PB96-916202

NTSB/HAR-96/02

NATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY

BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

HIGHWAY/RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT

Collision of Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter

Railroad Corporation (METRA) Train and

Transportation Joint Agreement School District 47/155

School Bus at Railroad/Highway Grade Crossing 

in Fox River Grove, Illinois, on October 25, 1995

6626C
Abstract: This report explains the collision of a Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation commuter train with a Transportation Joint Agreement School District 47/155 school bus that

was stopped at a railroad/highway grade crossing in Fox River Grove, Illinois on October 25, 1995.

Seven school bus passengers were killed and the bus driver and 24 bus passengers were injured.

From its investigation of this accident, the Safety Board identified the following safety issues:

the appropriateness of the busdriver’s performance; the adequacy of the school district bus routing and

busdriver monitoring and evaluating procedures; the road design; the railroad/highway signal interaction;

the coordination and communication between the Illinois Department of Transportation and the Union

Pacific Railroad Company and their oversight of the signal system integration; and the injury and

survival factors in the school bus.

As a result of its investigation of this accident, the Safety Board made recommendations to the

Secretary of Transportation, the Federal Highway Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration,

the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the State of Illinois, the Illinois Department of

Transportation, the Transportation Joint Agreement School District 47/155, the National Association of

State Directors of Pupil Transportation Services, the American Association of State Highway and

Transportation Officials, the National Association of County Engineers, the American Public Works

Association, the Institute of Transportation Engineers, the Association of American Railroads, the

American Short Line Railroad Association, the American Public Transit Association, and Operation

Lifesaver, Inc. The Safety Board also issued urgent action recommendations following this accident to

the Federal Highway Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration, and the State Directors of

Transportation.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine, pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the

agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable cause of accidents, issue safety recommendations, study

transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in

transportation. The Safety Board makes public its actions and decisions through accident reports, safety

studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and statistical reviews.

Information about available publications may be obtained by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Public Inquiries section, RE-51

490 L'Enfant Plaza East, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

(202) 314-6551

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from:

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(703) 487-4600
NTSB/HAR-96/02 PB96-916202

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY BOARD

Washington, D.C. 20594

HIGHWAY/RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT

Collision of Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter

Railroad Corporation (METRA) Train and

Transportation Joint Agreement School District 47/155 School Bus

at Railroad/Highway Grade Crossing in Fox River Grove, Illinois,

on October 25, 1995

Adopted: October 29, 1996

Notation 6626C
ERRATA

THESE CORRECTIONS SHOULD BE MADE

TO THE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED REPORT

IDENTIFIED AS FOLLOWS

HIGHWAY/RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT

COLLISION OF NORTHEAST ILLINOIS REGIONAL COMMUTER RAILROAD

CORPORATION (METRA) TRAIN AND TRANSPORTATION JOINT AGREEMENT

SCHOOL DISTRICT 47/155 SCHOOL BUS AT RAILROAD/HIGHWAY GRADE

CROSSING IN FOX RIVER GROVE, ILLINOIS, ON OCTOBER 25,1995

NTSB/HAR-96/02 (PB96-916202)

Page 7, Figure 3: revise injury citation for Bus Body seat immediately behind driver’s seat

(row 1, seat A), from F-14: AlS-l to

F-14 : AIS-O

Page 61: following text add

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

JAMES E. HALL

Chairman

ROBERT T. FRANCIS II

Vice Chairman

JOHN A. HAMMERSCHMIDT

Member

JOHN J. GOGLIA

Member

GEORGE W. BLACK, JR.

Member

October 29, 1996
iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................... v

INVESTIGATION ...................................................................................................................... 1

Accident Narrative ......................................................................................................................... 1

School Bus................................................................................................................................ 1

Train ........................................................................................................................................ 3

Collision .................................................................................................................................. 4

Emergency Response ..................................................................................................................... 4

Survival Aspects ............................................................................................................................ 6

Medical and Pathological Information .......................................................................................... 6

Meteorological Information .......................................................................................................... 8

School Busdriver Information ....................................................................................................... 8

School Bus Information ................................................................................................................. 9

School Bus Damage .................................................................................................................... 10

Train Information ........................................................................................................................ 10

Train Damage .............................................................................................................................. 11

Traincrew Information ................................................................................................................ 11

Toxicological Tests ..................................................................................................................... 12

Operations Information ............................................................................................................... 12

School District ....................................................................................................................... 12

Railroad ................................................................................................................................. 14

Description of the Accident Site ................................................................................................. 14

General .................................................................................................................................. 14

U.S. Route 14 ........................................................................................................................ 14

Algonquin Road .................................................................................................................... 14

Algonquin Road Grade Crossing Accident History............................................................... 17

Track ...................................................................................................................................... 17

Grade Crossing Traffic Controls ........................................................................................... 17

Railroad Signal System ............................................................................................................... 17

History of Algonquin Road ......................................................................................................... 20

Highway Signal System .............................................................................................................. 23

Railroad/Highway Signal Interaction .......................................................................................... 26

Documentation and Communication Between IDOT and the Railroad ...................................... 26

Tests and Research ...................................................................................................................... 29

School Bus Brake Lamps ...................................................................................................... 29

Event Recorder ...................................................................................................................... 29

Recorder Circuit Board ......................................................................................................... 30

Train Stopping Distance ........................................................................................................ 30

Warning Time Tests .............................................................................................................. 30

Activation of Crossing Warning Devices Tests .................................................................... 30

Audibility Tests ..................................................................................................................... 31

Sight Distance ....................................................................................................................... 31

CONTENTS
iv

Master Controller Event Log ................................................................................................. 32

Federal and State Oversight ......................................................................................................... 32

Federal Railroad Administration ........................................................................................... 32

Federal Highway Administration .......................................................................................... 32

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ................................................................. 32

Illinois Commerce Commission ............................................................................................ 32

Joint Training ........................................................................................................................ 33

School Transportation Standards ................................................................................................ 33

National ................................................................................................................................. 33

State ....................................................................................................................................... 33

Association ............................................................................................................................ 34

Action Taken After the Accident ................................................................................................ 34

Federal and State ................................................................................................................... 34

Task Force ............................................................................................................................. 38

IDOT and the Illinois Commerce Commission ..................................................................... 39

School Bus Transportation Safety ............................................................................................... 41

Nationwide ............................................................................................................................ 41

Illinois .................................................................................................................................... 41

Railroad/Highway Grade Crossing Safety .................................................................................. 41

Operation Lifesaver ..................................................................................................................... 41

ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................................. 43

General ........................................................................................................................................ 43

Accident Analysis......................................................................................................................... 44

School Busdriver Performance .................................................................................................... 45

School District Oversight ............................................................................................................ 47

Road Design ................................................................................................................................ 48

Railroad/Highway Signal Interaction .......................................................................................... 49

State and Railroad Coordination and Communication ................................................................ 52

Signal Training ............................................................................................................................ 54

Injury and Survival Factors ......................................................................................................... 54

CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................................... 56

PROBABLE CAUSE ................................................................................................................. 57

RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................................................................... 58

APPENDIXES

Appendix A — Investigation Information ........................................................................ 63

Appendix B — Abbreviated Injury Scale Table .............................................................. 65

Appendix C — Rail Signal System Information .............................................................. 67

Appendix D — Highway Traffic Signal System Information ......................................... 69

Appendix E — Excerpts from National Standards School Transportation Standards:

Recommended Procedures for School Bus Drivers at Railroad Grade Crossings .. 71

Appendix F — Task Force Recommendations ................................................................. 73
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On October 25, 1995, at 7:10 a.m., the

Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad

Corporation (d/b/a Metropolitan Rail) express

commuter train 624 struck the rear left side of a

stopped Transportation Joint Agreement School

District 47/155 school bus at a railroad/highway

grade crossing in Fox River Grove, Illinois. The

accident occurred after the school bus had

crossed the railroad tracks and stopped for a red

traffic signal, with its rear extended about 3 feet

into the path of the train. Of the 35 school bus

passengers, 7, 24, and 4 passengers sustained

fatal, serious to minor, and no injuries,

respectively; the busdriver received minor

injuries. The 120 passengers and 3

crewmembers aboard the commuter train were

uninjured.

The National Transportation Safety Board

determines that the probable cause of the

collision was that the busdriver had positioned

the school bus so it encroached upon the

railroad tracks because of the failure of: 1) the

Illinois Department of Transportation to

recognize the short queuing area on northbound

Algonquin Road and to take corrective action;

2) the Illinois Department of Transportation to

recognize the insufficient time of the green

signal indication for vehicles on northbound

Algonquin Road before the arrival of a train at

the crossing; and 3) the Transportation Joint

Agreement School District 47/155 to identify

route hazards and to provide its drivers with

alternative instructions for such situations. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the

Illinois Department of Transportation and its

many contractors, the Illinois Commerce

Commission, and the railroads to have a

communication system that ensures

understanding of the integration and working

relationship of the railroad and highway signal

systems.

The major safety issues discussed in this

report are: the appropriateness of the busdriver’s

performance; the adequacy of the school district

bus routing and busdriver monitoring and

evaluating procedures; the road design; the

railroad/highway signal interaction; the

coordination and communication between the

Illinois Department of Transportation and the

Union Pacific Railroad Company and their

oversight of the signal system integration; and

the injury and survival factors in the school bus.

As a result of its investigation of this

accident, the Safety Board makes

recommendations to the U.S. Secretary of

Transportation, the Federal Highway

Administration, the Federal Railroad

Administration, the National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration, the State of Illinois, the

Transportation Joint Agreement School District

47/155, the National Association of State

Directors of Pupil Transportation Services, the

Illinois Department of Transportation, the

American Association of State Highway and

Transportation Officials, the National

Association of County Engineers, the American

Public Works Association, the Institute of

Transportation Engineers, the Association of

American Railroads, the American Short Line

Railroad Association, the American Public

Transit Association, and Operation Lifesaver,

Inc. The Safety Board also issued urgent action

recommendations following this accident to the

Federal Highway Administration, the Federal

Railroad Administration, and the State Directors

of Transportation.

INVESTIGATION

Accident Narrative

About 7:10 a.m. on October 25, 1995, an

eastbound Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation d/b/a Metropolitan

Rail (METRA) express commuter train 624 en

route to Chicago, Illinois, collided with the left

rear side of a Transportation Joint Agreement

(TJA) School District 47/155 school bus at a

railroad/highway grade crossing in Fox River

Grove, Illinois. (See figure 1.) The collision

occurred on Algonquin Road near its intersection with U.S. Route 14 (US 14). The school

busdriver had driven across the railroad tracks

and stopped for the red indication of a highway

traffic signal. The northbound school bus, which

was waiting within the available storage space

(queuing area), had its left rear extending about

3 feet into the path of the train.

At the time, the Fox River Grove police

chief and the Area Traffic Signal Engineer from

the Illinois Department of Transportation

(IDOT) were in a parked car that faced Algonquin Road to observe the traffic signal at this

intersection for train and vehicular traffic problems. The police chief said that: the school bus

stopped on the south side of the tracks, proceeded across the tracks, and stopped near the

white-painted stop line; it was the only vehicle

in the queuing area; the railroad crossing gate

came down and bounced against the left side

(just to the rear of the center) of the school bus;

as the eastbound METRA train approached the

crossing, its horn was blowing; and the train

struck the rear of the school bus.

Two drivers waiting on the south side of the

railroad tracks saw the school bus in the left

lane across the tracks. They stated that the

traffic light was red when the crossing lights

began flashing and the gates came down. They

saw the north gate come down and hit the school

bus.

Of the 35 school bus passengers, 7 sustained

fatal injuries, 24 sustained serious to minor

injuries, and 4 were not injured. The school busdriver sustained minor injuries. The estimated

120 passengers and the 3 crewmembers aboard

the train were uninjured.

School Bus.—On the day of the accident,

the TJA school bus dispatcher called the

busdriver to substitute for the regular busdriver,

who was ill.1

 Arriving about 6:30 a.m. at the bus

garage, the substitute driver was provided a

route map on which the street names and the

stops were printed. She performed a pretrip

inspection of the bus and departed about 6:35

a.m., which was 20 minutes later than the

regular departure time.

She had never driven this route before,

either in a car or a school bus, when checking

routes in her role as the assistant director of

transportation.

She made her first stop to pick up passengers at 6:55 a.m. Because she was not familiar

with the stops on the route and the map was

difficult to read in the predawn darkness, she

asked one of these initial passengers to assist her

with the route, and he agreed to do so. She had

completed all but one stop on the route as the

bus approached the grade crossing at Algonquin

Road, where she stopped it on the south side of

the crossing, activated the hazard lights, opened

the bus door, and looked right and left. She said

that she did not see a train and therefore closed

the door and proceeded over the railroad tracks.

The passenger assisting the busdriver was seated

directly behind her and said that he looked both

ways and saw no train.

 

1 The regular school busdriver was absent that day, and the

regular substitute busdriver had been assigned to another

route.

3

A traffic signal system controls the intersection at Algonquin Road and US 14. Two

railroad tracks cross Algonquin Road about 45

feet south of US 14. The railroad/highway grade

crossing is equipped with active crossing

warning devices (gates, lights, and bell). Loop

detectors,2

 designed to detect the presence of

vehicles, are embedded in the pavement on the

north and south sides of the tracks.

The busdriver recounted:

I proceeded across the tracks because

the light [for Algonquin Road at US 14]

was red and I knew I had to go up there

[north of the tracks] and trip the sensor

in order for the light to turn green to

proceed through the intersection. It was

like moments that it [the accident]

happened.

She said that after the school bus had

crossed over the tracks, she did not believe that

it was extending into the path of the train and

that it appeared to have “plenty of room.” In

later statements, the busdriver said, “It never

entered my mind that there wasn’t enough room

for that bus to fit.”

Most passengers said they had been talking

to each other or sleeping during the ride. Some

commented that the noise level on the bus “was

not any louder than normal” and “was really

quiet” and that “people were talking calmly, like

in a restaurant, but not real busy.” Eight passengers reported that the music broadcast from the

AM/FM radio did not interfere with their conversations; nine passengers reported that they

heard the train horn. Four said that they saw the

crossing warning devices activate, and eight

recalled seeing the train before impact. Another

four passengers remembered standing up to

move forward in the bus just before impact.

 

2 Traffic Engineering Handbook, Fourth Edition, Institute

of Transportation Engineers, 1992. A loop detector has two

major components, an amplifier and an in-pavement loop

or sensor. The detector amplifier transmits its own energy

or electrical field and operates on the principle that a

vehicle resting in, or passing over the loop will unbalance a

tuned circuit and send an impulse to the amplifier.

From the back of the bus, passengers were

yelling, “a train is coming,” “we’re still on the

tracks,” “move the bus,” and “I think we’re

gonna get hit by a train,” recalled others.

Passengers recalled that such comments

were initially made in a joking fashion, but as

the train approached the bus, the yelled remarks

became serious warnings. The busdriver reported that her passengers were making noise; however, she did not understand that they were

warning her that a train was coming and added

that she did not hear the train horn, the crossing

bell, or the sound of the gate striking the bus.

She said that she was not aware that a train was

coming until it had struck the bus. The passenger assisting the busdriver with the route

recalled, although the busdriver could not, that

both the two-way radio with the TJA dispatcher

and the AM/FM radio were transmitting. He

said that he heard the train horn just before the

train struck the bus, and then both he and the

busdriver looked up into the rearview mirror at

the same time. They then simultaneously

exclaimed, “Oh!”. He also reported that he

observed the crossing gate in the mirror after

hearing the train’s horn. He said that “... right

before the train hit,” he became aware of the

others on the bus yelling about the train coming.

Several motorists traveling on US 14

reported that their traffic signal at Algonquin

Road turned from green to yellow to red just

before the collision. However, the busdriver and

passengers said that they never saw their traffic

signal on Algonquin turn green. Others who

witnessed the accident and who could observe

the same signal as the busdriver could only state

that it was red before the accident and green

afterwards.

Train.—The engineer of train 624 reported

that after arriving at the METRA terminal in

Crystal Lake, Illinois, about 6:30 a.m., he

inspected train 624 and its engine and performed an initial terminal air brake test. He was

satisfied with the inspection and test, and train

624 departed Crystal Lake on schedule at 7 a.m.
4

The train traveled eastbound at no more than 40

mph as it approached Cary, Illinois, the first

station southeast of Crystal Lake. The Cary

Station was not a scheduled stop for the train.

However, the engineer slowed the speed of train

624 to between 15 and 18 mph, as required by a

railroad timetable special instruction, to allow a

westbound train from Chicago, which was in the

station at the time, to discharge its passengers

and to provide time for the departing passengers

to cross the tracks. He then had a clear wayside

railroad signal (green aspect) just beyond the

Cary Station that permitted him to operate the

train at a maximum speed of 70 mph.

The engineer said that train 624 was traveling about 66 mph as it crossed the Fox River

bridge (about 2,300 feet west of the Algonquin

Road grade crossing) when he saw that the

school bus had crossed the first track at “a very

slow speed.” He reported that the sun was

coming up over a hill on his left but it did not

interfere with his view of the school bus. The

engineer considered that if the school bus

continued moving at that slow speed, it would

clear his train. However, because the school bus

was going so slowly, he placed the train throttle

in the idle position, made a full-service brake

application,3

 and sounded the horn. The

engineer stated that when he realized that the

school bus had not cleared the second track, he

placed his train brakes in emergency application.4

 He said that the bus came to a stop with

its rear on the railroad tracks in the path of the

train. (See Tests and Research section for more

information.)

Collision.—Train 624 struck the school bus

in its left rear side, and it rotated counterclockwise. The bus body and its chassis

separated and came to rest with the chassis

facing in a northwest direction and the body

facing south (approximately 42 feet apart from

each other). Gouge marks led up to the final rest

position of the bus body. The bus body struck

 

3 Operation of automatic brake valve in which reducing air

pressure in the brake cylinder applies the brake.

4 Substantial rapid reduction of brake cylinder air pressure

initiated to stop train in minimum distance.

and knocked down the breakaway traffic light

stanchion at the southeast corner of the US 14

intersection. (See figure 2.) Train 624 did not

derail, and its cab control car (the lead car)

stopped about 1,422 feet east of the point of

collision.

Emergency Response

The Fox River Grove police chief, after

witnessing the collision, immediately radioed

for assistance via his portable radio. After train

624 stopped, its engineer radioed his train

dispatcher and reported striking the bus.

The Cary Police Department dispatcher

received multiple 911 calls at 7:13 a.m., whereupon he notified the Fox River Grove Fire

Department and the Crystal Lake Regional

Command Center. Located on Algonquin Road,

about 350 feet southeast of the accident site, the

Fox River Grove Fire Department responded at

7:18 a.m. with an ambulance, a fire engine, four

emergency medical technicians, and two paramedics. The Fox River Grove assistant fire chief

arrived on the scene almost immediately and

acted as incident commander (IC), requesting

the Mutual Aid Box Alarm System5

 third alarm

response, which he later upgraded to a fifth

alarm response.6

 The IC established a command

post in the Algonquin Road and US 14 intersection and triage areas on both sides of the

school bus. Shortly after the Fox River Grove

Fire Department had arrived on the scene, 20

ambulances from 18 fire departments, as well as

2 helicopters, arrived and transported 32 of the

injured passengers to medical facilities. The

local hospital activated its disaster plan and

dispatched a doctor to the scene at 7:27 a.m.

 

5 Part of the McHenry County, Illinois, fire and rescue

disaster plan.

6 Third and fifth alarms request, respectively, chief officer

and 9 ambulance companies and chief officer and 15 ambulance companies.

6

An estimated 90 fire and emergency

response personnel and the McHenry County

Coroner’s Office responded and were directed

by a paramedic triage officer to assist in the

treatment and transportation of victims. Additionally, officers from 12 police departments

responded and assisted with the accident

investigation and traffic control. In less than 90

minutes from the time the collision occurred, all

seriously injured passengers had been transported to one of seven nearby hospitals. Table 1

lists the injuries reported in this accident.

Survival Aspects

The school busdriver, who sustained minor

injuries, was wearing the three-point lap/

shoulder belt available at the driver’s seat. Two

other lap belt restraints were available (in the

right front seat); however, none of the bus

passengers was restrained.

The seven fatally injured, as well as four

seriously injured, passengers had been seated at

the rear of the bus in rows 9 through 12. Four

passengers seated in rows seven and eight were

seriously injured. There were two seriously

injured passengers in rows 2 and 5 on the left

side. Fourteen passengers with minor injuries

and four uninjured passengers were seated in

rows 1 through 6. (For bus occupant seating and

injury distribution, see figure 3.)

According to witness statements, five passengers seated in rows 8 through 11 stood up

before the collision. One passenger was standing

at his seat in row 10 when the collision

occurred. The other four had reportedly moved

into the aisle and were attempting to move

forward in the bus. They were found in the aisle

near rows 6 and 7 after the accident. Four of the

five passengers who stood sustained moderate to

severe injuries and one passenger sustained

minor injuries.

Medical and Pathological Information

The minor to moderately injured passengers,

who were seated primarily in rows 1 through 8,

sustained concussions, contusions, lacerations,

abrasions, and fractures of the head and

extremities. The severely injured passenger in

row 5 sustained lung contusions, a skull

fracture, and a brain injury. The seriously injured passenger in row 7 sustained a concussion,

a skull fracture, and a contusion of his

Table 1 — Injuries*

TYPE Busdriver

Bus

Passengers Traincrew

Train

Passengers TOTAL

Fatal 0 7 0 0 7

Serious 0 10 0 0 10

Minor 1 14 0 0 15

None 0 4 3 **120 127

TOTAL 1 35 3 120 159

* Based on the injury criteria of Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830.2 of the International Civil Aviation

Organization, which the Safety Board uses in accident reports for all transportation modes. (For an injury table based on

the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) of the Association for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine, see appendix B.)

NOTE: Further references to injuries throughout the report are based on the AIS, except when referring to fatally injured

passengers.

