# Singapore - United States Department of State

- Joint Communique – United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement Environment Chapter Implementation and Memorandum of Intent Biennial Review Office of the Spokesperson													HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Joint Communique &#8211; United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement Environment Chapter Implementation and Memorandum of Intent Biennial Review				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Joint Communique &#8211; United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement Environment Chapter Implementation and Memorandum of Intent Biennial Review																																		Media Note																														May 10, 2024																																							The text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the United States of America and Singapore on the occasion of meetings to review implementation of the Free Trade Agreement Environment Chapter and Memorandum of Intent on Cooperation in Environmental Matters.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Begin text:&nbsp;&nbsp;On April 19, 2024, the Governments of the Republic of Singapore and the United States of America (Governments) held meetings to review implementation of Chapter 18 (Environment) of the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and to complete the eighth Biennial Review under the Memorandum of Intent between the United States of America and the Republic of Singapore on Cooperation in Environmental Matters (MOI).  The MOI was negotiated in parallel with the United States-Singapore FTA Environment Chapter.      The meetings serve as an important opportunity to continue and enhance the longstanding bilateral relationship between the United States and Singapore, and to highlight a shared commitment to environmental protection and the sustainable use of natural resources. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Republic of Singapore delegation was led by Mr. Lim Teck Kiat, Deputy Secretary (Resilience), Ministry of Sustainability and the Environment.  The United States delegation was co-led by Assistant United States Trade Representative for Environment and Natural Resources, Kelly Milton, and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment, Scott Ticknor, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of State.    The Governments reviewed progress in implementing obligations under the Environment Chapter (Chapter 18) of the FTA by exchanging information regarding recent actions each Party has taken to:  establish high levels of environmental protection; effectively enforce environmental laws and regulations; and provide opportunities for public participation with respect to the implementation of the Environment Chapter.    &nbsp;&nbsp;The Governments also exchanged information and views regarding respective and global efforts on a variety of topics including timber trade and related issues, innovation in recycling, marine litter, and circular economy and solid waste management.   &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;During the Biennial Review, the Governments reviewed accomplishments under the Eighth Plan of Action (POA) for implementation of the MOI that covered 2022 through 2023.  Officials discussed and reported on activities carried out under the POA, including collaboration on solid waste management and recycling, green building standards, training on climate change and environmental sustainability under the U.S.-Singapore Third Country Training Program, and technical exchanges on water management.  The Governments discussed a new POA for 2024 through 2025.  The new POA sets out technical exchanges and activities related to environmental protection, use of innovative environmental technology and pollution management techniques.   &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Governments also held a joint public session, consistent with relevant requirements in Chapter 18 of the FTA.  The public session included civil society and private sector representatives from the United States and Singapore.  The Governments updated the public about their respective efforts to implement Chapter 18 and to strengthen environmental cooperation under the MOI.  Public participants had the opportunity to engage directly with government officials by offering comments and asking questions about implementation of the FTA Chapter 18 and the MOI.   &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;End text.&nbsp;&nbsp;						Tags																					Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs																																														Economic Prosperity and Trade Policy																																							Free Trade Agreements																															Office of the Spokesperson																								Singapore																																Trade Policy
- Building Partnerships for Innovation and Safe Tech Around the World Richard R. Verma, Deputy Secretary of State  for Management and ResourcesIn our ever-changing tech landscape, the private sector is leading and, in many ways, outpacing the work happening in government. But this doesn’t mean that our governments need to get out of the way. Rather, as governments, we need to create the right ecosystem for innovation.Forging International Tech PartnershipsOne of our core strategies is to build strong partnerships globally. Take, for instance, the groundbreaking INDUS-X project initiated during Prime Minister Modi&#8217;s visit to Washington in 2023. It connects U.S. and Indian private sectors – addressing defense supply chain weaknesses and boosting innovation.I recently participated in the INDUS-X Summit in New Delhi, where I saw a strong commitment from both the U.S. and India to accelerate innovation, support researchers and start-ups, and eliminate regulatory obstacles for private industry success. To echo Prime Minister Modi: &#8220;A society that does not innovate will stagnate.&#8221;Launched in 2023, INDUS-X promotes #USIndia defense cooperation and bilateral trade via investments and capitalizes on critical and emerging technologies. This year we are working to lay sustainable commercial foundations for defense innovation and collaboration. pic.twitter.com/5QJRyUE2mq&mdash; Richard R. Verma (@DepSecStateMR) February 20, 2024Driving Digital Transformation in AfricaPartnerships drive our bilateral and multilateral initiatives in digital innovation. In 2022, President Biden initiated the Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA) program, underscoring our commitment to this cause.Through DTA, we&#8217;re allocating over $350 million and mobilizing further funding to enhance digital accessibility and literacy throughout Africa. Our goal is to partner with African nations, ensuring broader participation in the global digital economy.Innovating Defense CooperationOur partnerships go beyond traditional security aims. During Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin&#8217;s visit to Kenya in 2023, he signed a framework for defense cooperation in Nairobi, opening avenues for enhanced cooperation on defense technology and innovation.As Kenyan Defense Minister Aden Bare Duale said, &#8220;In an increasingly complex and interconnected world, our ability to work seamlessly together is paramount. This cooperation will enable us to respond effectively to the ever-evolving security challenges in our region.&#8221;Such partnerships are vital, not just for security but also for fueling economic growth and tackling environmental challenges, propelling businesses forward and preparing for the future.Today I met with 🇰🇪 Cabinet Secretary of Defense Duale in Nairobi. The signing of the Framework for Defense Cooperation between our countries demonstrates that our ever-growing defense partnership is resilient and strong. pic.twitter.com/P0lQIp6FNj&mdash; Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III (@SecDef) September 25, 2023Harnessing Technology for Environmental ResilienceSecretary Blinken&#8217;s recent visit to Brazil highlighted our partnership in using technology to combat climate change. With investments exceeding $260 million, we are upgrading infrastructure and deploying technologies to enhance environmental resilience.In Rio de Janeiro, the United States is providing more than $260 million in financing to help upgrade infrastructure and install 5,000 public Wi-Fi access points, as well as public lighting systems that cut electricity consumption by up to 60 percent, while also lowering costs and cutting CO2 emissions.Met with President @LulaOficial ahead of the G20 Foreign Ministers Meeting. Brazil is a key partner on many issues including combatting the climate crisis and advancing human and labor rights. As we approach 200 years of U.S.-Brazil relations, our ties are stronger than ever. pic.twitter.com/wdVWL6KQ5j&mdash; Secretary Antony Blinken (@SecBlinken) February 21, 2024Global Dialogues on Emerging TechnologiesOur conversations with other nations about emerging technologies are pivotal in constructing a digital landscape that embraces inclusivity and sustainability for all while benefiting the environment. We have launched high-level critical and emerging tech dialogues with the Republic of Korea, Singapore, India, and Israel to drive closer cooperation on AI, biotechnology, and quantum information sciences.During the U.S.-Republic of Korea ICT Policy Forum and the Japan-U.S. Dialogue on Digital Economy, we engaged with businesses to ensure safe 5G tech and foster digital growth in developing countries, focusing on AI, data security, system integrity, and eco-friendly tech.Ensuring Responsible AI DevelopmentAs we explore the possibilities of technologies like AI, it&#8217;s crucial to make sure they&#8217;re used responsibly and ethically. Through initiatives like President Biden&#8217;s Executive Order on AI, we are leading efforts to set international standards and guidelines for how AI is developed and used. We celebrate the recent adoption of the U.S.-led UN General Assembly Resolution together with 123 co-sponsors to demonstrate the widespread agreement on the need to seize the opportunities of safe, secure, and trustworthy artificial intelligence systems for sustainable development.While AI offers immense opportunities, we must ensure safety, accountability, fairness, and privacy. To leverage AI’s tremendous potential to advance U.S. diplomacy and statecraft and ensure ethical and responsible use at the Department, we’ve developed an enterprise-wide Artificial Intelligence Strategy.The challenges and opportunities of AI are global. That&#8217;s why we&#8217;re working with our partners to make sure AI is safe, secure, and works well for everyone, everywhere.Shaping a Better Future TogetherOur commitment to fostering global innovation is unwavering. As Secretary Blinken has said, “our success ultimately depends on working effectively together.”By leveraging partnerships, embracing digital transformation, and prioritizing responsible innovation, we&#8217;re not just shaping the future of technology — we&#8217;re shaping a better world for all.
- Singapore HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Singapore				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Singapore																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Singapore in the past year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of detention by the government without prior judicial review or warrant; monitoring private electronic or telephone conversations without a warrant; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media, including the enforcement of criminal libel laws to limit expression; serious restrictions on internet freedom; and substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association.The government took credible steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The law prohibited such practices, and the government generally respected these prohibitions.The law mandated imprisonment and mandatory caning for approximately 30 offenses, such as certain cases of rape, robbery, and drug trafficking. Caning was discretionary for convictions on other charges involving the use of force, such as kidnapping or voluntarily causing grievous hurt. Caning also could be used as punishment for legally defined offenses while in prison if a review by the Institutional Discipline Advisory Committee deemed it necessary and the commissioner of prisons approved. Women and girls, men older than 50, boys younger than 16, men sentenced to death whose sentences were not commuted, and persons determined medically unfit were exempt from caning.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Observers described some conditions as harsh, including cramped and poorly ventilated cells. The government described the conditions as “intentionally austere” but consistent with the basic needs of inmates. Inmates could be subjected to solitary confinement up to 30 days and to canings for prison offenses.Administration: Mechanisms existed for prisoners to file complaints alleging mistreatment or misconduct with judicial authorities. A board of justices of the peace appointed by the minister of home affairs monitored prisons and oversaw investigations.Independent Monitoring: Authorities allowed members of the press to visit prisons with prior approval. The Prisons Service permitted visits by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as Prison Fellowship International and volunteer welfare organizations during the year. The Ministry of Home Affairs also appointed a nongovernmental body composed of citizens to conduct regular prison inspections.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention. The law permitted arrest without warrant and detention without trial in defined circumstances. Persons detained under these circumstances had a right to judicial review of their case, but the scope was limited in certain instances by the law. The government generally observed the laws.The constitution provided for the right of habeas corpus in regular criminal law, although not in Internal Security Act (ISA) or Criminal Law (temporary provisions) Act (CLTPA) cases.Under the CLTPA, the minister of home affairs’ decision regarding a suspect’s engagement in criminal activities was final and not subject to appeal, as was the minister’s decision whether detention was necessary for reasons of public safety, peace, and good order, once concurrence by the public prosecutor was secured. The courts could review the decision but only based on the tests of illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety.Persons detained without trial under the CLTPA could challenge the substantive basis for their detention only to the CLTPA advisory committee, chaired by a Supreme Court judge, and only within 28 days of the detention order. The president considered the advisory committee&#8217;s report in determining whether to cancel or confirm the detention order.Under the ISA, detainees could challenge their detention only by seeking judicial review of whether their detention complied with the procedural requirements of the ISA; they had no right to challenge the substantive basis for their detention through the courts. Detainees under the ISA had a right to legal counsel and to make representations to an advisory board chaired by a past or sitting Supreme Court judge. The ISA specifically excluded recourse to the normal judicial system for review of a detention order made under its authority.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						In most instances the law required issuance of an authorized warrant for arrests, but some laws such as the ISA provided for arrest without a warrant if the government determined the suspect acted in a manner threatening the security of the country. The law specified some offenses, such as robbery or rape, did not require an arrest warrant.Those arrested according to regular criminal procedure had to appear before a magistrate within 48 hours or be released. Authorities expeditiously charged and brought to trial the majority of those arrested. A functioning bail system existed.Persons who faced criminal charges were allowed access to counsel within a “reasonable” but undefined period. Any person accused of a capital crime was entitled to free counsel assigned by the state. The government also funded a Criminal Legal Aid Scheme run by the registered charity Pro Bono SG that covered additional, but not all, noncapital criminal offenses. The Public Defender’s Office, established in December 2022, provided representation to citizens and permanent residents charged with noncapital criminal offenses but unable to afford legal representation.Arbitrary Arrest: Some laws, such as the ISA and the CLTPA, contained provisions for arrest and detention without a warrant, trial, or full judicial due process in defined circumstances when there was evidence a person was associated with any of the criminal activities listed in the law that posed a threat to public safety, peace, and good order. ISA cases were subject to review by the courts to provide for compliance with its procedural requirements. Authorities invoked the ISA primarily against persons suspected of posing a security threat and employed the CLTPA mostly against persons suspected of organized crime activity or drug trafficking.Pretrial Detention: Pretrial detention was not excessively long. Some individuals, however, were held in prolonged detention without trial and with minimal judicial due process under laws that allowed for such detention.The ISA and the CLTPA permitted preventive detention without trial for the protection of public security, safety, or the maintenance of public order.The government used the CLTPA against serious criminal activities involving narcotics, loan sharks, or criminal organizations. The law specified the criminal activities for which individuals could be detained without trial or placed under police supervision. Before issuing a CLTPA detention order for an initial period of one year, the minister of home affairs was required to obtain the consent of the public prosecutor. A Supreme Court judge chaired a committee that reviewed all cases and conducted hearings in which detainees, or their lawyers, were present. The country’s president considered the committee’s recommendations when deciding whether to cancel, confirm, or amend the detention. The president could extend detention for unlimited additional periods of up to one year at a time. Each detention, however, was reviewed by a separate advisory committee on an annual basis.The CLTPA allowed for supervision within the community through means such as curfews, residence limitations, requirements to report regularly to authorities, and limitations on travel.The ISA authorized authorities to order detention without filing charges if they determined a person posed a threat to national security. The initial detention could be for a maximum of two years, after which the minister of home affairs could renew the detention indefinitely. ISA detainees were permitted legal counsel. An independent advisory board consisting of a Supreme Court judge and two other presidential appointees reviewed each detainee’s case within three months of initial detention and at intervals of no longer than 12 months thereafter. If the minister disagreed with an advisory board recommendation to release a detainee, the president would have discretion whether to continue detention.In January authorities disclosed the arrest and detention in October 2022 of a teacher who allegedly was preparing to take up armed combat with Hamas against Israel.In February authorities disclosed the December 2022 detention of a student, age 18, who had allegedly planned armed violence in the country and overseas in support of ISIS, as well as of a boy, age 15, who had allegedly considered attacking with knives non-Muslims in popular tourist areas in the country, under the belief that “disbelievers” should be killed.In addition to detention, the ISA allowed for issuance of restriction orders that required an individual to seek official approval for a change of address or occupation, overseas travel, or participation in any public organization or activity. Individuals subject to restriction orders could be required to report regularly to authorities.In May the Ministry of Home Affairs announced that a youth detained in 2020 for alleged threats against Israel and Jews was released on a restriction order, stating the youth had made good progress in rehabilitation.There was also a category of restriction called “suspension direction” that replaced a suspended order of detention and could prohibit association with specified groups or individuals and overseas travel without prior written government approval. Suspension directions also included reporting conditions.The country’s drug laws permitted the involuntary admission of drug abusers to an approved institution for treatment and rehabilitation without judicial approval. If a suspected drug abuser tested positive for an illegal drug or displayed signs of drug withdrawal, the director of the Central Narcotics Bureau could commit the person to a drug rehabilitation center for a six-month period, which a review committee of the institution could extend for a maximum of three years. By law the bureau director could order treatment for up to six months of a person after first sending the suspected drug abuser for medical examination or observation to determine the person to be an abuser of intoxicating substances. The director’s decision could be challenged in court and the detained individual had the right to file a complaint to a magistrate who could issue an order to release the individual from the institution.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The constitution provided for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected judicial independence. Some civil society activists and government critics in the past expressed concern regarding undue government influence in the judicial system. Laws limiting judicial review, moreover, permitted restrictions on individuals’ constitutional rights.The ISA and CLTPA explicitly precluded normal judicial due process and empowered the government to limit, on broadly defined national security grounds, other fundamental liberties provided for in the constitution.																Trial Procedures						The law provided for a fair and public trial, except for persons detained under the ISA, CLTPA, and similar legislation. The judiciary generally enforced this right when applicable. Some commentators observed a small number of exceptions in cases involving direct challenges to the government or the ruling party. The judicial system generally provided an efficient judicial process.Criminal defendants enjoyed a presumption of innocence, although in some cases, the law employed a mechanism whereby once the prosecution had proven certain facts, the burden shifted to the defendant to disprove certain elements of the offense. For example, in a drug possession case, the defendant was presumed aware of the substance and was required to prove otherwise. Similarly, if the amount of the narcotic was above set limits, the defendant had to prove he or she did not have the drug for trafficking purposes.