D on R eav i s, Just i ce ( R et

. ) , S ev ent h C our t ofA ppeal s, si t t i ng b y assi gnm ent

. T ex. G ov ’ t C ode Ann. 1 § 7 5 .0 0 2 (a )( 1 ) (V e rn o n S u p p . 2 0 0 6 ). NO. 07-05 -013 8-CV IN THE CO UR T OF APPEA LS FO R THE S EVEN TH D ISTRI CT O F TEXAS

AT AM AR ILLO PAN EL D MA Y8, 2007

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___ FI RS T STATE BAN K, N .A., Appel lan t

v. C. D. M OR SE D /B/A

38 & Q AU TO, TH Appel lee

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______ FRO M T HE 72 DIS T RI CT COU RT OF L UB BO CKCOU NT Y; ND NO. 200 2-51 9,1 90; HON. BLAIR CHERRY , JR., PRESIDING

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____ Opinion

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____ Before QUINN, C.J., CAMPBEL L, J., an d REAVI S, S.J. 1 First S t a t e B ank (First State ) appe als f rom a judgmen t rende red in favor of C.D. Morse d/b /a 38 & Q Auto (M orse). Via six issues, it cont end s thatt he trial co urt erred in th 1) enter ing jud g ment on re spons es to jur y q uest ion s conc er nin g neg li g ence, 2 ) gra nti ng judgme nt on insuf

f icient evidence, 3 ) ad mitt ing pu rported e x pert testim ony o f lo st prof its, and 4) ente ring judgme nt on factu ally insuf f icient evidence su ppo rting the jury ’sC onsequ ent l y , we wi l l not addr ess whet her §9. 207( a) oft he T exas Busi ness a nd Com m er ce Code 2 p ro v i d e d th e d u ty a l l e g e d l y m i s s i n g . T h a t p ro v i s i o n o b l i g a te s a s e c u re d p a rty p o s s e s s i n g th e c o l l a te ra l o f i ts d e b to r to u s e re a s o n a b l e c a re i n th e c u s to d y a n d p re s e rv a ti o n o f th a t c o l l a te ra l

. T EX . B US
. & C O MM . C OD E A NN . §9

. 20 7(a ) ( V ern on S up p. 20 06 ). 2 det ermin ation regarding com para tiv e respo nsibility, joint enterprise and ag ency. On cross appeal , M orse cont ends that the t ri al cour t er re d by 1) faili ng to submi t a charg e i nv olv ing the Te x as T heft Liab ility Act and g ross neglig ence , 2) failing to impo se a con structive trust for th e benef itof

M orse and 3) di sreg ardin g the jur y ’s ans w er

on t he i ss ue of con v ersi on. W e aff ir m in par

t and rev erse and render i n par t. Back ground The di sput e arose w hen F irst Stat e rele ased to M onte Scar broug h a l arg e number of c ar ti tl es ow ned by Mo rs e. Fi rs t Stat e had hel d the ti tl es as col lat eral for a floor pl an l ine of credit it e xten ded t o Morse. Fu rtherm ore, the la tter testif ied th at he had directed First Stat e to re frai n from rele asi ng the document s to a n yon e oth er than hi msel f and an ind iv idu al named Lope z . Non ethel ess , F irst Stat e g av e Sc ar broug h the ti tl es w it hout Mo rs e’s approv al. Sc ar broug h the n s old v ar iou s of t he v ehi cl es re present ed by the ti tl es and us ed th e proceed s t o reduce hi s o w n s eparate d ebt o w ed to F irst Stat e.

Iss ues Oneand Two – NegligenceFinding Throug h i ts firs t tw o i ss ues, F irst State a ttacks the jur y ’s findi ng of neg li g ence. Pu rp o rt e d ly, itha d no du ty re gar d in g viz the preser

v ati on of the ti tl es, and the e v ide nce of
caus ati on w as non- ex is tent or factual ly i nsuffici ent. W e s ust ain the latter , w hic h di spens es w ith the nee d to ad dress the forme r. 2 Acc ordin g to Fi rs t St ate t he ev ide nce is defic ient b e ca u se i t di d notfores ee “ that Scar broug h w oul d mi sappropr iate ti tl es, v ehi cl es and funds. ” M oreov er , t he damag esF i rs t S ta te w a s a c q u i re d b y S ta te N a ti o n a l B a n k s h o rtl y a fte r M o rs e ’ s c a r ti tl e s w e re d e l i v e re d to 3 Scar br ough. 3 pur por tedl y su ffered arose not from i ts deci si on to rele ase the t it les to him but i ts
successo r’s decision “to term inate im me diate cred it t o Morse at any tim e, w ithou t regard to w hether

i t had extended suc h pr iv il eg e i n the pas t.” W e sus tai n the a rg ument i n par t. 3 The appl ic abl e s tandard of rev iew i s w ell kn ow n and needs lit tl e ex pla nati on. Regarding the ma tter of legal suff iciency, w e de term ine w het her the ev iden ce w ou l d ena ble
re asona b le a n d f air-mi nded pe opl e to re ach the v erdic t und er rev iew

