2000 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

5-31-2000

Courson v. Bert Bell Pension Plan & NFL

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 99-3279

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Recommended Citation

"Courson v. Bert Bell Pension Plan & NFL" (2000). 2000 Decisions. Paper 112.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000/112
Filed May 31, 2000 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 99-3279 

STEPHEN P. COURSON, 

 Appellant 

v. 

BERT BELL NFL PLAYER RETIREMENT PLAN; BERT 

BELL/PETE ROZELLE NFL PLAYER RETIREMENT PLAN; 

BERT BELL NFL PLAYER RETIREMENT TRUST; BERT 

BELL NFL PLAYER RETIREMENT TRUSTEE; BERT BELL 

NFL PLAYER RETIREMENT BOARD; BERT BELL/PETE 

ROZELLE NFL PLAYER RETIREMENT BOARD; THE NFL 

PLAYER SUPPLEMENTAL DISABILITY PLAN; THE NFL 

PLAYER SUPPLEMENTAL DISABILITY PLAN DISABILITY 

BOARD; THE NFL PLAYER SUPPLEMENTAL DISABILITY 

PLAN TRUST; THE NFL PLAYER SUPPLEMENTAL 

DISABILITY PLAN TRUSTEES; THE PLAN DIRECTOR; 

DOES 1 THROUGH 110, Inclusive 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Pennsylvania 

(D. Civ. No. 97-cv-02366) 

District Judge: Honorable Robert J. Cindrich 

Argued 

March 21, 2000 

Before: MANSMANN, GREENBERG and ALARCON,* 

Circuit Judges. 

(Filed: May 31, 2000) 

_________________________________________________________________ 

* Honorable Arthur Alarcon of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
 Philip J. Murray, III, Esquire 

 (ARGUED) 

 C. James Zeszutek, Esquire 

 Daniel A. Dzialga, Esquire 

 Thorp, Reed & Armstrong 

 One Riverfront Center 

 Pittsburgh, PA 15222 

 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT 

 Thomas S. Gigot, Esquire (ARGUED) 

 Douglas W. Ell, Esquire 

 Alvaro I. Anillo, Esquire 

 Groom Law Group Chartered 

 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

 Suite 1200 

 Washington, D.C. 20006 

 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 

In this appeal, we are asked to decide whether the 

decision of the Retirement Board for the National Football 

League's retirement plans, denying a request to reclassify 

disability benefits to a higher pay status, was arbitrary and 

capricious. Stephen P. Courson contends that the NFL and 

its member teams condoned and/or supervised, inter alia, 

his abuse of alcohol for pain relief and, therefore, his 

alcohol-induced cardiomyopathy arose from a "League

football activity" within the meaning of the retirement plan. 

Thus, Courson contends he is entitled to a higher level of 

disability benefits. Because we find the Board's decision 

was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, we 

will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

I. 

This appeal presents the unfortunate account of a former 

professional football player who once dominated the playing 

field as an offensive lineman in the National Football 

 2 
League ("NFL") but, due to alcohol-induced cardiomyopathy, 

is now in need of a heart transplant. In 1977, Courson was 

drafted by the Pittsburgh Steelers Football Club. Courson 

played professional football for the Steelers from the time 

he was drafted in 1977 until the end of the 1983 season. 

He was traded to the Tampa Bay Buccaneers Football Club 

in 1984 and played for that team during the 1984 and 

1985 seasons. After the conclusion of Tampa Bay's 1986 

mini-camp, Courson asked to be traded. Tampa Bay agreed 

and released him two weeks later. Courson then spent the 

next month in Myrtle Beach, working out with weights and 

running every day to stay in physical condition in the 

expectation that another NFL team would express an 

interest in him. No other team called, however, and in 

September 1986, Tampa Bay officially announced 

Courson's retirement from football. 

After officially retiring from football, Courson took the 

first fall vacation of his life--he flew to Munich for 

Oktoberfest. Upon returning from Germany, Courson 

rented a cabin in Wyoming and began taking notes for his 

autobiography, which was eventually published in 1991 

under the title, False Glory. In the spring of 1988, Courson 

found out he was flat broke, having lost more than 

$500,000 through a number of bad investments. Courson 

concluded that, "[o]ther than football, I didn't know of too 

many legitimate professions in which one could make that 

kind of dough. And without a college degree and with few 

marketable skills, it would be difficult for me to earn even 

a moderately decent wage." Consequently, Courson decided 

to pursue a career in professional wrestling. He thought he 

could make a lot of money fast and then retire. 

In his book, False Glory, Courson describes his first 

match in Charleroi, Pennsylvania, in which he quickly 

disposed of his opponent by giving "him a couple of hip 

tosses, [throwing] him off the ropes, lift[ing] him, bodyslamm[ing] him to the canvas, and then cover[ing] him up. 

Bing-bang-boom." Around the same time, Courson 

competed in his first and only weight lifting competition. At 

a September 10, 1988 event, Courson bench pressed 605 

pounds to win the super-heavyweight class, describing the 

victory as "exhilarating." 

