alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
HomeWanted: Narcotics Rewards Program Targets...Henry Castellanos Garzon

# 									Henry Castellanos Garzon							

Narcotics Rewards Program: Wanted

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

March 28, 2017

**NAME:** Henry Castellanos Garzon**ALIASES: “**Romana”**DOB:**March 20, 1965**POB**: El Castillo, Colombia**NATIONALITY**: Colombian**CITIZENSHIP:**Colombia**HEIGHT:**Unknown**WEIGHT:** Unknown**HAIR COLOR:**Brown**EYE COLOR**: Brown**SCARS, TATTOOS, OR MARKS:** Unknown

Henry Castellanos Garzon is allegedly a member of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which is a foreign terrorist organization in Colombia that was established in 1964. The FARC had a Marxist philosophy and is Latin America’s oldest, largest, most capable, and best-equipped insurgency — with perhaps 12,000 fighters and thousands of supporters. The FARC’s declared intent is to overthrow the democratic Colombian government. In addition to its attacks on Colombian military, political, and economic targets, the FARC is deeply involved in narcotics trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, murder, and other criminal activities.

Castellanos Garzon is allegedly a member of the Estado Mayor and head of several Eastern Bloc fronts. Castellanos Garzon allegedly participated in setting and implementing the FARC’s cocaine policies, including directing and controlling the production, manufacture, and distribution of hundreds of tons of cocaine to the United States and the world; the “taxation” of the drug trade in Colombia to raise funds for the FARC; and the murder of hundreds of people who violated or interfered with the FARC’s cocaine policies.

The United States Department of State is offering a **REWARD OF UP TO $2.5 MILLION** for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of **Henry Castellanos Garzon**.

If you have information and are located outside of the United States, please contact the nearest United States Embassy or Consulate. If in the United States, please contact the local Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), or Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) office in your city. Government officials and employees are not eligible for rewards.

**ALL IDENTITIES ARE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.**

This reward was approved by the Secretary of State in March 2006

Tags

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement AffairsColombiaDrug TraffickingNarcoticsRewards for Justice

Back to Top
#### Paul IGLESIAS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 77-1514.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 15, 1979.

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Paul Morris, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and James H. Greason, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before HAVERFIELD, C. J.,* and HEN-DRY and KEHOE, JJ.

*

 Chief Judge Haverfield participated in the decision in this case but did not hear oral argument.

PER CURIAM.

As to point I, the order is affirmed upon the authority of *Doerr v. State,*348 So.2d 938 (Fla.2d DCA 1977).

As to point II, we reverse. There is no longer statutory authority for sentencing an individual to “hard labor”, since the repeal of Section 922.05(2), Florida Statutes. Therefore, upon remand the phrase shall be stricken from the sentences imposed. *Growden v. State,*347 So.2d 631 (Fla.4th DCA 1977).

Accordingly, we affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part.
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases...Important Updates on Passport Processing

# 									Important Updates on Passport Processing							

Media Note

Office of the Spokesperson

March 7, 2023

The Department of State is committed to providing the best possible service for our passport customers.  We encourage all Americans to check their passport expiration date before making any definitive plans for international travel, and to **take action to renew their passport well in advance of international travel this year.**This is especially important as we approach what is expected to be our busiest summer travel season on record.

Our passport processing times are currently 8-11 weeks for routine processing and 5-7 weeks for expedited processing, which costs an additional $60 per application.  These processing times fluctuate throughout the year depending on demand and we anticipate that they will rise, especially as we approach the busier travel season.  Processing times begin when we receive an application and do not include delivery times.

As more Americans are traveling internationally again, we are directing resources to meet the unprecedented demand seen so far in 2023.  We are on track to set the record for the highest demand year ever, far surpassing volumes seen during previous surges in demand in 2007 and 2017.  During some weeks this winter, the Department received more than 500,000 applications, the highest number ever for this time of year, exceeding our official projections.

We are addressing the increased workload through a number of efforts.  We are aggressively recruiting and hiring across our passport agencies and centers.  Our passport team members nationwide contribute tens of thousands of hours of overtime a month to issue the millions of passports sought by traveling Americans.  We have opened a satellite office to help process the large number of applications we are receiving.

We understand some customers are facing extended wait times when calling the National Passport Information Center and we are taking steps to improve the telephone experience.  We encourage customers who have questions about how to apply or the status of their passport application to visit our website, travel.state.gov, which has extensive information and allows customers to check the status of their passport application and sign up for updates via email.

