alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### THE UNITED STATES v. GEORGE B. SPEARIN and GEORGE B. SPEARIN v. THE UNITED STATES.

[51 C. Cls., 155; 248 U. S., 132.]

Judgment was rendered in favor of claimant in the court below. On appeal the judgment was affirmed, and the Supreme Court decided:

Spearin agreed, for a lump sum, to build a dry dock in a navy yard in accordance with plans and specifications prepared by the Government and which provided, *inter alia,*for reconstructing a sewer which intersected the site, and prescribed the new *188location, dimensions, and materials tlierefor. Spearin rebuilt tbe sewer as so required, and it was accepted by tbe Government, but owing to a dam, unknown to both parties, existing in a connecting sewer, witbin tbe yard but beyond tbe limits of the operations, and to general conditions of drainage, known to tbe Government but not to Spearin, back waters burst the new sewer during heavy rain and high tide and flooded tbe dry-dock excavation, causing damage and menacing tbe work. Spearin, having declined to proceed unless tbe Government paid or assumed tbe damage and made safe tbe sewer system or assumed responsibility for future damage due to insufficient capacity, location, and design, tbe Government annulled tbe contract.

*IS eld:*(1) The provision for reconstructing tbe sewer was part of tbe dry-dock contract and not collateral to it.

(2) Tbe articles prescribing the character, dimensions, and location of tbe sewer imported a warranty that if so constructed tbe sewer would prove adequate.

(3) Such warranty was not overcome by general clauses requiring tbe contractor to examine tbe site, check up tbe plans, and assume responsibility for tbe work until completion and acceptance.

(4) Neither Revised Statutes, section 3744, providing that contracts with tbe Navy Department shall be reduced to writing, nor the parol evidence rule precluded reliance on such warranty, implied by law.

(5) The contractor, upon breach of tbe warranty, was not obliged to reconstruct tbe sewer and proceed at bis peril, but, upon tbe Government’s repudiation of responsibility, was justified in refusing to resume work on tbe dry dock.

(6) Having annulled tbe contract, tbe Government was liable for all damages resulting from tbe breach, including, the contractor’s proper expenditures on tbe work (less receipts from tbe Government) and tbe profits be would have earned if allowed fully to perform.

Mr. Justice Brandeis

delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court December 9, 1918.
**Complete the following tables for each sampling point**

**Plant Name Sample** 

**Collection Number**  **Date of Sample**

**Collection Sample Collection**  **Time Temperature (°C)**  **pH (S.U.)**  Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4

**Plant Name Sample** 

**Collection Number**  **Unit Overflow**

**Sampled at Influent**  **(7 or 8) Influent Samples** 

**Collected as Grabs (Yes or No)**  **Mercury and Cyanide**

**Samples Collected as Grabs**  **(Yes or No) Effluent Samples** 

**Collected as 24- Hour Composites**  **(Yes or No) Tyvek Suits** 

**used (Yes or No)**  **Dust Masks**

**Used for Mercury**  **(Yes or No) Clean Hands/Dirty** 

**Hands Sampling Techniques Used**  **(Yes or No) Description of Sample** 

**Collection Technique (if different than**  **instructions) Description of Abnormal** 

**Conditions in FGD System or FGD Wastewater**  **Treatment System that May Impact Concentrations**  Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4**Complete the following tables based on the plant operating characteristics during each set of samples collected**

**Units Operating During Sampling**  **Day Units Off-line** 

**Entire Sampling Day**  **SCRs/SNCRs**

**Operating on Units**  Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4

**Flow Rate (gpm) Duration**  Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4

**Lime Usage (tons)**  **Ferric Chloride**

**Usage (Liters/day** 

**) Organosulfide Usage** 

**(Liters/day**

**) Poly** **mer Usage**

**(Liters/day**

**) Ac** **id Usage (Liters/day** 

**) Chemical**  **Precipitation Sy**  **stem Effluent Flow**  **Rate (gpd)** Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 **Percent Hy droclone**  **Overflow Recy cled**  **Back to Scrubber**

