NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

JOHN PAUL JONES, III,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3123

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DE-3330-14-0364-I-1.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

JOHN PAUL JONES, III,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 

SERVICES,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3129

______________________ 
2 JONES v. DVA

Petitions for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DE-3330-14-0294-I-1, DE-3330-14-0295-I-1, 

DE-3330-14-0302-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: October 13, 2015

______________________ 

 JOHN PAUL JONES, III, Albuquerque, NM, pro se. 

 MEEN GEU OH, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondents. Also represented by BENJAMIN 

C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., ALLISON KIDDMILLER. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, MOORE, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

In these consolidated appeals, John Paul Jones, III

(“Jones”) appeals from two final orders of the Merit Systems Protection Board (the “Board”), which denied his

petitions for review and affirmed the Administrative 

Judge’s (“AJ’s”) decisions to deny his requests for corrective action under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (“VEOA”). Jones v. Dep’t of Veterans

Affairs, No. DE-333-14-0364-I-1 (M.S.P.B. Apr. 13, 2015) 

(“Jones I Final Order”); (M.S.P.B. Dec. 22, 2014) (“Jones I 

Initial Decision”); Jones v. Dep’t of Health & Human 

Servs., Nos. DE-3330-14-0294-I-1, DE-3330-14-0295-I-1, 

DE-3330-14-0302-I-I (M.S.P.B. Apr. 2, 2015) (“Jones II

Final Order”); (M.S.P.B. Nov. 24, 2014) (“Jones II Initial 

Decision”). We consider both appeals in this one opinion, 

but evaluate them separately. Because the Board did not 

err in denying both of Jones’s petitions for review, we 

affirm. 
JONES v. DVA 3

BACKGROUND

Jones served in the Army as a medical corpsman during the Vietnam War. As a result of his service, Jones is 

eligible for a five-point preference when seeking Federal 

employment. Jones has previously unsuccessfully appealed to this court from four different Board decisions 

since 2012 as part of his efforts to seek Federal employment. See Jones v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 

2015-3038, 2015 WL 4153929 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Jones v.

Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 544 F. App’x 976 (Fed. 

Cir. 2013); Jones v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 542 

F. App’x 912 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Jones v. Merit Sys. Prot. 

Bd., 497 F. App’x 1 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

I 

In 2014, Jones applied for Vacancy Announcement 

No. PG-14-DBA-1094170-ORD, as an Administrative 

Officer at the GS-14 level at the Department of Veterans 

Affairs (“VA”). As part of his application, Jones submitted 

a 30-page resume. Jones described his previous work 

experience, most of which he gained at King Faisal Specialized Hospital in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. In his resume, 

Jones explained that “Saudi Arabia was one of the poorer 

countries on earth,” “[g]oats still grazed the streets,” and 

“[t]here was no organized city garbage disposal.” Jones I, 

Appeal No. 2015-3123, Resp’t’s App. 50. According to 

Jones, those statements demonstrated his ability to work

constructively in different environments. 

Because the VA required applicants to have specialized experience, the VA required that applicants complete 

a self-assessment questionnaire to determine their suitability for the position. Jones completed the questionnaire, 

and for each selective experience question that the VA 

posed, Jones stated that he was “considered an expert in

performing” the stated task. Id. at 27–30. Based on 

Jones’s self-assessment, he was initially deemed “Best 
4 JONES v. DVA

Qualified” for the position. The VA then performed an 

audit of Jones’s application materials and found that 

Jones’s claimed “specialized experience” was not supported by his resume. Because Jones did not demonstrate the 

“specialized experience” necessary for the position, the VA 

ultimately deemed Jones ineligible for the position.

In response to his denial from the VA, Jones filed a 

complaint with the Department of Labor. Jones alleged 

that the VA violated the VEOA when it failed to find his 

experience sufficient to meet the selection criteria required by the announcement. The Department of Labor 

denied Jones relief, and Jones appealed to the Board. 

The Board’s AJ denied Jones’s request for corrective 

action. Jones I Initial Decision at 2. The AJ found that 

there was no dispute of material fact, and accordingly

declined to hold a hearing. Id. at 1. According to the AJ, 

Jones did not proffer “any evidence that [the VA] did 

anything other than what the evidence shows it did—

which was to consider, but find inadequate, [Jones’s] 

resume.” Id. at 6. The AJ further found that Jones’s 

assertion that the VA used “overly selective criteria” was 

not a violation of veteran’s preference and was beyond the 

AJ’s review. Id. at 6–7. The AJ thus concluded that the 

VA did not violate any of Jones’s VEOA rights. Id. at 7. 

Jones timely petitioned the full Board for review of the 

initial decision.

