* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

1 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________________

No. 01-21315

Summary Calendar

__________________________

CHARLES W. TAYLOR, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

COASTAL SECURITIES, LTD,

Defendant-Appellee.

___________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Texas

(Civil Action No. H-00-3156)

___________________________________________________ July 12, 2002

Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Taylor became a vice president in the public finance

department of Coastal Securities, L.P. (“Coastal”) in August 1999.

David Holland, a partner and Senior Vice President of Coastal,

hired Taylor with the approval of Dwight Whitehead, President and

CEO of Coastal. Taylor was expected to help maintain existing

accounts and to generate new revenue either by increasing the value2

of existing contracts or securing new clients. Taylor failed to

bring in any new revenue during his employment. Taylor was

Coastal’s only African-American banker.

In February 2000, Coastal’s human resources manager informed

Holland that a female employee had been offended by a comment

Taylor made comparing the strawberries on a cake to a woman’s

nipples. The employee also reported being offended by Taylor’s

b ehavior on two other occasions. With Whitehead’s approval,

Holland terminated Taylor’s employment the day after hearing about

the employee’s allegations. Both Holland and Whitehead testified

that Taylor’s alleged questionable behavior, some of which Taylor

admits should cause a company to fire an individual, was not the

reason for the termination but rather merely played into the timing

of the decision. Holland and Whitehead further testified that

Taylor’s failure to pro duce any revenue and his insufficient

prospects for production were the reasons for his termination.

Taylor filed suit against Coastal, claiming race-based

discrimination. The district court considered Taylor’s federal

claim that Coastal violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and his state claims that Coastal violated

the Tex as Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”) and committed

the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The

district court granted Coastal’ s motion for complete summary

judgment on each of the claims.3

Taylor appeals the grant of summary judgment on his

discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress

claims as well as the district court’s decision to exclude certain

portions of Taylor’s affidavit testimony. We review the grant of

summary judgment de novo, Norman v. Apache Corp.

, 19 F.3d 1017,

1021 (5th Cir. 19 94), and the exclusion of evidence for abuse of

discretion. S t . Romain v. Industrial Fabrication and Repair

Services , 203 F.3d 376, 381 (5th Cir. 2000).

Taylor claim s that the district court abused its discretion

when it excluded three portions of Taylor’s affidavit tes timony.

The district court struck the fifth and eighth sentences in

paragraph two of Taylor’s affidavit for d emonstrating a lack of

personal knowledge and a basis in hearsay and thus failing to

comply with Rule 56(e). The district court also struck paragraph

nineteen of Taylor’s affidavit for improperl y contradicting his

prior deposition testimony.

The fifth sentence of the affidavit reads: “After Mr. Hoopes

and Mr. H owell left Coastal I was hired to save their accounts.”

The eighth sentence reads: “Mr. Hoopes and Mr. Howell accepted

employment with competitors of Coastal, and were attempting to

encourage the customers with whom they had developed relationships

while employed by Coastal to shift their business to new

employers.” Having carefully reviewed the record and these

sentences in context, we rule that the district court did not abuse4

its discr etion in determining that the statements lack personal

knowledge and are based in hearsay.

The district court struck paragraph nineteen for improperly

contradicting Taylor’s prior deposition testimony. I n his

deposition Taylor testified that the only physical symptom of the

distress he suffered due to his termination was sleep loss and

scoffed at the notion that he may have been treated for a

psychological or emotional problem. In a subsequent affidavit

Taylor claimed that after his termina tion he suffered from

depression, appetite loss, humiliation, and sleeping problems. The

district court called the affidavit testimony “self-serving” and

found it inadmissible due to its inconsistency with Taylor’s

earlier deposition. See S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc. , 72

F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 1996) (“It is well settled that this court

does not allow a party to defeat a motion for summary judgment

using an affidavit that impeaches , without explanation, sworn

testimony.”). The district court did not abuse its discretion in

ruling that the affidavit did not supplement but rather was

inconsistent with the earlier deposition.

Even if admitted, paragraph nineteen would not alter the

emotional distress ruling. Texas takes a strict approach to

intentional infliction of emotional distress. See GTE Southwest,

Inc. v. Bruce

, 998 S.W.2d 605, 612 (Tex. 1999). Taylor’s situation

is not one of the unusual and extreme circumstances where Texas5

allows such a claim. Id. at 613.

Taylor has further failed to produce eviden ce that the

legitimate non-discriminatory reasons Coastal presented for

Taylor’s termination, lack of revenue production and insufficient

prospects for production, were a pretext fo r discrimination.

Taylor has not put forth evidence that he was treated any

differently than other employees in his position.

Having carefully reviewed the record and read the briefs, we

AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary ju dgment on the

discrimination and emotional distress claims for essentia lly the

reasons stated in that court’s opinion. We also AFFIRM the court’s

decision to exclude portions of the affidavit.