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FEMA PREPAREDNESS IN 2007 AND BEYOND

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 31, 2007

Serial No. 110–62

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman

TOM LANTOS, California

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland

PETER WELCH, Vermont

TOM DAVIS, Virginia

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

BILL SALI, Idaho

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

PHIL SCHILIRO, Chief of Staff

PHIL BARNETT, Staff Director

EARLEY GREEN, Chief Clerk

DAVID MARIN, Minority Staff Director

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C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on July 31, 2007 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Ashwood, Albert, director, Oklahoma State Emergency Management

Agency, president, National Emergency Management Agency; Christopher Geldhart, director, Office of National Capital Region Coordination; Dewayne West, director of emergency management for Johnston

County, NC, National Association of Counties, the International Association of Emergency Managers; Darrell Darnell, director, District of

Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency;

and Kathleen Tierney, director, Natural Hazards Center, University

of Colorado, Boulder ..................................................................................... 148

Ashwood, Albert ........................................................................................ 148

Darnell, Darrell ......................................................................................... 171

Geldhart, Christopher ............................................................................... 155

Tierney, Kathleen ...................................................................................... 179

West, Dewayne .......................................................................................... 162

Paulison, R. David, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management

Agency; Major General Terry Scherling, Director of the Joint Staff

National Guard Bureau; and Matt Jadacki, Deputy Inspector General,

Office of the Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security ........ 14

Jadacki, Matt ............................................................................................. 46

Paulison, R. David ..................................................................................... 14

Scherling, Major General Terry ............................................................... 39

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Ashwood, Albert, director, Oklahoma State Emergency Management

Agency, president, National Emergency Management Agency, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 151

Darnell, Darrell, director, District of Columbia Homeland Security and

Emergency Management Agency, prepared statement of ......................... 173

Geldhart, Christopher, director, Office of National Capital Region Coordination, prepared statement of ...................................................................... 157

Jadacki, Matt, Deputy Inspector General, Office of the Inspector General,

Department of Homeland Security, prepared statement of ...................... 49

Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Ohio:

Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ................. 85

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 10

Prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins ......................................................... 110

Paulison, R. David, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management

Agency, prepared statement of .................................................................... 17

Scherling, Major General Terry, Director of the Joint Staff National

Guard Bureau, prepared statement of ........................................................ 39

Tierney, Kathleen, director, Natural Hazards Center, University of Colorado, Boulder, prepared statement of ......................................................... 182

Towns, Hon. Edolphus, a Representative in Congress from the State

of New York, prepared statement of ........................................................... 204

Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the State

of California, prepared statement of ........................................................... 3

West, Dewayne, director of emergency management for Johnston County,

NC, National Association of Counties, the International Association

of Emergency Managers, prepared statement of ........................................ 165

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FEMA PREPAREDNESS IN 2007 AND BEYOND

TUESDAY, JULY 31, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 2154,

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry A. Waxman (chairman

of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Waxman, Towns, Kucinich, Davis of Illinois, Tierney, Clay, Watson, Higgins, Norton, Murphy, Sarbanes,

Davis of Virginia, Shays, McHugh, Westmoreland, McHenry, Foxx,

Sali, and Jordan.

Also present: Representative Jindal.

Staff present: Phil Barnett, staff director and chief counsel; Kristin Amerling, general counsel; Greg Dotson, chief environmental

counsel; David Leviss, senior investigative counsel; Erik Jones and

Susanne Sachsman, counsels; Daniel Davis, professional staff member; Earley Green, chief clerk; Teresa Coufal, deputy clerk; Caren

Auchman, press assistant; Zhongrui ‘‘JR’’ Deng, chief information

officer; Leneal Scott, information systems manager; Jaron Bourke,

staff director, Domestic Policy Subcommittee; Noura Erakat, counsel, Domestic Policy Subcommittee; Jean Gosa, clerk, Domestic Policy Subcommittee; Evan Schlom, intern, Domestic Policy Subcommittee; David Marin, minority staff director; Larry Halloran,

minority deputy staff director; Jennifer Safavian, minority chief

counsel for oversight and investigations; Keith Ausbrook, minority

general counsel; Steve Castor, minority counsel; Grace

Washbourne, minority senior professional staff member; John

Cuaderes and Larry Brady, minority senior investigator and policy

advisors; Patrick Lyden, minority parliamentarian and member

services coordinator; Brian McNicoll, minority communications director; Benjamin Chance, minority clerk; Ali Ahmad, minority deputy press secretary; and Meredith Liberty, minority staff assistant

correspondence coordinator.

Chairman WAXMAN. The meeting of the committee will please

come to order.

Today the committee is holding its second day of hearings on the

Federal Emergency Management Agency. Less than 2 weeks ago,

the committee examined the Agency’s response to reports of formaldehyde in FEMA trailers on the Gulf Coast. Our hearing revealed

an inexcusable indifference within FEMA to the suffering of displaced hurricane victims living in the contaminated trailers.

As good oversight should, the hearing also served as a catalyst

for reform. FEMA announced that it would reverse its policy and

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begin testing occupied trailers for dangerous levels of formaldehyde.

Today’s hearing will focus on FEMA’s preparedness going forward. We will take a broader look at the Agency and ask whether

the Federal Government is better prepared now for natural disasters than it was when Hurricane Katrina struck.

These hearings are part of a series of hearings in this committee

on how to make Government work. The goal of these hearings is

to spotlight deficiencies in Government and restore public confidence in key Government agencies. FEMA used to be widely admired for its effectiveness, but, as Hurricane Katrina showed, cronyism, under-funding, and lack of leadership turned FEMA in to

the most-ridiculed agency in Government.

The question we will ask in today’s hearing is a simple one: has

FEMA restored its capacity to serve the public effectively in times

of crisis?

I would like to thank two Members in particular for their work

on this hearing. Ranking Member Davis requested this hearing and

worked closely with us in selecting the witnesses and organizing

the hearing. As the Chair of the House Select Committee on Hurricane Katrina in the last Congress, he looked in detail at what went

wrong at FEMA. His expertise and perspective will benefit all committee members.

I also want to thank the Chair of our Domestic Policy Subcommittee, Dennis Kucinich, for his leadership. Oversight of FEMA

falls within his subcommittee’s jurisdiction, and he and his staff

have devoted many hours to examine FEMA and preparing for today’s hearing.

We have two panels of witnesses today and I look forward to

their testimony on the important issues of FEMA’s preparedness.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Henry A. Waxman follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Davis, I want to recognize you at this

point.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning.

Before embarking on their summer travels, every American family kicks the tires, checks the oil, and makes sure their vehicle is

ready for the ride. Before Congress heads home for the August recess, it is important that we do the same: we check under the hood

of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the vehicle meant

to carry us safely through the hazards in our path.

Disasters are indiscriminate, completely nonpartisan, purveyors

of devastation and grief. Reflecting that hard reality, this hearing

is also a nonpartisan review of FEMA’s readiness to perform its

vital mission.

Chairman Waxman and Domestic Policy Subcommittee Chairman Kucinich agreed with our request to continue the committee’s

active oversight of post-Katrina preparedness issues. We appreciate

their working with us to frame this experience as a constructive examination of reforms underway at FEMA.

Hurricane Katrina laid bare devastating dysfunction in the Nation’s catastrophic response capabilities. We saw critical failures in

essential response functions, personnel, planning, logistics, communications, and fiscal stewardship. The Select Committee on

Katrina, which I chaired, produced 90 substantive findings to guide

the reforms and restoration of national emergency systems. A

White House report made 125 recommendations. The administration acknowledged the need to strengthen FEMA and untangle the

crossed wires that left States and localities wondering who was in

charge and when needed help would arrive.

Many attributed FEMA’s problems to the organizational and fiscal price the Agency paid when it was merged into the Department

of Homeland Security. Preparedness programs were separate from

response planning. Logistic systems atrophied. Budget constraints

took a toll. Key personnel with essential skills and institutional

memories left. And communications with State and local stakeholders got muddled passing through layers of bureaucratic filters.

Some of us thought FEMA had to be independent again, liberated from the strangling, all-terrorism myopia at DHS and empowered once again to pursue a proven all-hazards approach.

To cure what the Select Committee characterized as a failure of

initiative, Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform

Act so that future catastrophes would trigger a far more proactive,

robust, and coordinated response to those in need of help. The new

FEMA to emerge, although not fully independent, was to be autonomous enough within DHS to take charge when disaster struck.

Preparedness grants and training were brought back home to

FEMA. Pre-positioning plans and logistics systems were modernized. Lines of authority and accountability were clarified.

Today we take a timely look at how those reforms are being implemented and what still might prevent FEMA from functioning effectively as the Nation’s trusted agent and premier catalyst for disaster preparation, response, and mitigation.

As we head into the heart of what is still predicted to be a very

active hurricane system, we see troubling signs that key reforms

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have not yet taken hold, and that FEMA may still be hobbled with

the larger DHS structure.

Specifically, lines of authority still seem blurred and local officials remain frustrated over high-handed, indecisive, and slow answers from Washington, when they get any answers at all. The recent appointment of principal Federal officials and Federal coordinating officers by Secretary Chertoff appears to have bypassed

FEMA altogether. Governors were told to direct any questions

about these key positions to DHS directorate not even in the emergency response chain of command.

The new logistics systems may not be ready for prime time, and

the Government Accountability Office reports FEMA still lacks a

strategic work force plan and a related human capital strategy to

attract and retain the right people with the requisite skills and experience to sustain effective response operations.

These are all indications DHS may again be following what one

of today’s witnesses cites as ‘‘the spare tire theory of emergency

management.’’ Under that discredited premise, disaster response

capabilities could be left locked away and forgotten, on the assumption they will work just fine when we need them. But when

Katrina struck and we dug FEMA out from under all the terrorism

manuals in DHS’ trunk, those critical tools had gone dull and flat

from neglect. That can’t happen again.

Like maintaining the family sedan, keeping the Nation’s emergency response vehicle running requires regular lubrication and

frequent road tests. Today’s oversight hearing is our part of the

new FEMA’s maintenance program.

I join the chairman in welcoming our witnesses. We look forward

to their testimony and to a candid discussion of our Nation’s readiness to overcome the predictable and the unexpected hazards on

the road ahead.

Thank you.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Davis.

Chairman Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Chairman Waxman, Ranking Member Davis. I appreciate the opportunity to work with you

and cooperate with you on these important hearings regarding the

Government’s lack of appropriate response to post-Hurricane

Katrina.

The totally inadequate response to and the problems plaguing

the recovery and reconstruction from Hurricane Katrina has

spawned numerous reports, recommendations, and legislation. We

would all like to believe that the executive branch’s response to all

of that oversight deserves its preferred name, the new FEMA.

Today we will examine whether the new FEMA lives up to its moniker.

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast.

It devastated the region, destroying homes, businesses, and properties, flooded New Orleans with more than 100 billion gallons of

water. In total, the storm took the lives of more than 1,500 people.

This vast swath of destruction across the Gulf Coast tested all

levels of government. State and local first responders were almost

immediately overwhelmed, and Federal agencies led by FEMA

struggled to respond to the hurricane’s impact. FEMA’s response

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displayed a shocking lack of disaster preparation and response capabilities.

As we approach the 2-year anniversary of the country’s last catastrophic disaster, we are taking a look at FEMA and seeing if

FEMA has learned the lessons from Hurricane Katrina, and we

will be looking to see if the so-called new FEMA is not just preparing for the last disaster but for the next national emergency, whatever that might be, whether from an earthquake or influenza pandemic or some other type of natural disaster.

The Government Accountability Office has stated that there are

three fronts necessary to prepare for, respond to, and recover from

a catastrophic disaster. Those areas are leadership, capabilities,

and accountability. The Federal Government’s response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated a failure on all three fronts. Roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority were not clearly defined. The

adequacy of the Government’s capabilities for communication, evacuation, search and rescue, mass care, and sheltering and logistics

were challenged, and FEMA likely made between $600 million and

$1.4 billion in improper and possibly fraudulent payments.

These failures spawned a number of Federal investigations, findings, and recommendations, and, following in-depth investigations,

reports were published by the House Select Bipartisan Committee

to Investigate Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina,

the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee,

the White House Homeland Security Council, the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security, and FEMA, itself.

These reports identified a variety of successes, failures, and recommendations for improving the Federal response to a catastrophic

disaster.

These reports were not the only Federal response. We had the

Post-Katrina Emergency Management and Reform Act of 2006, assessed by Congress, signed into law by the President in order to

strengthen FEMA and ensure that it is better prepared for the next

catastrophic disaster. We know that FEMA has begun implementing the Post-Katrina Act. We know that it has made significant

changes. We are to evaluate whether or not the new FEMA, as it

now stands, is capable of handling the next disaster, and we have

learned that, despite the strides FEMA has made, many challenges

still remain.

Some of those challenges include the following: FEMA has not released the National Response Plan, and the country is already 2

months into the 2007 hurricane season.

State and local officials have raised concerns about FEMA’s lack

of independence and its ability to provide assistance and coordination.

FEMA does not appear to be tracking which recommendations it

has and has not implemented from the reports published by the

White House, Congress, and other Federal agencies.

It is not clear whether or not FEMA is ready to coordinate largescale evacuations or mass care and sheltering. FEMA has created

over 180 mission assignments with over 20 Federal agencies, but

it is not clear whether proper FEMA oversight exists to effectuate

those missions in the case of a disaster.

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As of July 2007, 24 of 77 of executive positions at FEMA were

not filled, and as this committee learned 2 weeks ago at its trailer

hearing, FEMA is still making tragic mistakes in the Gulf Coast.

To be sure, FEMA’s lack of preparing for and responding to a

catastrophic disaster is daunting. The evacuation of an entire metropolitan area following a disaster is very complicated. It is expensive and difficult. The task of coordinating mass care and sheltering thousands of people is very complicated. It is expensive.

FEMA has a tough mission, but no one, as far as I know, has

told us the assignment is too tough and that the mission cannot be

accomplished, so FEMA has a tough but doable job, and this committee’s duty is to conduct oversight to ensure that FEMA can lead

a disaster response; prepare for, prevent, and help areas recover

from disasters. So today this committee will examine whether

FEMA is achieving that function.

Again I want to thank Mr. Waxman and Mr. Davis for suggesting today’s hearing. Mr. Davis, of course, has chaired the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, conducting important oversight on

disaster preparedness.

I want to thank Mr. Waxman and Mr. Davis. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Kucinich.

I now want to call on the ranking member of the Domestic Policy

Subcommittee, Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Davis.

This is the type of oversight the American public expects of us,

and what we discovered today, needless to say, cannot be nearly as

much as we have already seen here.

What we do want to find out today is whether or not at all levels

of government we are prepared post-9/11, when we clearly were not

prepared. The Katrina response pointed out weaknesses we had in

disaster preparedness and disaster response.

I want to join with my colleagues in recognizing the ranking

member and my friend, Tom Davis, who spent countless hours as

the chairman of the Bipartisan Select Committee to Investigate the

Response to Katrina, and the excellent work he did on a bipartisan

basis to expose the flaws in our country’s disaster preparedness regime. His work led to what we will be talking about today, postKatrina reform legislation, and today we are here to find out if

anything has changed in the world of disaster preparedness.

I feel strongly that it is likely that we will be told we are ready.

I feel equally strongly that we on the dias will have a responsibility

to figure out how we fill in the gaps that clearly, clearly exist but,

in fact, have either not been recognized or have been down played

as to their importance.

Specifically, we need answers to the following: is there a new

FEMA, and how is it different than the one that responded so poorly in the Gulf Hurricanes? What is the relationship between the

Federal Government, State governments, and local governments? Is

it stronger? Is it ready? Are they partners, or is one government

calling the shots and the others expected to fall in line?

Disaster preparedness and response should not be the sole responsibility of the Federal Government. State and local governments should be first in line of defense when it comes to preparedness and response and should be listened to by Federal agencies.

The bully tactics that were clearly in place cannot be accepted, nor

can, in fact, a refusal to cooperate, both of which, as well reported,

we saw in the post-Katrina report.

The Federal Government needs to supplement State and local

governments, not supplant them. But, as was evidenced in Hurricane Katrina, when the Federal Government is needed, they need

to be there swiftly and in coordinated fashion and instill the confidence to those affected by the disaster.

I hope that at the end of today’s hearing I can tell my constituents that we can count on the government at all levels—I repeat,

all levels—to be there for them in the time of disaster.

Clearly, the disaster like what happened after Hurricane Katrina

will not happen in California. I am also going to be very concerned

about not are we ready for Katrina II, but are we ready for an

earthquake, a sizable earthquake, a Northridge Earthquake times

two in California? California has had a long history of events that

are more catastrophic in the initial stages and often followed by

fire than anything we saw in New Orleans.

So, although I very much want to see what we have done postKatrina, it is my obligation and I am sure the chairman’s obligaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:23 Sep 03, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\43332.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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tion as California Members to ask about other disasters and other

responses not previously in the report.

Mr. Chairman, once again I thank you for your continued interest and yield back.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Issa.

We are pleased to welcome for our first panel Mr. R. David

Paulison, the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency; Major General Terry Scherling, Director of the Joint

Staff National Guard Bureau; and Mr. Matt Jadacki, Deputy Inspector General of the Office of the Inspector General, Department

of Homeland Security.

We are pleased to welcome you to our hearing today. Your statements will be made part of the record in full. We are going to have

a clock that will time 5 minutes. We would like you to try to keep

as close to the 5-minute period as possible.

It is the practice of this committee to swear in all witnesses, so

if you would, please stand and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman WAXMAN. The record will show that the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

Mr. Paulison, why don’t we start with you.

STATEMENTS OF R. DAVID PAULISON, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; MAJOR GENERAL TERRY SCHERLING, DIRECTOR OF THE JOINT STAFF

NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU; AND MATT JADACKI, DEPUTY

INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

STATEMENT OF R. DAVID PAULISON

Mr. PAULISON. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member

Davis, and other distinguished members of the committee. I do welcome the opportunity to appear before this committee to discuss

how FEMA has prepared for the 2007 hurricane season in the

wake of our recent reorganization.

Based on the many lessons learned, FEMA instituted numerous

reforms to improve our ability to respond to and recover from disasters. In addition to FEMA’s internal transformation that we embraced to improve this Agency, the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA have been working together closely to implement

adjustments included in the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act.

The result is a new FEMA that is strong, it is more nimble than

it was just a year ago. It has improved our preparedness posture

for the 2007 hurricane season.

You can see the impact of these changes in our recent response

this year to Florida, Georgia, Alabama, the Kansas tornados, the

nor’easter that affected the States across the mid-Atlantic and New

England, and recent flooding in the Plains.

In each of these cases, FEMA quickly was an engaged partner

with the State. We deployed operational and technical experts. We

rolled logistics and communication capabilities, and we did this

even before disaster declaration. We also coordinated with the Governor’s office to facilitate the Presidential declaration.

