Collision of a Greyhound Lines, Inc.

Motorcoach and Delcar Trucking

Truck Tractor-Semitrailer

Loraine, Texas

June 9, 2002

Highway Accident Report

NTSB/HAR-03/01

PB2003-916201

Notation 7532

National 

Transportation

Safety Board

Washington, D.C.

Highway Accident Report

Collision of a Greyhound Lines, Inc. 

Motorcoach and Delcar Trucking 

Truck Tractor-Semitrailer 

Loraine, Texas 

June 9, 2002

NTSB/HAR-03/01

PB2002-916201 National Transportation Safety Board

Notation 7532 490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W.

Adopted February 26, 2003 Washington, D.C. 20594
National Transportation Safety Board. 2003. Collision of a Greyhound Lines, Inc., Motorcoach and

Delcar Trucking Truck Tractor-Semitrailer, Loraine, Texas, June 9, 2002. Highway Accident Report.

NTSB/HAR-03/01. Washington, DC.

Abstract: On Sunday, June 9, 2002, about 5:10 a.m. central daylight time, near Loraine, Texas, a 1993

Motor Coach Industries MC-12 motorcoach, operated by Greyhound Lines, Inc., and occupied by the

driver and 37 passengers, was traveling east on Interstate 20, on a scheduled route from El Paso, Texas, to

Abilene, Texas, at a driver-reported speed of 65 to 67 mph. A truck tractor-semitrailer, consisting of a

tractor and a semitrailer leased by DelCar Trucking, which was being operated by a driver in training with

a codriver in the sleeper berth, was entering the interstate from a picnic area at a driver-estimated speed of

40 mph and proceeding into the eastbound lanes. The motorcoach collided with the rear of the semitrailer

near milepost 228 of Interstate 20, pushing the tractor-semitrailer approximately 276 feet. Three

passengers on the Greyhound bus, all seated in the front of the bus, were fatally injured. Five passengers

and the busdriver were seriously injured. Twenty-four passengers sustained minor injuries, and five

passengers were uninjured. The truckdriver sustained a minor injury, and the codriver was uninjured.

As a result of this accident investigation, which focuses upon the safety of and management oversight for

new entrant motor carriers, the National Transportation Safety Board makes two recommendations to the

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine,

pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board

Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study

transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board

makes public its actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and

statistical reviews.

Recent publications are available in their entirety on the Web at <http://www.ntsb.gov>. Other information about available publications also

may be obtained from the Web site or by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Public Inquiries Section, RE-51

490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

(800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National Technical Information Service. To

purchase this publication, order report number PB2003-916201 from:

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(800) 553-6847 or (703) 605-6000

The Independent Safety Board Act, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 1154(b), precludes the admission into evidence or use of Board reports

related to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. 
iii Highway Accident Report

Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

Factual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Accident Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Motorcoach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Truck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Accident Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Medical and Pathological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Survival Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Driver Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Truckdriver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Busdriver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Vehicle and Wreckage Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Truck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Motorcoach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Highway Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Highway Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Picnic Area Acceleration Ramp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Lighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Picnic Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Physical Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Operational Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

DelCar Trucking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Greyhound Lines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Meteorological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Tests and Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Acceleration Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Semitrailer Lights Examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Federal Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

U.S. Department of Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

U.S. Department of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

New Entrant Safety Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Requirements for New Entrants in Other Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Exclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Accident Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Lighting Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Tractor-Semitrailer Speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Survival Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Highway Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Contents iv Highway Accident Report

New Entrant Motor Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Forms and Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

SafeStat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Safety Audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Appendixes

A: Investigation and Public Hearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

B: Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration Forms 

MCS-150, MCS-150A, and OP-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
v Highway Accident Report

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation 

Officials

CDL commercial driverís license

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

DelCar DelCar Trucking

DOT U.S. Department of Transportation

DPS Department of Public Safety (Texas)

EMS emergency medical service

FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

FMCSRs Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations

Greyhound Greyhound Lines, Inc.

I-20 Interstate 20

MCI Motor Coach Industries

MTMC Military Traffic Management Command

NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

SafeStat Safety Status Measurement System

the act Motor Carrier Improvement Act of 1999

TRC Texas Transportation Code

TXDOT Texas Department of Transportation

Volpe Center Volpe National Transportation Systems Center
vi Highway Accident Report

Executive Summary

On Sunday, June 9, 2002, about 5:10 a.m. central daylight time, near Loraine,

Texas, a 1993 Motor Coach Industries MC-12 motorcoach, operated by Greyhound Lines,

Inc., (Greyhound) and occupied by the driver and 37 passengers, was traveling east on

Interstate 20 (I-20), on a scheduled route from El Paso, Texas, to Abilene, Texas, at a

driver-reported speed of 65 to 67 mph. A truck tractor-semitrailer, consisting of a tractor

and a semitrailer leased by DelCar Trucking (DelCar), which was being operated by a

driver in training with a codriver in the sleeper berth, was entering the interstate from a

picnic area at a driver-estimated speed of 40 mph and proceeding into the eastbound lanes.

The motorcoach collided with the rear of the semitrailer near milepost 228 of Interstate 20,

pushing the tractor-semitrailer approximately 276 feet. Three passengers on the

Greyhound bus, all seated in the front of the bus, were fatally injured. Five passengers and

the busdriver were seriously injured. Twenty-four passengers sustained minor injuries, and

five passengers were uninjured. The truckdriver sustained a minor injury, and the codriver

was uninjured.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

this accident was the unnecessarily slow acceleration of the unlighted semitrailer onto a

high-speed interstate by an inexperienced and unsupervised driver who was impaired by

cocaine. Contributing to the accident was DelCar Truckingís failure to exercise adequate

operational oversight and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administrationís failure to

ensure the safety of and provide management oversight for new entrant motor carriers. 

As a result of this accident investigation, which focuses upon the safety of and

management oversight for new entrant motor carriers, the Safety Board makes two

recommendations to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration.
1 Highway Accident Report

Factual

Accident Narrative

On Sunday, June 9, 2002, about 5:10 a.m. central daylight time, near Loraine,

Texas, a 1993 Motor Coach Industries (MCI) MC-12 motorcoach, operated by Greyhound

Lines, Inc., (Greyhound) and occupied by the driver and 37 passengers, was traveling east

on Interstate 20 (I-20), on a scheduled route from El Paso, Texas, to Abilene, Texas, (see

figure 1) at a driver-reported speed of 65 to 67 mph.1

 A truck tractor-semitrailer,

consisting of a tractor and a semitrailer leased by DelCar Trucking (DelCar), which was

being operated by a driver in training with a codriver in the sleeper berth, was entering the

interstate from a picnic area at a driver-estimated speed of 40 mph and proceeding into the

.

1 The posted nighttime speed limit was 65 mph.

Figure 1. Map of route.
Factual 2 Highway Accident Report

eastbound lanes (see figure 2). The motorcoach collided with the rear of the semitrailer

near milepost 228 of I-20, pushing the tractor-semitrailer approximately 276 feet.

Three passengers on the Greyhound bus, all seated in the front of the bus, were

fatally injured. Five other passengers and the busdriver were seriously injured. Twentyfour passengers sustained minor injuries, and five passengers were uninjured. The

truckdriver sustained a minor injury, and the codriver was uninjured.

Motorcoach

The bus departed El Paso at 8:30 p.m., mountain daylight time, on June 8, 2002, en

route to Abilene with a scheduled arrival time of 6:00 a.m. The location and time of the

accident indicated that the bus was on schedule when the accident occurred. The driver

estimated that he was traveling about 65 to 67 mph and said that he had the low-beam

headlights illuminated.

One bus passenger stated he observed the bus collide with the rear of the truck, and

it appeared that the truck was stopped in the right lane of the highway. He stated that he

ìdidnít notice any lightsî on the truck. Another passenger who also observed the collision

thought the truck was stopped or parked in the right lane of the highway. A third bus

passenger stated that after the accident, the busdriver told him the truckdriver ìdidnít have

his back lights onî and said he ìcouldnít see the semi before it was too late.î

Figure 2. Accident location.
Factual 3 Highway Accident Report

Truck

The truckdriver stated he departed El Paso on June 8, 2002, about 9:30 p.m. en

route to Michigan. In a written statement that the truckdriver sent to his employer

approximately 2 weeks after the accident,2

 the truckdriver noted that he had stopped in the

picnic area to go to the bathroom and check the lights on the semitrailer. He stated that

ìeverything was okay.î He reported that he was entering the highway at about 40 mph.

A Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) investigating officer on scene

reported that when he arrived, the tractorís headlights were illuminated, but none of the

lights on the rear of the semitrailer were illuminated.

A truckdriver parked in the same picnic area told police that while monitoring his

citizenís band radio, he overheard a report by another trucker that a tractor-semitrailer was

stopped in the roadway near the picnic area. When interviewed by National Transportation

Safety Board investigators, he stated that he also overheard that the tractor-semitrailer was

operating with no lights. From his location in the picnic area, he said he was unable to

observe whether the truck had its lights on.

Another truckdriver drove past the accident site and, in an interview with Safety

Board investigators, stated that when he returned to help at the scene, he noticed that the

headlights of the tractor were on. He also reported that when he found the busdriver

trapped in the wreckage, the busdriver repeatedly stated that the ìtruck had no lights onî at

the time of collision.

Accident Damage

After the collision, the vehicles traveled together for about 276 feet. The front of

the motorcoach underrode the rear of the semitrailer and the motorcoach sustained

damage extending about 100 to 125 inches rearward (see figure 3), while the tractorsemitrailer sustained crush damage to the semitrailer (see figure 4). The tractor was not

damaged.

2 After being released by the Texas Department of Public Safety, the truckdriver returned to Mexico

and has refused interviews with National Transportation Safety Board investigators.
Factual 4 Highway Accident Report

Figure 3. Postaccident left side of motorcoach and semitrailer.

Figure 4. Postaccident right side of motorcoach and semitrailer.
Factual 5 Highway Accident Report

Injuries

Table 1. Injury codes.3

Medical and Pathological Information

Three motorcoach passengers sustained fatal injuries. The fatally injured

passengers in row 1 (see figure 5) sustained severe impact injuries to the head, upper

torso, and arms, as well as internal injuries. The passenger in row 2 by the left window

sustained a fracture of the left temporal head area and fractures of the left scapula, arm,

pelvis, and leg.

Five motorcoach passengers and the busdriver sustained serious injuries. The

passenger in row 1, right window seat, sustained a diffused fracture of the left hip and

lacerations and contusions (bruises) to the left leg, ankle, femur, forearm, and wrist. The

passenger seated in row 2, right aisle seat, sustained a fractured right femur, a contusion to

the right upper chest, and multiple contusions and abrasions to the head and upper torso.

The passenger in row 3, left aisle seat, incurred multiple facial and head contusions and

abrasions, a fractured left shoulder, and lacerations of the left leg. The passenger in row 3,

left window seat, sustained several lacerations to the face, closed head injuries, neck

injuries, a fractured vertebra, and a dislocated left hip. The passenger in row 10, left aisle

seat, sustained a fractured left mid tibia, fractured left hand, left forearm fracture, and

contusions of the left arm. The busdriver sustained traumatic injuries to both legs, the

abdomen, and internal organs; his right leg was amputated during extrication from the

wreckage.

Injuries Truckdriver

Truck 

passenger Busdriver

Bus 

passengers Total

Fatal 0 003 3

Serious 0 015 6

Minor 1 0 0 24 25

None 0 105 6

Total 1 1 1 37 40

3 Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830.2 defines a fatal injury as any injury that results in

death within 30 days of the accident. It defines a serious injury as: an injury that requires hospitalization for

more than 48 hours, commencing within 7 days from the date the injury was received; results in a fracture of

any bone (except simple fractures of the fingers, toes, or nose); causes severe hemorrhages, nerve, muscle,

or tendon damage; involves any internal organ; or involves second or third degree burns, or any burns

affecting more than 5 percent of the body surface.
Factual 6 Highway Accident Report

Figure 5. Motorcoach seating chart. (Probable seating locations based on passenger 

interviews.) Definition of passenger labels: Gender ñ Age : Injury Severity.

11

F - 74 : F

F - 40 : F

F - 52 : M

F - 10 : S

M - 31 : S

M - 33 : M

M - 29 : M

F - 19 : M

F - 62 : S

F - 55 : S

F - 50 : F

F - 10 : M

F - 72 : S

F - 16 : M

M - 18 : M

M - 10 : N

M - 36 : M

M - 22 : N

M - 37 : N

M - 39 : S

M - 22 : M

F - 44 : M

M - 15 : M

M - 61 : M

M - 21 : M

F - 20 : M

M - 42 : M

M - 39 : M

M - 16 : M

M - 18 : M

F - 26 : M

M - 24 : M

M - 50 : M

F - 2 mos : N

M - 01 : N

F - 18 : M

M - 24 : M

M - 22 : M

12

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1
Factual 7 Highway Accident Report

Survival Aspects

The front of the bus struck the rear of the semitrailer; intrusion damage was found

about 100 inches rearward on the left (driver) side of the bus and about 125 inches

rearward on the right (passenger) side. The occupant compartment from the windshield

rearward to row 1 was destroyed. The instrument panel, left sidewall, and steering column

were collapsed to the rear and to the left. The busdriver was trapped in the wreckage

following the collision. The fatally injured passengers in row 1 were seated in the area of

impact. The seriously injured passengers in rows 2 and 3 collided with collapsed portions

of the front of the bus. The seriously injured passenger in row 10 was thrown into the aisle

during the collision. Only the busdriverís seating position was equipped with a

lap/shoulder belt; the remaining seats had no restraints.

After the impact, several passengers exited the bus via the side emergency window

exits; impact damage prevented use of the front boarding door of the bus. Seven

occupants, including the busdriver, were unable to exit the bus because of injuries and had

to be extricated by emergency personnel.

