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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

Nos. 122,410

122,411

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

TOMMIE LEE BARRETT,

Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; BRUCE C. BROWN, judge. Opinion filed September 24, 

2021. Affirmed.

Carol Longenecker Schmidt, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Julie A. Koon, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, 

attorney general, for appellee.

Before BUSER, P.J., POWELL and HURST, JJ.

POWELL, J.: Without having raised these issues before the district court, Tommie 

Lee Barrett appeals both the order of restitution and the aggravated sentence he received 

in two consolidated cases. Barrett contests the restitution order because he was not given 

a restitution payment plan and claims, therefore, that the order constitutes an illegal 

sentence. Barrett also argues the district court violated his rights under the Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by imposing an aggravated 

sentence without requiring the State to prove his criminal history to a jury beyond a 
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reasonable doubt. For reasons more fully explained below, we reject Barrett's claims and 

affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

For acts he committed in June 2019, the State charged Barrett in two cases. In the

first, Barrett was charged with two counts of burglary, two counts of theft, one count of 

aggravated burglary, and one count of criminal possession of a weapon by a felon. In the

second case, Barrett was charged with one count of possession of methamphetamine and 

one count of possession of stolen property. Pursuant to a plea agreement encompassing 

both cases, Barrett pled guilty to aggravated burglary in the first case and theft in the 

second; he also agreed to pay restitution as requested by the victims. In exchange, the 

State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts in both cases.

At sentencing in November 2019, the district court denied Barrett's motion for 

durational or dispositional departure and sentenced him to 60 months' imprisonment in

the aggravated burglary case and 12 months' imprisonment in the theft case. The district 

court also ordered restitution in the theft case in the amount of $1,299.43, stating 

specifically that it was "collectible immediately and while in custody." Barrett did not 

object to restitution. The district court later amended Barrett's sentence in the theft case to 

27 months' imprisonment after the district court determined it had incorrectly pronounced

the severity level for that conviction. The district court affirmed and incorporated all 

other previously pronounced sentencing conditions, including the restitution order, at the 

resentencing hearing.

Barrett timely appeals.
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I. DID THE DISTRICT COURT IMPOSE AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE BY FAILING TO PROVIDE 

A RESTITUTION PAYMENT PLAN?

Barrett argues the district court imposed an illegal sentence because it failed to set 

a payment plan for restitution. He asks us to vacate the restitution order and remand the 

matter so the district court may set a payment plan. Barrett further contends that a failure 

to remand would violate due process because it would remove his vested interest in the 

district court setting a payment plan, an interest that was available to him at the time of 

sentencing.

As we noted at the outset, Barrett raises his assertion that his restitution order is 

illegal for the first time on appeal. Typically, appellants cannot raise issues on appeal that 

they did not raise before the district court. See State v. Kelly, 298 Kan. 965, 971, 318 P.3d 

987 (2014). However, "certain issues, such as subject matter jurisdiction or an illegal 

sentence, can be raised at any time regardless of whether the issue was presented to the 

district court." State v. Johnson, 309 Kan. 992, 995, 441 P.3d 1036 (2019); see K.S.A. 

2020 Supp. 22-3504(a) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time while the 

defendant is serving such sentence."). Restitution is part of a defendant's sentence. State 

v. Hall, 298 Kan. 978, 983, 319 P.3d 506 (2014).

Whether a sentence is illegal within the meaning of K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3504(c)

is a question of law subject to our unlimited review. State v. Sartin, 310 Kan. 367, 369, 

446 P.3d 1068 (2019). A sentence is illegal when: (1) it is imposed by a court without 

jurisdiction; (2) it does not conform to the applicable statutory provisions, either in 

character or the term of punishment; or (3) it is ambiguous about the time and manner in 

which it is to be served. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3504(c); State v. Hambright, 310 Kan. 

408, 411, 447 P.3d 972 (2019). A sentence is not illegal because of a change in the law 

that occurs after the sentence is pronounced. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3504(c)(1). But a

change in the law is one that occurs after the sentence is pronounced, "unless the opinion 
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is issued while the sentence is pending on appeal from the judgment of conviction."