 3 
During his career in the NFL, Courson was exposed to 

the use of anabolic-androgenic steroids ("AAS") among his 

teammates and other NFL players. In order to compete with 

other NFL players who used AAS, Courson began ingesting 

AAS to increase his size, strength, speed, and aggression. 

Courson continued to ingest AAS after he retired from the 

NFL. 

At about the same time as he was ingesting AAS, 

Courson also began consuming large amounts of alcohol, 

primarily as a means to control the pain resulting from 

football injuries. According to Courson, his drinking 

eventually led to his addiction to alcohol because the pain 

remained constant yet more alcohol was needed as his 

tolerance level increased. Courson could have chosen 

narcotic painkillers, which he claims were frequently 

provided by team physicians, to quell his pain but, instead, 

he chose alcohol. Courson continued to drink excessively 

until he became ill in the fall of 1988. 

On November 26, 1988, Courson presented himself to the 

hospital emergency room with complaints of shortness of 

breath. Following a battery of tests, the hospital's 

physicians concluded that Courson was experiencing heart 

failure and diagnosed "dilated cardiomyopathy." According 

to Courson, cardiologist Richard Rosenbloom, M.D., 

explained that his muscle fibers were being "lost over time" 

and that his heart had become "flabby and baggy and

doesn't pump as a normal heart should." Dr. Rosenbloom 

immediately placed Courson on a waiting list for a heart 

transplant. 

In October 1992, Courson applied for disability benefits 

under the Bert Bell NFL Player Retirement Plan (the"Bert 

Bell Plan" or the "Old Plan"), an employee pension benefit 

plan within the meaning of section 3(2)(A) of ERISA, 29 

U.S.C. S 1002(2)(A). The Bert Bell Plan was established 

through a collective bargaining agreement between the 

National Football League Players' Association ("the Players' 

Association") and the National Football League Management 

Council ("the Management Council"). The Bert Bell Plan 

provides the following relevant categories of benefits: 

 4 
 1) a monthly pension of "no less than $4,000 if 

 disability results from a football injury incurred 

 while an Active Player;" and 

 2) a monthly pension of "no less than $750 if the total 

 and permanent disability results from other than a 

 football injury;" 

Bert Bell Plan, S 5.1 at p. 27. Thus, the Bert Bell Plan 

distinguishes between two types of benefits, "Football 

Injury" benefits and "Other Than Football Injury" benefits. 

The Bert Bell Plan provides for the creation of a 

Retirement Board composed of six voting members, three of 

whom are selected by the Players' Association and three of 

whom are selected by the Management Council, and one 

non-voting member, the Commissioner of the NFL. With 

regard to the powers of the Retirement Board, the plan 

states: 

 the Retirement Board shall have all necessary 

 powers incident to the creation, administration, 

 implementation and operation of the Plan and Trust, 

 including but not limited to the power: 

 A) To define and amend the terms of the Plan and 

 Trust, to construe the Plan and Trust and to reconcile 

 inconsistencies therein. 

Bert Bell Plan, S 8.4(A) at p. 36. 

On his application for disability benefits, Courson

identified "Idiopathic Dilated Cardiomyopathy" as the 

nature and cause of his disability with an onset date of 

November 1988. His application included a report from 

cardiologist Mark E. Thompson, M.D., who confirmed that 

Courson was totally and permanently disabled and that the 

disability onset date was November 26, 1988. Dr. 

Thompson described the nature of the disability as 

"Idiopathic Cardiomyopathy." Dr. Thompson further 

indicated in his report that the disabling illness or injury 

did not result from a football-related activity. In December 

1992, the Retirement Board awarded Courson "Other Than 

Football Injury" benefits under the Bert Bell Plan retroactive 

to December 1, 1988, the first month following the onset 

date of his disability. 

 5 
In June 1993, the Players' Association and the 

Management Council entered into a new collective 

bargaining agreement. The agreement called for the Bert 

Bell Plan and the Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan 

(the "Rozelle Plan"), an ERISA plan similar to the Bert Bell 

Plan, to be merged to form a new plan, the Bert Bell/Pete 

Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan (the "Player Retirement 

Plan" or the "New Plan"). The Player Retirement Plan, which 

governs eligibility determinations for benefits payable after 

July 1, 1993, is also an employee pension benefit plan 

within the meaning of section 3(2)(A) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 

S 1002(2)(A). Under the Player Retirement Plan, eligible 

players who had been awarded benefits under the Bert Bell 

Plan and the Rozelle Plan (collectively referred to as the 

"Predecessor Plans") will continue to receive disability 

benefits. 

