NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0499n.06 F iled: July 16, 2007 Case No. 06- 3312 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT RICK Y P ITTMAN, P laintif f-App ellant,
v. CU YA HOGA C OU NT Y D EP AR TM EN T OF CH ILD RE N A ND F AM ILYSER VI CE S; CY NT HIAHU RRIE; and C YN THI A KELLER, De fend ant s- App e lle e s.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE NORT HERN DI STR IC T OF OHI O

BEF OR E: KEN NE DY , BA TC HELD ER , a nd C LA Y, Ci r c uitJudg e s. ALICE M. BATCHEL DER, Circ uit Jud ge. Ric k y Pi tt ma n ( “ Pi tt ma n ” ) a p p e a ls the district
c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of

his thr e e c la ims br ou g ht und e r 42 U. S.C. § 198 3, wh ic h a lle g e that D e fe nd a nts Cuy ahog a County

Depa rtment of C hildren and Family Service s (“CCDCFS”), Cy nthia Hurrie , and Cy nth ia K e ll e r ( collectively

ref err ed to as “ Def

endants” ) (1) violated his Fourte enth Amendment due proce ss rig hts, (2) violated his Four teenth Amendme nt liberty interest in family

relationships, and (3) a cted wa

nton l y an d re cklessly

during state cour

t custody proce eding s. Defe ndants moved for dismiss al, arguing, among other things, that the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine de prived the district c ourt of subject matter

jurisdiction over Pittm an’s c laims. The district court a g re ed and dismissed Pittman’ s c la ims wi th p re jud ic e . Pittman a

pp e a ls t he dis mis sa l, a

rguin g that Rooke r-Feldman does not apply to hi s cl ai m s . We ag ree with Pit tman, RE VE RSE the district court’s de cision, and2

REMAND for f

urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s opinion. I. R i c ky P i t t m a n i s t h e b i o l o g i c a l f a t h e r o f N a j e e W a t e r s ( “ N a

j e e ” )
. W h e n N a

j e e w a s o n l y a fe w m on ths old , CC DC F S f ile d a mot ion

fo r t e mpo ra

ry c us tod y wi th t he Cuy a ho g a

County Juve nil e Court. I n that motion, CCDCFS highlig hted t he fa ults of both parents, noting that Najee ’s mother, L a tarr a Wat e rs , w a s a dr

ug a dd ic t wh o ha d a

ba nd on e d the c hil d, a nd

Na je e ’s fathe r, Pittman, c ou ld not be found, had not established paternity , did not provide care or support for the child, and f

ailed to v isi t th e c hil d o n a

re g ula r b a sis . Pi ttm a n c on te nd s th a t CCD CF S’ s repr e se ntatio ns a bo ut h im
we re fa l s e. C C DC FS at t em p t edt o co rr ec ts o m e o f t h es e e rr o n e o u s re p re s en t at i o n s b y fi l i n g a supplemental docume nt w ith the juvenile court a cknowledg ing tha t Pit tman actua lly

had esta blished pater nity , was providing financ ial support for the c hild, and was una ble to visit the child beca

use of int e rf e re nc e by the mot he r. De sp ite the se mor e fa vo ra ble re pr e se ntatio ns of

Pittman, the juv e nil e
c ourt g ra nte d te mpo ra

ry c us tod y of Na je e to C CD CF S. CCDCFS then filed an applica tion wi t h t he juvenile c ourt seekingperma nent custody

of Najee . I n that application, CCDCFS stated t h at P i t t m an failed to visi t Najee for more than three months and that Pit tman agr ee d CCDCFS should have perma nent custody

of Na jee. Pittman contends that these asser tions are patently

false. Afewmonths later, C C DC FS withdrew the application for perma

nent custody , seekinginstead to vest leg al custody of Na jee in his g reat aunt and uncle . The juvenile court held two hear ings on the issue of leg al custody ; Pittman was ser ved by publication, but was not persona lly notified of the hear ings. As a result, he did not attend either of the he aring s, and the juvenile c ourt g rante d leg al custody to Najee ’s g reat aunt and uncle
. Ov e r a y e a r l a te r, Pittman f

