IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-30353

In Re: LOUISIANA CRAWFISH PRODUCERS

consolidated with: 16-30355, 16-30357, 16-30358, 16-30359, 16-30360, 16-

30361, 16-30362, 16-30363, 16-30364, 16-30365, 16-30366, 16-30367, 16-

30368, 16-30369, 16-30370, 16-30371, 16-30372, 16-30373, 16-30374, 16-

30375, 16-30376, 16-30377, 16-30379, 16-30380, 16-30381, 16-30382, 16-

30383, 16-30384, 16-30385, 16-30386, 16-30387, 16-30388, 16-30389, 16-

30390, 16-30391, 16-30392, 16-30393, 16-30394, 16-30395, 16-30396, 16-

30397, 16-30398, 16-30399, 16-30400, 16-30401, 16-30402, 16-30403, 16-

30405, 16-30406, 16-30407, 16-30408, 16-30409, 16-30410, 16-30411, 16-

30413, 16-30414, 16-30415, 16-30416, 16-30417, 16-30418, 16-30419, 16-

30420, 16-30421, 16-30422, 16-30423, 16-30424, 16-30425, 16-30426, 16-

30427, 16-30428, 16-30429, 16-30430, 16-30431, 16-30432, 16-30433, 16-

30434, 16-30435, 16-30436, 16-30437, 16-30738, 16-30439, 16-30440, 16-

30441, 16-30442, 16-30443, 16-30444, 16-30445, 16-30446, 16-30447, 16-

30448, 16-30449

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

Before REAVLEY, ELROD, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:

The Louisiana Crawfish Producers Association-West and some of its 

commercial crawfishermen members sued a number of oil and gas companies 

and their insurers, claiming the companies’ dredging activities caused damage 

to the fisheries the fishermen used. The district court granted summary 

judgment in favor of two of the companies, Florida Gas Transmission Co. and 

Southern Natural Gas Co., finding that Plaintiffs did not create a genuine issue 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 28, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 16-30353

2

of material fact as to whether the two companies’ activities constituted 

“dredging” so as to support maritime tort claims. Plaintiffs moved the district 

court to reconsider its grant of summary judgment and submitted new evidence 

for its review. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration

as to both companies. Plaintiffs appeal both the district court’s order granting 

summary judgment as well as the denial of their motion for reconsideration. 

We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment and denial of the 

motion for reconsideration with respect to Florida Gas Transmission Co. With 

respect to Southern Natural Gas Co., we REVERSE the district court’s denial 

of Plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) motion and VACATE its grant of summary judgment.

I.

Plaintiffs-Appellants are the Louisiana Crawfish Producers AssociationWest and over eighty individual crawfishermen who operate in the Atchafalaya 

Basin in Louisiana (collectively, Plaintiffs).1 They sued several companies, two 

of which are relevant to this appeal—Florida Gas Transmission Co. (Florida 

Gas) and Southern Natural Gas Co. (Southern Natural). Plaintiffs alleged that 

the companies’ past canal dredging activities created spoil banks that damaged

the Atchafalaya Basin fisheries Plaintiffs utilized. 

After this case was removed from state court to the United States

District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, various defendant 

companies filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to state a 

cause of action for maritime tort. The district court held that Plaintiffs had 

 

1 Crawfish, also known as crayfish, crawdads, freshwater lobsters, mountain lobsters, 

mudbugs, or yabbies, are freshwater crustaceans resembling small lobsters. While there are 

over 500 species of crawfish in the world, the Southeastern United States is home to around 

330 of them. Wikipedia, Crayfish, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crayfish (last visited March 

21, 2017). In 1983, the state of Louisiana designated the Louisiana crawfish, Procambarus 

clarkii, as its Official Crustacean, becoming the first state to bestow such an honor on a 

species of crustaceans. Wikipedia, List of U.S. State Crustaceans, 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_U.S._state_crustaceans (last visited March 21, 2017). 