As was true for the Predecessor Plans, eligibility terms 

and benefit levels under the Player Retirement Plan were 

established through collective bargaining between the 

Players' Association and the Management Council and

memorialized in the governing plan document. Like the 

Predecessor Plans, the Player Retirement Plan is 

administered by a joint Retirement Board composed of six 

voting members, three selected by the Players' Association 

and three selected by the Management Council. The plan 

document provides in pertinent part: 

 [t]he Retirement Board will have full and absolute 

 discretion, authority and power to interpret, control, 

 implement, and manage the Plan and the Trust. Such 

 authority includes, but is not limited to, the power to: 

 (a) Define the terms of the Plan and Trust, construe 

 the Plan and Trust, and reconcile any 

 inconsistencies therein; 

 (b) Decide claims for benefits (except that the 

 Retirement Board will follow decisions submitted 

 to, and decided by, the Medical Advisory 

 Physician or an arbitrator pursuant to Section 

 8.3); 

 . . . 

 6 
Player Retirement Plan, S 8.2 at 32. 

The plan document also sets forth the following four-part 

classification scheme for awarding and paying total and 

permanent disability benefits: 

 (a) (Active Football) The monthly total and permanent 

 disability benefit will be no less than $4,000 if the 

 disability(ies) results from League football

 activities, arises while the Player is an Active 

 Player, and causes the Player to be totally and 

 permanently disabled "shortly after" the 

 disability(ies) first arises. 

 (b) (Active Nonfootball) The monthly total and 

 permanent disability benefit will be no less than 

 $4,000 if the disability(ies) does not result from 

 League football activities, but does arise while the 

 Player is an Active Player and does cause the 

 Player to be totally and permanently disabled 

 "shortly after" the disability(ies) first arises. 

 (c) (Football Degenerative) The monthly total and 

 permanent disability benefit will be no less than 

 $4,000 if the disability(ies) arises out of League 

 football activities, and results in total and 

 permanent disability before the later of (1) age 45, 

 or (2) 12 years after the end of the Player's last 

 Credited Season. 

 (d) (Inactive) The monthly total and permanent 

 disability benefit will be no less than $1,500 if (1) 

 the total and permanent disability arises from 

 other than League football activities while the 

 Player is a Vested Inactive Player, or (2) the 

 disability(ies) arises out of League football 

 activities, and results in total and permanent 

 disability after the later of (i) age 45, or (ii) 12 

 years after the end of the Player's last Credited 

 Season. The minimum benefits provided under 

 this Section 5.1(d) will be offset by any disability 

 benefits provided by an employer other than the 

 League or an Employer, but will not be offset by 

 worker's compensation. 

 7 
Id., S 5.1(a) - (d) at 21-22. As used in subsections (a) and 

(b) above, the phrase "shortly after" includes Players who 

become totally and permanently disabled within six months 

after the disability first arises. If a Player becomes totally 

and permanently disabled more than twelve months after 

the disability first arises, the disability will be conclusively 

deemed not to fall within the "shortly after" provision. The 

Retirement Board is vested with the discretion to decide 

whether the "shortly after" standard is satisfied in cases 

where the Player becomes totally and permanently disabled 

more than six months but less than 12 months after the 

disability first arises. Id., S 5.1 at 22. 

In addition to the minimum $4,000 benefit provided by 

the Active Football, Active Nonfootball, and Football 

Degenerative classifications, a player falling under one of 

these three classifications is automatically entitled to an 

additional monthly benefit under the NFL Player 

Supplemental Disability Plan (the "Supplemental Plan").1 The 

purpose of the Supplemental Plan is to provide additional 

disability benefits to certain players who also receive total 

and permanent disability benefits under the Player 

Retirement Plan. Like the Player Retirement Plan, eligibility 

terms and benefit levels under the Supplemental Plan are 

determined through collective bargaining between the 

Players' Association and the Management Council and

memorialized in the governing plan document. The 

Supplemental Plan is administered by a Disability Board 

composed of six voting members, three of whom are 

selected by the Players' Association and three of whom are 

appointed by the Management Council. The Disability

Board has absolute discretion and final authority in 

interpreting the Supplemental Plan, adopting rules and 

regulations regarding the administration of the plan, and 

reviewing claims for benefits. Supplemental Plan, S 4.3 at 9. 

When aggregated, benefit payments under the Player 

Retirement Plan and the Supplemental Plan amount to 

$200,000 per year for Players whose claims fall within one 

of these three categories. On the other hand, Players whose 

_________________________________________________________________ 

1. The Supplemental Plan is an employee benefit plan within the 

meaning of Section 3(1) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. S 1002(1). 

 8 
claims are classified in the Inactive category do not receive 

benefits under the Supplemental Plan. 

Courson petitioned the Player Retirement Plan's 

Retirement Board in May of 1996 to reclassify his disability 

from Inactive to one of the three higher-paying 

classifications--Active Football, Football Degenerative, or 

Active Nonfootball. In his petition, Courson cited his use of 

AAS and alcohol during the years that he played in the NFL 

as the cause of his disabling heart condition, and that such 

use should be considered "League football activities" for 

purposes of the Player Retirement Plan's disability

classification scheme. 

