U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

99–556PDF 2016

THE ADMINISTRATION’S PLAN TO CLOSE THE

GUANTANAMO BAY DETENTION FACILITY:

AT WHAT FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL

SECURITY COST?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 23, 2016

Serial No. 114–165

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Lee Wolosky, Special Envoy for Guantanamo Closure, U.S. Department 

of State .................................................................................................................. 5

Mr. Paul M. Lewis, Special Envoy for Guantanamo Detention Closure, U.S. 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 13

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Lee Wolosky: Prepared statement ................................................................... 8

Mr. Paul M. Lewis: Prepared statement ................................................................ 16

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 50

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 51

The Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of South Carolina: Prepared statement .............................................................. 53

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York: Material submitted for the record ............................................... 55

Written responses from Mr. Paul M. Lewis to questions submitted for the 

record by the Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of California, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs .. 58

(1)

THE ADMINISTRATION’S PLAN TO CLOSE THE 

GUANTANAMO BAY DETENTION FACILITY: 

AT WHAT FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL 

SECURITY COST? 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 23, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This committee will come to order. 

President Obama’s race to empty the Guantanamo Bay detention 

facility is on. In recent weeks and months, many hardened terrorists have been released. Many of them have been sent abroad, and 

according to the President’s closure plan sent to Congress last 

month, another 35 are set to be transferred this summer. 

Unfortunately, we know many of the recipient countries don’t 

have the desire or commitment or even ability to monitor these 

dangerous individuals and prevent them from returning to the battlefield. Countries like Ghana and Uruguay aren’t typical security 

and intelligence partners but they are being asked to shoulder a 

heavy burden and a heavy responsibility. And there are real concerns about the administration setting aside intelligence assessments to deceive countries about the threat posed by the militants 

they are being asked to take in. 

That was certainly a finding of our committee investigation into 

the release of six detainees to Uruguay in December 2014—and I 

want to thank Mr. Jeff Duncan of South Carolina, the chairman of 

our subcommittee that focuses on the Western Hemisphere. The 

top State Department official overseeing Guantanamo at the time 

wrote to the President of Uruguay that there was ‘‘no information’’ 

that these six ‘‘were involved in conducting or facilitating terrorist 

activities against the United States or its partners or allies.’’ No information? They were known to have been hardened al-Qaeda 

fighters involved in forging documents, trained as suicide bombers, 

fighting at Tora Bora, committing mayhem, committing murders in 

Afghanistan. 

Although the law clearly states that steps must be taken to ‘‘substantially mitigate the risk’’ of released individuals from again 

threatening the United States, senior Uruguayan officials asserted 

before that these six arrived that they would not impose or accept 

2

any conditions to receive these former detainees. Indeed, these six 

terrorists were housed just blocks from the U.S. Embassy, without 

the prior knowledge of U.S. officials and, frankly, were often seen 

outside of the Embassy. 

The administration often talks of detainees ‘‘cleared for release’’ 

as if they are no longer a threat. But just over 30 percent of the 

detainees that have been released are either confirmed or suspected to have returned to the battlefield. Several of the senior 

leaders of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula are alums of Guantanamo. 

The administration is emptying Guantanamo with the flimsy 

claim that it is a terrorist recruiting tool. Let me explain that I 

don’t think that if you’re standing in line in Raqqa to recruit into 

ISIS you say, oh, Guantanamo Bay is going to be closed—no need 

to enlist here. What Raqqa is about, what ISIS is about is the establishment of the caliphate. That’s what’s driving recruitment 

and, frankly, the success of ISIS on the battlefield is driving recruitment. 

Closing this detention facility has been opposed by bipartisan 

majorities in Congress and even members of the President’s own 

cabinet. It is no secret that former Secretary of Defense Hagel was 

pushed out in part because he was not certifying releases fast 

enough for the White House. 

Yet, President Obama remains determined to push out as many 

terrorists as he can to other countries. Forty-five or so other ‘‘law 

of war detainees’’ would be moved to U.S. soil. Doing so could open 

a Pandora’s Box of legal issues impairing our antiterrorism efforts. 

Fortunately, any effort to bring Guantanamo detainees to U.S. 

soil would be, according to the Secretary of Defense, against the 

law and that’s also according to the Attorney General. I see no interest in changing that law—certainly not by the American people—and our laws must be honored. 

The White House, meanwhile, has no solid plans to detain and 

interrogate terrorists captured today. That’s a problem. Indeed, the 

administration admits that its proposed domestic Guantanamo 

would not take in any new terrorists captured on the battlefield. 

If the administration was spending as much time working to capture and detain ISIS fighters as it was trying to close down this 

facility at Guantanamo Bay, we would be more secure. 

ISIS is continuing to threaten and expand in Libya, Afghanistan, 

and elsewhere across the globe. Europe is under siege by jihadists. 

We are under attack. So, unfortunately, we are going to need a detention facility for fanatical terrorists whose processing in the U.S. 

legal system is unwarranted and simply is not feasible. And we’re 

going to need that for some time to come. 

And we’ll now go an introduction of our panel. This morning we 

are pleased to be joined by Special Envoy Lee Wolosky. He’s the 

Special Envoy for Guantanamo Closure at the U.S. Department of 

State. 

Previously, he also served as the Director for Transnational 

Threats at the National Security Council under President Clinton. 

And we also have Special Envoy Paul Lewis for Guantanamo Detention Closure at the U.S. Department of Defense and previously 

3

Mr. Lewis served as both the general counsel and minority general 

counsel at the House Armed Services Committee. 

And we welcome them both to the committee. We appreciate that 

our two witnesses, along with the intelligence community, have already agreed to meet with the committee in April in closed session 

on necessary classified issues. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full prepared statements will be 

made part of the record and members here will have 5 calendar 

days to submit any questions or any statements or extraneous material for the record. 

And at this time, I would like to go to Mr. Eliot Engel of New 

York who is the ranking member of this committee for his opening 

statement here today. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

for calling this hearing. And gentlemen, Mr. Wolosky, Mr. Lewis, 

welcome to the Foreign Affairs Committee and thank you for your 

service. 

We’re reminded again today of the terrible cost of violent extremism. I was just on the floor of the House speaking on a resolution 

declaring our solidarity with the people of Belgium. That’s why I 

just got here—came here right from the floor. 

The dark shadow of a terrorist attack has fallen over another of 

Europe’s great cities, and we’re all standing alongside the Belgian 

people today as they mourn the dead, heal the wounded, rebuild 

what’s been broken, and seek justice. 

In these situations it’s important to look at what more we can 

be done to enhance cooperation with our partners to prevent this 

type of violence. 

It’s also important to reflect on where our policies have gone 

astray and maybe made the situation worse. So, it’s appropriate 

today that we’re taking a hard look at one of the most troubling 

and divisive symbols of our counterterrorism effort—the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. 

The subtitle of today’s hearing is what are the foreign policy and 

national security costs of closing the Guantanamo facility. 

But, as policy makers, legislators, and experts have been saying 

almost since the facility opened, the better question, perhaps, may 

be what are the costs of keeping it open. 

For starters, the prison’s a drain on military resources. It costs 

nearly $5 million a year to keep a person detained at Guantanamo 

versus $78,000 a year to hold someone in our most secure Federal 

prison. 

Closing Gitmo and transferring detainees to other secure prisons 

would free up $85 million a year, resources we could put to better 

use elsewhere to combat terrorism. 