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Not applicable.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The constitution did not address privacy rights; statutory or common law provided remedies for infringement of some aspects of privacy rights. Several laws provided for privacy, regulated access to and processing of personal data, and criminalized unauthorized access to data. Public agencies, however, were exempt from these data-protection requirements; subject to public sector-specific laws, they could intercept communications and surveil individuals if it was determined to be in the national interest or necessary for investigations or proceedings.The government generally respected the physical privacy of homes and families. Normally, police were required to have a warrant issued by a court to conduct a physical search but could search a person, home, or property without a warrant if they decided such a search was necessary to preserve evidence or was permissible according to discretionary powers of the ISA, CLTPA, and other laws.Law enforcement authorities had broad powers to search electronic devices without judicial authorization, including while individuals were in custody. In 2020 Privacy International stated, “Singapore has a well-established, centrally controlled technological surveillance system.” Law enforcement agencies, including the Internal Security Department and the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, had extensive networks for gathering information and conducting surveillance, and highly sophisticated capabilities to monitor telephone, email, text messaging, or other digital communications intended to remain private. No court warrants were required for such operations and the law gave police access to computers and decryption information under defined circumstances.Crimes for which police could collect DNA from persons under arrest included murder, rape, robbery, theft, molestation, voluntarily causing harm, drunk driving, mischief, obstructing public servants from fulfilling their duties, and obscene acts. Collected DNA could be used for criminal investigations, forensic comparisons, criminal proceedings, and identifying dead individuals and living persons unable to identify themselves. There was no requirement for police to immediately delete DNA data if the suspect was acquitted or discharged, or if the case was settled out of court. Eligible individuals had to apply to have their data deleted, and police could reject the application on grounds of national security or relevance to other cases. Members of parliament expressed concerns regarding citizens’ privacy rights and data protection.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The constitution provided for freedom of expression but allowed parliament to impose such restrictions on freedom of speech as it “considers necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of the country or any part thereof, friendly relations with other countries, public order or morality and restrictions designed to protect the privileges of parliament or to provide against contempt of court, defamation or incitement to any offense.”Freedom of Expression: The government significantly restricted public statements it contended would undermine social or religious harmony or the legal system, interfered in domestic affairs, or did not safeguard national or public interest.In September the Ministry of Communications and Information warned The Economist magazine’s Singapore bureau chief Dominic Ziegler for allegedly endorsing the Singaporean online publication Jom by allegedly comparing the country to an “illiberal state” and “encouraging Singaporeans to embrace an alternative vision, instead of what was being offered by the state and an allegedly captive media.”In March the professional-conduct body of the Supreme Court suspended capital defense lawyer Ravi Madasamy for five years, the maximum sanction for attorney misconduct, for statements made in a 2020 interview to alternative news website The Online Citizen. Ravi had stated the prosecutor’s “overzealous[ness]” in prosecuting his client led to the accused’s death sentence and the prosecution’s fairness was “called into question by the court itself.” In a judgment delivered by the chief justice, the court stated these were “grave and baseless accusations” and undermined the integrity of the country’s key legal institutions.In March a court extended an arrest warrant for former chairman of the opposition Reform Party Charles Yeo, who had earlier fled to the United Kingdom after being charged with “wounding the religious feelings of the Christian community” with remarks on his Instagram and Facebook pages and for making a threatening communication to a police officer. The warrant was for breach of bail conditions by failing to return to Singapore.The law gave the home affairs minister discretion to authorize special police powers if a “serious incident,” such as a terrorist attack, occurred or was threatened. These powers allowed the commissioner of police to prohibit anyone from taking or transmitting photographs or videos in a defined area, or from making text or audio messages concerning police operations if these actions could compromise the effectiveness and safety of the law enforcement operations. A breach of the order could lead to up to two years’ imprisonment, a substantial fine, or both.The law prohibited the public display of any foreign national emblems, including flags or symbols of political organizations or leaders. A 2022 law relaxed restrictions on the use of the country’s flag outside of the July to September national-day period, if permitted by the minister of culture, community, and youth. That law, however, added the national pledge, flower, lion head emblem, and public seal as recognized symbols and increased penalties for misuse of these national symbols to a substantial fine, a jail term of up to six months, or both. Barring limited exceptions, the national coat of arms could not be used without prior written permission. The national anthem could be performed or sung on any appropriate occasion but use for commercial purposes required permission from the minister of culture, community, and youth.The government-approved Speakers’ Corner remained the only outdoor venue where citizens or Singapore-registered entity members could give public speeches without a police permit, provided certain criteria were met. The Speakers’ Corner could be used for exhibitions, performances, assemblies, and processions. Event organizers were required, however, to preregister online with the National Parks Board and had to provide the topic of their event. Regulations stated the event should not be religious in nature or cause feelings of enmity, ill will, or hostility among different racial or religious groups. The commissioner of parks and recreation had the right to cancel or disallow any event or activity determined to endanger, cause discomfort to, or inconvenience other park users or the general public. Only citizens or permanent residents of the country were allowed to attend events at Speakers’ Corner. If the event required a police permit and the permit was obtained, nonresident foreigners could also attend.Citizens needed a permit to speak at indoor public gatherings if the topic referred to race or religion. Indoor private events were not subject to the same restrictions. Organizers of private events, however, had to prevent inadvertent access by uninvited guests or they could be cited for noncompliance with the rules regarding public gatherings.Although faculty members at public universities were not government employees, they were potentially subject to government influence. Academics spoke, published widely, and engaged in debate on social and political problems, but Freedom House noted self-censorship on topics related to the country occurred among academics, who could face legal and career consequences for critical speech. Publications by local academics and members of research institutions rarely deviated substantially from government views.According to a 2021 survey of 198 academics, 77 percent reported at least “moderate” interference by nonacademic actors in their decisionmaking and more than a quarter in some disciplines reported consistent censorship or self-censorship.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: According to the ISA and other legislation, the government could restrict or place conditions on publications that incited violence, counseled disobedience to the law, had the potential to arouse tensions in the country’s diverse population, or threatened national interests, national security, or public order.Government leaders urged news media to support the government’s goals and help maintain social and religious harmony, and authorities enforced strict defamation and press laws. Freedom House in 2022 reported “self-censorship is common, though newspapers occasionally publish critical content.” The government also strictly enforced laws protecting racial and religious harmony, which also applied to members of media.Although there were no legal bans on owning or operating private press outlets, government managerial and financial control strongly influenced all print and some electronic media. Two companies, SPH Media Trust and Mediacorp, owned all general circulation newspapers in the four official languages of English, Chinese, Malay, and Tamil. Following the restructuring of SPH Media Trust in 2021, the government announced in 2022 it would provide the new not-for-profit company up to 180 million Singapore dollars ($135 million) annually during the subsequent five years, which raised further questions concerning the company’s editorial independence. The government approved (and could remove) the holders of SPH Media Trust management shares, who appointed or dismissed the firm’s management. The country’s other major newspaper owner, Mediacorp, was wholly owned by Temasek Holdings, the government investment company. The two companies’ coverage of domestic events and reporting of sensitive foreign relations topics usually closely reflected official policies and views.Government-linked companies and organizations operated all domestic broadcast television channels and almost all radio stations. The government did not censor international news channels, but entertainment programs were required to meet the content codes of the state’s Infocomm (information and communication) Media Development Authority (IMDA), which operated under the Ministry of Communications and Information and regulated broadcast, print, and other media. The IMDA had the power to sanction broadcasters for transmitting what it deemed inappropriate content. All content broadcast between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. had to be suitable for viewers of all ages. Broadcasters often censored or edited content they anticipated would breach the IMDA code, such as content that normalized or positively portrayed lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) relationships, or offended any religion.The government could limit broadcasts or the circulation of publications by “gazetting” (listing) them under the Broadcasting Act and could ban the circulation of domestic and foreign publications. The law empowered the minister of communications and information to gazette or place formal restrictions on any foreign broadcaster it assessed was reporting on domestic politics in a one-sided or inaccurate manner.The government could require a gazetted broadcaster to obtain express permission from the minister to continue broadcasting. The government could impose restrictions on the number of households receiving a broadcaster’s programming and could impose a substantial fine on a broadcaster for failing to comply.In previous years international and regional human rights organizations criticized the government’s use of the law to file contempt of court charges against government critics. In April the high court fined Terry Xu, editor of The Online Citizen, 18,000 Singapore dollars ($13,500) for contempt of court for a 2021 Facebook post reposting an Australian citizen’s article allegedly impugning the integrity of the Singaporean judiciary. The high court stated Xu “failed to practice responsible journalism and instead proceeded to publish scurrilous allegations against the courts.” In 2022, following the suspension of its class license, The Online Citizen reactivated its website and social media accounts after Xu relocated to Taiwan. In response the IMDA highlighted that the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) and the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA) would continue to apply to the outlet independent of where its company was located.In May a court rejected journalist and antideath penalty activist Kirsten Han’s application to quash a conditional warning received in 2022 for contempt of court for comments made on Facebook, in which she criticized cost orders imposed on capital defense lawyers as “acts of intimidation.” The court held the conditional warning lacked legal effect and was thus unreviewable.In September the Ministry of Communications and Information suspended the press accreditation for local media website Mothership for six months after the website broke an embargo on the announcement of water price increases.The law allowed the banning, seizure, censorship, or restriction of written, visual, or musical materials if authorities determined such materials threatened the stability of the state, contravened moral norms, were pornographic, showed excessive or gratuitous sex and violence, glamorized or promoted drug use, or incited racial, religious, or linguistic animosities. The banned publications comprised sex-related and religious material.The IMDA regulated movies, video materials, computer games, and music. The law gave IMDA officers power to enter and search premises and seize evidence without a warrant for “serious offenses,” such as those involving films prohibited on public interest grounds or the unlicensed public exhibition of a film.Libel/Slander Laws: Defamation was a criminal offense and could result in a maximum prison sentence of two years, a fine, or both. Critics alleged government leaders used defamation lawsuits or threats of such actions to discourage public criticism, coerce the press, and intimidate opposition politicians.In September Minister of Home Affairs and Law K. Shanmugam and Minister of Foreign Affairs Vivian Balakrishnan sued Lee Hsien Yang, estranged brother of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, for defamation regarding Lee Hsien Yang’s earlier accusations the two acted improperly in arranging renovations at their government-owned rental properties.In May an appellate court upheld criminal defamation convictions of The Online Citizen editor Terry Xu and site contributor Daniel De Costa but reduced the three-week jail sentences to a fine. The convictions were originally for publishing that there had been “corruption at the highest echelons,” the meaning of which was disputed at trial. The prosecution had argued it referred to cabinet ministers, while the defendants had argued it referred to elite members of society. The appellate court held the meaning was that the cabinet members had allowed corruption to infect the elite, and thus while harming the cabinet ministers’ reputation, did not attack their integrity and merited a lower sentence. Xu had already served three weeks while his appeal was pending, and in August a court rejected the prosecution’s argument that Xu should serve an additional two-week default term.																Internet Freedom						The law permitted government monitoring of internet use, and the government closely monitored internet activities, such as social media posts, blogs, and podcasts. The IMDA could direct service providers to block access to websites that, in the government’s view, undermined public security, national defense, racial and religious harmony, or public morals. Political and religious websites were required to register with the IMDA.The government subjected internet content to similar rules and standards as traditional media, as defined by the IMDA’s Internet Code of Practice. Internet service providers were required to provide content that complied with the code. The IMDA licensed the internet service providers through which local users were required to route their internet connections. The IMDA investigated content potentially in breach of the code when it received complaints from members of the public.The Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) was used to curb what the government viewed as online falsehoods through various directives requiring addressees to carry correction notices or internet intermediaries to restrict access in cases of noncompliance. Under POFMA any government minister had broad authority to identify “falsehoods” and issue correction or takedown notices with immediate effect. Some aspects of a minister’s decision could be challenged in court.In March the POFMA Office added TikTok to a list of platforms the government stated were responsible for combating fake news, including preventing abuse by bots and ensuring online transparency for political advertising under POFMA.The law required individuals or online platforms, on a case-by-case basis, to publish corrections or remove online information where a government minister deemed a statement factually false or misleading and deemed it was in the public interest to do so. The law was not supposed to apply to opinions, criticisms, satire, or parody. Individuals in breach of the law could face a substantial fine and imprisonment for up to five years, with penalties doubled if the individual used bots. A platform that failed to remove false content could receive a substantial fine and, in the case of a continuing offense, a fine for each additional day the offense continued after conviction.In December the Ministry of Communications and Information designated opposition politician Kenneth Jeyaretnam’s website “The Ricebowl Singapore” and his Facebook, Instagram, X, and LinkedIn social media accounts Declared Online Locations under POFMA. The designation meant Jeyaretnam’s site and accounts were required to warn users for the following two years of Jeyaretnam’s alleged history of communicating falsehoods.  Designated platforms could remain active, but their owners could not accrue financial benefit from the sites. The ministry and others issued Jeyaretnam five POFMA correction orders between July and December for various articles and posts.In May the Ministry of Home Affairs rejected Terry Xu’s application to cancel a correction direction under POFMA related to Xu’s online article and social media posts alleging police had taunted an elderly woman for not wearing a mask.The Online News Licensing Scheme required heavily visited internet sites focused on news regarding the country to obtain a license, submit a bond, and remove prohibited content within 24 hours of notification from the IMDA. Many viewed this regulation as a way to censor online critics of the government. The IMDA cited the need to regulate commercial news sites and promote conformity with other forms of media such as print and television.Smaller news sites that covered political topics were required to register under the Broadcasting Act for a Class License, which required registrants to report their income sources and not receive foreign funding.The government’s stated goal of FICA was to help “prevent, detect, and disrupt foreign interference” in domestic politics conducted through hostile information campaigns and the use of local proxies. Under FICA’s hostile information campaign provisions, the minister of home affairs could compel internet and social media service providers to disclose information, remove online content, and block user accounts. Under the provisions regarding local proxies in effect as of December, the minister of home affairs could take “countermeasures” against “politically significant persons” who were suspected of working on behalf of or receiving funding from “foreign political organizations” and “foreign principals.”In February the Online Safety (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act came into effect. Passed in November 2022, the law empowered the IMDA to direct specified “online communication services” such as social media services to disable in-country users’ access to “egregious content” (including sexual harm, child sexual exploitation, cyberbullying, terrorism, self-harm, public health and security, racial or religious intolerance) or block specified sources from communicating the content to in-country users. The law also allowed the government to designate platforms “with significant reach or impact” as “regulated online communication services,” which would be required to proactively detect and remove such content under a code of practice. In July IMDA’s code of practice for online safety came into effect. Social media services that failed to comply with the law could be fined or blocked. Also in July, the parliament passed the Online Criminal Harms Act, which empowered the government to order the disabling, blocking, or removal of online content or restriction of accounts it suspected were being used to commit crimes. The law also required designated online services to put systems in place to counter scams and malicious cyber activities.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The constitution provided for the rights of peaceful assembly and association, but the government restricted those rights.