BIO-DEFENSE NOW: 

56 SUGGESTIONS FOR IMMEDIATE IMPROVEMENTS 

FINAL REPORT 

85% Biological Defense Project 

by 

Tasha L. Pravecek 

Jim A. Davis 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 

Bio-Defense Now: 

56 Suggestions For Immediate Improvements 

Final Report 

85% Biological Defense Project 

Tasha L. Pravecek 

Jim A. Davis 

May 2005 

The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established to provide education, information, and analysis to assist the understanding of the U.S. national security policymakers and USAF officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from 

weapons of mass destruction. This research was funded jointly by the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency Chemical and Biological Directorate and the USAF Counterproliferation Center. Copies of this report and other publications are available from the 

USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-

6427. The fax number is (334) 953-7530; phone (334) 953-7538. 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The Internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is: 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm 
ii 

DISCLAIMER 

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily 

reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, 

U.S. Air Force, or the U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center. 
iii 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

This workshop was sponsored and funded by Dr. Charles Galloway, Director of the 

DTRA Chemical and Biological Division, DTRA/CB. We, the authors of this report, 

and the USAF Counterproliferation Center appreciate his continued support of this critical area of bio-defense. We would also like to extend our sincere appreciation to all 

workshop participants. The workshop participants took precious time out of their hectic 

schedules to brainstorm on this critically important endeavor. In addition, the facilitators and recorders captured the thoughts and ideas of the attendees used to produce the 

informative and detailed workshop proceedings presented here. After the workshop, all 

participants spent time reviewing the list of ideas in order to provide their best biological 

weapons defense solutions. Without the enthusiastic efforts of the participants, facilitators and recorders, the workshop and subsequent report on the 85% solution to biological weapons defense would not have been as thought-provoking and beneficial to the 

warfighters in the DoD. Thank you for your tremendous effort! 

Workshop attendees included: Facilitators—Dr. Bruce Bennett, Mr. Leo Cropper, 

Mr. Jim Miller, Mr. Roy Williams; Recorders—Col Michael Ainscough, Mr. Dick Estes, 

MSgt Henry Mayfield, Mr. Walt Studdard; and Participants—Dr. Salvatore Bosco, Col 

John Bowley, Gen (ret) Walt Busbee, Dr. Steve Channel, Mr. Paul Clark, Ms. Renae Ditmer, Ms. Anne Dixon, Mr. Phil Gardner, Col Glenn Goddard, Dr. Richard Gullickson, 

LtCol Donna Hudson, Mr. Jerry Jensen, CDR Daizo Kobayashi, Mr. Randall Larsen, Dr. 

Peter Lavoy, Dr. Ross LeClaire, Mr. Russ Lewey, Dr. Kent Lohman, Mr. Al Mauroni, 

Mr. Dutch Miller, Col Donald Minner, Mr. Paul Mundt, Maj Jim Poel, Ms. Katheryn Szeliga, Dr. Robert Sherwood, Mr. Eric Stephens, Dr. David Stockwell, CAPT Steven Temerlin, Col Donald Thompson, Mr. Andrew Wilson, and Mr. Curt Wilhide. 

Also noteworthy in support of this project were several on the USAF Counterproliferation Center Staff. Ms. Brenda Alexander and Ms. Jo Ann Eddy provided crucial 

workshop support and have provided continued assistance on the coordination and many 

administrative details required to bring this project to fruition. Also, Ms. Abbey Plant, 

Associate Editor for CPC Publications, provided enthusiastic and tireless support in editing, formatting, and the final publishing of this report. 

Jim A. Davis, Col, USAF, BSC, DVM, DrPH 

Project Director and Researcher 

Tasha L. Pravecek, Major, USAF, BSC, PhD 

Assistant Project Director and Researcher 

v 

ABOUT THE AUTHORS 

Major Tasha L. Pravecek is the Chief of CBRNE Education, Research and 

Analysis at the USAF Counterproliferation Center. Previously, Major Pravecek was a 

student at Air Command and Staff College. She also served as the 354th Medical 

Group, Bioenvironmental Engingeering Commander at Eielson AFB, AK. Other positions included Chief, Chemistry and Toxicology Branch and Risk Assessment Consultant, Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, Brooks AFB, TX; Instructor 

of Chemistry, USAF Academy; Chief Cell and Tissue Culture Section and Research 

Toxicologist, Toxicology Division, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. Major Pravecek has a 

Doctorate in Environmental Science and Engineering from the University of North 

Carolina at Chapel Hill and Masters degrees in Biological Chemistry from Wright 

State University and Military Operational Art and Science from Air Command and 

Staff College.

Colonel (ret) Jim A. Davis was the Deputy Director of the USAF Counterproliferation Center. He retired March 1, 2005, and is currently employed by Battelle where 

he continues to work issues of combating weapons of mass destruction. Previously, 

Colonel Davis was the AF Surgeon General’s Chair to Air University. Before coming 

to Air University, he was the Commander, 48th Aerospace Medicine Squadron at 

RAF Lakenheath, UK. He also served as UK Medical Intelligence Officer and 

USAFE Consultant for Public Health. Colonel Davis served 4 years in the U.S. Army 

Veterinary Corps, 6 years in private veterinary medicine, and then joined the Air Force 

in 1987. His areas of special interest include Chemical and Biological Warfare, 

bioterrorism, homeland security, and occupational epidemiology. Colonel Davis has 

several academic degrees including a Doctorate of Veterinary Medicine from Texas 

A&M, a Doctorate of Public Health from the University of Texas, and is a graduate of 

Air War College. He is board certified with the American College of Veterinary 

Medicine. 

vii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

Disclaimer.................................................................................................................................ii

Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................. iii

About the Authors .................................................................................................................... v

Acronyms ................................................................................................................................ix 

Executive Summary................................................................................................................ xv

Purpose......................................................................................................................... xv

Scope........................................................................................................................... xvi

Why We Need an 85% Solution ................................................................................. xvi 

Structure of the Report............................................................................................... xvii

Workshop Process and Analysis ...............................................................................xviii

Results.......................................................................................................................xviii

Recommendations....................................................................................................... xix

Conclusion ................................................................................................................ xxvi

Introduction ..............................................................................................................................1 

Materials and Methods .............................................................................................................4 

Results ......................................................................................................................................6 

Discussion and Recommendations .........................................................................................12 

Tier 1 Bio-Defense Recommendations ........................................................................12 

Educate Senior-Level DoD Personnel..........................................................12 

Develop Decision Tools for Commanders ...................................................14 

Develop C-BW CONOPS ............................................................................15 

Tier 2 Bio-Defense Recommendations ........................................................................17 

Educate COCOMs........................................................................................17 

Train and Exercise DoD Personnel ..............................................................17 

Educate All Other DoD Personnel ...............................................................18 

Develop Installation Medical Surveillance Information ..............................19 

Prepare Public Information Packages and Media Relations.........................21 

Develop BW FPCON/RAM Measures.........................................................22 

Vaccinate All Military..................................................................................23 

Tier 3 Bio-Defense Recommendations ........................................................................24 

Provide Weekly Commander’s Stand-Up Briefings ....................................24 

Develop Quick-Reference Education Handouts...........................................25 
viii 

Research New Prophylaxis and Vaccines ....................................................25 

Institute the 922 Concept..............................................................................27 

Investigate New Detection Methods ............................................................28 

Modify Ventilation Systems.........................................................................31 

Develop DoD Integrated Information Collection.........................................32 

Re-Prioritize BW Threat Agents ..................................................................35 

Expand Joint BW ACTD Funding ...............................................................36 

Conclusion ...................................................................................................................37

Appendixes 

Appendix A: Needed Now: The “85% Quick-Fix” in Bio-Defense ........Appendix A-1 

Appendix B: List of Workshop Attendees ................................................ Appendix B-1 

Appendix C1: Workshop Initial Letter.................................................... Appendix C1-1 

Appendix C2: Workshop Second Letter ................................................. Appendix C2-1 

Appendix D1: Workshop Slides: Overview of “The 85% Biological 

 Weapons Solution Project” .............................................Appendix D1-1 

Appendix D2: Workshop Slides: Brief Summary 

 and Closing Remarks ......................................................Appendix D2-1 

Appendix E1: Group 1 Workshop Notes and Slides............................... Appendix E1-1 

Appendix E2: Group 2 Workshop Notes and Slides............................... Appendix E2-1 

Appendix E3: Group 3 Workshop Notes and Slides............................... Appendix E3-1 

Appendix E4: Group 4 Workshop Notes and Slides............................... Appendix E4-1 

Appendix F: List of 56 Ideas Generated at the 85% Workshop 

 with Description................................................................... Appendix F-1 

Appendix G: Data .....................................................................................Appendix G-1 

Appendix G1: Highest Frequency of #1 Votes .......................................Appendix G1-1 

Appendix G2: Priority Ranking by Number of Total Votes ...................Appendix G2-1 

Appendix G3: Priority Ranking by Number of Votes 1-5 ......................Appendix G3-1 

Appendix G4: Raw Data for All Categories ...........................................Appendix G4-1 
ix 

ACRONYMS 

ACADA Automatic Chemical Agent Detector/Alarm 

ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 

AFCESA Air Force Civil Engineering Support Agency 

AFDD Air Force Doctrine Document 

AFI Air Force Instruction 

AFIOH Air Force Institute for Operational Health 

AFMIC Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center 

AFMS Air Force Medical Service 

APOD Aerial Port of Debarkation 

AVIP Anthrax Vaccination Immunization Program 

AVRP Anthrax Vaccine Research Program 

BACE Bio-Attack Climatology Effectiveness 

BDTF Biological Defense Task Force 

BIDS Biological Integrated Detection System 

BIT BW/BT Intel Threat 

BW Biological Warfare 

BW/BT Biological Warfare/Biological Terrorism 

BWCI Biological Warfare Countermeasures Initiative 

BX Base Exchange 

CAM Chemical Agent Monitor 

CASPODS Contamination Avoidance at Seaports of Debarkation 

CBER Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research 

CBIRF Marine Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force 

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosives 

CBW Chemical and Biological Warfare 

C-BW CONOPS Counter-Biological Warfare Concept of Operations 

C-CBRNE Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield 

 Explosives 

C-CW CONOPS Counter-Chemical Warfare Concept of Operations 

CDC Centers for Disease Control 

CDC/ATSDR Centers for Disease Control/Agency for Toxic Substances and 

 Disease Registry 

CENTCOM Central Command 
Jim A. Davis and Tasha L. Pravecek 

x 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

COCOMs Combatant Commanders 

CONUS Continental United States 

COTS Commercial-off-the-Shelf 

CPC Counterproliferation Center 

CPS Collective Protection System 

CRAF Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

CSAF Chief of Staff of the Air Force 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DCP Disease Containment Plan 

DHHS Department of Health and Human Services 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 

DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid 

DoD Department of Defense 

DOE Department of Energy 

DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and 

Facilities 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

DTRA/CB Defense Threat Reduction Agency/Chemical and Biological Division 

EEE Eastern Equine Encephalitis 

EET Exercise and Evaluation Team 

EIS Epidemic Intelligence Service 

EPA Environmental Protection Agency 

Epi-X Epidemic Information Exchange 

ESSENCE Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of 

 Community-based Epidemics 

ETE Education, Training, and Exercise 

FDA Food and Drug Administration 

FHPC Force Health Protection Committee 

FOS Family of Systems 

FPBL Force Protection Battle Lab 

FPCON Force Protection Condition 

FSTR Full Spectrum Threat Reduction 

HAZMAT ID Hazardous Material Identification 

HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air (filter) 
xi 

HHA Hand Held Assay 

HHS Health and Human Services 

HMMWV Heavy High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 

HPAC Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability 

HQ AETC Headquarters Air Education and Training Command 

HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning 

ICAM Improved Chemical Agent Monitor 

ICD-9-CM Internal Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification 

IND Investigational New Drug 

INFOCON Information Threat Condition 

IPE Individual Protective Equipment 

JBAIDS Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System 

JBPDS Joint Biological Point Detection System 

JBSDS Joint Biological Standoff Detector System 

JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

JP Joint Publication 

JPME Joint Professional Military Education 

JPMG Joint Program Manager Guardian 

JPEO-CBD Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense 

JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

JSIPP Joint Service Installation Pilot Project 

JSLIST Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology 

JSLNBCRS Joint Service Lightweight NBC Reconnaissance System 

JSTO Joint Science and Technology Office 

KFE Kunsan Focused Effort 

LIDAR Light Detection and Ranging 

MAJCOM Major Command 

MARE Major Accident Response Exercise 

MB Methyl Bromide 

MCRP Medical Contingency Response Plan 

MDG Medical Group 

MERV Minimum Efficiency Reporting Value 

METL Mission Essential Task List 

MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War 

MOPP Mission Oriented Protective Posture 

MREF Medical Research and Evaluation Facility 
Jim A. Davis and Tasha L. Pravecek 

xii 

MTF Medical Treatment Facility 

NBC Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 

NBCC Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Conventional 

NCEH National Center for Environmental Health 

NCID National Center for Infectious Diseases 

NEDSS National Electronic Disease Surveillance System 

NEHC Navy Environmental Health Center 

NEO Non-combatant Evacuation Operation 

NIMS National Incident Management System 

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

NLT No Later Than 

NRP National Response Plan 

NSC National Security Council 

NWCA Nuclear Weapons and Counterproliferation Agency 

OPR Office of Primary Responsibility 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

OSI U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigation 

OTUSF Other Than U.S. Forces 

PA Public Affairs 

PACOM Pacific Command 

PCR Polymerase Chain Reaction 

PF Protection Factor 

PME Professional Military Education 

PX Post Exchange 

RAM Random Antiterrorism Measures 

RAND Research and Development 

RAPID Ruggedized Advanced Pathogen Identification System 

R&D Research and Development 

RESTOPS Restoration of Operations 

RSCAAL Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm 

RSVP Rapid Syndrome Validation Project 

SAF/PA Secretary of the Air Force/Public Affairs 

SAIC Science Applications International Corporation 

S&T Science and Technology 

SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 

SBCCOM Soldier and Biological Chemical Command 
xiii 

SEB Staphlyoccocal Enterotoxin B 

SOFA Status of Forces Agreement 

SPOD Seaport of Debarkation 

SVP Small pox Vaccination Program 

TB Tuberculosis 

TNT Tri-nitro Toluene 

TRANSCOM Transportation Command 

UJTL Universal Joint Task List 

USACHPPM U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine 

USAF U.S. Air Force 

USAMRIID U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases 

USPACOM U.S. Pacific Command 

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

UV Ultraviolet 

VEE Equine Encephalitis 

VISA Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement 

WEE Western Equine Encephalitis 

WHO World Health Organization 

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 

XO U.S. Air Force, Air and Space Operations 

XOS U.S. Air Force, Air and Space Operations, Strategic Security 

xv 

Bio-Defense Now: 

56 Suggestions for Immediate Improvements 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The search for the “best solution” for bio-defense is proving to be an obstacle to finding the more immediate “good solution”.... it is important we 

get to the immediate business of what might be termed the “85% Quick 

Fix”—some simple, effective, and immediate counters to today’s biological weapons threat. 

—Jim A. Davis and Bruce W. Bennett1

 

1

 Jim A. Davis and Bruce W. Bennett, 2004, “Needed 

Now: The ‘85% Quick Fix’ in Bio-Defense,” The 

Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series 

No. 23, USAF Counterproliferation Center, Maxwell 

AFB, AL. 

Purpose 

The 85% Biological Defense Project 

identifies those ideas that can significantly 

improve the defensive capabilities and 

facilitate military forces survival, operation, and sustainment in a biologically 

contaminated environment. The 100% 

biological warfare (BW) defense solution 

is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. 

The purpose of the “85% Biological Defense Project,” hereafter referred to as the 

“85% Project,” is to determine if there are 

quick-to-implement ideas using available 

technologies or capabilities that have not 

yet been adequately addressed to enhance 

our military forces’ protection against biological weapons. While this project was 

focused on the military services as a 

whole (Army, Navy, Marines, and Air 

Force), several ongoing initiatives within 

the United States Air Force (USAF) are 

used as examples of the different service’s 

initiatives to counter the biological warfare 

threat. Likewise, the “85% Project” identifies areas being worked by other USAF 

programs under the USAF CounterChemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high yield Explosives (CCBRNE) Council that require further attention and refinement. The ultimate goal is to 

reduce the biological weapons threat to 

U.S. and allied forces at fixed bases. This 

publication is the product of the authors’ 

research, the “Needed Now: The ‘85% 

Quick Fix’ in Bio-Defense” publication 

(Appendix A), and a workshop held to address shortfalls in biological weapons defense. 

This report has been prepared by U.S. 

Air Force Counterproliferation Center 

(USAF CPC) senior researchers for the 
Jim A. Davis and Tasha L. Pravecek 

xvi 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency/ 

Chemical and Biological Division 

(DTRA/CB). The report is targeted to be 

read by decision-makers, commanders, 

staff officers, and planners in all functional areas at the DoD, major command, 

and installation levels. 

Scope 

Biological weapons defense is a distinct element of the C-CBRNE continuum. Many of the counter-BW tactics, 

techniques, and procedures are clearly 

distinguishable from counter-chemical 

warfare and other elements of the 

CBRNE gamut. The ideas generated in 

this report consider solutions that could 

be easily implemented in the short-term 

and focus on protecting U.S. and Coalition military forces and their ability to 

survive, operate, and sustain themselves 

in a biologically contaminated operational environment. For the purposes of 

this study, researchers and workshop participants focused on ways to improve 

protection against a BW threat in the 

short-term timeframe of 2006 (two years 

from the research/workshop), but the 

value of their findings should help direct 

DoD activities for an even longer period. 

Why We Need and 85% 

Solution 

The search for the “best solution” 

for bio-defense is proving to be an obstacle to finding the more immediate 

“good solution.” In the day when 

Americans have grown used to fast 

food, instant access to the Internet, and 

minimal United States’ casualties during 

war, many have come to expect a “silver 

bullet solution” for almost any problem. 

The military, like the rest of America, is 

often in a quest for the 100% solution to 

its challenges. For example, the military, 

now awakened to the biological warfare/biological terrorism (BW/BT) threat, 

is in search of the perfect solution to the 

problem posed by biological weapons. 

The pursuit of the 100% solution often 

diverts efforts from potential quick 

(though incomplete) fixes for such tough 

problems that could provide valuable protection. Some new proposals are presented in this report to provide an “85% 

Solution.” 

Unless we adopt a group of partial 

fixes now, our military forces will be left 

grossly vulnerable to the BW/BT threat 

while we search for a more comprehensive breakthrough in vaccines, sensors, 

and other counters. In April 1990, two 

U.S. naval bases, Yokosuka and Yokohama, were attacked by botulinum toxin, 

and although the attacks failed, the scenario could have turned out much different. Likewise, consider the Gulf War in 

1991 when the U.S. had 320,000 military 

personnel massed in a 50 by 150 mile rectangular area southeast of Iraq. The Office of the Secretary of Defense estimated 

if an anthrax attack had occurred on our 

troops, 76,300 individuals would have 

died if they were not vaccinated. On the 

other hand, if all were vaccinated, it was 

estimated that only 122 would have died. 

Conversely, what if the attack had been 

tularemia, Q-fever, or a host of other bio-
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

xvii 

logical agents for which we do not have 

a vaccine? 

Since there is no mechanism in 

place today to provide even partial protection from a biological warfare attack 

at most military installations, both the 

Aum Shinrikyo and the Gulf War scenarios have grave implications. U.S. 

military forces could suffer death tolls 

higher than the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Death tolls could be more 

similar to those experienced in the December 24, 2004, Indian Ocean tsunami, 

unless some interim efforts for the partial protection occur prior to finding the 

100% solution. With the so-called “85% 

Solution,” the goal is to provide substantial immediate protection against a nearterm biological weapons attack on military personnel in the targeted area by 

adopting a combination of quick fix 

measures. For the purpose of this study, 

participants were asked to suggest immediate measures that might be taken with 

the goal of providing protection to at least 

85% of the soldiers, sailors, marines, and 

airmen present. While no single measure 

might provide such levels of safety, a 

combination of defensive steps might 

achieve the protection sought. 

The U.S. military forces must have 

the freedom to operate effectively in any 

CBRNE environment. However, today’s 

military forces have not been tested in a 

chemically or biologically contaminated 

environment. Although the military services, most notably the U.S. Air Force, 

have developed, educated, and trained a 

counter-chemical warfare concept of operations (C-CW CONOPS) and should 

be adequately prepared to withstand and 

operate in a chemically contaminated environment, the C-CW CONOPS cannot be 

used in defense of a biological weapons 

attack due to the significant differences in 

the characteristics of a chemical versus a 

biological attack. The armed services have 

an extreme lack of defensive BW warfighting planning capability and resilience. 

Currently, the DoD has not developed 

the 100% solution to these BW defense 

shortfalls. A biological attack may dramatically slow operations tempo to unacceptable levels. The inability of the U.S. 

military to sustain the fight in forward locations will limit the amount of power 

brought to the battlefield if a counterattack is desired. Hence, some solution, 

even if it is not the complete long-term 

answer to the problem, is warranted. 

Structure of the Report 

The report is organized similar to a 

standard research report with an executive 

summary, introduction, materials and 

methods, results, discussion and recommendations, and conclusion sections. The 

discussion and recommendations section 

primarily focus on the results of the 56 

ideas generated from the “85% Biological 

Weapons Solution” workshop. These 56 

ideas have been divided into five tiers 

based on their relative importance as determined by the workshop participants. 

When addressing each workshopgenerated idea that fits into one of the top 

three tiers, detailed background information is provided to indicate a current state 

of preparedness. Recommendations are 
Jim A. Davis and Tasha L. Pravecek 

xviii 

presented where additional emphasis or 

suggestions for improvement or refinement seem warranted. Ultimately, the 

U.S. military forces must be able to sustain and operate even if the enemy uses 

biological weapons. This report provides 

additional information and guidance toward reaching that goal. 

Workshop Process and Analysis

On October 20, 2004, the “85% Biological Weapons Solution” workshop was 

held in Washington, D.C. Forty-one workshop attendees (divided into four working 

groups) generated 56 ideas aimed at providing a substantial amount of additional 

protection against a BW attack (“the 85% 

Solution”) in the next two years. In order 

to cull these numerous ideas into a more 

manageable list for the DoD to address, 

the workshop attendees later reviewed the 

56 ideas and ranked their top 15 choices 

in three categories. The three categories 

were Implemented Quickest, Greatest 

Benefit, and Implemented Quickest and 

Greatest Benefit. Implemented Quickest

was described as “the solution that can be 

the most quickly implemented regardless 

of the amount of benefit to the war 

fighter.” Greatest Benefit was described 

as “the solution that offers the greatest 

benefit to our biological weapons defense 

without regard to cost, time, or other considerations which may inhibit implementation.” Finally, Implemented Quickest 

and Greatest Benefit was described as 

“the solution that offers the ‘most bang for 

the buck,’ or the ‘best solution’ when you 

consider the cost, speed of implementation, 

and value to the warfighter.” 

The workshop attendee’s ranking of 

the 56 ideas showed that developing a 

counter-BW concept of operations (CBW CONOPS) was selected the most 

times as the #1 choice in the Greatest 

Benefit, and Implemented Quickest and 

Greatest Benefit categories. The attendees placed the most #1 votes in the Implemented Quickest category to the 

suggestion of holding Weekly Commander’s Stand-Up Briefings to provide 

uniform, frequent briefings to installation 

commanders regarding illness trends. 

The rankings of the 56 ideas were 

also analyzed to yield a “top ten” in each 

of the three aforementioned categories. 

Since some of these top ten items reoccurred in more than one of the three 

categories, there were only 24 ideas that 

emerged in the “top ten” for the three 

categories. Of these 24 ideas, 19 appeared in more than one category of importance and are defined here in one of 

three tiers indicating relative importance 

given by the workshop attendees. 

Results 

Rankings regarding the importance of 

each of the 56 ideas generated at the “85% 

Biological Weapons Solution” workshop 

fell into five easily discernable categories 

(Tiers 1 through 5). Tier 1 ideas were 

those that were determined to be the most 

important for an 85% solution. The top 

ten ideas are in Tier 1 and Tier 2. The 

next nine ideas in importance for this project are in Tier 3. 
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

xix 

Tier 1 Bio-Defense Recommendations 

• Educate Senior-Level DoD Personnel 

• Develop Decision Tools for Commanders 

• Develop C-BW CONOPS 

Tier 2 Bio-Defense Recommendations 

• Educate Combatant Commanders 

(COCOMs) 

• Train and Exercise DoD Personnel 

• Educate All Other DoD Personnel 

• Develop Installation Medical Surveillance Information 

• Prepare Public Information Packages and Media Relations 

• Develop BW Force Protection Condition and Random Anti-Terrorism 

Measures (FPCON/RAM) 

• Vaccinate All Military 

Tier 3 Bio-Defense Recommendations 

• Provide Weekly Commander’s 

Stand-Up Briefings 

• Develop Quick-Reference Education 

Handouts 

• Research New Prophylaxis and Vaccines 

• Institute the 922 Concept 

• Investigate New Detection Methods 

• Modify Ventilation Systems 

• Develop DoD Integrated Information 

Collection 

• Re-Prioritize BW Threat Agents 

• Expand Joint BW Advanced Concept 

Technology Development (ACTD) 

Funding 

Recommendations 

The data reflect that the workshop attendees consider education and training as 

a top priority toward an 85% BW defense 

solution: five of the top ten ideas (Tiers 1 

and 2) related to education and training. 

The following section provides detailed 

information and discussion for each of the 

ideas. 

Recommendations related to the 

ideas generated at the “85% Project” 

workshop are provided where additional 

emphasis or suggestions for improvement 

or refinement are warranted. These recommendations are also summarized here. 

Tier 1 Bio-Defense Recommendations 

Educate Senior-Level DoD Personnel: 

Educate senior level military and civilian 

personnel in the DoD on the basics of BW 

agent effects, characteristics, treatment, 

the BW threat, passive defense measures, 

and operational considerations.

Education of senior-level DoD personnel appears in every list analyzed and 

should be considered a top priority in our 

BW defense development. Educational requirements should be mandated to all services to be included in all senior service 

schools, general officer schools, base/ post/ 

wing commander’s courses and joint 
Jim A. Davis and Tasha L. Pravecek 

xx 

courses for Colonels and higher ranks. 

Another suggestion is to ensure focus is 

given to educating senior level personnel 

through efforts like the Kunsan Focused 

Effort (KFE)2

 and CODE SILVER.3 A 

subset of the CODE SILVER exercises 

could be modified to focus solely on the 

senior-level personnel at MAJCOMs or 

Air Staff. 

Senior staff must be educated on 

the hazards of a biological weapons attack to ensure preparedness of U.S. and 

Coalition military forces. Senior military leaders are responsible for adequately determining the effects to 

operations, instilling BW-specific education and training, generating appropriate plans, developing effective 

information gathering techniques and 

capabilities, providing the physical protection of our forces, and research and 

development for future BW defenses. 

Develop Decision Tools for Commanders: Develop biological weapons 

attack Decision Tools for Commanders 

which include recommendations for 

baseline posture, indicators of biological 

attack, questions that need to be asked 

about the extent and implications of an 

attack, and appropriate actions. 

 

2

 The USAF KFE Program is an initiative designed to 

determine educational shortfalls and developing tools 

to ensure the education and understanding of the BW 

hazard. The study location is Kunsan Air Base, 

Korea. 

3

 CODE SILVER is a program that offers tabletop 

exercises emphasizing biological and chemical 

warfare responses by Air Force medical facilities. The 

exercise focuses on how the medical facilities interact 

with the rest of the base and the local civilian 

community. 

The purpose of Decision Tools is to 

ensure the information presented to the 

commander is defined and organized in a 

concise and logical manner to facilitate 

the decision-making process.4

 These 

tools must define the most critical decisions as they relate to preventing further 

injury and maintaining operational capability. The relevant installation functionals or personnel must also provide the 

commander with underlying information 

to make informed decisions. This information should fit into a Decision Tools 

matrix in a clear, well-organized and predictable manner. In addition, Offices of 

Primary Responsibility (OPRs) for each 

decision should be clearly identified. Decision tools should also include pre- and 

post-attack or exposure prophylaxis and 

treatment plans.5

The DoD should direct a Joint working group to bring together the lessons of 

the KFE and the USPACOM bio-defense 

initiatives with subject matter experts to 

define the best Decision Tools for Commanders. 

Develop C-BW CONOPS: Doctrine 

for BW should be de-linked from other 

CBRNE doctrine since it is significantly 

different. 

The COCOMs and services should 

develop C-BW CONOPS for all military 

operations in BW contaminated environment including individual, Joint and Coalition operations. Further, a comprehensive 

 

4

 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 2, p. E2-2, Appendix E-2. 

5

 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 1, p. E1-4, Appendix E-1. 
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

xxi 

C-BW CONOPS should address issues 

such as airfield operations, deployment 

and redeployment of forces, use of Civil 

Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement 

(VISA), trans-loading cargo and transloading airfield operations, operating contaminated Aerial Port of Debarkation 

(APODs) and Seaports of Debarkation 

(SPODs), re-supply, and disposition of 

BW-contaminated remains and mass 

casualties.6

 Biological defense is not a 

separate entity to be addressed in isolation by medical or disaster preparedness 

staff; it must be an integral part of war 

plans, operations, and training.7

Tier 2 Bio-Defense Recommendations 

Educate Combatant Commanders 

(COCOMs): Educate, train, exercise 

COCOMs regarding impacts of biological weapons attacks on combat operations. 

COCOMs (Major through Flag Officer ranks and their civilian equivalents) should receive pertinent BW 

education, training, and practice through 

active education programs and exercises 

in order to understand and effectively 

react to BW attacks that impact combat 

operations. The BW threat is often 

overlooked in war plans and operations 

due to frequent rotation of personnel 

without sufficient BW training. There 

should be recurring education at theaters 

of operation so as personnel rotate in 

 

6

 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 1, p. E1-8, Appendix E-1. 

7

 Ibid. 

they can receive the initial education 

within the first three months. 

Train and Exercise DoD Personnel: 

Train and Exercise all DoD personnel 

more specifically and thoroughly on BW 

agents.

All services should implement and 

integrate a comprehensive training and 

exercise program by the direction of the 

Joint Staff. The U.S. Air Force’s Education, Training, and Exercise (ETE)8

model can be used by the joint community as a starting point for this effort. 

Training of basic BW-defenses and responses to biological weapons attacks 

should occur at all levels of enlisted and 

officer ranks. Training expectations 

should be of a specific detail and level of 

knowledge appropriate for the rank. In 

order to ensure an effective training scenario, more definitive goals, objectives 

and requirements should be established; 

and resources and training aids should be 

made available. Likewise, exercises 

across services should be mandated to 

exercise BW-specific scenarios at least 

once annually.

Educate All Other DoD Personnel: 

Educate all personnel in the DoD on the 

basics of BW agent effects, characteristics, treatment, the BW threat, passive 

 

8

 The ETE is a Chief of Staff of the Air Force directed 

collaborative effort between AF/XOS-FC and HQ 

AETC. The goal of the ETE initiative is to develop CCBRNE learning objectives (education), skill sets 

(training), and operational capabilities (exercise 

requirements) that every airman must have to be 

competent against a CBRNE-armed adversary. 
Jim A. Davis and Tasha L. Pravecek 

xxii 

defense measures, and operational considerations. 

All DoD personnel should receive 

BW education in all levels of Professional Military Education (PME), 

through briefings, and in routine education and exercises.9

 The education provided during PME should be tailored to 

each rank and included at all levels of 

enlisted and officer PME. Exercises 

such as CODE SILVER help promote 

education and training of personnel associated with Air Force medical facilities. This type of activity should be 

encouraged at all military installations, 

and the involvement of the entire base 

should be required in order to educate 

all personnel.

Develop Installation Medical Surveillance Information: Develop and 

implement an installation system of near 

real-time, high-fidelity medical surveillance information for both military and 

local civilian populations. 

This integrated medical surveillance program will collect data from 

multiple sources, for example medical 

surveillance of clinic appointments, illness observed by co-workers, school 

absenteeism, veterinary reports, and 

over-the-counter drug sales.

DoD should make a review of DoD 

Directive 6490.2 a priority to ensure it 

provides for comprehensive medical 

surveillance. Priority should be given 

to its implementation and metrics for 

 

9

 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 1, p. E1-2, Appendix E-1. 

its compliance should be monitored by 

MAJCOMs. 

Public Information Packages and 

Media Relations: Prepare standardized 

public information packages, policies and 

procedures for public release concerning 

BW agents. 

Public Affairs, in coordination with 

medical, pubic health, bioenvironmental 

engineers, civil engineers, and others determined by the installation commander 

should prepare public information packages regarding how to respond to various 

forms of BW threats or attacks in advance.10 These public information packages can have a significant positive 

psychological impact on the local community. A properly worded and detailed 

message delivered by the right means 

with definitive and clear actions for each 

individual will reduce panic and the number of behavioral casualties. A poor message in content, timing, or delivery may 

promote panic, even if a BW has not been 

used. 

A critical step in the development of 

these messages is educating the messenger. Media relations, specifically Public 

Affairs, should receive BW-specific education and participate in training and exercises concerning procedures and 

capabilities for pre- and post-BW events. 

A template of announcements should be 

generated at a MAJCOM or DoD level 

for installation use. 

 

10 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 1, p. E1-2, Appendix E-1. 
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

xxiii 

Develop BW FPCON/RAM 

Measures: Develop BW-specific 

counter-measures in Force Protection 

Conditions (FPCONs) and Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAMs) for commands with elevated threats. 

The Joint Staff should host an interservice working group with COCOM 

representatives to develop a specific set 

of C-BW measures to be taken at different RAM or FPCON levels. Participants of the workshop must have a 

broad range of expertise such as intelligence, medicine, climatology, engineering, operations, etc. 

Vaccinate All Military: Vaccinate 

all military populations against most 

likely lethal BW diseases (e.g., smallpox 

and anthrax) to lessen likelihood of infection.

The Joint Staff should develop a 

team of multi-disciplinary subject matter 

experts as well as non-medical personnel to address challenges related to a 

universal vaccination program with the 

ultimate goal of vaccinating all military 

against smallpox and anthrax. 

Tier 3 Bio-Defense Recommendations 

Provide Weekly Commander’s 

Stand-Up Briefings: Provide uniform, 

frequent briefings to installation commanders regarding illness trends. 

At weekly commander’s stand-up 

briefings, overall disease trends should 

be reported, including occurrences of 

infectious diseases such as flu. Depending on the threat level, this information 

may need to be reported to the commander more frequently. 

Develop Quick-Reference Education Handouts: Develop a brief, simplified document (2-3 pages) with detail and 

level of knowledge specific for each rank. 

Potential application of this idea may 

be instilled in the KFE Program or the 

ETE Initiative. During the development 

of the education, training and exercise 

materials of the ETE Initiative, quickreference handouts could also be developed. These handouts may be incorporated as tabs in future editions of the 

Airman’s Manual for quick and easy reference. 

Research New Prophylaxis and 

Vaccines: Investigate alternate and improved prophylaxis and vaccines. 

The DoD should explore challenges 

related to new prophylaxis and vaccines. 

DoD should direct increased funding to 

support more aggressive vaccine production as well as alternatives to vaccines. 

Institute the 922 Concept: Evaluate 

922 Concept for military application. 

The National 922 Concept, if implemented, will be a telephone triage system 

that collects real-time, self-reported symptoms of a population and provide meaningful information that could prevent panic 

and enhance sustainment. Develop and 

institute a military 922 system. 

Investigate New Detection Methods: Identify and deploy current cuttingedge technologies to enhance identification of BW agents. 
Jim A. Davis and Tasha L. Pravecek 

xxiv 

DoD should aggressively explore 

commercial and government off-theshelf technology, such as the 454 technology,11 to reduce the time and enhance the accuracy of biological agent 

detectors. 

On a more strategic level, area 

monitoring on an installation could be 

conducted using a system similar to that 

used in the BioWatch program. BioWatch is the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) program, assisted by the 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/Agency for Toxic Substances and 

Disease Registry (CDC/ATSDR) and 

Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA), which performs 24/7 environmental surveillance using the existing 

EPA and Department of Energy (DOE) 

air quality monitoring systems. Collected air samples are tested as an early 

warning indicator of biological attacks.12 The BioWatch system has been 

successfully operating in more than 30 

urban centers since early 2003. The system has performed over a million tests 

with no false positive, and one true positive (an environmental source).13

 

11 The 454 Life Sciences Company offers a DNA 

sequencing system to sequence an entire genome. 

Through advanced technology, several million base 

pairs of genetic sequence data per hour can be 

generated on a single instrument. So, the complete 

identity of an organism, or BW agent, can be 

determined in hours instead of days. 

12 CDC, ATSDR, and DHHS, 2004, “A National 

Public Health Strategy for Terrorism Preparedness 

and Response 2003-2008,” March 2004, 9. 

13 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004, “Fact 

Sheet: A Better Prepared America: A Year in Review,” 

25 May 2004. On-line, Internet, 9 June 2004, available 

from 

Modify Ventilation Systems: Install 

protective ventilation system, filters, room 

air purifiers, or ultraviolet lights, as economically feasible. 

In normal buildings, some level of 

protection against BW can be achieved 

simply by using improved filters. Normal 

buildings use filters with a Minimum Efficiency Reporting Value (MERV) of 6 to 8, 

but filters with a MERV of 11 can usually 

be substituted without changing the heating, ventilation and air conditioning 

(HVAC) system capabilities, making a 

big difference in removal of many BW 

agents. High Efficiency Particulate Air 

(HEPA) filters are also readily available, 

and can remove particulates to 0.3 microns. DoD should acquire a supply of 

improved filters for its buildings in threat 

areas, and have rules for when to switch 

to their use.14

In addition to ventilation system filters, other options exist to provide limited 

protection to individual rooms. For instance, room air purifiers will filter out 

some biological particulates in the air. If 

a BW agent concentration can be reduced 

below its infectious level, then the inhabitants of the room will be protected for a 

short period of time. Ultraviolet (UV) 

lights may also kill some microorganisms. 

If UV lights are installed at building or 

room entrances and in ventilation ducts, 

this too may offer some additional protection. 

 

www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/print/ 

20040525-4.html. 

14 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 1, p. E1-6, Appendix E-1. 
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

xxv 

Develop DoD Integrated Information Collection: Adopt a DoD systems approach to combine information 

from all sources. Intelligence collection 

should focus on the strategic, operational, 

and tactical levels of war.

The DoD should develop a team 

with similar expertise to the Epidemic 

Intelligence Service (EIS)-trained officers (or send them to this training) to 

enable a specialized team of trained epidemiologists to assist in the collection of 

data indicative of a BW attack. These 

individuals should be integrally linked 

to Armed Forces Medical Intelligence 

Center (AFMIC), other Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) resources, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and 

other disease surveillance systems. 

Additionally, a DoD Integrated Information Collection System should be 

developed combining data from all 

sources. The suggested DoD Integrated 

Information Collection involves a systems approach for data acquisition. For 

example, the data may include adversary 

capabilities and intent, friendly vulnerability, measurements from detectors, 

environmental surveillance, information 

from local nationals, installation medical surveillance information, and regional (civilian) medical surveillance.15 

This integrated collection system must 

include development of effective interaction with the intelligence community 

to define and refine the threat. 

 

15 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 1, p. E1-3, Appendix E-1. 