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3

stated a maritime tort claim against Florida Gas, Southern Natural, and Dow 

Chemical Co. (Dow)2 by alleging that these defendants engaged in dredging 

activities.3 The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against all other 

defendant companies because Plaintiffs failed to allege these companies had 

engaged in dredging activities. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of these 

defendants, but we affirmed. In re Louisiana Crawfish Producers, 772 F.3d 

1026 (5th Cir. 2014). Our decision left Florida Gas, Southern Natural, and 

Dow, along with their insurers, as the remaining defendants. 

Following our decision in Louisiana Crawfish, the remaining defendants 

and Plaintiffs conferred and prepared a case management order to establish

litigation deadlines. At the time the parties created the case management 

order, Southern Natural’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition had not yet occurred. The 

parties agreed upon a proposed case management order, which stated, in 

pertinent part:

3. Dispositive Motions:

a. Any party having dispositive motion(s) concerning legal 

issues and not requiring additional fact discovery shall file their 

motion(s) by July 31, 2015. 

b. Oppositions to dispositive motions filed on or before July 

31, 2015 shall be filed by August 31, 2015. 

c. Any reply briefs shall be filed by September 15, 2015. 

d. Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the transcript of 

the Southern Natural Gas Company deposition in this matter, 

Plaintiffs shall file any dipositive motions or supplemental 

oppositions necessitated by factual information learned during the 

deposition. 

 

2 Dow remains a defendant in the district court but is not a party to this appeal. 

3 Specifically, the district court found that with respect to Southern Natural, Florida 

Gas, and Dow, Plaintiffs’ allegation of dredging on navigable waters bears a sufficient 

relationship to traditional maritime activity to state a claim for a maritime tort under Jerome 

B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (1995). 

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Southern Natural advised Plaintiffs that its earliest available deposition 

date was September 22, 2015. This date fell after the case management order’s

August 31 deadline for Plaintiffs to oppose dispositive motions. Plaintiffs 

nevertheless agreed to hold Southern Natural’s deposition on September 22, 

2015, anticipating they would be allowed to supplement their opposition to any 

dispositive motions with information learned at the deposition.

On July 31, 2015, in accordance with the case management order,

Florida Gas, Southern Natural, and Dow filed a joint motion seeking

reconsideration of the district court’s earlier denial of their motion to dismiss 

or, alternatively, seeking summary judgment and dismissal of Plaintiffs’ 

claims. Plaintiffs timely submitted their opposition to the motion in accordance 

with the deadlines set forth in the case management order. Plaintiffs attached 

to their opposition evidence pertaining to Florida Gas and Dow, but they did 

not attach any evidence pertaining to Southern Natural.4

While the motion was pending before the district court, Southern 

Natural’s corporate representative was deposed on September 22, 2015. 

During the deposition, Southern Natural’s corporate representative testified 

that Southern Natural engaged in dredging in connection with the subject spoil 

banks.5 At the end of the deposition, Southern Natural’s corporate 

representative reserved his right to read and sign the deposition transcript. At 

 

4 Plaintiffs did note in their opposition brief that they would be deposing Southern 

Natural in the coming months, and stated that they “reserved the right to supplement this 

opposition after the deposition of Southern Natural Gas which is set to take place in late 

September, 2015.”

5 Specifically, Southern Natural’s corporate representative testified:

Q: Let’s talk about the Section 28 line. Do you know how that line was actually 

constructed? 

A: I know that the line was permitted to be constructed by virtue of Southern Natural 

digging a flotation canal for waterborne equipment to lay the pipeline, and we know that 

was done in accordance with the permit. 

