As dis c us se d b e low , th e Court g ra nts De fe nd ants ’ m oti on

to d ism iss the I RS a s a 1 de fe nd ant i n th is a c tio n. Th e Cou rt ne ve rt he le ss r e fe rs to t

he Un ite d St ate s a

nd the I RS collectively

as “D efe ndants” in this opinion, so as to be consistent with the parties’ f ilings. P E T E R BO R I T Z, Plaintiff,
v. UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA and I NTERNAL

REVENUE SERVI CE, De fe nd ants . UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Civil Action No. 09-542 ( CKK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION (F ebrua ry 23, 2010) Pro se Plaintiff Peter B oritz brings this action ag ainst the United States and the I nterna l Revenue Service (“I RS,” collectively with the United States, “De fenda nts”) reg arding 1
a lle g e dly un lawf ul t a x co lle c tio n a

nd a sse ssm e nt a c tiv ity . Pl a int if f c omp la ins tha

t D e fe nd ants have wrong fully

held him liable for c erta in unpaid tax l iabilities for tax y ear s 1994 and 1995
and have iss ue d a

pr oc e dura lly

imp ro pe r N oti c e of

F e de ra l T a x L ie n a

nd No tic e of L e vy on his proper ty . He pr imarily

seeks r elief pur suant to the Taxpay er B ill of Rights, 26 U.S.C. §§ 7432 and 7433, which pe rmit a taxpay er to bringa suit for damag es ag ainst the United States for f a i l ur e t o r e l e a s e a

l i e nan d f o r c e rt a i nun a

u th o r i z e d c o l l e c t i o na c t i o n s , r e s p e c t i v e l y . In addition, Plainti ff a sserts a c laim for dec laratory and injunctive re lief pursua nt to the Ad min istrativ e Pr oc e dure s A c t, ( “ APA ” ), 5 U .S. C. § 70 6, and se e ks to q

uie t ti tle to t

he pr op e rt

y2

that is the subject of the N otice of F eder al Tax L ien and the N otice of L evy pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2410. Currently pendingbefor e the Court is Def endants’ [7] Mot ion to Dismi ss or in the Al te rn ativ e Mo tio n f

or Summary

Judg me nt. De fe nd ants argue tha t th e Un ite d St ate s is the on ly proper defe ndant in this action and that Plaintiff’s cla ims should be dism issed under F eder al Rule of Civil P roce dure 12( b)(1) and 12(b) (6) or alternatively

that Def endants should be g rante d summary

judgme nt pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 56. Upon consideration of Defe ndants’ motion and the par ties’ re sponsive briefing s as well as attachme nts thereto, as ma y be appr opriate, the rele vant ca se law a nd statutory

authority , and the re c or d o f t

his c a se a s a

wh ole , th e Court

GR AN TS D e fe nd ants ’ [7 ] Mot ion to D ism iss or

in the Alternative Motion for Summary J udg ment, for the r easons se t forth below. Spe c if ic a lly , th e Court

ho lds a s f

oll ow s. F ir st, De fe nd ants ’ M oti on to D ism iss Pla int if f’ s c la ims a g a ins t th e I RS is GR AN TE D a s c on c e de d. Se c on d, De fe nd ants ’ M oti on to Dismiss C ount I(quiet title action pursua nt to 28 U.S.C . § 2410) and Count IX (APA) f or lac k of jur isd ic tio n p ur su ant t o Ru le 12 (b )( 1) is G RA NT ED . T hir d, De fe nd ants ’ M oti on to D ism iss C o un tII ( f

a i l ur e t o i s s u e n o t i c e o f

d e f i c i e n c y i nv i o l at i o no f

§ § 6 2 1 2 an d

6 2 1 3 ) , C o un tIII (f a ilure to m ake a sse ssm e nt i n v iol atio n o f § 62 03 ), Count IV ( fa ilure to m ake a sse ssm e nt i n
v i o l at i o no f

§ 6 3 0 3 ) , C o un tV ( f

a i l ur e t o r e l e a s e l i e ni nv i o l at i o no f § 7 3 4 2 ) , C o un tV II (unauthorized disclosure in violation of § 6103(b)(6) ), and Count VI I I(fa ilure to issue
c e rt if ic ate of re le a se in v iol atio n o f § 63 25 ), fo r f a ilu re to s tate a

c la im p ur su ant t o Ru le 12 (b )( 6) is G RA

NT ED . F ourt

h a nd fi na lly , D e fe nd ants ’ M oti on fo r S umm ary

Judg me nt a s to Count VI(fa ilure to issue notice of le vy in violation of § 6331(d)) is GRANTED
.3 I. BACKG ROUND Plaintiff filed his Compl aint on Marc h 19, 2009. Plaintiff’s Complaint represe nts one of d o z en s o f l aw s u i t s b ro u gh ti nth i s j uri s d i ct i o nb y t ax p ro t es t o rs —

al l ege d l y p ro ce ed i n g pr o s e
— asser ting a varie ty of for ms of misconduct by

the I RS. See P ollinger v. United States , 5 39 F. Sup p. 2d 24 2, 24 5 & n. 3 ( D. D. C. 2 00 8) (c iti ngc a se s) . U nli ke the ma jor ity of the c omp la int s in tho se oth e r a c tio ns , h ow e ve r, Pla int if f’ s Co mpl a int

inc lud e s at le a st s ome pa rt ic ula ri zed fa c ts specific ally

perta ining to Plaintiff Peter B oritz. See ge nerally Com pl. Al tho ug h th e a lle g atio ns c on ta ine d in Pla int if f’ s Co mpl a int

are so me wh at ne bu lou s in nature , Plaintiff appea

rs to primarily

complain about a N otice of L evy and a N otice of F eder al Tax L ien issued by

the I RS for the tax y ear s 2004 and 2005. The f ormer w as issued on November

9, 2007, by

the I RS aga inst P laintiff’s bank a ccount in the amount of $12,558.73 for tax y ear s 1994 and 1995. Id. ¶ 8 & Ex. D (I RS N oti c e of L e vy ). Th e latte r w a s f

ile d s ho rt ly there afte r on Nove mber 13, 2007, with the County Auditor in King County , Washington in the amount of $21,485.89 for the tax y ear s 1994 and 1995. Id. ¶ 9 & Ex . C (I RS Noti ce of Fe dera l Tax L ien). Plaintiff now seeks to cha lleng e the va lidity of both the Notice of L evy and Notice of F e de ra l T a x L ie n. At

he art , Pl a int if

f d isp ute s th e un de rl yingtax ass e ssm e nt i ssu e d a g a ins t hi m for tax y ear s 1994 and 1995, alleg ing that he “is the sole owne r of his phy sical and me ntal la bo r” and that he “ do e s N OT ow e the UN I TE D ST AT ES, or any e mpl oye e s w or

kin gon its behalf , the fruit of his labor

proper ty .” Id. ¶¶ 2, 6 ( emphasis in orig inal). Plaintiff furthe r
c la ims that he ha s “ fi le d a ll r e tur ns re qu ir e d to be fi le d f

or tax y e ars 19 94 and

19 95 and fu lly
satis fi e d a nd pa id a ll income taxes P laintiff was ma de liable f or and r equire d to pay

reg arding4

the y ear s in dispute.” Id. ¶ 7 (e mphasis in origina l). Despite Plaintiff’s une quivocal denia l of any substantive liability

for tax y ear s 1994 and 1995 and his clea

r attac k on the validity

of the unde rlying tax assessments, Plaintiff has — in an appar ent ef

fort to avoid many

of the same pitfalls that have be fallen pr evious tax protester lawsuits — attempted to fra me his lawsuit as asser

ting only proce dural, rathe r than substantive,
c ha lle ng e s to the No tic e of L e vy and No tic e of F e de ra l T a x L ie n. Spe c if ic a lly , Pl a int if

f a sse rt s the fo llo wi ngnin e c a

us e s o f a c tio n in

his Com pla int :

• Count I : seeks to quiet t i t l e t o the prope rty that is the subject of the N otice of L evy and Notice of F eder al Tax L ien pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2410;

• Count I I : alleg es a claim for monetary damag es pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7433 ba se d u po n De fe nd ants ’ a lle g e d f a ilure to s e nd

a no tic e of

de fi c ie nc y

to Plai nt if f’s la st k no wn a dd re ss p ri or to i ssu anc e of

the No tic e of

L e vy in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 6212(a) and 6213( a);