Emergency Response

A citizen called 911 about 5:11 a.m. and reported that the accident was at milepost

242, which is in Nolan County, Texas. The call was initially routed to the Abilene

Emergency Communications Center, but was immediately rerouted to the Sweetwater,

Texas, dispatch because of the location reported by the caller. At 5:12 a.m., the

Sweetwater Fire Department was dispatched. At 5:15 a.m., based on other calls received

providing the accidentís true location, the Nolan County dispatch contacted the Mitchell

County Sheriffís Office. The first person to arrive on scene, at 5:18 a.m., was a Nolan

County Deputy Sheriff, who notified dispatch that the accident scene was at milepost 228,

in Mitchell County, Texas. At 5:20 a.m., one City of Loraine and three Mitchell County

emergency medical service (EMS) units were dispatched.

The Loraine Fire Department and EMS units established traffic control, shutting

down the eastbound lanes of I-20 until 3:00 p.m. The Sweetwater Fire Chief was the

incident commander for the extrication process, and the Mitchell County EMS Supervisor

was responsible for triage and transportation of the injured. Area fire and EMS agencies

provided a total of 12 firefighters and emergency medical technicians, as well as the

battalion chief.
Factual 8 Highway Accident Report

Driver Information

Truckdriver

The 36-year-old truckdriver possessed a Texas Class A commercial driverís

license (CDL) learnerís permit, issued on May 26, 2000, with an expiration date of

January 28, 2005. Federal regulations at 49 CFR 383.23 required that the truckdriver be

supervised by a licensed CDL holder when operating commercial vehicles and that the

licensed CDL holder be positioned in the front seat of the vehicle. Another employee of

the motor carrier was assigned as a codriver/supervisor but stated that he was in the truckís

sleeper berth at the time of the accident. Federal regulations at 49 CFR 391.41(a) require

that drivers possess a valid medical certificate prior to operating a commercial vehicle; the

truckdriver was not medically certified at the time of the accident nor did records indicate

that he had ever been certified. Texas DPS cited the driver for not having a licensed CDL

holder supervising him from the front passenger seat and for not having a medical

certificate in his possession.

The motor carrier reported that the truckdriver had been working for the company

about 2 weeks and had worked for another motor carrier prior to his employment at

DelCar (the owner of DelCar had no records indicating how long the driver had been

driving or working for another motor carrier). The truckdriver was on his second trip and

in his 4th day of supervised driving for the motor carrier at the time of the accident. (For

the truckdriverís logbook entries, see table 2.) The truckdriverís logbook was not

completed for June 8 or June 9.

Table 2. Truckdriver logbook entries.

After the accident, the truckdriver was released by Texas DPS to return to El Paso.

According to the owner of DelCar, the truckdriver traveled to Juarez, Mexico, where he

had relatives,4

 and refused Safety Board requests to return to El Paso. Safety Board

investigators were unable to contact the truckdriver.

Date Times Logbook entry Hours

June 6, 2002 0000 ñ 0600 Driving 6.0

ó 0600 ñ 1715 Off duty/sleeper berth 11.25

June 6-7, 2002 1715 ñ 0315 Driving 10.0

June 7, 2002 0315 ñ 1900 Off duty/sleeper berth 15.75

ó 1900 - ???? Driving ó

4 Though born in Mexico, the driver was a U.S. citizen.
Factual 9 Highway Accident Report

A postcrash urine specimen was collected from the truckdriver about 10:00 a.m.

on the day of the accident and analyzed by laboratory staff at the Mitchell County Hospital

in Colorado City, Texas. The specimen tested positive for benzoylecgonine, a cocaine

metabolite, at a level of 2,890 nanograms/milliliter. A blood specimen, collected at 8:35

a.m., was analyzed by the Texas DPS toxicology laboratory and found to contain 0.37

milligrams of benzoylecgonine per liter.

Busdriver

The 39-year-old busdriver possessed a Texas Class A CDL with a passenger

endorsement and corrective lens restriction having an expiration date of August 28, 2008.

He also possessed a valid medical examinerís certificate issued May 4, 2001, with an

expiration date of May 4, 2003. The busdriver reported that he was wearing glasses at the

time of the accident.

The busdriver had been employed with Greyhound since June 13, 1998. The

busdriver was a full-time extra-board driver5

 with Greyhound. His home terminal was

Abilene, and in the 4 months prior to the accident, he had driven roundtrips between

Abilene and Dallas and Abilene and El Paso.

According to the busdriverís logbooks, he had begun driving at 8:30 p.m., the

night before the accident. Table 3 lists the driverís logbook entries for the 3 days prior to

the accident. No records were completed for the day of the accident.

The driver stated he was not using any prescriptions or over-the-counter

medications, drugs, or alcohol prior to the accident. Specimens of blood and urine for the

busdriver were collected at Hendricks Medical Center in Abilene following the accident.

Both specimens were negative for alcohol and other drugs. The driver had received a

preemployment drug test on March 11, 1998, and a random drug test on April 28, 1999,

both with negative results.

5 Extra-board drivers are on-call drivers used as needed to provide extra capacity or substitute for

regular drivers. They are not scheduled on the same route or at the same time every day of the work cycle.
Factual 10 Highway Accident Report

Table 3. Busdriver logbook entries.

Vehicle and Wreckage Information

Truck

The 2000 Peterbilt tractor was towing a 1991 Stoughton 53-foot van semitrailer.

The total weight of the tractor-semitrailer and load6

 was 40,710 pounds; the gross vehicle

weight rating of the semitrailer was 68,080 pounds. The tractor, inspected by the Texas

DPS on June 9, 2002, and released prior to the arrival of Safety Board investigators, was

Date Times Logbook entry Hours

June 6, 2002 0000 ñ 0600 Driving 6.00

ó 0600 ñ 0615 On duty 0.25

ó 0615 ñ 1930 Off duty 13.25

ó 1930 ñ 2000 On duty 0.50

ó 2000 ñ 2230 Driving 2.50

ó 2230 ñ 2245 On duty 0.25

June 6 ñ 7, 2002 2245 ñ 0015 Off duty 1.50

June 7, 2002 0015 ñ 0030 On duty 0.25

ó 0030 ñ 0300 Driving 2.50

ó 0300 ñ 0315 On duty 0.25

June 7 ñ 8, 2002 0315 ñ 0115 Off duty 22.00

June 8, 2002 0115 ñ 0200 On duty 0.75

ó 0200 ñ 0730 Driving 5.50

ó 0730 ñ 0745 On duty 0.25

ó 0745 ñ 0945 Driving 2.00

ó 0945 ñ 1000 On duty 0.25

ó 1000 ñ 2030 Off duty 10.50

6 The load, consisting of automotive seat cushions, weighed about 6,000 pounds.
Factual 11 Highway Accident Report

found to have no mechanical defects. The Texas DPS commercial vehicle inspector stated

that a 15-amp fuse found in a 30-amp receptacle for the clearance and identification lights7

was burned out.

Texas DPS and Safety Board investigators inspected the semitrailer; no

mechanical defects, other than the poorly maintained lighting system wiring and the

burned-out fuse, were found. During a postaccident interview with the Texas DPS, the

truckdriver stated that when the turn signal was used, the semitrailerís lights sometimes

shorted out.8

 An examination of the wires supplying current to the clearance and

identification lights showed that they were melted due to an electrical short. According to

Texas DPS and Safety Board investigators, the general appearance of the wiring in the

back of the semitrailer was poor; several splices covered with black electrical tape

connected the wires. The wiring harness for the taillights on the right rear of the truck had

an exposed wire where the insulation was cracked. The taillights and the license plate

lights were on the same circuit. Testing of the lighting system could not be performed due

to accident damage, but several of the lamps (bulbs) were analyzed by the Safety Boardís

materialís lab (see Tests and Research).

The semitrailer had not been retrofitted with retroreflective sheeting as required by

Federal regulations.9

DelCar leased both the tractor and semitrailer but did not maintain maintenance

records for either, even though the carrier was responsible for doing so.

Motorcoach

Safety Board investigators inspected the 1993 MCI MC-12 motorcoach after the

accident. The defects noted were a leaking wheel oil seal on the second axle on the left and

an excessive engine oil leak. Greyhoundís maintenance records did not reveal any

recurring maintenance problems, and the busdriver stated the bus had no defects.

The busdriver stated he had the low-beam headlights on, as was his normal

practice. The headlights could not be tested because of accident damage. According to the

Texas Transportation Code (TRC) 547.333, low-beam lights must reveal a person or

vehicle at a distance of at least 150 feet.

7 Clearance lights are located along the sides of the trailer to allow the driver to see the edges of the

trailer during maneuvers.

8 The driver did not specify which lights he was referring to.

9 Title 49 CFR 393.13 requires that all trailers manufactured before December 1, 1993, be retrofitted

with retroreflective sheeting or reflex reflectors by June 1, 2001.
Factual 12 Highway Accident Report

Highway Information

Highway Design

The accident occurred on eastbound I-20 approximately 1,200 feet east of milepost

228 in Mitchell County. I-20 is classified as a principal arterial and is a divided, two-way,

four-lane, paved asphalt, controlled access highway. The posted speed limit was 70 mph

during the day and 65 mph at night. A picnic area was along the south side of the

interstate; the gore area10 for the entrance ramp from the picnic area was about 935 feet

west of the accident site (see figure 6).

10 Triangular piece of land between the interstate and the ramp as the ramp transitions away from the

interstate.

Figure 6. Interstate 20 diagram.

M

RP1

0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30

NORTH

Miles

 Interstate 20

Chevron alignment signs 

and easternmost area of 

highway safety lighting 

 Narrel Road (overpass)

Ramp leading to 

picnic area 

Designated truck 

parking location in 

picnic area 

Ramp leading from 

picnic area 

Milepost 228 

Tire marks at 

accident scene 

To El Paso

To Abilene
Factual 13 Highway Accident Report

Each eastbound lane measured approximately 12 feet across and was divided by

painted stripes approximately 10 feet long and spaced every 30 feet. The left paved

shoulder was about 4 feet wide and delineated by a 4-inch-wide retroreflective yellow

painted edge line; the right paved shoulder was about 10 feet wide and delineated by a

4-inch-wide retroreflective white painted edge line. Rolled rumble strips11 measuring 26

inches long were on the shoulder, approximately 4 inches from the right lane edge line.

The westbound lanes were similarly configured and separated from the eastbound lanes by

a 39-foot depressed earthen median.

Records provided by the Texas Department of Transportation (TXDOT) revealed

that in a 5-mile section of I-20 centered on milepost 228, one accident had occurred in the

previous 5 years: a single-vehicle run-off-the-road accident with possible injury.

According to TXDOT, the annual average daily traffic count for 1996 to 2000 ranged from

9,200 to 12,100 cars (see table 4), with trucks accounting for 35.7 percent of the total

traffic in 2000.

Table 4. Annual average daily traffic count.

Picnic Area Acceleration Ramp

The picnic area had a 975-foot acceleration ramp from the truck parking area to the

interstate (see figure 7). The acceleration ramp from the picnic area was defined by the

design plans as a single-lane, free-flow entrance terminal with a taper-type design. The

interstate had a 4-percent upgrade beginning 375 feet east of the gore created by the picnic

areaís acceleration ramp. No visual obstructions existed between the acceleration ramp

and the interstate.

According to current American Association of State Highway and Transportation

Officials (AASHTO) guidelines, an acceleration ramp should be long enough for a driver

to make the transition from the speed on the entering roadway to the operational speed of

the highway. The design of the ramp should be such that motorists can attain a speed

11 Rolled rumble strips are installed into shoulders to assist in preventing drift-off accidents and are

formed by a roller that leaves grooves during the compaction of asphalt during the pavement resurfacing

process.

Year Vehicles per day

1996 9,200

1997 9,800

1998 11,200

1999 12,100

2000 11,700
Factual 14 Highway Accident Report

approximately equal to the average running speed of the highway, less 6.21 mph, by the

time the left edge of the ramp joins the traveled portion of the highway.

Under current AASHTO guidelines, a vehicle leaving the picnic area from a

parked position and entering onto a highway with a design speed of 70 mph requires an

acceleration ramp of 1,410 feet at a maximum grade of 2 percent. When the picnic area

was built in 1965, no guidance existed for the lengths of acceleration ramps. According to

TXDOT, a roadwayís design features are brought up to the current standards when a major

rehabilitation project takes place. According to a TXDOT engineer, the agency plans to

investigate the feasibility of revising the rehabilitation contract12 to include changes to the

eastbound picnic area acceleration ramp in spring 2003.

Lighting

In the immediate area of the accident site, the highway did not have overhead

safety lighting. The picnic area west of the accident site did not incorporate lighting along

the ramps or within the picnic area. Approximately 1,500 feet west of the picnic area, a

series of eight dual-mast-arm light poles were in the center median, and two single-mast

light poles were along the right-side right of way in each direction. These 12 lights were

used to illuminate the interchange between I-20 and Ranch Road 644, as well as the 3-

degree left curve preceding the picnic area. The easternmost lights can be seen in figure 6.

Figure 7. Picnic area acceleration ramp (looking west from accident site).

12 Currently underway in the westbound lanes of I-20 near the accident site.
Factual 15 Highway Accident Report

Title 43, Texas Administrative Code, section 25.11, defines roadway lighting

systems, as well as the rules specifying highways eligible for State funds, for each type of

lighting. According to the code, TXDOT can only install and/or maintain lighting systems

on eligible roadways where conditions warrant such installations. According to the

TXDOT Operations Division Highway Illumination Manual, under rural conditions,

safety lighting may be warranted for a partial interchange/intersection with a current

average daily traffic count exceeding 10,000 on the through traffic lanes.

Picnic Area

A guidance sign on I-20 identified the rest area as a picnic area. The facility,

constructed in 1965, incorporated covered shelters with picnic tables and several trash

containers. The traffic lanes within the picnic area consisted of (1) a ramp from the

interstate to the picnic area; (2) a main through lane running parallel to the interstate; (3) a

paved area designed for pull-through truck parking with a lane back to the main through

lane; (4) a ramp allowing access for traffic from the south side frontage road; and (5) an

acceleration ramp from the picnic area back to the interstate.

According to AASHTO,13 rest areas operating complete facilities, including a

comfort station and a picnic area, should ìgenerate a feeling of safety and security by

ensuring the facility is adequately lighted for nighttime use.î The warrants for lighting

developed by AASHTO only apply to complete facilities; the picnic area near the accident

location was not a complete facility.