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It was also FEMA that supported and helped facilitate an effective, unified command system amongst the many Federal, State,

and local partners involved in the responses. We call this an engaged partnership. Our response to these diverse and numerous

events across the breadth of this great country are evidence of the

new FEMA’s readiness for the 2007 hurricane season.

Today I will focus on our advanced preparations, our plans for

operations during the storm, and our improved ability to help with

the short and long-term recovery.

Local governments will always be the first to respond, but FEMA

does have an important role to play. The old paradigm of waiting

for State and local governments to become overwhelmed before providing Federal assistance simply does not work. We have to go in

as partners. This engaged partnership with FEMA will strengthen

our relationship with key State and local partners, and we will also

recognize that one size does not fit all when it comes to responding

to States.

FEMA is helping each State analyze its strengths and weaknesses; thus, our planning is more informed and we can better anticipate specific needs and quickly move to support each State.

The reorganization has provided additional strength to these efforts. The Post-Katrina Reform Act establishes 10 regional administrator positions. This spring we have filled all 10, and not just

with anyone, but with solid, experienced managers, each with 20

and 30 years of hands-on experience dealing in emergency management.

We have added senior staff at the national level, with a new Disability Coordinator, Lou Daniel; the new U.S. Fire Administrator,

Chief Greg Kay; our Logistics Management Assistant Administrator, Eric Smith; and the pending confirmation of Assistant Administrator for Preparedness, Dennis Schrader.

I would like to highlight one office that has joined FEMA in the

new reorganization, the Office of National Capital Region Coordination, whose mission is to oversee and coordinate Federal programs for the relationship to State, local, and regional authorities

and the National Capital Region. Chris Geldhart, Director of the

Office, will be speaking to you today in a later panel about this important office’s role in the new FEMA and the NCR.

With these new and experienced leaderships in place, FEMA will

be ready to act. As part of our improved reform operation, we have

pre-arranged contracts, an approved and improving logistics system, and other elements already in place to expedite this response.

FEMA can surge its own team and assets into an area in anticipation of an approaching storm.

This forward-leaning new FEMA is evidence in our response to

the tornado that devastated Greensburg, KS, this past May. In the

first 72 hours, FEMA coordinated the efforts of numerous Federal

agencies. FEMA had an urban search and rescue team on the

ground the same day Kansas asked for the support. Supplies were

rolling in within hours. Mobile support vehicles moved in early. I

am proud of the response by our team. Federal, State, and local

partners all together responded to this tragedy.

Once the storm is passed, FEMA is also better organized and

better prepared to help in the recovery. FEMA’s Disaster AssistVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:23 Sep 03, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\43332.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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ance Directorate has expanded its capabilities to assist with mass

care; sheltering; debris removal; victim registration, including enhanced protections against waste, fraud, and abuse; and coordination among Government and private sector entities all moving to

provide assistance.

One example of FEMA’s response is the storms in the northeast

this spring. FEMA had staff on the ground before the rain stopped,

evaluating damage and registering victims. Mobile assistance centers were available in the immediate wake of the storm. The first

individual financial aid was activated, delivered less than 24 hours

after the President signed the first declaration. This fast, efficient,

multi-State response shows the type of action you can expect from

FEMA during this year’s hurricane storm.

In conclusion, we have made real progress with FEMA and are

much better aligned and prepared for the 2007 hurricane season.

By leaning further forward to coordinate the Federal response,

which is more informed through assessments and communications

with our partners, we can better serve all Americans.

To wrap up, Mr. Chairman, today FEMA has created engaged

partnerships with State and local governments. We facilitated and

supplied an effective, unified command across all levels of government. We have engaged hurricane-prone States to gain a better understanding of their vulnerabilities. We have improved logistics,

communication capabilities to improve response, and enhanced disaster assistance capabilities to recovery efforts.

We are not done yet, Mr. Chair, but if our progress over the past

year is any indication, I believe we are on the right track for fulfilling our vision of becoming the Nation’s preeminent emergency

management agency.

I am proud of the men and women of this Agency. They have put

their hearts and souls into rebuilding this Agency.

Thank you for your continued support, and I thank you for the

opportunity to appear in front of this panel.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Paulison follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Paulison. We appreciate

your testimony.

Major General Scherling.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL TERRY SCHERLING

General SCHERLING. Good morning, Chairman Waxman, Ranking

Member Davis, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before your committee to

discuss the role of the National Guard in support to civil authorities during disasters.

I am here on behalf of Lieutenant General Steven Blum, Chief

of the National Guard Bureau, who is currently at Northern Command with a number of Adjutants General from the Homeland Security Committee, continuing our efforts to improve planning, communication, and coordination between the active component and

the National Guard.

Mr. Chairman, this is not the first time key leaders have gathered to address the Nation’s domestic response capabilities. Earlier

this year, representatives from FEMA, Northern Command, and

the National Guard Bureau and Adjutants General from the hurricane-affected States met to address ways to better integrate our capabilities necessary for an effective response to domestic emergencies.

Mr. Chairman, these ongoing deliberations are indicative of the

Department of Defense’s and FEMA’s determination and commitment to ensure military support to domestic emergencies is timely,

sufficient, and integrated in such a way as to maximize effectiveness. When lives and property are at stake, every second counts,

and the National Guard, as first responders, will be ready to respond when a State requests assistance.

I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before the committee

today and welcome your questions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Scherling follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Jadacki.

STATEMENT OF MATT JADACKI

Mr. JADACKI. Good morning, Chairman Waxman, Ranking Member Davis, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today.

I will focus my remarks on FEMA’s plans to meet the next catastrophic incident. The five critical areas I will discuss are: coordination of disaster response efforts, catastrophic planning, logistics

and acquisitions, housing, and evacuation.

FEMA’s efforts to support State emergency management and to

prepare Federal response and recovery in national disasters are insufficient for an event of Hurricane Katrina’s magnitude. Reports

issued by Congress, the White House, Federal Office of the Inspector General, and the GAO, among others, identified issues, including questionable leadership decisions and capabilities, organizational failure, overwhelmed response and communications systems,

and inadequate statutory authorities. As a result, Congress enacted

a number of changes to enhance the Federal Government’s response capabilities for emergency management. In total, six statutes enacted by the 109th Congress contain changes that apply to

future Federal Emergency Management actions.

While most of the new laws contain relatively few changes to

Federal authorities related to disasters and emergencies, the PostKatrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006 reorganizes FEMA, expands it, statutory authority and imposes new conditions and requirements on the operation of the Agency.

In responding to a catastrophic event, it is important to keep in

mind that response and recovery are not solely a FEMA responsibility; it is inherently the Nation’s responsibility. The National

Response Plan was established to marshal, all the Nation’s resources and capabilities to address threats and challenges posed by

disasters, both natural and manmade.

A successful response to and recovery from a catastrophic event

can be directly tied to the resources and capabilities of citizens,

local and State governments, the Federal Government, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector.

FEMA is the face of our Nation’s response to large-scale disasters

and is charged with coordinated deployment of our Nation’s resources and capabilities, but success can only be realized when all

stakeholders are fully prepared and willing to contribute.

FEMA is largely dependent on other Federal, State, and local

agencies and outside resources in executing many activities that

take place. To be successful, FEMA needs to plan and conduct exercises with all its partners.

Budget constraints remain a concern for many entities. Some

that should participate may not have the resources to do so. Congress recently appropriated $20 million for catastrophic planning.

FEMA needs to continue to develop plans and exercises for highrisk scenarios and include all its emergency management partners.

Strong logistical and acquisition management capacity is necessary.

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FEMA is responsible for coordinating delivery of commodities,

equipment, personnel, and other resources to support emergency or

disaster response efforts to affected States; therefore, FEMA’s ability to track and acquire resources is key to fulfilling its mission.

Recent events, including the Kansas tornado, indicate improvements in FEMA’s response and logistics capability; however,

whether these improvements will work for a catastrophic event are

largely untested.

FEMA also has not been well prepared to deal with the kind of

acquisitions support needed for a catastrophic disaster. Their overall response efforts have suffered from inadequate acquisition planning and preparation; lack of clearly communicated acquisition responsibilities among FEMA, other Federal agencies, and local State

governments; and insufficient numbers of acquisition personnel to

manage and oversee the contracts.

Pursuant to the Post-Katrina Act, FEMA has undergone significant reorganization; however, with the hurricane season upon us,

a number of acquisition readiness concerns remain. FEMA has yet

to finalize a process to ensure that the Federal pre-negotiated contracts for goods and services are coordinated with Federal, State,

and local governments. FEMA acquisition process did not fully participate in strategizing and identification of goods and service for

which pre-negotiated contracting may be needed in a catastrophic

event, and FEMA and other Federal agencies may not have enough

trained and experienced acquisitions personnel in place to manage

and oversee the vast number of acquisitions that follow major catastrophic events.

An effective and efficient disaster housing strategy is required for

successful response. Some components of FEMA’s housing strategy

were not well-planned or coordinated in response to Katrina. Basically, after Katrina, FEMA used a traditional housing strategy for

a non-traditional event. As a result, the housing programs and policies were not effective, and housing problems persist in the Gulf

area. A comprehensive catastrophic housing plan and new and innovative housing approaches are needed for such events.

The fiscal year 2007 Homeland Security Appropriation Act mandated FEMA to develop a national disaster housing strategy.

FEMA has coordinated with other Federal agencies and the National Council on Disability to develop a strategy to address housing needs for future disasters. These are important first steps to

improve disaster housing. To be successful, FEMA needs to look to

other Federal agencies and State partners to take a bigger role in

disaster housing. While these efforts should improve housing coordination, they remain untested.

Hand in hand with housing is well-executed evacuation strategy.

Evacuation plans are complex and must consider a number of scenarios. Recent reports have indicated that, despite warnings and

mandatory evacuation orders, a significant number of individuals

would not leave their homes. Others may not have the ability to

evacuate because of health reasons or lack of transportation. Local

and State officials are in the best position to develop evacuation

plans based on local demographics; however, it is critical that the

Federal Government coordinate with State and locals, because in

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a catastrophic event it is likely they will play a major role in evacuation.

Let me end my statement by reiterating our goal, which is to

take lessons learned from response to Hurricane Katrina and assist

DHS/FEMA to form the foundation for necessary improvements to

effectively respond to the next catastrophic events.

That concludes my opening remarks. I am happy to answer any

questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jadacki follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Jadacki.

I am going to start off the questions.

Administrator Paulison, in the written testimony you submitted

to the committee, you discussed everything that FEMA has done

since Hurricane Katrina to ensure that it is ready for the next catastrophic disaster. In fact, I think the first 20 pages of your testimony were dedicated to explaining everything FEMA has done, and

I appreciate that FEMA has made changes. However, toward the

end of your submitted testimony you state, ‘‘Of course, we are not

done yet. There is still much work to do.’’

I am happy to see that you acknowledge this in your statement,

because it is important that FEMA acknowledge that work still

needs to be done. Your statement didn’t elaborate on what FEMA

still needs to do, and I would like to hear you explain which areas

FEMA still needs improvement and why.

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. First of all, that won’t ever be done.

There is always room for improvement. But specifically, we have

done some gap analysis for hurricane States from Texas all the

way to Maine to give us a very clear assessment of what the needs

are in those States and working with them very closely to fill those

gaps. We have not done the rest of the country, but we want to

make that gap analysis tool that we have developed with the State

of New York and the State Emergency Management available to

the rest of the States to deal with that.

The logistics system has been improved significantly and is improving. We still have a lot more work to do to make sure that I

have an end to end view of where those commodities are from the

time it is ordered until it is absolutely delivered to where it needs

to be. We have done a great job of being able to track that, and

we can track our supplies pretty much across the country.

But I want to move more to what we call a 3PL—third-party logistics—type system. We have hired some exceptional people from

the Defense Logistics Agency to run logistics, and we are not quite

where I want to be yet. I am very comfortable that we can provide

the supplies we need, but I still want to bring it into the 21st century to make sure that we have what we consider one of the best

logistics systems in this country. And we are looking at other private partners and how the Defense Logistics Agency does it, how

does Wal-Mart, Home Depot, Lowe’s, all those people, move supplies around. We are bringing those in to help us do that.

Those are just two examples of where we are not done yet. We

have done a lot, but we have more work to do.

Chairman WAXMAN. One concern I have is whether FEMA is taking on too much responsibility. After Hurricane Katrina, one of the

recommendations was that other agencies become more involved in

their areas of expertise. In the draft national framework, FEMA

has been named as the primary Federal agency for housing and

emergency services; however, the Lessons Learned Report issued

by the White House recommended that other Federal agencies and

organizations take the lead in these critical functions.

For example, recommendation number 69 stated, ‘‘Designate

HUD as the lead Federal agency for the provision of temporary

housing.’’ However, FEMA and not HUD will take the lead for

housing, according to the draft response framework.

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I am not sure that the White House was correct when it made

the recommendations, but I would like to understand FEMA’s view

of the matter. Why has FEMA decided not to follow the recommendations made by the White House report with respect to

temporary housing?

Mr. PAULISON. Actually, we are going to be leaning very heavily

on HUD for this long-term housing. FEMA should take the lead in

the short-term emergency housing, but we have been working with

an MOU with HUD right now to take over all of these people that

are in rental assistance places like apartments. That does belong

to HUD, and we are looking to transfer all of that this fall to HUD,

who are the experts in this type of housing. So it takes both of us

together, working with HHS and other agencies to make sure that

we can spread the workload, the expertise around the Federal Government, as opposed to all of it falling in FEMA’s lap. Put it where

the expertise is, and right now that long-term housing place, nobody does it better than HUD, so we are working with them to do

that.

Chairman WAXMAN. In the national draft framework, FEMA was

also designated as the primary Federal agency for human services;

however, recommendation No. 63 in the White House report states,

‘‘Assign the Department of Health and Human Services the responsibility for coordinating the provisions of human services during

disasters.’’

The American public doesn’t care what agency provides the response to a disaster, they just want the response to be done correctly, and that is our goal, of course, as well. But I am concerned

that this tug of war about who will perform what functions will impede an effective response and undermine effectiveness. What is

your response to that?

Mr. PAULISON. The response framework is not finished yet. We

are adjudicating some final comments this week, and hopefully we

will be able to get the draft to you within a week or so, hopefully

within a week, to make sure you have that.

We are not going to fight over responsibilities. We are going to

make sure that we know who is responsible for what. Those are

some clear lessons learned in Katrina, so I can assure you that we

will sort this out, putting those responsibilities exactly where they

belong, working as a partnership.

We are one Federal Government and we are going to start acting

like that.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to start my question with Administrator Paulison and the

issues related to command and control.

I know you are familiar with the Select Committee report. In

that report the Select Committee found command and control was

impaired at all levels, which delayed relief, and noted contributing

factors including lack of communications, situational awareness,

personnel training, and funding.

In a July 16, 2007, letter from Secretary Chertoff to Louisiana’s

Governor, describing prescripted assignments of the principal Federal officials—the PFO, the deputy PFO, and the Federal coordinatVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:23 Sep 03, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\43332.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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ing official, the FCO—the letter stated that the PFO is the DHS’

Secretary’s representative in the field during a disaster and helps

ensure smooth coordination among other senior officials.

What are the roles of the PFO and the FCO, and how you contribute to seamless command and control if one reports to you and

the other to Secretary Chertoff?

Mr. PAULISON. First of all, very seldom will there be a PFO

named unless it is some type of catastrophic event or something

that is not necessarily a Stafford Act event. For instance, if we had

several small terrorist attacks across the country that did not raise

to the level of disaster declaration in any particular State, you

wouldn’t have an FCO. The PFO would be that primary Federal official out there.

The PFO is the Secretary’s representative out there, and the

PFO will help coordinate all of those Federal groups together, but

the FCO handles the operational piece. The PFO does not have line

authority. The FCO does not report to that person. So I don’t see

a conflict here at all.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. What would Brown have been? Would he

have been the PFO or the FCO? How would you have considered

Michael Brown in a case like that?

Mr. PAULISON. One of the things that happened during Katrina,

and maybe rightfully so, was the PFO and the FCO were pretty

much the same person. That is not going to happen again. They are

two different jobs, two different entities. But, regardless, we are all

going to work through the joint field office. What we won’t have is

the PFO giving information. The Secretary does not go through the

joint field office and does not come to me also, so we are working

it out where the PFO and the FCO have totally different jobs, but

will coordinate together and work together very closely.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Have State and local preparedness officials bought into this concept of the PFO and the CFO? Can you

ensure the committee these roles will contribute to better communications?

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. One of the major failures inside during

Katrina was the breakdown in communication between the local

and the State government, and between the State government and

the Federal Government, and even inside the Federal Government,

itself. Our unified command system that we set up and have tested

and have actually had exercises all the way up including the President’s Cabinet will stop that from happening again.

The joint field office will be the focal point of that unified command system, so we are all sharing information. We all know what

each other knows, and there are no stovepipes. That was one of the

biggest failures during Katrina.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Let me go back to the July 16th letter

from Secretary Chertoff to Governor Blanco. It described the

prescripted assignments of the PFO, the Deputy PFO, the CFO.

The lieutenant states that ‘‘States should contact DHS’ Risk Management Analysis Unit within the National Programs and Protection Directorate,’’ the NPPD. Why is this being run by the NPPD

and not by FEMA?

Mr. PAULISON. That is just for the administrative part of the

PFO. In fact, in the 2008 budget that will transfer to the Director

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of Operations, Admiral Roof, to oversee that part of it. But as far

as managing the Federal assets on the ground, deciding which supplies go where, that will be handled by FEMA through the FCO.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Why is the NPPD even involved with

this in the first place?

Mr. PAULISON. I think that seemed like a good place to put it at

the time. Again, transferring that over to the Director of Operations, and that is who will manage the administrative part of the

PFO. But the PFO reports directly to the Secretary, does not report

through any body else.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. The Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act

of 2006 and the Stafford Act doesn’t appear to designate NPPD as

part of the authorities involved in emergency designation and leadership, so how do they get in it?

Mr. PAULISON. Well, they needed someone to oversee the training, the selection of the PFOs. The PFOs and the NCOs are selected. FEMA is part of that system selecting the FCOs. We do all

the FCOs and also sit on the panel for the PFOs. We also participate in the training of the PFOs. They just needed somebody in the

Secretary’s office to coordinate that. That is why it was the NPPD.

That, again, will be the Director of Operations will coordinate that

for the Secretary.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Our theory, of course, is for FEMA, that

you can go and conscript the resources of Government from anywhere in Government. That is where it is. A lot of us thought it

ought to be right there in the White House at a time of emergency.

Instead, it is sitting under DHS, and now we see NPPD and other

groups getting into it. Frankly, this makes me a little nervous.

I just want to ask one last question. Last week, as you know, we

had a hearing on the problems of formaldehyde in the FEMA trailers. FEMA was caught off guard in its mass housing strategy. In

his written testimony, Al Ashwood, Oklahoma State Director of

Emergency Management, who is on our second panel, he is highly

critical of your post-Katrina housing strategy.