ile d a motio n for mod if

ic a tio n of cu sto dy wi th the juv e nil e c ourt
.3

Najee ’s g uardia

n ad litem filed a motion to dismis s, arguing t h at t he cour t lacked jur isdiction beca use Pit t m an filed his motion more than a y ear afte r custody

proce eding s had conc luded. The
c o u rta g r e e d

w i t h t h e g u a r d i a n a d l i t e m a n d d i s m i s s e d P i t t m a n ’ s m o t i o n f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n o f c u s t o dy; the Ohio Court of Appe als aff irmed that dec ision. Whil e Pittman’ s a

pp e a l w a s st ill pe nd ingin s ta te c ourt, he in st itute d th e se pr oc e e din g s in fede ral district cour

t. I n the first two counts of his complaint, Pittman al l ege s t h at C CDCFS’s “fa ilure to awa

rd custod y of Na

jee a nd to even c onsider [Pi ttman] for c ustody , despite his being
re a dy , w ill ing [,] a nd a

ble to pare nt Na

je e ,” vio la te s his F ourt e e nth Am e ndme nt d

ue pr oc e ss r ig hts
an d l i b e r t y i n t e r e s ti n f

a m i l y m at t e r s . In t h e t h i r d c o u n t , h e a s s e rt s t h a t C C D C F S a c t e d w a n t o n l y,
rec klessly , in bad fa ith , an d with a malicious purpose by falsely repr esenting information to the j u v e n i l e c o u rt a n d o t h e r c o u n t y o f f i c i a l s i n o r d e r t o “ c o mp l e t e l y c u t h i m o u t o f t h e [ c u s t o dy] proce ss.” Def

endants filed a

motion to di smiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) a nd 12(b)( 6), pr e s e n t i n g e i g h ts e p a r a t e b a s e s f o r d i s m i s s a l
. T h e d i s t r i c tc o u r tg r a n t e d D e f e n d a n t s ’ m o t i o nto d i smiss, finding that the Rooke r-Feldman d o c tr in e d e p r iv e d it o f s u b je c t m a tt e r

ju r is d ic ti o no ver Pittman’ s c la ims . T he c ourt did no t a dd res s De fe nd a nts ’ o the r b a se s f or dis mis sa l. O n a

pp e a l, P i t t m an ar gu es t h at t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt erre d i n ap p l y i n g Rooke r-Feldman to d ism iss his c la ims
. II. We review de novo a district c ourt’s ruling that the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine de prived it of
s u bject matter

jurisdiction. McCormick v. Brave rman , 4 5 1 F
. 3 d 3 8 2 , 3 8 9 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 6 ). Gene rica lly

stated, the Rooke r-Feldman do c tr in e st a nd s f or the un re ma

rk a ble pr op os iti on

that a f e d e r a l d is tr ic t c o u rt la c k s s u b je c t matt e r ju

r is d ic ti o n to r e v ie w a s tate c o u rt d e c is ion. Id. (stating that “a district c ourt [cannot] ex erc ise appe llate r ev i ew of a state c ourt dec ision”). The doc trine4

orig inally derive d from the two Supre me Court case s bear ing its name
. See Ro ok e r v. F ide lit yTru st Co. , 2 63 U. S. 4 13 (1 92 3) ; Dist. of Col umbia C o u r t o f A ppeals v. Fe ldman , 460 U.S. 462 (1983). I n the y ear s following the Feldman decision, the lowe r cou rt s gradua lly expanded the doctr ine’s amorphous application until, re cently , the Supreme Court issued its decision in Exx on Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. , 544 U.S. 280 (2005), cla rifying a nd restric ting the doctrine’ s scope. The Exx on decision stresse d the “na rrow” and “limited” a

pplication of the do ct ri ne, holding that “[t] he Rooke r-F

el d man doctrine . . . is conf ined to case s of the kind from whic h the doctrine acquir ed its name: ca ses broug ht by state-c ourt losers complaining of injuries ca used by state-c ourt judgme nts render ed bef

