18-1181 

U.S. v. Williams

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

 

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY 

FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN 

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE 

EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION 

“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON 

ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 13th day of September, two thousand nineteen. 

PRESENT: 

JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 

SUSAN L. CARNEY, 

RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, 

Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Appellee,

 v. No. 18-1181 

STEVEN WILLIAMS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________

FOR APPELLANT: TINA SCHNEIDER, Esq., Portland, ME. 

FOR APPELLEE: LARA POMERANTZ (Rebekah Donaleski, 

Daniel B. Tehrani, on the brief), for Geoffrey 

S. Berman, United States Attorney for the 

Southern District of New York, New 

York, NY. 

.
 

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Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District 

of New York (Schofield, J.). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment entered on April 3, 2018, is 

AFFIRMED. 

Defendant-Appellant Steven Williams appeals from a judgment of conviction entered 

on April 3, 2018, following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of New York (Schofield, J.). Williams was convicted of conspiracy to distribute, or 

possess with the intent to distribute, cocaine and heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 

841(b)(1)(A). At trial, the government relied on the testimony of three cooperating 

witnesses—Patrick Edwards, Louis Lombard, and Miguel Chavez—each of whom pleaded 

guilty to charges relating to their respective roles in the drug-trafficking conspiracy. The 

evidence at trial showed, generally, that the conspiracy consisted of Edwards procuring 

heroin and cocaine in Los Angeles and shipping those drugs to Williams in New York.1 Like 

Edwards, Chavez and Lombard were Los Angeles-based drug dealers. They testified to 

Edwards’s activity in the Los Angeles side of the bi-coastal conspiracy. Of the three 

cooperating witnesses, only Edwards testified to Williams’s personal involvement in the 

conspiracy. 

At trial, the prosecution questioned all three cooperating witnesses on direct 

examination about certain provisions of their cooperation agreements (the “truth-telling 

provisions”). The witnesses explained that these provisions required each to testify truthfully 

in order to receive government letters recommending reduced sentences in the witnesses’ 

respective prosecutions. On appeal, Williams seeks to vacate his conviction on two bases. 

First, he challenges the prosecution’s elicitation of this testimony, arguing that the 

prosecution engaged in improper bolstering by introducing evidence of the truth-telling 

 

1 Details of the conspiracy are set out in this Court’s decision in a related appeal, United States v. Edwards, 723 

F. App’x 48 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 

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provisions before the defense attacked the cooperating witnesses’ credibility. Second, 

Williams argues that the prosecution’s emphasis on these truth-telling provisions during its 

summation was improper vouching and constituted prosecutorial misconduct. We assume 

the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and arguments on 

appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. 

Because Williams did not object at trial to the government’s questioning regarding the 

cooperation agreements’ truth-telling provisions, or to any relevant portion of the 

government’s summation, we review solely for plain error. United States v. Gaind, 31 F.3d 73, 

76 (2d Cir. 1994). To establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate: (1) error; (2) that 

is plain, meaning “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute”; (3) that 

“affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the 

outcome of the district court proceedings”; and (4) that “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29, 

52 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

I. Bolstering 

Federal Rule of Evidence 608(a) provides that “evidence of truthful character is 

admissible only after the witness’s character for truthfulness has been attacked.” This Court 

has therefore held that it is error for the prosecution to inquire into the truth-telling 

requirements of a cooperation agreement—which are “used by the government primarily to 

bolster the credibility of a witness”—before the defendant has attacked the credibility of a 

cooperating witness. Gaind, 31 F.3d at 78 (citation omitted). 

Once a witness’s credibility has been challenged, however, the government is free to 

elicit such testimony as rehabilitative evidence. United States v. Arroyo–Angulo, 580 F.2d 1137, 

1146 (2d Cir. 1978). A credibility challenge sufficient to open the door to such rehabilitative 

evidence may come during the defense’s opening statement. Gaind, 31 F.3d at 78. Where an 

opening statement “sufficiently implicates the credibility of a government witness,” we have 

held, “testimonial evidence of bolstering aspects of a cooperation agreement may be 

introduced for rehabilitative purposes during direct examination.” Id. (quoting United States v. 
 

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Cosentino, 844 F.2d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1988)); see also United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 313 

n.16 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Because defendants attacked the credibility of government witnesses in 

their opening statements, their challenge to the elicitation of . . . rehabilitative testimony on 

direct rather than redirect examination is unavailing.”). Moreover, if testimony on the truthtelling provisions of a witness’s cooperation agreement has been improperly introduced 

before that witness’s credibility has been challenged, but the defense challenges the witness’s 

credibility later—for example, on cross-examination, or during closing arguments—reversal 

is not necessarily required. See, e.g., Arroyo-Angulo, 580 F.2d at 1147 (holding that “the error in 

the timing of the introduction of the cooperation agreement [did] not require reversal,” 

given the “formidable assault which in fact was made” on the cooperating witness’s 

credibility later in trial). 