Physical Evidence

The motorcoachís tandem wheel tire marks began in the right traffic lane about

1,202 feet east of milepost 228, continued in the right lane for about 48 feet, then

transitioned into the left traffic lane in a right-hand arc for about 187 feet before crossing

back into the right traffic lane and continuing an additional 64 feet to where the Texas DPS

marked the final resting point of the motorcoachís drive (rear) axle (see figure 8). A single

tire mark was observed in the right traffic lane and followed the same general path as the

tandem tire marks with an overall length of 242 feet. The single tire mark terminated in the

right traffic lane, where the Texas DPS marked the final rest of the right side steer (front)

axle of the motorcoach. Another single tire mark was observed in the left traffic lane

running in a southeast direction with an overall length of 56 feet and terminating in the

right traffic lane, where the Texas DPS marked the final rest of the motorcoachís left-side

steering axle.

13 American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, An Informational Guide for

Roadway Lighting (Washington, DC: AASHTO, 1984).
Factual 16 Highway Accident Report

Figure 8. Postaccident diagram.

 Beginning of

 tandem wheel

 tire marks

Beginning of 

single wheel 

tire mark 

 Beginning of

 single wheel

 tire mark

Position of 

Greyhound bus 

at final rest 

Position of 

combination unit 

at final rest 

0 25 50 75 100

FEET

Eastbound 

Interstate 20 

 Westbound

 Interstate 20

NORTH

To Abilene 

To El Paso 
Factual 17 Highway Accident Report

Operational Information

DelCar Trucking

DelCar was an authorized for-hire motor carrier of general freight, household

goods, metal sheets, coils, and rolls based in El Paso. The motor carrierís facility was a

mobile trailer on a gravel lot. There was no maintenance garage or storage facility on the

property, although the owner reported light maintenance work was conducted on the lot.

Investigators found no maintenance contract.

DelCar had been a registered motor carrier since August 17, 2000. The owner and

his brother, who helped manage the company, had both been truckdrivers previously. The

owner started driving trucks in 1984 and became an owner/operator in 1991. He had no

previous experience running a motor carrier operation, nor did his brother; their only

experience was driving commercial vehicles. A Texas DPS review of the ownerís criminal

record revealed that he was found guilty of possession of marijuana over 50 pounds but

less than 2,000 pounds in March 1999. He received 10 yearsí probation. A review of the

ownerís driving record revealed two accidents (in 1999 and 2000), two speeding

convictions (in 1998 and 2000), and three speeding-in-a-commercial vehicle convictions

(two in 1995 and one in 1999 for driving 15 mph over the speed limit).

During interviews, the owner displayed some knowledge of driving rules, but little

knowledge of motor carrier operator regulations, despite submitting Federal Motor Carrier

Safety Administration (FMCSA) forms MCS-150 and OP-114 certifying that he was

familiar with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs). In addition, the

owner was required to maintain a current version (2002) of the FMCSRs, but investigators

found only a copy of the 2001 FMCSRs. Further, the owner signed Form OP-1 certifying

he had not been convicted of distribution or possession of a controlled substance.

When DelCar registered as a motor carrier, it had a fleet of two tractors and three

trailers. At the time of the accident, DelCar had a fleet of 13 tractors and 25 semitrailers.

When DelCar registered, it reported 4 interstate drivers; at the time of the accident, the

owner reported having 2 full-time local drivers and 17 full-time long-distance drivers.

Drivers were generally owner/operators and were hired through locally run

advertisements.

The owner did not conduct background checks on drivers nor conduct

preemployment or random drug screening (the driver tested positive for drugs at the time

of the accident). In addition, the owner did not require drivers to turn in their logbooks15 or

prepare vehicle inspection reports, nor did he keep maintenance records for the vehicles.

The FMCSRs require the owner to follow all of these procedures. In addition, DelCar

drivers were cited seven times for moving violations from November 2000 to January

2002.

14 These forms must be submitted to the FMCSA to request authority to operate as a motor carrier.

15 The owner stated that he required drivers to maintain their logbooks but did not require them to turn

them in.
Factual 18 Highway Accident Report

According to the FMCSA inspector, the owner stated that he knowingly dispatched

the accident driver to drive to Michigan as part of a team, even though the driver had only

a learnerís permit and no medical certificate. The codriver, also the driverís uncle, stated

that he was aware of the driverís non-CDL status and agreed to take the trip in the role of

codriver, not as supervisor.

At the time of the accident, DelCar did not have the minimum level of insurance,

$750,000, required by the FMCSA. The FMCSA received notice of the cancellation of

DelCarís insurance for nonpayment of premiums on May 12, 2002. The FMCSA sent a

notice of revocation of authority to DelCar on June 7, 2002 (2 days before the accident),

giving the carrier 30 days to obtain insurance or cease operation. DelCar obtained the

necessary insurance coverage on June 11, 2002 (2 days after the accident), and the

revocation proceedings were discontinued on June 18, 2002. This was the second time that

the FMCSA had sent notice of revocation to DelCar for a lack of insurance due to

nonpayment of premiums. On September 20, 2001, notice of revocation was sent because

DelCarís insurance was cancelled on August 24, 2001. DelCar obtained insurance, and the

revocation process was discontinued on October 9, 2001.

FMCSA records indicate that, at the time of the accident, roadside inspections of

DelCar vehicles and drivers resulted in a 35-percent out-of-service rate for vehicles16 (the

national average is 23 percent) as a result of poor maintenance and 17-percent out-ofservice rate for drivers17 (the national average is 8 percent) as a result of logbook, hoursof-service, and medical certification violations. Safety Board investigators have learned

that the brother of DelCar Truckingís owner applied for and received operating authority

just prior to the accident. The brother also has a felony drug conviction. He is currently

operating in DelCarís former location and employs DelCarís owner.

Motor carrier safety rating. To measure the relative safety performance and

compliance of individual motor carriers, the Safety Status Measurement System

(SafeStat), developed for the FMCSA, uses data from State and Federal sources, including

roadside inspections. Four safety evaluation areas (Accident History, Driver, Vehicle, and

Safety Management) are measured and rated. SafeStat is currently used by the FMCSA to

identify and prioritize motor carriers for on-site compliance reviews and roadside

inspections. SafeStat identifies as deficient any carrier that is in the worst 25th percentile,

as indicated by a score greater than 75 (out of 100) in a safety evaluation area. Using these

SafeStat scores,18 the FMCSA assigns carriers to categories A through G; category A

represents carriers with the highest range of SafeStat scores (a score of 350 to 550) and

thus those carriers with the greatest deficiencies. According to FMCSA inspectors, only

those carriers in categories A and B (a score greater than 225) receive a compliance

review; category C carriers most likely do not receive a compliance review. Carriers that

16 Sixty-six vehicles were inspected, and 23 were placed out of service.

17 One hundred-two drivers were inspected, and 17 were placed out of service.

18 The overall SafeStat score is the sum of two times the Accident History safety evaluation area value

plus 1.5 times the Driver safety evaluation area, plus the Vehicle safety evaluation area, plus the Safety

Management safety evaluation area values.
Factual 19 Highway Accident Report

are only deficient in one safety evaluation area are placed in categories D through G,

which are used to prioritize carriers for roadside inspections.

DelCarís SafeStat score (as of March 23, 2002, the most recent data available) was

based on 79.23 for the Vehicle safety evaluation area and 92.69 for the Driver safety

evaluation area; both scores are considered deficient. SafeStat did not rate DelCar in the

Accident History or Safety Management safety evaluation areas because, prior to the

accident, DelCar did not have an accident record and had not received a compliance

review from the FMCSA since beginning operation. The composite SafeStat score of

218.26 resulted in DelCar being placed in category C.19

The FMCSA also uses SafeStat to identify carriers for roadside inspections

through the Inspection Selection System. The Inspection Selection System is a decisionmaking aid for determining whether to conduct commercial vehicle roadside safety

inspections. A safety algorithm that uses a carrierís SafeStat safety evaluation area scores

calculates the value assigned by the Inspection Selection System. DelCarís Inspection

Selection System score was ì96óInspect.î20 The Inspection Selection System showed

that the violation rates were higher than average for DelCar in the following areas: wheels

or tires, steering or frame, medical certification, driversí logbooks, and driversí hours.

Postaccident compliance review. Following the accident, the FMCSA

conducted a compliance review of the motor carrierís operations. Violations cited by the

FMCSA included:

ï failing to conduct preemployment drug testing, postaccident drug testing, and

random drug and alcohol testing (the accident driver was cited as support for

this violation);

ï operating without having required minimum level of financial responsibility

(lack of insurance);

ï failing to maintain an accident register;

ï failing to maintain driver qualification files;

ï using a driver not medically examined or certified (the accident driver was

cited as support for this violation);

ï operating with driversí hours-of-service violations;

ï failing to maintain inspection and maintenance records; and

ï failing to require drivers to prepare vehicle inspection reports.

19 DelCar had received sufficient vehicle and driver inspections by September 2001 to be rated in the

Driver and Vehicle areas.

20 Carriers are rated in the Inspection Selection System on a 100-point system, which is divided into

three tiers: (a) Pass (no inspection required), for a score of 1 to 49; (b) Optional (may be worth a look), for a

score of 50 to 74; and (c) Inspect (inspection warranted), for a score of 75 to 100. Since DelCar was in

category C and had Driver and Vehicle safety evaluation area values greater than 75, the carrier

automatically received an Inspection Selection System rating of 96-99.
Factual 20 Highway Accident Report

The FMCSA inspectors did not look for or find information about the ownerís

previous conviction for drug possession or for the misleading information contained on

DelCarís new entrant motor carrier application. As a result of the violations cited by the

FMCSA, DelCar received an unsatisfactory rating on June 18, 2002. The operator had 60

days to improve the rating or cease operations; on August 18, 2002, the FMCSA placed

DelCar out of service for not improving the safety of its operations.

Greyhound Lines, Inc.

Greyhound is an authorized, for-hire interstate carrier of passengers providing

scheduled bus service, special destination service, charters, and package service

throughout North America. Greyhound operates from 11 driver operation and customer

service districts, and all schedules are monitored from a central location in Dallas, Texas.

Drivers are assigned to and report for duty at 89 terminals, and passengers are picked up

and discharged at 1,530 bus stop locations, which vary throughout the year. Greyhoundís

most recent compliance review prior to the accident was September 14, 2001; the

company received a satisfactory rating. In the 24 months prior to October 20, 2002,

Greyhound had an 8.9 percent out-of-service rate for vehicles (national average is 23

percent) and a 1.8 percent out-of-service rate for drivers (national average is 8 percent).

Meteorological Information

At 4:52 a.m. on the day of the accident at the Abilene Regional Airport, about 3

miles southeast of Abilene,21 the weather was clear with an air temperature of 72 degrees

Fahrenheit and a wind speed of 7 mph. The roadway was dry. In Loraine, on June 9, 2002,

the beginning of nautical twilight22 was at 5:28 a.m., the beginning of civil twilight23 was

at 6:07 a.m., and sunrise was at 6:36 a.m. Moonrise was at 5:37 a.m., and the phase was a

waning crescent with 2 percent of the moonís visible disk illuminated. The new moon

occurred on June 10, 2002, at 6:47 p.m.

21 Abilene is about 54 miles east of the accident location.

22 At the beginning or end of nautical twilight, under good atmospheric conditions and in the absence of

other illumination, general outlines of ground objects may be distinguishable, but detailed outdoor

operations are not possible, and the horizon is indistinct.

23 Civil twilight is the limit at which twilight illumination is sufficient, under good weather conditions,

for terrestrial objects to be clearly distinguished; at the beginning of morning civil twilight, the horizon is

clearly defined and the brightest stars are visible under good atmospheric conditions in the absence of

moonlight or other illumination. In the morning before the beginning of civil twilight, artificial illumination

is normally required to carry on ordinary outdoor activities.
Factual 21 Highway Accident Report

Tests and Research

Acceleration Tests

On June 18 and 19, 2002, Safety Board investigators recorded the acceleration

rates of 16 commercial vehicles departing the picnic area near the accident scene. The

average speed while the vehicles were still within the picnic area was about 17 mph. The

vehicles accelerated for about 35 seconds to the general area of the accident scene and

reached a speed at that location of about 34 mph. Both the highway and oncoming traffic

can be seen from the acceleration ramp.

Semitrailer Lights Examination

Four taillights, an identification lamp, and a license plate lamp on the semitrailer

(see figure 9) were examined to determine the condition of the lamp filaments. Each of the

four rear semitrailer taillight lamps had two filaments, a smaller one connected to the

taillights and a larger one connected to the stop lights. The filaments for all four of the

semitrailerís taillight lamps were intact and connected to their respective posts. The

smaller filaments for the two center taillight lamps displayed age sagging. The support and

electrical posts on the identification lamp were bent and distorted, but the single filament

was intact with some deformation in the area of the support hangers. No indications of

filament oxidation were found on the identification lamp, even though the glass envelope

was broken. None of the filaments exhibited stretching.

Figure 9. Rear semitrailer lighting.

Left 

side 

taillights 

 Right

 side

 taillights

Rear

identification lights

License 

plate 

light 

 Right

 side

 clearance

 lights

 (mounted on

 side of trailer)

Left 

side 

clearance 

lights 

(mounted on 

side of trailer) 
Factual 22 Highway Accident Report

Examination of the license plate lamp revealed significant filament stretching

between one electrical post and its nearest support post, sufficient to produce a visible

loop. The filament showed faceting consistent with long-term use, and the portion

opposite the stretched length showed age sagging.

Federal Regulations

U.S. Department of Transportation

Prior to January 1, 2003, new entrant motor carriers had only to demonstrate their

financial ability to operate and show proof of insurance. Once the appropriate forms24

were completed (see appendix B) and the application fee paid (currently $300), a motor

carrier could be granted authority to operate. According to the FMCSA, applicants were

rejected only if they did not pay the application fee or did not show proof of insurance.