We are committed to transparency and will continue to provide regular updates about passport processing times, and to encourage Americans to apply for their passport well in advance of any planned international travel to avoid last-minute issues.  We also encourage all U.S. citizens traveling overseas to enroll in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP.state.gov) so they can receive important messages about their destinations directly, including timely Alerts and updates to Travel Advisories, and to enable us to assist in an emergency.

Tags

Bureau of Consular AffairsOffice of the SpokespersonPassports

Back to Top
§ 433.72 Waiver provisions applicable to health care-related taxes. ( a ) *Bases for requesting waiver.* ( 1 ) A State may submit to CMS a request for a waiver if a health care-related tax does not meet any or all of the following: ( i ) The tax does not meet the broad based criteria specified in § 433.68c); and/or
( ii ) The tax is not imposed uniformly but meets the criteria specified in § 433.68(d)(2) or (d)(3).
( 2 ) When a tax that meets the criteria specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section is imposed on more than one class of health care items or services, a separate waiver must be obtained for each class of health care items and services subject to the tax.
( b ) *Waiver conditions.* In order for CMS to approve a waiver request that would permit a State to receive tax revenue (within specified limitations) without a reduction in FFP, the State must demonstrate, to CMS's satisfaction, that its tax program meets all of the following requirements: ( 1 ) The net impact of the tax and any payments made to the provider by the State under the Medicaid program is generally redistributive, as described in § 433.68(e);
( 2 ) The amount of the tax is not directly correlated to Medicaid payments; and
( 3 ) The tax program does not fall within the hold harmless provisions specified in § 433.68(f).
( c ) *Effective date.* A waiver will be effective: ( 1 ) The date of enactment of the tax for programs in existence prior to August 13, 1993 or;
( 2 ) For tax programs commencing on or after August 13, 1993, on the first day in the quarter in which the waiver is received by CMS.
[57 FR 55138, Nov. 24, 1992, as amended at 58 FR 43182, Aug. 13, 1993]
#### Danny LeGRAND v. The STATE of Louisiana Through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS and its Successor, the Department of Transportation and Development.

No. 80-C-2774.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 9, 1981.

In re Danny LeGrand, applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. Parish of Bossier. 390 So.2d 957.

Denied.
#### Turner STREET and David Street, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 54121.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 20, 1980.

Rehearing Denied June 11, 1980.

Stephen R. Keroff of Keller & Keroff, Palm Beach, for appellants.

Jim Smith, Atty.' Gen., and Robert L. Bogen, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

BOYD, Justice.

The appellants were convicted, following jury trial, of the offense of battery upon a law enforcement officer, a felony under Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977). The trial court passed upon the constitutional validity of the statute when it denied the appellants’ motions to dismiss, so their *901appeal lies to this Court. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const.

The appellants argue that improper instructions were given to the jury with regard to what the state was required to prove, but since there was no objection or request for instructions by the defense below, this contention will not be considered now.

The appellants contend that the statute violates equal protection by the special treatment it gives to police officers as victims of batteries. This issue has been resolved in favor of the statute’s validity. *Soverino v. State,*356 So.2d 269 (Fla.1978).

The appellants contend that as a matter of law the verdict is not supported by substantial evidence. Our review of the record reveals that this contention is without merit.

Appellants contend that the- statute fails to give sufficient warning as to what, conduct will render a person liable to prosecution for the felony created thereby as opposed to prosecution for ordinary battery. The statute, however, has a scienter requirement. *State v. Bailey,*360 So.2d 772 (Fla.1978). It requires that the accused know that his victim is a law enforcement officer or firefighter. Appellants argue that the phrase “engaged in the lawful performance of his duties” is vague and raise the question of whether a policeman who is using excessive force is so engaged. But the use of unlawful force by a police officer, giving rise to a right of self-defense, would not relate to the matter of sufficient notice but would be a defense to the battery charge itself. As a matter of common understanding and practice, the statute conveys sufficiently definite warning as to what is proscribed. *Zachary v. State,*269 So.2d 669 (Fla.1972).

Finally, appellants argue that the statute violates due process by overbreadth, in that it could be applied to conduct that should only be punished as a misdemeanor. Overbreadth attack is only proper when the statute could be applied to innocent, protected activity, which does not include battery. *Pruitt v. State,*363 So.2d 552 (Fla.1978); *State v. Bales,*343 So.2d 9 (Fla.1977).

The judgment is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

ENGLAND, C. J., and ADKINS, OVER-TON and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.
#### Robb *v.*Bowen.