**FGD Wastewater Treatment Operation During Sample Collection**

**Plant Name Sample** 

**Collection Number**  **Date of Sample**

**Collection Scrubber Purge** 

**Flow Rate During Influent Sample**  **Collection (gpm)**  **Plant Name Sample** 

**Collection Number**  **Date of Sample**

**Collection Plant Operation During Sample Collection** 

**Plant Name Sample** 

**Collection Number**  **Date of Sample**

**Collection Plant Operation During Sample Collection** 

**Scrubber Slurry**

**Blowdown Flow Rate**  **Scrubber Slurry**  **Percent Solids** 

### Unit 7 **Unit 8 Daily Power Generation (MW-hrs)**  **Plant Name Date**  **Provide the daily power generation for each scrubbed unit starting two weeks prior to the first set of samples through the last set of samples** 

### FGD Wastewater Treatment System Flow **Rates (gpd)**  **Chemical Precipitation Effluent Plant Name**  **Date Provide the average flow rate in the FGD wastewater treatment system for each stream included in the**  **table starting two weeks prior to the first set of samples through the last set of samples**
#### The American Book Co., Respondent, *v.*James T. Watson, Appellant.

(County Court, Oneida County,

September, 1898.)

Pleading — Verification — Judgment by default — Venue.

Where the affidavit of verification of a complaint in a Justice’s Court contains no venue; the complaint may be treated as unverified, and the defendant may file an unverified answer.

A judgment entered by default, where the defendant files an unverified answer, under the above circumstances, is erroneous.

This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by E. S. Williams, a justice of the peace of the town of Kirkland, ón the 7th day of May, 1897, for $41.95 damages and costs in favor of plaintiff and against defendant. Plaintiff sought to commence the action by the service of a summons and verified complaint. The affidavit of *525verification contained no'venue. Upon the return day of the summons defendant appeared and filed with the justice an unverified answer denying the allegations of the complaint. Plaintiff objected to the answer because the same was unverified, and asked that judgment be entered upon the complaint. Defendant objected to judgment being entered for the reason that the complaint had not been sufficiently verified and that the verification was defective. The defendant’s objection was overruled and judgment entered by the justice for the amount demanded in the complaint, •with costs. t

J. W. Cummings, for appellant.

L. M. Martin, for respondent.

Durmore, J.

The affidavit of verification of the complaint contained no venue, and was, therefore, a nullity. Lane v. Morse, 6 How. Pr. 394; Thompson v. Burhans, 61 N. Y. 52, 63; Cook v. Staats, 18 Barb. 407.

The complaint was consequently unverified and the defendant ,had the right to file an unverified answer. Upon filing the answer issue was joined in the action and plaintiff had no right to enter judgment excepting upon proof of the facts alleged in the complaint. Defendant had the right to try the issue made. Plaintiff asks upon this appeal to be permitted to amend the verification pursuant to sections* 2944, Y23 and Y28 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If no error had been committed by the justice in the proceedings before him and an amendment "was sought simply to sustain the judgment on appeal arising from some inadvertence of the plaintiff which was not pointed out at the time, we think it would be a proper case 'to exercise the discretion and allow the amendment, but an amendment allowed now would not cure the error committed by the justice. Issue was joined in the action and the defendant had the right to try that issue. By entering judgment upon the complaint the justice must have held that the answer was insufficient and that there was no issue to try, and for this error the judgment must be reversed, with costs.

Judgment reversed, with costs.
Record of Communication 

1. Phone Call on April 19, 2012, 2:30 pm CST 

Attendees: 

Environmental Protect Agency (EPA) Region 6: Ellen Belk and Carrie Thomas 

Counsel for Mosaic Uncle Sam Plant: Shae Satu, Arnold & Porter, LLP 

Summary: 

Mr. Satu called concerning EPA’s proposed disapproval of the BART evaluation for the Mosaic 

Uncle Sam Plant as part of the Louisiana Regional Haze SIP, published February 28, 2012 (77 

FR 11839). Recognizing that the comment period for this rulemaking closed on March 29, 2012, 

he requested the opportunity to submit additional information for EPA’s consideration in the 

final rulemaking. 