The forms required of new entrant motor carriers prior to January 1, 2003, when

DelCarís owner applied for motor carrier operating authority, FMCSA forms MCS-150

and OP-1, contained sections in which motor carrier applicants had to certify that they

were familiar with the FMCSRs and that they would comply with these regulations. The

applicant was only presented with the option of answering ìyesî for these areas and had to

certify that the answer given was true and that he or she had not been convicted for

possession or distribution of controlled substances. The owner of DelCar signed and

submitted both forms and was granted operating authority.

Enacted on December 9, 1999, the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999

(the act) required the Secretary of Transportation to establish regulations specifying

minimum requirements for applicant motor carriers seeking operating authority. The act

states that the secretary shall require all new carriers to undergo a safety review within the

first 18 months of operation. It also states that the secretary is to establish minimum

requirements for applicants seeking interstate operating authority to ensure that carriers

are knowledgeable about Federal motor carrier safety standards. The act specified that the

secretary consider a proficiency examination and other requirements to ensure applicants

understand applicable safety regulations.

On May 13, 2002, the FMCSA issued an interim final rule on the New Entrant

Safety Assurance Process, effective January 1, 2003. The deadline for comments on this

rulemaking was July 12, 2002. The purpose of the rulemaking was to establish minimum

requirements for new entrant motor carriers to ensure that they are knowledgeable about

applicable Federal motor carrier safety standards. Motor carriers must pass a safety audit

to obtain permanent U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) registration during their

first 18 months of operation.

24 The MCS-150 form must be used to register with the U.S. Department of Transportation as an

interstate carrier and the OP-1 form (or its comparable form, depending on the type of business) requests

authority to operate as a for-hire carrier; private carriers are only required to complete MCS-150.
Factual 23 Highway Accident Report

In the rulemaking, the FMCSA stated that it did not require a proficiency exam

prior to granting operating authority because it believes the educational and technical

assistance materials provided to new entrants and the new entrant certification should

suffice in demonstrating that new entrants understand the safety regulations. The MCS150A (see appendix B) form that all motor carriers must now submit, in addition to MCS150 and OP-1, requires new entrants to certify that they have a system in place to ensure

compliance with applicable FMCSRs. The certification reminds a new entrant of its

statutory and regulatory responsibilities, which, if neglected or violated, may lead to

penalties or revocation of registration.

According to the rulemaking, the safety audit, occurring within the first 18 months

of operation, will assess the adequacy of the new entrantís basic safety management

controls. It will consist of a review of the new entrantís safety data and motor carrier

documents and an interview session with the motor carrier to educate the carrier on

compliance with the FMCSRs and to determine areas in which the carrier may be

deficient. In the rulemaking, the FMCSA states that it will monitor a new entrantís

roadside inspection performance and, if the percentage of drivers or vehicles placed out of

service is above the national average, the FMCSA will expedite the safety audit.

If, after the safety audit, the FMCSA determines that safety management controls

are adequate, then, at the end of 18 months, the FMCSA will notify the new entrant of

permanent registration. If, after the safety audit, the FMCSA notes deficiencies in the new

entrantís management controls, it will notify the new entrants within 45 days that the new

entrant registration will be revoked unless the new entrant takes actions specified to

remedy the safety management practices within 45 days for passenger and hazardous

materials carriers and within 60 days for other entrants. If the corrective actions are not

taken, the FMCSA will notify the new entrant that registration has been revoked.

U.S. Department of Defense

Since 1992, motor carriers providing transportation for the U.S. Department of

Defense have been required to meet the Military Traffic Management Commandís

(MTMCís)25 prequalification inspection for safety. Prior to 1992, carriers were only

required to demonstrate they had a DOT rating of ìsatisfactoryî and had been in operation

at least 12 months to qualify as a MTMC motor carrier. MTMC implemented the

prequalification inspection in 1992 due to the high failure rates being experienced during

inspections by motor carriers who had previously been considered qualified. Once

prequalification requirements were implemented, the number of carriers applying dropped

from an average of 25 per month to 2.8 per month, probably due to the enforcement of

compliance with the FMCSRs, according to the contractor administering MTMCís

program. MTMCís prequalification inspection is a full, on-site compliance review and

performance evaluation. Prior to the prequalification inspection, MTMCís contractor

prescreens all passenger motor carriers seeking MTMC approval by testing the carrierís

knowledge and understanding of specific regulatory requirements. According to the

25 MTMC is the traffic manager for the U.S. Department of Defense.
Factual 24 Highway Accident Report

contractor,26 not once has any motor carrier correctly answered all the compliance

questions, even though the applicants are established motor carriers.

Currently, about 25 percent of motor carriers who apply to MTMC fail the initial

screening process, and about 40 percent of those carriers who pass the screening process

fail the prequalification inspection by MTMC contractors. All of these carriers have

ìsatisfactoryî ratings from the FMCSA and have been in operation over 12 months. Since

the implementation of the prequalification inspection, no fatalities have occurred to

persons while being transported by a MTMC-approved carrier.

New Entrant Safety Data

In 1998, the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) issued a

report on New Entrant Safety Research27 under a project agreement with the Federal

Highway Administrationís Office of Motor Carriers (now the FMCSA). The study found

that carriers with less than 1 year of experience had significantly more acute violations

and patterns of critical violations28 of safety management regulations than carriers with

more than 1 year of experience (see table 5). The number of violations drops dramatically

after the first year and, as carriers gain more experience, continues to decrease.

Table 5. Violations of safety management regulations per 1,000 drivers.

The study recommended that the FMCSA provide education and training

programs at the time a motor carrier begins operation to shorten the compliance learning

curve and increase the speed at which new carriers come into compliance with the

FMCSRs.

26 FMCSA Docket No. FMCSA-2001-11061.

27 National Transportation Safety Center, New Entrant Safety Research (Cambridge, MA: John A.

Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, April 1998).

28 An acute violation demands immediate corrective action regardless of the overall safety posture of

the motor carrier, whereas critical violations are regulatory violations that indicate breakdowns in a carrierís

management controls. A pattern of critical violations is necessary to downgrade a carrierís safety rating,

whereas a single acute violation can result in a lower safety rating.

Carriers Acute violations Critical violations

New entrants 128.8 206.3

Experienced 34.1 11.8
Factual 25 Highway Accident Report

Another study by the Volpe Center in conjunction with a project for the FMCSA29

found that over half (55.2 percent) of new entrants (carriers who registered in the previous

2 years) were deficient in the Driver safety evaluation area in SafeStat. Among

experienced carriers, about 26.9 percent were deficient in the Driver safety evaluation

area. In the Vehicle safety evaluation area, 34.1 percent of new entrants were deficient,

whereas 27.1 percent of experienced carriers were deficient. Researchers also found that a

comparison of the Safety Management Review Indicator, which is based on compliance

reviews and is part of the Safety Management safety evaluation area, showed that new

entrants had significantly worse safety management compliance compared with

experienced carriers (41.4 percent versus 23.8 percent).

In the 2002 Volpe Center study, researchers assessed the compliance review data,

which revealed that about 3.4 percent of experienced carriers received reviews in the 2-

year period prior to September 1999, whereas only 1.3 percent of new entrants received

compliance reviews. According to the authors of the study, since SafeStat is being used to

identify and prioritize carriers based on safety performance and compliance data over a

30-month period, recent registrants are unlikely to have accumulated sufficient data to be

scored by SafeStat. The report also found that although 18 percent of carriers are new

entrants, they received fewer than 12 percent of driver inspections and vehicle inspections.

Overall, the report concluded that new entrants receive disproportionately less FMCSA

oversight than experienced carriers.

As part of the rulemaking docket process, the FMCSA prepared a cost evaluation

of interim final rulemaking on the New Entrant Safety Assurance Process.30 In the

document, the FMCSA presented data on the motor carrier crash rates that show that crash

rates fall as the carrier becomes more experienced. Carriers with less than 1 year of

experience have a crash rate of 0.505 per million vehicle miles traveled;31 those with 1 to 6

years of experience, 0.469; those with 7 to 10 years of experience, 0.438; and those with

more than 11 years of experience, 0.411. According to the FMCSAís evaluation, cost

savings realized from the New Entrant Safety Assurance Process were estimated to exceed

the cost of implementing and administering the program.

The evaluation also estimated that it would take new entrants 1 hour to read the

educational and technical assistance package provided to applicants and to complete the

application forms.

29 National Transportation Safety Center, Analysis of New Entrant Motor Carrier Safety Performance

and Compliance Using SafeStat (Cambridge, MA: John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center,

March 2002).

30 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, New Entrant Safety Assurance Process Regulatory

Evaluation, FMCSA-2001-11061-3 (Washington, DC: FMCSA, January 2002).

31 For instance, a new carrier with 100 vehicles, each traveling 100,000 miles per year, would have

about five accidents in a year. The same size carrier with more than 11 yearsí experience would have about

four accidents in a year.
Factual 26 Highway Accident Report

Requirements for New Entrants in Other Countries

In Canada, the provincial governments are responsible for establishing new entrant

requirements. In British Columbia, for example, new motor carrier operators must

complete an application that includes a detailed self-assessment of their management

controls. The questions go beyond yes or no answers to request specific information on

who is responsible for each area and how the requirements will be managed. For instance,

the self-assessment asks who is responsible for hiring, who is responsible for

maintenance, how the carrier will ensure daily logs are accurate, and, if applicable, what

the carrierís plans for managing dangerous goods are. British Columbia implemented this

system in April 1999; since then, the number of new applicants has decreased by about

half. The National Safety Code (which administers the new motor carrier system) is

exploring the possibility of requiring new applicants to pass a test prior to being granted

operating authority.

In Europe, the European Union requires that member countries ensure that all new

motor carriers have a minimum level of knowledge that is certified through a professional

competence exam in the area of goods transport. The minimum level of knowledge must

include knowledge of civil law, commercial law, social law, fiscal law, business and

financial management, regulations and procedures governing access to market, technical

standards, and aspects of operation and road safety.32 The exam must include two tests:

one with multiple choice or direct-answer questions and one with case studies. Each test

must last at least 2 hours.

In the United Kingdom, in addition to passing the professional competence exam,

new motor carriers must show proof of adequate financial resources to maintain their

vehicles and show that they have a maintenance contract in place or, if they undertake the

inspection and repair of vehicles themselves, the facilities they have available. Once a

motor carrier has been in operation for 9 months, the operatorís facilities and vehicles are

inspected.

32 Council Directive 98/76/EC.
27 Highway Accident Report

Analysis

Exclusions

The weather was clear and dry at the time of the accident. Neither maintenance

records nor postaccident inspection of the motorcoach indicated mechanical problems that

may have hampered operation of the vehicle. The busdriver was familiar with the roadway

and had received adequate rest and time off prior to driving; data recorded in his logbook

complied with hours-of-service regulations. Toxicological tests performed on the blood

and urine specimens taken from the busdriver were negative for alcohol and other drugs.

The first 911 caller misidentified the location of the accident by a few miles; however, the

misidentification did not hamper the emergency response and did not prevent responders

from providing adequate and appropriate treatment to the motorcoach occupants. The

Safety Board concludes that there was no evidence of drug or alcohol use by the busdriver

or of busdriver fatigue. The Safety Board further concludes that the weather and the

mechanical condition of the motorcoach did not contribute to the accident and that the

emergency response was adequate. 

Accident Discussion

According to the truckdriver, he had stopped at the picnic area on I-20 to go to the

bathroom. As the tractor-semitrailer was pulling back onto the interstate, it was struck in

the rear by the motorcoach. The busdriver stated he did not see the semitrailer because

none of its lights were illuminated. Speed calculations based on physical evidence found

at the scene indicate that that the motorcoach was traveling about 65 to 70 mph and that

the tractor-semitrailer was traveling about 15 to 18 mph at the time of collision.

Lighting Conditions

Semitrailer lighting. Witnesses on the motorcoach stated that they did not see any

illuminated lights on the rear of the semitrailer. The busdriver also told several people at

the accident scene that he could not see the semitrailer until it was too late to avoid hitting

it.

Prior to departing the picnic area, the truckdriver stated he checked the lights and

that they were operational. However, investigators found shorted electrical wires for the

clearance and identification lights. The Texas DPS inspector stated that he found a burnedout 15-amp fuse in a 30-amp receptacle for the clearance and identification lights. The

general condition of the wiring to the back of the semitrailer was poor and there was an

exposed wire in the wiring harness for the taillights and license plate light. The Texas DPS

inspector also said that the truckdriver stated that the semitrailerís lights went out when
Analysis 28 Highway Accident Report

the turn signal was on. The semitrailer had not been retrofitted with retroreflective

sheeting as required by the FMCSA.

The filaments of the four taillight lamps showed no indications of hot stretching,

which would be a sign of impact while they were illuminated. The filament of the

identification lamp did show some stretching, but because it was near the posts, it may

have been due to deformation of the posts during the collision sequence and thus not

indicative of illumination at impact. Additionally, no tungsten oxide was present as would

be expected if the glass envelope had been fractured while the bulb was illuminated. Also,

since the fuse for the identification lamp circuit was burned out, the lamp could not have

been illuminated. The filament of the license plate light did display hot stretching

indicative of being hot (illuminated) during an impact. Investigators could not determine

whether the impact that caused the hot stretching occurred during this accident or whether

it occurred prior to this accident during a high-energy bump. Because DelCar had not

maintained service records, investigators could not determine whether the semitrailer had

been in a previous accident. However, if the license plate light was illuminated, the

taillights should have been illuminated also because they are on the same circuit.

However, based on the defective wiring on that circuit, suggesting an electrical short, no

evidence of hot stretching of the taillight filament, and statements by several witnesses,

the taillights were quite likely not illuminated prior to the crash and, therefore, the license

plate light was probably not illuminated, either. The Safety Board concludes that the rear

lighting on the semitrailer was inoperable at the time of the accident. 

Highway lighting. No highway lighting was present near the accident scene.