Five years’ non-claim after a sale for taxes, under tie act of 1815, bars the owner’s right; and, since the act of 1824, the limitation commences from the day of the sale.

In error from the Common Pleas of Lycoming.

*July*26. Ejectment. The plaintiffs were the former owners of an unseated tract of land, sold for taxes in 1886. Possession was not taken by the purchaser; and the question was, whether the plaintiff was barred by five years’ non-claim.

Lewis, P. J., instructed the jury that the limitation in the act of 1804 did not extend to sales under the act of 1815.

*milis*and *Maynard,*for plaintiff in' error.

*Armstrong,*contrá.

*July*29.

Coulter, J.

In McCall *v.*Hornebaueh, this court decided that the limitation contained in the 3d section of the act of 1804, of five years, is not repealed by the act of 1815, but is in full force; and in Bayard *v.*Inglis, 5 W. & S. 465, it was ruled that a purchaser at a treasurer’s sale, who enters into actual possession of the land, and continues it for five years, making improvements, cannot be disturbed by the owner, after the lapse of five years. It is, therefore, fully settled by authority, that the 3d section of the act of 1804 is not repealed by the act of 1815. This of itself would be sufficient to reverse the judgment below, if judicial precedent furnishes a rule; because the court below say that the limitation of five years applies to sales under the act of 1804, but has no application to sales under the act of 1815. An argument, however, has been conducted on the ground, that *72although the reason of the court below was not a good one, yet the judgment was correct, inasmuch as the limitation did not apply to this case, actual possession not having been taken. But that is not necessary since the act of 1824, which authorizes an action of ejectment to be brought by the owner against the purchaser at treasurer’s sale, notwithstanding he, nor any person under him or otherwise, resides on the premises.

In the case of Waln *v.*Shearman, 8 S. & R. 357, the Supreme Court decided that the limitation commenced at the time possession was taken by the purchaser, because then the owner had, for the first time, an opportunity of legally asserting his title. The -reason of the law is the life of the law; and the spirit of that decision is, that it would he unjust to make the statute run, when the owner had no opportunity to assert his title, but perfectly fair to launch it from the time he had such opportunity. After the act of 1824, the owner had a fair and full opportunity of commencing his action and asserting his right, when the treasurer’s deed was delivered to the defendant or those under whom he claims; and the statute then began to run. There was error in the charge of the court.

The judgment is reversed, and a *venire de novo*awarded.
§ 425.710 Data use agreement. ( a ) ( 1 ) Before receiving any beneficiary identifiable data, ACOs must enter into a DUA with CMS. Under the DUA, the ACO must comply with the limitations on use and disclosure that are imposed by HIPAA, the applicable DUA, and the statutory and regulatory requirements of the Shared Savings Program.
( 2 ) If the ACO misuses or discloses data in a manner that violates any applicable statutory or regulatory requirements or that is otherwise non-compliant with the provisions of the DUA, it will no longer be eligible to receive data under subpart H of this part, may be terminated from the Shared Savings Program under § 425.218, and may be subject to additional sanctions and penalties available under the law.
( b ) [Reserved]
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 177 (Tuesday, September 15, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 47208]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-22205]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Institute of Standards and Technology


Announcement of NIST Partnership Opportunities for Technology 
Transfer

AGENCY: National Institute of Standards and Technology, Commerce.

ACTION: Announcement of NIST Partnership Opportunities for Technology 
Transfer.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is 
interested in working with regional, state and local economic 
development organizations, technology incubation centers, technology-
oriented public-private business development initiatives and other 
organizations and partnerships to facilitate the transfer of 
technologies developed within the NIST Labs to the private sector 
through potential licensing and/or collaboration. A sampling of 
commercially viable technologies developed at the NIST Labs may be 
viewed at: http://www.nist.gov/patents. This is not an opportunity to 
apply for government funding and NIST will not make any funds available 
to any party pursuant to this announcement.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Office of Technology Partnerships, Attn: Clara Asmail, 
Building 222, Room A242, Gaithersburg, MD 20899. Information is also 
available via telephone: 301-975-2239, fax 301-975-3482, or e-mail: 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#fe9d929f8c9fd09f8d939f9792be90978d8ad0999188"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="84e7e8e5f6e5aae5f7e9e5ede8c4eaedf7f0aae3ebf2">[email protected]</span></a>. Please reference ``Opportunities for Tech 
Transfer Partnerships'' in any communications.