Just to remind everybody, the Select Committee report states,

‘‘FEMA failed to take advantage of the Department of Housing and

Urban Development’s expertise and large-scale housing challenges.

So my question is: how does FEMA plan the coordination of

short, medium, and long-term housing? What is different now in

the post-Katrina environment, and is Mr. Ashwood overreacting, or

is housing still a major concern?

Mr. PAULISON. Mr. Ashwood is not over-reacting. We did not take

advantage of HUD’s capabilities in the aftermath of Katrina. One

of the lessons learned. We know we are going to do that now. We

are working very closely with HUD. If the MOU is not signed now,

it will be signed very shortly to make sure that we move that longterm housing piece over to HUD and just use FEMA for the emergency housing to get people immediate help, put them in immediate safe housing, and then transfer it over to HUD. That will

take place this fall.

Mr. KUCINICH [presiding]. Major General, I would just like to ask

some questions about the readiness of the National Guard. Do you

have enough Guardsmen and Guardswomen to be able to respond

to a national emergency if another hurricane was to, let’s say, hit

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the Gulf Coast and cause tremendous damage and dislocation to

people? And could you tell this committee the degree of preparation

the Guard has made with respect to the number of personnel, the

kinds of equipment, and whether you are truly ready, aside from

any paper plans?

General SCHERLING. Yes, sir. To focus first on personnel, I will

tell you that the personnel availability within the States is very

good at this time. While we have approximately 50,00 personnel

deployed overseas, we have approximately 10,000 personnel day to

day here in the United States involved in domestic operations.

That leaves us approximately 390,000 personnel to be available in

the event of another disaster here in the United States.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you, Major General. Now I would like you

to square your response that you just gave this committee with the

response that the Senate committee heard on U.S. disaster response earlier this month from Army Lieutenant General Steven

Blum, head of the U.S. National Guard, who stated that in the case

of a major disaster without advanced notice, that the National

Guard is unprepared to respond? He said, ‘‘In a no-notice event we

are at risk, and we are at significant risk.’’ I would like you to

square the statement that you just gave to this committee with the

statement of Lieutenant General Blum. Thank you.

General SCHERLING. Yes, sir. I believe that General Blum was referring in particular to equipment, sir. And the reason I say that

is, because of the first of the year, the equipage rate of the National Guard was approximately 40 percent, and it has been our

policy within the National Guard that if a State has an equipment

requirement and the National Guard has equipment available in

our inventory, we will make sure that they have it. In order to prepare for this hurricane season, what we have done is focused on

the hurricane States, and in doing so we have held several hurricane conferences which FEMA has participated in and conducted

our own gap analysis on the equipment available to each and every

State.

What we have done subsequent to that is to also determine

where we would match shortages with availability from other

States. So, for example, the State of Louisiana may have particular

shortages and we have actually used the emergency management

assistance compacts to determine which States would be most

available to provide equipment to match their shortages.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you. And let me ask you this. Are you saying that you have enough manpower?

General SCHERLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. KUCINICH. And are you saying you have enough equipment?

General SCHERLING. Sir, we have enough manpower. The National Guard is short of our dual-use equipment.

Mr. KUCINICH. So you are saying that Lieutenant General Blum

was speaking only about equipment and wasn’t speaking about the

issue of whether or not you have enough people?

General SCHERLING. Yes, sir. I believe that to be the case.

Mr. KUCINICH. But if you have enough people and you don’t have

enough equipment, what does that say to the overall preparedness

of the National Guard?

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General SCHERLING. Sir, while we may not have enough equipment in particular States, what we have done is prepare for the upcoming season by making available other equipment from other

States to cover those shortages, and that would be General Blum’s

response, I believe, as well.

Mr. KUCINICH. So your response is that you only have shortages

of equipment in certain States?

General SCHERLING. Yes.

Now, Mr. Paulison, are you in close contact with the National

Guard relative to their level of preparedness?

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. In fact, we have the closest relationship

with the Department of Defense, the National Guard than we have

ever had. We meet with them on a regular basis. We have weekly

videoconferences that they participate in. We have developed an extremely good relationship and are working hand in hand together.

We are doing exercises together, making sure we know where the

shortfalls are in particular States. Like I said, we did the gap analysis already.

Mr. KUCINICH. Shortfalls? Have they given you a budget for

equipment?

Mr. PAULISON. No, sir, they have not given us a budget for equipment.

Mr. KUCINICH. Do you know if they have needs for equipment

that have not been met?

Mr. PAULISON. The system that we use is the emergency management assistance compact, so if they have a disaster in a particular State and there is something lacking, we can move that very

quickly from one State to another.

Mr. KUCINICH. Now, I want to go back to what Army Lieutenant

General Blum said to a Senate committee. He said that in a nonotice event we are at risk, we are at significant risk. You are just

telling this committee that you seem to have no problems about

whether they have the equipment they need, but you haven’t really

submitted a budget. You are saying that you have some equipment

needs but you can move them around from State to State. Since nonotice events really limit mobility, but by common sense I am just,

again, asking you—and we are going to go back to another round

on this—about what equipment needs are out there that haven’t

been met. Has there been a budget? Is there communication on

real, practical matters?

I am going to go to the next questioner. This is the ranking member of the Domestic Policy Subcommittee, a person who I serve

with, who serves with distinction, and who I am glad to work with

today, Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think this epitomizes a bipartisan hearing, and I am going to followup right where you left

off.

General, we all know what hangar queens are, especially since

I am an Army aviator, so we only know about helicopters we can’t

get out, but when we look at your shortfalls in equipment, as the

chairman was asking, what is the net number that you can deploy?

If you have 360,000 people potentially—and we all know there will

be sick, lame, and lazy that will fall out of that. We all know there

are people whose skill sets would be inappropriate, or for some

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other reason be inappropriate to deploy, so you get a lesser number.

Let’s say, for argument’s sake, that is 300,000. Now we talk

about the equipment you have that is appropriate for dual use.

How many people with full equipment can you put on a target, let’s

just say in each of the four regions in a 24 hour basis? So take the

southeast, the southwest, the northwest, the northeast, and let’s

just assume for a moment that a hurricane hits and the Fort Dix

guys do something on steroids, what can you put in each of those

zones?

General SCHERLING. As I mentioned earlier, we have approximately 390,000 people that would be available. Now, being a planner, one might put 100,000 in each of the four zones. What I would

tell you is that the availability of equipment is much like living in

a small town like I grew up in North Dakota, where you may have

a fire in your house, and say it is a two-truck fire, where you would

typically need two fire trucks to put this fire out, and you only

have one fire truck available, but you have to get the fire truck

from the neighboring town to get the fire out.

Mr. ISSA. General, I understand that, and I think we all understand that, exactly like forest fires—and I am from the west, so we

understand that there has never been a forest fire fought in California that wasn’t fought with out-of-Staters, and there has never

been anything else in the west that wasn’t fought with California

firefighters. However, my question really is: how many people with

full equipment can you put to the next Katrina? And let’s assume

that 24 hours into that disaster, whatever amount you give me, you

have an equal disaster in one of the other four quadrants. What

is your reserve? When do you run out of people in each of those

four regions?

The reason we are asking is that the likelihood of another

Katrina may be low, but the likelihood of two more events is what

we have been asking FEMA to be ready for for a long time.

So have a Katrina, then have the bad guys take advantage of

that situation and do something catastrophic. Let’s just divide it in

four. How many people can you have in four regions with equipment?

General SCHERLING. Congressman, the reason that I would separate equipment and personnel is really that when we respond to

disasters we do so with 10 essential different areas of equipment,

to include transportation, logistics, aviation, and it requires different numbers of people to sustain each different type of equipment, so——

Mr. ISSA. OK. Let me change to another subject then. I think I

will go to the IG, because I am a little frustrated. If I need 100,000

temporary dwellings in the southeast today without formaldehyde,

do you believe that these agencies are prepared to deliver those

today? And we are not talking about the ones that are already

there. I think that is clear.

Mr. JADACKI. I don’t think we can buy 100,000 temporary dwellings, whether they are travel trailers or mobile homes, without

formaldehyde. I don’t think there is any guarantee to do that. I

think, as some Members alluded to before, the fact that there are

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other agencies out there that probably have better capability to do

that.

There is Housing and Urban Development. Housing is in the

name. They should be doing housing. And I think, under the National Response Plan, and when there is a catastrophic event,

FEMA needs to look at these other Federal agencies where the expertise is. There are Stafford Act authorities that can be used early

on to provide temporary housing until the situation is stabilized. I

think, mid-to long-term, I think they do need to look for the experts

in the Federal Government to do that, including going out and buying 100,000 housing units.

Mr. ISSA. I only have time for two quick followups. One would

be for the IG, and that is basically: what effect do you believe the

global war on terror, which is translated into preparedness by

FEMA, has affected its ability to deal with other routine—I hate

to say hurricanes are routine, but they do happen more often than

terrorist attacks. How much has been diverted because of that portion of preparedness?

And, Mr. Paulison, so that I don’t leave you out, in Hurricane

Katrina we had a de minimis amount of need for hospitals, by comparison to other forms of disaster. It wasn’t there it was none, but

on a scale most ever had to do with people who didn’t have power,

didn’t have food, or whose medical emergencies were not caused directly by the hurricane. What are you doing to change that to be

prepared in the next disaster, hospitalized?

In either order, quickly.

Mr. PAULISON. We have particularly worked very closely with our

gap analysis in looking at hospitals, which hospitals can shelter in

place, what do they need to do that, and just particularly in Louisiana we have put six huge generators down there, installed them,

fueled them for those hospitals that can shelter in place and are

not part of a flood zone.

Some cannot shelter in place, and those we make sure that,

working with the State, we have very good, rock solid evacuation

plans. Where are they going to go? How are they going to get

there? Who is going to take them? Who is responsible for that? And

not only the hospitals, but the nursing homes, where we had some

of the issues down there.

Those are the types of things we have put in place for hospitals.

Am I answering your question?

Mr. ISSA. Yes. Thank you.

Just on the IG quickly, because my time is expiring.

Mr. JADACKI. Yes. After 2003 when Homeland Security formed,

a lot of the emphasis was on terrorist attacks and those types

things. I think the focus on natural disasters really was minimal.

After 2004, the hurricanes hit Florida. That was a little taste of

the capability of the Federal Government, but I think that Katrina

was the eye-opener. I think it brought to the attention to the American public, to everybody, that we can’t ignore.

The consequences are the same, whether it is a natural disaster

or it is a man-made disaster. There is still that response and recovery capability that is needed by the Federal Government and the

State and local government.

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Mr. KUCINICH. I want to thank the ranking member on our subcommittee and just to comment to you that this line of questioning

I hope other Members are going to pick up between the disparity

between having enough people and equipment, because if you are

a truck driver and you don’t have a truck, hello. So I want to thank

the gentleman for exploring that.

I am asking for unanimous consent for the committee to permit

the inclusion in this hearing of our good friend from Louisiana, the

distinguished gentleman, Mr. Jindal, to participate in this hearing

as a member of the committee and to be able to ask questions.

Without objection, so ordered.

The Chair at this point will recognize Eleanor Holmes Norton,

the distinguished representative of the District of Columbia.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I have a question about DHS dominance and the attending dominance of terrorism over natural disasters. I do want to say, for Mr.

Paulison and Mr. Jadacki, perhaps, I do want to say to Mr.

Paulison you are getting a great deal of oversight, including by my

own subcommittee, which has the primary jurisdiction over FEMA

and will be doing a comprehensive hearing in New Orleans on the

Katrina anniversary in late August. You have had hearings here

in this committee on formaldehyde most recently. We have had

hearings on ice and food. There has been a tendency on the part

of Katrina to respond to under-preparation and Katrina to overpreparation. It suggests the absence, even given the difficulties of

calibrating, it really does suggest the absence of skilled personnel

in these matters.

My question, though, goes in part to my membership on the Department of Homeland Security and my membership on this committee and, of course, our subcommittee. We passed the PostKatrina Emergency Reform Act to deal with DHS dominance, to try

to give FEMA more independence, and yet I really don’t see evidence of that.

Let me give you an example. First of all, apparently to declare

a national emergency one has to still go through bureaucracies all

the way to OMB, suggesting DHS is still in charge, no matter

whether the expertise would naturally flow to FEMA. But let’s look

at what is happening with emergency exercises, as a case in point.

We know we are dealing with all hazards, and, indeed, it is a failure if you have to attune to disaster. You should be able to handle

disasters across the board.

In the national emergency exercises for the hypothetical emergency scenarios, isn’t it interesting that, although you can expect

that there will be floods and hurricanes and earthquakes and snow

storms, although that is clearly the expectation, in your hypothetical emergency scenarios, where you have 15 scenarios in total,

12 of the scenarios are terrorist attacks.

I can understand post-9/11 everybody would want to, in fact,

make sure that we could do something in the event of terrorist attack, but that kind of dominance of a terrorism approach makes

you wonder whether you understand what American people have to

deal with every single year. Why are there only three scenarios

that deal with natural disaster—an earthquake in California, an

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earthquake on the New Madrid Fault Line, and a pandemic flu

outbreak?

I would like to know why there aren’t more real-time disaster exercises. For example, the District of Columbia on July 4th does a

very simple real-time, putting all the red lights on just to make

sure everybody can stop and go. They go on for a longer period of

time than usual. You know, that really comes out of the District

of Columbia.

I wonder, for example, whether you have had anything to do with

real-time exercises any place else. Suppose you had to evacuate

San Francisco or the District of Columbia. Could we do that?

Would people know to stay in place or evacuate? How would FEMA

respond? And why are there so many scenarios for terrorist disasters and so few for natural disasters?

Mr. PAULISON. First of all, that is an excellent question. We are

making sure that we don’t go one way or the other. I know FEMA

gets accused sometimes of focusing strictly on natural disasters and

not the terrorist events. We have just taken over, just this last

spring, all of the exercises, and I can tell you that I have done tabletop exercises for hurricane seasons. We did preparedness workshops and exercises in region two at the Caribbean office, region

two, region six, the Pacific area office, through March to June. I did

hurricane preparedness workshops in several different areas.

Ms. NORTON. I am really talking about the Presidential Security

Council. Are you doing those? Are you now doing the fifteen scenarios and not the Presidential Security Council, which had twelve

terrorist and three natural?

Mr. PAULISON. Yes. The 15 scenarios are out there for people to

train to, to do those types of things. I feel like we do enough natural disaster exercises across this country. All of our catastrophic

planning——

Ms. NORTON. What about real-time exercises?

Mr. KUCINICH. The gentlelady’s time has expired.

Ms. NORTON. Could he just answer that about real-time exercises, like the one that was in the District of Columbia?

Mr. PAULISON. We do that on a regular basis, particularly with

hurricanes and things like that, and earthquakes. We do the evacuation piece.

Ms. NORTON. Where have you done real-time exercises?

Mr. PAULISON. It has to be table top.

Ms. NORTON. Where have you done real-time exercises?

Mr. PAULISON. If you are talking about real-time exercises, every

State has a hurricane exercise, and we always participate in those

with the States, because that is where the impact is. Those are either real time or tabletop. For a hurricane it is tough to do a realtime type of exercise for that type of thing, because you can’t evacuate people. You don’t want to ship supplies, so you do a tabletop

to make sure you have things in place. That seems to work best

for us.

Mr. KUCINICH. The gentlelady’s time has expired.

I am going to recognize Mr. Shays from Connecticut.

Mr. SHAYS. I had the opportunity to serve on the Select Committee under the guidance of Chairman Davis. It was a hard-hitting

report. I think that my reaction to Katrina was that we could deal

69

with an administration that was being arrogant and competent,

but it was tough to deal with an administration that was being arrogant and incompetent, and Katrina looked so incompetent to all

of us. I realize it was a 500-year storm, so nobody is going to be

able to deal with it in the way we would want, but I would have

at least liked someone of authority to have gone into the Superdome and said, I am not leaving this place until all our fellow

Americans are out safe. It was almost like everybody avoided going

in there. It was a very shameful feeling for me.

By the way, Mr. Paulison, thank you for your work and your

work as the Acting Director and now as the Director, but what I

am hearing is that we are looking at this in a strategic way, which

is good, but I would like you to kind of outline some of the tactical

and operational areas that you are looking to improve. Not all of

them, because it would take you a long time, but just give me an

outline.

Mr. PAULISON. First of all, what happened at Katrina should not

happen in this country, and I am going to do everything in my

power to make sure it doesn’t happen again. I am going to make

sure that this organization is capable of responding.

We have taken all of those lessons learned from the reports that

came out of the House, out of the Senate, out of the White House,

the IG’s report, GAO—I mean, there is a ton of them. There were

similar themes to every one of them: tremendous breakdown in

communications; not having visibility on the ground in what is

really happening and getting all those multiple stories back; not

having a good victim registration in place; having people scattered

across this country and not knowing where they are or who they

were or what their needs were; not being able to provide the right

kind of logistics, having the right things in the right places at the

right time. So we are taking those and focusing on those major

issues that were a breakdown in the system.

Right now we can register over 200,000 people a day that we

could not do before. We have put five mobile registration vans in

place where we can go out to where people are, because they could

not come to our registration centers, and they are equipped with

satellite-based laptop computers and satellite-based cell phones.

We saw this work very well in Greensburg, KS, where people actually sat down at a table and sat on a computer and registered

themselves or pick up the phone and call that 1–800–621-FEMA

number to get registered, putting a logistics system in place that

brings it into the 21st century.

I know Eleanor Norton Holmes has helped us with that and recognized very clearly that we cannot continue to stockpile millions

and millions of dollars worth of ice and just let it go away; we have

to bring in a third-party logistics systems, which is what we have

done as——

Mr. SHAYS. Let me use that as a transition. One of the things

that I found most astonishing was how bureaucratic FEMA was

and how we had let out contracts. I have in Connecticut some of

the largest producers of bottled water. They were willing to give it

below cost, and in some cases free. They had to go through some

individual who didn’t have an office in Georgia, I think it was, who

had a contract, who basically was kind of trying to direct this out

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of what seemed like his kitchen. That was an absolute absurdity.

My folks came to me and said, Forget it. We are not going to go

through this individual.

I hope we are looking at how we give out contracts and have the

capability, if they are not instantly able to perform or if there is

an overwhelming effort, to be able to nullify those contracts.

Mr. PAULISON. There is no question that a tremendous amount

of bureaucracy built up over the 30 years that this organization has

been in existence, and we are trying to very quickly get rid of some

of that to move much faster and be much more nimble. It has been

tough, I have to tell you, be honest with you. It has been difficult

at times to do some of that. The Stafford Act needs to be looked

at again to make sure it gives us better tools to do what we need

to do.

But what you are saying should not happen.

Mr. SHAYS. Right.

Mr. PAULISON. We should be able to use the supplies where they

are.