The Retirement Board unanimously denied Courson's 

reclassification request under the Player Retirement Plan in 

a letter decision dated July 18, 1996. The Board's decision 

left intact Courson's current classification of Inactive for 

which he receives payments of $1,750 per month. The

Board concluded that Courson did not qualify for either 

Active Football, Football Degenerative, or Active Nonfootball 

benefits because: (1) his disability did not arise during the 

time he was an Active Player; (2) even if his disability did 

arise during the time he was an Active Player, it did not 

cause him to become totally and permanently disabled 

within 12 months of the onset date of the disabling

condition; (3) the taking of AAS and the consumption of 

alcohol are not League football activities; and (4) even if the 

taking of AAS was considered a League football activity, 

there is no established scientific evidence that there is a 

causal relationship between the use of AAS and the 

development of dilated cardiomyopathy. 

In accordance with the decision review provisions of the 

Player Retirement Plan, Courson appealed the Retirement 

Board's denial and submitted additional documentation 

related to AAS and alcohol use. Courson also raised for the 

first time new theories of benefit eligibility with new onset 

dates. In particular, Courson argued that he was entitled to 

benefits under the Bert Bell Plan from June 1986 through 

November 1988 because alcoholism rendered him disabled 

during this period. He further argued that his alcoholism 

was a "League football activity" which entitled him to the 

higher-paying Football Injury benefits during this period. 

 9 
Courson also claimed that his heart condition resulted from 

"League football activities" which entitled him to Football 

Injury benefits under the Bert Bell Plan from November 

1988 through July 1, 1993. 

The Retirement Board reviewed the supplemental 

documentation Courson submitted. In addition, the 

Retirement Board sought and obtained more information 

about the medical and non-medical issues related to AAS 

and alcohol use, all of which was made available for 

Courson's review. After considering all of the record 

evidence, the Retirement Board, on August 11, 1997,

unanimously affirmed its previous determination that 

Courson only qualified for "Other Than Football Injury" 

benefits under the Bert Bell Plan for the period December 1, 

1988 through July 1, 1993 and "Inactive" benefits under 

the Player Retirement Plan on an ongoing basis thereafter. 

The Retirement Board further found that Courson was not 

totally and permanently disabled from June 1986 through 

November 1988 under the Bert Bell Plan eligibility rules. 

Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Courson 

then filed this action in the District Court against the 

defendants, claiming that his application for benefits was 

denied in violation of ERISA. The parties subsequently filed 

cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court, 

finding that the Retirement Board's decision was reasonable 

and supported by substantial evidence, entered an order on 

March 31, 1999, granting summary judgment in favor of 

the defendants. Courson subsequently filed this timely 

appeal. 

II. 

Our review of the District Court's grant of summary

judgment is de novo. We employ the same legal standards 

applied by the District Court in the first instance. Where 

the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary 

authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe 

the terms of the plan, the denial of benefits is reviewed 

under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Mitchell v. 

Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 433, 437-38 & n.4 (3d Cir. 

1997) (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 

 10 
101, 115 (1989)). Under all of the plans at issue here, the 

Retirement Board is vested with complete discretion to 

determine eligibility for benefits and to construe the terms 

of the plans. Thus, we review the Retirement Board's 

decisions under the arbitrary and capricious standard on 

the basis of the administrative record before the Board 

when it made its decisions. Hullett v. Towers, Perrin, Forster 

& Crosby, Inc., 38 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 

Firestone, supra, at 115). 

Under this deferential standard, a plan administrator's 

interpretation of a plan may be disturbed "only if it is 

`without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence or 

erroneous as a matter of law.' " Abnathya v. HoffmannLaRoche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Adamo 

v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 720 F.Supp. 491, 500 (W.D. Pa. 

1989)). A decision is supported by "substantial evidence if 

there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable person to agree 

with the decision." Daniels v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 758 

F.Supp. 326, 331 (W.D. Pa. 1991). With this highly 

deferential standard in mind, we turn now to the merits of 

Courson's appeal. 

III. 

Courson maintains that the Retirement Board's decision 

was arbitrary and capricious as it was against the weight of 

substantial evidence. The Retirement Board addressed 

three distinct claims presented by Courson: (1) a claim for 

total and permanent disability benefits from 1986 through 

November 1988 due to alcoholism; (2) a request for 

reclassification of disability benefits from"Other Than 

Football Injury" to "Football Injury" for the period November 

1988 to July 1, 1993; and (3) a request for reclassification 

of disability benefits from "Inactive" to either "Active 

Nonfootball," "Active Football," or "Football Degenerative" 

benefits for the period July 1, 1993 to present. 2 We will 

address each of these claims seriatim. Before proceeding 

with our analysis, however, we will first consider the 

_________________________________________________________________ 

2. In this appeal, Courson has wisely abandoned his claim that his AAS 

abuse caused his cardiomyopathy as the medical evidence to date simply 

does not support a link between AAS and cardiomyopathy. 

 11 
meaning of the terms "totally and permanently disabled" 

and "League football activities" as those terms are used in 

the plan documents. 

