## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

People v . Morris , 2013 IL App (1st) 111251

Appellate Court Caption THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I L L I NOI S, Plaintiff-Appe l lee, v. HERBERT MORRI S, Defe ndant-Appe llant.

District & N o. First District, F ifth Division Docke t No. 1-11-1251

Filed Rehea ringdenied September 30, 2013

November

1, 2013

Held (Note : This syl lab us

con st it ute s n o par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Def endant’ s conviction for first-degree murder was aff irmed wher e there

was a sufficie nt foundation for the admissio n o f his bloodstained pants and boots, his public defe nder was not ineffe ctive in failing to introduce evidenc e to challenge the chain of custody of clothing exhibi ts or in failing to object to the S t at e’ s latent fing erprint analy sis, the trial court did not err in barring defe ndant from showing a still frame from a video

rec ording of him in an interrog ation room in order to impeach the testi mony of a police office r, and the threats defe ndant made shortly befor e the offe nse to two young men who wer e stay ing at the house wher e it occur red wer e properly admitted to show defe ndant’s ang er and jealousy that led to the killing.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l fr om the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 07-CR-1512; the Hon. Arthur F . Hill, J r., Judge, pr esiding

.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Michae l J

. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg
, and Phili p D. Pay ne, all of State Appellate D efe nder’ s Offic e, of Chica g o, for a ppellant.

Anita M. Alvare z, State ’ s Attor ney , of Chicag o (Alan J

. Spellberg
, Yvette L oizon, and L ori M. Rosen, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Panel PRES IDI NG J USTI CE GORDON delivered t h e judgment of the court, with opinion.
J ustices McB ride a

nd Palmer conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defe ndant Her bert Morris was convicted and sentenc ed to 55 year s in the I llinois Depa

rtment of Correc tions for the first-degree murder of Clint on Cavin, who

wa s found dead hours afte r eng ag ing in an argument with defe ndant on the morning of November 1 5
, 2006. At trial, witnesses testified that defe ndant’s then-g irlfriend, Sharon S m i t h
, left her home early that morning to drive to I owa, and befor e she left, she as k ed Cav i n , wh o l i v ed in the baseme nt, to watch her house while she was g one. This reque st ang ere d defe ndant, who fre quently spent time at Sharon’s house. Def enda n t then slapped Sharon and demande d that Cavin leave
, and defe ndant later threatened to cut the throats of S h aron’s teena g e son, Abel Smith, and his friend, Har old J ackson, who also lived i n t h e house. ¶ 2 L ater that morning
, Har old and his friend, Wil liam Alston, observe d defe ndant leave the house and return 15 minutes later with a knife. They locked the front door and left the house through the side door to walk to a nearby g as st ation, and when they returne d two minutes later, they observe d defendant down the street walking awa y from the house. Inside, they observe d a bloody shovel leaning ag ainst the wall, and t h en d i s co v ered Cavin dead in the baseme nt. Wi lliam called the police , and def endant wa s arr ested at his parents’ house

. ¶ 3 Upon his arr est, the police observe d bloodstains on defe ndant’s clothing and boots, and fore nsic scientists later tested samples of the bloodstains and deter mined that they matched Cavin’s DN A p rofile. The blood rec overe d from the shovel also matched Cavin’s DNA profile, and a palm print rec overe d from the handle of the shovel matched defe ndant’s prints. An expert in fore nsic pathology examined Cavin’s au t opsy files and opined that Cavin’s death wa s a homicide, ha ving die d as a r esult of blunt-forc e tra uma to the hea d. ¶ 4 On this direc t appea l, defe ndant claims, first, that his conviction should be reve rsed and

rema nded for a new trial beca

use defendant was deprive d of hi s right to due process and a fair trial by three related chain- of-c ustody err o rs : (1 ) the trial court admitted defe ndant’s

-2-bloodstained pants and boots into evidenc e despite the State’s failure to establish a chain of

custody ; (2) that the a ssistant publi c def ender provided inef

fec tive assistance of counse l at trial by not introducing defe ndant’s hospital belong ings list into evide n ce t o show that defe ndant’s boots wer e not seized at that time; and (3) the trial court prohibited the defe nse from pre sentinga still shot from a videotape of an unidentified of

fice r seiz ing the boots in

an interrog ation room at t h e p o l i ce station. Second, defe ndant claims that the trial court committed reve rsible err or when it allowed the State to prese nt testimony that defe ndant had made threatening rema

rks to Abel and Harold the morning of the homicide. Third, defe ndant claims that his tri al counsel was ineffe ctive for not objecting to the State’s fing erprint analy sis. Despite beingrepr esente d by counsel on a

ppeal, de fenda

nt has also filed a pro se supplemental appellate brief raising numerous additional claims of ineffe ctive assistance of counsel and trial court err ors at the suppress i o n h earing and at trial. For the following

rea sons, we af

firm.

¶ 5 BA CKGROUND ¶ 6 I . Pretrial Proce eding s ¶ 7 Prior to trial, defe ndant was repr esente d by the public defe nder. On October 7, 2008, the defe nse filed a motion to quash arr est and suppress evidenc e due to a lack of probable cause

. A suppression hearing was held on Marc h 30, 2009, and the trial court hear d testimony from defe ndant’s mother, Be verly Morris, and two arr esting police office rs, Daniel O’Connor and Der onis Cooper

. Be verly testified that, on November 15, 2006, one office r knocked on her door and a sked about he r son, while anothe r off icer pushed past her and entered her house without he r consent and without a sear ch or a

rre st warr ant. The of

fice rs then we nt upstairs and arr ested defe ndant. Offic ers O’Connor and Cooper both testified that they had rec eived

a flash messag e that described defe ndant as a murder suspect and that he lived at his pare nts’ 1 house, and that Be verly had g iven them permission to enter her home. After arg uments, the trial court denied defe ndant’s motion, finding : (1) that defe ndant’s mother consente d to the

sear ch of her house prior to defe ndant’s arrest; (2) that the arr esting office rs had probable

cause to arre s t d efe ndant based on the information they had at the time; and (3) that the

arr esti n g o ff

i ce rs wer e justified in sear ching the home without a war rant due to exigent circ umstances. ¶ 8 At the next hearing, on J une 10, 2009, defe ndant informed the trial court that he wanted
to proce ed pro se , and the tria l court orde red a behavior al clinical e x amination, in which a doctor opined that defe ndan t wa s fi t to repr esent himself. After a 30-day continuance
, the
t rial court found defe ndant fit to stand trial, admonished defe ndant of his rights t o s el frepr esentation, and allowed the a ssistant publi c def ender to withdraw. ¶ 9 As a pro se litigant, defe ndant attempted to file a second motion to suppress evidenc e on J anuar y 28, 2010. In his motion, defe ndant arg ued that, afte r he was arr ested in his pare nts’ home, the police should have obtained a sear ch warrant from a mag istrate judge prior to

A fl ash m ess age is a bro adc a s t of upda te d inf ormati on fr om the cr ime sce ne tha t is 1

tr ans m it te d t o al l r esp ondi ng off ic er s.

-3-seizing two knives in the house a long w ith defenda nt’s clothing. D efe ndant further argued that the assistant public defe nder was ineffe ctive for failing to make this ar gument at the prior suppre s s i o n h earing. The trial court advised defe ndant that he could not litigate the issue a second time beca

use the trial court alre ady ruled on the merits of defe ndant’s motion
to quash arr est and suppress evidenc e. In response , defe ndant expl ai n ed t h at the public d e f e n d e r “p r ovided ineffe ctive assistance of counsel” beca use she “su

p p re s s e d ” e v id e n c e th a

t showed t h at s h e counsele d the police office rs to perjure themselves at defe ndant’s suppression hearing. The trial court declined to consider defe ndant’s p r o se motion, explaining that his al l egations wer e appellate issues and that defe ndant could raise those issues on appea l. ¶ 10 Af

t erwa rd
, d ef

en d an t re qu es t ed co u n s el
, and the assistant public defe nder w as

rea ppointed on Marc h 3, 2010. Despite being repr esente d by counsel, defe ndant filed a pro se motion in limine conce rning ineffe ctive assist ance of this same co u n sel at the suppression h earing

. The trial court advised defe ndant that he may not file a motion when he i s repr esente d by an at t o rney , and defe ndant reque sted to proce ed pro se a second time. The trial court ag ain admonished the d ef endant and ag ain excused the same assistant public defe nder. Def

endant then argued a pro se motion in limine
, claiming that the police did not have probable cause to e nter his pa rents’ home and arr est him, and that the assistant public defe nder was ineffe ctive beca use she “suppre ss ed ” t h e arr est repor t and did not call the office r who issued the flash message t o t est ify at the suppression hearing. Following
arguments, the trial court denied defe ndant’s pro se motion, finding that the trial cour t had alre ady ruled on the probable cause issue in defe ndant’s motion to quash arr est and suppress evidenc e. De fenda

nt noted for the r ecor d that he disagree d with the trial court’ s ruling. ¶ 11 At the next court date, o n M ay 27, 2010, defe ndant filed a pro se “Motion in L imine Reg arding Knowing Us e o f Fa l s e or Perjured Testimony Constituting a Denial of Due Process in Response to Court Orde r Whether Pro-Se Def endant is Ready for Trial.” Def endant explained that he had uncovered new evidenc e that the assistant State’s attorney violated defendant’s constituti onal due pr ocess rights whe n she knowingly prese nted false testimony from Offic er Cooper at the suppression hearing. Also, defe ndant’s pro se motion
argues that the assistant public defe nder provided ineffe ctive assistance of counsel beca use she continued to ask Cooper misleading questions, despite knowing that he had testified falsely

. The case was continued so that defe ndant could file an answe r to discovery
, and at

2 the next court appea

ranc e, def endant r equeste d counsel. ¶ 12 On J une 30, 2010, the trial court re appointed the same assistant public defe nder a third time. Def endant objected to the appointment and informed the trial court that he had a case pending ag ainst this assistant publi c d e fende r in fede ral court. The trial court asked defe ndant about the nature of the fede ral case , and defe ndant explained that he had sued this a ssistant public defe nder for “fa

brication of statements in a sworn aff idavit.” Specifica lly
, defe ndant alleg ed that, at the suppression hearing, his counsel fabricated the evidenc e in “the complaint that was signe d by the office r that m ad e t h e 9 1 1 call” beca use the office r that wrote the