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						Although the constitution provided citizens the right to peaceful assembly, the law imposed restrictions in the interest of security, public order, or morality. Public assemblies, including political meetings and rallies, required police permission. It was a criminal offense to organize or participate in a public assembly without a police permit, and those convicted could be assessed a substantial fine; repeat offenders faced a steeper fine.By law a public assembly could include events staged by a single person. Citizens did not need permits for indoor speaking events unless they touched on “sensitive topics,” such as race or religion, or for qualifying events held at the Speakers’ Corner. The commissioner of police could decline to authorize any public assembly or procession that could be directed toward a political end and be organized by, or involve the participation of, a foreign entity or citizen. Police could also order a person to “move on” from a certain area and not return to the designated spot for 24 hours.International human rights organizations criticized authorities’ use of the law and their concerns regarding public order to prevent peaceful protest, especially by human rights defenders. Human Rights Watch lamented the government’s use of “laws that violate international standards ... against the country’s few remaining dissenting voices.” Amnesty International called on the government to stop “its penalization, intimidation and harassment of human rights defenders and activists.”The government closely monitored political gatherings regardless of the number of persons present. Spontaneous public gatherings or demonstrations were virtually unknown.In October the National Parks Board denied a permit for a rally to show support for Palestine; the board and police stated they would deny all permits related to the Israel-Hamas conflict, citing the sensitivity of the topic and the country’s need to preserve “peace and harmony between different races and religions.” They stated police “will not grant any permit for assemblies that advocate political causes of other countries or foreign entities, or may have the potential to stir emotions and lead to public order incidents.” Police initiated investigations in October and December, respectively, against activist Gilbert Goh for standing in front of the Speakers’ Corner with a placard on the Israel-Hamas conflict and against a woman for allegedly placing placards at the entrance to the Israeli embassy.As of year’s end, investigations continued against human rights activists Kirsten Han and Rocky Howe for holding two public assemblies outside Changi Prison Complex in 2022 without a permit. In January the UN special rapporteur on human rights defenders posted a communication with the government regarding the investigations, to which the government responded the investigations were being carried out under the Public Order Act in accordance with the law and were “in no way an attempt to intimidate any individual.”						Freedom of Association						Most associations, societies, clubs, religious groups, and other organizations with more than 10 members were required to register with the government. The government could deny registration to or dissolve groups it believed were formed for unlawful purposes or for purposes prejudicial to public peace, welfare, or public order, although it approved the majority of applications in prior years. The government had absolute discretion in applying criteria to register or dissolve societies, although an organization could appeal to the minister of home affairs if the registration was unsuccessful and challenge a dissolution in court.In October parliament passed a bill expanding the government’s powers to restrict the registration of societies, allowing the registrar to scrutinize all applications.The government prohibited organized political activities except by groups registered as political parties or political associations. These could not receive foreign donations but could receive funds from citizens and locally controlled entities. The ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) was able to use nonpolitical organizations, such as residential committees and neighborhood groups, for political purposes far more extensively than opposition parties.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The constitution and the law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights, although it limited them in certain circumstances.In-country Movement: The ISA permitted authorities to restrict a person’s movement, and they did so in the case of some former ISA detainees.Foreign Travel: The government could refuse to issue a passport; this was done primarily on security grounds.Persons with national service reserve obligations (male citizens and permanent residents between ages 18 and 40 for enlisted men, or between 18 and 50 for officers) were required to advise the Ministry of Defense of plans to travel abroad. Men and boys ages 13 and older who had not completed national service obligations were required to obtain exit permits for international travel if they intended to be away for three months or more.Citizenship: The law allowed the government to deprive naturalized citizens of citizenship if they engaged in activities deemed harmful to public safety and order or resided outside of the country for more than five consecutive years and either did not register annually at a consulate or were believed by the government to have no intention of retaining citizenship.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government occasionally cooperated with organizations such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to repatriate or send refugees to a third country.Access to Asylum: The law did not provide for granting asylum or refugee status. The government had no system for providing protection to refugees.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons										Not applicable.																																				g. Stateless Persons										As of December, there were 853 stateless persons in the country. Many were reportedly born in the country before independence but did not or could not meet requirements for citizenship then in force. Others were permanent residents who lost their foreign citizenship, or were children born to foreign nationals who were not recognized as citizens in their home countries. Stateless persons could apply for citizenship. The government provided a mechanism to facilitate stateless individuals’ travel abroad, called a certificate of identity.Approximately 76 percent of stateless persons had obtained permanent residency, but those without permanent residency could not buy or rent real estate, were not entitled to government health or education subsidies, and could have difficulty securing employment.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The law provided citizens the ability to choose their government in open and free periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage. In more than five decades of continuous rule, however, the PAP employed a variety of measures that effectively limited the ability of the opposition to mount a serious challenge to its hold on power. In recent years opposition parties won additional seats that amounted to only a small fraction of seats in parliament.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: The September presidential election and the 2020 parliamentary general election were reported to be free of abuses and irregularities. Although 10 opposition parties participated in the 2020 election, the PAP won 83 of 93 seats in parliament.Political Parties and Political Participation: The opposition criticized the PAP for abusing its incumbency. For example, government-appointed and predominantly publicly funded community development councils, which provided welfare and other services, strengthened the PAP’s position.The PAP controlled key positions in and out of government, influenced the press, and benefited from structural advantages such as the group constituency system and short campaign period that disadvantaged opposition parties, according to some human rights groups. While the PAP’s methods were consistent with the law and the prerogatives of parliamentary government in the country, the overall effect was to perpetuate PAP power.The PAP maintained its political dominance in part by circumscribing political discourse and action. There were 34 registered political parties, which were legally free to organize. Authorities, however, imposed strict regulations on their constitutions, fundraising, and accountability, including a ban on receiving foreign donations and a requirement to report donations.Changes to the law during the year expanded the ability of overseas citizens and nursing home residents to vote.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: No law limited the participation of women and members of historically marginalized or minority groups in the political process, and they did participate. Of the 19 members of the cabinet, three were women and six were members of a minority group. In September Tharman Shanmugaratnam became the first nonethnic Chinese candidate to win the presidency in a contested election.There were no restrictions against voting or political participation by members of minority groups; they were well represented throughout the government and civil service, except in some sensitive national security positions in the armed forces and intelligence community. As part of the country’s group representation constituency system – in which some constituencies were represented by groups of candidates who ran for election together – each group constituency had to include at least one candidate from a racial minority group.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, and the government implemented these laws effectively. There were isolated reports of government corruption.Corruption: On July 11, the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau arrested Minister of Transport S Iswaran as part of a corruption investigation, the first time in more than 30 years a minister was included in such an investigation. Prime Minister Lee stated he concurred with the bureau’s request to open a formal investigation and that Iswaran would be on leave of absence until the investigation was completed.In August Immigration and Checkpoints Authority officer Teo Hwee Peng was convicted of corruption and sentenced to 33 months’ imprisonment and fined 2,634 Singapore dollars ($1,940). In 2018 Teo accepted sex and cash from an overseas national who overstayed her visa in exchange for a special pass that allowed her to remain in the country while assisting with an investigation.For additional information about corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						A variety of domestic human rights groups generally operated without government interference, but subject to close monitoring and legal restraints, and these organizations investigated and published their findings on human rights cases. Government officials were somewhat cooperative and responsive to their views. NGOs were subject to registration according to the Societies Act or the Companies Act.Some international human rights NGOs criticized the government’s policies in areas such as capital punishment, migrant workers’ rights, freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and protection of the rights of LGBTQI+ persons. They alleged the government generally ignored such criticisms or published rebuttals.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: Under the law, rape was a crime, with maximum penalties of 20 years’ imprisonment and possible caning. There was no marital immunity for rape and the definition of rape was gender neutral. The law imposed up to twice the maximum penalty for offenses affecting the human body – “rape, hurt, or wrongful confinement” – committed by partners in a close or intimate relationship (even if unmarried) than it imposed for these offenses committed outside such relationships. Acts of domestic violence were crimes, and penalties ranged from fines to sentences of up to 24 years’ imprisonment. Survivors could also obtain court orders restraining the respondent and barring a spouse or former spouse from the survivor’s home until the court was satisfied the spouse had ceased aggressive behavior. The government effectively enforced the laws on rape and domestic violence. In May a man was sentenced to 29 years’ imprisonment and 24 strokes of the cane for drugging his wife and having her raped by five men during a period of eight years. The man himself raped the wives of two of the other men.Identity protection orders were mandatory for sexual crimes or child abuse even before a police report was filed. Survivors of sexual crimes could video-record their testimony instead of having to recount it in person. Survivors could testify in closed-door hearings, with physical screens to shield them from the accused person. Lawyers could not ask questions concerning a survivor’s sexual history unless the court granted them permission to do so.In July parliament amended the Women’s Charter to strengthen protections for survivors of domestic violence. The bill updated the definition of domestic violence to include emotional and psychological abuse, such as coercive control, besides physical and sexual abuse. It introduced two new types of protection orders which prohibited a perpetrator from being in the vicinity of or communicating with the survivor. It also lowered the eligible age to apply for a protection order from 21 to 18. The law further strengthened the government’s ability to intervene and protect survivors through so called “protectors.” Protectors were allowed to enter homes to assess and obtain information, issue emergency orders to protect survivors in high-risk settings, apply for protection orders on behalf of the survivors, and apply to the court to remove survivors from their home for their safety if they did not take steps to protect themselves, or to initiate electronic monitoring of high-risk perpetrators. The law increased fines for family violence-related offenses and increased the maximum prison term to 12 months from six months.In April police launched a new Sexual Crime and Family Violence Command after a five-year high of 2,549 sexual assault cases were reported in 2022.During the year, the government deployed specially trained forensic psychologists to protection specialist centers to provide consultation and assessments of survivors and offenders in sexual and family violence cases.Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): Types I (a) and IV (as classified by the World Health Organization) FGM/C were practiced among a portion of the Muslim population. There was no legislation banning FGM/C and no official data were available on how prevalent the practice was, but 75 percent of Muslim women indicated they had undergone FGM/C, according to an End FGC Singapore survey in 2020. Some medical clinics offered the procedure, requiring parents to consent and go through counseling, according to the Singapore Muslim Women’s Association. This medicalization, however, contravened guidance by the World Health Organization and the UN Population Fund on this practice. End FGC Singapore, a community-based movement, criticized the practice as covert and stated girls often did not know they had undergone the procedure until later in life.Discrimination: Women enjoyed the same legal rights as men in civil liberties, employment, commercial activity, and education. Women were well represented in many professions and the constitution provided for equality in employment, but women faced discrimination in the workplace. No specific antidiscrimination legislation existed, although statutes prohibited certain forms of discrimination and guidelines for employers prohibited asking about marital status or family responsibilities during job interviews. For example, employers could not dismiss women employees during pregnancy or maternity leave, and employers could not dismiss employees solely due to sex, marital status, or family responsibilities. The government effectively enforced these statutes and investigated complaints of workplace discrimination. Pregnancy, however, was deemed a breach of standard work permit conditions for foreign workers and, unless the worker was married to a Singapore citizen or a permanent resident, the government cancelled work permits and required repatriation of foreign domestic workers who became pregnant.Polygyny was permitted for Muslim men but was extremely rare; it was limited and regulated by the Registry of Muslim Marriages, which oversaw Muslim marriages and other family law matters.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities. The government provided access to sexual and reproductive health services, including emergency contraception and postexposure prophylaxis, for survivors of sexual violence. Contraceptives and sexual and reproductive health services were widely available. The government provided subsidies for such services to couples as long as one partner was a citizen, but the amount depended on the citizenship and residence status of the other partner. As of July, women between ages 21 and 38 were permitted to freeze their eggs for nonmedical reasons; however, only married couples could use their frozen eggs for procreation.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The law criminalized violence and incitement of violence against racial, ethnic, and religious minorities or groups. The government took a proactive stance in fighting racial and ethnic discrimination and enforced the law effectively.Racially motivated violence was rare. Cases of racial discrimination were also rare, although they occurred in the workplace. Employers were required to provide explanations for putting requirements such as specific language skills in a job advertisement. Companies found to have engaged in discrimination based on race or ethnicity could not hire foreigners for at least 12 months and could not renew work passes of existing foreign workers. The government maintained a watchlist of companies engaging in discriminatory hiring practices.Throughout the year individuals who committed racist or racially insensitive verbal offenses were prosecuted and sentenced under the law. In August a man was sentenced to three months’ jail for racially insulting and assaulting a woman. The man attacked the woman in 2021 during the COVID-19 pandemic because she was not wearing a mask while exercising outdoors, as permitted by law.The Presidential Council on Minority Rights examined pending bills to prevent any measure from disadvantaging a racial, ethnic, or religious minority or group. It also reported to the government on matters affecting any racial or religious community.Government measures to mitigate racial and ethnic biases and promote ethnic and racial harmony included mandated representation of all major ethnic groups in elected and nonelected government positions; allocation of public holidays for each racial group; and the use of four official languages, with an emphasis in schools on teaching English as the common language.																																				Children										Child Abuse: The law criminalized mistreatment of children, including physical, emotional, and sexual abuse. The government enforced the law and provided support services for child abuse victims.The number of child abuse cases the Ministry of Social and Family Development investigated remained high at approximately the same level as in 2022, after a 63 percent increase from 2020 to 2021.In September a man was sentenced to 21.5 years’ imprisonment and 18 strokes of the cane for physically abusing his daughter, age two, until she suffered a seizure and died. The parents burned her remains in a metal pot and stored them for five years before they were discovered.The courts sentenced several men to long prison terms for sexually abusing their children. In September a perpetrator was sentenced to 18 years in jail and 16 strokes of the cane for sexually abusing and raping his sister-in-law when she was between ages nine and 15.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The law characterized unmarried persons younger than age 21 as minors and persons younger than 14 as children. Individuals younger than 21 who wished to marry were required to obtain parental consent, and the couple was required to attend a mandatory marriage-preparation program. Individuals younger than 18 also required a special license from the Ministry of Social and Family Development to wed or, if marrying under Muslim law, required permission from the kadi (a Muslim judge appointed by the president), who granted permission only under special conditions.Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law criminalized human trafficking, including child sex trafficking, and authorities enforced the law.The age of consent for noncommercial sex was 16. Sexual intercourse with a person younger than 16 was punishable by a maximum of 10 years in prison, a fine, or both; if the survivor was younger than 14 it was punishable by up to 20 years in prison and a fine or caning.The law prohibited commercial sex provided by anyone younger than age 18. Authorities prosecuted those who organized or profited from commercial sex, brought women or girls to the country for commercial sex, or coerced or deceived women or girls into commercial sex.The law protected minors and children from sexual exploitation and distinguished between child pornography and other types of pornography. It was a separate offense to use or involve a child younger than age 16 in the production of child-abuse material and a crime to be involved in the supply and consumption of child-abuse material. The law criminalized offenses, such as sexual intercourse, pornography, or sexual grooming, committed in the context of exploitative relationships when the survivor was older than 16 but younger than 18, even if the survivor consented.By law, those convicted of any offenses committed against vulnerable survivors – children younger than age 14, persons with disabilities, and domestic workers – were subject to up to twice the maximum penalty.In March a man was sentenced to two years in jail for downloading more than 13,600 files depicting child pornography, some involving babies.																																				Antisemitism										According to the Jewish Welfare Board, there were approximately 2,500 members in the Jewish community. There were no known reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization:  The law did not criminalize consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults after the repeal of a previous law took effect in January. Before that, Section 377A of the Penal Code criminalized consensual sexual conduct between men, although it had not been enforced for years.Violence and Harassment: There were no official reports of violence against persons based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics, although observers noted some instances could go unreported.Discrimination: No laws explicitly protected members of the LGBTQI+ community from discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics; nor did the law recognize LGBTQI+ couples or their families. No law prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. Discrimination toward LGBTQI+ persons was reported across social domains, including the military, public accommodation, and educational settings.Same-sex partners had the same access to legal protections as others, including expedited protection orders in cases of harassment or violence, including by close and intimate partners.Since unmarried persons were prevented from purchasing government housing reserved for married couples until age 35, and same-sex marriage was not permitted, LGBTQI+ couples were unable to receive certain government services and benefits available to other citizens before age 35. Adoption was limited to couples married under laws recognized by the government and for single persons only if they met certain conditions, effectively preventing LGBTQI+ couples from adopting children.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: Individuals were prohibited from updating their gender on official documents unless they underwent sex reassignment surgery.