Re-Prioritize BW Threat Agents: 

Set priorities on most likely BW or disease 

threats to guide research and development 

(R&D) concerning detection, treatment, 

and defense (i.e., are anthrax, smallpox, 

and plague the top three?). 

The DoD BW-defense experts should 

conduct a technical assessment to determine the priority of BW agents. The 

DoD should partner with the Department 

of Homeland Security in conducting this 

national risk assessment to determine our 

probable BW threats. This assessment 

should include the following characteristics of an effective biological weapon:16, 

17, 18

• Inexpensive, 

• Easily acquired and readily available, 

• Easy to produce (enemy has technical 

capability), 

• Easy to hide and transport, 

• Easily weaponized (enemy has technical capability), 

• Stability in storage and after disseminated, 

• Effectively dispersed, 

 

16 Judith Miller, 2004, “Bush Issues Directive to Bolster 

Defense against Bioterrorism,” New York Times, 28 

April 2004. 

17 Graham S. Pearson, 2000, “The Essentials of 

Biological Threat Assessment,” in Biological Warfare: 

Modern Offense and Defense, Raymond A. Zilinskas, 

Ed., Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 61-67. 18 Raymond S. Weinstein and Kenneth Alibek, 2003, 

Biological and Chemical Terrorism: A Guide for 

Healthcare Providers and First Responders, New York, 

NY: Thieme, 4-9. 
Jim A. Davis and Tasha L. Pravecek 

xxvi 

• Stability as an aerosol (potentially 

the best dispersal method), 

• Short and predictable incubation period, 

• Initial recognition of disease likely 

to be delayed, 

• Communicable and highly contagious, 

• Highly lethal and/or incapacitating, 

• Maintains potency and persists in 

the environment, 

• Limited detectability (instruments 

do not readily detect), 

• No treatment or vaccine, and 

• Name of the disease induces fear, 

devastating psychological effect. 

Funding priorities and C-BW 

CONOPS could then focus on the reprioritized list of BW Threat Agents. 

Expand Joint BW Advanced 

Concept Technology Development 

(ACTD) Funding: Expand funding for 

joint experimentation ACTD for BW defense; more Limited User Tests to bring 

new technologies to field. 

Ensure funding for BW ACTDs is 

provided. Senior leaders should recognize the importance of ACTDs for BW 

defense issues and support Joint BW 

ACTDs. Proposed ACTDs dealing with 

bio-defense should be given top priority 

consideration.

Conclusion 

The military services, PACOM, 

DTRA, OSD, Joint Staff, and many others are addressing solutions to BW defense. The Joint Program Executive 

Office for Chemical and Biological Defense should be effectively utilized as a 

focal-point to ensure communication between all groups working programs related to BW defense. This office should 

ensure all lessons learned are shared to 

develop an effective BW program more 

efficiently. 

The DoD, services, and MAJCOMs 

are encouraged to aggressively support 

and implement the ten recommendations 

in Tier 1 and Tier 2. Most of these recommendations have been initiated in 

various services or MAJCOMs. By capitalizing on the work already done, DoD 

can rapidly improve its BW defense posture and at least be “85%” ready. 

Addressing quick-fix solutions to our 

BW defense insufficiency is critical today. 

We cannot afford to be the unready confronting the unthinkable! 
1 

Bio-Defense Now: 

56 Suggestions for Immediate Improvements 

Final Report 

The search for the “best solution” for bio-defense is proving to be an obstacle to finding the more immediate “good solution”.... it is important we 

get to the immediate business of what might be termed the “85% Quick 

Fix”—some simple, effective, and immediate counters to today’s biological weapons threat. 

—Jim A. Davis and Bruce W. Bennett 

“Needed Now: The ‘85% Quick Fix’ in Bio-Defense” 

INTRODUCTION 

The U.S. military forces must have 

the freedom to operate effectively in any 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or high yield Explosive (CBRNE) 

environment. The potential biological 

warfare (BW) threat has been described in 

Joint Doctrine19 and open-source literature.20 However, today’s military forces 

 

19 JP 3-11, 11 July 2000, “Joint Doctrine for 

Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 

(NBC) Environments,” I-4 through I-7. Document 

currently under revision. 

20 Many sources reference state and non-state actors 

that possess or desire to possess biological weapon 

development capability. For example, documents and 

equipment recovered from al-Qa'ida facilities in 

Afghanistan show that al-Qa'ida had conducted 

research on biological agents. Al-Qa'ida's BW program 

may primarily be “focused on anthrax for mass casualty 

attacks, although the group most likely will pursue 

opportunities to produce and use other biological agents 

in smaller-scale attacks.” CIA, 2003, “Unclassified 

Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology 

Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced 

Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 

2003.” On-line, Internet, 14 December 2004, available 

from http://www.odci.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/july_ 

have not been tested in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment. 

Although the military services, most 

notably the U.S. Air Force, have a developed, educated, and trained a counterchemical warfare concept of operations (CCW CONOPS) that should allow the U.S. 

to operate from airbases in a chemically 

contaminated environment, the military 

services have a shortfall in the education, 

training, equipping, and preparedness for a 

BW attack. 

A biological attack may dramatically 

slow operations tempo to unacceptable levels. The inability of the U.S. military to 

sustain the fight during biological weapons 

attacks in forward locations will limit the 

amount of power brought to the battlefield 

during a counter-attack. 

In general, Joint and Service doctrine 

address CBRNE defense. These doctrine 

documents include Joint Publication (JP) 

3-11 “Joint Doctrine for Operations in 

 

dec2003.htm. Many other references address BW and are 

too numerous to detail here, but are available upon request. 
Tasha L. Pravecek and Jim A. Davis 

2 

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 

(NBC) Environments” and JP 3-40 

“Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons 

of Mass Destruction.” These doctrine 

documents address Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (WMD) or Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) or 

CBRNE in general terms. JP 3-11 contains an Appendix C, “Biological Hazard Considerations,” which details some 

specific characteristics and types of biological agents and operational considerations. 

As an example of service doctrine, 

the USAF has the AF Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.8 “Counter Nuclear, 

Biological, and Chemical Operations.” 

AFDD 2-1.8 allocates a cursory paragraph to BW in Chapter One. Yet little 

doctrinal guidance exists to specifically 

address BW defense. As a result of lax 

BW defensive guidance, the U.S. Air 

Force and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) independently have started 

initiatives to fill this gap. 

The U.S. Air Force recognized the 

need to develop biological defense capabilities. In April 2002, the Air Force released the “Commander’s Guidelines: 

Force Protection and Operations in a Biological Warfare Environment” demonstrating the first step toward generating a 

cohesive biological defense strategy.21 

Next, in July 2002 the Chief of Staff of 

 

21 HQ USAF, 12 April 2002, “Commander’s 

Guidelines: Force Protection and Operations in a 

Biological Warfare Environment.” On-line, Internet, 14 

December 2004, available from https://www.xo.hq.af.mil/ 

xos/xosf/xosfc/CCBRNE_resource/biological/data/bdguid

elines.doc. 

the Air Force chartered the Biological 

Defense Task Force (BDTF), an Air and 

Space Operations (XO) led group.22 The 

BDTF developed the “Interim BioDefense Plan” to identify capability gaps, 

assess risks, and develop doctrine, training, exercises, and tactics, techniques, and 

procedures. In the “Status Report to the 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force,” the recommendations and directions aimed to 

refine and improve Air Force biological 

defense capabilities. 

In March 2004, the USAF C-CBRNE 

Council assumed the roles and responsibilities of the BDTF. Through the BDTF 

and C-CBRNE Council, programs such as 

the Kunsan Focused Effort (KFE) and 

development of a C-BW CONOPS have 

been initiated. The BDTF 2003 Action 

Plan23 identified 59 action items that have 

many similarities to the ideas generated in 

the October 20, 2004, “85% Biological 

Weapons Solution” workshop (annotated 

at Appendix F). 

As a separate effort, in 2003, USPACOM established the Biological Warfare Countermeasures Initiative (BWCI) 

to incorporate BW mitigating measures 

into deliberate plans, coalition needs, and 

domestic interagency efforts. USPACOM partnered with the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

 

22 Charter on-line, Internet, 14 December 2004 available 

from https://www.xo.hq.af.mil/xos/xosf/xosfc/CCBRNE_ 

resource/biological/bdtf/bdtf.shtml. 23 “Biological Defense Task Force Action Plan,” 28 

May 2003. On-line, Internet, 14 December 2004, 

available from https://www.xo.hq.af.mil/xos/xosf/xosfc/ 

CCBRNE_resource/biological/bdtf/bdtf.shtml. 
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

3 

in this initiative.24 Some of the BWCI 

initiatives that have similarity to the 

ideas generated by the October 2004 

“85% Biological Weapons Solution” 

workshop are annotated in Appendix F. 

The purpose of the “85% Biological 

Defense Project,” hereafter referred to as 

the “85% Project,” is to identify those 

ideas that can significantly improve the 

military services’ defensive capabilities 

and ability to survive, operate, and sustain 

in biologically contaminated environment. 

Instead of focusing on the “silver bullet” to obtain a 100% solution which may 

take many years, the “85% Project” aims 

to determine if there are additional quickto-implement ideas using available technologies or capabilities that are not being 

fully employed. The report uses several 

programs of the U.S. Air Force under the 

USAF Counter-CBRNE (C-CBRNE) 

Council25 as examples of a some De-

 

24 Thomas B. Fargo, 31 March 2004, Testimony 

before the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. 

House of Representatives. On-line, Internet, 14 

December 2004, available from http://armedservices. 

house.gov/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108th

congress/04-03-31 fargo.html. 

25 Excerpt from the C-CBRNE Charter, “At the 

direction of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the 

Air Force (AF/CVA), the HQ USAF 

Counterproliferation Integrated Process Team (CP 

IPT) is renamed the C-CBRNE Council and is 

chartered to address USAF-wide issues related to 

countering the chemical, biological, radiological, 

nuclear, and high-yield explosive threat on an ongoing 

basis... The C-CBRNE Council will address USAF 

actions to counter CBRNE through proliferation 

prevention, counterforce, active defense, passive 

defense, and crisis/consequence management. The 

Council will oversee USAF C-CBRNE issues to 

maximize warfighting capabilities and support lead 

Federal agencies if tasked and available. The Council 

will address C-CBRNE issues brought before it by its 

partent of Defense (DoD) efforts currently 

in progress and as a way to elucidate programs that still need further attention and 

refinement. The ultimate goal is to reduce the BW threat to U.S. and allied 

forces at fixed bases. 

During 2002, Col Jim Davis and Dr. 

Bruce Bennett were working on a draft of 

“Needed Now: The ‘85% Quick Fix’ in 

Bio-Defense.” The paper sought to spur 

the DoD toward a more immediate pragmatic approach to protecting today’s military forces from the BW threat. This 

think-piece was presented to both the 

U.S. Air Force BDTF and the USPACOM BWCI and helped stimulate discussion and new ideas in both forums. 

The paper was a springboard for further 

study of BW-defense ideas. 

The “85% Biological Defense Project” is a compilation of ideas and recommendations that should lead to 

enhanced defensive capabilities, survival, 

and operations in a BW situation. While 

this project was focused on the military 

services as a whole (Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force), several ongoing 

initiatives within the USAF are used as 

examples of the service’s initiatives to 

counter the biological warfare threat. The 

ultimate goal is to reduce the biological 

weapons threat to U.S. and allied forces at 

fixed bases. 

This publication is the product of the 

authors’ research, the “Needed Now: The 

 

members or submitted through the Council’s Policy 

Working Group (PWG).” On-line, Internet, 14 January 

2005, available from https://www.xo.hq.af.mil/xos/ 

xosf/xosfc/CCBRNE_council/040114/HQUSAF_CCBR

NE_CouncilCharter.doc. 
Tasha L. Pravecek and Jim A. Davis 

4 

‘85% Quick Fix’ in Bio-Defense” publication (Appendix A), and a workshop 

held to address shortfalls in biological 

weapons defense. 

This report has been prepared by 

U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center (USAF CPC) senior researchers for 

the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency/Chemical and Biological Division (DTRA/CB). The report is targeted 

to be read by decision-makers, commanders, staff officers, and planners in 

all functional areas at the DoD, major 

command, and installation levels. 

MATERIALS AND METHODS 

Approximately one hundred of the 

top biological weapons subject matter 

experts in the U.S. from various civilian 

and DoD organizations were identified, 

contacted, and invited to attend a workshop on October 20, 2004. The initial 

information and invitation letter (reference Appendix C-1) was sent via e-mail 

in late September and early October. 

After the selected subject matter experts 

responded, they received a second email in October with further details regarding the purpose of the workshop 

and administrative information (reference Appendix C-2). During all of the 

e-mail contact, the potential attendees 

were provided no pre-conceived notions 

or biased opinions on potential biological 

weapons defense solutions. In total, 50 

people confirmed their attendance to the 

workshop. 

The workshop was held on October 

20, 2004, in a group of meeting rooms 

operated by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) in the Crystal 

Gateway I building, Crystal City, Virginia. Forty-one of the 50 confirmed subject matter experts attended the workshop 

(Appendix B). 

The workshop began with an overview of “The 85% Biological Defense 

Project” by Col Jim Davis, Deputy Director, USAF Counterproliferation Center. 

The presentation slides are located at Appendix D-1. Col Davis’ presentation provided background of historical biological 

weapons use, why an 85% solution was 

needed, some ideas to create an 85% solution, and rules of engagement for the 

workshop. Col Davis instructed the attendees to focus on the threat in the 2006 

time frame (the next two years) and consider solutions that could be easily implemented through that period of time. 

He also advised the attendees to concentrate their efforts to generate ideas on protecting U.S. and Coalition military forces 

and their ability to survive, operate, and 

sustain themselves in a biologically contaminated operational environment. 

The 41 workshop attendees were divided into four groups of 9 or 10 people, 

including a facilitator and recorder. 

Every effort was made to separate attendees into different groups so that each 

group would have a broad range of backgrounds. The four groups broke to meet 

in separate meeting rooms for approximately three hours to individually brainstorm ideas or solutions to biological 

weapons defense shortcomings. In the 

afternoon, all four groups returned to the 

main conference room; facilitators (Jim 
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

5 

Miller, Bruce Bennett, Leo Cropper, and 

Roy Williams) for the different groups 

presented their group’s findings. This 

was an open forum discussion so the 

findings from each group were criticized 

and improved by peers in open discussion. Reference Appendix E-1 through 

E-4 for the individual group proceedings 

and the group slide presentations provided to all of the attendees. After each 

group completed their presentation, Col 

Davis provided a brief summary and 

closing remarks (reference slides at Appendix D-2). 

The week following the workshop, 

the recorders and facilitators edited the 

workshop notes to ensure all ideas were 

captured clearly and completely. The 

group notes were thoroughly reviewed 

to generate a comprehensive list of 56 

ideas from the workshop. The 41 workshop attendees were contacted by e-mail 

with an attached Excel worksheet listing 

the 56 ideas generated at the workshop 

(reference Appendix F). Respondents 

rank ordered the ideas listed in Appendix F with “1” denoting highest priority 

through “15” denoting the lowest priority in each of three categories: Implemented Quickest, Greatest Benefit, and 

Implemented Quickest and Greatest 

Benefit. 

The spreadsheet listing the ideas 

contained a comment block to describe 

each of the categories. Implemented 

Quickest was described as “the solution 

that can be the most quickly implemented regardless of the amount of 

benefit to the war fighter.” 

Greatest Benefit was described as 

“the solution that offers the greatest benefit to our biological weapons defense 

without regard to cost, time, or other considerations which may inhibit implementation.” 

Finally, Implemented Quickest and 

Greatest Benefit was described as “the 

solution that offers the ‘most bang for the 

buck,’ or the ‘best solution’ when you 

consider the cost, speed of implementation, and value to the war fighter.” For 

brevity, the last category, Implemented 

Quickest and Greatest Benefit, will be 

referred to as Best Overall hereafter. The 

respondents were given no other instructions as to how to conduct their rating and 

analysis. 

Three methods of analysis were used 

to analyze the data. First, the idea that 

generated the most number one votes in 

each of the three categories was identified. Second, a top ten for each of the 

three categories was determined by using 

a frequency distribution of total votes (regardless of the value of the vote). This 

provided a set of data titled “Priority 

Ranking by Number of Total Votes.” 

Third, a top ten for each of the three categories was determined by adding all the 

votes of one through five (each vote of 

one through five given equal value). This 

provided a set of data titled “Priority 

Ranking by Number of Votes 1-5.” 

After reviewing the results of these 

three methods of analysis, the ideas were 

prioritized as to their perceived precedence for implementation. Based on the 

total number occurrences of each idea in 

the “Priority Ranking by Number of 
Tasha L. Pravecek and Jim A. Davis 

6 

Total Votes” and “Priority Ranking by 

Number of Votes 1-5” data sets, three 

different levels (tiers) of priorities were 

easily discernable. See Appendix G for 

details. 

RESULTS 

Each workshop idea was rank ordered by Best Overall, Implemented 

Quickest, and Greatest Benefit. Of the 

41 workshop attendees contacted by email to provide a rank order of the ideas, 

36 responded with a Best Overall rank 

order. Only 34 respondents ranked the 

ideas using the Implemented Quickest

category; and 35 ranked the ideas using 

the Greatest Benefit category. The data 

were combined and analyzed to determine the most number one votes, the 

“Priority Ranking by Number of Total Votes,” and the “Priority Ranking 

by Number of Votes 1-5.” 

The table at Appendix G-1 provides 

the idea which received the most number “1” votes for each category. The CBW CONOPS idea was ranked first in 

the Greatest Benefit, and Best Overall

categories. The Weekly Commander’s 

Stand-Up Briefing idea was first in the 

Implemented Quickest category. 

The data from each of the three 

categories was combined and analyzed 

by looking at them in two different 

ways. First by using a “Priority Ranking by Number of Total Votes,” hereafter referred to as “Total Votes” category 

(regardless of the value of the vote). Secondly, by using a “Priority Ranking by 

Number of Votes 1-5,” hereafter referred 

to as “Votes 1-5” category. 

The “Total Votes” category is detailed in Tables G-2.1 to G-2.3 of Appendix G-2 which display the top 10 ideas for 

each category that garnered the most 

number of total votes regardless of rank 

order. To clarify, any vote (1 to 15) was 

given a value of “1” and the total number 

of votes summed. 

In order to further elucidate the priority that should be given to the 56 ideas 

generated at the workshop, a second frequency analysis was used and named 

“Votes 1-5.” Tables G-3.1 to G-3.3 of 

Appendix G-3 detail the top 10 ideas for 

each category that garnered the most 

number of votes 1 to 5. To clarify, any 

vote of 1 to 5 was given a value of “1” 

and the total number of those votes 

summed. 

After reviewing the “Total Votes” 

and “Votes 1-5” of all 56 ideas for each 

of the three categories (Best Overall, Implemented Quickest, and Greatest Benefit), the ideas were organized by priority 

into five “tiers.” Tier 1 ideas were those 

that received the highest priority emphasis by workshop attendees. Likewise, 

Tier 2 ideas were next in order of priority, 

and so on for Tiers 3 through 5.
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

7 

Table 1. Tier 1 BW Defense Ideas 

Total Votes Results Votes 1-5 Results 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop 

Best Overall 

Implemented 

Quickest 

Greatest Benefit 

Best Overall 

Implemented 

Quickest 

Greatest Benefit 

Total Occurrence 

in Categories 

Educate Senior-Level DoD Personnel 1 1 3 1 1 4 6 

Decision Tools for Commanders 2 1 4 2 5 2 6 

C-BW CONOPS 2 4 1 3 5 1 6 

Tier 1 BW defense ideas were those that workshop attendees considered were the 

most important toward improving quick defensive capabilities against BW. Tier 1 

ideas were solutions that occurred in all six of the “Total Votes” and “Votes 1-5” datasets. Numbers in “Total Votes” and “Votes 1-5” columns represent the ranking this 

idea received upon data analysis. “1” is the highest rank possible. Where there was a 

tie for an idea, the ideas received the same score. 
Tasha L. Pravecek and Jim A. Davis 

8 

Table 2. Tier 2 BW Defense Ideas 

Total Votes Results Votes 1-5 Results 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop 

Best Overall 

Implemented 

Quickest 

Greatest Benefit 

Best Overall 

Implemented 

Quickest 

Greatest Benefit 

Total Occurrence 

in Categories 

Educate COCOMs 8 - 8 6 5 6 5 

Train and Exercise DoD Personnel 3 5 7 8 - - 4 

Educate All Other DoD Personnel 8 5 - 7 6 - 4 

Develop Installation Medical Surveillance Info 4 - 2 7 - 7 4 

Public Information Packages and Media Relations 6 2 - - 3 7 4 

BW FPCON/RAM Measures 5 - - 4 - 6 3 

Vaccinate All Military 7 - - 5 - 6 3 

Tier 2 BW defense ideas were those that workshop attendees considered to be 

very important toward improving quick defense capabilities against biological weapons. Tier 2 ideas were solutions that occurred in three or more datasets. Numbers in 

“Total Votes” and “Votes 1-5” columns represent the ranking this idea received upon 

data analysis. “1” is the highest rank possible. Where there was a tie for an idea, the 

ideas received the same score. 
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

9 

Table 3. Tier 3 BW Defense Ideas 

Total Votes Results Votes 1-5 Results 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop 

Best Overall 

Implemented Quickest 

Greatest Benefit 

Best Overall 

Implemented Quickest 

Greatest Benefit 

Total Occurrence in 

Categories 

Quick-Reference Education Handouts - 3 - - 4 - 2 

Weekly Commander's Stand-Up Briefings - 5 - - 2 - 2 

Re-Prioritize BW Threat Agents - - - 8 6 - 2 

Develop DoD Integrated Information Collection - - 6 - - 7 2 

922 Concept - 5 - - 6 - 2 

New Prophylaxis and Vaccines - - 5 - - 3 2 

New Detection Methods - - 6 - - 5 2 

Ventilation Systems - - - 7 - 6 2 

Expand Joint BW ACTD Funding - - - 8 - 7 2 

Tier 3 ideas occurred in two datasets. Numbers in “Total Votes” and “Votes 1-

5” columns represent the ranking this idea received upon data analysis. “1” is the 

highest rank possible. Where there was a tie for an idea, the ideas received the same 

score. 
Tasha L. Pravecek and Jim A. Davis 

10 

Table 4. Tier 4 BW Defense Ideas

Total Votes 

Results 

Votes 1-5 

Results 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop 

Best Overall 

Implemented Quickest 

Greatest Benefit 

Best Overall 

Implemented Quickest 

Greatest Benefit 

Total Occurrence in 

Categories 

Train Health Care Workers and First Responders - 5 - - - - 1 

Daily Health Screening - - - - 6 - 1 

Rapid Vaccine Approval - - - - - 7 1 

Fast In-Theater Confirmatory Analysis - - 7 - - - 1 

Disease Containment Plan - - - 8 - - 1 

Tier 4 ideas were those ranked in the top ten of only one dataset. These Tier 4 

ideas received votes, which can be reviewed in the raw data at Appendix G-4. Numbers in “Total Votes” and “Votes 1-5” columns represent the ranking this idea received upon data analysis. 
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

11 

Table 5. Tier 5 BW Defense Ideas 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop

Determine BW Agents Possible 

Enhance Research Community and Operator Interaction 

Badge-Based Biometrics 

Thermal Sensors 

R&D of Novel Agents 

R&D Versus Acquisition of Current Bio-detectors 

Improve Solutions/Technology Implementation Process 

New Decontamination Methods 

New Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) 

Develop Individual Protection Guidance 

New Treatments 

Increase DoD Vaccine Funding 

External Inputs for Prophylaxis and Vaccination Policies 

Disposition of BW contaminated personnel, remains, equipment 

“How Clean is Clean” Policy 

Pre-positioned Material and Supplies 

Initial Deployment Packages 

Develop Specialized BW Teams 

Hire BW-educated Health Care Workers and First Responders 

Educate Non-DoD Personnel 

Train Non-DoD Personnel 

Mission Essential Task Lists 

Subject Matter Experts in Exercise Planning and Execution 

Publicize BW Preparedness 

Establish Collective Protection Standards 

Vulnerability Assessments 

Installation Quarantine (ETE) 

International Quarantine (ETE) 

Information Management/Risk Communication for 

Installations (ETE) 

Information Management/Risk Communication for Civilian Public Health Authorities (ETE) 

Information Management/Risk Communication for Public Release (ETE) 

Joint and Coalition Decision Tools 

These ideas may have received some votes 

by the workshop participants, however 

were not in the top ten rankings for any 

category upon analysis of the data. 

Tier 5 ideas were those not ranked in the top ten of any dataset. Nevertheless, 

some of these Tier 4 ideas received votes, which can be reviewed in the raw data at 

Appendix G-4. 
Tasha L. Pravecek and Jim A. Davis 

12 

DISCUSSION AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

The data reflect that the workshop 

attendees consider education and training as a top priority toward an 85% BW 

defense solution: five of the top ten 

ideas (Tiers 1 and 2) related to education 

and training. The following section will 

provide detailed information and discussion for each of the ideas identified in 

Tables 1-3 of the Results section.26

Tier 1 Bio-Defense Recommendations 

Educate Senior-Level DoD Personnel 

The workshop attendees determined 

that educating senior-level DoD personnel, including the rank of Colonel, Flag 

Officers, and civilian equivalents, is a top 

priority in all three categories (Implemented Quickest, Greatest Benefit, Best 

Overall). Senior-level personnel determine funding and planning priorities for 

the DoD. If they do not understand the 

BW threat and defenses, they may not 

assess the need for further attention in the 

BW arena. In addition, senior leaders 

developing doctrine, tactics, techniques, 

and procedures must be fully informed 

and knowledgeable in order to effectively 

 

26 Some ideas were ranked higher in more than one 

category, while others ranked in only one category. 

For those ranked high in only one category, there may 

be an inference that idea only meets the criteria of that 

category. For instance, if an idea appears highly 

ranked in only the Implemented Quickest category, 

this may indicate a selection based speed of 

employment only. 

prepare for and counter a biological attack.27 Therefore, it is critical that senior 

leaders receive the appropriate education 

to accurately understand the BW threat 

and the U.S. defensive shortfalls. 

The U.S. Air Force’s “Commander’s 

Guidelines: Force Protection and Operations in a Biological Warfare Environment” was released on April 12, 2002.28 

This document was designed to help 

Commanders make risk-based decisions. 

This document represents an initial step 

toward educating U.S. Air Force senior 

leaders. Additionally, several initiatives 

have focused on the education of all Air 

Force personnel, including Air Force senior leaders. These initiatives include the 

CODE SILVER program, the KFE Program, and the BDTF’s Education, Training and Exercise (ETE) Initiative. 

The BW education for all seniorlevel DoD personnel should focus on the 

basics of the current BW threat and BW 

agent effects, characteristics, treatment, 

active and passive defense measures, and 

operational considerations. One of the 

groups suggested CODE SILVER Command and Control type exercises at the 

MAJCOM or Air Staff level.29 

 

27 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 3, p. E3-2, Appendix E-3. 

28 HQ USAF, 12 April 2002, “Commander’s Guidelines: 

Force Protection and Operations in a Biological Warfare 

Environment.” On-line, Internet, 14 December 2004, 

available from https://www.xo.hq.af.mil/xos/xosf/xosfc/ 

CCBRNE_resource/biological/data/bdguidelines.doc. 

29 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 4, p. E4-4, Appendix E-4. 
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

13 

CODE SILVER is a program that 

offers tabletop exercises emphasizing 

biological and chemical warfare responses by Air Force medical facilities. 

The exercise focuses on how the medical facilities interact with the rest of the 

base and the local civilian community. 

Forty Air Force medical facilities and 

the communities surrounding them 

planned to participate in CODE SILVER exercises in 2004.30

Currently, the KFE Program is another initiative designed to determine 

educational shortfalls and develop tools 

to ensure the education and understanding of the BW hazard. The KFE program objectives include: examining the 

impact of BW on mission recovery and 

sustainment of operations; examining 

current capabilities to recognize and respond to BW attacks; assessing current 

integrated base defense capabilities in a 

BW environment; and examining the 

ability to conduct air operations in a BW 

environment.31

The KFE Program is a crossfunctional effort which should develop 

procedures, education, and risk man-

 

30 George Peach Taylor, Jr, (LtGen), USAF, Surgeon 

General, “Defense Health Programs,” before the 

Subcommittee on total force, House Armed Services 

Committee, United States House of Representatives, 

March 18, 2004. Online, Internet, 29 November 2004, 

available from http://www.house.gov/hasc/opening 

statementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/04-03-18ta 

ylor.html. 

31 Donna Hudson, (LtCol), XOS-FC, “CounterBiological Warfare (C-BW) Program,” slide 

presentation, 22 September 2004. 

agement tools in the short-term.32 And, 

the KFE should result in supporting doctrine, policy, and guidance in the longterm. In addition, the KFE Program also 

offers an opportunity to ensure thorough 

BW education of senior leaders. A further discussion of the KFE Program as it 

relates to educating the junior DoD personnel is addressed later in the “Educate 

All Other DoD Personnel” section of this 

report. 

The BDTF recognized the need for 

more robust education, training, and exercises in their February 6, 2004, status report.33 The BDTF was chartered by the 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) on 

July 13, 2002, to identify actions to improve Air Force bio-defense capabilities 

and develop a C-BW CONOPS. The 

Task Force recommended a life-cycle approach to biological defense education 

and training. 

This recommendation resulted in the 

establishment of the ETE initiative on September 17, 2003, which involves a collaborative effort between AF/XOS-FC and 

Headquarters Air Education and Training 

Command (HQ AETC).34 The goal of the 

 

32 Organizations participating in the KFE effort include 

XOS-FC, XOS-FP, SGOP, ILEX, AFCESA, Nuclear 

Weapons and Counterproliferation Agency (NWCA), 

Force Protection Battle Lab (FPBL), and PACAF. 

33 “Biological Defense Task Force, Status Report to the 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force,” 6 February 2004, p. 29. 

On-line, Internet, 29 November 2004, available from 

https://www.xo.hq.af.mil/xos/xosf/xosfc/CCBRNE_res

ource/biological/bdtf/CSAF_Report-CSAFVersion20_ 

15_Mar_04-2.doc. 

34 The USAF Counterproliferation Center (CPC) is a 

member of the ETE Initiative Working Group and can 

be contacted for further information. 
Tasha L. Pravecek and Jim A. Davis 

14 

ETE initiative is to develop C-CBRNE 

learning objectives (education), skill sets 

(training), and operational capabilities 

(exercise requirements) that every airman 

must have to be competent against a 

CBRNE-armed adversary.35 

The ETE working group has divided the levels of training for Colonels 

and higher into eight groupings.36 

Through the development of the ETE 

initiative, especially concerning the education of Colonel and higher ranks, appropriate education may be developed. 

Recommendations: Education of 

senior-level DoD personnel appears in 

every list analyzed and should be considered a top priority in our BW defense 

development. Educational requirements 

should be mandated to all services to be 

included in all senior service schools, 

general officer schools, base/post/wing 

commander’s courses, and joint courses 

for Colonels and higher ranks. 

Another suggestion is to ensure focus is given to educating senior level 

personnel through efforts like the KFE 

and CODE SILVER. A subset of the 

CODE SILVER exercises could be 

modified to focus solely on the seniorlevel personnel at Major Commands 

(MAJCOMs) or Air Staff. 

Senior staff must be educated on 

the hazards of a biological weapons at-

 

35 Op. Cit., “Biological Defense Task Force,” 29-30. 

36 The eight categories for levels of education, 

training and exercise include E-1 through E-3, E-4 

through E-5, E-6 through E-7, E-8 through E-9, precommissioning, O-1 through O-3, O-4 through O-5, 

and O-6 and higher. 

tack to ensure preparedness of U.S. and 

Coalition military forces. Senior military 

leaders are responsible for adequately determining the effects to operations, instilling BW-specific education and training, 

generating appropriate plans, developing 

effective information gathering techniques and capabilities, providing the 

physical protection of our forces, and research and development (R&D) for future 

BW defenses. 

Develop Decision Tools for Commanders

To assist commanders in their response to BW threats, attacks, or recovery, 

“Decision Tools” should be developed. 

The participants considered this idea to be 

an important priority in all three categories. Much of this information would 

probably also help commanders determine 

C-BW measures to take at different Force 

Protection Condition (FPCON) and Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAM). 

Decision tools should include recommendations for baseline posture, indicators of biological attack, information to 

collect concerning the extent and operational challenges of an attack, and appropriate actions.37 The KFE Program 

identified this need, and defined four trigger events to assist the commander: intelligence, weapons, detectors, and sentinel 

casualties.38 One workshop group also 

identified key components that should be 

 

37 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 2, p. E2-2, Appendix E-2. 

38 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 4, p. E4-1, Appendix E-4. 
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

15 

included in the further development of 

the Decision Tools for Commanders, 

these are included in the Group 2 slides 

at Appendix E-2. 

Recommendations: The purpose 

of Decision Tools is to ensure the information presented to the commander 

is defined and organized in a concise 

and logical manner to facilitate the decision-making process.39 These tools 

must define the most critical decisions 

as they relate to preventing further injury and maintaining operational capability. The relevant installation 

functionals or personnel must also provide the commander with underlying 

information to make informed decisions. 

This information should fit into a Decision Tools matrix in a clear, wellorganized, and predictable manner. 

In addition, Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPRs) for each decision 

should be clearly identified. Decision 

tools should also include pre- and postattack or exposure prophylaxis and 

treatment plans.40

The DoD could direct a Joint working group to bring together the lessons 

of the KFE and the USPACOM initiatives with yet untapped subject matter 

experts to define the best Decision Tools 

for Commanders. 

 

39 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 2, p. E2-2, Appendix E-2. 

40 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 1, p. E1-4, Appendix E-1. 

Develop C-BW CONOPS 

A Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 

describes the approach to the deployment, 

employment, and operation of capabilities 

used to meet identified tasks or missions. 

The workshop participants ranked the development of a separate C-BW CONOPS 

in the top ten of all three categories. In 

addition, the idea was also ranked as a #1 

selection in the Greatest Benefit categories (reference Table 1, Results section). 

These results indicate the importance with 

which the workshop attendees viewed the 

development of a C-BW CONOPS. 

The Air Force instituted the CounterChemical Weapons (C-CW) CONOPS 

Air Force-wide, in 2002. Through rapid 

spiral development, the Air Force planned 

to develop the C-BW CONOPS mirroring 

the C-CW CONOPS wherever possible. 

Some of the attendees stressed the 

need for the C-BW CONOPS to be delinked from other CBRNE doctrine since 

it is significantly different. For instance, 

the methods of countering and the effects 

of BW differ significantly from chemical, 

radiological or nuclear.41 In addition, 

chemical weapon exposure symptoms are 

generally seen quickly, versus biological 

weapon exposure which may take days or 

weeks to surface. 

Finally, when a biological attack is 

discovered, the contamination may be 

spread throughout the base making it difficult to cordon off an area and sector the 

 

41 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 3, p. E3-3. Appendix E-3. 
Tasha L. Pravecek and Jim A. Davis 

16 

base, as in a chemical weapon attack scenario. 

The C-BW CONOPS could incorporate lessons learned from the KFE Program and other related efforts such as 

Contamination Avoidance at Seaports of 

Debarkation (CASPOD), Restoration of 

Operations (RESTOPS), and Joint Service Installation Pilot Project (JSIPP). 

More specifically, AF/XOS-FC is leading the development of the C-BW 

CONOPS through the CBRNE Policy 

Working Group (including ILEXR and 

AFMSA/SGPF), with a first draft due no 

later than October 2006.42, 43 

The goal of the CASPOD demonstration was to generate operational concepts and tactics, techniques and 

procedures to initiate and sustain chemical and biological defense operations at 

seaports of debarkation (SPODs). The 

CASPOD program also developed and 

demonstrated resident, pre-positioned, 

or rapidly transportable chemical and 

biological defense equipment and material packages needed for employment at 

SPODs.44

The RESTOPS final demonstration 

was at Osan AB in February 2003. The 

RESTOPS demonstration developed 

tools and technologies, and tactics, techniques, and procedures to mitigate ef-

 

42 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 4, p. E4-6, Appendix E-4. 

43 Russell V. Lewey, SAIC, correspondence on 8 

November 2004. 

44 Salvatore Bosco, September 2004, “Chemical and 

Biological Defense Program, DTRA/CB,” 

presentation to AWC elective. 

fects of a chemical or biological attack on 

a fixed site.45

The JSIPP demonstrations occurred 

at nine diverse CONUS installations during the summer of 2003. The goal of the 

JSIPP program was to increase chemical 

and biological defense capabilities at 

DoD installations through contamination 

avoidance and protection and decontamination equipment.46

Recommendations: The COCOMs 

and services should develop C-BW 

CONOPS for all military operations in BW 

contaminated environment including individual, Joint, and Coalition operations. 

Further, a comprehensive C-BW CONOPS 

should address issues such as airfield operations, deployment, and redeployment of 

forces, use of Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

(CRAF) and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift 

Agreement (VISA), trans-loading cargo 

and trans-loading airfield operations, operating contaminated Aerial Ports of Debarkation (APODs) and Seaports of 

Debarkation (SPODs), re-supply, and disposition of BW-contaminated remains and 

mass casualties.47 Biological defense is not 

a separate entity to be addressed in isolation 

by medical or disaster preparedness staff; it 

must be an integral part of war plans, operations, and training.48

 

45 Ibid. 

46 Ibid. 

47 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 1, p. E1-8, Appendix E-1. 

48 Ibid. 
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

17 

Tier 2 Bio-Defense Recommendations 

Educate COCOMs

Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) 

are key decision-makers in a theater. The 

workshop participants recognized the 

critical importance of COCOMs by ranking this idea 83% (5 of 6) possible times 

in all three categories (reference Table 2, 

Results section). The leaders at combatant commands must thoroughly understand how to operate in the presence of a 

BW attack and recovery. 

Recommendations: COCOMs 

(Major through Flag Officer ranks and 

their civilian equivalents) should receive 

pertinent BW education, training, and 

practice through active education programs and exercises in order to understand and effectively react to BW 

attacks that impact combat operations. 

The BW threat is often overlooked in 

war plans and operations due to frequent 

rotation of personnel without sufficient 

BW training. There should be recurring 

education at theaters of operation so as 

personnel rotate in they can receive the 

initial education within the first three 

months. 

Train and Exercise DoD Personnel

The workshop attendees determined 

that all DoD personnel should also train 

and exercise with a more specific and 

thorough focus on BW agents. “Continuation or recurring training maintains 

and refines skills necessary for a unit to 

conduct their mission in a NBCthreatened/contaminated environment. 

Since continuation or recurring training 

sharpens knowledge of counter NBC 

functions and operations, this training 

should meet the highest standards.”49

This topic ranked 66% (4 of 6) of the 

time in all three categories (reference Table 2, Results section). When developing 

training, the expectations should be of a 

specific detail and level of knowledge 

appropriate for the rank. Again, the KFE 

and CODE SILVER Programs are guides 

that could be used to accomplish this task. 

In addition, the Guardian and Integrated 

Training and Education Program are also 

tools that are making strides toward training and educating DoD personnel. 

The Bio-Defense State of Knowledge 

Mission Sustainment and Recovery document produced by AF/XOS-FC provides 

more detailed information on military and 

civilian training and exercise programs. 

