that list in the report, if they weren’t 

spills, they were near misses and close calls and enough to kill people, and there were fires. 

Mr. YOUNG. Just like driving down the street, slipping on the ice. 

Mr. REILLY. I would like to say that again with respect to ice. 

Mr. YOUNG. Like driving down the street, slipping on the ice. 

There is going to be a chance. There is no fail-safe way to do anything. 

Mr. REILLY. No. And it can be done better. As Senator Graham 

said, you cannot eliminate risk; you can reduce it significantly. 

I would point out to you, Mr. Young, that—first of all, when you 

say what we really believe—what we really believe is in this report. 

And it is pretty detailed, and I think we have a lot of authority and 

documentation behind the recommendations and findings that are 

in here. So I actually would suggest that instead of interpreting 

comments made by Commissioners perhaps in an earlier time without this mission, you look at this as a definitive record of where 

we really stand. 

And we are for offshore oil and gas development. We think it can 

be done safely. And we also specifically recommend against a moratorium in Alaska in the Arctic. 

Mr. YOUNG. And that means that you, in fact, want us to go 

forth? 

Mr. REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Will you express that in your report? It doesn’t say 

that. 

Mr. REILLY. This Commission believes that we can go forward to 

drill in the offshore the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas, but it recommends a series of scientific analyses of Coast Guard search-andrescue movements, of a range of activities that will have to be supplied—either by government or the industry—to ensure over the 

long term that it will be done safely. But we specifically say that 

should not be a barrier to moving forward. 

Mr. YOUNG. It does say, then, you are supporting Arctic drilling 

in the report? 

Mr. REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. I didn’t read that. And if you do so, I wish you would 

explain that to the President. 

Mr. REILLY. You said in your remarks that we recommended it 

be done with caution and that is certainly true. We have a distinctive set of challenges that are being presented there. 

30 

Mr. YOUNG. That is what happens, though. We have the studies—for 40 years, we have been drilling in the Arctic, just not 

Prudhoe Bay. We had been drilling there when we had the PET4, when we had the new line operation. We have been doing the 

drilling, and we have done the studies. We have done the work. 

And all of the sudden now we have that moratorium in place by 

someone that doesn’t believe in fossil fuels. 

You heard him last night on the Floor. He doesn’t believe in fossil fuels. And I think it is wrong for this country. I want all forms 

of power, but all of the sudden, we have a Commission report I 

don’t believe that really suggests we can do without a big long 

delay. But we will send the money overseas. 

Mr. Chairman, my time is up. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Pallone from New Jersey. 

Mr. PALLONE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Chairman Hastings and Ranking Member Markey, 

for having the hearing today. 

The report in front of us today is clear in my opinion that we 

cannot drill safely off our shores under the current system and that 

our coastal communities need protection from untrustworthy big 

oil. 

Only big oil will claim that they can drill safely and look to expand drilling in the wake of our country’s worst environmental disaster and the finding of their systematic failures. 

Now, since the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the President has reversed course and, thankfully, taken drilling in the Atlantic off the 

table, at least for the next five years, and I commend him for that 

action and believe we must make that policy permanent. Only then 

can we be safe from the greed of the oil industry. 

Also, House Democrats passed the CLEAR Act to prevent another catastrophic spill, and at that time, my Republican colleagues 

opposed the legislation, saying we needed to wait for this Commission’s report. Now that we have it, it is time to take action to prevent big oil from wreaking havoc on our environment, and that is 

why I introduced the No New Drilling Act to prevent the expansion 

of offshore drilling, which I believe must be the policy, at least 

until we can be certain another Deepwater Horizon incident will 

not happen again. 

I represent a district along the Jersey Shore. I live along the Jersey Shore, as well. I have all my life. And one of the things I wanted to ask the two members of the panel is that I believe very 

strongly that the farther you go out and the deeper you are, the 

more dangerous it becomes. In arguing against the need for reform, 

the oil and gas industry likes to make the argument that the BP 

spill was like an outlier, and they point to the long history of drilling in the Gulf. 

But in reality, isn’t it true that the vast majority of the oil and 

gas industry’s offshore drilling in the Gulf has been in shallow 

water where drilling is much less complicated than in the ultradeep water where the Deepwater Horizon was operating? So, basically, as we go farther out—and certainly my understanding is that 

the Atlantic is strictly deep water, not in shallow water—the danger is greater, and that is even one more reason why the recVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Mar 14, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\63876.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
31 

ommendations that you put forth are crucial. I am asking either of 

you if you could answer that question. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, the answer is clearly there is a relationship 

between the danger and risk the deeper you go. And it is also true 

that up until about 1990, virtually all of the drilling that had ever 

taken place in the Gulf of Mexico was in waters of less than 1,000 

feet, which is the definition of shallow drilling, so that the circumstances have dramatically changed. And at the same time that 

the industry was developing a technology that can, frankly, only be 

analogized to the technology of the space program and its sophistication, there was an enormous burst of the offensive capability to 

drill in deeper areas. There was not a commensurate increase in 

the defensive capability to respond should there be an accident and 

to create the safety environment that would reduce the prospects, 

not to zero but to the degree possible, that there would not be accidents. 

In the materials that have been distributed, there is a chart, 

which is called ‘‘MMS Budget and Gulf of Mexico Crude Oil Production, 1984 to 2009.’’ It is on page 73 of our report. And you can 

see the degree to which the production in the Gulf of Mexico has 

gone from being shallow water production now not only to deep 

water, but the greatest increase has been in what is described as 

ultra-deep water, where the risks are even more significant. 

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Reilly, did you want to respond? 

Mr. REILLY. No. just to reenforce what Senator Graham said, the 

formations are deeper in the deepwater. That is, they are well 

under even very often—certainly in the case of Macondo—they 

were down at 18,000 feet, which is 13,000 feet below the mud level. 

The formations are under much greater pressure, something up in 

the range of 30,000 pounds per square inch, which means all sorts 

of things in terms of the complexity of dealing with a well situation 

that also involves, of course, robots, which are the only way you 

can actually monitor and maintain and improve or repair technology down at that level. 

So, for all of these reasons, it is a much more challenging enterprise. And that is why the industry in our view needs to improve 

its capacity, recognize that they are in a different era from the one 

that characterized shallow water drilling and establish the kind of 

safety institute we recommend. 

Mr. PALLONE. Thank you, gentlemen. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Lamborn from Colorado. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to the thank both of the distinguished witnesses for being 

here today and giving your testimony. 

You said earlier that you do not know why the blowout preventer 

did not work, and I am very concerned that you didn’t even wait 

until you knew what the cause of it not working was before issuing 

your report. 

Why didn’t you wait until we knew why that blowout preventer 

didn’t even work? Because that is a key element in this whole 

chain of events. 

Mr. REILLY. Yes, sir. This was clear from the start, when the 

President created us with an executive order, he gave us a timeVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Mar 14, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\63876.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
32 

table of 6 months. In our early conversation with him, we made 

clear to him we didn’t expect the blowout preventer to be pulled out 

before late August, which is about I think when it was taken up, 

and still hasn’t been forensically analyzed. So it was always understood that the blowout preventer would not be a part of our report; 

we would not have access to it and not be able to make any judgments about it. 

But the failure of the blowout preventer to work is itself known; 

as to specifically why it didn’t work, that remains to be seen. I 

think all other aspects of this spill, though, were subject to our investigatory analysis, and we were able to make the judgments that 

give us confidence that we know what happened. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thanks for that answer. I think you or the President should have had the patience to know why it didn’t work, and 

your report would have been much more significant in my opinion 

had we had that information. 

Mr. REILLY. As commissioners, we, sir, didn’t have that option. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Second, in a Wall Street Journal editorial from 

two weeks ago, it states that not a single member of your Commission was a drilling engineer or an expert in oil exploration technology or practices. Don’t you think that the Commission would 

have been improved had you had people with that kind of expert 

background on your board? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Frankly, I think that was a relevant question to 

ask in the summer of 2010. Today, we have submitted an almost 

400-page report. We would like our competence to be judged on this 

report. 

And if there are areas that you think demonstrate a lack of capacity to make the judgments that we did, we would be pleased to 

know what those are, and we would attempt to provide a response 

or an admission of our naivety. 

I would say that I believe even if you took the most extreme explanation of why the blowout preventer failed to function, that 

doesn’t trump the other nine factors that we have identified that 

were contributing causes to this. 

So while I am curious to know what the BOP did, I don’t think 

it would change the findings or the recommendations that we have 

made. 

We certainly wouldn’t withdraw our recommendations that the 

oil and gas industry should adopt, as the nuclear power industry 

has, some form of internal capability to assess safety. 

We would not change our position that we need to have an effective, competent Federal agency that can oversee the industry. 

We would not change our recommendation that that agency 

should be protected by independents within the Department of the 

Interior. 

Those are our key safety recommendations, and I don’t think 

there is any evidence that is going to come from the forensic examination that is currently going on at a NASA facility in New Orleans of the blowout preventer that would alter those recommendations. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, I will move on to my next question here. 

In its undertaking of the investigation of the Deepwater Horizon 

incident, the National Academy of Engineering and the National 

33 

Research Council announced that they would not be issuing their 

final report until it has been peer-reviewed, which is their standard 

practice for reports issued by the National Academies. Has your 

report been submitted for peer review to any other kind of body or 

experts or— 

Mr. GRAHAM. It is a public document, so it is not just submitted 

to peers, it is submitted to the American people for their comment 

and evaluation. 

Mr. REILLY. I would just say that it has been pretty well reviewed and pretty well received and commented on by experts in 

the field. 

And I also want to note that we say in our formal testimony that 

our senior technology and science advisor on this enterprise was 

Richard Sears, who has 33 years of experience, senior experience 

with Shell Oil, and he was present through all of our deliberations 

on technology. 

And I would also like to acknowledge publicly, we had strong cooperation from industry, from three companies in particular that 

spent several hours with us—Chevron, Shell, and ExxonMobil— 

and cooperation, obviously, from the Departments of the government, from BOEMRE and Director Bromwich, and Secretary 

Salazar. 

So I think we had a full range of input and plenty of opportunity 

on the part also of the scientific agencies, NOAA, the Coast Guard, 

to ensure that what we say is grounded in good science and respectable technology. 

And I must say we have become a little impatient, Bob and I, 

with the criticisms of our competence, or the credentials of our 

Commissioners, which maybe was OK to raise 6 months ago, but 

the proof is here. If there is something wrong or if there are people 

who have objections to the findings or think they are wrong or to 

the recommendations, we would be very happy to debate on that 

point. 

But it seems to me now a little churlish to refer back to the credentials without saying in some way how they are connected to the 

inadequacies in the report, which nobody seems to be doing. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Grijalva from Arizona. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, if the current offshore policy is based on some similar assumptions, as I understand it, one was the blowout preventers actually worked. That was an assumption. The assumption 

was that the industry had the ability to contain spills. The assumptions were that spills offshore won’t ever hit onshore. There was an 

assumption based that rigs are operated as safely as possible. 

And I read through your report that brought into question those 

assumptions. So, as a result, just for both of you gentlemen, don’t 

we have to rewrite our offshore policy based on the fact that we 

don’t have assumptions we can make right now? Senator? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, I think some of the assumptions are that 

drilling in the offshore is going to be a continuing and increasing 

part of America’s energy supply; number two, that its acceptability 

to the American people will be closely aligned with its safety. 

34 

You may recall that when Three Mile Island blew, almost 25 percent of America’s electricity was coming from nuclear power, and 

there was an expectation that that percentage was going to grow, 

maybe even to where France is, which is over 70 percent. But that 

one incident so chilled the public toward nuclear power, that we 

have had effectively a 30-year hiatus of any expansion. And therefore, the percentage of electricity from nuclear power is dramatically less than it was 30 years ago. 

Now, whether the continued activities in the Gulf, more 

Macondos, could have the same effect as Three Mile Island, as a 

singular event had on the nuclear power industry, we can all speculate. But I think it is in everybody’s interest that we conduct this 

industry to the highest standards. 

Would anyone answer the question, why should drilling for offshore oil in the Gulf of Mexico be at a lower standard of safety and 

environmental protection than it is in the North Sea? If there is 

some explanation as a matter of public policy, why we should accept a lower standard, then I think we could have a very good debate. No one has come forward making that assertion. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. The other point I think you called the liability cap 

arbitrary in the report. The question is, lifting the cap entirely as 

a means to assure that the taxpayer doesn’t get stuck with any bill 

beyond the cap; and two, as incentive to meet the highest standards that the Senator just mentioned for drilling, any reactions to 

no cap at all on liability? 

Mr. GRAHAM. We have recommended that the cap be lifted. We 

did not go beyond that. Clearly the $75 million cap, which is now 

21-years old, just this year the change in the value of money as a 

result of inflation over 21 years would cause you to believe that 75 

million was not adequate. Second, as Bill pointed out, when that 

cap was established, virtually all of our offshore drilling was in 

known, comparatively safe, low-pressure areas. And today the largest share of our drilling is in much riskier, deeper water. 

Now, I am now going beyond what the Commission recommended 

and just saying my own feeling is that if we have liability caps, the 

rationale is to maintain a competitive marketplace in the Gulf of 

Mexico, that we don’t want only the largest oil companies in the 

world to be able to drill, but we also don’t want to have financially 

incapable companies causing enormous consequences. 

So that would lead me to feel that the Congress might be able 

to fashion a policy built around liability limits in relationship to 

risk. It is one thing to have a liability limit for 100 feet of water 

than 18,000 feet of water. Today, the law applies the same standard to both of those two cases. 

Mr. REILLY. I would just add if I might, Congressman, that the 

establishment of some kind of liability cap that both ensures a continuing capacity of independence to operate in the Gulf, that 

doesn’t just restrict to leasing or bidding to a few majors, but also 

protects the public against being handed a bill for major damages 

caused is something that is going to take more time than we had 

in the 6 months and probably more involvement of the insurance 

industry, since I assume an insurance consortium of some sort 

would be necessary to address this. 

35 

I also would note that the liability cap in Canada is $35 million. 

I think it is 50 million pounds in Britain. And it does strike me, 

too, that particularly with respect to those resources, such as the 

Gulf and the Arctic, where other countries’ activities are also involved, there might be some merit in trying to work out a uniform 

system of liability which applies systematically to all oil and gas 

development in these areas. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fleming from Louisiana. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, panel members, for being here today and your 

service. This was, no question about it, a disaster. And like any disaster, even though we don’t know the precise cause of the blowout, 

we do know some things happened that are typical of disasters. 

Because this is a high-risk operation, much like many other 

things we do, travel in space, flying in airplanes, rarely is one 

thing the cause of the disaster. It is usually a number of different 

situations and occurrences and bad decisions that align themselves 

which probably over time have occurred, but because of some 

backup or redundancy, the disaster was prevented. And that can 

sometimes be a bad thing because what happens is we become, in 

your words complacent. If I make a mistake, there is a backup system that will solve that problem for me. And obviously that is 

something that on the industry side and on the government side 

we need to bear in mind going forward. 

But it was a disaster to Louisiana, my home State, in two ways: 

One, to our ecology, no question about it; but maybe even worse 

and longer term in jobs. Louisiana has now lost tens of thousands 

of jobs. Because these rigs are so expensive, they have left our 

shores in some cases, and more will come, to go to Brazil and Africa and other places. 

And you know what is interesting is that they are going to other 

parts of the world that have less standards than we do. So I think 

that is a real issue we need to look at. 

Now, the President lifted the moratorium, and I have been researching this. I cannot find one single permit for deepwater drilling that has been issued since the lifting of the moratorium, and 

we don’t know when they ever will. 

So what I am concerned about and I would like to have your reaction to this, I see recommendations for more legislation, but I 

think we need to be careful about just moving the chairs on the 

deck. For one thing, we are asking NOAA to sign off on things, and 

that is a good thing. But is that going to make the permit process 

even slower and more difficult? 

So I would love to have the reaction from both you gentlemen. 

Is this really going to get us where we need to be, and how is this 

going to affect the jobs, which are so desperately needed, and, finally, the price of gasoline and oil that is going up because of the 

loss in supply? 

Mr. REILLY. I would say two things. I would agree with you completely to the degree that we restrict our own domestic production, 

we are essentially, given our demand on supply, intending to get 

more oil and gas from risky places, like the Niger Delta or Venezuela. That is a given. And I think we have to take an interVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Mar 14, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\63876.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
36 

national perspective on the whole issue and also recognize that the 

environment in those places counts, too, and it has been very badly 

abused, particularly in the Niger Delta; some 2,500 accidents over 

the last 10 years. That is a perfectly fair point, and I think it is 

one that ought to underlie our approach to many of these questions. 

With respect to the moratorium itself, Senator Graham and I 

were pretty specific early on. We did not understand it, thought 

that it was excessive and considered that a more selective approach 

that did not penalize those companies with good records, particularly after they had once been inspected, as they all were in the 

weeks following the Macondo disaster. Once those few infractions 

that were found were corrected for, it struck us that it would have 

been reasonable to resume drilling at that time. But that has not 

happened. 

I would say that going forward, to the degree that we continue 

to under-staff, under-prepare, under-reform, and under-finance the 

regulatory agency, we probably are going to find that it is more reluctant to issue permits, less confident about signing a name to a 

permit, and less able to get us back into business. 

Mr. FLEMING. Senator, do you have a response? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I would just add that what Bill said at the end 

happens to be the position of the major petroleum companies in 

Great Britain, that they actually affirmatively support a strong, 

well-financed, competent regulator as a key part of their ability to 

do their business. I believe they are right, and I hope that we will 

come to the same conclusion as to the industry here in the United 

States. 

Mr. FLEMING. Can I get a commitment from you gentlemen—and 

Mr. Reilly has already suggested that the President not only lift 

the official moratorium, but actually allow permits—should we do 

away with what we have now, which is a de facto moratorium? 

Would you both agree that the President should move forward and 

begin to allow the issuance of permits? 

Mr. GRAHAM. As I understand it, there is a news story today that 

states the reason—or at least a primary reason for the delay in 

issuing permits for those rigs that have met the individual standards, rig by rig—is that the industry has not demonstrated that it 

has the capability to respond and contain such an event or, if it 

does, those standards have not yet been incorporated in the permit 

applications. 

If that is the case, that actually, in my judgment, is a positive 

signal that we are now down to essentially one issue. And there 

also is some indication that the ability to meet that standard of 

adequate response and containment is near an end. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Boren of Oklahoma. 

Mr. BOREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the 

members of the Commission for being here today and for your 

work. Thank you, Mr. Reilly, Senator Graham. It was mentioned 

earlier that there was some question about the qualifications of the 

Commission. I want to say that I have a high regard for the members of the Commission. Senator Graham—Chairman Graham of 

the Intelligence Committee, you and my father were chair of the 

Intelligence Committee about the same time, and we have a warm 

37 

regard for you and your work. So I want to thank you for your 

service. I want to touch on a couple of things that were, you know, 

in this book that we have here before us. I think a vast majority 

of the recommendations—actually, a lot of the industry would say 

that they don’t really have a problem with. You know, you are listening to someone who is a big supporter of the oil and gas industry coming from Oklahoma. 

But some of the verbiage, sometimes even just the words, just to 

pick out of the report, I kind of have some concerns about. One was 

the use of the term ‘‘systemic,’’ that there are these systemic problems in the industry. And if you look at the 30-year history, you 

know, over the last 30 years, the history of offshore oil and gas production, there have been some incidents but I think a major incident is very rare. And if you compare it with, you know, the airline 

industry or the commuter train industry or any other industry, the 

oil and gas industry has done quite a good job. The last few years, 

we have seen documentaries like ‘‘Gasland’’ on hydraulic fracturing. A lot of this that is out there is driven by a motion. It really 

isn’t driven by facts or science. And so I am really concerned. The 

rhetoric, even the State of the Union last night, about, oh, these 

oil and gas companies are making all this money. Let’s throw some 

more taxes on them. There are a lot of good quality jobs that are 

created in States like Oklahoma, Louisiana, all across this country, 

and they want to do the right thing. They want to do the right 

thing for the environment, as do most Americans. 