• Count I I I : alleg es a c laim for monetary damag es pursua nt to 26 U.S.C . § 7433 based upon D efe ndants’ alleg ed fa ilure to make a timely assessmen

t i n v iolation of 26 U.S.C. § 6203;

• Count I V: alleg es a c laim for monetar y damag es pursuant to 26 § U.S.C. § 7433 based upon D efe ndants’ alleg ed fa ilure to provide a timely notice of assessment in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 6303;

• Count V: alleg es a claim for mone tary damag es pursua

nt to 26 U.S.C . § 7432 based upon D efe ndants’ alleg ed fai l u re t o rele ase the Notice of Fe dera l Tax L ien in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 6325(a)(1) ;

• Count VI : alleg es a claim for monetary damag es pursua

nt to 26 U.S.C . § 7433 ba se d u po n D e fe nd ants ’ a lle g e d f a ilure to s e rv e him

wi th a no ti ce o f l e vy

in vio latio n o f 2 6 U .S. C. § 63 31 (d )( 2) ;

• Count VI I : alleg es a c laim for monetar y damag es pursua

nt to 26 U.S.C. § 7433 based upon D efe ndants’ alleg edly unauthorized public disclosure of his social secur ity number on the N otice of Fede ral Tax L ien i n violation of 26 U.S .C. § 6103(b)( 6);

• Count VI I I : alleg es a claim for monetary damag es pursua

nt to 26 U.S.C . § 74335 ba sed up on Def

e nd ants ’ a lle g e d f

a ilure to i ssu e a

c e rt if ic ate of re le a se wi th respe ct to the Notice of Fe dera l T ax L ien in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 6325(a)(1) ; and

• Count I X: a lle g e s th at D e fe nd ants a c te d in e xce ss o f t

he ir statut or y a uth or ity and see ks non-monetar

y decla ratory and injunctive re lief pursu an t t o the Administrative Procedur es Ac t, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Se e ge ne ra lly

Compl. As set forth in his Complaint, P laintiff states that he pr eviously submitt ed an administrative claim with the I RS and filed this lawsuit only afte r exhausting his administrative
reme dies. See id. ¶¶

11 -1 3 & Ex. A . N owbe fo re the Court is D e fe nd ants ’ M oti on

to D ism iss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary J udg ment. SeeDef

s.’ Mot., Docke t No. [7]
. Plaintiff has filed his opposition to Defenda nts’ Motion, seePl.’s Opp’n, Docke t No. [10] , and Def endants have filed the ir reply , see De fs .’ Re ply , D oc ke t N o. [11]. B ri e fi ngon De fe nd ants ’ Motion is t here fore complete a nd the issues are ripe for

the Court’s re solution. II. LEGAL STANDARDS Def endants have moved f

or dismissal of Plainti ff’ s Complaint pursuant to Feder al Rules of Civil P roce dure 12( b)(1) and/or 12(b) (6) a nd have a lso moved in the alternative for summary judgme nt pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 56. Insofar as De fenda

nts have moved for dismissal of ce rtain cla ims under Rule 12(b)( 1), the Court may consider a

complaint “supplemente d by

undisputed fac ts evidence d in the rec ord or the c omplaint supplemented by undisputed fac ts plus the court’s re solution of disput ed fa cts.’” Coalit ion for Underground Ex pa ns ion v . M

ine ta , 3 3 3 F. 3 d

1 9 3 , 1 9 8 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Herbe rt v. Nat’l Acad. of Sc is. , 974 F.2d 192, 197 ( D.C. Cir. 1992)). To the e x tent, howeve r, that De fenda nts have
mov e d to dis mis se d c e rt a in c la ims fo r f a ilure to s tate a

c la im und e r R

ule 12 (b )( 6) , th e Court

isThe Court notes that Plaintiff was g iven notice that De fenda nts’ motion may

be tre ated 2 as a motion for summar

y judgme nt under Rule 56 and that in opposing such a motion, he “may 6 limit ed to consider ing the fac ts alleg ed in the complaint, any documents attac hed to or incorporated in the complaint, matters of which the c ourt may

take judicial notice , and matter s of public re cord. See E.E.O.C. v. St. Francis Xavie r Parochial Sch. , 1 17 F .3 d 6 21 , 6 24 (D .C. Cir. 1997). In this case, De fenda

nts have attached f

ive exhibit s to their motion — namely , the J une 10, 1998 Orde r and D ecision of the United States Tax C ourt in Boritz v. Commissioner of Internal Rev enueand four Certificates of Of

ficial Rec ord (F orm 3430) re lating to Plaintiff
conce rningtax y ear s 1994 and 1995. SeeDe fs .’ Mo t. at E xs. A -E . A ll o f t he atta c he d e xhibi ts
may be a pp ro pr iate ly

c on sid e re d b y

the Court

fo r p ur po se s o f D e fe nd ants ’ M oti on to D ism iss br ou g ht u nd e r R ule 12 (b )( 1) . In a dd iti on , whil e the June 10 , 1 99 8 O rd e r a nd De c isi on is a
matte r o f p ub lic re c or d a

nd the re fo re may

be c on sid e re d b y

the Court

in r uli ngon De fe nd ants ’ Motion to Dism iss under Rule 12(b)( 6), the Cer tificates of

Offic ial Record a

re not incor

porate d i no r r ef er en ce d b y th e C o mp l ai n tan d

ar e t h er ef

o re ar gu ab l y

o u t s i d e t h e s co p e o f t h e p l ea d i n gs in t his matte r; a s su c h, the y

may no t be c on sid e re d in

e va luatin gDe fe nd ants ’ M oti on to D ism iss br ou g ht u nd e r R ule 12 (b )( 6) . A c c or din g ly , to the e xtent th e pa rt ie s h ave re lie d u

po n th os e
mate ri a ls i n mo vin gfo r d ism iss a l of Pla int if f’ s c la ims , th e Court

mus t c on str

ue De fe nd ants ’ motion as a Motion for Summary J udg ment pursuant to Rule 56. See Fe d. R. Civ. P . 12(d) ( “I f, on a motion under Rule 12(b) (6) . . ., matter s outside the pleading s are prese nted to and not excluded by

the cour t, the motion mus t be treated as one for summary judgme nt under Rule 56. Al l pa rt ie s mu st b e g ive n a

re a so na ble op po rt

un ity to p re se nt a ll the mate ri a l th at is pe rt ine nt t o the motion.”). 2not rely

mere ly on alleg ations or denials in its own pleading ; rather , its response must—by aff idavits or as otherw ise provided in this rule—set out spec ific fa cts showinga g enuine issue f or trial. I f the opposingparty does not so respond, summary judgme nt should, if appropriate , be enter ed ag ainst that party .” SeeA u g . 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 O r d e r , D o c k e t N o . [8 ]. 7 Her e, De fenda

nts have moved to dismiss Pl aintiff’s c laims ag ainst the I RS as well as Counts I(quiet title action pursua nt to 28 U.S.C . § 2410) and IX (APA) of his Compl aint for la c k o f j ur isd ic tio n und e r R ule 12 (b )( 1) . A s su c h, the Court may c on sid e r a ll atta c he d e xhibi ts in e va luatin gDe fe nd ants ’ M oti on to D ism iss the se c la ims purs ua nt t o Ru le 12 (b )( 1) . With
re sp e c t to the re ma ini ngc la ims , h ow e ve r, De fe nd ants have mov e d to dis mis s f or fa ilure to s tate
a c la im, or in t he a lte rn ativ e , f

or summa ry jud g me nt; a c c or din g ly , to the e xtent th e pa rt ie s r e ly upon and the Court does not e x clude f rom consider ation the Certificates of Of ficial Rec ord, the motion mus t be construe d as a motion for summar y judgme nt. I n this case, the pa rties have relied upon a

nd the Court does not exclude from c onsideration the Cer tificates in re solving Def endants’ motion only

with respec t to CountVI (fa ilure to issue notice of le vy in violation of § 6331(d)) . As such, the Court must construe D efe ndants’ motion as to Count VIas a Motion for Summary

J udg ment pursuant to Rule 56. Wit h respe ct to the re maining c ounts, however , the Court finds that the attac hed Certific ates of O fficia l Record a re ne ither re lied upon by

the pa rt ie s n or re le va nt t o r e so lut ion

of De fe nd ants ’ m oti on . T he Court the re fo re tr e ats Def endants’ motion on these c ounts — namely , Counts I I(fa ilure to issue notice of de ficienc y i nv i o l at i o no f