** The railroad company estimated the number of commuter passengers.
7

AIS* INJURY LEGEND

>F - 15<AIS-3

F = Female 15= Age

AIS-0 No Injury

AIS-1 Minor Injury

AIS-2 Moderate Injury

AIS-3 Serious Injury

AIS-4 Severe Injury

AIS-5 Critical Injury

AIS-6 Unsurvivable Injury

AIS-9 Unknown Injury

* Abbreviated Injury Scale

a“<- - - - - - -Denotes post-impact location of

ejectees, not trajectory path

<---------- Indicates passenger movement

prior to impact

<--------> Passenger stood, could not run

forward

AIS-5 indicates fatalities

Source: NTSB (Not to Scale)

•

F -54: AIS-1

M-15 :AIS-1

F -14 :AIS-1

F-15 :AIS-2

F -14: AIS-1

M-14 :AIS-1

M -14: AIS-1

M -14: AIS-1

---

‘-’5:A’S-”=4=

M-14 : AIS-1

M -14: AIS-4

F-15 : AIS-1

F-15 :AIS-3

‘-14’A’S”-I

F-15:&5

F-15: AIS-4

‘M\- 15: AIS-4

5 J 4

laL

N

P

‘-’5’’’2’-’”=

F - 14: AIS-1

F - 15: AIS-0

M -16: AIS-1

M-15: AIS-1

M-14:

M-1 5:

AIS-1

AIS-1

F-14: AIS-1

F-15: AIS-2

M-16 : AIS-4

F-15 : AIS-5

M-16: AIS-1

M-15: AIS-2

F-18: AIS-5

M-16:~

M-14:~5

M-14:~5

L’ //

Figure 3 — School bus occupant seating and injury distribution diagram
8

spleen. The severely injured passengers seated

in rows 8, 9, and 10 sustained multiple contusions, lacerations, and fractures of the head,

shoulders, and extremities, and blunt trauma to

the internal organs, such as the lungs, spleen,

kidneys, and liver.

The fatally injured passengers, who were

seated in rows 9, 11, and 12, sustained multiple

fractures to the head and pelvis, and contusions

and lacerations to the internal organs, such as

the pancreas, liver, kidneys, spleen, and lungs.

All seven of the fatally injured passengers sustained severe skull fractures (some with facial

bone fractures) with subsequent massive brain

injuries. A circular 0.2- to 0.5-inch abrasion was

noted on the forehead of one fatally injured

passenger and another had a 1.2- by 2-inch Lshaped abrasion on the left side of the head. The

interior window frames and the perforated

sound panels inside the school bus were shaped

similarly to these abrasions.

Meteorological Information

At the time of the collision, according to the

witnesses, the weather was clear and cold (temperature about 33 degrees Fahrenheit), the roadway was dry, and the sun was rising.

School Busdriver Information

The 54-year-old school busdriver had been

hired by the TJA School District on August 1,

1983, as a secretary and bookkeeper. Between

April 1986 and July 1989, she served as a bus

dispatcher. She passed the Illinois written

school busdriver examination at the State testing

facility on January 2, 1987. She took the school

bus road test at the facility three times between

January 2 and 5, 1987, before passing it. After

obtaining her Illinois school busdriver permit on

January 5, 1987, which she has since renewed

annually, she substituted, when necessary, for

the regular busdrivers. She had a valid Illinois

commercial driver license (CDL) with a passenger endorsement, which expires on March 22,

1997. When she took the CDL test on April 19,

1991, she passed the knowledge and passenger

tests; however, she failed the air brake test. The

TJA School District thereupon submitted a letter

to the Illinois Board of Education stating that

she had been driving a school bus for over 2

years, which enabled her to be “grandfathered”

and receive her CDL. She also possessed a valid

Illinois driver license. Her driving record

showed no traffic violations or convictions.

The busdriver was selected on July 15,

1989, for the new position of assistant transportation director for the TJA School District.

Her duties included assisting the transportation

director with planning school bus routes, interviewing and hiring new school busdrivers, and

overseeing busdriver training. She supervised

the State-certified school busdriver trainers.

Although she was not certified as a trainer, she

was responsible for auditing and evaluating the

performance of 92 school busdrivers, including

the substitute drivers, and for monitoring the

performance of a secretary and 2 dispatchers.

She also acted as liaison between the school

busdrivers, the parents, and the school administration. Her personnel file contained many

letters of appreciation for her work with the

school district. No written evaluations of her

performance from her supervisor were on file,

either concerning administrative tasks or school

bus operation.

Since 1976, the Illinois Operation Lifesaver

program has provided instruction to increase

public awareness of hazards at railroad/highway

grade crossings and to develop proper driver

behavioral patterns at these grade crossings. A

Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP)

representative had presented Operation Lifesaver material to school busdrivers in the TJA

School District area on three occasions since

1988. Forty, 250, and 263 busdrivers participated at the presentations in 1988, 1989, and

1992, respectively. The busdriver who drove the

accident bus had attended the 1992 Operation

Lifesaver presentation. The training curriculum

does not address short queuing areas such as

that encountered in this accident.
9

Illinois requires school busdrivers to receive

4 to 8 hours of training by State-certified

instructors who cover various subjects on school

bus operation. The school busdriver completed

this mandated initial training course on January

22, 1987. The annual renewing of her school

busdriver permit required that she attend one 2-

hour refresher course each year. The TJA

School District provided 12 certification notices

that she had attended State-mandated refresher

courses between 1987 and 1995, and two of

these courses, according to its records, were

presented by Operation Lifesaver. The last

refresher course that she attended before the

accident was in June 1995 and covered the

“stop, look, and listen” procedures to follow at

railroad/highway grade crossings. In addition to

the State-mandated courses, in July 1989, the

busdriver attended and passed a workshop on

advanced school bus driving maneuvers.

The busdriver reported that she was in good

health. During her last work-related physical on

January 16, 1995, her hearing was tested and

found to be within the normal range. She wore

glasses to improve her vision in both eyes to

20/20 and was wearing them at the time of the

accident. The busdriver said that she suffered

from sinus problems during the winter. She

stated that she had taken an over-the-counter

medicine (Equate Suphedrine) on the morning

of the day before the accident and one over-thecounter medicine (Equate cold decongestant) for

a cold and sinus condition on the night before

the accident.

Before the accident, the school busdriver

and her husband had been on vacation for 6

days, returning at 9:30 p.m. on October 22,

1995, whereupon she went to bed between 10

and 10:30 p.m. On October 23, 1995, the busdriver awoke at her usual time, between 6:30

and 7 a.m. and went to work between 7:45 and 8

a.m. She drove a morning elementary school bus

route, performed her office duties, left work at 5

p.m., attended a meeting, and went to bed

between 10:30 and 11 p.m. She followed the

same basic routine the next day. On the day of

the accident, October 25, 1995, after sleeping

about 7 hours 30 minutes, the driver woke about

6 a.m. and reported to work at 6:30 a.m. She had

been awake for 1 hour 11 minutes and on duty

for 41 minutes when the accident occurred.

The school busdriver stated that she had

driven 21 of the 42 school days that year; she

would drive mornings or afternoons and sometimes both. She reported that before the day of

the accident, she had never driven either a

school bus or a passenger car over the Algonquin Road grade crossing.

School Bus Information

The 1992 American Transportation Company (Am Tran) 71-passenger school bus had a

Navistar chassis, a diesel engine, power steering, and an automatic transmission. Its gross

vehicle weight rating was 29,000 pounds; when

the accident occurred its estimated weight was

23,390 pounds. The odometer reading was

60,083. The school bus was approximately 8

feet wide, 10 feet high, 38 feet 4 inches long,

and had a 276-inch wheel base.

The school bus had 12 rows of 3-passenger

bench seats on the right side, and the first 11

rows of 3-passenger bench seats on the left side.

The last row on the left side consisted of a 2-

passenger bench seat. The bus was equipped

with a three-point lap/shoulder belt (emergencylocking retractor) for the driver and two other

restraints.7

 The bus had two emergency roof

hatches.

The school bus was equipped with an AM/

FM radio-cassette player and eight speakers.

One speaker was above the driver’s head and the

remaining left side speakers were above the

windows at rows 2, 8, and 11. The right side

radio speakers were above the windows at rows

2, 5, 8, and 11. The bus was also equipped with

a two-way radio and a paging system located in

front of and over the driver’s head. All interior

 

7 These had been installed for the children of the regular

school busdriver.
10

roof panels of the bus were perforated to

attenuate interior noise levels.8

The only defect mentioned in the chassis

manufacturer’s records was the recall and repair

of the bus’s fuel tank cage. School bus maintenance records did not indicate any recurring

problems with the bus, except for three alternator replacements in 1995. Safety Board investigators conducted a postaccident inspection of

the school bus and found no mechanical defects.

School Bus Damage

The inward deformation of the left rear side

of the school bus extended along the last 105

inches (8.75 feet) of the bus to a maximum of 40

inches at the left rear corner. Contact damage

and light gray paint transfers were found at the

left rear corner and extended 36 inches toward

the front. The left rear tire was punctured and

the same light gray paint transfer was found on

the tire. (The train was painted light gray.) The

rear frame members of the chassis were bent

rightward (the direction the train was going) at

approximately a 41-degree angle (with the left

side chassis frame rail bent 82 inches). The left

side floor had separated between rows 7 and 8.

The bus body from the cowling rearward (just in

front of the driver’s position) had separated

from the chassis during impact. The right side of

the bus sustained buckling inward between rows

7 and 10, extending from the roof down the

entire side wall. A 2 1⁄2-inch-long scratch was

found above the 10th window on the left side of

the bus. A dent with a yellow paint transfer

similar to the yellow paint on the traffic signal

stanchion was above and to the right of the 10th

window on the right side of the bus.

The windshield and eight of the left side

windows were completely broken out, and the

left side window frames were skewed and

buckled. Although the right side window frames

 

8 The Illinois Minimum Safety Standards for Construction

of Type I School Buses states in Section 4.2.17 that “thermal and acoustic materials shall be installed in the ceiling

and the sides of the body to reduce heat transfer and the

interior noise level.”

were bent inward and buckled, the glass in 10 of

the 13 windows was intact. The right front

entrance door had been torn from all but one of

its front hinges and was lying partially inside the

entranceway. The rear emergency roof hatch

was dislodged. The rear emergency door had

buckled severely and was partially open after

the accident. Scrapes were found on the top and

right side of the fuel tank; however, it was not

punctured, nor was there any leakage.

The interior of the roof was deformed inward and upward in the rear. The left side

seatbacks in rows 9 through 12 were displaced

rearward. The right side seats in rows 8 through

12 were either warped, raised upward, displaced

leftward, or missing seat cushions. The left side

seat in row 12 was displaced inward 17 inches

from the sidewall to the center of the bus.

The transmission gear selector was found

locked in the “drive” position. The upper part of

the steering wheel was gouged and bent to the

right. The driver’s side window was found open

3/8 inch. The radio control volume was found

on and turned up slightly more than 1⁄4 of a turn.

The clearance and dome light switches were in

the “on” position. The front heat and auxiliary

heat switches were in the “low” position.

Train Information

Train 624, owned by METRA and operated

by the UP, was transporting passengers from the

suburbs into Chicago. It consisted of a bilevel

cab control car,9

 6 bilevel passenger cars, and a

locomotive. At the time of the accident, the

locomotive was pushing the passenger cars from

the rear and the train was being operated from

the cab control car. The train length was 650

feet and its weight was 570 tons.

 

9 Cab control cars produce no tractive effort, but control

train movements via train line electrical connections to the

locomotive at the opposite end of the train. They contain

the same passenger seating configuration as the other

bilevel passenger cars.
11

The cab control car (no. 8751) had a body

width of 10 feet (with handrails extending an

additional 3 1⁄2 inches on each side) and was

equipped with a 97-channel radio and a WABCO two-chime whistle with two trumpets

directed forward. The cab control car was equipped with a headlight and an orange rotating

light, both of which were operating at the time

of the accident. The leading face of the cab

control car was striped with red and white

reflectorized paint.

Train Damage

The front of the cab control car sustained 7

inches of maximum inward crush to the left side

of the left collision post. Yellow paint transfers

were on the left rear side sill step and the step

was destroyed. The left end ladder and sill handhold were crushed. The speedometer cable

sheathing was damaged on the left side at the

first axle. The toilet drain pipe and water fill

pipe housing were damaged on the left side. The

left side sill step on the first passenger car was

broken. The second passenger car sustained left

side scrape marks. Postaccident inspection of

the cab control car revealed no unusual precollision conditions.

Traincrew Information

METRA train 624 had three UP crew members, including the engineer, the conductor, and

the trainman/collector. Neither the conductor

nor the trainman/collector was in the cab control

car when the accident occurred.

The 45-year-old train engineer had been

hired by the Chicago and North Western Railway Company (C&NW) on October 9, 1973. He

had worked as a machinist’s helper and machinist until July 16, 1976, when he transferred

to engine service. He was promoted to locomotive engineer on November 22, 1977, and has

operated freight trains and METRA passenger

trains since that time. He successfully completed

his last locomotive engineer certification

examination on September 1, 1995. He is

qualified to operate over a territory of several

subdivisions, including the Harvard subdivision

in which the accident occurred.

The engineer works as an “extra board”

engineer, filling in for regularly assigned

engineers as the need arises. He had operated

trains on the accident route since October 13,

1995, because the regular engineer was on

extended leave due to illness. That assignment

included operating several METRA commuter

trains between Crystal Lake and Chicago.

The engineer said that he was in good health

and was not ill, nor did he take any medication

on the day of the accident. His last physical

examination was on August 31, 1995. His vision

was 20/30 in both eyes and his hearing tested

within acceptable parameters. He was wearing

safety sunglasses at the time of the accident.

The weekend before the accident, the

engineer had been off duty and he spent his time

painting his house. From Monday through Wednesday (the accident day), he worked his usual

schedule, which involves operating four trains

daily. He normally awakens about 4 or 4:15 a.m.

and leaves for work at 5 a.m.; he commutes 1

hour and 20 minutes to work. He reports for

duty at 6:30 a.m. and takes a METRA train from

Crystal Lake into Chicago, arriving at about

8:30 a.m. Between 8:30 and 9:30 a.m., he takes

the train to the coach yard for cleaning and the

engine to another yard for refueling. He then

eats breakfast and sleeps at a nearby facility for

4 hours. He reports back on duty at 3:15 p.m.

and operates a train from Chicago to Winnetka,

Illinois, arriving at approximately 6 p.m. He

changes operating ends of the train and travels

back to Chicago, arriving at about 6:30 p.m. He

then is off duty from 6:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m.

(during which period he eats dinner) and goes

back on duty, operating a train back to Crystal

Lake, arriving at approximately 9 p.m. He goes

off duty at 9:30 p.m. and travels the 1 hour and

20 minutes back home, arriving about 11 p.m.

He eats a meal and falls asleep about 11:30 p.m.
12

On the accident day, he woke between 4:15

and 4:30 a.m. and arrived at work about 6:30

a.m. When the collision occurred, the engineer

had been on duty for about 45 minutes and had

been awake for about 3 hours, having had 5

hours sleep in his most recent sleep period, and

9 hours sleep in the previous 24 hours.

Toxicological Tests

Although not required by Federal regulation, the train engineer and the school busdriver

complied with the Fox River Grove Police

Department’s request for blood and urine samples, which were analyzed at the Illinois State

Police (ISP) laboratory in Maywood, Illinois.

The Safety Board had portions of these samples

sent to the Center for Human Toxicology (CHT)

in Salt Lake City, Utah, for analysis.

The ISP toxicological analysis indicates that

the school busdriver’s blood and urine, obtained

4 hours after the accident, were negative for

alcohol. The urine analysis detected acetaminophen, phenylpropanolamine, and pseudoephedrine. The CHT analysis of her urine sample detected caffeine, acetaminophen, pseudoephedrine, phenylpropanolamine, and chlorpheniramine. Her blood sample showed pseudoephedrine at a concentration of 36 nanograms per milliliter. No other drugs10 were found in her blood.

Toxicological tests conducted by the ISP of

the engineer’s blood and the urine samples obtained 5 1⁄2 hours after the accident were negative for alcohol and controlled substances. Additional CHT tests showed that his urine sample

contained caffeine and no other drugs.

Operations Information

School District.—The school bus was owned

and operated by TJA School District 47/155. In

1974, School District 47, which includes students from kindergarten through 8th grade, and

 

10 Amphetamines, barbiturates, benzodiazepine, cannabinoids, cocaine, opiates, phencyclidine, and metabolites of

these drugs.

School District 155, which includes students

from 9th through 12th grade, had entered into a

Pupil Transportation Joint Agreement. At the

time of the accident, the school district operated

72 buses varying in size from 12- to 78-

passenger capacity. Average age of the vehicles

was 6 years. The operation encompassed 2

counties, 99 percent in McHenry County and 1

percent in Lake County, with a total of 174

routes. About half of these school bus routes

crossed railroad/highway grade crossings. The

TJA School District had about 80 grade

crossings.

The TJA director of transportation, hired in

1984, had previously been a school busdriver

and later became a certified school busdriver

instructor for the State. His staff includes an

assistant director (the accident school busdriver), two dispatchers, and a secretary/bookkeeper. The director is responsible for monitoring and evaluating drivers, planning routes,

and establishing school bus specifications.

The transportation director said that school

district routes were planned and reviewed for

new school passengers and for route hazards

(dangerous or unsafe conditions, such as

vegetation obscuring stop signs, work zones,

etc.) during the summer and that he would

himself drive the routes, sometimes in his car

and other times in a school bus. He said that his

office used a commuter train schedule and the

school bus route schedule and coordinated them

in an attempt to avoid scheduling crossings at

times when train traffic might be present. He

also stated that he relied on community input,

driver input, and his own personal knowledge of

the routes for hazard recognition. He said that

upon receipt of a hazard report, his followup

procedure would be to go out and personally

look at the scene. He had not driven this particular bus route before the accident.

Drivers were supposed to report the hazards

they encountered, either verbally or by making a

note on their daily pretrip inspection form. After
13

receiving the report, the director or his assistant

would talk to the driver and make an appropriate

note on the individual route sheet. Safety Board

investigators examined the route maps provided

to the drivers of the accident route and found no

mention of any hazardous locations. The TJA

School District Handbook called for route maps

to be updated bimonthly and stated that drivers

should review each map for any corrections, and

initial and date the map to indicate accuracy.

The Illinois Vehicle Code 625 ILCS 5/11-

1425 requires school busdrivers to:

Stop when traffic [is] obstructed. No

driver shall enter an intersection or a

marked crosswalk or drive onto any

railroad grade crossing unless there is

sufficient space on the other side of the

intersection, crosswalk, or railroad

grade crossing to accommodate the

vehicle he is operating without obstructing the passage of other vehicles,

pedestrians, or railroad trains notwithstanding any traffic-control signal indication to proceed.

The regular school busdriver, who had

driven the route on which the accident occurred

for the previous 5 years, had a total of 16 years

of experience driving school buses. She stated

that she usually gets to the crossing where the

accident took place at 6:55 a.m. and does not

encounter any trains. If the traffic signal at US

14 is red, she stays stopped south of the tracks

until it changes to green before crossing the

railroad tracks. She said that she did not know

the size of the queuing area but felt safer staying

on the south side of the tracks. She explained

that if a car is in front of her waiting for the red

light to change, she knows that there is not

enough room for the bus to fit. If the traffic

signal at US 14 is green as she approaches, she

does her “stop, look, and listen” and remains

stopped on the south side of the tracks because

she knows that the light will turn red soon and

she does not want to get stopped behind a car

and fail to fit in the queuing area.

The regular substitute driver for this route

also said he stops the bus on the south side of

the crossing because he does not believe that a

bus could safely fit into the queuing area. He

proceeds across the tracks only on a new green

signal cycle to avoid having to stop in the

queuing area.

A school busdrivers from District 3 (that

transports the kindergarten through 8th grade

students)11 stated that she crosses the tracks

about six times a day in her personal vehicle and

that before US 14 was widened in 1990, the

storage area had been large enough to accommodate a car and a school bus. However, since

the widening, a school bus has to drive onto the

pedestrian crosswalk to fit. Therefore, she trains

the other two school busdrivers in her district

never to stop on the north side of the railroad

tracks. She said that it is difficult to judge the

rear of the school bus at that location because

the queuing area is on a downgrade. The District

3 school busdrivers travel eastbound on US 14,

and sometimes cross the tracks when the light is

red (if no cars are in front of them) because they

can make a right turn on red.

The TJA director of transportation is

responsible for establishing bus specifications

for school buses used in the school district. No

written or verbal recommendations or policies

address the use of radio equipment on the school

buses. The director stated that radio equipment

usage is at the discretion of the driver. He said

that the radio-tape cassette stereo system was

purchased as an information tool for the drivers

to obtain weather and traffic reports. The twoway radio is used primarily for communication

between the busdrivers and the dispatcher. He

also explained that the radio pacifies the students. The public address system is an academic

aid used on field trips when informational

cassette tapes are played. A representative from

a school bus manufacturer stated that about 40

percent of the school buses ordered in the

 

11 District 3 is a completely separate organization and has

only three drivers and six bus routes.
14

United States are equipped with radio-tape cassette players.

Railroad.—Movement of trains over this

territory is governed by operating rules, timetable instructions, and signal indications of an

automatic block signal system12 supplemented

by an intermittent automatic train stop system.13

On April 25, 1995, the UP acquired the C&NW

railroad; however, the railroad dispatching

facility that monitors and controls train movements remained in Chicago. At the time of the

accident, UP owned and maintained the tracks.

Under a “purchase of service” agreement, UP

crews operated and maintained the train

equipment owned by METRA.

Train operations through Fox River Grove

consist of 57 regularly scheduled METRA commuter trains and approximately 6 freight trains

daily. The weekday morning commuter train

service begins at 4:59 a.m. and ends at 8:09 a.m.

Service consists of 13 eastbound trains and 1

westbound train. The maximum authorized

speed is 70 mph for commuter/passenger trains

and 50 mph for freight trains.

Description of the Accident Site

General.—The collision occurred on Algonquin Road near the intersection of US 14 in the

Village of Fox River Grove, Illinois. Two railroad tracks cross Algonquin Road about 45 feet

south of US 14. The railroad/highway grade

crossing is “active,” meaning it is equipped with

gates, lights, and a bell.14 US 14 is an arterial

highway that passes through the village’s business district. A commuter rail station is located

adjacent to the intersection, and several busi-

 

12 The Association of American Railroads defines this as a

series of consecutive blocks governed by block signals, cab

signals, or both, actuated by a train, or engine, or by certain

conditions affecting the use of a block.

13 The Federal Railroad Administration defines this as a

system so arranged that its operation will automatically

result in the application of the brakes until the train has

been brought to a stop.

14 These are referred to throughout the report as “crossing

warning devices.”

nesses and a fire station are on Algonquin Road

just south of the railroad tracks. Algonquin

Road then winds through a residential area.

(Refer to figure 1.) The 1993 average daily traffic count for US 14 was 26,300. The 1995 average daily traffic count for Algonquin Road was

5,282. No pedestrian counts had been made at

the intersection before the accident.

U.S. Route 14.—US Route 14 is an east/west

highway with a posted speed limit of 35 mph

through the Village of Fox River Grove. The

highway extends across the northern part of the

state. Near the accident site, the highway consists of two westbound lanes and two eastbound

lanes, separated by a center turn lane. A 6-footwide striped pedestrian crosswalk extends

across US 14 east of Algonquin Road.