. City of Keller v. W il son , 168 S .W .3d 8 02, 8 27 (Te x . 200 5). And, in deciding tha t, w e mu st credit favorable evidence if reaso nab le jurors could , and disregard cont rary evidence u n le s s re ason able jurors c oul d not

. Id. Co n ce rn in g t he factua l suffici ency of the e v ide nce, w e as ses s t he q uantum o f ev ide nce suppo rt ing the v erdict and dete rm in e w hether i t w as too w eak or s o me h o w o v e r

w h e l me d b y t h e c o n t ra r y ev ide nce. Pool

v. F or d Motor C o. , 715 S.W .2d 629 , 635 (Tex. 1986 ), ov er ru led on o ther

gr ounds by Cr

own Li fe Ins. C o. v

. C asteel , 22 S.W .3d 3 78 ( Tex . 200 0) ( hol din g thatthe cour t of appeal s must cons ide r and w eig h al l of the e v ide nce, and mayonl y se t as ide the findi ng i f t he ev ide nce is so w eak, or i f the findi ng is so ag ain st the g re at w eig ht an d preponderance of the ev ide nce that iti s c lea rl y w ro ng and unj ust ). Next, to s ati sfythe ele ment of ca usat ion under a c lai m of neg li g ence, the proponent
mu st prove that th e br e a c h e d d u t y wa s both a cause in fa ct of the injury and tha t injury
ar is ing from t he ac t w as re asona bly fores eeabl e. Rea d v. Scott Fet zer C o. , 990 S.W .3d 732, 737 ( Tex . 199 8) ; Schn ei de r v . Haws , 118 S.W .3d 886, 892 (Tex . Ap p.–Amar il lo 2003, no pet .)

. To be a caus e in fact , ther e need onl y be a reas onabl e probabi li ty that the actor4

omis si on g av e r is e t o t h e harm. Kr am er v. Lewi sv il le Me m or

ial Hosp. , 858 S.W .2d 3 97, 399- 400 ( Tex . 199 3) ; S c h n e ide r v. H aws , 118 S.W .3d a t 892

. And, suc h a p ro babi li ty
ex is ts if the actor

omi ss ion wa s a s u bst anti al factor i n br ing ing aboutan i nju ry , w it hout
w h i c h t h e h a r m w o u l d n o t h a v e o c c u r r e d. Sc h neider v. Haw s, 118 S. W .3d a t 892

. Re ga rd in g fo re s e e a b il it y, itre qu ir e s p ro o f t h a ta p e rs o n of

ord in a ry i n t e ll ig e n c e sh o u ld h a ve anti ci pated the d ang er ca used by

the neg li g ent a ct or

omi ss ion

. D oe v. Bo ys Club s o f G r e a te r D a l

la s , Inc ., 9 0 7 S .W .2d 4 72, 4 78 ( Tex . 199 5)

. W it h thi s s aid , w e tur n to the
ev ide nce of rec ord. It canno t be deni ed th at be fore Sc ar broug h c oul d effect uate the sal e of the v ehi cl es and convert the proce eds, he ha d to acquire t he titles. S ince First Sta te he ld the m, their rel ea s e by

t ha t en ti ty

w as e l em en ta l t o th e s uc c es s o f hi s p l an . Th us , i n F i rs t St ate ’s releasin g the m to Scarbrou gh contrary to th e directives of Morse and its duties to exercise
re asona ble ca re ov er

( and t o preser

v e) the col lat eral, a j ur y had re a so n a b le basi s t o conc lud e tha t Fi rs t State’ s act w as a substa nti al factor in br ing ing aboutthe inj ur y su ff ered by Morse. At the v eryleast, a jury could so reason ably conclude if it acce pte d Morse’s tes ti mony

as tr ue. Reg ardin g the ele ment of fores eeabi li ty , w e not e tha t t he i nju ry at is sue ste mmed from tw o roots

. One i nv olv ed F irst Stat e’s ac t of re lea si ng the ti tl es to S car broug h. The
sec ond enc ompass ed hi s c onv ersi on of thos e titl es to his ow n benefit