The document details military exercises 

such as CODE SILVER and Joint Service 

Installation Pilot Project, and civilian exercises such as Sooner Spring 2002 and 

TOPOFF 2.50

Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-2501, 

Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR) 

Planning and Operations, defines exercise 

requirements in its Table 10.1.51 Biologi-

 

49 AFDD 2-1.8, Counter Nuclear, Biological, and 

Chemical Operations, 16 August 2000, Chapter 5, 26. 

50 “Bio-Defense State of Knowledge Mission Sustainment and Recovery,” August, 2004. On-line, Internet, 

28 January 2005, available from https://www.xo.hq.af. 

mil/xos/xosf/xosfc/CCBRNE_resource/biological/biostate-of-knowledge/index.shtml. 

51 AFI 10-2501, Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR) 

Planning and Operations, 24 December 2002, 9.7.4, 64. 
Tasha L. Pravecek and Jim A. Davis 

18 

cal attack incident training biannual requirements are detailed under “Terrorist 

Use of WMD.” These exercises must be 

executed cross-functionally according to 

the local threat, incorporating all local 

response elements. In reality, these biological agent exercises are often conducted as a tabletop exercise in a 

cursory manner. In addition, the Exercise and Evaluation Team (EET) members who develop the exercise scenarios 

are often not experts in biological weapons or attack scenarios. 

Therefore, the quality of the exercise and its execution are defined by the 

limited knowledge of the EET team. 

Further, neither AFI 10-2501 nor any 

other source clearly defines a requirement to conduct both covert and overt 

biological attacks or a BW mass casualty scenario that affects the base and 

local community. 

Recommendations: All services 

should implement and integrate a comprehensive training and exercise program by the direction of the Joint Staff. 

The U.S. Air Force’s ETE model can be 

used by the joint community as a starting point for this effort. Training of basic BW-defenses and responses to 

biological weapons attacks should occur 

at all levels of enlisted and officer ranks. 

In order to ensure an effective training 

scenario, more definitive goals, objectives, and requirements should be established; and resources and training aids 

be made available. Likewise, exercises 

across services should be mandated to 

exercise BW-specific scenarios at least 

once annually. 

Educate All Other DoD Personnel

Education is different from training 

and exercises in that it involves the intellectual understanding of the “why” and 

“how.” For DoD personnel at any level 

to be able to respond to a changing battlefield environment, they must have an understanding of the threat and how to 

mitigate its effects. Workshop attendees 

selected the idea to educate all other DoD 

personnel as a high priority 66% (4 of 6) 

of the time in all three categories (reference Table 2, Results section). Again, the 

KFE and CODE SILVER programs are 

attempting to establish BW training for 

all DoD personnel. 

The CSAF has stated “all airmen are 

sensors”52 and therefore should be well 

versed on BW agent effects, hazards, 

characteristics, treatment, passive defense 

measures, and effects to operations. The 

KFE Program included a BW-101 Briefing, used during KFE II in August 2004, 

which provided basic education on BW to 

promote understanding of the hazard. 

However, the results of the first KFE exercise demonstrated the need to better 

educate airmen on the hazards associated 

with potentially contaminated equipment 

and environments.53

In reaction to the KFE findings to 

date, Air Force Civil Engineering Support 

Agency (AFCESA) is developing a new 

 

52 James G. Roche, 1 March 2004, “SecAF 2004 Focus 

Areas,” in The Secretary’s Vector. On-line, Internet, 1 

December 2004, available from http://www.af.mil/ 

media/viewpoints/focus_2004.html.

53 Donna Hudson, 22 September 2004. 
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

19 

C-CBRNE course to replace the Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Conventional (NBCC) Course with increased 

information on the BW threat. The new 

course will be completed by summer 

2005.54

Recommendations: All DoD personnel should receive BW education in 

all levels of Professional Military Education (PME), through briefings, and in 

routine training and exercises.55 The 

education provided during PME should 

be tailored to each rank and included at 

all levels of enlisted and officer PME. 

In addition, as discussed in the previous 

section, CODE SILVER exercises promotes education and training of personnel associated with Air Force medical 

facilities. This type of activity should 

be encouraged at all military installations and the involvement of the entire 

base should be required in order to educate all personnel. 

Develop Installation Medical Surveillance 

Information

Workshop attendees selected this 

idea as a high priority 66% (4 of 6) of 

the time in all three categories because 

early indication of a BW attack is critical to prompt response (reference Table 

2, Results section). People showing up 

with unexplained sicknesses at hospitals 

or clinics may be the first warning of 

 

54 AFCESA representative and Russell V. Lewey, 

SAIC, correspondence on 8 November 2004. 

55 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 1, p. E1-2, Appendix E-1. 

attack, even at facilities with BW detectors. Recognition that an attack occurred 

may not happen until symptoms develop, 

which may be days or weeks after the 

event. Therefore, proactive disease surveillance at hospitals and other medical 

facilities is paramount to successful defense against a BW attack. 

In environments with elevated BW 

threats, the rules for military personnel 

reporting illnesses need to be adjusted to 

require such reports more frequently, allowing medical professionals to rapidly 

determine that a BW attack has occurred. 

Making warning more rapid will speed 

medical responses at the site attacked, and 

allow protective actions to be taken at 

other sites.56

The installation medical surveillance 

information should include collection of 

data from multiple military and local civilian population sources.57 These 

sources may include, but are not limited 

to, medical (Public Health) surveillance 

of clinic appointments, illness observed 

by co-workers, school absenteeism, veterinarian reports, over-the-counter drug 

sale, and reports of un-explained pet and 

wildlife deaths. Public Health and medical personnel should emphasize epidemiologic principles and techniques to enable 

continuous population-based disease 

monitoring.58 

 

56 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 1, p. E1-3, Appendix E-1. 

57 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 2, p. E2-5, Appendix E-2. 

58 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 2, p. E2-2, Appendix E-2. 
Tasha L. Pravecek and Jim A. Davis 

20 

The installation Public Health currently uses Electronic Surveillance System 

for the Early Notification of Communitybased Epidemics (ESSENCE) to monitor 

illness trends to provide early warning of 

abnormal health conditions in a population. ESSENCE is a computer-based 

biosurveillance system that has been in 

use since 1999, with widespread use in 

the DoD after the September 11th attacks.59

ESSENCE is a DoD-Global Emerging Infections System sponsored system 

which looks at seven syndrome groups 

that best represent the symptoms and 

signs of infectious disease, such as dermal and fever cases. The system gathers 

information from the Internal Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical 

Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes input by 

the doctors after seeing a patient. 

The quality of the medical surveillance is therefore dependent on the doctors and medical technicians accurately 

reporting and inputting ICD-9-CM codes 

in a timely fashion. Although the Public 

Health officer may review the data once 

a day, there is a centralized organization 

conducting real-time monitoring of the 

information at all DoD installations. If 

the centralized organization detects a 

trend, they notify the installation personnel of a potential adverse health trend. 

The shortcomings of the ESSENCE 

system as an early indicator of a BW at-

 

59 Gretel Johnston, 2002, “System Adds to Biodefense 

Readiness,” Bio-IT Bulletin. On-line, Internet, 21 January 

2005, available from www.bio-itworld.com/news/ 

110102_ report1436.html?action=print. 

tack center on the delay in entering ICD-9-

CM codes. If a doctor or technician waits 

until the end of the duty day or following 

day to enter codes, the ESSENCE data is 

also delayed. Currently, medical personnel attempt to enter the codes by the end of 

the day. However, emergencies and increased patient workloads at times make 

this an impossible task. Nevertheless, the 

ESSENCE biosurveillance system has the 

capability to provide early warning of infectious diseases and incidents of bioterrorism. 

The Bio-Defense State of Knowledge 

Medical Surveillance document produced 

by AF/XOS-FC provides more detailed 

information on DoD medical surveillance 

activities. Information in this document 

includes a detailed description of the Defense Medical Surveillance System, the 

Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) and the Global Emerging 

Infections System.60

Another source of information that 

has not yet been implemented may be 

analysis of the installation population during elevated threat conditions through random sampling, such as throat culture 

swabs or temperature monitoring. A rapid 

assay technology [(e.g., polymerase chain 

reaction (PCR)] can determine exposure of 

personnel and contamination of environmental samples and inanimate objects. 

The technology currently exists to rapidly 

 

60 “Bio-Defense State of Knowledge Medical Surveillance,” August, 2004. Online, Internet, 28 January 

2005, available from https://www.xo.hq.af.mil/xos/xosf/ 

xosfc/CCBRNE_resource/biological/bio-state-of-knowledge/ 

index.shtml. 
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

21 

sequence bacteria and viruses from throat 

swabs.61 The earlier medical personnel 

can discover a population with elevated 

temperatures or other indications of 

widespread illness, the better the chance 

of isolating those affected, containing the 

attack, and continuing to operate.62

The DoD Directive 6490.2, Joint 

Medical Surveillance and DoD Instruction 6490.3, Implementation and Application of Joint Medical Surveillance for 

Deployments, provides further guidance 

regarding medical surveillance. The 

DoD instruction is currently under revision. One group highly recommended 

that the newly published DoD Instruction on medical surveillance should be 

universally implemented as soon as possible.63 Incorporating the DoD guidance 

into the Installation Medical Surveillance program should provide a more 

effective capability. This installation 

surveillance program may provide first 

indication of covert biological warfare 

attack. 

The U.S. Air Force has the Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR) Planning 

and Operations, AFI 10-2501, which 

requires the medical treatment facility 

(MTF) commander to “assure the medical facility has an ongoing and threatbased locally appropriate disease surveillance and disease and non-battle in-

 

61 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 2, p. E2-2, Appendix E-2. 

62 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 3, p. E3-4, Appendix E-3. 

63 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 2, p. E2-1, Appendix E-2. 

jury report program (see AFI 48-109).”64 

The fact that the attendees recommended 

implementation of a program that, by Air 

Force Instruction, should already exist at 

Air Force installations may reflect that 

the existing program has not been implemented in such a manner as to be an indicator of covert BW attacks. The 

workshop attendees suggested development of a more comprehensive medical 

surveillance program. 

Recommendations: DoD should 

make a review of DoD Directive 6490.2 a 

priority to ensure it provides for comprehensive medical surveillance. Priority 

should be given to its implementation and 

metrics for its compliance should be monitored by MAJCOMs. 

Prepare Public Information Packages and 

Media Relations

Public Affairs (PA) is critical in preparing a coherent, well-informed message 

to promote effective risk communication 

to the military installation, dependants, 

and local community. The workshop attendees determined that not only was this 

a quick solution, but also highly beneficial by selecting it 66% (4 of 6) of the 

time in the three categories. 

While it is unclear what all the services have done in this area, the Air Force 

C-CBRNE Council is currently addressing 

this idea in the form of a “BW Toolbox” 

for Public Affairs and also a BW Risk 

 

64 AFI 10-2501, Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR) 

Planning and Operations, 24 December 2004, A2.6.12, 

112. 
Tasha L. Pravecek and Jim A. Davis 

22 

Communication program for the base 

populace.65 They have established a 

working group of public health and life 

skills professionals to advise on BWrelated public awareness. 

Next, the working group is also interfacing with Secretary of the Air Force 

Public Affairs (SAF/PA) to determine 

the impact of the new National Incident 

Management System (NIMS) on PA activities. The group is also working with 

SAF/PA to develop BW-specific PA 

information templates to assist baselevel PA offices. Finally, the working 

group has drafted a BW defense public 

awareness product aimed at the base 

population at large.66

Recommendations: Public Affairs, 

in coordination with medical, public 

health, bioenvironmental engineers, civil 

engineers, and others determined by the 

installation commander should prepare 

public information packages regarding 

how to respond to various forms of BW 

threats or attacks in advance.67 These 

public information packages can have a 

significant positive psychological impact 

on the local community. A properly 

worded and detailed message delivered 

by the right means with definitive and 

clear actions for each individual will reduce panic and the number of behavioral 

casualties. A poor message in content, 

timing, or delivery may promote panic, 

 

65 Russell V. Lewey, SAIC, correspondence on 8 

November 2004. 

66 Donna Hudson, 22 September 2004. 

67 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 1, p. E1-2, Appendix E-1. 

even if biological weapons have not been 

used. 

A critical step in the development of 

these messages is educating the messenger. Media relations, specifically Public 

Affairs, should receive BW-specific education and participate in training and exercises concerning procedures and 

capabilities for pre- and post-BW events. 

A template of announcements should be 

generated at a MAJCOM or DoD level for 

installation use. 

Develop BW Force Protection Condition 

and Random Anti-Terrorism Measures 

(FPCON/RAM) 

C-BW specific Force Protection 

Condition measures should be considered 

when the threat level has been partially or 

wholly based upon a potential BW 

threat.68 Random Anti-Terrorism Measures are extra security measures or defensive measures taken to reduce the 

vulnerability of individuals and property 

when there is an increased suspicion or 

threat of terrorist acts. The workshop attendees viewed this idea as holding high 

significance in 50% (3 of 6) of the three 

categories (reference Table 2, Results 

section). One example of the development of BW specific Force Protection 

Condition measures is provided at Appendix A, pages A-14 to A-20, “BioThreatcon Levels.” In summer 2004, AF 

 

68 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 2, p. E2-2, Appendix E-2; and from the Draft CBW Force Protection Methods under development, 

provided by Russell V. Lewey, SAIC, 3 November 

2004. 
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

23 

XOS-FC hosted a BW FPCON workshop to specifically address this issue. 69 

In addition, the KFE Program is currently addressing this idea with draft CBW specific FPCON measures.70

Recommendations: The Joint 

Staff should host an inter-service working group with COCOM representatives 

to develop a specific set of C-BW measures to be taken at different RAM or 

FPCON levels. Participants of the 

workshop must have a broad range of 

expertise such as intelligence, medical, 

climatology, engineering, and operations. 

Vaccinate All Military

If the DoD vaccinated all military 

populations against the highest threat 

BW diseases; for example, smallpox and 

anthrax, our defensive stance against 

these agents would be greatly enhanced. 

The workshop attendees agreed that this 

vaccination policy would offer a great 

benefit by ranking it high in 50% (3 of 

6) of the three categories (reference Table 2, Results section). On June 28, 

2004, the Anthrax Vaccination Immunization Program (AVIP) and the Smallpox Vaccination Program (SVP) required 

vaccination of personnel assigned or deployed to the Korean peninsula, CENT-

 

69 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 4, p. E4-3, Appendix E-4; and Russell V. 

Lewey, SAIC, correspondence on 8 November 2004. 

70 Ibid. 

COM, or other “higher threat areas” for 15 

or more consecutive days.71

There are many challenges regarding 

a universal vaccination policy, the primary 

ones being funding and personnel wariness 

of side effects. DoD should increase funding for vaccination programs so all personnel can be vaccinated.72 Additionally, 

they should educate the force regarding 

medical side effects data. According to 

one workshop group, if the DoD discontinues sustainment of present BW detectors such as Portal Shield, which are less 

than optimally effective, this would free 

up monetary resources to vaccinate the 

force.73 Many senior level people in the 

DoD agree that funding reflects the priority and importance of an issue.74 If vaccination programs receive little funding, this 

indicates that it is not a priority issue. 

The second challenge relates to medical-legal challenges. The on-again, offagain legal battle regarding anthrax vaccinations clearly demonstrates the legal aspects of a universal vaccination policy. As 

late as October 2004, a legal action again 

stopped the mandatory anthrax vaccination 

 

71 Donna Hudson, 22 September 2004. 

72 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 1, p. E1-4, Appendix E-1. 

73 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 1, p. E1-4, Appendix E-1, and Group 3, p. E3-2, 

Appendix E-3. 

74 Lisa Bronson, 2004, Keynote speaker at “NonTraditional Chemical Agents: Assessing the Threat and 

Our Response,” 29 September 2004. Ms. Bronson is 

the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology 

Security Policy and Counterproliferation and Director, 

Defense Technology Security Administration. 
Tasha L. Pravecek and Jim A. Davis 

24 

of soldiers deployed to high threat areas.75 Legal challenges may be minimized by a continued wide-spread 

information campaign to broadcast the 

safety, minor health hazards, and risks of 

both the anthrax and smallpox vaccinations. 

In addition, the smallpox vaccine 

cannot be given to all personnel. For 

example, DoD policy today is that a person with dermatitis or other skin conditions will not be given the smallpox 

vaccine unless smallpox is used in a deployed location. Many military personnel fear the smallpox vaccination due to 

the reported potential to infect family 

members. Thus, many personnel preparing for deployment asked to be provided alternate government quarters 

during the healing time for their inoculation site in order to keep their family 

“safe.” 

Recommendations: The Joint Staff 

should develop a team of multidisciplinary subject matter experts as 

well as non-medical personnel to address challenges related to a universal 

vaccination program with the ultimate 

goal of vaccinating all military against 

smallpox and anthrax. 

 

75 United Press International, 28 October 2004, 

“Anthrax Vaccinations Halted Again.” On-line, 

Internet, 14 December 2004, available from 

http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,FL_ 

anthrax_102804,00.html. 

Tier 3 Bio-Defense Recommendations 

Provide Weekly Commander’s Stand-Up 

Briefings 

In order for commanders to make an 

operationally effective decision, they 

must be provided with complete information. The workshop attendees recognized 

the importance of frequent information 

presented to the commander, and also determined that this idea could be implemented very quickly. This idea received 

the most number one votes in the Implemented Quickest category. The BW 

threat and responses should be discussed 

during Command information sessions, or 

Commander’s Stand-Up Briefings, to increase Command BW focus at all levels. 

This action would increase individual and 

Command awareness and prepare all to 

respond to BW use.76 The briefings 

should be provided by the MTF Commander or appropriate representative. 

Recommendations: At weekly 

commander’s stand-up briefings, overall 

disease trends should be reported. Depending on the threat level, this information may need to be reported to the 

commander more frequently.77

 

76 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 1, p. E1-2, Appendix E-1. 

77 AFI 10-2501, Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR) 

Planning and Operations, 24 December 2004, states that 

the MTF commander: “establishes, operates and reports 

threat/vulnerability-based disease early warning and 

surveillance to Installation Commander and higher 

headquarters. This program may provide first 

indication of covert biological warfare attack.” 

A2.6.12, 112. 
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

25 

Develop Quick-Reference Education 

Handouts

The attendees determined that the 

development of quick-reference education handouts is one of the solutions to 

be implemented quickest. This brief, 

simplified non-technical handout would 

be specific for each rank in the form of a 

two to three page document.78 The format of the document should be concise, 

informational, and to the point. A 

document that is 100 pages may contain 

a significant amount of information, but 

is not what a senior leader through junior enlisted person is likely to read or 

reference at some later time. 

Recommendations: Each service 

should develop a brief, non-technical 

handout that would be specific for each 

rank in the form of a two to three page 

document. For the Air Force, potential 

application of this idea may be instilled 

in the KFE Program or the ETE Initiative. During the development of the education, training, and exercise materials of 

the ETE Initiative, quick-reference handouts could also be developed. These 

handouts may be incorporated as tabs in 

future editions of the Airman’s Manual 

for quick and easy reference. 

Research New Prophylaxis and Vaccines

The ultimate BW defense would be 

a comprehensive vaccine or pill that 

would defend against all BW agents. 

 

78 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 4, p. E4-4, Appendix E-4. 

This vaccine or pill obviously does not 

exist. However, the workshop attendees 

recognized that investigation of new prophylaxis and vaccines would provide a 

great benefit to U.S. forces. 

At the national level, President Bush 

has taken great strides to increase the focus on prophylaxis and vaccines for the 

nation. In addition, researchers continue 

to investigate alternatives to vaccines to 

assist in BW defense. Despite these advances, focusing attention on the known, 

high-threat agents like smallpox and anthrax may prove risky when considering 

genetically altered biological agents that 

current vaccines may not defend against. 

In President Bush’s 2004 State of the 

Union address, he proposed Project 

BioShield as a new bioterrorism countermeasure. The President signed the legislation on July 21, 2004, which committed 

$5.6 billion over 10 years.79 BioShield is 

a comprehensive effort to develop, stockpile, and make available drugs and vaccines to protect against biological and 

chemical weapons attacks. 

The main provisions include: “(1) relaxing procedures for bioterrorism-related 

procurement and peer review; (2) guaranteeing a market through contract authority 

granted to the Secretary of Health and 

Human Services (HHS) to buy countermeasures following Presidential approval, 

funded by a permanent, indefinite appropriation; and (3) allowing the Secretary of 

 

79 Jim Garamone, 2004, “Bush Signs $5.6 Billion 

BioShield Legislation,” American Forces Information 

Service, 23 July 2004. On-line, Internet, 23 July 2004, 

available from www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/ 

n07212004_2004072103.html. 
Tasha L. Pravecek and Jim A. Davis 

26 

HHS to permit the emergency use of 

unapproved countermeasures.”80

In short, BioShield provides incentives to pharmaceutical makers and biotechnology companies for development 

of medicines and vaccines to treat people exposed to biological agents. 

BioShield should strengthen research 

and development and enhance our ability to counter BW attacks. 

In addition to the R&D efforts under project BioShield, the Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention/Agency 

for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (CDC/ATSDR) is progressing on the 

defense of a number of other BW 

agents. The CDC/ATSDR is undertaking a 5-year project, under the National 

Center for Infectious Diseases (NCID), 

to acquire, maintain, and immunize 200 

horses to develop a botulinum equine 

heptavalent antitoxin as a treatment for 

clinical botulism. 

In addition, the CDC/ATSDR is attempting to manufacture anthrax immune globulin to provide treatments for 

anthrax illness, and is also involved in 

the Anthrax Vaccine Research Program 

(AVRP) to conduct studies to determine 

the factors associated with side-effects 

of the vaccine and the length of time the 

vaccine protects. 

Finally, the CDC/ATSDR will continue to administer the Smallpox Vaccination Program by providing expertise 

 

80 Gottron, Frank, 2003, “Project BioShield,” 

Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 

23 July 2003. 

and guidance for the delivery of the vaccine.81

Meanwhile, private researchers continue to investigate alternatives to vaccines to assist in BW defense. One area 

of study is in non-specific immune modulation. Non-specific immunity is a body’s 

innate ability to defend against attacks by 

foreign bodies, such as viruses and bacteria.82 When exposed to a BW agent, 

elements of innate immunity are marshaled quickly to respond. In contrast, 

adaptive or specific immunity is more 

focused and takes several days or weeks 

to develop (ex., anthrax and smallpox). 

Alternatively, the immune system 

can be enhanced in a number of ways. 

One example is non-specific immune enhancement through paraspecific vaccines. 

Paraspecific vaccines are not an immunization, but produce a non-antigen specific 

mechanism to combat viral infections. 

Paraspecific vaccines have been used to 

combat herpes and hepatitis B and C infections, chronic inflammatory diseases, 

and stress-related dysfunctions of the 

immune system.83

 

81 Op. Cit., CDC, 11, 26. 

82 Non-specific immunity is based on phagocytic 

leukocytes (polymorphonuclear (PMN) phagocyte or 

granulocyte and the mononuclear phagocyte or 

macrophage). PMNs and macrophages phagocytise or 

engulf foreign material and destroy them. From: 

Casarett and Doull’s Toxicology: The Basic Science of 

Poisons, Eds. Mary O. Amdur, John Doull, Curtis D. 

Klaassen. New York, NY: Permagon Press, 2004, 283. 

83 A. Mayr, 2003, “Development of a Non-Immunising, 

Paraspecific Vaccine from Attenuated Pox Viruses: a 

New Type of Vaccine,” New Microbiology, Volume 26, 

Issue 1, 7-12. 
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

27 

Another example is use of peptides, 

or parts of proteins, to augment innate 

immunity. Inimex Pharmaceuticals of 

Vancouver Canada has conducted extensive research on enhancing innate 

immunity to counter infectious agents. 

Specifically, Inimex has used their novel 

peptides in animal experiments investigating Salmonella Typhmurium, Escherichia coli, and Staphylococcus 

aureus.

84 

An alternative to vaccines and peptides is use of dietary supplements. Researchers have been investigating 

possible ways to broadly boost the human immune system. There is some preliminary evidence that a variety of 

vitamins and dietary supplements may 

mildly increase immunity.85 More research must be completed before dietary 

supplements can be considered a viable 

alternative. 

When considering manufacture and 

distribution of vaccines, one must remember that the former USSR genetically engineered biological agents to be 

used as weapons. Novel agents from 

molecular engineering of microbes may 

pose a future threat, and other agents that 

are not now on the classic BW charts 

could emerge. If the U.S. focuses on an-

 

84 E.M. Dullaghan, et al., 2003, “Enhancement of 

Innate Immune as A Strategy to Counter Infectious 

Agents,” American Society of Microbiology 

Biodefense Research annual meeting, 7-10 March 

2004. Further information available at the Inimex 

Pharmaceuticals’ website. On-line, Internet, 6 

December 2004, available from www.inimexpharma. 

com/st_a.htm. 

85 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 2, p. E2-4, Appendix E-2. 

thrax, smallpox, and plague, the agents at 

the top of the list, we could be missing the 

next big threat.86 However, the alternatives such as new prophylaxis and vaccines discussed here may offer widespread 

protection to even these genetically engineered biological weapons. 

Recommendations: The DoD should 

explore challenges related to new prophylaxis and vaccines. DoD should direct increased funding to support more 

aggressive vaccine research and production as well as alternatives to vaccines. 

Institute the 922 Concept

The National 922 Concept is a telephone triage system that collects real-time, 

self-reported symptoms of a population. 

The workshop attendees determined that 

since this is a civilian effort currently 

pending U.S. Government funding that the 

idea could be implemented very quickly. 

The National 922 Concept would establish a national computer center and 

telephone triage system that could collect 

real-time self-reported symptoms from 

civilians in a biological exposure area. 

Information about the disease and required actions could be requested and distributed on television stations. 

National 922 is designed for both response to man-made or naturally occurring epidemics. It also would be useful in 

chemical and other crisis scenarios. This 

epidemiologic data could be used to make 

 

86 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 3, p. E3-3, Appendix E-3. 
Tasha L. Pravecek and Jim A. Davis 

28 

decisions about treatment and quarantine.87

The National 922 Concept could be 

modified to be used by the military to 

help detect symptoms related to BW exposures. Some workshop attendees offered an alternative suggestion of a webbased version versus the telephone communications version detailed for the civilian community. A web-based version 

could enhance Air Force Commanders’ 

insight and management of a biooutbreak.88 Either a telephone-based or 

a web-based 922 Concept would provide 

a relatively prompt assessment of a potential BW attack.89

Recommendations: Develop and 

institute a military 922 system. 

Investigate New Detection Methods

The Joint Program Executive Office 

for Chemical and Biological Defense 

(JPEO-CBD) through the Joint Project 

Manager Guardian (JPMG) provides 

DoD installations with biological protection and response capabilities to reduce casualties, maintain critical 

operations, contain contamination, and 

restore operations.90

 

87 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 2, p. E2-2, Appendix E-2. 

88 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 3, p. E3-2, Appendix E-3. 

89 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 1, p. E1-3, Appendix E-1. 

90 Joint Project Manager Guardian (JPMG), Program 

Management Technical Directive #001, “Initial 

Family of Systems (FoS) Component List,” Draft, 

August 2004. 

The JPMG published a draft initial 

Family of Systems Component List which 

includes government and commercial 

products that are acceptable for Installation Protection Program use. The extensive list contains only two biological 

sampling kits and no biological detectors. 

This finding reflects the “85% Project” 

workgroup’s discussion that today there is 

no sensor that can give troops a real-time 

warning of BW attack.91 Thus, the attendees determined that developing new detection methods would offer great benefit. 

However, investigating new detection 

methods is not a solution that can be implemented very quickly. 

Most of the BW detection capabilities today provide “detect to treat” instead 

of “detect to warn” capability. In other 

words, today’s detection capabilities provide confirmation that a disease is present, but cannot provide advanced 

warning of an approaching cloud of biological agent. The military and civilian 

first responders are the primary users of 

detection equipment. The following provides a brief list of some of the equipment 

available to detect biological agents: 

• Hand Held Assays (HHA): a simple, 

inexpensive, easy to use, antibodybased assay to presumptively identify 

biological warfare agents. Identifies 

10 different biological agents and 4 

simulant agents. Designed to be used 

on only non-porous surfaces. Not de-

 

91 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 3, p. E3-3, Appendix E-3. 
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

29 

signed to be the sole method of identification.92

• HAZMAT ID: a rugged, compact, 

self-contained Fourier Transform Infrared spectrometer with an integrated computer weighing 22 lbs. 

Only a single drop of liquid or a few 

grains of powder are required to run a 

complete analysis. The instrument 

uses Bio-CheckIR software to analyze the spectrum of the unknown 

and alerts when a protein is detected 

indicating the presence of a possible 

biological material.93

• Ruggedized Advanced Pathogen 

Identification System (RAPID): detects and identifies various microbes 

associated with infectious disease and 

bio-warfare agents. Idaho Technology produces specific test reagents 

for detection of organisms including 

anthrax, botulinum, Brucella, plague, 

tularemia, Salmonella, E. coli O157, 

Listeria, and Campylobacter. The 

RAPID is a field-hardened air thermocycler capable of automatically 

analyzing samples for the presence of 

targeted DNA sequence. Easy-to-use 

software allows the RAPID to automatically collect and interpret data, 

and report results. RAPID is capable 

 

92 Department of the Army, 2002, “Information Paper, 

Hand Held Assay (HHA),” White Paper from 

Program Executive Office for Chemical and 

Biological Defense, Falls Church, VA, 23 July 2002. 

93 SensIR, 2004. On-line, Internet, 6 December 2004, 

available from http://www.sensir.com/newsensir/ 

On_scene/HazmatID.html. 

of analyzing 32 samples in less than 25 

minutes.94

• Joint Biological Agent Identification 

and Diagnostic System (JBAIDS): detects and diagnoses biological agent 

exposure or infection. JBAIDS will be 

capable of simultaneous identification 

of multiple biological agents and other 

pathogens.95

• Portal Shield: Consists of a variable 

number of biological sensors forming 

a network under the command and 

control of a centralized command post 

computer. Portal Shield uses the HHA 

as a primary identification component. 

Portal Shield will enhance a fixedsite’s NBC defensive posture. 

• Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS): consists of a common 

biosuite that can be installed on vehicles, ships, and at fixed sites. The first 

version will identify 10 biological warfare agents in less than 20 minutes. 

Uses the HHA as a primary identification component. The JBPDS can operate remotely up to 5 kilometers away 

from fixed sites. 

• Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS): consists of a shelter (S-

 

94 Idaho Technology, 2003, “Detection and 

Identification of Bio-Warfare Agents.” On-line, 

Internet, 21 September 2004, available from 

http://www.army-technology.com/contractors/nbc/idaho/ 

index.html#idaho1. 

95 Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of 

Defense, Chemical Biological Defense, 2004, “Joint 

Service Chemical and Biological Defense Program 

FY04-05 Overview.” 
Tasha L. Pravecek and Jim A. Davis 

30 

788 Lightweight Multipurpose Shelter) mounted on a dedicated vehicle 

[M1097 (Heavy High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle) 

HMMWV] and equipped with a biological detection suite employing 

complementary technologies to detect large area biological attacks. The 

BIDS Biological Detection Suite 

links aerodynamic particle sizing, 

bioluminescence and fluorescence, 

flow cytometry, mass spectrometry, 

and immunoassay technologies in a 

complementary, layered manner to 

increase detection confidence.96 BIDS 

also uses the HHA as a primary identification component. BIDS will be 

replaced by the JPBDS.97

• Joint Service Lightweight NBC Reconnaissance System (JSLNBCRS): 

The JSLNBCRS is comprised of the 

base vehicle, command and control, 

and NBC equipment suite. The NBC 

equipment suite allows for detection, 

identification, collection, and marking 

of NBC hazards. 

The NBC sensor suite has been 

digitally linked with the communications and navigation subsystems by a 

dual-purpose central processor sys-

 

96 SBCCOM, 2004, “Biological Integrated Detection 

System (BIDS).” On-line, Internet, 21 September 

2004, available from http://cjnewsline.com/ 

Homeland%20Defense/NucBioChemical%20Detectio

n/ECBC%20Biological%20Integrated%20Detection%

20Systems%20%28BIDS%29.htm. 

97 Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of 

Defense, Chemical Biological Defense, 2004, “Joint 

Service Chemical and Biological Defense Program 

FY04-05 Overview.” 

tem. The processor fully automates 

NBC warning and reporting functions 

and provides the crew commander 

with full situational awareness of the 

NBC sensors, navigation, and communications systems. 

The JSLNBCRS is also equipped 

with a global positioning system and 

other navigation capabilities to enable 

the system to accurately locate and report agent contamination. It has an 

over-pressure filtration system that 

permits the crew to operate in a shirtsleeve environment that is fully protected from the effects of NBC agents 

and contamination outside the vehicle.98, 99

• Joint Biological Standoff Detector 

System (JBSDS): uses LIDAR-based 

technology to detect aerosol clouds 

from long distances. “Light Detection 

And Ranging,” LIDAR, is based on 

the same physical principles as radar, 

except instead of bouncing longer 

wavelength radio waves off a target, 

higher energy light waves are used. 

Using lasers that generate light waves 

in the infrared, the ultraviolet, and the 

visible portion of the electromagnetic 

spectrum, the multiple energy wavelengths of LIDAR furnish more de-

 

98 U.S. Army, 2004, “Army Fact File: Nuclear, 

Biological, Chemical Reconnaissance System.” Online, Internet, 21 September 2004, available from 

http://www.army.mil/fact_files_site/nbcrs/.

99 Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of 

Defense, Chemical Biological Defense, 2004, “Joint 

Service Chemical and Biological Defense Program 

FY04-05 Overview.” 
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

31 

tailed information, including threedimensional imaging.100

New detection methods are being 

developed. In the 1990s, the U.S. saw a 

dramatic improvement in biological detection capabilities. After September 

11, 2001, the number of companies and 

research in this area notably increased. 

For instance, the 454 Life Sciences 

company offers a DNA sequencing system which uses “a revolutionary way to 

sequence an entire genome. Through 

miniaturization, advanced image processing and unique data analysis, several 

million base pairs of sequence data, per 

hour, are now generated on a single instrument.”101

So, the complete identity of an organism, or BW agent, can be determined 

in hours instead of days. Theoretically, 

if only a portion of the DNA library of 

an BW agent is needed to be identified 

to confirm the BW agent presence, the 

454 technology could speed detection of 

an agent to seconds. 

Recommendations: DoD should 

aggressively fund bio-detector research 

and development and explore commercial and government off-the-shelf technology, such as the 454 technology, to 

 

100 Margaret E. Kosal, 2003, “The Basics of Chemical 

and Biological Weapons Detectors,” Center for 

Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of 

International Studies. On-line, Internet, 21 September 

2004, available from http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/ 

031124.htm. 

101 454 Life Sciences, 2004. On-line, Internet, 6 

December 2004, available from http://www.454.com. 

reduce the time and enhance the accuracy 

of biological agent detectors. 

On a more strategic level, area monitoring on an installation could be conducted using a system similar to that used 

in the BioWatch program. BioWatch is 

the DHS program, assisted by the 

CDC/ATSDR and EPA, which performs 

24/7 environmental surveillance using the 

existing EPA and DOE air quality monitoring systems. Although it is a “detect to 

treat” system, collected air samples are 

tested as an early warning indicator of 

biological attacks.102

The BioWatch system has been successfully operating in more than 30 urban 

centers since early 2003. The system has 

performed over a million tests with no 

false positive, and one true positive (an 

environmental source).103

Modify Ventilation Systems

Appropriately equipped buildings can 

provide a significant component of force 

protection for the war fighter. Simple alterations to the ventilation systems of buildings can make them a less attractive target, 

protect human occupants, and quickly restore the building to full function. 

The workshop attendees determined 

that this idea is a high priority in both the 

 

102 CDC, ATSDR, and DHHS, 2004, “A National 

Public Health Strategy for Terrorism Preparedness and 

Response 2003-2008,” March 2004, 9. 

103 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004, “Fact 

Sheet: A Better Prepared America: A Year in Review,” 

25 May 2004. On-line, Internet, 9 June 2004, available 

from www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/ 

print/20040525-4.html. 
Tasha L. Pravecek and Jim A. Davis 

32 

Greatest Benefit and Best Overall categories. There are simple solutions that can 

be implemented now to provide some protection against BW agents. In addition, 

there is an on-going demonstration of Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency’s (DARPA) Immune Building 

Program which should offer significant 

advances in building protection. 

On a larger scale, in 2001 the Special Projects Office of DARPA began 

work on the Immune Building Program. 

The program focuses on protecting the 

occupants of a building from the release 

of airborne chemical or biological agents. 

This program has developed biological 

sensor-activated heating, ventilation, and 

air conditioning (HVAC) control systems, high efficiency agent filtration and 

neutralization technologies. In 2006, the 

first functional “Immune Building” will 

be demonstrated at Ft. Leonard Wood, 

MO.104

Recommendations: In normal 

buildings, some level of protection 

against BW can be achieved simply by 

using improved filters. Normal buildings use filters with a Minimum Efficiency Reporting Value (MERV) of 6 to 

8, but filters with a MERV of 11 can 

usually be substituted without changing 

the HVAC system capabilities, making a 

big difference in removal of many BW 

agents. High Efficiency Particulate Air 

(HEPA) filters are also readily available, 

and can remove particulates to 0.3 mi-

 

104 More information can be found on-line, Internet, 

available from www.darpa.mil/spo/programs/ib.htm. 

crons. DoD should acquire a supply of 

improved filters for its buildings in threat 

areas, and have rules for when to switch 

to their use.105

In addition to ventilation system filters, other options exist to provide limited 

protection to individual rooms. For instance, room air purifiers will filter out 

some biological particulates in the air. If 

a BW agent concentration can be reduced 

below its infectious level, then the inhabitants of the room will be protected for a 

short period of time. Ultraviolet (UV) 

lights may also kill some microorganisms. If UV lights are installed at building or room entrances and in ventilation 

ducts, this too may offer some additional 

protection. 

Develop DoD Integrated Information 

Collection

Strategic warning of potential biological weapons use is critical in the early 

warning, defense, and survivability of our 

deployed troops. Although this 85% solution idea may take time to implement, 

the workshop attendees indicated by votes 

that this idea offers a great benefit in our 

BW defense. The suggested DoD Integrated Information Collection involves a 

systems approach to combine data from 

all information sources. 

For example, the data may include 

adversary capabilities and intent, friendly 

vulnerability, measurements from detectors, environmental surveillance, informa-

 

105 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 1, p. E1-6, Appendix E-1. 
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

33 

tion from local nationals, installation 

medical surveillance information, and 

regional (civilian) medical surveillance.106 This integrated collection system must include development of 

effective interaction with the intelligence and civilian community to define 

and refine the threat. 

The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) is a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) organization 

that could be used to coordinate some of 

this information collection. The AFMIC 

advises the theater surgeon of important 

medical aspects of the theater. For instance, AFMIC prepares assessments of 

foreign military and civilian medical 

systems, infectious disease risks, environmental health risks, and life sciences 

and biotechnology.107 

The theater surgeon advises the 

commander of the appropriate actions 

required to permit personnel to function 

effectively and safely in the theater of 

operations. Medical Intelligence should 

encompass, at a minimum, indigenous 

and enemy threats, and a description of 

all national medical resources in the deployment area, to include availability 

and capabilities of host nation, joint, or 

coalition-held medical assets. Constant 

medical surveillance of local disease 

incidence may also assist in identifying 

 

106 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 1, p. E1-3, Appendix E-1. 