§ § 6 2 1 2 an d

6 2 1 3 ) , III

( f a i l ur e t o m ak e a s s e s s m e n ti nv i o l at i o no f § 6 2 0 3 ) , IV (fa ilure to make a ssessment in violation of § 6303), V (fa ilure to rele ase lien in violation of § 7342), VI I(unauthorized disclosure in violation of § 6103(b)(6) ), and V I I I(fa ilure to issue
cer tificate of rele ase in violation of § 6325) — a s a Motion to Dismi ss for fa ilure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6).8

Wit h this framew ork in place , the Court shall set forth the a pplicable leg al standar ds
re latin gto D e fe nd ants ’ M oti on to D ism iss purs ua

nt t o Ru le 12 (b )( 1) and

Rul e 12 (b )( 6) , o r i n the alter native, Motion for Summary J udg ment pursuant to Rule 56. A. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure12( b) ( 1) A c ourt mus t di smi ss a

c a se wh e n it

la c ks su bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n p ur su ant t o Ru le 12(b)( 1). As indicate d above, the Court may “conside r the c omplaint supplemented by
un dis pute d f

a c ts e vid e nc e d in

the re c or d, or

the c omp la int

su pp le me nte d b y

un dis pute d f

a c ts plus the court’s r esolution of disputed fac ts.” Coalit ion for Underground Expansion , 333 F.3d
at 19 8 ( c itatio ns omi tte d) ; se e als o Jerom e Stev ens Pharm., Inc . v. Food &Drug Admin. , 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 ( D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he district court may consider materia ls outside the pleading s in decidingwhether to gr ant a motion to dismi ss for lac k of jurisdiction.”); Vanove r v. Hantman , 77 F. Supp. 2d 91, 98 (D.D .C. 1999), aff’d , 38 F. App’ x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[W] here a docume nt is refe rre d to in the complaint and is centra l to plaintiff’s claim, such a do c ume nt atta c he d to the mot ion pa pe rs may be c on sid e re d w ith out c onve rt ingthe mot ion to
o n e f o r s u m m ary

j u d gm en t . ”) (c i t i n g Gree nberg v. The Life Ins. Co. of Va. , 177 F.3d 507, 514 (6 th C ir . 1 99 9) ). “ At

the mot ion

to d ism iss sta g e , c ouns e le d c omp la int s, a s w e ll a s pr o s e complaints, are to be construe d with sufficient libera lity to affor d all possible infere nces favor able to the plea der on a lleg ations of fa ct.” Settles v. U.S. ParoleComm’n , 429 F.3d 1098, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In spite of the fa vorable infere nces that a plaintiff re ceive s on a motion t o d i s m i s s , i tr e m a i n s th e p l a i n t i f f ’ s b ur d e nt o p r o v e s u

b j e c tm at t e r

j ur i s d i c t i o nb y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. Am. Farm Bure au v. Env tl. Prot. Agency , 121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D.D.C. 2000).9

B. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure12( b) ( 6) The F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure r equire that a complaint conta in “‘a short and plain statement of the c laim showing that the pleade r is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘ g ive the defe ndant fa ir notice of what the . . . cla im is and the g rounds upon which it re sts.’” Be ll A tl. Corp. v. Twombly, 5 5 0 U. S
. 5 4 4 , 5 5 5 (2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Conley v. G ibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) ; acc ord Erickson v . Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (pe r cur iam). Althoug h “deta iled fac tual alleg ations” ar e not nec essar y to withstand a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dism iss, to provide the “grounds” of

“entitle[ment] to relief,” a plaintiff must furnish “mor e than labe ls and conclusions” or

“a f ormulaic re citation of the e lements of a c ause of action.” Id. at 1964-65;
se e als o Pap as an v . A lla in , 4 78 U. S. 2 65 , 2 86 (1 98 6) . Ins te a d, a c omp la int

mus t c on ta in sufficie nt fac tual matter, a cce pted as true , to “state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Twom bly , 550 U.S. at 570. “A c laim has fac ial plausibilit y when the pla intiff pleads fa ctual content that allows the c ourt to draw the rea sonable infe renc e that the de fenda nt is li able f

or the misconduct alleg ed.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , __ U.S. __, 129 S. C t. 1937, 1949 (2009) (c iting Twom bly , 550 U.S. at 556). In evaluating a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to di smiss for failure to state a c laim, the court
mus t c on str

ue the c omp la int

in a light m os t f

avo ra ble to t he pla int if

f a nd mus t a c c e pt a s tr

ue a ll
rea sonable fa ctual infe renc es dra wn from we ll-pleade d fac tual alleg ations. In re United M ine W orkers of Am. Em

ployeeBene

fit Plans L itig. , 8 54 F .Su pp . 9 14 , 9 15 (D .D .C. 19 94 ); se e als o Schuler v . United States , 6 17 F .2 d 6 05 , 6 08 (D .C. Cir . 1 97 9) (“ Th e c omp la int mus t be ‘l ibe ra lly construed in f

avor of the plaintiff,’ who must be g rante d the bene fit of all infer ence s that can be derive d from the f

acts a lleg ed.”) . Howeve r, as the Supre me Court rec ently made c lear , a10

plaintiff must provide more tha n just “a shee r possibilit y that a def endant ha s acte d unlawfully .” Iqbal , 12 9 S. Ct. at 19 50 . Wh e re the we ll- ple a de d f a c ts s e t f or th i n th e c omp la int

do no t pe rm it
a cour t, drawingon its judi cial experienc e and c ommon sense, to infer mor e than the “ mere possibili ty

of misconduct,” the complaint has not shown that the plea der is entitled to re lief. Id. at 1950. C. Motion for Summary Judgm ent Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure56 Pursuant to Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a par ty is entitled to summ ary

judgme nt “if the ple ading s, the discover y and disclosure materia ls on file, and any aff idavits show that the re is n o g e nu ine iss ue a s to any mate ri a l f

a c t and that th e mov ant i s e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a
matte r o f l aw. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 6( c ); see also Tao v. Free h , 27 F.3d 635, 638 ( D.C. Cir. 1994). Under the summary

judgme nt standard, the movingparty bear s the “initial responsibility of informingthe district court of the basis for [its] motion, and identifying those portions of the pleading s, depositions, answers to interr og atories, a nd admissions on file, toge ther with the aff idavits which [it ] believe[s] demonstrate the absenc e of a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t.” Ce lote xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 4 77 U. S. 3 17 , 3 23 (1 98 6) . In r e sp on se , th e no n- mov ingpa rt y mus t

“ g o b e y on d th e ple a din g s and by [its] o wn a ff ida vit s, or de po sit ion s, ans we rs to i nte rr og ator ie s, and admissions on file, ‘de signate’ spec ific fa cts showingthat there is a g enuine issue f or trial.” Id. at 324 (interna l citations omit ted). Although a

court should dra

w all infer ence s from the supportingrec ords submitted by the nonmoving pa

rty , the mere exis tence of a f actua l dispute, by

itself, is insufficient to bar summary judgme nt. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To be materia l, the fac tual asser tion mustbe ca

pable of aff ectingthe substantive outcome of the11

lit ig atio n; t o b e g e nu ine , th e iss ue mus t be su pp or te d b y su ff ic ie nt a dmi ssi ble e vid e nc e that a
rea sonable trier -of- fac t could find for the nonmoving pa rty . Laningham v. U.S. Navy , 813 F.2d 12 36 , 1 24 2- 43 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 7) ; Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 251 (the c ourt must determine “whe ther the e vidence prese nts a sufficie nt disag ree ment to require submissi on to a jury or wh e the r i t is so on e -s ide d th at on e pa rt y mus t pr e va il a s a

matte r o f l aw” ). “ I f t

he e vid e nc e is
mere ly colora ble, or is not sufficie ntly

probative, summar

y judgme nt may

be g rante d.” Lib e rty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 249-50 (inter nal citations omitted). “Mer e alleg ations or denials in the adver se par

ty ’s pleading s are insufficient to def eat a n otherwise pr oper motion for summar y judgme nt.” W

illiams v. Call aghan , 9 38 F . Su pp . 4 6, 49 (D .D .C. 19 96 ). Th e a dv e rs e pa rt y mus t do more than simply