. Fur ther more, the
re cord i ll ust ra tes thatM orse had, on many occ asi ons, auth or iz ed F irst Stat e to re lea se car ti tl es to Sca rb ro ug h. Y et, now here are w e c it ed to ev ide nce of pri or mis condu ct by Scar broug h viz

t h o se t it les or

hi s a cti v it ies i n g eneral. N or di d w e find any

ev ide nce of5

misco ndu ct of

the ilk thatw ould have placed First Stat e on notice thatScarbrou gh may use the t it les f o r h is personal , unl awful g ain

. Indeed, M orse hims elf s tated thathe d id not dis tr ustSc ar b ro u gh before the i nci dent in q uest ion

. Si mil ar ly , Ed w ina M ey er ( the b ank
em ployee w ho n orma lly dea lt w ith Scarb rough) state d tha t she cou ld notreca ll M orse com plainin g abo ut Sca rbrough’s integrity , hon esty, or performa nce. Nor could she recall bei ng tol d tha t Sc ar broug h s houl d be w atc hed. And, w hen as ked if a n yone had “ ev er re por t[ed] to [her

] any probl em” re g ardin g the re lat ion shi p betw een Sc ar broug h and Mo rs e, she a nswered “no.” It ha s long been the rule th at th e crimina l condu ct of a t h ird party norm ally
cons ti tutes a s upersedi ng ca use relie vi ng a ne g li g ent a cto r of li abi li ty

. Pha n Son Van v. Pena , 9 9 0 S

. W

. 2 d 7 5 1 , 7 5 3 (Tex . 199 9) ; Ni xon v. Mr

. Pr op. M gt. Co. , 690 S.W .2d 5 46, 549- 50 ( Tex . 198 5) ; Picha rdo v. Big Diam ond , Inc. , 215 S.W .3d 497 , 501 (Tex. App. –Fort W orth 20 07, no pe t.). Th ough an ex cept ion to the r ule arises w hen the crimina l condu ct is fores eeabl e, Pichar

do v . Bi g Dia m ond, Inc ., 215 S. W .3d a t 501 , the te stimo ny of Morse and M ey er

and the d ear

th of ev ide nce re g ardin g Sc ar broug h’s potenti al for c ri minal ac ti v ity before h e c onv erted t he ti tl es, neg ates it s appl ic ati on here. Si mply put, no ev ide nce ex is ts
o f re c o rd f ro m wh ic h a re a s o n a b le ju ry c o u ld in fe r t h a tF i r s tS t a t e sh o u ld o r c o u ld h a ve fo re se e n Sc a rb ro u gh’ s m isc o n d u ct

. So , sin ce th e se co n d e le m e n t of ca u sa ti o n is m iss in g, the j ur y ’s findi ng of neg li g ence on th e par t of F irst Stat e i s l eg all y unfounded. Rem ain in g Issu es Hav ing resol v ed i ss ue tw o as w e did, w e need not address First Stat e’s fourt h i ss ue conc er nin g co mpara ti v e respon sib ili ty. Y et, it s o thers a s w ell as thos e of M orse that6

neces si tate re v iew . Moreov er , w e w il l address Morse’ s is sues nex t s inc e the ir resol uti on af fects disp osition of

First Stat e’s rema ining issues. Thef t Li abi lity Act Subm is si

on Mo rs e c ontends thatthe tr ial co u rt e rre d b y fail ing to inc lud e i n i ts jur y ch arg e an is sue e n co m p a ssing the Tex as Thef t Li abi li ty Ac t. This w as er ro r becau se ev ide nce of
re cord purpo rt edl y

ex is ted i ll ust ra ti ng thatF irst Stat e “ appropr iat ed M orse’ s p ro per ty
w ithou t his conse nt an d not only inten ded to dep riv e Morse of his prope rty , butin fa ct did depr iv e [hi m] of [i t]. ” W e di sag re e and ov er ru le the i ss ue. Acc ordin g to sta tute, a pe rs on “ w ho c ommits theft i s l iab le for th e damag es re sul ti ng from the theft.” T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C OD E A NN . §13 4.0 03 (Ve rnon 200 5). Per this sta tute, theft i s d efined as unl awfully appropr iat ing proper

ty or unl awfully

obta i n i ng se rv ic es as desc ri bed by

§§ 3 1.03 throug h 31. 07 and §§ 31. 11 th ro ug h 31. 14 of the Tex as Penal Cod e. Id. §134. 002( 2)

. Of thos e v ar iou s s ect ion s o nly one is pote nti all y

rele v ant t o the dis pute before u s. Iti s found i n §31. 03 and sta tes thata pe rs on c ommits t h e ft if he unl awfully

appropr iat es proper

ty w it h i ntentto depr iv e the ow ner of i t. T EX . P EN AL C ODE A NN . §31.03( a) (V er non Supp. 2006)

. Addi ti onal ly , the int ent to depr iv e co n templated under §31. 03( a) mustex is t atthe ti me of the t aking o r e x chang e. Ree d v . St ate , 717 S.W .2d 6 43, 6 45 ( Tex . Ap p.–Amar il lo 1986, no pet .)