T he appe ll at e r eco rd is si le nt con cernin g the d is pos it ion of def end ant ’s pro se m oti on. 2

-4-complaint was not called to testify . The a ssistant publi c def ender explained that defe ndant
may have confuse d the arr est repor t with the g ener al offe nse case repor t, which wer e prepa red by differ ent police office rs. The arr esting office r testified at the suppression hearing that he wa s not awar e of c erta in fac ts that were repor ted in the g eneral offe nse ca se report, which contained more detailed information ab o u t d efendant’s arr est. The assistant public defe nder explained that defe n d ant’s May 27, 2010, pro se motion also pointed to the

arr esting office r’s g ener al progress repor t, which contained information that the office r had lear ned only afte r defe ndant’s arr est. The trial court then asked the assistant public defe nder if she had written the ar

rest report or any of the poli ce reports in def endant’ s case , and she

answe red that she had not. Def endant then argued that, at the suppression hear i n g, the assistant public defe nder claimed that evidence was in the arr est repor t that is not there
, to which his counsel responded that she m ere ly impeache d t h e officer by omission when she elicited testimony

from the of

fice r that he did not state something in his police repor t. The trial court stated that it had just “conduc ted what we’ ll term a Kran kel
, which is usually posttrial, but call this a ‘mini-Krankel ’ hearing,” and it found that the assistant public defe nder would rema in on defe ndant’s case , despite his pending action ag ainst her in fede ral
court. ¶ 13 On September 14, 2010, defe ndant attempted to file a pro se motion pursuant to I llinois Sup re m e Court Rule 415 (ef f. Oct. 1, 1971). Def

endant attache d to his pro se motion a written request to the clerk of the circuit court of C ook County
, I llinois
, reque sting a copy of his arr est repor

t. The trial court struck defe ndant’s pro se filing, fi n d i n g t h at only his attorney may file docume nts. Defe ndant then re quested a third time to procee d pro se , and the trial cour

t denied this third reque st. ¶ 14 At a later pro ce ed i n g, o n November 5, 2010, defe ndant attempted to file an additional
pro se motion fo r substitut ion of judge for cause and to ag ain rec onsider the denial of his motion to quash arr est and suppress evidenc e. Def endant’s pro se motion repe ated his
arguments that the arr esting office rs lacke d probable cause and that the assistant p ub l ic defe nder provided ineff

ec t i v e assistance of counsel, though defe ndant did not addre ss his substitut ion ofjudge claim in the body of his motion. Def endant’ s counsel informed the trial
court that she did n o t intend to file defe ndant’s motion on his behalf

. The trial court subsequently bifurca

ted the pro se motion and denied defe ndant’s reque st for substitut ion of judge

. ¶ 15 On November 29, 2010, defe nse counsel filed a motion in limine to bar evidenc e of other crimes a nd bad ac ts, including e vidence : (1) that defe ndant slapped his g irlfriend the night befor e the murder; and (2) that defe ndant threatened Har old J ackson and Abel Smith the next morning that he would cut their throats. The trial cour t de nied defe ndant’s motion, finding that these incidents described a “contin uing course of conduct, which the jury could see, leads up to and inc ludes the murder of Mr. Clinton Cavin.” ¶ 16 A jury

was sele cted on F ebrua

ry 28, 2011, and the tria l beg an the ne x t day

.

¶ 17 I I . Trial ¶ 18 At trial, the State argued in its opening statement that, on November 15, 2006, defe ndant

-5-beat Clint on Cavin to de ath with a shovel afte r Cavin ref used defe ndant’s demand to leave Sharon Smit h’s h o m e. The State prese nted 15 witnesses, including two arr esting police office rs, fore nsic examiners that handled the eviden ce in the case , and defe ndant’s theng irlfriend, Sharon Smit h, and her t h re e s o n s

. Def endant exercised his right not to call witnesses or testify

at trial.

¶ 19 A. Sharon Smith’s Testimony ¶ 20 Sharon Smith testified that, in November 2006, she lived in Chicag o, I llinois
, in a house owned by Maurice Simm ons, the fathe r of one of her three sons. Sharo n s l ept in the downstairs bedroom, while her sons, Christopher Simm ons, Abel Smith, and Dezell Smith, occupie d the bedrooms on the second floor. The victim, Cl i n t o n Cavin, lived in the baseme nt. The front door of the house opened into the living room, and a back door acc essed the baseme nt. Sharon’s boy friend of five year s, defe ndant, lived in the house off and on, as well as three of Abel’s friends, Wil liam Alston, Walter Alston, and Har old J ackson. At the time, Abel was 17 year s old and went to school, while his friends Har old and Wil liam wer e 19 and 20 year s old, did not attend school
, an d were unemploy ed. Defenda nt occa sionally used various tools t o do maintenanc e wor k around the house. ¶ 21 Sharon testified that, on November 14, 2006, she hosted a party at the house to celebr ate her birthday
, in which her friend Renee Tate, Kenny Marsha ll, defe ndant, M au ri ce , and Maurice ’s friend N a

kit a M arsha ll attended. During the party , which continued past midnight, Sharon and Renee s m o k ed crac k coca ine i n her bedroom, whil e defenda nt, Cavin, Kenny
, Nakita, and Maurice drank alcohol and smoked cra ck co ca i n e in the baseme nt. Sharon’s three sons and their friends, Wil liam, Walter, and Har old, stayed upstairs in their bedrooms duringthe par

ty

. ¶ 22 Sharon testified that, at 2 a.m., she prepa red to leave the party with Kenny and Renee to drive to I owa to at t en d an 11:30 a.m. public housing appointment. Sharon went into the baseme nt and asked Cavin to watch the house while she was in I owa. After her conver sation with Cavin, defe ndant, who had been drinking and smoking cra ck coca ine, slapped Sharon

acr oss the fac e. Sharon crie d, ran back upstairs, and told her son Abel that defe ndant slapped her. She then went outside, and defe ndant acte d upset that she was leaving for I owa. Sharon then asked defe ndant to acc ompany her to I owa, and defe ndant went inside the house to g et his coat. Sharon waited for defe ndant but he never came back out, so she, Kenny
, and Renee left without him. S haron did not re turn to her home until 7:30 p.m. the next day

. ¶ 23 On cross-e x amination, Sharon admitted that, when she returne d home from I owa, she told detectives that she ha d left at 5 a .m., and not 2 a.m. as she ha d just testified.

¶ 24 B. Ma urice Simm ons’ Testimony ¶ 25 Maurice Simm ons testified that, on November 14, 2006, he left work at 10:30 p.m. and attended Sharon’s birthday party

. Maurice smoked cra ck with the adults in the baseme nt and

on the first floor, while the minors stayed in the upstairs bedrooms. Shortly befor e 2 a.m. the
next morning
, Maurice and Nakita observe d defe ndant arg uing in the baseme nt with Cavin beca use defe ndant wanted Cavin to leave the house. The argument was a “small, littl e thing,”

-6-and Maurice thought it was “no big deal.” Sharon then left for I o wa at 2:30 a.m., and

Maurice and Nakita went to sleep in Sharon’s bedroom and awoke at 7 a.m. to send the kids off to school. At that time, Maurice observe d defe n d an t i n the hous e without blood on his clothes. Maurice went back to sleep and was awa kened at noon by Har old and Wil liam, who told him t hat Cavin was de ad in the base ment. Maurice then went down into the basement and observe d Cavin’s body

. Maurice then left the house and used a neighbor’s telephone to call 911, and the dispatcher told him that someone had alre ady called and the police wer e on their wa y . Mauriceidentified def

endant in cour

t. ¶ 26 On cross-e x amination, Maurice testified that he did not reme mber if he left work at either 10:30 p.m. or 1 a.m. the next morning
, and that it took him 30 minutes to drive from his job
to Sharon’s party

. The defe nse asked Maurice whether he told the polic e that he observe d Sharon l eave at 5 a.m., and he testi fied that he did not reme mber s ay ing that to the pol ice. Maurice also testified that he did not speak with Abel at any point that morning.

¶ 27 C. Christopher Sim mons’ Testimony ¶ 28 Christopher Simm ons testified that, at the t i m e o f t ri al
, h e was 21 year s old. On November 14, 2006, he lived with his mother and he never left the house during her birthday party

. Christopher obs erve d defe ndant at the party drinkingand “ha

ving fun.” Christ opher
went to sleep shortly afte r midnight, and he awoke at 1:30 a.m. to use th e d o wn s t airs bathroom. Christopher o b s erved defe ndant downstairs but he did not speak to defe ndant befor e he went back to bed beca use defe ndant “looked kind of mad.” Christopher then went back upstairs to sleep, and h e an d Ab el left for school the next morning

. Christopher also identified def

endant in cour

t.

¶ 29 D. Renee Tate’ s Testimony ¶ 30 Renee Tate testified that she and Sharon celebrate d their birthday s toge ther on November 15, 2006, at S haron’ s residenc e. R enee p l an n ed on acc ompanying Sharon and Kenny on a short trip to I owa. Be fore they left, Sharon asked defe ndant to join them and he went inside the house to retrie ve his jacke t, but he never came back o u tside, so they left without him. Renee did not reme mber what time they left, and she did not lear n of Cavin’s death until she
returne d to Chicag o. Renee also identified def endant in cour

t. ¶ 31 On cross-e x amination Renee testified that, though she did not reme mber when they left for I owa, she arrived at the party at 12:30 a.m. and stayed for two hours. When asked if she had told the police that they left the party at 4:30 a.m., she stated, “I f that’s what I told him, that’s what ha

ppened.” Renee also testified they arrived at Sharon’ s appointment late.