The argument against this goes: We need to spend whatever it 

costs—these guys are too dangerous to bring here. Let’s look at 

that. Today, 91 detainees remain in Gitmo. Since the prison 

opened, 644 individuals have been transferred out—144 under 

President Obama and 500 under President Bush. 

As of today, more than a third of the current detainees have been 

cleared for release after a thorough review process. Under no circumstances will these people be released onto American soil. 

4

Like all the others, they will be transferred directly to other 

countries. Prior to 2009, more than one in five released detainees 

returned to the battlefield. But, improved procedures under the 

Obama administration have nearly eliminated this problem. 

If the President’s plan to close the Guantanamo detention facility 

goes forward, only a handful of detainees would ever be brought to 

the United States and those who are would be held in super max 

prisons. 

They’re called super max prisons for a reason. No one has ever 

escaped from one. And who are some of the current residents of 

these incredibly secure facilities? Terrorists. Zacarias Moussaoui, 

who helped plot September 11, 2001—as a New Yorker something 

that I’ll never forget—Richard Reid, the so-called shoe bomber, 

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the Boston Marathon bomber, the four men 

behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and six terrorists 

responsible for bombing our Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. All 

these men will call ADX Florence in Colorado home for the rest of 

their days. 

For the very few prisoners still in the military commission process, we should try them in Federal court and speed justice for their 

victims. If there’s any doubt whether our justice system can handle 

the most dangerous terrorists, ask any of the people I just listed. 

This isn’t a question of what rights Guantanamo detainees 

should or shouldn’t be accorded. It’s just a simple fact that the Federal justice system has tried and punished terrorists much more effectively than military commissions. 

But beyond the dollars and cents or safety here at home, we need 

to consider the harm Gitmo has inflicted on our security interests 

around the world and, just as importantly, on our values. 

For terrorists seeking to recruit more fighters into their ranks, 

the Guantanamo facility is a gift that keeps on giving. This prison 

has become so infamous and so reviled that our enemies no longer 

even need to call it by name. 

Instead, as we’ve seen again and again, terrorists flip on a camera so the whole world can see, parade out some innocent prisoner 

dressed in an orange jumpsuit, and cut off his head or light him 

on fire. 

The orange jumpsuits weren’t selected by accident. Everyone 

knows what they symbolize. This prison has helped strengthen our 

enemies. It has become a stumbling block in our relationship with 

coalition partners. 

After all, it’s not just Americans that ISIS is dressing in those 

orange jumpsuits and it has created deep division here at home, 

and that’s because Gitmo has long strained some of our country’s 

most important values. 

It has become synonymous with torture and indefinite detention. 

When we were going to school, we learned all about rights and the 

Constitution. This was never allowed under American law. 

I want to quote retired Major General Michael Lehnert, the first 

commander of the detention facility after 9/11. This is a quote from 

him. He said:

‘‘Guantanamo was a mistake. History will reflect that. It was 

created in the early days as a consequence of fear, anger, and 

political expediency. It ignored centuries of rule of law and 

5

international agreements. It does not make us safer and it sullies who we are as a nation.’’

So I ask unanimous consent that Major General Lehnert’s full 

statement be included in the record. 

Chairman ROYCE. Without objection. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Coming back to our question, what are the costs of closing Guantanamo? To me, the answers are clear. 

The costs of closing the facility are far, far less than the costs of 

keeping it open. I’m not alone in this view. President George W. 

Bush was very clear that he wanted to close Gitmo. John McCain 

made a campaign promise to do the same. 

An overwhelming majority of national security and military experts, including former Secretaries of State and Defense, CIA Directors, National Security Advisors, and Chairmen of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff think it should be shuttered. 

As I pointed out, the arguments against closing it just don’t hold 

up, and at the end of the day, in my opinion, the only justification 

for keeping the prison open is fear—fear of violent extremism and 

fear that our justice system or prison system cannot get the job 

done despite all the evidence to the contrary. Fear is precisely what 

our enemies want to instill in us. 

I don’t want them to win. We shouldn’t allow that. We should 

clean up this stain on America’s commitment to justice and democracy. We should take away this propaganda tool for terrorists. We 

should work to implement the President’s plan and shut down this 

prison. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. Everyone who 

knows me knows that I take a very hard line on this. But I think 

that we are far better off closing this facility for our interests, no 

other interests—our American interests—than if we leave it open. 

So I look forward to hearing our witnesses. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman, and I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

Lee? 

STATEMENT OF MR. LEE WOLOSKY, SPECIAL ENVOY FOR 

GUANTANAMO CLOSURE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, distinguished members of the committee, good morning. 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this morning 

to discuss the important matter of closing Guantanamo Bay, Cuba’s 

detention facility. 

I’m honored to be joined today by my colleague, Paul Lewis, Special Envoy for Guantanamo Detention Closure at the Department 

of Defense. 

Today I’ll describe the rigorous processes that determine whether 

a detainee should be approved for transfer and the extensive interagency efforts that assure compliance with applicable statutory requirements before each transfer takes place. 

At the outset, let me emphasize that President Obama concluded 

that the continued operation of the Guantanamo detention facility 

6

damages our national security for many of the same reasons that 

led President George W. Bush to the same conclusion. 

According to President Bush, by his second term, and I quote, 

‘‘The detention facility had become a propaganda tool for our enemies and a distraction for our allies.’’ It remained so when President Obama took office and remains so today. 

The bipartisan view that Guantanamo should be closed is not 

limited to Presidents Bush and Obama. Senator John McCain has 

said that he is in favor of closing Guantanamo. 

Likewise, former Secretaries of State Clinton, Rice, Powell, 

Albright, Christopher, Baker, and Kissinger have all advocated 

closing Guantanamo. 

So too have three former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

and 42 retired generals and admirals. The list goes on. 

In addition to leading Democrats and Republicans, world leaders 

and international organizations from the Pope to the Organization 

for American States consistently call on the United States to close 

Guantanamo. 

Today, there are 91 individuals detained at Guantanamo, down 

from the peak population of 680. All together a total of 779 detainees have passed through Guantanamo and of those 688 have departed. 

The vast majority of detainees are transferred out of Guantanamo to other countries. Some 532 were transferred before President Obama took office on January 20th, 2009. Prior to the implementation of rigorous interagency procedures that were implemented by this administration and are described more fully in my 

written testimony. 

My written testimony describes at length the two processes by 

which this administration has approved detainees for transfer. 

What they have in common is rigorous review and analysis of all 

available information in the possession of the U.S. Government and 

the unanimous agreement of six agencies and departments before 

a detainee may be designated as approved for transfer. 

After a detainee is approved for transfer, the Department of 

State leads negotiations with foreign governments about possible 

transfer. We are joined in our efforts by colleagues from the Department of Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security as well as by 

those in the intelligence community and on the Joint Staff. 

The decision as to whether, when, and where to transfer a detainee is the culmination of a rigorous interagency process similar 

to the initial decision to approve a detainee for transfer. 

This process, including the process by which we negotiate security assurances with our foreign partners is described at length in 

my written testimony. 

I look forward to your questions about it. Once we arrive at a 

satisfactory security framework with a foreign government, the 

Secretary of Defense seeks concurrence in a specific transfer from 

the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Only after he receives the views of those principals and only 

after he is satisfied that the requirements of the National Defense 

Authorization Act are satisfied does the Secretary of Defense sign 

7

and transmit a certification to the Congress conveying his intent to 

transfer a Guantanamo detainee. 