“show that ther e is some metaphy sical doubt as to the mater ial fac ts.” Ma tsu sh ita Ele c . I

nd us . Co . v . Ze nit

h R ad io C or p ., 47 5 U .S. 57 4, 58 6 ( 19 86 ). Ins te a d, wh ile the movant bea

rs the initial responsibility of identifying those portions of the re cord that demonstrate the absenc e of a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t, the burden shifts to the non-mova nt to “ c ome fo rw ard

wi th ‘ sp e c if

ic fa c ts s ho wi ngtha

t th e re is a

genuine issue for trial .’” Id. at 587 (citingFe d. R. Civ. P . 56(e) ) (e mphasis in origina l). III . LE G AL DI SCU SSIO N A. Defendants’ M

otion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12( b) ( 1) The Court turns first to consider Def endants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fede ral Rule of Civil P roce dure 12( b)(1) , which is direc ted towar ds Plainti ff’ s claims ag ainst the I RS as well as Count I(quiet title action pursua nt to 28 U.S.C . § 2410) and Count IX (APA) of Plaintiff’s Complaint.Alternatively , the Court notes that Plaintiff’s claims for mone tary damag es under 3 se c tio ns 74 32 (a ) a

nd 74 33 (a ) a g a ins t th e I RS w ou ld n on e the le ss f a il b e c a us e su its fo r c ivi l damag es for

wrong ful tax collection activity and for failure to relea se a lien ma y be brought, if at all, ag ainst the “United States.” See26 U. S.C. § 7 43 2( a ); id. § 7433(a) . Simi larly , Plaintiff’s 12 1. Pla int if

f’ s Cl a ims Ag a ins t D e fe nd ant I RS As indicated a

bove, Plaintiff has named as De fenda nts in thi s action both the United State s and

the I RS. D e fe nd ants c on te nd that th e Un ite d St ate s is the on ly pr op e r d e fe nd ant i n this action and have there fore moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims ag ainst the I RS for lack of jur isd ic tio n. Al tho ug h Pl a int if f f ile d a n o pp os iti on

to D e fe nd ants ’ m oti on , h e fa ile d to a dd re ss Def endants’ spe cific a

rgument that the I RS m ust be dismissed as a def endant in this case
. See ge ne ra lly Pl.’s Opp’n. “It is well understood in this C ircuit that when a plaintiff files an opposition t o a dispositive motion and addresse s only cer tain arguments raised by

the defe ndant, a c ourt may

treat those arguments that the plaintiff fa iled to addre ss as conc eded.” Hopkins v. W

omen’ s Div., Ge neral Bd. of Global Ministri es , 2 84 F . Su pp . 2 d 1 5, 25 (D .D .C. 2003), aff’d 98 F e d. Ap px. 8 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 4) ; see also Franklin v. P otter, 600 F. Supp. 2d 38, 60 (D.D.C. 2009) ( trea

ting de fenda

nt’s argument in motion for summary judgme nt as conc eded wher e plaintiff f

ailed to addr ess it in his response). The Court previously advised Plaintiff that his failure to re spond to the Defe ndants’ motion may result in the Court treating the motion as
conce ded. See8/22/09 Order, D ocket No. [8]. According ly , beca use Plaintiff had the opportunity

to respond to the De fenda nts’ argument but did not do so, t he Court shall construe his failure a s a conc ession with respec t to Defe ndants’ re quest to dismis s the I RS as a defe ndant in this action. See H

opkins, 28 4 F . Su

pp . 2 d at 25 . D e fe nd ants ’ M oti on to D ism iss sh a ll there fore be GRANTE D as CONCEDED insofar a s Defe ndants move to dismiss P laintiff’s
c la ims a g a ins t th e I RS. 3claims for de clar atory and injunctive re lief ag ainst the I RS would fail as “Cong ress ha s prese rved the immunity

of the United States f

rom dec laratory

and injunctive re lief with respe ct to all tax controve rsies except those per taining to the c lassification of or g anizations under § 501(c ) of the I RC. As an ag ency

of the Gove rnment, of c ourse, the I RS shares that immunity .” Murphy v

. IRS, 493 F.3d 170, 174 ( D.C. Cir. 2007) (interna l citations omit ted). Although Plaintiff a

rgues in his briefingthat section 2410 ac ts as the re levant wa iver of 4 sovere ign immunity

in this case, Plaintiff’s Complaint actually cites 28 U.S.C. § 1367 as jurisdictional gr ounds for his quiet title claim. SeeCompl. ¶ 16. Section 1367, however , does not save Plaintiff’s c laim. That section provide s only that “in any

civil action of whic h the 13 2. Count Iof Plaintiff’s Complaint Count Iof Plaintiff’s Complaint purports to bring a quiet title action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2410, which provides that the “ United States may be name d a par

ty in any civil action or suit in any

district court . . . havingjurisdiction of the subject matter . . . to quiet titl e to . . .
rea l or persona l property

on which the United States ha s or claims a mortg ag e or othe r lien.” 28 U. S.C. § 2 41 0( a )( 1) . D e fe nd ants argue that, a lth ou g h Pl a int if f h a s atte mpt e d to fr ame his c la im as cha lleng ing only

the proc edura l deficie ncies of the lien and levy at issue, it is appare nt that Plaintiff is in fact attemptingto use section 2410 as a means to cha lleng e the va lidity of the underly ing tax assessments and the Court theref ore la cks jurisdiction to entertain his cla im. Def s.’ Mot. at 5; Defs.’ Reply at 2-3. The Court ag ree s.

“ I t is e le me nta

ry that th e Un ite d St ate s, a s so ve re ig n, is i mmune fr om s uit save a s it consents to be sue d, and the ter ms of its consent to be sued in any court de fine that c ourt’s jurisdiction to entertain that suit.” Un ite d S tate s v . M itc he ll , 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (c itation omitted). Moreove r, “a

waiver of sover eig n immunit y

‘ca nnot be implied but mustbe unequivoca lly

expressed.’” Id. (c i t i n g United States v. King , 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)). Plaintiff argues that sec tion 2410 acts as a w aiver of sover eig n immunit y

for his quiet title claim. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 5-8. Plaintiff, however , is incorre ct. Section 2410 “c onstitut es a w aiver of 4district courts have orig inal jurisdiction, the district courts shall have suppleme ntal jurisdiction

over a ll other claims that ar e so re lated to claims in the ac tion within s uch orig inal jurisdiction that they form par t of the same c ase or

controve rsy

under Article I I Iof the United States C o n s t i tu t i o n . ” 2 8 U. S
. C
. § 1 3 6 7 (a ). S ec t i o n1 3 6 7 d o es n o tco n s t i tu t e awa i v er o f s o v er ei gn immunit y by the United States. See 28 U. S.C. § 1 36 7; see also San Juan Co., Utah v . United States , 5 03 F .3 d 1 16 3, 11 81 (1 0th Cir . 2 00 7) (“ Se c tio n 1 36 7( a ) i s e xpre sse d in g e ne ra l te rm s, applying to a ll lit iga

nts. There is no mention of sovereign immunit y or of the spe cial status of the go v ern m en tas a l i t i gan t . Un d er s et t l edl aw , . . . th i s s t atu t e d o es n o twa i v e f ed er al s o v er ei gn immun ity .” ); Dunn &Black v . United States , 492 F.3d 1084, 1088 n. 3 ( 9th Cir. 2007) (same) ; Un ite d S tates v . Ce rta in L an d S

itu ate d in City

of D e tro it , 361 F.3d 305, 307 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (same)
. 14 sovere ign immunity

to a suit broug ht by

a taxpay er a g ainst the United States which c halleng es th e v a li d it

y o f a f e d e r a l t a x li e n. . . [b u t o n ly] so lon g a s the tax pa y e r re fr ain s f ro m cont esti ng the meri ts o f t he unde rly ing

tax as se ssme nt it se lf .” Aqua Bar &Lounge v. U.S. De p’t of Tre as ur y , 5 39 F .2 d 9 35 , 9 39 -4 0 ( 3d Cir . 1 97 6) (e mph a sis a dd e d) ; see also Pollinger , 5 39 F. Sup p. 2d at 25 1. Ind e e d, “ [t]he pr inc ipl e that a taxpay e r c ann ot u se se c tio n 2 41 0( a ) t o challeng e the e x tent of, or e x istence of , substantive tax l iability

is well-settled.” Robinson v. United States , 9 2 0 F
. 2 d

1 1 5 7 , 1 1 6 1 ( 3 d

Ci r . 1 9 9 0 )
. D e s p it e Pl a inti f f ’ s e f f o rts to c h ar a c te r iz e his qu ie t ti tle a c tio n a s c ha lle ng ingon ly c e rt a in a lle g e d p ro c e dura l de fi c ie nc ie s, it i s a bund antl y clea r that his arguments reg ardingsuch alleg ed er rors a re pr emised upon his substantive challeng e to the mer its and validity of the tax assessment underly ing the Notice of