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Plaintiffs’ request, the court reporter provided an uncertified copy of the 

transcript to Plaintiffs on October 26, 2016. However, because Southern 

Natural’s corporate representative had not yet signed the transcript, an official 

transcript was not yet available. After the deposition took place, Plaintiffs also 

forwarded requests for admissions to all defendants, ahead of the agreed-upon 

discovery cutoff date. In its response, Southern Natural admitted to using

dredge vessels in the construction of the canal at issue.6

On November 12, 2015, while Plaintiffs were still awaiting the official 

deposition transcript, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of 

Florida Gas and Southern Natural,7 finding that Plaintiffs did not provide 

evidence that created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether either of 

these defendants had engaged in dredging activities. The certified transcript 

of the Southern Natural deposition was finally provided to Plaintiffs on 

November 17, 2015—five days after the district court’s ruling. 

Plaintiffs moved the district court to reconsider its grant of summary 

judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). In their brief in support 

of this motion, Plaintiffs argued that the district court’s ruling as it pertained 

 

6 Plaintiffs’ first request for admission asked Southern Natural to “Admit or deny that 

the canals in which Southern Natural Gas’ ‘South Section 28 Pipeline’ . . . [is/was] situated 

were dredged by dredging vessels.” In response, Southern Natural admitted that Southern 

Natural “constructed the South Section 28 Pipeline . . . in accordance with the permits issued 

by United States Army Corps of Engineers . . . .”

7 The district court denied the defendants’ motion to reconsider the order denying their

motion to dismiss, holding that dredging of a navigation canal, conducted from a vessel on 

navigable waters, shows a substantial connection to traditional maritime activity sufficient 

to support a maritime tort claim. (citing Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 367 (1990) (in addition 

to “navigation,” traditional maritime activities include “at least . . . any other activities 

traditionally undertaken by vessels, commercial or noncommercial”); Grubart, 513 U.S. at 

539-40 (dredge and dock company’s bridge repair and maintenance work from a vessel on a 

navigable waterway was substantially related to traditional maritime activity); In re The V14813, 65 F.2d 789, 790 (5th Cir. 1933) (“There are many cases holding that a dredge . . . 

employed on navigable waters, is subject to maritime jurisdiction . . . .”)). The parties do not 

contest this holding.

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to Southern Natural was procedurally erroneous because Plaintiffs did not 

have an opportunity to supplement their opposition to the defendants’ motion 

under the terms of the case management order. Plaintiffs also attached 

additional evidence to their brief which they argued supported their claims 

against both Florida Gas and Southern Natural. This new evidence included

Southern Natural’s deposition testimony, exhibits offered at Southern 

Natural’s deposition, and Southern Natural’s responses to requests for 

admissions.

The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration as to both 

Florida Gas and Southern Natural. Plaintiffs now appeal the district court’s 

original order granting summary judgment as well as the district court’s order

denying reconsideration. 

II. 

We review grants of summary judgment de novo, applying the same 

standard as the district court. Templet v. Hyrdochem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 477 

(5th Cir. 2004). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows 

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[W]here the 

nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely point to 

an absence of evidence, thus shifting to the non-movant the burden of 

demonstrating by competent summary judgment proof that there is an issue of 

material fact warranting trial. Only when ‘there is sufficient evidence favoring 

the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party’ is a full trial 

on the merits warranted.” Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 

(5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249

(1986)) (citations omitted). All reasonable inferences must be viewed in the 

light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and any doubt 

must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 

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v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Hillman v. Loga, 697 F.3d 299, 

302 (5th Cir. 2012). 

Typically, we review a district court’s decision on a Rule 59 motion to 

reconsider for abuse of discretion. Templet, 367 F.3d at 477. However, this

depends on whether the district court considered materials attached to the 

motion for reconsideration which were not previously provided to the court 

when it granted summary judgment. Id. (citing Ford Motor Credit Co. v. 

Bright, 34 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1994)). “If the materials were considered by 

the district court, and the district court still grants summary judgment, the 

appropriate appellate standard of review is de novo.” Id. “However, if the 

district court refuses to consider the materials, the reviewing court applies the 

abuse of discretion standard.” Id. Under an abuse of discretion standard of 

review, “the district court’s decision and decision-making process need only be 

reasonable.” Id.

III. 