I do have one question about the CLEAR Act legislation that was 

brought out earlier about the cap on liability. And I have a lot of 

independent oil and gas producers in Oklahoma that have this 

question. We have been talking quite a bit about this. But given 

such liability requirements, did your staff or the Commission ask 

the insurance industry if any independent operators would be able 

to obtain an insurance policy under such guidelines or circumstances? And the reason why I ask that question is, I am worried—and you kind of touched on this earlier with Mr. Grijalva. If 

we only have one or two companies, U.S. companies that do the 

drilling, we are going to have the Chinese be the only folks that 

can drill these wells. I would like to see—I am not talking about 

a mom and pop company. 

I am talking about, you know, Devon Energy is a huge company 

in Oklahoma, but it is not as large as some of the big majors. 

These are thousands of employees. They are very well capitalized. 

These are types of companies that could do this drilling without 

any problem. Are you all worried about that? And did you talk to 

the insurance industry about whether or not these smaller companies could, in fact, do this? 

Mr. REILLY. We are worried about it, and it is why we did not 

select a number with respect to an increase. We said it should be 

increased but we didn’t say how much. And we knew that it would 

require insurance company consultation and advice and help and 

didn’t, frankly, have time to get it. So we did not meet with the 

insurance industry on the liability cap. But for all the reasons you 

mention, and our own sense that it is a valued contribution that 

independent operators make to the economy, to the culture, to the 

industry in the Gulf, we did not want to make an irresponsible 

38 

choice without adequate information that might, in any way, inhibit their activities, or possibly even cause them to move to other 

jurisdictions where their liability cap is lower even than it is in the 

United States. 

Mr. BOREN. Senator, do you have the same opinion? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I would agree with that statement. We tried to operate within our areas of confidence. So the specific recommendations we made, we are prepared to defend them. Where an issue 

was outside of what we thought was our regional component, such 

as the role of insurance companies in determining the liability cap 

and how the role of insurance companies might be a means of giving some assurance that we would not be limited to just a handful 

of companies. We didn’t feel competent to comment on that. We did 

feel that on its face, the $75 million liability cap across the board 

for activities that are as divergently risky as shallow and ultradeep water needed to be lifted and re-examined. 

We also were aware that the Congress is going to make that ultimate decision, and we did not feel that we had anything additional 

to add to your consideration of that. 

Mr. REILLY. Mr. Boren, if I could add, I knew your dad too. I 

served in the EL Corporation with him for 6 years. And I know 

your district some. I serve on the board of an oil company who, half 

of which used to be based, headquartered in Bartlesville. And the 

senior executives there— 

Mr. BOREN. ConocoPhillips? 

Mr. REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BOREN. OK. Great. 

Mr. REILLY. —are stung by the use of the term ‘‘systemic,’’ and 

yet are perfectly willing to acknowledge they didn’t see this coming 

and weren’t prepared for it, didn’t think it could happen, and had 

a response plan which the Chairman acknowledged was embarrassing to him because it had the same characteristics as the other 

response plans. 

So I would just say, we do not by any means intend to disparage 

the safety or environmental standards of some of our leading iconic 

oil and gas companies, whether the majors or the independents. 

But the facts, I think, speak for themselves with respect to this 

particular disaster. And they led us to report all we did. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McClintock, California. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. 

When the Challenger exploded, we knew only one thing for sure 

after the accident. We knew that the launch vehicle had failed 

catastrophically. The Rogers Commission was impaneled. It was 

filled with technical experts. It painstakingly recovered the wreckage from underneath the ocean. It reassembled that wreckage. It 

then determined the precise cause of the disaster, and it then recommended changes so that the space program could move forward. 

The one thing we know for sure in this disaster was that the 

blowout preventer failed. Let me ask you quite directly, did you determine why the blowout preventer failed? 

Mr. GRAHAM. The answer is ‘‘no’’ for the reasons that we have 

given. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Did you look? 

39 

Mr. GRAHAM. Can I finish answering the question? 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. It is a yes-or-no question. It is my time, Senator. It is limited. So please. Did you even look at the blowout preventer? 

Mr. GRAHAM. No. 

Mr. REILLY. Most of the time we were at work, we would have 

taken a robot to go down and get us there. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Well, let me read you The Wall Street Journal 

that took you apart for ideological bias, for a lack of expertise, 

credibility, lack of thoroughness. And this is what they said, Unable to name what definitely caused the well failure, the Commission resorts to a hodgepodge of speculation. Adding to the confusion, it acknowledges it could find no evidence that BP or its contractors consciously chose a riskier alternative. And so forth. 

The Commission didn’t even wait to get an autopsy of the failed 

blowout preventer—and again, this is coming directly from The 

Wall Street Journal—which is rusting on a Louisiana dock. Why 

should we take your report seriously if you have not even made 

that modicum of effort to determine the actual cause of the disaster? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, as Mr. Reilly said to an earlier question, we 

had a Presidential 6-month charter. We knew early on that that 

charter was going to run out before the forensic examination of 

the— 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Did you ask for an extension of your deadline? 

Mr. GRAHAM. We did not. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. So you just participated in a rush to judgment 

without even looking at the cause of the failure that created this 

entire disaster? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, I would just direct your attention to page 125 

of our report which lists the nine steps that we assessed that contributed and cascaded. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. I understand that. But that would be like the 

Rogers Commission issuing its report without looking at any of the 

wreckage— 

Mr. REILLY. Congress, the cementing failed. The cement job 

failed to contain the well free from hydrocarbons. We said that. Is 

that not enough? 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Let me get to the question of ideological bias 

because this is also an indictment in The Wall Street Journal editorial. They said, The conclusions in your report were, ‘‘all too predictable given the political history of Commission members. Former 

Democratic Senator Bob Graham fought drilling off Florida. William Reilly is the former head of the anti-drilling World Wildlife 

Fund, and Frances Beinecke ran the Natural Resources Defense 

Council, which is opposed to carbon fuels. Not a single member was 

a drilling engineer or expert in oil exploration technology or practices.’’ Why should we take you seriously? 

Mr. REILLY. Congressman, I would just say the use of the word 

‘‘predictable’’ is surprising to me because what was predictable in 

the view of The Wall Street Journal when they wrote their first 

critical editorial was that we would recommend against future offshore oil and gas development, which we very definitively did not. 

40 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. You are recommending a whole new level of 

bureaucracy on top of an obviously already failed bureaucracy with 

the obvious aim of indefinitely delaying of the production of our 

Nation’s energy reserves. What is the economic damage caused by 

this disaster? Do we have a figure on that yet? 

Mr. REILLY. We know it is in the tens of billions. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. I have an estimate here of a worst-case and 

base-case analysis of the economic damage caused by the moratorium, and it runs from $279 billion all the way up to $341 billion. 

Mr. REILLY. Billion? 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Billion, I believe. 

Mr. REILLY. I haven’t seen those numbers before, sir. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Could we have an opportunity to evaluate those 

numbers? 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Absolutely. Absolutely. 

Mr. REILLY. I would only say, with respect to the bureaucracy 

question, I made clear in my opening statement, I think that—and 

certainly the report goes into detail on this—that the reorganization of the Interior Department should be cost-free. We do want to 

segregate the leasing, the revenue generating, and managing functions from the environment and safety regulation. That is a matter 

of straightforward reorganization. 

Second, the degree to which we add anything is intended to provide more capability, more expertise, more professionalism in an 

agency that then I would fully expect, based on my own history at 

the Environmental Protection Agency, of facilitating more confident 

permitting and a better regulatory oversight of the industry. I don’t 

think that it would work to delay. I think it would work to improve 

and create more efficiency in the relationship between the regulator and the industry. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Luja ́n from New Mexico. 

Mr. LUJN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I know this 

important hearing is going to outlie the recommendations to prevent another Deepwater Horizon disaster from happening again, 

which is why I think we are here. It is not to debate whether one 

supports or opposes offshore drilling. It is to make sure that we 

don’t let this happen again, and that we all understand the roles 

that we have to play to get there. 

And I want to thank the Commission for the work that they did 

because this was a tough job, and you have a tough set of circumstances with many critics. Many of us being those critics as 

well. And I hope that we truly listen closely to your recommendations and that we see what we can do to find common ground to 

be able to get to that point. 

By the time this Committee had convened last year to hear testimony from BP executives, it had already become clear what led to 

the Deepwater Horizon explosion was the culmination of systemic 

failures. It was the failure of companies who knowingly refused to 

implement the necessary safeguards to prevent this disaster, and 

it was a failure of governmental policies and regulators that did 

not apply the proper oversight to minimize the risk of the disaster. 

BP has shown itself to be negligent in safety violations and environmental protections. 

41 

We should not forget what happened in 2005 with the explosion 

in Texas and the lives that were lost, 15 people. 200,000 gallons 

of crude oil and a pipeline that ruptured in northern Alaska. These 

are real incidents. 

But what is most significant about the Commission’s report is 

that it reveals the culture of undermining safety standards. It is 

not just an issue for BP, but an epidemic failure facing the entire 

offshore drilling industry. Quoting directly from the report, ‘‘The 

blowout was not the product of decisions made by a rogue industry 

or government officials. Rather, the root causes are systemic, and 

absent significant reform in both industry practices and government policies, might well recur. 

The Bipartisan Commissions report only confirms that Congress 

must take action, do our part to prevent the disasters like this 

from happening again. During the 111th Congress, this Committee 

put in a lot of work to develop safeguards that would modernize 

safety and environmental protections for Federal offshore leasing 

programs in the CLEAR Act. Many expressed an interest to see the 

report before we moved forward. 

We now have that report. And as we hear from witnesses of the 

Bipartisan Commission today, we have to ask ourselves, What are 

we going to do? What is our role as Congress to make sure this 

never happens again? Are we going to sit back and allow a failed 

system to continue? We cannot turn a blind eye on this issue. The 

Commission’s report clearly outlines that Congress needs to act 

quickly to protect the safety of people, the welfare and livelihoods 

of communities, and the habitat of fragile wildlife. 

Only 7 months ago, we saw the horrific images of the explosion 

that killed workers, the plumes of oil that devastated marine life, 

local seafood industries, vulnerable wetlands, and the waters of the 

Gulf. Over 205 million gallons of oil were spilled in the Gulf because of the Deepwater Horizon spill. Let us never forget the people 

who were impacted and the families who lost so many of their 

loved ones. 

It is in everyone’s best interest, including industry, to not let this 

happen again, and to truly understand the responsibility that we 

all have to do our part to prevent that. 

The first question I have is a yes-or-no question. We also learned 

during the spill how woefully under-prepared the Federal Government was to estimate the actual flow rate of oil spewing from the 

well. In fact, the Federal response was initially entirely dependent 

on misleading flow rate estimates provided by BP, which had every 

reason to low-ball them because we knew that the liability was tied 

to the calculations on a per-barrel basis. 

The legislation Democrats introduced today creates a permanent 

scientific group which includes scientists from the National Laboratories in the Department of Energy that will maintain expertise 

needed to estimate flow rates. Is this consistent with your recommendation? 

Mr. REILLY. It is consistent. Yes, it is. We determined that one 

consequence of the structure of our laws is that the responsible 

party takes the lead in overseeing response, and we want to keep 

liability fixed there. But one part of it which government should 

have independent capability to carry out is determination of the 

42 

flow rate and the USGS Director, Marcia McNutt, has now said 

that will not be an issue next time. 

Mr. LUJN. And one last question, Mr. Chairman, to get on the 

record and we can get this answered later is, the report reveals 

that the cause of the spill was corporate mismanagement, inadequate government regulation, and a lack of political will to ensure 

proper oversight of the offshore oil industry as they pushed offshore 

drilling into deeper waters. You describe in the report that this 

problem is pervasive across the entire offshore drilling industry. So 

my question is: What will be the consequences if reforms fail to be 

prioritized, including the passage of proper legislation to minimize 

the chances of a disaster like this from ever happening again. 

And Mr. Chairman, I know we are going to run out of time. I 

want to be respectful of the other members. So we could ask the 

witnesses, Senator, to maybe send those back to us because I think 

that there is a very thoughtful answer that we need as a part of 

that. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Fleischmann of Tennessee. 

Mr. FLEISCHMANN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank 

you for being here today. It is a privilege. In addition to serving 

on this distinguished Committee, I also serve on the Small Business Committee. And my first question to you all in this group is 

in this regard. 

Gentlemen, what would you all say to the owners of the small 

businesses in this region struggling to survive until operations are 

restored in the Gulf? These people have lost most of their revenue 

streams, if not all of their revenue streams. They have made extraordinary personal and professional sacrifices to retain their employees and to preserve their businesses. But they cannot hold on 

indefinitely. I would like you all to address that, please. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, of course, what you just described describes 

a number of the industries that are dependent on the Gulf. There 

were thousands of fishermen who lost their ability to acquire their 

income and there was a degradation of the brand of Gulf seafood, 

a 20 percent to 30 percent drop almost overnight in the consumption of Gulf seafood which has not yet been overcome. We make 

some specific recommendations on that subject. The tourism industry, which depends upon people’s feeling that they are going to go 

to a place that is clean and healthy and enjoyable. 

It also suffered tremendous damage. So the consequences of an 

event like this have rippling effects. Mr. Reilly has described the 

fact that we believe that there needs to be a safe industry, that 

there can be a safe industry but that there needs to be an offshore 

oil industry in order to meet the energy requirements of the United 

States. And we sympathize with all the small business, whether 

they be fishermen, restaurant owners, or suppliers to the oil and 

gas industry. And we hope that we can get back in business as rapidly as possible with the safety measures that will protect all of 

those interests. 

Mr. FLEISCHMANN. Thank you. Mr. Reilly. 

Mr. REILLY. Congressman, I don’t know if you have had this experience. But I ordered some oysters in New York some time in 

September, I think, and asked whether they were from the Gulf, 

43 

and was reassured very confidently by the waitress, no, we would 

not serve any seafood from the Gulf. That problem persisted 

through the fall. I understand it has not entirely disappeared now. 

People continue, the seafood processors, the fishermen to suffer because of that. I remember talking to the Governor just around Memorial Day, the Governor of Mississippi, who told me that there 

wasn’t any oil within 60 miles of the beaches of Mississippi but 

there was 30 percent occupancy in what is usually the most important vacation tourism weekend of the year in Mississippi. Those 

stories and the Europeans canceling trips to Key West where the 

oil never approached are very poignant stories. The Vietnamese 

fishermen I think impressed me more than those of any other in 

my experience when I was in the Gulf. And we had hearings. Our 

first hearing was in New Orleans. We became very familiar with 

the problems you describe, and they are as serious as you say. 

Mr. FLEISCHMANN. Thank you, gentlemen. I have a follow-up 

question. In a lot of the additional fees and proposed taxes on industry, what would the total government take-away be, including 

royalties, severance taxes, property taxes, income taxes, lease bonuses, and the proposed additional fees and taxes mentioned in the 

report? 

Mr. REILLY. I don’t think we have costed those numbers in total. 

The only thing I would say is that it is really important to keep 

in perspective the amount of revenues the government takes in 

from offshore oil and gas development, anywhere from $6 billion to 

$8 billion in one year up to, I think, $18 billion in 2008. It is the 

second largest revenue generator after the IRS, and we can afford 

to spend some very small proportion of that which would be in dollar numbers reasonably significant, ensuring that it is better done 

and that it has been done by the government. 

Mr. GRAHAM. According to the chart which appears on page 73 

of our report, in the year 1984, the budget of the MMS was approximately $250 million. And in the year 2009, it was something 

south of 200. At the same time, the industry, as the same chart 

displays, has moved from being a relatively well-known shallow 

water industry to increasingly a deepwater, high-risk industry. You 

would have thought that the lines of cost of effective regulation 

would have coincided with the increased risk. So I can’t tell you exactly what the number is, but it would be hard to justify what appears to be about a $60 million to $70 million a year reduction in 

the capability of the regulatory agencies at the time the industry 

is going into more risky areas. 

Mr. FLEISCHMANN. Thank you, Senator. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Christensen. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to 

thank our panelists for being here. I too want to commend you and 

the broad array of contributors to this very comprehensive report. 

And among the many areas of concern, I too have to say that I 

could never understand why the U.S. permitting standards were 

lower than other countries and specifically lower than the U.K., if 

I remember correctly, where BP is actually based. 

Ours should be the highest in the world. And I also want to support, before I get to my question, Senator Graham’s response on 

the moratorium. Because according to my reports, the Department 

44 

of the Interior, since June of last year, has approved 28 permits to 

drill offshore in shallow water of 500 feet or less, and there are 

only four or five shallow water permits currently pending. On deepwater drilling, the moratorium was lifted on October 12, and gas 

operators have to comply with new regulations to show that they 

have a strategy in place to actually contain a bailout. According to 

the Interior Department, thus far, no one has been able to demonstrate that actually, although I know that they are working on 

it, and that is the holdup—not the Department, but the fact that 

the companies are not able to respond adequately at this time. The 

good news though is that according to the Department, some companies are getting close, as you said, to being able to demonstrate 

that ability, and I do share the majority’s hope that this can happen as quickly as possible. 

My first question, if I can get to it, I wanted to follow up on Mr. 

Boren’s question. In saying that a systemic failure occurred, did 

you mean systemic in this case, of the three companies in their 

management of the Deepwater Horizon drilling and MMS? Or did 

you mean to apply it to the entire industry and say that the entire 

industry has been complacent? So I just want to understand what 

you meant by systemic? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, we did not mean parity, that is that all companies were equally subjected to this culture of complacency. In 

fact, there are some companies that have a very strong record. 

What we meant to say was that there was evidence that the industry had not responded to the recognition that there were some 

outlier companies that needed to be sanctioned. You are a medical 

physician. If there were a physician in the U.S. Virgin Islands who 

was known by the other physicians to be performing at a rate that 

put people’s lives at risk, I would assume it would be your professional responsibility to bring that to the attention of someone in 

authority. Well, we do not feel that the industry carried out its obligation for self-policing and, thus, in part, the recommendation for 

the INPO-type organization. 

Second, the example of response. Response is an industry-wide 

obligation. We don’t expect every company to have all the equipment that is necessary to respond, but we expect the industry at 

large to have the capacity to respond, and it was clear that not only 

was there not that capacity, but that there had been relatively little investment in the technology or research and development, the 

understanding of the environment that would have put them in a 

position to have produced a response. 

Mr. REILLY. I will just comment on your point about the U.K. experience. We have discovered—and, of course, in our research that 

companies and industries get serious about reforming practices and 

improving them when they have their catastrophe. The U.K. had 

a very serious catastrophe. It cost 187 lives in 1989, Piper Alpha. 

Our chief counsel was intimately involved in investigating that accident. It was after that that the regulator separated revenues from 

regulation, just as we are proposing here. And it was after that 

that they developed a different mode of regulation which is known 

as the Safety Case where the particular risks that are likely to be 

entailed in a particular well situation—that is, with acknowledgement of the formation, the depth, the pressures and all the rest, 

45 

be explained by the company and the way in which the company 

proposes to address those risks, he made clear to the regulator. 

That is their system now. 

Norway has a similar system and they came to it after their catastrophe. Australia today, dealing with a blowout that occurred 

last year, has had a commission of inquiry, and they are reforming 

their own practices. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Are you seeing that happening now? 

Mr. REILLY. We know that the industry is very seriously examining the possibility and the practical challenges to creating the 

safety institute of the sort we recommend. We very much look forward to having the results of those inquiries, and we very much 

hope that they will do something along the lines that we have recommended. We think that it is very possible that they will. We certainly know that several CEOs of major companies take it seriously. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. Mr. Coffman of Colorado. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, thank you 

so much for your work and what you have accomplished. I think 

you mentioned some things that need to be done from your perspective, some kind of international agreement so there are uniform 

standards. I think you talked about responsibility to a spill or an 

accident if it occurs, having a better definition of that. And perhaps 

some insurance requirements for viewing that, liability issues. And 

I think what I am hearing from you is that in terms of prevention—so the two aspects. One is responding and the other one is 

prevention. 

So in terms of prevention, I guess my question to you is, did adequate regulations exist? But was it merely the enforcement of the 

regulations that was a problem? Because certainly we know that 

MMS had very significant problems. I think there was an IG report 

in 2008 that talks about how dysfunctional MMS was, and I think 

that we heard in this situation here how the inspection simply 

didn’t occur in the manner that they were prescribed and were supposed to occur. 

