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WORLDWIDE THREATS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 26, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

FEBRUARY 26, 2015

Page 

WORLDWIDE THREATS .............................................................................................. 1 

Clapper, James R., Director of National Intelligence ........................................... 4 

Stewart, Lt. Gen. Vincent, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency ............ 38 

(III) 

(1) 

WORLDWIDE THREATS 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room SD– 

106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, 

Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Reed, 

Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and King. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, good morning. Good morning, everybody. 

We have some nominations that, when we get sufficient number 

of frightened members who couldn’t brave the snow today to come 

in—and we also have a—that—— 

Glad to see the Senator from Maine here, who is used to this 

kind of weather year-round. 

So, anyway, so we’ll—if we get a quorum, we’ll talk about the 

nominations. 

And also, I’d like to tell the members here that Senator Reed and 

I have agreed on a letter to the Budget Committee concerning our 

views as to what the Budget Committee should do on Defense. And, 

hopefully, we’ll circulate that letter and get as many signatures as 

possible. Both Senator Reed and I have reached agreement on that 

letter, and I’d like you to look at it, and as many as possible can 

sign it. 

The committee meets today to receive testimony on the nature 

and scope of the global threats faced by the United States and our 

allies. 

I want to welcome James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, and General Vincent Stewart, the newly confirmed Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Thank you for being with 

us today. 

The committee recently conducted several hearings with some of 

our most respected national security leaders to explore the need for 

strategic thinking to address the threats we face. In the course of 

those hearings, these military and foreign policy leaders all agreed 

that the current international environment is more complex and 

dangerous than at any time in recent memory. 

On the terrorism front, ISIL continues to dominate much of Syria 

and Iraq while spreading its dark and vicious ideology in its effort 

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to become the dominant Islamic extremist group in the world. At 

the same time, the risk of attacks by foreign fighters returning 

from the battlefield, or lone-wolf threats inspired by ISIL’s successes, only increases the danger to the West. And Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Africa, al Qaeda and its affiliated groups continue 

to take advantage of ungoverned spaces to plan attacks against the 

United States and Western interests. 

Simply put, we are engaged in a generational fight for civilization against brutal enemies, and defeating these enemies require 

significant intelligence resources and focus, given the diffuse and 

constantly evolving nature of the threat. 

But, as we continue the fight against Islamic extremists, we 

must not lose sight of the other strategic threats we face. As the 

world ponders how to respond to Russia’s invasion and dismemberment of Eastern Ukraine, Russia’s provocations are only more worrisome in light of Vladimir Putin’s intense focus on building up and 

modernizing Russia’s military forces and doctrine and the geopolitical ambitions that these new Russian capabilities are designed to further. 

In Asia, stability and security of a vital and economically significant region is threatened by North Korea’s continued aggression, 

buildup of its nuclear arsenal, and development of long-range ballistic missiles. The far greater challenge is China’s dramatic growth 

and modernization of its own military capabilities, which appear 

designed to restrict the United States military’s ability to operate 

in the western Pacific. 

That chart over there is very interesting, in that it shows the expansion by China in areas of the South China Sea. And I hope our 

witnesses might comment on the fact that, apparently, they are filling in enough of that area to perhaps employ weaponry such as 

anti-air and other capabilities. 

Anyway, Iran continues to exert malign influence throughout the 

Middle East and Africa, using proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, 

Sudan, Yemen, Gaza, and Bahrain, to undermine United States 

strategic interests. In fact, the Iranian influence and presence in 

Iraq have become one of the key factors and, it seems, limitations 

in United States policy planning in Iraq and Syria. We must also 

remain focused on the myriad potential threats of the future and, 

thus, maintain technological superiority against potential adversaries. Today this is of most concern in the cyber and space domains, where we see increasingly capable and aggressive activities 

by nation-state adversaries in areas with few established norms. 

I’d appreciate our witnesses’ thoughts on each of these major 

issues. As policymakers, we look to the intelligence committee— 

community to provide timely and accurate information about the 

nature of the threats we face, the intentions of our adversaries, and 

the likely effect of certain actions we could take. In an age of increasing threats and flat defense budgets, the need for accurate intelligence about the plans and intentions of global actors becomes 

even more paramount. 

Again, I want to thank Director Clapper and General Stewart for 

testifying today. I look forward to your assessments of the nature 

and scope of the myriad threats we face, how the intelligence comVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:16 Jul 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING 2015\15-18-RTP WILDA
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munity prioritizes and approaches these many threats, and which 

of these many issues concern you the most. 

Senator Reed. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me join you in welcoming our witnesses. As they know very, 

very well, we currently face an alarming number of complex and 

varied national security challenges from many corners of the globe. 

And our witnesses’ views on, and assessments of, these challenges 

are critical to the work of this committee. 

Last week, I traveled to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and 

had the opportunity to meet not only with the leaders in those 

countries, but also with the United States civilians and uniformed 

personnel who are so ably and courageously serving the United 

States. 

In Iraq, our military commanders stressed that, despite the setbacks that extremist fighters have suffered, ISIS remains capable 

militarily. It continues to consolidate its power in the region, including through the coercion of local populations. Coalition airstrikes have enabled local security forces, including Kurdish 

peshmerga and the Iraqi government’s newly established militias, 

many of them Shi’a, to begin to gain ground from ISIS. But, concerns remain about when Iraq Security Forces will be ready to 

launch a counteroffensive to take Mosul and about Iran’s growing 

influence inside Iraq. I look forward to hearing the witnesses’ views 

on Iraq and the capabilities of both the military and the new government. 

In Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Taliban remains resilient, despite coming under pressure on both sides of the border. The challenge for United States forces in Afghanistan will be to keep the 

counterterrorism pressure on the Taliban even as we build the capacity of Afghan Special Operations Forces to ensure that Afghanistan does not once again become a haven for al-Qaeda and other 

terrorists. We would be interested in our witnesses’ views on the 

Taliban threat for the 2015 fighting season, the possibility of Pakistan-supported reconciliation talks with the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan, and the significance of reports of a growing ISIS presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

On Iran, the diplomatic effort to prevent Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons are ongoing, and the end of March is the next point 

at which we will assess Iran’s intent with regard to its nuclear program. I hope the witnesses will provide us with an update on the 

intelligence community’s thinking with regard to negotiations and 

our assessment of Iran’s activities in the region under the two possible scenarios: deal or no deal. 

In Syria, coalition airstrikes of the naval Kurdish fighters to regain control of Khobani and expand outward, but ISIS remains a 

formidable force. General Nagata will begin training the moderate 

Syrian opposition in the coming months. And, if successful, these 

forces could, over time, assist the coalition to promote the conditions for a political settlement. Just last week, at a Regional Chiefs 

of Defense Conference, the United States and Turkey signed a key 

agreement to allow training of these forces to begin in Turkey once 

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recruits are identified. I am interested in the witnesses’ views on 

the potential of this Syrian training initiative and the challenges 

we’ll face. 

In Europe, the post-cold-war international order is under threat 

from a Russia that seeks to intimidate the Ukraine and other 

neighboring countries through the creation or perpetuation of conflicts at increasingly aggressive military activities. Your assessment of the size of Russia’s military buildup and President Putin’s 

intentions could be of interest to the committee. 

We’ve faced a different, but no less complex, series of challenge 

in the Asia-Pacific region. A recent cyber attack on Sony by North 

Korea illustrates the unpredictable and coercive nature of that regime and demonstrates that even a relatively small and weak 

rogue nation taking advantage of our unparalleled dependence on 

electronic networks can reach across the ocean to cause extensive 

damage to a United States-based economic target through cyberspace. Furthermore, while Chinese cyber attacks are not as public, 

they are just as problematic and continue to pose a security challenge to the United States. We would be interested to know whether we can expect more attacks of this nature and what we can do 

to make our systems and our Nations more resilient in the future. 

Finally, we have a threat close to home, and that is sequestration. It is a threat that jeopardizes not only our National security, 

but our public safety, health, transportation, education, and environmental resources, as well. As we receive testimony today on the 

current and future threats to our National security, we here in 

Congress must be mindful of the necessity to find a balanced and 

bipartisan solution that includes a repeal of sequestration. 

Thank you again for appearing today, and I look forward to hearing your testimony. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Welcome the witnesses. 

General Clapper. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES R. CLAPPER, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 

INTELLIGENCE 

Mr. CLAPPER. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and 

members of the committee, it’s a great pleasure and honor for me 

to be here with General Vince Stewart. And he and I are here 

today to update you on some, but certainly not all, of the pressing 

intelligence and national security issues facing our Nation. 

I need to note up front that there were some classified issues we 

discussed in our closed hearing on Tuesday that we won’t be able 

to discuss as fulsomely in this open televised hearing. 

In the interest of time and to allow for questions, I will only 

cover some of the wave tops on behalf of both of us. Two overall 

comments at the outset: 

One, unpredictable instability is the new normal. The year 2014 

saw the highest rate of political instability since 1992, the most 

deaths as a result of state-sponsored mass killings since the early 

1990s, and the highest number of refugees and internally displaced 

persons, or IDPs, since World War II. Roughly half of the world’s 

currently stable countries are at some risk of instability over the 

next 2 years. 

5 

The second overall comment is, this pervasive uncertainty makes 

it all the harder to predict the future. 2014 and 2015 saw a number 

of events that illustrate this difficulty: the North Korean attack on 

Sony, the most serious and costly cyberattack against United 

States interests to date, the ebola epidemic, and the small-scale but 

dramatic terrorist attacks in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, and the United States. 

Again this year, I’ll start with cyber threats. Attacks against us 

are increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication, and severity of 

impact. Although we must be prepared for a catastrophic largescale strike, a so-called ‘‘cyber Armageddon,’’ the reality is that 

we’ve been living with a constant and expanding barrage of 

cyberattacks for some time. This insidious trend, I believe, will continue. Cyber poses a very complex set of threats, because profit-motivated criminals, ideologically motivated hackers, or extremists in 

variously capable nation-states, like Russia, China, North Korea, 

and Iran, are all potential adversaries, who, if they choose, can do 

great harm. Additionally, the methods of attack, the systems targeted, and the victims are also expanding in diversity and intensity 

on a daily basis. 

2014 saw, for the first time, destructive cyberattacks carried out 

on United States soil by nation-state entities, marked first by the 

Iranian attack against the Las Vegas Sands Casino Corporation, a 

year ago this month, and the North Korean attack against Sony in 

November. While the both of these nations have lesser technical capabilities in comparison to Russia and China, these destructive attacks demonstrate that Iran and North Korea are motivated and 

unpredictable cyber actors. 