Algonquin Road.—Algonquin Road is a

north/south village street that intersects and

ends at US 14 and has a posted speed limit of 30

mph. The portion of street north of the railroad

tracks consists of one southbound lane, one

northbound 12-foot-wide lane, and a northbound

11-foot-wide lane (one left turn lane, and one

through/right turn lane). The Village of Fox

River Grove designated Algonquin Road a truck

route and imposed size and weight restrictions

on it.

Algonquin Road intersects the railroad

tracks and US 14 at a 75-degree angle. Eighty

feet south of the grade crossing, the northbound

approach is a 2.5 percent upgrade that transitions to a 7.7 percent upgrade leading up to the

grade crossing. Between the railroad tracks and

US 14, the roadway slopes down 7.8 percent.

The roadway is level 9 feet north of and 3 feet

south of the outer rails. (See figures 4 and 5.)

In addition to the stop line and the pedestrian crosswalk mentioned above, traffic signals

mounted on breakaway signal supports with

pedestrian signal indicators were on the southeast, southwest, and northeast corners of the

Algonquin Road/US 14 intersection. No stop

line was on the south side of the tracks.


17

Algonquin Road Grade Crossing Accident

History.—Safety Board investigators gathered

accident information from data bases of three

sources: the Fox River Grove Police Department, the UP, and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). The Fox River Grove Police

Department records had the largest number of

incident/accident reports for February 1990

through September 1995. These records indicated that during this period 20 accidents/incidents

occurred, resulting in no fatalities or injuries

(see table 2). Nineteen accidents/incidents involved vehicles striking or being struck by railroad gates; eleven involved commercial

vehicles.

In the month before the accident, on September 18, 1995, a pickup truck driver drove

northbound across the tracks after the crossing

warning devices had been activated. The pickup

truck’s rear bumper extended over the railroad

tracks and the driver drove forward to move off

the tracks, striking the vehicle in front of him.

An eastbound train then struck the rear bumper

of the pickup truck.

Track.—The double main tracks are approximately 13 feet 6 inches from center to center.

The accident occurred on the northern track.

The track is standard gauge continuous welded

rail, laid in 1982. The track geometry through

the crossing is straight and level.

The UP designated the track to meet FRA

Class 4 requirements and maintained it to meet

the track safety standards for this designation.

This class of track allows a maximum operating

speed of 60 mph for freight trains and 80 mph

for passenger trains. A review of the track

inspection records revealed no anomalies.

Grade Crossing Traffic Controls.—The grade

crossing inventory number is U.S. Department

of Transportation (DOT)/FRA 176 958L. Both

approaches were posted with a sign indicating

that two railroad tracks were at the railroad

crossing. The crossing was also equipped with

flashing lights, a bell, and two red and white

striped crossing gates, each with three round, 4-

inch-diameter lights attached. Sixteen round, 12-

inch-diameter, flashing lights were mounted on

the signal masts and the cantilever.15 The

cantilever was located on the south side of the

railroad tracks. Although Federal regulations

require advance railroad pavement markings at

active grade crossings, the site had none.

Railroad Signal System

The railroad grade crossing signal system

uses a microprocessor to calculate the speed of

the train and the time it will take for the train to

arrive at the crossing. The system activates the

crossing warning devices at a predetermined

constant warning time regardless of the train’s

speed. A constant warning time device, as

defined by the Association of American Railroads (AAR), provides a relatively uniform

warning time. This time will fluctuate somewhat

due to variances in the train speed and lump

impedance16 levels due to environmental, ballast, and track conditions. The amount of warning time is limited by the length of the approach

circuit to the grade crossing and the maximum

speed of the train approaching the crossing.

After a train enters an approach circuit, the

microprocessor takes approximately 4 seconds

(according to the operations manual) to measure

the rate of change in the circuit voltage, electric

current levels, and signal phase relationships,

and to calculate the train’s speed. The system

then determines the point in time (depending on

the train’s speed and its distance from the

crossing) at which to activate the crossing

warning devices to provide the desired advance

warning time.

 

15 Defined by the Association of American Railroads as “a

structure consisting of a ground mast and a horizontal arm

extending to one side, used to support one or more signals

as required for multiple tracks, or one or more highway

grade crossing signals.”

16 The tendency to impede the flow of current in a manner

similar to resistance.
18

Table 2 — Accidents on Algonquin Road

Date of

Accident Description of Accident

5/13/90 Driver of a northbound vehicle is blinded by sun and strikes gate.

2/01/90 After waiting for one train to clear, a northbound vehicle proceeds across tracks only

to have an approaching train reactivate the gate, which lowers and strikes the vehicle.

9/13/90 Driver of a southbound truck strikes gate and keeps going (hit and run).

9/15/90 Driver of a northbound vehicle strikes gate and keeps going (hit and run).

1/21/91 A southbound tractor trailer strikes gate.

5/08/91 As a southbound mixing truck is crossing tracks, the gate lowers between the cab and

the mixer and is broken off.

5/22/91 As a southbound van proceeds across tracks, the gate lowers, striking the vehicle, and

is broken.

6/25/91 As a northbound tractor trailer is waiting to turn left, the gate lowers, striking the

vehicle, and is broken.

7/06/91 As a northbound van proceeds across tracks, the gate lowers, striking the vehicle, and

is broken.

7/25/91 Car northbound on Algonquin Road strikes gate and keeps going (hit and run).

8/16/91 As the gate begins to raise, a plumbing truck begins moving and clips the gate.

10/25/93 As a truck northbound on Algonquin Road proceeds across tracks, the gate lowers,

striking the vehicle, and is broken.

1/24/94 As a truck northbound on Algonquin Road proceeds across tracks, the gate lowers,

striking the vehicle, and is broken.

7/25/94 As a tractor trailer is making a southbound turn from US 14 and is proceeding across

the tracks, the gate lowers, strikes the vehicle, and is damaged.

11/23/94 Driver of a southbound dump truck crashes through lowered gates. Driver is

subsequently charged with DUI.

12/13/94 Northbound vehicle that is stopped on the tracks backs into gate.

1/31/95 A vehicle rear-ends another vehicle on US 14.

5/05/95 Large southbound tractor trailer strikes gate.

5/08/95 Vehicle southbound on Algonquin Road strikes gate.

9/18/95 Two vehicles northbound on Algonquin are stopped in the queue area for a red light at

US 14 when railroad lights activate. Driver of second vehicle moves forward to pull

away from tracks and strikes front vehicle.
19

Although the microprocessor continues to

monitor and calculate the train’s speed and

distance to the crossing to allow for trains of

varying speeds, once the signal is sent to activate the crossing warning devices, the warning

time cannot be changed. If a train accelerates,

decelerates, or brakes after the crossing warning

devices have been activated, the train may take

more or less time to arrive at the crossing than

originally calculated.

The desired advance warning time for a

crossing signal controlled by such a microprocessor is entered into the unit by adjusting its

warning time switch, which is known as a

“thumbwheel.” During the 5 years before the

accident, the thumbwheel on the microprocessor

at the accident site had been set at 30 seconds

for the northernmost railroad track and the

narrow band shunt was connected to the rails

approximately 3,053 feet from the edge of the

crossing (or 3,080 feet to the center of the

crossing). However, 2 weeks before the accident

(October 11, 1995), the thumbwheel was reset at

25 seconds. According to the UP, the thumbwheel setting was changed to 25 seconds to

ensure consistency at that crossing and throughout the railroad’s property. UP officials stated

that the thumbwheel setting change did not

change the minimum constant warning time of

20 seconds. Should any malfunction occur, the

microprocessor is programmed to activate the

crossing warning devices immediately.

FRA regulations address required minimum

warning time in Title 49 CFR, Part 234.225,

“Activation of Warning System,” which states:

A highway/rail grade crossing warning

system shall be maintained to activate in

accordance with the design of the

warning system, but in no event shall it

provide less than 20 seconds warning

time before the grade crossing is

occupied by rail traffic.

The State of Illinois Requirements for Highway Grade Crossing Protection, Section VII,

“Operating Time,” states:

All protection devices shall indicate the

approach of a train for not less than

twenty (20) seconds before the arrival at

the crossing of the fastest train operated

over the crossing.

Title 92: Transportation; Chapter III: Illinois

Commerce Commission; Subchapter C: Rail

Carriers; Part 1535: Crossings of Rail Carriers

and Highways: Subpart C: Establishment,

Construction, and Maintenance of Grade

Crossings, at 1535.350, “Circuits,” states:

Automatic flashing light signals shall be

arranged to indicate the approach of

trains on all main tracks and on auxiliary tracks included between the signals

where the speed of trains approaching

the crossing exceeds 5 mph, for not less

than 20 seconds before the arrival at the

crossing of the fastest train over the

track.

The AAR, in its Recommended Practices:

Part 3.3.10, Recommended Instructions for Calculating Approach Warning Times for Railroad

Activated Highway Grade Crossing Warning

Devices Minimum Warning Time states: “Warning devices shall operate for a minimum of 20

seconds before a train enters the crossing.”

The Federal Highway Administration

(FHWA) Railroad/Highway Grade Crossing

Handbook states:

On tracks where trains operate at speeds

of 20 mph or higher, the circuits controlling automatic flashing light signals

shall provide for a minimum operation

of 20 seconds before the arrival of any

train. This 20-second warning time is a

MINIMUM (p.126).

A UP representative testified at the Safety

Board’s public hearing in January 1996 that:

We design our circuits for 25 seconds to

give a 5-second buffer...because there

are conditions out on the track that
20

make us unable to give an exact warning

time. These conditions are beyond our

control, and we know that this warning

time is going to fluctuate; so we put in a

5-second buffer to this 20 seconds.

He also stated:

...constant warning is more of a generic

term, and these boxes are not capable of

giving an exact constant warning for

every train coming toward the crossing.

There are too many variables in the condition of the soil, the traffic, etc., the

different types of train movements

toward the crossing. Some of them stop

at platforms to pick up passengers,

increasing speed, decreasing speed. So

there is no way this box can give an

exact warning for every train. But they

do process the information to try to

develop that time as close as possible.

The system, as designed, would provide a

maximum of 25 seconds before the train reached

the crossing in the case of a 70-mph train

traveling at a constant speed (about 103 feet per

second) crossing over an approach circuit

located 3,080 feet17 from the crossing with a

thumbwheel setting of 30 seconds. In the same

situation, with a thumbwheel setting at 25

seconds, the train would reach the crossing in

about 24 seconds, a 1-second difference.

In the case of a 50-mph train traveling at a

constant speed (73 feet per second) and a

thumbwheel setting of 30 seconds, the

microprocessor would delay activation of the

crossing warning devices for about 12 seconds

until the train traveled closer to the crossing,

providing about 29 seconds of warning time. In

the same situation, with a thumbwheel setting at

25 seconds, the microprocessor would delay

activation of the crossing warning devices for

about 17 seconds until the train traveled closer

 

17 This is the approach circuit length measured by the

railroad from the narrow band shunt to the middle of

Algonquin Road.

to the crossing, providing about 24 seconds of

warning time. (See figures 6 and 7.)18

When the signal is sent to the crossing

warning devices, the flashing lights activate at

the grade crossing and within 3 seconds, the

gates begin to descend. Federal regulations Title

49 CFR Part 234.223 state:

Each gate arm shall start its downward

motion not less than three seconds after

flashing lights begin to operate and shall

assume the horizontal position at least

five seconds before the arrival of any

train at the crossing.

At the accident crossing, once the microprocessor activates the crossing warning devices, the highway signal system is simultaneously sent a signal. This arrangement is known

as a “highway interconnect circuit,” which is a

normally closed circuit (containing a flow of

electrical current) that is broken when the electrical current is interrupted, giving an indication

to the traffic signal system that the crossing

warning devices have been activated. The

highway signal system then immediately begins

its railroad preempt sequence.19 (As the rail

signal system is very complex, more detail

concerning it can be found in appendix C.)

History of Algonquin Road

Before 1989, US 14 was a two-lane, twoway roadway. Traffic on Algonquin Road had

been controlled with a stop sign, and the area

north of the railroad tracks (between the US 14

curb line and the northern rail) was about 80

 

18 A lag time of about 8/10 second elapses before the grade

crossing signal is activated, meaning a thumbwheel setting

of 30 seconds at 3,080 feet produces 25 seconds rather than

26 seconds of railroad signal operation. A thumbwheel

setting of 25 seconds actually produces 24 seconds. (See

Tests and Research Section.)

19 The highway traffic signal sequence that begins at the

time the interconnect circuit is de-energized.
21

Train at 70 mph

Warning time thumbwheel setting at 30 seconds

Termination

r

Shunt (NBS-1 )

Time to crossing from detection point = 25.2 sec measured

Distance to crossing from detection point = 2588 ft calculated

B

Acquistio ‘mTime Delay Time

4 sec@1 02.67 ft/s 0.8 sec —= 410 ft

Not to Scale

Train at 70 mph

Warning time thumbwheel setting

Termination

T

Shunt (NBS-1 ]

at 25 seconds

Time to crossing from detection point = 24,2 sec measured

Distance to crossing from detection point = 2484 ft calculated

4 *

4 3,080 ft

4 ➤

Acquisition

Time Delay Time

4 sec@102.67 ft/s 0.8 sec

= 410 ft

No Activation

1 sec@102.67 ft/s

= 102.67 ft Not to Scale

I

I

.

#

-||-||

Figure 6 – Warning times for train at 70 mph
22

Train at 50 mph

Warning time thumbwheel setting at 30 seconds

Termination

r

Shunt (NBS-1]

\

Time to crossing from detection point = 29.2 sec measured

Distance to crossing from detection point = 2145.6 ft calculated

+ I

k I

~=

Time

4 sec@73 ft/s

= 292 ft

J

~ NO Activation

8 sec@73 ft/s

=584 ft

Not to ScaIe

I

I

Train at 50 mph

Warning time thumbwheel setting at 25 seconds

Termination

Shunt [NBS-1 ]

Time to crossing from detection point = 24.2 sec measured IDistance to crossing from detection point = 1781 ft calculated

r

kc=M

Time

L

~DelayTime

4 sec@73 ft/s 0.8 sec

= 292 ft

No Activation

13 sec@73 ft/s Not to ScaIe

=949 ft

I

I

.

Figure 7 — Warning times for train at 50 mph
23

feet long. In 1989, IDOT widened US 14 using

about 35 feet of railroad property, thereby

shortening this area to about 45 feet. In addition,

IDOT widened the Algonquin Road approach to

the intersection from a two-lane to a three-lane

roadway, adding a left turn lane for northbound

traffic.

During the road-widening planning stages,

the railroad expressed safety concerns to IDOT

and local communities about US 14 being less

than 50 feet from its railroad tracks. However,

IDOT completed the road-widening as planned.

The railroad/highway grade crossing on Algonquin Road had had mast-mounted flashing

lights, crossing gates, and a bell. Renovations

included adding a cantilever with flashing lights

at the grade crossing and replacing the stop

signs on Algonquin Road at US 14 with traffic

signals. (See upcoming section addressing communication for more information.)

Highway Signal System

In conjunction with the road-widening

project, the Algonquin Road/US 14 intersection

was equipped with a traffic signal system. A

highway traffic signal system alternately assigns

the right-of-way to different traffic movements

at an intersection. A traffic-actuated controller

changes the signal indications (green, yellow,

red). The signal indications in traffic-actuated

controllers assign the right-of-way in response

to variations in the level and speed of traffic,

and when vehicle volumes vary over the course

of the day. The accident intersection was equipped with roadway loop detectors to detect these

variations in traffic levels.

The IDOT designed and installed a computerized traffic signal system using a master

controller to coordinate the traffic movement on

US 14. The plan was to use the master controller

to synchronize and coordinate individual signal

controllers at three adjacent intersections, US 14

at Lincoln Avenue, Algonquin Road, and State

Route 22. However, once the equipment was

installed, IDOT was unable to coordinate the

traffic phases of the three intersections with the

master controller, and the three signal

controllers operated in an uncoordinated mode

for about 5 years.

When installed in 1990, the traffic signal

system at Algonquin Road was programmed

with six separate traffic phases and two separate

pedestrian phases. The crosswalk pedestrian

phase across Algonquin Road was programmed

to automatically display a pedestrian “Walk”

indication with every green indication for US 14

between 5:45 a.m. and 10 p.m. on weekdays. In

addition, if a railroad preempt call was received,

the same pedestrian phase was displayed.

Between 10 p.m. and 5:45 a.m. on weekdays and

during the weekends, the “Walk” display for

Algonquin Road appeared only when activated

by the pedestrian push-button.

However, because IDOT was unable to

coordinate the traffic phases through the master

controller between January 1990 and October

1994, the traffic signal controller at Algonquin

Road gave a pedestrian “Walk” indication only

upon activation of a push-button located on the

traffic signal support at the intersection. The

automatic pedestrian phase never operated

during this period. Because it was installed near

a railroad crossing, the Algonquin Road highway signal system was also designed with a

railroad preemption20 sequence, and it was

necessary to coordinate the railroad and the

highway signal systems. In this case, the

highway signals were interconnected with the

railroad signals at the railroad signal box. The

railroad system would signal the highway system, notifying it of the approach of a train. The

highway signal system then would begin its

preemptive sequence to allow time for vehicles

and pedestrians to clear the railroad tracks.

Between January 1990 and October 1994, if

a train approached while US 14 had a green

indication, the US 14 signal would change to

 

20 The transfer of the normal control of signals to a special

signal control mode.
24

yellow for 4.5 seconds, and then to red for 1.5

seconds, and then the northbound Algonquin

Road signal would change to a green indication.

The sequence would allow 6 seconds to elapse

before a green indication was displayed for

northbound Algonquin Road, unless the pedestrian button had been pushed. Had a pedestrian

pushed the button, the 12-second pedestrian

phase would have been displayed, allowing 18

seconds to elapse before a green indication for

northbound Algonquin Road was displayed.

In October 1994, new signal controllers

were installed at the three intersections and a

new master controller was installed and the

equipment operated in a coordinated mode. At

the time of the accident, the following railroad

preemption sequence was programmed into the

highway signal system if a train approached

while US 14 had a green signal indication and

the pedestrians crossing Algonquin Road had a

“Walk” indication:

1. A flashing “Don’t Walk” would

display for 12 seconds for Algonquin Road pedestrians;

2. US 14 green indication would

change to yellow for 4.5 seconds,

with a solid “Don’t Walk” indication for Algonquin Road;

3. US 14 yellow indication would

change to red for 1.5 seconds;

4. Algonquin Road red indication

would change to green for 12

seconds.

After the traffic signal system began operating in a coordinated mode, the preemption

sequence included the automatic 12-second

pedestrian clearance phase, thereby allowing 18

seconds to elapse before a green indication was

presented to northbound Algonquin Road to

clear traffic from the railroad tracks during a

railroad preemption. (As the traffic signal

system is very complex, more detail concerning

it can be found in appendix D.)

Testimony from IDOT's contractors indicated that the preemption sequence could take as

long as 21 seconds to reach a green indication

for Algonquin Road under certain circumstances. For example, if a railroad preemption

sequence occurred within 3 seconds of US 14

receiving a green indication, a 3-second delay

would occur during the preemption sequence.

This delay was programmed into the traffic

signal sequence to prevent motorists on US 14

from receiving a momentary green indication.

The Manual on Uniform Traffic Control

Devices for Streets and Highways (MUTCD)21

and the Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing

Handbook22 provide specific standards, guidance, and recommendations for safely controlling traffic at intersections. The MUTCD

was adopted as the official manual for the State

of Illinois in 1990. The 1988 edition of the manual addresses the design and implementation of

highway signal systems at railroad/highway

grade crossings in Part 8C-6, “Traffic Signals At

Or Near Grade Crossings,” which states:

When highway intersection traffic control signals are within 200 feet of a

grade crossing, control of the traffic

flow should be designed to provide the

vehicle operators using the crossing a

measure of safety at least equal to that

which existed prior to the installation of

such signals. Accordingly, design, installation, and operation should be

based upon a total systems approach in

order that all relevant features may be

considered.

 

21 The national standard governing traffic control devices

on streets or highways placed there by the authority of a

public body or official having jurisdiction to regulate,

warn, or guide traffic. Published by the U.S. Department of

Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, 1988.

22 A handbook provided and sponsored by the U.S.

Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, to provide general information on railroad/highway

grade crossings, FHWA TS-86-215, September 1986.
25

The MUTCD also provides directions for

designing a preemption sequence for traffic

signals to emphasize the importance of reaching

a clearing green indication for the affected

roadway as soon as possible. Under Part 8C-6,

the MUTCD states:

The preemption sequence initiated when

the train first enters the approach circuit, shall at once bring into effect a

highway signal display which will permit traffic to clear the tracks before the

train reaches the crossing. The preemption shall not cause any short vehicular

clearances and all necessary vehicular

clearances shall be provided. However,

because of the relative hazards involved,

pedestrian clearances may be

abbreviated in order to provide the track

clearance display as early as possible.

Under 8C-5, “Train Detection,” the

MUTCD states:

On tracks where trains operate at speeds

of 20 mph or higher, circuits controlling

automatic flashing light signals shall

provide for a minimum operation of 20

seconds before arrival of any train on

such track.

Under 8D-1 “Selection of Systems and

Devices,” the MUTCD states “Before a new or

modified grade crossing traffic control system is

installed, approval is required from the

appropriate agency within a given state.”

Regarding traffic signals, the RailroadHighway Grade Crossing Handbook states:23

Highway traffic control signals located

at intersections within 200 feet of a

crossing should be preempted by the

approach of a train. Signals at intersections further than 200 feet from a

crossing should also be preempted if

traffic flow is such that vehicles queue

 

23 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway

Administration, September 1986, chapter IV, page 115.

up on the crossing, or if an engineering

study determines the need for preemption. Railroad-highway grade crossing

signals are coordinated with adjacent

highway traffic control signals so that

the operation of these separate control

devices will at all times complement

rather than negate each other.... A primary criterion is to avoid the entrapment of vehicles on the crossing by

conflicting aspects of the highway signal and the crossing signal. The best

way to do this is to prevent vehicle

queues onto the tracks by the proper

design and operation of the dual signal

systems.

Regarding warning time, the RailroadHighway Grade Crossing Handbook states:

This 20 second warning time is a

MINIMUM. The warning time should

be of sufficient length to ensure clearance of a vehicle that might have

stopped at the crossing and then proceeded to cross just before the flashing

lights begin operation. Some railroads

use a warning time of 25 seconds at

crossings with automatic gates....

Care should be taken to ensure that the

warning time is not excessive....