So sometimes we have problems I think where we actually have 

laws on the books, regulations on the books but they are simply not 

being enforced. So I think that when we look at what is now the 

Bureau of Ocean and Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement that, Mr. Reilly, you know, it is reported that you yourself said that personnel working for this agency are ‘‘often badly 

trained.’’ 

Secretary Salazar has said that he has already considered and 

executed some of the suggestions that your report has highlighted. 

Hopefully effective training and a cultural shift at his organization 

were implemented as well. 

Do you believe that these reforms, among the others that Secretary Salazar has said to have made, would have been sufficient 

to correct the missteps that were made by MMS prior to enduring 

the cleanup of the Deepwater Horizon spill? Let’s just go into the 

prevention. I mean, if, in fact, we had a functional regulatory organization that was enforcing the existing rules, would that have 

been adequate to prevent the incident that occurred? 

46 

Mr. REILLY. Let me say, I think that the recommendations in the 

new policies for scripted regulations that the Secretary and the 

BOEMRE’s Director Bromwich have imposed are very desirable 

and likely to be effective. Negative pressure tests are now prescribed. They were not before. There are a whole range of new requirements that appear to us to make sense. But the reality is that 

the existing personnel complement entails an inspector for every 55 

rigs. In California, it is one for every six. The answers given to a 

series of interrogatories of questions posed by the Interior Department, and the Coast Guard in their investigations make clear that 

basic petrochemical technologies, oil and gas technologies, like cementing and centralizing negative pressure tests, are not really understood, are not mastered by many of the inspectors who have 

said, frankly, that they take industry’s lead on those technologies, 

that they have been evolving over time. 

And we simply have to provide better formation, better training, 

and I think better compensation for the people who are conducting 

that work. So even if today the regulations are sufficient to guard 

against the repetition of this set of problems, I worry that in a fast 

evolving industry in 3 to 5 years, they may be outdated. And in 

order to keep them up to date, I think we are going to have to 

bring up the game among the professionals at the agency. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Senator Graham. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes. I would agree with that. And I believe that 

our recommendations, such as the independence of the safety function within the Department of the Interior, are as important as the 

decisions that Congress made a number of years ago to make the 

FBI a quasi-independent agency within the Department of Justice. 

Just like the FBI, the safety function within the Department of the 

Interior is susceptible to political interference. And in fact, in the 

case of MMS, it was rampant interference. And we think that it is 

a combination of good regulations, competent capacity, adequate 

capacity, and then insulation from inappropriate external influences that are all part of what is necessary to get us up to worldclass standards of safety in this industry. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Sarbanes of Maryland. 

Mr. SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

all for being here. I know it has been a long day. 

I first wanted to commend you on the report. I haven’t had a 

chance to read it from beginning to end, but I did look at a summary. And I think your recommendations based on the findings you 

have made are very, very helpful and will be for a lot of us going 

forward. 

My understanding, you have gotten some criticism about whether 

you had everything in front of you, whether you had the blowout 

preventer and so forth. But as I look at the recommendations, they 

seem to me all to be confined to a kind that you could make with 

a lot of confidence without having that extra piece of information 

at your disposal. It doesn’t strike me that anything about your recommendations will be changed in any kind of significant way based 

on other information that comes forward because you have really 

derived it from what you saw before you. 

47 

There was also a comment about your recommending layering 

another bureaucracy on top of a failed bureaucracy. But as I, again, 

read your recommendations, I think what you are doing is suggesting a reasonable set of regulatory oversight which in many 

ways will substitute for what has been a failed bureaucracy. 

On the issue of bureaucracy, I will ask you to respond to a proposal. This is something I suggested in earlier iterations of legislation suggesting the oil spill. It was a provision that we tried to include in the CLEAR Act. And this would be a requirement that the 

CEO of these corporations, these companies would certify—personally certify with the potential for liability to the adequacy and safety of the response plan, for example. You talked about, and many 

have alluded to how these response plans that were developed really across industry. It was highlighted in BP’s particular oil spill response plan but were wholly inadequate. 

So I would like you to speak to whether you think we ought to 

give meaningful consideration, as I would like to see, to a requirement on the part of the corporate CEO to certify that these plans 

are, in fact, good plans and that they have done due diligence in 

creating those plans. And you could do more in terms of changing 

the culture of those companies with that one sort of piece of leverage than a whole new bureaucracy could do. So if you could speak 

to that, I would appreciate it. 

Mr. REILLY. My own sense is that the way such certifications 

would occur practically is the head of offshore or North America 

would sign a certification. The chief financial officer might sign a 

certification. The chief safety and environment vice president 

would sign a certification. And if all of those signatures were 

present, then the CEO would sign. And I don’t know that it would 

enhance the liability assignment that you would like to see. 

It might, from a personal point of view, more closely involve, 

more intimately include a CEO in a decision that is made; but as 

Mr. Hayward said, he didn’t know anything about the problems 

that characterized that well situation. He did not know that it had 

been a troublesome well. He hadn’t been particularly involved in 

making decisions for it or apparently didn’t even know that it was 

coming in late. It is a very large company. So I am not confident 

myself, based on my own experience with boards of directors, that 

that would contribute that much positively to safety, frankly. 

Mr. SARBANES. Do you think he would have bothered to know 

more if he had been required to personally certify the safety and 

adequacy of these plans? 

Mr. REILLY. Well, he would have probably have had to sign 

scores and scores of certifications without any individual personal 

knowledge of the degree to which the characteristics of the well situations were familiar to him. And so, I have reservations about 

that particular recommendation. I had a conversation with Mr. 

Waxman about it. I know that it was strongly supported on the 

part of the Committee. But from my point of view—it is not that 

common in other high-risk industries either to try to fix the responsibility at the very top. It is there anyway if the company encounters a $10 to $20 to $30 billion expense, obviously. And now I think 

everybody’s attention is very focused on liability. And to my knowledge, every company has stood down to examine their own vulnerVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Mar 14, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\63876.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
48 

ability, their own risk and get their practices improved. But that 

is my personal judgment. I actually consulted our senior technology 

adviser on that particular issue, and we gave it some consideration 

within the Commission and did not go forward with it. 

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, can I get the Senator’s answer to 

that question? 

The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator can do it in 15 seconds, which is 

a test. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Your question was, would this be something worthy of exploring. I think the answer to that question is, yes. My colleague has done some of that exploring and has come to the conclusion that he has but I think it is an issue. And frankly, your father 

has given us the opportunity to move this from being a theory to 

reality, and that it hasn’t changed the behavior of corporate executives, that under his legislation, they now are required for public 

companies to sign personally as to the accuracy of their financial 

statements. It would be interesting to do some oversight and see 

what effect that has been. And then you might be in a better position to evaluate the potential applicability of offshore oil drilling. 

The CHAIRMAN. You didn’t quite do it, Senator. But 

nice try. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, I got a little bit off. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is all right. You were talking to the 

son of a Senator. I can understand why that happened there. 

Mr. Duncan from South Carolina. 

Mr. DUNCAN OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And gentlemen, thank you for being here. I sat by this graph all 

afternoon and I have studied it. And I want to comment on it. 

Mr. REILLY. You are the only one who can read it. 

Mr. DUNCAN OF SOUTH CAROLINA. You have referenced it several 

times today, and you have come to some conclusions that I think 

are flawed and here is why. I spent some time on the MMS OCS 

5-year planning subcommittee where we looked at oil and natural 

gas leases and came up with recommendations for the next 5-year 

plan on where those leases would be granted. And it struck me 

during the time that the only areas that we could even talk about 

within that committee was deepwater western Gulf of Mexico and 

deepwater Alaska. And nearshore—the 1,000 foot and shallower 

areas on that grid—were off-limits for us to even talk about for the 

next 5-year period. 

So when you see an increase in activity in deepwater exploration 

and production, I think it is directly attributable to the fact that 

policies of the U.S. Government have pushed oil exploration and 

production away from the shore, away from the marshes and the 

rivers and other things to deep water. 

So I think some of the conclusions you have come to based on 

that chart that your graphics were flawed. So I want to make those 

comments. Mr. Chairman, I hope that us on the Energy and Minerals Subcommittee or this Committee will continue to look at the 

policies that are in place that pushed it to deep water and continue 

to look at nearshore, onshore, and other resources going forward. 

A couple of questions for you based on your report that are on 

a whole different line of thinking, so bear with me. In your report, 

you provide a short review of the fire-fighting efforts and response 

49 

to the disaster. And I want to commend the guys that went out 

there on the rescue effort with our Coast Guard and others. And 

this line of questioning has no bearing on their efforts. But the lack 

of attention to this critical part of the disaster has left many of us 

confused. 

In the report, you state that others are going to study in issue 

more completely. Can you tell me first—and there are going to be 

three questions here—can you tell me first, in your opinion, if you 

believe the fire-fighting efforts were properly coordinated? That is 

number one. The second thing many believe that fire fighting contributed to the sinking of the rig and was there a possibility of saving the rig? And would the rig not sinking have permitted the subsea blowout that we saw? Was there a possibility to let the oil continue burning and work on shutting off the flow of oil that was contributing, that was the source of fuel for the fire? Or was the structural integrity of that rig in jeopardy anyway? So if you could answer those. And either one. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, I said that one of the lessons learned was 

that we were very ill-prepared to respond, particularly in the critical first hours and days of this. And I would suggest that that included our ability to restrain fire under these circumstances. If I 

could, I would like to go back to your first comments. I think you 

have to also look at the issue of depletion. We have been heavily 

mining for oil and gas in shallow waters since 1938 and continue 

to do so today. 

I believe that these charts are as much a function of the reality 

that most of where the oil is today—the so-called elephants of offshore oil—are not at 1,000 feet. They are more likely to be at 5,000 

or 10,000 feet, and that is why that is where the industry is moving. But that might be a question that your subcommittee could examine as to what are the factors that have gone into—— 

Mr. DUNCAN OF SOUTH CAROLINA. We will pursue that at a later 

time. Let’s get back to the fire-fighting efforts and what may have 

attributed. Because there are a lot of questions in my district and 

around South Carolina and across the land that I have heard. Do 

you think the fire-fighting efforts were coordinated? Do you think 

that the rig could have sat there and burned until we shut off the 

flow of oil underwater? And the structural integrity of the rig, was 

it in jeopardy? Do you have any input on that? 

Mr. REILLY. The only thing I would say without wanting to characterize a lot of activities that occurred in the chaos of the fire and 

the response is that there were moments at various times when 

well control could still possibly have been established, when even 

the gases that were rising in the drill pipe could have been diverted over the side and perhaps not come into contact with the ignition source and not caught fire, but that once the fire began, 

when we looked at transcripts of reports of what it was like on that 

rig and how it seemed like a jet airplane or a fast-moving train had 

just come out of the drill pipe, I am not sure that there was a great 

deal that could have been done that would have averted the disaster that did occur. 

It does occur to us, however, that the degree to which the response to the emergency immediately was characterized by a lot of 

chaos of one of the rescue boats leaving a number of people still 

50 

on the rig who then jumped into the water and did, in fact, survive, 

people who made that choice and then discovered those who were 

in the evacuation boat that they couldn’t get away from the rig, as 

it looked like it was going to topple on them. And they discovered 

it was because they were tethered by a rope and no one was allowed to have a knife on the rig. So they had to look for a means 

of severing the rope. It didn’t appear to us—and I think the documentation supports this—that there had been the kind of drills, 

simulations, practices that would have been appropriate and I 

think probably will be insisted upon in the industry in the future. 

And that is one more change that needs to occur that we have really learned a lesson from. 

Mr. DUNCAN OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Do you think the rig would 

have continued burning. 

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. 

Landry of Louisiana. 

Mr. LANDRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just for the record, I did 

raise the Commission’s credentials on my campaign to get here. 

Maybe they weren’t raising it here in June, but I sure was in Louisiana. 

Considering the industry’s performance record in the Gulf of 

Mexico, where over 42,000 wells have been drilled in addition to 

2,500 deepwater wells without any significant incidents, in my 

opinion, reflects a successful risk management, were these safety 

factors—and these are yes or no questions—were these facts the 

success and history of all of these wells that had been drilled out 

in the Gulf of Mexico, were they taken into account when you did 

this report? 

Mr. REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes. 

Mr. LANDRY. OK. Was there any economical analysis done during 

the course of this report in terms of the impact on not only the Gulf 

economy, but on the national economy as well? Was that taken into 

account? 

Mr. GRAHAM. We know that tens of billions of dollars of damage 

was done to the environment and the economy primarily of the 

Gulf as a result of this spill. 

Mr. LANDRY. So you say yes? 

Mr. GRAHAM. The answer is yes. 

Mr. LANDRY. The President charged his Commission to determine the cause of the disaster to improve the country’s ability to 

respond to spills and recommend reforms that make offshore 

energy production safer. Prior to the accident, there existed multiple layers of environmental reviews, including multiple EISs at 

all of the different phases that DOI uses, NEAs, environmental impact statements and environmental assessments. These included 

an EIS during the development of the 5-year review, and again, 

prior to the lease sales. Where does the Commission receive both 

the authority and conclusion that the need for review warrants any 

additional changes as I find that no conclusion that had contributed to the accident or to the impact of the cleanup? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, I think that the increasing emphasis on 

NOAA, the Coast Guard, other agencies that represent the best 

science in government, and our proposal to use best science from 

51 

outside the government all go to our interest in enhanced safety, 

including understanding what are the risks at the individual sites 

that are being suggested and what are the potential adverse effects 

on the safety of those who will be operating in that area and the 

environmental quality of the Gulf. So the answer to your question 

is yes, we took those into account as part of our overall assessment. 

We are aware of the fact that the industry, and particularly certain 

companies within the industry, have had a very strong safety 

record. 

We are not saying that everybody was the same. But we are saying that we think that the overall record in the Gulf is stunningly 

below what is in the standard of the world. If our aviation industry 

had a record by a 3-to-5-to-1 ratio, we were killing more people in 

airplanes than, for instance, Great Britain was, we would be pretty 

upset about why this was happening. That happens to be about the 

case in this industry between Norway and Great Britain and the 

U.S. We believe it is in the spirit of America to want to be the best. 

Mr. LANDRY. I am glad you brought that up, Senator. 

Mr. GRAHAM. And these recommendations will move us. 

Mr. LANDRY. I am also confused that you would make the suggestion of underreporting incidents in the U.S. because the numbers are low. Are you aware that the industry, as a whole, regards 

the European standards of reporting incidents much less reliable 

than the U.S. standards? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I am not aware of the assessment of that by the 

U.S. industry. I am familiar with the fact that our fatality accident 

ratio is significantly different than it is in the North Sea, which 

raises questions as to whether we are capturing all of the accidents 

that, in fact, are occurring. I am unaware of any evidence that 

would indicate that there should be such a significant differential 

between the fatalities and accidents in the Gulf and in the North 

Sea. 

Mr. LANDRY. I will be supplementing some questions to you all. 

Mr. REILLY. If I could just add, we are aware that there are very 

different ways of categorizing incidents, accidents, fatalities, days 

lost and so forth, total recordables in the North Sea versus the 

Gulf, different jurisdictions even between the U.K. and Norway. 

So some of those data need to be very closely scrutinized to determine that you are dealing with oranges and oranges and not apples and oranges. 

Mr. LANDRY. On both sides you would agree, though? 

Mr. REILLY. Yes, I would. 

Mr. LANDRY. I want to make sure that it is not just a one-way 

street. 

Mr. REILLY. But the less disputable number is the fatality number. It is a little harder to hide the bodies. So I think we are confident that those numbers are as we found and that they are disturbing. 

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Flores from Texas. 

Mr. FLORES. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today’s hearing. And Chairman Reilly, Chairman Graham, thank you for joining us today. I know you have put in a lot of work on your report 

and study and we appreciate you being here today. I have an openVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Mar 14, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\63876.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
52 

ing statement that I would like to give to the Chairman for the 

record. I will dispense with that for now. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Flores follows:] 

Statement of The Honorable Bill Flores, 

a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today’s hearing, and let me also take this 

opportunity to thank Chairman Reilly and Chairman Graham for appearing before 

us today. 

It has been nine months since the Macondo Well tragedy, and we all grieve for 

the families who lost loved ones and for the environmental and economic impacts 

along the Gulf coast. We can all agree that both industry and the federal government need to examine all the facts surrounding this incident and take the appropriate steps to ensure that we continue to produce American energy with safe, environmentally sound practices. Please know that I also lost a brother in an oilfield 

accident, so I want the oil and gas industry to operate in a safe and responsible 

manner. At the same time we should make sure that we facilitate a robust oil and 

gas industry to fuel our economy and jobs. 

For the past year and a half, the top concern that I’ve heard from all Americans 

is jobs, economic growth, and balancing the federal budget. We all know that our 

economic health is dependent on the energy sector, especially as we see gas prices 

rising to more than $3.00 per gallon. That being said, I’m afraid that the Obama 

Administration is taking us in the wrong direction—locking away our own energy 

resources and making us more dependent on foreign energy from unstable parts of 

the world. Even our Treasury is taking a direct hit. With production in the Gulf 

down due to the Obama Administration’s moratorium, it is costing them at least 

$3.7 million each day in lost revenue. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and to working with my 

colleagues on the committee to take what we’ve learned from the Macondo Well 

incident and ensure that we have a robust domestic energy sector that contributes 

to our economic recovery. 

Mr. FLORES. It has been 9 months since the Macondo well accident and we all grieve for the 11 families that lost loved ones and 

for those that were injured and for the impact on the families along 

the Gulf Coast. I want you to know from a personal standpoint that 

I lost a brother in the oil drilling business, so I have as much interest in conducting this industry as safely as possible as anybody in 

this room. But that said, I want to make sure that we facilitate a 

robust oil and gas industry because it is integral to our economic 

security and our military security. And as a person who is actively 

involved in the offshore energy business for over 30 years, I am 

keenly concerned about the recommendations in the Commission’s 

report. 

I think it is interesting that you use the Three Mile Island analogy because, as you pointed out, after Three Mile Island, we have 

not started and completed the construction of a nuclear power 

plant in 30 years. It appears we are headed down the same road 

today with offshore drilling. We have a permit moratorium, a de 

facto moratorium in deep water, and we have an incredible slowdown in shallow water drilling. 

Mr. FLORES. And we are already seeing that show up in higher 

oil prices, higher gasoline prices, and reduced economic activity 

along the Gulf Coast. 

Here is the issue. Congress has passed legislation. You want 

Congress to consider legislation. The Department of the Interior 

has issued new regulations. Lease sales have been canceled. Other 

areas of potential offshore activity have been put off-limits again. 

53 

And it is all based on a report that doesn’t provide a full postmortem of what happened. 

And here is the key phrase that is used that causes the concern. 

You keep referring to systemic industrywide failure. In chapter 4 

of the report dated January 6th, you have following key finding: 

The well blew out because a number of separate risk factors, oversights, and outright mistakes combined to overwhelm the safeguards meant to prevent just such a happening. 

But most of the mistakes and oversights in Macondo can be 

traced back to a single overarching failure: a failure of management. Better management by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean 

would almost have certainly prevented the blowout by improving 

the ability of individuals involved to identify the risk they faced 

and to properly evaluate, communicate, and address them. 

So how can you reconcile between what has happened in the offshore energy business today to calling a systemic failure—a systemic industrywide failure to report, which really just gets down to 

three companies. And we put the entire Nation’s economy in peril 

by doing this. 

Let me give you an example. What if we find out after we get the blowout preventer fully evaluated, it takes a $10 bolt that could 

cure the problem 99.999 percent of the time, and then this accident 

would essentially never happen. And that is about the ratio of accidents to wells drilled that we have in deep water. So, you know, 

we have gone overboard. 

So why did we use those words, systemic industrywide failure? 

Because that is what has caused the paranoia here. 

Mr. REILLY. In 1963, Congressman, it was a single weld, as I understand it, that sank the Thresher submarine. And the SUBSAFE 

system was developed, and we have not lost a SUBSAFE submarine since. We lost one every third year, on average, in peacetime before that. 