¶ 32 E. Abel Smith’s Testimony ¶ 33 Abel Smit h testified that, at the time of trial, he was 22 year s old, and he lived with his mother, Sharon Smith, in November 2006. On N ovember 15, 2006, Abel was in thehouse during his mother’s birthday party , and he fell aslee p on the couch in the living room at 1

a.m. He was awa

kened later by the sound of Sharon arguing with defe ndant. Sharon then told

-7-Abel that defe ndant had slapped her, and Abel asked defe ndant not to hit his mother. Sharon

later left for I owa, and Abel attempted to g o back to sleep, but he could n o t s l ee p b ec ause defe ndant was talking to himself and pacing in the k i tchen. Abel asked defenda nt to leave beca use he was disturbing the house, but de fenda nt said that he re fused to g o unless Cavin left first. Abel responde d that Cavin was homeless and that he had nowher e to g o, but d ef en dant replied that he would throw Cavin out of the house himself. Def endant then threatened to cut Abe l’s throat. ¶ 34 Abel testified that he left the kitchen and went in the baseme nt to chec k on Cavin, who
appea red to be fine. Abel next went upstairs to chec k on the other kids, and he told Maurice that defe ndant was disturbing him. Maurice told Abel that he would check o n i t , so Abel
went to an upstairs bedroom and attempted to sleep, but he was kept awake by the sound of

someone punching the kitch en walls. Abel then heard defe ndant arg uing in the baseme nt with Cavin, who told defe ndant that he was not g oing any wher e and “[i] f you hurt me, you’re
not doing nothing but hurting yourself.” Though he stated that he did not hear Cavin mention defe ndant’s name, he acknow ledg ed that he had previously testified befor e a grand jury that he had he ard Cavin sa

y , “He rb, what are you doing in the ba sement with me.” ¶ 35 Abel testified that he eventua lly fell back aslee p and woke up ag ain at 4 a.m. He chec ked

on Cavin ag ain, and he observe d defe ndant drinking vodka and pacing in the kitchen. Abel
went back upstairs and went to sle ep ag ain. Abel woke up ag ain at 7:30 a .m. to prepa re for school. He went downstairs and observe d defe ndant pacing i n fr o n t of the basement door, but he did not observe a shovel or any blood on defe ndant. Abel then washe d up, ironed his clothes, and le ft for sc hool with his brothers. Abel also identified de fenda nt in court. ¶ 36 On cr oss-examination, Abel testified that he wa s convicted of robber y in 2006.

¶ 37 F. William Alst on’s Testimony ¶ 38 Wil liam A lston testified that he wa s 24 year s old a nd that, in N ovember 2006, he lived
at Sharon’s residenc e beca use he had problems with his fathe r. After Sharon’s birthday party , Wil liam w ent to sle ep and was awakened in the morning by Maurice
, who asked to use his cellular telephone. T h at m orning
, Wil liam and Har old went downstairs to make some brea kfast. Def

endant enter ed the kitchen and started breat h i n g o n Har old’s food. When Har old asked him to stop, defe ndant threatened to cut Har old’s throat

. Har old pushed defe ndant awa

y , and def endant lef t the home drivingMaurice ’s vehicle

. ¶ 39 Wil liam testified that defe ndant returne d 15 minu t es l at er , and Wil liam observe d him standing by the vehicle in front of the house with a knife protruding from his jacke t pocket. Def endant attempted to conce al the knife as he approa ched the house, and Wil liam quickly locked the front door befor e defe ndant rea ched it. Def endant then knocked on the door, while Wil liam and Har old exit ed throu gh a s i de door and walked to a near by g as station to purcha se cig are ttes. They did not lock the side door when they left, and Maurice and Nakita

wer e still in the house at the time. ¶ 40 Wil liam testified that, when he and Har old returne d to the hom e t wo m i nu t es later, he observe d defe ndant walking down the street seven houses awa y from them. Def

endant was

wea ring a leather coat, blue jeans, and construction boots. Wil liam did not observe any blood

-8-on defe ndant’s clothing, nor did he observe defe ndant holding a shovel. Wil liam identified

defe ndant i n court, and he identified the l eathe r coat, jeans, and boots in court as the same clothes that he obse rved de fenda nt wearing on N ovember

15, 2006. ¶ 41 Wil liam tes t i fi ed t h at h e and Har old ree ntere d the home and Wil liam knocked over a shovel and he picked it up and place d it back wher e it was leaning ag ainst the wall. The shovel was usually kept in the baseme nt, and Wil liam observe d that it had blood on the back, but the handl e ap p ea re d t o be dry

. Wil liam identified the shovel in court. He then walked down into the baseme nt to chec k on Cavin, who lived in the baseme nt with Sharon’s brother, J oey

. Wil liam observe d bloody footprints on the baseme nt stairs. In the baseme nt he found 3 Cavin’s body
, an d h e i m mediately returne d upstairs and tol d Maurice and Harold what he had observed. W illiam then walked down the stree t to his fathe r’s home to call the police. After the police arrived, Wil liam rode in a police vehicle and direc ted the office rs to wher e defe ndant lived.

¶ 42 G. Serg eant Da niel O’Connor’s Te stimony ¶ 43 Chicag o Police Serg eant Daniel O’Connor testified that, on November 15, 2006, he and his partner, Of

fi ce r Costello, wer e dresse d in plain clothes when they responde d to a 4 homicide at Sharon’s home at 11:30 a .m. U pon arriving at Sharon’s residenc e, he rec eived a fla sh messag e that described the suspec t as a 40- to 50- year -old black ma le named H erb, who had been observe d leaving the house wea ring a black leather jacke t, dark- colore d jeans, and boots, and arme d with a wood-ha ndled knife. After rec eiving the flash messag e, O’Connor and his partne r drove to defe n d an t ’s re sidence and knocked on the front door. Def endant’ s mother answe red the door and had a co n v ersation with O’Connor befor e allowinghim and his partner to enter the house. O’Connor a nd his partner

walked upsta irs and observe d defe ndant lying fac e-up on a bed. Def endant stood up and O’Connor observe d that he was wea

ring a denim shirt, black jeans, and tan boots, and that defe ndant’s jeans and boots had reddish-br own stains on the front of them. O’Connor also observe d a leather jacke t in the room with a knife protruding from the pocket, as well as a second knife with a wooden handle. O’Connor photographed the room and the photogr aphs wer e admitted into evidenc e at trial. O’Connor identified defe ndant in court. O’Connor also identified defe ndant’s denim shirt, bl ac k jeans, and tan boots, and pointed to wher e he observe d the bloodstains on the clothing. ¶ 44 On cross-e x amination, O’Connor testified that, despite observing blood on defe ndant’s clothes, O’Connor d i d n ot rec over and seal defe ndant’s pants and boots prior to taking defe ndant to the police station beca use he did not want to strip defen d an t n ak ed of his clothes. O’Con n o r n o ted that he did not observe bloodstains on the white bed sheets, on defe ndant’s skin, or under defe ndant’s fing erna ils. O’Connor admitted that he did not write in his report that the fla sh messag e informe d him that defenda nt was ar med with a knife

.

T his was the fi rs t and o n l y me n t i o n o f J oey dur ing the tr ia l. None of the oth er wit nes ses 3

m ent ion ed thathe li ved in the bas ement wi th Cavin. W il li am did no t s ta te J oey’s la stname. Off ic erCost el lo’ s f

ir stname doe s no t appe arinth e appe ll at e r eco rd. 4

-9-¶ 45 H. Off icer Der onis Cooper’s Testimony ¶ 46 C h i ca go P olice Offic er Der onis Cooper testified that, on November 15, 2006, he wa s

wea ring civilian clothes and driving thro u gh the are a near Sharon’s home. In the late morning
, he rec eived a flash messag e that a black male suspect was observe d in the vicinity
, wea ring a black coat, black jeans, and work boots, and potentially cover ed in blood. Cooper drove through the are a but did not observe the suspect. He then drove to Sharon’s residenc e, wher e he spoke with Wil liam and Nakita. After speaking with them, Cooper drove to defe ndant’s residenc e, while Cooper’s supervisor drove Wil liam and Nakita there

. Offic ers 5 O’Connor and Costello wer e alre ady at defe ndant’s home when Cooper arrived. Coop er enter ed the house and observe d defe n d ant lying on a bed in a second floor bedroom. Def endant was wea

ring a blue denim shirt, black jeans, and tan work boots, and he had dried red stains on his pants and boots. Cooper then arr ested defe ndant and transporte d him to an interrog ation room at t he Ar ea 2 police st ation, and he rema ined with defe ndant the entire time. Cooper identified defe ndant in court, and he identified defe ndant’s pants and boots and noted that they wer e in the same or substantially the same condition as wh en h e observe d defe ndant wea

ringthem in the bedroom. ¶ 47 On cross-e x amination, Cooper testified that he did not rec all removing defe ndant’s boots while defe n d ant was in the interrog ation room. After Cooper brought defe ndant to the interrog ation room, other office rs later transporte d defe ndant to a hospital to treat an injury unrelated to the instant case

. Cooper testified that he knew that d ef en d ant’s clothes wer e

remove d at the hospital, but he did not state who re moved them.

¶ 48 I . Victor Rivera ’s Testimony ¶ 49 For en s i c investigator Victor Rivera testified that, at 1 p.m. on November 15, 2006, he and his partne r, fore nsic investigator Eddie Perez, proce ssed the evidenc e at the crime scene at Sharon’s home . In the base ment, Rivera obse rved Cavin’ s body slumped over in a c hair and a bloody shovel leaning ag ainst the wall. Cavin’s body was cover ed in blood, and there

wer e bloodstains on the walls. Rivera identified the s hovel and sever al photogr aphs of Cavin’s body in court. Rivera then left Sharon’s home to proce ss the evidenc e found at defe ndant’s re sidence , which included a kitchen knife , a dry

wall knife, a

nd a black leather jacke t in defe ndant’s bedroom. Rivera transporte d the evidenc e to the Are a 2 police station wher e he assigned a unique inventory number to eac h item. Rivera identified the knives and jacke t in court. ¶ 50 Rivera testified that, while he was at the Ar ea 2 p o l i ce s t at i o n , h e “r ec o vere d” defe ndant’s clothing, but did n o t e xp la in how he came into possession of defe ndant’s clothes. Rivera identified defe ndant in court. The State prese nted Rivera with a pair of brown boots, socks, black jean pants, and a shirt, and he identified eac h article of clothing as the same one that he rec overe d from defe ndant on November 15, 2006, and that eac h item was in the same