2. Phone Call on April 26, 2012, 9:30 am CST 

Attendees: 

Environmental Protect Agency (EPA) Region 6: Ellen Belk and Carrie Thomas 

Counsel for Mosaic Uncle Sam Plant: Shae Satu, Arnold & Porter, LLP 

Summary: 

Ms. Belk and Ms. Thomas informed Mr. Satu that, due to the consent decree deadline to take 

final action on the Louisiana Regional Haze SIP by June 15, 2012, EPA is unable to re-open the 

comment period to consider additional public comments on this rulemaking.
July 14, 1999


Mr. Robert R. Giordano
12 Cobbler Lane
Bedford, New Hampshire 031110

     Re:  Employment and Related Matters
          ------------------------------

Dear Bob:

This letter is intended to set forth our understanding
concerning certain employment matters, including the
operation of your Amended and Restated Management
Continuity Agreement, dated as of July 14, 1999 attached
as Exhibit A hereto (the "MCA"), in light of the proposed
   ---------
business combination between EnergyNorth, Inc. (the "Company")
and Eastern Enterprises ("Eastern").  Capitalized terms
used in this letter and not otherwise defined have the
meanings set forth in the Agreement and Plan of
Reorganization, dated as of July 14, 1999, among the
Company, Eastern and wholly-owned subsidiary of Eastern
(the "Merger Agreement").

By execution of this letter, you and we acknowledge and agree
that:

     1.   Your employment with the Company will be terminated
          effective upon the first day of the month immediately
          following the date of the Closing (the "Effective Date").

     2.   The Closing and the consummation of the transactions
          contemplated by the Merger Agreement constitute
          "Good Reason" as such terms are defined in Section
          5(b) of the MCA.

     3.   As of the date of this letter, both the Company and
          Eastern have entered into a Consulting Agreement
          with you substantially in the form attached as Exhibit B
          to this letter providing, among other things, for
          your provision of consulting services to Eastern
          following the Effective Date.

If you agree with the foregoing, please so indicate by signing
where appropriate below.


                                     EASTERN ENTERPRISES

                                     By:________________________

                                     Its:_______________________

AGREED AND ACCEPTED

_______________________________
Robert R. Giordano
Editorial Note on Part 414
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 414 appear at 60 FR 50442, Sept. 29, 1995, and 60 FR 53877, Oct. 18, 1995.