The reason that we concluded it is systemic—and I didn’t come 

in believing it was a systemic problem. I thought it was a single 

company that had blundered fatally because of the very large presence of those three companies throughout the oil and gas industry 

in the deepwater and in the shallow water throughout the world, 

BP is, I think, the largest explorer of offshore oil and gas development. Transocean is the largest rig operator. And Halliburton is 

the largest supplier of resource help, such as cementing. 

It is no longer possible for most companies to test the cement, 

for example, that they are provided by Halliburton. They no longer 

have the research capacity. Chevron does. Maybe one or two more 

do. But most decided in the 1980s and 1990s to contract that out. 

So the cement that is provided is the cement that gets used. And 

the cement that was provided by the test that Halliburton itself 

conducted and our commission had conducted was faulty. 

It is simply inconceivable to us that this was a problem so exclusive, so specially circumstantial with respect to one rig, especially 

since we know in Australia the cementing failed in the Montara 

well, just a year and a half or so ago, also. 

This is something that caused us to believe—and, again, most of 

the people on that rig were Transocean employees, the people who 

were responsible for responding to the emergency, as I just deVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Mar 14, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\63876.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
54 

scribed. That is the largest rig operator and owner in the world. 

It operates for everybody. Everybody hires Transocean. They also 

are implicated in this, in significantly failing to detect gas rising 

in the drill pipe. 

We concluded from that that all companies are at risk if they are 

using these two contractors, or BP, itself, is probably at risk in 

other places. 

Now, we did hear—and we asked the Norwegian regulators, are 

you taking any actions against BP? The answer was somewhat surprising: ‘‘No, we are not because we do not see issues in the North 

Sea with respect to BP operations. And, therefore, we have taken 

no action to discourage their continued operation.’’ 

That posed the question to us, well, what is it about the North 

Sea and the Gulf that has our companies operating safely and protectively in the North Sea, subject to a different set of regulators, 

and not in the Gulf? And that caused us to look very closely at the 

degree of oversight, the quality of regulation, and the capacity of 

the regulators, which we also fault. 

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. I wanted 

to let that response come because that, I know, is very important 

to the gentleman from Texas. 

Mr. Rivera from Florida. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. 

Commissioner Graham, Senator Graham, as a Floridian and, I 

believe, as my neighbor, are you still living in the Lakes, are you 

still in Miami Lakes? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I am, yes. 

Mr. RIVERA. West of the Palmetto? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes. 

Mr. RIVERA. Well, I am right there with you, in Doral, right 

down the road. So, as my distinguished constituent—as my distinguished constituent and fellow Floridian, I know we share a great 

concern for the economy and the environment of our State of 

Florida. 

One of the recommendations that you make in your report addresses the need for greater international scrutiny, international 

standards. As a representative from south Florida, I am deeply concerned about the ongoing development off the coast of Florida, ongoing oil development off the cost of Florida, off the coast of Cuba 

in particular. 

As you know, as we speak, there are a number of companies, including Repsol, interested in drilling in the waters off of Cuba. And 

I wanted to ask you, do you believe that this Cuban drilling between the coast of Florida and Cuba will be done safely? And what 

could the U.S. do to ensure that any lax Cuban oversight doesn’t 

threaten Florida and the Southeastern United States? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I am concerned about the safety, the relative lack 

of experience of the Cubans, in terms of being able to oversee this 

activity. The record of some of the companies that are being 

brought in to do this work is not comforting. 

I believe that something analogous to what Mr. Reilly has said, 

that we feed to have a Gulf of Mexico-wide set of safety standards 

that would apply to any country touching the Gulf, is the best asVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Mar 14, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\63876.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
55 

surance that the United States has against inappropriate, unsafe 

practices in our backyard. 

And I believe that there is sufficient interest, at least between 

the United States and Mexico, to move forward in that direction. 

And, as Mr. Reilly has indicated, the Mexicans have suggested, at 

least, that they might be the interlocutory to Cuba, to get it involved. 

To me, it also underscores the importance of the United States 

having the highest standards. If you go into a negotiation and you 

are urging the other parties to take their game up a notch and you 

have not already done that, your persuasiveness is limited. To me, 

for our own protection and for our ability to raise the standards in 

the Gulf, we need to adopt policies such as those we have suggested. 

Mr. RIVERA. Well, to that end, following through on that, do you 

believe that responsible domestic development in the eastern Gulf 

of Mexico would result in additional oil spill response capabilities 

being staged in Florida that could be used to respond to a potential 

spill off of Florida from the Cuban dictatorship’s oil-drilling efforts? 

Mr. GRAHAM. You say in the eastern Gulf. Do you mean in the 

U.S. waters or the Cuban waters? 

Mr. RIVERA. No, U.S. waters. 

Mr. GRAHAM. I don’t know what the ultimate treaty might say, 

but I would be surprised if it did not make it the sovereign responsibility of each of the countries to provide that kind of capability 

for those wells within their own area. 

And I certainly don’t think the United States ought to be depending upon Mexico, providing them the containment and response capability. We ought to do that. The Mexicans ought to do it. And if 

the Cubans proceed with their plan, they ought to do it. 

So the answer would be no. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Another gentleman from Florida, Mr. Southerland. 

Mr. SOUTHERLAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for your report. Thank you for appearing before 

us today. 

I am from Panama City, Florida. My district is the 2nd District 

of Florida. I took my baby steps on the beaches of Panama City. 

And I love our environment. And a day with my family, with my 

children on Shell Island is a little piece of heaven for me. 

I will tell you, my community, dear friends of mine, were deeply 

affected by this disaster. I just wanted to ask some brief questions. 

Number one, how much responsibility, in light of this disaster, 

how much responsibility do you believe that the government bears 

after having cited 790 violations? How much responsibility do they 

bear? 

Also, by refusing to waive the Jones Act and bringing in oil ships 

that had the ability to clean up that oil, OK, by oil leaders around 

the world that had produced those ships, how much responsibility 

should be beared by this government? 

Mr. REILLY. We did inquire into the application of the Jones Act 

and the allegations that have been made, particularly by the Europeans and a couple of commissioners of the European Union, that 

56 

we were keeping out Belgian and Dutch response capability. And 

the response we received from the Coast Guard is that their offers 

of help were looked at, largely not taken into account, I guess mostly not taken into account, because they were not considered necessary at the time or useful for the particular task. 

But I know that, in Mississippi, there were from France a series 

of skimmers, six or eight skimmers or something, that were 

brought in and were used. So it was possible, in other words, to get 

out help from other countries. 

My sense, frankly is that the Coast Guard was sufficiently preoccupied with its own response, that vetting applications from 

other companies and countries and other technologies was probably 

something that in realtime they didn’t have an awful lot of time 

to give. 

Mr. GRAHAM. If I can just say, I think this goes back to a theme 

of today, and that is, you don’t do basic research while fire is out 

of control. If you haven’t done it before the fire, it is not likely to 

be very effective. So I think that things like the—— 

Mr. SOUTHERLAND. I understand, Senator. But when you have a 

neighbor that is willing to bring a boatload of hoses, you accept 

those hoses, and you say, you know what? My first priority is to 

put out the fire. OK? 

And I have to tell you, I get angered when I think of the pain 

that we have experienced along that Gulf Coast, and I think of my 

dear friends who are no longer in business. It angers me. And yet 

today we want to talk about the responsibility of BP and how they 

should self-regulate their industry. When 790 violations were 

noted, that is incompetent. And yet, you know, we have the idea 

that we are going to have CEOs stand up and sign a letter of certification certifying liability. I want Secretary of the Interior and 

regulatory department heads to sign those same documents. OK? 

The American people are tired of sending their money to Washington, D.C., and Washington be the problem. I am angered by the 

response of this government in light of this disaster. I am angered 

by the same government that failed in its response to Katrina. 

And until we start looking inward and take personal responsibility for the lives we are destroying instead of assessing blame, it 

has to be somebody else’s fault. The responsibility is here. The 

buck stops here. 

And I am bothered that this commission—Qdecisions, there 

should be 10 down here. In the bottom, I wrote, ‘‘government’s decision to aid and abet.’’ Was there a less likely alternative available? 

Yes. Less time than alternative? Yes, they save time—decisionmakers—the Federal Government—onshore. 

And I am bothered, OK, that we are just going to add to the bureaucracy when the bureaucracy was the problem, in many ways. 

Mr. REILLY. May I answer that question, Mr. Chairman? 

The CHAIRMAN. You sure can. 

Mr. REILLY. You raise an important question that we address 

with respect to safety and personal safety, occupational safety and 

health on the rigs themselves. Presently, when a rig is under sail 

or in motion, it is the responsibility of the Coast Guard to ensure 

safety. 

57 

We recommend that BOEMRE has the full responsibility on the 

rig for safety personnel and that it understand and have the capability to enforce that, so that there is not a division of responsibility 

or a confusion about whether this is a delegated responsibility from 

OSHA to the Coast Guard and the role of MMS in all of this, that 

it be amalgamated in one agency. 

On the Jones Act, the key issue, in my view, is to have procedures in place ahead of time so that the extensive permitting reviews and approvals by the State Department are not necessary 

once the catastrophe may have occurred. 

Mr. GRAHAM. And that was what I was going to say, is that you 

need to anticipate. And I would suggest that this Committee could 

make a significant contribution in doing some serious thinking 

about what are the questions, what are the resources, what are the 

potential impediments when we have the next disaster. It won’t be 

exactly like this one, but we will have more disasters. And how can 

we, by anticipating, take actions that will avoid the hoses not being 

delivered. 

Mr. SOUTHERLAND. Yeah. 

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. 

Someone had offered an airline analogy earlier. And as I have 

looked at and read through and tried to synthesize this commission’s recommendations, if I applied the Commission’s recommendations to the airline industry, essentially, with one airplane crash, we would shut down all airplanes and, frankly, all airports. 

I apologize for being late. I was in a workforce hearing, and I had 

an opportunity to question Governor McDonnell from Virginia. 

And, specifically, my questions were about the impact of the Administration’s response and shutting down offshore as a result of 

this. 

Here are some of the statistics. And I will be quick with this, and 

then I have my questions. He indicated that, you know, this industry would create more than 1,900 new jobs just in Virginia, increase the State’s gross domestic product by $365 million annually, 

and generate approximately $19.48 billion in Federal, State, and 

local revenues. 

Senator Graham, Secretary Reilly, page 2 of your testimony 

states, quote, ‘‘But most of the mistakes and oversights of Macondo 

can be traced back to a single overarching failure—a failure of 

management by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean,’’ end quote. 

And under the key facts, you also stated that the investigation 

team identified several human errors, engineering mistakes, and 

management failures. 

You know, based on those statements, a logical person would 

conclude that it wasn’t the lack of adequate science and engineering but the proper application of science and engineering by those 

on the rig that resulted in the Deepwater Horizon Macondo tragedy. 

Basically yes or no, do you agree with that conclusion? 

58 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, I think part of the responsibility of effective 

management is to understand the risk and take steps to mitigate 

the risk. The fact is that there was no effective plan in place or capability to implement a plan before this accident occurred. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So it sounds that you agree, it was management. 

Mr. GRAHAM. I think that is a failure of management to do effective risk analysis and take steps to mitigate the risk. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Great. Thank you. 

Secretary, any thoughts? 

Mr. REILLY. I would support that. Yes, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. OK. Thank you. 

On page 7 of your testimony, you state, under the headline of 

‘‘Reforming Industry Safety Practices,’’ quote, ‘‘Government oversight must be accompanied by the oil and gas industry’s internal 

reinvention, sweeping reforms that accomplish no less than a fundamental transformation of its safety culture,’’ end quote. 

Internal reinventions, sweeping reforms, and fundamental transformation, you know, frankly, of an entire industry is what the implications are of the result of these recommendations, frankly are 

words of alarm and cast a very wide net. I assume they are based 

on a thorough review of the hundreds of companies involved in U.S. 

energy production and not just three companies, despite how large 

they are, that were mentioned in the report. 

Did the Commission conduct such a review? 

Mr. REILLY. We conducted a review of the incident itself, of accident data—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. So your review—— 

Mr. REILLY.—through the industry. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I think if you answer my question, your review 

was of three companies out of perhaps thousands. 

Mr. REILLY. Well, it is of 79 losses of well control in the last, 

whatever, 20 years or so, affecting a very large number of companies operating in the Gulf. 

Mr. THOMPSON. No, I understand. So the review—frankly, there 

are 3,500—the number I looked at—3,500 rigs in offshore production and thousands of companies engaged in production, but the 

conclusion was really based on looking at three companies? 

Mr. REILLY. Well, the inferences drawn for the likelihood of entailed risk with those three companies largely rest upon what we 

learned from the experience of those three companies. But we had 

significant data about many other companies and their experiences 

that caused us to use the term ‘‘systemic.’’ 

Mr. THOMPSON. And I appreciate, you know, that you are taking 

that inference from there, but, essentially, the inference is drawn 

from three companies but, frankly, casting a pretty wide net with 

your recommendations, impacting thousands of companies. 

Mr. GRAHAM. But if I could add to that, you made the allusion 

to, and I had suggested, if the United States had a four-fatalitiesto-one ratio in airline accidents versus, let’s say, Norway or the 

United Kingdom, I believe the American public would be outraged. 

That is the situation between the North Sea and the Gulf of Mexico. And I don’t think that one company—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. If I can reclaim my time, because I know I am 

going to get gaveled out here—I am new on the Committee. 

59 

I think the American people would also be pretty irate—they 

would be saddened with the loss of one life in an airplane accident, 

no doubt about it, and they would be concerned with that airplane 

crash. But they would also be irate if the Federal Government essentially shut down the entire airplane industry, as opposed to 

really focusing on drilling down, no pun intended, and systematically determining the root cause of that airplane crash. 

And I, obviously, am out of time. 

Mr. REILLY. Congressman, neither Senator Graham nor I nor our 

commission are here to defend the moratorium, not for a minute. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Very good. 

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

That completes the first round, but several Members have expressed an interest to follow up on their first questions. 

And, Senator Graham, while I didn’t ask you, I asked Mr. Reilly, 

and he says, ‘‘I have all the time in the world.’’ So he is going to 

have to answer to you if that is—you know, however you want to 

work that. 

Let me start—Mr. Grijalva had a follow-up, so let me recognize 

Mr. Grijalva for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you very much. 

And let me, at the outset, thank the gentlemen for your presence 

here and for a compelling report. 

The only question, I think—page 142 to 143 in your report, you 

deal with the issue of the Jones Act that came up, that it was not, 

indeed, an impediment to getting foreign assistance or outside assistance to come to the aid of that spill. Also, there are comments 

there, after the Governor insisted on those berms, that they probably created more problems than they solved. 

But the question, I think, has to deal with the word that some 

of my good friends found offensive, and that is the issue of ‘‘systemic.’’ We have here—and I think your report is compelling because it deals with the role of government and the lack of oversight 

on the part of the Federal Government as a contributing factor to 

the laxness that we found. And it deals very directly with systemic 

issues that occur within the management and the operation of the 

industry. 

I think the report is compelling insofar as something needs to be 

done. And if we want to raise the standard of oil production offshore, where it is safe, both for life and for the environment, then 

this report needs to be responded to. 

The recommendations that you made for legislative action are 

sound. I don’t agree with all of your recommendations, nor do I assume every Member agrees with everything in there. It is a sound 

framework. There are principles in there that we must deal with. 

I want to thank you for that, for the time that you took and for, 

I would assume, the seriousness in which we are going to take this 

report. 

So thank you for your time, and thank you for the report. As I 

said, compelling, necessary, and timely. 

Thank you. 

Mr. REILLY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK. I thank the gentleman. 

60 

Let me go to Mr. Landry of Louisiana. 

Mr. Landry? 

Mr. LANDRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am having trouble understanding how you all can come to the 

conclusion that there are these systemic failures by using those 

three companies and claiming that because those three companies 

do such a large percentage of the work in the Gulf of Mexico, that 

every time they go on a job they are using the same protocols in 

engineering for the different customers that they are doing business with. 

That simply is not true. There are different well designs that are 

in place by different oil and gas companies. Some of those well designs, I might add, have been around since the inception of deepwater drilling. 

And so I don’t understand how you came to this decision of a systemic failure. Why not look at those oil and gas companies who 

have drilled successfully, without incident, looking at the well design and saying, this type of well design seems to be the safest? 

In my opinion, it certainly would save the taxpayers a lot of bureaucracy if you all took a look at those different designs. 

Did you all take a look at the different well designs? And did you 

take in mind that they did not—that when those contractors work 

for different oil and gas companies, they don’t follow the same protocols and engineering specs? 

Mr. REILLY. We did look at the design of this particular well, and 

at least two companies made clear to us that they would not have 

chosen the design that BP did for that formation in that place. 

Mr. LANDRY. But, Mr. Reilly—and I apologize for cutting you off, 

but you told me earlier that you all took into account the 2,500 

wells that were drilled in deep water. You told me you took into 

account their history and their success. But yet, now you are telling me you only took into account the well design on BP, on BP’s 

Macondo well. 

Mr. REILLY. Well, the conclusion that the well design that was 

used by BP at Macondo was not an appropriate one or is one that 

created more risks than were necessary in the eyes of at least two 

companies is based upon a judgment about alternative well designs 

of the sort that you suggest. 

Mr. LANDRY. Well, I am trying to clarify your answer. I mean, 

did you look at the other well designs and take into account that, 

when you issued your report telling us that there is a systemic failure in the industry and that we have to create these additional levels of bureaucracy, costing the taxpayers hundreds of millions of 

dollars, when you made that recommendation, did you or did you 

not look at the history of the other deepwater wells, the 2,500 or 

so, that have been drilled in the Gulf of Mexico when you took into 

account issuing this report? 

Mr. REILLY. Yes. Yes, sir, we did. 

And let me say, from the point of view of someone who considers 

1 in 2,500 not so impressive, frankly, if it is going to cost $40 billion or $50 billion to the economy of the area and to the company 

involved, I think we are drawing a different conclusion from the 

success rate. 

61 

I regulated at the Environmental Protection Agency, with respect 

to a number of issues, one in a million, which was the maximum 

acceptable impact or fatality, mortality, premature death associated with a certain kind of decision, a pesticide decision, for example. So 1 in 2,500 doesn’t impress me as a very positive record, 

frankly. 

Mr. LANDRY. Well, I certainly would like you to look in the eyes 

of the people who are losing their jobs down in Louisiana, who 

have built this industry, who have basically been drilling since 

1947 off of that coast, and tell them that. I can tell you, from living 

down there, that safety is number one. It has been for a very, very 

long time. 

Mr. REILLY. Congressman, the decision to deny them their jobs 

and to shut down every rig in the deepwater area, every exploration rig, is one that I think is highly contentious, excessive, and 

hard to justify. And I have made that clear, as has Senator Graham, from the outset. 

We would have approached this in a more selective fashion so as 

not to penalize those companies that had not been specifically implicated in the disaster after some short period of review and inspection which did, in fact, take place, and they were cleared. 

So we are not here to defend the denial of jobs or against the resumption of activity in the Gulf. Very much we want to see it resume, but we want to see it resume safely and effectively. 

Mr. LANDRY. And may I put your name in as a recommendation 

to take Ms. Browner’s place then? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Congressman, I have to take some exception to the 

statement that you made about that we are recommending hundreds of millions of dollars of additional regulation. Yes, we are recommending that there be an adequate, competent, politically insulated safety function within the U.S. Department of the Interior. I 

don’t think those are radical suggestions. 

Number two, we are recommending that the industry, as other 

high-risk industries have done, assume more responsibility for 

their own evaluation of safety. That is no cost to the U.S. Government and, I think, is a very prudent suggestion to the industry and 

one which will contribute to the industry’s long-term viability. 

So I would just—if you see something in our report that you 

think is hundreds of billions of dollars, or millions of dollars, of additional expense and an excessive addition to bureaucracy, I would 

like to be directed toward that, because that was not our intention. 

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. Flores? 

Mr. FLORES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

With the backdrop that I introduced earlier today, and that is 

that we have lease sales that have been canceled, offshore areas 

that have been taken off the availability list to be drilled on in the 

future, higher gas prices, lower domestic oil production, lost jobs, 

a hurt economy, with that—and a lot of that is because this report 

is being relied upon to continue moratoria, either de facto or regulatory or however they want to be described. And it goes back to 

this ‘‘systemic, industrywide failures’’ comment. 