. W hile i t ma y be th at F i rs t St at e ma y ha v e de l i v ered th e ti tl es to Sc ar brou gh in
v iol ati on of M orse’ s d irect iv es, that , atbes t, merel y si g nifie s a pos si ble mis appropr iat ion

. T EX . P EN AL C OD E A NN . § 31. 03(b )(1) (Verno n Sup p. 200 6) (sta ting th at an app ropriation is unl awful i f it is w it hout t h e ow ner ’s effect iv e c onsen t)

. It does not e sta bli sh the req uis it e7

inten t, ho w ever. Again, no ev iden ce app ears of record esta blishing tha t at the time First Sta te delivered the t itles to Scarbro ugh it in ten ded t o de priv e Morse of them . Th e bu siness his tor y betw een Fi rs t State, M orse, and Scar broug h often i nv olv ed Sc ar broug h obt ain ing poss ess ion of car

ti tl es and dis posi ng of t hem in a manner acc eptabl e to or approv ed by Morse. Nothing of record sug gests First State th ought o r knew thatScarbrou gh’s course of conduc t w oul d be any di ff erent w hen he came t o retr iev e the ti tl es now at is sue. Fu rt h e rm o re , itis t o o gre a t a le a p to sa y tha t b e ca u se Sc a rb ro u gh o wed Firs t S ta te la rge sum s of mon ey and procee ds f rom th e sale of six cars w ere eventu ally

dep osited w ith First Stat e to re duce his personal debt, F irst Stat e musthav e ei ther kn ow n Sc ar broug h i ntended to us e the ti tl es for hi s o w n benefitor i ntended to depr iv e Morse of them. M ore i s n eeded to br idg e the g ap for the for mer proposi ti on does not al one nec ess ar il y sy nthes iz e i nto t he latte r hy pot hesis. So , w ithou t evi den ce of t he requisite in ten t, the t rial cou rt d id notabu se it s d is creti on i n refusing to submi t t he q uest ion

. Tex. W orkers' Com

p. In s. Fund

v. Ma ndl bauer , 34 S.W .3d 9 09, 9 12 ( Tex . 200 0) ( sta ti ng thata tr ial co urt doe s n ot er r w hen
om itting to instruct the jury on an issue having no e v iden tiarysupp ort). Gross Neglige nce Morse also asse rts that th e trial court erred by ref using t o subm it a que stion on First Stat e’s su ppose d g ro ss neg li g ence. W e di sag re e and ov er ru le the i ss ue. As su m in g ar

guendothatone coul d be g ro ss ly neg li g ent w hen t he ev ide nce fails to
ev en es tabl is h s impl e neg li g ence, the former r e qui res an ac t or omi ss ion w hic h, w hen
v iew ed objec ti v ely

f ro m the stand poi nt of

the act or

at the ti m e of occ ur

re nce, inv olv ed an
extreme deg re e of r is k a bout w hic h the ac tor su bje cti v ely

kn ew but dis re g arded. See T EX .M or se, t hr ough hi s at t or ney , t ol d t he t r i al cour t t hat t he m oni es i n qu est i on wer e “ t o be M ont e’ s [ or 4 Scar br ough’ s] m oney , but t o be t her e t o pr ot ect [ M or se] i n case som et hi ng went w r ong wi t h M ont e bu y i ng a nd s el l i ng t hro ug h [ M ors e’ s ] l i ne [ of c red i t ]