Coope r d id notst at e hi s s upe rviso r’ s na m e. 5

-10-or substantially the same c ondition as when he r ecove red the m. ¶ 51 On cross-e x amination, Rivera testified that he did not observe any bloody footprints on the baseme nt stairs and that the shovel curr ently did not appea r as bloody as it did when he

rec overe d it. He did not observe any blood on defe ndant’s l eathe r jacke t, and the knife protruding from d ef

en d ant’s jacke t’s pocket appea red to have rust on it rathe r than bloodstains. ¶ 52 In the middle of Rivera’ s cross-e x amination, the t ri al re ce s sed an hour for lunch, and when it resumed, the trial court stated outside the prese nce of the jury
, “The defe nse has been setting up audio/visual equipment as it relates to the cross-e x ami n at ion of For ensic Investig ator Ri vera

. Be sure that our m otion to exclude is being adher ed to.” The defense 6 then informed the trial court that it intended to prese nt a st i l l s h o t from a videotape that

s h o we d an unidentified police office r removing defe ndant’s boots from his fee t in an interrog ation room at the Are a 2 police station. The defe nse would first ask Rivera if he did in fac t remove defe ndant’s cl o t h es fr o m his person, and if he said no, then the still shot would not be shown. I f he Rivera said yes, then the defe nse intended to show the still frame from the video and ask Rivera if any of the four people depicted in the still frame was him, with his anticipated answe r being no. The trial court denied the defe nse’s reque st to show the frame from the video, finding that “the still [shot ] say s nothing in terms of the entirety of the time that [defendant] was at the [pol ice] station.” The defe nse then informed the trial court that it intended to show the video without sound at some later date. The trial court responde d that i t wo u l d rese rve its ruling until that issue prese nted itself, and the trial court ag ain advised the defe nse that there would be no ref ere nce to the video during Rivera’ s crossexamination, even for the purposes of impea chment. ¶ 53 Whil e the video was not play ed o r ad m i t t ed i n t o ev i d ence at trial, a DVD copy is contained in the appellate rec ord. The video shows that a white male office r in plain clothes

wea ring a baseba ll cap led defe ndant into the interrog ation room. Def endant was wea

ring a button-down collare d shirt, black jeans, and tan boots with visible marks on them. Shortly afte rwa rd, a second dark- skinned mal e o fficer enter ed the room and emptied defe ndant’s pockets, plac ing thecontents on the table. This sec ond office r wa s also not in uniform and

was instead wea

ring a blue shirt, blue jeans, an d a white baseba ll cap. Def endant then sat d o wn o n a bench and the second office r remove d defe ndant’s boots. A third black m al e office r wea

ring a gray shirt and pants, a black vest, and a flat cap enter ed the room holding

a clea r plastic bag

. The second office r, while holding defe ndant’s boots i n h i s right hand, place d the contents of defe ndant’s pockets into the bag and then left the room with the boots. The second office r returne d to the room five minutes later without the boots in hand, and the boots do not appear

on the re st of video. Def

endant wa s then taken to the hospital, and the video rec ording sy stem was shut off. The video rec ording resumed when defe ndant returne d from the ho s p i t al
, an d the video shows that defe ndant ree ntere d the interrog ation room

wea ringhospital scrubs without shoes rathe r than his pre vious clothing.

I t is unc le ar whic h m oti on the tr ia l cou rt re fe rr ed to bec aus e the appe ll at e re cor d doe s not 6

con ta in a motio n t o ex cl ude th atcon cerns t he p re sen ta ti on o f avideot ape attr ia l.

-11-¶ 54 W h en t h e cr o s s -e x am i n ati on resumed, Rivera testified that he could not rec all i f

defe ndant was still wea

ring his orig inal clothes and boots or new hospital scrub s when Rivera observe d him in th e interrog ation room. Rivera also did not reme mber whether he
persona lly remove d defe ndant’s clot h i n g an d boots, or i f they wer e already remove d from defe ndant bef

ore River a ar

rived a t the Are a 2 police station.

¶ 55 J . Steven White’s Testimony ¶ 56 Dr. Steven Whit e of the Cook County Medica l Ex aminer’ s Offic e testified as an expert in forensic pathology

conce rningthe autopsy perf ormed on Cavin by

Dr. Miche lle J ordan, who had since moved out of state. Whit e t es t i fi ed that he revie wed Dr. J ordan’ s case p ro to c o l, p h o to gr a

phs, and tox icology results to formulate his own opinion reg arding Ca v in ’ s death. Whit e identified multipl e lace rations on Cavin’s head and fac e, though he noted that Cavin’s body lacke d any signs of defe nsive wounds. Cavin had a comminuted fra cture of the skull, wh i ch was broken into many piece s. Whit e opined that Cavin died from multipl e

cra niocer ebra l injuries resulting from blunt-forc e trauma to his head due to an assault. Whit e opined that Cavin’s death was a homicide, and that Cavin was alive and breathing when he sustained t he inj uries because there was blood found i n his lungs and stomach. W hite was unable to dete rmine a time of de ath.

¶ 57 K. Ly nette Wilson’s Testimony ¶ 58 Ly

nette Wil son testified that she is a fore nsic biologist at the I llinois State Police Crime L ab
, an d that she analy

zed the stains found on the shovel, the wood-ha ndled knife, and defe ndant’s boots, jeans, and denim shirt. Her tests reve aled that all of these items contained blood on them. Wil son prese rved eac h of the samples and sealed them i n a vault for DNA analy sis. ¶ 59 On cross-e x amination, Wil son testified that there is a possibili ty of a false positive test result. The jeans had many dirt-like stains on them, and t he majority of the stains on the boots wer e scuff

marks and paint stains. Whil e the b o o t s have sever al blood-like stains on them, Wil son only

tested one a

rea

. ¶ 60 After Wil son’s testimony
, the defense ag ain i nformed the trial court that it intended to play the video without sound during its case -in-chie f t o s h o w that someone other than fore nsic inve s ti g a

tor Rivera rec overe d defe ndant’s boots from the Are a 2 interrog ation room. The State argued that the video was inadmissible beca use the defe nse could not lay a proper foundation, and the trial cour t stated that, though the issue was not be fore the trial court at that time, it “probably

would not” allow the video to be shown later. ¶ 61 The next morning
, the defe ns e re qu ested the trial court that it rec all Rivera to clarify whether he per sonally

remove d defe ndant’s clothes. The defe nse also intended to question Rivera about the evidenc e inventory form that he completed, in whi ch h e l eft blank the

-12-portion of the form indicating wher e the items wer e rec overe d or seized. The trial court 7 denied the de fense ’s reque st to rec all Rivera, finding that he testified that he wa s “not sure about how t h e cl o th es g ot to his possession,” and that play ing either a still or the entire interrog ation vide o w ould not advanc e the defe nse’s case either way

. After war ds, the defe nse did not request or attempt to play the video throughout the duration of the trial.

¶ 62 L . Christopher Webb’s Testimony ¶ 63 Christopher Webb testified that he is a DNA scientist at the J oliet Science L abora tory of the I llinois State Police, and that he tested the DNA samples found on the clothi ng , boots, and the shovel, and compar ed them to the DNA profiles of defe ndant and Cavin. A blood sample rec overe d from the cuff of defe ndant’s shirt matched defe ndant’s DNA profile, while blood samples rec overe d from defe ndant’s jeans, boots, and the shovel mat ch ed C av i n’s DNA pr ofile.

¶ 64 M. Wi lliam Kovacs’ T estimony ¶ 65 Wil liam Kovacs testified that he took defe ndant’s fing erprints and palm prints on May 22, 2007, and for

war ded them to the I llinois State Police latent print unit for compa rison.

¶ 66 N. Anasta sia Petruncio’s Te stimony ¶ 67 Anastasia Petruncio testified that she is a fing erpr int examiner, and that she examined the shovel and located four sets of prints on it: two on the plastic han d l e, an d t wo on the metal base. One of the prints on the handle was suitable for comparison, a nd she identified the print as defe ndant’s to the exclusion of all other individuals in the world. P et ru n cio demonstrated that the print on the handle corr esponded to defe ndant gripping the shovel with h is left hand. Petruncio identified the shovel at trial. Petruncio also examined the brow n

handled knife , but found no prints suitable for c omparison. ¶ 68 On cross-e x amination, Petruncio testified that one of the prints found on t h e shovel’s metal base excluded both defe ndant and Cavin as the source

. She did not compar e the other
two prints afte r she identified the palm print on the handle as defe ndant’s. Petruncio did not

rec eive print car ds from any other individual for comparison. She acknow ledg ed that it was impossibl e to te ll whe n the prints w ere left on the shovel and that they possibly could have been le ft day s, wee ks, or months before the crime. ¶ 69 Def

ense counsel never requested a Frye hearing conce rning the validi ty of l atent pa l m print analy sis, which is an issue defe ndant’s counse l raises on a ppeal.

¶ 70 O. J ennife r Ac osta’s Testimony ¶ 71 J ennife r Acosta testified that she is a fore nsic scientist at the I llinois State Police For ensic

Wh il e the invent ory for m was not admitt ed int o eviden ce at tr ia l, it app ear s in the app el la te 7

re cor d. T he p ort ion of

fo rm desi gnated“r eco vered/ sei zed fr om :” is le ftbl ank.

-13-Science Center, and that she t ested the DNA reco v ered from the wood-ha ndled kni fe. She deter mined that the DNA sample contained a mix ture of at least three profiles that she could
not sort out. She compar ed the mix ed profile to the DNA profiles of defe ndant and Cavin and deter mined that neither c ould be excluded as a possible match. ¶ 72 On cross -e x am i n ation, Acosta testified that the DNA sample from the wood-ha ndled knife was a degrade d sample and that she did not know whether it came from blood or skin cells

. T h o u gh defe ndant and Cavin cannot be excluded as a match, there are milli ons of potential combinations of DNA pr ofiles that could yield the mix ture found on theknife. ¶ 73 Af

t er Acosta’s testimony
, the S tate sought to admit defe ndant’s boots
, jeans, and shi rt into evidenc e. The defe nse objected, arguing that the State failed to establish a sufficie nt chain of custody beca

use Offic er Rivera ’s t es timony did not sufficie ntly explain how he

came into possession of the clothing. The trial court ove rruled the defe nse’s objec tion and admitted the clothing into evidenc e. The State rested, and the trial court denied defe ndant’s motion for a dire cted ve rdict. ¶ 74 Def

endant exercised his right not to test i fy o r ca l l wi t n es s es at trial. The de fense
prese nted stipulated testimony from Chicag o Police Detec tive Madden to impeach Abel 8 Smit h. It was stipulated that, if called to the stand, Madden would testify that Abel told him

on November 15, 2006, that Cavin had asked Abel to close th e b as em en t door when Abel chec ked up on himlater tha t night. Af

ter spea king w ith Cavin, Abel went to g o to sleep in his bedroom and he turned the volume up on his stere o so that it was loud. Madden w ould also testify that Abel did not mention that he observe d defe ndant pacing in front of the kitchen door in the morning . The de fense then re sted. ¶ 75 Du ri n g cl o s i n g ar gu m en t s, the State argued that defe ndant threa tened to kill C avin beca use he w as jealous that Sharon, his g irlfriend at the time, ha d asked Cavin to take car e of her house while she was awa y

. In response , the defe nse criticized the State’s evidenc e and
argued that the State did not prove defe ndant guilty beyond a re as o n ab l e doubt. Over the defe nse’s objection, the jury was allowed to view the shovel and defe ndant’s clothing during their deliberations. The jury later found defe ndant guilty of the first-degree murder of Clint on Cavin.