We first address the district court’s grant of summary judgment and 

subsequent denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration with respect to 

Florida Gas. Florida Gas contends that it did not perform any dredging, but 

rather that its activities were limited to placing a pipeline into an already 

existing canal. Under our precedent, merely placing pipeline—“pipeline 

construction and repair”—is insufficient to support a maritime tort claim. See 

Louisiana Crawfish, 772 F.3d at 1029–30. The issue before us on appeal is 

whether Plaintiffs met their summary judgment burden of demonstrating that 

a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Florida Gas engaged in 

dredging.

In opposition to Florida Gas’s summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs 

submitted Florida Gas’s United States Army Corps of Engineers permit and 

permit application. Plaintiffs attached additional evidence to their motion for 

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reconsideration, which included Southern Natural’s corporate deposition 

testimony, a photograph purporting to show the canal in which Florida Gas’s 

pipeline is placed, and a document entitled “Memorandum and Files.” Because 

the district court considered this additional evidence in denying the motion for 

reconsideration as to Florida Gas, this evidence became part of the summary 

judgment record. Templet, 367 F.3d at 477–79. Therefore, we review de novo

whether summary judgment was appropriate.8 Id. at 477. We hold that the 

district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Florida Gas 

and in subsequently denying Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration as to Florida 

Gas.

As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by

shifting the summary judgment burden to them because Florida Gas did not 

submit any evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment. However, 

Plaintiffs—not Florida Gas—bear the burden to present evidence creating a 

genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment. Lindsey, 16 F.3d 

at 618 (“[W]here the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant 

may merely point to an absence of evidence, thus shifting to the non-movant 

the burden of demonstrating by competent summary judgment proof that there 

is an issue of material fact warranting trial.”); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 

F.3d 1069, 1075, 1076 n.16 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (noting that the party 

moving for summary judgment may simply assert the “absence of facts 

supporting the elements of the plaintiffs’ theory of recovery” and need not 

“negate the existence of facts”); see also 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2727.1 (4th ed. 2016). Plaintiffs bear 

 

8 Both Plaintiffs and Florida Gas agree that the district court considered Plaintiffs’ 

new evidence as to Florida Gas and that the de novo standard of review applies. 

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the burden of proving their maritime tort claims at trial and therefore bear the 

burden of demonstrating that Florida Gas dredged the canals in question. 

In its summary judgment motion, Florida Gas “point[ed] to” the lack of 

record evidence that it participated in dredging activities; therefore, Plaintiffs

bore the burden of “demonstrating by competent summary judgment proof” 

that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Florida Gas 

dredged. See Lindsey, 16 F.3d at 618. The evidence submitted by Plaintiffs—

either initially in opposition to summary judgment or later attached to their 

motion for reconsideration—was not sufficient to satisfy this burden. 

Plaintiffs argue that Florida Gas’s Army Corps of Engineers permit 

application creates a genuine issue of fact because “[e]very company that 

dredged canals in the Atchafalaya during this time period was required to 

obtain a permit like these.” But Florida Gas’s application makes no reference 

to dredging; rather, it only provides for the pipeline to be dropped into an open, 

forty-foot-wide canal. Indeed, this application supports Florida Gas’s theory 

that it was seeking permission to drop a pipeline into an existing canal—not 

seeking to dredge a canal. 

Likewise, Florida Gas’s permit itself does not create a fact issue as to 

whether Florida Gas dredged the canal in question. The only mention of 

dredging in Florida Gas’s permit is in a list of boilerplate conditions that are 

not tied to any specific location. These conditions do not show that Florida Gas 

requested permission to dredge, that it received permission to dredge, or, most 

critically, that it actually dredged. There is nothing in Florida Gas’s permit 

that defeats summary judgment.9

 

9 Plaintiffs also argue that there are “vicinity maps” in Florida Gas’s permit that 

demonstrate there were no pre-existing canals at the time Florida Gas’s permit was issued. 