§ 414.1430 Qualifying APM participant determination: QP and partial QP thresholds. ( a ) *Medicare Option* — ( 1 ) *QP payment amount threshold.* The QP payment amount thresholds are the following values for the indicated payment years: ( i ) 2019 and 2020: 25 percent.
( ii ) 2021 and 2022: 50 percent.
( iii ) 2023 and 2024: 50 percent.
( iv ) 2025: 50 percent.
( v ) 2026 and later: 75 percent.
( 2 ) *Partial QP payment amount threshold.* The Partial QP payment amount thresholds are the following values for the indicated payment years: ( i ) 2019 and 2020: 20 percent.
( ii ) 2021 and 2022: 40 percent.
( iii ) 2023 and 2024: 40 percent.
( iv ) 2025: 40 percent.
( v ) 2026 and later: 50 percent.
( 3 ) *QP patient count threshold.* The QP patient count thresholds are the following values for the indicated payment years: ( i ) 2019 and 2020: 20 percent
( ii ) 2021 and 2022: 35 percent
( iii ) 2023 and 2024: 35 percent.
( iv ) 2025: 35 percent.
( v ) 2026 and later: 50 percent.
( 4 ) *Partial QP patient count threshold.* The Partial QP patient count thresholds are the following values for the indicated payment years: ( i ) 2019 and 2020: 10 percent
( ii ) 2021 and 2022: 25 percent
( iii ) 2023 and 2024: 25 percent.
( iv ) 2025: 25 percent.
( v ) 2026 and later: 35 percent.
( b ) *All-Payer Combination Option* — ( 1 ) *QP payment amount threshold.* ( i ) The QP payment amount thresholds are the following values for the indicated payment years: ( A ) 2021 through 2025: 50 percent.
( B ) 2026 and later: 75 percent.
( ii ) To meet the QP payment amount threshold under this option, the eligible clinician must also meet a 25 percent QP payment amount threshold under the Medicare Option.
( 2 ) *Partial QP payment amount threshold.* ( i ) The Partial QP payment amount thresholds are the following values for the indicated payment years: ( A ) 2021 through 2025:40 percent.
( B ) 2026 and later: 50 percent.
( ii ) To meet the QP payment amount threshold under this option, the eligible clinician must also meet a 20 percent Partial QP payment amount threshold under the Medicare Option.
( 3 ) *QP patient count threshold.* ( i ) The QP patient count thresholds are the following values for the indicated payment years: ( A ) 2021 through 2025: 35 percent.
( B ) 2026 and later: 50 percent.
( ii ) To meet the QP patient count threshold under this option, the eligible clinician must also meet a 20 percent QP patient count threshold under the Medicare Option.
( 4 ) *Partial QP patient count threshold.* ( i ) The Partial QP patient count thresholds are the following values for the indicated payment years: ( A ) 2021 through 2025: 25 percent.
( B ) 2026 and later: 35 percent.
( ii ) To meet the Partial QP patient count threshold under this option, the eligible clinician group or eligible clinician must also meet a 10 percent QP patient count threshold under the Medicare Option.
[81 FR 77537, Nov. 4, 2016, as amended at 86 FR 65681, Nov. 19, 2021; 87 FR 70230, Nov. 18, 2022; 88 FR 79539, Nov. 16, 2023]
INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

We consent to the  incorporation  by reference in  Registration  Statements  No.
33-90454, 33-96076, 33-80899,  333-02194,  333-09075,  333-34031,  333-66997 and
333-89983 of FileNET  Corporation  on Form S-8 of our reports  dated January 25,
2000,  appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of FileNET  Corporation  for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 1999.



/s/ DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP

Costa Mesa, California
March 30, 2000
40834.

#### YOUNG v. AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

Nichols, Presiding Judge.

1. In hearing an appeal *de novo*from an award by a deputy director the State Board of *270Workmen’s Compensation has a discretion as to whether it will hear additional testimony or pass anew upon the evidence introduced before the deputy director. *Code Ann.*§ 114-708; *Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. West,*213 Ga. 296 (99 SE2d 89); *American Cas. Co. v. Wilson,*99 Ga. App. 219 (108 SE2d 137).

2. Where an employer defends a workmen’s compensation claim on the ground that the-employee’s injury or death was caused by his own wilful misconduct or intoxication the burden of proving such contention is on the employer. *Code*§ 114-105; *Shiplett v. Moran,*58 Ga. App. 854 (2) (200 SE 449); *General Acc. Fire &c. Corp. v. Prescott,*80 Ga. App. 421 (2) (56 SE2d 137).

3. “Under the ruling of the Supreme Court in *Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll,*169 Ga. 333 (150 SE 208) . . . the wilful and conscious doing of an act which is in violation of a penal statute constitutes wilful misconduct and when the violation of such penal statute by the employee is the proximate cause of his injury or death, compensation is barred under the provisions of *Code*§ 114-105.” *Pacific Indem. Ins. Co. v. Eberhardt,*107 Ga. App. 391, 393 (130 SE2d 136).

4. The Act of 1963 (Ga. L. 1963, p. 26), amending section 48 of the “Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways”, (Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556), sets the maximum speed for passenger vehicles on highways which comprise a part of the national system of interstate and defense highways at 70 miles per hour from one-half hour before sunrise until one-half hour after sunset; and section 23 of the 1953 Act, supra, makes it a misdemeanor to violate the speed limitation referred to in section 48 of such Act as amended.