Excessive warning time has been

determined to be a contributing factor in

some accidents....

The IDOT Traffic Signal Plan Preparation -

A Design Guideline, Section 2.2.5 Railroad

Preemption Sequencing, published in November

1988, states, “Pedestrian clearances should coincide with vehicular clearances during railroad

preemption to insure maximum track clearance.”

This section also states, “The designer shall

document the review of his sequence with the

railroad involved and send the District 1 Bureau

of Traffic copies of this correspondence.”
26

The Illinois Requirements for RailroadHighway Grade Crossing Protection, published

in November 27, 1974, in Section VII,

“Operating Time,” states:

All protection devices shall indicate the

approach of a train for not less than 20

seconds before arrival at the crossing of

the fastest train operated over the crossing. Local conditions may require a

longer operating time. However, too

long an indication by slow trains on

high speed railroads is undesirable and

suitable arrangements shall be made to

compensate for differences in speeds of

trains.

Railroad/Highway Signal Interaction

The Federal Highway Administration

(FHWA) funded a February 1991 report24 by the

University of Tennessee that evaluated motorist

responses, warning time expectations, and tolerance levels at three active railroad/ highway

grade crossings with relatively high train and

vehicular traffic volumes. The actions of 3,500

motorists were assessed during 445 train crossings. Research25 indicates that extremely short

warning times can be dangerous and

Leave little margin of safety and poorly

accommodate larger vehicles such as

combination trucks and buses, especially if those vehicles must first come to a

stop as required by many state laws.

The study also found that excessively long

warning times (exceeding 40 seconds at flashing

light signal crossings and 60 seconds at gated

crossings) can cause drivers to lose confidence

 

24 Stephen H. Richards, R.A. Margiotta, and G.A. Evans,

Warning Time Requirements at Railroad-Highway Grade

Crossings with Active Traffic Control, Report No. FHWASA-91-007, 1991.

25 Stephen H. Richards and K.W. Heathington, Assessment

of Warning Time Needs at Railroad-Highway Grade

Crossings with Active Traffic Control, Transportation

Research Record No. 1254, Traffic Control Devices for

Highways, Work Zones, and Railroad Crossings, 1990.

in the traffic control system. Most motorists

expect a train to arrive within 20 seconds of the

traffic control device activating. Warning times

in excess of 30 to 40 seconds caused many

motorists to engage in risky crossing behavior.

The FRA requires railroads to provide a

minimum of 20 seconds of warning time before

train arrival at a grade crossing.26 The circuitry

can impart even more time than this, depending

on the speed of the train (whether accelerating

or decelerating) and the track condition.

Documentation and Communication

Between IDOT and the Railroad

Between the construction project planning

stages and the accident, IDOT, its consultants

and contractors, and the railroads exchanged

numerous documents that included information

on the railroad and highway traffic signal

systems. Additionally, representatives of these

agencies and the Fox River Grove police

responded to the Lincoln Avenue and Algonquin

Road and US 14 intersections and the grade

crossings for accidents and complaints at the

intersection. The following is a chronological

description of events related to the highway

signal system timing.

On May 13, 1987, before the road-widening,

the Illinois Commerce Commission had

approved the construction plans for a railroad

grade crossing at Foxmoor Road and the upgrading of the d.c. signal circuits at Algonquin

Road and Lincoln Avenue. On August 4, 1987,

the C&NW sent IDOT the design plans (dated

July 6, 1987) for the Algonquin Road/US 14

intersection indicating that the railroad grade

crossing approach circuit lengths for eastbound

and westbound trains were “3,080 feet, 30

seconds at 70 mph.” At that time, no highway

traffic signals existed or were proposed at

Algonquin Road.

 

26 49 CFR Part 234.225, “Activation of Warning System.”

Revised October 1, 1995.
27

On December 20, 1988, IDOT and the

C&NW entered into an agreement related to the

US 14 road-widening project and stipulated in

the agreement that the grade crossing would

conform to the State Requirements for RailroadHighway Grade Crossing Protection, which

called for 20 seconds advance warning time

before rail traffic occupies the grade crossing.

The specifications stated that long operating

times were “undesirable” and that “suitable

arrangements shall be made to compensate for

differences in speeds of trains.” The agreement

discussed road-widening details, parking lot

adjustments, and whether to install supplemental

cantilever railroad signals at both Lincoln

Avenue and Algonquin Road. It made no

mention of the installation of highway traffic

signals at Algonquin Road with an interconnect.

The IDOT hired a consultant to design the

traffic signals in accordance with its specifications. The design plans, which included highway traffic signals at Algonquin Road, were

approved by IDOT and a construction permit

was issued. An internal IDOT memorandum

dated November 20, 1989, indicated that on

November 14, 1989, a C&NW representative

discussed interconnection and preemption signal

options with IDOT. In a November 21, 1989,

letter27 to the C&NW, IDOT states:

Please note that at Lincoln Avenue,

railroad interconnection currently exists.

We would not anticipate major adjustments will be required at this location.

At Algonquin Road, new signals are

being installed. Please proceed with

installation of relays as required to

permit completion of interconnection at

this location.

This letter also included the traffic signal

sequence of operation diagram.

 

27 Note: IDOT subsequently advised the Safety Board that

the two roadways in this document -- Lincoln Avenue and

Algonquin Road -- were reversed in the text.

In January 1990, the highway traffic signal

system was installed at Algonquin and US 14.

The IDOT engineering technician could not

specifically recall nor does he have any documentation on how he programmed the traffic

signals in January 1990. However, he stated in

an interview with Safety Board investigators

that when he is installing and turning on a traffic

signal, he refers to the intersection plans for the

signal installation that consist of a plan view of

the intersection, the location of the signal facilities, the wiring diagram, and a sequence-ofoperation program. He said that he would set the

traffic signal timing for the normal sequence of

operation and for any applicable railroad or

emergency preemption sequences of operation.

He would check the loop detectors using a loop

analyzer, observe the traffic lights through a

short cycle, test the conflict monitor by causing

conflicting displays, and then place the signals

in the normal operation position and conduct a

physical inspection of the installation.

He stated that the pedestrian clearance time

was calculated using the MUTCD guidelines

and that a 12-second display of the Algonquin

Road pedestrian indication of “Don’t Walk” was

programmed into the traffic signal sequence. He

based his 12-second pedestrian phase on calculations using the width of Algonquin Road and

the 4-feet-per-second pedestrian walking rate

prescribed by the MUTCD.

The IDOT’s engineering technician stated

that in those cases when a preemption is programmed into the traffic signal system, he

would test the preemption by having a railroad

employee put in a simulated preemption call.

When asked how the timing for the preemptive

phase was determined, he said that he would use

the same values for the yellow (4.5 seconds) and

the all red (1.5 seconds) indications as in the

normal sequence of operation. Then he would

watch the grade crossing and, when the gates

came down, make sure that the signal was green

to clear the tracks and that an adequate amount

of time was provided for traffic to get off the

tracks and out of the intersection.
28

When asked how much information about

the warning time did the railroad provide IDOT

when a signal is turned on, the engineering technician responded, “You don’t get any written

documents...if we inquired, they [the railroad]

could give us an answer....” He said that IDOT

does not control the warning time duration and

that to find out what the timing was,

We would establish some timing and

put in some test calls and we could

observe how long it was from the time

we received the call from the railroad

until their gates were horizontal and

adjust our timing on that basis.

He stated that IDOT does not have a

document indicating the values (including the

railroad warning time) used when a signal is

turned on.

In April 1991, the C&NW submitted construction prints to IDOT that indicated an

approach warning time for track #1 (southern

track) of 25 seconds and an approach warning

time for track #2 (northern track) of 30 seconds.

A footnote on the plan indicates “crossing to

have 25 seconds of warning time.” In a July 9,

1991, letter, the C&NW provided IDOT with

another set of construction prints that states,

“crossing to have 25 seconds of warning time.”

On May 11, 1992, the C&NW provided

IDOT and the Illinois Commerce Commission

with a “project completion report” for relocating

a crossing gate and installing a cantilever at the

crossing. The report lists inspections and tests

made during the project. The railroad indicated

“yes” to the question “Do all approach start

distances provide a minimum operation of 20

seconds before arrival of any train?”

In October 1994, IDOT replaced the master

controller and the controllers at the three

adjacent intersections.

In January 1995, IDOT’s previous contractor installed an emergency vehicle preemption

phase. This preemption phase is activated once

an emergency vehicle call is received in the

traffic signal controller. This call is received via

a high intensity light emitter mounted on an

emergency vehicle and a detector mounted on or

near the traffic signal.

Between January 1, 1995, and September

24, 1995, IDOT’s contractor responded to 12

maintenance calls about the highway signal

systems at US 14 and Lincoln Avenue and

Algonquin Road. These calls involved complaints about synchronization of US 14 and the

railroad crossing warning devices, flashing red

lights, and no northbound green indication for

Algonquin Road when railroad gates were

down. The contractor investigated all of these

complaints and made necessary repairs. Each

time the highway traffic signal timing sequence

was found to be operating as programmed.

On September 18, 1995, after the pickup

truck/train collision took place at the crossing,

the UP’s lead signal maintainer and the IDOT

contractor responded to the Fox River Grove

police chief’s suggestion that there might have

been problems with the interaction of the

railroad and highway signal systems. The police

chief called the UP and IDOT, and the railroad

preemption sequence was tested and the timing

sequences of both the railroad and highway

signal systems were found to be operating as

programmed.

On September 19, 22, and 23, 1995, IDOT’s

contractor responded to complaints at US 14 and

Lincoln Avenue and Algonquin Road and

replaced equipment to correct signal system

problems. On October 11, 1995, the UP reset the

thumbwheel from 30 to 25 seconds (to ensure

consistency throughout the railroad’s property)

during maintenance work on the wayside signals. UP personnel stated that IDOT was not

notified of the thumbwheel setting change.

On October 24, 1995, the day before the

accident, the IDOT contractor received another

maintenance call that traffic was not clearing the

track area properly at the Lincoln Avenue grade

crossing. While inspecting the traffic signal
29

system, he asked a railroad employee to test the

circuit between the railroad signal system and

the highway signal system to check the

operation of the traffic signals at Lincoln Avenue. Again, he found that the railroad preemption sequence operated as programmed, with the

same 18-second sequence.

At 6:40 a.m. on the day of the accident, the

IDOT contractor arrived to monitor the signal

system from the master controller at the US

14/Lincoln Avenue intersection. The IDOT

contractor stated that he returned to monitor the

system during peak traffic hours. The alarm on

the master controller event log indicated that he

opened the master controller at 6:52 a.m. He

was not aware that, at the same time, the Fox

River Grove police chief and an IDOT engineer

were at the US 14/Algonquin Road intersection

monitoring the signal system from a laptop

computer via a modem. Just before the accident,

an eastbound and a westbound train had proceeded through the Algonquin Road crossing

and the police chief and IDOT engineer reported

that the traffic lights were operating properly

and that they visually saw traffic on Algonquin

Road clear the railroad tracks before the trains

arrived at the crossing. The eastbound train,

however, had stopped at the station before

proceeding across Algonquin Road. The next

eastbound train was the accident train, an

express train that did not stop at the station.

At the Safety Board’s public hearing in

January 1996, the UP presented construction

prints dated July 14, 1995, that indicated that

the railroad/highway grade crossing had a minimum of 20 seconds of warning time. IDOT

representatives indicated that they had never

seen these construction prints before the public

hearing. The IDOT contractor testified that he

used a timing sheet obtained from IDOT to

check the program operation during the complaint calls. Further, IDOT representatives testified that they compared the information from

this timing sheet with other documents and they

believed they had a warning time of 25 to 30

seconds from the railroad signal system. The UP

representatives testified that the UP designed

and maintained the railroad signal system to

always provide a minimum of 20 seconds of

warning time.

Tests and Research

School Bus Brake Lamps.—The rear brake

lamps were tested at the Safety Board’s laboratory and the lower left lamp bulb filament was

stretched, which is consistent with brakes being

on at the time of collision.

Event Recorder.—The trailing locomotive

was equipped with a Bach-Simpson Train Monitoring and Control System Model 500 Event

Recorder. The on-scene event recorder readout

by the UP indicates that the throttle was moved

from its maximum position “8” to “idle” at a

calculated distance between 965 and 1,066 feet

west of the crossing. About 2 seconds later, a

full-service brake application was made at a

calculated distance between 762 and 864 feet

west of the crossing. The speed of the train

during the throttle change and the full-service

brake application was about 69 mph. About 2

seconds later, an emergency brake application

was made at a calculated distance between 661

and 762 feet west of the crossing, when the train

was traveling about 67 mph. Impact with the

school bus occurred about 5 seconds later, when

the train was traveling about 60 mph. The

distance the train traveled from point of impact

to the cab control car’s final rest position was

1,422 feet. The Safety Board conducted its train

stopping distance tests using this information.

The train’s event recorder was also examined and read out by the Safety Board’s

Vehicle Performance Division in Washington,

D.C. Laboratory personnel calculated that the

throttle was moved from its maximum position

“8” to “idle” between 965 and 1,066 feet west of

the crossing. About 2 seconds later, the brake

pipe pressure began to decrease at a calculated

distance between 762 and 864 feet west of the

crossing. About 2 seconds after the initial reduction in brake pipe pressure, a rapid decrease

(from 77 to 11 pounds per square inch) occurred
30

at a speed of 69 mph, and at a calculated

distance between 560 and 661 feet west of the

crossing. This rapid decrease in the brake pipe

pressure is consistent with an emergency brake

application. Impact with the school bus occurred

about 6 seconds later, when the train was

traveling about 60 mph. The distance the train

traveled from point of impact to the cab control

car’s final rest position was 1,422 feet.

Recorder Circuit Board.—Although not

required, the railroad uses a recorder circuit

board (RCB), which is located in the railroad

bungalow, to record 222 train movements within

an approach circuit. The RCB records the train

speeds and time provided by the railroad signal

system. Once the railroad microprocessor begins

sending the signal, the RCB begins recording

information, including the following data

elements: the average speed of the train

calculated over 4 seconds after the signal is sent;

the average speed of the train between the time

that the signal is activated until the train reaches

the island circuit (which is about 50 feet from

the center of the crossing); the speed of the train

1 second before it arrives at the island circuit;

and the elapsed time between the signal’s

activation until the train reaches the island

circuit. On the day of the accident, the RCB for

the accident area was malfunctioning and did

not record this information. The RCB was

replaced for postaccident tests conducted by the

Safety Board and the data showed that the

replicated accident train had 22 seconds of

warning time.

Train Stopping Distance.—Safety Board

investigators performed stopping distance tests

using the on-scene initial event recorder data to

replicate the events that occurred, such as the

position change of the throttle and the fullservice and emergency brake applications. The

tests were conducted with the accident train

traveling 70 mph (the maximum authorized

track speed). The test that most closely replicated the accident had the train positioned 1,163

feet (which includes 200 feet of reaction time)

west of the crossing when the test train engineer

placed the throttle into idle position. About 761

feet west of the crossing, the test engineer made

a full-service brake application. About 459 feet

west of the crossing, the test engineer placed the

train into emergency braking. The test train

stopped 1,489 feet after point of impact, which

coincides with the on-scene measurement of

1,422 feet, the distance that the accident train

traveled before coming to a stop after striking

the school bus.

Warning Time Tests.—On October 25-26,

1995, Safety Board investigators timed approximately 15 trains to determine the amount of

time that passed between when the crossing

warning devices were activated and when the

train arrived at the crossing. The shortest warning time was about 20 seconds and the longest

warning time was 155 seconds. On the day

following the accident, train 624 (the same train

as the accident train) was traveling at a speed of

69-70 mph and the shortest time measured with

a stopwatch was about 26 seconds before the

train entered the crossing.

On October 29, 1995, Safety Board

investigators conducted tests to replicate the

accident train’s movements and recorded

warning times of 20.73 and 21.12 seconds.

In November 1995, IDOT independently

conducted postaccident testing of the warning

time and videotaped train traffic (both local and

express) and the traffic signal. The test results

indicate a 22.7-second average warning time for

70-mph eastbound trains, with a 21-second

warning time for some of these trains. The

warning times for the 70-mph westbound trains

averaged 26.8 seconds. The results also indicate

that in 34 out of 66 tests, the traffic lights

provided 10 seconds or less for traffic on

Algonquin Road to clear the railroad tracks.

Activation of Crossing Warning Devices

Tests.—At the request of the Safety Board,

Safety Engineering Associates28 performed six

tests to determine the amount of delay time

 

28 An engineering consultant firm retained by the UP.
31

between the circuit activation and the actual

activation of the lights and bell. The light

circuits and the bell circuits were tested

separately. The light circuit tests ranged from

803 to 819 milliseconds. The bell circuit tests

ranged from 800 to 802 milliseconds. The

average delay time for all six tests was 805

milliseconds, or 8/10 of a second.

Audibility Tests.—The Safety Board

requested that the FRA conduct sound level

measurements on the cab control car horn. Test

results indicate that the sound level exceeded

the minimum requirements of 96 decibels at a

position 100 feet forward of the horn. (49 CFR

229.129.)

For at least 5 years, school bus manufacturers have been producing school bus bodies

with sound attenuation panels to lower the noise

levels on diesel-powered school buses. The bus

design originally included two overhead attenuation panels. School districts subsequently began ordering entire buses with sound attenuation

panels to reduce interior noise levels on buses.

Am Tran, the school bus body manufacturer, performed tests in 1990 and 1994 to

compare interior engine noise levels with various materials to determine the attenuation of

noise within the school bus bodies. The results

indicated that the engine noise level was reduced at the driver’s position by 2 decibels, and

the noise level was reduced by 2 to 5 decibels

for the school bus passenger positions. Preaccident tests indicated that the interior perforated

ceiling panels provided sound attenuation that

lowered the bus interior noise levels by reducing

the reflected noise, much the way that acoustic

tile lowers reflected noise in buildings.

Tests performed by Am Tran after the accident were conducted on buses similar to the

accident bus, equipped with and without perforated interior overhead panels. In these tests, two

noise sources were used, a bus air horn for

exterior-generated noise and a bus back-up

alarm for interior-generated noise. These noise

sources did not match the noise levels at the

time of the accident and were chosen for

demonstration purposes only.

Measurements were taken approximately 6

inches from the driver’s ear. With the interior

noise source placed by the rear emergency door,

it produced a sound level of 78 decibels in a bus

with sound attenuation materials, and 101.5 in a

bus without sound attenuation materials. The

noise source was then placed 50 feet from the

vehicle and the exterior test produced a sound

level of 78.2 decibels without sound attenuation

materials and 73.5 decibels with sound attenuation materials.

The Safety Board also measured the sound29

on a similar school bus under various circumstances. In tests conducted with traffic passing,

the empty bus running (its doors closed), and the

bus’s radio turned on to the level it was at the

time of the accident, the noise level at the

driver’s seat ranged from 75 to 78 decibels.

Tests were also conducted of the sound

levels at the driver’s position when the horn

from the cab control car was sounded at distances ranging from approximately 2,500 feet

away to the impact point. In those tests, the train

was about 100 feet from impact before the horn

sound exceeded the ambient noise levels in the

bus at the driver’s position. Additional tests

conducted on the sound of the crossing gate bell

determined that it was inaudible to a person

inside the bus in the driver’s position.

Sight Distance.—Safety Board investigators

determined sight distances from both an

eastbound train and a northbound school bus.

When the bus was positioned 5 feet south of the

south crossing gate, both the test train engineer

and the test school busdriver had clear views of

each other’s vehicles for at least 2,000 feet. The

test school busdriver, looking over her left

shoulder, had a clear view of the train for 460

 

29 Using a Bruel & Kjaer audiometer (Precision Sound

Level Meter) type 2232, serial #1129961, calibrated with a

Sound Level Calibrator type 4230, with a tone of 93.8

decibels. The audiometer reading was 94.1 decibels.
32

feet when the school bus was positioned in the

approximate accident location.

Master Controller Event Log.—The master

controller event log, which records activity at all

three intersections within 1-minute intervals,

indicates that the alarm went on when the IDOT

contractor opened the master controller box. It

also recorded the times that the preemption

sequences were initiated for the two trains that

preceded the accident train (as witnessed by the

police chief and the IDOT engineer). The log

recorded a 7:10 a.m. preemption (an eastbound

train) and reported the system back on-line at

7:11 a.m. At 7:12 a.m., the log recorded a

preempt sequence initiating, the alarm going off

(the contractor closing the master controller

box), and the conflict monitor unit flashing,

which IDOT representatives believe may have

been an electrical surge or short circuit caused

when the traffic signal stanchion was struck by

the school bus during the accident sequence.

The cause of the initiation of the 7:12 a.m.

preempt sequence is unknown.

Federal and State Oversight

Federal Railroad Administration.—The FRA

was created in 1966 and given the responsibility

by Congress to ensure public safety over the

Nation’s freight, passenger, and commuter rail

systems. The FRA is responsible for ensuring

compliance with and enforcement of all Federal

rail safety regulations and has the authority to

monitor the inspection of rail operations, trains,

and properties. Another FRA responsibility is to

compile and maintain an accident data base to

determine trends and future safety concerns.

Postaccident inspections by the FRA on the

railroad involved in this accident revealed no

defects with the railroad equipment or violations

by its personnel.

One of the FRA’s responsibilities is to

maintain a listing of all railroad/highway grade

crossings in the U.S. DOT/AAR National Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory. The information is

supplied voluntarily to the Federal Government

by the States and the railroads. At present, the

U.S. DOT-AAR Crossing Inventory Form (FRA

6180.71) does not have an item that captures

railroad preemption/interconnection

information. The instructions explain that highway traffic signals refer only to train-activated

red-yellow-green signals that control street traffic over the crossing. Those persons filling out

the forms are told not to count highway signals

controlling nearby intersections even if they are

interconnected with the crossing devices. This

form is voluntary and the information previously

supplied for the Algonquin Road crossing was

out-of-date. The Rail-Highway Rail Crossing

Accident/Incident Report (FRA 6180.57)

requires railroads to indicate whether the

crossing warning interconnection with highway

signals was present.

Federal Highway Administration.—The

FHWA is the Federal agency responsible for

administering the Federal-aid Highway Program. The FHWA is responsible for reviewing,

approving, and monitoring projects and providing technical assistance to the State and local

transportation agencies. It also administers a

national motor carrier program, with a primary

mission of reducing commercial motor vehicle

accidents.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.—The National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration (NHTSA), established by the

Highway Safety Act of 1970, is responsible for

reducing deaths, injuries, and economic losses

resulting from motor vehicle crashes. NHTSA

sets and enforces safety performance standards

for vehicle equipment and, through grants to

State and local governments, helps them to conduct effective local highway safety programs.