¶ 76 I I I . Posttrial Proce eding s ¶ 77 Prior to sentenc ing on April 7, 2011, defe ndant filed a pro se posttrial motion for a new trial based on ine ffe ctive assistanc e of counsel. The trial court he ld a Krankel hearing, a

nd defe ndant argued that the boots admitted into evidenc e at trial d i d n o t belong to him. Def endant c laimed that the police r eturne d his boots and he wore his boots to the hospital, wh ich the police would not have done had the boots been cover ed in blood. As pro o f, defe ndant claimed that the video of his interrog ation at the Are a 2 police station showed an office r taking defe ndant’s boots and g iving them back to him, and that the hospital inventory

Det ect ive M add en’ s f

ir stname doe s no t appe arinth e appe ll at e r eco rd. 8

-14-l i st ref lected the seizure of his pants, shirt, and socks at the hospital. Def endant furth er 9
argued that his counsel was ineffe ctive beca use she did not use this information to impeach Offic er Cooper and she did not call Har old J ackson as a defe nse witness. The trial court then quest i o n ed d efe ndant’s counsel, who explained that Har old had g iven a handwritten
statement to the police and testified befor e a grand jury that defe ndant had threatened to cut his throat, and that Har old was g ener ally not a favor able witness for the defe nse. Def endant’ s counsel also explained that she tried to admit the interrog ation video or a still photo from the video during trial but thetrial court de nied her reque sts. The trial cour

t de nied defe ndant’s
pro se motion, finding that it would have applied i t s ru l i n g deny ing the use of the interrog ation video o r still to Offic er Cooper’s testimony as well. The trial court further found that the pro se motion “lac ked merit” and that it did not justify the appointment of new counsel. ¶ 78 On April 18, 2011, the de fense filed a posttrial motion for a new tria l, a lleg ing that the
tr ial court err ed when it: (1) denied defe ndant’s pretria l motion to quash arr est; and (2) denied defe ndant’s motion in limine to ba r evidenc e of other acts of defe ndant. Among the claims in the m otion for a new trial, th e d ef en se argued that the trial court: (1) improperly denied the use of the interrog ation video to imp ea ch R i v era at trial; and (2) err ed when it admitted defe ndant’s boots, pants, shirt, and socks into evidenc e despite a broken c hain of custody

. The trial court denied the defe nse’s motion
, an d d ef en dant then advised the trial
court that he had filed a pro se motion for “obstruction of justice” ag ainst the assistant public defe nder. The trial court advised defe ndant that it had alre ady ruled on these issues befor e,

1 0 but it never

thel es s held another “

Krankel -ty

pe hearing” and denied defe ndant’s pro se motion, finding that the assistant public defe nder offe red a tactica l rea s o n fo r n o t calling Har old J ackson a s a witness and that defe ndant did not need ne w counse l. ¶ 79 The trial co u rt t h en h el d a sentenc ing hearing, and the State noted defe ndant’s 1985 convictions for a

rmed robbe ry

and residential burg lary

. The S tate called threecorr ectional officers fr o m C o ok County J ail to testify to three separ ate instances of defe ndant’s insubordination and confr ontation during the pendenc y of his case

. The defe nse called Eric Morris, def

endant’ s young er brother, who te stified that defe ndant worke d with their fathe r

as a plumber, that he had moved in with his parents as they wer e bec oming older, and that defe ndant had taken car e of Eric’ s son when Eric was too irresponsible to do so. Def endant then addre ssed the t ri al co u rt and ag ain claimed: (1) that the assistant public defe nder provided ineffe ctive assistance of counsel; (2) that the police enter ed his par en t s ’ h o m e without probable c ause or a wa rra nt; and (3) that ther e wa s a break in the cha in of custody of his clothes. Following defe ndant’s allocution, the State argued in ag gravation that the way

Wh il e the hos pit al invent ory li st was n ot admitt ed int o eviden ce at tr ia l, it app ear s in the 9

re cor d on app eal

. T he l is t ind ic at es tha t def end ant ’s shi rt , pan ts , and soc ks we re giv en to a pol ic e off ic er , whil e the “Sho es/ Boot s/ Sli ppe rs ” cat egory is cr oss ed off
, ind ic at ing tha t no suc h it ems wer e

re covere d. Def

end ant did not si gn the bot tom of the li st acknowl edging tha t “t he ind ic at ed it ems and dis pos it ion ar e corre ct and complet e.” Howe ve r , t he li st is si gned by “ Sgt. E. Boone 1964 ” as the “Acc ept ing Per son ,” a nd anot hersi gnatur e t hatis il le gible app ear s be low tha t a s a“W it nes s.” Def end ant ’s m oti on d oes notapp earinth e appe ll at e r eco rd. 1 0

-15-in which def endant murde red Cavin wa s espec ially heinous, and that de fenda nt had a long history of criminal behavior that continued even afte r he was incar cer ated. In mitigation, the defe nse argued that the murder was the result o f defe ndant’s continuing strug g le with substance abuse, and that defe ndant’s actions in jail wer e actua lly minor rela tive to the environment that he lived in. ¶ 80 After considering the fac tors in ag gravation and mitigation, the trial court considere d that the manner in which defe ndant s t ru ck C av i n ’s head war rante d a sentenc e “close r to the maxi mum as opposed to the minimum .” The trial court sentenc ed defe ndant to 55 year s’ imprisonment, with 1,587 day s of prese ntence custody cre dit ag ainst his senten c e, and a $925 fine. The trial court de nied def endant’ s motion t o rec onsider, and de fenda nt appea led. ¶ 81 T h e Of

fi ce o f t h e State Appellate Def ender
, appointed on April 28, 2011, repr esents defe ndant on appe al. On J uly 25, 2012, appointed counsel filed a brief and argument on behalf of defendant. Defe ndant then filed a pro se brief and argum en t o n Marc h 20, 2013, entitled “Supplemental Br ei f [ sic ] and Arg ument For Def

endant- Appellant Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 3 4 1 (b ). ” In his pro se brief, defe ndant makes numerous additional claims of trial court errors and ineffec tive assistance of counsel at the suppression hearing and at tria l. Defe ndant states that his pro sebrief is intended to supplement the brie fs filed by his appellate counsel beca use his counsel chos e n o t t o ra ise these additional issues on appea l. Since defe ndant is repr esente d by counsel and has made no reque st to proce ed pro se , we will consider only the claims raised by counsel. People v. McD onald
, 168 I ll. 2d 420, 435 (1995); People v . Thompson , 331 I ll. App. 3d 948, 951 (2002).

¶ 82 ANALYSI S ¶ 83 On appea l, defe ndant’s counsel arg ues, first, that his conviction should be reve rsed and

rema nded for a new trial by three rela ted chain- of-c ustody err ors: (1) t h e t rial court improperly admitted defe ndant’s bloodstain ed pants and boots into evidenc e despite a defic ient chain of custody ; ( 2) the assistant public defe nder provided ineffe ctive assistance of counsel at trial whe n s he did not introduce the hospital belong ings list into evidenc e to show that defe ndant’s boots wer e not seized at the hospital; and (3) the trial court denied the defe nse’s reque st to show a still shot from a video of an unidentified office r removing defe ndant’s boots in an interrog ation room at the police station. Second, counsel argues that the trial court err ed when it d enied the defe nse’s motion in limine to bar testimony that defe ndant threatened to cut Abel Smith’s and Har old J ackson’ s throats the morning of the homicide. Third, defe ndant’s appellate counsel argues that the trial counsel was ineffe ctive for not objecting to the State’s latent fing erprint analy sis. For the following rea s o ns, we aff irm.

¶ 84 I . Chain of Custody ¶ 85 The first claim is that the trial court err ed when it admitted defe ndan t ’s b l oodstained pants and boots into evidenc e despite a brea k in the chain of custody

. The admissi bility of evidenc e lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s decision may not be overturne d on appea l absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Bec ker
, 239 I ll. 2d 215,

-16-234 (2010). “An abuse of discretion occur s wher e the trial court’s decision is arbi tra ry ,

fanc iful, or unrea sonable, or wher e no rea sonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Bec ker , 239 I ll. 2d at 234. ¶ 86 When the State seeks to introduce blo o d s t ai n ed clothing into evidenc e, it must lay an adequate foundation either “ ‘through its identification by witnesses or through a chain o f possession.’ ” People v. W oods
, 214 I ll. 2d 455, 466 (2005) (quoting People v. Stewart
, 105 I ll. 2d 22, 59 (1984))

. “[W ]here an item has rea dily identifiable a

nd unique characte ristics, and its composition is not easily sub j ec t to chang e, an adequate foundation is laid by testimony that the i t em s o u gh t to be admitted is the same item rec overe d and is in substantially

the same c ondition as when it was re cover ed.” W oods , 214 I ll. 2d at 466. ¶ 87 In the case at bar, the State sufficie ntly established a fo un d at i o n beca use def endant’ s pants and boots wer e rea dily identif i ab l e b y unique characte ristics that wer e not easily subject to chang e. W

oods
, 214 I ll. 2d at 466. At trial, four witnesses identified the pants and boots a s defe ndant’s. First, the State prese nted the jeans a nd boots to Willi am Alston, who identified them, along with defe ndant’s leather jacke t, as the clothing that he observe d defe ndant wea ri n g the morning of the crime. Next, Serg eant Daniel O’Connor identified defe ndant’s jeans and boots a s the same clothing that defe ndant was wea ring at the time of his arr est. O’Connor also pointed ou t wh er e he observe d the bloodstains on defe ndant’s pants. After that, Offic er De ro n i s Cooper identified the black jeans and tan boots as the clothes that defe ndant was wea ring at the time of his arr est. And lastly
, fore nsic investigator Victor Rivera

identified def

endant’ s black jea

ns and boots as the items he rec overe d at the police st ation. Rivera testified that, besides the marking s made by the crime lab, the it ems

wer e in the same or substantially the same condition a s when he rec overe d and inventoried the clothing

