[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 00-2565

ISRAEL FALCON-CARTAGENA,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]

Before

 Boudin, Chief Judge,

Torruella and Lipez, Circuit Judges.

Melba N. Rivera-Camacho on brief for appellant.

Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Camille Velez-Rive,

Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Robert J. Triba, Regional Chief

Counsel, Social Security Administration, on brief for appellee.

October 11, 2001
Per Curiam. Claimant Israel Falcon-Cartagena

appeals from a decision of the district court upholding the

Commissioner's denial of disability and disability insurance

benefits under the Social Security Act. After carefully

reviewing the briefs and record below, we affirm the

Commissioner's decision.

The issues on appeal center around two questions:

(1) whether, as of September 30, 1997, the date he was last

insured, claimant had the exertional capability to perform

sedentary work, and (2) whether the ALJ's reliance on the

Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the "Grid"), 20 C.F.R. Part

404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, was improper in light of his

finding that claimant suffered from significant

nonexertional limitations. Claimant also contends that the

ALJ improperly discounted his subjective complaints of pain.

I. Exertional Limitations

We conclude that there was ample support in the

record for the ALJ's assessment of appellant's exertional

capabilities. Although claimant's treating physician

concluded that he was disabled, that is an issue reserved

for the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1); Irlanda
1For the same reason, we reject claimant's contention that

the ALJ erred in failing to give controlling weight to his

treating physician's opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2);

Rodriguez Pagan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 819

F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1987); Lizotte v. Secretary of Health and

Human Services, 654 F.2d 127, 130 (1st Cir. 1981).

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Ortiz v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 955 F.2d

765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991); Rodriguez v. Secretary of Health

and Human Services, 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981).

Moreover, the treating doctor's opinion was inconsistent

with other evidence in the record including treatment notes

and evaluations performed by both examining and nonexamining physicians, and the record as a whole was adequate

to support the findings.1 Ward v. Commissioner of Social

Security, 211 F.3d 652, 655 (1st Cir. 2000); Rodriguez, 647

F.2d at 222. 

The same can be said for the ALJ's findings

concerning the appellant's subjective complaints of pain.

Although claimant suffered from "a clinically determinable

medical impairment" -- tenosynovitis and myositis -- "that

can reasonably be expected to produce the pain alleged,"

Avery v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 797 F.2d

19, 21 (1st Cir. 1986), there was also evidence to the

contrary, and the ALJ personally observed claimant at the

hearing. "[W]e pay particular attention to an ALJ's
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evaluation of complaints of pain in light of their

subjective nature." Ortiz v. Secretary of Health and Human

Services, 890 F.2d 520, 523 (1st Cir. 1989) (citations and

internal quotations omitted). 

II. Nonexertional Limitations

Claimant's nonexertional impairments present only

a slightly closer question. Where a claimant has a

nonexertional impairment in addition to an exertional limit,

the decision to rely on the Grid to sustain the

Commissioner's burden of proof depends upon whether the

claimant's nonexertional impairments significantly affects

his ability to perform the full range of jobs at the

relevant exertional level. See Rose v. Shalala, 34 F.3d 13,

19 (1st Cir. 1994); Heggarty v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 990, 996

(1st Cir. 1991); Ortiz, 890 F.2d at 524. 

Here, the ALJ found that claimant had a

"significant" nonexertional limitations that made it

"impossible for him to perform tasks requiring constant

overhead reaching and engage in complex, non routine and

skilled tasks." However, the ALJ determined that claimant's

capacity for the full range of (unskilled) sedentary work

was not significantly compromised, and, using Rule 201.23 of
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the Grid as a "framework," concluded that claimant was not

disabled. Because the ALJ reached this determination

without taking any vocational testimony, he is deemed to

have relied exclusively on the Grid to show that jobs that

claimant could perform existed in the national economy. See

Ortiz, 890 F.2d at 524 n.4. 

A. Mental Restriction

The relevant medical evidence shows that claimant

suffered from "slight" or "mild" major depression, and

exhibited symptoms of nervousness, anxiety, somatic

difficulties, chest pain, and hypertension. Claimant's

treating physician noted that he frequently had trouble

understanding instructions. A treating psychiatrist and a

consulting psychiatrist evaluated claimant and reported that

claimant had a relatively normal mental status except for

a depressed mood, poor concentration, poor recent memory,

and diminished judgment and insight. Psychiatric RFC

assessments and Psychiatric Review Technique Forms ("PRTF")

rated claimant as moderately limited in his activities of

daily living and in several work-related areas of

functioning, but only slightly or not significantly limited

in all other areas of functioning. 
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In his decision, the ALJ expressly adopted the

opinions of the psychiatrists who rated claimant's abilities

to do work-related activities. To the extent claimant's

treating physician's opinion that claimant was unable to

work is inconsistent with those reports, we note that the

treating doctor is not a psychiatrist and that, in any case,

her opinion on the ultimate issue of disability is not

controlling. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1); Irlanda Ortiz, 955

F.2d at 769; Rodriguez, 647 F.2d at 222. Accordingly, we

think that the ALJ was justified in relying on the expert

medical opinions of the state psychiatrists, and his

decision demonstrates that he gave due consideration to the

effect of claimant's mental impairment on his capacity for

unskilled work. Further, since the RFC and PRTF reports

indicate that claimant was at the most moderately limited in

areas of functioning required for unskilled work, we

conclude that they adequately substantiate the ALJ's finding

that claimant's mental impairment did not affect, more than

marginally, the relevant occupational base. 

B. Reaching Restriction

Finally, with respect to claimant's limitation on

reaching, we recognize that, since reaching is an activity
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required in almost all unskilled jobs, significant

limitations on reaching may eliminate a large number of

occupations a person could otherwise do. See Social

Security Ruling 85-15, Titles II and XVI--Capability to do

Other Work--The Medical-Vocational Rules as a Framework for

Evaluating Solely Nonexertional Impairments (S.S.A. 1985),

available in 1985 WL 56857. In this case, the ALJ did not

find that claimant's overall ability to reach was

significantly affected. Rather, the ALJ concluded that

claimant was unable to perform only tasks requiring

"constant overhead reaching with the left arm." Since this

specific ability is only a narrow subset of the full range

of reaching, and the evidence as a whole does not suggest

that the ALJ's characterization of claimant's limitation was

understated, we think the ALJ was justified in concluding

that claimant's reaching restriction had only a marginal

effect on the relevant occupational base. Accordingly, the

ALJ's use of the Grid was proper and no further vocational

evidence was required. 

Affirmed. Loc. R. 27(c).