    Dated: September 10, 2009.
Patrick Gallagher,
Deputy Director.
[FR Doc. E9-22205 Filed 9-14-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-13-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
#### Shaw *v.*The State of Ohio.

*Constitutional law*— *State Medical Act*— *Section 1269 et seq., General Code*— *Practitioners in limited branches*— *Examinations.*

(No. 16335

Decided January 13, 1920.)

Error to the Court of Appeals of Summit county.

*Messrs. Holloway & Chamberlin,*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. C. G. Roetsel,*prosecuting attorney, and *Mr. W. A. Spencer,*assistant prosecuting attorney, for defendant in error.

By the Court.

After the present case was decided, and before the opinion was prepared, the case of *Nesmith*v. *State, ante,*158, was argued and submitted.

In all essential respects the same questions were raised, but more fully argued by counsel for the plaintiff in error in the *Nesmith case*than in the present case. The court therefore delayed the opinion in the *Shaw case*until after the *Nesmith case, supra,*had been fully considered and decided, and the opinion prepared.

We hold that there was no error in the ruling of the courts below, and that substantial justice has been done.

The judgment of the court of appeals is therefore affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Nichols, C. J., Jones, Matthias, Johnson, Wanamaker and Merrell, JJ., concur.

Robinson, J.,- not participating.
###### Editorial Note on Part 413

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 413 appear at 76 FR 50537, August 22, 2014.

#### § 413.195 Limitation on Review.

Administrative or judicial review under section 1869 of the Act, section 1878 of the Act, or otherwise of the following is prohibited: The determination of payment amounts under section 1881(b)(14)(A) of the Act, the establishment of an appropriate unit of payment under section 1881(b)(14)(C) of the Act, the identification of renal dialysis services included in the bundled payment, the adjustments under section 1881(b)(14)(D) of the Act, the application of the phase-in under section 1881(b)(14)(E) of the Act, and the establishment of the market basket percentage increase factors under section 1881(b)(14)(F) of the Act.

[75 FR 49199, Aug. 12, 2010]
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                           8,411
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   12,212
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (9,222)
<INVENTORY>                                        968
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                14,391
<PP&E>                                          13,443
<DEPRECIATION>                                   9,803
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  19,525
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           12,436
<BONDS>                                         25,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                      4,371
<COMMON>                                            67
<OTHER-SE>                                    (22,371)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    19,525
<SALES>                                         50,861
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                50,861
<CGS>                                           14,587
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   59,712
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (1,264)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 952
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (23,126)
<INCOME-TAX>                                        39
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (23,165)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (23,165)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.45)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.45)
        

</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 281 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 281

  To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to reinstate the tax on 
   interest received by foreigners on certain portfolio investments.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 4, 1995

  Mr. Jacobs introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to reinstate the tax on 
   interest received by foreigners on certain portfolio investments.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, amend the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 to reinstate the tax on interest received by 
foreigners on certain portfolio investments.
    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) the following 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 are hereby repealed:
            (1) Section 871(h) (relating to repeal of tax on interest 
        of nonresident alien individuals received from certain 
        portfolio debt investments).
            (2) Section 881(c) (relating to repeal of tax on interest 
        of foreign corporations received from certain portfolio debt 
        instruments).
            (3) Section 1441(c)(9) (relating to exception for interest 
        income from certain portfolio debt investments).
    (b)(1) Paragraph (1) of section 871(a) of such Code is amended by 
striking ``Except as provided in subsection (h), there'' and inserting 
``There''.
    (2) Subsection (a) of section 881 of such Code is amended by 
striking ``Except as provided in subsection (c), there'' and inserting 
``There''.
    (3) Paragraph (2) of section 864(c) of such Code is amended by 
striking ``section 871(a)(1), section 871(h), section 881(a), or 
section 881(c)'' and inserting ``section 871(a)(1) or 881(a)''.
    (4) Subsection (b) of section 2105 of such Code is amended--
            (A) by inserting ``and'' at the end of paragraph (1),
            (B) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (2) and 
        inserting a period,
            (C) by striking paragraph (3), and
            (D) by striking ``and Certain Other Debt Obligations'' in 
        the subsection heading.
    (5) The last sentence of section 1442(a) of such Code is amended by 
striking ``, the references in section 1441(c)(9) to sections 871(h) 
and 871(h)(3) shall be treated as referring to sections 881(c) and 
881(c)(3)''.
    (c) The amendments made by this section shall apply to interest 
received after the date of the enactment of this Act with respect to 
obligations issued after such date.
                                 <all>
```