Russia and China continue to develop very sophisticated cyber 

programs. While I can’t go into detail here, the Russian cyber 

threat is more severe than we had previously assessed. And Chinese economic espionage against United States companies remains 

a major threat, despite detailed private-sector reports, scathing 

public indictments, and stern U.S. demarches. 

With respect to non-nation-state entities, some ideologically motivated cyber actors expressing support for ISIL have demonstrated 

their capabilities by hacking several social media accounts. The socalled ‘‘Cyber Caliphate’’ successfully hacked CENTCOM’s Twitter 

account and YouTube page in January, and, 2 weeks ago, hacked 

Newsweek magazine’s Twitter handle. 

The most pervasive cyber threat to the U.S. financial sector is 

from cyber criminals. Criminals were responsible for cyber intrusions in 2014 into JPMorgan, Home Depot, Target, Nieman 

Marcus, Anthem, and other United States companies. And, in the 

future, we’ll probably see cyber operations that change or manipulate electronic information to compromise its integrity instead of 

simply deleting or disrupting access to it. In the end, the cyber 

threat cannot be completely eliminated. Rather, we must be vigilant in our efforts to detect, manage, and defend against it. 

Moving on to terrorism. In 2013, just over 11,500 terrorist attacks worldwide killed approximately 22,000 people. Preliminary 

data for the first 9 months of 2014 reflects nearly 13,000 attacks, 

which killed 31,000 people. When the final accounting is done, 2014 

will have been the most lethal year for global terrorism in the 45 

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years such data has been compiled. About half of all attacks, as 

well as fatalities, in 2014 occurred in just three countries: Iraq, 

Pakistan, and Afghanistan. 

I’m drawing this data—the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 

(ISIL) conducted more attacks than any other terrorist group in the 

first 9 months of 2014, and in—credit where credit’s due, I’m drawing this data from the National Consortium of the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, or START, at the University 

of Maryland. 

The recent terrorist attacks in Europe emphasize the threat 

posed by small numbers of extremists radicalized by the conflicts 

in Syria and Iraq. The global media attention and widespread support in extremist circles for these attacks probably will inspire additional extremists to conduct similar attacks. 

And ISIL, al Qaeda, and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and, 

most recently, al-Shabaab, are calling on their supporters to support lone-wolf attacks against the United States and other Western 

countries. Of the 13 attacks in the west since last May, 12 were 

conducted by individual extremists. 

Since the conflict began, more than 20,000 Sunni foreign fighters 

have traveled to Syria from more than 90 countries to fight the 

Assad regime. Of that number, at least 13,600 have extremist ties. 

More than 3400 Western fighters have gone to Syria and Iraq. 

Hundreds have returned home to Europe. About 180 Americans or 

so have been involved in various stages of travel to Syria. I should 

point out this is those who’ve attempted to go, didn’t get there, 

those who got there and were killed, those who got there, fought, 

and went to another country, and some number who have come 

back. A relatively small number have returned, and we’ve not identified any of them engaged in attack plotting. Nevertheless, the 

homegrown violent extremists continue to pose the most likely 

threat to the Homeland. Lone actors or insular groups who act autonomously will likely gravitate to simpler plots that don’t require 

advanced skills, outside training, or communication with others. A 

small, but persistent, number of Sunni terrorist groups remain intent on striking the United States and the west, some of whom still 

see commercial aviation as an appealing target. 

Moving to the Mideast, ISIL is increasing its influence outside of 

Iraq and Syria, seeking to expand its self-declared caliphate into 

the Arabian Peninsula, North Africa, and South Asia, and planning 

terrorist attacks against Western and Shi’a interests. ISIL’s rise 

represents the greatest shift in the Sunni violent extremist landscape since al Qaeda affiliates first began forming, and it is the 

first to assume at least some characteristics of a nation-state. 

Spillover from the Syrian conflict is raising the prospect of instability in Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. In Iraq, sectarian conflict in mixed Shi’a/Sunni areas is growing, and, if not blunted, will 

undermine progress against ISIL. While Prime Minister Abadi has 

begun to alter the ethnosectarian tone in Iraq, resistance from his 

Shi’a political allies and persistent distrust among Iraqi leaders 

will limit progress toward a stable, inclusive political environment. 

ISIL’s ability to conduct large-scale offensive operations in Iraq 

has been degraded by coalition airstrikes, the provision of weapons 

and munitions by the United States and other allies, and stiffened 

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defenses by the Iraqi Security Forces, Kurdish peshmerga, Shi’a 

militants, and tribal allies, not to mention the Iranians. However, 

ISIL remains, as we’ve seen, a formidable and brutal threat. 

Moving to Syria and parts of western Syria, the Syrian regime 

made consistent gains in 2014, but it will require years for it to reassert significant control of the country as a whole. The regime has 

a clear advantage over the opposition, which is plagued by disunity 

as well as firepower, manpower, and logistical shortfalls. Right 

now, they’re incapable of militarily ousting Assad, and will probably remain so in 2015. 

Assad is confident. He thinks the war is winnable. The conflict, 

with over 202,000 people killed—estimated to have been killed— 

will continue to threaten the stability of its regional neighbors and 

foster the rise of regional sectarianism and extremism. As well, it 

will strain the region’s fragile economic balance as millions of refugees continue to flee the conflict. Over 52 percent of Syria’s prewar 

population, or about 11.4 million people, has been displaced. 

Iran is exerting its influence in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Tehran 

has provided robust military support to Damascus and Baghdad in 

the form of arms, advisors, funding, intelligence collection, electronic warfare, and cyber support, and combat support. More 

broadly, Iran will face many of the same decision points in 2015 

as it did in 2014. Foremost is whether the Supreme Leader will 

agree to a nuclear deal. He wants sanctions relief, but, at the same 

time, to preserve his options on nuclear capabilities. 

In Libya, two rival governments emerged, so the country has no 

clear legitimate political authority and is embroiled in a civil war. 

External support to both sides by countries in the region has further stoked the violence. Extremists and terrorist groups affiliated 

with al Qaeda and ISIL are exploiting Libya’s permissive security 

environment. They’re using the country to train and to plot. ISIL’s 

beheadings of the Coptic Christians highlight the growing threat 

posed by ISIL and affiliated groups in Libya. 

Moving to Yemen, the evacuation of our Embassy in Sana’a has, 

for now, reduced the effectiveness of our counterterrorism efforts. 

After President Hadi’s attempted resignation and the Huthi’s unilateral dissolution of the government, Yemen’s political future and 

stability are, at best, uncertain, particularly with Hadi’s apparent 

escape to Aden and perhaps his reassertion of his presidential authorities. Iran has provided support to the Huthis for years, and 

there ascendancy is increasing Iran’s influence. 

Let me move briefly to Russia. The crisis in Ukraine is entering 

its second year and is achieving—and achieving a lasting solution 

that allows Kiev to pursue western integration will be difficult, to 

say the least. Moscow sees itself in direct confrontation with the 

west over Ukraine, and will be very prone to overreact to United 

States actions. Putin’s goals are to keep Ukraine out of NATO and 

to ensure separatist control and autonomous entity within Ukraine. 

He wants Moscow to retain leverage over Kiev. And Crimea, in his 

view, is simply not negotiable. 

Russian dominance over the former Soviet space is Russia’s highest foreign policy goal. Falling oil prices, Ukraine-related costs, and 

Western sanctions have spurred double-digit inflation and have 

tipped Russia’s economy towards recession. Russia will continue to 

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possess the largest, most capable foreign nuclear ballistic missile 

force. Russia’s weapons modernization plans will focus on strategic 

warfare and ways to mitigate what they think are our advantages, 

like prompt global strike. 

China. China’s leaders are primarily concerned with domestic 

issues: the Communist Party’s hold on power, internal stability, 

and economic growth. Although China is looking for stable ties 

with the United States, it’s more willing to accept bilateral and regional tensions in pursuit of its interests, especially on maritime 

sovereignty issues. And, as you noted, Chairman McCain, China is 

expanding and accelerating the buildup of outposts in the South 

China Sea, to include stationing for their ships and potential airfields. More broadly, they continue an aggressive military modernization program directly aimed at what they consider to be our 

strengths. Their military training program last year included exercises unprecedented in scope, scale, and complexity to both test 

modernization progress and to improve their theater warfare capabilities. President Xi Jinping is pursuing an ambitious reform agenda that risks both leadership tensions and domestic unrest. The 

slowdown of the Chinese economy is reinforcing the leader’s neuralgia about internal stability and reinforcing a harsh crackdown 

on internal dissent. 

Needless to say, there are many more threats to United States 

interests worldwide that we can address, many of which are covered in detail in our statement for the record—notably, the classified version—such as Afghanistan, North Korea, and weapons of 

mass destruction. 

But, I think, with that grim litany, will—I will stop and will 

open to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Clapper follows:] 

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STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. VINCENT STEWART, DIRECTOR OF 

THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

General STEWART. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, we 

have the statement for the record and just one oral statement from 

Director Clapper. 

[The prepared statement of General Stewart follows:] 

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Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Director Clapper, on the issue of defensive weaponry to Ukraine, 

do you believe that, if we give that assistance, that it would escalate—provoke Putin to escalate his assistance to the, quote, ‘‘separatists’’ and his aggression against Ukraine? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, General Breedlove discussed this recently, 

and he did make, I think, a very apt comment, and, you know, predicting exactly what Putin will do or what his behavior will be is 

something of an unknown. I think the intelligence community view 

is that, if we were to provide lethal assistance to Ukraine, that this 

would evoke a negative reaction from Putin and the Russians. It 

61 

could potentially further remove the very thin figleaf of their position that they’re not—have not been involved in Ukraine, and could 

lead to accelerating or promoting more weaponry and higher sophistication into the separatist areas to support the separatists. 

But, I hasten to add, this is an intelligence community assessment, 

and this is not necessarily to suggest opposition to provision of lethal aid. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, I’m glad you added that, because my 

next question is, What more do you think that Putin would do— 

could do? Go to Kiev? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Sir, we don’t—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. They certainly—the weaponry he’s using now 

is his most sophisticated weaponry. 

Mr. CLAPPER. We don’t—well, he could bring in a lot more if he 

wanted to, and—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. He could bring in more—— 

Mr. CLAPPER.—certainly more volumes of it. 