Plaintiffs argue that if Florida Gas laid its pipeline into an existing canal, the canal would 

have been depicted on these maps. However, the maps themselves are unclear and it is 

difficult to discern what they are depicting. Plaintiffs do not offer testimony or other record 

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Plaintiffs contend that Southern Natural’s corporate deposition 

testimony also creates a genuine issue of material fact as to Florida Gas’s 

dredging. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that Southern Natural’s corporate 

representative testified that if a forty-foot wide canal remained in existence 

today, that could be an indication that the canal had been dredged. Plaintiffs’ 

reliance on this testimony is misplaced because the testimony does not 

specifically address Florida Gas’s pipelines nor does it address whether Florida 

Gas had conducted any dredging. Further, Plaintiffs have not cited to anything 

in the record that indicates that Southern Natural’s representative had any 

knowledge of Florida Gas’s pipeline construction history.

Plaintiffs also submitted a photograph that they contend shows “an 

approximately forty-foot wide canal with adjacent spoil banks still in existence 

today in the fishery, in which FLORIDA’s pipeline rests, today.” Plaintiffs

contend that because this canal exists, Florida Gas, “or someone on its behalf

. . . dredged a canal.” However, as the district court noted, the photograph is of 

such poor quality that it is extremely difficult to determine what it depicts. 

Further, even if the photograph proves the existence of a canal, this does not 

serve as evidence that Florida Gas dredged the canal. Indeed, Florida Gas has 

agreed all along that a canal exists; it only contends it did not dredge it.

The final piece of evidence offered by Plaintiffs to defeat summary 

judgment with respect to Florida Gas is a document entitled “Memorandum 

for the Files.” In this document, a Southern Natural employee purportedly 

writes that he consulted with an employee from Florida Gas to inquire about 

the credentials of a dredging contractor Florida Gas had used. Plaintiffs argue 

 

evidence to support their assertion that “there are no pre-existing canals depicted” on the 

maps, much less that Florida Gas dredged canals. Such conjecture, unsupported by 

competent summary judgment evidence, cannot create a fact issue to defeat summary 

judgment. 

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that given the proximity in time between when the memo was produced and 

when Florida Gas constructed its pipeline at issue in this case, “there is 

certainly a logical inference to be made that the memo refers to FLORIDA’s 

pipelines at issue in this case.” However, as the district court correctly 

recognized, this document cannot defeat summary judgment as to Florida Gas 

because the document does not reference a specific Florida Gas project and 

there is nothing on the face of the document that connects it to any of the 

pipelines at issue.10

In sum, none of Plaintiffs’ evidence creates a genuine issue of material 

fact as to whether Florida Gas participated in dredging activities. Little, 37 

F.3d at 1075. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment in favor of Florida Gas. Having done so, we also affirm the denial of 

Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration as to Florida Gas. 

IV.

We turn next to the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor 

of Southern Natural and its subsequent denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for 

reconsideration as it pertained to Southern Natural. The district court granted 

summary judgment in favor of Southern Natural because Plaintiffs did not 

 

10 In its opinion granting summary judgment, the district court also addressed the 

deposition testimony of Florida Gas’s corporate representative, Dennis Alters. Alters testified 

that after reviewing Florida Gas’s “construction notes . . . foot by foot,” there was no mention 

of any dredging activity. The district court accepted Alters’s testimony as “uncontradicted 

and unimpeached.” Plaintiffs argue that because Alters “could only speculate on how the 

canals came into existence” and did not testify as to what actually happened, Florida Gas 

“never established that there was no genuine issue of fact as to whether it engaged in 

dredging.” Again, it is Plaintiffs’ burden to produce evidence that Florida Gas dredged, not 

Florida Gas’s burden to prove they did not. Despite Alters’s testimony, however, Plaintiffs 

could have defeated summary judgment as to Florida Gas had they produced evidence that 

created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Florida Gas dredged. See Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587; Hillman, 697 F.3d at 302 (“Doubts are to be resolved in 

favor of the nonmoving party, and any reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of that 

party.” (quoting Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 507 (5th Cir. 2003)). 