With respect to disability benefits paid after July 1, 1993, 

a Player will be deemed totally and permanently disabled 

under the New Plan in the following situation: 

 An Active Player or a Vested Inactive Player . . . will be 

 deemed to be totally and permanently disabled if the 

 Retirement Board finds that he has become totally 

 disabled to the extent that he is substantially 

 prevented from or substantially unable to engage in 

 any occupation or employment for remuneration or 

 profit, but expressly excluding any disability suffered 

 while in the military service of any country. A Player 

 will not be considered to be able to engage in any 

 occupation or employment for remuneration or profit 

 within the meaning of this Section 5.2 merely because 

 such person is employed by the League or an 

 Employer, manages personal or family investments, is 

 employed by or associated with a charitable 

 organization, or is employed out of benevolence. 

Player Retirement Plan, S 5.2 at 22-23. Under section 5.2 of 

the Old Plan, which applies to disability benefits paid before 

July 1, 1993, the standard for determining total and 

permanent disability is stated as follows: 

 A Player or Vested Inactive Player, other than a Retired 

 Player, shall be deemed to be totally and permanently 

 disabled if the Retirement Board shall find that he has 

 become totally disabled to the extent that he is 

 prevented from or unable to engage in any occupation 

 or employment for remuneration or profit, but 

 expressly excluding any disability suffered while in the 

 military service of any country. 

Bert Bell Plan, S 5.2 at 28. 

Once a determination of total and permanent disability 

has been made, the eligibility criteria set forth previously 

for the various levels of benefits must be reviewed in light 

of the nature and cause of an individual Player's disability. 

Under the New Plan, the four-part classification scheme is 

 12 
used (Active Football, Active Nonfootball, Football

Degenerative, Inactive); under the Old Plan, disabilities are 

categorized as either "Football Injury" or"Other Than 

Football Injury." 

Under the New Plan, the key to determining the correct 

benefit category is whether the disability arises or results 

from "League football activities." The New Plan provides the 

following definition of "Arising out of League football 

activities": 

 "Arising out of League football activities" means a 

 disablement arising out of any League pre-season, 

 regular-season, or post-season game, or any 

 combination thereof, or out of League football activity 

 supervised by an Employer, including all required or 

 directed activities. "Arising out of League football 

 activities" will not include any disablement resulting 

 from other employment or activity initiated by the 

 Player outside of official pre-season training, including 

 athletic activity for recreation or for the general 

 purpose of maintaining or achieving playing condition. 

Player Retirement Plan, SS 6.4(c) and 6.5(g) at 27 (emphasis 

added). Under the Old Plan, the key to correctly classifying 

the disability is determining whether the disability"results 

from a football injury." The Old Plan defines"Arising out of 

football activities" as follows: 

 "Arising out of football activities" shall mean a 

 disablement arising out of any Game or any pre-season 

 or post-season game of the League or out of football 

 activity supervised by an Employer, including all 

 required or directed activities. "Arising out of football 

 activities" shall not include any disablement resulting 

 from other employment or activity initiated by the 

 Player outside of official pre-season training, including 

 athletic activity for recreational or for the general 

 purpose of maintaining or achieving playing condition. 

Bert Bell Plan, S 6.5 at 30 (emphasis added).3 With these 

_________________________________________________________________ 

3. This definition comes from a separate article of the Old Plan relating 

to temporary "line of duty" disability benefits for a player who suffers a 

"substantial disablement arising out of football activities." We refer to 

this definition because it provides some guidance in determining whether 

Courson's disability "result[ed] from a football injury" for purposes of 

total and permanent disability benefits. 

 13 
definitions in mind, we turn now to a discussion of the 

three claims raised by Courson before the Retirement 

Board. 

A. 

Denial of Benefits from June 1986 - November 1988 

Courson claims that the Retirement Board's decision to 

deny him total and permanent disability benefits under the 

Old Plan for the period June 1986 through November 1988 

was arbitrary and capricious. He contends that the record 

establishes that he was totally and permanently disabled 

during this period due to alcoholism. Courson further 

contends that his addiction to alcohol arose as a result of 

the failure by the NFL and its member clubs for whom he 

played, despite knowledge of Courson's use and abuse of 

alcohol, to follow NFL policies regarding such abuse. 

Moreover, Courson contends that by providing alcohol to 

Players after games, the Steelers supervised and directed 

his alcohol consumption, thus making it a football activity. 

Thus, Courson submits that because his alcoholism 

resulted from a football activity, he is entitled to"Football 

Injury" benefits. The Board's decision to the contrary, 

Courson argues, was against the weight of substantial 

evidence. 

In support of these claims, Courson argues that the

Board relied solely on a few isolated excerpts from his book, 

False Glory, to support its conclusion that he was not 

totally disabled from alcoholism. As explained below, 

Courson's assertion, however, misstates the basis of the 

Board's decision and the record evidence. 

Courson further argues that the Board failed to consider 

that the temporary ability to engage in purely physical feats 

of strength does not necessarily mean that one is capable 

of employment. In support of this argument, Courson cites 

Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 433 (3d Cir. 