K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3504(c)(2).

Barrett appears to be arguing his sentence is illegal because it does not conform in 

character to the statutory provisions. He states: "At the time of sentencing, K.S.A. 2019 

Supp. 21-6604(b)(1) & (2) required a district court to set a payment plan when ordering 

restitution. The district court in the present case failed to set a payment plan, and, as such, 

the restitution order in the present case is illegal." Parenthetically, we note the parties 

argue the applicability of the 2019 version of the statute, but at the time Barrett 

committed his crimes, the 2018 version was in effect. Fortunately, the two versions are 

the same in relevant part, so we apply their arguments as if they were arguing the 

applicability of the 2018 version.

To evaluate the legality of Barrett's restitution order, we must first interpret the 

statute that addresses restitution. We exercise unlimited review of legal questions 

involving the interpretation of the underlying statutes. State v. Martin, 308 Kan. 1343, 

1350, 429 P.3d 896 (2018).

When Barrett was sentenced in November 2019, K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6604(b)

governed restitution orders and stated in relevant part:

"(1) . . . [T]he court shall order the defendant to pay restitution . . . unless the 

court finds compelling circumstances that would render a plan of restitution unworkable. 

. . . If the court finds a plan of restitution unworkable, the court shall state on the record 

in detail the reasons therefor.

"(2) . . . If, after 60 days from the date restitution is ordered by the court, a 

defendant is found to be in noncompliance with the plan established by the court for the 

payment of restitution, . . . the court shall assign an agent . . . to collect the restitution on 

behalf of the victim." (Emphases added.)
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While this case has been on appeal, another panel of this court held that this statute 

required the district court to set a restitution plan. State v. Roberts, 57 Kan. App. 2d 836, 

845, 461 P.3d 77, vacated and remanded 2020 WL 8269363, at *1 (2020).

Subsequent to the Roberts opinion, however, the Legislature amended K.S.A. 21-

6604(b), effective June 11, 2020, to remove all references to a restitution plan. L. 2020, 

ch. 9, § 1. The amended version states:

"(1) . . . Restitution shall be due immediately unless: (A) The court orders that 

the defendant be given a specified time to pay or be allowed to pay in specified 

installments; or (B) the court finds compelling circumstances that would render 

restitution unworkable, either in whole or in part. . . . If the court finds restitution 

unworkable, either in whole or in part, the court shall state on the record in detail the 

reasons therefor.

"(2) . . . If, after 60 days from the date restitution is ordered by the court, a

defendant is found to be in noncompliance with the restitution order, . . . the court shall 

assign an agent . . . to collect the restitution on behalf of the victim." (Emphases added.)

K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6604(b).

The changes between the 2018 and 2020 versions above primarily function to 

remove any allusion to a restitution plan from the language of the statute. The phrase 

"would render a restitution plan unworkable" in the 2018 version became "would render 

restitution unworkable" in the 2020 version, while the phrase "if the court finds a 

restitution plan unworkable" became "if the court finds restitution unworkable." Finally, 

the language "in noncompliance with the plan established by the court for the payment of 

restitution" became "in noncompliance with the restitution order." These alterations to the 

statutory language are not substantive except in the removal of an allusion to a plan.
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With the 2020 amendments, the Legislature also added both a retroactivity clause

and a subsection providing an avenue for relief for a defendant who was not given a 

specified time to pay restitution or a restitution installment plan. The retroactivity clause 

reads as follows: "The amendments made to this section by this act are procedural in 

nature and shall be construed and applied retroactively." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6604(v). 

The other new subsection allows a defendant who is subject to a restitution order issued 

prior to the effective date of the 2020 amendments and which lacks a specified time to 

pay or an installment plan until December 31, 2020, to file a motion with the sentencing 

court seeking such a restitution order:

"If a restitution order entered prior to the effective date of this act does not give 

the defendant a specified time to pay or set payment in specified installments, the 

defendant may file a motion with the court prior to December 31, 2020, proposing 

payment of restitution in specified installments. The court may recall the restitution order 

from the agent assigned pursuant to K.S.A. 20-169, and amendments thereto, until the 

court rules on such motion. If the court does not order payment in specified installments 

or if the defendant does not file a motion prior to December 31, 2020, the restitution shall 

be due immediately." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6604(b)(3).