Plaintiffs have failed to do so, and thus summary judgment as to Florida Gas is appropriate. 

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submit any evidence relating to Southern Natural’s dredging activity in 

opposition to the summary judgment motion. The district court’s initial grant 

of summary judgment in favor of Southern Natural was proper11— Southern 

Natural pointed “to an absence of evidence” supporting Plaintiffs’ claims, thus 

shifting to Plaintiffs “the burden of demonstrating by competent summary 

judgment proof that there is an issue of material fact warranting trial,” a 

burden Plaintiffs did not satisfy. Lindsey, 16 F.3d at 618. 

However, we must also determine whether the district court’s denial of 

reconsideration as to Southern Natural was proper in light of the evidence 

Plaintiffs submitted along with their motion for the district court to reconsider 

Southern Natural’s dismissal. Unlike the district court’s review of Plaintiffs’ 

new evidence pertaining to Florida Gas, the district court likely did not 

consider Plaintiffs’ new evidence pertaining to Southern Natural;12 therefore,

we review the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) motion as to 

Southern Natural for abuse of discretion. See Luig v. N. Bay Enters, Inc., 817 

F.3d 901, 905–06 (5th Cir. 2016) (applying the abuse of discretion standard 

where “[t]he district court likely did not consider [movant’s] newly presented 

 

11 Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in “converting” Southern Natural’s 

motion from a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to a motion 

for summary judgment under Rule 56. However, Southern Natural moved the district court 

to reconsider its prior dismissal of Southern Natural’s motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to 

grant summary judgment in Southern Natural’s favor. To the extent that Plaintiffs argue 

they did not have adequate notice that the district court could grant summary judgment, the 

title of the defendants’ motion made it clear that Southern Natural and the other defendants 

were seeking summary judgment. 

12 Plaintiffs contend that the district court considered Southern Natural’s responses 

to Plaintiffs’ requests for admissions wherein Southern Natural admitted to dredging. 

Plaintiffs argue that the district court’s opinion “acknowledges the substance and contents” 

of Southern Natural’s responses and therefore the district court “considered” them so as to 

trigger our de novo review. See Templet, 367 F.3d at 477. While the district court may have 

acknowledged the new evidence, it did not consider that evidence under the summary 

judgment standard, and therefore de novo review is inappropriate here.

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evidence when denying the [Rule] 59(e) motion”). We hold that the district 

court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration as 

to Southern Natural. 

The district court declined to reconsider its grant of summary judgment 

in favor of Southern Natural despite Plaintiffs providing three types of new 

evidence upon reconsideration: (1) Southern Natural’s deposition transcript; 

(2) documentary evidence offered during Southern Natural’s deposition; and 

(3) Southern Natural’s responses to requests for admission. There are several 

factors the district court should have considered when determining whether to 

grant Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration in light of Plaintiffs’ new evidence: 

(1) the probative value of the evidence; (2) the reason for Plaintiffs’ default; (3) 

whether the evidence was available to Plaintiffs at the time of the summary 

judgment motion; and (4) potential prejudice to Southern Natural. See Luig, 

817 F.3d at 906 (citing Templet, 367 F.3d at 478). These factors “are simply 

illustrative and not exhaustive.” Templet, 367 F.3d at 482. The district court 

concluded that all of the additional evidence that Plaintiffs asked the court to 

consider was “plainly available or easily discovered before summary 

judgment.” We disagree with the district court’s analysis, particularly as it 

pertains to Southern Natural’s deposition transcript and responses to requests 

for admissions.13

 

13 In addition to Southern Natural’s deposition transcript and responses to requests 

for admission, Plaintiffs also offered the documentary evidence from Southern Natural’s

deposition as “new” evidence. Plaintiffs candidly acknowledge in their brief that “all of the 

deposition exhibits were in [their] possession at the time they originally opposed the 

summary judgment.” Because this evidence was available to Plaintiffs at the time of the 

summary judgment motion and because Plaintiffs have not presented a satisfactory reason

for not coming forward with this evidence at the time their opposition was filed, we conclude 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in not reconsidering its grant of summary 

judgment in light of this particular evidence. See Luig, 817 F.3d at 906. Further, it is 

unnecessary to address the deposition exhibits in more detail because we conclude that the 

district court abused its discretion when it did not reconsider its grant of summary judgment 