Co-Chairman William Reilly stated, in your January 6th release, 

on chapter 4’s release, ‘‘My observation of the oil industry indicates 

62 

that there are several companies with exemplary safety and environmental records. So a key question posed from the outset of this 

tragedy is, do we have a single company’’—that being BP—‘‘that 

blundered with fatal consequences, or a more pervasive problem of 

a complacent industry? Given the documented failings of both 

Transocean and Halliburton, both of which served the offshore industry in virtually every ocean, I reluctantly conclude that we have 

a systemwide problem.’’ That is your quote. 

Now, Mr. Reilly, based on what I see of the internal inconsistency and the weight which this report is being given and the 

energy future of this country, I would respectfully ask the Commission if they will amend the report to remove the words ‘‘systemwide 

industry failure.’’ Will you do that? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Congressman, how would you defend the presence 

of walrus protection and polar bears in a response plan? Or how 

would you defend Mr. Hayward’s telling me there is no subsea containment capability? Or the inadequacy of the response technology 

and the failure to invest in it over the last 20 years after we experienced the disaster in Prince William Sound? I think these speak 

for themselves. 

And the response plans were not confined to the three companies. All the majors that we looked at had literally the same response plans and the same concern for walruses and the dead expert and all the other things we know. And several CEOs have said 

they found it embarrassing and were humiliated by it. And that 

had a lot to do with their decision to create the Marine Well Containment Corporation, which is a very significant and positive step 

on the part of the industry. 

So I don’t think that you can infer anything other than, ‘‘Well, 

it sure looked like complacency.’’ And when people say, ‘‘We never 

thought it could happen’’—and I include myself in that—we were 

complacent. I think the government was, the industry was, I was. 

Mr. FLORES. Well, again, the application for permits that are 

filed are based on pretty much cookie-cutter requirements that the 

MMS—or what was formally called MMS used to issue. 

Mr. REILLY. And I don’t exempt them from the criticism. 

Mr. FLORES. OK. And so, maybe there was a regulatory failure—— 

Mr. REILLY. Uh-huh. 

Mr. FLORES.—as part of it. I think we all agree that there was. 

And we all agree that BP had an integral part to play in this failure. 

But, unfortunately, what has been condemned here is the entire 

industry, as well as the energy security of this country, going forward. And I think it goes back to those words, ‘‘industrywide, systemic failure.’’ 

And I just—I would respectfully disagree with you. I don’t think 

that we have that type of a failure. And I would like to state for 

the record, I think those words ought to be struck from the report. 

Mr. REILLY. Well, let me just say that our report is 11 days old, 

and the degree to which there has been a delay in issuing permits 

or a de facto moratorium that has been referred to, I don’t think 

has anything to do with this report. And we certainly don’t expect 

or didn’t intend that we would contribute to that. 

63 

We, in fact, were assuming that a number of these recommendations could be implemented coterminously with the resumption of 

activity on the part of the companies that weren’t in any way involved in the Macondo disaster. 

Mr. FLORES. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. [presiding.] The gentleman yields back. 

Congressman Thompson? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Chairman. 

Just one additional question. On page 6 of your testimony, under 

the heading ‘‘Environmental Review,’’ you state that the Commission recommends, quote, ‘‘a more robust and more formal interagency consultation process in which NOAA, in particular, is provided a heightened role, but ultimate decision-making authority is 

retained by the Department of the Interior,’’ end quote. 

And my question—and I wanted to get your rationale behind it. 

Obviously, you know, the role of NOAA was of great concern to the 

Commission. My question actually is, shouldn’t the Departments of 

Energy and Commerce have an equal, if not greater, voice in 

NOAA in the formulation of rules and regulations that certainly 

have a great influence on our domestic energy production? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, just let me clarify. NOAA is part of the Department of Commerce. So, I assume, through NOAA—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. Commerce was involved. How about Energy? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Yeah, Department of Commerce would be involved. 

What we were focusing on there, I mentioned it in my opening 

statement. A key fact to understand is that the relationship of the 

U.S. Government to the offshore oil industry is not just as a regulator. It is not like the relationship of the Department of Transportation to the bus industry of America. It is also the relationship of 

the owner of the property. All of that property out there in the Gulf 

of Mexico, beyond the State limits, belongs to the people of the 

United States of America. 

We have made a decision that we will lease portions of that to 

oil companies under certain conditions to evaluate and, if found, extract oil and gas. We have the same interests that, if you owned 

a small shopping center, you don’t want to have a tenant in your 

center who is trashing it and is going to make it impossible for 

other tenants to have a profitable enterprise. 

So I think we need to put ourselves in the position of, what 

should we be doing to assure that our children and grandchildren 

will have a Gulf of Mexico that is of a quality that we would be 

proud to hand over to them as our inheritance. 

I think these recommendations, and particularly the recommendations of bringing the best science—and we think the Department of Commerce and NOAA represents the best science in 

this area—to bear, in terms of what should be the conditions of our 

proposed tenant to lease our property, is not an imprudent thing 

to do. 

Mr. THOMPSON. OK. 

Well, one of the—as I came to Congress 2 years ago, one of the 

things that just appalled me—and, you know, this is over different 

administrations, different parties—is the absolute lack of a national energy plan in this country. And when we are talking about 

64 

the Outer Continental Shelf and offshore resources or onshore resources, you know, frankly, the Energy Department was formed for 

that very purpose, to achieve energy independence, I guess, in the 

1980s when it happened. It has failed miserably. But I think one 

of the proper steps, obviously, would be involved in this type of a 

process. 

Mr. GRAHAM. I am completely in agreement with that. In fact, 

it was my position, and I think this is reflected in the report, that 

you can’t answer the question, ‘‘What is the future of the offshore 

industry?’’ without answering the larger question, ‘‘What is our 

energy policy in the United States?’’ 

I was telling Bill, and he had already seen it, that in yesterday’s 

newspapers there were some articles about the fact that the RAND 

Corporation had raised questions about whether the U.S. military 

could convert to a less fossil-dependent Navy, Air Force, Army. And 

they raised serious doubts about whether that could be done, 

which, to me, just underscores the importance of this industry for 

our fundamental national security. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Great. Well, thank you. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. I have additional 

questions, but we will forward those along. Thanks. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Thank you. 

Mr. Grijalva? 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you. 

And this, gentlemen, I swear, are the last questions. We all need 

to be outside, enjoying the blizzard that is happening. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Why not stay here? There is no place else to 

go. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Gentlemen, both of you have said that the resumption and full production of offshore drilling, in terms of energy 

production, is something that you want to see and that could be occurring as we make the other kinds of adjustments that we have 

to make to make this industry safer and our role as a government 

stronger. 

And one of the key recommendations that the Commission made 

is that the Federal oil and gas regulators that have been underfunded—I think they are getting less now than they did 20 years 

ago—that we create a dedicated funding stream for oil and gas fees 

to fund this, so it is well-trained, professional, a level of—an insulation of independence. 

And yet, as we are talking about this and the critical need to 

deal with the production issue that has come up consistently here 

by my colleagues, we are also talking about reductions to 2006 levels, to 2008 levels, based on the resolutions that we are dealing 

with on the Floor. 

So, at some point, this full production restoration idea and concept that you support as commissioners, with the backdrop of not 

ever meeting the Commission report in terms of providing a robust 

oversight regulatory function for government that is independent, 

how do you reconcile that one opinion with the lack of resources on 

the other end? 

Any comment would be fine. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, it is our recommendation that, like is the 

case with most other industries, industries who don’t have this adVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Mar 14, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\63876.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
65 

ditional characteristic of being our tenants, we expect the airline 

industry, the telecommunications industry, across the board virtually, to pay for their own regulation. They are self-funded regulation. We did not see any compelling reason why that should not be 

true of this industry. So that would be our basic recommendation. 

That would take action by the Congress if, for instance, there 

were—as there is now for the oil liability fund—a fee attached to 

each barrel of oil. I believe that is for both imported as well as domestically produced, which goes into that fund. Maybe we need to 

have a supplemental stream to go into a fund for the regulation of 

the industry so that we can assure to the industry that we will 

have a competent, sustained ability to assure safety and—— 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Well, Senator, on my question, if I may, you see 

a linkage and not an either/or proposition? 

I21Mr. GRAHAM. I mean, either/or—— 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Either you have the regulatory capacity and the 

resources to deal with the demand for full production, and if that 

linkage doesn’t occur, is it an either/or proposition? 

Mr. GRAHAM. No, my—— 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Can you have one without the other? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, the answer is, I don’t think it is in the interest of the American people not to have adequate standards, again, 

in part, because we have just seen what the consequences are to 

a lot of very innocent people, and we have seen what the consequences are to an important piece of real estate that belongs to 

all of the people of America. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Yeah, I think the question is, reducing Interior’s 

levels to 2006-2008 that directly impact your recommendation, in 

terms of building up the resource capacity and the overall capacity 

of regulators and oversight, that, I think, does not help the safety 

demands for offshore drilling that is also a part of the recommendations. 

Mr. REILLY. We are quite clear that the quality of regulation has 

been insufficient; that an industry which did not used to be a highrisk industry, as it has proceeded so heavily into deep water, has 

become that. The industry, itself, needs to take the steps that are 

suggested by this catastrophe, but so does government. 

Other governments have done so after their own catastrophes. 

We have mentioned the United Kingdom and Norway, which responded to very severe accidents that they had by separating the 

revenue-generating function from the regulatory function and significantly improving the quality of their regulator. 

Senator Graham mentioned that, in the United Kingdom, the oil 

and gas industry lobbies for more appropriations for the regulator, 

because they recognize that quality in the regulator—as did Mr. 

Tillerson, the Chairman of ExxonMobil, in his testimony before us, 

and Mr. Odum, the President of Shell USA. Both of them mentioned the quality of regulation as essential to the quality of industrial activity. 

That is all we are really suggesting. So, to try to save money at 

BOEMRE, at this point, having seen that budget go down 20 percent over the last 20 years as the oil and gas production in the Gulf 

went up 300 percent, is really penny-wise and pound-foolish. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you, sir. 

66 

1Page 90 of the full Obama Spill Commission Report 

2Page 115 

3Page 115 

4Page 116 

5Page 120 

The CHAIRMAN. [Presiding.] The time of the gentleman has 

expired. 

Mr. McClintock of California? 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I would like to ask unanimous consent to insert into the 

record the Wood-MacKenzie report commissioned by the American 

Petroleum Institute, entitled, ‘‘The Impact of Gulf of Mexico-Deepwater Permit Delays on U.S. Oil and Natural Gas Production, Investment, and Government Revenue,’’ dated December 2010, which 

I cited earlier. And I have souvenir copies for our lucky panelists. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Thank you. 

[NOTE: The report entitled, ‘‘The Impact of Gulf of 

Mexico-Deepwater Permit Delays on U.S. Oil and Natural 

Gas Production, Investment, and Government Revenue’’ has 

been retained in the Committee’s official files.] 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. I would also like to ask unanimous consent to 

include the Wall Street Journal editorial which I referenced. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The Wall Street Journal editorial follows:] 

Gulf Political Spill 

Wall Street Journal 

Editorial dated January 13, 2011 

President Obama’s drilling commission released its 398-page report on the causes 

of the Gulf oil spill this week, and talk about a lost opportunity. After six months 

of hearings and interviews, the commission still doesn’t know what caused the accident but does think it knows enough to condemn all and sundry. 

The disaster, we are told, was primarily the result of ‘‘overarching failure of management’’ 1 by BP, Transocean and Halliburton—which is hardly news to anyone 

who’s been paying attention. Yet the commission didn’t stop with the companies 

that managed the Macondo well, going on to blame the highly unusual blowout on 

a ‘‘system-wide problem’’ of failed regulation and a complacent industry that requires ‘‘significant reform.’’ 

These sweeping conclusions are remarkable from a commission that admits to 

knowing so little. The report cites several questionable decisions made by Macondo 

drillers as the ‘‘immediate causes’’ of the blowout, only to acknowledge it can’t say 

which, if any, were the cause: 

• ‘‘It is not clear whether the decision to use a long string well design contributed 

directly to the blowout.’’ 2

• ‘‘The evidence to date does not unequivocally establish whether the failure to 

use 15 additional centralizers was a direct cause of the blowout.’’ 3

• ‘‘Whether ... ‘unconverted’ float valves contributed to the eventual blowout, has 

not yet been, and may never be, established with certainty.’’ 4

Unable to name what definitely caused the well failure, the commission resorts 

to a hodgepodge of speculations. Adding to the confusion, it acknowledges it could 

find no evidence that BP or its contractors ‘‘consciously chose a riskier alternative 

because it would cost the company less money.’’ The commission didn’t even wait 

to get an autopsy of the failed blowout preventer, which is rusting on a Louisiana 

dock. 

The report’s one firm conclusion boils down to this: In the hours preceding the 

explosion, crew members missed ‘‘critical signs’’ that something was wrong. ‘‘The 

crew could have prevented the blowout—or at least significantly reduced its impact—if they had reacted in a timely and appropriate manner.’’ 5 This is called 

human error, in this case with tragic consequences to those who erred. 

67 

6Page 122 

Yet it’s hardly evidence that the entire drilling industry is an accident waiting 

to happen, as the commission insists. Its section ‘‘The Root Causes: Failures in Industry and Government’’ 6 uses questionable decisions made by the Macondo players 

to suggest, with no evidence, that such behavior is the industry norm. 

The report fails to reconcile this indictment with the industry’s prior safety 

record, or with the fact that many countries have modeled their drilling technology 

and practices on those of the Gulf. For a better account of how unusual the Macondo 

practices were, we recommend the June 11, 2010 letter to the editor in this newspaper from Terry Barr, the president of Samson Oil and Gas. 

The commission nonetheless offers an array of recommendations, most of which 

would severely restrict oil and gas drilling. Despite President Obama’s promises 

that the new Bureau of Ocean Management (formerly the Minerals and Management Service) is now a shipshape regulator, the commission recommends that Congress create another agency to supervise drilling. Now, there’s a new idea—another 

layer of bureaucracy to supervise the bureaucracy that failed. 

The report also advocates toughening the National Environmental Policy Act to 

make it harder for companies to obtain drilling leases. Another section doubts it is 

possible ever to drill safely in Alaska or the Arctic—a hardy perennial of the antioil lobby. 

This was all too predictable given the political history of commission members. 

Former Democratic Senator Bob Graham fought drilling off Florida, William Reilly 

is the former head of the antidrilling World Wildlife Fund, and Frances Beinecke 

ran the Natural Resources Defense Council, which is opposed to carbon fuels. Not 

a single member was a drilling engineer or expert in oil exploration technology or 

practices. 

Compare this to the Rogers Commission, which investigated the Challenger space 

shuttle disaster of 1986. Led by former Secretary of State William P. Rogers, that 

group included theoretical and solar physicists, engineers and aeronautics specialists. The commission located the exact cause of the disaster (failed O-rings) and prescribed precise safety changes. The preface of the Rogers report states that the only 

way to deal with such a failure is to investigate, correct and ‘‘continue the program 

with renewed confidence and determination.’’ 

The unbalanced, tendentious nature of the commission report vindicates those 

who suspected from the start that this was all a political exercise. The White House 

has been pounded on the left for agreeing to ease drilling restrictions before the 

spill, and now it is looking for support to walk that back. Though the Administration officially lifted its Gulf drilling moratorium and issued new safety rules two 

months ago, it has refused to permit a single new well. 

U.S. gasoline prices are now above $3 a gallon, and the decline in Gulf drilling 

will not help supply. Forecasters predict domestic production will fall at least 13% 

this year due in part to the Gulf lockdown. Meanwhile, last week the British Parliament rejected a drilling moratorium in U.K. waters on grounds it would cause 

‘‘expertise to migrate,’’ decrease ‘‘security of supply’’ and harm the British economy. 

The BP spill was a tragedy that should be diagnosed with a goal of preventing 

a repeat, not in order to all but shut down an industry that is vital to U.S. energy 

supplies and the livelihood of millions on the Gulf Coast. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Mr. Chairman, if I were to summarize what 

we have learned today, it is this: We faced an engineering issue. 

A blowout preventer failed, and it failed catastrophically. It caused 

enormous environmental and economic devastation. 

Before this commission was empaneled, we did not know why 

that blowout preventer failed. After the Commission concluded its 

work and issued this report, we still don’t know why that blowout 

preventer failed. We don’t know why it failed because the Commission never even bothered to look at the blowout preventer, which, 

according to the Wall Street Journal, is rusting on a dock in Louisiana. 

We have never had a blowout failure like this one. Until we find 

out why it failed, it could happen again. It could happen at any 

68 

time. And the Commission has not advanced our understanding of 

how to prevent it one bit. 

The contrast between this commission’s work and the Rogers 

Commission after the Challenger disaster is staggering. If the Rogers Commission had operated in the same manner, we would still 

have no idea what caused the Challenger to explode or how to prevent it in the future. 

We have before us a report offering bureaucratic prescriptions to 

an engineering problem, authored by bureaucrats, rather than an 

engineering prescription authored by engineers. 

I don’t know exactly how the Committee would advance the issue 

from here. I certainly seek the Chairman’s guidance. But I would 

recommend that we take whatever action is necessary to empanel 

a panel of engineering experts to go down to that dock in Louisiana, retrieve that blowout preventer, tear it apart piece by piece, 

find out what caused it to fail, and do so before it happens again. 

Mr. REILLY. Would the gentleman yield? I would just respond to 

that, if I might. 

Sir, I think that you can draw an analogy between the blowout 

preventer and a seatbelt in an automobile accident. It is obviously 

important to the survival of someone that the seatbelt wasn’t fastened, but it doesn’t really explain why the accident occurred. 

We explained why the accident occurred. We fingered and identified, I think, all of the major contributors, the decisions, and their 

technological consequences, their engineering consequences that led 

to the disaster. 

Examining the blowout preventer is not going to cause those 

other facts that we uncovered to go away. They are there. They are 

distressing. They do have implications for policy, and we tried to 

draw them. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I want to thank both of your witnesses for 

being here today. I know you had a long day. You started at 10 

o’clock in the Senate. And I very, very much appreciate your willingness to stay here so some of our Members could have another 

explanation or a clarification of what is going on. 

I know that there will be some other questions that Members, 

probably on both sides, would like to ask you. And if you would 

agree to respond in writing to those questions, we would very much 

appreciate that. 

Mr. REILLY. We will do that, Mr. Chairman. We have a staff I 

think for another 5 weeks, 4 weeks. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK, great. 

Mr. REILLY. And we will use them to the very end, to the extent 

they allow that. 

I would just like to say, we very much appreciate the attentiveness, the interest of this Committee, the thoroughness of the kinds 

of questions that we received, and understand the seriousness of 

different kinds of concerns about our report and about the conclusions that we drew. 

We hope it is helpful to the deliberations of the Committee and 

that the relatively modest proposals we have made are looked at 

seriously and perhaps implemented. As I mentioned, I think they 

are modest in terms of cost and bureaucracy disruption. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank you for that. 

69 

And let me just mention and, again, reiterate what I said at the 

start of this, at the start of when the BP well broke, that we had 

to find out what went wrong. We will continue to do that. And, as 

I mentioned in my opening statement, there are two more reports 

out. We will look at what they have to say and draw, hopefully, 

some conclusions from that. 

But I also will reiterate what I also said in my opening response. 

What we do here will send a very, very strong signal into what I 

think is very, very critical long term. And long term is the energy 

security of our country. You alluded to that. So the balance we 

have to make is make sure that we continue to have a robust industry, especially in a down economy. 

So, with that, I want to thank all of the Members again for being 

here, and especially for the two of you to stay for this long time. 

And, with that, if there is no further business, the hearing 

stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:16 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

[Additional material submitted for the record follows:] 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Holt follows:] 

Statement of The Honorable Rush D. Holt, 

a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey 

Thank you Chairman Hastings and Ranking Member Markey for holding this 

hearing today on the final report of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater 

Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. I look forward to hearing from the distinguished co-chairs of the Commission; Senator Graham and Mr. Reilly on the findings of the Report. 

Although the oil has stopped gushing into the Gulf, the crisis is far from over. 