Chairman MCCAIN. To do what? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, for example, armed helicopters—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Yeah, to do—to achieve what goal? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, it is not our assessment that he is bent on 

capturing or conquering all of Ukraine. He certainly wants—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Absolutely. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—I believe he wants a whole—from an infrastructure standpoint—entity, I believe, composed of the two oblasts in 

eastern Ukraine— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Which he’s already—— 

Mr. CLAPPER.—to include, perhaps—— 

Chairman McCain:—achieving. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—a land bridge to Crimea and perhaps a port—specifically, Mariupol. We do not believe that an attack on Mariupol 

is imminent. Think they’re in the mode now of reconstituting and 

regrouping after the major confrontation in Debaltseve. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, I have to tell you that I disagree with 

you. They’re already increasing activities around Mariupol, and I 

will predict to you now he will put additional pressure on Mariupol, 

because he wants to establish the land bridge there. Just as some 

of us predicted exactly what he’s doing now. 

And to say that we’re worried about provoking him, he’s not 

going to go to Kiev. He’s going to establish the land bridge to Crimea, and then he’s going to figure out whether he should go to 

Moldova, or not. He’s already putting intense pressure on the Baltics. We all know that. We don’t have to have intelligence reports 

to get that. 

So, this idea that somehow we will provoke Vladimir Putin—he’s 

done everything he wanted to do, General. You tell me what he 

didn’t want to do that would have—that he would have done if we 

had provided these people with the ability to defend themselves 

rather than be slaughtered by the most modern equipment that the 

Russians have. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I don’t think he will view it happily if we 

provide—if the United States provides lethal support. That’s—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Because more Russians might be killed who 

are now in Crimea killing Ukrainians. 

62 

Mr. CLAPPER. That’s right. And it will be harder for him to hide 

that fact to the home audience. 

Chairman MCCAIN. What difference does it make whether he 

hides it? There’s no hiding what he’s done. Everybody knows what 

he’s done. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, everyone in Russia—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. General Breedlove has made it—laid it out 

very clearly. 

Well, I’m not in an open dispute with you. I’d—we’ve got to move 

on. But, it is just incredible to believe that he would be, quote, 

‘‘provoked’’ to further action, when he has achieved every goal that 

he sought along the way. And we’ll see who’s right about Mariupol, 

Director Clapper. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Sir, I’m not arguing about Mariupol. The only 

issue there is timing. I believe they will not—they’ll wait—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. He’s got plenty of time. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—they’ll wait til the spring before they attack. 

That’s—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Sure. 

Mr. CLAPPER. That will be a formal undertaking for the Russians 

and the separatists. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I agree with you. 

Mr. CLAPPER. It’s much better defended. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I totally agree with you. Why not pull back? 

He’s not getting any increasing in sanctions, he’s not getting weapons—or the Ukrainians aren’t receiving defensive weapons from us. 

If I were him, I would do exactly that, too. He’s got plenty of time. 

Yesterday, the Secretary of State said, ‘‘Our citizens, our world 

today, is actually—despite ISIL, despite the visible killings that 

you see and how horrific they are, we’re actually living in a period 

of less daily threat to Americans and to people in the world than 

normally. Less deaths, less violent deaths today than through the 

last century.’’ And yet, just today, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and others have said that there are 

threats to 30 nations—excuse me—30 States in this Nation. What 

is your view of the threat to the United States of America, Director 

Clapper? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, first, sir, I will say, as I’ve said every year— 

this’ll be the fifth year that—in my 50-plus years in the intelligence 

business, I don’t know of a time that has been more beset by challenges and crises around the world. I worry a lot about the safety 

and security of this country, for a lot of reasons, not the least of 

which, which Senator Reed alluded to, is the impacts that sequestration is having on the intelligence community. We didn’t get a 

pass. So, the same rules that apply to, say, the Department of Defense apply to us, as well. So, the combination of the challenges 

that we have around the world and the declining resource base 

that we have to monitor them is of concern to me. 

Chairman MCCAIN. So, could I just—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. Director Comey was referring to the fact that he 

now has some form of investigation—and, of course, the FBI has 

a tiered system for intensity of investigation—and they now have 

some form of investigation on homegrown violent extremists, not 

63 

necessarily direct sympathizers or supporters of ISIL, but in all 50 

of our States. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Director. And I could just ask, 

again, because you made reference to it, if we don’t—if we stick to 

sequestration, as it is planned, it will impair our ability for you to 

do your job and defend this Nation. Is that a correct statement? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, sir. And I’ve said that in the past. A little 

harder for intelligence to make that case as concretely as, say, the 

Navy and how many ships it builds, or the Air Force and how 

many aircraft it’s able to fly. In our case, the impacts—I hate to 

use the word, but I will—are more insidious, in that predicting 

when we have a lesser capability will eventuate in a failure is hard 

to quantify. But, just based on my best professional judgment from 

having served in this business for a long time, I’m very concerned 

about it. And if we revert to sequestration in 2016, the damage to 

the intelligence community will be quite profound. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I thank you very much, Director. 

Thank you, General. 

Jack? 

Senator REED. General, thank you. And, both generals, thank 

you. 

The Chairman has covered very well some of the issues arising 

out of the Russian activities in Ukraine and Crimea. Is your assessment that Putin is carrying out a strategic plan, or is some of 

this opportunistic? He’s just seizing the moment? Or it’s a combination of both? 

Mr. CLAPPER. I’m sorry, sir, I didn’t—— 

Senator REED. Or is it a combination of both. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Both—— 

Senator REED. He has a strategy—— 

Mr. CLAPPER.—a strategic plan and—— 

Senator REED.—and opportunistic—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, yes. I think it became a strategic plan when 

Yanukovych upped and left very suddenly last—almost a year ago, 

22nd of February. And then I think he saw an opportunity, particularly with the seizure of Crimea, which I think has always been in 

his craw. And, given Putin’s approach and the way he looks at 

greater Russia and what a disaster the breakup of the Soviet 

Union was, and his—as I said in my statement, that his highest 

foreign policy objective is controlling the former Soviet space. So, 

I think, on the heels of the seizure of Crimea and the establishment of some sort of an arrangement in eastern Ukraine, and what 

I believe will be more of a softer approach, maybe not direct military action, but, as the Chairman alluded to, Transnistria and 

Moldova, and certainly there’ll be pressure brought to bear in the 

Baltics, particularly where there are high levels of Russian minorities. A little different situation with the Baltics, since they are 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, which, of 

course, Moldova, Ukraine, et cetera, are not. 

Senator REED. We have conducted recently some very small military demonstrations in the Baltics. Company of the 173rd Airborne 

went in. I think just a day or two ago there was a parade of U.S. 

military vehicles. What’s the reaction to the Russians to those? 

64 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, they, I think, watch that. I mean, that’s—it’s 

an—it’s symbolically important. There’s a messaging there. And I 

think it is—and they’re sensitive to that. They’re mindful of the 

fact that the Baltic nations are NATO members. And I do think 

they distinguish that. 

Senator REED. We have elaborate sanctions in place. You’ve indicated in your comments that they have not had, in my interpretation, an appreciable effect yet on his strategy. They might be affecting the economy, but they haven’t affected his strategy. 

Mr. CLAPPER. That’s exactly right, Senator Reed. So far, that has 

not changed his approach. And, of course, what’s had the greater 

impact, frankly, on the economy has been the—— 

Senator REED. Oil. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—precipitous drop in oil prices. 

Senator REED. Do you have any sort of indication that this is— 

as this situation deteriorates further, there will be an impact on 

his strategy? 

Mr. CLAPPER. There could. And there—and, of course, what we 

see is, they’re very sensitive to opposition, you know, demonstrations in the street. They’re very, very sensitive about a color revolution occurring in Russia, itself. And, of course, that’s another reason why Putin reacted to the situation in Ukraine, because he believes we instigated that as another color revolution in Ukraine 

right on his doorstep, and that, in turn, posed a—in his mind, an 

existential threat to—in Russia. 

Senator REED. Just changing gears, the Iranians have a explicit 

presence in Iraq today, and we have forces there, too. And in the 

next several days or weeks, there’s two possible triggering events. 

One would be much more aggressive action against the Assad regime in Syria or the resolution of the negotiations with the Iranians on their nuclear program. Do you have any views with respect to what might happen to—within Iraq with respect to their 

Iranian forces, which are now sort of not cooperating with us, 

but—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. Is your question, sir, Is there a connection between 

the nuclear negotiations and agreement—— 

Senator REED. Will there be a reaction in Iraq to either the activities that we undertake, or proceed to undertake, in Syria or the 

conclusion of the negotiations? 

Mr. CLAPPER. I really don’t think that the negotiations, one way 

or the other, will have much bearing on what they do in Iraq or 

anyplace they are trying to exert their influence, meaning Syria or 

now Yemen. As best we can tell, the Iranians have kind of segmented the nuclear negotiations and potential nuclear agreement 

from their regional aspirations. 

Senator REED. Thank you, General. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have three questions—two short ones; the other one may require going on the record. 

Director Clapper, I know what your answer is, after hearing your 

opening statement, but, when you said, ‘‘Looking back over my now 

more than half century of intelligence, I’ve not experienced a time 

65 

when we’ve been beset by more crisis and threats around the 

globe.’’ And you still stand by that. And—correct? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, sir. And if I’m hear next year, I’ll probably say 

it again. 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah. Well, I appreciate that. You’ve been 

straightforward and honest about these things. 

General Stewart, you stated, and this—that we face a more diverse and complex problem than we have experienced in our lifetimes. Still stand by that? 

General STEWART. Absolutely, Senator. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. Well, now, there’s an assumption, when 

we’re out in the public, out talking to real people and away from 

Washington, that we, who are on this committee, know a lot of answers that we don’t know. And one of them that should be a very 

easy answer—and I want to get something from you guys that I 

can stand on—when we talk about the power, in terms of the 

strength and number of bodies in this—in ISIL or ISIS—in September 2014, we talked about that it’s been an additional some— 

20,000 since this all started. I think we all agree on that. But, they 

said it was somewhere between 20- and 31,5- fighters that were in 

Iraq and Syria. Now we know, since that time, it’s gone beyond 

that. Then, in August, they talked about from 80- to 100,000. Then, 

in November, one of the Kurdish leaders stated that the—ISIL’s 

military had increased to 200,000 fighters. Can you kind of give us 

an idea—and, number one, why it’s so difficult to do, and, number 

two, something that we can use and quote you two as the sources? 