Mr. SHAYS. Right. And instead of bringing them all the way from

Connecticut, if they are already down close to the area. But I particularly have concerns about these contracts which seem to me

like all they do is skim from the top.

Let me just make this final point to you. When this committee

helped create the Department of Homeland Security, we wanted

the Department of Homeland Security to be added value to FEMA.

I have told this to the Secretary. I was dumbfounded that he basically stood back and said, I want FEMA to be FEMA. We wanted

FEMA to be FEMA plus have a Department of Homeland Security

adding value, to be able to call in all the other resources that the

Department has.

Mr. KUCINICH. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. SHAYS. I would just like to know, Do you feel there is a better working relationship with the Secretary, etc?

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. I have a great relationship with the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary. Being inside of Homeland Security has given me access to assets that I may not have. I meet

every week with the operational components of Homeland Security.

That gives me access to people on a first-name basis that I can just

pick up the phone and ask for assistance.

I feel like I get a tremendous benefit out of what is inside Homeland Security.

Mr. SHAYS. Terrific.

Mr. KUCINICH. I want to thank the gentleman for the practical

line of questioning that is being asked here. It is really essential.

The Chair recognizes Representative Clay from Missouri. Mr.

Clay.

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for conducting

this hearing.

You know, FEMA failed Americans during Hurricane Katrina,

and they continue to fail those who were displaced by the storm.

Last week’s hearing did not reassure me that FEMA is anything

short of a dysfunctional agency that epitomizes mismanagement

and waste.

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In addition to potentially putting the health of displaced hurricane victims at risk by exposing them to formaldehyde, reports of

disaster ice being stored for 2 years at a cost of $12.5 million to

taxpayers was irresponsible.

Mr. Paulison, is it true that FEMA contracts require disposal of

the ice 3 months after its purchase date?

Mr. PAULISON. We are disposing of all that ice we purchased in 2005 and 2006 at a cost of $3.5 million to get rid of the ice. We

are no longer going to store ice. We are using a third-party system

with the Corps of Engineers. They can deliver 3.5 million pounds

of ice within 24 hours, and then whatever else we need within 72

hours.

This is a new system that we are going to. If we had not stored

ice and food and had the type of hurricane season that was predicted in 2006, we would have not had the supplies we needed to

do the job we did, like we learned at Katrina.

Mr. CLAY. Wait a minute. Who advised FEMA to go against its

own policy and store this ice for 2 years?

Mr. PAULISON. The ice was still good. We had it tested on a regular basis. We kept it for as long as we could. We recognized that

we could not keep it any longer, and we did not want to use it, so

we are disposing of the ice. It is an expendable commodity, like

anything else that has a shelf life, so we are getting rid of it.

Again, we learned from those lessons. Since we cannot depend on

predictions for hurricane seasons—we were supposed to have a

heavy hurricane season last year and it did not happen. So instead

of storing those massive quantities of food and ice, we are looking

at a just-in-time delivery system, like the rest of the business community uses. I want to bring FEMA into the 21st century logistics,

and that is why we are bringing top-notch logistics people in who

know how to operate in this type of a system.

Mr. CLAY. OK. I have a limited amount of time, Mr. Paulison.

So apparently cost is no object here? I mean, that is what it seems

like, and it seems like in your response you indicated that was the

policy then and you kept storing the ice for almost 2 years. So apparently cost is no object when it is the taxpayers’ dollars.

Mr. PAULISON. No, sir, that is not accurate. I am sorry, I can’t

let that go. We stored what we thought was enough supplies to get

us through that 2006 hurricane season. We didn’t have any hurricanes, so we had excess supplies. Learning from that, we are no

longer going to do that.

Mr. CLAY. OK. Let’s go to the next one then, Mr. Paulison. GAO

estimated that FEMA, in responding to Hurricane Katrina, made

between $600 million and $1.4 billion in improper and possibly

fraudulent payments. How has FEMA addressed concerns over

these payments that were made in the aftermath of Hurricane

Katrina?

Mr. PAULISON. A couple of things. I don’t know about the dollar

amount, but GAO is correct: FEMA did a lot of payments that they

should not have done. They did not have a system in place to accurately identify a person were who they said they were and they

lived where they said they lived. So we have put a system in place

where we can now do that. We have an identity verification company, a system in place so when you come for payment we can tell

72

you are who you said you are and you lived where you said you

lived.

The second piece of that is some of the contracts that FEMA did

during Katrina were done on the fly, and we don’t want to do that.

We have those contracts in place ahead of time. We are negotiating

from a position of strength, as opposed to negotiating from a position of weakness when you are in the middle of a storm and you

need that type of assistance.

Mr. CLAY. And at that time, again, taxpayer money was no object

here. Let me——

Mr. PAULISON. No, sir. That is why I was brought in, to fix those

issues, and that is what I am doing.

Mr. CLAY. And I hope you do.

Mr. PAULISON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. CLAY. Let me go on to Mr. Jadacki.

Mr. Jadacki, an agency like FEMA cannot properly prepare for

nor respond to a disaster without effective leadership. What personnel changes have been made to address ineffective leadership

within FEMA since the hurricane?

Mr. JADACKI. Some of the changes that were made in FEMA, we

have been providing a lot of oversight over contracting and those

types of things. There was a goal by the Director to ensure that 90

to 95 percent of the vacancies be filled by the beginning of hurricane season. They recently achieved that goal. There is a number

of industry experts that are now working for FEMA in senior leadership positions that have practical disaster management experience from the outside that they are bringing in to FEMA right now.

But, again, a lot of these new initiatives aren’t tested, so it remains

to be seen what is going to happen when a major disaster occurs,

but the signs are encouraging. We have seen some of the leadership positions being filled and some of the capabilities along with

those positions are coming in place.

Mr. KUCINICH. The gentleman’s time is expired.

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KUCINICH. I thank the gentleman.

The Chair recognizes my colleague from Ohio, Representative

Jordan. Thank you.

Mr. JORDAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the panel

being with us.

I had underlined the same sentence that Congressman Clay just

pointed out in the memorandum that was prepared for us by the

majority and the minority staff members, highlighting the $600

million to $1.4 billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments.

Mr. Paulison is that an accurate estimate, or is it more or less?

Can you elaborate more? And also talk about some of the things

you said in response to Congressman Clay’s question. What checks?

What balances? What auditing mechanism do you have in place so

that if, in fact, that is accurate, it doesn’t happen again?

Mr. PAULISON. The estimate of the amount of dollars of $1.4 billion, we don’t think it was that high, but regardless, there were not

good systems in place to stop that waste, fraud, and abuse that we

saw, so we put several things in place. One, the identity verification. It was going to help us tremendously, being able to give the

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right people the amount of money they are due and not give it to

the people who don’t deserve it.

The second piece is having contracts in place ahead of time,

where we are negotiating the contract as opposed to the contractor.

FEMA put in place a tremendous amount of contracts in the middle of the hurricane, and we did not get a good deal, quite frankly,

on a lot of those contracts. They were no bid. The contracts were

not written into the best interest of the taxpayer or the best interest of FEMA, the Federal Government.

So what we have done now is put those contracts in place ahead

of time, what we call readiness contracts, where they are sitting on

the shelf ready to go. We had the upper hand negotiating them.

They are bid out, they are not no bid, to make sure we can stop

that waste, fraud, and abuse. We want to be good stewards of taxpayers’ money. Disasters cost a lot of money, but we should be able

to spend it wisely, and that is what we are trying to do.

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Jadacki, would you care to comment at all?

Mr. JADACKI. Yes. One of the problems they had after Hurricane

Katrina was the capacity of the system to accept applications, as

Mr. Paulison alluded to. It had the capacity to take in about 100

registrations a day. So in order to increase capacity, some of the

controls were dropped, and one of the critical controls was validating Social Security numbers, whether they were valid or not. Depending on how you applied for assistance, they would either check

it or wouldn’t check it. In some cases we found a lot of Social Security numbers were all zeroes or sequential and those types of

things, but the system accepted them and provided checks to those

individuals.

Some of the other items that GAO pointed out in its report were

checks going to Federal prisons and those types of things. In some

cases, yes, they were fraudulent and we are looking into it. We

have active investigations. In some cases, some of the prisoners actually had residences that were destroyed and they are eligible for

those types of things.

So the numbers appear to be a little high from GAO, but, nevertheless, there was a pretty good amount of fraud, waste, and abuse,

a lot of because there were citizens that were fraudulently applying

for assistance, but in some parts the checks and balances on the

back end just weren’t there.

Mr. JORDAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance

of my time.

Mr. KUCINICH. I thank the gentleman. The Chair recognizes Representative Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Mr. Paulison.

I wanted to talk a little bit about how we get to the point of a

disaster being declared. No doubt when you talk about an incident

such as Katrina, about that declaration, but there are dozens if not

hundreds of smaller disasters that happen all around the country

on a yearly basis. I come from an experience in Connecticut where

we had, I think, a fairly unfortunate interaction with FEMA this

spring when we had, on April 15th and 16th, some historic, major

flooding in northwestern Connecticut and throughout the State.

The next day our Governor was in touch with FEMA to ask for a

74

disaster declaration, and it took nearly a month before that disaster was declared. It took, in fact, 2 months before homeowners and

individual businesses were allowed to even apply for disaster assistance.

Representative Shays inquired about some of the bureaucratic

hurdles that exist within FEMA in relation to disaster response. It

certainly seems that, at least in this case, there remain some fairly

significant and troubling bureaucratic hurdles, even for the declaration of a disaster.

In Connecticut we simply couldn’t understand, as we stood outside and looked at flooding that we had never seen before, why it

would take a month in order for the Federal Government to declare

what we knew over night: that a major, unprecedented disaster

had hit our State.

I have some specific questions on that but first want to ask you

in general whether you still see bureaucratic hurdles to disaster

declarations within FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security.

Mr. PAULISON. We do have still a lot of work to do on the declaration process. No question about it. The ones that are really obvious and overwhelming are easy. We have been turning those

around in less than 24 hours. The ones like in Connecticut and

some other areas where, although it maybe devastated you, the

thresholds that we set down for individual and public assistance

sometimes aren’t quite there and we have to do what we call preliminary damage assessments.

We worked very hard with Connecticut, with the State, to get to

yes. And it took a while, probably longer than it should, but at

least we finally got there.

We have to do something to streamline the process even better

to make it move faster, and in some cases the general guidelines

that we have that we are applying across the country don’t necessarily work for smaller States, and that is why we are bringing

in the small State and rural advocate into FEMA, to help us come

up with some of those things.

For instance, 100 homes damaged in Texas is a lot different than

100 homes damaged in Connecticut or a smaller State out there,

but that is kind of like some of the rough guidelines we use. So we

need to re-look at that whole system, look at that individual assistance piece, and how do we make it equitable from one State to another based on size, based on population, all those types of things.

Those are things we are looking at. What happened with Connecticut, with taking 2 months for that, we don’t want to happen

again.

Mr. MURPHY. That is the second question. How long is too long?

A disaster is a disaster. In Connecticut we have small towns that

simply didn’t have the resources available to them on a short-term

basis in order to make some of the immediate emergency infrastructure improvements that they needed to make. I mean, in your

mind how long should it take in order for a disaster to be declared,

even if it is a smaller, more localized disaster like we had in the

northeast?

Mr. PAULISON. As quick as we can do the preliminary damage assessments and get the numbers that we need. Again, it goes back

75

to the thresholds that we set down to either declare a disaster or

not, and I am not comfortable that those are where they need to

be, again particularly with the smaller States. So we have to work

very hard. Sometimes it takes longer to find all of the damage. We

go back to the State, which we did with Connecticut, and say, look,

the numbers aren’t there. We do the preliminary damage assessments together. FEMA doesn’t do them by themselves. We do it

hand-in-hand with the State to go out and do that.

Something that is major we have been turning around in 1 or 2

days, and my goal would be to not take more than a week or so

to get those declarations through the process and give you a yes or

a no so that——

Mr. MURPHY. Before my time is up I want to ask one more question. It is my understanding that one of the hurdles is that right

now, in order to declare a disaster, you have to check with the

White House’s Office of Budget and Management. It concerns me

that a budgetary agency is having input on decisions as to whether

a disaster occurred. It seems like that is a wholly separate question. As we have moved FEMA into DHS, it seems to me that some

of the independence of those decisions is being compromised.

Do you have to check with OMB before you make a disaster declaration?

Mr. PAULISON. We don’t check with OMB. I make my recommendation to the President, and that does go through the Office

of Budget and Management. They are the receiver of that for the

President.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you have to wait for——

Mr. PAULISON. But we don’t pick up the phone and check with

them and say, Gee is this right? I send my recommendation over

to them, and then they process it for the President.

Mr. MURPHY. If OMB comes back and gives a negative input or

feedback on your requests, can you still declare a disaster?

Mr. PAULISON. The President has to sign the declaration. All I

do, I make a recommendation to the President.

Mr. KUCINICH. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you.

Mr. KUCINICH. I thank the gentleman.

The Chair is pleased to recognize Mr. McHenry.

Mr. MCHENRY. I thank my friend for recognizing me, and I yield

a 15-second intervention.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Paulison, I think Mr. Murphy and I are very

grateful that you responded to our concerns. It took a little longer,

but ultimately we got what we needed. We are very grateful to you

on that.

I think, though, there is another little point that we realized.

You need to look at metropolitan areas, because it may be the

State is divided up in a way that neither side has enough, but the

area has critical mass. I hope you pursue that. I don’t want to comment now on that because the gentleman has yielded to me, but

thank you.

I thank our other two witnesses, as well.

Mr. MCHENRY. I thank my friend, Mr. Shays.

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Mr. Paulison, we appreciate your leadership. You have had an

enormous record of public service. This is a culmination of a career

well trained for you.

There are a couple of things that I think are important as you

have an ongoing rebuilding FEMA, ensuring that not only the National Guard but State and local authorities are incorporated and

the private sector. Located in my District is Lowe’s Home Improvements. Well, they have a financial interest in making sure 2 by 4s

and rakes and shovels and chain saws get to affected areas, and

they do this very well. They have a whole facility dedicated to this.

I am sure Home Depot, as well as the big box retailers like WalMart, all have that facility up and running.

What have you done to coordinate the private sector response?

Mr. PAULISON. One of the biggest issues that I see in hurricanes,

particularly being raised in south Florida, is getting those businesses back up and running as quickly as possible and building

that resiliency. The Stafford Act does not allow us to assist private

businesses. What we can do is work with them and lecture to them

and talk to them how do they build resiliency into their business

so they can get back up and running.

Mr. MCHENRY. With all due respect, Mr. Paulison, that is not the

issue. I am asking if you are asking them for help.

Mr. PAULISON. I misunderstood.

Mr. MCHENRY. I will tell you——

Mr. PAULISON. We are. Yes, sir. Can I finish?

Mr. MCHENRY. I will tell you that they have the capability, they

have the technology, they have the ability, and, based on what I

have seen out of FEMA prior to your service, FEMA doesn’t have

it, but these private sector entities do.

So I am not asking you to assist a private sector company; I am

asking if you are asking them to assist you, because I will tell you

this: Wal-Mart could get bottled water there. They could get those

trucks of ice that were never delivered, the tens of millions of dollars we spent on ice for Katrina that was never delivered. I am

sure Wal-Mart could get it there. I am sure Yellow Freight could

find a way to get it there. What are you doing to incorporate them?

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir, we are, and what we are trying to do is

to bring FEMA into the 21st century logistics-wise and use some

of those business models that you just talked about.

We are meeting with the business roundtable, with the National

Chamber of Commerce, with other groups like that to tap into that

expertise. We are working with a couple of groups now to bring

perhaps some interns from the private sector into FEMA to help

us learn from them of how they move these types of logistics. The

people that I am hiring in the logistics area have that type of expertise.

We are definitely looking to that business model. We are talking

with them. We are talking to the Home Depots, we are talking to

the Wal-Mart’s about how do we do that, how do we do a better

job of providing logistics and not necessarily taking it all on ourselves but use that third-party logistics where we can tap into what

they already do and what they do best as far as moving supplies.

Mr. MCHENRY. The thought I have is that, instead of trying to

rebuild what is out there in the private sector, utilize the private

77

sector, whether it is Lowe’s or Wal-Mart or even grocery stores that

have an interest in getting products to the marketplace. They just

need some assistance.

To that end, what about first responders’ ID cards? For instance,

if the home improvement store, like Lowe’s that I am familiar with,

if they have employees that are trying to get to the facility, if we

had an ID card for first responders they would be able to get

through maybe two or three jurisdictions in order to get to the facility that otherwise they couldn’t get to because they don’t have

an identification card that refers to them as first responders. Same

for local fire departments, volunteer fire departments. Where are

we in this process for a first responder ID card?

Mr. PAULISON. We are looking at a credentialing system for this

country for first responders—nurses, doctors, paramedics, all those

types of things. Mr. Geldhart, who is going to testify on the next

panel on the National Capital Region about what they are doing is

a prototype system here, to see if this system is going to work and

how we are going to use that.

But what you are saying is actually right on target. That is

where we want to go. We want to credential people so if I am going

to the disaster scene if I am the local fire chief or the local mayor

I know who is coming into my district and I know what credentials

they have.

Hurricane Andrew, I had 3,500 fire fighters show up to help out.

I didn’t know who they were or were they really fire fighters. At

the World Trade Center we had the same type of thing—people

crawling on that rubble pile that we don’t know who they were.

That has to stop.

The national credentialing system is where we really need to go,

and we are working on that right now.

Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you. I appreciate your comments.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KUCINICH. I thank the gentleman.

As I think everyone is aware now, there is a vote on. We are

going to entertain questions from Mr. Towns of New York, then the

committee will recess for the vote. I am going to ask the witnesses

to return because we have more questions.

Mr. Towns, would you proceed? Thank you.

Mr. TOWNS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Paulison, on May 15th Chairman Thompson of Mississippi,

who is the chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, held a

hearing on hurricane season preparedness. During that hearing,

Mr. Paulison, you were asked for an approximation of the NRP,

when would it be ready, the National Response Plan. This is what

you said: ‘‘I can tell you that we are working hard to get it done

in the June timeframe and not in July.’’ Now, Mr. Paulison, this

is the last day of July, the last day. My question is: what is the

problem?

Mr. PAULISON. It is not a problem; it is the issue of trying to

make sure we get it right. We set some artificial time lines for ourselves to get this thing done. That is when I testified in front of

Mr. Thompson’s committee, and I was sincere about that, but I was

not going to put it out just to meet an artificial date.

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We are now distributing the National Response Plan among the

rest of our Federal partners. We will have a copy to this committee

hopefully within a week, and then we are going to put it out for

review to the first responder and emergency management world

out there on a 30-day review very shortly. So we are going to do

that.