The Report to the President from the Commission made one point all too clear. The 

BP Deepwater Horizon Spill is not an isolated incident. As long as we continue to 

drill for gas and oil off our shores it is not a question of if, but when the next oil 

spill is going to happen. 

Our existing regulatory system is inefficient, plagued with loop-holes for big oil 

companies, and all too often lets polluters off the hook while exposing taxpayers to 

economic harm. 

One of the issues that I am pleased that the Commission addressed in the Report 

is that of liability limits for oil and gas companies as the result of an oil spill. Since 

the spill began I have been concerned about the fisherman, the hotel owner, the 

tourism operator and those whose livelihoods depend on the Gulf. Under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990, oil companies are required to cover the full costs of ‘‘removal.’’ However the law set a $75 million cap for economic and natural resources 

damages. 

Many of us breathed a sigh of relief when BP established a $20 billion escrow account to compensate individuals and businesses for the damages inflicted by the 

spill. So far they have paid over $2.5 billion in economic damages from the spill, 

demonstrating that the current $75 million liability cap remains a laughable 

amount. 

When the next spill occurs—and it’s a matter of when, not if—there is no guarantee that the next oil company can or will cover all damages. We shouldn’t wait 

for that spill to occur to make the necessary legal changes to ensure that companies 

like BP pay for every last cent of the mess they made. 

This is why today I, along with 17 of our colleagues, introduced the Big Oil Bailout Prevention Act which would eliminate the liability cap for economic and natural 

resources damages. 

The report reinforces the need for this legislation, finding that the current liability cap ‘‘limits liability well below levels that might actually be incurred’’ and that 

the ‘‘cap distorts the incentives of industry participants to adopt cost-effective safety 

precautions.’’ 

The liability cap is just one of the issues that need to be addressed by Congress 

in the wake of this report. The Commission’s Report states that without Congressional action, we cannot ensure that the Department of Interior will have the tools 

70 

necessary to protect America’s coastal communities economic and environmental interests, or guarantee the safety of our nation’s oil and gas rigs for workers. I am 

proud to be a cosponsor of legislation introduced by Ranking Member Markey today 

that would implement all of the much needed reforms cited in the Report. I look 

forward to hearing from our distinguished speakers today and to work with my 

colleagues to implement these much needed reforms. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Landry follows:] 

Statement of The Honorable Jeffrey M. Landry, 

a Representative in Congress from the State of Louisiana 

Thank you, Chairman Hastings, for calling this hearing and for starting this Congress off on the right foot with responsible and meaningful oversight. I can think 

of no better way to start a new tradition of oversight than reviewing the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Commission Report. 

Many thanks to the Chairman for also giving me time to express the views of 

many of my constituents who have not had an opportunity to make known their 

grievances with the recommendations of the Commission. 

I would also like to thank Senator Bob Graham and the Honorable William Reilly 

for coming before this committee to answer, what I believe will be tough but fair 

and very important questions. 

Let me state that the tragic accident of April 20, 2010 cannot be ignored nor minimized. This disaster killed eleven workers and generated one of the largest oil spills 

in United States history. Many Louisianans were affected by the explosion on the 

Gulf and the subsequent waves of oil that blanketed our coastline. 

While this accident cannot be ignored, it can also not be employed as justification 

for debasing the entire offshore drilling industry. 

My first priority is always the safety and economic well-being of my constituents 

in Coastal Louisiana. After analyzing and evaluating the Commission’s broad range 

of recommendations, I have some concerns that I would like for our witnesses to 

address today. 

First, I would like to express my concerns with the Commission’s recommendation 

of continued overlapping of new and existing regulatory agencies within the Department of Interior. I believe that more agencies at the Department of Interior and at 

the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) 

will ultimately create more red tape without improving human or environmental 

safety. 

Moreover, the proposed regulations will delay offshore oil production and will prolong Louisiana’s high unemployment rate. Thus, the Commission’s recommendations 

are diametrically opposed to the Administration’s own stated goals of reducing unemployment and lessening our dependence on foreign oil. 

Furthermore, I am disappointed that the Commission does not address the economic and labor impacts of actually implementing all the Commission’s recommendations. 

A scant eight days ago, President Obama signed an Executive Order stating that 

government regulations should ‘‘take into account benefits and costs’’ and ‘‘further 

economic growth, innovation, competitiveness and job creation.’’ Again, the Commission’s report runs directly counter to the Administration’s own stated goals. 

Specifically, I am frustrated that the Commission failed to address the economic 

factors of the President’s offshore drilling moratorium—including the number of lost 

jobs, wages and oil revenue to the United States Treasury. The moratorium has already reduced United States oil production and has cost numerous Louisiana jobs. 

I believe these facts needed to be fully addressed in the report. 

Finally, I believe we need to make sure that effective, efficient reforms are made 

to improve safety while still allowing drilling to be conducted in the Gulf of Mexico. 

Rest assured, I will continue to work with my fellow like-minded colleagues on the 

Natural Resources Committee to create and keep jobs in the offshore energy sector. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman follows:] 

Statement of The Honorable Robert J. Wittman, 

a Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia 

Chairman Hastings, thank you for holding this important oversight hearing. Senator Graham and Administrator Reilly thank you for your presence here today and 

71 

for your efforts leading the President’s National Commission on the BP Deepwater 

Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. 

The fire, sinking and loss of the 11 crewmembers of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig was a true tragedy. The Gulf region is still recovering from the economic 

and ecological impact of the oil spill. 

We must make every effort to ensure that federal agencies are effectively structured to regulate offshore drilling, while protecting the environment and meeting 

our nation’s energy demands. 

Since the oil spill significant steps have already been taken to improve safety 

standards for the oil and gas industry. Structural reforms at the Department of Interior by Secretary Ken Salazar have fundamentally altered the regulatory body responsible for offshore drilling. These new regulations and structure address many 

of the key government oversight failures that led to the Gulf oil spill. Additionally, 

the oil and gas industry has taken steps to develop advanced technology that would 

lessen the likelihood of similar catastrophic blowouts. These and other steps have 

already made the offshore industry safer. 

It is appropriate to carefully review and ensure that offshore energy production 

is appropriately regulated and conducted in a safe and environmentally sensitive 

manner. However, it is also critical that we promote responsible American made 

energy, including oil, natural gas, nuclear, coal, and renewable energy. Unfortunately, the Commission’s report on balance includes proposals that would ultimately 

restrict domestic energy production with little measurable increases in safety. Of 

particular concern is the Commission’s implicit support for the Administration’s 

ongoing moratorium on energy development in the Atlantic Ocean. 

Virginia has the opportunity to develop offshore energy in an environmentally 

friendly manner and lead the nation in improving our energy security and creating 

thousands of jobs. The economy of Virginia will benefit tremendously from the 

demand for goods and services created by offshore development. 

Promoting offshore oil and gas development is one tool in an ‘‘all of the above’’ 

energy strategy that is necessary to meet our nation’s growing needs. In addition 

to oil and gas, Virginia has the potential to develop offshore windmills and other 

types of renewable energy. All of these forms of energy are necessary to meet the 

challenges of the 21st Century. 

I look forward to continuing to move Virginia towards energy independence, offshore energy development and job creation. 

[The response to questions submitted for the record by Mr. Reilly 

and Senator Graham follows:] 

Response to questions submitted for the record by the National 

Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 

Chairman Doc Hastings (WA-R)—Questions 

Question: Acknowledging that the U.S. will have less domestic production 

from the OCS in the foreseeable future; does the Commission have any recommendations as to where Congress should promote domestic oil and gas 

development to offset those losses? 

Response: The Commission does not foresee that any of its recommendations will 

lead to less domestic production from the OCS in the foreseeable future. The Commission instead concluded that the Macondo well blowout was fully preventable and 

that deepwater drilling in the Gulf can be done safely in the future with appropriate 

safeguards, all of which are readily achievable. The only threat to domestic production from the OCS would be the failure of industry and government to take those 

necessary steps to restore safe drilling to the Gulf. 

Question: The Commission dealt primarily with offshore production, would 

the Commission encourage greater onshore oil and gas production from 

federal lands where an oil spill would be less complex to clean up and 

mitigate? 

Response: The Commission did not consider the comparative safety of onshore and 

offshore drilling because the President’s charge to the Commission was limited to 

the viability of offshore drilling, especially in deep waters. Because, moreover, the 

Commission concluded that deep water drilling in the Gulf can be done safely and 

those deep waters are where significant oil and gas resources exists, the Commission never had occasion to determine whether onshore production was needed as a 

substitute for offshore drilling. 

72 

Question: According to press reports, after the Commission released some 

of its findings, companies came forward with information that rebutted 

specific statements in the Commission’s report. 

Since the Commission doesn’t appear to have incorporated the new information provided after the press leak in the final report, how will that new 

information be utilized and made available to the public? 

Response: The Commission has received no information from companies since the 

release of the Commission’s final report that has refuted any of the Commission’s 

findings and conclusions concerning the causes of the Macondo well blowout and the 

resulting Deepwater Horizon rig explosion. Chapter 4 of the Commission’s final report summarized those findings and conclusions. As promised by that report, moreover, the Commission’s Chief Counsel has since released a detailed and full account 

of those same findings and conclusions in a 350 page technical report. That Chief 

Counsel’s Report describes in exhaustive detail all the engineering and management 

mistakes made by the three companies that resulted in the well blowout and rig 

explosion. 

The Chief Counsel, the Commission’s Chief Scientist, and the Chief Counsel’s 

investigation team met repeatedly with representatives of the three companies 

principally involved in the blowout—BP, Halliburton, and Transocean—and other oil 

and gas companies. Indeed, for much of the investigation, those companies were all 

extremely cooperative and provided invaluable information. The Chief Counsel 

asked BP, Halliburton, and Transocean to review his draft final report to the Commission prior to its publication to give them the opportunity to correct 

misstatements and provide additional information. The Chief Counsel took that 

same precaution in late October 2010, immediately prior to holding a public hearing 

in which he detailed for the Commission his preliminary findings and conclusions. 

Each of the three companies was provided a preview of that presentation, again, in 

order to allow them to correct misstatements and provide additional information. 

In short, the Commission’s Chief Counsel gave the companies extraordinary opportunities to comment on the Chief Counsel’s findings and conclusions prior to 

their release because the Chief Counsel was determined to provide the Commission 

and the American public with the most comprehensive and accurate accounting of 

the causes of the Gulf oil spill disaster. The Commission’s investigation has never 

been aimed at determining legal responsibility or allocating blame for the blowout. 

The companies involved may nevertheless believe that the Chief Counsel’s and Commission’s findings could be relevant to the outcome of other proceedings. It is therefore understandable that they would advocate factual positions that would, if accepted, minimize their potential liability. 

Question: Did any controversial findings require corroboration? 

Response: The Commission does not view its findings as controversial or in any 

manner as unsupported. The Commission’s exhaustive investigation identified precisely the mistakes made that caused the well blowout and rig explosion. Both the 

Commission’s final report and the Chief Counsel’s report to the Commission provide 

detailed corroboration for each of the Commission’s findings and conclusions regarding the causes of the blowout and explosion. The Commission’s final report provides 

that description and corroboration in a more summary fashion as part of the Commission’s overall report, and the Chief Counsel’s report to the Commission sets it 

forth in greater detail, in over 350 pages of text, figures, and footnotes. That accounting properly identifies areas where there is unavoidable uncertainty. Any remaining uncertainty, however, has no bearing on the strength of the Commission’s 

ultimate recommendations for changes in government and industry practices, which 

are more than amply supported by what the Commission concluded with certainty. 

Question: What record of proof was considered sufficient to support a 

particular finding? 

Response: The Commission did not assume the role of a judge or jury, applying 

a strict legal standard of proof, such as the ‘‘preponderance of evidence test’’ applied 

in civil liability lawsuits or the ‘‘beyond reasonable doubt’’ standard applied in criminal prosecutions. The President’s Executive Order to the Commission expressly instructed the Commission not to apply formal legal standards that might intrude 

upon potential civil litigation or criminal prosecution. For that reason, the Commission instead applied a standard of reasonable certainty, meaning whether the evidence allowed the Commission to conclude with reasonable certainty what had happened and whether the action taken was either an engineering mistake or failure 

in management. 

73 

Question: How did Commission staff resolve conflicts between witness accounts? 

Response: As a practical matter, by the time the Commission staff had completed 

its investigation, there were very few witness accounts of facts that differed in ways 

that affected the Commission’s ultimate findings and conclusions regarding the 

causes of the well blowout. The Commission’s investigation instead found striking 

common ground regarding the basic facts and the Commission consulted its own 

Chief Scientist and a team of expert engineers and scientists, many of whom work 

with industry, to evaluate those facts in identifying the mistakes made by the three 

companies. 

When the Chief Counsel discovered an important factual or analytical dispute 

that was central to the Commission’s investigation, he took the steps to resolve the 

dispute. For instance, after BP called into question the stability of the Halliburton 

cement slurry, and Halliburton refuted those claims, the Chief Counsel obtained 

from Halliburton the cement recipe used at Macondo as well as materials for testing 

the recipe. The Chief Counsel then obtained the services of Chevron, one of the 

world’s leading experts on cement, to test the stability of that formula. Those tests 

revealed that Halliburton’s cement, based on that formula, was in fact unstable. 

This was a major fact finding achieved by the Commission. 

Finally, to the extent that the Commission concluded that the facts were uncertain, the Commission expressly acknowledged that uncertainty and explained to 

what extent, if any, that uncertainty affected the Commission’s finding and conclusions. Such candor was consistent with the Commission’s charge: to provide the 

American people with a full and comprehensive accounting of the blowout. Such an 

accounting invariably includes acknowledgement of remaining uncertainties. 

Question: What standards did the staff apply to determine whether a 

particular statement was credible or not? For example, was hearsay 

considered reliable? 

Response: The Commission staff considered the full context of any statement in 

determining its reliability, including but not limited to the credibility of the person 

making the statement, his or her relative expertise, and corroborating documentary 

evidence. As a general matter, the Commission sought to rely primarily on statements of facts offered by those with firsthand knowledge of factual assertions being 

made. And, for that same reason, hearsay as a general matter was discounted. In 

some instances, however, the Commission staff had no choice but to rely on hearsay, 

for example, to investigate the statements and actions of several men who died on 

the rig. In such circumstances, hearsay is the only available evidence. When such 

hearsay was the basis of the Commission’s findings, the Commission sought, as fact 

finders traditionally do in such circumstances, corroboration of those statements by 

more than one source. In addition, the Commission always made clear in its report 

the full basis of its factual finding so others could weigh it accordingly. 

As described in response to an earlier question, however, as a practical matter, 

factual disputes were not a major problem for the Commission staff investigation. 

The Commission’s factual investigation resulted in a factual accounting regarding 

the drilling of the Macondo well and the response and containment efforts about 

which there is very little meaningful dispute about what happened. 

On occasion, there were disputes regarding the engineering or scientific significance of certain facts and data. In some instances, representatives of the companies 

principally involved disputed the importance of certain data or undisputed facts. In 

cases of analytic disputes, the Chief Counsel’s staff consulted an extensive array of 

industry and academic experts before reaching conclusions, and noted in the Chief 

Counsel’s report any meaningful differences between our findings and those of 

others. 

Question: How did the staff conduct its deliberations? 

Response: There were no formal deliberations by staff. Staff met frequently and 

informally to discuss facts, analyses, and written work products. In addition, they 

prepared draft written work products, which were reviewed by staff team leaders 

and ultimately by the Executive Director and/or Chief Counsel prior to submission 

to all the Commissioners. The Commissioners, by contrast, did deliberate and, as 

required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, Commissioner deliberations took 

place in public. 

Question: Who was present? 

Response: There were no formal meetings in which staff deliberated. Of course, 

there were informal conversations between staff on a consistent basis over the 

course of their research and investigation. 

74 

Question: Were they confidential? 

Response: There were no staff deliberations. Internal staff discussions that occurred regularly on an informal basis during staff research and investigation were 

not open to the public. As discussed above, staff frequently invited technical experts 

from the companies involved in the blowout to discuss and explain facts and data. 

Question: If they were not confidential, will you make the deliberations 

public? 

Response: Because there were no formal staff deliberations, there is no information to be made public. There are no minutes or written account of the myriad informal conversations that staff had with each other during staff research and investigation. The work product that resulted from staff research and investigation were 

draft staff working papers, draft staff findings and recommendations, and draft staff 

chapters, all of which were submitted to the Commissioners. Draft staff working papers submitted to Commissioners were published on the Commission website. Draft 

staff findings and recommendations were presented to the Commissioners at a hearing open to the public at a December deliberative meeting. And, finally both the 

Commission’s final report, which was based on the Commission’s written work and 

the final staff working papers have all been released to the public, as has the Chief 

Counsel’s Report to the Commission. 

Question: Some individuals have raised concerns about the investigative 

techniques practiced by the staff working on the Commission’s report. In 

order to better understand the reasons behind the investigative techniques 

employed by the staff, please answer the following questions: 

Why did the staff conduct ‘‘group interviews,’’ that is, interview more than 

one person at a time, thus allowing the perspective of one person to influence that of another? 

Response: The Commission staff conducted interviews both on an individual basis 

and on a group basis. Both types of interviews can be effective in fact finding. At 

the November hearing, the Chief Counsel engaged in some group interviews because 

that was an effective means of resolving and highlighting for the Commissioners 

and the American public significant differences in viewpoints expressed by witnesses. Staff also conducted several group interviews with teams of technical experts (as opposed to fact witnesses) to facilitate a robust discussion of technical 

issues. 

Question: Why did the staff announce preliminary findings publicly, thus 

allowing witnesses and subjects of the investigation to adjust their rendition of events prior to the final findings being published? 

Response: The purpose of announcing preliminary findings when the Commission 

staff did so was to ensure the accuracy of the staff’s final proposed findings for submission to the Commissioners. Such a procedure allowed, and the Commission staff 

encouraged, anyone with information relevant to the preliminary findings to submit 

that information prior to the issuance of any final staff proposed findings. Like any 

fact finder, the staff can discount the persuasiveness as appropriate of efforts by 

witnesses and subject to investigation to adjust their rendition of facts in light of 

those preliminary staff findings. 

Question: Why did the Chief Counsel paraphrase and summarize testimony 

during the Commission’s public hearings instead of quoting witness statements as a means of ensuring an accurate record? 

Response: The transcript of the hearing already provided a verbatim record of 

what witnesses said. The purpose of the Chief Counsel’s paraphrasing and summarizing was to provide the full Commission with the benefit of the Chief Counsel’s 

considered judgment concerning what had been learned from the two days of testimony the Commissioners had heard. The Commission has publicly posted all transcripts of witness testimony on its website for public review. 

Question: The Commission’s recommendations state that pollution prevention standards should be developed in consultation with international regulatory peers. Are you familiar with the joint work of the International Oil 

Spill Conference? Is that an adequate international working group? 

Response: The Commission is aware of the International Oil Spill Conference and 

Commission staff had occasion in their research to review some of the papers and 

abstracts presented at every International Oil Spill Conference from 1969 to 2008. 

The Commission has taken no view on whether that particular organization would 

be sufficient for the development of the necessary standards. 

75 

Question: The Commission has made it clear that all of industry has the 

same ‘‘safety culture’’ that was practiced on board the Deepwater Horizon 

and that the failure of the ‘‘safety culture’’ as evidenced by the explosion 

and subsequent oil spill are systemic and overarching. 

How many drilling contractors operate in the Gulf and what percentage of 

those operators did the Commission interview and which of these operators safety records and cultures did the Commission analyze? 

Response: The question is based on an incorrect premise. The Commission made 

no such statement regarding the safety culture of the offshore oil and gas industry. 

The Commission’s final report instead makes clear that many companies have exemplary safety records. And the Commission further expressly praised those companies 

not only in the Commission’s final report but in public hearings held this past November. 