1997). Courson specifically refers to our comment in 

Mitchell that given the characteristics of chronic fatigue 

syndrome, it was not inconsistent for the plaintiff 's 

physician to conclude that the plaintiff was totally unable 

 14 
to engage in substantial gainful activity even though his 

ability to perform isolated activities such as standing, 

pushing, pulling and communicating was only "somewhat" 

limited. Id. at 440 n.7. To further support his position, 

Courson cites McShea v. Schweiker, 700 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 

1983), a case involving a claim for social security disability 

benefits where the disabling condition was alcoholism. 

Courson claims he has displayed many of the same signs of 

disabling alcoholism as the claimant in McShea and, just as 

the claimant in McShea was not precluded from receiving 

social security disability benefits due to periods of lucidity 

and sobriety, so, too, should Courson not be precluded 

from receiving disability benefits just because the record 

indicates periodic activity and sobriety. Id. at 118. 

Our decision in Mitchell, however, can be distinguished 

on the facts here. The so-called "isolated" activities 

performed by Courson were much more than "standing,

pushing, pulling and communicating." Moreover, the 

Retirement Board considered the nature of the activities 

performed by Courson from June of 1986 through 

November 1988 in light of his claimed alcoholism, as well 

as other evidence, and concluded that he was not 

substantially prevented from or substantially unable to 

engage in any occupation or employment for remuneration 

or profit. 

Finally, Courson contends that the Retirement Board

ignored substantial evidence that Courson was, in fact, 

totally disabled from alcoholism for the period June 1986 to 

November 1988. The substantial evidence which Courson 

contends the Board ignored consists of the report of Paul 

Freyder, Courson's affidavit, and his federal income tax 

returns for the years in question. A review of the record and 

the Retirement Board's decision, however, requires the 

opposite conclusion. 

Despite Courson's allegations to the contrary, it is clear 

that the Retirement Board considered all of the evidence, 

including Paul Freyder's report, Courson's affidavit, and his 

federal income tax returns, and that its decision was based 

on substantial evidence. The Retirement Board considered 

Paul Freyder's report and found it to be completely

implausible in light of the facts reported earlier by Courson 

 15 
in his book, False Glory. Freyder, a human services

consultant, opined that Courson's alcoholism "consumed 

his life and substantially prevented him from or rendered 

him unable to find (and maintain) any employment[from 

June 1986 through November 1988]." Freyder's report was 

based entirely on an extensive interview he conducted with 

Courson in 1997. 

On the other hand, in False Glory, which was published 

in 1991, Courson described his post-football experiences 

very differently than he described them to Freyder in 1997. 

For instance, in False Glory, Courson stated that after the 

Buccaneers released him, Courson then spent the next 

month in Myrtle Beach working out with weights and 

running every day to stay in condition with the expectation 

that another NFL team would express an interest in him. In 

October, Courson vacationed in Munich. Upon returning 

from Germany, Courson rented a cabin in Wyoming and

began taking notes for his book. In the spring of 1988, 

upon learning that he was impoverished as a result of a 

number of bad investments, Courson decided to pursue a 

career in professional wrestling. Around the same time, 

Courson also competed in a weight lifting competition. 

There is no indication from these post-football activities 

that alcoholism substantially prevented Courson from 

finding and/or maintaining any employment from June

1986 through November 1988. 

The Retirement Board also considered Courson's lack of 

substantial income from June 1986 through November 

1988 but concluded that alone it was not indicative of total 

and permanent disability as defined by the Old Plan. Here, 

when Courson's income tax returns are viewed in light of 

the other evidence, the lack of substantial income is 

reflective of his intent and attitude between June 1986 and 

November 1988. In this regard, Courson did not view

himself as a person who was unable to engage in any

occupation or employment for remuneration or profit

because of a disability. Indeed, one gets the impression 

from his statements in False Glory that he was not really 

looking for work until his investments severely decreased in 

the spring of 1988, at which point he decided to go into 

professional wrestling to make some fast money. Thus, the 

 16 
record evidence here shows that his lack of substantial 

income is attributable to a conscious decision on his part 

not to seek employment until he discovered his 

impoverished situation -- not because he viewed himself as 

disabled in any way and incapable of working. 

Moreover, Dr. Thompson's report and Courson's initial 

application for disability benefits both state that the onset 

date of his total and permanent disability is November 26, 

1988. Other than Freyder's report and Courson's affidavit 

which are based on the self-serving statements of Courson 

made in 1997, no other evidence, medical or otherwise, 

refutes the onset date of November 26, 1988. Thus, the 

Retirement Board's conclusion that Courson was not totally 

and permanently disabled from June 1986 through 

November 1988 is reasonable and supported by substantial 

evidence. 

B. 

