alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EX-10.5





 Exhibit 10.5 

Leo Holdings Corp. II 

Albany Financial Center 
 South
Ocean Blvd 
 Suite #507 
 P.O.
Box SP-63158 
 New Providence, Nassau, 

The Bahamas 
 March 2, 2021 

Leo Investors III LP 
 Albany Financial Center 

South Ocean Blvd 
 Suite #507 

P.O. Box SP-63158 
 New Providence, Nassau, 

The Bahamas 
 Ladies and Gentlemen: 

This letter will confirm our agreement that, commencing on the effective date (the “Effective Date”) of the
registration statement (the “Registration Statement”) for the initial public offering (the “IPO”) of the securities of Leo Holdings III Corp (the “Company”) and continuing until
the earlier of (i) the consummation by the Company of an initial business combination or (ii) the Company’s liquidation (in each case as described in the Registration Statement) (such earlier date hereinafter referred to as the
“Termination Date”), Leo Investors III LP Limited Partnership shall take steps directly or indirectly to make available to the Company certain office space, secretarial and administrative services as may be required by the
Company from time to time, situated at 100 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90401 (or any successor location). In exchange therefore, the Company shall pay Leo Investors III LP or one of its affiliates a sum of $10,000 per month, respectively, on
the Effective Date and continuing monthly thereafter until the Termination Date. Leo Investors II Limited Partnership hereby agrees that it does not have any right, title, interest or claim of any kind in or to any monies that may be set aside in a
trust account (the “Trust Account”) that may be established upon the consummation of the IPO (the “Claim”) and hereby waives any Claim it may have in the future as a result of, or arising out of, any
negotiations, contracts or agreements with the Company and will not seek recourse against the Trust Account for any reason whatsoever. 












 
			
	Very truly yours,
	
	LEO HOLDINGS III CORP
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Simon Brown

	Name: Simon Brown
	Title: Secretary


  

			
	AGREED TO AND ACCEPTED BY:
	
	LEO INVESTORS III LP
		
	By:	 	Leo Investors III GP, its general partner
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Simon Brown

	Name: Simon Brown
	Title: Director

 Signature Page to Administrative Services Agreement
41179.

#### HARVEY v. THE STATE.

Nichols, Presiding Judge.

“ ‘There is a very wide distinction between admitting the main fact and admitting some minor or subordinate fact or series of facts which could be true whether the main fact existed or not.’ *[Fletcher v. State,*90 Ga. 468]. A confession is a voluntary admission of *guilt;*an admission as applied to criminal cases, is the avowal of a fact or of circumstances from which guilt *may*be inferred, but only *tending*to prove the offense charged and not amounting to a confession of guilt.” *Riley v. State,*1 Ga. App. 651 (3) (57 SE 1031). “An incriminating statement is indirect or circumstantial evidence.” *Pressley v. State,*201 Ga. 267, 270 (39 SE2d 478).

“Where in a criminal case the evidence relied upon for the conviction of the accused is wholly circumstantial, it is error, requiring the granting of a new trial, to omit to charge the jury upon the law of circumstantial evidence, even without a request so to do. *Riley v. State,*1 Ga. App. 651 (57 SE 1031); *Harvey v. State,*8 Ga. App. 660 (70 SE 141); *Weaver v. State,*135 Ga. 317 (69 SE 488).” *Allen v. State,*14 Ga. App. 115 (1) (80 SE 215).

“The rule, applicable where the evidence relied on to convict of a crime is wholly circumstantial, that, to warrant a conviction, the proved facts must not only be consistent with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, but must exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of his guilt *[Code*§ 38-109], should not have been omitted from the instructions of the court to the jury, where, to convict . . . the State relied *280wholly on circumstantial evidence and on an admission. . .” *Hart v. State,*14 Ga. App. 714 (3) (82 SE 164).

Decided March 9, 1965.

*Robert K. Ballew,*for plaintiff in error.

*C. B. Holcomb, Solicitor General,*contra.