. ” 8 C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C OD E A NN . §41 .00 1(11 ) ( Verno n Sup p. 20 06) (def ining g ross negligence). Th e sam e indicia or lack of ev iden ce w hich com pell e d u s t o susta in First St at e’ s s ec on d i s s ue an d M ors e’ s i s s ue r eg ardi ng th e The ft Li ab i l i ty A c t c om pe l s t he s am e re sul t here. Again, the re is no evidence f rom w hich a reaso nab le jury could inf er Scarbrou gh’s int ent o r prospec ti v e mi sc onduc t. W it hout that, w e cannot say thatan e xtreme deg re e of ri sk ex is ted o f w hic h F irst Stat e c oul d k now and dis re g ard. Constru ctive Trust Next, M orse com plains a bou t the trial court’s refu sal to place a co n s t ru ctiv e trust upon cer ti ficat es of de posi t ow ned by Sc ar broug h. Al leg edl y , F irst Stat e ag re ed th at t he f und s represen ted bythose certif icates w ould b e used for h is (Morse’s) “protect ion.” T his 4
conc ess ion pur por

tedl y w as made to ind uce him to deal w it h Sc ar broug h. Apparentl y , t he depos it s, w hic h approx imat ed $99, 000, w ere ev entual ly offsetby

F irst Stat e to sat is fy the ind iv idu al debt due from Scar broug h to Fi rs t St ate. W e ov er ru le the i ss ue. Ass uming the re present ati ons w ere made for the purpos es menti oned, Mo rs e c it es u s t o n o e vid e n c e i l l u s t ra t in g t h a tt h e re s o r p ro p e rt y t o b e ca p t u re d via t h e co n s t ru c t ive tr ust w as in ex is tenc e at the t ime of tri al. See Mowb ray v. Avery , 76 S.W .3d 6 63, 6 81 n. 27 (Tex . Ap p.–C or pus Chr is ti 2002, pet. deni ed) ( re q uir ing , among other thi ng s, “[ t]raci ng to an i denti fiabl e res” ). That bei ng req uired to obta in the t ru st and i t hav ing not been9

est abl is hed, w e c annot say thatM orse prov ed hi s e nti tl ement t o the reli ef soug ht. Con ver si on Next, Mo rs e arg ues that the t ri al cour t er re d in re fusing to enter j udg ment upo n the j u r y ’ s f i n d i n g t h a tF i rs tS t a t e c o n v e rt e d s i x o f t h e c a r t i t l e s i tg a v e t o S c a r b ro u g h

. W e sus tai n the i ss ue. One converts property w hen he exercises dom inion a nd co ntrol over it in disregard to the ri g hts of

the ow ner . Sunr

ay Enter pr ., Inc . v . R osena ur

, 3 3 5 S

. W

. 2 d 6 7 0 , 6 7 2 (T e x. Civ . App .–Dallas 1 960 , w rit ref ’d n.r.e). App earing of record is ev iden ce tha t 1) Morse
ow ned t he c ar

ti tl es in que st io n , 2) F irst Stat e proper ly ac q uired th em as col lat eral but agreed t o r e le a s e them as nee ded and as app rov ed b y Morse, 3) Morse directed First Sta te no t to release t hem t o Scarbro ugh w ithou t his (Morse’s) prior a ppro v al, and 4 ) Fi rst Sta te inte ntion ally

deliv ered them to Scarbro ugh (a person w ho h ad n o claim to them ) in
v iolation of

Morse’s directiv e. T hatis some evidence upo n w hich the jury could rea sona bly f ind, if it care d t o , tha t First State exercised do min ion an d con trol over the chatt el in dis r eg ard of M ors e’ s o w ne rs hi p i nt eres ts

. I n ot he r w ords , th e r ec ord c on ta i ns e v iden ce suppo rt ing the jur

y ’s v erdict reg ardin g co nv ersi on, and the tr ial co urt er re d i n di sreg ardin g that findi ng . Fi rs t St ate mak es much about a pur por ted lac k of de mand by Mo rs e upon itfor t he return o f the titles. W hile such a dem and may norma lly be required w hen the de fend ant ’s in i t i a l p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e p ro p e rt y i s l a wfu l , t h a ti s n o tt r u e i f t h e c o n v e rs i o n i s c o mp let e, Autr y v. D ear

m an , 933 S.W .2d 182 , 191 -92 (Te x . App .–Hou ston [14 Dist.] 1996 , w rit th deni ed) , or

demand w oul d be usel ess . Mc Vea v . Ve rk ins , 5 8 7 S

. W

. 2 d 5 2 6 , 5 3 1 (T e x. Ci v.Var i ous a ut o au ct i ons h ad su ed M ors e up on ch ecks he had wr i t t en b ut wer e di shonor ed b y Fi r st 5 St at e. 10 App.–C or pus Chr is ti 1979, no w ri t)