TXDOT only installs or maintains lighting systems on roadways meeting specific criteria

such as traffic volume and type of roadway; based on the average daily traffic count, this

roadway would have become eligible for lighting in 1998. However, according to

TXDOT, just because an area meets a warrant and becomes eligible for highway safety

lighting does not necessarily mean that lighting will be installed; a warrant only implies

that lighting will be installed should funding be authorized. Moreover, other factors, such

as accident rates and their contributory factors, are typically taken into account as well. At

the accident location, only one accident had occurred in the previous 5 years,33 and

TXDOT did not consider it the type of collision likely to have been prevented by highway

lighting.

The circumstances of this collision suggest that safety lighting at this location

could be beneficial in preventing similar accidents. Typically, on high-speed limited

access roadways, commercial vehicles enter the interstate from entrance ramps at a speed

significantly less than the through traffic. At the ramp near the accident site, the average

speed measured by investigators was 34 mph. In this accident, the tractor-semitrailer was

traveling about 47 to 50 mph less than the posted nighttime speed limit. Because the

semitrailer did not have any operational lighting, overhead highway lighting would have

afforded the busdriver greater opportunity to detect the slow-moving tractor-semitrailer

ahead and possibly avoid the collision. Based on the information gathered during this

33 A single-vehicle rollover crash.
Analysis 29 Highway Accident Report

investigation, TXDOT is evaluating the safety lighting associated with the picnic area near

the accident scene and performing assessments of similar rest areas within the Abilene

District. Following these evaluations, TXDOT will determine how to proceed with

lighting modifications.

Effects of lighting on the accident. The semitrailer had not been retrofitted with

retroreflective sheeting, as required by Federal law, and the semitrailerís rear lights were

most likely nonoperational. Additionally, no ambient light was available in the area of the

collision. The moon was not bright (it was a thin crescent, one day from being a new

moon), the sun had not begun to rise at the time of collision, and no artificial lighting was

present.

At nighttime, differences in illumination levels occur where there are natural or

artificial sources of illumination. However, when no other sources of illumination are

present, little, if any, luminance contrast occurs between the objectsóin this case, the

semitrailer and the background or the night sky. For an object to be seen at night, it must

be sufficiently brighter than the background.34 In this case, the only source of brightness

was the motorcoachís headlights, which probably only provided enough illumination to

distinguish the dark semitrailer from the background at a distance of about 150 feet. Had

the semitrailer been equipped with retroreflective sheeting or had its lighting illuminated,

the busdriver probably would have been able to distinguish it earlier.

At a closing speed of about 48 to 55 mph, as calculated based on physical

evidence, the busdriver would have had about 1.8 to 2.1 seconds to perceive the

unexpected slow moving semitrailer ahead and react to it. Typical driver perception and

reaction time is about 1.5 seconds in noncomplex conditions35 but can be greater based on

a variety of factors, including nighttime and surprise. Additionally, drivers tend to react

and respond more slowly to a slow-moving vehicle ahead when they expect it to be

moving at normal highway speed.36 Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the lack of

luminance contrast between the truck and the background due to the absence of both

natural light and artificial highway lighting, in combination with the semitrailerís

inoperative lighting equipment, the lack of retroreflective material on the semitrailer, and

the high closure rate between the vehicles, afforded the busdriver little opportunity to

detect and identify the slow-moving tractor-semitrailer. 

Tractor-Semitrailer Speed

The motorcoach driver stated to the Texas DPS that he was traveling between 65

and 67 mph, and on-scene evidence indicates that the bus was traveling between about 65

34 Robert E. Dewar and Paul L. Olsen, ìEnvironmental Factors, ì eds. Robert E. Dewar and Paul L.

Olsen, Human Factors in Traffic Safety (Tucson, AZ: Lawyers and Judges Publishing Company, Inc., 2002)

494-495.

35 Paul L. Olsen, ìDriver Perception Reaction Time,î eds. Robert E. Dewar and Paul L. Olsen, Human

Factors in Traffic Safety (Tucson, AZ: Lawyers and Judges Publishing Company, Inc., 2002) 60.

36 Robert E. Dewar, Paul L. Olsen, and Gerson J. Alexander, ìPerception and Information Processing,î

eds. Robert E. Dewar and Paul L. Olsen, Human Factors in Traffic Safety (Tucson, AZ: Lawyers and Judges

Publishing Company, Inc., 2002) 26.
Analysis 30 Highway Accident Report

and 70 mph. Based on the postcollision tire marks at the scene, the tractor-semitrailer was

probably traveling about 15 to 18 mph at the time of collision. Although the truckdriver

stated that he was traveling approximately 40 mph prior to the collision, the on-scene

evidence and the postcollision distance traveled by both vehicles contradicts the

truckdriverís statement. After the accident, investigators measured the average speed of

vehicles entering the interstate from the picnic area and found that the average speed of

commercial vehicles when they reached the point of impact was about 34 mph,

significantly higher than the calculated speed reached by the accident truckdriver.

The accident semitrailer was not fully loaded and an inspection of the tractor

revealed no mechanical problems that would have prevented the tractor-semitrailer from

accelerating at a normal rate of speed. Had the tractor-semitrailer accelerated at a normal

rate, the busdriver would have had nearly 4 seconds to detect the tractor-semitrailer and

react. The Safety Board concludes that the tractor-semitrailer should have been able to

attain a speed of approximately 34 mph as it reached the accident location, instead of the

estimated speed of 15 to 18 mph, thus potentially reducing the closure rate between the

tractor-semitrailer and the motorcoach and providing the busdriver with additional time to

identify the semitrailer ahead and take evasive action. 

Because the truckdriver refused to be interviewed by the Safety Board, staff

investigators were unable to ask him why the tractor-semitrailer was traveling at such a

slow speed as it entered the interstate; however, several possible reasons exist.

Postaccident toxicological tests indicate that the driver had recently used cocaine. Based

on the levels of benzoylecgonine in the blood and urine, amounts of cocaine typically

used, and the rate at which cocaine and benzoylecgonine are typically processed and

excreted by the body, the driver is likely to have used cocaine within approximately 6

hours prior to the time that the blood was drawn (or about 2.5 hours prior to the accident).

Given the truckdriverís route and his statement that he had been driving since 9:30 p.m.

and had just stopped at a picnic area, the driver most likely used cocaine while he was

stopped in the picnic area just before the accident. The indication of recent cocaine use

suggests the truckdriver was impaired by the effects of the drug, including

overconfidence, hyperactivity, and irritability. The driver may have thought he could

merge into traffic no matter what speed he was traveling or he may have misjudged his

speed. On the other hand, had the driver used cocaine earlier than when he was stopped at

the picnic area, he may have been suffering from acute withdrawal from the drug,

primarily resulting in depression and fatigue. Thus, the driver may have been affected by

fatigue, which may have impaired his motor skills. The circumstances of this accident

suggest that the driverís impairment due to cocaine use played a role in the accident.

The driver was also a new employee and a trainee. He possibly had little

experience in the operation of tractor-semitrailers and was only in the 4th day of

supervised driver training with the motor carrier. However, the instructor stated that he

was resting in the sleeper berth of the tractor and was not available to assist the driver. The

driverís inexperience may have affected his ability to operate the clutch and shift the

transmission as he accelerated onto the interstate. The driverís view was not an issue; the

investigation found no visual obstructions that would have prevented the driver from
Analysis 31 Highway Accident Report

seeing the approaching motorcoach as the semitrailer entered the interstate, had he looked

over his shoulder or in the sideview mirror. The Safety Board concludes that the

truckdriverís performance was impaired due to the recent use of cocaine and his

inexperience in the operation of a tractor-semitrailer, resulting in a slower acceleration of

the truck onto the highway than was prudent or appropriate. 

Survival Factors

The fatally injured occupants were seated within the area of impact. In its

investigations of other motorcoach accidents,37 the Safety Board has found that most

motorcoach passengers who are seriously or fatally injured are seated within the area of

impact and sustain their injuries due to impact with the deformed areas within the vehicle

or with the intruding vehicle. Those seriously injured passengers seated immediately

behind the area of impact were probably thrown into the area of impact during the

collision sequence. The seriously injured passengers further to the rear of the area of

impact (rows 3 and 10) were most likely thrown out of their seating compartment during

the collision events, thus sustaining their injuries. The Safety Board concludes that the

lack of a restraint system for the passengers contributed to the injuries of those seated

outside of the area of impact. 

In its 1999 bus crashworthiness study,38 the Safety Board found that one of the

primary causes of preventable injury in motorcoach accidents is occupant motion out of

the seat during a collision and recommended that the National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration (NHTSA):

H-99-74

Develop performance standards for motorcoach occupant protection

systems that account for frontal impact collisions, side impact collisions,

rear impact collisions, and rollovers.

On October 27, 2000, NHTSA responded that it had initiated a research plan with

motorcoach manufacturers to support bus crashworthiness recommendations. On March 6,

2002, NHTSA responded that it had assisted in the formation of the Bus Manufacturers

Council, which will work to facilitate industry-wide standards development to enhance

motorcoach passenger safety. NHTSA also sponsored a public meeting in spring 2002 on

motorcoach safety. Safety Recommendation H-99-74 was classified ìOpenóAcceptable

Actionî on June 28, 2002, pending development of industry-wide standards in the area of

occupant protection.

37 National Transportation Safety Board, Bus Crashworthiness Issues, Special Investigation Report

NTSB/SIR-99/04 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1999).

38 NTSB/SIR-99/04.
Analysis 32 Highway Accident Report

Highway Design

The picnic area was constructed in October 1965 in accordance with the design

guidelines in use at the time. The length of the acceleration ramp from the picnic area to

the interstate is 975 feet, but under current AASHTO design guidelines, an acceleration

ramp of at least 1,410 feet would be required. AASHTO also recommends that the speed

of merging vehicles under these conditions be at least 50 mph. When investigators

measured the speeds of commercial vehicles entering the interstate from the picnic area,

they found that the vehicles reached an average speed of about 34 mph over a distance of

1,351 feet.

Typically, when the local transportation authority performs a major rehabilitation

of a roadway, its geometric design features are brought up to current standards. At the time

of the accident, TXDOT was performing a major rehabilitation project in the westbound

lanes of I-20. As a result of this investigation, TXDOT is exploring the feasibility of

revising the rehabilitation project to include changes to the eastbound picnic area that

would lengthen the entrance ramp from the picnic area to the interstate. These changes

will be considered during the spring 2003 highway rehabilitation.

New Entrant Motor Carriers

The FMCSA granted DelCar Trucking the authority to operate on August 17,

2000. At the time, DelCar had sufficient insurance to operate. However, during

postaccident interviews, the owner displayed very limited knowledge of the FMCSRs. He

did not need to demonstrate that he understood them when he submitted his application;

he only had to sign a form (OP-1) certifying that he was familiar with the Federal

regulations and had a system in place to comply with them. While the owner did sign the

application form signifying that he had such a system in place, investigators found that he

did not. The carrier did not maintain any records on drivers or vehicles, did not have a

drug and alcohol program in place, did not conduct background checks, and operated out

of a trailer on an empty lot. While he did have an outdated copy of the FMCSRs, he did

not display any evidence during the postaccident compliance review or subsequent

interviews that he understood them. The owner also knowingly dispatched the accident

driver, who had only a learnerís permit and no medical certificate, to drive to Michigan as

part of a team. The codriver was also aware of the driverís non-CDL status and agreed to

take the trip, even though he could not have supervised the accident driver and driven the

truck while still getting the required hours of rest and making the trip on schedule.

Twice, after receiving authority to operate, DelCar had its insurance canceled for

nonpayment, and the FMCSA sent notices of revocation of authority to operate. After

receiving these letters, DelCar obtained insurance and the revocation process was

discontinued. The FMCSA conducted no further reviews of the carrier to ensure DelCar

was operating safely and within the law.
Analysis 33 Highway Accident Report

Some of the same problems that were found during the postaccident compliance

review, such as hours-of-service violations, driving a commercial vehicle while

disqualified, operating without a medical certificate, and maintenance violations, had been

identified previously during roadside vehicle and driver inspections. Yet the motor carrier

addressed none of these problems after the roadside inspections.

DelCarís owner had been found guilty of possession of large amounts of marijuana

in 1999, yet he certified, under penalty of perjury on his application to the FMCSA (Form

OP-1), that he had not been previously convicted of possession of a controlled substance.

No system was in place at the FMCSA to verify whether the owner had a criminal record,

even though this information was readily available to investigators after the accident. The

owner was granted permission to operate as a motor carrier even though he had a recent

drug conviction and insufficient knowledge of the FMCSRs.

Education

New motor carriers receive fewer compliance reviews than experienced carriers,

yet they are more likely to be unfamiliar with the FMCSRs, as is evidenced in their higher

SafeStat scores and higher accident rates. Motor carriers appear to have a learning curve;

their safety improves over time, probably as they become more familiar with the safety

regulations and learn how to implement them.

One way to improve the operations of new entrants is to reduce the learning curve

time by educating new carriers before they begin operations. The FMCSAís new motor

carrier entrant requirements attempt to do that. However, as written now, the requirements

do not ensure that a motor carrier will comply with the regulations, nor even that the

carrier understands the regulations until a safety audit is performed up to 18 months later.

However, as the data indicate, new motor carriers have more pronounced patterns of

critical violations of safety regulations (206.3 per 1,000 drivers for new entrants versus

11.8 for experienced carriers), far more acute violations (128.8 per 1,000 drivers for new

entrants versus 34.1 for experienced carriers), and higher accident rates in the 1st year of

operation (0.505 per million vehicle miles traveled versus 0.411 for those with more than

11 years of experience); consequently, the safety audit may come too late.