In a prosecution for larceny or burglary the recent, unexplained possession of the property alleged to have been stolen by the defendant is considered sufficient proof, if the jury sees fit to accept it, to satisfy the requirements of the circumstantial evidence rule as contained in *Code*§ 38-109. *Cheatham v. State,*57 Ga. App. 858, 859 (197 SE 70); *Myerholtz v. State,*109 Ga. App. 352 (136 SE2d 165); *Jones v. State,*105 Ga. 649 (31 SE 574).

The written statement made by the defendant in the present case was an incriminating statement which connected him with the event but was not a confession of guilt, and was therefore circumstantial evidence, as was the evidence dealing with the possession of the stolen goods.

All the evidence in the case connecting the defendant with the alleged crime being circumstantial it was error for the trial court to fail to charge, even without request, the rule of circumstantial evidence set forth in *Code*§ 38-109, and the trial court erred in overruling the defendant’s motion for new trial on such ground.

In as much as the case must be again tried and the evidence on such trial may be different the usual general grounds of the motion for new trial are not passed upon.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Eberhardt and Pannell, JJ., concur.*
#### Eugene PASCHAL, alias v. STATE.

7 Div. 577.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Dec. 19, 1978.

REVERSED AND REMANDED on authority of the Supreme Court of Alabama, 77-590, November 10, 1978, 365 So.2d 681. No opinion.

All the Judges concur.
# C_2006010EN.01002201.xml

| 14.1.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 10/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.1.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 10/22

---

Action brought on 5 October 2005 — Seegmuller v Commission

(Case T-377/05)

(2006/C 10/44)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Magali Seegmuller (Uccle, Belgium) (represented by: K.H. Hagenaar, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Commission of the European Communities

Defendant:

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the Decision of 5 July 2005 of the Appointing Authority of the European Commission which prevents the applicant from making her posting effective and from taking up her post in the Guinea Conakry delegation as head of administration of that delegation; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the Decision of 5 July 2005 of the Appointing Authority of the European Commission which prevents the applicant from making her posting effective and from taking up her post in the Guinea Conakry delegation as head of administration of that delegation;

| — | grant in principle the applicant's claim for compensation, to be quantified at a later date, which arises from the material and non-material harm caused to her by the defendant; |
| --- | --- |

—

grant in principle the applicant's claim for compensation, to be quantified at a later date, which arises from the material and non-material harm caused to her by the defendant;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The applicant, a member of temporary staff at the Commission, applied for the post of head of administration in Congo Brazzaville (Vacancy notice COM/2004/2982/F). On 5 January 2005, she was informed that she had passed the selection board. Asked by Commission DG RELEX whether she would accept another delegation, the applicant also agreed to be posted to Guinea Conakry.

As is the practice, the applicant underwent a medical examination with a view to her departure for the delegation in Guinea Conakry. By note of 17 March 2005, the Commission's medical officer stated that the applicant did not have the required physical aptitudes to carry out her functions in that delegation. Following that note, DG RELEX informed the applicant that she could not take up the post in Guinea Conakry. The applicant therefore submitted a complaint against that decision, which was rejected by the contested decision of 5 July 2005.

In support of her action, the applicant claims that it was not within the competence of the Director of DG RELEX to make the decision of 15 April 2005 and that there was a misuse of powers. Furthermore, she submits that there were alleged errors of assessment on the part of the Commission's medical officer, whose report of 17 March 2005 fails to establish, she alleges, any comprehensible link between the medical findings which it contains and the conclusions which he draws from them.

---
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Alvin SEALS.

No. 62731.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 20, 1978.

In re: Alvin Seals, applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and stay order. Orleans Parish.