The rigorous approval and negotiation process I’ve described has 

contributed to the dramatic reduction in the confirmed reengagement for detainees transferred during this administration. 

Thank you again, ladies and gentlemen of the committee. I greatly appreciate the opportunity to speak before you about this important issue and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wolosky follows:]

8


99556a-1.eps
9


99556a-2.eps
10


99556a-3.eps
11


99556a-4.eps
12


99556a-5.eps
13

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Lewis. 

STATEMENT OF MR. PAUL M. LEWIS, SPECIAL ENVOY FOR 

GUANTANAMO DETENTION CLOSURE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

Mr. LEWIS. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, distinguished members of the committee, good morning and thank you 

for the opportunity to testify today. 

I’m honored to join my colleague, Lee Wolosky. And Mr. Chairman, I particularly appreciate your continued and sustained interest in this extremely important issue. 

At the outset, I want to echo Special Envoy Wolosky’s statement 

and make one fundamental point regarding the detention facility at 

Guantanamo Bay. 

The President and his national security team have determined 

that closing this detention facility is a bipartisan national security 

imperative. 

The President has repeatedly stated that the continued operation 

of the detention facility at Guantanamo weakens our national security by damaging our relationships with key allies and partners, 

draining resources, and providing violent extremists with a propaganda tool. 

In January of last year, 42 retired military leaders, all retired 

general officers or flag officers, wrote the leadership of the Senate 

Armed Services Committee and forcefully argued for the closure of 

this facility, stating that the issue of what to do with Guantanamo 

is not a political issue. 

There is near unanimous agreement from our nation’s top military, intelligence, and law enforcement leaders that Guantanamo 

should be closed. 

This letter was signed by General Charles C. Krulak, a retired 

commandant of the Marine Corps, Major General Michael Lehnert, 

the first commander of the Joint Detention Task Force at Guantanamo, General Joseph Hoar, former commander of U.S. Central 

Command, General David Maddox, the former commander of the 

U.S. Army in Europe and many other leaders. Many of these leaders reaffirmed this letter this month. 

As Lee noted, in addition, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen and General Martin Dempsey support Guantanamo closure. 

It’s the opinion of many others in our military. Envoy Wolosky 

has noted the bipartisan support for Gitmo closure but I think it’s 

important to highlight this broad conclusion. 

This conclusion is shared by two Presidents, four former Secretaries of Defense, eight former Secretaries of State and it demonstrates this bipartisan support at the highest level of our national security leadership. 

As Envoy Wolosky noted, in his memoirs President George W. 

Bush himself concluded that the Guantanamo detention facility 

was a propaganda tool for our enemies and a distraction for our allies. 

The President himself made this statement, and as President 

Obama recently noted, by 2008 it was widely recognized that this 

14

facility needed to close. This was not my opinion. This is the bipartisan support to close it. 

As the Special Envoy for Guantanamo Detention Closure, my primary focus is on the transfer process. Sixteen detainees have been 

transferred to date in 2016. These transfers have reduced the 

Guantanamo detention facility’s population to fewer than 100 for 

the first time since 2002. 

Overall, 27 nations since 2009 have accepted Guantanamo detainees who are not from that prospective country. In addition, 13 

other countries or territories have accepted repatriation of their 

own citizens since 2009. 

As with our military leaders, foreign leaders regularly cite the 

Guantanamo detention facility as an obstacle to counterterrorism 

efforts. 

In my written statement, I cite several statements. Cliff Sloan, 

Envoy Wolosky’s predecessor, noted an example. As a highly ranking security official from one our staunchest allies on counterterrorism once told me, the greatest single action the United States 

can take to fight terrorism is to close Guantanamo. 

And I know highlights by other counterterrorism experts from 

the previous administration—John Bellinger and Matt Waxman, 

who both worked for the Department of State—noted, the counterterrorism effects of not closing Gitmo and I describe those in more 

detail in my opening statement. 

Mr. Chairman, I’m also prepared to address the plan to close 

Guantanamo detention facility. The President, announcing the 

plan, stated that it has four main elements. 

We’ll continue to transfer, we’ll accelerate the POB process, we’ll 

look for individual dispositions and, most importantly, we’ll work 

with Congress to find a location to transfer everybody from Guantanamo safely and securely. 

As far as the transfer process, I just want to state that Secretary 

Carter has forcefully stated that safety is his number-one priority. 

He does not transfer a detainee unless he is confident that the 

threat is substantially mitigated and it’s in the national security 

interests of the United States. 

Finally, I’d like to take a moment to recognize the military service members conducting detention operations at Guantanamo Bay. 

Too often in the course of considering the future of this facility we 

lose sight of the remarkable men and women who serve honourably 

under extraordinarily difficult conditions. 

They have our deepest appreciation for their service and their 

professionalism, which they display each and every day on behalf 

of our nation. 

Gentlemen, President Bush worked toward closing Guantanamo. 

Many officials in his administration worked hard toward that objective. We’re closer to it than many people realize. 

Of the nearly 800 detainees who have been held at Guantanamo 

since the facility opened over 85 percent have been transferred, including more than 500 that were transferred by the previous administration. 

The President, his national security experts, and this administration believe it should be closed. The senior military leaders of this 

country and the leaders of the Department of Defense concur. 

15

As indicated in the letter by the retired military leaders, many 

believe that closure of this facility is the single most important 

counterterrorism effort the United States can undertake. 

We believe the issue is not whether to close the Guantanamo detention facility—it’s how to do it. Thank you, and I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lewis follows:]

16


99556b-1.eps
17


99556b-2.eps
18


99556b-3.eps
19


99556b-4.eps
20


99556b-5.eps
21


99556b-6.eps
22


99556b-7.eps
23


99556b-8.eps
24


99556b-9.eps
25


99556b-10.eps
26


99556b-11.eps
27


99556b-12.eps
28


99556b-13.eps
29


99556b-14.eps
30


99556b-15.eps
31

Chairman ROYCE. Let me ask both our witnesses. The Secretary 

of Defense and Attorney General Lynch have both stated that 

transfers of Guantanamo detainees to the United States are legally 

prohibited. Is that your understanding of the law as well? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. It’s my understanding of the law that with the 

statute in its current form prohibits transfers to the United States, 

which is why we are working at this time with the Congress or 

seeking to work with the Congress to modify the law in order to 

be able to bring into the United States a small, reducible minimum 

number of detainees as described in the President’s closure plan. 

Chairman ROYCE. Is it correct then that under current law the 

Department of Defense is prohibited from selecting any U.S. site or 

making any preparations for transfer of the detainees to the U.S. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Frankly, I have no idea. That is a legal question 

that is most appropriately directed to the Department of Defense. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Lewis? 

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman, we believe detainees can be safely and 

securely and humanely detained in the United States. I believe the 

current statute does prohibit us from doing that. 

So we are working toward doing that. The plan that was sent up 

we gave a look at locations, military facilities and Federal and 

state facilities that could do that. We believe detainees, as I said, 

can be detained. We did not pick a specific location. 

Chairman ROYCE. One of the concerns that Congress clearly has 

here is that in terms of our experience with those who have left 

Guantanamo Bay, over the long haul those that returned to the 

fight or those who are suspected of having returned to the fight is 

a little over 30 percent. 

I understand the argument that the administration is making 

that of recent individuals released, they haven’t returned—there’s 

a lower percentage that return to the fight. 