. ¶ 88 As a result, the State established a sufficie nt foundation for defe ndant’s pants and boots beca use four witnesses identified the article s of bloodstained bl ac k j ea n s and tan boots as defe ndant’s. W

oods
, 214 I ll. 2d at 466. Be cause the State suffic iently laid a foundation for the pants and boots, it was not require d to establish a chain of custody for the evidenc e to be admissible, and the trial court did noterr when it allowed the items into evidenc e over the defe nse’s objection. W

oods
, 214 I ll. 2d at 466. See People v. Gilyard, 124 I ll. App. 2d 95, 105 (1970) (the State established a sufficie nt foundation for hat and g loves found at the crime

scene wher e witnesses identified the items as t h o s e worn by defe ndant during the crime) ; People v . Krist ovich , 32 I ll. App. 3d 979, 985 (1975) ( foundation suffic ient wher e witness identified clothingexhibi ts as her own). ¶ 89 Def

endant’ s counsel argues that since the pant s an d b o o t s contained bloodstains, the State neede d to establish a sufficie nt chain of custody
, rathe r than witness identification, for the items to be admissible. Counsel argues th at co u rt s have found that blood is a highly fung ible, highly transfe rra ble substance that require s a chain of custody t o ensure that the evidenc e is prese rved and cites three case s: (1) People v. W inters
, 97 I ll. App. 3d 288, 295-96 (1981) (discussing chain- of-c ustody require ments for admitting a blood sample); (2) People v. Shif let
, 125 I ll. App. 3d 161, 178-79 (1984) (cha in of custody established for admission of a vial of victim’s blood); and (3) People v. Bradney
, 170 I ll. App. 3d 839, 864-65 (1988) (same)

. See also 725 I L CS 5/116-3 (West 2012) (p ro c e d u r e f o r s e curing postconviction DNA

-17-testing r equire s defe ndant to establish a cha in of custody for phy sical items to be tested). ¶ 90 Def

endant’ s counsel also points to two 30-year old case s wher e courts applied a cha in-ofcustody analy sis to clothing exhibi ts that contai n ed biologica l materia l. In People v. Gholston
, 124 I ll. App. 3d 873, 890-9 1 (1 984), the appellate court analy zed the chain of custody of the defe ndant’s pants and underw ear that wer e later shown to contain mucus and spermatozoa. In People v. Rogers
, 42 I ll. App. 3d 499, 501 (1 9 76), the appellate court examined the chain of custody for bloody shorts admitted at trial. Counsel argues that, while foundation may have been proper for t h e ar ticles of clothing alone, the fac t that they contained visible samples of blood meant that the State was require d t o s h o w a sufficie nt chain of custody to establish a founda

tion for the evide nce. ¶ 91 Howeve r, the W inters
, Shiflet
, and Bradney case s cited by d e f endant’ s counsel c oncer

ned vial o r s am p l es of blood rathe r than bloody clothing. W inters
, 97 I ll. App. 3d at 295-96; Shiflet
, 125 I ll. App. 3d at 178-79; Bradney , 170 I ll. App. 3d at 864-65. While a sample of blood in itsel f m ay require a sufficie nt chain of custody for admissibili ty , the blood in the i n stant case was contained on unique article s of clothing that wer e identified by sever al witnesses at trial. Once the blood samples wer e rec overe d from the clothing, then they wer e subject to the chain- of-c ustody pro c edure s used for samples of biological materia l. Howeve r, the defen s e n ev er raised a challeng e to the chain of custody of the blood afte r the samples

wer e re moved from the c lothing. ¶ 92 Fur

thermore
, while the appellate cour t i n the Gholston and Rogers case s analy zed the chain of custody for clothing exhibi ts that contained biologica l materia l, neither case states that such an analysis is require d or that the Sta t e m ust prove a chain of custody in such instances. Gholston , 124 I ll. App. 3d at 890-91; Rogers
, 42 I ll. App. 3d at 501. Rather, our supreme court in W

oods held that a chain of custody is not require d wher e an item has rea dily identifiable and unique charac teristics, and its composition is not easily subject t o chang e. W ood s , 214 I ll. 2d at 466. Since the composition of the pants and boots wer e not easily subject to chang e, and sever al witnesses identified the items through unique characte ristics, the State did not need to establish a chain of custody

. The State laid a sufficie nt f oundation for the exhibi ts, and the trial court did not err when i t admi tted the pants and boots into evidenc e at tria l. ¶ 93 Even if the St at e failed to establish a sufficie nt foundation, the trial court’s err or wa s harmless beyond a rea sonable doubt. People v. Thurow
, 203 I ll. 2d 352, 363 (2003) (citing United St a t es v. Olano
, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993))

. The evidenc e at trial showed that defe ndant was ang ere d by Sharon’s comments, and that he acte d ag gressively toward Cavin throughout the morning . Def endant wa s then observe d approa chingthe house with a knife in his pocket, and then observe d leaving the home shortly befor e Cavin was discovere d dead in the baseme nt. The police rec ov er ed a bloody shovel at the home, which contained defe ndant’s fing erprints. E v en if the clothing had been excluded at trial, there was still

overwhelming e vidence that defe ndant was guilty beyond a re asonable doubt.

¶ 94 I I . Hospital Be longing s L ist ¶ 95 The second claim is that the assistant public defe nder provided ineffe ctive assistance at

-18-trial when she did not prese nt defe ndant’s hospital belong ings list to c halleng e the chain of

custody of the clothing exhibi ts. “ ‘The six th and fourtee nth amendment of the United States Constitution guara

ntee the fundame ntal right of a defe ndant in a cri m i n al case to be eff ectively assisted by counsel.’ ” People v. Y oung , 347 I ll. App. 3d 909, 927 (2004) (quoting People v. Spann
, 332 I ll. App. 3d 425, 429 (2002), citing U.S. Const., amends. VI
, XIV). A

succe ssful claim of ine f

f e c ti v e a s s is tance of counsel require s a two-prong ed showing : (1) that counsel’s repr esentation falls below an objective sta n d ar d of rea sonablene ss; and (2) that there is a rea sonable probability that, but for counse l’s defic ient perf ormanc e, the r esult of the trial would have been differ ent. Strickland v. W ashington
, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); People v . Albanese , 104 I ll. 2d 504, 525 (1984). I f we c an dismiss on the second prongfor failure to show prejudice , we ne ed not discuss the first prong

. Albanese
, 104 I ll. 2d at 527. ¶ 96 Wit h respe ct to the second prong , defe ndant’s appellate counsel argues that the assistant public defe nder failed to p re s ent the hospital belong ings list at trial to attack the chain of custody of defe ndant’s pants and boot s

. T he list shows that defe ndant’s pants, shirt, and socks wer e remove d at the hospital and gi v en t o a p olice office r, presumably Serg eant Boone
, who then signe d the form. Counsel argues that the list would have had had the eff ect of proving a g ap in the chain of custody
, since fore nsic investigator Rivera testified that he

rec overe d the clothes at the Are a 2 police station and did not state Boone obtained possession of the items first. ¶ 97 Howeve r, the assist an t p ub l i c d ef en d er ’s perf

ormanc e did not prejudice defe ndant beca use, as discussed in section I
, the State was not require d to prove a chain of custody for defe ndant’s clothing. W

oods
, 214 I ll. 2d at 466. Even if the hospital belong ings list wer e prese nted at trial, it would have had no eff ect on the outcome of the c ase be cause the State laid a proper foundation for defe ndant’s pant s an d boots through witness identification. W oods , 214 I ll. 2d at 466. ¶ 98 Also, as previously stated in section I
, even if the clothing had been excluded at t ri al, there was still overwhelming evidenc e that defe ndant was guilty beyond a rea sonable doubt. The evidenc e at trial showed that defe ndant acte d ag gressively toward Cavin and threatened him, that defe ndant was observe d in the house near the time of the murder, and that defe ndant’s fing erprints wer e on a bloody shovel found at the crime scene

. Since defe ndant

was not prejud i ce d by his counsel’s failure to prese nt his hospital belong ings list, the assistant public defe nder did not provide ineffe ctive assistance of counsel, and we need not consider counsel’s perf

ormanc e with respe ct to the first prong

. Strickland
, 466 U.S. at 690; Albanese , 104 I ll. 2d at 527.

¶ 99 I I I . Ex clusion of the Interrog ation Video ¶ 100 The third claim is that the trial court err ed when it barr ed the defe nse from showing a still frame from a

video re cordingof def

endant in an Area

2 interrog ation room. A trial cour t’s finding conce rning whether evidenc e is rele vant and admissible will not be reve rsed absent

a clea r abuse of discretion. People v. Morgan
, 197 I ll. 2d 404, 455 (2001) (citing People v. Haye s , 139 I ll. 2d 89, 130 (1990))

. As stated, “[a]n abuse of discretion occur s wher e the trial court’s decision is arbitra ry , fanc iful or unrea sonable [citation] or wher e n o rea sonable

-19-person would agree with the position adopted by the trial court.” Bec ker
, 239 I ll. 2d at 234.