Mr. CLAPPER. It’s—from my vantage, it’s unfortunate these numbers get out. For one, we don’t have what I would call Census Bureau door-to-door survey accuracy or fidelity over these numbers. 

They’re very hard to come by. We have to derive them inferentially 

from a number of different sources. Ergo, even when we do come 

out with numbers, they’re—you’ll have a wide range. So, the current estimate is—that we’re standing on, here, is somewhere in the 

range between 20- and 32,000 fighters. Now, the difficulty here is 

assessing who’s a core fighter who does this full-time, who may be 

a facilitator or supporter and do it part time, and all that sort of 

thing. 

I will say that the—this is one effect of the airstrikes, has been 

substantial attrition. They lost at least 3,000 fighters in Khobani. 

For whatever reason, they wanted to do that. And, as well, what 

that’s driving them to—now we’re seeing evidence of conscription. 

So, the estimate that we’re going with—— 

Senator INHOFE. But, that’s—— 

Mr. CLAPPER.—right now, but this is very dynamic, is 20- to 

32,000. 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah. We’re—gosh, I—well, anyway. 

It may take a while to get into this, but I am—I’m very much— 

I was over in the Ukraine when they had their elections. And that’s 

when they had the elections, and it was Yatsenyuk as much as 

Poroshenko. They were just elated. Both of them from different political parties, but the political parties are very pro-Western, and 

they were rejoicing in the fact that, for the first time in 96 years, 

the Communists don’t have one seat in Parliament. To me, I 

thought, when that happened, there’s not going to be any problem 

66 

with us going in with weapons. And obviously, the Democrats and 

Republicans up here agreed with that. We have language in our 

last defense authorization bill that we had $75 million, where we 

were encouraging the President to use, through the European Reassurance Initiative, for weapons going in to be of assist to our best 

friend in that area. 

Now, I can’t figure out why we don’t do it. Let me just ask the 

two of you. Would you recommend it? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Sir, I think I have to answer two ways, here. One, 

institutionally, this is a policy issue. And—— 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah, now—— 

Mr. CLAPPER.—the Intelligence Community doesn’t—— 

Senator INHOFE.—let me make sure. I’m not talking about sending troops, I’m talking about sending lethal weapons. 

Mr. CLAPPER. I understand. I understand—— 

Senator INHOFE. All right. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—what you’re asking, and that’s what I’m answering, I think. So, from an intelligence community perspective, that 

is a policy issue. We’re down in the engine room, shoveling intelligence coal, and the people up on the bridge, to use a Navy metaphor, drive the ship and rearrange the deck chairs. 

I have a personal view. And it is only that—— 

Senator INHOFE. All right. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—that I would favor it. But, that’s a personal perspective, and—— 

Senator INHOFE. That’s what—— 

Mr. CLAPPER.—it does not—— 

Senator INHOFE. And I appreciate your—— 

Mr. CLAPPER.—represent an official company policy of the Intelligence Community. 

Senator INHOFE. I appreciate that very much. 

And General Stewart? 

General STEWART. Sir, I’m trying to stay out of the personal—— 

Senator INHOFE. I know you’re trying to stay out, but—— 

General STEWART. So—— 

Senator INHOFE.—it’s time that we—we’ve got to get this done. 

General STEWART.—we stand by the assessment, that lethal aid 

couldn’t be delivered quickly enough or change the military balance 

of power on the ground. 

Senator INHOFE. So, you’re for lethal, right? 

General STEWART. It would not change the military balance of 

power, and it couldn’t get there quickly enough to make a difference, and that Russia will up that—— 

Senator INHOFE. As a military guy, do you buy this argument 

that we might be provoking negative reaction from Putin? You 

know, I listen to—I see what our—what the President is doing on— 

every once in a while. And they talk about, ‘‘Well, we don’t want 

to make the terrorists mad at us, they might hurt us.’’ And, you 

know—so, what’s your opinion about this statement on provoking 

a negative reaction from Putin? 

General STEWART. I think as important as Moscow placed on 

Ukraine to keep it in their near abroad, to keep it out of the EU, 

to keep it out of NATO, I think they will up the ante if we do any 

lethal aid or take any actions to bolster the Ukrainians. Whether 

67 

that provokes the President or not, it’s hard for me to say. The realities are, they see this as central to their foreign policy, they see 

it as critical that they keep Ukraine out of NATO, to keep it out 

of the Western sphere of influence—— 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah, and—— 

General STEWART.—and exert influence. And they’ll react accordingly, I suspect. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, General. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, I’m sure that Hitler felt the same way, 

General Stewart, about the Sudetenland, about German-speaking 

people. I’m sure he felt exactly the same way that Vladimir Putin 

does. And, for you to say that we can’t get lethal weapons there 

quickly enough, that defies logic, General. I know how we can 

transport weapons. We can put ’em on aircraft and fly ’em over 

there. 

General STEWART. But, you—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. How do you justify a statement like that? 

General STEWART. Senator, I believe the answer was, ‘‘We 

couldn’t deliver lethal aid sufficiently—quickly enough to change 

the military balance of power on the ground.’’ And I think I 

stand—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Quickly enough? What does that mean? I— 

it’s—— 

General STEWART. Russia and the separatists have significant interior lines that they can resupply a lot faster with a lot heavier 

weapons than we could deliver in—so, it would be a race to see who 

could arm. And I think, with their interior lines, they would have 

a significant advantage on the ground. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I’m sure that the Russians had a significant 

advantage when they invaded Afghanistan. I’m sure that, throughout history, when we’ve helped people who have been invaded and 

oppressed, and when we haven’t, what is—the consequences have 

been. Very disappointing, General. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for your testimony. 

I want to go back to the Middle East and to what’s happening 

in Syria. To what extent is Assad’s continued—I don’t want to say 

‘‘control over Syria,’’ because I appreciate that he doesn’t have control over the entire country—but, to what extent is his position 

there an obstacle to our fight against ISIL? And is there—what’s 

the thinking about how to change that dynamic? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I—that—the last part of your question is a 

tough one. I—he maintains the control because of his control of the 

economic levers, to the extent that they have them. His focus is on 

the—what I would call the ‘‘Western spine,’’ say from Aleppo to Damascus. That’s where most of the population is, and the major commercial entities, to include the ports. So, he has surrounded by people who are committed to preserving that, because they benefit 

from it. They are the minority. The Alawites are, you know, only 

10 percent. So, for them, this is an existential struggle. And, of 

course, the irony is that we actually are in common in—both Assad 

and his regime are opposed to and fighting ISIL, as we are. And 

so, it’s a very, you know, complex array of factors there. 

68 

Senator SHAHEEN. And to what extent have—has that affected 

other Arab countries in the Middle East and their willingness to 

engage with us? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, there’s been, you know, I think, somewhat of 

a change. It’s gradual. But, the fact that many of these countries 

aren’t participating in the coalition that General John Allen has 

been organizing. I do think the brutal savagery of the ISIL, and the 

beheadings and then the emulation of the Jordanian pilot, have 

had a galvanizing effect on opinion in the Mideast region. So, I 

think there is more of a willingness to cooperate. There certainly 

is, from the standpoint of intelligence sharing and our partnering 

with our counterparts in that part of the world. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And are you optimistic that Turkey will become more engaged than they have been? 

Mr. CLAPPER. No, I’m not. I think Turkey has other priorities 

and other interests. They are more focused on what they consider 

to be the threat: the KGK, the Kurdish resistance, if you will, in 

Turkey. Public opinion polls show, in Turkey, they don’t see ISIL 

as a primary threat. They’re more focused internally on their economy and this sort of thing. And, of course, the consequence of that 

is a permissive environment, in terms of—because of their laws, 

and the ability of people to travel through Turkey en route to 

Syria. So, somewhere in the neighborhood of 60 percent of those 

foreign fighters find their way to Syria through Turkey. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And to move to Iraq, to what extent is Iran’s 

presence in Iraq an obstacle to Abadi’s ability to make the kinds 

of overtures and engage the Sunnis in the way that he needs to 

in—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, he—he’s in a very—— 

Senator SHAHEEN.—order to keep the country unified? 

Mr. CLAPPER.—very difficult position, having to balance these 

competing constituencies. And clearly the Iranians have influence. 

They’re there. They’re helping, as well, in the fight against ISIL. 

He’s got issues with his own Shi’a power base, since they’re competitors to him. There’s still great reluctance to fully include the 

Sunnis, which must happen. There are two laws in their Council 

of Representatives that are extremely important to Sunnis: deBa’athification and—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. Right. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—anti-terrorism laws. So, he’s in a very, very difficult position. 

Senator SHAHEEN. What I’m trying to ask you to respond to, and 

I haven’t been as articulate as I should, I guess, is, To what extent 

does—is Iran weighing their efforts to under—to take on ISIL 

versus the Sunni’s role in Iraq? I mean, are they balancing that? 

Are they just—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, the fundamental interest of the Iranians, of 

course, is to preserve a Shi’a or Shi’a-friendly government in Baghdad. So, that is kind of their underlying policy objective. And, of 

course, ISIL poses a threat to the Iranians, as well. And so, they 

have an interest there in sustaining their aggressive combat, if you 

will, and assistance in opposing ISIL. 

Senator SHAHEEN. My time is up. Thank you both. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ernst. 

69 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing before us today. I do appreciate your service. 

I’d like to go into the discussion with Iran a little bit more. Their 

Iranian military is arguably one of the most deployed forces in the 

Middle East from—in probably more than a generation. But, they 

have been into areas, such as Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, 

Yemen. So, Iran is effectively reinforcing and increasing its sphere 

of influence in the region. And it is also defending its allies in ways 

which afford Iran the ability to decisively engage its adversaries 

and immediately alter any battlefield momentum. So, we have seen 

a progression of expert witnesses in front of this very panel, and 

many of my colleagues and these witnesses have stated that they 

do believe the President is failing in this area of setting a national 

strategy. And his failure to construct a comprehensive strategy 

against Iran has led to Iran’s expanded influence in the Middle 

East. 

So, I would like to hear your assessment, Director Clapper, on, 

of course, the tools that Iran has in its pocket, and whether we are 

effectively engaging Iran, what we need to do to gain a national security strategy. I’d like to see all the pieces put together, please. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I can—Senator, I can comment on the intelligence aspects of this. national security strategy, again, is not my 

compartment. 