5. Where, as in the present case, the claimant was injured as a result of the overturning of a vehicle being operated by him, and the sole evidence as to speed was that he was operating the automobile at a speed of approximately 100 miles per hour on an “interstate and defense highway” after he was requested to slow down by a fellow employee who was riding in the automobile, the award of the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation denying compensation because of the provisions of *Code*§ 114-105, supra, as to wilful misconduct was authorized, and the superior court did not err in affirming such award.

*Judgment affirmed.-*

*Hall arid Bussell, JJ., concur.*

*271Decided September 17, 1964.

*D. B. Phillips,*for plaintiff in error.

*Smith, Ringel, Martin, Ansley & Carr, Williston C. White,*contra.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2989 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 2989

       To redesignate the Jemez Canyon Dam as the ``Tamaya Dam''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 28, 1996

Mr. Schiff (for himself, Mr. Richardson, and Mr. Skeen) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation 
                           and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
       To redesignate the Jemez Canyon Dam as the ``Tamaya Dam''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REDESIGNATION.

    The dam located in the Pueblo of Santa Ana, New Mexico, and known 
as the Jemez Canyon Dam, shall be known and designated as the ``Tamaya 
Dam''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in any law, regulation, document, record, map, or 
other paper of the United States to the dam referred to in section 1 
shall be deemed to refer to the ``Tamaya Dam''.
                                 <all>
```
# C_2006096EN.01001502.xml

| 22.4.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 96/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.4.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 96/15

---

Action brought on 26 January 2006 — Bundesverband deutsche Banken e.V. Berlin v Commission of the European Communities

(Case T-36/06)

(2006/C 96/30)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Bundesverband deutsche Banken e.V. Berlin (Germany) (represented by: H.-J. Niemeyer and K.-S. Scholz, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: Commission of the European Communities

Defendant:

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the defendant's decision of 6 September 2005 [C(2005)3232 Final] in Case N 248/04 — Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the defendant's decision of 6 September 2005 [C(2005)3232 Final] in Case N 248/04 — Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen;

| — | order the defendant to pay costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The applicant challenges Commission Decision C(2005)3232 Final of 6 September 2005, in which the Commission determined that the notified transfer of the special Hessian Investment Fund as silent partnership participation to Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen (‘Helaba’) does not constitute state aid.

In support of its application, the applicant advances four pleas.

First, the applicant contends that the Commission has breached the duty to state reasons under Article 253 EC.

Second, the applicant supports its claim in contending that the defendant, by confirming the appropriateness of the agreed remuneration for the transfer to Helaba, has breached the principle of a private investor in a market economy and, thereby, Article 87(1) EC.

The applicant further claims that the Commission wrongly deducted the refinancing costs because of the lack of liquidity of the transfer to Helaba. The applicant contends that, for this reason, the Commission has breached the principle of a private investor in a market economy and, thereby, Article 87(1) EC.

Finally, the applicant submits that the right to a fair hearing has been infringed, on the ground that the Commission failed to open a formal investigation procedure under Article 88(2) EC and Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 in respect of the transfer to Helaba (1).

1

---

(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty.

1

---
# C_2006121EN.01001801.xml

| 20.5.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 121/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.5.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 121/18

---

Order of the Court of First Instance of 20 March 2006 — Bioelettrica v Commission

(Case T -287/01) (1)

1

(2006/C 121/32)

Language of the case: Italian

Language of the case: Italian

The President of the Third Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 31, 2.2.2002.

1

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
UNAUDITED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AS OF DEC. 31, 1996 AND THE UNAUDITED
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDED DEC. 31, 1996,
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                       1,753,938
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  243,250
<ALLOWANCES>                                     7,000
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,047,354
<PP&E>                                       6,976,020
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,366,887
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              10,772,448
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        3,082,212
<BONDS>                                      3,852,892
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           53,500
<PREFERRED>                                  1,109,141
<COMMON>                                        65,970
<OTHER-SE>                                   8,069,477
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                10,772,488
<SALES>                                        187,057
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             4,347,193
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                4,396,297
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             156,354
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (192,476)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (192,476)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                              1,450,392
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,153,178
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.88
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.88
        

</TABLE>