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: Practices of “conversion therapy” to change a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity or expression reportedly included talk therapy, encouragement of celibacy, and physical and psychological abuse. Perpetrators included families and religious groups. There was no law banning “conversion therapy” but acts of abuse were punishable by law. In 2021 the Singapore Psychological Society discouraged “conversion therapy” on LGBTQI+ individuals due to its harmful effects and encouraged therapy that affirmed a person’s orientation and identity.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: The country’s overall legal restrictions on freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly applied to those speaking on LGBTQI+ topics. Critics were concerned media censorship resulted in underrepresentation of the LGBTQI+ community. According to the IMDA website, authorities allowed the broadcast of LGBTQI+ themes on television “as long as the presentation does not justify, promote, or glamorize such a lifestyle.”																																				Persons with Disabilities										Persons with disabilities had access to education, health services, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others. Government information and communication on disability concerns were provided in accessible formats such as screen readers, sign language interpretation, captioning, and subtitling. Government websites also complied with the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines.The government maintained a comprehensive code on barrier-free accessibility mandating minimum accessibility requirements for new building developments undergoing additions or alterations.The country provided a high level of educational support for children with disabilities from preschool to university, allowing them to choose between mainstream programs and special-education schools depending on their needs.The Disabled People’s Association, an advocacy group, stated discrimination against persons with disabilities was underreported and noted discrimination against persons with disabilities who were seeking private-sector employment continued.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Although no legislation barred employers from discriminating against job applicants based on their HIV status, government guidelines for employers stated employees dismissed based on their medical status, including HIV-positive status, had grounds for wrongful dismissal claims against their employers. Many persons living with HIV were, however, afraid to disclose their status during the job application process and, during employment, feared dismissal if discovered and determined to have made a false declaration.The government discouraged discrimination, supported initiatives that countered misperceptions regarding HIV and AIDS, and publicly praised employers who welcomed workers with HIV or AIDS. HIV-positive foreigners, however, were barred from obtaining work permits, student visas, or immigrant visas.In May a man was convicted of perjury and sentenced to 3.5 months in jail after lying about his sexual activities and his HIV-positive status to authorities to donate blood.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for the right of most workers to form and join trade unions, with limits on union independence. Workers had the legal right to strike and to bargain collectively. The law prohibited antiunion discrimination.Parliament could impose restrictions on the right of association on security, public order, or morality grounds. The Ministry of Manpower also had broad powers to refuse to register a union or to cancel a union’s registration. Refusal could occur when a trade union already existed in an industry or occupation. Laws and regulations restricted freedom of association by requiring any group of 10 or more persons to register with the government. The law also restricted the right of uniformed personnel and government employees to organize, although the president, as head of state, could grant exemptions. Foreigners and those with criminal convictions generally could not hold union office or become employees of unions, but the ministry could grant exemptions.The law provided for the right to strike with certain limits. A legal strike required the majority of affected unionized workers to vote in favor by secret ballot, as opposed to the majority of those participating in the vote. Workers in “essential services,” defined broadly, were required to give 14 days’ notice to an employer before striking, and there was a prohibition on strikes by workers in the water, gas, and electricity sectors.The government effectively enforced applicable laws. Penalties were commensurate with those under other laws involving denial of civil rights, such as discrimination. Collective bargaining was common but strikes almost never occurred.Unions were unable to carry out their work without interference from the government. The law limited how unions could spend their funds, prohibiting, for example, payments to political parties or the use of funds for political purposes. Legal strikes were limited to trade disputes within the trade or industry in question.Almost all unions were affiliated with the National Trade Union Congress, an umbrella organization with a close relationship with the government and the ruling PAP. The organization prohibited union members who supported opposition parties from holding office in its affiliated unions.Collective bargaining was a routine part of labor-management relations in the private sector. Because nearly all unions were affiliates, the National Trade Union Congress had almost exclusive authority to exercise collective bargaining power on behalf of employees. A national tripartite Industrial Arbitration Court had to certify all collective bargaining agreements before they went into effect. Although transfers and layoffs were excluded from the scope of collective bargaining, employers consulted with unions on both matters.Foreign workers constituted approximately 15 percent of union members. Labor NGOs also filled an important function by providing support for migrant workers, including legal aid and medical care.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										The law prohibited all the worst forms of child labor. The law prohibited employment of children younger than age 13. A child age 13 or older could engage in light, nonindustrial work, subject to medical clearance. Exceptions existed for family enterprises; children age 13 or older could work in an industrial undertaking if it employed members of their families. Ministry of Manpower regulations prohibited night employment of children and restricted industrial work for children ages 15 and 16. Children younger than age 15 could not work on commercial vessels, with moving machinery, on live electrical apparatus lacking effective insulation, or in any underground job, and normally they were prohibited from employment in the industrial sector.The Ministry of Manpower effectively enforced these laws and regulations. Employers who violated laws related to child labor were subject to fines, imprisonment, or both. Penalties were not commensurate with those for analogous serious crimes, such as kidnapping. Government officials asserted they had no information on any violations of the laws. The incidence of children in formal employment was low, although some children worked in family enterprises.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The law did not specify a national minimum wage for all sectors. All firms hiring foreign workers were required to pay local employees a minimum salary. The government, in consultation with unions and employers, had a sectoral progressive wage model (PWM), which set wage floors and skills requirements for specific positions in employment with companies providing cleaning, landscaping, and elevator maintenance, and in security services and retail sectors. The government extended PWM coverage to the food sector and waste management sector. In March the government introduced an occupational PWM which covered administrators and drivers because these occupations existed across many sectors. Employers were required to follow these pay scales as a requirement to obtain a business license.The law set the standard legal workweek at 44 hours and required employers to apply for an overtime exception from the Ministry of Manpower for employees to work more than 72 hours of overtime per month. Workplace protection, including paid sick leave, mandatory annual leave, overtime pay, and protection against wrongful dismissal, was available to all private-sector employees except domestic workers and seafarers, covered under separate laws. Foreign domestic workers were required to receive one rest day per week or be compensated with at least one day’s salary in addition to their basic salary or a replacement rest day. As of January, foreign domestic workers were required to receive at least one rest day per month. The law also mandated benefits for part-time employees, defined as those working 35 hours per week or less.Wage and hour laws applied to migrant workers. Foreign workers were concentrated in low-wage, low-skill jobs in construction, shipbuilding, services, and domestic work and were often required to work long hours. Approximately 323,000 migrant workers lived in purpose-built dormitory housing which met clearly defined living standard conditions.The majority of foreign domestic workers, mainly from the Philippines and Indonesia, worked under clearly outlined contracts. Certain offenses, such as causing harm or insulting modesty, had significantly higher penalties if the victim was a foreign domestic worker than if the victims were other foreign workers.Throughout the year the government investigated and sentenced several employers for abuse of their foreign domestic workers. In June a woman was jailed for 20 months for abusing her domestic worker, including burning her with a hot iron. The mother of the convicted woman was sentenced to nine months in jail for injuring the worker with a knife, and the father to three weeks in jail for slapping the worker.NGOs advocated for structural changes to the work permit employment system in order to reduce the financial vulnerability and the potential for exploitation of migrant workers.Occupational Safety and Health: Occupational safety and health (OSH) standards were appropriate for the main industries in the country, and OSH experts actively identified unsafe conditions, including lack of personal protective equipment against COVID-19 in addition to responding to workers’ OSH complaints. The law established a framework for workplaces to comply with OSH standards, and regular inspections enforced the standards. Officials encouraged workers to report situations endangering health or safety to the Ministry of Manpower. The law incentivized companies to prevent workplace injuries by permitting employers with better safety records to pay lower insurance premiums, expedited the benefit claim process for workers, and increased the size of benefit payouts to injured workers. The law provided employees with the right to remove themselves without jeopardy to their employment if they were threatened by a danger not agreed to in the contract. The Ministry of Manpower continued to promote training to reduce the frequency of job-related accidents in high-risk sectors such as construction, and authorities provided tax incentives to firms that introduced hazard control measures.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The Ministry of Manpower was responsible for enforcing laws and regulations establishing working conditions and comprehensive OSH regulations. Penalties for violating these regulations – fines and stop-work orders – were commensurate with those for similar crimes. The number of inspectors was sufficient to enforce compliance. While inspectors had authority to make unannounced inspections and the government stated such inspections were generally unannounced, some NGOs contended this was not always the case. Inspectors had broad powers to act against offenders, including to arrest without warrant, search arrested persons, and seize weapons. The government effectively enforced wage floor and overtime laws, although penalties were lower than those for similar crimes, such as fraud. Penalties were regularly applied against violators, including for nonpayment of salaries, serious safety violations, and abuse or mistreatment of foreign domestic workers.The Tripartite Alliance for Dispute Management, which included the Ministry of Manpower, unions, and the employers’ federation, offered mediation services to help employees and employers settle employment disputes such as disagreements on salary. From January through June, the ministry conducted 3,500 worksite inspections, an increase of 35 percent compared with the first half of 2021. It took 9,000 enforcement actions in response to safety breaches and issued 50 stop-work orders, a twofold increase compared with the first half of 2021, with an average duration of 7.5 weeks. The government fined 550 companies a total of 1.8 million Singapore dollars ($1.35 million). In 2021 the government issued 60 stop-work orders with an average duration of six weeks and fined 590 companies a total of 1.97 million Singapore dollars ($1.48 million). The Ministry of Manpower noted receiving between 2,400 and 3,800 reports of unsafe work activities each year during the prior five years and that 84 percent of its 2021 inspections resulted in enforcement actions. The government also enforced requirements for employers to provide one rest day per week or compensation for foreign domestic workers.Amid a rise in workplace injuries and deaths, in 2022 the ministry put new policies and programs in place, doubling fines for offenses observed during safety inspections. The government required companies subject to stop-work orders and companies where major injuries occurred to engage external auditors to review their safety systems.In May the government ended a heightened safety period which it previously extended by three months because the workplace fatality rate per 100,000 workers improved. The government retained several OSH measures from this period, including a multiagency workplace safety taskforce, and announced new ones to improve OSH at the sectoral, company, and worker level including mandatory safety training for directors and installation of cameras that were expected to take effect progressively.Companies were required to set up internal reporting systems to assure workers of fair treatment, make workplace safety a regular item on the agenda of board meetings, and demand effective safety standards from suppliers. In cases of offenses against the Workplace Safety and Health Act, courts could consider noncompliance with the new code in their judgment.Under a demerit system, companies with poor safety performances could be placed on the ministry’s business-under-surveillance program and be barred from hiring foreign workers for up to two years. The ministry had a multisectoral workplace safety task force to strengthen work safety practices.The government charged numerous employers with OSH violations during the year. In June a manufacturing firm was fined 200,000 Singapore dollars ($150,000) for failing to implement adequate safety measures, leading to the death of a worker in a workplace accident in 2021. The company’s director of operations was fined an additional 125,000 Singapore dollars ($93,800). In August several individuals responsible for fatal workplace accidents were sentenced to imprisonment for between two to seven months. Also in August, three companies of the MES Group were fined between 59,000 and 396,500 Singapore dollars ($43,300 to $297,000) for labor offenses including illegal employment of foreigners, excessive overtime hours, and making false salary declarations, in one of the largest and most extensive cases of false declaration contraventions to date, according to the Ministry of Manpower. Four of MES Group’s former directors were sentenced to jail terms between four months and 42 weeks.The World Bank estimated the informal economy in 2018 constituted approximately 11 percent of GDP. The government set and enforced basic employment standards and protections, some of which also applied to workers in sectors that could be considered informal. The law covered all contracts of service and employment, regardless of whether the contract was oral or written, express or implied. The law tightly regulated and provided protections for migrant labor, which accounted for a large proportion of jobs that typically fall in the informal economy.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons																																																						g. Stateless Persons																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Singapore
- Special Representative for Commercial and Business Affairs Morgenthau’s Travel to Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia Office of the SpokespersonU.S. Department of State Special Representative for Commercial and Business Affairs Sarah Morgenthau traveled to Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia from March 11 to 22 to highlight the positive impact of U.S. investment and American companies in Southeast Asia. U.S. companies hold more than $359 billion in direct investments across the region, which support more than three million American jobs.In Singapore, the Special Representative met with government officials and U.S. private sector leaders to discuss how to increase U.S. economic presence in the region and participated in a roundtable organized by The American Chamber of Commerce in Singapore.In Hanoi, Special Representative Morgenthau joined one of the largest-ever delegations of U.S. businesses to Vietnam.  The delegation, facilitated by the US-ASEAN Business Council, included 94 representatives from 49 U.S. companies.  The delegation also included President and Chair of the Export-Import Bank of the United States Reta Jo Lewis and U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Marc Knapper.In Jakarta, the Special Representative joined U.S. Ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Yohannes Abraham to lead discussions on the importance of our shared commitment to an inclusive digital economy to ensure that benefits and opportunities flow to all people and all places.This trip highlighted the United States’ position as the largest foreign direct investor in Southeast Asia and our readiness to be ASEAN&#8217;s partner of choice.  Our shared future is bright.For further information please contact the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs at EB-Press-Inquiry@state.gov.
- Department Press Briefing – March 26, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – March 26, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – March 26, 2024																																																					March 26, 2024																																																								1:25 p.m. EDTMR MILLER: All right. Good afternoon, everyone. No Matt Lee today? Who wants to – who wants to go first?QUESTION: I’ll vote for me.MR MILLER: Leon. A lot of people auditioning for the role of Matt Lee. (Laughter.) Let the record reflect a snicker from the – from the front row. (Laughter.)QUESTION: (Off-mike.)QUESTION: I know you talked about this already yesterday, but I’d like to come back to it because it’s a little bit mind-boggling to me. Since when is a UN resolution, a Security Council UN resolution, not – nonbinding? Because that’s a significant shift. That’s not the understanding of most countries, and it’s not the understanding of the UN either. This is not a Chapter VII resolution. So I don’t get how the U.S. is now saying that it would be nonbinding, and basically giving the message that another country wouldn’t necessarily need to comply with it.MR MILLER: So let me explain what we meant by that. First of all, as we said yesterday and we’ve made clear all along, we have always believed that the path to a ceasefire and the release of hostages is something that will be reached through negotiations between Israel and Hamas, enabled by third-party countries and in which the United States is participating, and not through a UN process. And that remains our belief.Nevertheless, we – when we say the resolution is nonbinding, what we mean is that it does not impose any new obligations on the parties the way, for example, some UN resolutions that impose obligatory sanctions, impose actual requirements on people to implement them. That said, we do believe that even though there are – this resolution lacks nonbinding provisions and lacks new requirements that is imposed on the parties, it does carry weight and it is something that should be implemented.QUESTION: I mean, that’s a little bit contradictory, if I may. I mean, either it’s binding or it’s nonbinding. If it’s nonbinding, like you said, because it lacks provisions, why would anybody comply with it?MR MILLER: It’s nonbinding in that it does not impose any new obligations on the parties, but we do believe it should be respected, that it carries weight, and that it should be implemented, as has always been the – as has always been our belief when it comes to UN Security Council resolutions.QUESTION: Can I follow up, Matt, just to clarify?MR MILLER: Sure.QUESTION: Okay. So if this was nonbinding – now, the other resolution, the three resolutions that you vetoed, were they also in the same kind of resolution?MR MILLER: So, Said, I’d have to go back and look at the provisions, but we vetoed them, so ultimately they weren’t – they weren’t the voice of the UN Security Council.QUESTION: So I’m saying if they are not binding, then why bother and veto it?MR MILLER: Because – so they – they carry weight and should be implemented, and so we want to see resolutions that pass ultimately reflect the policy positions of the United States, which is what I said yesterday. We came to the determination that this Security Council resolution, although it did contain – or it lacked some provisions that we wanted to see, most notably condemning Hamas’s actions on October 7th, that it ultimately – it called for two things that we support: a ceasefire and the release of hostages together. And so that’s why we abstained from the resolution. We do believe that it carries weight and should be implemented.QUESTION: But you know – and I remember, like, during the – the whole Iraq thing, there were 12 UN resolutions, and they were all binding. They were all binding every time, and the U.S. would be the first one to say it’s binding. I mean, I worked in Iraq; I knew exactly what was going on. So I’m saying that any UN resolution that passes, that is allowed to pass, it potentially can be utilized within the framework of Chapter VII.MR MILLER: Is there a question there, Said?QUESTION: Yes, there is. I’m asking you. I mean, there – can you answer the &#8212;MR MILLER: No, I just – there was a statement. I wanted to see if there’s actually a question.QUESTION: No, I – absolutely. So, okay, let me reframe my question.MR MILLER: Or maybe ask one.QUESTION: Do you think that this resolution can potentially be subject to Chapter VII?MR MILLER: We believe that the – that the UN Security Council resolution carries weight and should be respected, as I said.QUESTION: Okay. I have a couple of other questions, but I’ll –MR MILLER: Sure, go ahead.QUESTION: &#8212; defer to others on Gaza.