But, of course, there’s a continuum in terms of collecting the information and monitoring and transitioning as people end up—I’m 

just looking at the overall number. The overall number is in the 

neighborhood of 31 percent, and if we begin to focus on some of the 

recent examples of those who did, it is pretty concerning, given 

Ibrahim al-Qosi. He was one of the high-risk detainees, transferred 

by this administration and by 2014 he had joined al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula and now he is in their leadership. 

And last month we saw a video urging a takeover in Saudi Arabia. He would not be out doing his propaganda if he were housed 

in Guantanamo and one of the concerns I have about the rap sheet 

on those inside as we make the argument—we’ve been through 

these discussions—when we make the argument about the necessity of releasing them. 

But the fact is—but the bottom line is they end up, a certain percentage of them, pulling stunts like this, calling for the overthrow 

of the Government of Saudi Arabia and very engaged in that process. 

And so in terms of the—I understand the theory that it’s a recruitment tool—that thesis. But the fact is that a significant percentage of them return to the fight and we have an unclassified letter to Congress last month from the director of national intelligence 

writing that the intelligence community lacks reporting that GuanVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:17 Jun 30, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\032316\99556 SHIRL
32

tanamo propaganda has motivated more recent ISIS recruits to join 

the group. 

So there is a debate. I certainly talked to former administration 

high ranking officers and officials who have the opposite of the 

view that you’ve laid out today who tell me no, they don’t think it 

has to do with recruitment. 

We understand your theory on it. But there is the fact, and the 

fact is that we do have this process. So let me ask you this question. 

We do have this challenge because of the way this process is releasing individuals to countries that don’t have the capabilities. So 

here’s my question. 

Mr. Lewis lists in his testimony some of the countries that the 

administration has transferred detainees to since 2009. So Mr. 

Lewis, El Salvador, Kazakhstan, Ghana, and I would just ask Lee, 

have you been to Ghana? 

Now, this is one of the countries that I’ve been to. Are you fully 

confident that it has the capability and motivation to monitor and 

track these detainees? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Mr. Chairman, yes, we are. As you know, no 

transfer occurs unless we are confident in the security assurances 

that we’ve received and the Secretary of Defense makes the requisite certifications to the Congress. 

To date, and we only have admittedly several months of experience, what I can tell you in this open forum—and we’re happy to 

come and brief you in closed session—is that we are very pleased 

by the implementation by the Government of Ghana of the security 

assurances that have been agreed to. 

Chairman ROYCE. As I said, I’ve been to Ghana and across West 

Africa. Ghana is a wonderful place. It’s a wonderful country. But 

the fact is that it doesn’t have top notch intelligence or law enforcement services to deal with this kind of problem. 

The GDP per capita is, like, $4,000. It’s 175th in the world. The 

fact is that their leaders have many, many challenges in Ghana 

facing them every day. So I’m going to guess that tracking and 

monitoring former Guantanamo detainees isn’t a priority just as it 

wasn’t in other examples that I’ve laid for you—laid out for you 

like Uruguay. 

It just wasn’t high up there and if they weren’t returning or if 

31 percent of them haven’t returned to the fight this wouldn’t be 

a concern. But this is a very real concern. 

I’ll go to Mr. Engel for his questioning. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, emotionally—because of terrorists and the attacks on 

9/11 and the attacks in Brussels and things that we’re hearing—

emotionally, you just want to say well, throw them all in jail and 

put them all in jail and throw away the key. 

But that’s not how were supposed to work as a nation. That’s not 

what we stand for, and I don’t believe that we should abandon our 

principles if we can still be safe. 

I would say that things are a trade-off. I wouldn’t be for abandoning our principles if it meant that there was going to be a larger chance of being unsafe as a result of releasing or transferring 

some of these people. 

33

But when you read the facts and you look at the facts, you see 

that it’s really worse by keeping them there. I have a balance 

sheet. 

I’m not for releasing anybody who was guilty, but I’m also not 

for keeping people in prison year after year after year with no trial. 

That’s not what I learned when I was in grade school about one 

of the reasons why this country is so great. 

Opponents of closing the Guantanamo detention facility often say 

that the people currently in the prison are the worst of the worst 

or the most dangerous, and that’s why we should not release them 

at all. 

Some critics point to risk assessments from the previous administration—from the Bush administration—in support of this claim. 

What’s your view of how risk assessments have been conducted 

by the interagency task force and the periodic review boards compared with previous risk assessments. 

And given what you know about detainees currently held at 

Guantanamo, are they really the most dangerous? If not, why have 

they been in Guantanamo for so long? 

Is it because we’ve already transferred all the easy cases? Explain how these people are vis-a-vis cases that have already been 

adjudicated. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Sure. Thank you, Congressman, for the question. 

It’s certainly the case that there are some extremely dangerous 

individuals who remain in Guantanamo. 

But it’s also the case that there are individuals in the Guantanamo who are not extremely dangerous. Of the 36 that are currently approved for transfer, 29 are Yemeni nationals and, of 

course, we have been unable to return them to Yemen. Returning 

them to the country of origin is always our first choice in removing 

a Guantanamo detainee from Guantanamo. 

So there is a significant component of country of origin that goes 

into the remaining detainee population and while they are still 

there. 

With respect to your first question, it sort of bleeds into the reengagement issues that the chairman raised which I appreciate the 

opportunity to address because we actually do have hard data on 

re-engagement and I’d like to refer you to the numbers in the report issued by the Office of Director of National Intelligence earlier 

this month on re-engagement. 

The actual numbers are, in this administration, seven confirmed 

re-engagement former detainees. In the previous administration, 

111. 

Seven in this administration out of 144 transferred. That translates into 4.9 percent. The number for the previous administration 

is 111 out of 532, which translates into 20.9 percent. 

We believe that this data affirms that the procedures that we 

have put in place during this administration have worked to substantially reduce any re-engagement concerns. 

And I also think that you’re exactly right when you indicated in 

your opening statement that the risks of transferring detainees, 

and we’ve acknowledged that there are risks, must be weighed 

against the risks of keeping the facility open. 

34

There has been until recently a bipartisan consensus that there 

are significant national security and foreign policy risks associated 

with keeping the facility open. 

That was articulated by the previous President who transferred 

over 500 detainees out of Guantanamo in furtherance of his effort 

to close Guantanamo because he recognized that it was a propaganda tool. 

The conclusion was also reached by nonpartisan military leaders 

across the services. So I think that when we talk—I’ll stop speaking in a moment—when we talk about re-engagement it is important to refer to the actual data that has been put forward by the 

director of national intelligence. 

Mr. ENGEL. Let me ask you, who’s left at Guantanamo? Is it correct that of the 91 individuals who remain at Guantanamo, 81 are 

not facing criminal charges? Is that true, and is it also correct that 

35 individuals have been cleared for transfer out of Guantanamo? 

So what does that mean to be transferred out? Who decides? How 

long have they been cleared for transfer and why are they still 

waiting to leave? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Thank you for your question. 

There are 91 detainees in Guantanamo. Thirty-six have been approved for transfer. Some of them have been approved for transfer 

since 2010, some of them more recently. 

Ten are in some stage of the military commission process either 

facing charges or serving sentences and the remainder, 40 some 

odd detainees, are neither approved for transfer nor currently facing charges. 

Mr. ENGEL. Can I—Mr. Chairman, could you just indulge me? 

I just want to quickly ask a Federal court question. The administration’s plan calls for some Guantanamo detainees to be tried in 

the U.S. Federal courts, but Congress has imposed a ban on transferring any Guantanamo detainees to the U.S. for any reason including for trial. 