ore the district court proc eeding s commence d and inviting di strict court revie w and re

jection of those judg ments.” Id. at 284. The doctrine does not preve nt “a district c ourt from exerc isings u

b je c t- matter jurisdiction simply beca use a pa rty attempts to lit iga

te in fede ral c ourt a matter previously

litigated in state court.” Id. a t 29 3. “ I f a federal pl ain ti ff

pr e se nts so me ind e pe nd e nt c la im, a lbe it o ne that de nie s a le g a l c on c lus ion

that a state c ourt ha s r e a c he d in a c a se to which he wa s a par

ty , then there is juri s diction” bec ause Rooke r-Feldman does not apply
. Id. (quotations omitted). I n the wake of Exx on , this circuit has tig htened the sc ope of Rooke r-Feldman
. See Coles v. Gran v ill e , 448 F.3d 853, 857 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (“ Rooke r-Feldman is a doctrine w ith only limit ed
a pp lic a tio n” ). I n f

or mul a tin g a

c og e nt p os t- Exx on anal y s is , w e h a ve distinguished be tween pla intiffs who bring an impermissible attac k on a state c ourt judgme nt — situations in which Rooke r-Feldman
a pp lie s — a nd pla int if fs who as se rt

ind e pe nd e nt c la ims be fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt — s itu a tio ns in which Rooke r-Feldman does not a pply
. McCormick

, 451 F.3d at 393. I n delineating this dist inction, we noted:5

The in q u i ry

[focuses on] the so ur c e of t he inj ur ythe plaintiff alleg es in the fe dera l complaint. I f the source of the injury is the state cour

t decision, then the Ro ok e rFeldman doctrine w ould preve nt the district court fr om asserting jurisdi c ti o n . I f there is s ome oth e r s ourc e of inj ur y , suc h as a thir d pa rt

y ’s a c tio ns , the n the pla int if f a sse rt s an in de pe nd e nt c la im. Id. (e mph a sis a dd e d) ; see also Coles , 4 48 F .3 d at 8 58 (no ti ng that we “ have take n th e Sup re me Court’s g uidance on the application of Rooke r-Feldman and applied the doctrine only when a plaintiff complains of injury from the state court judg ment itself”). W e c o n c l u d e t h a tn o n e o f P i t t m a n ’ s c l a i m s a r e b a r

r e d b y Rooke r-Feldman
. I n the first two
c ounts of his c omp la int , Pi ttm a n a lle g e s th a t D e fe nd a nts vio la te d his du e pr oc e ss r ig hts and his lib e rt y int e re st i n fa

mil y ma tte rs by

re fu sin g to g ive or

e ve n to c on sid e r g ivi nghim c us tod y of his
c hil d. De fe nd a nts , a s a

c hil dr e n s e rv ic e s a g e nc y

a nd e mpl oy e e s the re of

, ar e re qu ir e d by

state statut e to pr epar e a case plan for a ny child to whom the ag ency is providing se rvice s, see Ohio Rev. Code § 2 15 1. 41 2(A), and to c on sid e r, a s p a rt of that pl a n, wh e the r t

he c hil d s ho uld

be pla c e d w ithhis biologica l pare nts, see Oh io R e v. Cod e § 2 15 1. 41 2( G) (1 ). De fe nd a nts ’ e va luatio n o f w he the r a c hil d
c anb e p l a c e d

w i t h h i s p a r e n t s i s i n d e p e n d e n t f r o m t h e j u v e n i l e c o u rt ’ s d e c i s i o n t o a w a r d c u s t o dy. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.23(A) (2). We re ad P i t t m an ’s first two cla ims as challeng ing De fe nd ants ’ r e fu sa l to re c omm e nd that he be g ive n c us tod y of Na je e , r a the r t

ha n a s a c ha lle ng e to the juvenile court’s judgme nt a war ding custody to N ajee ’s g reat a unt a nd uncle; afte r all, the ac tual
awa rd of c ustody