. Hav ing al re ady rele ased the t it les w hen t he ac t w as dis cov ered by

M orse, F irst Stat e no lon g er had them t o retur n. So, itca n be sai d tha t 1) the conversion w as com plete upo n the ir relinquishm entt o Scarbro ugh, 2) re quiri ng Morse to de ma nd th eir return could reason ably be v iew ed a s a useless a ct, an d 3) First State’s argume nt is erroneo us. Unau tho rized Ad vance Next, Mo rs e arg ues that the tr ial cour t er re d in deny ing hi m $103,1 50 aw arded by the j ur y and re present ing the amount “ for an unautho ri z ed adv ance on [Morse’ s] floor pl an.” W e overrule the issue for several reaso ns. Mo rs e d o e s n o tc o n t e s tF i rs tS t a t e ’ s j u s t i fi c a t i o n t h a tt h e a w a rd w a s a lr eady encompas sed w it hin the $280,09 8.50 aw arded for the l oss of the 1 9 c ar ti tl es. The l aw abhors mul ti ple recov er ies fo r the same i nju ry . Stewar t T it le Guar . C o. v . Ster li ng , 822 S.W .2d 1, 5 (Te x . 199 1). Seco nd, the “un aut horized advance” ref lected the v alue of six cars Scarbrough sold after improper ly

obta ini ng the ti tl es from F irst St ate. Those si x ca rs w ere or ig ina ll y

on Mo rs e’s floor

pl an; s o, he w as li abl e for that por ti on of the loa n th e y represent ed. Furthe rmore , tha t lia b il it y w ould rema in his viz Firs t S ta te eve n th o u gh S ca rb ro u gh eff ect iv ely

co nv erted t he v ehi cl es. So , i n s hor t, he is not enti tl ed to a credi t aga ins t hi s l oan si nce the d ebt w as sti ll due Fi rs t St ate. Atto rn ey’ s F ees Last ly , Morse conte nds th at th e trial court erred in de nying him $5 0,0 00 in at torne y ’s fees i ncur re d “ in defending the cl aims of the A uto A uct ion s.” W e ov er ru le the i ss ue. 511

Nor mall y , at tor ney ’s fees c annot be recov ered abs ent a cont ra ct or st atute al low ing for s ame. T

ra ve le rsI n d em . Co. v. Mayfield , 923 S.W .2d 590 , 593 (Tex. 1996 ). M orse ci tes us to no c ontractor st atute auth or iz ing the aw ard i n q uest ion

. Seco nd, t he fees w er e aw arded as damag es ar is ing from F irst St ate’ s p ur por ted neg li g ence. Thus , t he recei pt w as cont ing ent, at t he v e ry l east , upo n the v ali dity of the negligence f inding; tha t is, unless First State w as ne gli gent an d tha t neglig ence proxi ma tely
caus ed i nju ry , t here w oul d be no need to aw ard damag es to redress thati nju ry . Mo re ov er , hav ing prev iou sl y hel d that the tr ial co urt er re d i n ent er ing j udg ment upo n the claim of neglig ence , w e con clude (as w e did in add ressing th e prece ding issu e) t hatthere is no l ong er

any foundati on for the recov er y of the $ 50,000. Lost Pr ofits – Ina dm is si

ble Ex per t T est im ony Havi ng dispose d of

Morse’s cross-po ints, w e now retu rn to the issues raised by First Sta te. T he n ext one w e ad dress con cerns the jury aw ard of

lost prof its to Morse. First Sta te po sits t hatsu ch dam ages shou ld noth ave b een a w arde d since, a mo ng othe r things, the e x per

t testi mony

on t he matt er

offered by

M orse w as defici ent. W e s ust ain the is sue b u t n o t fo r re a so n s o f

fe re d b y Fir st St a te

. Ra th e r, th e to p ic is m o o t giv e n ou r ho ld in g viz the c lai m of neg li g ence. The ju ry aw arded M orse los t profits as dama ges re lat ed to hi s n eg li g ence and
conv ersi on c lai ms. Y et, in address ing the jur y ’s findi ng of neg li g ence, w e det er mined that Mo rs e fail ed to prov e the forese eabi li ty el ement of c ausat ion

. Thus, the n eg li g ence findi ng coul d notst and, and bec ause itco u ld n o t, t h e damages rela ted t o tha t c lai m w ere not
re cov erabl e. A s imi lar

probl em env elo ps the los t profit s aw arded as part of the damag es aw arded M orse for c onv ersi on.O u r de t erm i na t i on w ou l d al s o ne ga t e r ec ove ry for t he da m ag es fou nd by t he j ury i n a n s w e r to 6