Fe dera l Tax L ien and Notice of L evy

issued. See Compl.¶ 7 (alleg ing that he “f iled all returns r equire d to be filed for tax y ear s 1994 and 1995 and f ully satisfied and pa id all income taxes Pl aintiff wa s
ma de lia ble fo r a nd re qu ir e d to pa

y re g ard ingthe y e ars in d isp ute ” ); see also id. ¶¶ 2- 6. Hi s principal c oncer

n is with the assessments — not with the actual tax liens. At heart, he alleg es that th e No tic e of

F e de ra l T a x L ie n a

nd No tic e of L e vy are pr oc e dura lly

de fi c ie nt onl

y be c a us e he does not owe the claimed unde rlying tax es and/or no a ssessment ever took place, suc h that15

“De fenda nts have no e state, title, claim, lien, or super ior claim in the Plaintiff’s per sonal proper ty or any portion thereof

.” Id. ¶ 26. Ac cording ly , as Plaintiff has not “r efr ain[ed] from contestingthe merits of the unde rlying tax assessment itself,” this Court lacks jurisdiction over his quiet tit le ac tion. Defe ndants’ Motion to Dismis s is therefor e GRANTE D insofar as Def endants see k dismiss al of Count Iof Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
.

3. Count I X of Plaintiff’s Complaint In Co un t IX o f t

he Com pla int , Pl a int if

f a lle g e s th at D e fe nd ants a c te d in e xce ss o f t

he ir statutory authority and see ks non-monetar

y decla ratory and injunctive re lief pursua nt to the section 706(2) of the APA. Compl. ¶¶ 58-64. A s Defe ndants corr ectly point out, however, Plaintiff cannot pursue a cla im for dec laratory or injunctive re lief under the APA base d upon alleg ed wr ong ful tax assessment or collection ac tions. First, to the ext ent Plaintiff seeks inj un c tiv e re lie f, his c la im i s b arr e d b y the Anti- Inju

nc tio n A c t, 2 6 U .S. C. § 74 21 (a ), wh ic h is pa rt of the Tax Code and

wh ic h “ wi thd

ra w[s ] jur isd ic tio n f

ro m th e state and

fe de ra l c ourt s to enter tain suits seeking injunctions prohibiti ngthe collec tion of fede ral taxes.” Enochs v. W illiams Packing &Nav. Co. , 3 70 U. S. 1 , 5 (1 96 2) ; se e als o R os s v. United States , 4 60 F. Sup p. 2d 13 9, 14 9 ( D. D. C. 2 00 6) (f ind ingpla int if

f’ s c la im f

or inj un c tiv e re lie f u

nd e r t he APA barr ed by the Anti-Injunction Act wher e cla im based on asse ssment or collec tion of tax es). Although the Supreme Court has r ecognized a limit ed exception to this rule, Plaintiff has not shown that the exception applies in this case. I n Enochs , th e Sup re me Court he ld t hat th e a su it for injunction may

be maintained “ [o] nly

if it is [ ] apparent that, unde r the most liberal viewof the law a nd the fa cts, the United States ca nnot establish its claim . . . . Otherwise, the D istrict16

Court is withoutjurisdiction, and the complaint must be dismissed.” 370 U.S. at 7. As is selfevident fr om the Court’s ruling s here in gr antingDef endants’ motion, it is clear that the limit ed exception rec og nized in Enochs is inapplicable to the c ase at hand. Second, Plaintiff’s cla im for dec laratory relief is barre d by

the Dec laratory

J udg ment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, which authorizes a c ourt of the United States to “ decla re the rig hts and oth e r l e g a l r e latio ns of

any int e re ste d p art

y ,” but e xpre ssl y

e xclu de s c a se s “ wi th r e sp e c t to Fe dera l tax es,” subjec t to one exception not applicable he re. See B ob Jones U niv. v. Simon , 416 U.S. 725, 732-33 n. 7 (1974) ( “The cong ressional a ntipathy for pr emature interfe renc e with the assessment or c ollection of any fede ral tax also ext ends to dec laratory judgme nts. . . .[ T]he fede ral tax ex ception to the De clar atory J udg ment Act is at lea st as broad a s the Anti-Injunction Ac t.” ); se e als o McG uirl v. United States , 360 F. Supp. 2d 129, 132 (D.D .C. 2004) (finding Plaintiff’s claim under

the APA for de clar atory

relief based upon the assessment or c ollection of taxes was bar

red by Dec laratory

J udg ment Act), aff’d , 167 Fe d. Appx. 808 (D.C. C ir. 2005). F or the se re a so ns , th e D. C. C ir c uit ha s ma de c le ar t

hat “ Con g re ss h a s p re se rv e d th e immun ity of the United States f

rom dec laratory

and injunctive re lief with respe ct to all tax controversies except those perta ining to the c lassification of or g anizations under § 501(c ) of the I RC.” Murphy v . IRS, 493 F.3d 170, 174 ( D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Cong ress ha s prese rved the immunit y of the United States fr om declar atory and injunctive re lief with respe ct to all tax controversies except those perta ining to the c lassification of or g anizations under § 501(c ) of the [I RC] .”). Ac c or din g ly , D e fe nd ants ’ M oti on to D ism iss is G RA

NT ED ins of

ar a s D e fe nd ants mov e to dismiss Count I X of Plaintiff’s Complaint for lac k of jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 1).17

B. Defendants’ M

otion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12( b) ( 6) The Court turns next to consider Def endants’ Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a
c l a i mp ur s u an tt o R

u l e 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) , w h i c ha s c o n s tr u e d b y th e C o urti s d i r e c t e d

t o w ar d s C o un tII, which alleg es a f

ailure to issue a

notice of de ficienc y ; Counts I I Iand IV, which a lleg e a f ailure to a sse ss t a xes a

nd pr ov ide a sse ssm e nt n oti c e s; C ount Vand VI I I , whic h a lle g e a

fa ilure to rele ase a lien and to issue a c ertifica te of re lease ; and Count VI I , which alleg es unauthorized disclosure of Plaintiff’ s social sec urity number. 1. Count I Iof Plaintiff’s Complaint Count I Iof Plaintiff’s Complaint alleg es that De fenda nts failed to send a

notice of defic iency

to Plainti ff’ s last known addre ss before issuing the Notice of L evy there by violating 26 U.S.C. §§ 6212(a) a

nd 6213(a) . Plaintiff seeks dama g es pursua nt to section 7433 based upon this alleg ed violation. Compl. ¶¶ 28-31. Section 6212(a ) “a uthorize[ s]” the I RS, upon deter mining the e x istence of

a tax deficienc y , “to send notice of such de ficienc y to the taxpay er by c e rt if ie d ma il o r r e g ist e re d ma il. ” 26 U. S.C. § 6 21 2( a ). Suc h n oti c e “ sh a ll b e su ff ic ie nt, ” “ if mailed to the taxpay er at his last known address . . . e ven if such tax pay er is dec ease d or under a leg al disability .” Id. § 6 21 2( b) . T he taxpay e r h a s 9 0 d ay s a ft e r t he no tic e is m a ile d in

wh ic h to “file a petition with the Tax Court for a r edete rmination of the def iciency .” Id. § 6213(b). Pursuant to section 6213(a) , the I RS i s prec luded from imposing any “asse ssment of a defic iency” or f

rom makingany

“levy or proc eedingin court for its collection” until the “notice [of deficienc y ] has been mailed to the taxpay er, []or until the expiration of [t he] 90-day
. . . period, . . . [] or, if a pe tition has been filed with the Tax Court, until t he dec ision of the Tax Court has bec ome final.” Id.18

