SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1137-16T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v. 

JASON PETTIS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Submitted October 31, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Yannotti and Carroll.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, 

Indictment Nos. 09-08-1370 and 09-08-1383.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (William Welaj, Designated 

Counsel, on the brief).

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, 

attorney for respondent (Arielle E. Katz, 

Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

November 13, 2017
2 A-1137-16T3

 Defendant Jason Pettis appeals from the denial of his petition 

for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. 

For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

 In October 2011, a jury convicted defendant of second-degree 

aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1), as a lesser-included 

offense of first-degree attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) or (2) (count one); second-degree unlawful 

possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (count two); and seconddegree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A.

2C:39-4(a) (count three). In a second trial, the same jury 

convicted defendant of second-degree possession of a weapon by a 

prohibited person, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b. 

 On December 22, 2011, defendant was sentenced to an extended 

term of fifteen years imprisonment on the aggravated assault 

charge, with an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility 

under the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The court 

merged count two with count three, and imposed a concurrent sevenyear prison term. A consecutive five-year sentence with no parole 

eligibility was imposed on the certain persons not to have weapons 

offense, resulting in an aggregate twenty-year prison term with 

seventeen years and nine months of parole ineligibility. 

Defendant appealed and, in an unpublished opinion, we 

affirmed his convictions and sentence, but remanded to correct an 
3 A-1137-16T3

error in the judgment of conviction.1 State v. Pettis, No. A3508-11 (App. Div. Dec. 27, 2013). The Supreme Court denied 

defendant's petition for certification. State v. Pettis, 218 N.J.

531 (2014). 

The facts underlying defendant's convictions are set forth 

in our earlier opinion and need not be repeated in the same level 

of detail here. Pettis, supra, slip op. at 3-7 (App. Div. Dec. 

27, 2013). Briefly summarizing, the State alleged defendant shot 

the victim, Jarred Campfield, multiple times at close range. The 

two men had allegedly been involved in a physical altercation 

within the previous week. On the day in question, Campfield told 

police "it was Jason" who shot him, and "he was wearing a white 

t-shirt, blue jeans, and he had dreadlocks." Soon thereafter, 

however, Campfield became uncooperative. At trial, Campfield 

testified he did not know who shot him, and denied he provided 

police with the name of the shooter. 

Robert VanAnglen, a mutual acquaintance of defendant and 

Campfield, testified he witnessed the shooting, and identified 

defendant as the shooter. VanAnglen stated he heard defendant say 

"what's up, home boy" to Campfield before shooting him five to 

 

1 We directed that defendant's conviction for unlawful possession 

of a weapon merge with the aggravated assault conviction rather 

than the conviction for possession of a weapon for an unlawful 

purpose. 
4 A-1137-16T3

seven times. The State also presented evidence that defendant 

left New Jersey after the shooting and was ultimately located in 

Illinois nearly a year later. 

In August 2014, defendant filed a PCR petition alleging 

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. PCR counsel 

was appointed and submitted a brief contending trial counsel failed 

to: (1) conduct an adequate investigation, specifically by failing 

to locate and interview Campfield prior to trial; (2) effectively 

cross-examine witnesses; (3) effectively counter testimony that 

defendant left the State while on probation; and (4) present 

effective opening and closing statements. Defendant also 

requested an evidentiary hearing on his petition. 

Judge Joseph Paone, who was also the trial judge, denied 

defendant's petition by order filed on October 13, 2016. Judge 

Paone determined defendant failed to establish a prima facie case 

in support of his petition after carefully analyzing each of 

defendant's contentions. 

 In his comprehensive oral opinion, Judge Paone found that 

trial counsel's pre-trial investigation and failure to interview 

Campfield did not fall below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. The judge added: 

[I]t's clear here that [defendant] is unable 

to articulate what benefit the interview of 

[Campfield] would have accomplished here. 
5 A-1137-16T3

[Defendant] knew exactly what the victim was 

going to testify to prior to trial, and, in 

fact, the victim testified, essentially, in 

conformance with the information that had been 

provided by the [S]tate to the defense before 

the commencement of trial, and [defendant] has 

failed to demonstrate how this decision not 

to interview the victim has prejudiced him in 

any way. 

The judge further reasoned that Campfield's reluctance to 

testify for the prosecution was irrelevant to the State's pretrial plea offer and would not affect the jury's determinations 

because Campfield's on-the-scene identification of defendant as 

the shooter was admissible as an excited utterance, N.J.R.E.