Illinois Commerce Commission.—IDOT provides funding for railroad/highway grade crossing improvements under Illinois law, but the

Illinois Commerce Commission has regulatory

authority over railroad/highway grade crossings.

The Commission’s regulations have jurisdiction

over both “the interested rail carrier” and the

public bodies and highway authorities having
33

jurisdiction over involved roadways, including

IDOT. The State of Illinois Administration

Code, Chapter III, Section 1535.350, states:

It is frequently desirable that controls

for crossing signals be interconnected

with those for traffic control signals at

nearby highway intersections to permit

highway traffic to move into the clear in

advance of train movements and to

permit traffic on the paralleling highway

to flow while train movements are

made. Where such interconnection is to

be made, approval of plans shall first be

received from the Illinois Commerce

Commission.

Section 1535.400(d) of the Code states:

Where a rail carrier plans a major

change or a reduction in marking or

warning devices at any such grade

crossing and no order has been issued

by the Commission approving such

change or reduction, the rail carrier

shall give written notice of such change

or reduction to the highway authority

having jurisdiction over the roadway

involved....

Section 1535 (e) of the Code states:

When any city, town, village, township,

county or the Department proposes any

highway change, including changes in

highway traffic direction, which would

necessitate a change in the marking,

warning devices at, or construction of

any crossing, notice of such proposed

change shall be submitted to the rail

carrier involved at least three months in

advance of the date upon which the

change is to be made. Copy of said

notice shall be furnished to this Commission.

Joint Training.—The Safety Board reviewed

training programs from the National Highway

Institute, other Federal sources, and private

sources. The Board found no training courses or

programs that specifically addressed the interaction and operation of railroad and highway

signal systems at interconnected/preemptive

railroad/highway grade crossings.

School Transportation Standards

National.—In 1992, the NHTSA published

its revised Highway Safety Program No. 17,

Pupil Transportation Safety, which provides the

States guidelines for establishing pupil transportation operations. The guidelines regarding

route planning, driver training, driver evaluations, etc., are general and do not give specific

information. For example, the guidelines state

that States should conduct careful planning and

annually review school bus routes to identify

safety hazards.

State.—Effective July 1, 1995, the school

busdriver permitting authority in the State of

Illinois was transferred from the Illinois State

Board of Education (BOE) to the Illinois Secretary of State’s office. However, the Illinois State

BOE continues to update the school busdriver

curriculum and provide school busdriver instructors with initial and refresher training.

The 1995 edition of the Illinois School Bus

Driver Training curriculum states that the primary responsibility of the school busdriver is to

provide safe transportation for students and calls

the role of school busdriver “a very important

position.” In the section on “The Driver” it

states that “Positioning a school bus vehicle in

relationship to another object can give you a

whole new perspective on your ability to judge

distance in any direction.” In the section on

“School Bus Operations,” it states:

Always keep in mind the size of your

vehicle. Your vehicle is much higher

than any automobile and also weighs

much more. A school bus generally is

twice as long and much wider than any

full-sized automobile. Allow for oversize and limited maneuverability of
34

your bus when turning.... Whether

making a right or left turn, be aware that

in many situations part of the REAR of

your bus may project outward as you are

making the turn.

The section “Trains Always Have the Right

of Way” addresses railroad/highway grade

crossings, stating:

Many train/vehicle collisions could be

avoided by following a few very easy

but extremely important procedures

when approaching a railroad crossing...

require silence when approaching a

crossing...all radios, tape players, etc.,

must be turned off or down; turn off all

heaters and fans, if necessary, to hear

adequately.

Scan the surroundings for information

that may indicate danger...never drive

onto a railroad track until you are

certain there is adequate room ahead for

your ENTIRE vehicle to clear the tracks

completely. It can be life threatening to

begin to cross a set of railroad tracks

only to find that you must stop your

vehicle for traffic before you have

completely cleared the tracks.

The local or State BOE has no guidance

pertaining to school busdriver evaluations. An

Illinois State BOE representative testified at the

Safety Board’s public hearing in January 1996

that Illinois does not provide any guidance other

than what the law requires, and that routing is

the responsibility of the local school districts

because all districts are different.

Association.—The National Association of

State Directors of Pupil Transportation Services

(NASDPTS) is comprised of State Directors

from 34 States and other school bus transportation representatives at various levels within

the other States. In addition, school bus and

parts manufacturers, contractors, training companies, etc., belong to the NASDPTS. The

purpose of the association is to develop guidelines and standards to further the goal of safe

pupil transportation. The NASDPTS’ National

Standards for School Transportation provide

standards for school buses and school bus

operation. These guidelines address school bus

routing, driver training and evaluation, and

railroad/highway grade crossings. Appendix E

contains information from the National

Standards entitled “Recommended Procedures

for School Busdrivers at Railroad/Highway

Grade Crossings.” The following are excerpts:

For improved hearing, all noisy equipment (fans, etc.) should be off until the

bus has cleared the crossing.

When any school bus must stop to cross

any railroad track, all passengers must

be silent until the crossing is completed.

A signal for silence shall be given by

the driver in whatever manner is

deemed suitable.

The 1995 National Standards for School

Transportation recommends that:

Every school bus shall be constructed so

that the noise level taken at the ear of

the occupant nearest to the primary

noise source shall not exceed 85

decibels....

Action Taken After the Accident

Federal and State.—During the on-scene

investigation, the Safety Board called upon the

Federal oversight agencies, the FRA and the

FHWA, and all the States (including the District

of Columbia) to check the coordination of railroad and highway signals to ensure that vehicles

have sufficient time to clear the railroad tracks.

The Safety Board issued three Class 1, Urgent

Safety Recommendations: H-95-15, H-95-16,

and R-95-45. Safety Recommendation H-95-15

asked that State Directors of Transportation:

Identify all railroad/highway grade

crossings where control of a highway

traffic signal is preempted by train

movements. In cooperation with the
35

Federal Highway Administration and

the Federal Railroad Administration,

determine if the preemption allows

sufficient time for vehicles to safely

clear the crossing. For those crossings

determined to have insufficient time for

vehicles to safely clear, take immediate

corrective action.

Table 3 (see pages 36-37) illustrates by

State the number of preemptive/interconnected

crossings reviewed as compared to each State’s

total number of crossings.

Safety Recommendation H-95-16 asked the

FHWA to cooperate with the State Directors of

Transportation and the FRA to:

Determine, at those railroad/highway

grade crossings where control of a highway traffic signal is preempted by train

movements, if the preemption allows

sufficient time for vehicles to safely

clear the crossing. For those crossings

determined to have insufficient time for

vehicles to safely clear, take immediate

corrective action.

In a letter dated March 19, 1996, the FHWA

indicated that immediately following receipt of

Safety Recommendation H-95-16, the FHWA’s

Executive Director issued a November 2, 1995,

directive to Regional and Division Administrators urging that they work closely with the

States and FRA regional officials in their efforts

to comply with Safety Recommendation H-95-

15 to the States.

Safety Recommendation R-95-45 asked that

the FRA:

Cooperate with the State Directors of

Transportation and the Federal Highway

Administration to determine, at those

railroad/highway grade crossings where

control of a highway traffic signal is

preempted by train movements, if the

preemption allows sufficient time for

vehicles to safely clear the crossing. For

those crossings determined to have

insufficient time for vehicles to safely

clear, take immediate corrective action.

In a letter dated November 30, 1995, the

FRA indicated that it had requested the railroads

to start necessary processes to determine how

many and which of their crossings should be

reviewed. The FRA also indicated that it was

prepared to enter information regarding crossings with preemption circuitry into the U.S.

DOT/AAR National Highway-Rail Crossing

Inventory. In a letter dated April 16, 1996, the

Safety Board acknowledged the FRA’s pledge

to cooperate and assist in any way to identify

and test these crossings.

The following are examples of actions taken

by several States in response to the Safety

Board’s urgent recommendations.

The State of Virginia used a preemption

technique that does not interconnect with the

rail automatic warning system. This is accomplished by installing a loop on the approach

between the tracks and the traffic signal. This

system would have a time delay feature, thus

permitting traffic signals to preempt before a

vehicle can be entrapped. In a letter dated June

29, 1996, the Virginia Department of Transportation stated that its list of preempted

crossings had been forwarded to the Virginia

Department of Education for distribution to

school busdrivers throughout the State. The list

not only identifies crossing locations but also

includes information to provide a better understanding of each interconnect crossing.

The Missouri Department of Transportation

has developed a warning notice that will be put

inside each signal house (both the road authority’s and the railroad’s) at each interconnected

crossing location in Missouri. The Missouri

Department of Transportation will print these

blank forms and then type or write in the

specific information pertaining to the railroad,

road authority, and DOT number. This form will

be placed on the wall inside the controller box.
Table 3 - Total Number of Preemptive/Interconnected Crossings Reviewed (States)

State

Total Number of

Highway/Rail Grade

Crossings (Public and

Private)*

Total Number of

Preemptive/Interconnected

Crossings Reviewed

Remarks

Alabama 6,826 57 Forwarded list to the

Alabama DOE

Alaska 365 6 ---

Arizona 1,914 97 ---

Arkansas 5,239 23 3 crossings in Morrilton

upgraded

California 14,816 122 ---

Colorado 3,894 25 ---

Connecticut 1,274 100 School bus drivers helped

to identify crossings

Delaware 532 5 ---

District of Columbia 129 2 May 28, 1996, accident at

Suitland Parkway crossing

Florida 5,901 276 ---

Georgia 9,839 77 ---

Hawaii 6 2 Both near airport

Idaho 3,163 23 Forwarded list to Idaho

DOE

Illinois 19,415 243 24 crossings were adjusted

Indiana 10,777 135 ---

Iowa 10,496 45 ---

Kansas 12,793 46 ---

Kentucky 6,675 29 ---

Louisiana 7,475 29 ---

Maine 2,051 22 ---

Maryland 1,992 30 Includes 12 light rail

crossings. List forwarded

to Maryland DOE

Massachusetts 3,116 31 ---

Michigan 9,398 113 ---

Minnesota 9,255 91 25 crossings needed minor

adjustment

Mississippi 5,483 23 ---
State

Total Number of

Highway/Rail Grade

Crossings (Public and

Private)*

Total Number of

Preemptive/Interconnected

Crossings Reviewed

Remarks

Missouri 9,387 24 Developed warning label

Montana 3,941 12 ---

Nebraska 7,274 17 ---

Nevada 660 8 ---

New Hampshire 1,051 21 ---

New Jersey 3,900 150 ---

New Mexico 1,607 19 ---

New York 9,395 78 ---

North Carolina 9,386 240 ---

North Dakota 7,016 13 ---

Ohio 13,108 64 ---

Oklahoma 6,932 56 Developed training video

Oregon 5,900 92 ---

Pennsylvania 13,032 106 ---

Rhode Island 356 53 ---

South Carolina 4,977 92 ---

South Dakota 3,692 6 ---

Tennessee 6,369 72 --

Texas 21,106 330 ---

Utah 1,972 2 ---

Vermont 1,408 4 ---

Virginia 6,595 56 Transferred list to Virginia

DOE

Washington 7,137 125 ---

West Virginia 5,248 10 ---

Wisconsin 8,861 68 ---

Wyoming 1,705 10 Developed new W10-3

sign.

∗ Source: FRA Highway-Rail Crossing Accident/Incident and Inventory Bulletin (1994).
38

In response to Safety Recommendation H95-15, the Idaho Department of Transportation

conducted a review of all railroad crossings in

the State of Idaho to find those with configurations similar to the accident crossing in

Illinois. The Idaho Department of Transportation identified 23 crossings and conducted onsite reviews at each. The final report documenting the Idaho Department of Transportation’s reviews and actions was submitted to the

Safety Board on April 23, 1996. In a letter dated

May 8, 1996, to the Idaho Pupil Transportation

Coordinator, the Idaho State Traffic Engineer

submitted this same report to the Idaho Department of Education (DOE). His letter stated:

We believe that the information contained in the report would be of interest

to all school busdrivers, and of particular interest to those drivers whose

routes cross the 23 crossings in the

report. Please forward this information

to the appropriate school districts.

Through the Idaho DOE’s Pupil Transportation Communicator magazine dated May

1996, every transportation supervisor in Idaho

received a copy of the Idaho Department of

Transportation’s final report to the Safety

Board. Supervisors were urged to use the report

in school busdriver training.

In a letter dated May 31, 1996, to the

Alabama Department of Education, the Alabama

Department of Transportation forwarded its list

of preempted crossings for distribution to school

busdrivers throughout the State.

The Wyoming Department of Transportation developed a modified MUTCD advance

warning sign (W10-3) that shows the distance in

feet between the highway and the nearest rail.

The Oklahoma Department of Transportation, in conjunction with Oklahoma Operation

Lifesaver, has developed a school busdriver

training video. This video was the result of a

mock crash conducted by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation in May 1996 between a

school bus and a freight train at a crossing with

configurations similar to the Algonquin Road

crossing in Illinois.

Nationwide, the States found that most of

the 3,360 preempted signals (more than 98 percent) were programmed with sufficient time to

clear the tracks. They reported that timing had

been corrected in the 52 cases in which deficiencies were found. Many of the adjustments

involved reducing the pedestrian clearance time

and increasing the track clearance time. Some of

the States reported that pedestrian clearance

times will be a continuing problem since this

phase must be completed before the track

clearance time.

Many of the States reported that it was

beneficial and important to have the railroad

representative attend the inspections so that

both the highway and the railroad representatives could learn how their preemption systems

worked together. The detailed responses to the

Safety Board’s urgent recommendations are

contained in the public docket.

Task Force.—After the accident, the

Secretary of the U.S. DOT convened a

railroad/highway grade crossing task force to

review the decisionmaking process for designing, constructing, and operating rail crossings,

and to report back to him by March 1, 1996. The

task force, led by the Associate Deputy

Transportation Secretary, included representatives from the FRA, the FHWA, the NHTSA,

the Federal Transit Administration, and the

Safety Board. The task force consulted with

State and local transportation authorities and

conducted three public hearings to identify how

railroad/highway grade crossing safety could be

improved. The task force focused on the

following five issue areas:

• Interconnected highway traffic signal and

highway-rail crossing warning devices;

• Space available for motor vehicles

between highway-rail crossings and

adjacent highway-highway intersections;
39

• High-profile crossings and low-clearance

vehicles;

• Light rail transit crossings;

• Special vehicle operating permits and

information.

The report recommends actions addressing

both physical and procedural deficiencies, some

of which are shown in appendix F.

A longterm recommendation of the task

force asked that the FHWA:

 ...convene a technical working group

of representatives of rail crossing safety

organizations to review existing standards and guidelines. One of the outputs

of this group could be recommended additions and/or changes to the MUTCD,

the Railroad/Highway Grade Crossing

Handbook, or other appropriate documents.

The FHWA and the FRA have set up a

Technical Working Group on Rail-Highway

Intersections, and the FHWA has contracted

with the Institute of Transportation Engineers

(ITE) to facilitate the working group. Meetings

were held in July and September 1996, and

another is planned in January 1997.

The ITE has revised its 1979 Recommended

Practice Preemption of Traffic Signals at or

Near Active Warning Railroad Grade Crossings. The September 1996 version has included

more definitive guidelines regarding the design

and operation of traffic signals adjacent to

railroad grade crossings with active warning

devices. The document states that the intention

is to supplement the requirements set forth in

the MUTCD, the Traffic Control Devices Handbook, and the Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook. The document concludes with

the following recommendations:

1. Develop a cooperative design process and an operating procedure

that includes notifying other parties

of anticipated or proposed traffic or

geometric changes, [and] maintain

continuous, joint reviews among

participating parties to ensure

satisfactory operation to account

for changing traffic conditions.

2. The distance separating the tracks

from the signal must be carefully

evaluated, and traffic and geometric conditions must be diligently

reviewed and analyzed.

3. Complete preemption sequence

time must be thoroughly analyzed,

and control equipment for both the

highway and railroad must be

properly utilized.

Also, a National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP)30 panel is creating a

compendium of current practices entitled

“NCHRP 28-12 Traffic Signal Operations Near

Highway Rail Intersections,” scheduled to be

completed within the next year.

IDOT and the Illinois Commerce Commission—On January 15, 1996, IDOT and the

Commission published a Report to the Illinois

House of Representatives’ Counties and Township Committee. The report identified ways to

further improve the safety of school buses and

rail crossings. The first action taken by IDOT

was to close both the Algonquin Road and the

Lincoln Avenue crossings. The State updated its

crossing inventory and identified its interconnected traffic signals to ensure that these

systems provided sufficient warning time.

IDOT then petitioned the Illinois Commerce

Commission to provide additional warning time

 

30 The NCHRP is administered by the Transportation Research Board, sponsored by participating members of the

American Association of State Highway and Transportation

Officials in cooperation with the FHWA, and is funded by

participating State highway and transportation agencies.
40

for signal operations at the Algonquin and Lincoln crossings. The Commission staff subsequently directed, without benefit of a formal

order, the UP to change the thumbwheel setting

to 45 seconds. The manufacturer of the microprocessor recommended that the approach

distance setting be increased to 3,840 feet. The

Commission ordered the UP to extend the

approach circuit to 3,594 feet. Several other

changes were made by IDOT and the Fox River

Grove village, including:

• Inserting a stop line on the south side of

the crossing;

• Installing post-mounted traffic signals

next to the stop line;

• Installing traffic signals on the railroad’s

south side cantilever;

• Removing post-mounted traffic signals on

the north side of railroad tracks;

• Reprogramming the traffic signals on the

south side to turn red before the traffic

lights located on the north side of US 14;

• Eliminating the 12-second pedestrian

clearance time during railroad preemption;

• Replacing the master highway traffic

signal controller with another one;

• Posting a “Do Not Stop on Tracks” sign

on the northbound approach to the

crossing;

• Posting a “Stop Here on Red” sign with

an arrow at the south side stop line;

• Posting a “Caution Walk Time Shortened

When Train Approaches” sign at the

pedestrian crosswalks;

• Increasing the vehicle clear-out time for

Algonquin Road vehicles from 12 to 17

seconds.

In addition, the TJA School District now

requires that school busdrivers stop before the

railroad tracks and wait through the entire

sequence unless they are the first vehicle and the

light is green. After the accident, the school

district provided busdrivers with copies of

revised routes with hazards noted. The note

concerning the accident route reads:

Notice to all TJA Personnel

Lincoln Avenue and Algonquin Road

railroad crossings in the Village of Fox

River Grove:

Effective immediately and until further

notice, any TJA School Bus, whether

empty or loaded, when proceeding

Northbound on either of the stated thoroughfares at the railroad crossings,

shall, in addition to normal State of Illinois mandated railroad crossing procedures for School Buses, NEVER

attempt to cross the railroad tracks in

their School Bus unless:

1. The School Bus is the first vehicle

in line at the “Stop Bar” painted on the

pavement South of the railroad tracks.

(Stop Here on Red)

2. The School Bus driver has already

performed the State of Illinois railroad

crossing procedures.

NOTE: If the traffic light is already

green after #1 and #2 above, then the

School Bus driver shall wait through the

traffic light cycle until receiving another

full green light before proceeding.

Then proceed only if it is safe to do so.

A survey commissioned by the Village of

Fox River Grove in May 1996 revealed that only

four pedestrians used the Algonquin crosswalk

in a weekday 12-hour period between the

daylight hours of 6 a.m. and 6 p.m.
41

School Bus Transportation Safety

Nationwide.—Approximately 410,000

school buses transport 23.9 million students

over 4.0 billion miles across the United States

annually. The NHTSA’s statistics indicate that

between 1984 and 1994, a total of 70 crashes

occurred in which at least 1 occupant of a

school bus died. Three of the 70 crashes were

railroad/highway grade crossing accidents

involving school buses.

Illinois.—In the State of Illinois, 21,428

school buses transport 1 million students over

225 million miles annually. TJA School District

47/155 used 72 school buses to transport about

7,500 students over 1.3 million miles during the

1994-1995 school year. Between 1984 and

1994, two accidents in Illinois involving a

school bus and a train were reported. One accident resulted in an injury and the other resulted

only in property damage.

Railroad/Highway Grade Crossing

Safety

The FRA reports that as of 1994, about 17.5

percent of all public railroad/highway grade

crossings were equipped with automatic gates,

29,325 with flashing light signals and 6,459

with other active devices.31 The FRA also

reports that between 1989 and 1994, fatalities at

railroad/highway grade crossings were reduced

from 725 to 542, and injuries decreased from

2,791 to 1,885. However, over 47 percent of all

railroad/highway grade crossing accidents involving motor vehicles in 1994 occurred at

public railroad/highway grade crossings with

active warning devices.

Between 1976 and 1995, the Safety Board

investigated more than 325 railroad/highway

grade crossing accidents and issued more than

200 safety recommendations. Table 4 lists those

 

31 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, “The Highway-Rail Crossing Accident/ Incident and Inventory Bulletin,” No. 17, CY 1994, published July 1995.

crossing accidents involving school buses that

the Safety Board investigated.

All of these accidents occurred at passive

crossings (no bell, lights, or gates) except for

those in Stratton, Nebraska, and Port St. Lucie,

Florida. The Safety Board has, over the past 30

years, issued school bus safety recommendations regarding:

• School bus routing to avoid railroad/

highway grade crossings;

• Methods of looking for trains at

crossings;

• School authorities monitoring drivers at

railroad/highway grade crossings;

• Conspicuity and audibility of train’s

lights and horns.

Operation Lifesaver

Operation Lifesaver, Inc., (OL) is an active,

continuous public information and education

program designed to help prevent and reduce

railroad/highway grade crossing accidents. The

UP founded OL in Idaho in 1972. Today, OL is

sponsored cooperatively by Federal, State, and

local government agencies, highway safety

organizations, and the Nation’s railroads. In

Table 4 —Safety Board Investigations of Grade

Crossing Accidents Involving School Buses

Date Place Number of

deaths/injured

10/02/1967 Waterloo,

Nebraska 4 fatal, 9 injured

3/24/1972 Congers,

New York 5 fatal, 44 injured

10/23/1974 Aragon,

Georgia 7 fatal, 71 injured

8/08/1976 Stratton,

Nebraska 9 fatal, 8 injured

4/12/1984 Carrsville,

Virginia 1 fatal, 26 injured

9/27/1984 Port St. Lucie,

Florida 2 fatal, 1 injured
42

fiscal year 1995, the national OL program

received $300,000 from the FHWA in general

support, and approximately $100,000 from the

FRA in project-specific grants.