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Can we just – there are some reports that Israelis feel that depend – their ability to depend on the United States has now decreased because of the abstention at the Security Council vote yesterday. Can you just speak to that and the relationship right now?MR MILLER: So absolutely not. The – first of all, the relationship between the United States and Israel is one that is longstanding. They’re a longstanding ally of the United States. And the President has made clear that the United States will always support Israel’s right to defend itself. That was true before our action in the Security Council – in the Security Council yesterday; it remains true today.As I said yesterday, the position that we take and the position that was contained in that resolution that led us to not block its moving forward is that there should be a ceasefire, and there should be the release of hostages. That is our position; we have believed it has been Israel’s position, because Israel has been negotiating to try to achieve a ceasefire that would secure the release of hostages. So far from there being, at least in our eyes, any distance between the United States and Israel, we believe the position that we were endorsing at the United Nations yesterday is the same one that Israel has been trying to achieve through the ongoing negotiations.Now, none of that is to say there are not things with which we disagree with Israel. There obviously are. There have been a number of things in recent months that – where we have had disagreements with them, and we have been very direct and candid with them in our conversations about those disagreements, and those of course have been well aired in public, at this podium and in other places.QUESTION: And Netanyahu’s office is indicating that the U.S. not vetoing the resolution actually hampered or harmed the hostage talks. Is that the U.S. understanding?MR MILLER: So that statement, which I believe said that Hamas pulled out of the hostage talks or Hamas rejected the most recent proposal because of the United Nations Security Council resolution, that statement is inaccurate in almost every respect and it is unfair to the hostages and their families. The description of Hamas’s response that has been aired in the public is all from news reports – it’s not the actual substance of the response – and I can tell you that that response was prepared before the UN Security Council vote, not after it.So for the United States, we are not going to engage in rhetorical distractions on this issue. We are going to continue to work to try to bring the hostages home.QUESTION: Just one last question on this. I understand that U.S. officials say that there are domestic political concerns for Prime Minister Netanyahu when he went forward with canceling these Rafah meetings here in the United States. But it does have a damaging effect on the U.S.-Israel relationship as well, and now he’s going even further and saying that this move is harming hostage talks. Are there going to be ramifications for Israel for pulling back on these talks and for now blaming the U.S. for hostage talks not moving forward quickly enough?MR MILLER: So I wouldn’t look at it that – the way – I wouldn’t look at the question of ramifications in the way that you posed the question. We’re not going to make our decisions based on minor disagreements or whether someone canceled a meeting or not. We’re going to make our decisions based on what we believe is in the best national security interests of the United States, and ultimately when we have conversations with Israel, we are talking to them about what we believe are in the national security interests of Israel, as well the national security interests of the region and in the interests of the Palestinian people and others.So when you think about ramifications, we wanted to have that meeting with Israel to present to them an alternative way to accomplish their legitimate security goals of defeating the Hamas battalions in Rafah, because we believe it is in their interest to do this in a better way. We believe that a full-scale military operation in Rafah will not just cause civilian harm to the Palestinian people; it will not just hinder the flow of humanitarian assistance – most of which is coming in through the Rafah area and being distributed initially through Rafah; we believe that that kind of operation would hurt Israel’s national security. It will leave Israel more isolated in the world. It will separate Israel from countries that have been longtime partners of Israel – and you’ve heard this from countries all around the world.So we have been making clear that this kind of operation is not in Israel’s interests, let alone in the interests of the Palestinian people. So when you speak to ramifications, those are the type of ramifications that we are worried about for Israel, and that’s why we want – we wanted to have this meeting, to present to them what we think is a better alternative.QUESTION: Are you rescheduling those meetings anytime soon?MR MILLER: I don’t have any schedule – any announcements to make regarding schedules.Go ahead.QUESTION: Just to clarify, what does it mean to say that it should be – that the resolution should be implemented? From the Israeli point of view, I guess they would say there’s no – there’s no deal to be taken at the moment. So how can they implement?MR MILLER: It goes back to the first point I made, which is that we believe a ceasefire and the release of hostages will be ultimately secured through negotiations, and it’s the negotiations that we have been pursuing in the region, most recently over the weekend in Doha. And so we are going to continue to pursue those negotiations to reach a ceasefire and secure the release of all hostages.QUESTION: Sure. I wonder if you can just talk about the meeting with the defense minister yesterday, the Israeli defense minister. Did he come with specific requests in terms of more arms that the U.S. – that Israel wants the U.S. to provide for the continued operation in Gaza?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak specifically to that other than to say that, as you would expect, whenever we have a conversation with the defense minister, they usually have things that they want from the United States – and I know that he’s having meetings at the Pentagon today, also met at the White House yesterday.From our perspective – and I will let the defense minister speak for himself – from our perspective, we were there to talk – to continue the conversation that the Secretary had in Tel Aviv last week with the security cabinet, which included Defense Minister Gallant, about what we thought would be the harm of a full-scale military operation in Rafah, and as well as more things we think Israel needs to do to allow humanitarian assistance in.QUESTION: So you’ve got an ally coming, asking for more military support. You’ve already given quite a lot of military support during this operation, during this conflict. But they’re also basically planning to go ahead with an operation that you’re telling them is unwise. Are you saying we’re – your acceptance of these requests for future arms provisions is going to be conditioned in some way on whether you listen to us on Rafah or not?MR MILLER: Let’s take this one step at a time. We believe that it’s still important to have this conversation. We believe that there is a better way for them to accomplish a legitimate security imperative. And I don’t want to preview any possible actions if it goes a different way.QUESTION: On this, Matt?MR MILLER: Let me – go ahead, Michel.QUESTION: Did you – did you provide the defense – the Israeli defense minister any guarantees that the U.S. will continue providing Israel with arms?MR MILLER: So the President has spoken to this. He spoke to it recently and said that the United States will always support Israel’s right to defend itself. That’s not going to change. And I wouldn’t want to preview any further steps.Leon, go ahead.QUESTION: Also on this &#8212;MR MILLER: Leon, go ahead.QUESTION: Wondering on Rafah – I mean, you’ve been very clear from the very beginning that you don’t dictate operate policy or operations to Israel. You’ve said that numerous times. You’ve said you’re not involved in the military planning. Here you’re telling them not to do a major offensive in Rafah, but you’re giving them or want to talk to them about alternatives, whether they may be – counterterrorism, what have you, I don&#8217;t know specifically. But by doing that, you would get directly involved in the operations that were to take place in Rafah and potentially there could be more civilian deaths and what have you. So in that case, you would be directly involved. How big of a problem is that?MR MILLER: So I don’t agree with that. Let me say a few things. Number one, when it comes to dictating, you’re right; no, we do not dictate to them. We can’t dictate to them. They’re a sovereign country, and the United States can’t dictate to any sovereign country. They’re going to make their own decisions, and they have been quite clear about that, and we would expect nothing less from any sovereign country.That said, we always offer our best advice to them. We have done that from the beginning. You’ve heard the President talk about that when he went to Israel just a week after or a little over a week after October 7th, where he talked about the fact that Israel is – because Israel is such a longtime friend, we are going to offer advice about them, oftentimes colored by the mistakes that we have made and the experiences that we have learned from mistakes that we have made in our past and we have conducted military operations. And so we try &#8212;QUESTION: Well, it wasn’t very good advice. Sorry to interrupt, but &#8212;MR MILLER: No, we try to give them that advice. In terms of the options that we will present to them – or that I assume we will present to them at some point – I wouldn’t think of it as military planning. We’re going to offer them – and I also don’t want to preview too much in detail publicly, because these are still conversations that ought to happen privately. But the intent would be to give them advice about how to conduct such operations. It’s not to do actual military planning. For example, what to do when, how, with that level of specificity. When I come – when I talk about we’re not involved in military planning, that’s what I mean. We’re not in with them, planning exact military operations. But we have always offered them advice about what we believe the best way to go about this operation is. That’s true going back to some of the first meetings that we had in Israel right after October 7th.QUESTION: Well, then either one of two things – either you gave very bad advice, because you have 30,000 civilians who got killed, or they didn’t listen to your advice. So what about Rafah? You think they would – are they actually listening to what you’re saying? Because they said if we don’t have the U.S. on board, we’re going it alone.MR MILLER: So they will speak for themselves, but we have not yet had the meeting where we outline the steps that we believe that they ought to take.QUESTION: Thank you. I appreciate it. A couple more questions. First of all, the Palestinian Red Cross just announced that an Al Amal Hospital in Khan Younis has been completely shut down. The Israeli army threw out the patients, the staff, and so on, and put dirt, whatever – they closed it off and so on. Are you aware of this?MR MILLER: So I haven’t seen that exact report. I’ve seen reports of operations at hospitals – hold on. Hold on, Said. Just let me finish. I’ve seen reports of operations at hospitals; I haven’t seen that specific one. And I know that oftentimes we’ve gotten – especially over the past few days – conflicting information from Palestinian sources and Israeli sources about exactly what is going to happen. So I’m a little reluctant to make a definitive comment absent definitive information.What I will say – two things. Number one, we generally don’t want to see operations at hospitals. But number two, we have – you have seen over the past few weeks that areas that had been cleared by Israel, that Hamas fighters have flown – flowed back in and are inside hospitals. And so while we don’t want to see operations in hospitals, we also don’t believe that Hamas should be hiding there. And we would, again, encourage them to stop hiding behind patients and hospitals.QUESTION: Will you look into Al Amal Hospital situation?MR MILLER: Of course.QUESTION: Okay. A couple more things. Now, UNRWA – I know that the largest contributor thus far has been the United States of America, so that’s a big chunk, close to $350 million a year, maybe $400 million a year, except – I mean, these operations not only in Gaza, but they are in Gaza, in the West Bank, in Lebanon and in Jordan and in Syria. How do you see this being replaced? Because obviously nobody’s going to shell out that kind of funding. And while the World Food Program and so on can provide food, they cannot replace UNRWA in terms of providing medical care, schools, all kinds of stuff that they do, that they have uniquely done thus far.MR MILLER: So Said, I think you’re referring to – you didn’t mention it definitively, but just make – to make sure I’m clear, you’re referring to the provision that the United States Congress passed to ban U.S. funding of UNRWA. So &#8212;QUESTION: Right. Because I have a follow-up on &#8212;MR MILLER: Right. So you’re right, that Congress has barred us in this fiscal year and a few months beyond from continuing to fund UNRWA. We do remain committed to the work that UNRWA does. It’s important. We also remain committed to providing humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people.I will note that in that appropriations bill that passed that contained that provision there is somewhere north of $10 billion for humanitarian assistance around the world. That is the pot of money from which we would have drawn to fund UNRWA. And I can tell you that we will draw from that pot of money to fund humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people, and we’re exploring what avenues that assistance will take now.QUESTION: Okay. And my question, to follow up on this one, the President of the United States has – for instance, when they passed the resolution back in ’95 that the embassy should be moved to Jerusalem, we had an executive waiver that the presidents used time – every six months and so on to keep the embassy in Tel Aviv. Will the President have a similar waiver to keep funding of UNRWA going if it &#8212;MR MILLER: I think that’s a question you should direct to the White House.QUESTION: Okay. Thank you.MR MILLER: Any more on Israel before I go on? Yeah, Ryan, go ahead.QUESTION: Just on your point about Israel being a sovereign country and the U.S. can’t tell them what to do, back on May 19th, 2021, you have Joe Biden telling Netanyahu – his quote was, “Hey man, we’re out of runway here. It’s over.” And it was over. Ronald Reagan famously did the same back in 1982, told them it was over. Why can’t he say “it’s over” this time? Does that mean that he supports the continuation of this war, even if it means going into Rafah?MR MILLER: So we support Israel’s ability to defeat Hamas. We support Israel’s legitimate security objectives. We support them ensuring that October 7th can never happen again, and so we continue to support their ability to do that while offering, as I – them, as I said, our best advice on how to go about that campaign, and that’s what we’ll continue to do.QUESTION: What is your assessment on those two Hamas battalions that you – that the U.S. has said are so key to take out and that Israel has said are key to take out? What’s the assessment on why Hamas wouldn’t be able to just create new battalions &#8212;MR MILLER: So &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; in the absence of a political solution?MR MILLER: Yeah. Yeah, so it’s a great – it is actually – it’s a great question. First of all, I think it’s more than two. I think it’s more than two battalions that Israel has said continue to operate in Rafah.So a few things about that. First, in the areas in which it has operated, Israel has been somewhat successful in taking out the leadership of some of those Hamas battalions, and while you can replace fighters, ultimately the leaders are harder to replace, or at least takes more time. The initial people who might move up into a leadership role maybe don’t have the same experience that those who have been training for some time do, so Israel has been successful in taking out some of the leadership of the Hamas battalions and in taking out fighters, either by killing them on the battlefield or arresting them. So it has degraded Hamas’s battalions outside of Rafah, and we believe in a military operation, hopefully in the way that we are suggesting, they could be successful in degrading those battalions in Rafah as well, and that’s something that we would support.That said, your underlying question is exactly right. Ultimately, something that we have learned in our counterterrorism experience around the world is that you can – while you can accomplish counterterrorism objectives on the battlefield, ultimately, when it comes to winning the larger battle, you have to offer a political path for the Palestinian people’s legitimate – or in this case, you would have to offer – we believe you have to offer a political path for the Palestinian people’s legitimate aspirations. And so we have – you have heard the Secretary make very clear that there needs to be a political path forward for a couple reasons: one, because you have to offer that legitimate path to people; but two, because in order to have some other kind of security force in place to keep those Hamas battalions from reforming, you have to have a political solution. You have to have a political path forward.So, for example, one of the possibilities is for the Palestinian Authority to offer policing and security on the ground with a trained-up force. Well, you have to have a – the PA operating in Gaza to be able to do that. And so you have to have some of the – a political path forward to achieve that. So we have made very clear that the ultimate – the ultimate – Israel’s ultimate long-term security objectives can only be accomplished not just through a military campaign but through some kind of political resolution with the Palestinian people.QUESTION: Can the U.S. imagine Hamas or some version of it being a part of that political solution if that’s what the Palestinian &#8212;MR MILLER: No, no. Absolutely not. Hamas is a brutal terrorist organization that committed terrorist acts long before October 7th and then, of course, committed the heinous attacks on October 7th, so they do not have any right to political participation, given the blood that continues to be on their hands.QUESTION: On Gaza.QUESTION: I have a Pakistan question &#8212;MR MILLER: You – I’ll come back to you. Yeah, finish Gaza.QUESTION: Gaza.MR MILLER: Yeah. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. I have a simple question. U.S. allowed Gaza ceasefire. What does it – that mean for the war?MR MILLER: I’m sorry, what?QUESTION: That U.S. allowed Gaza ceasefire. What does that mean for the war?MR MILLER: I don’t know what you mean. I don’t know what you mean, the U.S. – I don’t know what you mean, the U.S. allowed a Gaza ceasefire.QUESTION: That ceasefire in the UN resolution, you support it.MR MILLER: In the resolution? I spoke to that. I spoke to that already.QUESTION: And can I have another question on the – on Assistant Secretary of State Donald Lu?MR MILLER: Let me come back to you. I just want to close out Israel.QUESTION: Yeah, thank you.MR MILLER: Rowdy room today. Go ahead.QUESTION: I want to go to the military aid. You’ve seen the reports that people drowned while trying to get to those aid, and previously the aid fell on the head of other people. There is still some difficulty in bringing convoys to the northern Gaza. Israelis still put a lot of restrictions on that. What your plan to ease this and prevent future incidents like that?MR MILLER: So I have seen the reports of people unfortunately drowning, and it is a tragedy. It’s – and it’s not just a tragedy that those – I believe it’s 12 individuals – died trying to get aid. It’s a tragedy that they felt so desperate that they had to swim out in the ocean to try to retrieve it in the first place. No one should have to do that. No one should have to put themselves at risk to try to get food and water and medicine for their families. It should just be there for them, and that is what we are trying to accomplish through the work that we are doing to provide humanitarian assistance and in our engagements with the Government of Israel to encourage them to facilitate the delivery of additional humanitarian assistance.So – excuse me – air drops have always been a supplement to the humanitarian assistance that goes in through the land, not a replacement. The same is true for the maritime option that we have been working to deploy, this floating pier that we want to deploy to get aid in, not over land but over sea into Gaza, which would dramatically increase the amount of humanitarian assistance flowing it and would not carry the same risks that air drops unfortunately do.But that said, even that is not a replacement to aid going in over land. We believe aid going in over land needs to be increased and it needs to be sustained. We have seen some improvement over the past few weeks, but there have been times before where we have seen an increase in the number of trucks going in on a daily basis, and that increase hasn’t been sustained. It’s fallen off for a variety of reasons, and so we want to see the increase – the modest increase that we’ve gotten be sustained, be increased, and then be sustained at an increased level. And that’s what we’re working on every day to try to achieve.QUESTION: One – Matt – but those tragedies, Matt, are manmade. They’re not because of the nature of the geography of the region or whatever. They are because of the Israeli restrictions on letting aid to get in. This can easily be dealt with.MR MILLER: So this is not a simple, one-faceted problem. There was a lot of aid going into Gaza before October 7th, before Hamas launched this war that has had such a dramatic impact on the Palestinian people. So anyone that says Hamas doesn’t also bear some responsibility in the tragic situation and in the inability of aid to get into Israel is ignoring the reality on the ground and ignoring the fact that it was Hamas that launched this war in the first place, and it is Hamas that has at times prevented aid from actually getting to the people it needed to inside Gaza.So we believe Israel needs to do more to facilitate the increase of humanitarian assistance into Gaza. We have been quite clear about that, and you have seen the Secretary push the Israeli Government. You’ve seen the President push the Israeli Government. It is because of our interventions that Rafah opened in the first place; it is because of our interventions that Kerem Shalom opened. It is because of our interventions that the 96 gate opened in the last few weeks and got us up to the level that we are at now.But that doesn’t mean we’re satisfied. We want to see that level continue to increase, and that’s why we’re going to continue to stay engaged on it.QUESTION: Last – last one – last one.QUESTION: Yeah, could I just follow up on the question about the air drops?QUESTION: Just – I have a last question.QUESTION: Okay, I’ll – yeah, we’ll come back to it.QUESTION: Just if – any update on when the pier will be operational?MR MILLER: I would defer to the Pentagon on that, who has operational control over that issue.