IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

HITACHI KOKI CO., LTD.,

Defendant Below, Appellant,

v.

EDUARDO DIAZ CARDONA and WENDY CARDONA, his wife,
Plaintiffs Below, Appellees. § § § No. 102, 2019 § § Court Below

— Superior Court § of the State of Delaware § § C.A. No. N15C

- 09

- 210 SKR § § §

Submitted: March 5, 2019 Decided: April 16, 2019

Before VAUGHN
, SEITZ , and TRAYNOR
, Justices.

O R D E R
After consideration of the notice of appeal from an interlocutory order, it
appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Hitachi Koki Co., Ltd. (“HKK”), 1 a Japanese
corporation with its principal place of business in Toyko, Japan, has petitioned this
Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 42, to accept an appeal from the Superior
Court’s opinion dated February 5, 2019, which denied HKK’s motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction.

1 It appears that the appellant’s name has changed to Koki Holdings Co., Ltd.2

(2) Eduardo Diaz Cardona was using a NV83A3 nail gun designed and
manufactured by HKK when the nail gun allegedly malfunctioned and ejected a nail
into his eye, causing serious, permanent injuries. Cardona brought an action in
Superior Court against HKK; Hit achi Koki U.S.A., Ltd. (“HKU”), which is a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Georgia and a
whollyowned subsidiary of HKK, created to sell Hitachi power tools in the United
States market; and Schell Brothers, LLC, which was the ge neral contractor of the
construction site where Cardona was working at the time of his injury.
(3) HKK moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. After the
completion of jurisdictional discovery, the Superior Court denied the motion to

dismiss. Th e court held that HKK was subject to personal jurisdiction under
Delaware’s long

- arm statute because (i) HKK’s formation of HKU as its exclusive
U.S. distributor, for the purpose of selling its products in the U.S. market, including
Delaware, demonstrated HKK’s intent to serve Delaware; (ii) the facts relating to
sales of Hitachi’s products supported a strong inference that significant numbers of
the NV83A3 nail gun had been sold in Delaware; and (iii) it was undisputed that

Cardona was injured by a NV83A3 nail gun used in Delaware. 2 The Superior Court
also held that asserting jurisdiction would comport with the Due Process Clause of

2 See Cardona v. Hitachi Koki Co., Ltd. , 2019 WL 449698, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2019) (applying Boone v. Oy Partek Ab , 724 A.2d 1150 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997), which held tha t a Finnish producer of asbestos was subject to personal jurisdiction in Delaware under the “dual jurisdiction”3

the United States Constitution because HKK had sufficient “minimum contacts”
with Delaware, Cardona’s claims arose out of those contacts, and subjecting HKK
to jurisdiction in Delaware was not unreasonable. 3

(4) The Superior Court denied HKK’s application for certification of an
interlocutory appeal. The court agreed with HKK that its decision sustained the
controverted jurisdiction of the court 4 and arguably involved a question of law
relating to the construction or application of the long

- arm statute. 5 But the court held
that the issue of personal jurisdiction was not a “substantial issue of material
impo rtance” 6 because it does not go to the merits of the case. 7 The court also
determined that certification would not promote efficient resolution of the case,

theory of personal jurisdiction identified in LaNuova D & B, S.p.A. v. Bowe Co. , 513 A.2d 764 (Del. 1986)). 3 Id. at *4

- 7.

4 Cardona v. Hitachi Koki Co., Ltd. , 2019 WL 956779, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2019) (citing D EL

. S UPR

. C T

. R. 42(b)(iii)(D)).

5 Id. (referring to D EL

. S UPR

. C T

. R. 42(b)(iii)(C)).

6 D EL

. S UPR

. C T

. R. 42(b)(i).

7 Cardona , 2019 WL 956779, at *2 (citi ng Tortuga Cas. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh , 1991 WL 247813, at *2 (Del. Nov. 14, 1991)). See also Curran Composites, Inc. v. Total Holdings USA, Inc. , 2009 WL 4170395 (Del. Nov. 25, 2009) (refusing interlocutory appeal of order denying motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction); Olivieri v. Aveta, Inc. , 2008 WL 4216352 (Del. Sept. 16, 2008) (refusing interlocutory appeal of order denying motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens); Jelin v. NR G Barriers, Inc. , 1996 WL 442907 (Del. July 23, 1996) (refusing interlocutory appeal of denial of motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction).4

which has been pending for more than three years, and that the benefits of an
interlocutory appeal do not outweigh its probable costs. 8

(5) We agree that interlocutory review is not warranted in this case.
Applications for interlocutory review are addressed to the sound discretion of this

Court. 9 In the exercise of its discretion and giving great weig ht to the trial court’s
view, this Court has concluded that the application for interlocutory review does not
meet the strict standards for certification under Supreme Court Rule 42(b).
Exceptional circumstances that would merit interlocutory review of th e decision of
the Superior Court do not exist in this case, 10 and the potential benefits of
interlocutory review do not outweigh the inefficiency, disruption, and probable costs
caused by an interlocutory appeal.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the inte rlocutory appeal is

REFUSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Justice

8 Cardona , 2019 WL 956779, at *2 (referring to D EL

. S UPR

. C T

. R. 42(b)(iii)).
9 D EL

. S UPR

. C T

. R. 42(d)(v).

10 D EL

. S UPR

. C T

. R. 42(b)(ii).