The full Board denied the petition for review and affirmed the AJ’s initial decision. Jones I Final Order at 2. 

The Board found that the VEOA did not “empower the 

Board to reevaluate the merits of an agency’s ultimate 

determination that a preference-eligible veteran is not 

qualified for a position with the agency.” Id. at 6. The 

Board found that Jones did not identify any relevant 

experience in his resume that the VA failed to consider in 

reviewing his application and in making the determina-
JONES v. DVA 5

tion that Jones was ineligible. Id. at 7. According to the 

Board, “[a]n agency is not required to hire a preferenceeligible veteran, if, as was the case here, the agency does 

not believe that the candidate is qualified or possesses the 

necessary experience.” Id.

The Board also addressed Jones’s argument that the 

AJ failed to substantively address the VA counsel’s use of 

the phrases “goat herder” and “garbage collector” in a 

pleading in reference to Jones’s work experience. Id. The 

Board found that the counsel’s conduct, including the use 

of the language Jones objected to, did “not constitute 

preponderant evidence that the agency violated [Jones’s] 

statutory or regulatory veterans’ preference rights in the 

selection process.” Id. at 8. The Board thus denied 

Jones’s petition for review. Id.

Jones appealed to this court from the Board’s final decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(9).

II

In 2014, Jones also applied for three different positions at the Centers for Disease Control, an agency of 

Health and Human Services (“HHS”): Vacancy Announcement Nos. HHS-CDC-D3-14-1053427, HHS-CDCD3-14-1049139, and HHS-CDC-D4-14-1058639. Each of 

the three competitive selection vacancy announcements 

indicated that the HHS had concurrently issued a vacancy 

announcement for the same position under merit promotion procedures. The competitive selection announcements advised the applicants to apply separately for each 

announcement to be considered under both procedures. 

However, Jones did not apply to the vacancy announcements under the merit promotion procedures, but did so 

only under the competitive selection procedure. In any 

event, for each position, HHS determined that Jones was 

not eligible for employment pursuant to the vacancy 
6 JONES v. DVA

announcement. HHS made no employment selections 

pursuant to the competitive selection announcements, 

and, instead, made all of its employment selections pursuant to the merit promotion vacancy announcements. 

Following HHS’s non-selection of Jones for the vacancies, Jones filed three complaints with the Department of 

Labor. The Department of Labor denied him relief, and 

he appealed to the Board. 

The AJ consolidated Jones’s appeals and denied his 

requests for corrective action. Jones II Initial Decision at

2. As in Jones I, the AJ found that there was no dispute 

of material fact, and accordingly declined to hold a hearing. Id. The AJ first found that HHS’s unrebutted evidence established that HHS never made selections from 

the three competitive selection vacancy announcements, 

“instead making all selections from the applicable merit 

promotions announcements.” Id. at 5. The AJ concluded 

that HHS did not violate the VEOA by advertising a 

vacant position under both competitive selection and 

merit promotion announcements, and then making its 

selection exclusively from the merit promotion announcement. Id. at 5–6. Even if HHS had filled the 

positions from competitive selection announcements, the 

AJ found that “preponderant evidence establishes that 

the agency did not improperly omit, overlook, or exclude a 

portion of [Jones’s] experiences or work history in assessing his qualifications for the vacancy and finding him 

not qualified.” Id. at 8–9. Jones petitioned the full Board 

for review of the initial decision.

The full Board denied the petition for review and affirmed the AJ’s initial decision. Jones II Final Order at 2. 

The Board agreed with the AJ that Jones failed to show 

that HHS violated his veterans’ preference rights “when it 

made its selections from the merit promotions certificates 

issued pursuant to the merit promotion announcements, 
JONES v. DVA 7

for which he did not apply.” Id. at 4. The Board also 

agreed that there was no genuine issue of material fact, 

and as a result, the AJ did not err in proceeding without a 

hearing. Id. Responding to Jones’s claim that the AJ was 

biased against him, the Board found that Jones failed to 

meet his burden of showing that the AJ’s actions evidenced “a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that 

would make fair judgment impossible.” Id. at 5 (citation 

omitted).

Jones appealed to this court from the Board’s final decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(9).

DISCUSSION

The scope of our review in an appeal from a Board decision is limited. We can only set aside the Board’s decision if it was “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) 

obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or 

regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by 

substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); see Briggs v. 

Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 331 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

The Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence 

“if it is supported by such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Brewer v. U.S. Postal Serv., 647 F.2d 1093, 1096 

(Ct. Cl. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).

To establish a claim under the VEOA, a preference eligible veteran must show that an agency has violated his 

rights under any statute or regulation relating to veterans’ preference with respect to federal employment. See 5 

U.S.C. § 3330a(a)(1)(A).