¶ 101 The fede ral constitution guara ntees the right of an acc used to prese nt a defe nse, including evidenc e to rebut the State’s version of events. U.S. Const., amend. VI ; W ashington v. Texas
, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967); People v. Manion
, 67 I ll. 2d 564, 576 (1977). “Evidenc e is admissible if it is rele vant to an issue in dispute and its prejudicia l eff ect does not outweigh its proba tive value.” People v. Ross
, 395 I ll. App. 3d 660, 678 (2009) (citing People v. Patterson
, 1 9 2 I ll. 2d 93, 114-15 (2000))

. “Evidenc e is considere d rele vant if it has any tendenc y to make the exis tence of any fac t that is of conseque nce to the deter mination of an action either more or less probable than it would be without the evidenc e.” Morgan
, 197 I ll. 2d at 455-56 (citing People v. Illgen
, 145 I ll. 2d 353, 356-66 (1991))

. A trial court may bar evidenc e on the grounds of rele vancy if the evidenc e is remote, uncer tain, or speculative. Morgan , 197 I ll. 2d at 456 (citing People v . Clouti er , 156 I ll. 2d 483, 501 (1993)). ¶ 102 Def

endant’ s counsel argues in its brief that the defe nse twice sought to prese nt a “short video clip depicting an unnamed office r seizing [defendant’ s] boots at Are a 2 befor e [defendant] was taken to the hospital,” and that the t ri al court barr ed this evidenc e both times. This is an incorre ct statement of the fac ts beca use the appellate rec ord shows that the defe nse never attempted to play a video clip at trial. Rather, during the cross-e x amination of fore nsic investigator Rivera, the defe nse informe d the trial court that it intende d to present

a still fra me from the video, and the trial court denied the reque st. After war ds, befor e t h e State rested, the defe nse twice informed the trial court that it intended to play a cl ip of the video in the future during its case -in-chie f, but both times the trial court stated that the issue

was not yet befor e the trial court, though it “proba bly would not” allow t h e v i d eo t o be
prese nted later . The de fensenever actua lly attempted to play the video at any other time at trial. ¶ 103 As a result, o u r re view is limit ed to the trial court’s decision to bar the defe nse fr om prese nting a still fra

me of the video during Rivera’ s cross-e x amination. Rivera testified on direc t examination that he “re cover ed” defe ndant’s boots. During the cross-e x amination, the defe nse informed the trial court that it intended to show a single frame from the video, which would show th re e p olice office rs in an Are a 2 interrog ation room with defe ndant. The defe nse stated that it would first ask Rivera if he persona lly remove d defe ndant’s boots, and if Rivera said no, the still video would not be prese nted. I f Rivera said yes, then the defe nse would prese nt the still shot and ask Rivera if he was one of the office rs depicted in the frame, with his anticipated answe r being no. The trial court barr ed the prese ntation of a still frame, and when the cro s s -e x amination resumed, Rivera explained that, although he rec overe d defe ndant’s boots at the Are a 2 police statio n , h e did not rec all who persona lly remove d defe ndant’s boots. On appea l, defe ndant’s counsel arg ues that the trial cour t improperly barr ed the prese ntation of a still video frame beca use it would have impeache d Rivera, who had just testified that he rec overe d defe ndant’s boots. Vancil v. Fletche r , 90 I ll. App. 2d 277, 284 (1967) (findi n g defe ndant m ay impeach a witness’s equivocal answers); Edward Don Co. v. Industrial Comm’n
, 344 I ll. App. 3d 643, 652 (2003) (finding impeachm en t proper wher e witness denie s makingprior inconsistent statement or g ives unequivoca l a nswers to questi o n conce rning prior statement); People v. Preston
, 341 I ll. 407, 419 (1930) (same)

. Additionally , counsel a

rgues that the still video is relevant be cause it attacks the weig ht of

-20-the evidence by showing that the pol ice’ s handli n g l ef t a b re ak in the chain of custody for defe ndant’s boots. The trial court did not err when it barr ed the defe nse from showing a still shot from the video beca use it was not impeachi n g R ivera ’s testimony

. Although Rivera testified that he “re cover ed” defe ndant’s boots at the Are a 2 police station, he did not state that he actua lly remove d the boots from defe ndant’s fee t. When asked on cross-e x amination
to clarify how he came in t o p o s s es s ion of defe ndant’s boots, Rivera stated that he did not

rec all if he personally remove d defe ndant’s boots or i f another pol ice officer had re moved them befor e Rivera arrived at the police station. Since Rivera testified that he only rec overe d the boots and did not persona lly remove them from defe ndant, video evidenc e of another
p o li c e o f f ic e r removing defe ndant’s boots does not impeach or contra dict Rivera’ s te s ti mo ny

. ¶ 104 Fur

thermore
, as the trial court corre ctly noted, the st ill im age s h o ws only one moment from the entire time that defe ndant was in custody
, which is inconclusive to the question of who remove d the boots from defe ndant’s fee t. A still video imag e would not impeach Rivera beca use the prese ntation of a single moment in time would not be deter minative of whether he re covered defe ndant’s boots. Also, prese nting a still imag e would not undermine the boots’ chain of custody beca use it would be impossibl e to deter mine who actua lly remove d the boots, which police office rs handled the boots, and how the boots wer e inventoried. As

we explained in section I
, four witnesses identified the boots as belong ing to defe ndant, and the State was not re quired to demonstrate a chain of custody to lay a suff icient foundation. W oods
, 214 I ll. 2d at 466. Thus, the trial court did not err when it barr ed the defe nse fr om prese nting a still vid eo shot that neither impeache d Rivera nor undermined the State’s evidenc e. ¶ 105 Also, the trial court’s err or was harmless beyond a re as o n ab l e d o ub t b ec au s e, as discussed i n sections I and I I
, the evidence ag ainst defe ndant was overwhe lming. Thurow
, 203 I ll. 2d at 363 (citing Olano
, 507 U.S. at 734). Th e evidence at trial showed that defe ndant had a motive and o p p o rt u n ity to kill Cavin, and that his palm prints wer e discovere d on the murder wea pon. Even if the defe nse had impeache d Rivera, there was still

overwhelming e vidence that defe ndant was guilty beyond a re asonable doubt.

¶ 106 IV. Ver bal Thre ats Ag ainst Abel Smith and Harold Jackson ¶ 107 The fourth claim is that the trial court err ed when it allowed the State to prese nt e vidence that defe ndant verba lly threa tened to cut Abel Smith’s and Har old J ackson’ s throats the morning of the crime. The admissibili ty of evidenc e, including other crimes evidenc e, is left
to the trial court’s discretion and will not be overturned ab s ent a clea r abuse of di scre tion. Illgen
, 145 I ll. 2d at 364. As stated, “ [a] n abuse of discretion occur s wher e the trial court’s decision is arbitra

ry , fanc iful or unrea sonable [citation] or wher e no rea sonable person would
agree with the position adopted by the trial cour

t.” Bec ker , 239 I ll. 2d at 234. ¶ 108 Other crimes evidence is admissible if it is relevant to a prope r i ssue, s uch as “motive, intent, identity
, absenc e of mistake or acci d en t , mo d u s operandi
, or the exis tence of a

common plan or design.” People v. Norwood
, 362 I ll. App. 3d 1121, 1128-29 (2005) (citing People v. W

ilson
, 214 I ll. 2d 127, 135-36 (2005))

. Evidence of other crimes is admissible to prove any materia l fac t rele v an t to the case , but is inadmissible if only rele vant to

-21-demonstrate a defe ndant’s propensity to eng ag e in criminal activity

. Norwood
, 362 I ll. App.

3d at 1128 (citing People v. Donoho
, 204 I ll. 2d 159, 170 (2003), and People v. Hendrick s , 137 I ll. 2d 31, 52 (1990))

. The trial court may exclude evidenc e of other crimes if its prejudicia l eff

ect substantially outweighs its probative value. Illgen
, 145 I ll. 2d at 365. When the prior conduct is intrinsic to the matter being charg ed as a “continuing course of conduct,” other crimes evidenc e may be admitted if it is rele vant to establish a materia l issue, and the
g ener al principles of rele vance apply

. People v. Manuel
, 294 I ll. App. 3d 113, 123-24 (1997). Gene rally
, threats by a defe ndant ag ainst a third party are not admissible unless “ ‘ “the

connec tion betwee n them and the dece ased is such that u n der cer tain circ umstances the threat would import harm to or host ility toward the dec ea s ed

. ” ’ ” People v. Szudy
, 262 I ll. App. 3d 695, 706 (1994) (quoting People v. W illiams
, 8 5 I l l

. App. 3d 850, 856 (1980), quoting People v. S

co t t , 2 8 4 I ll. 465, 474-75 (1918) (“The g ener al rule also is, that a threat by the

acc used to kill or injure a person other than the dece ased, or a mer e idle thre at of a g ener al
nature not direc ted to any particula r person, is not admissible to sh o w malice towards the dece ased.” )). “The threat must in some way be linked to the victim.” W illiams
, 85 I ll. App. 3d at 856 (c iting People v . W atkins , 34 I ll. App. 3d 369, 374 (1975)). ¶ 109 In the case at bar, defe ndant’s counsel argues that defe ndant’s threats to Abel Smith and Har old J ackson wer e inadmissible beca use they wer e not direc ted toward Cavin and bore no

connec tion to his death. At trial, Abel testified that defe ndant threatened to cut his throat the morning of the crime, and Wil lia m Al s t o n t estified that defe ndant confr onted Har old and simil arly threa

tened to cut Harold’s throat. Counsel argues that Cavin was not prese nt during either incident, and that the State did not establish a connec tion betwee n defe ndant’s threats and a thr eat of

harm to Cavin. ¶ 110 However
, wh er ea s evidenc e of other crimes may be admissible to show, amongother things, motive, intent, identity
, absenc e of mistake or acc ident, modus op erandi
, or the exis tence of a common plan or design ( Norwood
, 362 I ll. App. 3d at 1128 (citing W ilson
, 214 I ll. 2d at 135-36)), r eleva

nt evidence mere ly tends to “ ‘make the exist ence of any fac t that is of conseque nce to the de termination of the a ction more proba ble or less probable than it would be without the evidenc e.’ ” People v. Stewart
, 105 I ll. 2d 22, 54 (1984) (quoting Fe d. R. Evid. 401). Her e, defe ndant’s threats to Abel and Har old constituted a continuing “cour se of conduc t” that led up to Cavin’s murder