But, the way that Iran is exerting its influence, I think, most 

prominently in the region is through the—their organization called 

the Iranian Republican Guard Corps, Quds Force, which is a combination of intelligence and special ops, has extensive commercial 

enterprise businesses, and this sort of thing. And so, they use that 

as their instrumentality, as they are now in Iraq, for extending 

their influence, as one of their proxies. And, of course, another one 

of their proxies is the Hezbollah, which they have had a long clientsubordinate relationship with. And so, they use those as sort of the 

physical manifestation of their spreading their influence in the region. And, certainly from an intelligence perspective, we—you 

know, we try hard to keep tabs on those entities as we can from 

intelligence. 

Senator ERNST. And is there a way, Director, that we can more 

effectively engage our neighbors in the Middle East to push back 

on Iran’s influence? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, we—from an intelligence perspective, which 

is all I can speak to, we do engage with our intelligence counterparts in all of these countries, those who are willing to engage with 

us, particularly the Sunni countries, who also—who do harbor 

great reservations about Iranians—Iranian objectives. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you very much. 

I’ll yield back my time. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Donnelly. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for being here. 

In regards to Iraq, what do you think are the biggest challenges 

that the Iraqi forces face right now in pushing ISIS back from 

Mosul and Tikrit? 

70 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, a first thing, I think—and General Stewart 

can speak to this as well, since he’s—— 

Senator DONNELLY. Right. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—served there—but, obviously, the Iraqi Security 

Forces, particularly the army, need to reconstitute, after the precipitate losses in northern Iraq last June, where about four-and-ahalf divisions or so of Iraqi forces just kind of melted away. So, that 

is—first order of business, I think, is to reconstitute them, which 

includes training and, hopefully, instantiation of a will to fight. 

They have challenges, clearly, with command and control, with 

leadership, with logistics. So, they’ve got a whole range of issues 

there that need to be attended to before they’d be in a position to, 

certainly unilaterally, retake a—you know, a place like—— 

Senator DONNELLY. General, how long do you think that’ll take, 

to try to get them back up to speed? 

General STEWART. So, if I could put it in context, last fall they 

had about 185,000 in the Iraqi Security Force, about three divisions—the 6th, the 9th, and the 7th Division. All three of those divisions are engaged today, so they’re not getting that continuous 

training. They’re engaged in operations. They’re building three additional divisions. Those three divisions, you’re talking about building from the ground up. So, to build from the ground up individual 

soldiers—— 

Senator DONNELLY. When are they ready? 

General STEWART. We’re talking probably 6 to 9 months, at a 

best estimate. 

Senator DONNELLY. Director Clapper, here at home, when I look 

at what’s going on with ISIS and see the threats that occur here, 

and the threat levels that we had last year—if you had to put it 

in perspective—this time last year, this time now—and it’s an inexact art, percentagewise—significantly increased threats now than 

we were having last year at this same time, about the same? 

Mr. CLAPPER. It’s probably about the same, sir. 

Senator DONNELLY. Okay. And in regards to ISIS—so, our push 

is to get ’em out of Iraq, then to remove them from Syria—when 

we get to that point where ISIS is gone, does that threat level come 

down, here at home? 

Mr. CLAPPER. It would—I—yeah, absolutely it would, I think, 

but—at least that would reduce the threat some. But, again, as— 

if the caliphate is extended to other locations, which is what ISIL 

is trying to do—Libya, Egypt, et cetera—then we’ll have that to 

contend with. So, yes, there would be some reduction of threat because—if ISIL were defeated in both Iraq and Syria, at least you 

are—have done away with a substantial safe haven, which would 

serve to reduce the threat some. 

Senator DONNELLY. When you look over to Libya, is that the next 

place, or one of the key places, they look now as, ‘‘Here’s open 

space that’s failed. Here’s a place where we can try to grow’’? 

Mr. CLAPPER. It is probably the most troublesome, from that 

standpoint, just because of the conditions in Libya—you know, two 

competing governments fighting with each other. There are, in addition to ISIL, probably six or eight other terrorist groups that 

have gathered in Libya. So, it’s a magnet because of—essentially, 

it’s ungoverned. 

71 

Senator DONNELLY. And when you look at a place that’s 

ungoverned, you know, not too far from the Mediterranean, right 

there, what do you see—like you said, you don’t set all the strategy; you review all the intelligence—but, what do you see as the 

best steps we can take in that region right now—and, General 

Stewart, you, too—in Libya, to try to change the course of what’s 

going on? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, from an intelligence perspective we, I think, 

clearly need to step up our game from an ISR perspective, where 

we can operate. I think there’s a lot of merit to partnering with the 

French, who have sort of staked out their claim in the Sahel region 

of North Africa. So, we have worked with the French, particularly 

from an intelligence perspective, to share with them. They have 

history and heritage there, access, and have committed to deploying troops in that area—boots on the ground, which we can supplement. So, those are things, from an intelligence perspective, that 

we—so, as we get a better handle on just what is going on in that 

part of the world. 

Senator DONNELLY. And I see my time is up, but I just want to 

ask one very quick question that you can just—— 

How are we doing on cooperation, interagency, here at home? 

Better than ever before? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, that’s, frankly, the reason my job was created, after September 11, is—promote integration here in this 

country. I’d like to think it’s better. I was around for a long time 

before September 11, so I—it is better, but it’s—there was always 

improvement. We’re not as mature in the—on the domestic side, in 

coordinating with State, local, tribal, et cetera, but I think we’ve 

made a lot of progress there, and we’ll continue. And it’s something 

I push very hard. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Fischer. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Clapper, what do you assess is Assad’s likely response 

to the introduction of our United States-trained Syrians to move in 

against ISIL in Syria? And do you assess that Assad will attack 

them? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, if the—as long as Assad is—believes somehow that this—once it gets up sufficient center of mass, you know, 

enough force—as long as he felt as though this were something to 

be used only against ISIL, he’d probably be okay with it. But, I 

think he’d have a hard time determining whether it’s a threat to 

ISIL or a threat to him. So, I could see a circumstance where, depending on what information he’s getting—and we wonder about 

that sometimes—that he could easily consider that force as a 

threat to him. 

Senator FISCHER. Do you believe that you’re receiving good intelligence from that—from Syria, from that area, in regards to this? 

Mr. CLAPPER. No, we have a lot of gaps for—intelligence gaps in 

Syria, principally because we’re not there. So, no, I’m not satisfied 

with that. We’re working at it, obviously, to come up with more intelligence from Syria. But, that’s a tough problem for us. 

72 

Senator FISCHER. Have you received any intelligence that would, 

I guess, give you comfort, in that the moderates that would be 

trained by us would, in fact, be fighting ISIL and not Assad? 

Mr. CLAPPER. I think a more fulsome response to that would be 

best in a classified environment. But, I guess the short answer 

would be yes. 

Senator FISCHER. Okay. And how do you—how would you assess 

Russia and Iran will be looking at these trained forces? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, probably wouldn’t like it. I think, at this 

point, you know, Russia looks at Syria as a client, as an ally, someone that they provide support to. So, again, it would be almost the 

same perception problem with the Russians as it would be with 

Assad. If—they could probably rationalize, if it’s focused on ISIL, 

but if it be—it’s perceived as a threat to the regime, then I think 

that they would react negatively to it. 

Senator FISCHER. And if they would perceive it as a threat, what 

type of force would they employ, then? You said they’d react negatively. 

Mr. CLAPPER. The Russians? 

Senator FISCHER. Yes. 

Mr. CLAPPER. I’d—well, I—this is really speculative, hypothetical. I don’t think they would necessarily deploy combat forces 

to Syria. They would probably step up military equipment support, 

which they’ve been doing, intelligence support, if, in fact, they, too, 

perceive that what we were doing was a direct threat to Assad. 

Senator FISCHER. Okay. And if I could shift gears, here, I’d like 

to ask you something about cybersecurity. As you know, the Senate 

is looking at a bill to authorize greater information sharing. There 

are some concerns out there about the entities that the—that we 

might be sharing that information with. I’d like to ask you, How 

do we balance that? How do we balance the risks between really 

valuable information sharing and the need not to provide information either to private individuals, hackers that are out there, or to 

a foreign government that may be able to pick up information that 

we give our colleagues, in trying to work with this, that they could 

then, in turn, use against us? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, that’s exactly the issue. In fact, that’s a general dilemma that we have across the board, whether it’s cyber or 

any other dimension. You know, the—sharing versus security. And 

that’s the same issue here. There is no silver-bullet answer here. 

I do think there, though, needs to be some form of legislation 

that would protect, from a liability standpoint, commercial concerns 

so that they would more freely—they’d be in a position to share 

with the government. This is not something government can do all 

by itself. There has to be—given the pervasiveness of cyber in our 

society, we must have the partnering of the civilian sector, which 

means promoting sharing, both ways. 

But, you’re right, there’s always this concern, there’s always a 

tradeoff between security and sharing. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To follow up on that, I believe that it’s critically important that 

we move legislation that provides for that sharing so that we have 

73 

more vigorous defense. And, indeed, the Intelligence Committee reported out a bill last summer. I understand that that bill has been 

somewhat renegotiated, reworked, and it will be moving forward 

reasonably soon. I hope that that’s one of the Congress’s highest 

priorities. I don’t know how many warnings we have to have. 

Turning to ISIS, what are the chances that it will wear out its 

welcome within the areas where it is now trying to govern, because 

of the weight of its brutal and harsh ideology? And I guess the followup question is, Do we have any intelligence about what’s going 

on inside Mosul, inside Raqqa, in terms of the citizens and how 

they feel about the—this new regime? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Senator King, to answer the question, I think that 

is a very important point, and we are seeing anecdotal evidence of 

resentment, and even resistance, in those areas that are controlled 

by ISIL, because of their brutal approach to enforcing Sharia. 

I think the challenge—and we’re already seeing indications of 

this—that ISIL has—as I mentioned in my oral statement, assuming some of the accouterments are some of the characteristics of a 

nation-state, and now they’ve having challenges with governance— 

they do not have enough financial wherewithal to provide the services—municipal services that are required to run a city of a million 

people. So, we’re—— 

Senator KING. You mean they’re running—— 

Mr. CLAPPER.—electricity—— 

Senator KING. You mean they’re running a deficit? Maybe we 

could ship them the sequester in a sealed railroad car. [Laughter.] 

Mr. CLAPPER. That’d be good. 

We’re seeing signs of electrical—electricity outages, shortages of 

food and commodities. The airstrikes against their—the refining capability has forced them to go to a lot of individual mom-and-pop 

refining stills. So, they’re going to have trouble generating the revenue that would be needed to actually run the areas they have captured. And that—and we’re seeing anecdotal evidence of the strains 

and the stresses that’s putting particularly on the city of Mosul and 

its citizens. 