As to the government’s primary cooperating witness, Patrick Edwards, the 

prosecution’s elicitation of testimony regarding the truth-telling provisions of his 

cooperation agreement on direct examination was not premature. Williams’s defense counsel 

attacked Edwards’s credibility in his opening statement, declaring, among other things, that 

Edwards’s forthcoming testimony would be “riddled with inconsistencies” and would “not 

make sense in terms of what is normal . . . in the [drug dealing] industry.” Tr. 40.2 This line 

of argument opened the door for the government’s introduction of rehabilitative evidence 

about Edwards’s credibility on direct examination. There was thus no error in the timing of 

the government’s inquiry into the truth-telling provisions of Edwards’s cooperation 

agreement on direct examination. 

As to Lombard and Chavez, the other cooperating witnesses, the prosecution’s 

elicitation of testimony regarding the truth-telling provisions of their respective agreements 

appears to have come before the defense attacked their credibility. Williams has not, 

however, demonstrated that the premature introduction of this credibility-bolstering 

testimony “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings,” as he must to prevail on plain error review. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 

 

2 “Tr.” refers to the trial transcript, which is found in Volumes I and II of the Appendix. 
 

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732 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether the jury credited Lombard and 

Chavez’s testimony had little bearing on Williams’s conviction, as even Williams’s defense 

counsel acknowledged at trial, when he declared to the jury on summation, “I’m not going to 

attack what Mr. Chavez had to say because I submit to you what Mr. Chavez had to say was 

believable. What Mr. Lombard had to say, believable. What Mr. Edwards had to say, a far 

different story.” Tr. 676. Williams makes no argument on appeal as to why the premature 

inquiry into the terms of Chavez’s and Lombard’s agreements affected the outcome of his 

case, in the face of his attorney’s concession that Chavez and Lombard’s testimony was 

credible. 

Thus, although the prosecution may have erred by prematurely introducing the truthtelling provisions of Chavez’s and Lombard’s cooperation agreements, Williams has failed to 

demonstrate that the error “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 (internal quotation marks omitted). His 

challenge on this ground therefore fails. 

II. Vouching 

Williams urges next that the government improperly vouched for its cooperating 

witnesses in its closing arguments by declaring that the cooperators “knew that if they lied, 

they would get caught,” Tr. 672, thereby suggesting that the prosecutors had “the ability to 

divine the truth” as to the witnesses’ testimony. Appellant Br. at 18. It has long been 

established that prosecutors may not “vouch for their witnesses’ truthfulness” or otherwise 

express their “personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or 

evidence or [the] guilt of the defendant.” United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (2d 

Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). The government may, however, “reply with 

rebutting language suitable to the occasion” when defense counsel “impugns its integrity or 

the integrity of its case” or “attack[s] the prosecutor’s credibility or the credibility of the 

government.” United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 807 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 
 

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Reversal of a conviction on grounds of improper vouching is justified only if a 

prosecutor’s improper remark “causes the defendant substantial prejudice by so infecting the 

trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” United States 

v. Carr, 424 F.3d 213, 227 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Shareef, 190 F.3d 71, 78 (2d 

Cir. 1999). Where, as here, the defendant did not object at trial, and we review for plain 

error, we will reverse a conviction only in instances of “flagrant abuse.” Id. (quoting United 

States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 103 (2d Cir. 2000)). 

In Carr, we rejected a defendant’s argument that the government improperly vouched 

for a cooperating witness in circumstances very similar to those presented here. 424 F.3d at 

227-28. There, the government had stated that the cooperating witnesses “ha[d] to tell the 

truth to [the jury], most importantly. Because if they don’t tell the truth, then the 

government doesn’t write them their letter.” Id. at 228. We reasoned that “[t]he agreements 

did . . . require that the witnesses ‘tell the truth’ to benefit from them,” and that this 

statement was a “permissible reference to the evidence in the case.” Id. The government also 

speculated on the cooperating witnesses’ motivations to tell the truth, in light of the truthtelling provisions in their cooperation agreements. Id. at 229. We found this speculation to 

be a permissible “simple, common-sense argument,” not vouching. Id. 

Several of the statements Williams challenges here are akin to the statements we 

found permissible in Carr and likewise do not constitute vouching. In Carr, we did find that 

some of the challenged statements might be vouching because they arguably were not 

supported by evidence in the record. Id. at 229-30. We concluded, however, that any error 

was insignificant when “read in the context of the trial as a whole,” id. at 230, throughout 

which “the defense continually sought to undermine the credibility of the government’s 

witnesses.” Id. at 227. As in Carr, Williams invoked the witnesses’ cooperation agreements 

throughout the trial, attempting to erode their credibility. Even if the remaining statements 

that Williams challenges could be construed as references to evidence outside the record, 

such statements did not cause Williams substantial prejudice or rise to the level of flagrant 

abuse. 

* * * 
 

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 We have considered Williams’s remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that 

they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s judgment is 

AFFIRMED. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court