Writ denied.
§ 412.235 Criteria for all hospitals in a State seeking a statewide wage index redesignation. ( a ) *General criteria.* For all prospective payment system hospitals in a State to be redesignated to a statewide wage index, the following conditions must be met: ( 1 ) All prospective payment system hospitals in the State must apply as a group for reclassification to a statewide wage index through a signed single application.
( 2 ) All prospective payment system hospitals in the State must agree to the reclassification to a statewide wage index through a signed affidavit on the application.
( 3 ) All prospective payment system hospitals in the State must agree, through an affidavit, to withdrawal of an application or to termination of an approved statewide wage index reclassification.
( 4 ) All hospitals in the State must waive their rights to any wage index classification that they would otherwise receive absent the statewide wage index classification, including a wage index that any of the hospitals might have received through individual geographic reclassification.
( 5 ) New hospitals that open within the State prior to the deadline for submitting an application for a statewide wage index reclassification (September 1), regardless of whether a group application has already been filed, must agree to the use of the statewide wage index as part of the group application. New hospitals that open within the State after the deadline for submitting a statewide wage index reclassification application or during the approved reclassification period will be considered a party to the statewide wage index application and reclassification.
( b ) *Effect on payments.* ( 1 ) An individual hospital within the State may receive a wage index that could be higher or lower under the statewide wage index reclassification in comparison to its otherwise redesignated wage index.
( 2 ) Any new prospective payment system hospital that opens in the State during the effective period of an approved statewide wage index reclassification will be designated to receive the statewide wage index for the duration of that period.
( c ) *Terms of the decision.* ( 1 ) A decision by the MGCRB on an application for a statewide wage index reclassification will be effective for 3 years beginning with discharges occurring on the first day (October 1) of the second Federal fiscal year following the Federal fiscal year in which the hospitals filed a complete application.
( 2 ) The procedures and timeframes specified in § 412.273 apply to withdrawals of applications for redesignation to a statewide wage index and terminations of approved statewide wage index reclassifications, including the requirement that, to withdraw an application or terminate an approved reclassification, the request must be made in writing by all hospitals that are party to the application, except hospitals reclassified into the State for purposes of receiving the statewide wage index.
[66 FR 39935, Aug. 1, 2001]
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Ricky FARBE.

No. 80-K-2464.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 26, 1980.

In re Ricky Farbe, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Parish of Avoyelles.

Granted.
# C_2006096EN.01001301.xml

| 22.4.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 96/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.4.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 96/13

---

Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 23 February 2006 — Karatzoglou v EAR

(Case T-471/04) (1)

1

(Member of the temporary staff - Termination of contract - Article 47(2)(a) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities - Observance of the provisions of the contract - Legitimate expectations)

(2006/C 96/24)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Georgios Karatzoglou (Ioannina, Greece), represented by S. Pappas, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) (represented by J.-N. Louis, S. Orlandi, X. Martin and C. Manolopoulos, lawyers)

Defendant:

Application

for annulment of the decision of the EAR of 26 February 2004 to terminate the applicant's contract of employment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the decision of the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) of 26 February 2004 terminating the applicant's contract of employment; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decision of the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) of 26 February 2004 terminating the applicant's contract of employment;

| 2. | Orders the EAR to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the EAR to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 57, 5.3.2005.

1

---
#### Susan BANKSTON, wife of/and James Bankston v. Limon COOPER and State Farm Ins. Company.

No. 65120.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 4, 1979.

In re Susan Bankston, wife of/and James Bankston, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Jefferson Parish. 371 So.2d 654.

Denied.
#### John L. Lawrence, Plaintiff, *v.*George W. Smith et al., Defendants.

(Supreme Court, Queens Special Term,

July, 1898.)

Towns — An incorporated village cannot be included in a lighting district — Laws of 1896, chap. 309.

A town board has no power, under the general act authorizing towns to establish lamp or lighting districts outside the limits of any incorporated village or villages (Laws of 1896, chap. 309), to include in 'the district any part of the territory of an incorporated village; its action, in establishing such á district and .in making a contract for lighting it, is wholly void, and the court has no power to separate such a district and set up a new one. •

Action by a taxpayer to annul the action of the town board of the town of Hempstead, Queens county, in establishing a hghting district and making a lighting contract therefor for ten years. Part of the territory of the district is within the incorporated village of Lawrence.