Senator KING. Does that suggest that perhaps a containment 

strategy instead of a reinvasion strategy—General Stewart, you’ve 

testified recently about the proportion of troops it takes to root 

somebody out of an urban setting. Could you articulate that for us? 

General STEWART. If I recall, we talked about the ratio of offensive forces to—— 

Senator KING. Correct. 

General STEWART.—take a urban environment, something in an 

order of 10 to 1, offense versus a defense. That requires a very 

skilled, determined force to take that kind of action. 

There is something to be said about ISIL wearing out its welcome. It’s precisely what turned al Qaeda in Iraq before—the brutality, the inability to govern—that convinced the tribes that there 

may be a better option. 

Senator KING. And ISIS is much more brutal than—and difficult 

than al-Qaeda, as I understand. 

General STEWART. The question is, Where is the tipping point? 

And it’s very hard to determine where that tipping point where, 

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74 

ferent option, and we ought to counter ISIS.’’ So, I think there will 

be a tipping point at some point. We just don’t know where that 

will be. 

Senator KING. But, a—as you just testified, a 10-to-1 ratio of offense to defense going into a city like Mosul means you’re going to 

have a large, well-trained force. And it’s just a question of whether 

that’s going to be necessary, rather than let it fall of its own 

weight. And I guess that’s a question of timing. 

General STEWART. It’s a question of timing, yes, sir. 

Senator KING. Quick question on cyber. It concerns me that all 

of our discussions about cyber are essentially defensive. We’re talking about legislation to share information, we’re talking about 

greater rebutting of these kinds of intrusions. Should we think, Mr. 

Director, about developing an offensive capability to provide a deterrent? It concerns me that now a—particularly a state actor can 

act essentially without fear of consequences. Whereas, the theory 

of deterrence in our nuclear field stood the test of time for 75 years. 

Should we think about a deterrent capacity so that people know 

that if they attack us in any kind of critical way, they’re going to 

suffer in return? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, we—I agree with you, Senator King. We—and 

we do—you know, we do have offensive capabilities that I can’t go 

into here. I think the issue, though, is, What is the policy? What 

is it that would achieve cyber deterrence? And that is an issue 

that, at the policy level, we’re still, frankly, wrestling with. 

Senator KING. But, it is one that—I’m delighted to hear that it 

is being wrestled with, and I think I heard you say that this is 

something that we need to consider. And, of course, to go back to 

Dr. Strangelove, if you have a deterrent and don’t tell people about 

it, it’s not a deterrent. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, that’s true. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. I want to thank the Chairman, thank both of 

you for what you do to protect the country. 

And I wanted to ask about Iran. And I know that in, your written testimony, you have said—and you previously testified, Director Clapper, before this committee, that Iran was on track, by this 

year, in terms of its ICBM program. So, since the negotiations have 

been ongoing on the nuclear program, has Iran continued to develop its ICBM program? And can you tell me what the status and 

the goal of that program would be from Iran? 

Mr. CLAPPER. The Iranians have continued on their space launch 

vehicle program, and recently put into orbit a satellite. And obviously, that—any work they do on missile—missiles could conceivably go towards work on an intercontinental ballistic missile. And 

it’s going to be hard to determine whether a given missile is 

launched for the purposes of a space launch vehicle, a satellite they 

want to put into space. Because if they do that, they also acquire 

proficiency, expertise, and experience in what could be a—an 

ICBM. And so, it’s a hard question to answer, because it has a lot 

to do with intent. But, there’s no question they have the technical 

competence. 

75 

Senator AYOTTE. Do you think they have good intent, in terms 

of what they’re doing with their missile program? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, it’s—no. I mean, I think the huge mediumrange ballistic missile force they have today that’s operational is— 

you know, I think poses a threat to the region now. So—— 

Senator AYOTTE. And if they—— 

Mr. CLAPPER.—no, it’s not. 

Senator AYOTTE. And if they were to get ICBM capability, that 

obviously poses a threat, in terms of our country, and the East 

Coast in particular. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, it could. I mean, it, again, depends on what 

they actually do. If they actually are able to—you know, it’s theoretically possible they could attempt to launch one this year. So, 

this is something we just have to watch. But, again, the challenge 

for us is going to be, you know, determining just what their intent 

is. 

Senator AYOTTE. Could you help me understand also, as we think 

about Iran’s activities, what types of other activities they’re engaging in to establish regional hegemony? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, they are certainly trying to, where they can, 

reach out diplomatically. The organization that we watch a lot is 

the IRGC Quds Force that I mentioned previously, their intelligence activities throughout the region. But, they will look to establish their influence by whatever mechanism they can. 

Senator AYOTTE. So, as I understand it, obviously they continue 

to support Assad, they have continued to support groups in the region, including Hezbollah. What other activities—are they still— 

would you still characterize them as one of the largest state sponsors of terrorism in the world? 

Mr. CLAPPER. They are still classified that way, yes. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

I would like to follow up on an issue that is hitting us at home, 

but I think has international implications, and that is of the international drug trafficking that’s occurring. And, in particular, my 

home State of New Hampshire, we’ve had a devastating number of 

people who are dying from heroin overdoses. And so, I would certainly like to hear your opinion, General Stewart, about what is 

happening, in terms of drug trafficking—in particular, heroin—and 

how is—are the networks that are being used for drug trafficking, 

are they also being used to fuel terrorism? 

So, General Stewart, if you could share that with me. And I’d be 

curious, Does Southern Command and Northern Command—what 

do they need, in terms of fighting heroin and also the drug trafficking that can be used to fuel terrorism, as well? 

General STEWART. I’ll have to look at the numbers again, but I 

don’t think drug trafficking is on the increase from our—through 

our southern borders. I think Pakistan and Afghanistan heroin production continues about at the norm that we’ve seen over the last 

several years. We’ve seen no indications that the drug trafficking 

routes are being used for terrorist activities or hostile actions. And 

I spoke recently to the folks down in Southern Command, and I 

don’t recall any request for additional capability to help them with 

the problem in the south. 

Mr. CLAPPER. If I can add, Senator. 

76 

Senator AYOTTE. Yes. 

Mr. CLAPPER. I well recall, I think it was last year, when General 

Kelly, Commander of SOUTHCOM, testified with then-General 

Jacoby, who was the NORTHCOM Commander—they testified together. And one of the challenges with drug trafficking is not so 

much a lack of intelligence—we have a lot of intelligence on it— 

is the lack of resource, particularly in the case of the ability to 

interdict, by the Coast Guard and others. And that, since General 

Kelly’s testimony, has been—is being addressed. I’ve spoken—discussed that with the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and we are 

putting more of his capability, deploying more ships and planes, in 

the southern hemisphere. 

But, I think I would take, you know, a little mild disagreement, 

here, with Vince, that I think this is a—it is a problem, the— 

throughout this region, not only across the border, but through 

Puerto Rico is another vulnerability we have. And so—and we have 

pretty good intelligence on this. 

I think the challenge has been—and again, sequestration has 

had impacts—is on the ability to react and interdict. 

Senator AYOTTE. I thank both of you. And I also noticed that, in 

your testimony, Director Clapper, you noted the incredible surge of 

heroin-related deaths since 2007. So, thank you. It’s a horrible 

problem. 

Senator Reed [presiding]: Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for your testimony, both earlier in the week 

and today. Mindful that this is a—not a classified hearing, a few 

questions. 

My perception of the level of American and allied intelligence 

about the extent of the Iranian nuclear program is that, before November 2013 and the beginning of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), 

the level of intelligence was good. Certainly there were gaps and 

challenges, but at least, if I go by public reports, the level of intelligence at—that all have, together, enabled some actions that have 

slowed the Iranian program. 

One of the reasons I supported the JPOA is my assumption that 

our intel sources haven’t gone away, but the inspections that were 

allowed—required under the JPOA, together with existing intel 

sources, would even give us a better level of intel, which would (a) 

help us determine if we needed, God forbid, to take military action 

to stop the program, and (b) enable us to better target any military 

action if, God forbid, we should need to take it. Am I looking at this 

the right way? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, sir, I think you are. I will tell you that the, 

you know, huge—that the important aspect of any sort of agreement we might reach with the Iranians would be a very invasive 

and thorough surveillance and inspection capability on the part of 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). I think that would be 

requisite to any kind of an agreement. 

I—you know, we have, I think, a reasonably capable intelligence 

capability, but I wouldn’t want to rely on it, only, for verification 

that, in fact, the terms of the agreement were being lived up to. 

Senator KAINE. And, Director Clapper, I agree with the last point 

you made, is—I would look at any final deal, if one is reached, in 

77 

analyzing its content and determining whether I support it or not. 

The degree of inspections, to me, is the key factor, because that, 

combined with existing intel, is our guarantee of an ability to (a) 

know if there’s going to be a problem, and (b) take appropriate action—target an appropriate action to eliminate the problem. 

You indicated, Director Clapper, in earlier testimony, that your 

intel suggests that Iran is looking at the nuclear negotiation as sort 

of separate from this whole question of Iranian bellicosity and adventurism in the region, that these are sort of separate items. My 

sense is, there is at least one connection between the two. And this 

also bears on my analysis of any deal, if reached. And that is this. 

Any deal, if reached, would involve sanctions relief—i.e., dollars to 

Iran. And they use dollars to carry out adventurism. I think—you 

know, just from what I’ve heard, some of the sanctions relief already may have enabled them to invest more heavily in running 

Syria as a puppet state or invest more heavily in the Quds Force 

or other agents that are destabilizing governments outside of their 

own borders. And so, to at least that extent, as we look at any deal, 

if there is such a deal, there could be a connection between a deal 

and Iranian bellicosity outside their borders. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Perhaps, sir. And, in a classified environment, I 

can go into this a little bit more. But, the sanctions have had impacts on—financial impacts on the Iranians, and it—that, in turn, 

has impacted funding for the military and for even the Quds Force. 

So, I—— 

Senator KAINE. Yeah. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—perhaps best left to a classified environment 

for—— 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—more details. 

Senator KAINE. We have had two meetings of the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee, in the last 3 weeks, where we’ve heard from 

leaders from the region who are engaged in the fight against ISIL. 