A. Restitution order legal under the 2018 restitution statute

Although the restitution statute was amended after Barrett was sentenced, our 

Supreme Court has held that "in a direct appeal, a defendant will receive the benefit of 

any change in the law that occurs while the direct appeal is pending." State v. Murdock, 

309 Kan. 585, 591, 439 P.3d 307 (2019). Barrett, however, does not believe he benefits 

from the change in the law, so he does not want it to apply.

Barrett argues that if the 2018 version of K.S.A. 21-6604 applies, he is entitled to 

remand because K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6604(b) requires a court not only to set an amount 

of restitution, but also to include a plan of payment when it orders restitution. He alleges 
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that the district court failed to meet this statutory requirement when sentencing him.

Barrett leans heavily on Roberts, 57 Kan. App. 2d at 845, in which another panel of this 

court vacated the district court's restitution order and remanded to "correct [Roberts'] 

sentence by establishing a plan of payment for restitution." The Roberts panel stated that 

"the statutory language of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6604(b) imposes upon 'the court' the 

responsibility for making a plan for the payment of restitution." 57 Kan. App. 2d at 845.

This reliance on Roberts, however, is problematic because in September 2020, which was 

after Barrett filed his brief in this court on June 30, 2020, the Kansas Supreme Court 

summarily vacated the Roberts panel's opinion and remanded the case for the panel to 

reconsider the matter in light of the 2020 amendments to K.S.A 21-6604 and K.S.A. 21-

6607. State v. Roberts, No. 120,377, 2020 WL 8269363, at *1 (Kan. 2020) (unpublished 

opinion).

But even if we assume the correctness of Roberts and that the 2018 version of 

K.S.A. 21-6604(b) did require the district court to impose a restitution payment plan, as 

Barrett argues, the district court did so here. The Roberts panel explained that a 

restitution payment plan "may be as simple as ordering a defendant to make the full 

restitution payment immediately or ordering monthly installments." 57 Kan. App. 2d at 

843. In the case before us, the district court made Barrett's restitution obligation 

"collectible immediately and while in custody." This meets the Roberts test that any 

restitution payment plan establish the amount of restitution owed and how it is to be 

repaid. 57 Kan. App. 2d at 844. Hence, when applying 2018 version of the restitution 

statute, there is no illegality in the district court's restitution order.

B. Restitution order legal under the 2020 restitution statute

The State argues Barrett's restitution order is legal because the 2020 amendments 

to the restitution statute have retroactive effect. However, we need not answer whether 

the 2020 amendments have retroactive effect because we have already determined 
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Barrett’s restitution order is legal under the 2018 version of the restitution statute. But 

even if we were to assume all the 2020 amendments are applicable to Barrett’s restitution 

order, his restitution order is also legal under the 2020 restitution statute. As we have 

noted above, the 2020 amendments to K.S.A. 21-6604(b) strip out any reference to a 

restitution "plan" and make restitution due and payable immediately unless the district 

court orders otherwise. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6604(b)(1). Here, the district court 

clearly ordered the amount Barrett owed in restitution and made it due immediately.

C. Too late to seek relief under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6604(b)(3)

As we have explained, a defendant gets the benefit of any change in the law which 

occurs while the defendant's case in on direct appeal. Murdock, 309 Kan. at 591. One 

such benefit included in the 2020 amendments to K.S.A. 21-6604 is the addition of new 

subsection (b)(3), which allows defendants with restitution orders imposed prior to the 

enactment of the 2020 amendments to seek a revised restitution order in the district court 

allowing restitution to be paid in installments. But this provision contains a deadline for 

seeking relief of December 31, 2020. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6604(b)(3). Barrett asks us to 

remand the case to the district court for that purpose. The State responds that K.S.A. 2020 

Supp. 21-6604(b)(3) specifies that Barrett may motion the district court for relief, 

implying a remand is not necessary and that Barrett’s appeal is moot.