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Southern Natural’s deposition transcript and responses to requests for 

admissions are clearly probative. The district court granted summary 

judgment as to Southern Natural because Plaintiffs failed to present evidence 

that Southern Natural engaged in any dredging activities. In both its 

deposition and its responses to requests for admissions, Southern Natural 

candidly admitted that it dredged the canal in question.14 If the district court 

would have considered the contents of Southern Natural’s deposition or its

admissions, Plaintiffs would have defeated summary judgment as to Southern 

Natural.15

Plaintiffs’ reasons for their default also support granting their motion for 

reconsideration. First, as to Southern Natural’s deposition transcript, 

Plaintiffs had not yet received an official copy of the transcript at the time the 

district court granted the motion for summary judgment. In evaluating 

Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, the district court faulted Plaintiffs for 

failing to seek an extension of time to file supplemental briefing after Southern 

Natural’s deposition took place and while Plaintiffs were waiting for an official 

copy of the transcript. However, no extension of time should have been 

necessary—Plaintiffs were justified in relying on the deadlines set forth in the 

 

as to Southern Natural in light of Southern Natural’s deposition transcript and responses to 

request for admissions, which were sufficient to defeat summary judgment. 

14 Notably, Southern Natural does not dispute that it admitted to dredging the canal 

at issue in its deposition and its responses to requests for admissions. Rather, Southern 

Natural only contends that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs 

Rule 59(e) motion because Plaintiffs did not present this key evidence to the court in a timely 

manner. 

15 As we have noted above, the parties do not dispute the district court’s holding that

dredging of a navigation canal, conducted from a vessel on navigable waters, has a 

substantial connection to maritime activity sufficient to support a maritime tort claim. See

Grubart, 513 U.S. at 539. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ evidence that Southern Natural dredged 

would have been sufficient to support their maritime tort claim and defeat summary 

judgment. 

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case management order. The case management order allowed Plaintiffs thirty 

days from the time they received Southern Natural’s deposition transcript to 

file any dispositive motions or any supplemental oppositions with the court. 

However, the district court entered its order granting summary judgment on 

November 12, 2015—five days before Plaintiffs received the official deposition 

transcript. Plaintiffs submitted their motion for reconsideration along with the 

new evidence on November 25, 2015—a mere eight days after Plaintiffs 

received the official transcript and well within the thirty-day timeframe 

established by the case management order.16 Contrary to the district court’s 

conclusion, Plaintiffs were not required to request an extension of time in order 

to submit the deposition transcript to the district court.

Second, as to Southern Natural’s responses to requests for admissions, 

the district court faulted Plaintiffs for “failing to immediately move to 

supplement their opposition when they received [Southern Natural’s]

responses” three days before the district court’s ruling. But the district court 

failed to recognize that Plaintiffs, relying on the terms of the case management 

order, had no reason to believe the district court would grant the defendants’ 

motion while Plaintiffs were still awaiting Southern Natural’s official 

deposition transcript.17 Plaintiffs therefore had no reason to “immediately” 

 

16 To the extent Southern Natural argues that the thirty-day time period should run 

from the time that Plaintiffs received the unofficial deposition transcript, this does not 

change our analysis. Plaintiffs received the unofficial, unsigned draft of the deposition 

transcript on October 26, 2015. Therefore, Plaintiffs still satisfied the thirty-day requirement 

when they filed their motion for reconsideration, along with the new evidence, on November 

25, 2015. 