Reclassification of Disability Benefits- November 1988 to 

July 1993 

Courson further argues that the Retirement Board's 

denial of his request for reclassification of his disability 

benefits from "Other Than Football Injury" to "Football 

Injury" for the period November 1988 to July 1, 1993 was 

arbitrary and capricious. He claims that he is entitled to 

the reclassification because his cardiomyopathy is a total 

and permanent disability which resulted from a football 

injury, i.e., an abuse of alcohol which was supervised and 

condoned by the Steelers and Buccaneers. While we can 

appreciate counsel's zealousness to fashion an argument on 

Courson's behalf in support of reclassifying his benefits to 

"Football Injury" benefits under the Old Plan, we do not 

find any merit to his argument. 

The Retirement Board carefully considered whether 

Courson's self-described alcohol abuse was an activity 

"supervised by," or "required or directed" by, the Steelers or 

Buccaneers. In particular, the Retirement Board 

considered: (1) the NFL policy expressly prohibiting serious 

misuse of alcohol; (2) that the Steelers provided alcohol to 

 17 
players after games but only a maximum of two cans of 

beer per player; (3) then Steelers' coach Chuck Noll's 

statement that Courson displayed no outward signs that he 

was alcoholic or abusing alcohol; and (4) Courson's earlier 

statements in False Glory that episodes of heavy drinking 

occurred at bars or at home, not at the club facilities, that 

he did not believe he was an alcoholic because he did not 

match the typical profile -- he was rarely late for work, 

never started a fight in a bar, and did not drink every day 

-- and that he was a big guy who could drink a lot without 

getting roaring, sloppy drunk. 

The Retirement Board found that alcohol abuse and AAS 

consumption did not constitute activities "required," 

"directed," or "supervised" by the NFL or either the Steelers 

or Buccaneers. The Board completely rejected Courson's 

argument that the teams' alleged failure to supervise his 

alcohol and AAS consumption somehow rendered those 

activities "League football activities" within the meaning of 

the plan document. To the contrary, the Board found the 

evidence showed "Courson decided to overindulge in alcohol 

and to use AAS on his own initiative, on his own time, and 

in knowing contravention of League policy." 

We do not find any fault with the Retirement Board's 

conclusion. Although the medical evidence indicates that 

alcohol consumption is a cause of cardiomyopathy, the 

facts here simply do not support a conclusion that alcohol 

consumption is an activity "supervised," "required or 

directed" by the League clubs. Likewise, our review of the 

evidence causes us to conclude that the record clearly 

shows that Courson decided to overindulge in alcohol 

consumption on his own initiative, on his own time, in 

contravention of League policy. Moreover, no precedent 

exists for finding that the failure to supervise Courson's 

alcohol intake somehow renders that activity one that 

"arises out of football activities" as meant by the Plan. 

Given these facts, it would be unreasonable to conclude 

that Courson's alcohol abuse was an activity "supervised", 

"required or directed" by the Steelers or Buccaneers. 

Although alcohol consumption may have caused or 

contributed to Courson's cardiomyopathy, such alcohol 

consumption was not an activity "supervised,""required or 

 18 
directed" by an NFL team. Therefore, Courson's argument 

that his disability arose from a football injury lacks merit. 

The Retirement Board's denial of his request to reclassify 

his disability benefits under the Old Plan was thus

reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. 

C. 

Reclassification of Disability Benefits- July 1993 to 

Present 

With regard to his claim for benefits under the New Plan, 

Courson makes two arguments. First, Courson argues that 

the Retirement Board's denial of his request to reclassify 

his disability from "Inactive" to "Active Nonfootball" benefits 

was arbitrary and capricious. In support of his argument, 

Courson submits that he presented substantial evidence 

establishing his eligibility for "Active Nonfootball" benefits 

under the New Plan. Specifically, Courson claims he

presented substantial evidence proving: (1) that his 

alcoholism arose while he was an active Player, and (2) that 

his alcoholism caused him to be totally and permanently 

disabled within twelve months of his retirement. Courson 

further contends that the Retirement Board rejected his 

claim solely on the basis that Courson failed to establish 

that his disability existed within twelve months of his June 

1986 retirement. Courson submits that the record is

replete, however, with evidence that proves his disease 

satisfied the requirements for "Active Nonfootball" benefits. 

Courson's argument lacks merit. First of all, a 

prerequisite to qualifying for "Active Nonfootball" benefits is 

that the disability did not result from"League football 

activities." In all other respects, Courson has maintained 

that his disability did result from a League football activity, 

alcohol consumption. He cannot have it both ways. 

Nonetheless, Courson meets this prerequisite since the 

Retirement Board's conclusion that his disability did not 

result from a League football activity is reasonable and 

supported by substantial evidence. Courson's claim of 

eligibility for "Active Nonfootball" benefits fails, however, 

because he has not shown that his disability, 

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cardiomyopathy, arose while he was an active Player and 

that it caused him to be totally and permanently disabled 

shortly after the disability first arose.4 Although Courson 

avers that the record is replete with evidence that proves he 

satisfied the eligibility requirements for "Active Nonfootball" 

benefits, he fails to identify the particular evidence that 

supports his conclusory statement. 