Yes, it is not where I wanted it to be, but we do have an actual

response plan in place. It is not like we are operating without a

plan. The plan is there. The one we are reviewing now brings some

of the Post-Katrina Reform Act issues into it. We wanted to make

it less bureaucratic, more readable. We wanted to make it smaller,

take some of the annexes out and put them on the Web so it wasn’t

such a bulky document.

Mr. Towns, I just want to make sure that when it goes out it is

as right as I can get it, and that is the reason for the delay. But

those dates were artificial. I set up to really push myself and our

team to get it out. We didn’t meet those dates, but we are going

to get it out very shortly.

Mr. TOWNS. We are into the hurricane season already, so, Mr.

Jadacki, could you comment on that? I mean, here we are. We entered the hurricane season. The States have to prepare for incorporating into their plans. I mean, there has to be coordination here.

This has not happened. I would like to get your comments on that.

Mr. JADACKI. We did a lot of work immediately after Hurricane

Katrina. We spent about 5 weeks on the ground down in the Gulf

area. One of the things that we found was that there was a lot of

confusion that was created as a result of the National Response

Plan being rolled out really for the first time with some of the

names and incident command system and those types of things.

There was a lot of confusion. I think a lot of the reports that have

been written as a result of that, lessons learned, identified the need

to revise the National Response Plan so the clear roles, the roles

of the FCO versus the PFO and those types of things, are clearly

defined so people know.

The fact that the National Response Plan is not issued yet

doesn’t clarify those roles yet. As we are in the midst of hurricane

season, I think there may still be some confusion if there is another

catastrophic event.

Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Chairman, I know we have a vote so I am going

to yield back.

But I want to let you know, Mr. Paulison, that this is very disturbing. I think that if there is a need for additional help or resources or whatever it is, I think you need to yell out and let us

know, because we are talking about the lives of people. Of course,

as you heard from the comments coming from the various members

of this committee, we are troubled by what is going on. Of course,

I must say that you did not relieve my pain.

With that, I yield back.

Mr. KUCINICH. I thank the gentleman. I want to just say to the

gentleman that when we come back after the votes we are going

to continue this line of questioning. Staff has provided us with

some additional information that is critical to being able to establish where we are at this moment.

I thank the gentleman.

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The Chair recognizes the distinguished gentlewoman, Congresswoman Virginia Foxx, for questions, and then as soon as you are

complete we are going to go right to the vote.

Ms. FOXX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this. I am not

going to be able to come back afterwards because of a meeting I

have to go to.

I want to say to you, Mr. Paulison, that I share Mr. Towns’ comments and his concerns. You used the word you are trying to get

it right. Do me a favor, try to pick up that cup in front of you. You

picked it up. You didn’t try. You did it. This issue of the plan is

a metaphor for what is wrong with FEMA, and the fact that you

are not getting your plan done in a timely fashion does not give me

or the American people any comfort that you have learned lessons

at FEMA and that you are doing things differently.

When you set that deadline, I respectfully say to you that you

could have done a lot to help the image of FEMA, and perhaps not

just the image but the impact of FEMA, had you stuck to the deadline, because by not being able to mobilize within your own Agency,

plus with the other agencies to get a plan done, what does that tell

the American people about the effectiveness of FEMA doing its job?

I am not sure why you couldn’t understand that, again, as a metaphor for the whole problem with FEMA.

You have used words, ‘‘We are going to start acting like,’’ ‘‘hopefully,’’ ‘‘trying.’’ I would again respectfully say to you that those are

words that indicate in the future something is going to happen; it

is not happening now. It has been a long time since the failures

of FEMA with Katrina, and I think that it is time for action, not

trying.

Mr. KUCINICH. Would the gentleman like to respond?

Mr. PAULISON. Again, the National Response Plan is in place. We

are simply making it a document much easier to use.

Mr. KUCINICH. The Chair would like to observe that the

gentlelady’s remarks are quite perceptive, because when you listen

to the language about whether there is preparedness, it is one

thing to say you are going to try, you are hoping, but it is another

thing to be able to do. So when the committee comes back we are

going to go to a second round of questions quite specific about the

level of preparation, and so I want to thank the members of the

panel. I would ask that you remain in the vicinity. The Chair is

going to declare a one-half hour recess and we will return for questions immediately after votes.

Thank you very much.

[Recess.]

Mr. KUCINICH. The committee will come to order.

I want to thank the witnesses for remaining, and we are going

to begin a second round of questions. We just had a series of votes,

but Members may be rejoining us. They will also be entitled to ask

some questions.

I would like to begin by sharing with the members of the panel

a story, and it is a story that relates to preparedness.

About 30 years ago I had the honor of being elected mayor of the

city of Cleveland. At that time there was a very short transition

to the office. The election was on a Tuesday, and the following

Monday the new mayor was sworn in.

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A few weeks into my term we were visited by an unexpected

snow storm. One of the worst storms of the century hit the city of

Cleveland. I was the new mayor, and I was intent on demonstrating to the people that the city was ready, because we had a wonderful work force in the service department that operated the snow

plows, and the personnel we had were just the best. So I called my

new service director, Morris Pettis, and with the feeling of a new

general I called and I said, Director, Pettis, get those snow plows

out on the road. Clear those streets. We are going to show the people of Cleveland that we can do the job. He said, Yes, sir.

About 21⁄2 hours later I got a call from Director Pettis, and he

said, Mayor, we don’t have any snow plows. We had the manpower,

but they didn’t have the plows, because the previous administration had sent all the plows out to be repaired and didn’t provide

that the city would have equipment to be able to move the snow.

The result? Our city was buried in snow for weeks.

Now, I am sharing this story with you for an obvious reason. We

had terrifically prepared workers that could do the job. They didn’t

have the equipment.

Now, Mr. Jadacki, your job is to review this preparedness that

the Department asserts. Is the United States prepared for the next

catastrophic disaster?

Mr. JADACKI. We are better prepared than we were 2 years ago.

Mr. KUCINICH. That is not saying a lot, my friend.

Mr. JADACKI. Right.

Mr. KUCINICH. You don’t want to use that as a benchmark.

Mr. JADACKI. Right.

Mr. KUCINICH. I will give you another shot at it.

Mr. JADACKI. OK. We are not there yet. A lot remains——

Mr. KUCINICH. Where are we not yet? I want you to be quite specific.

Mr. JADACKI. I don’t think we will ever get to an end point. It

is always evolving. There are always new threats. There are always

new types of disasters, always changes. So if you are looking for

an end point, I can’t say when that is going to be.

Mr. KUCINICH. You know what I am looking for? I am looking for

you to be quite specific. Plan, logistics, equipment, manpower,

womanpower—I want specifics. This is part of your job. You are,

in fact, the Deputy Inspector General in the Office of the Inspector

General, Department of Homeland Security. You are the person

that Congress counts on to oversee and look over the level of preparedness.

Mr. JADACKI. OK. I will tell you that in catastrophic planning

more needs to be done. We are not there yet. I will tell you in logistics that a lot more needs to be done. There are systems that are

getting into place, but more needs to be done.

Mr. KUCINICH. Where are we not that we should be? Please be

specific. This is too general, and the whole idea of emergency preparedness is to be quite specific. We have had a bipartisan hearing

where Members are looking for specifics. Generalities won’t do.

Please be specific.

Mr. JADACKI. I don’t think the Nation is ready for the next catastrophic event or series of events if it occurs because of some of the

issues that were discussed before. The National Response Plan is

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still an issue that is evolving. There is communications, there is

confusion.

There is a draft that is out right now, but I think that if we had

another catastrophic event right now there would be some improvement but we are not there yet. I can’t give you a percentage of how

close we are, but we are not there yet in a number of areas, probably hundreds of areas: acquisitions, pre-positioning supplies, logistics, the National Response Plan, staffing—I think FEMA is making strides in getting staffing. We are not there yet—State communication. I still think there are issues that can be resolved in all

those areas, and more.

Mr. KUCINICH. Catastrophic disaster exercises, are we there yet?

Mr. JADACKI. We are not there yet.

Mr. KUCINICH. OK. Information technology capabilities, are we

there yet?

Mr. JADACKI. There are improvements there, but we are not

there yet.

Mr. KUCINICH. Funding, are we there yet?

Mr. JADACKI. No, we are not there yet.

Mr. KUCINICH. Leadership, are we there yet?

Mr. JADACKI. No.

Mr. KUCINICH. OK. We are not there yet.

Mr. JADACKI. Right.

Mr. KUCINICH. OK. I think it would be very helpful if you would

provide this committee with the list of exactly what remains to be

done in order for the American people to be assured that their Government will be able to respond in a way that they can be confident.

How long will it take you to be able to put together a detailed

report going over the areas that you have just basically off-the-cuff

responded to? How long would it take you to create the list and

then let us know where the deficiencies are so that we may be able

to track the level of readiness and provide resources or whatever

needs to be done in order to encourage the readiness? How long

would it take you?

Mr. JADACKI. I would say at least 6 months to put together a report of that magnitude.

Mr. KUCINICH. Wow. Is there something you could do in a few

days so that you could help us, at least on an interim basis?

Mr. JADACKI. We can probably do a high-level review based on

some of the work we have done over the past couple of years and

some of our experience dealing with some of the FEMA activities

in a short period of time. But if you are looking for a more comprehensive review, that would probably take longer.

Mr. KUCINICH. But just from a short period of time, how long

would it take you to be able to at least notify this committee of the

level of preparedness?

Mr. JADACKI. I think to do a high-level review, probably 90 days

we can do a high-level score-card-type review.

Mr. KUCINICH. I think it would be helpful to have a score-cardtype review, but let’s go to a shorter term here. What are the critical areas that you think we need to focus on for an immediate improvement in preparedness in the event of another hurricane, let’s

say?

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Mr. JADACKI. I think the lines of communication are critical. I

think the roles of the various parties at the Federal, State, and

local level. I think a clear understanding of the FCO’s responsibility versus the PFO’s responsibility is critical. I think interoperability among the various first responders is critical, and I think

logistics is probably a critical thing that needs to take place now

in the midst of hurricane season—supplies, those types of things.

I also think coordination with other Federal agencies I think is also

critical, too, the prescripted mission assignments and those types

of things.

Mr. KUCINICH. Just so you understand this approach in this

hearing, this isn’t a ‘‘gotcha’’ hearing. I am not interested in that.

I want to see what kind of guidance FEMA could receive and that

the National Guard could receive so that whatever resources are

available right now would be put to the best use in the event that

there was some type of disaster, so it is in that spirit that I think

it would be important for the Inspector General’s office to provide

some immediate response to the committee so that we can look at

it now. Even 90 days might be a problem. I mean, there are some

areas—you just told us a few areas—catastrophic disaster exercises, for example, Mr. Paulison. The Inspector General’s Office,

you are not there. This relates to a question that Eleanor Holmes

Norton raised at the beginning. Your answer was somewhat divergent.

We all understand that real-life exercises require a vast movement. I don’t think she was asking about that, but I am just giving

you the concerns that members of this committee have about the

level of preparedness. Your job is to say you are going to do everything you can to get ready. I understand that. You made it very

clear.

Representative Virginia Foxx also made it clear that we have to

look at the rhetoric here. We can’t soft-soap this. We can’t tell the

American people yes, we are ready, and not be. We need to be very

candid with the American people.

I am going to ask Mr. Jadacki to work with FEMA and the National Guard. And I would like to engage my colleague here, who

has actually spent more time than anybody on this committee on

this, Mr. Davis, in assisting in this line of inquiry.

Do you have any recommendations as to what would be helpful

to get the committee up to speed so we get a good read of where

we are so we can know where we need to push, my friend?

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Well, I mean, there are a lot of things.

We have talked about it. I think that the test runs that you do are

very, very important. As you know, they did a Hurricane Pam prior

to Katrina, which went fairly well, but when Katrina came it was

so overwhelming we didn’t follow the models that had been set

there. But, as I said in my opening remarks, this isn’t just like a

spare tire you can take out of the trunk and hope it works; you

have to constantly be testing, you have to be asking tough questions. I think it would be good for the committee to understand

some of those models that you are looking at, that you are simulating and testing again, to see where the weaknesses are.

One of the difficulties you had in the whole Department of Homeland Security is you took 22 different agencies and 170,000 employVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:23 Sep 03, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00086 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\43332.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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ees and put them under one roof with a lot of different cultures and

a lot of different missions, and it is a work in progress. Just getting

the computer systems to mix and match up and work across platforms, that we give them a FISMA grade every year, and it has

been bad because yours is as bad as your weakest link.

This is a tremendous undertaking. What we have tried to do

with FEMA is kind of take you out of that and make you autonomous, so that when there is a crisis you have access to every asset

of Government in whatever agency it is. We saw in Katrina it

didn’t all come as quickly as we would have liked. Now, part of

that was the fact that we weren’t coordinated locally. We didn’t

have that. But some of these simulations let us know very early on

what is happening, how quickly you can get access to all of the elements that the Government has put together.

Katrina was an overwhelming, unforgiving storm, but as we look

back at it there were so many little mistakes in this storm that

was so unforgiving they have become exaggerated. The prospects

for this year and the projections for the hurricanes this year are

not good, so it would be helpful to know what simulations they are

using, Mr. Chairman, what we are testing against, and what weaknesses appear, because nothing ever worked perfectly even in the

simulation.

Mr. KUCINICH. And I would like to add to my colleague’s suggestion that 20 years ago there was computer software out there,

SimCity, where actually it was kind of a test of logistics of what

do you need to be able to do to manage a city under different circumstances. I think that it would be useful, as Mr. Davis said, to

look at where you are with that kind of modeling that would enable

the broader discussion among all the operations in Government.

Would you like to respond, Mr. Paulison?

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Could I ask one quick question, too? The

other question is just having key personnel there. I mean, this personnel is an issue in every Government agency in key positions,

being able to attract and retain the best and the brightest. This is

an agency, again, where expertise and experience are at a premium.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Paulison.

Mr. PAULISON. And actually we have done very well in that area

as far as bringing the right people in.

Let me talk about the exercises you talked about.

Mr. KUCINICH. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. PAULISON. Since 2005 we have a course at the Emergency

Management Institute called the Integrated Emergency Management Course. We bring 70 people from a particular city into Emmitsburg and keep them for a week and walk through similar

things. We have done 134 cities since that time to bring them

through that course, and hundreds before then. Salt Lake City

went through just before the Olympics. Oklahoma City went

through it before the bombing, and other cities. We just brought

New Orleans in to bring the top administrators in the individual

cities, because we know that response is at that local level and they

have to be ready because they are the first responders.

Mr. KUCINICH. And I think that what you have just said confirms

that you have done some response capabilities with respect to terVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:23 Sep 03, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\43332.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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rorism scenarios. But, according to Mr. Jadacki, you haven’t done

a natural catastrophic disaster test run.

Mr. PAULISON. What we do on the catastrophic——

Mr. KUCINICH. Is that correct?

Mr. PAULISON. First of all, we bought in planners into FEMA

that we have never had before. We just hired 13 operational planners. I was incredulous to find out we didn’t have those people in

place. But we are doing catastrophic planning right now. One is a

hurricane in south Florida, going through the Miami Dade and

Broward County, Palm Beach area. Probably 6 million people live

in that area—catastrophic plan around Lake Okechobee, catastrophic planning for the New Orleans, Louisiana/Mississippi area,

and catastrophic planning for the New Madrid earth fault, and also

catastrophic plan for California for a major earthquake out there.

So we are now putting those plans in place and doing them to

make sure we have those rock solid plans.

The exercises are extremely important also. We inherited the

training and exercise program of the Post-Katrina Reform Act and

brought those into FEMA. That is allowing us to integrate like we

could not do before. We can do some things now that we could not

do before, where we had a separate training section over in DHS

and FEMA was doing its own thing. Now it is all together.

So the work that the committee did to help get that through is

invaluable for us as far as making sure that our cities and our

States are going to be ready for these type of disasters.

Mr. KUCINICH. Well, appropro of what Mr. Davis just said, I have

here the most recent report from the Intergovernmental Panel on

Climate Change, which, as you know, is an assembly of the world’s

most famous and leading scientists. On page 8 of this report, table

SPM.2, they project—and I would ask you to follow this carefully—

that ‘‘the likelihood of future trends, based on projections for the

21st century, for intense tropical cyclone activity increases; likely,

increased incidents of extreme high sea level; likely, high precipitation events; frequency increases, very likely.’’

Without objection, I would like to include this in the record of the

hearing.

[The report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

follows:]

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Mr. KUCINICH. I would ask Mr. Paulison, can you tell this committee if FEMA is or is not planning for any effects attributable to

calculation?

Mr. PAULISON. I am making sure that this organization is ready

to respond, regardless of what comes our way. The prediction of

hurricanes has not been very scientific. Last year we were predicted to have a lot of hurricanes; we did not have them. So far we

have had none this year. We do have one storm out there north of

Bermuda. But we are going to be ready, regardless of what the calculation people say to make sure yes, we are getting ready for that.

Mr. KUCINICH. OK.

Mr. PAULISON. We are going to be ready for that. I am trying to

be as positive as I can.

Mr. KUCINICH. Do you have that as a matter of policy, though?

I mean, for example, in your policy division, which you have developed, does the policy division have a policy on global warming?

Mr. PAULISON. FEMA does not have a policy on global warming.

We have a policy that says this organization is going to be ready

to respond to disasters, whether they are natural disasters, whether they come in bunches or they come one at a time.

Mr. KUCINICH. But does FEMA have a position that calculation

would have no impact on the kind of natural disasters that we are

supposed to deal with?

Mr. PAULISON. I am not a climatologist nor am I a meteorologist,

so I don’t know what impact the climate change is going to have

on natural disasters. All I am telling you is this agency is ready

to respond, and we are going to continue to be ready to respond.

Mr. KUCINICH. Did you have an interest, though, on the impact

of calculation on creating natural disasters? Is that something that

has occurred to you?

Mr. PAULISON. Well, of course it would. Any time we get predictions that there is going to be something worse coming on down

the road——

Mr. KUCINICH. You don’t dismiss that out of hand?

Mr. PAULISON. No, sir. No, sir.

Mr. KUCINICH. I just was curious about that.

What I would like to do, since Representative Jindal is here and

has not yet had a chance to ask questions, with the permission of

Mr. Davis we could perhaps refer to Mr. Jindal.

You have the floor for 5 minutes. Thank you.

Mr. JINDAL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Davis.

Thank you for allowing me to sit in on the committee, and thank

you also to the committee for allowing me to participate in the previous hearing on the trailers and the formaldehyde hearing.

Mr. Paulison, it is good to see you again. I want to thank each

of the witnesses for their testimony.

I have several questions. Mr. Chairman, with your consent I

would like to submit my written statement for the record, if there

is no objection.

Mr. KUCINICH. Without objection.

Mr. JINDAL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I should have asked for more, Tom.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Without objection.

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Mr. JINDAL. I have several questions also to submit for the

record, but I have two points I really want to make with the time

I have. The first has to do with the regional office infrastructure.