The basis for the Commission’s conclusion that the offshore drilling industry suffered from a ‘‘systemic’’ problem was very different, as the Commission’s report 

makes clear. That conclusion was based on the nature of the mistakes that the Commission found were the cause of the Macondo well blowout and rig explosion as well 

as the identity of those making the mistakes. The Commission did not discover one 

or two isolated mistakes but a pattern of repeated mistakes in well drilling operations that revealed a fundamental failure of risk management and safe drilling 

practices. In addition, those making the mistakes were not just three insignificant 

companies. They included the largest operator of deepwater drills in the Gulf (BP); 

the largest supplier of cement for all deepwater wells, not just to BP but to all operations in the Gulf (Halliburton); and the largest operator of deepwater drilling rigs 

in the Gulf that services not just BP but all major operators (Transocean). In addition, the Commission staff investigation revealed that BP was not the only company 

that had failed to plan for a possible deepwater well blowout;BP did not maintain 

resources adequate to contain and respond to such a blowout, as promised by the 

oil spill response plans BP had submitted to the government. None of the other oil 

companies was prepared for such a blowout, notwithstanding their formal and repeated claims to the government that they were prepared. Indeed, all of their oil 

spill response plans were riddled with inaccuracies and false promises. It was on 

this firm basis that the Commission concluded that the offshore industry as a whole 

suffered from a culture of complacency that had assumed away, rather than effectively planned for a possible deepwater well blowout. 

Question: The report includes a ‘‘loss of well control graph’’ showing 79 accidents in the Gulf of Mexico between 1996 and 2009. 

How many wells were drilled during that time period? 

Response: According to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and 

Enforcement, operators drilled 13, 359 wells in the Gulf between January 1, 1996 

and December 31, 2009. 

Question: What does the Commission believe constitutes a safe industrial 

record? 

Response: A loss of well control does not, by itself, indicate that an operator was 

engaging in unsafe drilling practices. Some risk is inevitable in offshore drilling, especially in deep water. The purpose of the chart in the report describing the 79 incidents of loss of well control is not to suggest that each of those incidents demonstrates unsafe drilling practices. It is instead simply to document the inherent 

risks of offshore drilling and the reason why it is so essential that industry always 

be on guard to ensure that such incidents do not result in the kind of major disaster 

that occurred with the Macondo well blowout. 

Question: Does the Commission believe it is possible to eliminate human 

error from the disaster equation? 

Response: No, it does not. Safe drilling practices, however, require anticipating 

the potential for such human error and building in safeguards both to minimize its 

occurrence and its consequences. The human error that caused the Macondo well 

blowout was entirely preventable and was not the result of unavoidable human 

error. 

76 

Question: Since taking office one of Secretary Salazar’s primary efforts has 

been to ensure that oil and gas companies ‘‘use or lose’’ their leases. This 

effort has included changes in rental payments, reducing the length of 

leases, and greater regulatory attention to the speed of the development of 

leases. You have highlighted in your report that many of the steps taken 

by BP in the development of this well were done to save time. 

Considering the Department’s pressure to speed development, does the 

Commission believe that BP felt obligated to use these time saving measures to meet the Department’s demands? 

Response: The Commission has insufficient information upon which to form a belief concerning BP’s motivations for saving time and whether they might have been 

related to Department of the Interior policies. 

Question: Does the Commission believe that we should consider extending 

the length of leases to allow companies and regulators additional time to 

conduct environmental and safety studies? 

Response: The Commission did not consider that issue and neither a decision to 

extend or a decision not to extend the length of leases would, accordingly, be inconsistent with the Commission’s recommendations. 

Question: UCSD Economics Professor James Hamilton has written that 

‘‘nine out of ten of the U.S. recessions since World War II were preceded 

by a spike up in oil prices.’’ In fact, he has recently written that it was high 

oil prices that caused a significant decline in personal spending and new 

car purchases that contributed to our current recession. 

Did the Commission look at the impact of reduced domestic oil and gas 

production on gasoline prices, the GDP, or the Nation’s balance of trade? 

If high gasoline prices and oil price spikes are known to do significant 

harm to the U.S. economy, should the U.S. ensure that adequate domestic 

production is available to prevent significant price spikes and declines? 

Did the Commission conduct an analysis on the economic impacts of higher 

gasoline prices and declining domestic production on the lower income 

brackets of the U.S. population? 

Response: The Commission did not undertake a detailed analysis of the relationship of the nation’s economy to oil and gas prices because such an inquiry was outside the Commission’s charge, as described by the President’s Executive Order creating the Commission. Consistent with that Executive Order, the Commission identified the root causes of the oil spill and made recommendations concerning how to 

prevent future spills and mitigate their consequences. 

Question: Did the Commission at any time receive direction on policies to 

consider or recommendations that should be made from: 

a. Ms. Carol Browner, Special Assistant to the President? 

b. Mr. Steve Black, Counselor to the Secretary of the Department of the 

Interior? 

c. The Honorable Ken Salazar, Secretary of the Department of the Interior? 

d. Mr. Michael Bromwich, Director, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 

e. The Honorable Steven Chu, Secretary Department of Energy? 

f. Would the Commission please provide any directions or instructions 

from these individuals that were provided to the Commission to the 

Committee? (These requests include emails, letters, phone logs, and 

other communications) 

Response: The only direction or instruction that the Commission received from 

anyone outside the Commission itself concerning the proper scope of the policies and 

recommendations for the Commission’s consideration was contained in the President’s Executive Order establishing the Commission. That Executive Order defined 

the scope, purpose, structure, and timetable for the Commission’s work. The Commission neither received nor entertained any other instructions or directions concerning what the Commission should consider or recommend. No one, including any 

of the listed individuals, purported to direct or instruct the Commission on policies 

or recommendations or otherwise to exercise supervisory or managerial authority 

over the substantive nature of the Commission’s work. Any such assertion, moreover, of supervisory or managerial authority would have been antithetical to the 

independence of the Commission’s investigation and recommendations and for that 

77 

reason rejected by the Commission. Because the Commission received no ‘‘instructions’’ or ‘‘directions’’ of this kind, the Commission has no related documents to 

provide. 

Congressman and Ranking Member Edward J. Markey (MA–D)—Questions 

Question: During the hearing, it was asserted that the Commission should 

not have issued its final report until it knew definitively why the blowout 

preventer (BOP) failed to function as it should have. How can you say you 

did a thorough review of the accident and determined the causes if you 

weren’t able to inspect the BOP? 

Response: The Commission could do so for the straightforward reason, explained 

in the Commission’s Final Report and further elaborated upon in the Chief Counsel’s Report to the Commission, that even if the blowout preventer did fail, that failure did not cause the explosion that killed 11 men on April 20th. As the Commission 

report and Chief Counsel’s Report explain, the rig crew realized too late what was 

happening and thus activated the BOP too late to have prevented an explosion. By 

the time the crew tried to activate the BOP, gas had already flowed above the BOP 

and was rocketing up the riser. That gas is what ignited on April 20th. 

By contrast, as the Commission report and Chief Counsel’ Report further explain, 

if the crew had heeded warning signs earlier in the day, they could easily have prevented the explosion from happening. These included misinterpreting the negative 

pressure test used to check the integrity of the cement job. In the hour or so before 

the explosion, there were several other odd and unexpected pressure readings that 

the crew should have realized were signs of a problem, but unfortunately did not. 

If they had properly recognized these signs, they could easily have closed in the 

well. 

To be sure, any blowout preventer failure may potentially have played a part in 

the severity of the oil spill, but the disaster as a whole was due to a rather staggering series of errors by the three companies, all of which our investigation has 

documented. These errors can be addressed through better regulation, better training for workers, and a strong commitment to safety by both the companies and the 

regulators. Examples of key mistakes by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean as identified by the Commission’s investigation include: 

• Failure to get a good cement job 

• Failure to understand that the negative pressure test indicated that the cement was instable 

• Problems with BP’s temporary abandonment procedures, in particular, its decision to displace mud from the riser before setting additional barriers to back 

up the cement at the bottom of the well. This left the faulty cement at the 

bottom of the well as the only physical barrier that could prevent the flow 

of hydrocarbons into the well 

• Failure to understand that a kick was occurring, even though there were several odd and unexpected pressure readings in the hour or so leading up to 

the explosion that the crew should have realized signaled a problem 

• Failure to respond appropriately once mud and gas began spewing onto the 

rig floor. The crew should have diverted the gas overboard instead of diverting it through the mud-gas separator. While it is not entirely clear this would 

have prevented the explosion, it could have at least limited its impact. 

For these reasons, the blowout preventer analysis, while important, will not 

change the Commission’s conclusions that a failure of management led to numerous 

risky and unnecessary decisions made by the companies involved, each of which led 

to the occurrence of the blowout. The blowout preventer can, like a seatbelt, reduce 

the amount of harm that is caused, but in the circumstances of the Macondo well, 

even a properly functioning blowout preventer was not a root cause of the accident 

and its immediate tragic consequences for those on the rig on the night of April 

20th. The BOP’s relationship to an oil or gas well is the same as the relationship 

of an airbag to a car—it is not intended as a means to prevent an accident, but to 

mitigate its effects. 

Question: Can you briefly list all the errors or other problems encountered 

in the weeks, days and hours leading up to the blowout at the Deepwater 

Horizon well that caused the accident to occur in the first place? 

Response: A brief and necessarily under inclusive list of errors and other problems 

follows. Chapter 4 of the Commission’s overall report provides a summary of the engineering, process, and management decisions that led to the blowout. The Chief 

Counsel’s report explains these mistakes and others in greater detail. 

78 

1. BP and the rig crew experienced difficulties drilling the well. When combined 

with earlier design decisions, these problems required them to plan a ‘‘finesse’’ cement job. 

2. The cement slurry that BP and Halliburton used was very likely unstable. 

3. BP and Halliburton did not adequately test the cement or review test results 

prior to pumping the cement. 

4. BP’s temporary abandonment procedures called for the crew to unnecessarily 

underbalance the well and stress the cement without first installing additional static barriers. 

5. BP provided inadequately detailed procedures to the crew for temporary 

abandonment and negative testing, and provided them late, causing confusion. 

6. BP’s well site leaders, in consultation with the Transocean rig crew, misinterpreted data from the negative pressure test. 

7. The rig crew and mudloggers missed several signs of the ‘‘kick’’ that became 

the blowout in the last hour before the blowout occurred. 

8. Once the blowout began, the rig crew did not immediately divert mud flow 

overboard and instead attempted to route flow through the mud-gas 

separator. 

Question: Can you also describe any delays, errors or other problems associated with efforts to activate the BOP once it became clear that this was 

necessary (please only describe any problems that are separate and apart 

from BOP malfunctions)? Could any of these have impacted the likelihood 

of using the BOP to stop the explosion(s) on the Deepwater Horizon even 

if it had properly functioned? 

Response: The Chief Counsel concluded that the crew first activated an annular 

preventer in the BOP at best only moments before drilling mud erupted onto the 

rig floor. By this time, gaseous and liquid hydrocarbons had already passed the BOP 

rams and were in the riser. Once those materials were in the riser, there was nothing the crew could have done to prevent them from flowing to the surface. As gaseous hydrocarbons flowed up through the mile of riser pipe, they expanded, further 

increasing the speed and force of the blowout as they rose. Accordingly, the Chief 

Counsel concluded that even if the BOP had functioned flawlessly, the explosion 

would have occurred and eleven men would have died. Put another way, the main 

problem associated with activating the BOP was timeliness—the rig crew recognized 

signs of a kick too late to use the BOP to prevent a blowout and an explosion. 

Question: The Commission report concluded that safety problems in the oil 

and gas drilling sector are ‘‘systemic’’ in nature and not just associated 

with one company or group of companies. 

Could you please provide me with some specific justifications for this conclusion? 

Response: The Commissioner’s conclusion concerning the systemic nature of the 

problem was based on the nature of the mistakes that the Commission found were 

the cause of the Macondo well blowout and rig explosion as well as the identity of 

those making the mistakes. The Commission did not discover one or two isolated 

mistakes but a pattern of repeated mistakes in well drilling operations that revealed 

a fundamental failure of risk management and safe drilling practices. They included 

the largest operator of deepwater drills in the Gulf (BP); the largest supplier of cement for all deepwater wells, not just to BP but to all operations in the Gulf (Halliburton); and the largest operator of deepwater drilling rigs in the Gulf that services 

not just BP but all major operators (Transocean). In addition, the Commission staff 

investigation revealed that BP was not the only company that had failed to plan 

for a possible deepwater well blowout. BP did not maintain resources adequate to 

contain and respond to such a blowout, as promised by the oil spill response plans 

BP had submitted to the government. None of the other oil companies was prepared 

for such a blowout, notwithstanding their formal and repeated claims to the government that they were prepared. Indeed, all of their oil spill response plans were riddled with inaccuracies and false promises. It was on this firm basis that the Commission concluded that the offshore industry as a whole suffered from a culture of 

complacency that had assumed away, rather than effectively planned for a possible 

deepwater well blowout. Finally, the Commission concluded that the nature of the 

problem was of such a nature that a ‘‘systemic’’ solution was needed to ensure 

achievement by industry of safety in offshore drilling operations. 

79 

Question: Did your meetings with foreign regulators or other entities that 

are familiar with safety or safety culture in other countries highlight differences between the safety of offshore drilling operations in the United 

States compared with other countries? If so, can you describe the key elements of what you were told that informed your views? 

Response: Two key factors in particular influenced the Commission’s views. The 

first was that the same operators that were drilling in U.S. waters were operating 

more safely in their drilling operations offshore of other nations. They were successfully complying with pro-active risk management approaches in other nations. The 

costs were not exorbitant and better safety was apparently being achieved elsewhere. Second, the Commission learned that other nations had prescriptive technical standards for drilling safety not reflected in U.S standards. The Commission 

saw no excuse for U.S. standards not to be at least as demanding as what other 

nations applied and what the same companies were already doing in those other nations to achieve regulatory compliance. 

Question: In arguing against the need for reform, the oil and gas industry 

and some Members of the Committee have asserted that the BP Deepwater 

Horizon disaster was an outlier and point to the long history of drilling offshore in the Gulf of Mexico. 

Does the industry’s record of drilling tens of thousands of wells offshore in 

the Gulf of Mexico mean that this was an isolated incident? Why or why 

not? 

Response: The offshore drilling industry certainly deserves praise for the lack of 

any major well blowout in the Gulf of Mexico in U.S waters during the past several 

decades of exploration and production there. As the Macondo well blowout demonstrates, however, one cannot rely on a past record of safety when, as has occurred 

offshore in recent years, the industry is moving to wells located in ever deeper 

waters where the potential for recovery of increased volumes of oil and gas is accompanied by significant increases in associated risk. 

Question: What differences exist between drilling or responding to a blowout in shallow water verses in ultra-deep water where the Deepwater Horizon was operating? Please detail any added technical challenges and difficulties presented by deepwater drilling. 

Response: Added water depth itself creates complications and risk because of the 

lower temperatures and higher pressures exerted on wellhead equipment and BOPs 

at those greater depths. For example: 

• In deeper water, rigs need to be larger with greater lifting capacity to manage 

heavy tubular (casing, riser, drill pipe). 

• Deeper water requires a longer riser pipe, which makes it more difficult to 

manage mud pressures and also makes it more dangerous when gas enters 

the riser. 

• Hydrates are also a more common problem in deepwater due to the seabed 

pressure-temperature relationships. This poses challenges in development and 

production, but also in well control. 

• Deepwater oil and gas reservoirs can have exceptionally high porosity and 

permeability. These characteristics promote productivity but also make well 

control more difficult and means that ‘‘kicks’’ (influx of oil and gas into the 

well bore) can be significant 

• In deepwater, the margins between pore pressure and fracture gradient are 

typically less than in shallow water. This leads to greater risks of taking a 

‘‘kick’’ not just during drilling, but also during topping (pulling out of the 

hole). 

• Because the water is so deep, gas expansion of any kick is mostly in the riser 

and therefore above the BOP. This means that drillers must be attuned to 

subtle signs of an influx and shut in the well before hydrocarbons enter the 

riser. In shallow water, the expansion is mostly below the BOP. 

• Added water depth also increases the complexity of efforts to stop a blowout 

that is already in progress. For instance, BOP stacks are often on the surface 

in shallow wells, which means that repairs can be done above water. By contrast, BOPs in deep water wells can be a mile or more below the surface, 

meaning that all work must be done by Remote Operated Vehicles (ROVs). 

On the other hand, rigs and equipment can station themselves directly over 

a deepwater blowout, which has operational advantages, and cannot as readily do so in shallow waters because of the presence of hydrocarbons at the 

surface. 

80 

• Deepwater wells tend to contain significantly larger volumes of oil and gas 

and consequently can be more productive, which also means that spills resulting from deepwater blowouts may potentially be larger. Good shallow wells 

produce at rates of a few thousand barrels of oil a day. By contrast, deepwater wells commonly produce more than 10,000 barrels per day. 

For much of the nation’s history offshore drilling occurred exclusively in shallower 

waters, where the risks were generally lower. During the last two decades, however, 

offshore drilling has increasingly occurred in ever-deeper water, beginning with 

‘‘deep waters’’ (approximately 1,000–5000 feet) and now even ‘‘ultra-deep waters’’ 

(more than 5,000 feet), where the amount of oil and gas can be greater still. The 

Deepwater Horizon was operating at depths of approximately 4,992 feet of water. 

Chapter 2 of the Chief Counsel’s report addresses these issues in greater detail. 

Question: On January 26th, I, along with several other House Members, introduced legislation, H.R. 501, to implement the recommendations of the 

National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 

Drilling. The legislation we introduced contains provisions designed to be 

consistent with the recommendations of the Commission. For each of the 

following provisions, please describe whether the legislation appears to be 

generally consistent with the recommendations the Commission has made 

to improve the safety of offshore drilling: 

a. Our legislation would reorganize the regulatory structure of the Department of the Interior to separate the offshore leasing, revenue 

collection, and environmental and safety review and enforcement 

functions. The legislation would also make the head of the safety 

agency a fixed-term appointee. 

b. The legislation would create a dedicated funding stream from oil 

and gas fees to fund the agencies responsible for regulating and 

overseeing the industry. 

c. The legislation would require the federal government to use sound 

science to properly estimate the potential worst-case spill scenarios 

and then requires industry’s oil spill response plans to incorporate 

those worst-case scenarios into a realistic analysis of what could 

happen in the event of a catastrophic blowout. 

d. The legislation would establish a permanent scientific group to ensure that the government develops and maintains the extensive expertise needed to estimate the flow rate of oil from a spill. 

e. The legislation would dedicate 80 percent of the Clean Water Act 

fines and penalties to Gulf Coast restoration. 

f. The legislation would ensure that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has a formal consultative role in the 

decision making process for where and how new drilling can occur 

so that the best possible science can be incorporated into the decision-making process. The Department of the Interior would have to 

respond in writing if it chose not to accept NOAA’s recommendations. 

g. The legislation would create a dedicated funding stream from oil 

and gas fees to fund oil spill response research and development. 

h. The legislation would increase the per incident payout from the oil 

spill liability trust fund. 

i. The legislation would require strong new standards for blowout preventers, cementing and well-design. 

j. The legislation would require extensive study on the potential effects 

of dispersants on the marine environment. 

k. The legislation would protect whistleblowers from being retaliated 

against for reporting violations of oil and gas drilling safety laws 

and regulations. 

Response: All of the above legislative proposals, if enacted, would be consistent 

with the Commission’s final report and recommendations. 

81 

Question: One of the Commission’s findings is that federal oil and gas regulators have historically been underfunded and the Commission recommends creating a dedicated funding stream from increased oil and gas 

fees to fund the agencies responsible for overseeing and regulating the industry. 

However, some have indicated a desire to reduce federal non-security 

spending levels across the board. In your opinion, would reducing rather 

than increasing funding for federal oil and gas regulators help or hurt our 

ability to ensure that offshore oil and gas drilling operations are safe? 

Response: The Commission believes that increasing funding for oil and gas regulators is essential to ensuring drilling safety and is necessary to get the oil and gas 

industry fully back in operation in the Gulf as expeditiously as possible. 

Question: The Commission’s recommendations note that historically most 

applications of the Natural Resource Damage Assessment process have focused on coastal restoration, as opposed to restoration in water column or 

on the sea floor. Would focusing primarily on coastal restoration be appropriate in this case? What suggestions do you offer for how to address the 

damage offshore, which the Commission notes is ‘‘unprecedented and unknown’’? 