Under the New Entrant Safety Assurance Process that began on January 1, 2003,

the FMCSA plans to make available to new applicants educational and technical

assistance materials. Although the FMCSA estimates that it will take a motor carrier

operator about 1 hour to read and understand the regulations, a new motor carrier would

probably need significantly more than 1 hour to attain a comprehensive understanding of

them, since such an undertaking would require reading in numerous areas, including:

ï Organization and delegation of powers and duties of the Federal Highway

Administration

ï Compliance with interstate motor carrier noise emission standards

ï Commercial motor carrier safety assistance program
Analysis 34 Highway Accident Report

ï Compatibility of State laws and regulations affecting interstate motor carrier

operations

ï Waivers, exemptions, and pilot programs

ï Controlled substances and alcohol use and testing

ï Commercial driverís license standards

ï Requirements and penalties

ï State compliance with commercial driverís license program

ï Safety fitness procedures

ï Rules of practice for motor carrier safety and hazardous materials proceedings

ï Minimum levels of financial responsibility for motor carriers

ï Qualifications of drivers

ï Driving of commercial motor vehicles

ï Parts and accessories necessary for safe operation

ï Hours of service of drivers

ï Inspection, repair, and maintenance

ï Transportation of hazardous materials

ï Driving and parking rules

ï Employee safety and health standards

Because of the regulationsí complexity, the DOT has issued numerous

interpretations to assist the publicís understanding of them. The regulations, as originally

printed, are 383 pages long. A guide containing all the FMCSRs and their interpretations

is 520 pages long.39 One hour is inadequate for a new motor carrier entrant to fully

understand the regulations and determine how they apply to the carrierís operation.

DelCarís owner maintained a copy of the FMCSRs, yet he neither understood nor

complied with a majority of the regulations.

Forms and Verification

Once an applicant reads the material, he or she completes forms MC-150, OP-1,

and a new form, MCS-150A, which asks only whether the applicant will have procedures

and systems in place to comply with each part of the FMCSRs, including driver

qualifications, hours of service, drug and alcohol testing, vehicle condition, accident

monitoring, production of records, and hazardous materials (as applicable). Apparently,

the only difference between the MCS-150A and the OP-1 forms initially completed by

new entrants prior to January 1, 2003, is that OP-1 combined the compliance areas into

39 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49 ñ Department of Transportation (Chicago, Illinois:

LabelMaster, 2002).
Analysis 35 Highway Accident Report

one response, whereas MCS-150A requires the applicant to respond affirmatively to each

area individually.

Once a carrier checks all of the answers, certifies he or she understands the

regulations (similar to what is required on the OP-1 form), and submits the applications,

fees, and proof of insurance, the carrier is granted new entrant operating authority for 18

months. The FMCSA has no mechanism to determine whether a carrier reads the material,

understands the regulations, and has developed a safety management system to ensure

compliance, a situation similar to the one that existed prior to the new interim rulemaking,

when DelCar applied to be a motor carrier.

Nor does the FMCSA have a process in place to verify that the information

submitted is correct. The owner of DelCar stated in his application that he had safety

systems in place, understood the FMCSRs, and had no controlled substance convictions,

but upon investigation, these statements were obviously not true. The MCS-150A form

does little more than the previous new entrant form requirements did. The Safety Board

concludes that the FMCSAís Form MCS-150A, Safety Certification for Application for

U.S. DOT Number, does not allow the FMCSA to determine a motor carrierís level of

safety fitness prior to operation because it does not require applicants to provide detailed

information on operations. Further, no mechanism is in place to verify the validity of an

applicantís statements. 

The current application process relies on the motor carrier to read the material and

do what is required. The FMCSA has no way of determining whether a motor carrier is

complying with the FMCSRs until the safety audit occurs, up to 18 months after the motor

carrier begins operations. In other countries and territories, the new applicant process is

more stringent. In British Columbia, a new motor carrier must describe the types of

systems that are in place and the records that will be kept. In all member countries of the

European Union, a new motor carrier must take an examination to ensure that he knows

the rules and regulations. In the United Kingdom, the new motor carrier must inform the

licensing agency of its maintenance program and capabilities and is inspected within 9

months.

In the U.S. motor carrier certification process, no such checks are in place. The

FMCSA does not verify that the motor carrier understands or has complied with the

regulations. While some new motor carriers will probably put safety management systems

in place to comply with the FMCSRs, the Safety Board is concerned that some carriers,

such as DelCar, will fail to do so. The new form that must be filled out only requires the

carrier to check ìyesî or ìnoî boxes; even the previous form required the motor carrier to

verify that he understood the rules and regulations and had no possession or distribution of

a controlled substance convictions. The Safety Board therefore concludes that the

FMCSAís New Entrant Safety Assurance Process lacks meaningful safeguards to ensure

that a motor carrier is aware of, understands, and has a safety management system in place

to comply with the FMCSRs. 
Analysis 36 Highway Accident Report

SafeStat

DelCar obtained interstate operating authority from the FMCSA and operated for

22 months, apparently violating many Federal regulations, with no oversight other than

roadside inspections, which do not examine a carrierís overall operating posture. This lack

of oversight appears to be typical for new motor carriers: only 1.3 percent of new carriers

(those operating less than 2 years) receive compliance reviews, while 3.4 percent of older

motor carriers do. One reason for this discrepancy is the practice of conducting

compliance reviews based on a motor carrierís SafeStat score, which consists of four

safety evaluation areas: Accident History, Vehicle, Driver, and Safety Management. Many

new motor carriers, because they have yet to be audited, do not have a score in the Safety

Management safety evaluation area nor do they have an accident history. Even if the

motor carrier has high scores in the Driver and Vehicle safety evaluation areas, the

composite SafeStat score places the new motor carrier in category C, which does not

warrant a compliance review.

For instance, DelCar had a score of 79.23 for the Vehicle safety evaluation area

and 92.69 for the Driver safety evaluation area, but was not rated in the Accident History

or Safety Management safety evaluation areas; therefore DelCar was placed in category C.

The FMCSA probably would not have conducted a compliance review had the accident

not occurred, despite DelCarís high scores in the Vehicle and Driver Safety evaluation

areas. The Safety Board concludes that the current SafeStat system does not accurately

reflect a new motor carrierís safety posture because the composite score is based on areas

in which a new motor carrier may not be rated and therefore is unlikely to provide

FMCSA inspectors enough data to determine whether a safety audit should be performed

sooner rather than later. The Safety Board believes that the FMCSA should revise SafeStat

to base scores on the Driver and Vehicle safety evaluation areas for new motor carriers, so

that new motor carriers with high scores in either of these areas can be identified and will

receive an immediate safety audit or compliance review.

Safety Audit

Once a motor carrier is granted new entrant operational authority, it can operate for

up to 18 months without review of its operations. The rulemaking states that the safety

audit is primarily for educational purposes, that is, to ensure that the new entrant

understands the FMCSRs and has the systems and procedures in place to comply with

them. The FMCSAís regulatory evaluation states that the safety benefits of this New

Entrant Safety Assurance Process will result from the safety audits, which will deter more

than 14,000 crashes over 10 years. But, if every new entrant carrier is to receive a safety

audit before being granted full operating authority, it would be more advantageous for the

FMCSA to conduct the safety audit before the motor carrier begins operation. The motor

carrier can then comply with the regulations from the beginning of operation, and the

FMCSA can ensure the motor carrier understands all of the regulations. This approach is

likely to further reduce both the number of accidents involving new entrant motor carriers

and the learning curve time that has been cited as a reason for the poorer performance of

new entrant motor carriers. It may also discourage unsafe operators from seeking authority

to operate in the first place.
Analysis 37 Highway Accident Report

The experience of MTMC has been that those carriers that have satisfactory

ratings from the FMCSA still do not understand all of the regulations and do not comply

with them. In fact, 25 percent do not pass a written test of the regulations and 40 percent of

those that do pass do not qualify to be a motor carrier for the military because of safety

deficiencies found during a prequalification review similar to a compliance review. When

MTMC began its testing and prequalification requirement, the number of motor carriers

applying decreased significantly because of the more stringent criteria for carriers seeking

to operate under contract to the military. British Columbia also experienced a decrease in

the number of applicants when it instituted more stringent new applicant requirements.

Similarly, new motor carrier entrants applying to operate under the FMCSAís

authority may not apply if they are held to more stringent requirements than filling out

three forms and obtaining insurance. Although studies have shown that motor carriers

have more safety violations and accidents within the 1st year of operation, the FMCSAís

New Entrant Safety Assurance Process does not require new motor carriers to undergo a

safety audit for 18 months. The Safety Board concludes that by conducting safety audits

up to 18 months after carriers begin operation, the FMCSA potentially allows unsafe

carriers to operate without oversight and without the benefit of the educational and

technical assistance that the FMCSA provides during the safety audit. 

The FMCSA could have performed a safety audit of DelCar before granting the

carrier operating authority. Had it done so, the FMCSA may have detected the lack of a

safety management system; deficiencies in hiring practices, maintenance, and drug and

alcohol testing; and the ownerís previous drug conviction. Had a safety audit taken place

before DelCar began operating, the FMCSA could have used the opportunity to educate

DelCar on the FMCSR requirements and assist the carrier in implementing the necessary

management systems. The FMCSA could have withheld operating authority unless

DelCar complied with the FMCSRs. For instance, had the FMCSA required DelCar to

demonstrate that it had a drug and alcohol testing program in place, the accident driverís

cocaine use may have been detected or the driver may have been deterred from obtaining a

job with DelCar. He might not have been permitted to drive, and the accident may not

have occurred. Further, the FMCSA may have noticed deficiencies in DelCarís

maintenance and driver inspection programs, and, if the carrier had upgraded its

maintenance to comply with Federal requirements, the semitrailerís lighting deficiencies

may have been noted and corrected, the lights may have been operational, and the

semitrailer may have had retroreflective sheeting, as required, providing the busdriver

with the opportunity to see the slow-moving vehicle earlier.

DelCarís owner may have believed that by virtue of being able to drive a truck, he

could operate as a motor carrier. He neither understood nor complied with many of the

FMCSRs that are in place to ensure safety. In fact, DelCarís owner made a false

representation on his applications without detection because the FMCSA lacked a process

to evaluate the validity of his statements. After the initial application, DelCar grew from 2

to 13 tractors, from 3 to 24 trailers, and from 4 to 17 drivers, none of which were under

safety management oversight, further compounding the danger to the motoring public.

Yet, the New Entrant Safety Assurance Process does not give the FMCSA an opportunity
Analysis 38 Highway Accident Report

to evaluate the validity of applicantsí statements until a safety audit occurs 18 months

later. DelCarís situation was probably not unique, and no process is in place to ensure that

the 40,000 new motor carrier applicants each year understand the safety regulations and

have programs in place to comply with them. For at least 18 months or until a safety audit

has been performed, the New Entrant Safety Assurance Process does nothing to prevent

motor carriers such as DelCar from obtaining operating authority. In fact, DelCar, which

successfully registered as a motor carrier in 2000, could do so again today under the New

Entrant Safety Assurance Process without changing its qualifications or operational

posture in any way.

The New Entrant Safety Assurance Process, as currently designed, does little more

than make information on the requirements for operating a motor carrier more readily

available to new entrants by telling new applicants how to obtain such information. While

it requires that new motor carriers have a safety audit within 18 months rather than

possibly wait many years for a compliance review, it does not require a preoperation

evaluation. As the U.S. Department of Defense found, many carriers40 with even

satisfactory ratings from the FMCSA fail a prequalification compliance review and

performance evaluation.

To have a greater impact on new carriersí out-of-service and accident rates and on

improving their safety management, the new entrant application process needs to require

that new motor carriers understand the regulations and put into place systems and

processes that ensure compliance with these regulations before beginning operations.

Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the FMCSA should require all new motor

carriers seeking operating authority to demonstrate their safety fitness prior to obtaining

new entrant operating authority by, at a minimum: (1) passing an examination

demonstrating their knowledge of the FMCSRs; (2) submitting a comprehensive plan

documenting that the motor carrier has management systems in place to ensure

compliance with the FMCSRs; and (3) passing an FMCSA safety audit, including vehicle

inspections. 

40 Twenty-five percent of applicants fail the initial application process, which includes regulatory

questions, and 40 percent of the remaining applicants fail the prequalification review.
39 Highway Accident Report

Conclusions

Findings

1. There was no evidence of drug or alcohol use by the busdriver or of busdriver fatigue.

Further, the weather and the mechanical condition of the motorcoach did not

contribute to the accident and the emergency response was adequate.

2. The rear lighting on the semitrailer was inoperable at the time of the accident.

3. The lack of luminance contrast between the truck and the background due to the

absence of natural light and artificial highway lighting, in combination with the

semitrailerís inoperative lighting equipment, the lack of retroreflective material on the

semitrailer, and the high closure rate between the vehicles, afforded the busdriver

little opportunity to detect and identify the slow-moving tractor-semitrailer.

4. The tractor-semitrailer should have been able to attain a speed of approximately 34

mph as it reached the accident location, instead of the estimated speed of 15 to 18

mph, thus potentially reducing the closure rate between the tractor-semitrailer and the

motorcoach and providing the busdriver with additional time to identify the

semitrailer ahead and take evasive action.

5. The truckdriverís performance was impaired due to the recent use of cocaine and his

inexperience in the operation of a tractor-semitrailer, resulting in a slower

acceleration of the truck onto the highway than was prudent or appropriate.

6. The lack of a restraint system for the passengers contributed to the injuries of those

seated outside the area of impact.

7. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administrationís Form MCS-150A, Safety

Certification for Application for U.S. DOT Number, does not allow the Federal Motor

Carrier Safety Administration to determine a motor carrierís level of safety fitness

prior to operation because it does not require applicants to provide detailed

information on operations. Further, no mechanism is in place to verify the validity of

an applicantís statements.

8. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administrationís New Entrant Safety Assurance

Process lacks meaningful safeguards to ensure that a motor carrier is aware of,

understands, and has a safety management system in place to comply with the

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations.
Conclusions 40 Highway Accident Report

9. The current Safety Status Measurement System (SafeStat) does not accurately reflect

a new motor carrierís safety posture because the composite score is based on areas in

which a new motor carrier may not be rated and therefore is unlikely to provide

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration inspectors enough data to determine

whether a safety audit should be performed sooner rather than later.