“The purpose of

a notice of

defic iency

is, first, to notify

the taxpay er that a def

iciency has bee n deter

mined ag ainst him, and second, to af ford him an oppor

tunity to challeng e the deter mination in tax court.” Kile yv . Ku rtz , 533 F. Supp. 465, 467-68 (D . Colo. 1982) (citing Barnes v. Commissioner of Internal Re venue , 4 08 F .2 d 6 5, 68 (7 th C ir . 1 96 9) ). As the Ni nth Circuit has observe d, Re a din gthe int e rr e late d s e c tio ns of the Cod e a s a

n inte g rate d who le , it

is appar ent that the leg islative plan contemplate s that actua l notice of the defic iency

should be g iven wher e such c an re asonably be ac hieved a

nd that the mailing a uthorized by

§ 6212(a) is a means to that end. Clodfelter v. Commissioner of Internal Reve nue , 5 2 7 F
. 2 d 7 5 4 , 7 5 6 ( 9 thC i r . 1 9 7 5 )
. T h e k e y, then, “is that the taxpay er ha ve ac tual notice and not that he have it in any particula r wa y .” Id.
at 75 7; see also Borgman v . Commissioner of Internal Reve nue , 888 F.2d 916, 917 ( 1st Cir. 1989) (“ Th e purp os e of

se c tio n[] 62 12 (a ) .
. . is t o e ns ur e tha t th e taxpay e r r e c e ive s a

tim e ly actua l notice so he c an cha lleng e the a ssessment within the 90-day period provide d in section 6213.”). A ccor dingly , “[w]here the taxpay er r ece ives ac tual notice of the contents of the defic iency

notice, the pur

pose of the statute is satisfied.” Gibson v. United States , 761 F. Supp. 685, 690 (C.D. Cal 1991). Plaintiff in this case alleg es that he did not re ceive the re quired notice of def iciency prior to the issuance of the Notice of L evy and ar g ues that De fenda

nts are the ref

ore in violation of sec tions 6212(a) a

nd 6213(a)
. SeePl.’s Opp’n, Att. 1 (Aff idavit of Peter B oritz) (here inafter , “B oritz Aff.”), ¶

7. Def endants re spond that — even a cce pting Plaintiff’s a lleg ation as true — Plaintiff’s claim must nonetheless be dismissed bec ause public r ecor ds demonstrate that he filed a timely

petition with the Tax Court reg ardingthe deter mination of tax defic iencies in the y ear s at issue and ther efor e cle arly rec eived a ctual notice of the def iciencie s. See Def

s.’ Mot. atAs shown by the Tax Court Order, Plaintiff wa s held to have outstandingtax 5 defic iencies f

or the year s in question. See Tax Court Order. 19 5-6 & Ex . A (Or der a

nd Dec ision dated J une 10, 1998, in Boritz v. Commissioner of Internal Rev enue , N o. 17 66 4- 97 ) ( he re ina ft e r, “ Tax Cour t O rd e r” ). Th e Court

a g re e s. 5 Plaintiff conce des that he f iled a petition in Tax C ourt for tax y ear s 1994 and 1995, but argues that he did so “w ithout said noti ces, ba sed on other le tters and notice s rec eived f rom the I RS allegingthe assessment of penalties.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 8. Even a ssuming, as Plaintiff appar ently

asser ts, that none of the “ letters and notice s” he r ece ived from the I RS constit uted the re quired notice of def iciency , this does not neg ate that Plaintiff had a ctual notice of the de fi c ie nc ie s and

fi le d a tim e ly pe tit ion in T a x Cour

t f or the tax y e ars in q

ue sti on . A s th e I RS’ mailings a

nd notices “r esult[ed] in actual notice without prejudicial dela y (as wa s clea

rly the
case here ),” the Court finds that the I RS has “[m et] the conditions of § 6212(a).” Clodfelter , 52 7 F .2 d at 75 7. Mo re ov e r, “ [b]y tim e ly inv ok ingTax Cour

t juri sd ic tio n, [Pla int if

f] e ff e c tiv e ly waived a ny objection to the notice of defic iency .” Mulvania v. Commissioner of Internal Rev enue , 7 69 F .2 d 1 37 6, 13 80 (9 th C ir . 1 98 5) ; see also Roszkos v . Commissioner of Internal Rev enue , 8 50 F .2 d 5 14 , ( 9th Cir . 1 98 8) (whe re the “ taxpay e r a c kn ow le dg e s n oti c e by tim e ly pe tit ion ingthe Tax Cour

t f or a re de te rm inatio n o f d e fi c ie nc y ,” he “ re nd e r[s ] harm le ss t he I RS’
e rr or ” ); cf. Kiley , 533 F. Supp at 468 (“ In the pre sent ca se, the plaintiff a cknowledg es that he
a c tua lly re c e ive d h is n oti c e of

de fi c ie nc y

and he do e s n ot a lle g e any

de tr ime nta l de lay . H is
c ha lle ng e to t

he no tic e of

de fi c ie nc y

is the re fo re wi tho ut m e ri t.” ). Ac c or din g ly , D e fe nd ants ’ Motion to Dism iss is GRANTED insofar a s Defe ndants asser t that Count I Iof Plaintiff’s Complaint shoul d be dismissed for fa ilure to state a c laim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
.20 2. Count I I Iand Count I V of Plaintiff’s Complaint Counts I I Iand IV of Plaintiff’s Complaint seek damag es pursua nt to 26 U.S.C . § 7433 f o r th e IR S ’ a l l e g e d

f a i l ur e t o a s s e s s t a x e s an d

p r o v i d e a s s e s s m e n tn o t i c e s . S p e c i f i c a l l y, Plaintiff alleg es in Count I I Iof the Complaint that Defe ndants violated 26 U.S.C. § 6203 by issuing the Notice of F eder al Tax L ien and the N otice of L evy without first making a

n
a s s e s s m e n tr e g ar d i n gP l a i n t i f f ’ s t a x l i a b i l i t i e s f o r y e ar s 1 9 9 4 an d

1 9 9 5
. C o mp l
. ¶

¶ 3 2
- 3 5
. In Count I V of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleg es that De fenda nts failed to g ive him notice within 60 day s after any alleg ed asse ssment as is require d by 26 U.S.C. § 6303(a). Id. ¶¶ 36- 39. B oth c la ims the re fo re re late to t he I RS’ a sse ssm e nt o f t a x lia bil ity . A s su c h, the c la ims
are not actionable unde r sec tion 7433 and must be dismis sed for failure to state a c laim. As noted above , Section 7433(a) authorizes taxpay ers to bringactions for civil damag es ag ainst the Un ite d St ate s w he n a

ny I RS of fi c e r o r e mpl oye e re c kle ssl y , inte nti on a lly , o r n e g lig e ntl y a c ts i n d i s r e g ar d o f th e C o d e o r

i t s i mp l e m e n t i n gr e g u l at i o n s “ i nc o n n e c t i o nw i than y collection of Fe dera l tax .” 26 U.S.C. § 7433(a) (e mphasis added) . As this Court has previously held, sec tion 7 4 3 3 is li mi te d

to a ll e g e d

v io lati o n s o f

la wb y th e I RS in

c o n n e c ti o nw it

htax collection and “‘doe s not provide a c ause of action for

wrong ful tax assessment or other a ctions that are not specific ally

related to the collec tion of income tax.’” Pollinger , 539 F. Supp. 2d 242 at 255-56 (qu o t i n g Buaiz v. United States , 4 71 F . Su pp . 2 d 1 29 , 1 35 -3 6 ( D. D. C. 2 00 7) ); see also Jae ger v. United States , 524 F. Supp. 2d 60, 63-64 (D .D.C. 2007) (holdingthat “sec tion 7433 does not provide a cause of ac tion for wrong ful tax assessment, the absenc e of a tax assessment, or other
a c tio ns no t r e late d to c oll e c tio n o f i nc ome tax”) ; Spahr v. United States , 501 F. Supp. 2d 92, 95Whil e some c ourts have he ld that the limit ations on the rig ht of ac tion under sec tion 6 7433 are jurisdictional beca use they perta in to the scope of the United States’ wa iver of sovere ign immunity , se e, e .g., Bu aiz , 4 71 F . Su pp . 2 d at 13 5- 36 ; Spahr , 501 F. Supp. 2d at 96, this Court finds persuasive the r easoningset forth by J udg e John D. Bates in Jaegar concluding that “the limitations on the right of action ar e nonjurisdictional bec ause the languag e of se ction 7433 is not jurisdi ctional, and, f urthermor e, this Circuit treats the lac k of a r ight of action as a

n issue of fa ilure to state a c laim upon which re lief ca n be g rante d, id. 524 F. Supp. 2d at 64 n.1 (interna l citations omit ted). See also Pollinger , 5 39 F . Su pp . 2 d at 25 6 ( dis mis sin gc la ims relating to tax assessment under Rule 12( b)(6) for f ailure to state a

claim). Alternatively , the Court notes that Def endants would be entitled to summary judgme nt 7 as the undisputed fa cts demonstrate that assessments we re timely made a nd that notice wa s sent to Plainti ff a s require d. Def endants submit the Certificates of Of ficial Rec ord (F orm 4340), reg ardingPlaintiff’s tax l iability in the tax y ear s 1994 and 1995, which de monstrate that assessments we re ma de, and that notice and de mand in acc ordanc e with sec tion 6303 was g iven, on November