107 “Bio-Defense State of Knowledge Medical Surveillance,” August, 2004. Online, Internet, 28 January 

2005, available from https://www.xo.hq.af.mil/xos/ 

xosf/xosfc/CCBRNE_resource/biological/bio-state-ofknowledge/index.shtml.

sources of large-scale chemical and biological production facilities.108

The Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA) has components that monitor disease outbreaks and are actively monitoring potential CBRN attacks. DoD should 

establish liaison officers in these departments to facilitate information flow back 

to AFMIC. 

The Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention and Agency for Toxic Substance Disease Registry (CDC/ATSDR) 

is a proven agency in the world of epidemiology since the inception of the Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) in 1951. 

The CDC has capabilities to detect, investigate, and communicate a variety of public health concerns, especially those from 

a terrorist act. The following bullets detail some CDC/ATSDR activities discussed in their strategy:109

• Epidemic Information Exchange 

(Epi-X): a secure web-based communications network for public health officials. Provides 24/7 emergency 

alerts and forum to share disease information nationwide. Epi-X enables 

public health officials to detect and 

respond accordingly to suspected terrorism emergencies. Used by the 

CDC/ATSDR Emergency Operations 

Center and state terrorism coordinators to share information with state 

and CDC/ATSDR public health experts. 

 

108 JP 3-11, 2000 “Joint Doctrine for Operations in a 

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment,” 11 

July 2000. 

109 Ibid., 8-9, 11-12, 17. 
Tasha L. Pravecek and Jim A. Davis 

34 

• National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS): performs 

automatic capture and analysis of 

data already available electronically. 

Monitors public health conditions. 

The NEDSS system will promote the 

use of data and information system 

standards to advance the development of efficient, integrated, and interoperable surveillance systems at 

federal, state, and local levels. 

• PulseNet: an early warning system 

for outbreaks of food borne disease 

run by the NCID. PulseNet is a national network of laboratories that 

perform DNA fingerprinting on bacteria that may be food borne. The 

NCID uses PulseNet to identify and 

label each fingerprint pattern and 

compare these patterns through an 

electronic database at CDC/ATSDR 

to identify related strains. The 

PulseNet system functions like an Interpol system for microbes, identifying outbreaks and their sources. 

• Syndromic Surveillance Evaluation: 

An initiative to evaluate the efficacy 

of collecting data that precedes diagnosis, such as laboratory test requests, emergency department chief 

complaints, ambulance run sheets, 

prescription and over-the-counter 

drug use, and school or work absenteeism. This data may provide early 

indication of an outbreak of disease. 

• Rapid Toxic Screen: Developed by 

the National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH), capable of 

performing tests to identify 150 

chemical agents in human blood or 

urine. In a terrorism event, Rapid 

Toxic Screen will help determine what 

chemical agents were used, who has 

been exposed, and to what extent in 

order to guide treatment of affected 

persons. 

• Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS): 

A 2-year, post-graduate program consisting of service and on-the-job training for epidemiologists. The EIS 

generates highly trained CDC “Disease Detectives.” The CDC is attempting to place an EIS Officer or 

EIS-trained epidemiologist in every 

state. Training includes terrorism preparedness and emergency response. 

One example of the EIS in action occurred in summer 2002 with the increase in West Nile Virus infections. 

Thirty-nine EIS officers were deployed on 45 occasions to assist teams 

sent to southern and mid-western 

states affected by the West Nile Virus 

infections.110

As our information technology capabilities advance, so too do the tools available to health care providers. The Rapid 

Syndrome Validation Project (RSVP) is a 

web-based tool that maps symptoms, 

showing when, where, and how people 

fall sick. Another tool is the ProMedmail, an internet mailing list that sends 

information regarding disease surveil-

 

110 CDC, 2003, “Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS): 

CDC’s ‘Disease Detectives.’” On-line, Internet, 20 June 

2004, available from www.cdc.gov/programs/bio.htm. 
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

35 

lance. Many other information technology advances are being investigated.111

Recommendations: The DoD 

should develop a team with similar expertise to the EIS-trained officers (perhaps by sending them to this training) to 

enable a specialized team of trained epidemiologists to assist in the collection of 

data indicative of a BW attack. These 

individuals should be integrally linked 

to AFMIC, other DIA resources, the 

CIA, and other disease surveillance systems. 

Additionally, a DoD Integrated Information Collection System should be 

developed combining data from all 

sources. The suggested DoD Integrated 

Information Collection involves a systems approach for data acquisition. 

For example, the data may include 

adversary capabilities and intent, 

friendly vulnerability, measurements 

from detectors, environmental surveillance, information from local nationals, 

installation medical surveillance information, and regional (civilian) medical 

surveillance.112 This integrated collection system must include development 

of effective interaction with the intelligence and civilian community to define 

and refine the threat. 

 

111 Laxminarayan, Swamy and Beth Hudnall Stamm, 

2004, “Technological Challenges in Counter 

Bioterrorism: Science and Technology Needs for 

Responding to Attacks by CBRNE Weapons of Mass 

Destruction,” IEEE Engineering in Medicine and 

Biology Magazine, Jan/Feb 2004, 119-121. 

112 The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Workshop, 

Group 1, p. E1-3, Appendix E-1. 

Re-Prioritize BW Threat Agents

In order to more efficiently guide the 

use of scarce R&D resources for detection, treatment, and defense, the potential 

BW agents the U.S. troops may be threatened with should be reassessed. The 

workshop attendees viewed this as a 

quick solution as well as an overall best 

solution to our BW defense shortfalls. 

Many experts agree the “top three” BW 

agents presenting the most serious threat 

are anthrax, smallpox, and plague.113

However, different BW agents may 

be considered the highest threat when an 

assessment of their properties as weapons 

is assessed. For instance, there may be a 

biological agent more easily dispersed 

with greater deleterious effects on combat 

forces than anthrax or smallpox. Recently, Milton Leitenberg, a prolific 

writer in the field of biological weapons, 

argued that the U.S. has completed no 

real threat assessment and our current 

definition of enemy capabilities in the 

field of BW is vague.114

On April 27, 2004, President Bush 

approved the creation of a common surveillance system to collect and analyze 

information about bioterrorist threats. The 

plan calls for the Department of Homeland 

Security to conduct a national risk assess-

 

113 Mark G. Kortepeter and Gerald W. Parker, 1999, 

“Potential Biological Weapons Threats,” Emerging 

Infectious Diseases, Vol. 5, No. 4, 523-527. 

114 Milton Leitenberg, 2 December 2004, “Experts 

Question Levels of Bio-Defense Spending,” in an 

interview by David Kestenbaum, National Public 

Radio. On-line, Internet, 2 December 2004, available 

from www.npr.org. 
Tasha L. Pravecek and Jim A. Davis 

36 

ment every two years on new biological 

threats. The plan does not include funding, but depends on part of the $6 billion 

allocated annually for bio-defense.115

Recommendations: The DoD BWdefense experts should conduct a technical assessment to determine the priority 

of different BW agents. The DoD 

should partner with the Department of 

Homeland Security in conducting this 

national risk assessment to determine 

our probable BW threats. This assessment should include, as a minimum, the 

following characteristics of an effective 

biological weapon:116, 117, 118

• Inexpensive, 

• Easily acquired and readily available, 

• Easy to produce (enemy has technical capability), 

• Easy to hide and transport, 

• Easily weaponized (enemy has technical capability), 

• Stability in storage and after disseminated, 

 

115 Judith Miller, 2004, “Bush Issues Directive to 

Bolster Defense against Bioterrorism,” New York 

Times, 28 April 2004. 

116 Ibid. 

117 Graham S. Pearson, 2000, “The Essentials of 

Biological Threat Assessment,” in Biological 

Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense, Raymond A. 

Zilinskas, Ed., Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 

Publishers, 61-67. 

118 Raymond S. Weinstein, and Kenneth Alibek, 2003, 

Biological and Chemical Terrorism: A Guide for 

Healthcare Providers and First Responders, New 

York, NY: Thieme, 4-9. 

• Effectively dispersed, 

• Stability as an aerosol (potentially the 

best dispersal method), 

• Short and predictable incubation period, 

• Initial recognition of disease likely to 

be delayed, 

• Communicable and highly contagious, 

• Highly lethal and/or incapacitating, 

• Maintains potency and persists in the 

environment, 

• Limited detect-ability (instruments do 

not readily detect), 

• No treatment or vaccine, and 

• Name of the disease induces fear, 

devastating psychological effect. 

Funding priorities and C-BW 

CONOPS could then focus on the reprioritized list of BW Threat Agents. 

Expand Joint BW ACTD Funding

The Advanced Concept Technology 

Development (ACTD) Program, which 

began in 1995, is designed to introduce 

mature technologies and related concepts 

of operations into war fighting use as rapidly as possible. Technologies or systems 

that prove successful can be left behind 

and fielded with warfighters upon completion of the program. 

ACTDs are demonstrations, not an 

acquisition program. Recently, ACTDs 

involving BW defense have not been 

funded, with preference given to other 

programs deemed to be more important. 
The 85% Biological Defense Project 

37 

The workshop attendees agreed that expanding ACTD efforts, to include demonstrations for BW defense, is of great 

benefit to the warfighter. This idea was 

also ranked highly in the Best Overall

category. 

The ACTD efforts help field new 

technologies more rapidly, educate military personnel on the nature of the 

threats they face, develop response capabilities, assist in the development of 

non-material solutions, and help the 

military understand how to better use 

the technologies it already has available.119 CASPODS and RESTOPS are 

two ACTDs that have demonstrated 

some BW defense application. 

CASPODS purpose was to provide a 

fly-away capability that fills the gap in 

Chemical and Biological Defense at 

seaports of debarkation. RESTOPS included realistic attack scenarios to challenge personnel operating in a 

chemically and biologically contaminated environment. From these ACTD 

efforts, participants identified critical 

shortfalls in capability, policy, nonmaterial solutions and operations. 

Recommendations: Senior leaders 

should recognize the importance of ACTDs 

 

119 Ibid. 

for BW defense issues and support Joint 

BW ACTDs. Proposed ACTDs dealing 

with bio-defense should be given top priority consideration. 

CONCLUSION 

The military services, PACOM, 

DTRA, OSD, Joint Staff, and many others are addressing solutions to BW defense. A DoD organization should be 

identified as a focal-point to ensure communication between all groups working 

programs related to BW defense. This 

focal-point will ensure all lessons learned 

are shared to develop an effective BW 

program more efficiently. 

The DoD, services, and MAJCOMs 

are encouraged to aggressively support 

and implement the ten recommendations 

in Tier 1 and Tier 2. Serious consideration should be given to implement at least 

some of the ideas in Tier 3. Most of these 

recommendations have been initiated in 

various services or MAJCOMs. By capitalizing on the work already done, DoD 

can rapidly improve its BW defense posture and at least be “85%” ready. We 

cannot afford to be the unready confronting the unthinkable. 

Appendix A-1 

Appendix A 

Needed Now: 

The “85% Quick Fix” in Bio-Defense 

Jim A. Davis and Bruce W. Bennett 

I. Introduction 

Some new proposals are presented to provide an “85% Quick 

Fix,” including implementation of a Bio-Threatcon level, 

building preparation, providing off the shelf 1/2 mask 

respirators and more. 

The search for the “best solution” for bio-defense is proving to be an obstacle 

to finding the more immediate “good solution.” In the day when Americans have 

grown used to fast food, instant access to the Internet, and minimal United States’ 

casualties during war, many have come to expect a “silver bullet solution” for 

almost any problem. The military, like the rest of America, is often in quest for the 

100% solution to its challenges. For example, the military, now awakened to the 

biological warfare/biological terrorism (BW/BT) threat, is in search of the perfect 

solution to the problem posed by biological weapons. The pursuit of the 100% 

solution often diverts efforts from potential quick (though incomplete) fixes for 

such tough problems that could provide valuable protection. Some new proposals 

are presented to provide an “85% Quick Fix,”1

 including implementation of a BioThreatcon level, building preparation, providing off the shelf 1/2 mask respirators 

and more. While the technical information in this paper needs further study, it is 

hoped this chapter will provoke discussion and stimulate the development of new 

ideas for immediate solutions (albeit partial solutions) rather than waiting on the 

100% solution. 

In April 1990, two U.S. naval bases, Yokosuka and Yokohama, were 

attacked with botulinum toxin, and although they failed, the scenario could have 

turned out much different. A home-grown Japanese terrorist organization, Aum 

Shinrikyo, had amassed over a billion dollars in net worth and had developed a 

clandestine biological warfare program. This group became famous for its nerve 

 

1

 The 85% number here is notional. We believe that a large percentage of potential BW casualties can be 

averted through a series of quick fixes, but the actual percentage will vary by type of BW and other issues. We 

cannot say with precision what the actual improvement will be with detailed scientific studies. Nevertheless, 

the basis for the 85% number is derived from a scientific understanding of Biological Warfare. 
Appendix A-2 

agent attack in the Tokyo subways in March 1995 that killed 12 and injured 

5,500. Fortunately, in 1990, technology and scientific know-how were not as 

accessible as they are today, and as a result, the Aum Shinrikyo cult had not 

perfected its program.2

 To our knowledge, no U.S. forces became ill from this 

attack. But if this attack occurred today when technological capabilities and the 

proliferation of information are rampant, it seems far more likely they would have 

been successful, leading to thousands of U.S. forces casualties. 

Likewise, consider the Gulf War in 1991 when the U.S. had 320,000 military 

personnel massed in a 50 by 150 mile rectangular area southeast of Iraq. The 

Office of the Secretary of Defense estimated if an anthrax attack had occurred on 

our troops, 76,300 individuals would have died if they were not vaccinated. On the 

other hand, if all were vaccinated, it was estimated that only 122 would have died. 

Conversely, what if the attack had been tularemia, Q-fever, or a host of other 

biological agents for which we do not have a vaccine? Thousands would have died 

or become ill because we did not have even a partial protection from such agents. 

Yet, if an “85% Quick Fix” was put into place, hundreds or possibly thousands of 

lives could be saved, allowing the military mission to continue. 

Since there is no mechanism in place today to provide even partial protection 

from a biological warfare attack at most military installations, both the Aum 

Shinrikyo and the Gulf War scenarios have grave implications. U.S. military 

forces could suffer death tolls higher than the tragic events of September 11, 

2001, unless some interim efforts for partial protection occur prior to finding the 

100% solution. With the “85% Quick Fix,” it is hypothesized 85% of the affected 

soldiers would be protected. 

Indeed, there is an obligation to protect our forces completely from threats 

when practical. We owe that protection to U.S. military personnel, to their 

families, and to our nation. Yet, the complexities of this threat make it difficult to 

field comprehensive defensive measures in the near-term — and BW/BT threats 

exist today. The weapons of this threat are bacteria, viruses, other microorganisms, 

and toxins. Unlike TNT, chemicals, and radioactive material, biological organisms 

are alive and can adapt to new challenges in the quest for survival. These invisible 

weapons are much different from other threats. They can be released to travel 

difficult terrain silently and effortlessly over long distances, creating sickness and 

death in their wake. 

Sometime in the 21st century we may be able to provide 100% protection 

against all the dozens of pathogens that might be used as weapons. However, 

unless we adopt a group of partial fixes now, our military forces will be left 

grossly vulnerable to the BW/BT threat while we search for a more 

comprehensive breakthrough in vaccines, sensors, and other counters. We have 

 

2

 David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World (New York: Crown Publishers, 

1996), 92, 251, 294. 
Appendix A-3 

much ground to make up in biodefense. Until very recently, senior DoD leaders 

were unable to grasp the urgency in protecting military forces and were unwilling 

to obligate large investments necessary to counter an unlikely event. Hopefully 

that has changed. 

The anthrax attacks in the United States during the Fall of 2001 have helped 

convert many such doubters, but further complicating a solution is the fact that 

some within DoD have seen this problem as “too hard to do.” Not knowing just 

what to do and not sure the threat was real, they did little. Also, one of the 

difficulties in preparing for this threat is the military’s fixation on technological 

answers more than procedural solutions. That finally may be changing, because a 

few in the military are beginning to ask, “Is there an inexpensive, quick fix that can 

provide partial protection for our forces while we look for the 100% solution?”3

Our frustrating quest for such items like the “detect to protect”4

 technology 

provided by biological detectors or highly reliable vaccines for a myriad of 

pathogens has led many to despair. Others have realized that for immediate 

protection, new technology innovations may not be the major portion of the 

immediate solution. 

Today, more than a dozen countries are suspected of having some level of a 

biological warfare program. It is also true that terrorist organizations such as AlQaeda have shown a keen interest in obtaining these weapons. Since Al-Qaeda 

says it is their God-ordained responsibility to kill Americans and most of the 

countries with BW/BT programs are not our best of friends, it is important we get 

to the immediate business of what might be termed the “85% Quick Fix”–some 

simple, effective, and immediate counters to today’s biological weapons threat. 

Effective interim and partial protection might be accomplished with several simple 

procedural changes and by minor applications of current technology at modest 

expense. 

The quest for the perfect answer can be the enemy of the “good solution,” and 

no one would credibly argue that 100% of personnel left unprotected in the near 

term is better than protecting 85% of personnel immediately through quick-fix 

procedures. 

 

3

 An example of one effort is the U.S. Air Force’s Biological Defense Task Force, which was a 120-day project in 

the summer and fall of 2002. This was an effort directed by the Chief of Staff of the USAF through HQ 

USAF/XONP to assist in developing a concept of operations for military installations in the event it was faced 

with biological warfare. 

4

 “Detect to protect” means that a biological attack can be detected before people are infected, giving them time 

to protect themselves from infection before it arrives. 
Appendix A-4 

II. Defining the BW/BT Threat 

The biological threat can be quantified by integrating three distinct variables:5

• An adversary’s intent to use biological weapons 

• An adversary’s capability to use biological weapons 

• Our own vulnerability to biological weapons 

Enemy Intent + Enemy Capability + U.S./Allied Vulnerability = Threat 

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to thoroughly analyze the possible 

intent of various rogue states/adversaries or to fully describe the myriad of 

biological weapon agents that may be used in an attack. Likewise, it is important 

to understand that to appropriately defeat BW/BT a full range of activities should 

be pursued, including: arms control, export controls, diplomatic and economic 

sanctions, deterrence, counterforce, active defense, passive defense and 

consequence management. However, this analysis will look at how a few simple 

and immediate steps can be taken to mitigate the hazards from biological 

weapons in the areas of passive defense, intelligence and warning, consequence 

management, and active defense/offensive options. 

Understanding BW Agents 

Threats like biological warfare/biological terrorism can be serious when the 

United States and/or its allies are vulnerable, and this is generally the case for every 

BW agent. This vulnerability is in turn a function of the characteristics of the BW 

agents and their various delivery systems. Nevertheless, the details of U.S. 

vulnerability are critical to determining the potential impacts of a BW attack. 

Many sources suggest that BW threats can be overwhelming. The actual area in 

which people would be affected by BW would vary depending upon the means of 

delivery (aerosol delivery is generally expected to be the most serious),6

 the quantity 

and positioning of the BW source, time of day, weather conditions, where people are 

 

5

 Lt Col Don Noah, USAF, “Medical Intelligence with a Weapon Focus on Biological Warfare.” Presentation was 

at the USAF Counterproliferation Center, Maxwell AFB, on 11 Jan 2000 to an Air War College elective class. He 

stated that U.S. national threat assessments often uses the formula of: intent + capability + vulnerability = threat. 

Lt Col Noah was the primary author of the National Medical Intelligence Threat Assessment for the United States, 

published in January 2000. 

6

 “Biological weapons can be deployed in three [primary] ways: by contaminating food or water supplies; 

releasing infected vectors, such as mosquitoes or fleas; or creating an aerosol cloud to be inhaled by the 

victims. By far, the most effective mode for applying biological weapons [to produce mass casualties] is an 

aerosol cloud. Such a cloud is made up of microscopic particles and is therefore invisible.” Ken Alibek, 

Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee Oversight Panel on Terrorism, May 23, 2000. 
Appendix A-5 

located, what they are doing when exposed, and various other factors. For example, 

the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment indicated that 100 kilograms of 

anthrax could cover 46 to 300 square kilometers with lethal effects, depending upon 

weather conditions,7 while other sources suggest potentially larger areas.8 Another 

source suggests that spray from “... a single airplane could be expected to infect a 

high percentage of individuals within an area of at least 10,000 km2” with equine 

encephalitis (VEE, EEE, or WEE).9 These large areas suggest that even Special 

Forces carrying a kilogram or so of BW, could affect large parts of a city, airfield, 

port, ground force base, or command/control or logistics facility. An aircraft or 

missile carrying tens of kilograms of BW agents could thoroughly overwhelm most 

military targets and cover much of the surrounding areas. 

There are a significant number of biological agents that have different 

characteristics, as shown in Table 1. These weapons vary in their potency (ECt50),10

their lethality, their survivability in air and other media, their period of incubation 

and duration of effects, whether they are contagious between people, the degree to 

which they can be prevented (e.g., by vaccines) or treated (e.g., by antibiotics), and 

their potential resistance to various forms of treatment (e.g., in antibiotic resistance). 

For example, a toxin like Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B (SEB) could rapidly affect a 

military population (starting within 2 hours or so), would have serious effects for 

perhaps a day or so, have residual effects for as long as weeks, should cause few 

fatalities, and could be treated only by supportive treatment. Alternatively, some 

 

7 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, U.S. Congress Office of Technology 

Assessment, August 1993, 53-54. 

8

 See Steve Fetter, “Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” International Security, Summer 

1991. Computer models like Hazard Predication and Assessment Capability (HPAC) show areas where 

varying fractions of those present will become anthrax fatalities. Dr. Bruce Bennett did four HPAC runs 

assuming the use of five kilograms of anthrax, the results of which provide a useful comparison. For an 

untreated and non-vaccinated population the 90 and 50 percent lethality areas range from 2 to 26 square 

kilometers (90 percent lethality) and from 31 to 2,600 square kilometers (50 percent lethality). The 20 percent 

lethality areas run from 500 to 15,000 square kilometers, and the 2 percent fatality areas run from 6,000 to 

32,000 square kilometers. 

9

 Jonathan F. Smith, et. al., “Viral Encephalitides,” in Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, 

eds. Frederick R. Sidell, Ernest T. Takafuji, and David R. Franz, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon 

General, U.S. Army, 1997). (VEE is Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis; EEE is Eastern Equine Encephalitis; and 

WEE is Western Equine Encephalitis. 

10 ECt50 is Effect Concentration Time 50%. The ECt50 is a measure of the dose at which 50 percent of the 

population experiences the agent’s primary effect. “For a vapour cloud or aerosol presenting a respiratory hazard, 

the exposure can be conveniently expressed as the product of the agent concentration (C) and the exposure time 

(t), which is known as the ‘Haber Product’, or ‘Ct’ exposure, with units of milligrams minutes per metres cubed 

(mg.min.m-3). (33) Since the susceptibility to CW agents varies from human to human, it is not possible to specify 

an exact minimum effective dosage or lethal dose for each agent. As a result, scientists can only define the dosage 

that has a specified probability of producing a particular effect. It is possible to define the term ‘Effect Ct50’ 

(ECt50) which indicates the Ct exposure that has a 50% probability of producing some kind of an effect.” Found at 

British Ministry of Defence site: http://www.mod.uk/issues/gulfwar/info/ukchemical/annexa.htm on 17 January 

2003; Also see Brian G. Chow, et. al., Air Force Operations in a Chemical and Biological Environment, RAND, 

DB-189/1-AF. 1998, 29. 
Appendix A-6 

bacterial weapons like anthrax and plague take longer to incubate, are highly lethal, 

but can generally be countered by certain antibiotics if these are taken in a timely 

manner and the BW agent has not been engineered to resist the antibiotic. 

Table 1. Characteristics of Some BW Agents 

Agent 

ECt50* 

(μg)-

min/m3

Nighttime 

Decay 

(%/min) 

Untreated 

Mortality(%)

Incubation

(Days) Contagious Treatment Vacc. 

Bacteria 

 Anthrax 0.01 0-0.1 100 1-6 No Antibiotic Yes 

 Plague 0.01 10 100 2-3 Yes Antibiotic No** 

 Tularemia 0.0001 5 5-60 2-10 No Antibiotic IND 

 Q Fever 0.00002 0-0.1 0-1 10-40 Rare Antibiotic IND 

Toxins 

 Bot Tox 0.1 5 5 1-5 No Antitoxin* IND 

 Ricin 200* ? High* 18-24 hr* No* Support* No* 

 SEB 0.03* 1 1 3-12 hr No Support* No 

Viruses 

 VEE ? ? Low* 2-6* Low* Support* IND* 

 Ebola ? ? 50-90* 4-21* Moderate* Support* No* 

 Smallpox 0.1 0.5 15-40 7-17 Yes Support* Yes 

* ECt50 - Exposure Concentration Time 50%; Vacc. – Vaccine; SEB-Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B; 

VEE - Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis; IND – Investigational New Drug 

Source: Brian G. Chow, et. al., Air Force Operations in a Chemical and Biological Environment, 

RAND, DB-189/1-AF. 1998, 29. Values with a “*” come from USAMRIID, Medical Management of 

Biological Casualties Handbook, February 2001, 64 and Appendices C, D, and I. The vaccine for plague 

“**” (actually for bubonic as opposed to pneumonic plague) is no longer being produced per Thomas V. 

Inglesby, et. al., “Plague as a Biological Weapon,” JAMA, May 3, 2000, 2285.11

The impact of the different potency and decay rate values is illustrated in Figure 

1, based on a series of biological weapons exposure curves produced by the Hazard 

Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC) model for a one-kilogram BW agent 

release of one-kilometer width. The model also assumes a temperature inversion and 

a wind speed of approximately 10 mph. Even in daylight (8:00 a.m.), the model 

 

11 This table is a modification of the unclassified table at: Brian G. Chow, et. al., Air Force Operations in a Chemical 

and Biological Environment, RAND, DB-189/1-AF. 1998, 29. On-line. Internet, 9 September 2002. Available from 

http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB189.1/DB189.1.pdf/DB189.1.sec2.pdf. Values with a “*” come from 

USAMRIID, Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook, February 2001, 64 and Appendices C, D, and 

I. The vaccine for plague “**” (actually for bubonic as opposed to pneumonic plague) is no longer being produced 

per Thomas V. Inglesby, et. al., “Plague as a Biological Weapon,” JAMA, May 3, 2000, 2285. 
Appendix A-7 

shows that the concentration of viable anthrax stays above the median infective dose 

for an hour or so after the release (reflecting its relative resistance to UV 

degradation). This is enough time to cover most fixed military targets as long as 

there is a temperature inversion, the wind was properly forecast, and the original 

release was sufficiently wide. At night (8:00 p.m.), the anthrax concentration stays 

above the median infective dose for several hours, sufficient to cover large military 

assembly areas with a favorable breeze. In contrast, the greater potency (determined 

by the reduced number of microorganisms required to induce infection) of tularemia 

starts with far higher infective dose levels, but the infective dose declines much more 

rapidly because of the decay rate of tularemia in air. Still, the dosage for tularemia is 

well above the median infective dose for almost two hours, giving reasonable time to 

cover most fixed targets. Indeed, even modest amounts (a kilogram or so) of both 

anthrax and tularemia should carry well beyond an intended military target and could 

affect large civilian areas under ideal conditions. With anthrax, doses well less than 

the median infective dose may still cause some lethal exposures many hours after the 

release, well downwind of the target.12

Figure 1. Maximum Infective Dose Received at the Front of a 

BW Cloud traveling at approximately 10 mph.13

 

12 In the aftermath of the anthrax letters, the threshold dose required for some level of anthrax lethality was widely 

debated. A recent article indicated that even a few spores (about 0.0003 median lethal dose) might cause lethality 

in a small percent of those exposed, well below the 0.01 levels shown in this chart. See C.J. Peters and D.M. 

Hartley, “Anthrax Inhalation and Lethal Human Infection,” The Lancet, February 23, 2002, 710. 

13 Decreased dose over time is primarily due to degradation from ultraviolet light and dispersion of the agent in the 

air. This figure is based on a one kilogram released over a distance of one kilometer. Dr. Bruce Bennett employed a 

series of eight HPAC forecasts to estimate these curves; the results showed some variability for other factors, 

with these curves reflecting roughly median values. 

Hours After Release 

Maximum Infective Doses Received 

BW Agent – Release Times 

0.01

0.1

1

10

100

1000

10000

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14

Tularemia - 8:00 p.m.

Anthrax - 8:00 p.m.

Anthrax - 8:00 a.m.
Appendix A-8 

Antibiotics against bacterial weapons can often be effective, whether used for 

treatment14 or for post-exposure prophylaxis.15 Nevertheless, use of antibiotics 

could still lead to some debilitating side effects16 that could impact both civilian 

and military operations. While antibiotics fight bacteria, many toxins and viruses 

lack a direct means of treatment (as shown in Table 1), meaning that victims will 

be sick and many will be incapacitated for some period of time. 

The Soviets, recognizing the potential for antibiotics to defeat many biological 

agents, developed genetic variations of BW agents (such as plague, anthrax, and 

tularemia), that were resistant to various antibiotics. One of the Soviets’ former 

leading bio-weaponeers stated: 

“There was a task force to develop a new strain of weapon with a 

resistance to ten antibiotics. These antibiotics were first released in 

the United States and some European countries just to treat infections. 

In 1989 it was very difficult to have strains of plague resistant to 

antibiotics. But one of our facilities developed a new approach. They 

developed two different strains resistant to five antibiotics each. And 

they cultivated them together and they have a mutual relationship, one 

with another. That was about ten, twelve, fifteen years ago. 

Recently, Russian scientists have proclaimed success in developing a 

Bacillus anthracis strain resistant to most antibiotics.”17

III. Mitigating U.S./Allied Vulnerability Against Bio-Weapons 

The U.S. military has studied the BW threat and concluded that the military’s 

goal of full-dimensional protection, enshrined in Joint Vision 2020,

18 cannot be 

achieved against BW today (no 100% solution). Each element of a potential 

response to BW use is limited in its ability to resolve the threat. Therefore, no 

individual element can mitigate the BW threat. Yet, the “85% Quick Fix” could be 

 

14 For example, 6 of the 11 victims of inhalation anthrax from the 2001 anthrax letters survived based upon 

antibiotic treatment that started after the development of symptoms. Indeed, in all cases where antibiotic 

treatment was started during the initial phase of the illness (post-symptoms), the victims survived. See John A. 

Jernigan, et. al., “Bioterrorism-Related Inhalation Anthrax: The First Ten Cases Reported in the United States,” 

Emerging Infectious Diseases, November-December, 2001, 933-944. 

15 After potential anthrax exposure, antibiotic use (referred to as prophylaxis) can prevent the disease from 

developing. See Thomas V. Inglesby, et. al., “Anthrax as a Biological Weapon, 2002,” Journal of the 

American Medical Association, May 1, 2002, 2244-2248. 

16 See CDC, “Update: Adverse Events Associated with Anthrax Prophylaxis Among Postal Employees – New 

Jersey, New York City, and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Area, 2001,” Morbidity and Mortality 

Weekly Report, November 30, 2001, 1051-1054. 

17 Alibek Interview, Op. cit. 

18 Joint Vision 2020 is the vision document from the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. 
Appendix A-9 

realized if the following four areas are addressed: passive defense, intelligence and 

warning, consequence management, and active defense/offensive options. 

Passive Defense Quick Fixes 

Passive defenses seek to prevent the infection of people by a BW attack. 

Passive defenses include several elements: 

Vaccines - A vaccine is an antigen that is introduced into the body to stimulate 

the immune system to build defenses against that antigen. An effective vaccine 

will neutralize a specific virus, bacteria, toxin, or rickettsiae - the four categories of 

BW agents. In the future it is hoped one vaccine will be developed that boosts the 

immune system against all or many diseases. But for now, vaccines are diseasespecific. Relatively few vaccines are FDA approved for use against BW agents, 

and all of those, specifically the anthrax and smallpox vaccines, are controversial. 

Nevertheless, vaccines are one of the most effective ways to reduce BW 

vulnerability, especially against the most serious BW agents like anthrax and 

smallpox. This is probably the greatest payoff area for protecting military forces 

long term and DoD should fund this at much higher levels. 

Individual protective equipment (IPE) - includes various kinds of masks and 

suits; it keeps BW agents away from people and thereby prevents infection. The 

quandary with IPE is that its use reduces operational effectiveness, and in many 

weather conditions, it can only be used for a limited period of time (it causes heat 

casualties and other effects after a period of minutes to hours). The most 

devastating BW threats come from aerosol delivery; a commercial half mask 

respirator will significantly reduce biological agent inhalation providing protection 

factors of 50 to 500 or more against BW stimulants—a level of protection often 

adequate to prevent infection, without the operational degradation and heat burden 

of traditional chemical masks.19

Collective protection systems (CPS) - are facilities that provide a BW-free 

area by filtering incoming air. These are places where people can eat and sleep, 

change clothes, and perform other operations without being vulnerable to BW 

agents or having to wear the hot and cumbersome protective boots, gloves, masks 

and over garments. Many facilities could provide much protection from BW 

agents, albeit not 100% protection, with minimal upgrades as outlined later. 

Biological decontamination - includes solutions and delivery devices to 

neutralize BW agents in the air, ground, water, or on people or their clothing. 

 

19 “Protection Factor (PF) and Saturation Testing of Commercial Negative Pressure Half-Mask Respirators,” 

Edgewood Chemical & Biological Center (ECBC) Interim Technical Memorandum; Soldier and Biological 

Chemical Command (AMSSB-REN), Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, November 9, 2001. 
Appendix A-10 

Advances are being made technologically in this field and will help us move 

toward the 100% solution. 

Avoidance and Operations - With chemical weapons, rapid detection of an 

attack allows commanders to direct personnel to avoid exposure, for example by 

moving in-doors and turning off heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) 

systems that would otherwise draw the agent into the building. Because biological 

weapon detection is so slow, such procedures generally will not be implemented 

quickly enough after detection to help; indeed, by the time BW detection occurs, 

the air outside will likely be clear of contamination while the air inside buildings 

may be contaminated because of HVAC operations.20 Therefore, if the HVAC was 

shut off shortly after an attack the levels of BW agent might linger in a building 

long after the outside air has cleared. 

Dissimilarly, the sensitivity and rapid response of chemical detectors allows 

users to fairly quickly identify the area of contamination and mark it so that 

people can be directed to stay out. But with BW, most detectors, due to 

sensitivity and specificity shortfalls, may not identify some contaminated areas 

and may not be sufficiently sensitive to identify some potentially infectious 

dosages. As a result, an extremely conservative view is often taken whereby 

detection of any BW agent usually becomes the basis for complete isolation of 

that and surrounding areas; this will probably help people to avoid contamination 

but often restricts the use of more areas than necessary, while missing some areas 

that may be contaminated. 

One concept of military operations when potentially facing chemical or 

biological weapon threats is similar to the concept when facing nuclear threats: 

forces should disperse to operate at low density to reduce the damage that can be 

done by any given attack. Currently most concepts of operations are designed to 

build tent cities that force all the personnel in a small area. It is not clear, however, 

that military units are prepared to execute dispersion of personnel on a base. While 

this would be beneficial for a point release close to the base, this concept would not 

be as helpful for a line source release that would disperse BW agent over a large 

area. Nevertheless, an effort to disperse people on a base if there is a potential BW 

attack might lessen the likelihood of some individuals being exposed once an attack 

occurs. 

Operational procedures can also help when combined with knowledge of the 

limits of various biological weapons. Most biological agents degrade rapidly with 

 

20 “Once the outdoor concentration has diminished to safe levels (as determined by emergency response teams), 

evacuate the building and flush it with outdoor air. After the contaminated plume passes, the concentration of 

contamination will actually be higher inside the building than outside, because the building will tend to retain 

contamination that managed to enter” Phillip N Price, Michael D Sohn, Ashok J Gadgil, et.al., Protecting 

Buildings From a Biological or Chemical Attack: actions to take before or during a release., LBNL/PUB-5195. 

(Berkeley, California: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, January 10, 2003), 11. 
Appendix A-11 

ultraviolet (UV) light. For instance, Francisella tularensis dies at a rate of 50% 

every 20 minutes on a bright sunny day. There are only two biological agents that 

are generally considered “UV resistant” and those are Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) 

and Coxiella burnetii (Q Fever). Even though their degradation is refractory to UV 

light, they still decay at a rate of approximately or less than 0.1% per minute in 

sunlight.21 Based on this understanding, it is far more productive and, therefore, 

likely for an adversary who wants mass casualties to launch a BW/BT attack when 

there is no sunlight, since such an attack has a much greater potential for delivering 

higher concentrations of virulent organisms. 

Although biological agents can be delivered by several mechanisms, biological 

agents that are aerosolized would be dependent on the wind to move them. If it is a 

day with less than 3 mph of wind and an attacker is outside the fence of a military 

installation spraying a biological agent, the germ cloud will not move very far and 

probably will not pose a major threat to personnel on base. Conversely, if the wind 

is too strong, perhaps at speeds greater than 23 to 25 mph, the cloud of agent is 

thought to become so unstable and diffuse so rapidly that it is unlikely to deliver 

enough concentration to infect many individuals and cause a mass casualty event. 

Of course, distance from the point of dissemination is also important here. If an 

individual or group was very close to the release point, whether there was slow or 

fast wind speeds, concentrations may still be high enough to infect large numbers 

of people.22

In order for a biological weapons attack to be optimally successful, the wind 

needs to be blowing at certain velocities and no UV light should be present. 

Additionally, biological agents will not infect anyone unless they are close to the 

ground in the human breathing zone, 3 to 7 feet above the surface. This means a 

temperature inversion would be necessary to keep large concentrations of the BW 

agent close to the ground. Temperature inversions, where cold air overlays and 

pins warmer air against the ground, may occur at various times of the day but 

usually occur at dawn, dusk, or night. Also, certain seasons of the year are more 

likely to have temperature inversions than others, helping forecasters to predict 

their occurrence. Additionally, it may seem counterintuitive, but Bill Patrick, an 

expert in offensive biological warfare, has stated that light to moderate rain or snow 

will not appreciably affect the delivery of aerosolized BW agents. In other words, 

light to moderate rainstorms do not wash the skies clean of BW particles.23

 

21 Bill Patrick, Biological Warfare Consultant, “The United States Offensive Biological Program (1940-1972).” 

Presentation was at the USAF Counterproliferation Center, Maxwell AFB, on 19 Feb 1999 to an Air War 

College elective class. 

22 Bill Patrick, Biological Warfare Consultant, “Fundamentals of Biological Warfare.” Presentation was for the 

USAF Counterproliferation Center at USAMRIID, Ft Detrick, Maryland, on 13 Sept 2002 to an Air War 

College elective class. 

23 This can be understood by realizing that only a small portion of each cubic foot of air will have water passing 

through it during a light or moderate rain or snow. This allows most BW agents to escape being washed to the 

ground by the water particles passing through it. Bill Patrick, Biological Warfare Consultant, “The United States 
Appendix A-12 

Building Preparation Before the Attack - All buildings, including homes, 

where persons might be present during dawn, dusk or night should be inspected and 

made as airtight as possible. Simple efforts such as caulking, painting, taping, or 

sealing around doors or windows might greatly reduce the airflow through a 

building.24

Inexpensive small particle air filters are now available at hardware stores that 

can be installed in most existing air conditioning or heating units. This is not as 

good as creating positive pressure throughout a building to keep air flowing into it, 

nor does it provide as good a filtration as provided by a High Efficiency Particulate 

(HEPA) filter, but it is something that can be done now with minimal expense. 