10. By conducting safety audits up to 18 months after carriers begin operation, the

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration potentially allows unsafe carriers to

operate without oversight and without the benefit of the educational and technical

assistance that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration provides during the

safety audit.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

this accident was the unnecessarily slow acceleration of the unlighted semitrailer onto a

high-speed interstate by an inexperienced and unsupervised driver who was impaired by

cocaine. Contributing to the accident was DelCar Truckingís failure to exercise adequate

operational oversight and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administrationís failure to

ensure the safety of and provide adequate management oversight for new entrant motor

carriers.
41 Highway Accident Report

Recommendations

To the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration:

Revise the Safety Status Measurement System (SafeStat) to base scores on the

Driver and Vehicle safety evaluation areas for new motor carriers, so that new

motor carriers with high scores in either of these areas can be identified and will

receive an immediate compliance review. (H-03-01)

Require all new motor carriers seeking operating authority to demonstrate their

safety fitness prior to obtaining new entrant operating authority by, at a minimum:

(1) passing an examination demonstrating their knowledge of the Federal Motor

Carrier Safety Regulations; (2) submitting a comprehensive plan documenting

that the motor carrier has management systems in place to ensure compliance with

the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations; and (3) passing a Federal Motor

Carrier Safety Administration safety audit, including vehicle inspections. (H-03-02)

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 

JOHN A. HAMMERSCHMIDT CAROL J. CARMODY

Acting Chairman Member

JOHN J. GOGLIA

Member

Adopted: February 26, 2003

43 Highway Accident Report

Appendix A

Investigation and Public Hearing

The National Transportation Safety Board was notified of the Loraine, Texas,

accident on June 9, 2002. Investigative team members were dispatched from the

Washington, D.C., and Fort Worth, Texas, offices. Groups were established to investigate

human performance; motor carrier operations; and highway, vehicle, and survival factors.

Participating in the investigation were representatives of the Federal Motor Carrier

Safety Administration, the Texas Department of Transportation, the Texas Department of

Public Safety, Greyhound Lines, Inc., and Consolidated Safety Services.

No public hearing was held; no depositions were taken.
44 Highway Accident Report

Appendix B

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration Forms MCS-150, 

MCS-150A, and OP-1
C S K. DIV 2.2A (AMMONIA) B NB

C S L. DIV 2.3A B NB

C S M. DIV 2.3B B NB

C S N. DIV 2.3C B NB

C S O. DIV 2.3D B NB

C S P. CLASS 3 B NB

C S Q. CLASS 3A B NB

C S R. CLASS 3B B NB

C S S. COMB LIQ B NB

C S T. DIV 4.1 B NB

24. CARGO CLASSIFICATIONS (Circle All that Apply)

IF THE SPACE ABOVE IS BLANK OR THE INFORMATION THEREIN IS INCORRECT, PLEASE IDENTIFY YOUR COMPANY’S PRINCIPAL OFFICE IN THE SPACES BELOW.

1. NAME OF MOTOR CARRIER/HM SHIPPER 2. TRADE OR D.B.A. (DOING BUSINESS AS) NAME

3. PRINCIPAL STREET ADDRESS/ROUTE NUMBER 4. MAILING ADDRESS (P O BOX)

5. CITY

11. COLONIA (MEXICO ONLY)

8. MAILING CITY

13. COLONIA (MEXICO ONLY)

6. STATE/PROVINCE 7. ZIP CODE+4 9. STATE/PROVINCE 10. ZIP CODE+4 

12. PRINCIPAL PHONE NUMBER

15. USDOT NO. 18. IRS/TAX ID NO.

EIN # SSN # 

20. CARRIER OPERATION (Circle One)

A. Interstate B. Intrastate Only (Hazardous Materials) C. Intrastate Only (Non-Hazardous Materials)

21. SHIPPER OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS OPERATION (Circle One)

A. Interstate B. Intrastate 

22. CARRIER MILEAGE (to nearest 10,000 miles for Last Calendar Year)

23. OPERATION CLASSIFICATION (Circle All that Apply)

A. Authorized For-Hire

B. Exempt For-Hire

C. Private (Property)

E. Private Passengers (Non-Business)

D. Private Passengers (Business)

F. Migrant

G. U.S. Mail

H. Federal Government

I. State Government

J. Local Government

K. Indian Tribe

L. Other

25. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS CARRIED OR SHIPPED (Circle All that Apply.) C - CARRIED S - SHIPPED B(BULK) - IN CARGO TANKS NB(NON-BULK) - IN PACKAGES

C S U. DIV 4.2 B NB

C S V. DIV 4.3 B NB

C S W DIV 5.1 B NB

C S X. DIV 5.2 B NB

C S Y. DIV 6.2 B NB

C S Z. DIV 6.1A B NB

C S AA. DIV 6.1B B NB

C S BB. DIV 6.1POISON B NB

C S CC. DIV 6.1SOLID B NB

C S DD. CLASS 7 B NB

A. GENERAL FREIGHT

B. HOUSEHOLD GOODS

C. METAL: SHEETS,

D. MOTOR VEHICLES

E. DRIVE AWAY/TOWAWAY

J. FRESH PRODUCE

K. LIQUIDS/GASES

L. INTERMODAL CONT.

M. PASSENGERS

N. OIL FIELD EQUIPMENT

O. LIVESTOCK

P. GRAIN, FEED, HAY

Q. COAL/COKE

R. MEAT

S. GARBAGE, REFUSE, TRASH

T. U.S. MAIL

U. CHEMICALS

14. PRINCIPAL FAX NUMBER

16. MC OR MX NO. 17. DUN & BRADSTREET NO. 19. INTERNET E-MAIL ADDRESS

YEAR

F. LOGS, POLES

G. BUILDING MATERIALS

H. MOBILE HOMES

I. MACHINERY,

BEAMS, LUMBER

LARGE OBJECTS

COILS, ROLLS

V. COMMODITIES DRY BULK

W. REFRIGERATED FOOD

X. BEVERAGES

Y. PAPER PRODUCTS

Z. UTILITY

AA. FARM SUPPLIES

BB. CONSTRUCTION

CC. WATER WELL

DD. OTHER

C S A. DIV 1.1 B NB

C S B. DIV 1.2 B NB

C S C. DIV 1.3 B NB

C S D. DIV 1.4 B NB

C S E. DIV 1.5 B NB

C S F. DIV 1.6 B NB

C S G. DIV 2.1 B NB

C S H. DIV 2.1LPG B NB

C S I. DIV 2.1(METHANE) B NB

C S J. DIV 2.2 B NB

C S EE. HRCQ B NB

C S FF. CLASS 8 B NB

C S GG. CLASS 8A B NB

C S HH. CLASS 8B B NB

C S II. CLASS 9 B NB

C S JJ. ELEVATED TEMP MAT B NB

C S KK. INFECTIOUS WASTE B NB

C S LL. MARINE POLLUTANTS B NB

C S MM. HAZARDOUS SUB(RQ) B NB

C S NN. HAZARDOUS WASTE B NB

C S OO. ORM B NB

26. EQUIPMENT Straight

Trucks

Truck

Tractors Trailers

HazMat Cargo

Tank Trailers

HazMat Cargo

Tank Trucks

P A S S E N G E R S

Motor coach School bus Mini-bus/Van Limousine

OWNED

TERM LEASED

TRIP LEASED

INTERSTATE

27. DRIVER INFORMATION

28. CERTIFICATION STATEMENT (to be completed by an authorized official)

Beyond 100-Mile Radius

100-Mile Radius

INTRASTATE

Beyond 100-Mile Radius

100-Mile Radius

TOTAL CDL DRIVERS

TOTAL DRIVERS

(Please print Name)

Signature Date Title

I, , certify that I am familiar with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations and/or the Federal Hazardous Materials Regulations.

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that the information entered on this report is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, true,

correct, and complete.

This form was electronically produced by Elite Federal Forms, Inc.

U.S. Department of Transportation

Federal Motor Carrier

Safety Administration

MOTOR CARRIER IDENTIFICATION REPORT

(Application for U.S. DOT Number)

OMB No. 2126-0013

Form MCS-150 (Rev. 3-2000)
 Form MCS-150A (12-19-2002)

U.S. Department of Transportation 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

Safety Certification for Application 

(Safety Certification for Application for U.S. DOT Number)

1. NAME OF MOTOR CARRIER 2. TRADE OR D.B.A. (DOING BUSINESS AS) NAME

3. PRINCIPAL STREET ADDRESS/ROUTE NUMBER 4. MAILING ADDRESS (P 0 BOX)

5. CITY 6. STATE/PROVINCE 7. ZIP CODE+4 8. MAILING CITY 9. STATE/PROVINCE 10. ZIP CODE+4

11. PRINCIPAL PHONE NUMBER 12. PRINCIPAL FAX NUMBER

13. USDOT NO. 14. MC OR MX NO. 15. DUN & BRADSTREET NO. 16. IRS/TAX ID NO. 

EIN# SSN#

17. INTERNET E-MAIL ADDRESS

18. SAFETY CERTIFICATIONS (Applicants subject to FMCSRs must complete certification item(s) 18A through 18C).

A. Applicant maintains current copies of all U.S. DOT Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, Federal Motor Vehicle 

Safety Standards, and the Hazardous Materials Regulations (if a property carrier transporting hazardous materials), 

understands and will comply with such regulations, and has ensured that all company personnel are aware of the 

current requirements.

 

 

 Yes No 

B. Applicant certifies that the following tasks and measures will be fully accomplished and procedures fully implemented before it commences 

operations in the United States.

 

1. Driver qualifications:

a) The carrier has in place a system and procedures for ensuring the continued qualification of drivers to 

operate safely, including a safety record for each driver, procedures for verification of proper licensing of 

each driver and procedures for identifying drivers who are not complying with the safety regulations.

 

 

 Yes No 

b) The carrier has procedures in place to review drivers’ employment and driving histories for at least the last 3 

years to determine whether or not the individual is qualified and competent to drive safely. 

 

 

 Yes No 

c) The carrier has established a program to review the records of each driver at least once every 12 months 

and will maintain a record of the review. 

 

 

 Yes No 

d) The carrier will ensure that all of its drivers are at least 21 years of age and if applicable possess a valid 

Commercial Drivers License (CDL).

 

 

 Yes No 

2. Hours of Service:

a) The carrier has in place a recordkeeping system and procedures to monitor the hours-of-service performed 

by drivers, including procedures for continuing review of drivers’ log books, and for ensuring compliance 

with all operations requirements.

 

 

 Yes No 

b) The carrier has ensured that all drivers are knowledgeable of the hours-of-service requirements, and has 

clearly and specifically instructed the drivers concerning the application to them of the 10-hour, 15-hour, 

and 60 and 70-hour rules as well as the requirement for preparing daily log entries in their own handwriting 

for each 24-hour period.

 

 

 Yes No 

 3. Drug and alcohol testing:

a) The carrier is familiar with the alcohol and controlled substance testing requirements of 49 CFR part 382 

and 49 CFR part 40 and has in place a program for systematic testing of drivers.

 

 

Yes No N/A 

4. Vehicle condition:

a) The carrier has established a system and procedures for inspection, repair and maintenance of its vehicles 

in a safe condition, and for preparation and maintenance of records of inspection, repair and maintenance 

in accordance with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations and the Hazardous Materials Regulations.

 

 

 Yes No 

b) The carrier will ensure that all violations and defects noted on inspection reports are corrected before 

vehicles and drivers are permitted to continue operation.

 

 

 Yes No 

5. Accident monitoring program:
 Form MCS-150A (12-19-2002)

a) The carrier has in place a program for monitoring vehicle accidents and maintains an accident register in 

accordance with 49 CFR 390.15.

 

 

 Yes No 

b) The carrier has established an accident countermeasures program and driver training program to reduce 

accidents.

 

 

 Yes No 

 6. Production of records:

a) The carrier can and will produce records demonstrating compliance with the safety requirements within 48 

hours of receipt of a request from a representative of the USDOT/FMCSA or other authorized Federal or 

State official.

 

 

 Yes No 

 7. Hazardous Materials (to be completed by carriers of hazardous materials only).

a) The HM carrier has full knowledge of the U.S. DOT Hazardous Materials Regulations and has established 

programs for the thorough training of its personnel as required under 49 CFR part 172, Subpart H, and 49 

CFR 177.816.

 

 

Yes No N/A 

b) The carrier has established a system and procedures for inspection, repair and maintenance of its reusable 

hazardous materials packages (cargo tanks, portable tanks, cylinders, intermediate bulk containers, etc.) in 

a safe condition, and for preparation and maintenance of records of inspection, repair and maintenance in 

accordance with the U.S. DOT Hazardous Materials Regulations.

 

 

Yes No N/A 

c) The HM carrier has established a system and procedures for filing and maintaining HM shipping

documents.

 

 

Yes No N/A 

d) The HM carrier has a system in place to ensure that all HM trucks are marked and placarded as required by 

49 CFR part 172, Subparts D and F.

 

 

Yes No N/A 

e) The carrier will register under 49 CFR part 107, Subpart G, if transporting any quantity of hazardous 

materials requiring the vehicle to be placarded.

 

 

Yes No N/A 

8. For Cargo Tank (CT) Carriers of HM

a) The carrier has a system in place to ensure that its cargo tanks are inspected and tested as required by 49 

CFR 180 by a facility registered with the U.S. DOT under part 107, Subpart F.

 

 

Yes No N/A 

By signing these certifications, the carrier official is on notice that the representations made herein are subject to verification through inspections in the 

United States and through the request for and examination of records and documents. Failure to support the representations contained in this application 

could form the basis of a proceeding to assess civil penalties and/or lead to the revocation of the authority granted.

C. All applicants must certify as follows:

1. Applicant is willing and able to provide the proposed operations or service and to comply with all pertinent 

statutory and regulatory requirements and regulations issued or administered by the U.S. Department of 

Transportation, including operational regulations, safety fitness requirements, motor vehicle safety standards, 

and minimum financial responsibility requirements.

 

 

 Yes No 

2. Applicant is willing and able to produce for review or inspection documents which are requested for the purpose 

of determining compliance with applicable statutes and regulations administered by the U.S. Department of 

Transportation, including the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards 

and Hazardous Materials Regulations, within 48 hours of any written request.

 

 

 Yes No 

3. Applicant is not presently disqualified from operating commercial vehicles in the United States pursuant to the 

Motor Carrier Improvement Act of 1999 or any other law.