Response: The Commission recommends that restoration not be limited to coastal 

restoration but also encompass the full marine environment damaged by the Gulf 

spill, including the water column. To address this need, the Commission recommends, among other things, longer term study of those non-coastal adverse impacts and broader efforts at implementing the Gulf Hypoxia Action Plan, utilizing 

marine spatial planning, and providing for marine protected areas to conserve marine biodiversity and to enhance the resilience of fish stocks. 

Question: What are some of the challenges that would be associated with 

responding to an oil spill offshore in the Arctic, especially at certain times 

of the year when sea ice is present? Would effectively responding to a spill 

in the Arctic present greater challenges than responding to a spill in the 

Gulf of Mexico? 

Response: As described in Chapter 10 of the Commission’s final report, three of 

the greatest challenges presented by the Arctic in particular include: (1) the current 

lack of significant Coast Guard resources in the Arctic or readily deployable there; 

(2) the presence of ice during significant parts of the year, which would complicate 

significantly and potentially delay effective containment and oil spill response efforts; and (3) the absence of daylight during significant parts of the year, which 

would hinder both containment and oil spill response efforts. In at those three respects, the challenges would be greater in the Arctic than in the Gulf. As described 

in Chapter 10, in some respects there are fewer challenges. For instance, many of 

the areas now under consideration for exploration and production in the Arctic are 

located in shallow rather than deep or ultra deep waters as in the Gulf. 

Question: During the hearing, questions were raised regarding the expertise of the Commission members and its staff. Could you please describe a) 

the expertise and experience possessed by those responsible for conducting 

the Commission’s technical work and writing those aspects of its report 

and b) the range of experts consulted by the Commission or its staff as it 

sought to develop its findings and recommendations? 

Response: The Commission established a team of staff to investigate the root 

causes of the Macondo well blowout with enormous technical and legal expertise. 

That team was led by the Commission’s Chief Counsel, Fred Bartlit, and by the 

Commission’s Chief Scientist, Richard Sears. Bartlit is not only one of the nation’s 

most highly regarded trial lawyers, with deep professional roots with industry and 

a degree in civil engineering from West Point, but he led for industry the investigation of the Piper Alpha rig explosion in 1988, in which 167 people died in the North 

Sea. Bartlit is widely credited by industry and government alike for the rigor and 

fairness of that investigation, which successfully identified the root causes of the explosion. Richard Sears is a petroleum engineer with over three decades of experience 

with the oil and gas industry, having recently retired from Shell Oil. Bartlit and 

Sears put together not only an in-house team within the Commission staff, but also 

worked closely with experts in the oil and gas industry itself, who were enormously 

cooperative in assisting the Commission’s work. The Commission’s investigative 

team consulted with industry and academic experts on virtually every aspect of 

deepwater well drilling and fully vetted the investigation’s findings with those same 

experts. The best proof of the depth, scope, rigor, balance, and fairness of that staff 

82 

work is the recently-released Chief Counsel Report to the Commission, which describes in exhaustive detail in 350 pages the engineering and management mistakes 

made that caused the well blowout and rig explosion. 

Congressman Dale Kildee (MI–D)—Questions 

Question: Your comments today and the findings of your report highlight 

the vital importance of the Gulf Coast ecosystem. Can you briefly tell us, 

in terms of natural, economic, and other resources, why this area and its 

fragile ecology are so significant to the region and to the nation at large? 

Response: Chapter 6 of the Commission’s final report best describes the significance of the Gulf to the Gulf economy and environment, as well as to the nation 

as a whole. In addition to the oil and gas industry, the Gulf hosts the nation’s largest seafood industry as well as an enormously important and vital tourism and 

recreation industry. As witnessed last summer, both those critical economies were 

devastated by the spill and it is still unclear, almost eleven months later, the extent 

to which they will have recovered this coming summer. Those who live along the 

coast were especially hard struck, including many vulnerable communities, not only 

in their livelihoods but in terms of their mental and physical heath, by the spill. 

More than 650 miles of Gulf coastal habitats—salt marsh, mudflat, mangroves, and 

sand beaches—were oiled. Tidal mudflats are especially sensitive to oil pollution and 

the Louisiana delta and the estuarine bays of Mississippi and Alabama have large 

expanses of tidal mudflats, and support dense populations of species. Salt marsh 

and mangroves are likewise both highly productive and sensitive habitats highly 

vulnerable to oil pollution. 

Question: What would you say to the average American who sees the prices 

at the gas pump going up each week and may be reluctant for the government to apply additional regulations to gas and oil drilling companies? 

Response: None of the Commission’s recommendations should have a significant 

impact on the price of gasoline. The primary factor in the price of gasoline is the 

price of crude oil, which is set by the global market. U.S. crude oil production currently accounts for roughly 10% of total global production, and it is unlikely that 

small changes in U.S. crude oil production could affect global prices. More importantly, our recommendations are aimed at moving us forward to allow for the full 

recovery of offshore operations in the Gulf. Improved drilling safety could impose 

some upfront costs on oil and gas companies, but these costs are small compared 

to the cost to industry of another major blowout. 

Question: Your report calls for the dedication of a significant portion of 

Clean Water Act penalties for restoration of the Gulf Coast’s threatened 

ecosystem. Can you tell us more about the relationship between resiliency 

of the Gulf Coast ecosystem and your proposed use of these incident-specific spill-related funds? 

Response: The Gulf is presently especially vulnerable to oil spills because of the 

elimination of natural barriers, loss of land, destruction of wetlands, and high concentrations of nutrients otherwise threatening the viability of marine life within the 

Gulf. As a result of these accumulating threats to the Gulf ecosystem, the harm 

caused by a catastrophic oil spill can be much greater because, combined with existing harm, the Gulf may lack the strength needed for recovery. It is for this reason, 

that mitigation of the harm of future spills warrants not just eliminating the incremental harm caused by the Macondo well blowout, but building back the strength 

of the Gulf ecosystem so as to be able to withstand future spills. 

Question: Given that your report sites that ‘‘since 2001, the Gulf of Mexico 

workforce—35,000 people, working on 90 big drilling rigs and 3,500 production platforms—has suffered 1,550 injuries, 60 deaths, and 948 fires and explosions.’’ Do you believe that the oil and gas industry is capable of regulating itself without additional government oversight? 

Response: We think that safe drilling operations will require both effective government and industry oversight. Neither can do it alone. That is why the Commission recommends the creation of an independent safety authority within the Department of the Interior. And that is why the Commission further recommends that industry establish its own independent, self-policing entity to oversee offshore drilling 

operations, akin to what the nuclear power industry did in 1979 in the immediate 

aftermath of the Three Mile Island Accident when industry established the Institute 

of Nuclear Power Operations. 

83 

Question: Some experts have suggested that the Commission has drawn 

overly broad conclusions about the oil and gas industry’s commitment to 

safety, based on the decisions on a single rig. How would you respond to 

this criticism? 

Response: The Commissioner’s conclusion concerning the systemic nature of the 

problem was based on the nature of the mistakes that the Commission found were 

the cause of the Macondo well blowout and rig explosion and the identify of those 

making those mistakes. The Commission did not discover one or two isolated mistakes but a pattern of repeated mistakes in well drilling operations that revealed 

a fundamental failure of risk management and safe drilling practices. In addition, 

those making the mistakes were not just three insignificant companies. They included the largest operator of deepwater drills in the Gulf (BP); the largest supplier 

of cement for all deepwater wells, not just to BP but to all operations in the Gulf 

(Halliburton); and the largest operator of deepwater drilling rigs in the Gulf that 

services not just BP but all major operators (Transocean). In addition, the Commission staff investigation revealed that BP was not the only company that had failed 

to plan for a possible deepwater well blowout; BP did not maintain resources adequate to contain and respond to such a blowout, as promised by the oil spill response plans BP had submitted to the government. None of the other oil companies 

was prepared for such a blowout, notwithstanding their formal and repeated claims 

to the government that they were prepared. Indeed, all of their oil spill response 

plans were riddled with inaccuracies and false promises. It was on this firm basis 

that the Commission concluded that the offshore industry as a whole suffered from 

a culture of complacency that had assumed away, rather than effectively planned 

for a possible deepwater well blowout. Finally, the Commission concluded that the 

nature of the problem was of such a nature that a ‘‘systemic’’ solution was needed 

to ensure achievement by industry of safety in offshore drilling operations. 

Question: I appreciate the fiscal logic of your recommendation that Clean 

Water Act penalty dollars be returned to revive the natural and economic 

resources of the Gulf Coast’s wetlands. Can you summarize for us the reasons why that kind of funding is needed here, and what you expect it to 

accomplish? 

Response: As described in Chapter 7 of the Commission’s Final Report, many have 

studied the current problems affecting the Gulf’s ecosystem and the central role it 

plays in the nation’s economy and there is no lack of understanding concerning the 

kind of steps now needed to address those problems. The problem has not been lack 

of understanding but lack of sufficient resources to commit to the necessary measures. The estimated costs of such a restoration effort, however, roughly mirror estimates of the amount of monies potentially recoverable in Clean Water Act penalties 

from those private companies responsible for the Gulf oil spill. Those penalties, accordingly, provide an extraordinary opportunity for the Gulf and the nation to undertake restorative measures of enormous value to the Gulf, the nation, and current 

and future generations of Americans. 

Question: In last night’s SOTU address, the President talked about the need 

for investments in critical infrastructure for America’s long-term economic 

health. Would your proposal to invest Clean Water Act penalties in Gulf 

Coast restoration offer this kind of necessary economic security? 

Response: Yes, it would. The Gulf’s ecosystem supports some of the nation’s most 

important economies. 

Question: Recognizing the importance of the Gulf Coast ecosystem, many 

of us are hopeful that the Natural Resource Damages Assessment process 

will result in an aggressive response to some of the worst effects of the 

spill. How would your proposal for Clean Water penalties go beyond this 

NRDA response? 

Response: It would go beyond because the NRDA is more limited in its ability to 

extend beyond the immediate effects of the spill itself and address the longer term 

and broader need to restore the overall health of the Gulf’s ecosystem, which has 

been threatened by many activities in recent decades, including the Gulf’s ability 

to withstand future oil spills. 

Congresswoman Betty Sutton (OH–D)—Questions 

Question #1 (Questions on Culture of Worker Safety): 

1. In your report you suggested that the oil and gas industry should 

work to establish a ‘‘Safety Institute’’ similar to organizations in 

other high risk industries like the nuclear industry. By your recVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Mar 14, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 L:\DOCS\63876.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
84 

ommendation, this would be an industry sponsored entity aimed at 

improving safety and operation standards in the offshore drilling industry. 

2. At the same time, you hint at the lack of a ‘‘safety culture’’ in this 

industry. You make some great recommendations, but there is a concern that industry will be slow to self-regulate and change long 

standing practices. 

3. Have you found the industry receptive in any way to your suggestions for forming a safety group? 

4. What obstacles exist to creating a culture of safety in the oil and gas 

industry? 

5. What are some of the concerns you’ve encountered or what might be 

done to encourage the establishment of a safety culture? 

Response: The Commission has been encouraged in many private conversations 

with leading industry officials that they are receptive and ready to create such an 

industry self-policing entity and that many recognize its value and importance. The 

greatest obstacle right now, however, is that there still seem to be significant voices 

in industry that have not reached that conclusion and seem open instead to seeing 

if the current demands for safer drilling will naturally subside without industry taking significant steps to reform drilling practices. The Commission’s related concern 

is that there appears to be a tendency within the oil and gas industry, promoted 

by the American Petroleum Institute, to be reflexively opposed to enhanced oversight measures and a willingness to defer to ‘‘average’’ business practices rather 

than to demand ‘‘best’’ drilling practices. It is not yet clear to the Commission that 

those industry leaders who made clear that they share the Commission’s view of the 

existing problem and the need for industry reform will be successful in moving the 

industry as a whole. 

Question #2 (Conflicts within Agencies Dealing with Drilling): 

1. In your report you hit on one of the major issues leading up to the 

oil spill, the conflicting mission of the Minerals Management Service. 

The report suggested the creation of an independent agency to oversee aspects of offshore drilling. 

2. Secretary Salazar recently announced two new independent agencies to carry on functions once assigned to MMS, one agency to deal 

with leasing and one agency to deal with safety issues. 

3. But even under these two new agencies the Bureau of Safety will 

still operate under the same assistant secretary who oversees leasing 

duties. 

4. How do these agencies line up with your recommendations? 

Response: Much of what the Secretary is doing is fully consistent with the Commission’s recommendations. The Commission does, however, believe that more is 

needed, including not having the two new agencies operating under the same Assistant Secretary. In addition, the Commission recommends a series of other steps to 

enhance the independence of a new safety authority within Interior, including having the head of that authority possess special engineering credentials and experience and be appointed to a fixed term. 

5. What consequences do you foresee with the way Interior has moved 

forward in forming these new agencies? 

Response: The risk of not making the new agency as autonomous as the Commission recommends is that the new agency, especially after there is less political attention paid over time to the risks of well blowouts, will, as in the past, place greater weight on revenue collection to the detriment of ensuring safe drilling operations. 

Congressman Jeff Landry (LA–R)—Questions 

Question: Do you propose these recommendations from the report for both 

deep and shallow water drilling operations? 

Response: The Commission’s recommendations are not limited to deepwater drilling. As a practical matter, however, the challenges and associated risks of drilling 

are greater for deep water than they are for shallower water, so the practical impact 

of the recommendations are commensurately great for operations in deep water. 

85 

Question: Can you discuss what the economic impacts are on the nation as 

a whole in light of your recommendations in the report and the Obama Administration’s response to permitting post-spill? Specifically, can you discuss what the International Energy Agency meant by it’s anticipation of 

the U.S. needing an additional 300,000 barrels per day of imports by 2015 

based on the ongoing permitorium and Interior Department actions? 

What about the U.S.’s own Energy Information Administration’s announcement that production in the Gulf would be down 220,000 barrels per day 

in 2011 and 400,000 barrels per day by 2012 due to the permitorium. Can 

you please discuss those numbers, including what they mean for the Gulf 

economy, the U.S. economy, and our national security? 

Response: The Commission is aware of the Energy Information Administration 

and International Energy Agency analyses of the adverse impact of the moratorium 

and permitting delays in the Gulf of Mexico on U.S oil production. Indeed, precisely 

because the Commission was aware of the significant associated costs of such delays 

on the nation’s energy supply and the national economy, the Commission made a 

series of recommendations for the purpose of reducing permitting delays. Most important, the Commission concluded that a significant cause of current and potential 

future delays was a lack of sufficient funding for the government agency, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (the successor to 

the Minerals Management Service). Absent the necessary resources, BOEMRE cannot process permit applications as expeditiously as possible while ensuring drilling 

safety and the impact on the nation’s energy resources and economy may well be 

even worse than projected by these two forecasts. 

In particular, the Commission found that Congress had persistently and increasingly underfunded the Minerals Management Service to meet the challenges of the 

expanded activity in the Gulf. As offshore activity dramatically increased during the 

1990s, the Minerals Management Service had increasingly-stretched budget resources available and its ability to maintain the capacity necessary for safety management and permitting suffered. The Commission, accordingly, identified the need 

for new hiring authority to compete with other employers for technical expertise as 

well as the budget certainty to enable the agency to make the hiring and training 

commitments necessary to accommodate the industry’s permitting needs. Neither of 

these has yet been provided. Until Congress provides those resources, the absence 

of necessary government oversight will likely be the greatest source of continuing 

permit delays. 

Question: Other countries have determined that there was no need to shut 

down offshore production. In fact, African and South American countries 

are actively pursuing long-term contracts for rigs to move out of the Gulf. 

Including rigs from energy companies from the likes of Murphy Oil, BP, 

Anadarko and Statioil. How come the commission report did not discuss 

the loss of rigs in the Gulf and economic impacts long-term? 

Response: The Commission report did not discuss the loss of rigs and the economic impacts long term because the Commission concluded that deepwater drilling 

could be done safely and economically in the Gulf and sought to propose recommendations that would allow such drilling to occur in a safe and expedited manner. The Commission, accordingly, did not foresee a reason to assume that there 

would be a long term loss of rigs in the Gulf. 

Question: Due to a 2008 Bureau of Labor Statistics Report on Work Place 

injuries 89 percent of working Americans work in industries with higher 

injury rates than oil and gas extraction. So please explain why only commercial banking, insurance carriers and certified public accountants fare 

better and why child day-care services were twice as high as oil and gas 

extraction? 

This BLS report goes on to state that a total of 120 fatal work injuries occurred in the oil and gas extraction industry in 2008. The three most frequent fatal events in 2008 were transportation incidents (41 percent), contact with objects and equipment (25 percent), and fires and explosions (15 

percent). The number of fatal work injuries associated with fires and explosions over the past five years ranged from 10 fatalities in 2007 to 21 fatalities in 2006. In 2008, there were 18 fatalities. Why would the extraction portion of the industry be labeled by the Commission ‘‘a systematic breakdown 

of safety and engineering practices’’ when in 2008 41% of fatal work injuries happened in the Transportation sector of the industry? 

86 

Do you or don’t you agree that without any further regulations the Offshore Oil and Gas industry is safer today then it was prior to the accident? 

Response: In the immediate aftermath of an accident, it is reasonable to assume 

that the offshore industry has on its own initiative taken some measures to enhance 

safety by learning from the specific mistakes made at the Macondo well and on the 

Deepwater Horizon rig. The Commission’s recommendations, however, seek to promote safety far more by identifying the root causes, and thereby not just prevent 

a repetition of the precise, same mistakes, and to create an institutional structure 

for safety oversight within both government and industry that will endure over the 

longer term, long after memories of the BP Deepwater Horizon Gulf Spill begin inevitably to dim. 

Question: The President charged this commission to determine the causes 

of the disaster, to improve the country’s ability to respond to spills, and 

recommend reforms that make offshore energy production safer. Prior to 

the accident, there existed multiple layers of environmental reviews, including multiple EIS and EA’s. These included EIS’s during the development of the 5 year review and again prior to the lease sale. Where does the 

Commission receive both the authority and the conclusion that the NEPA 

review warrants any additional changes, as I find no conclusion that it contributed to the accident or to the impact of the clean up? 

Response: Under the Executive Order that established the Oil Spill Commission, 

the President specifically tasked the Commission with suggesting improvements to 

Federal laws and regulations applicable to offshore drilling that would prevent future spills and mitigate their impact. Investigating the Department of the Interior 

and the Mineral Management Service’s application of NEPA for offshore oil and gas 

development was an important part of this review because such NEPA review is designed to ensure, among other things, that agency decision-making considers potential adverse environmental consequences, including those resulting from oil spills 

conducted on federal properties and supervised by federal agencies. 

Congressman Jeff Denham (CA–R)—Questions 

Question: The report recommends that there needs to be the creation of a 

new government bureaucracy. How is it that the functions of this new 

agency can’t be performed by the current massive [over sized] federal 

structure? 

1. Why can’t the need for planning, coordination, execution, and clean 

up after a disaster fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)? 

2. With better and more efficient government action couldn’t the damages from an emergency be lessened? 

3. Isn’t it necessary to reduce the bureaucratic red tape that prevents 

an overseeing agency, such as FEMA, from being allowed to take the 

lead role and manage the necessary actions following an incident? 

4. Wouldn’t having one agency allowed to take the lead and coordinate 

eliminate the communication breakdown and resolve a need for an 

expansion of expensive and inefficient government? 

Response: The Commission does not recommend the creation of a new federal bureaucracy to plan, coordinate, or execute the response to an offshore oil spill. Rather, the Commission recommends maintaining the existing command structure, in 

which the Coast Guard takes the lead role in responding to an offshore spill of oil 

or other hazardous substances. The National Contingency Plan properly assigns this 

lead role to the Coast Guard because of its expertise in the offshore and marine environment. Reassigning that role to FEMA would ignore the Coast Guard’s decades 

of experience in oil spill response and planning, and would require a significant and 

inefficient expansion of FEMA to duplicate functions and expertise that already 

exist within the federal government (indeed, within the same cabinet department). 

The Commission agrees that ‘‘better and more efficient government action’’ could 

lessen the damage caused by a major oil spill. As set forth in the Commission’s report, the response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster revealed a series of deficiencies in government planning and execution. Accordingly, the Commission recommends a series of steps that the federal government could take, consistent with 

the existing command structure, to better address the demands created by a spill 

of national significance. 

Æ