But from what I can see, Federal courts have been extremely effective at trying terrorism cases. Since 9/11, Federal courts have 

convicted over 500 people on terrorism-related offenses. By contrast, the 9/11 military commission trial has been in pre-trial hearings since 2012. 

So the trial itself is not expected to start until 2020. So, why 

have the Federal courts, in your opinion, been so much more effective at bringing these terrorists to justice? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Well, the Federal courts have a proven mechanism for both convicting and then making sure that convicted felons serve time safely and responsibly. 

You’re right, there are numerous terrorists who have been effectively convicted and are now serving time in the Federal prison 

system. Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber, Richard Reid, 

the shoe bomber, Mr. Tsarnaev, the Boston Marathon bomber, 

Moussaoui—the list goes on. They all have been held safely and securely. 

Back to the point that the chairman raised about Mr. Al-Qosi. I 

should point out that he was released from the custody of the 

United States after serving his military commission sentence. 

35

So he is an example of someone who went through the military 

commission system, pled guilty to materiel support and conspiracy 

and then after he served his sentence in that system he was released. 

If he were put through the Article 3 system, he would probably 

still be serving his sentence and not be off doing what he’s been 

doing. 

Chairman ROYCE. If I could—we’re talking about two different 

sets of numbers. So if I could just address that quickly before we 

go to the next member. 

In terms of the administration’s numbers that they released, the 

administration’s claim is 7.9 percent of detainees released under 

the President are confirmed or suspected of reengaging in terrorism. 

You were just using the number of confirmed and the administration that released a figure that overall the rate is just over 31 

percent. Investigators tell us that it takes 4 years to confirm. 

So there is—there is a question in terms of the time line on detainees’ recidivism. But the overall rate that I’m quoting here is 

the rate on confirmed or suspected. 

We’ll go now to Mr. Chris Smith of New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, 

both of you, to the committee. 

Yesterday, I chaired an oversight hearing focusing on the 14 

countries that Reuters found after a series of investigative reports. 

I want this on the record and I hope the press will take notice of 

this because I think it’s an egregious flaw in our implementation 

of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, which I am the author of. 

I am deeply concerned that Cuba’s tier, their State Department 

ranking, which had been the worst—it had been there during the 

Bush administration, had been so designated during the Obama 

administration—only to be manipulated politically for non-human 

trafficking criteria in anticipation of this rapprochement, which I 

find absurd. 

The TIP Report should be absolutely accurate and speak truth to 

power and defend those who have been—are you bored with this? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. No. No. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Should speak truth to power when it 

comes to sex trafficking and child sex tourism, which is rampant, 

and the Castro regime gleans enormous profits from it as they do 

from labor trafficking. 

And we have an upgrade which takes them off the sanctions list, 

which I find to be appalling. Yesterday one of our witnesses pointed out that the Cuban Government is likely one of the largest and 

most profitable trafficking promoters in the entire world. 

So my hope is that this year, and yesterday’s title of our hearing 

was next time get it right, that there will be no political manipulation of the trafficking tiers. 

If you read the report itself, it reads inescapably to a tier three 

sanctions rating. But when it got to another level there was a manipulation there for political reasons and I find that appalling and 

deeply, deeply saddening. 

36

Let me just ask you a question on point. The point man in Uruguay, as we all know, for overseeing the six transferred Guantanamo detainees is the Minister of Interior, Eduardo Bonomi. 

Are you confident in Minister Bonomi’s commitment to ensuring 

that the former detainees do not link up with international Islamic 

terrorist networks or ensuring that these six individuals do not 

threaten our Embassy personnel or American nationals in Uruguay? 

In other words, do you trust Eduardo Bonomi and believe he is 

a man of honorable character? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Well, thank you for your question, Congressman. 

I don’t know him but what I can say is that we are confident. 

There’s never—as I said, there’s never no risk associated with 

transferring a detainee. The appropriate calculus, we believe, is the 

one essentially that Congressman Engel put forth, which is weighing the risks of transferring versus the risks which have been recognized across the spectrum of maintaining the facility. 

But we are confident, to your question, that the Government of 

Uruguay is taking appropriate steps to substantially mitigate the 

risk associate with each of the six detainees that have been transferred to its custody. 

Mr. SMITH. Again, is it your view that the minister—this particular minister, an avowed leftist, is trustworthy? Because he is 

the guardian. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. I don’t agree with that necessarily. When we look 

at countries to resettle detainees in we do not base it on personalities. 

We base it on the government as a whole, the capabilities of the 

government as a whole and the willingness of the government, and 

then of course the specific security assurances that have been negotiated and our assessment of whether or not can and will be implemented. 

Mr. SMITH. Well, since he is likely to be the point man or is the 

point man, could you provide for the record at least your analysis 

as to his trustworthiness? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. I can’t because I don’t know him. But, again, 

when we look at transfer opportunities we base our conclusions on 

the capabilities of the government. 

Mr. SMITH. But he is the point person for the government. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. He may be now. He may not be tomorrow and so 

we don’t—we don’t rely on particular personalities is sort of the 

bottom line. 

Mr. SMITH. I understand. But with all due respect, personnel is 

policy and if a government has a person walking point on a particular issue like this one and it happens to be this Minister of Interior, I think we would want to know whether or not he is a person who can be trusted, particularly with such people who have 

committed terrorism and may recommit. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Well, again, as I said, I have not met him so I feel 

uncomfortable offering a personal assessment and what we do do 

is we base our decisions on governments as a whole. 

Mr. SMITH. But, again, that’s why—for the record if you could 

provide an additional amplification of those who analysed the situVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:17 Jun 30, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\032316\99556 SHIRL
37

ation and felt comfortable enough to proceed with this vis-a-vis this 

particular minister. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. The Department of State felt comfortable. 

Mr. SMITH. If you could provide us that analysis in a follow-up—

just answer. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Just to be clear, what—the analysis of——

Chairman ROYCE. And we can do a lot of that by follow-up and 

answer because we need to go to Mr. David Cicilline and get 

through a lot of members here. 

Mr. Cicilline, you’re next. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our 

witnesses. 

The title of this hearing refers to the foreign policy and national 

security costs of the administration’s plan to close Guantanamo 

Bay, the detention facility. 

However, the vast majority of national security leaders, as you 

both indicated, as well as leaders on both sides of the political spectrum, say that the real foreign policy and national security costs 

come as a result of keeping the prison open and in fact describe the 

closing of the Guantanamo detention facility is a national security 

imperative. 

And so I’d like you to speak to how the administration’s plan to 

close Guantanamo Bay detention facility will impact our ability to 

work with our coalition partners in the fight against terror and 

how the failure to close it is providing a real impediment to that 

critical work. 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, sir. 

As I noted in my opening statement, continuously countries 

across the world and allies tell us that Gitmo hurts us. So we work 

with those countries. 

By closing Gitmo we address a concern of the rest of the world. 

The United States needs to lead. We can’t do this alone, and when 

our allies in counterterrorism are telling us that Gitmo needs to be 

closed we take an issue off the table. 

We don’t remove the risk completely. It’s always going to be a 

propaganda issue but we take that issue off the table. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And does the presence of Guantanamo Bay have 

an impact on our ability to use diplomacy and soft power to press 

other countries to uphold human rights obligations including responsibilities against torture, forced disappearance, arbitrary or 

definite detention—things that we speak about with other countries—and has our credibility been harmed by the continued indefinite detentions at Guantanamo Bay and the opening of this facility? 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir, I believe it does. As the President noted in 

his statement last month, leaders that he meets with continuously 

raise the issue of Gitmo. They continuously raise the issue of specific detainees. 