OL promotes crossing safety by coordinating speaking engagements by trained and certified presenters, responding to media inquiries,

providing testimony at public hearings, and distributing educational materials. OL has a specific program designed to be presented before

school busdrivers that emphasizes, among other

things, the need to maintain quiet in the vicinity

of railroad crossings and the importance of

assuring that when a driver starts across the

tracks there is adequate room on the other side.

Every State, except Hawaii, has an OL program

coordinator, and the Safety Board has issued

safety recommendations to OL in the past.
General

The weather was clear and dry at the time of

the accident and, although the sun was rising,

neither the school busdriver nor the train

engineer identified the sun as impairing visibility. Safety Board tests conducted about the

same time of day did not indicate that the sun

posed a visibility problem. The railroad track

approaching the accident site is straight and provides an unobstructed view of the Algonquin

Road grade crossing. A review of track inspection records revealed no anomalies, and the train

engineer took no exception with the track.

A review of the maintenance records and

inspections both before and after the accident

revealed that neither the train locomotive nor

the cab control car had any mechanical problems. The maintenance records for the 3-yearold school bus indicated no mechanical problems. The busdriver did not indicate that she had

any difficulty (mechanical or otherwise) with

the operation of the school bus, and the

postaccident examination of the school bus did

not reveal any discrepancies.

The engineer was experienced in operating

the commuter passenger train over the territory

and had been observing the appropriate rules

and procedures, in accordance the UP operating

practices, while operating the train. Also, his

past efficiency and safety audits revealed

compliance with the UP rules. Data from the

event recorder correspond with the engineer’s

statement of his observations and actions before

impact, and no evidence indicates that he might

have been fatigued.

The school busdriver had held a valid

school busdriver license for 8 years, had no

record of violations or accidents, had passed all

applicable tests, and had taken more than the

required number of busdriver training courses,

including the OL course addressing grade

crossing hazards. Although a substitute busdriver, she had had substantial school bus

driving experience in the past 3 years. Witnesses

said that she stopped the school bus before the

crossing and that she looked and listened for

oncoming trains. From her actions, it appears

that she was aware of the correct procedures to

follow when approaching a grade crossing, and

no evidence indicates that she might have been

fatigued.

Toxicological tests performed on blood and

urine specimens taken from the train engineer

and the school busdriver several hours after the

accident were negative for alcohol and illicit

drugs. The fact that the analgesic, antihistamine,

and nasal decongestant were present in the

busdriver’s urine specimen is consistent with

her statement that she had taken an over-thecounter cold medication at 9 or 10 p.m. the night

before the accident. The fact that analgesic and

antihistamine were found in the urine, but not in

the blood, indicates that most of the medication

had metabolized and should not have affected

the busdriver’s abilities.

Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that

neither the weather, the position of the sun, the

track, nor the mechanical condition of the train

or of the school bus either caused or contributed

to the collision. The train engineer was qualified

to perform his duties and was in compliance

with the hours-of-service requirements, and the

busdriver was trained and experienced to drive

school buses. Neither alcohol nor drug use by

the train engineer or the school busdriver was a

factor in the accident.

Several factors contributed to an expeditious

emergency response. The Fox River Grove

police chief witnessed and immediately reported

the collision. Motorists equipped with cellular

phones also called 911 to report the accident.

Additionally, fire and rescue equipment was

close by because a volunteer fire department

was located 350 feet southeast of the collision

site. The clear weather and the dry road enabled

ANALYSIS
44

the emergency equipment to arrive at the scene

without difficulty. As a result, critically injured

school bus passengers were quickly triaged and

transported to nearby trauma centers, and the

other injured passengers were directly conveyed

to and treated at local hospitals. Therefore, the

Safety Board concludes that emergency

response personnel reacted promptly to the

emergency and acted effectively and efficiently

at the collision site, and that the emergency

response efforts were well coordinated.

Immediately following the accident, the

Safety Board called upon the FRA, the FHWA,

and the States, including the District of

Columbia, to check the coordination of railroad

and highway signals to ensure that vehicles have

sufficient time to clear the railroad tracks. The

Safety Board issued three Urgent Safety

Recommendations: H-95-15, H-95-16, and R95-45 to this effect. Because all the States and

the District of Columbia have complied with its

intent, Safety Recommendation H-95-15 is herewith classified “Closed—Acceptable Action.”

Further, because all the States and the District of

Columbia have completed their reviews of

railroad/highway grade crossings having preemptive signals, Safety Recommendation H-95-

16 is herewith classified “Closed—Acceptable

Action.” For the same reason, Safety Recommendation R-95-45 is herewith classified

“Closed—Acceptable Action.”

The following analysis addresses the school

busdriver’s performance; the school district

oversight, including bus routing and busdriver

monitoring and evaluating procedures; the road

design; the railroad/highway signal interaction;

the State and railroad coordination and

communication, including oversight of the

signal system integration; and the injury and

survival factors in the school bus.

Accident Analysis

After reviewing the train event recorder

data, railroad and highway signal system design

and calculations, postaccident testing, and

witness statements, the Safety Board considers

that the following event sequence likely

occurred. Train 624 approached the railroad/highway grade crossing on a clear signal.

Traveling 64 mph, it crossed the narrow band

shunt, which was 3,080 feet from the crossing,

32 seconds32 before impact. Then, 24 seconds

before collision, the railroad system signaled the

highway system of the approach of the train,

which was 2,400 feet from the crossing and

traveling 66 mph. The preemption cycle began 1

second later for the highway traffic signal

system; about the same time, the train engineer

first saw the school bus on the grade crossing.

Still traveling 66 mph, the train was 2,300 feet

from the crossing. The pedestrian phase in the

highway traffic signal system ended 12 seconds

before impact; the train was then traveling 69

mph and was 1,200 feet from the crossing. Ten

seconds before the collision, the train engineer

began sounding the horn as well as making a

throttle reduction to idle and a full-service brake

application; at this point, the train was still

traveling 69 mph and was 1,000 feet from the

crossing. The US 14 yellow indication and the

intersection red indication ended 7 1⁄2 and 6

seconds, respectively, before impact. Concurrently, the train was traveling 67 mph and was

600 feet from the crossing when a green indication would have been displayed for Algonquin

Road. The engineer placed the train into

emergency braking 500 feet from the collision

site and 5 seconds before the collision.

The school bus had stopped on the south

side of the tracks, proceeded across the tracks,

and stopped at US 14 for a red signal indication.

The crossing warning devices activated with the

lights flashing, the bell sounding, and the gates

descending. The passengers in the rear of the

bus initially joked about the northern crossing

gate descending and striking the school bus on

its left side near the 10th window. Then, seeing

the train, they yelled warnings about its

 

32 Approximate values are used for this discussion because

timing values can fluctuate within railroad and highway

signal systems as designed.
45

approach to the busdriver. Traveling about 60

mph, the train struck the bus at a 75-degree

angle in the left-side rear and penetrated as

much as 3 1/3 feet into the passenger area. The

bolts that secured the bus body and chassis

sheared; the body and chassis separated. The

bus body rotated counterclockwise, scraped the

ground, struck and knocked down a traffic light

signal support, and came to rest about 195 degrees from its original orientation. The chassis

rotated counterclockwise, struck the side of the

train, and came to rest in the road about 45

degrees from its original orientation.

The Safety Board considers that the highway traffic signal sequence may have taken 21

seconds and would only apply when the light for

US 14 displayed a green indication within 3

seconds of the preempt signal. However, the

school busdriver indicated that the traffic signal

displayed a red indication as she approached the

crossing and proceeded slowly across the

railroad tracks. The traffic signal for northbound

Algonquin Road displayed a red indication for 3

seconds or more; therefore, US 14 would have

had a green indication before the preempt

signal. The occurrence of a 21-second traffic

signal sequence at the time of the accident is

unlikely. The Safety Board determined that the

traffic signal had an 18-second cycle before the

green indication for northbound Algonquin

Road displayed and that the US 14 traffic signal

displayed a red indication for several seconds

before the collision. The school busdriver said

that she never saw the traffic signal for

Algonquin Road display a green indication; the

passenger who had been assisting the busdriver

reported that the busdriver’s attention had been

diverted to the rear of the bus before impact.

School Busdriver Performance

The school busdriver was unfamiliar with

the route that included the queuing area and the

traffic light sequence at the intersection of

Algonquin Road and US 14. She stated that she

stopped the bus on the south side of the tracks,

did not see any trains or the crossing warning

devices activated, and then slowly crossed the

railroad tracks. She added that the traffic light

for Algonquin Road was displaying a red

indication and she believed that she would need

to proceed across the tracks to trip a sensor that

would trigger the traffic light to display a green

indication. The busdriver said that she drove

over the stop line to wait for the light to change.

The distance between the crossing gate and

stop line north of the tracks on Algonquin Road

was about 20 feet. However, the school bus was

38 feet 4 inches long and the overhang of the

train was about 3 feet on each side; therefore, at

least 3 feet of the school bus was in the path of

the train. The right and left side of the bus were,

respectively, overlapping the tracks and in the

path of the train because the bus was at a 75-

degree angle to the tracks. No evidence indicates that the school busdriver ever attempted to

determine whether her bus had adequate space.

She stated that, “It never entered my mind that

there wasn’t enough room for the bus to fit,”

and that she did not know the rear of her bus

was in the train path. The other school

busdrivers who had traversed this crossing knew

from their experience that the space was too

short for a school bus, and they would stop on

the south side of the railroad crossing.

The Safety Board investigation of a 1993

collision33 in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, involving

a gasoline tank truck and a train underscores the

need that motorists understand vehicle

positioning when stopped at a railroad crossing.

In the Fort Lauderdale case, due to congested

traffic at a work zone, the truckdriver was

stopped at a railroad crossing when its gate

came down and struck his truck hood. Because

the gate was not parallel to the rail, the distance

between the two varied and was 14 feet at its

narrowest point. The truck and its hood were 22

and 6 feet long, respectively. Had the gate struck

the hood windshield, the front of the

 

33 Highway Accident Report--Gasoline Tank Truck/Amtrak

Train Collision and Fire in Fort Lauderdale, Florida,

March 17, 1993 (NTSB/HAR-94/01).
46

truck would have been about 8 feet from the east

rail. The train overhang was 3 feet on each side,

which left about 5 feet of clearance between the

truck and the train.

After the accident, a Safety Board investigator who was seated in a similar vehicle with

its air ride seat fully extended measured the

sight distance and was able to see the ground 16

feet in front of the bumper. Therefore, the truckdriver probably was not able to see the track

directly in front of his truck. He may have

thought that he had encroached on the railroad

track and needed to move forward. He proceeded to drive across the tracks and was struck

by the passenger train. A fire subsequently

erupted killing the truckdriver and five motorists

on the opposite side of the crossing. Had the

truckdriver remained in the position under the

crossing gate, he would have avoided the

collision.

The Illinois school busdriver training curriculum addresses the importance of recognizing

the position of the school bus in relation to other

vehicles and objects. No specific or practical

instruction (except the road test administered

when a driver first obtains a school busdriver

permit) is provided to ensure that a busdriver

understands positioning on the road. The school

busdriver in this accident was trained and

experienced, but she did not accurately judge

the position of her vehicle and acknowledged

that she did not know where the rear of her bus

was in relation to the railroad tracks. Other

drivers familiar with this route were aware of

vehicle positioning, but not as a result of

training. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes

that the guidance provided in the Illinois school

busdriver training curriculum about vehicle

positioning in relation to the roadway is

ineffective. Consequently, the Safety Board

believes that the State of Illinois should advise

school busdrivers of the circumstances of this

accident and provide the busdrivers with

practical training about vehicle positioning on

the road, especially at railroad/highway grade

crossings.

During its investigation, the Safety Board

found that no specific guidance is provided at

the national level about vehicle positioning and

available space at railroad/highway grade

crossings. The OL is developing a training

videotape that addresses school bus vehicle

positioning at railroad/highway grade crossings,

and this should provide valuable guidance on

this subject to those school busdrivers who

receive OL training. However, other school

busdrivers throughout the United States who are

exposed to short queuing areas near such grade

crossings may not be provided with the OL

information. Therefore, the Safety Board

believes that the NASDPTS should advise its

members of the circumstances of this accident

and provide guidance about vehicle positioning

on the road, especially at railroad/highway grade

crossings.

According to the school busdriver and the

passengers in the front of the bus, they had not

seen the crossing warning devices activate or the

train approaching, nor had they heard the

crossing gate strike the bus. The front of the bus

had likely passed the warning light pole before

the lights began flashing. Once positioned

forward of visual cues, the busdriver and

forward passengers would have had to look

rearward at an angle to have seen the danger

cues, which they did not. The passengers in the

rear of the bus who first saw the crossing gate

strike the bus initially joked about it. However,

when they saw the train coming and heard the

horn blowing, they began yelling at the

busdriver to move the bus. As more passengers

became aware of the approaching train and

began yelling, the noise level in the bus

increased and caught the attention of the busdriver and passengers up front, who did not

initially grasp what those yelling were

attempting to convey. The busdriver looked in

the rearview mirror at this time; hence, the

increased sound likely had the unintended

consequence of distracting her attention from

the traffic signal, which displayed the green

indication for 2 to 6 seconds before the

collision. Because the busdriver did not realize

that her bus was in the train’s path, whether she
47

would have reacted to the crossing warning

devices had she seen and heard them activate is

unknown. The Safety Board therefore concludes

that, had the school busdriver discerned the

combined visual and audible warnings that a

train was approaching, she might have had

sufficient time to recognize the hazard and move

the bus before impact.

From the school district’s experience,

playing the AM/FM radio on a school bus had a

pacifying effect on its passengers. One of the

eight radio speakers on the bus was positioned

on the left side wall next to the busdriver’s head.

Safety Board tests indicated that when the radio

was turned on, the busdriver could not hear the

train horn. Regardless of the possible passenger

pacification safety benefits that may result from

playing the radio on a school bus, placing a

radio speaker adjacent to a busdriver’s head is

unnecessary to achieve this effect. Therefore,

the Safety Board believes that the NASDPTS

should develop guidelines for the appropriate

placement of radio speakers on school buses and

disseminate these guidelines to its members.

The Board further believes that the NASDPTS

should advise its members to check their school

district buses and disable any radio speakers

located immediately adjacent to school

busdrivers’ heads.

The Safety Board recognizes that perforated

ceiling liners, as on the accident school bus,

probably provide a benefit by reducing the noise

level and thereby lessening the distractions for

busdrivers. However, tests conducted by both

the manufacturer and the Safety Board revealed

that in a bus with a perforated ceiling liner, the

sounds from the rear to the front of the bus were

reduced as much as 25 decibels compared with a

bus without the liner. The perforated ceiling

liner reduced the volume of the train horn and

the warnings from the bus passengers. The

Safety Board is unable to determine in this

accident, whether sound attenuation materials

affected the busdriver’s ability to discern the

audible warnings. The Safety Board therefore

believes that NHTSA should determine what

effect school bus sound attenuation materials

have on the ability of a busdriver to discern both

interior and exterior audible warnings.

School District Oversight

Although school bus routes should avoid

crossing railroad tracks, a railroad grade crossing on this route could not be avoided because

of the limited paths available to access the

residential area that the school bus was serving.

However, methods to identify railroad/highway

grade crossings hazards can be employed, and

the school district specified three procedures to

identify hazards on its school bus routes. The

school transportation director described these

procedures as 1) planning and monitoring the

routes and consulting a commuter train schedule

for those that crossed railroad tracks, 2) driving

the route in his car after a hazard had been

reported, and 3) noting hazards or unusual

conditions on the back of the busdrivers’ route

maps.

There are problems with these procedures.

First, using a commuter train schedule to

identify route hazards is an unreliable method

because trains and buses do not always run on

time, as evidenced in this accident. In addition,

such schedules provide no information about

freight train movements or the characteristics of

trains and railroad grade crossings. Second,

driving the routes can be an effective method of

hazard evaluation if it is done routinely. The

transportation director could cite only one

occasion during his 15 years of experience in

which he drove a school bus route in response to

a hazard report. This information indicates that

this method of hazard identification was

infrequently employed by the TJA School

District. Finally, no notations about hazards or

unusual conditions were found on the back of

the accident route map or any other route map.

The busdrivers familiar with the accident route

had adopted strategies to avoid remaining on the

tracks at Algonquin Road and an adjacent

railroad crossing. However, these practices had

been neither formalized as written instructions

for busdrivers nor discussed by the busdrivers
48

familiar with the route with other school

busdrivers or school officials.

Although all busdrivers should be encouraged to report perceived hazards to school

authorities, the school transportation director is

responsible for periodically monitoring the

school bus routes and the busdrivers. The TJA

transportation director stated that he monitored

the school bus routes; however, he did not

identify the Algonquin Road grade crossing as a

hazard. The policy for drivers to share information on route hazards was not enforced and

was, therefore, useless, as the regular and

substitute drivers did not share their driving

strategies with each other or school officials.

Had a note with a special instruction about the

short queuing area been provided, the accident

busdriver might have stopped on the south side

of the crossing to wait for a green signal indication and thus have avoided the accident. The

Safety Board therefore concludes that the

methods employed by the school district to

identify and evaluate route hazards were ineffective. Furthermore, had the school district

ensured that all school busdrivers exchanged

information about any identified route hazards,

such as the short queuing area, the accident

busdriver might have avoided the collision.

The State of Illinois requires that school

busdrivers be evaluated regularly. The school

transportation director is responsible for ensuring that school busdrivers are monitored and

evaluated. The monitoring of substitute school

busdrivers especially should be conducted

because substitute drivers may not be familiar

with the different bus routes, existing hazards,

or bus equipment. Although the accident

busdriver frequently had substituted over the

past years, her driving performance had not been

monitored or evaluated. The Safety Board

therefore concludes that had the regular and

substitute school busdrivers been monitored

during their morning routes, school officials

might have been aware that the regular school

busdrivers habitually stopped on the south side

of the Algonquin Road grade crossing to wait

for a green indication.

The Safety Board believes that the TJA

School District should develop and implement a

program for the identification of school bus

route hazards and should routinely monitor and

evaluate all regular and substitute school busdrivers. The Safety Board additionally believes

that the NASDPTS should encourage its members to develop and implement a program for the

identification of school bus route hazards and to

routinely monitor and evaluate all regular and

substitute school busdrivers. Further, the Safety

Board believes that the NASDPTS should

advise its members to consider railroad/highway

grade crossing accident histories when

establishing school bus routes.

Road Design

Illinois State law prohibits driving onto a

railroad grade crossing unless the other side of

the grade crossing has sufficient space to accommodate the vehicle without obstructing rail

traffic. After the road widening was completed

at the US 14 and Algonquin Road intersection in

1989, the distances from the northern rail and

crossing gate to the stop line were 28.5 and 21

feet, respectively. The IDOT design for the road

widening failed to allow for space in the

queuing area sufficient to accommodate vehicles

such as dump trucks, tractor-semitrailers, mobile

homes, and school and commercial buses. The

accident school busdriver could have known

about the short queuing area through a school

district route hazard identification system, had

such a system been available. However, other

motorists would not have had the advantage of

using a school district hazard identification

system, even had one been in place.

Because no road signs were posted to provide information on the available space in the

queuing area, these other motorists might be

unable to determine whether the queuing area

could adequately accommodate their vehicles.

IDOT could have posted signs indicating the

length of the queuing area, prohibiting motorists

with vehicles in excess of that length from
49

crossing the tracks during a red indication, and

instructing those motorists to wait on the south

side of the tracks for a green indication. Another

traffic signal also could have been installed to

coordinate with the intersection light. IDOT has

installed a stop line, traffic signs, and traffic

signals on the south side of the grade crossing

since the collision. Therefore, the Safety Board

concludes that IDOT had not employed sufficient measures before the accident to prevent

vehicles from encroaching on the railroad tracks

while stopped at the north side of the grade

crossing. On this basis, the Safety Board

believes that IDOT should review all railroad/highway grade crossings in Illinois to ensure that vehicles have adequate space and time

to clear the crossing before the arrival of a train.

This collision and the March 1993 Fort

Lauderdale accident indicate that motorists

often do not recognize the position of a vehicle

in relation to an approaching train at a railroad/highway grade crossing. Automatic gates

in the down position and stop lines offer visual

references to define a train right-of-way. The

MUTCD specifies the location of the railroad

warning devices and the stop lines relative to the

railroad tracks. However, not all grade crossings

have these visual references. These accidents

illustrate that motorists may not be aware that

they are in the train path, even at crossings

equipped with warning devices and stop lines.

The Safety Board therefore believes that the

FHWA should develop guidelines and amend

the MUTCD to provide methods to delineate the

area (zone) that a train, or its cargo, or both,

may occupy on the track or tracks of a railroad

grade crossing so motorists have visual

reference points to ascertain whether their

vehicle is encroaching on the travel path of the

train, or its cargo, or both. The Safety Board

also believes that the FHWA should disseminate

safety information, in cooperation with NHTSA

and OL, once guidelines are developed, to

national, State, police, public service, and safety

agencies to provide a training and education

module to inform motorists of the methods

developed to delineate the area (zone) that a

train, or its cargo, or both, may occupy on the

track or tracks of a railroad grade crossing.

Also, the Safety Board believes that NHTSA

and OL should disseminate safety information,

in cooperation with the FHWA, once it develops

guidelines, to national, State, police, public

service, and safety agencies to provide a training

and education module to inform motorists of the

methods developed to delineate the area (zone)

that a train, or its cargo, or both, may occupy on

the track or tracks of a railroad grade crossing.

Railroad/Highway Signal Interaction

All railroads are required by the FRA to

provide a minimum of 20 seconds of warning

time before train arrival at a grade crossing.34

The FHWA-funded February 1991 report35 by

the University of Tennessee found that both

extremely short and excessively long warning

times are dangerous. Warning times in excess of

30 to 40 seconds were found to cause many

motorists to engage in risky crossing behavior.

Most motorists expect a train to arrive within 20

seconds of traffic control device activation.

Before October 11, 1995, at the Fox River

Grove collision site, the thumbwheel setting for

the preempt was set at 30 seconds; however, 2

weeks before the accident, the UP reset the

thumbwheel to 25 seconds. Nonetheless, all

postaccident tests conducted by the FRA, the

Safety Board, the UP, and IDOT resulted in a

warning time of 20 seconds or more before a

train reached the crossing.

Because the highway traffic signal system at

the accident site did not operate in a coordinated

mode after it was installed in January 1990,

northbound traffic on Algonquin Road waited

only 6 seconds before receiving a green

indication. Therefore, traffic would have had 14

seconds or more to clear the grade crossing

before the arrival of a train traveling 69 mph, as

 

34 49 CFR Part 234.225.