Although there are many manufacturers of these types of filters, here are two 

examples of filters that can be purchased at local hardware stores. Web Products 

from Kansas City, Kansas has a filter called The Web Plus that is marketed as 

“trapping 91% of the pollen, dust, and dander sized particles from 0.245 to 85 

microns” and the fourteen by twenty inch version was priced at $8.40 per filter. 

3M Construction and Home Improvement Markets Division from St. Paul, 

Minnesota has a filter called Filtrete: Ultra Allergen filter that is marketed as “90% 

effective at capturing large allergens like mold spores and pet dander ... captures 

bacteria and particles that can carry viruses” and in calling their toll free number, 

one of the authors was told that it is “90% efficient at removing particles from 0.1 

to 10 microns.” The 3M filter was $15.97 per filter for the sixteen by twenty inch 

size. The idea of using these higher efficiency filters is to get a quick improvement 

in filtering BW/BT agents without requiring new blowers or other expensive, time 

consuming modifications to be made to existing ventilation systems. 

Since buildings with larger concentrations of people might elevate the risk of 

mass casualties if they became contaminated, some extra precautions might be 

reasonable for them. Buildings that would likely house over, perhaps, 50 people at 

dawn, dusk, or night could be equipped with counter-bactericidal UV lights in the 

ventilation systems. Rather than turning them on during higher Bio-Threatcon levels, 

it would probably be easiest to have them lit whenever the ventilation system is 

running. The lights would need to be arranged in ventilation ducts to provide 

maximum contact with BW agents. Although these may not affect Bacillus 

 

Offensive Biological Program (1940-1972).” Presentation was at the USAF Counterproliferation Center, Maxwell 

AFB, on 19 Feb 1999 to an Air War College elective class. 

24 Phillip N Price, Michael D Sohn, Ashok J Gadgil, et. al., Protecting Buildings From a Biological or 

Chemical Attack: actions to take before or during a release, LBNL/PUB-5195. (Berkeley, California: Lawrence 

Berkeley National Laboratory, January 10, 2003), page 30; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 

“Guidance for Protecting Building Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks, 

“ May 2002, 19; and on-line, Internet, 10 November 2002, available from http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/bldvent/ 

2002-139.html. 
Appendix A-13 

anthracis, Coxiella burnetii, or smallpox appreciably, the lights, if properly arranged, 

would likely have significant effect on many other bacterial agents. 

Stand-alone room filtering devices are now available as commercial off-theshelf items. These small freestanding units re-circulate the air in rooms through the 

unit’s filter thereby trapping particles. If biological agents get into the building, 

these devices might greatly reduce the level of concentrations that people would 

breathe. This would be effective as long as the filter captured particle sizes in the 1 

to 10 micron diameter range, the size that tends to lodge in the lungs of those 

exposed. A side benefit filters like this might offer is that if a BW attack did occur 

they could be sent to a diagnostic lab for confirmation of the particular agent that 

had been in the air. 

Intelligence and Warning 

The greatest problem in defending against BW attacks is the limited amount of 

intelligence and warning we will likely have. In contrast to chemical weapon 

attacks, where there are a multitude of detectors that can provide tactical warning of 

attacks, there are BW detectors at very few bases today (though the number of 

bases is expanding), and in general, they take too long to provide adequate attack 

warning. 

For example, the Portal Shield system deployed at a number of U.S. military 

bases takes roughly half an hour to process an air sample and determine that it 

potentially contains a BW threat. By that time, an aerosolized BW cloud has 

usually passed through a military base being attacked, exposing almost everyone 

before protection can be applied in response to warning. This type of warning is 

usually referred to as “detect to treat” rather than “detect to protect,” the preferred 

approach. Detect to treat allows the base to promptly begin treatment for BW 

exposure, which could significantly reduce or eliminate casualties in the case of 

most bacterial and some other biological weapons. 

A preferred solution for warning would involve rapid standoff detection: the 

ability to see BW agents in an approaching cloud and quickly identify them. If this 

can be achieved, then personnel would have time to don protective clothing or 

move into protected buildings before arrival of a BW cloud, and thereby, not be 

infected. Work is ongoing to develop such detectors, but they appear to be still 

several years away from production and deployment. 

In places where there are no BW detectors or as a back-up to BW detectors, 

discovery of a BW attack can be achieved by disease surveillance at hospitals and 

other medical facilities. Recognition of a BW attack may not happen until 

symptoms develop, which, according to the incubation periods in Table 1, will 

normally be days after the attack. Still, aggressive disease surveillance is an 
Appendix A-14 

important part of the “85% Quick Fix” and should receive major attention and 

resourcing at installations. 

However, when the initial detection of a BW attack has happened, it is then 

necessary to confirm that the suspected biological agent is indeed what it appears 

to be, and also to determine if it has been mixed with other biological agents 

(especially contagious ones) which have not yet been detected. This process is 

pursued through advanced medical laboratory capabilities. Once such a 

confirmation is accomplished, medical officers have a stronger basis for taking 

actions to treat for the identified BW agent. 

While the military has labs capable of such confirmation in a few locations 

overseas, it needs to deploy more labs and enhance the capabilities of these facilities 

(giving them the ability to identify more types of BW agents)—an important part of 

the “85% Quick Fix.” Although each year technology greatly improves the ability to 

detect and identify particular BW agents, appropriate resourcing with today’s 

technology would provide a large and immediate improvement. The ongoing cost 

will be that the Department of Defense will need to be willing to switch out old 

systems as new technologies for bio-detection are developed, much like it does as it 

continually updates its computer and software systems. 

Bio-Threatcon Levels - To reduce U.S. forces, Allied Forces, and civilian 

vulnerability to BW/BT attacks, military installations should develop and issue 

warnings of the daily Bio-Threat condition (Bio-Threatcon) level, reflecting the 

likelihood of a successful aerosol BW attack that could inflict massive numbers of 

casualties. Then decision guidelines can be established to help commanders make 

reasonable and logical force protection decisions. 

The Bio-Threatcon level would be determined by two pieces of information – 

the first, “BW/BT Intel Threat (BIT)” levels, is designed to help predict the 

likelihood of a BW attack. The intelligence officer at each installation could fuse at 

least four and perhaps more types of information to assign a BIT level: (1) the 

current overall force protection level (alpha, bravo, charlie, delta), (2) current 

intelligence assessments of the BW/BT capability of an adversary, (3) assessments 

of the predicted intent of the adversary, and (4) assessments of adversary 

movement of SOF or activity with other potential BW delivery systems. 

This data, some objective and some subjective, would be amalgamated to 

come up with a BIT level (ranging from 1 to 4). “One” would indicate that an 

adversary is very unlikely to use BW on the given military installation, whereas, 

“Four” would indicate a BW attack was very likely. Two and three would be 

interim ranges between one and four. 

The BIT level would be integrated with another variable, the “Bio-Attack 

Climatology Effectiveness” (BACE) level, which would be made up of 

meteorological factors such as wind speed, ultraviolet light levels, and the 

probability of a temperature inversion. A meteorological computer model could be 
Appendix A-15 

developed without great difficulty to integrate these three variables, as a minimum, 

giving current and projected BACE levels that would predict the likelihood of 

specific meteorological conditions for successfully delivering enough biological 

agents to cover an airfield or other military facility to cause mass causalities. Note, 

though, that depending upon the size of the target to be affected and other factors, a 

successful BW attack might still be carried out in conditions that are not 

climatologically ideal. 

The BACE levels would be assigned so that BACE-1 means the climatogical 

conditions are extremely adverse toward a successful biological attack, whereas a 

BACE-4 rating would indicate the existence of optimal climatic conditions for a 

successful enemy biological attack. 

For BIT level 2 and above (heightened likelihood of an attack), the BACE 

computer model should be run continuously. At these heightened threat levels the 

“Bio-Attack Climatology Effectiveness” levels should be available instantly to the 

Intelligence Officer and the Command Staff because BACE is meaningless unless 

it is combined with the “BW/BT Intelligence Threat” level. At the BIT level 1, 

“Bio-Attack Climatology Effectiveness” levels would only be calculated 

intermittently to indicate the conditions that would be climatologically ideal for a 

mass casualty attack using a BW agent. 

After the “BW/BT Intel Threat” (BIT) level and “Bio-Attack Climatology 

Effectiveness”(BACE) levels are determined, it would be easy for a commander to 

see where their axes intersect and determine an overall Bio-Threatcon level (BIT + 

BACE = Bio-Threatcon Level). This intersection would be assigned a designator 

of alpha, bravo, charlie, or delta. Similar to other threatcon levels that the military 

are accustomed to, the alpha is the lower threat level while the delta is the highest 

threat level. The model (Table 2) shows alpha where the threat is so low that a 

commander would not need to implement protection procedures. But a delta would 

mean the highest level of threat for a successful biological attack that might cause 

mass casualties has been achieved, and all personnel on the installation are at great 

risk. Obviously, bravo and charlie are in between areas where there is a heightened 

threat of exposure but are less likely than delta. 

A notification system for base personnel at military facilities also would need 

to be designed. Some options available are the installation “Giant Voice,” audio 

and visual alarms, individually carried beepers, and/or television broadcast 

warnings. Base personnel should exercise these notification procedures during 

dawn/dusk hours or the times a given base is most likely to be vulnerable. The 

entire base populace, even civilians and dependents, will need to become familiar 

with these procedures because any large number of people that become casualties 

would affect the mission regardless of who they are. 

Currently, most installation meteorologists, bioenvironmental engineers, 

epidemiologists and intelligence officers at the installation level do not have 
Appendix A-16 

adequate training in biological warfare issues. To properly manage the BioThreatcon levels and be a valuable consultant to the commander, these individuals 

would require scientific training dealing with aerodynamics of BW agents, 

signatures of BW facilities, etc. 

The idea of including a biological warfare threatcon level into the more well 

known “Force Protection Condition Level” (FPCON) is attractive to help simplify 

the number of indices a commander would have to keep track of to protect his 

forces, but it would undermine the awareness needed. Just as there is an 

“Information Threat Condition Level” (INFOCON) that is distinct from FPCON, 

Bio-Threatcon levels should also be distinct.25

Several unique aspects of BW/BT make it appropriate that the Bio-Threatcon 

level be separate from FPCON. Some examples of these unique aspects include: 

(1) silent weapons that can be delivered many miles from the base, (2) some 

adversaries are known to already possess BW/BT capability, (3) some adversaries 

are thought to be very unlikely to use BW/BT, (4) the intent of certain adversaries 

may be clearly toward civilian rather than military targets, (5) detection of an 

ongoing attack is not very likely because of the level of sophistication of today’s 

detection systems, or, (6) unlike conventional weapons, aerosol delivered 

biological weapons can be greatly affected by meteorology. 

 

25 There may be some who will complain that BIT, BACE, INFOCON, FPCON and the nation’s new homeland 

security threat levels are all a bit too much for commanders to remember. Yet, the high consequence of an 

effective BW/BT attack necessitate it receive a separate threat condition from the FPCON. By commingling it 

with the existing FPCON, this will reinforce in commander’s minds that BW/BT is like the chemical threat or 

other threats. Over time, this will ultimately diminish the commander’s understanding of this threat and hence, 

decrease the proper emphasis that should be placed against this potentially catastrophic and unique danger. 
Appendix A-17 

Table 2. Commander’s Decision Matrix to Avoid Mass BW/BT Casualties

Bio-Threatcon Levels26

BIT-4 Bravo Charlie Delta Delta

BIT-3 Alpha Bravo Charlie Charlie

BIT-2 Alpha Bravo Bravo Bravo

(BIT-4: Attack most likely) 

(BIT-1: Attack least likely) BIT-1 Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha

BACE-1 BACE-2 BACE-3 BACE-4 

(Low effectiveness) (High effectiveness) 

 

Bio-Attack Climatology Effectiveness(BACE)

(UV light, Wind Speed, 

Probability of Temperature Inversion)

BW/BT Intel Threat (BIT) level

(BIT level is derived from at least 

four components of information) 

1. FPCON level 

2. Capability of adversary 

3. Intent of adversary 

4. Adversary’s movement of 

BW/BT delivery systems

Below are some thoughts on how a commander could respond at the different 

Bio-Threatcon Levels: 

1. A (Alpha) - No precautions needed. 

2. B (Bravo) - 

• All outside personnel on duty must wear lightweight half mask27 respirators that cover nose and mouth, which can be purchased inexpensively 

using commercial off the shelf (COTS) technology. 

• All other personnel are encouraged to stay indoors or, if they must go 

outside, to wear the half mask respirator. 

 

26 The complex nature of command requires commanders to make assessment of risk and deal with those risks 

while completing the military mission. Dr. Jim Davis developed this table as one concept that could be used to 

help commanders make simple, yet critically important decisions. A table like this could be applied across the 

spectrum of all military installations. For instance, an installation in the continental U.S. would hopefully 

never reach a BIT-2 and would therefore never reach a Bio-Threatcon level of Bravo. Likewise, an installation 

located in South Korea might frequently be at BIT-2 necessitating its Bio-Threatcon level to change with as 

climatology (BACE) changes. 

27 Two inexpensive respirators were bought randomly from a local hardware to show the accessibility of 

protective gear. Mine Safety Appliances (MSA) Company had two respirators priced reasonably: Dust 

Respirator with odor filter for Harmful Dust ($4.93) and Dust Respirator with exhalation valve for Harmful 

Dust ($6.97). Both respirators were rated N95. According to a manufacturer representative this means the 

filters in these masks can filter 95% of the particles down to 0.3 microns. The main concern for human 

infectivity of BW/BT agents is the 1 to 10 micron range. 

Alpha = Minimal Threat Charlie = Partially Effective BW/BT atBio-Threatcon tack possible with elevated risk 

Levels: Bravo = Partially Effective BW/BT attack is 

possible Delta = Effective BW/BT attack is likely 
Appendix A-18 

• Outside personnel are educated to stand with their back to the wind as 

much as is possible when outside as long as it does not affect completion of the mission.28

• Building ventilation systems should be turned off unless special filters 

are installed. (Discussed in section titled “Building preparation before 

the attack.”) 

• Keep all windows and doors shut. 

• Assigned installation personnel should increase air-sampling procedures. 

• The medical staffs in hospitals/clinics are notified of the Bio-Threatcon 

level to give a heightened awareness of a biological threat and exhibit 

greater vigilance in disease surveillance. 

• Inside buildings and shelters, personnel must turn on room airflow filter 

units (Discussed in section titled “Building preparation before the attack.”) 

3. C (Charlie) - 

• All outside personnel on duty must wear lightweight half mask respirators that cover nose and mouth, which can be purchased inexpensively 

using commercial off the shelf (COTS) technology. 

• Only in an emergency situation should dependents or other personnel 

exit a building. In that case they should wear their half face respirator. 

• Outside personnel are educated to stand with their back to the wind as 

much as is possible when outside as long as it does not affect completion of the mission. 

• Building ventilation systems should be turned off unless special filters 

are installed. (Discussed in section titled “Building preparation before 

the attack.”) 

• Keep all windows and doors shut. 

• Assigned installation personnel would increase air-sampling procedures. 

• The medical staffs in hospitals/clinics are notified of the Bio-Threatcon 

level to give a heightened awareness of a biological threat and exhibit 

greater vigilance in disease surveillance. 

 

28 Bill Patrick related through personal anecdotal experience that by having his back to the wind with even 

crude respiratory protection reduced the concentration of deposited BW agent simulate around his face. Bill 

Patrick, Biological Warfare Consultant, “Fundamentals of Biological Warfare.” Presentation was for the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center at USAMRIID, Ft Detrick, Maryland, on 13 Sept 2002 to an Air War College 

elective class.
Appendix A-19 

• Inside buildings and shelters, personnel must turn on room airflow filter 

units (Discussed in section titled “Building preparation before the attack.”) 

• Personnel must have sleeves rolled down. 

• Upon detection of BW agents in the area, prophylaxis must begin immediately. 

4. D (Delta)- 

• All outside personnel on duty should wear a full-face military protective 

mask and hood. 

• Only in an emergency situation should dependents or other personnel 

exit a building. In that case, they should wear their half face respirator. 

• Turn off ventilation units unless unbearable temperature demands they 

run; even then, let operate only if they have a special filter installed. 

(Discussed in section titled “Building preparation before the attack.”) 

• Keep all windows and doors shut. 

• Assigned installation personnel would increase air-sampling procedures. 

• The medical staffs in hospitals/clinics are notified of the Bio-Threatcon 

level to give a heightened awareness of a biological threat and exhibit 

greater vigilance in disease surveillance. 

• Inside buildings and shelters, personnel must turn on room airflow filter 

units (Discussed in section titled “Building preparation before the attack.”) 

• Personnel must have sleeves rolled down. 

• Upon detection of BW agents in the area, prophylaxis must begin immediately. 

Consequence Management Suggestions 

Once a BW attack has occurred, military efforts can be organized to manage 

the consequences of those attacks. A major aspect of consequence management 

involves medical treatment with antibiotics, serums, and other appropriate therapies 

designed to prevent, mitigate, and cure various diseases caused by BW agents. 

Sufficient medical care personnel will be required to handle casualties, and plans 

should be made for how to handle mass casualties. Likewise sufficient medications 

and supplies can be stockpiled in advance in specified locations. 

Greater care needs to be taken after a contagious biological weapons attack 

to prevent further spread of the disease. Quarantine procedures need to be put in 
Appendix A-20 

place to handle such situations, and police and other security personnel will need 

to be mobilized to enforce such quarantines. Unfortunately, it is often impossible 

to know whether a person is infected with a contagious disease until they show 

symptoms. Therefore, once it appears that a biological weapon has been used, it 

may be necessary to impose a local quarantine until medical authorities can explicitly rule out the possibility that contagious diseases were not included in the 

attack. 

Note that this may impair the most likely approach to handling mass casualties: moving casualties to other medical facilities. It will often be necessary to 

solve the mass casualty problem in the area of the initial outbreak until the incubation period has passed for potential contagious diseases (as long as a couple of 

weeks) or until other actions can be taken to prevent the disease in those not yet 

symptomatic. This approach will be a serious problem for the U.S. military, which 

normally plans to stabilize and then evacuate all casualties. Instead, they may be 

forced to bring in medical care personnel, supplies, and equipment, and thereby potentially disrupt the force flow into a combat region. By resolving these quarantine, 

manpower, and supply issues in advance, the “85% Quick Fix” will help enhance 

protection immediately at other locations. 

It may also be necessary to impose some travel restrictions after a biological 

warfare attack, even when it was clearly not contagious. For example, if a military 

service member were exposed in Country A, but was transported to Country B and 

then developed symptoms there, the military may not be able to prove whether this 

person was exposed in Country A or in Country B, potentially causing hysteria to 

spread to Country B unnecessarily. All travel should likely be restricted from the 

area where a BW attack occurred until enough time has passed to definitively diagnose the disease as non-contagious. Note that whether quarantine or travel restrictions are imposed, these will likely disrupt noncombatant evacuation and even 

conventional casualty evacuation from the area attacked. 

With BW attacks, it will not be uncommon for psychological reactions to occur in greater numbers than actual BW/BT casualties. Masses of people, including many with little chance of having been in the infected area, will insist upon 

receiving medical treatment, potentially exhausting medical supplies in that area. 

Some will even develop psychosomatic symptoms, making them difficult to differentiate from actual casualties until laboratory work can be accomplished (and 

thus heightening the laboratory workload.) Many will also try to flee the area of 

infection, potentially seeking to break quarantine or travel restrictions. 

Every effort needs to be made to prevent and then later treat psychological 

reactions. Efforts to understand the “panic phenomena” and the “worried well” in 

a BW event should be a priority but often remain under-funded. Aggressive efforts in planning and executing public relations and public information before an 

attack will probably be one of the commander’s most valuable investments to en-
Appendix A-21 

sure mission completion and prevent chaos. This will usually be best done with 

an active public information campaign to explain to people what has happened 

and what they should do about it. The public information effort can be vastly 

aided if authorities can accurately determine the time and area of the attack, 

thereby excluding many people from fear. But the capabilities to do so today are 

inadequate, and efforts to make such projections may only undermine the effectiveness of the public information as mistakes are made. 

Every military facility should have public information packages for various 

BW agents and various scenarios detailing the types of information that should be 

released to the public or military forces and when they should be released. The Israeli Home Front Command has had hands on experience with many threats to their 

population over the last decade. As a result, they have a comprehensive system of 

communicating with the entire country through television, radio, faxes to key personnel, etc. Additionally, they have prepared thousands of information messages 

ready to be disseminated depending on the type of event. Their appreciation for 

minimizing panic and minimizing the numbers of “worried well” has helped them 

to come up with these valuable mitigation procedures.29

Active Defense and Offensive Options 

Some BW threats may be best countered using active defenses or offensive options. Active defenses seek to intercept and destroy the means of WMD delivery 

before they reach the target area. U.S. and allied forces are normally very effective 

in intercepting opposing aircraft threats, though they would likely be less effective 

at intercepting ballistic and cruise missiles or terrorists/special forces. Since SOFdelivered BW is perhaps the largest BW threat, active defenses need to be augmented in the form of a more robust security system that is capable of patrolling 

and monitoring upwind of an installation. 

Another way to defeat biological weapons use is to destroy BW through attack 

operations (counterforce) before the BW can be used. To do so, one must be able 

to locate the biological weapons storage and production sites and have the proper 

agent defeat type munitions available to destroy the BW in these sites. As noted 

earlier, it is difficult at best to locate these sites using current methods. These actions need to be taken before the adversary can disperse its BW agents. 

Perhaps one of the strongest defenses against biological weapons use is the 

ability to inflict unacceptable levels of damage on countries that use such weapons. 

 

29 Col Gilad Shenhar, Head of Doctrine & Development Dept., Israeli Defense Force Home Front Command, 

“Home Front Command Overview with Emphasis on Chemical and Biological Warfare Issues. “ Presentation 

was given at Home Front Command Headquarters, Israel on 30 Oct 2002 to a delegation of USAF officers (one 

of the authors was part of the delegation) supporting the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Bilateral 

Counterproliferation Working Group. 
Appendix A-22 

Such a retaliatory capability may deter BW attacks if the U.S. leadership possesses 

both the tools and the will to strike back. Nevertheless, even if he fears capture, a 

terrorist may not be deterred by retaliatory threats because the terrorist may lack a 

home location or some other valued item that he would not want damaged by retaliation. 

IV. Conclusions 

The quest for the “perfect” long-term protection against biological warfare or 

terrorist attacks must not become the enemy of the “good” solution today. Partial 

measures can provide significant levels of protection against biological threats at 

U.S. and allied military bases and facilities. 

First, a new Bio-Threat condition alerting system needs to be created, and personnel need to be trained in its use. 

Second, each military base must make upgrades to its facilities and acquire 

commercial off-the-shelf technologies to provide protection to building occupants. 

Third, inexpensive masks must be purchased and personnel, including civilians 

and dependents, should be trained in their use. 

In addition, we must deploy biological agent detectors more broadly, enhance 

disease surveillance systems, enhance stocks of medical supplies needed to treat 

casualties of biological attacks, design realistic plans to handle mass bio-casualties, 

develop procedures for quarantine and travel restrictions, and prepare to manage the 

psychological effects that are expected in the wake of biological weapons attacks. 

These are some of the effective quick fixes available to United States now to 

counter mass casualty bio-events. We need to bolster protection today via the 

“85% Quick Fix” while working on longer-term, more perfect countermeasures to 

protect against emerging biological warfare and terrorist threats. 
Appendix B-1 

Appendix B: List of Workshop Attendees 

Col Michael Ainscough 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

325 Chennault Circle 

Maxwell AFB AL 36112 

334-953-4849 

michael.ainscough@maxwell.af.mil 

Dr. Bruce Bennett

RAND 

Research Leader, Strategy, Force Planning 

and Counterproliferation 

RAND Corp. 

1700 Main Street, PO Box 2138 

Santa Monica CA 90407-2138 

310-393-0411 x6671 

bruce_bennett@rand.org 

Dr. Salvatore Bosco

Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

OSD 

8725 John J. Kingman Road, Stop 6201 

Fort Belvoir VA 22060-6201 

703-325-8136 

sal.bosco@dtra.mil 

Col John Bowley

College for Enlisted PME 

550 McDonald Street 

Maxwell AFB AL 36114-3107 

334-416-1470 

john.bowley@maxwell.af.mil 

Mr. Walt Busbee

Computer Sciences Corporation 

6101 Stevenson Avenue 

Alexandria VA 22304 

703-461-2011 

wbusbee@csc.com 

Dr. Steve Channel

AFRL/HEPC 

APGEA MD 

Dir. Air Force CBD Tech Pgms. 

410-436-8872, DSN 584-8872 

stephen.channel@apgea.army.mil 

Mr. Paul Clark 

AFMSA/SGPF 

110 Luke Ave, Suite 400 

Bolling AFB, DC 20032 

Commercial: 202-767-5589 

DSN: 297-5589 

PaulS.Clark@pentagon.af.mil 

Dr. Thomas ‘Leo’ Cropper 

Battelle 

4100 Piedras Drive East, Suite 185 

San Antonio TX 78228-1425 

210-738-8771 

croppert@battelle.org 

t.cropper@earthlink.net 

Col (ret) Jim Davis

Battelle 

Senior Program Manager 

7762 Wildcreek Trail SE 

Huntsville AL 35802 

256-656-7544 

davisja@battelle.org 

Ms. Renae Ditmer

HQ USAF/ILEXR 

1235 S. Clark Street, Suite 1000 

Arlington VA 22202 

703-604-5244 

renae.ditmer@pentagon.af.mil 
Appendix B-2 

Ms. Anne Dixon

SAIC 

4301 N. Fairfax Drive, Suite 210 

Arlington VA 22203 

703-963-8227 

anne.m.dixon@saic.com 

Mr. Dick Estes

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

110 Walton Heath 

Williamsburg VA 23188 

757-253-1646 

estesconsulting@cox.net 

Col Glenn Goddard

PACAF Command BEE 

25 E. Street, Suite D1 

Hickam AFB HI 

DSN 315-448-3426 

glenn.goddard@hickam.af.mil 

Mr. Phillip Gardner

SAIC 

1235 S. Clark Street, Suite 610 

Arlington VA 22202 

703-415-7271 

phillip.d.gardner@saic.com 

Lt Col Donna Hudson

HQ USAF/XOS 

1480 Pentagon 

Washington DC 

703-692-0371 

donna.hudson@pentagon.af.mil 

Richard Gullickson

Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

DTRA 

8725 John J. Kingman Road MS 6201 

Ft. Belvoir VA 22060-6201 

703-767-4974 

richard.gullickson@dtra.mil 

Jerry Jensen

NWCA Hazard Asst Team 

4035 Col. Glenn Hwy 

Beavercreek OH 45431 

937-431-4324 

jerry.g.jensen@saic.com 

CDR Daizo Kobayashi

Homeland Defense Coordinator 

HQ U.S. Marine Corps 

Medical Officer of the Marine Corps 

2 Navy Annex, Room 1116 

Washington D.C. 20380-1775 

703-614-4477 

kobayashiD@hqmc.usmc.mil 

Mr. Randall Larsen

HLA 

CEO Homeland Security Associates 

Homeland Security Associates 

3839 Eisenhower Avenue 

Alexandria VA 22304 

703-405-4555 

randall.larsen@hlsassociates.com 

Dr. Peter Lavoy

Naval Post Graduate School 

Monterey CA 95125 

831-656-3167 

plavoy@aol.com 

Dr. Ross LeClaire 

Battelle, Medical Research and Evaluation Facility 

505 King Avenue 

Columbus OH 43201 

614-424-5525 

LeClaireR@battelle.org 

Russ Lewey

SAIC 

1235 S. Clark Street, Suite 610 

Arlington VA 22202 

703-415-7266 

russell.v.lewey@saic.com 
Appendix B-3 

Dr. Kent Lohman

454 Life Sciences 

20 Commercial Street 

Branford CT 06405 

203-627-8125 

klohman@454.com 

Al Mauroni

Senior Policy Analyst 

Innovative Emergency Management 

201 12th Street South, Suite 604, 

West Tower 

Arlington VA 22202 

703-414-8194 

al.mauroni@ieminc.com 

MSgt Henry Mayfield

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

325 Chennault Circle 

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427 

334-953-7596 

henry.mayfield@maxwell.af.mil 

Dutch Miller

SAIC 

1235 S. Clark Street, Suite 610 

Arlington VA 22202 

703-415-7276 

thomas.d.miller@saic.com 

Mr. Jim Miller

Hicks and Associates 

Senior Vice President 

Center for Adaptive Strategies and 

Threats 

4301 N. Fiarfax Dr., Suite 210 

Arlington VA 22203 

703-516-3308 

millerjrj@saic.com 

Col Donald Minner

Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

Advanced Systems and Concepts Office 

DTRA/CB 

8725 John J. Kingman Road MS 6201 

Ft. Belvoir VA 22060-6201 

703-767-5870 

donald.minner@dtra.mil 

Mr. Paul Mundt

J5-C, USCENTCOM 

7655 Nottinghill Sky Drive 

Apollo Beach FL 33572 

313-827-5971 

mundtpd@centcom.mil 

Maj James Poel 

AFMSA/SGPF 

110 Luke Avenue, Suite 400 

Bolling AFB DC 20032 

James.poel@pentagon.af.mil 

202-767-0771 

Maj Tasha Pravecek

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

325 Chennault Circle 

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427 

334-953-6474 

tasha.pravecek@maxwell.af.mil 

Mr. Eric Stephens

311 Human Systems Wing 

Deputy Director 

311th Human Systems Wing 

2510 Kennedy Circle, Suite 116 

Brooks City-Base TX 78235-5116 

210-536-6080 

eric.stephens@brooks.af.mil 
Appendix B-4 

Dr. Robert Sherwood

IIT Research Institute 

10 West 35th Street 

Chicago IL 60616 

312-567-4845 

rsherwood@iitri.org 

Dr. David Stockwell

Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

Chemical/Biological Defense Directorate 

6801 Telegraph Road 

Alexandria VA 22310-3398 

703-325-8156 

david.stockwell@dtra.mil 

Mr. Walt Studdard

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

23 Belmont Road 

Anniston AL 36207 

256-236-6156 

everwalt56@aol.com 

Ms. Kathryn Szeliga

SAIC 

1235 S. Clark Street, Suite 610 

Arlington VA 22202 

703-415-3333 

kathryn.a.szeliga@saic.com 

CAPT Steven Temerlin

Chemical Biological Incident Response 

Force 

Building 901 

NSWC 

Indian Head MD 20640 

301-744-1025 

TemerlinSM@cbirf.usmc.mil 

Roy Williams

CB Defense 

1600 Highland Circle 

Guntersville AL 35976 

256-582-2996 

kwilli50@bellsouth.net 

Col Donald Thompson

National Defense University 

CTNSP 

Building 20 Suite 3 

Fort McNair 

Washington DC 20314 

202-685-2406 

thompsond1@ndu.edu 

Andrew M. Wilson

Bioquell 

10640 Main Street, Suite 200 

Fairfax VA 22030 

703 352 3400 

awilson@jgwgroup.com 

Mr. Curt Wilhide

Joint Program Executive Office 

703-681-1607 

Curt.wilhide@JPEOCBD.OSD.MIL 
Appendix C1-1 

Appendix C1: Workshop Initial Letter 

The USAF Counterproliferation Center (CPC) invites you to be an active participant in a one-day biological warfare (BW) workshop at the SAIC office (1235 

Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1211, Arlington, VA), entitled: “The 85% BW Solution Workshop – Phase I.” We have identified you as one of the top BW issue 

“thinkers” or subject matter experts in our nation. The goal of the workshop is to 

generate new ideas to address the vulnerability our military forces face today. 

First, I would like to provide one brief example to demonstrate my concerns. 

As Operation Iraqi Freedom grew near and an imminent chemical warfare and BW 

battle troubled each of us, I pondered what we would say to the American public if 

we lost 5, 10, 15, or maybe even 50,000 of our forces due to BW. More than a 

decade had passed since Desert Storm, yet our forces’ BW protection had only 

marginally improved. In Operation Iraqi Freedom our forces were more current on 

anthrax and smallpox vaccinations, but what about the many other BW possibilities—plague, Q-fever, glanders, Marburg virus, botulinum toxin? 

The USAF CPC “85% BW Solution Project” is sponsored by Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency, Chemical-Biological Directorate (DTRA/CB), and we appreciate their support to formally pursue a long overdue effort. The “85% BW Solution” 

recognizes that there are no “silver bullets” to solve 100% of the BW problem. 

There may be some immediate, partial solutions that we have not yet tapped, and 

we would like you to be part of brainstorming these novel ideas. 

At present, we plan on inviting 35 subject matter experts such as yourself for the 

workshop on October 20, 2004 (reference attached agenda). We will meet corporately for 45 minutes to explain the rules of engagement and objectives. The next 2 

1⁄2 hours will be spent in Defensive Biological Warfare Innovation Subgroups. Each 

subgroup will have approximately seven members, one of which will be the facilitator. A lunch will then be provided and all participants are encouraged to mingle and 

discuss their ideas. After lunch, the facilitator of each subgroup will give a 15 to 30 

minute presentation of their group’s recommendations. This will be an open discusUSAF Counterproliferation Center

AWC/CPC, 325 Chennault Circle

Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6427

Tel/ (334) 953-2103 Fax/ (334) 953-7530
Appendix C1-2 

sion forum. Around 4:00 p.m. the workshop will end, however new ideas generated 

by individuals can be communicated to the USAF CPC any time after the workshop. 

We are making an effort to have a very broad range of experts. However, in 

an attempt to keep the workshop manageable, only a few people could be invited to 

participate. Therefore, some of your recognized, world-class BW defense colleagues regrettably could not be invited. 

I hope you will seriously consider participation in this critical endeavor. My 

Assistant Project Director for this project is Major (Dr.) Tasha Pravecek. We must 

have you confirm your participation before 31 September by contacting her at: 

Major Tasha Pravecek: (334) 953-6474, DSN 493-6474 

e-mail: Tasha.Pravecek@maxwell.af.mil 

We hope that you can find time in your schedule to participate in this workshop. We look forward to seeing you! 

JIM A. DAVIS, Col, USAF, BSC 

DVM, DrPH, DACVPM, FADD 

Deputy Director, USAF Counterproliferation Center 

Project Manager, The 85% Solution Project 

Attachment: 

Agenda 
Appendix C1-3 

USAF Counterproliferation Center (CPC) Sponsors 

“THE 85% BW SOLUTION WORKSHOP – PHASE I” 

October 20, 2004 

Location: SAIC, 1235 Jefferson Davis Highway 

Suite 1211 

Arlington VA, 22202 

Project Director: Col (Dr) Jim Davis (334) 953-7530 

Jim.Davis@maxwell.af.mil 

Assistant Project Director: Maj (Dr) Tasha Pravecek (334) 953-6474 

Tasha.Pravecek@maxwell.af.mil 

Agenda

8:00 a.m. – 8:30 a.m. Registration and Refreshments 

8:30 a.m. – 09:15 a.m. ROE and Objectives 

Col Jim Davis

9:15 a.m. – 09:25 a.m. Break 

9:25 a.m. – 12:00 p.m. Defensive BW Innovation Subgroups Meet Separately 

12:00 p.m. – 12:50 p.m. Lunch 

1:00 p.m. – 3:45 p.m. Brief by Each Subgroup Facilitator - Open Discussions 

All Participants

3:45 p.m. – 4:00 p.m. Closing Remarks and Thoughts on the Future 

Col Jim Davis

Appendix C2-1 

Appendix C2: Workshop Second Letter 

4 October 2004 

We are pleased you have accepted our invitation to attend “The 85% BW Solution Project Workshop.” We know this will be a productive and exciting endeavor in 

generating quickly attainable ideas to address the vulnerability our military forces 

face today.

Our challenge to you is to come with at least two and maybe even four ideas 

of current off-the-shelf technology or processes that could be implemented now to 

provide partial protection against and/or recovery of a fixed-site base or facility from 

a BW attack. Improved recovery capability may not directly protect forces but may 

help provide a deterrent effect on would-be aggressors. Even if you do not have 

documentation or other proof your ideas will work, we still want to hear them. If you 

do have proof or other documentation in support of your ideas, please bring that to 

the workshop. 

There are probably a great number of new counter-BW technologies and new 

ways of doing things that could make us safer in the near term. The attached article, “Needed Now: The ‘85% Quick Fix’ in Bio-Defense” is enclosed with the purpose of stimulating your imagination and giving you just one example of a set of 

some quick-fixes to help protect personnel and operations, our airbases, ports and 

other facilities. The concepts in this article and the ideas you add in our forthcoming workshop are aimed at moving us forward toward at least a partial solution to 

the BW threat. 

As we detailed in the invitation letter, we plan on having 35 subject matter experts such as yourself for the workshop on October 20, 2004. We will meet corporately for 30-45 minutes to explain the rules of engagement and objectives. The 

next 2 1⁄2 hours will be spent in subgroups where we ask you to share your going-in 

ideas, brainstorm for others, and discuss the merits of each. Each subgroup will 

have seven to ten members, one of which will be the facilitator. The goal of each 

subgroup will be to come up with a prioritized list of new counter-BW innovations 

in any area you think is relevant, including but not limited to, medical surveillance, 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

AWC/CPC, 325 Chennault Circle

Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6427

Tel/ (334) 953-2103 Fax/ (334) 953-7530
Appendix C2-2 

medical treatment, protective masks and suits, contaminated remains, decontamination (personnel, equipment environmental), detection (stand-off, environmental, 

laboratory), building protection, and quarantine. These may be proposed in the 

form of new technologies, concepts of operation, or Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). We are particularly interested in your suggested innovations for 

improving our capabilities in passive defense and consequence management, but if 

you have ideas in other components of counterproliferation that you think we 

should hear, bring them. 

A lunch will be provided and all participants are encouraged to mingle and discuss their ideas. After lunch, the facilitator of each subgroup will give a 15 to 30 

minute presentation of their group’s recommendations. This will be followed by 

questions, answers and an open discussion forum to further stimulate new ideas and 

explore the validity of each group’s concepts. Although the workshop will end at 

4:00 p.m., additional new ideas generated by participants would be welcomed any 

time after the workshop. Please call or mail these to the USAF Counterproliferation Center. 

Attached to this e-mail is some logistical information. Due to the limited funding for this workshop, we are not able to provide funds for lodging or travel. However, we will provide light snacks at the breaks and lunch. There is no workshop fee. 

We have included a list of hotels in the local area. We ask that you secure your reservations individually. We have also included directions to Crystal Gateway I where 

SAIC is located (12th floor, 1235 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1211, Arlington, 

VA 22202). 

We will keep this workshop at an unclassified level, therefore no security 

clearance information is required. 

If you require any further information, please contact my Assistant Project Director for this project: 

Major Tasha Pravecek: (334) 953-6474, DSN 493-6474 

e-mail: Tasha.Pravecek@maxwell.af.mil 

We look forward to working with you and hearing your innovative solutions! 

JIM A. DAVIS, Col, USAF, BSC 

DVM, DrPH, DACVPM, FADD 

Deputy Director, USAF Counterproliferation Center 

Project Manager, The 85% Solution Project 

Jim.Davis@Maxwell.af.mil
Appendix D1-1 

Appendix D1: Workshop Slides: 

Overview of “The 85% Biological Weapons Solution Project” 

The 85% Biological 

Warfare Solution

Workshop

Col (Dr) Jim Davis

October 20, 2004

“The greatest threat 

before humanity today 

is the possibility of 

secret and sudden 

attack with chemical or 

biological or 

radiological or nuclear

weapons.”