Lee’s predecessor, Cliff Sloan, mentioned how he’s been told by 

foreign leaders that closing Gitmo would be the single greatest 

issue to help our counterterrorism efforts and repeated leaders 

from both this administration and the previous administration 

have said the same. So I think it does hurt us. 

38

Mr. CICILLINE. And with respect to the 36 detainees that have 

been approved for transfer, some since 2010, what is the—what is 

taking so long for that to be completed? 

Mr. LEWIS. As we said, most of them are Yemenis. Twenty-nine 

are Yemenis so we can’t confidently send them to Yemen right now. 

So we have to go look at this list of 27 other countries that have 

stepped up and find a fit for that detainee, find a fit for the security situation in the country, their willingness, and their capacity. 

So it’s a mixture of sequencing. It’s a mixture of the domestic 

issues in the country. But 27 countries demonstrates that there are 

countries that want to help us and are willing to step up. 

We are confident that the majority of these 36 can be transferred 

the next several months. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. And with respect to the issues regarding reengagement, the office of the director of national intelligence 

categorizes these reengagement in three different ways for these 

purposes of this hearing. 

Seventeen and a half percent of detainees have pre-engaged. But 

if you break that number down prior to this President, prior to 

January 2009, the number was 20.9 percent. But since President 

Obama the figure if 4.9 percent. 

So Mr. Wolosky, will you explain are those figures accurate? 

What do they represent and how do you account for this dramatic 

reduction in reengagement, which is critical? I mean, those are—

obviously, any reengagement is alarming but the fact that it’s been 

brought to 4.9 percent from 20 percent didn’t happen just by magic. 

There has to have been some change in process. Could you speak 

to that? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Sure. Yes, there have been many changes in process that have been put in place in this administration from the actual decision to approve someone for transfer, which is a complicated, time-consuming and very thorough and very rigorous 

interagency process and only moves forward with the consent of 

each of six agency and departments. 

Two, then the actual decision to transfer and approve for transfer 

detainee to a specific country which, again, is a rigorous interagency process that entails the negotiation of detailed and quite 

specific security assurances with the specific country and then ultimately input from the same six agencies and departments and then 

congressional notification by the Secretary of Defense. 

So our process is very thorough and it’s very rigorous and it’s 

very time-consuming, further to your question about why things 

have taken so long and we believe that, again, there’s never no 

risk. 

But we believe that the relative success of our processes are reflected in the reengagement figures when you look at the figure—

the small figure in this administration and the larger figure in the 

previous administration. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, and I yield back. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, the first question I’d like answered I 

think could be answered with a yes or no. 

39

Has the Defense Department ever knowingly transferred a detainee to a country that did not exhibit an ability to substantially 

mitigate the risk or maintain control of that individual? I think a 

yes or no could be—it’s a very straightforward. 

Has the Defense Department ever sent someone to a country 

knowing that that country was unable to keep control of that person? 

Mr. LEWIS. No. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Well, I’m not from Defense Department but I’m 

assuming that your question relates to this administration while 

that was the statutory standard. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Actually, it doesn’t. Do you know of any examples? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. I can’t speak for the previous administration, certainly. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Well, what about this administration? 

Can you speak to whether or not that the Defense Department has 

transferred a detainee to someone who—is there some reason that 

you can’t say yes or no? 

Mr. LEWIS. I don’t work at the Department of Defense so——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. But you——

Mr. LEWIS. So what I can tell you is——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let’s leave it at knowingly. Do you know of 

a case where the Defense Department has knowingly transferred 

a detainee to a country that did not exhibit the ability to substantially mitigate the risk by maintaining control of the individual? Do 

you know of a case like that? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. I do not. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Mr. LEWIS. So the statutory standard is——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It’s all right. It’s all right. 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You made your answer. 

Let me just suggest that this idea that people throughout the 

world are so upset with us for keeping a significant number of people who were captured as part of terrorist units—incarcerating 

them in Guantanamo, that that is such a horror story that it’s a 

recruitment vehicle—that’s what the President is telling us. It’s 

what the administration is telling us. 

Let me suggest if that is true than our European allies and some 

others believe that taking these hardened murderers who murder 

men, women, and children and incarcerating them in Cuba or anywhere else—let me suggest that that attitude of Europe may well 

be changing in the next 6 months or so when they realize that the 

slaughter that’s taking place in Paris and now in Brussels is part 

of an international movement to destroy Western civilization and 

replace it with a caliphate. 

And when they understand that, my guess is that view that it’s 

so bad to keep these people in prison will change as well. 

Let me ask you this. We say that about 30 percent or whatever 

that figure is that have been released have returned to terrorist activities. 

How many lives have been lost by those terrorists who went back 

to their terrorist activity? How many lives? 

40

Mr. LEWIS. I can talk about that in a classified setting but——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh, classified? 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh, it’s going to—so is it over ten? 

Mr. LEWIS. So what I can tell you is, unfortunately, there have 

been Americans that have died because of Gitmo detainees. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How many Americans have to die? How 

many people in Brussels or Paris have to die, civilians? What’s the 

threshold at that point—well, maybe we will keep them under control in Gitmo? 

Mr. LEWIS. When anybody dies it’s a tragedy and we don’t want 

anybody to die because we transferred detainees. 

However, it’s the best judgment and the considered judgment of 

this administration and the previous administration that the risk 

of keeping Gitmo open is outweighed—that we should close Gitmo, 

that the risk——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So the innocent people who are going to lose 

their lives because of this they’re just part of the equation? 

Mr. LEWIS. No, sir. There are risks——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I’m sorry. I want to tell you this much. As 

far as I’m concerned if one child is saved because she would have 

been blown up by someone who’s being released it’s better to keep 

all 90 of those people in Gitmo, and this idea that the people of the 

world oh, they’re so upset with us that it’s a recruiting vehicle, that 

we’ve kept terrorists who murder innocent people in Gitmo, well, 

you know what? I think the bigger recruiting tool today is when 

our Government, especially this administration, is perceived as 

being weak. 

I think terrorists are recruited not because we’ve held other terrorists in prison but because we look like we’re weak and cannot 

deal with the challenge. 

This disgusts me. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Robin Kelly of Illinois. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. Wolosky, yesterday I returned from Cuba with President 

Obama’s delegation where we discussed the opening of U.S.-Cuban 

relations. 

While we have made steps toward developing positive bilateral 

relations, President Castro has repeatedly stated that relations 

with the United States will never be fully normal so long as the 

United States occupies or utilizes the Guantanamo Bay detention 

facility. 

How do you imagine the continued use of the Guantanamo Bay 

detention facility would affect the process of normalizing relations 

between the United States and Cuba? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Thank you, ma’am. 

As the President has said, this administration has no plans to 

turn over the base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. We are intent, as 

you know, to close the detention facility at that base. 

We would expect to continue to use the base for dealing with 

mass migration contingencies and also to support Coast Guard operations with respect to counter drug operations in the region. 

41

Ms. KELLY. Okay. To what extent do you believe this local diplomatic security could contribute to advancing our national security 

efforts? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Well, as you know, President Obama feels firmly 

that closing Guantanamo is in the national security interests of the 

United States. 

No detainee is transferred from Guantanamo absent a certification from the Secretary of Defense that the transfer will—the 

specific transfer will further the national security of the United 

States. 