“ Q uest i on 7 " of

t he t r i al cour t ’ s char ge. T hose dam ages ev i nce sp eci al dam ages aki n t o l ost pr of i t s t hat m ust nat ur al l y and p ro x im a te ly flo w fr o m th e to rt. S e e U n i te dM o b i l e N e tw o rk s , L .P . v . D e a to n , 939 S. W

. 2d 1 46, 147- 48 ( T ex. 199 7) ( hol di ng t hat act ual , as oppose d t o spe ci al , dam ages ar i si ng f r om a conv er si on co nsi st o f t h e fa i r m a rk e t v a l u e o f t h e p ro p e rty c o n v e rte d ); H ar r is v. C hr istianson- Kei thl ey Co. , 303 S

. W

. 2d 422, 427
- 28 ( T ex. C i v . A pp. –G al v est on 1957, w r i t re f ’ d n. r . e. ) (st at i ng t hat t o be l i abl e f or speci al dam ages such a s l ost pr of i t s, t he d ef endan t m ust hav e no t i ce or k now l edge ofsuff i ci ent f act s and ci r cum st ances t o pu t hi m on not i ce of

t he l i k el i hood oft he pl ai nt i ff sust ai ni ng som e such dam age as a nat ur al and pr obabl e r esul t of t he c on vers i on ). 12 Si mply st ated, the absen ce of ev ide nce ind ic ati ng thatSc ar bro u gh’ s theft w as forese eabl e neg ates the re co ver y . This i s s o bec ause w hil e l ostprofits may be
re cov erabl e to re dress a c onv ersi on, Har ri s v. Chr is ti anson -K eit hle y C o. , 303 S.W .2d 4 22, 427- 28 ( Tex . C iv . A pp.–G alv est on 1957 , w ri t ref’d n. r. e.) , t hey mustnatu ra ll y

and proxim ate ly

ar is e from t he defendant’ s w ro ng . Groves v. Han ks , 546 S.W .2d 6 38, 6 47- 48 (Tex . C iv . Ap p.–C or pus Chr is ti 1976, w ri t ref’d n. r. e.)

. In ot her w ords, theymustbe a forese eabl e c onseq uence of the mi sc onduc t. Har ri s v. Chr is ti anson -K eit hley Co. , 303 S

. W

. 2 d a t 4 2 7 ( s t a t i n g t h a t t o b e l i a b l e fo r s p e c i a l d a ma g e s s u c h a s l o st pr ofits , t he def end antmusthave n otice or kn owl edge of suf f icient facts an d circumst ance s to puthim on not ic e of the li kel iho od of the pla int iff sust ain ing so me such damag e as a na tural and probabl e resul t of the conv ersi on)

. Gi v en the d ear th of ev ide nce re g ardin g the forese eabi li ty

of Scar broug h’s theft, w e mustl og ic all y co ncl ude t hat n o ev ide nce suppo rt s a findi ng thatthe los t profits rela ted t o tha t t heft w ere foreseea ble

. In s hor t, if one canno t fo re s e e a p a rt ic u la r t h e f t , o n e ca n n o t fo re s e e t h e c o n s e qu e n c e s o f t h a tt h e f t

. T h u s , we 6
nee d no t consid e r wh eth er the e x pert te stimo ny of fered byMorse w as eith er adm issible
or su ppor ted t he aw ard of lo st profits ar is ing from t he c onv ersi on.13

Joint En terprise Next, Fi rs t St ate a rg ues that factual ly i nsuffici ent e v ide nce suppo rt s t he findi ng that S c a rb rough and Morse w ere not engaged in a joint enterprise w hen Scarbro ugh ga ve M o rs e a c h e c kfo r

$ 8 8 , 0 8 5

. 0 0 a n d M o rs e d e p o s i t e d i ti n h i s ( M o rs e ’ s ) a c c o u n t

. W e dis ag re e and ov er ru le the i ss ue. A j oin t enter pr is e ex is ts w hen t he persons co ncer ned hav e 1) ei ther an e x press or impl ied ag re ement w it h respec t t o the ente rpri se or endeav or , 2) a c ommon pur pose, 3)
a c o m m u nity

of pecun iar

y i nterest s i n tha t pur pose, and (4 ) an eq ual r ig ht t o di re ct and cont ro l the e nter pr is e. S t

. Jo s ep h Ho s pital v. W

olf f , 94 S. W .3d 513 , 526 (Tex. 2002 ); W atts v. Gr een, 190 S.W .3d 44, 50 (Tex. App. –Am arillo 2005 , no pe t.); R E S TA TE MENT (S E COND ) OF T O RT S , § 491 ( 1965)