President Bush

Fort McNair - National Defense University 

11 February 2004

Workshop Objective

Identify 85% Solutions

- Have Sense of Urgency – What 

happens today if an adversary 

initiates a BW attack ?

- Identify material and non-material

solutions to improve our military 

force’s protection now or in the 

near future against a BW attack

“85% Solution” in Bio-Defense

• What is the “85% Solution?”

• Why do we need it ? 

• What are some ideas

to create one ?

• What could help us develop an 

“85% Solution?”

• Today’s agenda, objectives, and ROE

“... the enemy intended spreading smallpox

among us .... I now must give some credit to it 

[and take] Every necessary precaution ....” 

• Mortality - naturally 16%, 

vaccination 0.33% 

(1 per 300 died)

• January 6, 1777 - Washington ordered vaccination of 

all forces in Colonial Army

George Washington dealing 

with the threat of BW

George Washington dealing 

with the threat of BW

What is the “85% Solution?” What is the “85% Solution?”

• Not the Long Term Solution

• The Best Solution for TODAY!

– Key is to fill the gap between the 

present & the long term solution

• Goal – Prevent 85% of casualties 

(85% is notional but the % is significant)

• Stimulate debate, innovation, ideas over 

new ways to protect forces
Appendix D1-2 

Why do we need an 

“85 % Solution?”

• The military must fight & win the nation’s wars

• There are NO SILVER BULLETS

– Current focus is new technologies with a 100% solution

– Some technologies are years from being fielded

– Some don’t live up to expectations when fielded

• We have just been lucky

– Aum Shinrikyo

– Desert Storm 

– Fall 2001 – Anthrax delivered by aerosol

• We probably will not know about 

the next attack unless it is successful

Bio Warfare Programs

German AntiAnimal Biological

Warfare Program: 

1915 - 1917

• Germany leader in 

medical & 

Veterinarian Science

• 1917 German 

saboteur infected 

4,500 mules w/ 

glanders in 

Mesopotamia

• German Agents 

disseminated 

glanders in the US 

with limited 

success 

Japanese Biological 

Warfare Program

& Unit 731, 1939-1945

• Experimented on 

Humans (Chinese & 

POWs)

• Used bubonic plague, 

typhoid, & other diseases

• Released plague 

infected animals caused 

1946-48 plague outbreaks

in Harbin area 30,000 

deaths

200,000 

Chinese 

were 

killed

America’s Biological 

Warfare Program

1940s - 1969

• Some Agents 

Developed

• Anthrax 

• Q-Fever

• Tularemia

• SEB Toxin

• Cuba Plan (Q Fever)

• Nixon Canx Program

Anthrax pilot plant used to 

produce billions of anthrax 

spores

South African 

Bio Program

Project Coast, 

1981-93

• Top secret program 

run by S.A. Military 

Health Service

• Collected & tested 

most USSR BW agents

• Plans for mass 

production, 

weaponization of BW 

agents.

•Collected pathogens 

“never seen before.”

Soviet Union’s Biological Warfare Program

•1980 - Russians - Smallpox, 

Ebola-like, Plague, and 

Anthrax in ICBMs targeting 

major cities

Ken Alibek

Agents 

Developed

for BW:

•Anthrax

•Tularemia

•Plague

•Cholera

•BOT

•VEE

•Smallpox

•Ebola

•Marburg

•Ricin

•Typhus

• Apply against strategic and operational targets 

(not tactical use)

• Apply in massive concentrations to: 

• Cause mass panic

• Disrupt vital (including military) activity

• Make it impossible to treat all exposed

• Cause difficulty in liquidating epidemic 

consequences

Why do we need an “85 % Solution?”

Countries 

have and 

will have 

BW 

Programs

NBC in the Middle East

Oman

1957

Israel Nuclear

Program

1948

Iraq

1917

Morocco

1920-30

Libya

1930

Kurdistan

1930

Ethiopia

1935-36

USSR -

Afghan

1982-84

Gaza

1917

Chad

1987

Israel/Palestine

1944

Yemen

1963-67

Iraq

1965

Iran/Iraq

1980-88

Sudan

1990

Jordan

1997

Kurds in

Iraq

1988

WestBank

2000

Israel

2002

Afghan

2002

WB-Lebannon

2002

London

Al Qaeda

2003

Desert 

Storm 

1991

Arab-Israeli

War 1948

Arab-Israeli

War 1956

Arab-Israeli

War 1967

Arab-Israeli

War 1973

Iraq attack on Bushehr

nuclear reactor 1984-8

Iran and Israel attack on 

Osirak nuclear reactor 1980-1

CBW “How to” Materials CBW “How to” Materials
Appendix D1-3 

Terrorists 

Ayman al-Zawahiri

Why do we need an “85 % Solution?”

Aum Shinrikyo

Chemical Programs

• CW - Sarin & VX 

(Australian Outback 

(Banjawarn Station) 

- Sheep Ranch 

1995 Tokyo Sarin

Nerve Agent 

Attack

Biological & Other Chemical Agent Incidents

Al Qaeda 

Experimentation With 

Chemicals: 2001-02 

One of the tapes 

obtained by CNN shows 

the killing of three dogs 

with poison gas. 

Al Qaida Plot’s to Set 

off a Chemical Bomb in 

Jordan - April 2004 

• 6 terror suspects captured

• Approx 20 tons of

chemicals, & explosives

• Attackers hoped to kill 

80,000 people & injure

160,000. 

• Based on current Technology

– ( both COTS and DoD technology)

• Based on current understanding the agent

– Climatology

– UV Degradation

– Infectivity

• Based on Doctrinal changes

What are some ideas to 

create an “85 % Solution?”

• Examples of COTS

–N95 mask

–Special building filters

–Stand alone room filters

–UV lights

Web Plus filter

3M FiltreteTM 

Ultra Allergen 

What are some ideas to 

create an “85 % Solution?”

85% Quick Fix Focused on: 

– Passive Defense

– Intelligence & Warning 

– Consequence management

– Active Defense & Offensive Options

– CONOPS

What are some ideas to 

create an “85 % Solution?”

• Passive Defense – Quick Fixes

– Vaccines

– IPE – N95, etc 

– CPS

– Biodecon

– Avoidance & Operations

– Building Preparations

What are some ideas to 

create an “85 % Solution?”
Appendix D1-4 

• Intelligence & Warning

– Detection Devices 

– Medical Surveillance

–Bio-Threatcon Levels

What are some ideas to 

create an “85 % Solution?”

• Consequence Management

– Plans & resources to handle mass casualties

– Quarantine/Policing issues worked out in 

advance

– Travel restrictions

– Psychological reactions 

(Panic phenomena)

– Public information - preplanned

What are some ideas to 

create an “85 % Solution?”

• Active Defense & Offensive Options

– Monitor upwind of installation

– Counterforce

– Clear communication of 

retaliatory capability

What are some ideas to 

create an “85 % Solution?”

• Why a Bio-Threatcon Level (BIOCON)?

– FPCON

– INFOCON

– High consequence vs. Low probability

• Unique aspects that dictate a BIOCON

– Silent weapons

– Can be delivered miles away 

– Some adversaries possess BW agents

– Some adversaries are unlikely to use

– Some adversaries focus on civilian targets 

– Detection of ongoing attack is unlikely

– Aerosol delivered agents affected by meteorology

What are some ideas to 

create an “85 % Solution?”

• Arguments against a Bio-Threatcon?

–To confusing on soldier to have another 

threatcon

–The BW threat is just too low

–A “big event” hasn’t happened 

(Do we need to wait for the “Pearl Harbor” 

Effect? – perhaps Korea?)

– Current protective measures would almost 

provide NO protection (don’t know when)

What are some ideas to 

create an “85 % Solution?”

• How could a Bio-Threatcon Program work?

– Merge two pieces of information

• Intelligence (best guess of likelihood 

of an attack)

• BW Agent Climatological Model

• What is the value of a Bio-Threatcon Level ?

– Commander’s Decision Matrix

to Avoid Mass BW/BT Casualties

What are some ideas to 

create an “85 % Solution?”
Appendix D1-5 

• Bio-Attack Intelligence Threat Level (BIT)

• Current overall Force Protection (FP Con)

• Current Intel on adversary capability

• Predicted intent of adversary

• Movement of SOF or other potential BW delivery 

systems

• Others

• Bio-Attack Climatology Effectiveness Level (BACE)

* UV Light * Wind Speed * Others

* Probability of Temperature Inversion

• BIT + BACE = Bio-Threatcon level

What are some ideas to create 

an “85 % Solution?”

Bio Threatcon Levels (2 parts)

Commander’s Decision Matrix

Bio-Threatcon Model

Commander’s Decision Matrix

Bio-Threatcon Model

Commander’s Decision Matrix

Bio-Threatcon Model

• Alpha – No response needed

• Bravo

– Outside personnel wear N95 respirators

– Dependants and non-essentials encouraged to stay 

indoors

– Turn off ventilation unless special filters installed

• Charlie

– Only in emergencies- Dependents and non-essentials 

leave building

– Security monitor upwind roads

• Delta 

– Outside personnel in military full-face respirator

– Only essential personnel allowed outside

Examples of Potential Action

What are some ideas to 

create an “85 % Solution?”

What could help us develop 

an “85% Quick Solution?”

• Clear definition of various BW agent characteristics

– Literature and Organizational research

– Defining quickest payback hard science research

– Research study on lesson learned in

• Old U.S. program

• Old Soviet program

• Old Japanese program

• New research and new programs

• Generation of new ideas and ways to possible quickly vet 

them to produce the best yields (workshops/reports?)

• Select current technologies for quick and inexpensive 

use with new doctrine

• Top down authority willing to implement 

recommendations
Appendix D1-6 

“We Cannot Afford to be 

THE UNREADY

Confronting 

THE UNTHINKABLE”

USAF CPC

An “85% Quick Fix” is better than 

waiting for the Silver Bullet

Workshop Objective

Identify 85% Solutions

- Have Sense of Urgency – What 

happens today if an adversary 

initiates a BW attack ?

- Identify material and non-material

solutions to improve our military 

force’s protection now or in the 

near future against a BW attack

Workshop Agenda

8:00 - 8:30 am Registration & Refreshments 

8:30 – 9:15 am ROE and Objectives Col Davis

9:15 – 9:25 am Break

9:25 am -12:00 pm Defensive BW Innovation

Subgroups Meet Separately

12:00 – 12:50 pm Lunch

1:00 – 3:45 pm Brief by Each Subgroup (Facilitator) 

Open Discussion (All Participants)

3:45 – 4:00 pm Closing Remarks and Thoughts on the 

Future (Col Jim Davis)

What Happens to IDEAS?

• Final report upon approval of DTRA/CB, will 

be forwarded to workshop participants and the

USAF CPC’s mailing list of approximately 400 

individuals – All COCOM, MAJCOMS, and 

Services

• Goal 1: Rapidly Implement viable ideas now for 

both war plans & homeland security

• Goal 2: Stimulate improved research by 

DoD, DHS, and HHS on BW Defense 
Appendix D2-1 

Appendix D2: Workshop Slides: 

Brief Summary and Closing Remarks 

The 85% Biological 

Warfare Solution

Workshop

Col (Dr) Jim Davis

October 20, 2004

What Happens to Your IDEAS?

• Final report upon approval of DTRA/CB, will 

be forwarded to workshop participants and the

USAF CPC’s mailing list of approximately 400 

individuals – All COCOM, MAJCOMS, Services

• Our hope is that these will stimulate research

by DoD, DHS, and HHS on your ideas 

• Our hope is that the most viable ideas will 

stimulate consideration for inclusion in TTPs, 

Conops, and war plans

What Happens to IDEAS?

• Final report upon approval of DTRA/CB, will 

be forwarded to workshop participants and the

USAF CPC’s mailing list of approximately 400 

individuals – All COCOM, MAJCOMS, and 

Services

• Goal 1: Rapidly Implement viable ideas now for 

both war plans & homeland security

• Goal 2: Stimulate improved research by 

DoD, DHS, and HHS on BW Defense 

Will there be a Phase II ?

• Propel research and/or implementation

of viable ideas by different organizations

• Possibly explore quick partial solutions 

to counter chemical, radiological, or IED 

threats 

• Readdress these BW ideas and look for 

new ones several months or a year from 

now

“We Cannot Afford to be 

THE UNREADY

Confronting 

THE UNTHINKABLE”

USAF CPC

Thanks for being a part of our nation’s 

“85% Solution” for the BW threat

Appendix E1-1 

Appendix E1: Group 1 Workshop Notes and Slides 

GROUP 1 NOTES 

Facilitator: Dr. Bruce Bennett 

Recorder: Mr. Walt Studdard 

FOCUS 

The group began by discussing 

where to focus, given we had limited 

time to arrive at recommendations for 

“The 85% Quick Fix in Biological Defense.” We had been directed to concentrate our efforts on protecting 

military forces (U.S. and coalition) and 

their ability to operate, survive, and be 

sustained in an operational environment. 

We were further directed to focus on a 

threat in the 2006 time frame—

considering changes that could be made 

in the short-term. 

The group noted that the best targets for biological weapons (BW) attacks are troop concentrations either at 

fixed facilities (like airfields or ports) or 

in the field, prior to operational employment. We therefore focused our 

discussion on protection of such facilities and deployments. While biological 

defense encompasses all levels (strategic 

to tactical) and many activities (e.g., national-level controls and sanctions, active and passive defense, counterforce, 

deterrence, and consequence management), because of time limitations the 

group chose to focus on defensive 

measures rather than offensive measures 

(like counterforce and retaliation). 

ASSUMPTIONS 

Technology Options 

Based on input from group members currently working in research and 

development (R&D), the group made 

the assumption that there are no substantial new material solutions on the 

horizon for 2006 or sooner. That is, 

some new equipment might be fielded 

at one or two places, but there is no 

major fielding of equipment planned 

that would affect large numbers of 

U.S. forces. 

While not expecting the fielding 

of substantial new technologies, the 

group argued strongly for the need to 

increase joint experimentation (like 

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs), including more 

limited user tests), and to make this 

process quicker. These efforts help 

field new technologies more rapidly, 

but they also educate military personnel on the nature of the threats they 

face and how to respond to them, assist in the development of non-material 

solutions, and help the military understand how to better use the technologies it already has available. In addition, we must provide a better, quicker 

way for civilian industry to bring good 
Appendix E1-2 

ideas/new technology to DoD science 

and technology personnel and decisionmakers (we recommend that the Joint 

Science and Technology (S&T) community address this issue). 

To better field new technologies, the 

group also argued that DoD needs to improve the BW-related testing infrastructure. It is too small and lacks many of 

the kinds of facilities necessary to test 

and support fielding new technologies. 

The group agreed that U.S., coalition, and host nation forces must be considered in determining solutions, since all 

could be targets or could suffer equally 

from the spread of contamination or infectious diseases. 

Threat 

The biological threat must consider 

three aspects: 

• An adversary’s capability to use biological weapons. 

• Adversary’s intent to use biological 

weapons. 

• Our own vulnerability to these weapons. 

The group decided to concentrate on 

our own vulnerability because we would 

normally know little about an adversary’s 

intent to use BW and often know little 

about his capabilities, as well. We also 

chose to focus on aerosol threats because 

the greatest vulnerability is from clandestine use of BW aerosols (e.g., use of a 

BW line source at Diego Garcia). We 

spent only a modest amount of time discussing food, water, and vectors as vehicles for delivery of BW agents (e.g., adversary uses contaminated host nation 

personnel as food servers for 

U.S./coalition forces or the adversary 

contaminates food stores). 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Training, Education, and 

Information 

DoD should train and educate all 

personnel (military, civilian, dependants) on biological threats and defense, 

including information at all levels of 

PME. The BW threat and responses 

should be discussed during Command 

information sessions to increase Command emphasis at all levels. Such action would increase individual and 

command awareness and prepare all to 

respond to BW use. Such actions would 

also reduce the negative psychological 

reactions that would occur with BW use. 

Military installations should prepare in advance public information 

packages on how to respond to various 

forms of BW. They should prepare to 

distribute them in the event of a BW 

attack, but be extremely careful about 

their release because of the psychological impact they could cause if BW is not 

being used. 

Achieving Warning and Situational 

Awareness 

The ultimate goal of BW defense 

is to get more rapid identification of an 

attack—improve situational awareness 

by providing information on imperfect 

cues that indicate the use of BW agents. 

We must also have a better, more inte-
Appendix E1-3 

grated method of providing information 

to the entire community—military, civilians, and dependants. Early detection 

and warning involves assessments of: 

• Threat 

• Indication 

• Warning 

• Detection 

• Identification 

Early Indication (e.g., people showing up at hospitals or quick, tentative 

identification from detectors) is critical to 

prompt response. People showing up 

with unexplained sicknesses at hospitals/clinics may well be the first indication of attack even at facilities with BW 

detectors because of the limitations with 

current detectors. Recognition that an 

attack occurred may not happen until 

symptoms develop, which may be days 

(or weeks) after the event. Therefore, 

proactive disease surveillance at hospital 

and other medical facilities is paramount 

to successful defense against a BW attack. In environments with BW threats, 

the rules for military personnel reporting 

illness need to be adjusted to require such 

reports promptly, allowing medical professionals to more rapidly determine that 

a BW attack has occurred.1

 Making 

warning more rapid will speed medical 

responses at the site(s) attacked, and al-

 

1

 The “922” concept was introduced in another group, 

and would apply equally to the military population. If 

all military personnel were required to report any 

illness to an automated telephone exchange, a 

relatively prompt assessment of BW is more likely. 

low protective actions to be taken at 

other sites. 

U.S. forces need to integrate their 

surveillance of indicators with civilian 

medical and environmental surveillance 

in surrounding areas. The civilians 

may well show symptoms first. 

Full warning of BW attack will not 

normally be achieved until one or more 

BW diseases are identified in the laboratory. The few overseas (in-theater) 

labs currently have limited capability to 

identify specific BW agents. Shipping 

samples to the U.S. is time-consuming 

and may not always be possible because of the risk of contamination at en 

route locations or the potential for the 

BW in the sample not to survive the 

trip. DoD should deploy more labs in 

the theaters with BW threats and give 

them the capability to identify more 

types of BW agents, with particular focus on BW agents that tend to perish in 

transit or pose a high threat in transit. 

The current BW detectors are limited in part by the assays being used. 

Significant efforts should go into improving those assays. 

DoD must adopt a systems approach to combine information from all 

sources (e.g., adversary capabilities and 

intent, friendly vulnerability, detectors, 

local nationals, medical surveillance 

etc). Strategic warning (theater level) 

is paramount. Warning conditions need 

to be developed to reflect varying levels of potential threat, and varying levels of actual BW use. Theaters need to 

think about warning from a theater, and 

not an individual base perspective. The 

first use of BW should cue substantial 
Appendix E1-4 

protection efforts at all other facilities in 

the theater. 

The systems approach to warning 

should also cue actions on imperfect information. For example, it may be appropriate to begin antibiotic prophylaxis 

on the suspicion of BW use (based on 

detector hits or clinical observations) 

rather than waiting for full laboratory 

confirmation. 

PROTECTION MEANS 

Preventive 

Vaccines are very effective in reducing vulnerability to adversary use of BW 

agents. The group agreed that DoD 

should increase funding for vaccines so 

that more personnel can be vaccinated. 

Even though vaccines are not available 

for all BW, DoD has taken an appropriate 

approach of focusing on vaccination 

against the most serious BW agents (like 

smallpox and anthrax), seeking to blunt 

these serious threats and perhaps deter 

their use. 

Not all active duty personnel in DoD 

are eligible to receive smallpox vaccinations in peacetime. Some are not vaccinated because they are not assigned to 

theaters with a serious threat, and some 

are not vaccinated because of the potential for personal or family side effects 

(about 10 percent of personnel in theater, 

and closer to 20 percent in CONUS). 

Strategic warning conditions should be 

established for vaccinating these personnel, a plan established for rapidly vaccinating personnel, and adequate stocks of 

vaccine maintained at all DoD facilities 

to cover them. 

Plans should also be made for vaccinating dependents, essential civilians, 

and key host nation and coalition personnel at appropriate levels of strategic 

warning. These plans should include 

the personnel and stocks adequate to 

perform the vaccination function. DoD 

should also develop the ability to 

promptly vaccinate a significant portion 

of host nation personnel, something 

that is important for both defensive and 

deterrence purposes. 

In this regard, rules also need to be 

developed for who can be vaccinated. 

For example, the anthrax vaccine is 

currently licensed only for people 18 to 

64. At what point in the warning process should it be used more broadly? 

Similarly, theater commanders are authorized to designate whom they would 

like to vaccinate among host nation 

personnel—they need to make these 

determinations so that their requirements can be resourced. 

Post-Exposure Prophylaxis 

Antibiotics have been approved by 

the FDA for post-exposure, presymptomatic use against certain bacterial BW. But the rules for what constitute “post-exposure” need to be 

developed. Absolute laboratory proof 

of BW use takes too long to develop, 

putting many more people in jeopardy. 

And often military commanders will 

not know what areas a BW cloud affected, which people have been exposed, or even whether an attack has 

occurred. Commanders need decision 

rules to cue action on post-exposure 

prophylaxis based upon imperfect in-
Appendix E1-5 

formation; DoD needs to develop these 

rules promptly. It also needs to determine who will receive antibiotics besides 

active duty personnel, and develop an 

“Other Than U.S. Forces Antibiotic Prophylaxis Policy” like to its similar vaccination policy. And DoD needs procedures for distributing these antibiotics, 

insuring their use, and monitoring and 

handling side effects. 

Because adversaries know the standard antibiotics the U.S. will use against 

specific BW agents, they may well engineer resistance in the BW agent strains 

they use against these antibiotics (not difficult scientifically). DoD needs to be 

prepared to promptly assess resistance 

(both in the theater laboratories and clinically), and have plans for adjusting antibiotic use. DoD needs to establish its 

antibiotic supply requirements based 

upon the diverse population it may have 

to cover, the duration of coverage required, the potential for re-supply, and 

the potential requirement to respond to 

antibiotic resistance. 

Operational Considerations 

The World Health Organization 

(WHO), Centers for Disease Control 

(CDC)/Agency for Toxic Substances and 

Disease Registry (ATSDR), and regional/coalition partners should be consulted in establishing policies for 

vaccination/post-exposure prophylaxis. 

In this regard, it may be impossible 

to perform a non-combatant evacuation 

operation (NEO) or other aspects of retrograde from a theater where BW is being used without vaccination and other 

forms of prophylaxis for those to be 

moved. DoD needs to establish policies for retrograde activities, coordinated with coalition partners, the WHO, 

and the U.S. interagency environment. 

It also needs to identify where the 

needed stocks of vaccine and antibiotics would come from. 

Individual and Collective Protection 

In an environment where BW use 

is occurring or expected, some forms of 

individual and collective protection are 

required. Unfortunately, BW use will 

normally not give tactical warning at 

the facility being attacked. Instead, individual and collective protection 

against BW use is likely a long-term, 

ongoing effort, potentially required 24 

hours per day for weeks or months. It 

is not possible to use standard chemical 

weapon-related individual protective 

equipment (IPE) continuously for a 

long period, though in practice if there 

is only a BW threat, only the mask and 

not the full suit will generally be required for protection. But even the use 

of just the M40 mask for most hours in 

the day over many days is impractical 

in most operating environments. 

Some have therefore turned to the 

medical community to examine how 

long-term protection is achieved in tuberculosis (TB) hospitals and comparable locations. Such medical facilities 

use a mixture of masks, depending 

upon the threat assessed for each person and the personal characteristics of 

the individual.2

 These discussions dis-

 

2

 See, for example, the CDC/NIOSH recommendations 

for TB hospitals at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/99-

143.html, or against Severe Acute Respiratory 
Appendix E1-6 

count the value of normal surgical masks, 

but identify the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 

approved N-95 and better respirators as 

viable means for preventing the spread of 

disease. 

Our group had considerable discussion on the use of N-95 or similar respirators and their associated protection 

factor (PF). Supporters of these respirators found them attractive because they 

could be worn for protracted periods with 

minimal operational degradation to personnel, because the respirators were inexpensive, and because they gave a reasonable level of protection (a PF of 10 or 

greater3

). Opponents of the respirators 

argued against their use because they believed the masks provided a lower PF 

(maybe only 4 or 5) and because the 

threat dosages from a primary release of 

BW would normally be much higher (requiring a PF more like 100) than the secondary dosages found in a medical setting. No consensus was achieved on this 

issue, except an agreement that more testing and evaluation of these respirators 

was needed. 

The group concluded that full collective protection is far too expensive for 

most buildings and applications. Collective protection should be provided only 

 

Syndrome (SARS) at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npptl/ 

topics/respirators/factsheets/respsars.html. 

3

 See, for example, “Protection Factor (PF) and 

Saturation Testing of Commercial Negative Pressure 

Half-Mask Respirators,” ECBC Interim Technical 

Memorandum, November 9, 2001. The N-95 

disposable respirators in these tests achieved a PF of 9 

in up to 92% of personnel/activity combinations, 

while N-100 disposable respirators achieved a PF of 

49 in 100% of tests and a PF of 999 in 92% of tests. 

for key facilities and operations. Deployable collective protection is necessary for critical activities such as Command and Control and medical treatment. In normal buildings, some level 

of collective protection can be achieved 

simply by using improved filters. 

Nomal buildings use filters with a 

Minimum Efficiency Reporting Value 

(MERV) of 6 to 8, but filters with a 

MERV of 11 can usually be substituted 

without changing the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system capabilities, making a big difference in removal of many BW agents. 

DoD should acquire a supply of improved filters for its buildings in threat 

areas, and have rules for when to 

switch to their use. 

If the value of respirators can be 

established, they offer an option that 

clearly ought to be employed based 

upon a cue from imperfect threat information. For example, if there is a 

threat of BW use in a theater and the 

theater determines that there is warning 

of war, that would be an appropriate 

time for respirators use because adversaries are likely to consider BW use 

before the traditionally defined D-Day 

(when personnel are not warned and 

insertion of attackers is easier). Similarly, such cues could be used to determine when to upgrade filters in normal 

buildings, or turn on collective protection in fully protected buildings. 

Other Protective Efforts 

For many years now the military 

has debated how to handle the remains 

of BW victims. DoD currently has no 
Appendix E1-7 

remains bag that will maintain a seal 

when transported by air (in a pressurized 

cabin), and thus removal of remains is 

dangerous. There appears to be an interim conclusion at TRANSCOM that 

remains will be interred locally during a 

conflict until the contamination can be 

addressed post-conflict. 

A part of the issue here is determining the requirements for a remains bag 

and the means of evacuating remains. If 

remains can be evacuated by ship, the 

current bags may be adequate, though 

they potentially raise a longer-term contamination risk wherever interred. More 

generally, the issue of whether to cremate 

such remains needs to be addressed as do 

other options for handling remains. If 

current or modified remains bags are determined to be an appropriate answer, a 

quantitative requirement must also be 

established. 

Some BW like anthrax pose a persistent contamination threat. Therefore, aircraft, ships, cargo, and personnel could 

spread BW. Current field decontaminants and techniques are resource intensive, not always effective, corrosive to 

most surfaces, and sometimes produce 

toxic by-products. DoD needs to establish criteria for BW decontamination and 

coordinate those criteria in the interagency environment and with WHO and 

U.S. coalition partners. It needs to improve its ability to achieve these standards.4

 

4

 Pulse corona discharge was mentioned as a possible 

technology to sterilize BW contaminated objects; 

however, a group member pointed out that this 

technology had been around for decades and has not 

yet been proven effective for operational use. 

Handling Mass Casualties 

The military medical community 

needs to determine how it would handle 

the mass casualties that would likely 

occur with BW use. Subjects that need 

to be addressed include: 

• To what extent will BW and other 

casualty care need to be performed 

in the theater, as opposed to the 

normal DoD medical assumption 

of stabilizing personnel in the theater and then evacuating them to the 

U.S. for specialty medical care? If 

BW casualties must be kept in the 

theater (the developing 

TRANSCOM perspective), how 

must the force flow into a theater 

changed to provide the needed 

medical care up front to handle BW 

and other medical cases? 

• How will DoD hospitals and clinics 

deal with medical overload? What 

other facilities might they use and 

how would they organize care? 

• Who must the military hospitals 

handle? Must they provide care 

relative to BW exposure for all U.S. 

citizens? For host nation citizens 

(at least the ruling personnel)? 

• Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) spread considerably 

in hospitals, reducing medical capacity. How will such disease 

spread be prevented in hospitals, 

especially if the first attacks may be 

associated with no warning?5

 

5

 For example, the triage function in front of the 

hospital entrance may need to send all potential 
Appendix E1-8 

One tool to use against BW is quarantine and the isolation of BW casualties. 

Commanders must have the capability to 

quickly quarantine all or part of a 

base/facility, even if they must make decisions on very limited information; movement to and from quarantined areas must 

be curtailed. Until a full assessment of 

disease at a facility can be completed 

(days to a week?), it will not be known 

whether only a single biological agent was 

used or whether a cocktail was used that 

might include contagious disease. Police 

and security personnel must be trained 

and equipped to handle quarantine operations and available when needed. Logistics forces may not be able to bring in 

supplies because of the quarantine or contamination. All facilities must have plans 

and procedures developed in advance, and 

should have sufficient stocks of food and 

other necessities to endure quarantine (3 

weeks or so). 

Operations 

Operational concepts must be developed for the gamut of military operations in a BW threat or contaminated 

environment. For example, would operations continue from an airfield that 

has been hit with BW, whether the operations are for combat or force deployment? The airlines supporting CRAF 

have been told that their aircraft will not 

be required to fly into hazardous circumstances (e.g., none are flying into 

Iraq today), so presumably they would 

have to be flown to a trans-load airfield 

 

patients with flu-like symptoms to a different facility 

to prevent or reduce the contamination in the hospital. 

and their passengers and cargo 

switched to military airlift for delivery 

to the theater. But where would transload be done and when do such procedures begin? Are they based upon a 

BW threat, or do they require BW use 

before implementation? Biological 

defense is not a separate entity to be 

addressed in isolation by medical/disaster preparedness staff; it must 

be an integral part of battlespace plans, 

operations, and training. 

One example of improved operations to deal with BW threats would be 

to package U.S. Army pre-positioned 

material on ships in unit sets, much as 

the U.S. Marines do. That would reduce the time required to move units 

through the port bottleneck where BW 

targeting is more likely. 

All key Aerial Ports of Debarkation (APODs) and Sea Ports of Debarkation (SPODs) in a theater with a BW 

threat should have an airfield/port BW 

defense opening package deployed to 

them. This package would include 

BW detection, defense, security, medical, and support personnel, establishing a basic level of BW protection. 

This package should be deployed to 

the airfield/port before significant 

force flow begins, seeking to protect 

that flow. 

The most difficult of operations 

will be retrograde. Because we do not 

have reliable BW detectors, we will 

not know which populations or equipment have been exposed to BW. Anyone being moved could be infected. If 

these personnel become sick en-route 

or on return to the United States, they 
Appendix E1-9 

could spread disease and also cause a 

loss of access for military movement. 

While this condition might prompt us 

not to move NEO or other non-essential 

personnel, even the pilots and crews of 

airlift aircraft could carry disease with 

them back to coalition countries or the 

United States. DoD needs to establish a 

containment program that will take nonessential personnel through a staged 

quarantine, and monitor essential personnel so that they are quarantined as 

soon as any potential symptoms develop. 

Deterrence and Dissuasion 

DoD has a strong preference to deter BW use, and even better to dissuade 

the development of BW threats. In general, deterrence is strengthened by a capability to deny the adversary effective 

use of BW. Thus, building BW defenses both protects U.S. forces and 

helps deter adversary use of BW in the 

first place. If the U.S. capability is 

developed promptly enough, the adversary may conclude that he has little 

to gain from even developing a BW 

threat in the first place (he has been 

dissuaded). But this leverage is most 

effectively achieved when the adversary is aware of U.S. defensive capabilities, but perhaps not aware of the 

details of (limitations in) these capabilities. Thus, DoD needs to develop a 

significant information operation 

against adversaries who pose BW 

threats, seeking to deter and dissuade 

them. This operation needs to be carefully crafted not to reveal details of 

U.S. vulnerabilities. 
Appendix E1-10 

Group 1 Workshop Slides

Group 1

Facilitator: Dr. Bruce Bennett 

Recorder: Mr. Walt Studdard

Members: Dr. Salvatore Bosco

Col John Bowley

Gen (ret) Walt Busbee

Mr. Phil Gardner

Mr. Jerry Jensen

Dr. Kent Lohman

Mr. Paul Mundt

Mr. Curt Wilhide

Group 1: Initial Comments

• Assumption: No major new material 

solutions on horizon for FY 2006 

– Still, emphasize joint experimentation 

(ACTDs) for new technology, more Limited 

User Tests

• Also good for education, nonmaterial solutions 

• Need to improve process for assimilating 

BW defense technologies

Group 1 Recommendations (1)

• Education

– At all levels; information on BW threat and responses

– Awareness, preparation to respond

– Will help reduce negative psychological reactions

• Situational Awareness

– Improve military/civilian interfaces around facilities

– Recognize limitations in detectors; improve assays

• Work threat indications 

– Strategic warning, think theater responses (not just 

individual bases)

– Take a systems approach to combine information

– Cue actions on imperfect information

– Don’t expect very timely warning (expect hours+)

Group 1 Recommendations (2)

• Protection means

– Strong preference for vaccination where possible

– Cue: More complete vaccination, vaccination of HN

• Need more vaccine supplies forward

– Cue: Antibiotic prophylaxis 

– Use masks as opposed to full MOPP on specific 

warning

– Use expedient masks for longer-term , uncertain 

threat

• Example: Another base has been hit

– Deployable collective protection

– Improved filters (MERV 7 to 11) in standard buildings

• Involve WHO, CDC, and regional/coalition 

partners in prophylaxis/vaccination policy

Group 1 Recommendations (3)

• Restriction of movement

– Movement from, to affected bases

– Retrograde (personnel and equipment)

• Prepare to manage mass casualties

• Need to establish requirements

– Human remains bags (also a policy issue)

– Decontamination

Group 1 Recommendations (4)

• Operational Concepts

– Using CRAF, VISA

– When, where to deploy forces

– Package Army prepositioned material as unit 

sets

– Port/airfield/base opening packages

• Other effects of these efforts

– Deterrence: Adversary thinks his leverage is 

lost

– Dissuasion: Adversary decides a threat not 

worth developing
Appendix E2-1 

Appendix E2: Group 2 Workshop Notes and Slides 

GROUP 2 NOTES 

Facilitator: Mr. Jim Miller 

Recorder: Col Michael Ainscough 

ASSUMPTIONS 

Group 2 bounded their discussion 

and recommendations according to the 

following criteria. Solutions needed to 

be currently possible or available within 

two years (by 2006). The technology 

must be immediately available. The primary focus was defensive protection of 

DoD and coalition personnel. 

The primary means of attack was 

considered to be aerosol distribution, 

however, food, water, and vector distribution were also considered. Attacks on 

military facilities and troop concentrations at deployed (in-theater) locations 

and also at continental U.S. (CONUS) 

locations were both considered to be atrisk in this assessment. 

Although biological weapons are often considered “strategic” in their effect, 

for the purposes of this discussion they 

were evaluated based upon attacks at the 

operational and tactical levels (individual 

military bases or troop concentrations). 

Interagency considerations were considered essential because solution sets are 

multi-factorial and may require Department of State, Department of Homeland 

Security, and other coordination. It was 

assumed that technology and equipment 

could be acquired by nonstandard acquisition means. Biological weapons (BW) 

defense is a complicated problem optimally approached with system(atic) 

analysis. 

“FOUR S” CONCEPT 

Group 2 decided to use the “Four 

S” construct to organize recommended 

solutions. The Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council (JROC) has approved the “Four S” concept for CBRN 

defense. “Four S” terms and general 

definitions are: 

• Sense–standoff detection, point detection, and reconnaissance and 

surveillance 

• Shape–hazard prediction, integrated 

sensors, and decision support systems 

• Shield–individual protection (medical and non-medical) and collective 

protection systems 

• Sustain–decontamination and longterm medical treatment 

Sense 

In this category, there were two 

primary recommendations. First, a 

system of near real-time high-fidelity 

medical surveillance system (for both 
Appendix E2-2 

military and local civilian populations) 

should be implemented. The newly published DoD Instruction on Medical Surveillance should be universally implemented as soon as possible. Epidemiologic principles and techniques need to 

be emphasized to use continuous population-based disease monitoring. The ideal 

is to diagnose biological exposures at the 

pre-symptomatic stage of infection. 

Rapid assay technology (e.g. polymerase 

chain reaction (PCR)) can determine exposure of personnel and contamination of 

environmental samples and inanimate 

objects. The technology currently exists 

to rapidly sequence bacteria and viruses 

from throat swabs. 

The second important recommendation was to deemphasize acquisition of 

new bio-detectors for the near term. Recently fielded bio-detection equipment 

has not performed as advertised. It has 

been larger, heavier, or required more 

maintenance than initially thought. Research and development of new biodetectors should definitely continue, but 

we should not be in such a hurry to purchase every new model until reliability 

and value are adequately proven. 

Shape 

There were four main Shape recommendations. First, Commanders need 

Decision Tools to deal with biological 

attacks. Basic decision tools would include 1) recommendations for baseline 

posture, 2) indicators of biological attack, 

3) questions that need to be asked about 

the extent and implications of an attack, 

and 4) appropriate actions. A basic set 

of decision tools could be further tailored 

to several force/base sizes and missions. Eventually, individual 

units/bases would have specific decision tools (possibly in decision-tree or 

checklist formats). A separate BioCON (Biological Threat Condition) 

assessment or a Bio-CON contribution 

to current FPCON (Force Protection 

Condition) should be considered in this 

context. 

The group made the assumption 

that demonstration of a capability has 

deterrent effect. If we can demonstrate that we have the capability to 

survive and operate after a biological 

attack, an adversary may assess that 

such an attack would not be useful or 

worth the risk. Therefore, a second 

recommendation was that biological 

incidents should be included and integrated in war games and exercises. 

Mission Essential Task Lists (METLs) 

and standards of performance should 

be established. Response to biological 

incidents should routinely be assessed 

in inspections. 

The 922 Concept should be evaluated for military application. The 922 

Concept is a civilian effort currently 

pending U.S. government funding. It 

would establish a national computer 

center and telephone triage system that 

collects real-time self-reported symptoms from civilians in a biological exposure area. Information could be 

requested and distributed on television 

stations. This epidemiologic data 

would then be used to make decisions 

about treatment and quarantine. 

The fourth “Shape” recommendation was to develop strategies for distri-
Appendix E2-3 

bution of information to the public (risk 

communication). Such communication 

plans should be tested before actual 

events. The strategy should include both 

general pre-incident information and also 

plans for incident management and how to 

communicate actions to the public in an 

incident area (both military and civilian). 

Shield 

There were five recommendations 

for individual and group protection 

(Shield). First, all active duty, guard and 

reserve members (Total Force) and critical other than U.S. forces (OTUSF) personnel should receive vaccination for anthrax and smallpox. This would include 

mission essential contractors and host 

nation support personnel. 