And as I said in my opening statement, President Obama was 

hardly the first U.S. President to conclude that closing Guantanamo was in the national security and foreign policy interests of 

the United States. 

The first President to do that was the man who opened it up, 

George W. Bush, who concluded that it was a propaganda tool and 

a distraction to our allies. Not only did he believe that, he acted 

on it in transferring over 500 detainees from Guantanamo to third 

countries. 

So we believe, as did President Bush, as did numerous former 

Secretaries of State of both parties, the same for Secretaries of Defense, same for three former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

and numerous retired flag officers, that closing Guantanamo will 

on balance enhance our national security. 

As we have said, you cannot live life without risk and the proper 

analysis, as Congressman Engel suggested, we believe is balancing 

the risks of keeping it open versus the risks of closing it and, you 

know, we work diligently to prevent reengagement. 

We’ve been quite successful in this administration in preventing 

reengagement and even one detainee returning to the fight is too 

many. But the proper analysis is balancing the risks of closure 

versus the risks of keeping it open. 

And I would point out that, obviously, our hearts go out to the 

people of Belgium today and our hearts went out to the people of 

Paris just a few short months ago. 

But the continued maintenance of the facility at Guantanamo 

Bay did not prevent either of those attacks. 

There are, unfortunately, going to be acts of terrorism, probably 

whether the facility is opened or closed. The proper analysis is 

what are the risks of keeping it open in light of the very obvious 

use of the that facility as a propaganda tool which, frankly, you 

should not have to question. 

ISIL, which has now claimed responsibility for the Belgium attacks, uses Guantanamo as a propaganda tool. There’s no question 

about this. 

We’ve all seen images of prisoners taken by ISIL being executed 

wearing orange jumpsuits that we believe are meant to mimic and 

invoke Guantanamo jumpsuits. 

There’s no question that this is being used as a propaganda tool 

as President Bush himself concluded when he determined to close 

the facility. 

Ms. KELLY. I’m running out of time. So thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Matt Salmon of Arizona. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

42

As long as we’re talking about Cuba policy, I’ve got something I’d 

like to get off my chest. 

I find the imagery of the President yukking it up with FARC terrorists at a baseball game yesterday when Europe is under siege 

by terrorists disgusting, absolutely disgusting, and I believe that, 

well, I’m not going to go on on that. I just think there are better 

things I think the public should be seeing. 

One of the troubling aspects of the transfer of the six detainees 

to Uruguay was the Sloan letter, the letter assuring the Uruguayan Government that none of the detainees had ever been associated with terrorism. We know this isn’t true, and I know it was 

your predecessor who wrote the letter. Can you walk us through 

how the administration could make such a misleading statement? 

How can you expect a host government to then take seriously the 

monitoring and mitigation of the detainee? In Uruguay’s case, the 

government stated ahead of time they would not monitor the detainees and we still released them. 

Does this speak to the administration’s overall willingness to accept greater risk in pursuit of the President’s political goal to 

empty the prison? Mr. Wolosky. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Sure. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

First, although we cannot speak in an open session about the 

specifics of the security assurances that have been agreed to with 

any one country, I can assure you that any public statements you 

may have just referenced are not accurate and we do have security 

assurances with Uruguay. 

We briefed this committee in closed session on those security assurances. We’re happy to come and brief you about what they are 

and how they’re being implemented. 

As to the Sloan letter, what I can tell you is that the conclusions 

in the Sloan letter mirrored the conclusions reached by the executive—the EOTF process, which was the process put in place at the 

beginning of this administration to carefully review all reasonably 

available information to the U.S. Government with respect to a 

particular detainee. 

That process was described in some detail in my written submission. It involved dozens of national security professionals from all 

relevant agencies and departments of the government including the 

intelligence community, many of them career professionals, and 

they reached certain conclusions about each detainee and the information available to the United States about each detainee. 

So what the Cliff Sloan letter does is it attracts the conclusion 

of the EOTF report, which was this comprehensive interagency review that was conducted for the specific purpose of analyzing the 

available information in the U.S. Government about each detainee 

and then making a disposition recommendation about that detainee. 

Mr. SALMON. Whatever justification you’re trying to make for 

why the letter, though inaccurate, was sent doesn’t really provide 

a lot of comfort to most of us. 

The fact is it was flat out wrong. It was an error and a gross 

error. In a recent interview with NPR you said that after having 

visited Guantanamo Bay you felt the detention center was better 

certainly than any state or local correctional facility or prison you 

43

visited and better than many of the Federal facilities. Yet, you’re 

advising the President on the closure of this facility so we can propose building a new facility here. Does that make any sense? 

Would it not be better to tell the American people and the world 

the real story about the facility, that it’s a model detention facility, 

that the International Committee of the Red Cross, the ICRC, has 

regular access to it? 

Wouldn’t it be best to dispel the false narrative that some use, 

rather than close down what by your estimation is a great facility? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Well, I do think it’s a professionally run and a humanely run facility and in particular the servicemen and women 

who serve there face enormous hardship in their service and they 

do an outstanding job in running the facility. 

General Kelly did an outstanding job in managing that. Now Admiral Tidd has taken over that process, and they both do an incredible job in maintaining what is a very well-run facility. 

That said, we still think it should be closed. 

Chairman ROYCE. We’re going to Greg Meeks of New York and 

then Mo Brooks of Alabama. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to get, first, a couple of things straight, you know, 

for the record. 

As I listened and my heart goes out to those individuals who lost 

their lives recently in Belgium as well as, you know, we talk about 

the Paris attacks often and you talk about—I just want to make 

sure that everyone and the record is clear that this war is not just 

against the West. 

We don’t talk about all of the attacks that have taken place in 

various places. It’s taken place—and we should be just as concerned in Nigeria, in Kenya, in Turkey. 

So to think—these are all human lives. We ought to be concerned 

about all of those lives, not just in one area. And it’s not just 

against us. 

It’s not just against Christians because when you look at that 

Muslims have been killed also by these thugs and that should be 

properly noted. And it should also be clear, and I think that the 

historical record is clear, that when we act out of fear our nation 

has made monumental mistakes, and keeping Gitmo in operation 

out of fear—because that’s what I’m hearing. 

Folks are saying out of fear we need to keep Gitmo—we beget 

another monumental mistake that, one, hurts America’s interest 

rather than helps it. 

You know, what comes straight to mind is we acted out of fear 

when we put the Japanese into internment camps. And so therefore I caution us. And then after it happens then we say oh, look 

at our past or we try to not talk about what we did. 

And so history gives us a reminder of what we should or should 

not be doing in this place and calmer heads and better heads as 

opposed to acting out of fear and emotion. 

So I just think that the record should be clear on that and it 

should be clear that all kinds of lives are lost in all parts of the 

world. 

44

And so this is a threat to everybody—not just to the West, not 

just to Christians but to everybody and that’s why we’ve got to 

band together and work together in a cooperative manner. 

That being said, let me ask a quick question. Where do we go? 

If the Guantanamo detention facilities close—we close them—what 

will the United States do when we capture terrorist suspects in the 

future? 

Do we have other adequate facilities for these individuals and 

how would the administration in the future capture, detention, and 

interrogation of high-level ISIS commanders? 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, sir. 

We do believe we have the facilities. We do—any future captures 

would be considered on a case by case basis and we’d consider 

whether the host nation could detain them or whether there’d be 

a disposition under prosecution, either Article 3, possibly military 

commissions. 