was not th e p re ro gative of D efe ndents, but that of the juvenile c ourt. See id. Pitt man’s third cla im sim ilarly ch al l enges D efe ndants’ conduc t, asserting that Def endants a cted wantonly , rec klessly , in bad fa ith, and with a malicious purpose by falsely repr esenting information t o t h e j u v e n i l e c o u rta n d

o t h e r c o u n t y o f

f i c i a l s i n o r d e r

t o “ c o mp l e t e l y c u th i m o u to f t h e [ c u s t o dy] proce ss.” As re lief for

these c laims, Pi ttman seeks compe nsato ry d amag es and a decla ratory6

jud g me n t s tati n g th a t D e f e n d a n ts ’ a c ti o n s v io late d th e F o u rte e n th A me n d me n t; Pi ttma n does not seek custody of Najee or otherwise reque st a reve rsal of the juvenile court’s decision. All three of Pitt man’s cla ims focus o n De fendants’ ac tions, rather tha n the outcome of

the state c ourt custody pr oc e e din g s. We t

he re fo re c on clu de that th e so ur c e of Pittman’ s a lle g e d in

jur y is D e fe nd a nts ’
a c t i o n s , n o t t h e s t a t e c o u rt j u d g m e n t
. B e c a u s e P i t t m a n d o e s n o t c o mp l a i n o f a n i n j u r y c a u s e d b y a state cour t judgment, we find t h at h e i s asser ting indepe ndent claims, which a re not ba rre d by Rooke r-Feldman
. Our p os t- Exx on de c isi on s c on fi rm th at Rooke r-Feldman does not bar a fede ral-c ourt challeng e to an i n d i v i d u al ’s i mproper c onduct during a prior state cour t proce eding . I n Todd v. W eltman, W einberg & Reis Co. , 434 F .3 d 432 , 436 -3 7 (6t h Cir. 20 06 ), the pla int if

f b ro ug ht a

c la im under the Fa ir Debt Collection Prac tices Ac t, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 e t se q. , complaining that the defe ndant had submitted a fa lse aff idavit in a state cour

t ga rnishment proce edi n g. T he cour t
c on c lud e d th a t Rooke r-Feldman did not apply beca use the plaintiff complained of harm c aused by the def endant’ s false a ffidavit, not by the state c ourt’s dec ision in t he g arnishment proc eeding s. Id. at 437. Simil arly , in McCormick , th e c ou rt fou nd that Rooke r-Feldman did not bar the plaintiff’ s claims that the def

endant ( 1) committed fra ud and misrepr esentati on in state court divorc e pr oc e e din g s, (2 ) c omm itt e d a n a bu se of pr oc e ss i n th e div or c e pr oc e e din g s, a nd (3) int e nti on a lly excluded the plaintiff as a party to state court r ece ivership proc eedi n gs in order to pr event the plaintiff from a sserting an intere st in property
. McCormick , 45 1 F .3 d a t 39 2. I n ho ldi ngthat Ro ok e rFeldman did not apply , the cour t noted: None of these c laims assert an injury cause d by the s tate court judgme nts; P laintiff do e s n ot c la im that th e state c ourt jud g ment s th emse lve s a

re un c on sti tut ion a l or

in vio la tio n o f f

e de ra l la w. I ns te a d, Pla int if

f a sse rt s independe nt claims that th os e state7

court judg m en t s wer e proc ured by cer tain Def endants throug h fra

ud, misrepre sentation, or other improper mea

ns[.] Id. Finally , in Brown v. First Nat ionwide Mortgage Corp. , No. 05-3597, 2006 WL 3289232, at *3-4 (6th Cir. November

9, 2006), the plaintiff “ maintain[ed] that his injuries were cause d not by the final decr ee of fore closure issued by

the state c ourt but, instead, by the actions of various people involved in the mortg ag e for eclosure proce eding s.” Id. a t * 3
. Re ly in g o n o u r d e c is ion in McCormick , we
rea soned: [Th e pla int if

f’ s] a lle g a tio ns of fr a

ud in c on ne c tio n w iththe state c ourt pr oc e e din g s, like those in McCormick