Second, Collective Protection Standards should be developed and implemented in three levels. Full Collective 

Protection should be required for Command and Control (C2) and other critical 

nodes. Expedient Collective Protection 

(hardening) should be used for important 

(but not critical) facilities. The remaining general population should “Shelterin-Place;” use best available procedures 

and equipment such as duct tape, masks, 

and other commonly accessible means. 

Third, Individual Protection Guidance should be used as an incremental 

solution to reduce secondary exposures 

and the impact of behavioral casualties. 

An example would be the use of surgical 

or N-95 masks post-exposure. (Note: 

The use of N-95 masks was controversial 

within the group. A compromise proposal was not to use them for general 

pre-exposure use, but for protection after 

an exposure at the affected site as well 

as other sites.) Use of such masks is 

not intended to be a universal solution, 

only an option. Concepts for the use of 

such masks – under what conditions to 

mask and unmask – would have to be 

worked out over time. There are “resourcing implications” to almost all of 

the other recommendations. At $2-$3 

per mask, the resource implications of 

this approach would be relatively small. 

Fourth, food and water vulnerability assessments are vital and should be 

conducted according to current DoD 

guidance. 

Finally, every key installation and 

unit should develop a Disease Containment Plan. DoD should develop a 

core outline of requirements. Plans 

should include details to implement 

quarantines (both voluntary and enforced) and how to conduct temperature monitoring (thermal scanning) of 

personnel. 

Sustain 

There were two recommendations 

in this category. Antibiotic prophylaxis 

is a high priority after select bacterial 

exposures. Stockpiles of antibiotics 

must be strategically pre-positioned, 

and the location of these supplies must 

be closely held information (classified?). Mission-essential and critical 

personnel should be ground-tested to 

rule out any anaphylactic reactions to 

these medications. 

Interim standards for operational 

decontamination should be developed. 

We need a quantitative (not qualitative) 

answer for the question “How clean is 
Appendix E2-4 

clean?” Because of the differences in 

effective doses of different biological 

agents, these standards need to be agent 

specific. 

THINKING “OUT-OF-THE-BOX” 

FOR AN 85% SOLUTION 

As a separate topic of discussion, 

Group 2 considered “out-of-the-box” solutions. These were possible solutions 

that either did not fit well in the previous 

four categories, would provide significant 

value if achieved or implemented, or may 

be outside the two-year window of availability. 

First, a breakthrough in nonspecific immune modulation would 

greatly enhance personal protection 

against a spectrum of biological agents. 

Dr. Ken Alibek has been researching 

possible ways to broadly boost the human immune system. There is some 

preliminary evidence that some vitamins 

and dietary supplements may mildly increase immunity. More research obviously needs to be done. 

Second, there needs to be a more 

rapid process to develop and obtain FDA 

approval for new vaccines. The current 

FDA process takes 5-15 years for new 

vaccine approval. Another issue is tort 

reform. Many U.S. pharmaceutical companies have stopped making vaccines 

because liability outweighed the profit 

margin. U.K. and Canadian laws prohibit frivolous lawsuits. Possible “Outside-the-box” solutions (all bureaucratic, 

not technological limitations) were offered. The DoD could guarantee purchase of selected vaccine production. 

The DoD could build a laboratory to 

produce needed “orphan” vaccines. 

The FDA could “fast-track” specific 

vaccines for military use (this “military 

specific approval” may imply “experimental” to military members). Congress could pass national tort reform to 

reduce vaccine liability. 

Finally, population-based noninvasive monitoring for biological exposures could be instituted. Two examples are thermal scanning (temperature monitoring of asymptomatic personnel) and badge-based biometrics. 

CLOSING THOUGHTS 

Many of the barriers to improving 

biological warfare defense are bureaucratic, not technological or economic. 

But we may have more ability to 

change bureaucratic limitations (policy, processes, education, and training) 

than technological solutions. 

An 85% solution for a biological 

warfare event at a forward deployed operational military base may be different 

from an 85% solution at a CONUS base 

and both of these are probably different 

than the 85% solution for a bioterrorism 

event on a civilian population. 

The 2001 anthrax letters did not 

result in a true mass casualty event. 

Senior leaders “still don’t get it.” 

They have not implemented procedures to deal with an actual mass casualty. How do we convince leadership 

that now is the time to act and to institutionalize biological preparedness and 

defense measures? 
Appendix E2-5 

Group 2 Workshop Slides 

Group 2

Facilitator: Mr. Jim Miller

Recorder: Col Michael Ainscough

Members: Dr. Steve Channel 

Col Glenn Goddard 

Mr. Randall Larsen 

Mr. Russ Lewey 

Mr. Al Mauroni

Mr. Dutch Miller 

Col Donald Thompson 

Mr. Andrew Wilson

85% Solution – WG Assumptions

• Near term (2006)

• Immediately available technology

• DoD/coalition personnel focus

• Aerosol, food/water, vectors

• In Theater or CONUS

– Operational/tactical (individual military bases)

• Interagency considerations essential

• Nonstandard acquisition

• System(atic) analysis

“Four S” Concept 

• JROC has approved the “four S” concept 

for CBRN defense

– Sense – standoff detection, point detection, 

and reconnaissance and surveillance

– Shape – hazard prediction, integrated 

sensors, and decision support systems

– Shield – individual protection (medical and 

nonmedical) and collective protection systems

– Sustain – decontamination and long-term 

medical treatment

Sense

• Near real-time high fidelity medical 

surveillance system (military and local civ

population)

– Implementation of DoDI on Med Surveillance

– Pre-symptomatic diagnosis 

– Rapid assay technology (eg. PCR) to 

determine exposure/contamination 

– Continuous population-based disease 

monitoring 

• Deemphasize acquisition of bio-detectors 

for the near term (but continue R&D)

Shape • Decision Tools for Commanders

– Baseline posture, indicators, questions to ask, actions

– Tailored to several force/base sizes and missions (eventually to

individual units/bases)

– Consider FPCON/Bio-CON in this context

• Wargames and Exercises

– Establish standards of performance

– Demonstration of capability has deterrent effect

– Inspections

• 922 Concept

• Public information strategies; pre-tested communication 

plans 

– Pre-incident

– Incident management

Shield

• Vaccination for anthrax and smallpox for 

Total Force and critical OTUSF

• Collective Protection Standards (3 levels)

– Full Collective Protection

• C2 and critical nodes

– Expedient Collective Protection (hardening) 

• Important (but not critical) facilities

– Shelter In Place 

• For general population
Appendix E2-6 

Shield (cont’d)

• Individual Protection Guidance (surgical/ 

N-95 masks post-exposure) 

– Incremental solution to reduce secondary 

exposures and the impact of behavioral 

casualties?

• Food and water vulnerability assessment

• Develop Disease Containment Plan for key 

installations/units (includes voluntary quarantine, 

personnel temperature monitoring

Sustain

• Preparation for antibiotic prophylaxis

– Preposition supplies

– Ground-tests for critical personnel

• Develop interim operational decon standards 

(“How clean is clean?”)

– Quantitative (not qualitative) 

– Agent specific

85% Solution – “Out-of–the-Box”

• Non-specific immune modulation (broadly 

boost immune system)

• More rapid development/approval process of 

new vaccines 

– DoD lab to develop vaccines

– Military specific approval - current FDA process takes 5-

15 years

• Population-based non-invasive monitoring for 

exposures (i.e., thermal scanning, badgebased biometrics)
Appendix E3-1 

Appendix E3: Group 3 Workshop Notes and Slides 

GROUP 3 NOTES 

Facilitator: Mr. Leo Cropper 

Recorder: Mr. Dick Estes 

THOUGHTS FROM DR. LEO 

CROPPER

As we pursue the immediate problem of countering biological weapons, 

we must have a sense of urgency. The 

Secretary of Defense has said that it is 

not a question of “if” but rather “when” 

these weapons will be used against us. 

Our hope is that any such use will occur 

on foreign soil, but that may be false optimism. 

When seeking solutions, we must be 

ever mindful that the perfect is the enemy 

of the good, making this workshop particularly appropriate. What exists today 

that is good enough to be pressed into 

service now, without waiting for the silver bullet that will solve all of our problems? Furthermore, while we are 

concentrating on military solutions in this 

workshop, the weapon we must counter 

may not come in the form of an artillery 

shell. The adversary may be seeking out 

an easier point of entry such as schools, 

child care centers, churches, ventilation 

systems of major buildings, or the food 

and water supply. An asymmetric attack 

against our overwhelming capabilities 

has already been accomplished, and we 

can expect more. After all, George 

Washington expected smallpox to be delivered on a contaminated blanket. 

DOTMLPF 

One of the guides for exploring 

the problem is the widely used 

“DOTMLPF” formula. Let’s briefly 

look at each element of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities before 

we mention some specific recommendations and ideas. 

Nuclear, biological, and chemical 

(NBC) is not necessarily a good way 

to approach doctrine nor is chemical, 

biological, radiological, and high-yield 

explosives (CBRNE). Each of the 

specific threats – nuclear, nuclear, biological, radiological, explosive, and 

chemical – present quite different challenges. The methods of countering 

them differ significantly, and the effects of each type of weapon are radically dissimilar. For those reasons, the 

doctrine for countering biological 

warfare should be de-linked from that 

of the others. [Although, it should be 

borne in mind that an adversary might 

use BW, CW, and RW agents in combination, requiring us to develop a 

doctrine that responds to combinations 

of such topic agents.] 

The most advanced doctrine that 

we have, along with the most developed concepts of operations, belong to 
Appendix E3-2 

chemical warfare. In addition, the services – particularly the Army – have 

many people trained in the field. But 

since currently we group weapons of 

mass destruction together, we tend to 

rely on those trained in chemical warfare 

to handle the others, particularly biowarfare – apparently because there seems to 

be some similarities. However, while 

some checklist procedures could apply 

coincidentally, the skills required to 

counter each threat couldn’t be more 

distinct. We may not have the proper 

organization to counter biowarfare. 

Similarly, the USAF tends to rely 

on civil engineer readiness people at the 

unit level to handle mass disasters, when 

their training may not be suited to the 

task. Frequently it takes a medical doctor, a biologist, or a bioenvironmental 

engineer to understand and cope with 

the nuances of a biological attack. 

These people are highly educated, are in 

short supply, and cannot be effectively 

turned-out in a few months at a tech 

school. 

Furthermore, a biological weapons 

(BW) attack requires reverse engineering of our protective public health 

measures – and understanding disease 

transmission routes is no small undertaking. To understand pathogenic BW 

agents requires a mix of scientific skills 

in virology, bacteriology, entomology, 

epidemiology, infection control, laboratory sciences, public health, and medicine at the college through postdoctorate levels. And to be able to differentiate an emerging novel biological 

agent like West Nile or Severe Acute 

Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) from an 

intentional covert attack requires sophistication. Academic knowledge is 

key to defending against BW agents; 

in biological warfare, the warriors are 

often the medical team and scientists. 

We should be looking for material solutions that can be applied right 

now. Some new technological fix may 

be on the shelf or being developed by 

an enterprising company that we can 

place in service in the near term to 

some appreciable gain. But as we look 

for these, we must remember that the 

same solutions may be available to our 

adversaries. 

Whatever the technological advances, whatever the developments in 

doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, if the leadership and the personnel who must face these threats are 

not fully informed and prepared, we 

are lost. The people in the field, and 

even at home, must understand what a 

biological attack can mean, and must 

be fully versed in countering such an 

attack, to include comprehending the 

element of panic among the military, 

dependents, and citizenry. 

Finally, we should fully explore 

easy and quick fixes that can be applied to existing facilities that would 

be of some incremental gain against a 

biological attack. These may be something as simple as a new kind of air 

filter or ways of making windows 

more airtight. And in the field, we 

may wish to single out some specific 

buildings to make more robust against 

an attack, similar to a bomb shelter. 

These “immune buildings” would receive the latest in ventilation systems, 
Appendix E3-3 

protective technology, and sensors, 

along with semi-annual vulnerability 

assessments by public health experts in 

conjunction with security forces and 

OSI. 

BOUNDING THE PROBLEM 

As the group tried to find the 

boundaries of the problem, there was a 

significant discussion of the goals of this 

exercise. The group quickly coalesced 

around the idea that in seeking shortterm and “good” solutions, attempting to 

address all threats at all levels would not 

be productive. Theaters differ from one 

another, and overseas locations differ 

from the continental U.S. We don’t 

know all of the agents that are out there, 

or even who the adversary may be in 

some cases. We should therefore plan 

against a range of capabilities, while 

singling out the most likely diseases that 

we could face. 

There are dangers in such an approach. Novel agents from molecular 

engineering of microbes could be a future threat, and other agents that are not 

now on the classic BW charts could and 

will emerge. If the United States focuses on anthrax, smallpox, and plague, 

the lethal agents most easily weaponizable, we could be missing the next big 

threat. On the other hand, if we sincerely seek the 85% solution, we should 

make every effort to be capable against 

known agents, at a minimum, as quickly 

as possible. 

This project was developed concurrently with the Air Force’s Biological 

Defense Task Force – which itself offers 

a perspective on getting something in 

the field now instead of waiting for the 

perfect solution. The Air Force has 

inbeing a well-developed, albeit controversial, Counter-Chemical Warfare 

CONOPS (C-CW CONOPS). In 

2002, leadership in the Air Force directed that that experts use the C-CW 

CONOPS. Through spiral development, the Air Force was to create 

guidelines to the field for commanders 

to use in a BW scenario; and to do so 

quickly. An invasion of Iraq was imminent at that time. We should take 

the existing C-CW CONOPS, see what 

applies to BW, brainstorm the rest and 

get a plan to the field, even if only partially developed. The point was then, 

and should be now, waiting until the 

next countermeasure is developed, or 

waiting until we know all of the possible agents and delivery means, will 

leave our forces with nothing as we 

seek the perfect solution. We can do 

better than that. 

SENSORS 

The group had a long and healthy 

discussion of BW sensors. While there 

are some available, and others that 

show promise, today there is no single 

sensor upon which we can rely to give 

us real-time warning of an attack.1

 To 

be sure, these sensors are part of the 

 

1

 BIDS can give confirmation of attack within 

30 minutes for up to ten BW agents, but this is 

a point detector and can give warning only if 

turned on, and the BW agent is present at the 

exact location of one of the relatively few deployed BIDS units. 
Appendix E3-4 

85% solution because we have them 

now, and they can be quite helpful – but 

almost always as confirmation that a disease is present rather than for initial detection. 

Key finding: Today’s 85% solution 

must not rely on the hope that the magic 

BW sensor is just around the corner. We 

absolutely must develop doctrine and 

procedures to deal with BW attacks using 

technology as we find it today. And the 

initial detection sensor most effective today is the HUMAN. 

The most likely sign of a covert BW 

attack is the an increased body temperature of those that have been infected, and 

those people will not present themselves 

to medical personnel until several days 

after the attack, since they may not know 

themselves that they have an elevated 

temperature early on. 

The triage at that point involves 

critical knowledge and expertise to distinguish the presence of an agent from an 

influenza outbreak, which most diseases 

resulting from a BW attack resemble in 

the initial stages. 

The next step is to determine if those 

infected have any commonality: same 

dorm, dining hall, building, or region of 

the area, for instance. 

And finally – a critical step – this information, which is essentially medical, 

must find its way into the operational 

chain of command so that commanders 

can make critical decisions. 

Therefore, the earlier BW warriors 

can discover a population with elevated 

temperatures or other indications, the better the chance of isolating those affected, 

containing the attack, and continuing to 

operate. 

Three courses of action may be 

available immediately. First, military 

populations can be vaccinated against 

the most likely diseases to lessen the 

likelihood of infection. Of course there 

are associated problems: Which diseases? What about emerging diseases? 

Do we have sufficient vaccine? Is the 

risk from the vaccine worth the gain? 

Do we require foreign nationals on a 

base to be vaccinated? If not, are we 

wasting our time vaccinating the military members? And what about other 

civilian populations that could spread a 

disease? Should we require them to be 

vaccinated – if it is even possible? 

Second, with controlled populations such as those that exist on a military base, we can conduct regular wellpatient health screening, which would 

include an examination for symptoms 

of incipient disease. Chief among 

those symptoms being screened for 

would be elevated temperature, catching a spike in temperatures before the 

general population starts to present. 

Obtaining DNA samples may be useful as well, and a means for breath 

analysis, useful in identifying disease, 

is nearing completion. A representative number of samples (i.e. blood, 

urine, throat swab) could be sent for 

polymerase chain reaction analysis 

against the standard panel of biowarfare agents each day. 

Third, it may be possible to carefully place thermal sensors in hightraffic areas such as dorms, dining 

halls, command posts, or exchanges, to 
Appendix E3-5 

assess body temperatures of the population that passes nearby – again giving an 

early warning of problems. False positives are likely from people that are engaged in strenuous activity such as 

manual labor or exercise, so there must 

be an accurate normal benchmark against 

which samplings are measured – to ensure a spike indeed has occurred. 

Every moment of advanced knowledge of the presence of pathogenic agents 

allows commanders more time to develop options to, first, contain the attack 

and spread of disease, and, second, continue the mission. And since bio-attacks 

are almost certain to cross the “fence 

line” of the base, communication is 

critical with local hospitals and community health officials as well. 

OPTIONS FOR THE COMMANDER 

As commanders at different levels 

assess what has happened to their forces 

as a result of a BW attack, the two imperatives may diverge quickly. An attack contained at a local base may be 

catastrophic for that locale to the point 

that the local commander’s only option 

is to try to contain the outbreak. At the 

same time, the task force or component 

commander may wish to remove that 

base from his operational plans and continue the fight without it. 

In another scenario, an attack that is 

discovered too late to be contained at a 

specific locality may become the focus 

for the combatant commander, or the entire nation if such an attack were to happen in the United States. Stopping the 

spread of disease then becomes the primary focus, and such measures as quarantines (which may become international) and mass vaccinations take on 

primacy over immediate combat. 

Immediate improvement may be 

possible in either scenario by engaging 

commanders and political leaders in 

rigorous table-top exercises, causing 

them to think through actions ahead of 

time in the luxurious environment of 

peacetime. Part of these exercises 

should include the element of panic almost certainly to be present as the worried well present themselves to medical 

personnel in an actual attack, or only 

slightly better – in an unsubstantiated 

attack that may be only a flu outbreak. 

Commanders need extensive training 

on options for controlling populations, 

gaining maximum efforts from forces 

that are predisposed to panic because of 

the developing situation, and assessing 

combat capability in the face of a BW 

attack. The commander may even need 

to know if he is authorized to use 

deadly force against friendlies or allies 

to enforce quarantine. A suggestion: 

exercise, exercise, exercise. 

Finally, the group re-emphasized 

the importance of ensuring the commander gets the information in the first 

place. It need not be a 100% confirmation of a BW attack; the information that something has happened may 

be sufficient for a commander to take 

some appropriate action. 

INFORMATION OPERATIONS 

If we put defensive plans and 

measures in place, or conduct large-
Appendix E3-6 

scale exercises, we should publicize 

those preparations. Preparation for a 

BW attack is good deterrence in the first 

place, and even better if publicized 

widely. That is not to say that vulnerabilities should be made public. 

On the other hand, information regarding forces impaired from a disease 

outbreak – whether food borne, influenza, or actual BW attack – could be 

used by adversaries. In releasing information on such degradation, commanders and public affairs experts must 

weigh the requirement for public needto-know against any advantage an adversary could gain from such a release. 

Ethics are involved in this decision: 

Depending on the circumstances, not 

informing the public of a serious health 

threat carries grave consequences. 

OTHER INPUTS FROM GROUP 

MEMBERS 

One group member suggested four 

improvements that could be useful in 

countering BW: 

1. An improved acquisition process 

for getting new equipment to the 

warfighter. 

Identify emerging requirements 

through analysis of operations plans and 

concept plans. Focus should be on 

quick and inexpensive solutions to fill 

the requirements – the 85% solution. 

We should look for technologies that 

have already been tested with third-party 

validation. The Joint Science and Technology Office (JSTO) funds Military 

Utility Assessment and operational testing while industry seeks GSA approval in parallel. Finally, it is suggested that the JSTO assists 

COCOMs in entering items into the 

Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and developing Urgent Needs Statements. 

2. Use Force Protection Conditions 

(FPCONs) as operational drivers 

for expedient solutions. 

AF/XOS and USPACOM have 

advanced this concept through the 

Kunsan Focused Effort (KFE) trials. 

The KFE is now ready for additional 

Red Teaming. 

3. Use perception management to 

mitigate risk. 

This is a STRATCOM responsibility. It requires more national-level 

guidance (NSC level) and should be 

effects-based. The COCOMs should 

add theater flavor to STRATCOM 

planning. 

4. Develop quicker confirmatory 

analysis for COCOMs. 

This requires in-theater assets and 

labs to reduce the turn-around time on 

biological samples. 

Another group member suggested 

using Methyl Bromide (MB) to decontaminate items contaminated with anthrax spores. Methyl Bromide is relatively inexpensive and leaves no aftereffects. Buildings can be enclosed in a 

tent, infused with MB gas, and inhabited after 48 hours. The M1A1 

Abrams tank can be decontaminated 

inside and out for a total cost of $2,500 

and no damage to the tank. In both 
Appendix E3-7 

cases, a relatively high ambient temperature is required: around 37 degrees Centigrade. This is a technology that is 

available now.

A third group member mentioned a 

simple system they implemented in Sigonella, Sicily, and in Naples for giving 

warnings of BW incidents. The Navy 

used physical training flags in various 

colors to indicate different conditions 

during a BW incident, and all personnel 

were trained on the meaning of each.

A final group member offered inputs 

from the research and development 

community that involves cooperation between the U.S. Army Medical Research 

Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and the Marine ChemicalBiological Incident Response Force 

(CBIRF). He said that defining medical 

counter-measures to support an 85% solution is dependent on the threat scenario 

that is to be protected against. If the 

threat posed is open-air aerosol delivery 

with the intent of mass casualties, immunization of at-risk populations with 

available investigational new drug 

(IND) vaccines may be applicable. 

Situations involving limitedaerosol delivery to buildings or other 

fixed facilities – or bioterrorism targets 

involving individuals or limited populations (e.g., direct delivery or food 

source) do not necessarily target entire 

populations. 

Therefore, post-exposure countermeasures would play a more significant 

role in these scenarios. The means of 

execution of an attack and means to 

counter the threat differ in each scenario. The use of the IND botulinum 

toxin vaccine and antitoxin are examples of pre-, overt, and post- attack 

countermeasures/responses. 
Appendix E3-8 

Group 3 Workshop Slides 

Group 3

Facilitator: Mr. Leo Cropper 

Recorder: Mr. Dick Estes

Members: CDR Daizo Kobayashi 

Dr. Ross LeClaire 

Col Donald Minner 

Maj Jim Poel 

Dr. Robert Sherwood 

Mr. Eric Stephens 

Dr. David Stockwell 

CAPT Steven Temerlin

DOTMLPF

• Need to de-link doctrine

– Bio should be considered alone

• Organization

– People who work chem are not equipped to 

work bio

• Training

– People at unit level tasked with working bio 

are the least educated

DOTMILPF

• Material

– While there may a technological fix on the 

shelf, the same is available to adversary

• Leadership and Personnel

– Are leaders prepared and do personnel 

understand what they are up against?

• Facilities

– Need a quick fix

Narrowing the Problem

• Strategic, CONUS, Combatant Command, 

or base level?

– All threats may be too broad

– Look at capabilities-based planning

• Look at the most likely diseases

– Anthrax, Smallpox, Plague

– Need to set priorities among these

Narrowing the Problem

• There are no effective sensors available 

for all environment

– Some can be helpful, but usually as 

confirmation rather than initial detection

• The HUMAN sensor is the best short term 

solution

Perfecting the Human Sensor

• Thermal sensors

• Daily health screening
Appendix E3-9 

Using the Data from the Human 

Sensor

• Human event vs. combat capability

– Base level perspective may be different from 

task force/combatant commander

• Ensure useful data on infections makes it 

out of medical channels and to the 

decision makers

Information Operations

• Publicized preparation is good deterrence

• Should we publicize increased illness in an 

area?

– Playing into adversary’s hands

Stockwell inputs

1) Improved process to get material solutions out to 

warfighters

2) FPCONs/RAMs as operational drivers for expedient solutions

3) Mitigate risk through perception management

4) Quicker confirmatory analysis

M1A1 "Abrams“ Tank

Spore Decontamination

Using Methyl Bromide

Replacement cost $4.3M

Volume 3,072 ft3 Equipment needed (cost $2.5K):

MeBr Required 15.3 lbs 40'x60' tarp thermometer

Set-up Time* 2 hrs 80' snake shooting hose

Exposure Time 48 hrs 50 clamps 2.8 amp fan

Aeration Time 24 hrs Fumiscope Kitagawa tubes

* 2 person taskforce heat exchanger tube pump

 

Appendix E4-1 

Appendix E4: Group 4 Workshop Notes and Slides 

GROUP 4 NOTES 

Facilitator: Mr. Roy Williams 

Recorder: MSgt Henry Mayfield 

FOCUS 

Mr. Roy Williams opened discussions about 85% BW Solutions by outlining the necessary framework for 

understanding the threat. First, Mr. Williams initiated discussions by highlighting our national strategy and JP 3-40, 

Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons 

of Mass Destruction. Our workshop, 

Group 4, emphasized the need for greater 

“force information sharing and crossfunctional approaches.” 

DEFINING THE THREAT 

The group participated in a brainstorming session that generated ideas 

about reducing BW threats. One of the 

group’s early findings was that opinions 

differed about ways and means of threat 

reduction. During the brain-storming 

process, the group realized that before we 

could achieve an 85% Solution, we 

needed first to develop a better understanding of the BW threats. The threat is 

more than understanding, growing, and 

weaponizing BW agents and more than 

the development of their delivery systems. We must look at the full spectrum 

of what constitutes a threat. This will 

range from the basic scientific research to 

sequence DNA, to the terrorist trying to 

buy capability for BW on the world 

market. 

The group discussed the term 

“threat” and determined that they were 

not absolutely clear about what exactly 

constitutes a biological threat. The discussions revolved around whether “terrorists” constitute a biological threat or 

whether a threat might be defined as a 

scientist working on something that has 

dual-use. If you can prevent a BW’s 

use by terminating the threat at the 

source, it would eliminate the need to 

react to the BW on the battlefield. 

The group argued about the effectiveness of our country’s efforts to reduce the level of BW threats. Some 

argued that responders are too focused 

on “BW agent threat lists” as opposed 

to what biotechnology can actually produce. The group agreed that we can 

better define the potential threat based 

on what science and technology will 

permit. 

Who is most likely to attack us with 

biological weapons? It was suggested 

that terrorists were most likely to use 

biological weapons against the U.S., but 

all in the group did not agree that Al 

Qaeda was the greatest threat. Some 

were more concerned about the possibility of war with China emerging over a 

crisis in the Taiwan Straits. (The U.S. 
Appendix E4-2 

National Security Strategy states that the 

gravest danger is the crossroads of radicalism and technology.) 

The group pondered questions about 

the ways and means of reducing threats. 

For example, do we start looking at the 

BW problem from the ground up, or do 

we look at it from where we are currently? 

Can we separate BW facts from BW 

myths? How much confidence do we 

have in the basic knowledge about BW? 

Do we build from already proven information or waste time reinventing the 

wheel? 

At a point where many countries are 

pursuing BW, the more attention we call 

to the “BW threat,” internationally, the 

more other countries will invest in defense 

of BW. Unfortunately, this is also likely 

to increase the interest of adversaries in 

obtaining BW weapons. Anything they 

know we are afraid of, is something the 

bad guys will want. Nor should we think 

in terms of final solutions to the BW 

threat. Eventually, each offensive measure will have a defensive countermeasure, 

that will, in time, also be countered. 

INFORMATION SHARING 

We need to structure intelligence 

function at each level of war (strategic, 

operational, and tactical) to enable collection of information to counter BW threats. 

National efforts at the strategic level 

should include developing networks of 

health care information that can quickly 

spot abnormal incidents, including inputs 

from veterinarians, agriculture experts, as 

well as healthcare professionals. Operational level intelligence should include 

tying together the host nations and allies 

into a comprehensive detection network. 

Tactical intelligence should focus on 

agents and delivery vehicles to provide 

focused warning and de-warning of a 

BW threat to critical assets and infrastructure. 

The group also further suggested 

ways to improve BW defenses: 

• Work with the intelligence community to define and refine the BW 

threat spectrum; 

• Use capability-based planning instead of threat-based planning; 

• Define what experts believe is possible in creating new types of biological weapons; and 

• Apply new BW information immediately, as it becomes available. 

The struggle to get essential information readily from the CDC and other 

national agencies is presently very difficult. Full efforts should be made to develop a forum that allows for timely information sharing and reduces duplication of effort. 

CROSS-FUNCTIONAL 

APPROACHES 

The group discussed the importance of cross-functional approaches to 

BW defense. They concluded that the 

DoD simply must synchronize and integrate joint, national, and international 

efforts. At present, there are too many 

stovepipes. The group discussed incorporating trans-national efforts such as 

the Australia Group to control sensitive 
Appendix E4-3 

technology and materials. To make the 

connection in BW defense, work within 

the DoD must blend with work in the 

foreign sector, civil authority, and public 

health arenas. In addition, we must expand cooperative defense initiatives to 

allies. 

Many good things are being done in 

BW defense. We should explore present 

concepts of operations and ideas, not discard them without good reasons. We 

need to work on building risk assessment 

tools, risk communication procedures, 

and better health surveillance. 

NON-PROLIFERATION...USING 

“DOTMLPF” 

The group discussed supporting 

non-proliferation and counterproliferation programs to reduce the threat over 

time. The following organizes the group 

thoughts from the day into a DOTMLPF 

(Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materials, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities) format. 

Doctrine (and the CONOPS) 

The group seemed to agree that 

those currently working toward a C-BW 

CONOPS have so much information that 

needs to be better organized and prioritized. It was suggested that we look at 

BW threats and solutions at all levels 

(strategic, operational, and tactical) and 

by mission area. For example, one suggestion was someone needs to develop a 

commander’s decision guide and staff 

estimation procedure to prepare personnel to do a better job in a BW environment. Some in the group also stated that 

“we must have a complete C-CBRNE 

CONOPS since we need to prepare for 

all of it!” 

Some suggestions regarding the 

development of the CONOPS included 

exploiting the successes of the C-BW 

concepts and refining procedures presented in JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for 

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 

(NBC) Defense. The group discussed 

“Spiral development” and the positive 

value this approach would bring to developing a C-BW CONOPS. It was 

suggested that we define our best guess 

regarding a C-BW CONOPS, let the 

community try it, tell us what to 

change, and then, keep working the issue. A satisfactory solution to the BW 

threat may take some time to implement, involving trying out several iterations. The BW threats didn’t evolve 

overnight, and the question of how to 

counter them won’t be solved overnight. 

We must look at a range of agents 

and look at doctrine to figure out how 

to change. Given real-time detection 

we may be able to opt for a “mask only 

MOPP” vice MOPP 4 when reacting to 

weaponized BW agents since most are 

only respiratory threats. Understanding 

how an agent gets into the body may 

preclude the necessity of adopting a 

MOPP 4 posture. 

To be effective, we need a clear 

separation of BW research and analysis 

from other possible weapons use. CBW is so important that it should be 

treated first as a “stand alone” problem, 

rather than being grouped with chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, 
Appendix E4-4 

and high-yield explosive threats and 

countermeasures. When we discuss, 

teach, or develop employment profiles 

against weapons (a weapons centric approach), initially it would be wise to analyze each one separately. C is not B is 

not R is not N. However, when we then 

turn to telling people what to do, and 

how to react, clustering defense concepts 

is to be encouraged. For example, it is 

suggested that when encountering a substance that attacks through the respiratory 

track, the appropriate first reaction 

should be masking. If it proves, in fact, 

to be a material against which the mask 

does not work, then the only effective 

response would be to hold one’s breath 

and rapidly leave the area. The point is 

that there will be many possible cues that 

should trigger just a few simple actions. 

Clearly, if we want someone to respond 

effectively to a BW attack, we must provide the best real-time information that 

tells them what they should do. 

Organization 

The group discussed the importance 

of aligning military organizations to fit 

National Response Plan (NRP) requirements. In addition, they suggested building integrated base defense structure with 

cross-functional teams. 

Training 

The group examined ways to reduce BW threats between now and 

2006. The group concluded that the 

number one thing we can do to take 

care of BW threats is to accelerate the 

training and education of the general 

military and civilian populations, and 

emergency responders. 

The need for more BW expertise in 

first responders was highlighted. The 

consensus of the group was that most 

personnel have not read CBRN doctrine 

that focuses on training and development. The group concluded that the current information on BW threats and 

defenses is not well understood. In addition, if we have validation that any 

CBRN solutions work, we should take 

what works and build on them. 

Education and training should be 

emphasized at all levels: commander’s 

decision-making, staff developing estimates, operators doing their jobs while 

coping, etc. One question that came up 

in the group was “what is the objective 

of the BW defense?” Is it to simply protect personnel or to sustain operations? 

We concluded that this is not an issue. 

Military forces must accomplish the assigned missions. This is paramount in 

wartime. Therefore, training should be 

based on this assumption. 

There has been considerable discussion about what the military can and 

should respond to outside the gates of 

U.S. military bases. It was concluded 

that we need to bring together military 

and civilian training and education because of the military’s heavy reliance on 

civilian response and treatment facilities. 

Further, it is anticipated that some large 

BW crises will eventually require DoD 

assistance even if it is not the lead 

agency responsible. There needs to be 

much greater civil-military coordination. 

We need to get away from our silver 

bullet mentality. There is no single sil-
Appendix E4-5 

ver bullet that will solve the BW threats 

and there is no means of removing the 

threat entirely. 

The group also discussed “Strategic 

Education:” 

• Education and training about BW 

needs to be simplified. Commanders, 

responders and other personnel do not 

need 100 pages of material but, rather, 

guidance should be printed on handouts of two or three pages. 

• Joint Professional Military Education 

(JPME) needs to incorporate more 

CBRN threat/defense education. 

• BW awareness needs to get up to the 

DoD level. 

• Additional Counter-BW products 

need to be made for commanders and 

those at other levels. 

In addition, the group discussed the 

elimination of the wartime and peacetime dichotomy regarding education, 

training, and exercising. And finally, 

the group concluded that the established 

and refined training requirements should 

use the Universal Joint Task List 

(UJTL). 

Materials 

The group sought ideas about short 

term fixes that could enhance early detection of BW agents. It is believed that the 

current BW detector is too expensive. 

They argued that we can achieve an 85% 

BW solution by innovations such as personnel screening and implementation of 

retina scans in airports and areas where 

large groups of people gather. It is suggested that infrared (IR) detectors could 

be employed for temperature monitoring. This approach may allow the detection of illnesses caused by BW exposure 

before individuals realize they are affected. 

Dual-use bio-defense materials/items for military and civilian use 

was also suggested. 

The group also discussed the 

meaning of “Detection.” There are 

different interpretations about the 

meaning of detection. Does detection 

mean identification of a BW-agent by 

a monitor or is it informational, such 

as provided by defectors or other human intelligence? The group defined 

detection as providing cues against 

which to react. The better and more 

informative the cue, the better we react. The need for better detection and 

monitoring of BW agents is crucial, 

whether reacting to an attack on a military base or when responding to support the local community. 

The group suggested that available technology can be expanded. The 

group discussed the need for bioindicators or bio-metrics for identifying who is on installations. Installing 

biometric sensors at each gate per installation was believed to hold promise 

for reducing threats. 

Also, a standardized list of C-BW 

response equipment and supplies needs 

to be determined and provided at each 

base. 

Leadership 

How can we reduce uncertainties 

and help commanders make informed 

decisions? Because of present uncer-
Appendix E4-6 

tainties in our sensors and knowledge of 

BW, and because we need to both survive 

and fight, a commander must take a riskbased approach. 

The group suggested developing user 

friendly decision tools. In addition, the 

group discussed risk communications for 

BW attack. The focus should be on 

minimizing panic and maximizing cooperative steps that help avoid problems. 

Personnel 

The group agreed that the DoD 

needs more BW expertise. Group discussion also explored the possibility of 

more specialized career fields in the 

armed services to specifically deal with 

BW threat issues. 

Facilities 

The group agreed that facilities at 

bases and installations need to be better 

prepared to provide air-tight shelter in 

times of BW attack. Filtration systems 

need to accompany air conditioning systems and doors, windows, and other 

openings need to be sealed to prevent 

exposure to outside contaminants during 

times of peak danger. 

THREAT REDUCTION 

The group suggested that security 

perimeters around the U.S. bases need to 

be expanded so that no residence is 

within a 3 mile radius of base, as is economically feasible. For overseas bases, 

the group stated a need for more readiness exercises and dialogue with host 

nations on how to reduce and mitigate 

BW threats and perform better consequence management of BW events. It 

is suggested that agreements with host 

nations should be expanded to clear-up 

what responses to take in BW crises, 

what the process should be, and what 

training and equipping needs to be 

done. This likely will require changes 

in the present support agreements. 

DISPOSITION OF CONTAMINATED 

REMAINS AND EQUIPMENT 

The group was unclear about BW 

contamination disposal. They stated 

that greater research of the actual 

threat and the impact on our environment is needed. In handling contaminated bodies of those killed in a BW 

attack, the means of proper disposal 

was confusing to the group. Some 

work group members thought placement and burial in plastic bags with a 

slit in the bag bottom would be acceptable. The belief is that the slit would 

help accelerate decomposition. Others 

believed that bodies should be cremated in place. There was uncertainty 

about the existence of guidelines and 

rules regarding exhuming bones and 

repatriation of contaminated remains. 

Another option for dealing with 

contaminated remains was Kappler’s 

human remains pouch tested during 

the recent Restoration of Operations 

(RESTOPS) ACTD at Osan AB, ROK. 

CONCLUSIONS 

Group 4 came to the consensus that 

the provision of rapid detectors, and 
Appendix E4-7 

biometric monitors could improve the 

means of detecting the presence of BW 

contamination. Most importantly, education and training of both the military and 

civilian populations about BW threats and 

counter-measures would do the most to 

help cope with BW attacks and threats 

and would reduce panic levels, which 

would enable everyone to cope better 

with this kind of situation. It was also 

agreed across the board that the gaps 

need to be closed between military and 

civilian functions, especially in medical treatment. Closer civil/ military 

medical coordination was seen as very 

important. 
Appendix E4-8 

Group 4 Workshop Slides 

Group 4

Facilitator: Mr. Roy Williams

Recorder: MSgt Henry Mayfield

Members: Mr. Paul Clark 

Ms. Renae Ditmer 

Ms. Anne Dixon 

Dr. Richard Gullickson 

LtCol Donna Hudson 

Dr. Peter Lavoy 

Ms. Kathryn Szeliga

Nonproliferation Framework

• Detect and monitor acquisition and development

• Conduct NP operations

• Security cooperation

Counterproliferation 

Framework

• Detect and Monitor

• Prepare to Conduct CP Operations

• Conduct Offensive Operations

• WMD Active Defense

• WMD Passive Defense

Consequence Management

Framework

• Assess

• Coordinate operations

• Conduct logistics

• Health service support

• Decontaminate

Framework

• Doctrine

• Organization

• Training

• Material

• Leader Development

• Personnel

• Facilities
Appendix F-1 

Appendix F: List of 56 Ideas Generated at the 

85% Workshop with Description 

Implemented Quickest 

Greatest Benefit 

Implemented Quickest 

& Greatest Benefit

Idea from 85% 

Workshop Brief Description 

 

C-BW CONOPS † 

Develop a C-BW CONOPS; Doctrine for BW 

should be de-linked from other CBRNE doctrine 

since it is significantly different; develop operational concepts for all military operations in BW 

contaminated environment for individual, Joint and 

Coalition operations (ex., airfield operations, deployment and redeployment of forces, use of 

CRAF and VISA, re-supply, etc.). 