But we believe we have the abilities. We’ve shown one or two 

cases in Iraq recently to detain people and then turn them over to 

the host country. But it’s on a case by case basis. 

Mr. MEEKS. So there is a clear and concrete plan on how we 

would do this? 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MEEKS. Now, let me ask also. I was listening to some of the 

debate earlier and there was a question about recidivism rates and 

I guess according to the official reports from the office of the director of national intelligence that fewer than 5 percent of detainees 

that are transferred by the Obama administration are confirmed to 

have engaged in terrorist attacks. 

But I did hear—I think it was Chairman Royce—talk about they 

used a reengagement rate that is 30 percent. Now, is it 30? Can 

you describe how you make that determination—how those rates 

are determined and why was there such a disparity? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Well, I’ll let the chairman speak for himself. But 

I think that——

Chairman ROYCE. Will the gentleman yield? I will speak. Because it’s confirmed and suspected and you’re leaving out suspected. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Not in this administration, respectfully, sir. The 

rate of suspected in this administration is 8.3 percent. 

Chairman ROYCE. No, that’s the exact numbers that I concur are 

right and the overall numbers are over 30 percent overall. 

And 8.9 confirmed and suspected, and as explained to us the investigators say it takes about 4 years lead time in order to get all 

of the confirmation. I’ve just explained—I yield back. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. There were over 530 detainees transferred during 

the previous administration. Obviously, we cannot speak to the circumstances under with those detainees were transferred. 

First, how was the decision made to transfer them. Second, how 

was the decision made to transfer them to a specific country. Third, 

what assurances, if any, did the previous administration obtain 

from the third country to keep us and them safe. 

We can’t speak to that. All we can do is speak to what we are 

doing in this administration. 

Mr. MEEKS. And that’s what I want you to do, speak to——

45

Mr. WOLOSKY. What we are doing in this administration is at 

both stages of the process, first, making a determination in principle that a detainee may be approved for transfer and designated 

as such and, second, transferring him to a specific country subject 

to specific and detailed security assurances. 

What we are doing is very thorough. It’s interagency. It’s very 

comprehensive and it takes a long time. It’s described at length in 

my written testimony. I’m happy to answer questions about it. 

But the results of it as set forth in the ODNI report from this 

month are clear. The results of it are, first, confirmed reengagement. Seven out of 144—that’s 4.9 percent. Suspected, 12 out of 

144. That’s 8.3 percent. Those are what the numbers are, sir, for 

this administration. 

I’d point out also that with respect to the standards that are applied in defining what it even means to be confirmed or suspected 

it’s important to point out, first, that confirmed is a preponderance 

of information standard. So this is not a reasonable doubt. This is 

not that we are——

Chairman ROYCE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

If I could just go to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Yoho, for 

his questions and then maybe a question from Mr. Trott and Mr. 

Connolly. 

Mr. YOHO. I have more of a statement, and I appreciate it. 

You know, to start with, when we speak about closing Guantanamo I’m glad to hear you on the record backing up what the administration said that they will not transfer the naval base back 

to Cuba. 

We’re talking about the detention center only. There are two entities there, as we’re all aware of. As far as a recruiting tool, the 

Guantanamo Bay as a recruiting tool, I don’t see how—I think 

that’s a weak argument. Because if those people come to the 

United States is that not a recruiting tool, too? 

So to say that they’re in Guantanamo is going to be a stronger 

recruiting tool I think is sophistry at its finest because the jihadis 

are going to look at them being here in the belly of the great Satan. 

So I think that argument is very weak and we shouldn’t even 

talk about that. And I disagree with your comments about the Uruguay Six. I just came back there and met with their foreign minister. 

They don’t have a clue of what that negotiation was when it was 

negotiated under President Mujica. They don’t know what the 

deals were, what the conditions were. They don’t have a clue of 

monitoring and I think it’s a joke. 

But saying that, I think the overall success rate—if there were 

780 total detainees we’re down to 94 percent have been processed. 

That leaves only 6 percent, and of those 6 percent there’s—that’s 

taking out the 36 percent or the 36 that have already been cleared. 

Yet this administration hasn’t found them a suitable place to go 

and I would encourage you to move a little bit quicker on that. 

And of the remaining 52 percent, if we take the 30 percent that 

we know will go into combat against our young men and women 

or suspected, that comes out to be 15.6 terrorists back fighting our 

young men and women and I don’t think any American would want 

that or people around the world. 

46

And I’m going to yield back the rest of my time back to Mr. 

Trott, if that’s——

Chairman ROYCE. Yes, we’re going to have one question from Mr. 

Trott and one question from Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. TROTT. So thank you. I thank the gentleman from Florida. 

So if we move the detainees to U.S. soil that’s not going to be 

used as a recruitment tool by ISIS? They’re going to go silent now 

that we’ve done right by our allies? 

Mr. LEWIS. It still will be a tool but we take away—from a legal 

point of view we’re taking away the issue that our allies are asking 

us to do. They’re saying close Gitmo. So——

Mr. TROTT. And do you think our allies might change their position in light of Brussels and Paris, like was suggested earlier? Isn’t 

there a chance—would you agree that there’s a chance they will 

change their position with respect to our activities in Gitmo in light 

of recent events? 

Mr. LEWIS. Sir, it’s been a continuing position that they want 

Gitmo closed, that our leadership and the Bush administration 

leadership said that the costs of Gitmo outweigh the benefits. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Trott. 

Now we go to Mr. Connolly for his question. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Wolosky or Mr. Lewis, do you remember the 

CIA terrorist incident a number of years ago in Fairfax County? 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Was the perpetrator of that terrorist incident 

caught and tried? 

Mr. LEWIS. It’s my understanding yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Was he tried in Guantanamo or was he tried in 

a U.S. district court right here in Virginia? 

Mr. LEWIS. It’s my understanding a U.S. district court here in 

Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And was he sentenced? 

Mr. LEWIS. It’s my understanding yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. He received the death sentence, as a matter of 

fact, did he not? 

Mr. LEWIS. That I do not know personally. I know it was a severe 

sentence. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, and somehow our system of justice worked. 

Not on Cuban soil—on Virginian soil. We could handle a terrorist 

and did. 

I just—for the record, you know, we have to take into account the 

consequences of the symbolism of Guantanamo and, frankly, the 

fact that the suggestion is planted that we’re not all that confident 

in our system of justice in handling terrorist cases and the fact of 

the matter is we do have experience and our system worked. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 

We have votes on the floor. We appreciate the time of our witnesses this morning, and our witnesses have agreed to meet with 

us in April in closed session so we appreciate that. 

As you have heard, there are many concerns with the President’s 

plan, especially given the ever-growing terrorist threat as evidenced by what happened in Brussels this week. 

47

The points made by Mr. Trott and by Mr. Yoho bring to mind a 

conversation I had yesterday with the former NSA and CIA director about the concept that if you move them to U.S. soil, that in 

fact that will be a magnet for terrorists—the fact that jihadists are 

being held in the United States. 

And so I think the last questions raised were also questions 

worth contemplating. But we will adjourn at this time for the votes 

and we thank our panel. 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 10:54 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(49)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

50

f


99556n.eps
51


99556m-1.eps
52

f


99556m-2.eps
53


99556c-1.eps
54

f


99556c-2.eps
55

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE ELIOT L. ENGEL, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK


99556d-1.eps
56


99556d-2.eps
57

f


99556d-3.eps
58


99556e-1.eps
59


99556e-2.eps
60

Æ


99556e-3.eps