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Sorry, on the air drops.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Are you saying – you said it’s tragic, but do you know if it was – if these were U.S. air drops?MR MILLER: I don’t. I don’t. I would refer to the Pentagon on that question.QUESTION: Were there air drops going – you don’t know if an air drop has been – was going on yesterday in this &#8212;MR MILLER: There are – the Pentagon has been conducting regular air drops, but other countries have also been conducting regular air drops, so I’d refer to the Pentagon to speak to that specific one that the question referenced.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Hold on – guys. Guys, no one needs to – anyone else have anything on Gaza before we move on? Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Excuse me. How the USA look at the people or, like, a human being that Israel arrested them? Around like 7,000 more have been arrested from Israel or by Israel in West Bank and in Gaza, some of them, like, humiliated. Does USA look at them as hostage, or are they, like, legally prison? Because Hamas now in the part of the negotiation is to exchange hostages, like to release some hostages from Israeli prisons and releasing some hostage at, like, Hamas – with Hamas. How USA look at those thousand people that USA arrested them and humiliated them?MR MILLER: We believe that every detainee, whether it’s in Israel or anywhere around the world, should be treated with dignity and should be treated with respect for the law.QUESTION: But they are hostage or not?MR MILLER: Go – let me – I’m just going to move on because we’ve spent a lot of time and I want to get to other stuff. Go ahead on Gaza, and then we’ll move on to other things.QUESTION: A little quick. The United States emphasized that release the hostages in Gaza is a priority. Why some of them were killed due to the Israeli bombing in different part? There is no safety place – middle, north, south. And some were killed due to the hunger – and stressed – and thirst. Despite this, the United States still emphasized that the hostages issue is a priority. Don’t you see U.S. bears a large of part of this responsibility because it’s continued to supply IDF with the military aid?MR MILLER: The only entity that bears responsibility for the plight of the hostages and the fact that they continue to be held is Hamas. It’s Hamas that took these hostages; it’s Hamas that has refused to release these hostages. It’s Hamas that could release them today if it wanted to. So no, I think it’s – there is only one entity that bears responsibility. It’s Hamas.Go ahead. This will be the last question on Israel, and then we’ll – then we’ll move on. Many people &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah, a question on Israel and then I have, like, two on – and I’m kind of in a hurry, if you don’t mind, Matthew. Thank you.MR MILLER: You’re kind of in a hurry?QUESTION: Yeah. No, very busy. You’ll see why. Okay. (Laughter.)MR MILLER: Okay.QUESTION: It’s a busy news day, a busy news day.So there is funding for UNRWA that was suspended. Given that the minibus prohibits funding of UNRWA through 2025, what will happen to the suspended funding? Is it still available were the U.S. to find the investigation into UNRWA employes allegedly involved in October 7th satisfactory, or does – it going to go back to the Treasury Department?MR MILLER: It’s funding that we can use for other humanitarian assistance priorities.QUESTION: Okay, and then has the – regarding what happened in Baltimore, the bridge collapse, it was a ship that has a Singaporean flag and then it was supposed to go to Sri Lanka. Has the United States been in touch with Sri Lanka and Singapore since the incident?MR MILLER: I’m not aware of any contacts with Sri Lanka. The U.S. Embassy Singapore has been in contact with Singapore’s maritime port authority, which has offered to provide assistance to the U.S. Coast Guard.QUESTION: And does the U.S. expect this tragedy to interrupt international commerce?MR MILLER: I’m not going to speak to it from here. I would defer to other agencies. Obviously, the Port of Baltimore has been closed. You heard the President speak to the fact that they want to get it reopened as soon as possible. But I would – I’d refer to an agency with more direct responsibility to comment and to offer any kind of actual assessment of the effect on shipping.QUESTION: Thank you so much.MR MILLER: Okay, Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. A few separate topics. Let me start with Evan Gershkovich. Today Russian, quote, ”extended” his detention beyond one year until June, which one might argue that contradicts against even their own laws. No prosecutors are allowed to expand on the complex cases beyond one year, and they have claimed that this was not a complex case. He was, as they said at the very beginning, that captured red-handed – quote/unquote. What was your reaction, and have you received any evidence from Russia during this one year?MR MILLER: So let me just say that at the hearing today Russian authorities did not provide any evidence of a crime. They just extended his detention for another three months. And despite their claims, they have provided no justification for holding him at all, and we believe there’s a simple reason for doing that, and it’s because he has done nothing wrong. It’s because journalism is not a crime. So we believe, as we have believed, that Russia should stop using individuals like Evan Gershkovich or Paul Whelan – who has been detained for five years – as bargaining chips. They should be released immediately.QUESTION: The point that you just made about bargaining chips – have you exhausted your options in terms of defending him, getting him out of Russian prison?MR MILLER: I’m not going to speak to that in detail. We – but other than to say that no, we continue to remain engaged on trying to secure the release of both Evan Gershkovich and Paul Whelan. And we will – that will remain a top priority for us.QUESTION: Another country that I was also hoping you could help us put Alsu Kurmasheva’s case into context. I asked this last week to Vedant, but if she is not wrongfully detained, then what is this all about, in your opinion?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to that other than what Vedant said last week and what you have heard us say many times about the case. I don’t have any new assessment to offer today.QUESTION: And another question. I know you got this yesterday – Moscow attack.MR MILLER: Come on.QUESTION: Just to – going back to yesterday. The Secretary also spoke to ISIS threat this morning. Despite the fact that terrorist group has claimed responsibility, Russian officials, most recently the spy chief today, keep claiming that not only Ukraine – the U.S., the UK – everyone is behind it. So how do you read that?MR MILLER: So first of all, it’s simply not true. We’ve made that clear that there is no evidence at all that Ukraine was involved in this, because Ukraine was not involved in this. And I would say that those comments by Russian officials, including from President Putin, are just propaganda to justify their continued aggression against Ukraine.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you very much, Matt. Last week Assistant Secretary Donald Lu had stated that the U.S. is not in the favor of Pakistan starting work on the pipeline with Iran. Now Pakistan is consulting some law firms to see if the U.S. can give a waiver. Is there a chance for a waiver, or no?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to preview any potential sanction actions, as I never do from here, or any actions involving sanctions. But we always advise everyone that doing business with Iran runs the risk of touching upon and coming in contact with our sanctions, and would advise everyone to consider that very carefully. And as the assistant secretary made clear last week, we do not support this pipeline going forward.QUESTION: Matt &#8212;QUESTION: Just one more thing. Today five Chinese who were working in Pakistan were hit by a suicide car bomb. Five of them have perished. Do you also have the same feeling with regard to Pakistan doing business with China as well, especially with regard to the CPEC, or no?MR MILLER: So I would say that we – first of all, we condemn the attack on a convoy of PRC engineers in Pakistan. We are deeply saddened by the loss of life and injuries sustained, and share our heartfelt condolences with those affected by the attack. The Pakistani people have suffered greatly at the hands of terrorists, and I’ll note that PRC nationals in Pakistan have also been the victims of terrorist attacks, and no country should suffer the acts of terror. And I don’t have anything beyond that.Ryan, go ahead.QUESTION: Matt, on Pakistan.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Don Lu last week had said that he wants to see the Pakistani courts undertake an investigation into election rigging and irregularities. Today, as you may have seen, there was this extraordinary statement from six supreme court justices in Pakistan saying that they have been pressured, tortured, their families kind of abducted and pressured, by the Pakistani military to put pressure on the court system. What is the U.S. response to these judges coming forward rather courageously to make these claims? And does that undermine the confidence in the court’s ability to kind of independently assess the elections?MR MILLER: So let me just say with that I saw the letter right before I came out here. I didn’t have a chance to read it or to consult with any of my colleagues about it. So before I offer any definitive comment, let me take that back and consult with people and get something for you.Kylie, did you have something? No?QUESTION: On Ukraine.MR MILLER: Ukraine? Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: The Ukrainians have recently said after some reports about the U.S. warning them not to target Russian oil refineries that they understand those warnings but they have certain military targets that they will continue to target. Can you just bring us up to speed with regard to those conversations between the U.S. and Ukraine and if you guys have recently been telling them that they should not go after these Russian oil refineries?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to specific conversations, but it has always been our position since the outset of this war that we do not encourage or support Ukraine taking strikes outside its own territory.QUESTION: Okay. But there have been reports of this happening more recently, so have these conversations been reupped even though they’ve been reiterated?MR MILLER: I’m not going to speak to specific conversations, but this has been our longtime policy that we have made clear to the Ukrainian Government, so it’s not something that they would – of which they would be unaware.QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: It has been announced that a (inaudible) meeting between the Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan, plus Secretary Blinken, and president of the European Commission is to be held on 5 – April 5. So what items are on the agenda? Is – any support for Armenia is being considered? Is it of a political, economic, or security nature?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to it in detail other than to say that our objectives in every engagement with the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan are to include – are to encourage them to work to bridge the differences that – between the two countries and reach a durable and lasting peace agreement.Michel and then we’ll – and then Simon, then we’ll close out.QUESTION: Matt, the high court in London ruled today that Julian Assange would not be extradited immediately and gave the U.S. three weeks to give a series of assurances around his First Amendment rights and that he would not receive the death penalty. Do you have any comment on that?MR MILLER: Yeah, my comment is that you should ask – take that question to the Justice Department, who can speak to it. We don’t typically comment on extradition matters. I was a little flip. I guess that wasn’t a comment after all. It’s a referral to DOJ. They should speak to that.Simon, let me put – hold you off. I’m going to take a couple over here, then I’ll come to you and close out. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank – thank you, Matt. About today’s meeting between Secretary Blinken and Iraqi foreign minister, have they touched disputes between Erbil and Baghdad in that meeting? And what is the U.S. view on the current disputes between these two cities? Do you have any concern about that?MR MILLER: So they did discuss that issue. The Secretary made clear that stability between Baghdad and Erbil would bring economic benefits to all Iraqis, it would be good for the region, and that we encourage the two partners to work together.QUESTION: And second question about energy issue, which Secretary Blinken mentioned that they will discuss this in their meeting. It’s been a year that the KRG oil export been stopped and the IOC, including the U.S. companies, has stopped their operations, and there is a dispute between the U.S. companies and the Iraqi minister of oil. So the U.S. has been engaged with all parties to resume that exports. And in your point of view, why it hasn’t happened yet? And then how does the U.S. work with the U.S. companies and also with the Iraqi Government to resume that exports?MR MILLER: So the U.S. has been engaged at the most senior levels on this issue, and we have urged all parties to reach an agreement to resume the flow of oil through this pipeline. We believe that restarting oil exports through the pipeline would be mutually beneficial to all parties, and because of that reason, that’s why we’ll continue to pursue it.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: The Taliban claimed recently that they have crushed ISIS-K in Afghanistan; however, we have seen the Daesh branch has expanded its operation, particularly with the recent attacks in Iran, Moscow, also in Kandahar. How do you see ISIS-KP activities and operations in Afghanistan and also in the region? Also, Lindsey Graham yesterday said in a tweet, quote, “We should be hitting ISIS-K targets in Afghanistan hard, disrupting their operations before it’s too late.” What is your reaction?MR MILLER: So we have long been worried about ISIS-K’s potential for terrorist activities. You’ve seen us actually give warnings to Russia and Iran about these two most recent terrorist attacks. And you’ve seen ISIS-K plots disrupted in Europe. And so we have made clear that we remain – need to remain vigilant against the threat of ISIS-K and we’re working with our allies and partners to do just that.And then I would say with respect to Afghanistan, we have always said that it is important that Afghanistan not become a safe haven for terrorists who bring – who could – who might want to bring harm to Americans. We have demonstrated a commitment to hold terrorists in Afghanistan accountable. But we have also made clear to the Taliban that it is in their interest to counter violent terrorist groups inside Afghanistan.Simon. Now we’ll close out.QUESTION: Yeah, it just came in during the briefing, a statement from Senator Van Hollen regarding your comments yesterday about the National Security Memorandum 20. So he’s seeking some clarity on basically what you said about this yesterday. Have you determined and what is the basis for determining that those assurances provided by Israel in line with the NSM-20 are credible and reliable?MR MILLER: So I do think there has been a lot of confusion around this memo really from the beginning. Let me back up and say that the memo required all of the seven relevant countries – as well as other countries that are not in active conflict that will report later – but these seven relevant countries, including Israel, to make assurances to the United States that they will not act in violation of international humanitarian law.But it has always been required that these countries that are receiving defense articles from the United States act in compliance with international humanitarian law, both in the use of those defense articles and in the provision of humanitarian assistance and in allowing humanitarian assistance to enter into the affected areas. That is not a requirement that was imposed by the NSM; it is something that was already required by U.S. law, and so we have already, before the NSM, had processes ongoing to assess Israel’s compliance with international humanitarian law – both, as I said yesterday, in the use of those arms and as it pertains to the delivery of humanitarian assistance. And we have not yet reached any conclusion that they are in violation of international humanitarian law.So when we receive those assurances from the Government of Israel and the governments of Ukraine and other governments, we look at those assurances and we look at them informed by the assessments that we have had ongoing. And as I said, the – we have not reached the conclusion with respect to Israel that they have violated international humanitarian law.But those are processes that are very much ongoing; they didn’t start with the letter. They were – as I said, they were going on before, and they’ll continue. And the next step is we are due to provide Congress a report – this is the next thing that’s required by this memo – on May 8th, where we will get into these issues in more detail.QUESTION: Could I have a follow-up?QUESTION: So to try to clarify that – to try to &#8212;QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Simon has the last question. We’re going &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; make sense of that a little bit – so you haven’t reached the conclusion that Israel have violated international humanitarian law. But have you reached the conclusion that they haven’t? Has any process concluded –MR MILLER: So we have –QUESTION: &#8212; that found that they haven’t breached international humanitarian law?MR MILLER: So the processes are ongoing. That’s why when I say that the – that these processes to assess their compliance with international humanitarian law are ongoing, they have not reached a definitive conclusion. Now, the way this usually works is we have partners that we provide defense articles to. They use those defense articles. You see allegations at times that those defense articles are used in violation of international humanitarian law, and we assess them. And those assessments are ongoing, and those assessments could reach a conclusion at some point that there were violations of international law, or that they’re in compliance with international law. But those ongoing processes remain ongoing, and not terminated at this point.QUESTION: Given this war has been going on for nearly six months, can we assume that there have been some incidents that have been fully assessed, that have taken place during this war, that people might have seen, that we could – there’s a few that have come up in this meeting, and there’s been incidents that you’ve then raised with the Israelis – have there been incidents that have gone through whatever black-box process this involves, and come out the end with a sort of a green tick with the U.S. saying, “We’re fine with this”?MR MILLER: So it’s hard to answer that question without getting too much into internal deliberations. I will say that the ways these processes work, as you would expect, right, when you look at any kind of thing, they have different levels that they move through. There are a number of incidents that have been raised as potential violations of international humanitarian law that we are able to look at with a very quick assessment and determine that no, there’s an actual justification for this action, and it is – it does not violate international humanitarian law. We can look at a particular strike, for example. There are others that more – are more complicated that require an extensive fact-finding process and taking those facts and applying them against the law, and a number of those are ongoing.QUESTION: Can you say whether by May 8th, when you provide this report to Congress, would there be – will you be able to say something conclusively?MR MILLER: I just can’t speak to what – where we might be on May 8th at this point. So – it’s a month and a half away. So &#8212;QUESTION: Just to clarify one thing on that –MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: When you’re saying “we have not yet reached” the conclusion, you’re talking about the whole – I mean, since the beginning of the war. You’re not – because it could be almost interpreted as we have not seen yet up until now certain acts in violation of humanitarian – international – U.S. law, basically. Do you see what I mean?MR MILLER: I don’t. I don’t. (Laughter.)QUESTION: The way I –MR MILLER: If other – maybe other people do and I’m just slow, but I didn’t – I don’t see what you meant.QUESTION: You said, “We have not yet reached” the conclusion that –MR MILLER: Correct, yeah.QUESTION: Okay. You could interpret that by saying we have not yet made the determination from October 7th up until today that they have done something against international law. That’s not what you’re saying. You’re saying the whole – you haven’t yet made a conclusion on the whole assessment, right?MR MILLER: Again, I’m not sure if – we have not concluded in any sense – and again, you have to look at – these are all – like, when you come to the use of – use of weapons, it’s a determination you have to make with respect to individual strikes, or individual campaigns, or individual acts. And so we have had ongoing assessments to look at some of those, and none of – in none of those have we yet found violations of international humanitarian law.I don’t know if that answers the question. I’m not sure &#8212;QUESTION: So you’ve looked at them and you have not found any violations?MR MILLER: That’s correct. Yeah, that’s correct.QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: That’s what I meant to say. But a number of them are ongoing. So –QUESTION: Yeah, yeah. But some – so you have reached a conclusion on some specific events up until now, where there has been no violation, right?MR MILLER: Yeah, but that’s not to say that all those have gone through an entire process, because some of them – this is what I was trying to say in answer to Simon’s question. There are different levels of review, right.QUESTION: Yeah, yeah.MR MILLER: And you can imagine, like, a filtering process, if you look at something and it’s something you can throw out right away, they’re not a – an allegation that’s not substantiated, and some that require more. And so we have had those, and then there are others that require more fact-finding and more review, and those are ongoing. That’s &#8212;QUESTION: Isn’t the whole point of the NSM – and I think what Senator Van Hollen, to come back to that, what he’s trying to do by getting you to agree to this – is to put some kind of deadlines and reporting requirements on it? But what you’re describing is kind of a process that never has to come to any firm conclusions about anything.MR MILLER: So, no. I wouldn’t agree with that. If you look at the actual language of the NSM, it does require a report on May 8th, and that language does spell out things that we need to assess and things that we need to include in that report when it comes to credible allegations and how we are handling those. And I just can’t offer any more definitive guidance today about what that report is going to look like. Because again, remember, this is a brand new process. We’ve never done one of these reports before. This memo has only been around for 47 days now. So then we have an active process to figure out what that’s going to look like. But I can tell you that we will follow the obligations of the memo and send that to report – report to Congress by May 8th.So with that – with that, we’ll end today. Thank you, everyone.(The briefing was concluded at 2:13 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Armenia																								Azerbaijan																								China																								Iran																								Iraq																								Israel																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Singapore																								Ukraine