803(c)(2), and as a prior identification, N.J.R.E. 803(a)(3);2 and 

because an independent eyewitness, VanAnglen, made a confirmatory 

identification of defendant as the shooter.

 With respect to defendant's other ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims, Judge Paone found trial counsel's opening and 

closing remarks sufficient. In his opening statement, counsel 

"introduced the issue of identification[,] discussed the 

prosecutor's role [and] urged the jury to pay [ ] careful attention 

 

2 The judge also found Campfield's prior identification of 

defendant was non-testimonial under Crawford v. Washington, 541 

U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1365-66, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 194 

(2004) (holding that the Confrontation Clause only forbids the 

hearsay use of "testimonial" out-of-court declarants). See also

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2279, 165 

L. Ed. 2d 224, 243 (2006) (creating an exception for otherwise 

testimonial statements under the "public safety exception").
6 A-1137-16T3

to the evidence[.]" Similarly, during closing remarks, trial 

counsel discussed "the inconsistencies of the case, the witness' 

credibility, [and] the fact [] defendant was not the shooter[.]" 

The judge also found defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's 

opening and closing statements. 

Judge Paone rejected defendant's contention that trial 

counsel failed to effectively cross-examine the State's witnesses. 

He found that, while cross-examining Campfield, defense counsel 

"established identification issues, specifically, that Campfield 

had lied at some point about identifying defendant as the 

shooter[.]" Similarly, while cross-examining VanAnglen, defense 

counsel "highlighted the integral issue of identification in this 

case by eliciting the [eyewitness's] description of the shooter 

did not match [ ] Campfield's description based on what [counsel] 

elicited through his adversarial testing of the prosecution's 

witness." 

 Judge Paone found unpersuasive defendant's argument that 

trial counsel was ineffective in exploring why defendant violated 

his probationary program and fled to Illinois after the shooting. 

Rather, to combat the State's theory that this showed consciousness 

of guilt, defense counsel offered "an alternative motive for 

defendant's flight, that his mother and family lived in 

Illinois[.]" 
7 A-1137-16T3

 Judge Paone concluded defendant did not establish a prima 

facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel and therefore 

no evidentiary hearing was required. This appeal followed, in 

which defendant presents a single point for our consideration: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 

DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION 

RELIEF WITHOUT AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY 

HEARING TO FULLY ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT 

HE FAILED TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL 

REPRESENTATION FROM TRIAL COUNSEL.

The standard for determining whether counsel's performance 

was ineffective for purposes of the Sixth Amendment was formulated 

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, l04 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. 

Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. 

Fritz, l05 N.J. 42 (l987). In order to prevail on a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must meet the 

following two-prong test: (l) counsel's performance was deficient 

and he or she made errors so egregious counsel was not functioning 

effectively as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution; and (2) the defect in performance prejudiced 

defendant's rights to a fair trial such that there exists a 

"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 

Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, l04 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed.

2d at 698. 
8 A-1137-16T3

 Here, defendant focuses his appeal on his contention that 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct an adequate 

pretrial investigation with respect to the victim, Campfield. 

Defendant asserts, without any record support, that Campfield 

could have potentially provided testimony that would have 

exonerated him. Defendant further argues that an evidentiary 

hearing should have been ordered so that trial counsel could have 

been questioned about his alleged improper investigation. 

 When a defendant asserts his attorney has inadequately 

investigated his matter, "he must assert the facts that an 

investigation would have revealed, supported by affidavits or 

certifications based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant 

or the person making the certification." State v. Porter, 216 

N.J. 343, 353 (2013) (citing State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super.

154, 170 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 199 (1999)). Thus, 

a defendant "must do more than make bald assertions that he was 

denied the effective assistance of counsel." Cummings, supra, 321 

N.J. Super. at 170. 

 Here, defendant fails to meet this standard. He proffers no 

competent evidence of what counsel would have discovered had he 

interviewed Campfield, or how Campfield's testimony or the result 

at trial would have differed had counsel interviewed him. In 

short, defendant's claim that trial counsel conducted an 
9 A-1137-16T3

inadequate investigation is merely a bald assertion devoid of any 

substance. 

 The record also supports Judge Paone's findings on 

defendant's other claims. Accordingly, we are satisfied from our 

review of the record that defendant failed to make a prima facie 

showing of ineffectiveness of trial counsel under the StricklandFritz test. The judge correctly concluded an evidentiary hearing 

was not warranted. See State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 452, 462-63 

(1992). Moreover, in view of the evidence presented, it appears 

defense counsel was quite effective in securing a jury verdict of 

aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of the charged 

crime of attempted murder. 

 Affirmed.