35 Report No. FHWA-SA-91-007, 1991.
50

was train 624. In October 1994, IDOT installed

new traffic signal controllers that automatically

displayed the 12-second pedestrian clearance

phase from 5:45 a.m. to 10 p.m., and the traffic

on Algonquin Road then waited a minimum of

18 seconds for a green indication. As a result,

traffic would only have 2 to 6 seconds (20- to

24-second warning time, respectively) to clear

the grade crossing.

After receiving complaints about the short

green indication for Algonquin Road, IDOT and

its representatives checked the timing sequence

numerous times to ascertain whether the

highway signal system was operating as

programmed. Each time they found it to be so

operating. The IDOT contractor had never

inspected the highway signal system during a

time that 70-mph commuter trains were in

operation. The least time duration of a green

indication for northbound Algonquin Road

would result from a commuter train approaching

the grade crossing. Because the contractor had

only been checking the signal system against its

program, he had never considered the critical

element — the length of time the green

indication provided for northbound Algonquin

Road before the arrival of a train. Then, the day

before the accident, he recognized that the time

of day might have been a factor in the complaints and, as a result of this recognition, he

was inspecting the highway signal system at the

Lincoln Road and US 14 intersection at the time

of the accident.

IDOT representatives and the signal manufacturer indicated that the contractor at the

master controller could not have manipulated

the highway signal system from the Lincoln

Road intersection to have caused a preempt

signal at the time of the accident. The IDOT

engineer monitoring the highway traffic signal

system on the laptop computer at Algonquin

Road had the capability to initiate a preempt

signal by downloading a program, changing it,

and uploading it again. However, these actions

would have taken several minutes to perform,

and they would have been recorded on the

master controller log had they occurred. Another

possibility was that the preempt sequence could

have been caused by an emergency vehicle

arriving on the scene of the accident. However,

the first emergency vehicle responding to the

scene either did not have the equipment capable

of signaling a preempt sequence or did not have

the equipment activated at the time. The Safety

Board was unable to determine what caused the

preempt sequence that occurred at 7:12 a.m. on

the day of the accident.

The RCB was not recording on the day of

the accident. During postaccident Safety Board

tests, the RCB was replaced and it recorded data

for the tests. Two tests were conducted to

replicate the accident train event recorder data.

Both tests provided 22 seconds of warning time.

The results indicate that the maximum green

time based on the recorded data could have been

between 2 to 4 seconds before the train arrived

at the crossing.

Railroads are not required to install nor

maintain RCB equipment at railroad/highway

grade crossings. This equipment is primarily

designed as a diagnostic tool for railroad signal

maintenance personnel. However, information

recorded by RCBs or similar equipment can be

used to determine the performance of the grade

crossing devices. If used for this purpose, RCBs,

similar railroad recording devices, and corresponding highway recording devices can significantly improve the opportunities for railroad and

highway personnel to accurately determine

warning times at interconnected/preemptive

grade crossings. For example, had the RCB at

the accident site been recording information,

and had IDOT and UP maintenance personnel

reviewed this information after the September,

1995 accident or when evaluating complaints of

a short green signal, the IDOT contractor may

have recognized the actual warning times that

the railroad signal system provided. The Safety

Board concludes that the installation and use of

railroad and highway signal recording devices at

interconnected/preemptive grade crossings can

improve opportunities for highway and railroad

personnel to determine if the signals are coor-
51

dinated and operating properly. The Safety

Board therefore believes that the U.S. Department of Transportation should require the use

and maintenance of railroad and highway traffic

signal recording devices on all new and improved installations at railroad/highway grade

crossings that have active warning train detection systems and are interconnected/preemptive

to highway signal systems. The devices should

record sufficient parameters to allow railroad

and highway personnel to readily determine if

the highway signals and railroad-activated

warning devices are coordinated and operating

properly. The Safety Board also believes that

the U.S. Department of Transportation should

require that existing recording devices for railroad and highway signals systems at interconnected/preemptive grade crossings be retained

or upgraded as necessary, and that these recording devices should be maintained and that the

information from these devices be used during

comprehensive and periodic joint inspections.

Had the RCB at the accident site been recording

information on the day of the accident, the

Safety Board could have used the information

during its investigation to determine the exact

warning time provided by the railroad signal

system for the accident train.

The school busdriver stated that she never

saw a green indication; the student assisting her

said that the busdriver was looking in the mirror

toward the rear of the bus just before the

collision. From the evidence, the green indication was displayed 2 to 6 seconds before impact.

Research36 shows that the average time for a

driver to perceive and react to a traffic light

change is 2.56 seconds; the Safety Board calculated that it would take 1.8 seconds for the accident schoolbus to accelerate out of the path of

the approaching train. Therefore, the driver

would have needed about 4.4 seconds to perceive/react and move the bus far enough

forward to avoid the collision. However, be-

 

36 G. Johansson and K. Rumar, “Drivers’ Brake Reaction

Times,” Human Factors, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1971), pp. 22-27;

G.H. Robinson et al, “Visual Search by Automobile

Drivers,” Human Factors, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1972), pp. 315-

323.

cause the school busdriver was distracted

seconds before the impact by the passengers and

had diverted her attention to the rear of the bus,

the 2 to 6 seconds was not sufficient time for her

to clear the tracks before the arrival of Train

624. The Safety Board concludes that the highway traffic signal hardware (heads, controllers,

masts, posts, and loop detectors) conformed to

design standards and operated as intended, but

the signal system did not provide sufficient time

for northbound traffic on Algonquin Road to

clear the grade crossing. The Safety Board also

concludes that the highway traffic signal system

before the collision provided a green indication

for northbound Algonquin Road for 2 to 4

seconds based on the postaccident testing, or for

2 to 6 seconds based on the highway signal

system programming.

No national data base, including the U.S.

DOT/AAR grade crossing inventory, currently

identifies and documents railroad/highway

grade crossings in which the railroad signal system preempts or interconnects with the highway

signal system. Having this documentation available in a data base would have been valuable,

especially after the Safety Board issued its

urgent recommendations following this accident. The Safety Board concludes that had a

data base containing grade crossing signal

system information been available after this

accident, the States could have more readily

identified and then inspected specific crossings

to ensure that the signal systems posed no

hazards. Therefore, the Safety Board believes

that the FRA should expand the U.S. DOT/AAR

National Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory to

include information on highway/railroad grade

crossings having preemptive or interconnected

signals, and should review and update the

inventory, once modified, annually.

State and Railroad Coordination and

Communication

The IDOT and the railroad had exchanged

various documents before the accident that
52

included information about the warning times of

the railroad signal system. After the accident,

IDOT reviewed the documents and thought that

they had been given 30 and 25 seconds of

warning time, respectively, before and after

October 11, 1995. During the review, the most

misunderstood term was “warning time.” IDOT

personnel had concluded from the construction

prints, numerous letters and memos, and the

thumbwheel setting, that a minimum warning

time of either 25 or 30 seconds was provided

between the time the crossing warning devices

were activated and a train reached the crossing.

The warning time provided by the railroad

signal system does not always equate to the

thumbwheel setting (25 seconds at the time of

the accident). Postaccident testing found that the

warning time may have been less than 25

seconds, although never less than 20 seconds, as

required. Although IDOT acknowledged that it

understood the railroad terminology for

“preempt” and “interconnect,” it did not understand that additional time must be built into the

thumbwheel setting to ensure the minimum

warning time because of delay times in the circuitry. IDOT officials, according to testimony,

did not understand that the railroad was only

providing a 20-second minimum warning time

through the thumbwheel setting.

Before the accident, State and railroad signal technicians had discussed the signal systems,

and several design reviews of the accident grade

crossing had also been conducted. IDOT

representatives had responded to the intersection

on several occasions to check for short green

indications. However, until the day of the

accident, they had checked the operating program of the traffic signal system and not

recognized that Algonquin Road did not receive

a signal in time for traffic to clear the railroad

tracks. IDOT did not understand the timing.

According to the IDOT engineering technician,

he programmed the highway signal system

conforming to his experiences of 20 to 30

seconds; he never used any written information

on the warning time from the railroad.

Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that

IDOT had programmed its highway signal

system without applying the minimum warning

time information from the railroad.

The UP had reset the thumbwheel from 30

to 25 seconds on October 11, 1995, but it did

not notify IDOT of the change. The Safety

Board is unable to determine whether IDOT

would have reacted had they been notified. Even

after the accident, IDOT thought that the 25-

second thumbwheel setting meant 25 seconds of

warning time. Also, IDOT had not modified the

programming previously, even though the 25-

second warning time was referenced before the

change in the thumbwheel setting.

IDOT and its contractors had opportunities

to identify the short green indication for

northbound Algonquin Road during 70-mph

train operations and, as a result, could have

modified the highway traffic signal system or

requested more time from the railroad to ensure

a sufficient interval for traffic to clear the

crossing. However, communication about the

interconnected signal systems was not effective

between the State and the railroad. The Safety

Board therefore concludes that had an effective

communication system existed between IDOT

and the UP about the interconnected signal

systems, IDOT might have understood that the

railroad had provided through the thumbwheel

setting only a minimum of 20 seconds of

warning time before the arrival of a train at the

grade crossing.

In three previous investigations, Safety

Board determined that ineffective communications between highway departments and the

railroads caused or contributed to grade crossing

accidents. First, in the March 1993 Fort Lauderdale accident,37 highway engineers designed a

work zone that caused traffic to congest at the

railroad/highway grade crossing. The Safety

Board found that the highway engineers had not

 

37 Highway Accident Report--Collision of Amtrak Train

No. 88 with Rountree Transport and Rigging, Inc., Vehicle

on CSX Transportation, Inc., Railroad near Intercession

City, Florida, on November 30, 1993 (NTSB/HAR-95/01).
53

“adequately considered either the traffic congestion or the resulting obstruction of the

railroad/highway grade crossing.” In the November 1993 Intercession City, Florida, accident

involving a low clearance, overdimension,

overweight vehicle, the Safety Board found that

the Florida Department of Transportation did

not ensure that the railroad had been notified of

the vehicle’s movement over its grade crossing.

Finally, in the May 1995 collision at a grade

crossing near Sycamore, South Carolina,38 the

Safety Board reported:

Recent interviews and previous accident

investigations conducted by the Safety

Board have revealed that the degree of

communication and cooperation between railroads and public entities regarding grade crossing activities varies

widely. Railroad and public officials

tend to communicate more on activities

that involve funding of active crossings

or the installation and maintenance of

active warning devices, or that are likely

to generate public complaints. The same

level of communication does not exist

when it comes to other crossing maintenance activities, particularly as they

relate to passive crossings. CSX

Transportation (CSXT), which operates

more than 20,000 miles of track,

performs crossing profile maintenance

to ensure track vertical and horizontal

alignment and adequate drainage, while

State, local, and sometimes private

entities are responsible for maintaining

the alignment of the crossing

approaches. When crossing maintenance

is performed, the CSXT does not always

advise respective entities of these activities. By the same token, in some

cases, local entities perform work to

realign crossing approaches without

informing the railroads. Thus, the Safety

Board concludes that railroads and

 

38 Highway Accident Report--Highway/Rail Grade Crossing Collision near Sycamore, South Carolina, May 2, 1995

(NTSB/HAR-96/01).

public entities do not routinely communicate with each other on grade

crossing maintenance activities.

Misunderstandings about grade crossing

systems can be manifested through differences

in terminology, construction and maintenance

designs and practices, and inspection and operation methods. The Safety Board therefore

believes that the U.S. Secretary of Transportation should develop a common glossary of

railroad/highway grade crossing terms and

disseminate this glossary to railroads and public

entities. Although many efforts have been made

to address grade crossing safety, no single

coordinated program has been available to

ensure effective communication on all aspects

of grade crossing safety between transportation

modes. The Safety Board concludes that, had a

coordinated program to ensure effective communication between transportation modes about

all aspects of grade crossing safety been in operation, the ineffective communication between

IDOT and the railroad might never have

occurred. The Safety Board therefore believes

that IDOT should train its personnel and contractors involved in the design, inspection, and

maintenance of highway signals at highway/

railroad crossings to ensure that they understand

the integration and working relationship to the

railroad and highway signal systems.

The Safety Board further believes that the

U.S. Secretary of Transportation should develop

a comprehensive and periodic railroad/highway

grade crossing safety inspection program to be

conducted jointly by railroads and public

entities and also require that railroads and public

entities coordinate changes to railroad/highway

grade crossings before implementation.

Development of an inspection program for

the more than 314,000 railroad/highway grade

crossings will be a significant challenge. However, the U.S. DOT has successfully implemented a similar national inspection program.

As a result of recommendations from the Safety

Board investigation of the 1967 Silver River
54

Bridge collapse in Point Pleasant, West

Virginia,39 and other bridge collapses, the

FHWA developed the National Bridge Inventory

and inspection programs. These efforts have

resulted in the inspection and safety review of

over 577,000 bridges nationwide.

Also, the Safety Board believes that the U.S.

Secretary of Transportation should notify, in

cooperation with the American Association of

State Highway and Transportation Officials, the

National Association of County Engineers, the

American Public Works Association, the Institute of Transportation Engineers, the AAR, the

American Short Line Railroad Association, and

the American Public Transit Association, railroads and public entities about the importance

of exchanging information about railroad/highway grade crossings. Furthermore, the Safety

Board believes that the American Association of

State Highway and Transportation Officials, the

National Association of County Engineers, the

American Public Works Association, the Institute of Transportation Engineers the AAR, the

American Short Line Railroad Association, and

the American Public Transit Association should

advise their members of the circumstances of

this accident and, in cooperation with the U.S.

DOT, notify railroads and public highway

entities about the importance of exchanging

information regarding railroad/highway grade

crossings.

Signal Training

A primary component of the communication

issue in this accident was the misunderstanding

of the operation of the railroad and highway

signal systems by personnel responsible for their

design, operation and maintenance.

Understanding is an integral element of an

effective communication process, and training

has proven to be an effective method of developing understanding. However, the Safety

Board could not locate any training programs

 

39 Highway Accident Report--Collapse of U.S. 35 Highway

Bridge, Point Pleasant, West Virginia, December 15, 1967

(NTSB-HAR-71/1).

addressing specifically the interaction of these

systems at railroad/highway grade crossings.

The Safety Board therefore believes that the

U.S. Department of Transportation should

develop a training program in the design and

operation of railroad/highway grade crossings.

The program should include the interaction

between rail and highway signal systems. Those

representatives of the railroads, public entities,

and others who design and maintain grade crossing signal systems should be required to

complete the training.

Injury and Survival Factors

The bus passengers who were seated the

farthest from the impact area received the least

severe injuries, and four of those passengers,

seated in rows one through four, were uninjured.

Those seated in rows eight and nine sustained

serious injuries. Five passengers sustaining

serious to minor injuries were either standing or

running in the aisle outside the impact area

when the bus was struck. They could have

received injuries from striking obstacles or other

passengers. Had standing passengers struck

seated passengers, they likely contributed to the

injuries sustained by those seated passengers.

Most of the fatally and seriously injured

passengers were seated in the last four left side

rows, which the crash forces and collision

intrusion displaced during impact.

Four of the five fatally injured passengers

who had been seated in rows 11 and 12 were

found outside the bus near the left side windows. These passengers sustained their fatal

injuries during the impact sequence by striking

the left side interior of the bus body (windows,

frames, and roof structures) and not during the

ejection. One ejected passenger from row 12

had a 1.2- by 2-inch, L-shaped abrasion on the

left side of his face that closely matched the

interior window frame next to his seat. In

addition, a fatally injured passenger in row 9

sustained 0.2- by 0.5-inch abrasions across the

forehead that matched the perforated sound

panel pattern on the upper left side of the bus
55

interior. The fifth fatally injured passenger who

had been seated in the direct impact area was

not ejected, but a seat frame had to be cut to

extricate this passenger, who sustained fatal

skull fractures and brain and crushing internal

injuries similar to those suffered by the ejected

fatalities.

The Safety Board considers, with the concurrence of the Cook County pathologist, from

the similarity of the head injuries that the fatally

injured passengers sustained, as well as from the

patterned abrasions and contusions received that

closely resembled objects within the bus that

could have been struck, all fatal injuries were

incurred inside the bus. Therefore, the Safety

Board concludes that the passengers found

outside the bus sustained their fatal injuries

during the initial impact sequence and not as a

result of being ejected.
1. Neither the weather, the position of the sun,

the track, nor the mechanical condition of

the train or of the school bus either caused

or contributed to the collision. The train

engineer was qualified to perform his duties

and was in compliance with the hours-ofservice requirements, and the busdriver was

trained and experienced to drive school

buses. Neither alcohol nor drug use by the

train engineer or the school busdriver was a

factor in the accident.

2. Emergency response personnel reacted

promptly to the emergency and acted effectively and efficiently at the collision site; the

emergency response efforts were well

coordinated.

3. The guidance or training provided in the

Illinois school busdriver training curriculum

about vehicle positioning in relation to the

roadway is ineffective.

4. Had the school busdriver discerned the

combined visual and audible warnings that a

train was approaching, she might have had

sufficient time to recognize the hazard and

move the bus before impact.

5. The methods employed by the school

district to identify and evaluate route

hazards were ineffective. Furthermore, had

the school district ensured that all school

busdrivers exchange information about any

identified route hazards, such as the short

queuing area, the accident busdriver might

have avoided the collision.

6. Had the regular and substitute school

busdrivers been monitored during their

morning routes, school officials might have

been aware that the regular school

busdrivers habitually stopped on the south

side of the Algonquin Road grade crossing

to wait for a green indication.

7. The Illinois Department of Transportation

had not employed sufficient measures

before the accident to prevent vehicles from

encroaching on the railroad tracks while

stopped at the north side of the grade

crossing.

8. During the Safety Board tests, the railroad

grade crossing signal system provided 20

seconds or more warning time before the

arrival of a train.

9. The installation and use of railroad and

highway signal recording devices at interconnected/preemptive grade crossings can

improve opportunities for highway and

railroad personnel to determine if the signals are coordinated and operating properly.

10. The highway traffic signal hardware (heads,

controllers, masts, posts, and loop detectors)

conformed to design standards and operated

as intended, but the highway signal system

did not provide sufficient time for

northbound traffic on Algonquin Road to

clear the grade crossing.

11. The highway traffic signal system before the

collision provided a green indication for

northbound Algonquin Road for 2 to 4

seconds based on the postaccident testing,

or for 2 to 6 seconds based on the highway

signal system programming.

12. Had a data base containing grade crossing

signal system information been available

after this accident, the States could have

more readily identified and then inspected

specific crossings to ensure that the signal

systems posed no hazards.

CONCLUSIONS
57

13. The Illinois Department of Transportation

had programmed its highway signal system

without applying the minimum warning time

information from the railroad.

14. Had an effective communication system

existed between the Illinois Department of

Transportation (IDOT) and the railroads

about interconnected signal systems, IDOT,

its contractors, and the Illinois Commerce

Commission might have understood that the

railroad had provided through the thumb

wheel setting only the FRA minimum

requirement of 20 seconds warning time

before the arrival of a train at the grade

crossing.

15. Had a coordinated program to ensure

effective communication between transportation modes about all aspects of grade

crossing safety been in operation, the

ineffective communication between IDOT

and the railroad might never have occurred.

16. The passengers found outside the bus

sustained their fatal injuries during the initial impact sequence and not as a result of

being ejected.

The National Transportation Safety Board

determines that the probable cause of the

collision was that the busdriver had positioned

the school bus so that it encroached upon the

railroad tracks because of the failure of: 1) the

Illinois Department of Transportation to recognize the short queuing area on northbound

Algonquin Road and to take corrective action;

2) the Illinois Department of Transportation to

recognize the insufficient time of the green

signal indication for vehicles on northbound

Algonquin Road before the arrival of a train at

the crossing; and 3) the Transportation Joint

Agreement School District 47/155 to identify

route hazards and to provide its drivers with

alternative instructions for such situations.

Contributing to the accident was the failure of

the Illinois Department of Transportation and its

contractors, the Illinois Commerce Commission,

and the railroads to have a communication

system that ensures understanding of the

integration and working relationship of the

railroad and highway signal systems.

PROBABLE CAUSE
As a result of its investigation of this

accident, the National Transportation Safety

Board makes the following recommendations:

--to the U.S. Secretary of Transportation:

Develop a comprehensive and periodic

railroad/highway grade crossing safety

inspection program to be conducted

jointly by railroads and public entities

and also require railroads and public

entities to coordinate any changes to

railroad/highway grade crossings before

implementation. (I-96-6)

Notify, in cooperation with the

American Association of State Highway

and Transportation Officials, the

National Association of County Engineers, the American Public Works

Association, the Institute of Transportation Engineers, the Association of

American Railroads, the American

Short Line Railroad Association, and

the American Public Transit Association, railroads and public entities about

the importance of exchanging information about railroad/ highway grade

crossings. (I-96-7)

Develop a common glossary of railroad/highway grade crossing terms and

disseminate this glossary to railroads

and public entities. (I-96-8)

Develop a training program in the

design and operation of railroad/

highway grade crossings that includes

the interaction between rail and highway signal systems. Require representatives of the railroads, public entities,

and others who design and maintain

grade crossing signal systems to complete the training program. (I-96-9)

Require the use and maintenance of

railroad and highway traffic signal

recording devices on all new and

improved installations at railroad/ highway grade crossings that have active

warning train detection systems and are

interconnected/preempted to highway

signal systems. These devices should

record sufficient parameters to allow

railroad and highway personnel to

readily determine that the highway

signals and railroad-activated warning

devices are coordinated and operating

properly. Require that the information

from these devices be used during

comprehensive and periodic joint

inspections. (I-96-10)

Require that existing recording devices

for railroad and highway signals

systems at interconnected/preempted

grade crossings be retained or upgraded

as necessary. Require that these recording devices be maintained and that the

information from these devices be used

during the comprehensive and periodic

joint inspections. (I-96-11)

--to the Federal Highway Administration:

Develop guidelines and amend the

Manual on Uniform Traffic Control

Devices for Streets and Highways to

provide methods to delineate the area

(zone) that a train, or its cargo, or both,

may occupy on the track or tracks of a

railroad grade crossing so motorists

have visual reference points that enable

them to ascertain whether their vehicle

is encroaching on the travel path of the

train, or its cargo, or both. (H-96-40)

Disseminate safety information, in

cooperation with the National Highway

RECOMMENDATIONS
59

Traffic Safety Administration and

Operation Lifesaver, Inc., once guidelines are developed, to national, State,

police, public service, and safety agencies for them to use in developing a

training and education module that

informs motorists how to recognize the

area (zone) that a train and/or its cargo

may occupy on the track or tracks of a

railroad grade crossing. (H-96-41)

Cooperate with the Federal Railroad

Administration in the review and modification of the existing parameters of the

National Highway-Rail Crossing

Inventory to ensure that it meets the

needs of both railroad and highway

users. (H-96-42)

--to the Federal Railroad Administration:

In cooperation with the Federal Highway Administration, review and modify

the existing parameters of the National

Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory to

ensure that it meets the needs of both

railroad and highway users. Include, as

a minimum, information on highway/

railroad grade crossings having preemptive or interconnected signals. Once

modified, review and update the information annually. (R-96-50)

--to the National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration:

Determine what effect school bus sound

attenuation materials have on the ability

of a busdriver to discern both interior

and exterior audible warnings (H-96-43)

Disseminate safety information, in

cooperation with the Federal Highway

Administration and the Operation Lifesaver, Inc., once guidelines are developed, to national, State, police, public

service, and safety agencies for them to

use in developing a training and education module that informs motorists how

to recognize the area (zone) that a train

and/or its cargo may occupy on the track

or tracks of a railroad grade crossing.