King Abdullah was with us about 3 weeks ago, and he told us, in 

a coffee at the Foreign Relations Committee, that American ground 

troops as part of this battle of ISIL would not be a good idea, in 

his view. Yesterday, we had a coffee with the Emir of Qatar, 

Sheikh Tamim, who also said American ground troops is a bad idea 

because it would convert the perception of the battle against ISIL 

to the United States or west against ISIL rather than, ‘‘We are engaging in a battle to clean up our own regional extremists. And we 

want the—we want America’s help on that.’’ But, they both offered 

us advice that American ground troops would be problematic, because it would enable, from a propaganda standpoint, this being 

positioned as American or Western occupation, and that America is 

the point of the sphere—the spear against that terrorist threat. I’d 

just report that to you, and I would be curious to either of your’s— 

your reactions to those comments from trusted allies. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, the—I have had similar discussions with the 

King, and he is a staunch proponent, an articulate one, for, you 

know, ‘‘the people in the region have to take this on and have to 

lead,’’ and that, you know, the United States—anytime we show up 

someplace, then, you know, we’re a—we’re, by definition, occupiers. 

He—you know, he recognizes, as do many others, that, at some 

78 

point, there will be a need for boots on the ground, but hopefully 

others, not the United States, because that engenders its own challenges and issues. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

And just to follow up on Senator Kaine’s comment, I think we 

need to reestablish where we are, or confirm where we are, not— 

Director Clapper, is it still our policy that no options are off the 

table and that Iran should not have a nuclear weapon? 

Mr. CLAPPER. That’s my understanding, yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. That’s your understanding. Do you have any 

doubt about it? 

Mr. CLAPPER. I take what the administration said for its word, 

that all options are not—no options are off the table. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I think that’s true. We had a very important hearing yesterday on nuclear forces and strategic forces. 

And one of the things I came away with was greater concerns than 

I had before about the proliferation impacts, the instability in the 

region that could occur from a nuclear-armed Iran. And I just think 

that we’ve got to be careful about that. And I do remember that 

the CIA reported, in, what, early 2000s, that Iran wasn’t intent on 

building a nuclear weapon. That was wrong, was it not? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, up until 2003, they were. Right now, they— 

and, of course, the—we believe the Supreme Leader would be the 

ultimate decisionmaker, here. And, as far as we know, he’s not 

made a decision to go for a nuclear weapon. I do think that they 

certainly want to preserve options across the capabilities it would 

take to field one, but right now they don’t have one, and have not 

made that decision. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, we’ve been—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. But, I agree with you, it would be very—it would 

be very profound and very destabilizing if they were to achieve a 

nuclear weapon. 

Senator SESSIONS. Is—I mean, it really makes us face some really tough choices. Our—I don’t—but, I don’t think there’s any doubt 

they were—they would never—they never relinquished the intention to build a weapon. The CIA report was in error. And they are 

closer today. And every month that goes by, it seems they get closer. 

General Stewart, I had the honor to be briefed by you in 2006 

or 2007 in the al-Anbar region in Iraq. And you gave us a remarkable briefing about how you had—the marines had worked with the 

tribal leaders, and they began The Awakening that allowed them 

to remove al-Qaeda from that region after great, great commitment 

by the marines and other forces. 

This is what I would like to see. I am not for any major, massive 

American troop leadership in Iraq, but I do think—and I want you 

to give us your best judgment—but isn’t it true that even a few embedded forces with the Iraqis with the ability to communicate to 

aircraft and bringing in smart bombs and to assist them, that that 

does encourage them, and that the Iranian forces fight better under 

79 

those circumstances than if they don’t have the confidence that a— 

even a small American presence with them brings? 

General STEWART. Senator, let me answer the question this way. 

Senator Kaine raised a great point of what we’ve heard. The best 

propaganda victory that we could give ISIL is to make this a fight 

between the West and Islam—and ISIL. But, being able to provide 

ISR, precision fires, some command and control will certainly help 

those forces—Iraqi forces—to be much more effective on the ground 

than left to their own devices. 

Senator SESSIONS. And—all right, I agree with that. But, I’m just 

asking you, from your experience with them, isn’t it true that there 

is more confidence, even if there are just one or two Special Forces 

there with them—not out in the—leading the fight— 

General STEWART. Right. 

Senator SESSIONS.—but with the forces that are advancing? 

General STEWART. There is a great sense of comfort when U.S. 

forces are with our partners to provide precision, to provide command and control, to help bolster leadership. There is some advantage, yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. With regard to the momentum that we have 

there, aren’t there—I mean, we have a large Iraqi army. And—— 

Is my time up? My time’s up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Maybe 

we’ll—— 

Chairman MCCAIN [presiding]. If you want to finish your question—— 

Senator SESSIONS. How—are they—can’t some of those divisions, 

some of those units, be utilized now to blunt the momentum that 

they have—that ISIS has achieved, and maybe take the bloom off 

their rose and give some confidence again, in the Iraqi forces, that 

they can retake the territory, and the sooner is better than later? 

General STEWART. Yes, Senator. In fact, they have blunted the 

ISIL advance. And, best as we can guess, ISIL has lost territory 

over the last couple of months. So, it’s not just the Iraqi Security 

Forces. You have the Kurdish forces that are involved. And they 

are making a difference. I wouldn’t categorize the difference as significant, but they are, in fact, causing ISIL to lose territory at this 

point. 

Senator SESSIONS. We’ve been training them for a decade. Not as 

if they need another—I don’t know. I’m—a little odd that we need 

another 6 to 9 months of training, when I thought we were training 

the Iraqi armies for nearly a decade. 

General STEWART. When we talk about the 6 to 9 months additional training, it is to deal with an urban fight, which is very, very 

different, very complex, requires a great deal of skill, a great deal 

of precision to be successful. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, General, in your leadership and 

your commitment to fight this—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Also has to do with the collapse of the Iraqi 

army. 

Senator Manchin. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks, both of you, again for being here. And just a couple 

of questions I have. 

80 

Following up on the Iran nuclear capabilities that they may 

have, since we know that they haven’t dismantled—they might 

have downgraded some of their enriched uranium—are we just prolonging the inevitable? I mean, they’re going to be able to get up 

to enrichment and to armament speed pretty quickly, if they desired, unless there’s an absolute dismantlement of their—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well—— 

Senator MANCHIN.—capabilities. Director Clapper? 

Mr. CLAPPER.—that’s obviously the concern, and that’s why the 

importance of intrusive and comprehensive surveillance and inspection is so critical, to make sure they don’t, particularly, enrich to 

highly enriched uranium. 

Senator MANCHIN. But, we’re not doing away with any of their 

centrifuges. They’re not downgrading some of the things that they 

can, or taking away their capabilities. I don’t think our agreement’s—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, that’s—— 

Senator MANCHIN.—going to achieve that. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—that’s to be determined. That’s a—you know, 

the—and I don’t want to talk too much about this—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Sure. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—because of the delicate state of play with the negotiations, themselves. But, that’s all in play as part of the negotiations. 

Senator MANCHIN. Well, I have a concern. 

If I could switch gears over to China and—basically, our partners 

in Asia-Pacific area, especially Taiwan. They’re growing uneasy 

about China’s access area denial strategy which seeks to limit 

American power in that region. Can you please update us on China’s effort to deny American access to the Asia-Pacific region, sir? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, the Chinese—and I can’t go into a great deal 

of detail here, but the Chinese are embarked on extremely impressive military modernization program across the board. And their 

modernization program is deliberately designed to counteract or 

thwart what they feel are our strengths; meaning carrier aviation, 

our bases, C4ISR, and our abilities in space. And they are doing 

specific things in each one of those realms to deny us, first, potentially, surveillance, command and control, as well as what they 

view is our primary weapons—our primary strengths. I can certainly go into—in more detail if you’re—if you’d like, in a classified 

setting. 

Senator MANCHIN. Okay. I’m just—I guess you’re not able to 

speak about their developing capabilities within the last 10 years 

or what they’re accelerating. I’m understanding they’re accelerating 

very fastly. You said they’re impressive. 

Mr. CLAPPER. They are. And they also are getting more and more 

into the realm of indigenously designing and producing things, 

rather than relying on others, notably the Russians. 

Senator MANCHIN. Okay. Let me see, I had one more here for 

you. 

We talked about, I think, in a closed setting—you might be able 

to talk about it in generality here—as far as ISIS, their ability, as 

far as financial ability, to attract the dollars they do, be able to opVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:16 Jul 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING 2015\15-18-RTP WILDA
81 

erate the way they can. And are we having any success in shutting 

down that money flow? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, they—again, I’ll have to speak in generalities, here—they acquired a lot of funding initially, some of which 

was derived from overrunning Iraqi banks. 

Senator MANCHIN. Sure. 

Mr. CLAPPER. That’s going to dry up. And, of course, the airstrikes against the oil has made that—forced them to go to sort of 

mom-and-pop stills. And, as a consequence of the brutality, the donations that they’ve received are tapering off. So, I think, again, 

this says something about an attrition—— 

Senator MANCHIN. I—— 

Mr. CLAPPER.—approach which I think, over time—and the other 

thing, of course, that’s draining resources is the demands that they 

have for governance, particularly in large—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Yeah. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—cities like Mosul. 

Senator MANCHIN. Just a—just very quickly. But, the rapid rise, 

as far as in their—when we first heard about ISIS, it was 3-, 5,000, 

then it just seemed to leapfrog to 10-, 15-, 20-, and 30-. Were they 

paying their soldiers, or attracting because of better pay than— 

Mr. CLAPPER. The reason they—— 

Senator MANCHIN.—al Qaeda and Taliban? 

Mr. CLAPPER. The reason they—there was sort of mushrooming 

growth there, and the initial phases when they did their attacks in 

northern Iraq—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Sure. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—was because the—this is largely a Sunni region. 

They were very receptive, frankly, to joining up with ISIL, which 

I think many viewed as a better protector of themselves and their 

communities and their families than were the Iraqi Government. 

So, that’s what occasioned the joining up. 

Senator MANCHIN. Do you have any—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. Now, we’re—we’re now seeing anecdotal evidence 

of their having—and paid, you know, money—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Were they paying better than—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. They are—— 

Senator MANCHIN.—everybody else? 

Mr. CLAPPER.—also having to reduce the amount of money 

they’re paying some of their fighters. 

Senator MANCHIN. So, that should reduce—that could reduce 

some of their strength, right? If they don’t pay them as well as 

somebody else? 