, d id n ot co ns tit

ute c omp la int s of inju

ri e s c a us e d b y the state court judg ments, beca

use they do not claim that the source of [the plaintiff’s] alleg ed injury is the fore closure de cre e itself. I nstead, the c laims conce rn the a ctions of defe ndant[s]
. . . that prec eded the decr ee. There fore , [t he plaintiff’ s] claim that the m o rt g a g e f

o r e c l o s u r e d e c r e e w a s p r o c u r e d b y f r a u d i s n o tb a r r e d b y Rooke r-Feldman
. Id. at *4 (quotations and c itations omi tted). As did the plaintiffs in Todd , McCormick , and Br own , Pi ttm a n c ha lle ng e s D e fe nd a nts ’
a lle g e dly imp ro pe r c on du c t, rathe r tha n the ou tc ome of the state c ourt pr oc e e din g s. Re lyingon the se
c a s e s , w e c o n c l u d e t h a tP i t t m a n ’ s c l a i m s a r e n o tb a r r e d b y Rooke r-Feldman be c a us e he is complaining of an injury

cause d by a thi rd party , not a state c ourt judg ment. See also Holloway v. Br us h , 220 F.3d 767, 778-79 (6th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (finding , in a pre

- Exx on c a se , th a t Ro ok e rFeldman did not bar a § 1983 action for monetary damag es ag ainst a county and an individual socia l worke r). Def endants a ssert that Pittm an’s c laims should be dismi ssed under Rooke r-Feldman be c a us e they are “inextricably

intertwined” with issues decide d in the s tate court custody proce eding s. Even though pr e- Exx on Rooke r-Feldman analy sis employ ed the “ inext rica bly intertwined” analy sis, see Pennzoil Co. v. Texac o, Inc. , 481 U. S. 1, 25 (1 98 7) (M a rs ha ll, J., c on c ur ri ng ); Exe cutive A rts Studio,8

In c. v. C ity of Grand Rapids , 3 9 1 F
. 3 d 7 8 3 , 7 9 3 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 4 ) , w e h a v e s i n c e a b a n d o ne d th is “inextricably

intertwined” analy sis. I n McCormick , we noted that “inextricably intertwined” is not
a s ep ar at e leg al test used to extend Rooke r-Feldman ’s scope ; rather , it merely “desc ribes the conclusion that a c laim asserts an injury whose source is the state court judgme nt, a claim that is thus b ar r e d b y Rooke r-Feldman .” McCormick , 4 5 1 F. 3 d at 3 9 4 -9 5 (c i t i n g Davani v. V a. Dep’ t of Tr ansp. , 43 4 F .3 d 7 12 , 7 19 (4 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; Hoblock v

. Albany County Bd. of Elections , 422 F.3d 77, 86- 87 (2 d Ci r. 20 05 )) ; se e als o B ro wn , 2006 WL 3289 2 3 2 , at *4. We are thus not persuade d by De fe nd ants ’ a

rgume nts
. The district cour

t did not have the bene fit of our de cisions in Todd , McCormick , and Br own wh e n it und e rt oo k it s Rooke r-Feldman a na ly sis
. Th a t pre c e de nt, ho we ve r, re qu ir e s tha t we re ve rs e the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on . We pa us e to a c kn ow le dg e that, i f P ittman we re to pr e va il on the me ri ts of his fede ral claims, it is unclea r what impact his success in this fede ral law suit would have on the underl y in g s tate c o u rt j u d g me n t. Wi th o u t e xp r e s s in g an o p in io n o n th e matt e r , w e r e c o g n iz e th at this is an inevitable by

product of the Supreme Court’s c onfining the scope of R o o k e r - F e ldman in Ex x on Mo bil e , 544 U.S. at 284. III . For the foreg oing r easons, we RE VE RSE the judg ment of the district cour t and REMAND for f urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s opinion.