You know, back after the hurricane struck in 2005, the White

House released its assessment, the Federal Response to Hurricane

Katrina, Lessons Learned: Identifying Critical Flaws in the Nation’s Response, including, in terms of preparing this, an absence

of regional planning and coordination.

According to the report, DHS did not have the needed personnel

or resources in the regional offices. This led to reduced communications and an understanding of onsite needs, further delaying an effective response.

That report actually recommended an increase in regional response capabilities, specifically called on DHS to build regional

structures to integrate State and local strategies, and capabilities

to encourage regional partnerships. Indeed, in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress mandated that DHS set up a regional

structure. On April 28, 2005, 4 months before Hurricanes Katrina

and Rita struck the Gulf Coast, I actually called on Secretary

Chertoff to follow through with a regional framework in which Louisiana would have been equipped to facilitate a regional response.

My first point, my first question is this. When you contrast the

Coast Guard’s response, an agency within DHS, versus FEMA’s

and other agencies’, there is a much more robust, much more effective response, I think partially due to the fact the Coast Guard had

boots on the ground before the storms, they knew the area, they

knew the people. That wasn’t their first experience.

Given the fact the Gulf Coast will be hit in the future by future

hurricanes, future storms, certainly we have been a long-time advocate for a robust DHS regional office in the greater New Orleans

area in Louisiana.

My first question is a leading question, but my first question, the

same question I asked the Secretary in 2005, Don’t you agree an

enhanced regional structure could improve the flow of communication between Washington and local emergency management officials? I know you all have staffed up some of the regional administrators, but couldn’t we do more to have a more robust presence on

the ground?

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir, we can and we are.

Mr. JINDAL. I will followup in writing. One of the reasons I want

to spend some of my time talking about this, I do want to continue

to get public commitments, because I do think there is an opportunity. New Orleans is building a Federal city concept, bringing together different Federal agencies. There is already a regional headquarters there for the Coast Guard, for Customs, for different Federal agencies that are part of DHS. It just seems like it would be

a natural place to consolidate and get those synergies.

I thank you for your commitment to that. Like I said, I would

like to followup on that with you.

My second question is: you all have done an assessment, and you

refer to this in your statement earlier about the gaps and preparedness among the different States. I know in Louisiana, in part, you

identified some gaps when it came to in-place sheltering, when it

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pared. This is especially important considering the fact we are in

the middle of another hurricane season.

Last year we passed in Congress the Post-Katrina Emergency

Reform Act that required FEMA to provide assistance to the States

in terms of evacuations. I also added some language to the Defense

authorization bill requiring the Secretary of Defense to pre-position

pre-identified assets such as medical supplies, food, water, and

communications equipment to help the Department of Defense help

us, to help the Department of Defense respond to requests from civilian authorities. The provision also called for Defense to work

with DHS to develop concept plans to maximize military support.

You talked about the gaps in Louisiana, and some of those I have

talked about. given the directives in last year’s legislation, what is

the status on your work with Louisiana in providing additional

shelter space, pre-positioned supplies, and what can we do to utilize the Homeland Security grant program to help meet those

needs that are identified in that gap analysis?

Mr. PAULISON. Particularly in Louisiana, but we have done it

pretty much from Texas all the way to Maine, but particularly in

Louisiana we have been working very closely with the State and

the cities to make sure we have adequate shelters identified to put

people in, who is going to staff them, who is going to put supplies

in them. Also, for transportation modes in place, how many people

do we think are going to self-evacuate in their own vehicles, how

many buses without objection we need, do we have ambulance contracts in place? And the answer is yes to all of those. We now have

identified enough shelter space for the predicted amount of people

that would evacuate out of New Orleans and out of Louisiana

should a hurricane come.

We did it with three States. We did it with Mississippi, Louisiana, and Alabama, together, because we know what affects one

State affects all the others. This is the most robust involvement

FEMA has had with working with States to fill those gaps and

making sure that we have good, solid plans in place to move people

out.

Louisiana really stepped up to the plate this year, has put bus

contracts in place and other things to really help us work together

as a team to make sure that, if we do have to evacuate, that we

know where people are going to go and how they are going to get

there.

My time has expired. My last point, Mr. Chairman——

Mr. KUCINICH. I just want the gentleman to know that if the

gentleman wishes to ask questions for another 5 minutes, I will

permit that, because I think that, given the fact that you represent

Louisiana, you are entitled to this. So if you would like to proceed,

proceed.

Mr. JINDAL. Well, I appreciate the chairman’s indulgence. Thank

you. And I thank the ranking member, as well.

Mr. KUCINICH. Without objection.

Mr. JINDAL. What I was going to make in my final moments—

and I appreciate the additional time—is that one of the things I

would certainly ask FEMA to consider doing is providing guidance

to the State about the best use of those security grant programs

to help fill these gaps year in and year out.

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I know one of the things we have heard, for example, there has

been a lot of funding—maybe not enough, but a lot—provided, for

example, for interoperable communications. One of the things we

are hearing is that if those dollars aren’t coordinated and spent effectively, we may not get that chance again. We did not have interoperable communications we needed. We didn’t have it in Oklahoma City, we didn’t have it on 9/11, and we certainly didn’t have

it after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. So as you identify gaps, I

would request that FEMA help provide guidance to the State on

what might be the best ways to utilize some of the discretionary

Homeland Security grants to help make sure that we can address

these gaps.

You know, one of the things I added in that language was requiring coordination with the Department of Defense to pre-position. I

heard your comments before about having generators for hospitals

and wanting to avoid no-bid contracts, and I applaud you for that.

I absolutely agree. We don’t want to be in that same position again

where we don’t have adequate food and water supplies. But then

we also don’t want to end up paying too much for supplies. We saw

what happened in the last couple of years.

What has been done as far as coordinating with the Department

of Defense? I put that language in there. Has that taken place to

your satisfaction? Is there more that could be done between the two

departments?

Mr. PAULISON. Like I said earlier, we have the best relationship

with the Department of Defense, NORTHCOM, and the National

Guard than we have ever had. I know Katrina was a wake up call

for all of us, and we recognize we have to work together, we have

to plan together, we have to train together so we are not exchanging business cards in the middle of the disaster.

We have put a Defense coordinating officer in every region in

this country, every region that FEMA has, to help with that coordination. We meet. We have a videoconference with them every week

and with NORTHCOM on there. We meet with the National Guard

to make sure that we are coordinated, we are sharing information,

and we are working together as a team as opposed to working in

silos.

We are doing this. We are going to continue doing it. It is the

right thing to do.

Mr. JINDAL. I have two last points. One of the points I want to

make—and I have said this at previous hearings—one of the things

I am going to advocate for, and I would hope you all would be supportive of this, I think there is a lot of flexibility in the Stafford

Act we have not taken advantage of, but I do think that there

needs to be a completely different category for the kinds of catastrophes that were Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

For example, allowing more flexibility on housing, allowing more

flexibility for the assistance. I think we could have done more with

the dollars we ended up spending, but too often found ourselves

tied by rules—for example, not being able to improve public infrastructure; the rules requiring us to replace what had sometimes

been there before; the rules that are preventing the hazard mitigation money to help families who are trying to get help through the

Road Home program.

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I know we have declarations for disasters, but I think we need

a designation for a catastrophe.

I want to ask you one of the things. If, not when, if we get to

that point I would hope that FEMA within the administration

would also advocate for that.

My last question. I know there had been press reports that after

the hurricanes, after the storms there was approximately $854 million in cash and oil that was pledged by foreign governments, but

only $40 million has been used so far for disaster victims or for reconstruction. I know there were some issues with the State Department. What mechanisms have FEMA and the Department of

Homeland Security made to reduce the bureaucracy to make sure

that if there are future offers of support that they are handled in

a more effective way?

Mr. PAULISON. A major, major problem for us and embarrassment, as far as I am concerned, not having a system in place to

handle donations from our friends in other countries, so we have

worked with our Office of International Affairs, we are working

with the State Department, working with the Department of

Homeland Security to make sure that we have a plan in place, and

we do have a plan in place. One, making sure that people understand what our needs are so we are not being offered things that

we can’t use; making sure we have a place to put them, and how

we are going to distribute those. We have put those plans in place

so that does not happen again.

We have a lot of friends around this world who offered a lot of

things. Some of it we could not use, and we should have let them

know right up front what our needs were and what we could use.

Mr. JINDAL. Even my extended time has expired, but I want to

ask you one last quick question to make sure I am understanding.

In your judgment, based on the assessment gap and the work you

have done, do you feel the Gulf Coast is ready, God forbid, if there

should be another hurricane on the order of magnitude of another

Katrina?

Mr. PAULISON. Congressman, I do. Louisiana is, in my opinion,

more ready than it has ever been. They have really done a great

job of putting this organization back together, getting on board. We

still have issues, as you know because you live there, with the parishes not talking to the State. The communication system there is

not what it should be. But as far as what I see happening on the

ground, as far as making preparations for contracts in place, having shelter in place, willing to make evacuation calls early, and

also with our new policy of, if a State can ask for pre-landfall declaration, we will help them with that, as any Gulf Coast State. So

I think with all those things in place I am comfortable we are going

to be able to respond there and we are going to do a good job if

a hurricane does come. God forbid, we don’t want one. They surely

don’t need it right now with everybody in those mobile homes and

trailers. But yes, they are as ready as I have ever seen them.

Mr. JINDAL. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your

indulgence.

Mr. KUCINICH. I just want Mr. Jindal to know that the members

of this committee support you and your community and we want

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to make sure that all your questions are asked and that you are

satisfied that everything is being done.

When I spoke to Mr. Jadacki earlier, he had said that it would

take 6 months to be able to get a detailed assessment of readiness

and that perhaps some degree of report might be available in 90

days.

What I am going to ask you to do is this, Mr. Jadacki—to at least

provide us when we come back in September, 1 month from now,

with the areas of concern that you have, and then within 90 days

to be able to establish, on a scale from 1 to 10, some quantification

of the degree of readiness, with 1 being the lowest and 10 being

the highest. If you could do that, it would give this committee some

ability to be able to know where we are going.

Can you respond to that question?

Mr. JADACKI. Yes. I think we can meet those deadlines.

Mr. KUCINICH. I think that would be something we would find

comforting.

Mr. JADACKI. And that will be working closely with FEMA.

Mr. KUCINICH. That is appropriate, and we appreciate that. And

with the Guard, of course.

Also, before dismissing the first panel, I would just ask Mr.

Paulison, I want to clarify your answer to my previous question.

This is a question. Is FEMA incorporating the predicted effects of

global warming into its planning, yes or no?

Mr. PAULISON. The answer is no. We are planning for the worst

and hoping for the best, so regardless of what the predictions are,

we are going to make sure the organization can respond to disaster, whether they are hurricanes or terrorist event or anything

else.

So do we plan on the weather changing? The answer is no. What

we do is plan on having hurricanes and dealing with them.

Mr. KUCINICH. Do you think it would be appropriate for FEMA

to consider the predicted effects of global warming in your planning?

Mr. PAULISON. I do. I think there are modeling tools that are out

there that we can tap into that we have not been that could be useful for us in planning for the future of this organization, so the answer is yes.

Mr. KUCINICH. So will FEMA from this point on incorporate the

predicted effects of global warming into its planning?

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. We will look at that very closely and

work with our Science and Technology Department, along with

other modeling tools that we know we are going to have to use to

do a better job of planning for the future.

Mr. KUCINICH. I just want to make sure, as we are moving forward now, that we have a clear and concise response from FEMA

with respect to incorporating predicted effects of global warming

into planning, because then that relates essentially to readiness. So

you are saying that you will do that?

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. That is one of those things we have to

deal with, just like everything else.

Mr. KUCINICH. You know what? That then is part of the new

FEMA.

Mr. PAULISON. OK.

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Mr. KUCINICH. I want to thank the members of the panel for

their patience and their participation. I want to thank you on behalf of every member of this committee. We had many Members

show up for participation today.

What we are going to do, now that we have concluded the testimony from panel one, we have many significant issues that will be

raised on a second panel that we could not address on the first

panel, and so I want my staff to summarize those issues in a letter

to you, Mr. Paulison, so that you can address them after the hearing.

I want to thank you members of the panel—Major General, Mr.

Paulison, Mr. Jadacki. You are much appreciated and you are excused.

We will now take a 5-minute recess to allow for our staff to set

up the second panel, so 5 minutes from now we will begin.

Again, thanks to each of you for your service to our country.

Mr. PAULISON. And, sir, thanks to you also. The feedback from

this panel is extremely helpful for us in putting this organization

back on track. Thank you.

Mr. KUCINICH. Well, we are all working together. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. KUCINICH. The committee will come to order.

The first witness had to leave to take a flight, so we are going

to put into the record the testimony of William Jenkins, who is Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues at the Government

Accountability Office. Without objection, we will include his testimony in the record of the hearing.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:]

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Mr. KUCINICH. We have a full panel of witnesses, and I appreciate their attendance.

Mr. Albert Ashwood is the Director of the Oklahoma Department

of Emergency Management and has held that position for 10 years.

He joined the State of Oklahoma in 1988 and has served the department in various positions, including Deputy Director from 1995

to 1997. In his tenure at the Oklahoma Department of Emergency

Management, Mr. Ashwood has overseen the distribution and administration of over $500 million in Federal and State aid. He also

serves on FEMA’s National Advisory Council and is President of

the National Emergency Management Association.

Thank you, Mr. Ashwood, for being here.

Mr. Christopher Geldhart is Director of the Office of National

Capital Region Coordination in FEMA. Before joining FEMA in

April 2007, Mr. Geldhart worked for the State of Maryland as assistant director in the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security. He

is a 12-year veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps, and was formerly

a strategy consultant for the consulting firm of Booz Allen Hamilton.

Thank you for being here.

Mr. Dewayne West is director of emergency services for Johnston

County, NC, where he is responsible for supervising the emergency

management program, fire marshal’s office, and emergency medical

services for the county. He has held this position for almost 20

years. Mr. West is a certified emergency manager by the International Association of Emergency Managers, and is a member of

many industry boards and commissions.

Thank you, Mr. West.

Mr. Darrell Darnell is director of the District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency. Mr. Darnell is

responsible for operating and maintaining the District’s emergency

management infrastructure and coordinating the District’s emergency response. Mr. Darnell joined the Homeland Security and

Emergency Management Agency after serving as director of the

Urban Areas and Exercise Program at IEM, a Louisiana-based national disaster and Homeland Security consulting company, as well

as working at the Department of Justice and the Department of

Homeland Security.

Thank you, Mr. Darnell.

And, finally, Professor Kathleen Tierney is professor of sociology

and director of the Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center at the University of Colorado, Boulder. Professor

Tierney has over 20 years of experience in the disaster field and

has conducted research projects on a wide variety of subjects. She

is also the author of dozens of articles, book chapters, and technical

reports on the social aspects of hazards, disasters, and risks.

To members of the panel, it is the policy of the Committee on

Oversight and Government Reform to swear in all witnesses before

they testify. I would ask that you please rise and raise your right

hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. KUCINICH. Let the record reflect that all of the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

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Members of the panel, as we requested with panel one, we ask

that each witness give an oral summary of his or her testimony,

and keep the summary under 5 minutes in duration. I want you

to bear in mind that the complete record of your written testimony

will be included in the record of the hearing.

Let us begin with Mr. Ashwood. You may proceed, sir. Thanks

again for your attendance.

STATEMENTS OF ALBERT ASHWOOD, DIRECTOR, OKLAHOMA

STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, PRESIDENT,

NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; CHRISTOPHER GELDHART, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION COORDINATION; DEWAYNE WEST, DIRECTOR

OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT FOR JOHNSTON COUNTY,

NC, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES, THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EMERGENCY MANAGERS; DARRELL DARNELL, DIRECTOR, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY;

AND KATHLEEN TIERNEY, DIRECTOR, NATURAL HAZARDS

CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, BOULDER

STATEMENT OF ALBERT ASHWOOD

Mr. ASHWOOD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a

pleasure to be here today to express my views on the current collaboration between FEMA and the States on the issues of preparedness, response, and recovery in the post-Katrina environment.

I come here today as the current president of the National Emergency Management Association, which represents State emergency

management directors throughout the Nation and U.S. territories,

and also as the state director of emergency management in Oklahoma.

Nearly 2 years ago I testified before the House Committee on

Transportation and Infrastructure, with the topic being Recovering

from Katrina: Ensuring that FEMA is up to the Task. At that time

I addressed the issue by asking which FEMA was being assessed,

the one prior to the development of the Department of Homeland

Security or the shell which was in place at the time Katrina made

landfall. I talked about FEMA success stories of the 1990’s and the

long evolutionary trek FEMA took to get there. I talked about the

disassembling of FEMA under the Department of Homeland Security structure and the total de-emphasis of natural disasters from

September 11, 2001, through July 2005. I also told the committee

that moving FEMA out from under DHS and returning its funding

and manpower to the pre-DHS levels would be a way to return

FEMA to the level of efficiency we should all expect.

Today, however, I cannot honestly say these recommendations

would be enough. I still personally believe FEMA should be an

independent agency, working directly for the President, but I would

be naive if I were to sum up all the Agency’s problems under this

one issue.

I believe all current issues can be summarized in one topic: communication. In my 19 years of emergency management, I have

never experienced a more polarized environment between State

and Federal Government. It seems that the Katrina Federal legacy

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is one of minimizing exposure for the next event and ensuring future focus is centered on State and local preparedness efforts.

The perfect example of this attitude is illustrated in the National

Plan review, which was conducted in 2006. States were told that

this was an opportunity for all levels of government to sit together,

review plans, identify shortfalls, and develop a strategy to address

those shortfalls, both operationally and financially in the future. It

seemed like a wonderful concept, right up until the time the national planning report card was published for each State; then the

entire exercise seemed little more than an opportunity for the Federal Government to tell the press, We told you the States weren’t

prepared.

Also, consider the National Response Plan—excuse me, now

called the National Response Framework—which is to be released

by DHS in the near future. You will be told that this national document was developed over many hours of collaboration between all

levels of government and all disciplines. Let me be the first to say

that this statement is totally inaccurate. I have queried my colleagues at both the State and local level and realized that no one

knows what information this document contains, and we won’t

until we read it like everyone else in this room.

Then there are the efforts currently being performed along the

Gulf Coast to ensure that every future evacuee is accounted for and

the public’s expectation of government will be met. Millions of dollars are being spent on Federal plans to airlift individuals from

Louisiana to Oklahoma, Arkansas, Tennessee, and other host

States, yet the arithmetic doesn’t work. The contractors can’t find

enough States to pledge support to host the number of evacuees in

the New Orleans area, alone; therefore, I am constantly receiving

calls from FEMA saying, can’t you handle another 20,000, another

30,000? We will make sure your costs are reimbursed.

Unfortunately, it seems a bigger issue is the revelation which appeared in the newspapers last week. One in three people surveyed

along the Gulf Coast said they would ignore Government evacuation warnings. This is up from one in four in last year’s survey.