I 

We first consider whether the Board erred in denying 

Jones’s request for corrective action under the VEOA for 
8 JONES v. DVA

the VA vacancy announcement. Jones argues that the VA 

violated his VEOA rights, and he specifically asserts that 

the VA counsel’s use of the “slurs,” “goat herder” and 

“garbage collector,” was overlooked by the Board. Jones 

also contends that he should have been entitled to a 

hearing because there were disputed material facts. 

The government responds that the Board did not err 

in denying Jones’s request for corrective action. According to the government, the VA properly reviewed Jones’s 

relevant experience. The government contends that VA 

counsel’s choice of language during the Board proceedings 

does not diminish the fact that the VA gave due consideration to the experience listed in Jones’s application materials and deemed him ineligible prior to the Board

proceedings. Finally, the government argues that the 

Board correctly concluded that the VEOA appeal could be 

decided without a hearing because there were no genuine 

disputes of material fact.

We agree with the government that the Board did not 

err in denying Jones’s requests for corrective action under 

the VEOA. Jones does not dispute that the VA reviewed 

and considered all of his application materials. As the 

Board found, the VA deemed Jones ineligible for the 

vacant position because he was unable to demonstrate the 

“specialized experience” necessary for the position. As we 

have stated, “the VEOA does not enable veterans to be 

considered for positions for which they are not qualified.” 

Lazaro v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 666 F.3d 1316, 1319 

(Fed. Cir. 2012). And to the extent Jones argues that the 

test the VA used in deeming him ineligible was too strict, 

the VEOA does not empower the Board to supplant the 

VA’s criteria with its own. See id. Although the VA 

counsel’s choice of language in its pleading may not have 

been satisfying to Jones, the language does not indicate 

that the VA misinterpreted Jones’s relevant work experience when reviewing his employment application. 
JONES v. DVA 9

With respect to Jones’s argument about the lack of a 

hearing, “the Board has the authority to decide a VEOA 

appeal on the merits, without a hearing, where there is no 

genuine dispute of material fact and one party must 

prevail as a matter of law.” Haasz v. Dep’t of Veterans 

Affairs, 108 M.S.P.R. 349, 353 (2008) (citations omitted); 

see 5 C.F.R. § 1208.23(b) (“[a] hearing may be provided to 

the appellant” (emphasis added)). Jones has failed to 

point to any genuine dispute of material fact, and thus the 

Board did not err in declining to conduct a hearing. We 

have considered Jones’s remaining arguments, but find 

them unpersuasive. 

II

We next consider whether the Board erred in denying 

Jones’s request for corrective action under the VEOA for 

the three competitive selection vacancy announcements at 

HHS. Jones argues that HHS violated his rights pursuant to the VEOA, and further contends that the Board 

erred in failing to consider the AJ’s bias against Jones. 

Jones also asserts that he should have been entitled to a 

hearing because there were disputed material facts.

The government responds that the Board did not err 

in denying Jones’s requests for corrective action. According to the government, HHS did not violate Jones’s rights 

under the VEOA by making its employment selections 

through merit promotion announcements. The government also asserts that the Board considered the allegations of bias, but correctly found that there was no abuse 

of discretion by the AJ.

We agree with the government that the Board did not 

err in denying Jones’s requests for corrective action under 

the VEOA. As the Board found, HHS posted three competitive selection vacancy announcements, and concurrently posted announcements for the same positions 

under merit procedures. Jones did not apply to the merit 

promotion vacancy announcements, and HHS made its 
10 JONES v. DVA

selections through those merit-based announcements. 

The Board did not err in concluding that Jones was not 

denied his rights pursuant to the VEOA because an 

agency may solicit applications from both the public and 

merit promotion applicants simultaneously, and then fill 

the vacant position from the merit promotion certificate

without violating the rights of those who applied only 

through the public, competitive process. Joseph v. Fed. 

Trade Comm’n, 505 F.3d 1380, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

The Board considered Jones’s allegation of bias, but 

the Board correctly concluded that there was no abuse of 

discretion by the AJ. Jones argues that the AJ’s decision 

not to grant a hearing is evidence of the bias, but Jones 

has failed to point to any genuine dispute of material fact

that would necessitate a hearing. See Haasz, 108 

M.S.P.R. at 353. None of the AJ’s actions exhibited “a 

deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make 

fair judgment impossible.” Bieber v. Dep’t of the Army, 

287 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Liteky v. 

United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). We therefore 

conclude that the Board did not err in denying Jones’s 

request for corrective action under the VEOA. We have 

considered Jones’s remaining arguments, but find them 

unpersuasive. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decisions of the Board 

in both appeals are affirmed. 

AFFIRMED