Mr. CLAPPER. That and the—and what we’re also seeing—again, 

anecdotal evidence of—they’ve been driven to conscription. In other 

worse, forcing people to join the ranks to—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Gotcha. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—sustain their fighter force, particularly as they’ve 

taken some pretty heavy losses—notably, in Khobani. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sullivan. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, gentlemen, for your wonderful 

service to our country. 

82 

General Stewart, you may have noticed the Chairman has a particularly soft spot in his heart for marines. He’s probably treated 

you in that regard. So—— 

General STEWART. I’m pretty delighted about that, too, Senator. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Yeah. Well, I’ll make sure he keeps treating 

you with kid gloves, I’m sure. 

I want to thank you gentlemen for what you’re doing, because I 

think that your service, particularly providing real, accurate threat 

assessments to not only the Congress, but to the American people, 

the administration, is absolutely, fundamentally critical if we’re 

going to get a hold of these—many of the challenges that we face 

right now as a country. And you probably noticed that this committee has had several hearings over the last several weeks about 

these assessments with some luminaries, Democrat, Republican, 

former Secretaries of State, former four-star generals, about what 

they see as some of the challenges and strategies that we need. I 

think there was consensus that we’re living in a very challenging 

environment. Henry Kissinger mentioned it was one of the most 

challenging that he’s ever seen in his career, which says a lot. 

What I want to touch on a little bit is what I see as a rather disturbing disconnect between some of the testimony that comes from 

gentlemen like yourself from this whole series of hearings that we 

had and the disconnect between that and senior administration officials. Let me give you a few examples. 

The President, himself, in the State of the Union, talked about 

the crisis of 9/11 and everything has passed. Went through a whole 

list of things that made it sound like we’re living in a very benign 

world environment. 

The Secretary of State yesterday talked about, ‘‘actually living in 

a period of less daily threats to American and people in the world 

normally.’’ That was his quote. 

The recent National Security Strategy document from the White 

House lists, I believe, climate change if—as one of the top, if not 

the top, national security threat, relative to, say, Iran gaining nuclear weapons, or ISIS. 

Do you agree with these assessments from the senior leadership 

of the administration, that we’re living in a less daily threatening—that Iran gaining nuclear weapons is less of a threat than 

climate change? I really need—I think it’s critical that we level 

with the American people what exactly are the threats that we face 

as a country right now. And I don’t think we’re getting it from the 

administration. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I think our function, in the intelligence community, is to portray, as accurately as we can, what we see as the 

threats. We probably always occupy the half of the glass that’s 

empty, and policymakers, and oftentimes military commanders, 

will occupy the half of the glass that’s full. Probably the real truth 

is at the water line. 

I think our instinct, frankly, is to perhaps—I’ve been criticized 

for this—worst-case the situation. Having been on the receiving 

end of virtually every post-event critique investigating intelligence 

failures since September 11, I think we are much more conservative and much more cautious than others might be about the nature of the world out there. But, I think we have a certain instituVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:16 Jul 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00086 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING 2015\15-18-RTP WILDA
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tional responsibility, which we try to discharge. If others don’t see 

it that way or others don’t agree, that’s certainly their prerogative. 

Senator SULLIVAN. So, do you agree with those assessments 

that—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. I’m not in the mode of—we don’t do policy, and I’m 

not critiquing those who do make it. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Okay. I don’t think that’s policy that they’ve 

been putting out. I think it’s—they’re giving threat assessments to 

the American people that are inaccurate. But, let me—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, climate change—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. I’ll move on—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. I mean, climate change, for example, I think will 

have—does have national security implications. It—if you watch 

what’s going on in the Arctic now, and the impacts on climate 

change, in terms of water availability and this sort of thing, does 

have national security implications. I probably wouldn’t rank it up 

there as problem or threat number one, but it is a serious concern. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Let me just ask General Stewart. The—you 

know, the—Senator Manchin was talking about the increasing recruitment of ISIL. What role do you see that they are perceived as 

continuing to win, as continuing to be victorious, as continuing to 

be kind of a team that’s gaining ground, not being defeated? I 

think—in your experience, I’m sure that if a recruit thinks he’s 

going to go join a team and get killed, he probably is not going to 

be interested in joining that team, but if they seem to be perceived 

as kind of gaining ground—North Africa now, Syria, Iraq—do you 

think that that helps in their recruitment efforts? 

General STEWART. A very capable propaganda media operation 

that emphasizes their success and their victories, however small, 

and that is a basis for attracting those who would move to that ideology. So, their success on the battlefield, or perceived success, or 

the way they’re presented, certainly helps them in gaining recruits 

for the fight. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Gillibrand. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for being here today. 

The execution of Coptic Christians in Libya by terrorists affiliated with ISIL raises a question about ISIL’s ability to coordinate 

with other groups. What’s your assessment of the links between 

ISIL in Syria and Iraq and the groups that have acted in its name 

outside of those two countries? 

Mr. CLAPPER. If you’re referring to ISIL’s other chapters or provinces, so-called, if that’s what you—if that’s what you’re referring 

to? 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Yes. 

Mr. CLAPPER. And what’s the connection there? 

Senator GILLIBRAND. So, what’s your assessment of their ability 

to coordinate, to communicate, to engage in terrorist acts outside 

of Syria and Iraq? 

Mr. CLAPPER. If you—do you mean the homeland or elsewhere in 

the world? 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Your choice, but both would be good. 

84 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I think what they’ve tried—they’re trying to 

do, of course, is to create the—both the substance and, maybe more 

importantly, the image of this global-scale caliphate by establishing 

chapters or franchises, if you will, in places like Libya, Egypt, 

Yemen, and South Asia. The extent to which, though, they—this is 

some monolithic organization, where ISIL in al-Rikah or Abu Du’a 

or Baghdadi is calling the shots in, say, Afghanistan/Pakistan, I 

don’t see a lot of evidence of this. I think this is more about pledging allegiance to the brutality and the savagery of the—of ISIL. 

But, the first and foremost issues for these local chapters is local. 

I think, aspirationally, there is a threat that ISIL poses, potentially, to the homeland, and those they might harbor in their area, 

particularly in Iraq and Syria, who would do us harm. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. I agree with that assessment. And we just 

had a recent case out of Brooklyn, where we had threats being 

made. 

You mentioned Yemen. Could you just briefly—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. If I—— 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Go ahead. 

Mr. CLAPPER. If I might comment on that, ma’am, this is what 

I was referring to in my oral statement about—and this is a real 

challenge for all of us in—whether homeland security or intelligence—is the appeal, the rhetorical or spiritual appeal that, because of the effective—very highly effective media capabilities that 

ISIL has demonstrated, and how that—they are able to appeal to 

people, who then can act on their own at a time—in a time and 

place and circumstance of their choosing. And that is a very worrisome challenge, particularly in this country. So, not so much them 

commanding/controlling plots as much as—— 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Inspiring—— 

Mr. CLAPPER.—inspiring them. 

Senator GILLIBRAND.—plots, right. 

So, do you have recommendations for us about ways to stem that 

tide? Do you believe that our allies and other countries are doing 

their fair share? Particularly, I am concerned about the flow of foreign fighters, some of them from the United States, from Europe 

into—in and out of Syria. For example, what should Turkey be 

doing to help us more? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, as we discussed before, Turkey has its own 

focus, which doesn’t necessarily comport with ours, in terms of focusing on ISIL or al-Qaeda. They have very permissive laws. It 

would be good if they could—if we could—if they would change 

them to have more stringent controls over who transits through 

their country. 

I do—I would volunteer that I think, because of the effectiveness 

of the media campaign or the propaganda campaign that ISIL 

mounts, that we, the United States, and we, the West, we who oppose ISIL need to be, I think, much more aggressive in mounting 

the counternarrative. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I want to thank the witnesses. 

Just before we conclude, could I just, again, take a look at that 

chart over there—General, I know you’ve seen it—as to the expansion of the Chinese by filling in areas in the South China Sea. 

85 

That’s a rather dramatic change, it seems to me. And obviously, 

they’d be filling in—that in, in order to place installations there. 

Is—could you talk a little bit about that before we conclude? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, the Chinese, of course, have had their exorbitant claims, the so-called ‘‘Nine-Dash line,’’ throughout the South 

China Sea, been very aggressive about pursuing that. The—and, of 

course, this runs afoul of counterclaims that many of the other 

countries also have in the same area. And they, too, are very concerned about it. In fact, I think, in a sense, that’s—that may be a 

good thing, because, in the end, their strength is going to be as— 

if an act—they can act collectively. 

So, what the Chinese are doing, here, of course—in one case, you 

know, building airfield—an airdrome so that they can launch aircraft in and out to do patrols and surveillance and further exert 

what they consider is their sovereignty over the South China Sea. 

And it has been impressive, in the last year, year and a half since 

they’ve been doing this, as they pursued drilling, which has caused 

conflict with the Vietnamese and others. And so, this is a worrisome trend of the Chinese because of the tensions it’s going to create in the South China Sea. 

Chairman MCCAIN. So, you’ve—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. But, they’ve been very aggressive about it. 

Chairman MCCAIN. So, you’ve got, not only the capability to 

build an airfield, but, obviously, weapon systems. Could also be— 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, they could, exactly. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Yeah. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Of course, they’re still in the construction phase, 

so what they actually deploy to something like this, or whether 

they permanently—they make it big enough so they could permanently station forces, that’ll be interesting to see what they do. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, obviously our attention is on other 

parts of the world, but this is really quite a major step on their 

part. And I thank you for helping us out on that. 

Jack, do you—— 

Senator REED. I’d—if I may, with just one question, in reaction 

to Senator Gillibrand’s questioning. 

We all understand, there’s a huge, sort of, public campaign that 

ISIL is undertaking to attract recruits, to dramatize what they’re 

doing. And you may not be able to comment in this setting. But, 

are we taking steps to interdict that communication so that they’re 

not able to put things up and attract recruits and communicate? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, the problem there is, their ubiquitous use of 

the media. And so, the challenge is, How do you take down the 

Internet? Because that’s more and more what they’re doing. In the 

day when al Qaeda or ISIL put these things out, it was kind of 

channelized, and we kind of watched it, and could do that. They’ve 

gotten wise to that, and now they make it very difficult, because 

of the universal forums and the way they get things out so ubiquitously. Very hard to control it. Ergo, what we must do, I believe, 

is counter the messages. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. General, I know you’ve had a—are going to 

have and are having a very busy couple of days, and I know you 

86 

understand that we have our responsibilities to try to inform members in the Senate so that we can shape legislation to help you do 

your job more effectively and efficiently. 

And we thank both of you for being here. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 

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