(H-96-44)

--to the State of Illinois:

Advise school busdrivers of the circumstances of this accident and provide the

busdrivers with practical training about

vehicle positioning on the road,

especially at railroad/highway grade

crossings. (H-96-45)

--to the Illinois Department of Transportation:

Review and modify the highway design

for all railroad/highway grade crossings

in Illinois to ensure that vehicles have

adequate space and time to clear the

crossing before the arrival of a train. (H96-46)

Train Illinois Department of Transportation personnel and contractors involved in the design, inspection, and

maintenance of highway signals at railroad/highway crossings to ensure that

they understand the integration and

working relationship of the railroad and

highway signal systems. (H-96-47)

--to the Transportation Joint Agreement School

District 47/155:

Develop and implement a program for

the identification of school bus route

hazards and routinely monitor and evaluate all regular and substitute school

busdrivers (H-96-48)

--to the National Association of State Directors

of Pupil Transportation Services:

Advise your members of the circumstances of this accident and provide

guidance about vehicle positioning on
60

the road, especially at railroad/ highway

grade crossings. (H-96-49)

Develop guidelines for the appropriate

placement of radio speakers and use of

radios on school buses and disseminate

these guidelines to your members. (H96-50)

Advise your members to check their

school buses and disable any radio

speakers located immediately adjacent

to school busdrivers’ heads. (H-96-51)

Encourage your members to develop

and implement a program for the

identification of school bus route

hazards and to routinely monitor and

evaluate all regular and substitute

school busdrivers. (H-96-52)

Advise your members to consider railroad/highway grade crossing accident

histories or unusual roadway characteristics when establishing school bus

routes. (H-96-53)

--to the American Association of State Highway

and Transportation Officials:

Advise your members of the circumstances of this accident and, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of

Transportation, notify railroads and

public entities about the importance of

exchanging information regarding railroad/highway grade crossings. (H-96-

54)

--to the National Association of County

Engineers:

Advise your members of the circumstances of this accident and, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of

Transportation, notify railroads and

public entities about the importance of

exchanging information regarding railroad/highway grade crossings. (H-96-

55)

--to the American Public Works Association:

Advise your members of the circumstances of this accident and, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of

Transportation, notify railroads and

public entities about the importance of

exchanging information regarding railroad/highway grade crossings. (H-96-

56)

--to the Institute of Transportation Engineers:

Advise your members of the circumstances of this accident and, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of

Transportation, notify railroads and

public entities about the importance of

exchanging information regarding railroad/highway grade crossings. (H-96-

57)

--to the Association of American Railroads:

Advise your members of the circumstances of this accident and, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of

Transportation, notify railroads and

public entities about the importance of

exchanging information regarding railroad/highway grade crossings. (R-97-

51)

--to the American Short Line Railroad

Association:

Advise your members of the circumstances of this accident and, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of

Transportation, notify railroads and

public entities about the importance of

exchanging information regarding railroad/highway grade crossings. (R-96-

52)
61

--to the American Public Transit Association:

Advise your members of the circumstances of this accident and, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of

Transportation, notify railroads and

public entities about the importance of

exchanging information regarding railroad/highway grade crossings. (R-96-

58)

--to Operation Lifesaver, Inc.:

Disseminate safety information, in

cooperation with the Federal Highway

Administration and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, once

guidelines are developed, to national,

State, police, public service, and safety

agencies for them to use in developing a

training and education module that

informs motorists how to recognize the

area (zone) that a train and/or its cargo

may occupy on the track or tracks of a

railroad grade crossing. (H-96-59)

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

JAMES E. HALL

Chairman

ROBERT T. FRANCIS II

Vice Chairman

JOHN A. HAMMERSCHMIDT

Member

JOHN J. GOGLIA

Member

GEORGE W. BLACK, JR.

Member

October 29, 1996

63

APPENDIX A

Investigation Information

Investigation

The National Transportation Safety Board

was notified of this accident at approximately

8:30 a.m. on October 25, 1995. Accident investigators dispatched from the Safety Board’s

Chicago, Illinois, regional office arrived at

approximately 9 a.m. on October 25, 1995, and

investigators from the Safety Board’s headquarters in Washington, D.C., and the regional

offices in Atlanta, Georgia, and Arlington,

Texas, arrived on the scene that afternoon. A

19-person team conducted the on-scene

investigation.

Participating in the investigation were

representatives of the Federal Highway Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration,

the Illinois Department of Transportation, the

Illinois Commerce Commission, the Transportation Joint Agreement School District, the Union

Pacific Railroad Company, the Illinois State

Police, the McHenry County Sheriff’s

Department, the Fox River Grove Police

Department, Navistar International, Amtran

Corporation, and Harmon Industries.

Hearing/Deposition

The Safety Board held a public hearing in

conjunction with this investigation on January

17-19, 1996.

65

APPENDIX B

Abbreviated Injury Scale Table

Injuries Busdriver Bus

passengers

Traincrew Train

passengers

Total

AIS-0 none 0 4 3 120 127

AIS-1 minor 1 14 0 0 15

AIS-2 moderate 0 4 0 0 4

AIS-3 serious 0 1 0 0 1

AIS-4 severe 0 5 0 0 5

AIS-5 critical 0 7 0 0 7

Total 1 35 3 120 159

Injuries in this table have been coded to the revised 1990 Abbreviated Injury Scale of the American

Association for Automotive Medicine, which is the standard system of assessing injury severity.

67

APPENDIX C

Rail Signal System Information

Harmon HXP-1: General

The Harmon Crossing Processor, Model

HXP-1, is a microprocessor-based crossing control system that provides constant warning (CW)

times by calculating the speed of the train and

its arrival time at the crossing. An RCA 1802

microprocessor chip, the heart of the system,

activates the crossing signals by looking at

voltage and current levels as well as phase

relationship, calculating their rate of change,

and determining whether or not the rate of

change is sufficient to activate the crossing signals providing the warning time required. The

warning time is set by adjusting the warning

time (WT) switch with the approach terminations. The WT is limited by the physical

distance to the approach terminations.

The microprocessor determines when HXP

is to go in high signal or low phase detection.

By monitoring voltage increase (RX), the

microprocessor causes the crossing control DC

voltage Motion Detection (MD) relay to drop,

activating the crossing signals when RX voltage

increases to 110 or above (RX voltage is set at

100 during initial setup). The microprocessor

also monitors the phase relationship between

voltage and current, causing the MD relay

voltage to drop, activating the crossing signals

when the phase angle is below specified limits.

By installing an optional plug-in recorder

board into the HXP cabinet, the HXP-1 can

record train movement within the confines of

the approaches to the highway/rail crossing.

The Recorder Circuit Board (RCB) is an

optional HXP-1 module primarily intended for

system troubleshooting. It is non-vital1

 in design

and has no effect on operation of the HXP.

Data are stored in the RCB in three different

 

1 Any circuit the function of which does not affect the

safety of train operations (AAR).

forms: the train record log, the event buffer log,

and the train data log.

The train record log contains a record of the

current status of the HXP, along with 222 lines

of events, including status lines of the day, time,

cabinet number, bi/uni-directional (BI/UNI)

switch position, CW/MD switch position, WT,

switch settings, and RX pot value. A new status

line is generated whenever a variable changes.

The train record also logs three calculated train

speeds on the approach, the WT, and remarks

intended to aid in understanding the data. The

three speeds calculated are: initial speed detected on the approach; speed when the island

circuit is deenergized; and average speed on the

approach calculated when the initial speed is

detected until the island circuit deenergizes.

These data are retained with power removed.

The event buffer log shows the status of the

HXP and records event changes to either the

MD,2

 island circuit (ISL), or constant warning

enable (CWE) along with corresponding RX

and phase values. This log has 256 event lines.

The data are not retained with power removed.

The train data log contains the same information as the event buffer log except that it

records events twice every second for a maximum of 128 seconds, or 256 events. This log

can be used to monitor the RX and phase

response during a train move. The data are not

retained with power removed.

Data stored in the RCB can be retrieved

with any 80-column printer that has an ASCII

character set and is RS232C interfaced. Laptop

personal computers are ideal means of

retrieving, storing, and printing out these data.

 

2 This circuit is designed to detect the motion of a train as it

moves through the crossing approach circuit.
68

A secondary means of viewing the last

(most recent) 9 lines of the train record log is

provided by means of a thumb wheel switch

located on the front edge of the RCB (to select

the event line) and the LED display (to view the

data). With or without a RCB, the warning time

of the most recent train move is available on the

LED display, when the display switch is rotated

to the WT position.

HXP-1 Operating Principles

During each loop of the HXP operating program, essential track and operating parameters

are sequentially tested for proper operation. If

any function fails its test, an error code is

generated. Any time an error is generated, the

MD relay voltage is eliminated (which activates

the crossing warning system), a delay timer is

initiated (which will prevent the recovery of the

relay drive voltage for 25 seconds), and the CPU

is reset. The MD relay drive can never recover

until the fault is corrected.

Track-related parameters, such as signal

amplitude and current and phase (which are

combined to produce the RX voltage), are monitored through two separate input channels and

stored in diverse form (true and complement) in

independent locations. Vital calculations are

stored in separate true and complement form,

and all data and calculations are cross-checked

and verified to be within proper limits. Any

discrepancy will produce an error code which

will eliminate the MD relay drive voltage.

The CPU operating program loop time is

critical to the proper operation of the HXP and

is tested to complete its cycle, on time, within a

3.8ms window. Failing this test, the CPU will be

reset, and the MD relay drive voltage eliminated. The CPU clock frequency is tested by

means of a vital narrow band filter. Any variation of the CPU clock frequency beyond the

filter limits will cause the MD relay drive

voltage to be permanently eliminated.

The following are some hardware tests that

the CPU performs on a regular basis:

• During each program loop cycle, a CPU

register test on internal registers verifies

that these registers can be written to end

read back correctly.

• A test of the RAM is performed every 16

seconds to verify that each byte can be

written to and read back correctly.

• A complete test of ROM is performed

every 26 seconds, using a 16-bit checksum on each 256-byte block of memory.

• An test of the ROM is performed about

every 1.8 hours, using a 16-bit CRC on

each 512-byte block of memory to verify

that there are no changes to the operating

program.

• Power supply voltages are tested each

program loop cycle.

• Approach Length Warning Time, LIA,

TC switches, and the RX potentiometer

are all provided with dual outputs that are

compared during each program loop cycle

to validate requested values.

• Track data is monitored each loop cycle

to identify variations which represent

train movement. Some of the parameters

calculated are train location, speed, and

direction. Track data is averaged for 4

seconds (eight loops), to allow the speed

and distance parameters to stabilize,

before prediction of train time to island is

predicted.

In summary, because of the dual information input paths, the diversity of locations,

the manner of data storage, the many hardware

checks regularly performed by the CPU, the

frequency test of the CPU clock, and the strict

limitation of loop cycle timing imposed upon

the CPU, it is not possible for the HXP, as a

result of internal failures, to produce MD relay

voltage yet fail to activate the warning system in

a timely manner.
69

APPENDIX D

Highway Traffic Signal System Information

The Algonquin Road intersection was

controlled by a fully traffic actuated signal system. The components of the signal installation

included the following equipment: signal heads,

pedestrian signal heads, pedestrian push buttons,

signal posts, mast arms, internally illuminated

blank out regulatory signs, vehicle loop detectors, controller and cabinet, conduit, cable, and

hand-holes. The traffic signal controller at

Algonquin Road was part of a closed loop traffic signal system that included a master controller to the west at US 14 and Lincoln Avenue

and a traffic signal controller to the east at US

14 and Illinois State Route 22. The traffic signal

installation at Algonquin Road provided six

separate vehicle phases and two pedestrian

phases with turn movement overlaps for:

• Northbound traffic

• Southbound traffic

• Southeast-bound traffic

• Northwest-bound traffic

• Southeast- and Northwest-bound left

turns

• Two separate pedestrian phases, movements crossing US 14 on the east side

of the intersection and crossing Algonquin Road on the south side of the

intersection. In addition, a north to

southeast-bound right turn overlap

appears in conjunction with the northwest to southbound left turn phase

during normal operation.

1. Normal Sequence — This sequence

operates the intersection at all times that

the signal is not being preempted by

railroad or emergency vehicles.

A. Coordinated Operation - When the

system operates in the semi-actuated

mode from 5:45 a.m. until 10 p.m.,

the mainline detectors are

inoperative. This type of operation

includes the display of two separate

nonconflicting phases on an ondemand basis for the intersecting

roadways.

B. Fully Actuated Sequence — When

the system operates in the free mode

from 10 p.m. to 5:45 a.m., mainline

detectors for US 14 are turned on

and all other detectors remain

active. In addition, the pedestrian

detection associated with the nonconflicting mainline coordinated

phase is turned on until the controller receives a preemption call.

2. Railroad Preemption - The railroad

preemption sequence takes priority

control over the intersection once a call

to the traffic controller is received that a

train is approaching the intersection.

This call is received via a hardwire

connection from the railroad control

bungalow to the traffic signal control

cabinet. Once the call is received and all

of the conflicting vehicle and/or

pedestrian phases have terminated with

their proper clearance intervals, the

controller allows the northbound

Algonquin Road phase to appear green

while everything else is omitted.

3. Emergency Vehicle Preemption - The

emergency vehicle preemption sequence

is activated once an emergency vehicle

call is received in the traffic signal

controller. This call is received via a

high-intensity light emitter mounted on

the emergency vehicle and a detector

mounted on, or near, the traffic control

signal. Once the emergency or priority

vehicle is detected, the detector relays a
70

signal to a phase selector which is

connected to the signal controller. This

phase selector then checks the status of the

controller. The selector either extends the

green interval for the emergency vehicle or

terminates the green on the street or streets

opposing the emergency vehicle after all

proper clearance intervals for vehicle or

pedestrian traffic have terminated.

The emergency vehicle preemption sequence takes lower priority control of the intersection than the railroad preemption sequence. For example, if an emergency vehicle

preemption is received by the traffic controller

and a subsequent railroad preemption call is

received, the railroad preemption overrides the

emergency vehicle call. After all proper clearance intervals for vehicle or pedestrian traffic

have terminated, the controller allows the northbound Algonquin Road phase to appear green.

Between January 1990 and October 1994

the three intersections were operated by Multisonics controllers. During that period, IDOT and

their contractor were unable to operate the

traffic signals as a coordinated system. Therefore, the pedestrian clearance indications would

appear only if a pedestrian push button were

pushed. Without the pedestrian push button

activation, during the approach of a train, the

green track clearance signal for Algonquin Road

would have appeared after the 4.5 seconds of

amber and 1.5 seconds of all red (6 seconds). If

the pedestrian push button was activated, prior

to the approach of a train, a 12-second pedestrian clearance time (flashing DON’T WALK)

would appear in addition to the 6 seconds (solid

DON’T WALK) for the amber and red traffic

signals before the green track clearance green

for Algonquin Road would be displayed. In

October of 1994, the three Multisonics

controllers were replaced with Econolite ASC8000 controllers (the master controller was

placed at Lincoln Avenue).

At that time, the three controllers began

operating as a coordinated system. When the

Econolite controllers were in coordinated

operation, between 5:45 a.m. and 10 p.m., the

12-second pedestrian clearance interval would

be displayed every cycle even without pedestrian push button activation. The total time for

this cycle would be 18 seconds before a green

traffic signal would be displayed for Algonquin

Road vehicles waiting in the queue area.

Between 10 p.m. and 5:45 a.m. the signal

system was fully actuated and the 12-second

pedestrian clearance phase would be eliminated

unless a pedestrian push button were pushed.
71

APPENDIX E

Excerpts from National Standards School Transportation Standards:

Recommended Procedures for School Bus Drivers at Railroad Grade Crossings

General

1. The driver of any school bus, whether

carrying passengers or not, must before

crossing any track or tracks, bring the bus to

a full and complete stop within not less than

fifteen feet or more than fifty feet from the

rails nearest the front of the bus.

2. When drivers are making stops for railroad

crossings, they shall carefully observe traffic and reduce speed far enough in advance

to avoid trapping other motorists in panic

stops or rear-end collisions with the bus. On

multiple lane roadways, no such stops shall

be made in the center or left-hand lanes.

3. No special signs, signals or flashers

designated for use on school buses shall be

activated while the bus is stopping for this

purpose. Note: The option to activate hazard

lights or four-way flashers is at the

discretion of the transportation agency or

regulated by state statute.

4. The driver, when stopped, shall fully open

the service door and driver’s window, and

must, after the stop and while so stopped,

listen and look in both directions along the

track or tracks for approaching engines,

trains or cars. Upon resumption of motion,

the service door may be closed.

5. If the view of the track or tracks, for a distance of one thousand feet in either direction

is not clear or is obstructed in any way, no

portion of the bus may be propelled onto the

tracks until, by personal inspection, the

driver has made certain that no train is

approaching. In no instance may a signal

indicating safety be considered as conclusive or serve to abrogate this precaution.

6. Drivers shall, in every instance, cross in a

gear that will not changing gears while

traversing such crossing and shall not, under

any circumstances, shift gears while actually

crossing tracks or crossings.

7. In the event that a train has passed over the

crossing, no bus driver shall drive the bus

onto the track or tracks until such train has

sufficiently cleared the crossing so that the

driver is certain that no train, hidden by the

first train, is approaching on an adjacent

track.

8. For improved hearing, all noisy equipment

(fans, etc.) should be off until the bus has

cleared the crossing.

At Crossings Controlled by Signals Only

1. In addition to the above, the driver of a

school bus which has stopped at any railroad tracks where there are red lights and/or

bells in operation, shall not proceed across

such track or tracks unless by authorization

from a law enforcement officer or train

personnel, though this does not relieve the

driver of personal responsibility for safe

crossing.

2. In the event that switching operations or

stopped trains delay the use of the crossing

for frequent or extended periods of time,

complaint should be made through proper

channels to management and traffic authorities.

At Crossings Controlled by Crossing

Gates or Barriers

1. No bus driver shall drive the bus through,

around or under any crossing gate or barrier
72

at a railroad crossing while such gate or

barrier is closed or being opened or closed.

2. The bus driver must never accept a lack of

movement as indicating that the device is

either in or out of order or not properly

operating, but must always take a crossing

as a conclusive warning of danger and must

not cross the tracks until the bus driver has

conclusively ascertained that no train is

approaching.

Weather Conditions

During wet, stormy or foggy weather, before

placing part of the bus on the tracks, the driver

must know conclusively that the crossing can be

made safely. Any use of flares, etc., in addition

to warning signals or devices maintained at such

railroad crossings, must be taken as an

additional warning of danger.

Management of Passengers

When any school bus must stop to cross any

track, all passengers must be silent until the

crossing is completed. A signal for silence shall

be given by the driver in whatever manner is

deemed suitable.

Adapted from Fact Sheet, “Recommended

Procedures for School Bus Drivers at Railroad

Grade Crossings,” revised, School Transportation Section, 1984, National Safety Council,

1121 Spring Lake Dr., Itasca, IL 60143-3201.
73

APPENDIX F

Task Force Recommendations

A. Short-Term Recommendations

1) State transportation agencies (or other State

agencies, if appropriate) should formally

agree to be the focal point in the State to

ensure proper coordination between highway authorities and railroads regarding the

interconnection of grade crossing warning

devices and highway traffic signals, and

consideration of the storage distance between the tracks and the parallel highway.

The responsibilities of the agency, as a focal

point, would be to:

a) Develop, distribute, and continually

update a list of State and local highway

authorities and railroad contacts who

should be involved in the planning,

design, construction, operation, and inspection of grade crossing warning

devices interconnected with nearby

highway traffic signals;

b) Serve as a clearinghouse for collecting

and disseminating to State and local

highway authorities and railroads all

pertinent information necessary for the

planning, design, construction, and safe

operation of grade crossings in close

proximity to highway-highway intersections;

c) Develop guidelines which recommend

that, on at least an annual basis, State

and local highway authorities and

railroads and/or transit agencies conduct

joint inspections of the timing and

operation of highway traffic signals that

are interconnected to nearby grade

crossing warning devices; and,

d) Coordinate with State and local school

transportation officials, operators of

public transit or intercity buses, and

trucking organizations to help ensure

that drivers are familiar with the

operation of interconnected signals and

are aware of any storage space limitations at grade crossings on their routes.

This information exchange would be

carried out in cooperation with Operation Lifesaver.

2) State and local highway authorities should

initiate engineering studies to determine if

safety improvements are warranted at grade

crossings near highway-highway intersections where there is no interconnection and

where there is limited storage distance. Emphasis should be given to locations with

STOP sign control at the highway-highway

intersection, where storage space is less than

that required to accommodate the longest

legal vehicle permitted to use the highway,

and where accident potential is greater due

to high volumes of highway and/or rail

traffic.

3) State and local highway authorities, through

coordination with the railroads, should

ensure that storage space is a significant

consideration early in the planning and

design processes where physical changes are

being proposed to the highway or railroad at

interconnected signal locations.

4) FHWA and FRA field staff should initiate

regional conferences throughout the country

for highway agencies and railroads to

specifically discuss grade crossing safety

issues, including interconnected signals and

storage practices.

B. Long-Term Recommendations

1) The FHWA should convene a technical

working group that includes representatives

of rail crossing safety organizations to
74

review existing standards and guidelines

and develop new ones, if appropriate,

on grade crossing safety including the

following issues: when interconnected

signals should be used, minimum clearance

green time, the existing 20-second minimum

warning time, critical storage distance, use of

near side traffic signals, joint highway

agency/railroad/transit inspections, and

stopping on tracks. One of the outputs of

this group could be recommended additions

and/or changes to the MUTCD, the Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook,

or other appropriate guidance documents.

The group should be established and hold its

initial organizational meeting by June 1,

1996, and submit proposed standards/

guidelines within a year.