- Special Advisor on International Disability Rights Minkara’s Travel to Sri Lanka, Nepal, Laos, and Singapore Office of the SpokespersonU.S. Special Advisor on International Disability Rights (SAIDR) Sara Minkara traveled to Sri Lanka, Nepal, Laos, and Singapore from March 6 to 23 to engage with host government officials, civil society, and veterans with disabilities on how to integrate disability rights issues across government, industry, and society.In Sri Lanka, SAIDR Minkara met with government officials and civil society to learn about efforts to enhance physical accessibility and political participation for Sri Lankans with disabilities. She also met with demining personnel with disabilities to highlight the benefits of greater disability inclusion in recovery and reconciliation efforts in the aftermath of the Sri Lankan Civil War.In Nepal, she discussed accessible tourism with Nepalese tourism companies and expanding persons with disabilities’ access to legal protections with host government officials. She also gave remarks during a wheelchair marathon, where she emphasized the importance of sports in creating a community for persons with disabilities.In Singapore, she encouraged greater capacity-building ahead of the upcoming meetings of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Ministers Responsible for Trade and the APEC Women and Economy Forum in Arequipa in May, building on discussions from when the United States chaired the forum last year.In Laos, she supported the government’s leadership to drive further integration of disability-inclusive policies during its host year of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
- Digital Press Briefing with Daniel J. Kritenbrink, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink, Assistant SecretaryBureau of East Asian and Pacific AffairsMODERATOR:  Greetings from the U.S. Department of State’s Asia Pacific Media Hub.  I would like to welcome journalists to today’s on-the-record briefing with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink.  Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will provide an overview of his visit to Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei.  He will also discuss the historic progress the United States has made with Southeast Asian allies and partners over the past two years in advancing an Indo-Pacific that is free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.And with that, let’s get started.  Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, I’ll turn it over to you for your opening remarks.  Thanks for joining us.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Thank you, Katie, and thank you as always for hosting me, and I’m really excited to have this opportunity to engage with journalist friends in Southeast Asia and here in the United States as well, and really grateful to all of our colleagues at the Bangkok Media Hub for setting this up.  I really am excited to have the opportunity to chat with colleagues tonight.  I’m just back from an incredibly productive five-country trip to Southeast Asia last week.  I had the pleasure of visiting Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei, and I’m eager to share how these engagements, I think, further strengthened our commitment to the region and demonstrated that commitment – again, particularly to our friends and partners in Southeast Asia.Before I dive into the specifics of each stop, let me just make a couple general framing comments about just how critical these relationships are to advancing our overall Indo-Pacific Strategy.  And I think you know that our Indo-Pacific Strategy is designed to advance a region that’s free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.And one key point that I made this past week in Southeast Asia to each and every one of my counterparts was this:  Despite the many global challenges that we collectively face, the United States remains squarely focused on the Indo-Pacific region.  I think you all know that we recently marked the second anniversary of our Indo-Pacific Strategy, and I emphasized to all of my counterparts that in accordance with that strategy, our top priority remains investing in the collective capacity of our allies, partners, and friends.  And I think we’ve made tremendous progress in advancing that strategy, especially in Southeast Asia.Just a couple of highlights.  I’ll remind friends that we held the U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit in D.C. in 2022, and we of course continue to strongly support ASEAN centrality, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, and really honored to have upgraded our partnership with ASEAN to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.I think friends are aware as well we’ve strengthened our ties with traditional allies and partners, including elevating our relationships with both Vietnam and India to Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships, and we’ve also increased engagement with other key partners in the region, including the Philippines.We signed the IPEF Supply Chain Agreement and we substantially concluded negotiations of the Clean Economy Agreement and Fair Economy Agreement under IPEF, and we look forward to continuing discussions around IPEF, including with our IPEF Southeast Asian partners Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.And of course, we continued our unwavering support for democracy in Burma.  In the three years since the coup d’etat, we have provided nearly $317 million in lifesaving humanitarian assistance and dedicated hundreds of millions of dollars to advance democracy, human rights, and justice for the people of Myanmar.Now, I could continue listing our accomplishments in the region over the last couple of years, but why don’t I spend the remainder of my time focusing more specifically on my activities in the last week across the region.In Singapore, I was absolutely delighted to join my counterpart Permanent Secretary Albert Chua to co-host the sixth U.S.-Singapore Strategic Partnership Dialogue.  And during our very productive conversations, we reaffirmed our nations’ wide-ranging partnership on defense and security, economic cooperation, critical and emerging technology, and climate and energy.  I was also honored to meet with Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan, and I took the opportunity to thank Singapore for its continued leadership in the region, including in ASEAN and in IPEF, and Singapore’s incredibly strong support for tackling today’s greatest challenges.In Phnom Penh, I had a range of productive conversations with counterparts on how the United States and Cambodia can deepen our relationship and address issues of concern.  I met with new Prime Minister Hun Manet as well as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Tea Seiha for what were really wide-ranging discussions on the whole range of issues before the United States and Cambodia.  Now, on the positive side that includes our cooperation on DPRK UN sanctions enforcement, condemning Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine, and other cooperative areas, including related to law enforcement.  We also addressed candidly other areas, including areas of difference related to issues such as human rights, trafficking in persons, and creating space for free and independent media.I also reiterated to Prime Minister Hun Manet that the United States remains committed to the Cambodian people and their aspirations for a more prosperous, democratic, and independent country where all voices are heard and respected, and where Cambodia’s sovereignty is protected.In Bangkok, my Thai counterpart Permanent Secretary Eksiri Pintaruchi and I co-chaired a very productive ninth U.S.-Thailand Strategic Dialogue.  I was also honored the next day to co-host the second U.S.-Thailand Strategic and Defense Dialogue, or 2+2, alongside Ministry of Defense Permanent Secretary Sanitchanog and my DOD colleague Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Jed Royal.  And during those two dialogues, I was really gratified that we were able to reaffirm with our Thai allies our commitment to advancing our bilateral cooperation across a whole range of areas, including economic growth, climate change, global health, security cooperation, and people-to-people ties.  We also had an opportunity to discuss with our Thai allies shared concerns, including regarding the situation in Burma.In Hanoi, I participated in the Asia-Pacific Dialogue, which was our first iteration of this dialogue since we upgraded our relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.  During the dialogue with my counterpart Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Minh Vu, we further deepened our relationship and found new ways to facilitate our shared vision for, again, a prosperous, open, resilient, and peaceful region.  We also discussed the need to maintain peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea in the face of rising challenges there.  I was also delighted to meet with Vice Foreign Minister Ha Kim Ngoc as well as Chairman of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s Commission for External Relations Le Hoai Trung, in which we were able to discuss a broad range of other issues important to our partnership with Vietnam.And last but not least, I was absolutely delighted to travel to Brunei, which was my first trip there ever.  Of course, this year marks our 40th anniversary of formal bilateral relations, and I was proud to mark the milestone with my friend Foreign Minister Dato Erywan, Minister of Finance Dato Amin, and Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense Dato Alirupendi.  I also had the opportunity to reaffirm our enduring bilateral ties and commitment to our strong partnership with Brunei.So let me just sum up this rundown of my trip with, again, a reaffirmation of how proud I am of our efforts to strengthen our partnerships across all of Southeast Asia as well as our strong relationship with ASEAN.  These relationships continue to be critical to American national security and prosperity, and as the United States we are always looking for ways to boost our cooperation and demonstrate our ongoing commitment to the Indo-Pacific.  Again, we believe the Indo-Pacific is the region where much of the history of the 21st century will be written.  And perhaps more than anything, I was incredibly gratified by the close strategic alignment between the United States and our partners in the region in tackling our shared priorities together.So, Katie, why don’t I stop there.  Sorry my opening was a little bit longer than usual, but after a five-country trip, I hope people will understand.  But now let’s get on to the main event and I’m delighted to take your questions.  Over.MODERATOR:  Thank you so much, Assistant Secretary.  So now we’ll turn to the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  Our first question came in in advance from Bui Mai of Nguoi Lao Dong newspaper in Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam, who asks:  “What will the U.S. do to demonstrate its security commitment in the Pacific region to its Southeast Asian allies, including Vietnam?  And in the context of China increasing its military presence in the area, recently a ship collision with the Philippines, will the U.S. take any specific actions such as deploying military force to this area or not?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Katie, thank you, and thanks to our friends in Vietnam for leading us off with an excellent question.  Let me say just a couple of things in response.  First thing I’ll do is reiterate what I said in my opening remarks:  The focus of the United States in the Indo-Pacific – and including in Southeast Asia – is investing in the collective capacity of our partners so as to support the rules-based regional order and to advance our shared challenges.  And we do that across a whole range of domains, from working to combat pandemic disease and climate change to investing in the economic prosperity of our partners.  But also – related to your question – in the security domain, we also invest in the capacity of our partners.And I would say in particular for many of our friends in Southeast Asia, especially the five claimant states, they are especially concerned about the situation in the South China Sea.  And our focus in our response to meeting those concerns is threefold.  First, we continue to focus on our diplomacy, including with partners in ASEAN, to make sure that all countries – including all claimants – base their claims in international law, that all claimants commit to recognizing and respecting freedom of navigation, freedom of overflight, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.We also – secondly, we spend a great deal of time, effort, and money investing in building the maritime capacity of our partners, especially building an increasing maritime domain awareness.  So the United States has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in partners’ maritime domain awareness capabilities because we believe that the more countries are able to understand what is happening in their maritime domains and defend their own interests in the maritime domains, we further promote stability across the region.And then thirdly and finally, the United States continues through our own operations to be physically present in the region on a daily basis, and we continue to fly, sail, and operate everywhere that international law allows, demonstrating thereby that all countries share those same rights.So our goal, again, is to promote peace and stability, security and prosperity, promote respect for international law, peaceful resolution of disputes, but also ensure that countries have their own ability to protect their sovereignty and their own interests.  And we think if we do that, we maximize our chances of preventing miscalculation and conflict and, again, promoting peace and stability.And I should be candid too:  I think we’ve seen in a number of instances where the People’s Republic of China has taken a number of steps in the South China Sea that both run counter to international law, but that also utilize coercion to intimidate partners in ways that we find deeply unacceptable and destabilizing.Hope that answers your question.MODERATOR:  Great, thank you.  I see we have a question from Kea Puy of Kyodo News based in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.  “During your recent meeting with PM Hun Manet, did you raise any concern about Ream Naval Base?  If so, what was the response?  Also, did you raise the South China Sea issue?  If so, what were your concerns and reply from PM Hun Manet?  Thank you.”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, thanks to our Japanese friends for asking another good question.  Look, as I hope I made clear in my opening remarks, I did have the opportunity to meet with Prime Minister Hun Manet and we had a very productive, very positive, and very candid meeting.  And we discussed a number of ways in which we would like to both deepen and expand the existing cooperation between the United States and Cambodia, but also address certain areas of concern.Now, I will state just very clearly and transparently that we did discuss issues related to Ream Naval Base, and I think that as the United States has stated very clearly and transparently before, that the United States and a number of countries in the region have expressed serious concerns about the intent, the nature, and the scope of construction at Ream Naval Base as well as the role that the PRC military is playing in this process and in the future use of the facility.But I do want to underscore while we had a very productive and candid exchange, it was a broad-ranging conversation.  Ream was one of many topics that we discussed, but again, I underscored – whether it was related to Ream or a range of other issues – again, America’s approach to the region is to ensure that our partners continue to have choice and that partners continue to be able to preserve their own sovereignty.  And that helped form the basis of my very productive conversation with Prime Minister Hun Manet.I think you also asked about the South China Sea.  Obviously, I discussed the South China Sea really in all of my stops in the region, but we did not discuss it in detail with the prime minister.  We focused a bit more squarely on the bilateral relationship and some of the issues that I’ve outlined here this evening.  Thanks very much.MODERATOR:  Okay, next we’ll go to the live queue.  We have Sangho Song of Yonhap based in Washington, D.C.  You should be able to unmute yourself now.QUESTION:  Can you hear me?MODERATOR:  Yes, we can.QUESTION:  Okay.  Thank you very much for doing this, Assistant Secretary.  I have a question about North Korea.  Recently, U.S. senior official for DPRK Jung Pak and NSC official Mira Rapp-Hooper talked about the need for interim steps on a path towards North Korea denuclearization.  Can you comment on why officials have started to mention that expression “interim steps”?  We understand it is only natural to think that there should be interim steps towards the time-consuming denuclearization process, but interim steps are usually involving a nuclear freeze in return for sanctions relief and other incentives.  Can you elaborate on the reason why the officials started to use that expression “interim steps”?ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, look, I very much appreciate your question.  Here’s what I would say.  The United States continues to be deeply concerned, along with our close allies and partners in the region, particularly the Republic of Korea and Japan – continue to be concerned with the range of destabilizing North Korean activities, including now a large number of ballistic missile tests and other provocative behavior that we find unacceptable.  We’ve continued to demonstrate, as the U.S. Government, that we will remain absolutely committed to the security of our partners and to the security of the United States, that we will carry out a number of steps to deter North Korea.  We will also continue to strictly enforce a range of sanction measures both in the UN context and also bilaterally and trilaterally.At the same time, we have continued to indicate that the door remains open to North Korea to engage and to proceed down a better path that leads to denuclearization and stability in the region.  But I don’t have any new developments to share with you this evening, but I do appreciate your comment and I will say this too: that North Korea did feature in many of my conversations in the region, including in Southeast Asia, where I think it’s fair to say that countries across the entire Indo-Pacific remain deeply concerned about the range of actions that North Korea continues to take.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Our next question comes to us from the Q&amp;A tab, from Huong Doan of SOHA News in Vietnam, who asks:  “Would you mind telling more detail about the trip to Vietnam?  Was there any developments in IPEF negotiation and semiconductor cooperation?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, to my friend from Vietnam, I’m always delighted to talk about Vietnam, and it was a privilege to return to the country where I had the – again, the privilege of serving as America’s ambassador for three and a half years.  I would say that the conversations I had in Hanoi were – they were detailed, they were rich, they were incredibly broad-ranging and extremely candid.  We did talk about the economic and trade relationship, of course, which remains vitally important to our Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Vietnam, but we also exchanged views on a whole range of security and strategic issues from the South China Sea to the situation in Myanmar to the Korean Peninsula.  We talked about our cooperation in a broad range of other areas, including on a range of transnational and global issues, including climate change and health.Now, I would say that our economic engagement in IPEF and our cooperation in the high-tech sector also remains a really important element of the relationship.  We’ve certainly – again, in accordance with our strategy, we’ve demonstrated that we are invested in Vietnam’s success, literally and figuratively, including in Vietnam’s high-tech sector.  So we’re very grateful, actually, for the leadership role that Vietnam has played in IPEF thus far.  I think you saw from the announcements at the time we upgraded our partnership to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership last year during President Biden’s visit that our cooperation in the tech sector is really a critical, new, and exciting element of the relationship.  That will continue going forward.  Certainly it was a key element of my conversations, but I didn’t go to Hanoi to make any new announcements in that area, but I’m confident it will remain one of the most important and exciting elements of our relationship for decades to come.MODERATOR:  Okay, next we’ll go to the live queue.  We have Giff Johnson from the Marshall Islands Journal.  Giff, you should be able to unmute yourself now.QUESTION:  Thank you.  I know you’re focused on Asia because of the visit, and I’m just wondering, however, if you could comment briefly on where the Compacts of Free Association for the three North Pacific countries are headed given the holdup in congressional approval, but some developments over the last few days.