. Reg ardin g the ele ment of co ntrol and v oic e, more tha n s ome ev ide nce il lus trates the a bsenc e of a j oin t ent er pr is e. For inst ance, Morse deci ded w here to bank and how to f inan ce his own business op e ra t io n s when it cam e to allowing oth ers to use his deale r’s li cens e to buy

and se ll ca rs. H e, no t Sc ar broug h, w as li abl e for the flo or pl an l oan from Fi rs t St ate a nd had to au thor iz e rele ase of the c ar ti tl es. F urther more, othe rs al so uti li z ed Mo rs e’s deal er ’s l ic ense to bu y and sell ve h icles muc h l ik e Sc ar broug h. In t ur n, Scarbro ugh testif ied th at he had his ow n bu siness acco unt s and line of credit, an d Morse
w as not a sig nator

y on t hem. So t oo di d Sc ar broug h hav e the auth or ity to buy the cars h e selecte d at th e price he selecte d. In exchan ge fo r enjoying t h e o p p o rtunity to do so throu gh use of

Morse’s li cense , Scarbrou gh paid him $85 per car w het heror not a prof it on th e transacti on w as made. And, to t he extent that a profit w as made, i t bel ong ed to Scar broug h, no t M orse.14

In vi ew of the foregoing, the b usine ss relationsh ip bet w een t he two indiv idua ls could be l ik ened t o one of a li cens ee and li cens or as opposed to a j oin t ent er pr is e. One s old and the othe r boug h tt h e c h a n c e t o de al in the a uto trade, and each w as in cont rol of their
re spec ti v e par

t of thatrel ati onshi p thoug h theyprofited off each oth er . So, subs tanti al (a s oppos ed to w eak ) e vide n ce suppor ted t he findi ng thatthe tw o di d notenj oy j oin t c ontrol over the irrespective interests when it cam e to th eir busine ss relationsh ip and Morse’s pay ment of the debt due t he aut o auc ti ons. M oreov er , t hat fin din g i s n ot ov er w hel med by any co ntrar y ev ide nce. Scar br ough’ s C apacity as Mo rs e’

s A gent Fi nal ly , F irst Stat e contes ts the jur y ’s f ind ing that Scar broug h w as not the ag ent o f Mo rs e w hen he obtai ned from Fi rst St a te t h e c ar ti tl es at i ss ue. The findi ng w as purp orted ly

“contrary to th e great w eight and p repo nde rance o f t he e v iden ce” or fa ctua lly ins uff ic ien t t o s uppor

t t he v erdict. W e ov er ru le the i ss ue. To est abl is h an ag ency rela ti onshi p, on e mustpresentev ide nce il lus trati ng thatthe all eg ed pr inc ipa l int ended for anot her to actfor him, and the suppo sed ag ent mus t i ntend to ac ceptthatauth or ity and actupon it

. G r

i s son v. W

ats on , 7 0 4 S

. W

. 2 d 3 2 5 , 3 2 6 (T e x. 1986)

. The ev ide nce menti oned i n our di sc uss ion of j oin t enter pr is e not onl y neg ates the
ex is tenc e of a j oin t ent er pr is e betw een M orse and Scar broug h butal so the e x is tenc e of an ag ency

rela ti onshi p betw een the tw o. Each operated thei r ow n busi ness and manag ed thei r o w n a c c o u n t s . M o r e o v e r , S c a r b ro u g h h a d t o p a y M o rs e fo r u s i n g t h e l a t t er ’s auto deal er ’s l ic ense. Si mply p ut, the record ev ide nce il lus trati ng thatM orse did not int end Scarbro ugh to act for h im and t hatS carbrou gh did not int end to accep t tha t relation ship is15

nei ther w eak nor

ov er w hel ming ly

outw eig hed by

co ntrar y ev ide nce. Thus , w e mustac cept the jury ’s v erdict on the m atte r. Accordin gly , w e rev erse tho se portio ns of the jud gmen t 1) den y ing M orse recovery upo n the jury

f inding tha t First State co nverted prop erty of Morse and 2 ) awarding Morse damag es ag ain st Fi rs t Stat e for neg li g ence. W e modify the jud g ment t o aw ard M orse the dam ages foun d by the jury i n an sw er to “Quest ion 6" app earing as a subca tegory den om inate d “Procee ds f rom Motor v ehicle certifica te of title, if any,” i. e. $280, 098.50, to
re compens e the co nv ersi on. Fi nal ly , i n al l other thi ng s t he j udg ment i s a ff ir med.

Br ian Qui nn Chief Justice Re a vis, S. J. , n o t p a rt ici p a ti n g.