. Manuel , 294 I ll. App. 3d at 124. ¶ 111 The evidenc e at trial showed that defe ndant spent the night drinking alcohol and smoking

cra ck coca ine, and then ar gu ed with and slapped his g irlfriend when she asked Cavin to watch her house while s he was in I owa. Maurice hear d def en d an t ar guing with Cavin that night a bout Cavin leavingthe house, a nd Abel aske d defe ndant not to put his hands on his mother. Abel also observe d defe nd ant talking to himself and pacing in the kitchen, and defe ndant told Abel that Cavin had to l ea v e and that he would not leave unless Cavin left first. Def endant beca

me incre asing ly hostile and threatened to c ut A bel’s throat. Abel later hear d defe ndant confront Cavin in the baseme nt, and Cavin responde d that if defe ndant hurt him, then defe ndant would only be hurting himself. L ater that morning
, Wil liams Alston also observe d defe ndant’s temper flare when he started breathing on Har old’s food, to which Har old insisted that defe ndant back awa y

. Def endant responde d that he would cut Har old’s throat, and Har old pushed him. Def endant then left the house in Maurice ’s vehicle and

-22-returne d 10 to 15 minutes later with a knife in his pocket. W illiam and Ha rold quickly

left to visit a near

by g as station, and when they returne d a few minutes later, Wil liam obse rved defe ndant walking awa

y from the house. Inside, W i l liam discovere d a bloody shovel and Cavin dead in the ba sement. ¶ 112 These fac ts demonstrate defe ndant’s incre a s e d a g it a ti o n a n d e s c a la tin g h o s ti li ty , the foc us of which was Cavin’s ref

usal of defe ndant’s demands to leave the house. The incident beg an whe n S haron asked Cavin to watch the house. Def endant’ s ang er or jealousy continued throughout the night as he arg ued with Cavin sever al times, demanding that he leave

. Also, defe ndant beca

me incre asing more violent, as he first slapped Sharon, and then later threatened t o cut the throats of her son and his friend. This course of events culminated in defe ndant beating Cavin to death with a shovel in the baseme nt. As such, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it allowed the testimony that defe ndant had threatened Abel and Har old the morningbefor e the murde r. Illgen , 145 I ll. 2d at 364. ¶ 113 Even if the testimony conce rning defe ndant’s threats should have been excluded, the trial court’s err or was harmless beyond a rea s o n able doubt. Thurow
, 203 I ll. 2d at 272 (citing Olano
, 507 U.S. at 734). The e vidence at trial showed that defe ndant was with Cavin, and that d ef endant was observe d approa ching the home with a knife shortly befor e Cavin was discovere d dead in the baseme nt. Def endant’ s prints wer e discovere d on the bloody shovel, and defe ndant’s clothes contained bloodstains, which matched Cavin’s DNA profile. There

was overwhelming evidence to convict defe ndant beyond a rea sonable doubt even in the absenc e of thetestimony

that he thre atene d Abel and H arold.

¶ 114 V. L atent F inge rprint Analysis ¶ 115 The final claim is that the assi s t an t public defe nder provided ineffe ctive assistance of counsel when she did not reque st a Frye hearing conce rning the admissibili ty of I llinois State Police print examiner Anastasia Petruncio’s testimony that a palm print rec overe d from the bloody shovel found at the crime scene matched defe ndant’s left palm print. Frye v. United States
, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Servic e Co.
, 199 I ll. 2d 63, 77 (2002). A defe ndant is denied eff ective assistance of counsel when: (1) his counsel’s r epre sentation falls below a n objective standa

rd of reasona

bleness; and ( 2) there is a rea sonable probability that, but for his counsel’s defic ient perf ormanc e, the result of the trial would have been dif fer ent. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Albanese , 104 I ll. 2d at 525. ¶ 116 T h e d ec i s i on whether to file a pretria l motion is considere d trial strategy , an d t ri al counsel enjoy s a strong presumption that the failure to file such a motion was proper

. People

v. Spann
, 332 I ll. App. 3d 425, 432 (2002) (citing People v. Rodriguez
, 312 I ll. App. 3d 920, 925 (2000))

. To overc ome that presumpt i o n , t h e defe ndant must demonstrate: (1) that the motion had a rea sonable probability of succe ss; a nd (2) that the outcome of the trial would have been differ ent. Spann
, 332 I ll. App. 3d at 432-33. A re asonable probability is de fined

as a probability sufficie nt to undermine confide nce in the outcome. Spann
, 332 I ll. App. 3d
at 437 (citing Strickland
, 466 U.S. at 694)

. The question then, is not whether the defe ndant would more likely t h an n o t have rec eived a different verdic t absent the defic iency
, but whether in light of the defic iency
, he rec eived a fair trial resu l t i n g i n a verdic t worthy of

-23-co n fidenc e. Kyles v. W hitley
, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). Since the fac ts surrounding t ri al counsel’s perf

ormanc e are not in dispute and the claim was not raised in trial court, this court’s revie w is de novo conce rning assessment of the ultimate leg al issue of whether counsel’s omission supports an ineffe ctive assistance claim. People v. Berrier
, 362 I ll. App. 3d 1153, 1166-67 (2006) (citing People v. Davis
, 353 I ll. App. 3d 790, 794 (2004))

. De novo consideration means we perf orm the s ame analy sis that a trial judgewould perf orm. Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP , 408 I ll. App. 3d 564, 578 (2011). ¶ 117 I llinois follows the test outlined in Frye
, commonly called the “g ener al acc eptanc e” test, which dictates that “scie ntific evidenc e i s only admissible at trial if the methodology or

s c ientific principle upon which the opinion is based is ‘suffic iently established to hav e g a in e d
g ener al ac ce p t an ce in the particula r field in which it belong s.’ ” Central Illinois Public Servic e Co.
, 199 I ll. 2d at 77 (quoting Frye
, 293 F. at 1014). “A cou rt m ay deter mine the
g ener al acc eptanc e of a scientific principle or methodology in either of two way s: (1) based

on the re s u l t s o f a Frye hearing; or (2) by taking judicial notice of unequivoca l and undisputed prior judicial decisions or technica l writing s on the subject.” People v. McKown
, 266 I ll. 2d 245, 254 (2007). ¶ 118 Def

endant’ s appellate counsel argues that there is a long- standing debate in the scientific community conce rning the validity of latent print identification. In support, counsel c ites a 2009 National Resear ch Council (NRC) repor t, which opined that latent fing erprint analy sis,

as well as other fore nsic identification methods, has not “bee n rig orously shown to have the

cap acity to consistently and acc urate ly demonstrate a connec tion betwee n evidenc e and a specific individual source .” National Resear ch Council of the National Ac ad em ies, Streng thening For ensic Science in the United States: A P at h Fo rw ard 137 (2009), at https://www.ncjr s.g ov/pdffiles1/nij/gra nts/2 2 8 091.pdf. Counsel also cites an unpublished Maryland trial court order
, Mary land v. Rose, No. K06-0545 (Cir. Ct. Ba ltimore Co. Oct. 19, 20 0 7 ), wh ich ex cluded finge rprint analy sis from evidence after the trial court conducte d a Fryehearing. ¶ 119 Howeve r, over 100 year s ag o, our supreme court found that there is a scientific basis for fing erprint identification and that court s ar e justified in admitting this class of evidenc e. People v. Jennings
, 252 I ll

. 5 3 4
, 549 (1911). Si nce then, fede ral and state appellate courts have uniformly reje cted challeng es to latent fing erprint analysis. People v. L u n a , 2013 I L App (1st) 072253, ¶ 68. Though defe ndant’s appellate counsel claims that the unpublished Maryland trial court order reje cted the “g ener al acc eptanc e” of latent fing erprint analy sis, we

are unawa re o f t h e trial court’s standing on that issue. After the prosec ution withdrew the

case in state court, the fede ral di s t ri ct co u rt considere d the issue on the same rec ord and reje cted the challeng e to the fing erprint analy sis. United States v. Rose
, 672 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725 (D. Md. 2009). A fter the district court’s finding in Rose , the Mary land appe llate cour

t noted that the defe ndant h ad provided only a “sole citation *** to a circ uit court decision excluding fing erprint evidenc e,” and it reje cted the d ef en d an t’s arg

ument that latent print analy sis was not a g ener ally acc epte d methodology within the scientific community

. Markham v. State
, 984 A.2d 262, 274 n.7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009). Acc ording ly
, there is

no authority in I llinois
, or in any other state, to support the claim that it is err or for a circ uit court to not hold a Fryehearing c oncer ning the admissibili ty

of latent fing erprint analy sis.

-24-People v . Mitchell , 2011 I LApp (1st) 083143, ¶ 31.

¶ 120 Also, even if the assistant p ub l i c d efender err ed in failing to reque st a Fryehearing, defe ndant did not suffe r prejudice beca use there was still overwhelming evidenc e that he was guilty beyond a rea sonable doubt. The evidenc e at trial showed that defe ndant was angry and
acte d ag gressively toward Cavin, that defe ndant was observe d leaving the hous e jus t prior
to the discovery of the murder, and that the blood on defe ndant’s clothing matched Cavin’s DNA profile. S i n ce d efe ndant was not prejudice d by his counsel’s failure to object to the latent fing erprint a

n aly sis, the assistant public defe nder did not provide ineffe ctive assistance of counse l. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

¶ 121 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 122 For the fore g oing rea sons, we aff irm defe ndant’s conviction and sentenc e. First, the trial
court did not err when it admitted defe ndant’s bloods tained pants and boots int o ev i d en ce beca use the State established a sufficie nt foundation through witness identification. Second, the assistant public defe nder did not provide ineffe ctive assistance of counsel at trial for not introducing the hospital be longing s list since the State was not require d to prove a chain of custody

. Third, the trial court did not err when it denied the defe nse’s reque st to show a still shot from the Are a 2 interrog ation video beca use doing so would not impeach fore nsi c investigator Rivera. Four th, the trial court did not err in denying the defe nse’s m o tion in limine to bar testimony that defe ndant threatened to cut Abel Smith’s and Har old J ackson’ s throats the morning of the homicide beca use it established defe ndant’s continuing course of conduct of ang er and jealousy t h at cu l m i n ated in Cavin’s murder. And last, the assistant public defe nder was not ineffe ctive for not objecting to the State’s latent fing erprint analy sis since such me thods have be en g ener ally acc epted in the scientific community for over 100
year s. Also, we will not consider defe ndant’s pro se supplemental motion beca use defe ndant is repre sented by

counsel on a

ppeal a nd has made no reque st to procee d pro se

.

¶ 123 Affir

med.

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