In Oklahoma I am lucky to have a boss, Governor Brad Henry,

who realizes emergency management is a customer service business. More importantly, he understands that the customers we

serve are at the local level, not in Washington. Following disaster

events, he expects me to brief him on what assistance is being provided to the victims immediately and what assistance we are working to provide in the future. The Governor does not expect me to

provide anything which is not available under the law, but he does

expect me to extract the full potential of the law to the victims’ advantage, and he expects the same level of customer service to be

provided by the Federal Government in support of our State.

Unfortunately, our recent dealings with FEMA in response to

disasters our State has experienced over the last 18 months has

done little to ensure customer service is a concern, or that we are

even considered a customer. Since December 2005, Oklahoma has

experienced wild fires, ice storms, tornadoes, and floods which have

resulted in six major disaster declarations, one emergency declaration, and 26 fire management assistance grants. One might say

that this level of activity is proof that the new FEMA is working

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diligently to make sure assistance is being provided as quickly as

possible, but I would offer that each request has been viewed from

a Federal perspective of what is the minimum we have to provide,

as opposed to what is the need.

Never before have I entered into so many discussions regarding

interpretation of the law or the standard of assessment. I have

even had one FEMA attorney question the authority my lieutenant

Governor has to make a request for the State in the Governor’s absence.

Through this all, the Governor has asked me some very simple

questions like: is FEMA this unresponsive because they are under

DHS? Why does it take 2 weeks to make a decision on my request?

Why does the FEMA region support our request and FEMA headquarters doesn’t? Or even, why won’t they return my phone calls?

Regretfully, I have but one answer to each of these questions: I

don’t know, sir, but I do know this is not the way it is supposed

to be.

In conclusion, I would like to summarize the current philosophical differences between my State and FEMA with a brief illustration.

In my operations center a sign defining what is expected of each

employee has hung on the wall for many years. It simply says, if

it is legal, moral, and ethical, just do it. While I realize much of

this creed is subjective by nature, it does stress the reason we are

all employed: to provide a service to our citizens during their time

of need. With this in mind, I wonder what a similar sign would say

if it were currently hanging on the wall of FEMA headquarters.

Perhaps it would say something like, if it is legally concise and limits our Agency’s exposure and potential liability, we should consider doing it, contingent, of course, on General Counsel’s final

opinion and coordination with the Office of Management and Budget and subject to a final vote of a tribunal convened to effectively

disperse responsibility throughout the Federal Government.

Whether this philosophy is a product of FEMA, DHS, the White

House, Congress, or a combination of any or all of the above, I simply don’t know. I only know it does not meet my expectations as

either a State customer or a private citizen.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ashwood follows:]

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Mr. KUCINICH. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Geldhart.

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER GELDHART

Mr. GELDHART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member

Davis. I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today. I would also like to recognize my colleague, Darrell Darnell, from Washington, DC, Homeland Security

Emergency Management Director, and also the other distinguished

members of this panel.

I am here today to discuss the role of the Office of the National

Capital Region Coordination and how we work with our local,

State, regional, and Federal partners to enhance preparedness

within the National Capital Region.

I joined the Office of National Capital Region as its new Director

4 months ago, as the chairman said before earlier, when the office

became a component of the newly reorganized Federal Emergency

Management Agency. Also, as the chairman had mentioned earlier,

I came from the State of Maryland. Part of my duties at the State

of Maryland were to work within the National Capital Region on

many different topics and areas such as critical infrastructure protection and many of the governance groups that govern how all

three jurisdictions within the NCR come together to work together.

As such, I have first-hand knowledge of the NCR, the geographic,

economic, and socio-political complexity that exists here in the region.

As you know, the NCR has some very key characteristics that

make it different than a lot of other places. We are the fourth largest metropolitan population area in the United States, second largest public transportation system, robust private and public nonprofit sector. We are the seat of the national government and home

to more than 230 individual Federal departments and agencies representing all three branches of Government. Most importantly, the

NCR is home to more than 5 million residents and 20 million tourists annually.

The complexity inherent in the region was a key factor that led

to many in Congress, including members of this committee, to establish the Office of National Capital Region Coordination in the

Department of Homeland Security to oversee and coordinate Federal programs for and relationships with State, local, and regional

authorities.

The Office of National Capital Region Coordination leverages key

partnerships to successfully execute the strategic priorities. These

include the Joint Federal Committee, the Metropolitan Washington

Council of Governments, Regional Emergency Preparedness Council, and the National Capital Region Senior Policy Group.

Through these and other venues, the Office of National Capital

Coordination coordinates daily with Homeland Security advisors,

emergency management directors, chief administrative officers,

first responder leaders, leadership from the private sector and nonprofit communities, as well as other Federal officials.

The office has had several key accomplishments that it has completed prior to me coming into this office, and I would just like to

highlight a couple of them.

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Mr. KUCINICH. And I would ask the gentleman, you have about

2 minutes left.

Mr. GELDHART. Absolutely. Homeland Security governance structure, the way that things are operated here in the National Capital

Region for planning and preparedness, response and recovery from

Homeland Security; the strategic plan that was put in place, working with all the stakeholders I mentioned earlier; communications

interoperability, which that accomplishment, alone, has led to advanced ratings in every category of DHS’ interoperability score card

for this region; and the National Capital Region’s first responder

partnership initiative landmark credentialing effort that allows

first responders to move quickly through multiple jurisdictions in

the event of an incident.

Moving forward from here, my job, my goal, the way I see the

office moving forward has three key objectives:

First key objective, coordinated and integrated catastrophic planning effort, not only within the boundaries of the legislated, directed National Capital Region, but also those areas that surround

this region that will be part of a major catastrophic event, such as

evacuation, mass care, and mass shelter.

Second, enhance the Federal coordination, focusing on the operational and strategic planning and decisionmaking within the region.

Last, to create a more robust regional risk assessment for this

region so we have a clear understanding of what we need to invest

in, when, why, and how.

I can go into detail with all of these different areas, Mr. Chairman, but in the interest of finishing up my introduction I would

say by focusing on these key areas our office can help the NCR continue to be the model for regional planning throughout the Nation.

Building upon the foundation that has already been constructed,

the NCR will take tangible steps to enhance catastrophic planning,

improve Federal coordination, and better understand risk from a

regional perspective. At the end of the day, we are all committed

to one goal, the continued safety and security of the region, its residents, and visitors.

I would like to thank the chairman and the ranking member and

the members of the committee for the opportunity to discuss the

role of the National Capital Region, and I am happy to answer any

questions you may have, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Geldhart follows:]

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Mr. KUCINICH. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. West, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF DEWAYNE WEST

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Chairman Kucinich and Ranking Member

Davis and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for

allowing me the opportunity to provide testimony on this critically

important topic.

I am Dewayne West, director of the Johnston County Emergency

Services located in the great State of North Carolina. We are located midway between New York and Florida on I–95 at the crossroads of I–95 and I–40. With that, Johnston County connects to the

Nation’s north and south with east and west.

Currently I am a member of the National Association of Counties

[NACO], board of directors, and a past president of the International Association of Emergency Managers. Since the tragic

events of September 11th, NACO and IAEM have formed a strong

affiliate partnership, and today I provide this testimony on both

their behalf.

The International Association of Emergency Managers has over

3,800 members, including emergency management professionals at

the State and local government levels, the military, private business, and nonprofit sector in the United States and other countries.

Most IAEM members are U.S. city and county emergency managers who perform the crucial function of coordinating and integrating the efforts at the local level to prepare for, mitigate the effects of, resolve, respond to, and recover from all types of disasters,

including terrorist attacks. Members include emergency managers

from both large urban areas, as well as rural counties.

Founded in 1935, NACO is the Nation’s leading advocate for the

county elected and appointed officials. NACO advances issues with

a unified voice before the Federal Government, improves the

public’s understanding of county government, assists counties in

finding and sharing innovative solutions through education and research, and provides value-added services to save counties and taxpayers money. NACO’s membership totals more than 2,000 counties, representing over 80 percent of the Nation’s population.

Again, I am pleased to join you today to present our position on

these issues.

Since Hurricane Katrina ravaged the Gulf Coast in the fall of

2005, Federal, State, and local elected officials, emergency managers, and other public safety officials have worked to strengthen

the Nation’s preparedness and response to future hazards. While

States, local governments, emergency managers, and other public

safety officials across the Nation focused on strengthening and revising pre-existing emergency preparedness, prevention, response,

and recovery plans, and in educating residents during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Congress focused their attention on

strengthening the agency most associated with the Federal Government’s response to a catastrophe, that being the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

After most of the debate, Congress included the Post-Katrina

Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 in the fiscal year 2007

appropriations bill for the Department of Homeland Security. Local

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governments, emergency managers, and other public safety officials

across the Nation applauded the hard work of Congress in arriving

at these comprehensive revisions to strengthen FEMA. It was clear

that FEMA’s ability to respond had deteriorated after its inclusion

in the Department of Homeland Security, and this vital link in the

emergency management system needed to be repaired.

The legislation made a number of changes to FEMA, and we supported many of these provisions, specifically: The strengthening of

the role of FEMA Administrator, and the assurance that the Administrator would be principal advisor to the President, DHS Secretary, and Homeland Security Council during times of disaster;

the restoration of preparedness functions with response and recovery functions within Federal Emergency Management Agency, thus

representing a return to established emergency management doctrine, all hazards integrated, all phases; the assurance that FEMA

Administrator would have a demonstrated ability and knowledge of

emergency management and/or Homeland Security and at least 5

years of executive leadership and management experience;

strengthen FEMA regional offices and integrated regional preparedness initiatives and resources; enhance training exercises and

technical assistance for Federal, State, local governments, and first

responders; creation of FEMA regional advisory councils in existing

FEMA regional offices; and the establishment of a formal and effective mechanism for identifying and deploying local assets for effectively strengthening EMAC, which you have heard about.

Prior to these changes and since creation of the Department of

Homeland Security, FEMA can best be characterized by a cycle of

neglect, crisis, and further neglect. In fact, I would like to refer to

this cycle as the spare tire theory, which you have heard expounded on earlier today. It seemed unusual to hear that coming

back from the Federal level.

This theory suggests that we forget about or neglect the condition of our car’s spare tire until we have a flat, and then we hope

it is in good enough shape to get us to where we need to go. Likewise, we tend to forget about and neglect our system of emergency

management until we need it.

As we explore today’s topic, I strongly urge our Federal partners

to heed the lessons we should have learned from the past.

Overall, I cannot say with certainty that FEMA is ready for the

next catastrophic disaster. The changes legislated by Congress only

went into effect last March. While we applaud the effort of Congress to legislate needed changes, we are very concerned that the

law may not be implemented as intended.

We applaud the efforts being made by Administrator Paulison

and Deputy Administrator Johnson, but we are concerned that they

may not have the protections within DHS that they need and Congress expects.

Mr. KUCINICH. I want to thank the gentleman. Your time has expired.

Mr. WEST. I am sorry.

Mr. KUCINICH. No, it is fine. You are doing very well. What we

will do is to include your entire statement in the record of the hearing. It is quite extensive. I have read it.

Mr. WEST. Thank you.

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Mr. KUCINICH. It is going to contribute to enhancing the work of

this committee, and I think we will be able to get to some of the

questions, which will enable you to draw out some of the other contributions that you have made.

I want to thank you, Mr. West.

Mr. WEST. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. West follows:]

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Mr. KUCINICH. We are going to move on to Mr. Darnell now for

5 minutes. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF DARRELL DARNELL

Mr. DARNELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon.

Good afternoon Congressman Davis and members of the subcommittee.

I am Darrell Darnell, director of the District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency. I am pleased

to have the opportunity to testify before you today about the extent

to which the District of Columbia is prepared to respond to emergencies and disasters and our collaboration with our partners in

the National Capital Region.

During the almost 6 years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the 2-years since the Gulf Coast devastation from

Hurricane Katrina, the District and the NCR, as a whole, have

worked independently and in collaboration with our partners at the

Federal, State, and local levels to enhance and improve our abilities in five critical areas.

Transportation and housing. Evacuating the District is a

daunting challenge under any circumstance. Moreover, a significant portion of the population relies exclusively on public transportation, necessitating government assistance during an evacuation

effort. Acknowledging these difficulties and having learned lessons

from the Gulf Coast experience with Hurricane Katrina, the District has conducted regular evacuation drills, such as Operation

Fast Forward, in conjunction with the July 4th festivities on the

National Mall, and is leading the NCR’s efforts to coordinate evacuation and sheltering plans throughout the region.

Understanding that any evacuation undertaken in the District

will quickly involve our regional partners, we have worked closely

with them to develop a number of tools that would assist decisionmakers in all of the jurisdictions during an emergency. These resources include regional unified evacuation route profiles; an inventory of vehicles, drivers, transportation pickup points and standing

agreements; as well as shelters that could be activated across the

region in the event of an emergency.

Medical assistance. The ability to respond to the health and medical consequences of a large-scale incident requires a combination

of plans, facilities, properly trained clinical staff, pharmaceuticals,

equipment, and supplies, broadly interpreted as medical surge capacity. The District, in coordination with the region, has steadily

increased bed capacity and has added 300 hospital beds within the

district’s borders.

To assist in preventing the spread of a biological agent, the District’s health community has been provided with the syndromic

surveillance system. This system provides an early warning capability that alerts the public health community to impending health

situations, allowing them to take proactive measures to stop a potential public health emergency. This system connects pharmacists,

hospital emergency rooms, schools, veterinarians, laboratories, and

emergency medical services information and spots trends within

the data to begin to track an outbreak and assist in identifying the

potentials for it.

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Security and law enforcement. As the Nation’s Capital, the District of Columbia presents a unique environment for security and

law enforcement. The District is home to numerous law enforcement agencies, with more per capita than anywhere else in the

country. These agencies work together in a collaborative fashion on

a daily basis to provide security to the citizens of the District, as

well as Federal Government agencies and employees.

Logistics. In addition to the accomplishments noted in transportation and housing, our efforts in the area of interoperable communications, a primary focus for the region have yielded significant

improvements in our ability to share information and communicate

across jurisdictional boundaries. In an assessment conducted by

DHS, the National Capital Region ranked in the top 10 percent of

urban areas of the Nation for advanced interoperable communication.

Collaboration with the Office of National Capital Region Coordination. Since its establishment in March 2003, the Office of National Capital Region Coordination has worked closely with the jurisdictions in the NCR to help ensure regional cooperation and coordination.

However, one final comment. The restructuring of the Federal response structure to include a principal Federal officer [PFO], in addition to the full coordinating officer. As a State emergency management director, it is my opinion that adding additional Federal

officials to the process may lead to confusion about the roles and

responsibilities of each. It would be helpful to have only one Federal official assigned for all the events, versus multiple Federal officials for different incidents. Clarification of the role and responsibility of that official would also improve the process.

With the leadership of Chris Geldhart, I believe ONCRC will continue to work with its partners to ensure further progress in preparing and securing the NCR against disaster, whether natural or

manmade, in the coming years, and we look forward to our continued success.

This is not a part of my prepared testimony, Mr. Chairman. The

one thing that I think we have been missing from the discussion

today, if I may respectfully say, is the role of citizens in our preparedness efforts. Here in the District of Columbia since 2002 we

have trained over 2,400 volunteers in citizen emergency response

training. We signed up 39 neighborhoods with over 60 volunteers

to update and to develop community preparedness plans for their

specific neighborhoods in all eight wards of the cities.

This fall, as a part of the National Preparedness Month, and at

the start of our school year, we are going to implement our Commander Ready program, where we signed up 75 volunteers to teach

over 650 school-aged kids in the grades of two to five, 5 to 13 in

age, about emergency preparedness and Homeland Security, because we really believe that this effort is not one of government

only; citizens also have to take part and take an active role in preparedness efforts.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Darnell follows:]

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Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to just respond briefly to what you

said.

I have read the testimony of each person here, and you are all

making a contribution by being here and it is very important that

you are here, and I look forward to Ms. Tierney’s testimony momentarily.

I want to say that the point that you make about citizen involvement is absolutely critical. So what I would ask you to do is to provide this committee and our staff here with the information that

you use to advance that program. Show us the manuals or models

that you use, because it may be that this is something that would

be important for the entire Nation. I would ask that you provide

it to the staff, and I also would like an extra copy so that I can

review it personally.

Mr. DARNELL. Yes, I will do that.

Mr. KUCINICH. I think it is a very valuable testimony here.

Mr. DARNELL. Thank you, sir.

Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to thank you.

I would ask Ms. Tierney to proceed with your testimony for 5

minutes. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF KATHLEEN TIERNEY

Ms. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for giving

me the opportunity to be here to testify today.

It is almost impossible for an academic to say anything in 5 minutes, but I will do my best.

The new FEMA is in the process of being created; however, we

don’t know at this time how proposed and in-process changes will

affect the Agency’s ability to respond in the future, particularly to

catastrophic events. Major changes must be instituted. The necessary resources must be applied to address glaring deficiencies in

our inter-governmental system of emergency management, and

those given responsibility for the implementation of new reforms

must be held accountable through strong oversight at various levels of government.

In my testimony I discuss seven areas that require immediate attention.

First is to ensure that the Nation develops a fully functional

emergency management system, intergovernmental emergency

management system, placing a priority on the Nation’s most vulnerable urban areas.

The Nation does not currently have an effective intergovernmental system for managing hazards and disasters. What now exists is a patchwork or lily pad arrangement within which some entities have the knowledge, resources, and political clout to deliver

effective programs, but the majority do not. This is termed in emergency management scholarship the leaders and laggers problem.

At the same time, as we strengthen the leaders and assist the

laggers, the efforts that we make have to be risk and vulnerability

based. The potential for catastrophic losses from disaster events is

well understood. Metrics already exist to assess the vulnerability of

communities, and we know where the problems are.

Second, ensure that an all-hazard approach to emergency management is implemented at all levels of government. The Federal

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Government’s official position is supportive of an all-hazards approach. At the same time, investments in terrorism-related programs far outstrip those devoted to other hazards.

As Ms. Norton said earlier, the scenarios which communities

around the country were required to prepare as part of the national

preparedness goal are skewed toward terrorism-related threats.

State and local agencies that receive funding for terrorism-related

programs will naturally focus on terrorism unless something is

done.

Third, ensure that FEMA and other crisis-relevant organizations

center their efforts on comprehensive emergency management. We

are talking today about preparedness and response, but what we

need is a return to the pre-September 11th emphasis on the four

phases of the disaster cycle: mitigation, preparedness, response,

and recovery.

Mitigation is particularly important so that we can have smaller

disasters to respond to, because we have less loss and disruption,

and it is also proven to be cost effective.

Again, long-term recovery is very important. That the Nation

lacks a strategy for large-scale disaster recovery is all too glaringly

evident right now in the Gulf region.