Another panel of this court considered the 2020 amendments in State v. Logan, 

No. 122,116, 2021 WL 645929 (Kan. App. 2021) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied

August 31, 2021. Logan's restitution order was likewise issued before the 2020 

amendments and did not include a payment plan. While his appeal was pending, Logan 

requested the panel to stay the appeal and remand the case to the district court so that 

Logan could timely file a motion regarding the method of paying for restitution with the 

district court. The panel granted the stay and the remand. But at a December 15, 2020 

hearing before the district court, Logan waived his right to have a payment plan 
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established, yet he also stated he was not waiving his right to request a payment plan in 

the future, once his appeal was final. Once back before our court, the panel lifted the stay 

and issued a decision in which it noted that Logan's "remedy for the district court's 

alleged error in not providing a payment plan for its order of restitution lies solely with 

the district court by making a timely motion under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6604(b)(3)."

Logan, 2021 WL 645929, at *4. The panel further found that Logan failed to adequately 

support his claim that he was entitled to some future right to have the district court 

establish installment payments once his appeal was final and deemed that argument 

abandoned. 2021 WL 645929, at *5.

We also note that the Roberts panel, after having the case sent back to it by our 

Supreme Court, did remand the case to the district court to allow the defendant to motion 

the district court for relief under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6604(b)(3). However, that remand 

order was issued in October 2020, prior to the expiration of the December 31, 2020 

deadline.

Here, Barrett filed his brief on June 30, 2020, prior to the December 31, 2020 

statutory deadline, but has never asked us for a stay of his appeal as Logan did, and the 

deadline for that avenue of relief has now passed. Given that K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-

6604(b)(3) stipulates that a defendant seek relief in the district court, not an appellate 

court, Barrett's remedy lies there. As Barrett failed to avail himself of the statutory right 

to file a motion in the district court or request a stay from this court to do so prior to the 

deadline, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6604(b)(3) now provides no avenue whereby Barrett is 

entitled to request that his restitution be paid in specified installments.
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II. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN IMPOSING AN AGGRAVATED SENTENCE 

WITHOUT REQUIRING THE STATE TO PROVE THE AGGRAVATED FACTORS TO A

JURY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT?

Barrett argues for the first time on appeal that his constitutional rights under the 

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were violated due to 

the district court sentencing him to an aggravated sentence which was based in part on his 

criminal history, and the State did not prove that criminal history to a jury beyond a 

reasonable doubt. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 

147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000) (any fact that increases defendant's maximum penalty must be 

proven to jury beyond reasonable doubt). While constitutional issues may not typically be 

raised for the first time on appeal, State v. Daniel, 307 Kan. 428, 430, 410 P.3d 877 

(2018), Barrett argues we may consider this issue for the first time on appeal because it 

involves only a legal question arising from proven or admitted facts and is finally 

determinative of the case. See State v. Johnson, 309 Kan. 992, 995, 441 P.3d 1036 

(2019). But this question is not finally determinative of the case as a favorable resolution 

for Barrett would simply mean a remand to the district court for resentencing.

Moreover, Barrett acknowledges that the Kansas Supreme Court has already 

decided this issue adversely to him in State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44, 46, 41 P.3d 781 (2002)

(use of defendant's criminal history to increase sentence without it having been proven to 

jury beyond reasonable doubt not violative of Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments). See 

State v. Sullivan, 307 Kan. 697, 708, 414 P.3d 737 (2018) (reaffirming Ivory). 

Accordingly, we decline to address Barrett's constitutional challenge to his sentence. See 

State v. Rodriguez, 305 Kan. 1139, 1144, 390 P.3d 903 (2017) (Court of Appeals dutybound to follow Supreme Court precedent); see also State v. Gray, 311 Kan. 164, 170, 

459 P.3d 165 (2020) (no obligation to consider issue raised first time on appeal even if 

exception applies).
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Affirmed.