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, Giff, thanks so much for your question, and I’m really delighted to be speaking with you.  Because even though my trip last week and the primary focus for this evening has been on my five-country trip in Southeast Asia, I think you know very well that the United States is committed to the entire Indo-Pacific, and in particular to the Pacific Islands.  I know President Biden was absolutely honored to host two U.S.-Pacific Island Forum summits in Washington, D.C.  He really benefitted from developing close personal relationships with leaders across the entire Pacific.And I think as you know, our approach to the Pacific is – the way we’ve termed it – meeting our partners where they live.  In other words, in accordance with the 2050 Pacific Island Forum Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, we have worked with Pacific partners to identify their key priorities, whether it’s related to combatting climate change or illegal fishing or focusing on economic development and people-to-people ties.  And then we’ve crafted a strategy to meet each of those needs and demands.Now, in the North Pacific, I think particularly for out partners in the three Freely Associated States, obviously the newly renegotiated Compacts of Free Association have been the key focus for the last couple of years.  We were really delighted to substantially complete the negotiations for the new compacts, and of course we’ve been working with our friends on Capitol Hill to make sure that the implementing legislation for the compacts is in fact passed so that the newly negotiated agreements can come into effect and, of course, the United States can continue to provide the assistance that I think has played such a key role in our partnerships.Look, we’ve engaged with our – with congressional leaders very intensively over the past several weeks and months to demonstrate the importance of the Pacific, the importance in particular of the Freely Associated States and the Compacts of Free Association.  Have been very pleased and excited to see the positive developments on Capitol Hill that you mentioned just a little while ago.  We’ll continue to watch closely work by leaders in Congress, but certainly the developments of the last week that we’ve seen are very promising and we very much look forward to early passage by the Congress of the compacts and then their full implementation.  And most importantly, once we do so, we can get back to the daily business of continuing to grow our partnerships in every possible way.I hope that’s helpful and responsive to your question.  Really delighted to have you on the call tonight.MODERATOR:  Okay, our next question goes to Pimuk, who comes to us from Radio Free Asia:  “What is the U.S. role in Thai Government efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to displaced people in Myanmar?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, this is a great question.  And look, I’ll say a couple of things.  First of all, I was really delighted to be in Thailand and to engage in the two dialogues that I did with our Thai allies – just refreshingly candid and cooperative and productive.  Those discussions were really focused on how the United States and Thailand can work together to make the region more prosperous and more secure.  I praised in great detail and repeatedly the Thai Government’s ongoing and longstanding efforts to support refugees who have fled from the violence in Myanmar, and also Thailand’s both historic strong support for providing humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar but also the more recent efforts by the Prime Minister Srettha government in the ASEAN context to, again, increase humanitarian assistance across the board.Now, the United States also provides a great deal of assistance – humanitarian assistance – both to people in Myanmar and to refugees in the region.  And again, as I said in my opening, we’ve provided nearly $317 million in lifesaving humanitarian assistance.  We’ve also dedicated, I think as you know, hundreds of millions of dollars to advance democracy, human rights, and justice.  And I will say that much of that humanitarian assistance is implemented and delivered with the Royal Thai Government’s cooperation and support.  And so we remain, again, very grateful to the leadership role that Thailand has played in the region, including on Myanmar, and in particular most helping – helping those, rather, most in need from Myanmar.So thanks for the opportunity to be able to highlight both Thailand’s role and America’s role in close cooperation with our Thai allies.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Well, we have so many great questions we could probably go another half hour, but I think we have to let the Assistant Secretary go soon.  So I’ll turn it back over to him for closing remarks.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  I’m happy – if you want, Katie, let’s do one more.MODERATOR:  Okay, maybe we’ll mix it up and go to the live queue.  Christopher Woody, independent journalist based in Bangkok.  Christopher, you should be able to unmute yourself.QUESTION:  Hi, thank you for your time this morning.  Thailand is among the U.S.’s five treaty allies in the region, but it seems like over the past three years of the administration most of the major progress on defense and security was with the other four.  I wanted to ask if after your most recent engagements in Bangkok, do you feel like the U.S.-Thai relationship is in a position to kind of pursue those – pursue that progress on defense and security that wasn’t possible previously?ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, look, I’ll state very candidly and very enthusiastically that I came away from our two days of dialogues in Thailand as optimistic as I’ve ever been about the U.S.-Thai alliance, and particularly after the 2+2 dialogue I was really struck and impressed by the depth of our security relationship and our military-to-military ties.  And look, that’s been the case for more than six decades now.  But I really do think that our two militaries are closer than ever.  I think our security cooperation is probably more robust than ever.  And look, I think you could argue across the board that the U.S.-Thai alliance is as strong as it’s ever been.But really, I was impressed by first our strategic alignment on the major issues in the region – the decades-long cooperation between our militaries; the deep and rich interpersonal relations that have developed, mainly by our operating and training together, studying in one another’s academies, and the like.  So I came away very bullish on the U.S.-Thai alliance, and again, I think you’ll see our security cooperation probably more robust than it’s ever been in the coming years.MODERATOR:  All right.  And now, Assistant Secretary, if you have any last words you’d like to sum up, please go ahead.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, I’ll just – I’ll thank you again, Katie, and most importantly I’ll thank our friends from the media in the region.  It’s always a pleasure to spend time together with you.  I really appreciate your questions.  I wish we had more time because I think you are right, we could probably go on for another few hours.  But I hope you’ve taken away my primary message that the United States of America remains strongly committed to the Indo-Pacific region.  It’s where we think, again, much of the history of the 21st century will be written, and where America’s future security and prosperity will largely be determined.  And in particular, I was delighted to spend so much time last week in Southeast Asia, where together with our – with the 10 countries of ASEAN we intend to ensure the most secure and prosperous future possible for our 1 billion people.So thank you very much for spending time with me, and I’ll look forward to the next opportunity.  And thank you again, Katie.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  That brings us to the end of our time for today.  Thank you for your questions, and big thanks to Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink for joining us.  We will provide a transcript of this briefing to participating journalists as soon as it’s available, and we’d also love to hear your feedback.  You can contact us at any time at AsiaPacMedia@state.gov.  Thanks again for your participation and we hope you can join us for another briefing soon.
- Joint Statement from the 6th U.S.-Singapore Strategic Partnership Dialogue Office of the SpokespersonThe following statement was released by the Governments of the United States of America and Singapore on the occasion of the 6th United States-Singapore Strategic Partnership Dialogue.Begin Text.Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Albert Chua and United States Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink met in Singapore on 27 February 2024, to co-chair the 6th United States-Singapore Strategic Partnership Dialogue.  Building on the enduring strength of the bilateral strategic partnership, the Dialogue reviewed ongoing areas of cooperation and discussed ways to further advance robust approaches to emerging challenges and mutually beneficial areas, such as in critical and emerging technologies (CET), energy, climate change, and regional capacity building.The co-chairs reaffirmed the strong defense and security partnership underpinned by the 1990 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding United States Use of Facilities in Singapore, the 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security and accompanying 2005 Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), and the 2015 Enhanced DCA. Both sides benefit from U.S. forces’ access to military facilities in Singapore, which supports the United States’ presence in and engagement of the region, as well as from the United States’ provision of overseas training and technology access to the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). Our two militaries also participate in overseas operations together, including during the SAF’s ongoing deployment for Operation Prosperity Guardian under Combined Task Force 153: Red Sea Maritime Security.  The co-chairs reiterated the governments’ December 19 joint statement along with over 40 other partners condemning Houthi interference with navigational rights and freedoms in the waters around the Arabian Peninsula, particularly the Red Sea. The co-chairs welcomed the recent signing of the Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA) between the U.S. Department of Defense and Singapore Ministry of Defense in December 2023 that would enable both sides to better address unanticipated supply chain disruptions that could affect defense needs. They also lauded the recently held 7th Law Enforcement and Homeland Security and Safety Cooperation Dialogue, which focused on the growing threat of cybercrime and online scams as well as a wide range of law enforcement and homeland security issues. They noted the continued progress of the bilateral Cyber Dialogue, which was now in its third year.The co-chairs welcomed the 20th Anniversary of the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) this year. The USSFTA, which has been in force since 2004, is a linchpin in the bilateral economic relationship and testament to the strong economic and business ties between the two countries. The co-chairs also took stock of progress under the U.S.-Singapore Partnership for Growth and Innovation (PGI), launched by Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo and Minister for Trade and Industry Gan Kim Yong in October 2021, and looked forward to further cooperation under this initiative. The PGI aims to strengthen trade and investment collaboration between the two economies in new and forward-looking areas, as reflected in joint statements released following the PGI annual dialogues in October 2022 and June 2023. In addition, the co-chairs noted the close cooperation between Singapore and the United States on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). Both sides welcomed the significant outcomes announced to date, which will support the continued and constructive economic engagement among the United States, Singapore, and other IPEF partners in the region and provide a firm foundation to further deepen regional cooperation. They include the entry –into force of the Supply Chain Agreement on 24 February 2024, and the substantial conclusion of negotiations on the Clean Economy and Fair Economy Agreements, as well as the Agreement on IPEF. Both sides looked forward to continuing to work closely together to implement these Agreements to deliver concrete benefits to all the IPEF partners.The co-chairs discussed emerging areas of cooperation in areas such as CET, climate change, and energy. Both sides welcomed the launch of the inaugural U.S.-Singapore CET Dialogue in October 2023 and looked forward to greater collaboration in artificial intelligence (AI), digital economy and data governance, biotechnology, critical infrastructure and technology supply chains, defense innovation, as well as quantum information science and technology. Both sides also discussed progress on the U.S.-Singapore Climate Partnership (USCP) which was launched in August 2021 and updated in June 2023. Notable progress has been made on regional energy transition, low- and zero-emission technologies and solutions, nature-based solutions and carbon markets workstreams and capacity building. On energy, the co-chairs underscored their support for ASEAN’s clean energy transition and the realization of the ASEAN Power Grid. The co-chairs also discussed partnership on civil nuclear energy cooperation to support Singapore’s capability building in nuclear safety, security, nonproliferation, and understanding of advanced civil nuclear energy technologies, as part of Singapore’s efforts to study all potential pathways for decarbonization.The co-chairs re-affirmed the close collaboration between Singapore and the United States in supporting capacity-building in Southeast Asia under the Singapore-U.S. Third Country Training Program (TCTP). Singapore and the United States have jointly organized 76 capacity building programs for more than 2,000 officials from ASEAN Member States (AMS), Timor-Leste and the ASEAN Secretariat since the TCTP was established in February 2012. The co-chairs also welcomed the planned expansion of the scope of the TCTP to include the Pacific Islands region and looked forward to the pilot course in March 2024, which would include AMS, Timor-Leste, and members of the Pacific Islands Forum. Both sides expressed continued commitment to the TCTP and collaboration in new areas such as the Smart Cities Program on AI to deepen knowledge sharing in emerging areas.The co-chairs exchanged views on regional and global developments and reiterated the commitment by the United States and Singapore to uphold the rules-based international order. Both sides reaffirmed the position that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and attempts to annex Ukrainian territory are violations of international law and the principles of the UN Charter. The co-chairs condemned the acts of violence and terrorism by Hamas on 7 October 2023 in Israel and reaffirmed Israel’s right to self-defense in a manner that complied with international law, including international humanitarian law. Israel should do its utmost to ensure the safety and security of civilians, while Hamas must safely and immediately release all civilian hostages. The co-chairs expressed serious concern about the dire humanitarian crisis in Gaza and urged all parties to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian supplies in a timely and sustainable manner. Both sides affirmed their shared view that the only viable path to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is through a negotiated two-state solution, consistent with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.The co-chairs emphasized the importance of reinforcing an open, transparent, inclusive, and ASEAN-centric regional architecture. To this end, Singapore welcomed the commitment to ASEAN Centrality by the United States as seen from the upgrade of ASEAN-U.S. Relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) in 2022 and the adoption of the ASEAN-U.S. Summit Leaders’ Statement on Cooperation on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) in September 2023 at the 11th ASEAN-U.S. Summit. The Statement reaffirms shared principles between the AOIP and the United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy, as well as ASEAN and the United States’ commitment to tangibly support implementation of the four priority areas of the AOIP. Both sides also welcomed the Quad’s support for ASEAN Centrality, including the Quad’s agenda to support Indo-Pacific countries’ priorities and needs, and explored synergies for mutually beneficial cooperation.On Myanmar, the co-chairs reaffirmed ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus and reiterated their calls for the de-escalation of the situation, cessation of violence, and commencement of constructive dialogue among key stakeholders, as well as the need for access to humanitarian assistance. Both sides underscored the role of the United States and ASEAN’s other external partners in working with ASEAN to address the crisis and facilitate national reconciliation in Myanmar. On the South China Sea (SCS), the co-chairs underscored the importance of maintaining peace and stability, as well as the need to uphold freedom of navigation and overflight as provided under international law as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Both sides reaffirmed that all concerned parties must abide by the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and reiterated support for ASEAN-led efforts to develop an effective and substantive Code of Conduct for the South China Sea that upholds the legitimate rights and interests of all parties and is consistent with UNCLOS.End Text.
- Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kritenbrink’s Travel to Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei Office of the SpokespersonAssistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink will travel to Singapore; Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Bangkok, Thailand; Hanoi, Vietnam; and Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, February 23-March 4 to underscore the United States’ strong and enduring commitment to its allies and partners in Southeast Asia.In Singapore, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will co-lead the U.S.-Singapore Strategic Partnership Dialogue alongside Ministry of Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Albert Chua.  They will discuss the wide-ranging U.S.-Singapore partnership, including defense and security ties, economic cooperation, critical and emerging technology, and climate and energy.In Phnom Penh, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will meet with Cambodian officials to advance our shared vision of a free, prosperous, secure, and resilient Indo-Pacific.  The Assistant Secretary will also underscore U.S. commitment to the Cambodian people and their aspirations for a democratic and independent country where all voices are heard and respected, and Cambodia’s sovereignty is protected.In Bangkok, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will co-lead the 9th U.S.-Thailand Strategic Dialogue alongside Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Eksiri Pintaruchi.  He will also co-lead the Second Strategic and Defense Dialogue alongside Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Jedidiah Royal.  During these two dialogues, under the auspices of the U.S.-Thai Communiqué on Strategic Alliance and Partnership, the Assistant Secretary will work to advance bilateral cooperation in areas of shared interest including economic growth, climate change, global health, security cooperation, and people-to-people ties.In Hanoi, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will meet with Vietnamese officials and participate in the Asia-Pacific Dialogue.  Building on the recent upgrade of U.S.-Vietnam ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the Assistant Secretary will seek to further deepen U.S.-Vietnam relations and advance our shared vision of a prosperous, open, resilient, and peaceful Indo-Pacific Region.In Bandar Seri Begawan, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will commemorate the 40th anniversary of U.S.-Brunei relations.  He will also meet with senior Bruneian officials to discuss key issues in the bilateral relationship, including economic and security initiatives, efforts to tackle climate change, and regional cooperation.
- Ambassador Murray’s Travel to Kuala Lumpur and Singapore  HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Ambassador Murray’s Travel to Kuala Lumpur and Singapore 				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Ambassador Murray’s Travel to Kuala Lumpur and Singapore 																																		Media Note																														February 13, 2024																																							U.S. Senior Official for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Ambassador Matt Murray will travel to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, February 14-17 and to Singapore, February 17-21.&nbsp; In both cities Ambassador Murray will meet with government counterparts and the American business community to highlight broad U.S. economic engagement with the region as outlined in the Indo-Pacific Strategy Prosperity pillar. &nbsp;&nbsp;In Kuala Lumpur, Ambassador Murray will participate in the first APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) meeting of the year and help lay the groundwork for expanded public-private collaboration during APEC 2024.&nbsp; The ABAC meeting will be chaired by Peru ABAC 2024 Chair Mrs. Julia Torreblanca and will explore ways to advance the APEC agenda, including through the annual dialogue between ABAC and APEC Senior Officials.&nbsp;In Singapore, Ambassador Murray will participate in&nbsp;the&nbsp;APEC Outcomes 2023/Outlook 2024&nbsp;event hosted by the APEC Secretariat focusing on the U.S. and Peru host years.&nbsp; During this event, he will highlight key outcomes from the U.S. APEC Host Year, along with insights from the 2023 APEC Economic Leaders’ Week and their implications for the future of the APEC region.For further information, please contact the U.S. APEC Team at DOSAPEC@state.gov.						Tags																													Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation																															Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																																														Economic Prosperity and Trade Policy																																							Indo-Pacific																																							Indo-Pacific Strategy																															Malaysia																								Office of the Spokesperson																																Official International Travel																															Singapore