Fourth, explore organizational arrangements and authorities

that depoliticize high leadership positions within FEMA, DHS, and

other crisis-relevant organizations. There have been a number of

different suggestions for how this might be done, including making

the head of FEMA something like the head of the Federal Reserve

System or the Government Accountability Office.

Fifth—and we come back to Mr. Darnell’s comments—invest in

and mobilize institutions that provide the backbone for effective

emergency management.

We have to recognize that many of the systems that we will be

relying on in future disasters, such as medical and health care systems, are already over-strained. We also know that the critical information on which effective disaster responses depend is largely in

private hands. We need public/private partnerships.

We also need to expand and strengthen the role of civil society

institutions in the management of hazards and disasters. The program that Mr. Darnell describes is exactly what I am talking about

in my testimony. Mobilize the critical civic infrastructure. One logical way to do this is to begin first with organizations that normally provide services to at-risk populations and that would be required to do so even more during disasters.

Sixth—and this echoes a recommendation by the Government Accountability Office—develop and implement a strategy for work

force planning for emergency management, a strategic work force

initiative. Again, this is something that the GAO has talked about,

and I provide some more details in my written testimony.

Finally, build oversight accountability and evaluation into emergency management programs at all levels of government. All the

reports after Katrina talk about the need for greater transparency

and accountability, but it is astonishing that we have invested so

much in so many initiatives without systematic research on program effectiveness.

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At this time, the goal of evidence-based emergency management

remains illusive, but the need for objective assessments of programs and practices is clearer than ever before. Reasonable people

might well wonder which emergency management practices actually achieve their intended results, where programs are falling

short, and which investments are likely to bring the greatest return. Likewise, they might wonder whether the communities in

which they live will be able to meet their needs in disasters.

The Federal Government owes the Nation answers to questions

like these.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Tierney follows:]

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Mr. KUCINICH. I thank the witness and all members of the panel.

We are going to go to questions now. The Chair will recognize our

ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Davis.

Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you very much. I apologize for not

being able to stay for additional questions, but I have a meeting

with Chairman Waxman down the hall.

Let me start, Mr. Ashwood, just on your comment that if it is

legal, ethical, or moral, just to do it. I mean, sometimes I think in

the bureaucracy that is what you need is people who are willing

to get outside the regulations and the box, and in our Katrina report some of the real hearings are those that were able to step outside the box, see an emergency situation, and respond.

Unfortunately, Government doesn’t generally reward that kind of

behavior. It gets punished. In private sector you get a promotion.

You don’t need to say anything, but I think that is what it needs

to be, customer service. You have to empower the guy at the window or that person on the street to make a split decision. They are

going to make bad decisions once in a while, and we need to be

careful about second-guessing everything they do, but that is what

it takes in emergencies. Nothing is ever quite neat and fit and

wrapped in a neat package when it comes to emergency situations.

My real questions, Mr. Geldhart, are for you, because I represent

parts of the National Capital Area. We had an issue a few years

ago with Tractor Man. Do you remember Tractor Man?

Mr. GELDHART. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. It was a disaster. It held up, I think,

three or four rush hours while we were waiting to make a decision,

and there was nothing. Where are we today? If a similar situation

occurred today, do you step into the breach? Are we well coordinated? And for emergencies, whether it is a hurricane or a snow

storm or, heaven’s sake, a terrorist attack of some kind, have we

run any regional models or tests to show how everybody is coordinating?

Mr. GELDHART. Thank you for the question, sir. To answer your

question as far as regional models, I am not aware of a regional

model that we have run to see if everybody is prepared, but what

I would offer is what has happened in just the 4-months that I

have been here, to answer your question.

One of the first things that came up when I came onboard was

July 4th. In getting into the breach of the first real major event

that happened since I have been here and going to all the coordination meetings, all the different folks that were involved and the

way that they brought things together was amazing to me, even

though I have worked here for 3 years prior, to see the Federal,

State, and local coordination, and it showed through in a couple of

ways.

First, we had a storm that came in at 5 p.m., with a packed Mall

with a bunch of people waiting for the fireworks to happen, and we

had to evacuate the mall. The way that flowed from the National

Weather Service giving the update to the Federal folks within the

Park Police that sent out the message, since they were the lead

Federal agency that said we need to get everybody off the mall, to

D.C.’s Emergency Management Homeland Security Agency, who

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then helped communicate that word out to all of the folks who were

on the Mall, to help execute and get everybody off the Mall, MPD

being there, Metropolitan Police Department being there. And then

once again going back to the outstanding Federal side and opening

up all the buildings that we had along the Mall so that folks had

a place to go and we had a place where they could get in and out

of the storm.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. I was out working parades in Fairfax

and stuff. How did it go downtown?

Mr. GELDHART. I think that worked phenomenally, and it worked

phenomenally because the folks on the ground, sir, have been doing

this for years. What we have been able to do is we have been able

to start to attach on, like a Lego, attach on the next level of what

we need to do to make this thing come off well.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Who coordinated that?

Mr. GELDHART. That was a mutual coordination effort. When we

look at these type of incidents, that one in particular the lead agency in that was Park Police, because they are in charge of the Mall,

but everybody falls in behind that, and whether that be D.C. Emergency Management Agency, whether it be Metropolitan Police Department, whether it be Capital Police, if any of those folks are in

the lead the others will fall in behind, because this is what we do.

We are either in the lead or we support in this region.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. You have issues making sure, if there is

any kind of an attack or a huge emergency of some kind, hospitals

moving people in and out is the most difficult, getting first responders in, making sure that you are going to draw on the whole region.

Do we have agreements with Maryland, the District, Virginia,

where they can come from all over? There are differences in tort

laws, liability issues, all of those kinds of things if it happens that

gives somebody’s hesitancy to move people in if they could get sued

and the like. Do we have regional agreements that tie that together?

Mr. GELDHART. We do have regional agreements in place for mutual aid, sir. There are MOUs in place for the regions of the National Capital Region to provide mutual aid to each other.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. And you feel confident, if there is something, that you can draw on all the resources of the region, including National Guard, in case of an emergency to bring people in

very quickly?

Mr. GELDHART. Not only myself, sir, but whoever is the lead in

that particular case.

I can give you one more example. Just this past weekend we had

a WMATA worker—Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority worker—notice some dead birds around one of the stations, and

in that raised awareness, rose it up to the WMATA operations center, who then called out to several other stations and they found

several other dead birds.

In that instance now all of the sudden we have what potentially

could be a bunch of different things. Who knows what it is? What

we were able to do was coordinate throughout the region. We got

on a conference call. We brought everybody together and we said,

OK, what do we know right now? What do we know that we can

act on? Who is in the lead? Who is in charge?

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That happened very quickly, and very quickly we recognized that

WMATA was in charge. They were chasing down what they were

doing. We had the National Terrorism Task Force there, the Joint

Terrorism Task Force was there, Washington Field Office was

there, I was on the phone, all of the Homeland Security advisors

and emergency management directors coordinated that.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Let me suggest this. I mean, I think

some of the things that are helpful that are here is we had the test

run on Hurricane Pam in New Orleans, and it wasn’t executed, but

those are the kinds of things that I think we need to be ahead of

the curve.

Mr. GELDHART. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. You can never predict with precision exactly what emergency you are going to have to encounter. It just

never perfectly fits the scenario.

Mr. GELDHART. That is right, sir.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. But in the episodes we have had today,

I am happy that you are discussing them all, evacuation, because

that is an indication of everybody working together. But in the

other episodes we have seen, whether it was the Janitors for Justice, whether it was the Tractor Man, whatever, we have in many

cases, I think, seen an inability to get the right decisions made in

a timely manner. Evacuation plans are difficult.

Mr. GELDHART. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. What we need, I think, from our perspective, just speaking for myself, are some test models of how everybody responds, what would be the protocols in a situation like that.

We remain a target. The new Homeland Security bill that we just

passed starts putting more money into this region and areas that

face this.

Weather can be anywhere, but some of the other issues that may

face us could be far more severe. I think running tests and models

and all that kind of stuff can be very important.

So if you could work with us in terms of what you might be looking at in those areas, what the results are, if you could make it

public, but what the plans are, it would make us feel a lot more

comfortable.

We have had episodes in this region where one guy having a bad

day on the bridge has held up traffic along the East Coast for

hours; where one guy driving a tractor on the Mall holds it up and

emergency vehicles can’t get through. When you see that, you just

sit and wonder what if it is a real attack.

I am glad you are back on the job. I hope you are coordinating

appropriately and have been out to Fairfax and out to Prince William and out to Arlington and Alexandria and Prince George’s and

all the other jurisdictions in here. The important thing: do you

think they are comfortable with the plans at this point, or are you

still getting your feet wet?

Mr. GELDHART. Your question, sir, was whether they are comfortable with the plans that are in place?

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. With the plans that are in place and the

coordination, or do you think we are still getting our feet wet?

Mr. GELDHART. I think that at the tactical level, on the ground,

as I said earlier, our firefighters within this region, they go from

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a one-alarm to a four-alarm fire in a given day. They work with

the different jurisdictions within this region. I think those folks are

ready. I think they are up to the task and I think they will perform

admirably in any condition we throw them into.

I think our coordination and the piece that you are mentioning,

sir, that needs to be better—and that I think we would all agree

on needs to improve—is at the strategic and operational level. I

think that is a constant area of improvement that we need to work

on.

One of my top priorities, catastrophic planning, we have to do

that in this region. We have to get deeper into that. And it is not

a one-person show. This is a team sport here in the National Capital Region. At any given time, somebody is the quarterback, but

we are going to drive from my office to have catastrophic planning

done.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Well, welcome aboard.

Mr. GELDHART. Thanks.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Let me just say this may be the subject

of a future hearing, I may suggest to the chairman, just for this

region, because you have Congress and the operations of Government and everything else, and we hope to continue to stay in correspondence with you on this. Thank you very much.

Mr. GELDHART. Thank you, sir.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you, Mr. Davis. I concur that there is a

reason to have a specific hearing with respect to this region and

to the District.

In the time that we have remaining before we wrap up this hearing for the votes, I want to direct some questions to the members

of the panel.

First of all, to Mr. Ashwood and to Mr. West, within your own

sphere of activities, do you feel that you are prepared to meet the

disasters, let’s say, in your State, your respective States?

Mr. ASHWOOD. I will go ahead and tackle that question first. I

feel we are better prepared every day. Do I feel we are prepared

to meet any disaster? I would have probably told you yes prior to

the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, and I would have been totally

wrong. I would probably told you yes before the ice storms we had

in 2000 and 2001, and I would have been totally wrong.

Mr. KUCINICH. So what do you expect from the Federal Government? I think that is a fair question to ask.

Mr. ASHWOOD. What I expect from the Federal Government, I expect their support. I expect their participation in the planning process. I think that is the key here. It is not the plan, it is the process.

It is making sure that all levels of government are in on the front

end of the process so that we all know what each other is doing

so we can support each other more effectively when the event does

occur. That is what I expect.

Mr. KUCINICH. So at this moment what would be your assessment of the ability of the Federal Government to do that?

Mr. ASHWOOD. I would say, as I did in my testimony, my biggest

concern is the communication with the Federal Government on

what to expect. I don’t know if I am talking to FEMA or DHS or

the White House or who exactly is calling the shots.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. West.

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Mr. WEST. I would concur with his comments. To say we are

ready, I would say we are as ready as we can be, given the resources and the funding, personnel, etc., that we have had over the

last 20 years. A good emergency manager probably would refrain

from ever saying they are ready, but we are getting ready.

Mr. KUCINICH. Let me go back to Mr. Ashwood a minute. Is it

your opinion that, in light of the testimony that you have heard

today on the previous panel and in light of what you have experienced and heard based on your work for the State of Oklahoma,

does it appear that there is some shifting of responsibility back to

the State and local level as a means of trying to forego Federal responsibility for its appropriate role in helping to coordinate and

provide resources for a disaster?

Mr. ASHWOOD. Probably not. I will say this because I do have a

great deal of respect for Dave Paulison. I think he is trying to do

the right thing. I think what the real issue here is, though, is that

disasters are a bottom-up event. You have to have a strong base.

The stronger local government is, the stronger the State is, the

stronger the individual citizen is, and the more prepared that they

are the better prepared that we are nationally.

Mr. KUCINICH. So if the communication is there, then you have

the chance for preparation?

Mr. ASHWOOD. Absolutely, sir.

Mr. KUCINICH. Would you agree with that, Mr. West?

Mr. WEST. Yes, sir, and at the end of the day people like me and

my elected officials have to face our citizens, and they say we did

well or we did not. Certainly FEMA and our State is going to be

involved in that, but we have to live with these people after everybody else goes home.

Mr. KUCINICH. I want to go back to the issue of preparedness.

We are still working with the old National Response Plan. I mean,

they haven’t really implemented a new one. They are talking about

it. How does using this old plan affect your State of Oklahoma and

your State of North Carolina, Mr. Ashwood?

Mr. ASHWOOD. I don’t think it does, really, to tell you the truth,

and I was part of the initial writing team of the first National Response Plan. Frankly, I didn’t know what was wrong with the Federal Response Plan prior to that except that there needed to be a

national plan, which makes perfect sense, to incorporate all levels

of government in the process. When that didn’t happen, I lost a lot

of faith in the National Response Plan in any form.

Mr. KUCINICH. Well, there is a new plan. How long do you think

it will take to implement a new plan once it is put in place?

Mr. ASHWOOD. Having not read it, I have no idea, sir.

Mr. KUCINICH. But it does take time to implement a plan?

Mr. ASHWOOD. Absolutely.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. West.

Mr. WEST. Yes, sir, I agree. I concur with his comments. We felt

good about the fact that we were going to be included in some of

the initial work, but then we have not seen any results from that

at this point.

Mr. KUCINICH. So you don’t know if the input that you provided

has been included in the plan?

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Mr. WEST. That is correct, sir. I think one of the frustrating

things is that we attend listening sessions and various meetings,

and we rarely see the results of those meetings being implemented,

or suggestions, or things of that nature.

Mr. KUCINICH. Now, were you told, Mr. West, that a high-level

DHS official was rewriting the plan but with no input from State

and local officials?

Mr. WEST. That is correct, and I was pleased to hear today that

this is going out in draft form for comment, because we were not

aware of that until today.

Mr. KUCINICH. OK. I think this committee would be interested

to know, when the draft report gets to the State level, whether or

not that draft report reflects the input from the State in terms of

enhanced communication.

Mr. Ashwood.

Mr. ASHWOOD. I would be glad to, sir.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. West.

Mr. WEST. Absolutely.

Mr. KUCINICH. Now, to Mr. Ashwood and Mr. West, you are concerned that your input be included in that?

Mr. ASHWOOD. Absolutely.

Mr. KUCINICH. I want to go to the decisionmaking at FEMA before we conclude. Many people have expressed concern to our staff

that decisions at FEMA are not being made by on-the-ground regional directors, but instead are being made by bureaucrats in

Washington; therefore, decisions that used to be made by experienced management coordinators who were most knowledgeable

about the needs of the area are being overruled by attorneys and

people in the Office of Management and Budget.

Now, Mr. Ashwood, I understand that you faced this problem recently when you attempted to get a declaration of emergency in

Oklahoma; is that correct?

Mr. ASHWOOD. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. KUCINICH. And what would you tell this committee that

might facilitate, let’s say, a quick response to a State that needed

a declaration? What could we do to make sure we serve your constituency?

Mr. ASHWOOD. I could illustrate the frustration that we had, and

we have actually had it a couple of times this year. The most recent request we had, our Governor on July 5th of this year requested that four counties be declared for individual assistance because of torrential rainfall and flooding that we had across the

State from May 24th to that time period, over a month’s time. We

had record rainfall and we had documentation from the National

Weather Service showing record rainfall during that entire period

of time.

We requested four counties be declared for individual assistance.

We requested that the time period begin May 24th to the present.

And we requested that direct Federal assistance—that would be

Federal resources such as water and ice and that type of thing—

be made available for these four counties.

The turnaround on that request was exceptional. It was within

24 hours. However, receiving the answer to our request, we received two counties for declaration, no direct Federal assistance nor

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no mention of direct Federal assistance, and the timeframe had

changed from June 10th to the present rather than May 24th to

the present.

Now, while I am not saying that we were totally correct on everything, it would seem to me that if there was a problem with our

request, the Governor’s request to the President, that a phone

would have been picked up somewhere along the line and said,

look, we have a problem here, can we talk about it and work this

thing out, rather than just making a unilateral decision and saying, Here, take it.

Mr. KUCINICH. The interesting thing about your testimony and

what we have heard from Mr. West is that the lack of communication in this era of cell phones and pagers and every manner of

being able to contact people instantaneously, it still comes down to

human relations, people talking to people saying how do we work

this out and how do we come together.

I think that your testimony today will send a message to FEMA

of the urgency of not only including you in the planning, but also

in tightening up lines of communication so that mobilization in the

case of disaster can happen. I think that the testimony of Mr.

Tierney in terms of the specific steps that have to be taken is really

important in this regard, and I am hopeful that FEMA will reflect

on it.

Mr. Darnell, you have given us an image of a system that you

are really working to test, but also involve more and more people.

When I heard you speak, it reminded me of the kind of preparedness that we saw communities involved with in Y2K, which was a

kind of model. Had you thought about that?

Mr. DARNELL. Well, I wasn’t at the local level during Y2K, but

a lot of my experiences are born out of my previous experience at

Department of Justice and DHS, particularly in interoperable communications and in the planning aspects of it.

One of the things that we try to do in the NCR, going to Congressman Davis’ concerns about the Tractor Man incident, all of

our emergency operations centers now can work an event or an incident using a common operating picture, and we couldn’t do that

in the past, and so we have software programs called WebEOC that

all 140 emergency operations centers in the National Capital Region are using. What that allows us to do is have real-time situational awareness looking at the same information, sending out the

same messages on the same information system and sharing that

information. That makes it easier to communicate.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Darnell, I want to thank you for that response.

I have just been notified that we have about 4 minutes left on

a vote.

We have had an extensive hearing today, and the participation

of each and every one of the witnesses here has been essential for

us to be able to continue our efforts to make sure that this country

is better prepared to be able to meet the needs of disasters and

emergencies.

This has been a hearing of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives. I am Dennis

Kucinich, and I am the Chair of the Subcommittee on Domestic

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Policy. I have been privileged to Chair these proceedings with the

permission and good graces of Chairman Waxman, who is the

Chair of our full committee. We have had a very extensive discussion that started at 10. The panel has been patient, and your participation has been invaluable.

The committee is going to continue to proceed to explore the

issues that came out as a result of your testimony and the previous

panel’s.

At this point I want to thank the panel. You are excused.

This concludes the hearing of the Committee on Oversight and

Government Reform, the hearing on FEMA preparedness on 2007

and beyond. Thank you very much. Good afternoon.

[Whereupon, at 2:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statement of Hon. Edolphus Towns and additional

information submitted for the hearing record follow:]

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