17 Plaintiffs were justified in believing that the district court was aware of the case 

management order and that the district court would abide by the deadlines agreed to by the 

parties. The case management order was signed by Magistrate Judge Hanna and entered 

into the case docket. However, in its opinion denying Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration,

the district court noted that “it was unaware” of the case management order. While we do 

not fault the district court for overlooking the case management order docket entry in this 

complicated, drawn-out case, the district court should have corrected this oversight upon 

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bring Southern Natural’s responses to the district court’s attention, but rather 

were justified in waiting for the transcript so that they could file a single 

supplemental opposition brief that would include both Southern Natural’s 

deposition transcript and Southern Natural’s responses. See Luig, 817 F.3d at 

907 (“Although the [the movant] likely had access to the evidence presented in 

the [Rule] 59(e) motion at the time it filed its summary judgment motion, [the 

movant’s] failure to present the evidence was excusable because the district 

court did not give [the movant] the opportunity to present this evidence before 

effectively granting summary judgment . . . .”).

The third factor—whether the evidence was available to Plaintiffs at the 

time of the summary judgment motion—also favors Plaintiffs. Southern 

Natural contends that the case management order limits Plaintiffs’ rights to 

file supplemental materials to those materials that include “factual 

information learned during the deposition.” Southern Natural argues that 

none of the information Plaintiffs learned at the deposition or from Southern 

Natural’s admissions was new—Plaintiffs had all of the deposition exhibits in 

their possession for several years before the summary judgment motion and 

these documents contained evidence that Southern Natural dredged. 

We disagree. While it may be true that Plaintiffs had much of the 

relevant documentary evidence in their possession before Southern Natural 

moved for summary judgment, the admission made by Southern Natural that 

the company dredged the pipeline in question was indeed “information 

learned” by Plaintiffs. An admission by a party carries considerably more 

weight than inferences drawn from documentary evidence purporting to 

support a certain fact. Indeed, an admission by a party “is conclusively 

 

Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. Plaintiffs should not be punished as a result of the 

district court’s oversight. 

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established” as fact in the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b); see also In re Carney, 258 

F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Rule 36 admissions . . . are conclusive as to the 

matters admitted, they cannot be overcome at the summary judgement stage 

. . . .”); 8B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 

Procedure § 2264 (3d ed. 2017) (noting that a Rule 36 admission, “deliberately 

drafted by counsel for the express purpose of limiting and defining the facts in 

issue, is traditionally regarded as conclusive”). Plaintiffs did not have Southern 

Natural’s admission before Southern Natural responded to Plaintiffs’ requests 

for admissions and the Southern Natural deposition took place. We therefore 

conclude that Southern Natural’s candid admission that it dredged the pipeline 

in question is new evidence that was not available to Plaintiffs at the time of 

the summary judgment motion. 

Finally, Southern Natural will not be unfairly prejudiced by the district 

court’s consideration of Southern Natural’s own admissions and deposition 

testimony. This is not situation in which Southern Natural was unaware that 

the evidence at issue existed—the contents of both the deposition testimony 

and admissions were always known to Southern Natural and within its control. 

Further, had the district court utilized the case management order, this 

evidence would have been properly in front of the district court before it 

granted summary judgment in Southern Natural’s favor. See Luig, 817 F.3d at 

907 (holding that there was no prejudice where, had the district court allowed 

the moving party the proper opportunity to respond, “the evidence would have 

been properly in front of the district court”).

There are “two important judicial imperatives” relating to a motion for 

reconsideration: “(1) the need to bring litigation to an end; and (2) the need to 

render just decisions on the basis of all the facts.” Templet, 367 F.3d at 479 

(emphasis added). Plaintiffs presented new, conclusive evidence in their

motion for reconsideration pertaining to Southern Natural that they were 

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justified in not presenting earlier. The district court’s failure to reconsider its 

grant of summary judgment as to Southern Natural in light of this new 

evidence amounted to an abuse of discretion. See Luig, 817 F.3d at 907. 

V. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

and denial of the motion for reconsideration with respect to Florida Gas. With 

respect to Southern Natural, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of 

Plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) motion and VACATE its grant of summary judgment. We 

REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

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