Courson's second reclassification argument pertains to 

the Retirement Board's denial of his request to reclassify 

his disability from "Inactive" to either "Active Football" or 

"Football Degenerative" benefits. Courson contends the 

Board's decision denying such reclassification was arbitrary 

and capricious because the Board's conclusion that alcohol 

use was not a "League football activity" contradicted the 

substantial evidence. Specifically, Courson contends that 

the Retirement Board ignored the simple and indisputable 

facts -- that alcohol consumption was managed by the 

Steelers; managing the activity is the equivalent of 

supervising the activity; since his disability was caused by 

alcohol consumption which was an activity supervised by 

the Steelers, the disability was caused by a "League football 

activity." 

In support of his argument, Courson submits that the 

following unrebutted substantial evidence proves a 

correlation between the use of alcohol and "League" play: 

(a) incessant pressure by NFL teams and the League placed 

on athletes to gain every possible edge; (b) the NFL was 

_________________________________________________________________ 

4. Courson maintains that "shortly after" includes disabilities where the 

claimant becomes totally and permanently disabled within twelve 

months of his retirement. As stated earlier, however, the Player 

Retirement Plan provides that a disability will be conclusively deemed to 

have occurred "shortly after" if the claimant becomes totally and 

permanently disabled within six months after the disability first arises. 

Although Courson became totally and permanently disabled from 

cardiomyopathy within six months after his disability first arose (i.e., 

November 26, 1988), he cannot show that the cardiomyopathy arose 

while he was an active player. Other than the single report in 1985 of 

atrial fibrillation, nothing in the record indicates that he suffered any 

symptoms of this disease until November 1988. Thus, Courson first 

became totally and permanently disabled on November 26, 1988, after 

he had been retired from football for over two years. 

 20 
fully aware of alcohol abuse by certain players and declined 

to act or to enforce its own policies; and (c) Courson drank 

incessantly at first to quell the pain from football injuries 

which led to his uncontrollable urge to drink continuously. 

Moreover, Courson claims the Retirement Board refused to 

acknowledge sworn statements of his former teammates 

regarding the widespread availability of alcohol after home 

and away games. Thus, Courson maintains that he is 

entitled to "Active Football" benefits because his disability 

results from "League football activities,"first arose while he 

was an active Player and caused him to be unable tofind 

or maintain employment within twelve months of his 

retirement. 

As we stated earlier, the evidence supports a contrary 

finding. While all of Courson's assertions linking alcohol 

consumption with League play may be true, they fall short 

of establishing that the NFL teams actually condoned or 

encouraged the consumption of alcohol, let alone in the 

large quantities consumed by Courson. Any perceived

pressure on the part of the Players was self-imposed. If 

anything, the evidence shows that the League and member 

teams discouraged alcohol abuse. To this end, when 

Courson mentioned his alcohol abuse to the Buccaneers, 

they referred him to a psychiatrist for counseling. When he 

played for the Steelers, Courson did not exhibit any 

behavior that indicated that he had a drinking problem. As 

he admitted in his book, Courson's binge drinking occurred 

in bars and at home--not in the clubhouse.5 Courson's use 

of alcohol to quell the pain from his football injuries was 

clearly self-imposed and thus not " `supervised' or `required 

or directed' " by any NFL team. Accordingly, because 

Courson has failed to establish that his disability resulted 

_________________________________________________________________ 

5. Courson refers to the affidavits of teammates regarding widespread 

alcohol consumption in the clubhouse. However, an examination of Craig 

Wolfley's affidavit reveals nothing more than that alcohol was served on 

the plane rides home from away games, that alcohol was used by some 

NFL players as a "primitive pain killer for bumps, bruises and injuries," 

and that NFL management appeared to place a greater emphasis on 

preventing alcohol abuse towards the end of his career (1980-1991). 

Nothing in Mr. Wolfley's affidavit supports Courson's theory that the NFL 

" `supervised' or `required or directed' " alcohol consumption. 

 21 
from a "League football activity," he is not eligible for 

"Active Football" benefits. 

In the alternative, Courson argues that if we find the 

Retirement Board's decision that Courson did not become 

totally and permanently disabled until November 1988 was 

supported by substantial evidence, he is nonetheless 

entitled to "Football Degenerative" benefits. Courson 

contends he has satisfied the eligibility criteria because his 

cardiomyopathy was caused by alcoholism which arose out 

of a "League football activity," i.e., alcohol consumption, 

and he became totally and permanently disabled at the age 

of 33 and within three years after the end of his last 

Credited Season (1985). As discussed previously, however, 

the Retirement Board's conclusion that alcohol 

consumption is not a "League football activity" is 

reasonable. Thus, because Courson's disability does not 

arise from a "League football activity," he is not entitled to 

"Football Degenerative" benefits under the New Plan. 

Accordingly, we cannot say that the Retirement Board's 

decision was arbitrary and capricious on the record

evidence in this case. 

IV. 

For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the

judgment of the District Court. 

A True Copy: 

Teste: 

 Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 

 for the Third Circuit 

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