16, 1998, Dec ember

18, 1998, and De cembe r 21, 1998, thus satisfying se ctions

21 (D.D.C. 2007) ( same). The Court’s holdingin Po lli nge r applies equa lly here and mandates the 6 dis mis sa l of

Pla int if f’ s c la ims in C ount I I Iand Count IV a

ri sin gfr om t

he I RS’ a lle g e d f

a ilure to
make an a sse ssm e nt i n c omp lia nc e wi th 2 6 U .S. C. § § 6 20 3, 63 03 . Wh ile De fe nd ants the mse lve s h ave no t sp e c if ic a lly c ha lle ng e d th e via

bil ity of Pla int if f’ s c la ims on

thi s p oint, instead addr essingthe merits of Plaintiff’s c laims, it i s well settled in this Ci rcuit that “[c]ompl aints may

[] be dismissed, su a s

po nteif nee d be, under

Rule 12(b)(6) whene ver ‘ the plaintiff ca

nnot possibly

win relief

.’” Be st v . Ke lly , 39 F.3d 328, 331 ( D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Bake r v. Direc tor, United States Parole Comm’n , 916 F.2d 725, 726 ( D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam)). Ac cording ly , beca use it is patently

obvious that Pl aintiff’s c laims relatingto the alleg ed er rors in the a ssessment of taxes “ca nnot possibly

win relief

,” the Court conc ludes that Count I I Iand Count I V must be dismissed su a s po ntefo r f

a ilure to s tate a

c la im und e r R

ule 12(b)( 6). De fenda

nts’ Motion to Dism iss is t here fore GRANTED insofa r as De fenda

nts have moved to dismiss Counts I I Iand IV, albeit on the a lternative r easoningthat Plaintiff has failed to state a c laim under sec tion 7433. 76203 and 6303. See Def s.’ Mot. at Exs . B, C, D, a nd E. Whil e Plaintiff contends that the Certificates of Of

ficial Rec ord ar e insuffic ient to support an awa rd of summary

judgme nt without providing the under lying suppor ting doc umentation, the ca se law makes cle ar that the cer tified F or m 43 40 s “ are se lf

-a uth e nti c atin gand

ne e d n o e xtri ns ic e vid e nti ary su pp or t a s a pr e dic ate to admissibili ty .” Bu aiz , 521 F. Supp. 2d at 96. As such, the y are “pre sumptive proof of the taxpay er’ s liabilit y ” and “ may provide a sufficie nt basis for summary judgme nt.” Id. Plaintiff has off ere d no fac ts or documentar y evidenc e to re fute the a ccur acy of the c ertified f

orms, and he ha s th e re fo re fa ile d to de fe at th e De fe nd ants ’ m oti on fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. 22 3. Count V and Count VI I Iof Plaintiff’s Complaint In Count V and Count VI I Iof the Complaint, Plainti ff a lleg es that De fenda nts have failed to re lease the Notice of Fe dera l Tax L ien and issue a cer tificate of rele ase a s require d by 26 U.S.C. § 6325(a)(1) . Plaintiff seeks monetar y damag es for

this failure unde r 26 U.S.C. §§ 7432 and 7433, re spectively . Compl. ¶¶ 40-43, 53-57. Sec tion 6325 provides that “the Secre tary shall issue a ce rtificate of re lease of any lien imposed with respec t to any internal
reve nue tax not later than 30 day s after the day on which . . . [t] he Secr etar y finds that the lia bil ity fo r t he amou nt a sse sse d, tog e the r w itha ll i nte re st i n r e sp e c t th e re of , h a s b e e n f

ull y satisfied or ha s become leg ally unenfor cea

ble.” 26 U.S.C. § 6325(a) (1). In th is c a se , th e pa

rt ie s a g re e that th e No tic e of F e de ra l T a x L ie n is no w u ne nf or c e a ble beca use the ten- y ear

limit ation periods for

collection of the underly ing tax assessment have expired. SeeCompl. ¶ 56; Defs.’ Mot. at 9 (“ the liens have not been r efiled a nd are considere d rele ased” ). This is confirmed by ref ere nce to the N otice of F eder al Tax L ien, which is attac hed
a s an e xhibi t to Pla int if

f’ s Co mpl a int

and wh ic h s tate s a s f

oll ow s: I MPORTANT REL EASE I NFO R M ATI ON: For

eac h assessment listed below, un le ss not ic e of the lie n is re fi le d b y the date g ive n in

c olumn ( e ), thi s n oti c e sh a ll, on the da y fo llo wi ngsu c h date , op e ra te a s a c e rt if ic ate of re le a se a s d e fi ne d in

I RC 6325(a)
. Id. , Ex . C. There is no alleg ation by Plaintiff that the liens have be en re filed; indeed, Plaintiff23

alleg es that the liens ar e now une nforc eable ( i.e., that no enfor cea ble lien was r efiled)
. See id. ¶¶ 54- 56. Acc ording ly , the Notice of Fe dera l Tax L ien itself oper ated a s the ce rtificate of rele ase r equire d under se ction 6325(a) and automatica lly rele ased the tax l iens at issue whe n no notice of lien w as re filed by the dates listed in column (e ). See R otte v. United States , 6 15 F. Sup p. 2d 13 47 , 1 35 1 ( S.D . F la . 2 00 9) (f ind ingtha

t I RS “ c omp lie d w ithse c tio n 7 43 2 b e c a us e the no tic e of

fe de ra l tax lie n w a s se lf

-r e le a sin g ); cf. Enax v . United States , Civ. Act. No. 06- 14774, 2007 WL708976, *450 (11th Cir. Mar. 8, 2007) ( observing that “[a]t t he end of

the limit ations period, the liens self -re lease unless the I RS had revoked the self-r elea se and r e-f iled the lie ns be fo re the lim itatio ns pe ri od e xpir e d” ); Eastman v. United States , Civ. Act. No. 06 c v1 06 9, 20 08 WL89 92 52 , * 2 ( W.D . A rk . M ar. 31 , 2 00 8) (“ [T]he 10 y e ar c oll e c tio n s tatut e of lim itatio ns on

the se a sse ssm e nts e xpir e d a nd the lie n d oc ume nts se lf

re le a se d. Th e I RS di d not refile its notice of

lien . . . [t ]herefor e, . . . the Notice of F eder al Tax L ien bec ame the § 63 25 (a ) c e rt if

ic ate of re le a se of

the se lie ns .” ). As su c h, Pla int if f c ann ot s uc c e e d o n h is c la ims that Def endants violated se ction 6325 by failingto relea se the Notice of F eder al Tax L ien and/or by failingto issue a ce rtificate of re lease . Def endants’ Motion to Dismiss is there fore GRANTED insofa

r as De fenda

nts move to dismi ss Counts V and VI I Iof Plaintiff’s Complaint for f ailure to state a

claim pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6). 4. Count VI Iof Plaintiff’s Complaint In Count VI Iof the Complaint, Plainti ff se eks dama g es under 26 U.S.C. § 7433 based upon Def endants’ a lleg edly

unauthorized public disclosure of his social secur ity

number on the Notice of Fe dera l Tax L ien in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(6). Compl. ¶¶ 48-52. Sec tion 6103 states the g ener al rule that return infor mation shall be kept conf idential and, except as24