 

 

 Yes No 

NOTE:

All motor carriers must comply with all pertinent Federal, State, local and tribal statutory and regulatory requirements when operating within the United States. Such 

requirements include, but are not limited to, all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements administered by the U.S. Department of Labor, or by a State agency 

operating a plan pursuant to Section 18 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (“OSHA State plan agency”). Such requirements also include all applicable 

statutory and regulatory environmental standards and requirements administered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency or a State, local or tribal environmental 

protection agency. Compliance with these statutory and regulatory requirements may require motor carriers and/or individual operators to produce documents for review 

and inspection for the purpose of determining compliance with such statutes and regulations.

19. Certification Statement (to be completed by an authorized official)

I, _________________________________________________ , certify that I am familiar with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations and/or the Federal Hazardous 

Materials Regulations. Under penalties of perjury, I declare that the information entered on this report is, to 

the best of my knowledge and belief, true, correct, and complete.

Signature ____________________________________ Date _________________________________ Title ____________________________________________

(Please print Name)
FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION Approved by OMB

 FORM OP-1 2125-0568

 APPLICATION FOR MOTOR PROPERTY CARRIER AND BROKER AUTHORITY Expires 04/30/01

This application is for all individuals and 

businesses requesting authority to operate as 

motor property common or contract carriers or 

property brokers. 

SECTION I 

Do you now have authority from or an application being processed by the former ICC, FHWA, 

OMCS or FMCSA? 

G NO G YES If yes, identify the lead docket number(s) 

Applicant 

Information

LEGAL BUSINESS NAME 

DOING BUSINESS AS NAME 

 BUSINESS ADDRESS 

_______________________________________________________________(_____) 

Street Name and Number City State Zip Code Telephone Number 

MAILING ADDRESS (If different from above) 

 

Street Name and Number City State Zip Code 

 REPRESENTATIVE (Person who can respond to inquiries) 

 Name and 

title, position, or relationship to applicant 

 Street 

Name and Number 

 City State

 Zip Code 

Telephone Number (______)_________________________FAX Number (______) 

U.S. DOT Number (If available; if not, see Instructions.) 

FORM OF BUSINESS (Check only one.) 

G Corporation State of Incorporation 

G Sole Proprietorship Name of Individual 

G Partnership Identify Partners 

 

 FOR FMCSA USE ONLY 

__________________________________________________

Docket No. MC-__________________________________ 

Filed ___________________________________________ 

Fee No._________________________________________ 

CC Approval No._________________________________ 
FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION Approved by OMB

 FORM OP-1 2125-0568

 APPLICATION FOR MOTOR PROPERTY CARRIER AND BROKER AUTHORITY Expires 04/30/01

SECTION II

Type of Authority

You must submit a filing fee of $300.00 for each type of authority requested (for each box checked). 

G MOTOR COMMON CARRIER OF PROPERTY (except HOUSEHOLD GOODS) 

G MOTOR CONTRACT CARRIER OF PROPERTY (except HOUSEHOLD GOODS) 

G MOTOR COMMON CARRIER OF HOUSEHOLD GOODS 

G MOTOR CONTRACT CARRIER OF HOUSEHOLD GOODS 

G BROKER OF PROPERTY (except HOUSEHOLD GOODS) 

G BROKER OF HOUSEHOLD GOODS 

G UNITED STATES BASED ENTERPRISE OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY PERSONS OF 

MEXICO PROVIDING TRUCK SERVICES FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF 

INTERNATIONAL CARGO (except HOUSEHOLD GOODS) 

G UNITED STATES BASED ENTERPRISE OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY PERSONS 

OF MEXICO PROVIDING TRUCK SERVICES FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF 

INTERNATIONAL HOUSEHOLD GOODS 

 

SECTION III

Insurance 

Information

This section must be completed by ALL motor property carrier applicants. The dollar amounts in 

parentheses represent the minimum amount of bodily injury and property damage (liability) insurance 

coverage you must maintain and have on file with the FMCSA. 

NOTE: Refer to the instructions for information on cargo insurance filing requirements for motor 

common carriers and surety bond/trust fund agreement filings for property brokers. 

G Will operate vehicles having Gross Vehicle Weight Ratings (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or 

more to transport: 

G Non-hazardous commodities ($750,000). 

G Hazardous materials referenced in the FMCSA’s insurance regulations at 49 CFR 

1043.2(b)(2)(c) ($1,000,000). 

G Hazardous materials referenced in the FMCSA’s insurance regulations at 49 CFR 

1043.2(b)(2)(b) ($5,000,000). 

G Will operate only vehicles having Gross Vehicle Weight Ratings (GVWR) under 10,000 

pounds to transport: 

G Any quantity of Class A or B explosives, any quantity of poison gas (Poison A), or highway 

route controlled quantity of radioactive materials ($5,000,000). 

G Commodities other than those listed above ($300,000). 
APPLICATION FOR MOTOR PROPERTY CARRIER AND BROKER AUTHORITY - OP-1 (cont.) 

SECTION IV 

Safety 

 Certification 

 (Motor Carrier 

Applicants Only) 

APPLICANTS SUBJECT TO FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY REGULATIONS - If 

you will operate vehicles of more than 10,000 pounds GVWR and are, thus, subject to pertinent 

portions of the U.S. DOT's Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations at 49 CFR, Chapter 3, 

Subchapter B (Parts 350-399), you must certify as follows: 

Applicant has access to and is familiar with all applicable U.S. DOT regulations relating to the safe 

operation of commercial vehicles and the safe transportation of hazardous materials and it will comply 

with these regulations. In so certifying, applicant is verifying that, at a minimum, it: 

(1) Has in place a system and an individual responsible for ensuring overall compliance with 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations; 

(2) Can produce a copy of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations and the Hazardous 

Materials Transportation Regulations; 

(3) Has in place a driver safety training/orientation program; 

(4) Has prepared and maintains an accident register (49 CFR 390.15); 

(5) Is familiar with DOT regulations governing driver qualifications and has in place a system for 

overseeing driver qualification requirements (49 CFR Part 391); 

(6) Has in place policies and procedures consistent with DOT regulations governing driving and 

operational safety of motor vehicles, including drivers’ hours of service and vehicle 

inspection, repair, and maintenance (49 CFR Parts 392, 395 and 396); 

(7) Is familiar with and will have in place on the appropriate effective date, a system for 

complying with U.S. DOT regulations governing alcohol and controlled substances testing 

requirements (49 CFR 382 and 49 CFR Part 40). 

G YES 

EXEMPT APPLICANTS - If you will operate only small vehicles (GVWR under 10,000 pounds) 

and will not transport hazardous materials, you are exempt from Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Regulations, and must certify as follows: 

Applicant is familiar with and will observe general operational safety guidelines, as well as any 

applicable State and local laws and requirements relating to the safe operation of commercial motor 

vehicles and the safe transportation of hazardous materials. 

G YES 

SECTION V 

Affiliations

 

AFFILIATION WITH OTHER FORMER ICC, FHWA OR OMCS, NOW FMCSA-LICENSED 

ENTITIES. Disclose any relationship you have or have had with any other FMCSA-regulated entity 

within the past 3 years. For example, this could be through a percentage of stock ownership, a loan, 

or a management position. If this requirement applies to you, provide the name of the company, MCnumber, DOT number, and that company's latest U.S. DOT safety rating. (If you require more space, 

attach the information to this application form.) 

____________________________________________________________________________________

_ 

____________________________________________________________________________________

_ 

____________________________________________________________________________________

_ 
APPLICATION FOR MOTOR PROPERTY CARRIER AND BROKER AUTHORITY - OP-1 (cont.) 

SECTION VI 

Household Goods 

Certifications

HOUSEHOLD GOODS MOTOR COMMON CARRIER APPLICANTS including United Statesbased enterprises owned or controlled by persons of Mexico providing truck services for the 

transportation of international household goods shipments must certify as follows: 

Applicant is fit, willing, and able to provide the specialized services necessary to transport household 

goods. This assessment of fitness includes applicant’s general familiarity with former ICC, FHWA, 

or OMCS now FMCSA regulations for household goods movements and also requires an assurance 

that applicant has or is willing to acquire the protective equipment and trained operators necessary to 

perform household goods movements and that applicant will offer arbitration as a means of 

settling loss and damage disputes on collect-on-delivery shipments. The proposed operations will 

serve a useful public purpose responsive to a public demand or need. 

G YES 

HOUSEHOLD GOODS MOTOR CONTRACT CARRIER APPLICANTS must certify as follows: 

Applicant is fit, willing, and able to provide the specialized services including United States-based 

enterprises owned or controlled by persons of Mexico providing truck services for the transportation 

of international household goods shipments necessary to transport household goods. This assessment 

of fitness includes applicant’s general familiarity with former ICC, FHWA, or OMCS, now FMCSA 

regulations for household goods movements and also requires an assurance that applicant has or is 

willing to acquire the protective equipment and trained operators necessary to perform household 

goods movements and that applicant will offer arbitration as a means of settling loss and damage 

disputes on collect-on-delivery shipments. The proposed service will be consistent with the public 

interest and the transportation policy of 49 U.S.C. 10101. 

G YES 

HOUSEHOLD GOODS BROKER APPLICANTS must certify as follows: 

Applicant is fit, willing, and able to provide household goods brokerage operations and to comply 

with all pertinent statutory and regulatory requirements. The involved services will be consistent with 

the public interest and the transportation policy of 49 U.S.C. 10101. 

G YES 

NOTE: Applicant may attach a supporting statement to this application to provide additional 

information about any of the above certifications. This evidence is optional. 
APPLICATION FOR MOTOR PROPERTY CARRIER AND BROKER AUTHORITY - OP-1 (cont.) 

SECTION VII

Applicants for 

Contract Carriage 

of Household 

Goods

SCOPE OF OPERATING AUTHORITY. Complete one or both box(es) below, as applicable. 

G Contracting shippers have one or more of the distinct needs delineated in Interstate Van Lines, 

Inc., Extension - Household Goods, 5 I.C.C.2d 168 (1988). 

 Describe briefly the distinct need(s): 

 _________________________________________________________________________ 

 _________________________________________________________________________ 

_________________________________________________________________________ 

G Contracts provide for assignment of one or more vehicles for the exclusive use of each shipper 

in the manner specified in Interstate Van Lines, Inc., Extension - Household Goods, 5 

I.C.C.2d 168 (1988). 

 

SECTION VIII 

Applicant's 

Oath

 This oath applies to all supplemental filings to this application. The signature must be that of 

applicant, not legal representative.

 I, ___________________________________________________________, verify under penalty of 

 Name and title

perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, that all information supplied on this form or 

relating to this application is true and correct. Further, I certify that I am qualified and authorized to 

file this application. I know that willful misstatements or omissions of material facts constitute Federal 

criminal violations punishable under 18 U.S.C. 1001 by imprisonment up to 5 years and fines up to 

$10,000 for each offense. Additionally, these misstatements are punishable as perjury under 18 U.S.C. 

1621, which provides for fines up to $2,000 or imprisonment up to 5 years for each offense. 

 I further certify under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States, that I have not been 

convicted, after September 1, 1989, of any Federal or State offense involving the distribution or 

possession of a controlled substance, or that if I have been so convicted, I am not ineligible to receive 

Federal benefits, either by court order or operation of law, pursuant to Section 5301 of the Anti-Drug 

Abuse Act of 1988 (21 U.S.C. 862) 

Finally, I certify that applicant is not domiciled in Mexico or owned or controlled by persons 

of that country. (Note: This portion of Applicant’s does not pertain to applicants that are U.S.-based 

enterprises owned or controlled by persons of Mexico seeking to provide truck services for the 

transportation of international cargo.). 

Signature _____________________________________________________ Date___________________ 
FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION Approved by OMB

 FORM OP-1 2125-0568

 APPLICATION FOR MOTOR PROPERTY CARRIER AND BROKER AUTHORITY Expires 04/30/01

6

Filing Fee 

Information All applicants must submit a filing fee for each type of authority requested. The enclosed fee schedule 

will show the appropriate filing fee. The total amount due is equal to the fee times the number of 

boxes checked in Section II. Fees for multiple authorities may be combined in a single payment. 

Total number of boxes checked in Section II: _______ x filing fee $__________ = $___________ 

INDICATE AMOUNT $__________________________ AND METHOD OF PAYMENT 

G CHECK or G MONEY ORDER, payable to: FMCSA 

G VISA G MASTERCARD 

Credit Card Number _____________________________________Expiration Date _______________ 

Signature _______________________________________________Date 

_________________________ 

 

 Fee Policy ! Filing fees must be payable to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, by check 

drawn upon funds deposited in a bank in the United States or money order payable in U.S. 

currency or by approved credit card. 

! Separate fees are required for each type of authority requested. If applicant requests multiple 

types of permanent authority on one application form (for example, common and contract 

carrier authority) or if applicant submits more than one form in the OP-1 Series in a single 

filing, multiple fees are required. The applicant may submit a single payment for the sum of 

the applicable fees.

! Filing fees must be sent, along with the original and one copy of the application, to 

FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, P. O. Box 100147, 

Atlanta, GA, 30384-0147. For express mail only: Nationsbank Wholesale Lockbox 

100147, 6000 Feldwood Road, 3rd Floor East, College Park, GA 30349. For credit card 

only: FMCSA, Suite 600, 400 Virginia Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C., 20024. 

! After an application is received, the filing fee is not refundable. 

! The FMCSA reserves the right to discontinue processing any application for which a check is 

returned because of insufficient funds. The application will not be processed until the fee is 

paid in full. 

PAPERWORK BURDEN. It is estimated that an average of 2 burden hours per response are required to complete this 

collection of information. This estimate includes time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and

maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Comments concerning the accuracy

of this burden estimate or suggestions for reducing this burden should be directed to the FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER

SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, Licensing Division, Suite 600, 400 Virginia Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20024. This

collection of information is required in order for the FMCSA to obtain data and register for-hire motor carriers of regulated

commodities,property brokers, and certain U.S.-based Mexican-owned enterprise property carriers. Please note that an agency

may not conduct or sponsor, a person is not required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a currentlyvalid OMB control number. The OMB control number for this collection is 2121-0016.