W. S. Coggswell for plaintiff.

H. A. Monfort for defendants.

Gaynor J.

The Town Board had no power to include any part of the territory of an incorporated village in the district (ch, 309, Laws of 1896). Its action in establishing the district and making the contract is therefore void. The court has not the power to separate the district and set up a new one. The assessments upon property in such new district to pay the expense of the lights would be as void as similar assessments laid within the present district. And even if the court had the power to separate the good from the bad in the resolution of the town board establishing the district, it could not do so unless they are so independent of each other that the court could see and say that the town board would have exercised its discretion to pass the resolution with the bad left out, as is the rule in respect of statutes void in part (Matter of Kenny, 23 Misc. Rep., at p. 14, and cases cited).

Judgment for the plaintiff with costs.
* Pursuant to 5 TH CIR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH CIR
. R. 47.5.4. 

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-50966 Conference Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee
v. DAVID RAY JIMENEZ-ZAVALA Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 3:07-CR-867-ALL Before KING, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, David Ray Jimenez-Zavala raises arguments that are foreclosed by Al mendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), whic h held that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) is a penalty provision and not a separate criminal offense. United States v. PinedaArrellano, 492 F.3d 624, 625 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 872 (2008). United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D March 5, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 07-50966

2 The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
#### Donnie Ray SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-215.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 8, 1974.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

CRUZ LOPEZ BERNAL, 

 

 Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 State.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-14-00158-CR

Appeal from the

112th Judicial District Court

of Pecos County, Texas 

(TC# P-3310-112-CR)

O R D E R

The Court GRANTS the State’s third motion for extension of time within which to file 

the brief until December 22, 2014. NO FURTHER MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 

TO FILE THE STATE’S BRIEF WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT.

It is further ORDERED that the Hon. Laurie K. English, the State’s attorney, prepare the 

State’s brief and forward the same to this Court on or before December 22, 2014.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 8

th day of December, 2014.

PER CURIAM
Editorial Note on Part 431
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 431 appear at 75 FR 48852, Aug. 11, 2010.

§ 431.705 Licensing authority. ( a ) The State licensing program must provide for licensing of nursing home administrators by— ( 1 ) The agency designated under the healing arts act of the State; or
( 2 ) A State licensing board.
( b ) The State agency or board must perform the functions and duties specified in §§ 431.707 through 431.713 and the board must meet the membership requirements specified in § 431.706 of this subpart.
From: Emily H. Nunez

Sent: Thursday, August 16, 2012 2:54:27 PM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada)

To: Manufactured Housing

Subject: EERE-2009-BT-BC-0021

Dear Ms. Edwards,

I reviewed the attached Federal Register Vol. 75, No. 34 dated February 22, 2010, and would like to

learn more about the status of the proposed rules on the Energy Efficiency Standards for Manufactured

Housing. Any information you can provide would be greatly appreciated!

Thank you,

Emily H. Nunez

Management Analyst

Nevada State Office of Energy

T 775.687.1850 ext. 7324

F 775.687.1869

ehnunez@energy.nv.gov

http://energy.nv.gov

This communication, including any attachments, may contain confidential information and is intended

only for the individual or entity to whom it is addressed. Any review, dissemination, or copying of this

communication by anyone other than the intended recipient is strictly prohibited. If you are not the

intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e

‐ mail and delete all copies of the original

message.
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Christopher KENNER, Jr. v. Hon. E. A. DELAHOUSSAYE, III, Judge, Criminal District Court, Parish of St. Mary.

No. 65219.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 21, 1979.

In re Christopher Kenner, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of St. Mary. No. 80,616.

Writ denied. The mandamus application is moot, the trial court having acted on relator’s application on June 7, 1978.
EXHIBIT 31.1

I, Joseph J. Lazzara certify that: 

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Scientific Technologies Incorporated;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport; 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures,or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensurethat material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, ismade known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourthfiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonablylikely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting to the registrant's auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant'sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant's internal controls over financial reporting.

Date: March 31, 2005		
/s/ Joseph J. Lazzara