 

Determine BW Agents 

Possible 

Define BW threat based on what biological agents 

can realistically be created with today's science and 

technology; threat determination should also include an adversary's capability to use biological 

weapons, an adversary's intent to use biological 

weapons, and our own vulnerability to these weapons. 

 

Re-Prioritize BW 

Threat Agents †, ‡ 

Set priorities on most likely BW/disease threats to 

guide R&D concerning detection, treatment, and 

defense (i.e., are anthrax, smallpox, and plague the 

top three?). 

 

Decision Tools for 

Commanders 

Develop Decision Tools for Commanders for BW 

attacks; include recommendations for baseline posture, indicators of biological attack, questions that 

need to be asked about the extent and implications 

of an attack, and appropriate actions. 

 

BW FPCON/RAM 

Measures † 

Develop BW-specific counter-measures in 

FPCONs/RAMs for commands with elevated 

threats. 
Appendix F-2 Implemented Quickest Greatest Benefit Implemented Quickest & Greatest Benefit

Idea from 85% 

Workshop Brief Description 

 

Develop Installation 

Medical Surveillance 

Information †, ‡ 

Develop and implement an installation system of 

near real-time, high-fidelity medical surveillance 

information for both military and local civilian 

populations. This integrated medical surveillance 

program will collect data from multiple sources, for 

example medical surveillance of clinic appointments, illness observed by co-workers, school absenteeism, veterinarians, over-the-counter drug 

sales, etc. 

 

Develop DoD 

Integrated 

Information 

Collection 

Adopt a DoD systems approach to combine information from all sources (ex., adversary capabilities 

and intent, friendly vulnerability, detectors, local 

nationals, installation medical surveillance information, regional medical surveillance). Intelligence 

collection at the strategic, operational, and tactical 

levels of war. 

 

Daily Health 

Screening 

Conduct/record daily health screening;daily random blood, urine, and/or throat swab for PCR. 

 922 Concept Evaluate 922 Concept for military application (reference attached cell comment). 

 

Weekly Commander's 

Stand-Up Briefings 

Provide uniform, frequent briefings to installation 

commanders regarding illness trends (ex., occurrences of infectious diseases such as flu). 

 

Enhance Research 

Community and 

Operator Interaction 

Develop streamlined procedures for effective information exchange between biomedical research 

community and operators. 

 

Badge-Based 

Biometrics 

Develop/employ badge-based biometrics, like radiation dosimitry badges, to use humans as sensors. 

 Thermal Sensors Employ personnel thermal, or infrared, sensors 

(ex., barracks, chow halls, base/post exchange). 

 R&D of Novel Agents Increase R&D of defense and treatment of novel 

agents (ex., genetically engineered BW). 

 

R&D Versus 

Acquisition of Current 

Bio-detectors †, ‡ 

De-emphasize acquisition of bio-detectors (ex., 

Portal Shield) for the short-term but continue R&D 

on alternatives. 
Appendix F-3 

Implemented Quickest 

Greatest Benefit 

Implemented Quickest 

& Greatest Benefit

Idea from 85% 

Workshop Brief Description 

 

Improve Solutions/ 

Technology 

Implementation 

Process 

Improve the process to get materiel solutions and 

technology more quickly; look for and employ 

technologies that have been tested with third-party 

validation; identify emerging requirements through 

analysis of operations plans and concept plans. 

 

Expand Joint BW 

ACTD Funding 

Expand funding for joint experimentation ACTD 

for BW defense; more Limited User Tests to bring 

new technologies to field; ensure funding for BW 

ACTDs is provided. 

 

Public Information 

Packages and Media 

Relations †, ‡ 

Prepare standardized public information packages 

and policies/procedures for public release concerning BW agents; educate, train, and exercise media 

relations procedures and capabilities for a post-BW 

event to control panic. 

 

Ventilation Systems † 

Install protective ventilation system, filters (ex. 

HEPA filters or MERV 7 to 11), room air purifiers, 

ultraviolet lights, or airtight window technologies, 

as economically feasible. 

 

New Detection 

Methods †, ‡ 

Identify and deploy current cutting-edge technologies to enhance identification of BW agents (ex., 

454 DNA Sequencing system to rapidly sequence 

DNA of biologic agents). 

 

New Decontamination 

Methods †, ‡ 

Investigate novel methods for decontamination, for 

example pulse corona discharge or methyl bromide 

to decontaminate anthrax spores from large vehicles (ex., M1A1 Abrams tank) or buildings. 

 

New Individual 

Protective Equipment 

(IPE) † 

Research and develop alternatives to MOPP or 

JSLIST protective equipment. For instance, investigate alternative fabrics or microporous film technologies specific for biological challenges. 
Appendix F-4 Implemented Quickest Greatest Benefit Implemented Quickest & Greatest Benefit

Idea from 85% 

Workshop Brief Description 

 

Develop Individual 

Protection Guidance 

†, ‡ 

Develop Individual Protection Guidance to reduce 

secondary exposures (ex. Use N-95 masks postexposure); investigate the use of items such as expedient masks with lower protection factors, especially concerning longer-term uncertain threats; 

consider development of a “mask only MOPP” 

versus MOPP 4 when reacting to biological agents 

with respiratory effect only. 

 

New Prophylaxis and 

Vaccines † 

Investigate alternate and improved prophylaxis and 

vaccines; conduct R&D on non-specific immune 

modulation, for example, use of vitamins and dietary supplements to enhance immunity. 

 New Treatments Investigate alternate and improved treatment options. 

 

Rapid Vaccine 

Approval 

Investigate a more rapid process to obtain FDA 

approval for new vaccines, including “fast-track,” 

for military use vaccines. 

 

Vaccinate All Military 

† 

Vaccinate all military populations against most 

likely BW diseases (smallpox and anthrax) to 

lessen likelihood of infection. 

 

Increase DoD Vaccine 

Funding 

Increase DoD funding for vaccination programs 

(ex., R&D, administration). 

 

External Inputs for 

Prophylaxis and 

Vaccination Policies 

Involve WHO and CDC/ATSDR and regional/coalition partners in establishing policies for 

prophylaxis/vaccination of U.S. military, U.S. contractors and host nation personnel. 

 

Disposition of BW 

contaminated 

personnel, remains, 

equipment †, ‡ 

Develop policy for when, where, and how to move 

biological contaminated personnel, remains, and 

equipment back to the CONUS; develop aeromedical evacuation policies for BW contaminated patients; investigate COTS technology/products such 

as Kappler's human remains pouch (tested in 

RESTOPS). 
Appendix F-5 

Implemented Quickest 

Greatest Benefit 

Implemented Quickest 

& Greatest Benefit

Idea from 85% 

Workshop Brief Description 

 

"How Clean is Clean" 

Policy † 

Develop DoD policy to establish “how clean is 

clean” or the level decontamination at which assets 

are considered safe for use without individual protective equipment. 

 

Fast In-Theater 

Confirmatory 

Analysis 

Develop methods for quicker confirmatory analysis 

(more and higher quality in-theater laboratories and 

assets). 

 

Pre-positioned 

Material and Supplies 

† 

Package pre-positioned material, including BW 

protection/defense assets; generate stockpiles of 

strategically pre-positioned antibiotic prophylaxis 

for post-exposure treatment. 

 

Initial Deployment 

Packages 

Develop port/airfield/base initial deployment (barebase) packages specific for the BW threat. 

 

Develop Specialized 

BW Teams 

Align military organizations to fit NRP requirements; build integrated base defense structure with 

cross-functional teams; construct specialized teams 

with expertise in BW to respond to BW local 

events. 

 

Hire BW-educated 

Health Care Workers 

and First Responders 

Hire physicians, nurses, public health officers, bioenvironmental engineers, and laboratory officers 

with specific academic preparation to respond to 

BW agent use. 

 

Train Health Care 

Workers and First 

Responders 

Provide existing physicians, nurses, public health 

officers, bioenvironmental engineers, and laboratory officers specific academic preparation to respond to BW agent attack; bring together military 

and civilian care providers in training scenarios... 

military will continue a heavy reliance on commercial treatment facilities. 

 

Quick-Reference 

Education Handouts 

Develop a brief, simplified Strategic Education 

specific for each rank. Each rank-specific education document 2 to 3 pages. Education should be 

of a rank specific detail and level of knowledge. 
Appendix F-6 Implemented Quickest Greatest Benefit Implemented Quickest & Greatest Benefit

Idea from 85% 

Workshop Brief Description 

 

Educate Senior-Level 

DoD Personnel (O-6 & 

Flag Officer, or Civilian Equivalent) † 

Educate senior level military and civilian personnel 

in the DoD on the basics of BW agent effects, 

characteristics, treatment, the BW threat, passive 

defense measures, and operational considerations. 

 

Educate All Other 

DoD Personnel † 

Educate all personnel in the DoD on the basics of 

BW agent effects, characteristics, treatment, the 

BW threat, passive defense measures, and operational considerations (ex. include in all levels of 

PME). All Airmen are Sensors! Education should 

be of a specific detail and level of knowledge appropriate for the rank. 

 

Train and Exercise 

DoD Personnel † 

Train and Exercise all DoD personnel more specifically and thoroughly on BW agents. Training 

expectations should be of a specific detail and level 

of knowledge appropriate for the rank. 

 

Educate Non-DoD 

Personnel † 

Educate non-DoD personnel (dependents, contractors, etc.) on an installation regarding the threat, 

hazards, and treatment of BW. 

 

Train Non-DoD 

Personnel † 

Train all non-DoD personnel (dependents, contractors, etc.) on an installation on how to respond in a 

BW attack. 

 

Mission Essential Task 

Lists 

Develop Mission Essential Task Lists (METLs) 

specific for accomplishing a unit's combat mission 

and standards of performance for BW incident response. 

 

Subject Matter 

Experts in Exercise 

Planning and 

Execution 

Include BW subject matter experts from 

USACHPPM, NEHC, AFIOH, USAMRIID, 

CDC/ATSDR, etc. in all Command or OSD level 

tabletop exercise planning and execution. 

 

Educate COCOMs 

(ETE) 

Educate, train, exercise combatant commanders 

regarding impacts of BW attacks on combat operations. 

 

Publicize BW 

Preparedness 

Publicize BW preparedness (deterrent measure), 

including defensive measures and large-scale exercises. 
Appendix F-7 

Implemented Quickest 

Greatest Benefit 

Implemented Quickest 

& Greatest Benefit

Idea from 85% 

Workshop Brief Description 

 

Establish Collective 

Protection Standards 

†, ‡ 

Develop and implement Collective Protection 

Standards at three levels: Full Collective Protection 

for Command and Control and other critical nodes, 

Expedient Collective Protection (hardening) for 

important facilities, “Shelter-in-Place” for remaining population using best available procedures (ex. 

duct tape, masks). 

 

Vulnerability 

Assessments 

Conduct semi-annual “food and water supplies and 

places of assembly” vulnerability assessments by 

public health, OSI, bioenvironmental engineering, 

and civil engineering. 

 

Disease Containment 

Plan †, ‡ 

Develop Disease Containment Plan for key installation/units to include voluntary and mandatory 

quarantine and personnel temperature monitoring. 

 

Installation 

Quarantine (ETE) 

Educate, train and exercise all commanders and 

installation personnel (especially medical and police/security personnel) regarding local quarantine 

operations, plans, and procedures. 

 

International 

Quarantine (ETE) 

Educate, train, and exercise commanders and installation personnel on international quarantine and 

allied notification procedures. 

 

Information 

Management/Risk 

Communication for 

Installations (ETE) † 

Educate, train, and exercise theater commanders on 

information management/risk communication regarding identification of agent, means of transmission, treatment and infection control measures 

essential for installation population. 

 

Information 

Management/Risk 

Communication for 

Civilian Public Health 

Authorities (ETE) 

Educate, train, and exercise commanders, Public 

Affairs, and medical personnel regarding information management/risk communication regarding 

identification of agent, means of transmission, 

treatment and infection control measures essential 

for public health authorities in adjoining civilian 

community. 
Appendix F-8 Implemented Quickest Greatest Benefit Implemented Quickest & Greatest Benefit

Idea from 85% 

Workshop Brief Description 

 

Information 

Management/Risk 

Communication for 

Public Release (ETE) 

Educate, train, and exercise commanders, Public 

Affairs, and medical personnel regarding information management/risk communication regarding 

identification of agent, means of transmission, 

treatment and infection control measures essential 

for public release to ease anxiety and quell fear. 

 

Joint and Coalition 

Decision Tools 

Synchronize and integrate joint, coalition, and international efforts, avoid stovepipes that may limit 

how Commanders respond to BW event. 

† Similar to or related to one of the 59 action items identified in Biological Defense Task Force Action Plan, 28 

May 2003, available at https://www.xo.hq.af.mil/xos/xosf/xosfc/CCBRNE_resource/biological/bdtf/bdtf.shtml, 

last accessed 14 December 2004. 

‡ Similar to or related to one of the action items of the PACOM Biological Warfare Countermeasure Initiative 

(BWCI). Hudson, Donna (LtCol), XOS-FC, “Counter-Biological Warfare (C-BW) Program,” slide presentation, 22 September 2004. 
Appendix G-1 

Appendix G: Data 

The following is a description of 

the data found in Appendices G1 

through G4. 

Respondents rank ordered the ideas 

listed in Appendix F with “1” denoting 

highest priority through “15” denoting 

the lowest priority in each of three categories: Implemented Quickest, Greatest 

Benefit, and Best Overall. Implemented 

Quickest was described as “the solution 

that can be the most quickly implemented regardless of the amount of 

benefit to the warfighter.” Greatest 

Benefit was described as “the solution 

that offers the greatest benefit to our 

biological weapons defense without regard to cost, time, or other considerations which may inhibit 

implementation.” Finally, Best Overall 

was described as “the solution that offers the ‘most bang for the buck,’ or the 

best solution when you consider both the 

cost, speed of implementation, and value 

to the warfighter.” 

Three methods of analysis were 

used to analyze the data. First, the idea 

that generated the most number one 

votes in each of the three categories was 

identified (Appendix G1). Second, a 

top ten for each of the three categories 

was determined by using a frequency 

distribution of total votes (regardless 

of the value of the vote). This provided a set of data titled “Priority 

Ranking by Number of Total Votes” 

(Appendix G2). Third, a top ten for 

each of the three categories was determined by adding all the votes of one 

through five (each vote of one through 

five given equal value). This provided 

a set of data titled “Priority Ranking 

by Number of Votes 1-5” (Appendix 

G3). 

In the tables of Appendix G4, the 

“Number of Raw Votes” column indicates the total number of times the idea 

was selected by the workshop attendees. The “% of Respondents” column is the number of raw votes 

received divided by the total number 

of respondents who provided inputs 

for that category, multiplied by 100%. 

This raw data is organized into the top 

ten for each category in Appendix G2 

(Total Voted 1-15) and Appendix G3 

(Total Voted 1-5). 

Appendix G1-1 

Appendix G1: Highest Frequency of #1 Votes 

Category Idea from 85% Solution Workshop Number 1

Votes 

Best Overall C-BW CONOPS 8 

Implemented Quickest Weekly Commander’s Stand-Up Briefings 6 

Greatest Benefit C-BW CONOPS 9 

This table presents the solutions that received the highest frequency of “1” 

votes for each category. 

Appendix G2-1 

Appendix G2: Priority Ranking by Number of Total Votes 

Table G2.1. Priority Ranking by Number of Total Votes for the Best Overall Category 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop Votes % of 36 

Respondents 

Educate Senior-Level DoD Personnel (O-6 & Flag Officer, or Civilian Equiv.) 25 69 % 

C-BW CONOPS 23 64 % 

Decision Tools for Commanders 23 64 % 

Train and Exercise DoD Personnel 20 56 % 

Develop Installation Medical Surveillance Information 18 50 % 

BW FPCON/RAM Measures 17 47 % 

Public Information Packages and Media Relations 16 44 % 

Vaccinate All Military 15 42 % 

Educate All Other DoD Personnel 14 39 % 

Educate COCOMs (ETE) 14 39 % 

Table G2.1 presents the ideas ranked in the top 10 for the Best Overall category. Total votes were determined by summing the number of times an idea was 

voted on (1–15) with equal weight given to each vote. Total number of workshop 

participants who submitted votes for this category was 36. 

Table G2.2. Priority Ranking by Number of Total Votes for the 

Implemented Quickest Category 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop Votes % of 34 

Respondents 

Educate Senior-Level DoD Personnel (O-6 & Flag Officer, or Civilian Equiv.) 22 65 % 

Decision Tools for Commanders 22 65 % 

Public Information Packages and Media Relations 19 56 % 

Quick-Reference Handouts 17 50 % 

C-BW CONOPS 16 47 % 

922 Concept 13 38 % 

Weekly Commander’s Stand-Up Briefings 13 38 % 

Educate All Other DoD Personnel 13 38 % 

Train and Exercise DoD Personnel 13 38 % 

Train Health Care Workers and First Responders 13 38 % 

Table G2.2 presents the ideas ranked in the top 10 for the Implemented Quickest category. Total votes were determined by summing the number of times an idea 

was voted on (1–15) with equal weight given to each vote. Total number of workshop participants who submitted votes for this category was 34. 
Appendix G2-2 

Table G2.3. Priority Ranking by Number of Total Votes for the 

Greatest Benefit Category 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop Votes % of 35 

Respondents 

C-BW CONOPS 22 63 % 

Develop Installation Medical Surveillance Information 20 57 % 

Educate Senior-Level DoD Personnel (O-6 & Flag Officer, or Civilian Equiv.) 19 54 % 

Decision Tools for Commanders 18 51 % 

New Prophylaxis and Vaccines 17 49 % 

Develop DoD Integrated Information Collection 16 46 % 

New Detection Methods 16 46 % 

Fast In-Theater Confirmatory Analysis 14 40 % 

Train and Exercise DoD Personnel 14 40 % 

Educate COCOMs (ETE) 13 37 % 

Table G2.3 presents the ideas ranked in the top 10 for the Best Overall category. Total votes were determined by summing the number of times an idea was 

voted on (1–15) with equal weight given to each vote. Total number of workshop 

participants who submitted votes for this category was 35. 
Appendix G3-1 

Appendix G3: Priority Ranking by Number of Votes 1-5 

Table G3.1. Priority Ranking by Number of Votes 1-5 for the Best Overall Category 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop Votes % of 36 

Respondents 

Educate Senior-Level DoD Personnel (O-6 & Flag Officer, or Civilian Equiv.) 17 47 % 

Decision Tools for Commanders 14 39 % 

C-BW CONOPS 13 36 % 

BW FPCON/RAM Measures 9 25 % 

Vaccinate All Military 8 22 % 

Educate COCOMs (ETE) 7 19 % 

Ventilation Systems 6 17 % 

Educate All Other DoD Personnel 6 17 % 

Develop Installation Medical Surveillance Information 6 17 % 

Re-Prioritize BW Threat Agents 5 14 % 

Expand Joint BW ACTD Funding 5 14 % 

Train and Exercise DoD Personnel 5 14 % 

Disease Containment Plan 5 14 % 

Table G3.1 presents the ideas ranked in the top 10 for the Best Overall category. Votes were determined by summing the number of times an idea with a 

value of 1 to 5. To clarify, any vote of 1 to 5 was given a value of “1” and the total 

number of those votes summed. Total number of workshop participants who submitted votes for this category was 36. The reason for more than ten ideas indicates 

a tie of the tenth position. 

Table G3.2. Priority Ranking by Number of Votes 1-5 for the 

Implemented Quickest Category 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop Votes % of 34 

Respondents 

Educate Senior-Level DoD Personnel (O-6 & Flag Officer, or Civilian Equiv.) 15 44 % 

Weekly Commander’s Stand-Up Briefings 11 32 % 

Public Information Packages and Media Relations 10 29 % 

Quick-Reference Handouts 9 26 % 

C-BW CONOPS 7 21 % 

Educate COCOMs (ETE) 7 21 % 

Decision Tools for Commanders 7 21 % 

Re-Prioritize BW Threat Agents 6 18 % 

Daily Health Screening 6 18 % 

922 Concept 6 18 % 

Educate All Other DoD Personnel 6 18 % 
Appendix G3-2 

Table G3.2 presents the ideas ranked in the top 10 for the Implemented Quickest category. Votes were determined by summing the number of times an idea with 

a value of 1 to 5. To clarify, any vote of 1 to 5 was given a value of “1” and the 

total number of those votes summed. Total number of workshop participants who 

submitted votes for this category was 34. The reason for more than ten ideas indicates a tie of the tenth position. 

Table G3.3. Priority Ranking by Number of Votes 1-5 for the 

Greatest Benefit Category 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop Votes % of 35 

Respondents 

C-BW CONOPS 16 46 % 

Decision Tools for Commanders 13 37 % 

New Prophylaxis and Vaccines 10 29 % 

Educate Senior-Level DoD Personnel (O-6 & Flag Officer, or Civilian Equiv.) 9 26 % 

New Detection Methods 8 23 % 

BW FPCON/RAM Measures 6 17 % 

Ventilation Systems 6 17 % 

Vaccinate All Military 6 17 % 

Educate COCOMs (ETE) 6 17 % 

Develop Installation Medical Surveillance Information 5 14 % 

Develop DoD Integrated Information Collection 5 14 % 

Public Information Packages and Media Relations 5 14 % 

Expand Joint BW ACTD Funding 5 14 % 

Rapid Vaccine Approval 5 14 % 

Table G3.3 presents the ideas ranked in the top 10 for the Best Overall category. Votes were determined by summing the number of times an idea with a 

value of 1 to 5. To clarify, any vote of 1 to 5 was given a value of “1” and the total 

number of those votes summed. Total number of workshop participants who submitted votes for this category was 35. The reason for more than ten ideas indicates 

a tie of the tenth position. 
Appendix G4-1 

Appendix G4: Raw Data for All Categories 

Category: Best Overall, Total Voted 1-15 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop Raw 

Votes % of Total 

C-BW CONOPS 23 64 

Determine BW Agents Possible 9 25 

Re-Prioritize BW Threat Agents 10 28 

Decision Tools for Commanders 23 64 

BW FPCON/RAM Measures 17 47 

Develop Installation Medical Surveillance Information 18 50 

Develop DoD Integrated Information Collection 12 33 

Daily Health Screening 7 19 

922 Concept 10 28 

Weekly Commander's Stand-Up Briefings 7 19 

Enhance Research Community and Operator Interaction 5 14 

Badge-Based Biometrics 4 11 

Thermal Sensors 6 17 

R&D of Novel Agents 2 6 

R&D Versus Acquisition of Current Bio-detectors 11 31 

Improve Solutions/Technology Implementation Process 7 19 

Expand Joint BW ACTD Funding 10 28 

Public Information Packages and Media Relations 16 44 

Ventilation Systems 12 33 

New Detection Methods 8 22 

New Decontamination Methods 5 14 

New Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) 7 19 

Develop Individual Protection Guidance 12 33 

New Prophylaxis and Vaccines 6 17 

New Treatments 2 6 

Rapid Vaccine Approval 5 14 

Vaccinate All Military 15 42 

Increase DoD Vaccine Funding 6 17 

External Inputs for Prophylaxis and Vaccination Policies 5 14 

Disposition of BW contaminated personnel, remains, equipment 7 19 

"How Clean is Clean" Policy 7 19 

Fast In-Theater Confirmatory Analysis 10 28 

Pre-positioned Material and Supplies 8 22 

Initial Deployment Packages 4 11 

Develop Specialized BW Teams 4 11 

Hire BW-educated Health Care Workers and First Responders 2 6 

Train Health Care Workers and First Responders 12 33 

Quick-Reference Education Handouts 11 31 

Educate Senior-Level DoD Personnel (O-6 & Flag Officer, or Civilian Equivalent) 25 69 

Educate All Other DoD Personnel 14 39 

Train and Exercise DoD Personnel 20 56 

Educate Non-DoD Personnel 7 19 

Train Non-DoD Personnel 6 17 

Mission Essential Task Lists 11 31 
Appendix G4-2 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop (cont.) Raw 

Votes % of Total 

Subject Matter Experts in Exercise Planning and Execution 9 25 

Educate COCOMs (ETE) 14 39 

Publicize BW Preparedness 5 14 

Establish Collective Protection Standards 3 8 

Vulnerability Assessments 10 28 

Disease Containment Plan 12 33 

Installation Quarantine (ETE) 7 19 

International Quarantine (ETE) 3 8 

Information Management/Risk Communication for Installations (ETE) 13 36 

Information Management/Risk Communication for Civilian Public Health Authorities 

(ETE) 6 17 

Information Management/Risk Communication for Public Release (ETE) 10 28 

Joint and Coalition Decision Tools 6 17 

Category: Best Overall, Total Voted 1-5 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop Raw 

Votes % of Total 

C-BW CONOPS 13 36 

Determine BW Agents Possible 4 11 

Re-Prioritize BW Threat Agents 5 14 

Decision Tools for Commanders 14 39 

BW FPCON/RAM Measures 9 25 

Develop Installation Medical Surveillance Information 6 17 

Develop DoD Integrated Information Collection 2 5.6 

Daily Health Screening 1 3 

922 Concept 2 6 

Weekly Commander's Stand-Up Briefings 2 6 

Enhance Research Community and Operator Interaction 0 0 

Badge-Based Biometrics 0 0 

Thermal Sensors 1 3 

R&D of Novel Agents 0 0 

R&D Versus Acquisition of Current Bio-detectors 1 3 

Improve Solutions/Technology Implementation Process 2 6 

Expand Joint BW ACTD Funding 5 14 

Public Information Packages and Media Relations 3 8 

Ventilation Systems 6 17 

New Detection Methods 4 11 

New Decontamination Methods 0 0 

New Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) 0 0 

Develop Individual Protection Guidance 3 8 

New Prophylaxis and Vaccines 0 0 

New Treatments 0 0 

Rapid Vaccine Approval 1 3 

Vaccinate All Military 8 22 

Increase DoD Vaccine Funding 1 3 

External Inputs for Prophylaxis and Vaccination Policies 0 0 

Disposition of BW contaminated personnel, remains, equipment 1 3 

"How Clean is Clean" Policy 3 8 

Fast In-Theater Confirmatory Analysis 2 6 
Appendix G4-3 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop (cont.) Raw 

Votes % of Total 

Pre-positioned Material and Supplies 0 0 

Initial Deployment Packages 2 6 

Develop Specialized BW Teams 1 3 

Hire BW-educated Health Care Workers and First Responders 1 3 

Train Health Care Workers and First Responders 2 6 

Quick-Reference Education Handouts 4 11 

Educate Senior-Level DoD Personnel (O-6 & Flag Officer, or Civilian Equivalent) 17 47 

Educate All Other DoD Personnel 6 17 

Train and Exercise DoD Personnel 5 14 

Educate Non-DoD Personnel 2 6 

Train Non-DoD Personnel 1 3 

Mission Essential Task Lists 4 11 

Subject Matter Experts in Exercise Planning and Execution 2 6 

Educate COCOMs (ETE) 7 19 

Publicize BW Preparedness 1 3 

Establish Collective Protection Standards 1 3 

Vulnerability Assessments 4 11 

Disease Containment Plan 5 14 

Installation Quarantine (ETE) 1 3 

International Quarantine (ETE) 0 0 

Information Management/Risk Communication for Installations (ETE) 0 0 

Information Management/Risk Communication for Civilian Public Health Authorities 

(ETE) 0 0 

Information Management/Risk Communication for Public Release (ETE) 4 11 

Joint and Coalition Decision Tools 2 6 

Category: Implemented Quickest, Total Voted 1-15 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop Raw 

Votes % of Total 

C-BW CONOPS 16 47 

Determine BW Agents Possible 8 24 

Re-Prioritize BW Threat Agents 11 32 

Decision Tools for Commanders 22 65 

BW FPCON/RAM Measures 15 44 

Develop Installation Medical Surveillance Information 12 35 

Develop DoD Integrated Information Collection 8 24 

Daily Health Screening 12 35 

922 Concept 13 38 

Weekly Commander's Stand-Up Briefings 13 38 

Enhance Research Community and Operator Interaction 4 12 

Badge-Based Biometrics 3 9 

Thermal Sensors 10 29 

R&D of Novel Agents 1 3 

R&D Versus Acquisition of Current Bio-detectors 5 15 

Improve Solutions/Technology Implementation Process 3 9 

Expand Joint BW ACTD Funding 9 26 

Public Information Packages and Media Relations 19 56 

Ventilation Systems 9 26 
Appendix G4-4 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop (cont.) Raw 

Votes % of Total 

New Detection Methods 2 6 

New Decontamination Methods 1 3 

New Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) 4 12 

Develop Individual Protection Guidance 15 44 

New Prophylaxis and Vaccines 4 12 

New Treatments 1 3 

Rapid Vaccine Approval 2 6 

Vaccinate All Military 11 32 

Increase DoD Vaccine Funding 5 15 

External Inputs for Prophylaxis and Vaccination Policies 1 3 

Disposition of BW contaminated personnel, remains, equipment 9 26 

"How Clean is Clean" Policy 10 29 

Fast In-Theater Confirmatory Analysis 6 18 

Pre-positioned Material and Supplies 6 18 

Initial Deployment Packages 8 24 

Develop Specialized BW Teams 6 18 

Hire BW-educated Health Care Workers and First Responders 5 15 

Train Health Care Workers and First Responders 13 38 

Quick-Reference Education Handouts 17 50 

Educate Senior-Level DoD Personnel (O-6 & Flag Officer, or Civilian Equivalent) 22 65 

Educate All Other DoD Personnel 13 38 

Train and Exercise DoD Personnel 13 38 

Educate Non-DoD Personnel 5 15 

Train Non-DoD Personnel 5 15 

Mission Essential Task Lists 11 32 

Subject Matter Experts in Exercise Planning and Execution 10 29 

Educate COCOMs (ETE) 12 35 

Publicize BW Preparedness 9 26 

Establish Collective Protection Standards 5 15 

Vulnerability Assessments 10 29 

Disease Containment Plan 12 35 

Installation Quarantine (ETE) 8 24 

International Quarantine (ETE) 4 12 

Information Management/Risk Communication for Installations (ETE) 11 32 

Information Management/Risk Communication for Civilian Public Health Authorities (ETE) 9 26 

Information Management/Risk Communication for Public Release (ETE) 11 32 

Joint and Coalition Decision Tools 7 21 

Category: Implemented Quickest, Total Voted 1-5 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop Raw 

Votes % of Total 

C-BW CONOPS 7 21 

Determine BW Agents Possible 5 15 

Re-Prioritize BW Threat Agents 6 18 

Decision Tools for Commanders 7 21 

BW FPCON/RAM Measures 5 15 

Develop Installation Medical Surveillance Information 3 9 

Develop DoD Integrated Information Collection 0 0 
Appendix G4-5 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop (cont.) Raw 

Votes % of Total 

Daily Health Screening 6 18 

922 Concept 6 18 

Weekly Commander's Stand-Up Briefings 11 32 

Enhance Research Community and Operator Interaction 1 3 

Badge-Based Biometrics 1 3 

Thermal Sensors 3 9 

R&D of Novel Agents 0 0 

R&D Versus Acquisition of Current Bio-detectors 1 3 

Improve Solutions/Technology Implementation Process 0 0 

Expand Joint BW ACTD Funding 3 9 

Public Information Packages and Media Relations 10 29 

Ventilation Systems 3 9 

New Detection Methods 2 6 

New Decontamination Methods 0 0 

New Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) 1 3 

Develop Individual Protection Guidance 3 9 

New Prophylaxis and Vaccines 0 0 

New Treatments 0 0 

Rapid Vaccine Approval 0 0 

Vaccinate All Military 3 9 

Increase DoD Vaccine Funding 2 6 

External Inputs for Prophylaxis and Vaccination Policies 0 0 

Disposition of BW contaminated personnel, remains, equipment 0 0 

"How Clean is Clean" Policy 4 12 

Fast In-Theater Confirmatory Analysis 3 9 

Pre-positioned Material and Supplies 0 0 

Initial Deployment Packages 1 3 

Develop Specialized BW Teams 1 3 

Hire BW-educated Health Care Workers and First Responders 1 3 

Train Health Care Workers and First Responders 2 6 

Quick-Reference Education Handouts 9 26 

Educate Senior-Level DoD Personnel (O-6 & Flag Officer, or Civilian Equivalent) 15 44 

Educate All Other DoD Personnel 6 18 

Train and Exercise DoD Personnel 5 15 

Educate Non-DoD Personnel 1 3 

Train Non-DoD Personnel 0 0 

Mission Essential Task Lists 2 6 

Subject Matter Experts in Exercise Planning and Execution 5 15 

Educate COCOMs (ETE) 7 21 

Publicize BW Preparedness 1 3 

Establish Collective Protection Standards 0 0 

Vulnerability Assessments 2 6 

Disease Containment Plan 5 15 

Installation Quarantine (ETE) 2 6 

International Quarantine (ETE) 0 0 

Information Management/Risk Communication for Installations (ETE) 3 9 

Information Management/Risk Communication for Civilian Public Health Authorities (ETE) 1 3 

Information Management/Risk Communication for Public Release (ETE) 2 6 

Joint and Coalition Decision Tools 2 6 
Appendix G4-6 

Category: Greatest Benefit, Total Voted 1-15 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop Raw 

Votes % of Total 

C-BW CONOPS 22 63 

Determine BW Agents Possible 8 23 

Re-Prioritize BW Threat Agents 6 17 

Decision Tools for Commanders 18 51 

BW FPCON/RAM Measures 10 29 

Develop Installation Medical Surveillance Information 20 57 

Develop DoD Integrated Information Collection 16 46 

Daily Health Screening 4 11 

922 Concept 8 23 

Weekly Commander's Stand-Up Briefings 2 6 

Enhance Research Community and Operator Interaction 6 17 

Badge-Based Biometrics 9 26 

Thermal Sensors 6 17 

R&D of Novel Agents 9 26 

R&D Versus Acquisition of Current Bio-detectors 8 23 

Improve Solutions/Technology Implementation Process 10 29 

Expand Joint BW ACTD Funding 11 31 

Public Information Packages and Media Relations 8 23 

Ventilation Systems 10 29 

New Detection Methods 16 46 

New Decontamination Methods 10 29 

New Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) 11 31 

Develop Individual Protection Guidance 6 17 

New Prophylaxis and Vaccines 17 49 

New Treatments 11 31 

Rapid Vaccine Approval 11 31 

Vaccinate All Military 12 34 

Increase DoD Vaccine Funding 7 20 

External Inputs for Prophylaxis and Vaccination Policies 4 11 

Disposition of BW contaminated personnel, remains, equipment 3 9 

"How Clean is Clean" Policy 8 23 

Fast In-Theater Confirmatory Analysis 14 40 

Pre-positioned Material and Supplies 10 29 

Initial Deployment Packages 3 9 

Develop Specialized BW Teams 9 26 

Hire BW-educated Health Care Workers and First Responders 4 11 

Train Health Care Workers and First Responders 8 23 

Quick-Reference Education Handouts 5 14 

Educate Senior-Level DoD Personnel (O-6 & Flag Officer, or Civilian Equivalent) 19 54 

Educate All Other DoD Personnel 12 34 

Train and Exercise DoD Personnel 14 40 

Educate Non-DoD Personnel 5 14 

Train Non-DoD Personnel 4 11 

Mission Essential Task Lists 6 17 

Subject Matter Experts in Exercise Planning and Execution 9 26 

Educate COCOMs (ETE) 13 37 

Publicize BW Preparedness 2 6 
Appendix G4-7 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop (cont.) Raw 

Votes % of Total 

Establish Collective Protection Standards 4 11 

Vulnerability Assessments 8 23 

Disease Containment Plan 12 34 

Installation Quarantine (ETE) 7 20 

International Quarantine (ETE) 3 9 

Information Management/Risk Communication for Installations (ETE) 8 23 

Information Management/Risk Communication for Civilian Public Health Authorities 

(ETE) 6 17 

Information Management/Risk Communication for Public Release (ETE) 8 23 

Joint and Coalition Decision Tools 5 14 

Category: Greatest Benefit, Total Voted 1-5 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop Raw 

Votes % of Total 

C-BW CONOPS 16 46 

Determine BW Agents Possible 3 9 

Re-Prioritize BW Threat Agents 1 3 

Decision Tools for Commanders 13 37 

BW FPCON/RAM Measures 6 17 

Develop Installation Medical Surveillance Information 5 14 

Develop DoD Integrated Information Collection 5 14 

Daily Health Screening 1 3 

922 Concept 1 3 

Weekly Commander's Stand-Up Briefings 1 3 

Enhance Research Community and Operator Interaction 1 3 

Badge-Based Biometrics 2 6 

Thermal Sensors 2 6 

R&D of Novel Agents 2 6 

R&D Versus Acquisition of Current Bio-detectors 3 9 

Improve Solutions/Technology Implementation Process 4 11 

Expand Joint BW ACTD Funding 5 14 

Public Information Packages and Media Relations 5 14 

Ventilation Systems 6 17 

New Detection Methods 8 23 

New Decontamination Methods 4 11 

New Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) 1 3 

Develop Individual Protection Guidance 2 6 

New Prophylaxis and Vaccines 10 29 

New Treatments 3 9 

Rapid Vaccine Approval 5 14 

Vaccinate All Military 6 17 

Increase DoD Vaccine Funding 2 6 

External Inputs for Prophylaxis and Vaccination Policies 0 0 

Disposition of BW contaminated personnel, remains, equipment 0 0 

"How Clean is Clean" Policy 2 6 

Fast In-Theater Confirmatory Analysis 3 9 

Pre-positioned Material and Supplies 1 3 

Initial Deployment Packages 1 3 
Appendix G4-8 

Idea from 85% Solution Workshop (cont.) Raw 

Votes % of Total 

Develop Specialized BW Teams 3 9 

Hire BW-educated Health Care Workers and First Responders 2 6 

Train Health Care Workers and First Responders 1 3 

Quick-Reference Education Handouts 0 0 

Educate Senior-Level DoD Personnel (O-6 & Flag Officer, or Civilian Equivalent) 9 26 

Educate All Other DoD Personnel 3 9 

Train and Exercise DoD Personnel 2 6 

Educate Non-DoD Personnel 0 0 

Train Non-DoD Personnel 0 0 

Mission Essential Task Lists 1 3 

Subject Matter Experts in Exercise Planning and Execution 2 6 

Educate COCOMs (ETE) 6 17 

Publicize BW Preparedness 0 0 

Establish Collective Protection Standards 0 0 

Vulnerability Assessments 4 11 

Disease Containment Plan 4 11 

Installation Quarantine (ETE) 1 3 

International Quarantine (ETE) 0 0 

Information Management/Risk Communication for Installations (ETE) 1 3 

Information Management/Risk Communication for Civilian Public Health Authorities 

(ETE) 0 0 

Information Management/Risk Communication for Public Release (ETE) 2 6 

Joint and Coalition Decision Tools 2 6 
Appendix G4-1