a uth or ize d, sh a ll n ot b e dis c los e d. 26 U. S.C. § 6 10 3; Church of Scientology of Calif. v. IRS , 484 U.S. 9, 10-12 (1987). O ne of the exceptions to section 6103, however , permits disclosure of re turn information “in c onnection with . . . collec tion activity . . . to the extent that such disclosure is nec essar

y in obtaining infor

mation . . . with respec t to the enforc ement of a ny other provision of [the Code].” 26 U.S.C. § 6103(k)(6). The implementing r egulations for section 6103 fur

ther provide that disclosure may be made in order “ to locate a ssets in which the taxpay er ha s an intere st . . . or otherwise to a pply the provisions of the Interna l Revenue Code
re latin gto e sta

bli sh me nt o f l ie ns a g a ins t su c h a sse ts, or le vy , s e izur e , o r s a le on

or of the a sse ts to s atis fy any su c h li a bil ity .” 26 C.F .R. § 3 01 .6 10 3( k) (6 )- 1( vi) ; see also Glass v. United States , 480 F. Supp. 2d 162, 165-66 (D .D.C. 2007). Ba sed on sec tion 6103(k)(6) a nd the re lated re g ulations, severa l courts, includingthe undersig ned Judge, ha

ve conc luded that a notice of lien does not g ive rise to an una uthorized disclosure a ction. See, e .g., Pollinger , 539 F. Supp. 2d at 253 (“ Plaintiff cannot state a n
un a uth or ize d d isc los ur e c la im b a se d u po n th e va

ri ou s n oti c e s o f l ie ns and

le vie s. ” ); se e als o Glas s , 480 F. Supp. 2d at 165-66 ( finding that “a notice of lien does not g ive rise to a c ause of
a c tio n” ); Mann v. U

nited States , 204 F.3d 1012, 1018 ( 10th Cir. 2000) (dismissi ngplaintiff’s claim for una

uthorized disclosure of socia l security number in notice of

lien beca use “§ 6103(k)( 6) and the rele vant re g ulations do permit disclosure of tax return infor mation when made in notices of

lien and levy , to the extent necessar y to collect on taxes assessed.” ); McG raw v. United States , Civ. Act. No. 08-0092, 2008 WL4000570, *3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 25, 2008) (dismissing plaintiff’ s claim that I RS vi olated sec tion 6103(k) by disclosing plaintiff’ s social sec urity

number in the notice s of fe dera l tax liens and levies be cause disclosure wa s25

permitted under

implementing r egulations). Acc ording ly , the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot state an una

uth or ize d d isc los ur e c la im b a se d u po n th e No tic e of

F e de ra l T a x L ie n. De fe nd ants ’ Motion to Dism iss is t here fore GRANTED insofa r as De fenda

nts move to dismi ss Count VI Iof Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a c laim. C. Defendants’ M

otion for Summary Judgme nt The Court finally

turns to consider De fenda nts’ motion for summary

judgme nt, which as construe d by

the Court is directed towa rds Plaintiff’s final c laim — Count VI , in which Plaintiff alleg es that De fenda nts failed to serve him with a notice of levy , as re quired by 26 U. S.C. § 6 33 1( d) (2 ). Pla int if f s e e ks c ivi l da

ma g e s f or thi s a lle g e d f

a ilure purs ua

nt t o 2 6 U .S. C. § 7 43 3. Com

pl. ¶¶ 44 -4 7. Gi ve n th e so me wh at ob sc ur e natur e of Pla int if f’ s Co mpl a int , it

is not entirely

clea r whe ther he means to alleg e that De fenda nts violated section 6331(d)( 2) by failingto serve him with an a ctual copy of the Notice of L evy

issued ag ainst his bank acc ount
or rather by

failingto serve him with a notice of its intent to is sue the Notice of L evy befor e d o i n gs o . A s D e f

e n d an t s c o r

r e c t l y p o i n to u t , s e c t i o n6 3 3 1 ( d ) r e qu i r e s o n l y th atth e IR S n o t i f y a taxpay er “ in writing of

his intention t o make [the] levy ” at lea st 30 day s befor e the da y of the levy . 26 U.S.C. § 6331(d)(1). It does not require that a copy of the Notice of L evy

itself be provided to the taxpay er. See id. Ac c or din g ly , to the e xtent Pla int if f c on te nd s th at th e I RS
v i o l at e d s e c t i o n6 3 3 1 ( d ) b y f

a i l i n gt o p r o v i d e h i mw i tha c o p y o f th e a c tu a l N o t i c e o f

L e v y, such a c laim cannot succ eed. No ne the le ss, c og niza

nt o f P la int if

f’ s pr o s e status, the Court shall give Plaintiff the benef it of the doubt and instead c onstrue Count VIas alleg ing that Defe ndants violated sec tion 6331(d) by

failingto provide a notice of intent to levy . Even c onstruing Plaintiff’ s Complaint26

in his favor, howe ver, it is clea r that Plaintiff’s cla im is wit hout merit. The undisputed fa cts on th e p r e s e n tr e c o r d

d e m o n s tr at e th atth e IR S i s s u e d th e r e qu i r e d

n o t i c e s o f

i n t e n t . S p e c i f

i c a l l y, Def endants dire ct the Court to the Certificates of Of ficial Rec ord (F orm 4340) re g arding Plaintiff’s tax l iability

in the tax y ear s 1994 and 1995. De fs.’ Mot. at 8 n. 2. The se Certificates of Off icial Recor d, which ar e attac hed to Def endants’ motion as Exhibit s B, C, D a nd E, indicate that the r equire d notices of intent to levy wer e provide d to Plainti ff. See id. , E x. B , C, D, and E. A s noted above , se e su pra n. 7, these Cer

tificates of

Offic ial Record a

re “ selfauthenticating” and “pr ovide a suff icient basis for summar

y judgme nt.” Bu aiz , 521 F. Supp. 2d
at 96 ; see also Hines v . United States , 658 F. Supp. 2d 139 (D.D .C. 2009) (aw arding presumption of re g ularity to I RS records de monstrating that notices of intent to levy wer e sent to plaintiff). Plaintiff has off ere d no fac ts or documentar y evidenc e to re fute the a ccur acy of the
cer tified forms or to other

wise indicate that the notices of intent to levy wer e not provided. A s
s u c h , h e h a s f

a i l e d t o d e f e atth e D e f

e n d an t s ’ m o t i o nf

o r s u m m ar y j u d g m e n t . A c c o r d i n g l y, Def endants’ Motion for

Summary

J udg ment is GRANTED insofar as De fenda

nts contend that the re are no mate ri a l di sp ute s o f f a c t and the y are e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a matte r o f l aw w ith
re sp e c t to Count V Iof

Pla int if f’ s Co mpl a int
. IV . C ON CL USI ON For the re asons set for

th above, De fenda

nts’ [7] Motion to Dism iss or in the Alternative Mo tio n f or Summary

Judg me nt i s G RA

NT ED . Sp e c if

ic a lly , th e Court

ho lds a s f

oll ow s. F ir st, Def endants’ Motion to Dismiss P laintiff’s cla ims ag ainst the I RS i s GRANTED a s conce ded. Second, De fenda

nts’ Motion to Dism iss CountI(quiet title action pursua nt to 28 U.S.C . § 2410) and Count IX (APA) f or lac k of jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 1) is GRANTED.27

Third, Def

endants’ Motion to Dismiss C ount I I(fa ilure to issue notice of de ficienc y in violation
o f § § 6 2 1 2 an d

6 2 1 3 ) , C o un tIII

( f a i l ur e t o m ak e a s s e s s m e n ti nv i o l at i o no f § 6 2 0 3 ) , C o un tIV (fa ilure to make a ssessment in violation of § 6303), Count V (failure to relea se lien in violation
o f § 7 3 4 2 ) , C o un tV II ( un a

u th o r i z e d d i s c l o s ur e i nv i o l at i o no f § 6 1 0 3 ( b ) ( 6 ) ) , an d

C o un tV III (fa ilure to issue ce rtificate of re lease in violation of § 6325), for f ailure to state a

claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is GRANTED. F ourth and fina lly , Def endants’ Motion for

Summary Judg me nt a s to Count V I(f a ilure to i ssu e no tic e of

le vy in v iol atio n o f § 63 31 (d )) is GRANTED. An appropr iate Or der a ccompa nies this Memorandum Opinion. Date: Fe bruar

y 23, 2010 /s/ CO LLEEN K OLLA R- K OTEL LY Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge