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Love Signs had a duty to discover any latent defect in the sign 

that could cause the sign to collapse.

The district court concluded that Love Signs clearly had 

no duty to inspect, maintain, or care for the sign and pole on 

Wilkinson’s premises. It concluded that Love Signs’ obligations were to service the sign and replace lamps and ballasts 

within the sign. It sustained Love Signs’ motion for summary judgment. The district court did not err in sustaining 

the motion.

CONCLUSION

Durre’s claims against Tri-City are time barred by the statute 

of repose in § 25-223. There was no fraudulent concealment 

by Tri-City that prevented Durre from timely filing his claim 

against Tri-City. Love Signs owed Durre no duty to discover 

any latent defect in the sign. Therefore, we affirm the judgment 

of the district court.

Affirmed.

McCormack, J., participating on briefs.

J.P., a minor, by and through his father and

next friend, A.P., appellee, v. Millard

Public Schools et al., appellants.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed May 17, 2013. No. S-11-777.

1. Administrative Law: Schools and School Districts: Appeal and Error. 

Appeals from the district court under the Student Discipline Act are governed by 

the Administrative Procedure Act.

2. Administrative Law: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. A judgment or 

final order rendered by a district court in a judicial review pursuant to the 

Administrative Procedure Act may be reversed, vacated, or modified by an appellate court for errors appearing on the record.

3. Administrative Law: Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing an order 

of a district court under the Administrative Procedure Act for errors appearing on 

the record, the inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported 

by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.

4. Constitutional Law: Schools and School Districts: Search and Seizure: 

Appeal and Error. In reviewing claims of Fourth Amendment violations in 

connection with searches conducted by school officials, an appellate court 
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applies the same two-part standard of review utilized with respect to such 

issues in criminal cases. Regarding historical facts, the appellate court reviews 

the trial court’s findings for clear error. But an appellate court independently 

reviews the trial court’s determination of whether those facts violated the Fourth 

Amendment’s protections.

5. Constitutional Law: Warrantless Searches: Search and Seizure: Police 

Officers and Sheriffs. The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures generally requires a law enforcement officer to have 

probable cause to conduct a warrantless search without consent.

6. Constitutional Law: Warrantless Searches: Search and Seizure. Warrantless 

searches and seizures are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions, which 

must be strictly confined by their justifications.

7. Schools and School Districts: Search and Seizure: Proof. There is a two-part 

test for determining the reasonableness of school searches. First, the search must 

be justified at its inception. Second, the search must be reasonably related in its 

scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.

8. Schools and School Districts: Search and Seizure: Probable Cause. Under 

ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official 

will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting 

that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating 

either the law or the rules of the school.

9. ____: ____: ____. Reasonable grounds for a search exist when school officials 

reasonably believe that there is a moderate chance of discovering evidence 

of wrongdoing.

10. Schools and School Districts: Search and Seizure. A search is permissible in its 

scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the 

search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and 

the nature of the infraction.

11. Schools and School Districts: Statutes: Legislature. A school district is 

a creature of statute and possesses no powers other than those granted by 

the Legislature.

12. Schools and School Districts: Search and Seizure: Probable Cause. Implicit 

within the school-needs exception set forth in New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 

325, 105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1985), requiring only reasonable suspicion for the search of students on school grounds, is that school officials had the 

authority to conduct the search.

13. Schools and School Districts. On school grounds, school officials have authority 

to regulate and control student conduct.

14. Schools and School Districts: Search and Seizure: Motor Vehicles. Permitting 

school officials to search a student’s vehicle based upon a nexus to the school 

because a student drove the vehicle to school is overly broad and would lead to 

confusing inquiries into whether vehicles parked off school grounds were sufficiently connected to the school.

15. Appeal and Error. In order to be considered by an appellate court, an alleged 

error must be both specifically assigned and specifically argued in the brief of the 

party asserting the error.
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Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: James T. 

Gleason, Judge. Affirmed.

Jeff C. Miller, Duncan A. Young, and Keith I. Kosaki, of 

Young & White Law Offices, for appellants.

Richard P. McGowan, of McGowan Law Firm, for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Stephan, McCormack, 

and Miller-Lerman, JJ.

Wright, J.

NATURE OF CASE

This case originated from a school official’s search of a student’s pickup truck that was parked on a public street across 

from the school. Without permission and in violation of school 

policy, the student retrieved a wallet and sweatshirt from his 

truck. When the student returned to school grounds, the assistant principal searched the student’s person, backpack, and wallet. The search disclosed only a cellular telephone and a set of 

keys. Without the student’s consent, the assistant principal then 

searched the truck. Drug paraphernalia was found, and the student, J.P., was suspended for 19 days.

The school board upheld the suspension. On appeal under 

the Student Discipline Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-254 et seq. 

(Reissue 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2012), the district court reversed 

the school board’s decision based on the court’s conclusion that 

the search violated the Fourth Amendment. For the reasons set 

forth, we affirm.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

[1] Appeals from the district court under the Student 

Discipline Act are governed by the Administrative Procedure 

Act. Busch v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 261 Neb. 484, 623 

N.W.2d 672 (2001).

[2,3] A judgment or final order rendered by a district court 

in a judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure 

Act may be reversed, vacated, or modified by an appellate 

court for errors appearing on the record. Id. When reviewing 

an order of a district court under the Administrative Procedure 
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Act for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is whether 

the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent 

evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. Id.

[4] In reviewing claims of Fourth Amendment violations 

in connection with searches conducted by school officials, an 

appellate court applies the same two-part standard of review 

utilized with respect to such issues in criminal cases. Regarding 

historical facts, we review the trial court’s findings for clear 

error. But we independently review the court’s determination of whether those facts violated the Fourth Amendment’s 

protections. See State v. Sprunger, 283 Neb. 531, 811 N.W.2d 

235 (2012). The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by 

state officers, including public school officials. See, Vernonia 

School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 132 

L. Ed. 2d 564 (1995); New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325, 

105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1985) (T.L.O.). Thus, we 

conclude that our two-part standard of review is also applicable to claims of Fourth Amendment violations in school 

search cases.

FACTS

Search

On August 18, 2010, J.P. drove his truck to Millard West 

High School (Millard West). The majority of students parked 

on school property, but about 15 percent parked along 176th 

Avenue, which bordered the east side of the campus. J.P. 

parked on 176th Avenue in front of a private residence located 

across the street from Millard West.

J.P. arrived at school around 7:45 a.m. and went to his first 

class. Afterward, he tried to leave the building. Lori Bishop, a 

hall monitor, saw J.P. and a classmate approach the front door. 

Bishop asked where they were going, and the classmate said he 

had to get a book. Bishop allowed the classmate to leave but 

told J.P. to remain in the building.

Later, a parking lot security person, Dennis Huey, saw J.P. 

walk from the school building with a female student. Huey 

drove up next to the two students and asked them where they 
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were going and why they were outside. They responded that 

they needed to get some things out of J.P.’s truck. Huey followed them to the truck and observed them until they reentered 

the building. J.P. testified at the disciplinary hearing that he 

went directly to his truck from the school building and that 

Huey watched him walk to the truck, get his wallet and sweatshirt, and immediately return to school.

J.P. and the female student returned through the front doors 

of the school at 9:46 a.m., and Bishop asked why they had 

been outside. J.P. took his wallet from his back pocket and said 

he had to go out and get it. The students said Huey had given 

them permission to leave the building. However, when Bishop 

asked Huey whether he gave J.P. permission to leave the building, Huey stated that he had not.

Around 9:50 a.m., Bishop radioed Harry Grimminger, an 

assistant principal, and reported the incident. Grimminger 

became suspicious and decided to investigate. A school 

security guard escorted J.P. to Grimminger’s office, and J.P. 

spoke with Grimminger alone. Even when challenged by 

Grimminger, J.P. continued to claim he had permission to 

leave the building.

Grimminger then decided to search J.P.’s person and his 

truck. He told J.P. to empty his pockets and searched his backpack. J.P. removed his cellular telephone, keys, and wallet and 

put them on Grimminger’s desk. Grimminger did not find any 

contraband. He returned J.P.’s wallet and cellular telephone, 

but told J.P. his truck would be searched. When J.P. said his 

father did not want the truck to be searched, Grimminger 

responded that J.P.’s father would not make that decision. At 

Grimminger’s request, a school resource officer then joined 

Grimminger and J.P.

When Grimminger and J.P. reached the truck, J.P. stood in 

front of the driver’s side door and refused to allow the search, 

but eventually, he moved away from the door. It is clear he 

did not give his consent to the search, which took about 10 

minutes. Grimminger looked under and behind the seats, in the 

glove box, and in a compartment behind the front seat console. In the console, Grimminger found “a small drug pipe and 

zigzag papers.” In the compartment in back of the console, he 
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found another drug pipe. He also found cigarettes and lighters 

in the truck. Once he had completed his search of the truck, he 

and J.P. returned to the school building. Grimminger searched 

the two students who were with J.P. earlier, but he found no 

drug-related contraband.

School Discipline Proceedings

J.P. and his father were informed by letter dated August 19, 

2010, that he had been recommended for suspension but could 

request a hearing. J.P.’s father requested a hearing, and a hearing examiner was appointed. J.P. was charged with violating 

§§ III.A. and VI.F. of the district standards for student conduct, 

which were contained in the “Millard West High School 2010-

2011 Student Handbook” (Student Handbook). Section III.A. 

prohibited “[p]ossession or use of an illegal narcotic drug, 

controlled substance . . . or possession or use of drug paraphernalia.” Student Handbook at 47 (§ III. Violations Against 

Public Health and Safety). Violation of this section required a 

19-day suspension if the violation occurred on school grounds, 

though the suspension could be reduced in certain circumstances. § III.A.1.a. Legal authorities were required to be contacted. § III.A.1.c. In general, sanctions for conduct off school 

grounds required a citation or admission by the student to a 

violation of a particular subsection of the Student Handbook. 

§ III.A.2.a. “‘Citation’ shall mean a summons to appear in 

court issued by a law enforcement officer.” Student Handbook 

at 58 (§ IX. Definitions).

“On school grounds” was defined as “on District property, 

in a vehicle owned, leased, or contracted by the District being 

used for a school purpose or in a vehicle being driven for a 

school purpose by a school employee or his or her designee, 

or at a school-sponsored activity or athletic event.” Id., § IX.Q. 

at 59.

Section VI.F. prohibited “[d]isruptive [b]ehavior,” which 

was defined as “[b]ehavior or possession of any item 

that materially interferes with or substantially disrupts 

class work, school activities, or the educational process.” 

Student Handbook at 54 (§ VI. Violations Against School 

Administration).
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On August 24, 2010, the hearing officer found that J.P. had 

committed the charged offenses and that a 19-day suspension 

was appropriate. He determined that “[t]echnically, the search 

of the [truck] by the assistant principal was beyond school 

jurisdiction, since the school boundary, in this situation, ended 

at the curb.” However, the hearing officer found that the search 

was not simply justified, but required, based on the truck’s 

proximity to the school and the school’s obligation to protect 

the learning environment.

He concluded that the Student Handbook extended school 

jurisdiction to “‘any other place where the governing law permits . . . discipline . . . for prohibited conduct’” and that the 

truck, on a curb “immediately adjacent” to the school, was 

“‘any other place.’” Section IX.V. of the Student Handbook 

defined school jurisdiction as

on District property, in a vehicle owned, leased, or contracted by the District being used for a school purpose or 

in a vehicle being driven for a school purpose by a school 

employee or his or her designee, or at a school-sponsored 

activity or athletic event, or any other place where the 

governing law permits the District to discipline students 

for prohibited conduct.

Id. at 60 (§ IX. Definitions).

The director of pupil services reviewed the hearing officer’s 

decision. On August 27, 2010, he upheld the suspension, and 

J.P.’s father requested an appeal. Before the September 29 

hearing, J.P. completed his 19-day suspension. He returned to 

school on September 15. He subsequently asked a committee 

of the board of education of Millard Public Schools (Board) 

to remove the suspension from his record. The committee 

upheld the suspension and did not expunge the suspension 

from J.P.’s record.

District Court Decision

Through his father, J.P. brought an action in the district court for Douglas County under the Student Discipline 

Act, § 79-254 et seq. The petition alleged, summarized and 

restated, that the decision of the Board should be reversed 

because (1) the decision was based on evidence found during 
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a search that violated J.P.’s rights under the 4th and 14th 

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 7, of 

the Nebraska Constitution; (2) the decision was arbitrary and 

capricious; and (3) J.P. was charged with a violation for conduct occurring on school grounds when the truck was parked 

off school grounds.

The district court initially addressed whether the issue was 

moot because J.P. had already completed his 19-day suspension. It concluded that because J.P. claimed he was innocent 

of the violations charged and the suspension would be part 

of his permanent record, he was entitled to have the suspension reviewed on appeal and that, therefore, the issue was 

not moot.

In addressing the constitutionality of the search of J.P.’s 

truck, the district court discussed T.L.O. It determined that the 

repeated emphasis on activity occurring on school grounds 

distinguished T.L.O. from the present case, because J.P.’s truck 

was searched while parked off school grounds.

The district court proceeded to apply traditional Fourth 

Amendment jurisprudence. It noted that, generally, searches 

without a warrant are unreasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment. J.P. did not consent to the search, and Grimminger 

had no reason to believe contraband or evidence of a crime 

would be found in J.P.’s truck. There was no indication that 

J.P. was in possession of drugs or weapons, and school officials 

had not witnessed J.P. commit any illegal acts.

It recognized that Grimminger’s claim that “[J.P.] skipped a 

class, left the school building without permission, and lied to 

school officials” allowed Grimminger to search J.P.’s person 

and belongings out of concern for school safety. However, it 

concluded that because no contraband was found in the search 

of J.P.’s person and belongings, Grimminger lacked probable 

cause to expand the search to the truck. The court concluded 

the search of J.P.’s truck violated the Fourth Amendment. It 

reversed the decision of the Board and ordered the offenses 

and the 19-day suspension removed from J.P.’s school record. 

The defendants, Millard Public Schools, the Board, and various 

school officials (collectively the District), appealed. Pursuant to 

our statutory authority to regulate the dockets of the appellate 
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courts of this state, we moved the case to our docket. See Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Reissue 2008).

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The District assigns, summarized and restated, that the district court erred in (1) determining that the search violated 

J.P.’s Fourth Amendment rights and (2) reversing the decision 

of the Board.

ANALYSIS

Background

[5,6] The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures generally requires a law enforcement officer to have probable cause to conduct a warrantless 

search without consent. See State v. Borst, 281 Neb. 217, 221, 

795 N.W.2d 262, 267 (2011) (“warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, 

subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions, which must be strictly confined by 

their justifications”). Probable cause to search requires that 

the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a 

person of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or 

evidence of a crime will be found. State v. Howard, 282 Neb. 

352, 803 N.W.2d 450 (2011).

[7-10] But in T.L.O., the U.S. Supreme Court relaxed the 

Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard for school 

searches to balance students’ legitimate privacy interests with 

“the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools.” 469 U.S. at 341. There 

is a two-part test for determining the reasonableness of school 

searches. First, the search must be justified at its inception. 

Second, the search must be reasonably related in its scope to 

the circumstances which justified the interference in the first 

place. Id.

Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by 

a teacher or other school official will be “justified at its 

inception” when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student 
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has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of 

the school.

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42. Reasonable grounds for a search 

exist when school officials reasonably believe that there is a 

moderate chance of discovering evidence of wrongdoing. See 

Safford Unified School Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 129 

S. Ct. 2633, 174 L. Ed. 2d 354 (2009). A search is permissible 

in its scope “when the measures adopted are reasonably related 

to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in 

light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the 

infraction.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.

Authority to Search

The District contends that the court erred in applying a probable cause standard to Grimminger’s search of J.P.’s truck. It 

argues that the court should have applied the reasonable suspicion standard for school searches because a probable cause 

standard will unnecessarily tie its hands. J.P. asserts that the 

court correctly applied the probable cause standard and that 

even under a reasonable suspicion standard for school searches, 

the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

In our consideration of the reasonableness of the search, we 

examine the authority of school officials to search J.P.’s truck. 

The district court’s determination that school officials lacked 

probable cause to search the truck implies that school personnel had the authority to search the truck if they had probable 

cause. The question is whether the school officials had the 

authority to conduct a search of J.P.’s truck when it was across 

from the school on a public street.

[11] The District is granted its powers by statute. “Every 

duly organized school district shall be a body corporate and 

possess all the usual powers of a corporation for public purposes . . . .” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-405 (Reissue 2008). A school 

district is a creature of statute and possesses no other powers other than those granted by the Legislature. Robertson v. 

School Dist. No. 17, 252 Neb. 103, 560 N.W.2d 469 (1997). 

The Student Discipline Act sets out the permissible disciplinary actions that schools can take against students. And it 

authorizes disciplinary actions against students for conduct 
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that occurs on school property, in school vehicles, or at schoolsponsored activities.

Section 79-267 describes student conduct that

shall constitute grounds for long-term suspension, expulsion, or mandatory reassignment, subject to the procedural provisions of the Student Discipline Act, when such 

activity occurs on school grounds, in a vehicle owned, 

leased, or contracted by a school being used for a school 

purpose or in a vehicle being driven for a school purpose 

by a school employee or by his or her designee, or at a 

school-sponsored activity or athletic event.

(Emphasis supplied.) That conduct includes “[e]ngaging in the 

unlawful possession . . . of a controlled substance or an imitation controlled substance . . . .” § 79-267(6). Section 79-267 

sets the limits of a school’s authority to discipline students for 

unlawfully possessing a controlled substance. A student may be 

expelled for unlawful possession of a controlled substance on 

school grounds, in a vehicle owned by the school and used for 

a school purpose by a school employee or their designee, or at 

a school-sponsored activity or athletic event.

School officials are given no specific statutory authorization to conduct searches. Such authority is implied by the 

provisions of the Student Discipline Act, which grants school 

officials the authority to discipline students. School personnel 

“may take actions regarding student behavior, other than those 

specifically provided in the Student Discipline Act which are 

reasonably necessary to . . . further school purposes, or prevent interference with the educational process.” § 79-258. But 

because a school’s authority to search is implied by its authority to discipline students to maintain order, its authority to 

search is also limited by its authority to discipline.

We recognized that many courts, including the Nebraska 

Court of Appeals, have expanded T.L.O.’s reasonable suspicion 

standard to a school’s search of a student’s vehicle parked on 

school grounds. See, e.g., Bundick v. Bay City Independent 

School Dist., 140 F. Supp. 2d 735 (S.D. Texas 2001); Anders 

ex rel. Anders v. Fort Wayne Commu. Schools, 124 F. Supp. 

2d 618 (N.D. Ind. 2000); In re Interest of Michael R., 11 Neb. 

App. 903, 662 N.W.2d 632 (2003); State v. Best, 403 N.J. 
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Super. 428, 959 A.2d 243 (2008), affirmed 201 N.J. 100, 987 

A.2d 605 (2010); State v. Slattery, 56 Wash. App. 820, 787 

P.2d 932 (1990); State v. Schloegel, 319 Wis. 2d 741, 769 

N.W.2d 130 (Wis. App. 2009).

The District also cites to federal cases extending the T.L.O.

standard to school searches conducted while a student was 

attending a school-sponsored class or activity that was held off 

campus. See, Shade v. City of Farmington, Minnesota, 309 F.3d 

1054 (8th Cir. 2002); Hassan v. Lubbock Independent School 

Dist., 55 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1995); Webb v. McCullough, 828 

F.2d 1151 (6th Cir. 1987); Rhodes v. Guarricino, 54 F. Supp. 

2d 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).

But none of these cases, nor any that we have found, recognize a right of school officials to conduct off-campus searches 

of a student’s person or property which are unrelated to schoolsponsored activities. To the contrary, courts have held that 

school officials lack authority to conduct such searches.

In Spencer v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 252 Neb. 750, 566 

N.W.2d 757 (1997), we stated that any action taken by a school 

board must be through either an express or an implied power 

conferred by legislative grant. An administrative agency cannot 

use its rulemaking power to modify, alter, or enlarge provisions 

of a statute which it is charged with administering. Id.

In Busch v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 261 Neb. 484, 488, 

623 N.W.2d 672, 676 (2001), this court stated: “We have long 

acknowledged that school boards are creatures of statute, and 

their powers are limited. . . . Any action taken by a school 

board must be through either an express or an implied power 

conferred by legislative grant.”

Here, the District claims its school officials have the authority to search if they reasonably suspect the student has engaged 

in conduct that is subject to discipline by the school. It argues 

that driving to and from school is a school-sponsored activity 

and is a nexus to the school.

We find that the District’s claim of authority is too broad 

and exceeds the authority given to school personnel pursuant to the Student Discipline Act. In interpreting its state law, 

one court that has addressed the authority to search off school 

grounds has rejected a nexus to the school argument.
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For example, in Com. v. Williams, 749 A.2d 957 (Pa. Super. 

2000), a Pennsylvania appellate court rejected the argument 

that the district makes here: i.e., that a school has the authority to search a student’s vehicle parked off campus because the 

student’s conduct in driving to and from school has a nexus to 

controlling student conduct on campus. There, Pennsylvania 

law authorized school districts to obtain school police officers. 

Unless they were specifically granted the same powers as city 

police, they were limited to issuing summary citations, detaining students until law enforcement arrived, and enforcing good 

order on school property.

While off school grounds, an officer encountered three 

students in a car. They made a U-turn, gave the officer “the 

proverbial finger,” and drove off. Id. at 958. As expected, the 

officer confronted the students in the vehicle, which was now 

parked off school property. After they exited the vehicle, the 

officer observed a sawed-off shotgun in plain view. He called 

the city police, but before police arrived, he and other school 

officers searched the vehicle and found three revolvers in addition to the shotgun. The trial court found the school officer 

was acting within the scope of his duties even if the incident 

occurred off school property.

The appellate court disagreed. It concluded that the governing statute “jurisdictionally limit[ed] the School Police 

Officer’s authority to ‘in school buildings, on school buses 

and on school grounds.’” Id. at 961. The court declined to 

expand that authority to include any action that had a nexus 

to enforcing good order on school grounds. It reasoned that if 

the search were upheld, city police could obtain the fruits of a 

search conducted without a warrant or exigent circumstances. 

It further reasoned that a “‘nexus to the school under the totality of the circumstances of the incident’ inquiry” would be 

“nebulous, and would certainly lead to confusion,” both for 

school officials deciding if they had authority to search off 

school grounds and for courts in deciding if school officials 

had authority to search and whether a sufficient nexus was 

present. Id. at 962.

Similarly, in State v. Crystal B., 130 N.M. 336, 24 P.3d 771 

(N.M. App. 2000), a New Mexico appellate court reversed a 
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trial court’s refusal to suppress evidence obtained by an 

assistant principal when he had seized a student (appellant) 

and her belongings off campus. A student informant told the 

assistant principal that appellant and two other girls had left 

campus and were smoking cigarettes in an alley. The principal found the girls and ordered them into his car. At his 

office, a search of appellant’s bookbag disclosed a marijuana 

roach, and appellant was suspended. Appellant was charged 

on a delinquency petition for possession of marijuana, and 

the trial court denied her motion to suppress. In reversing, 

the New Mexico appellate court concluded the reasonableness standard for school searches applied “only in furtherance of the school’s education-related goals; that is in a 

situation where the student is on school property or while the 

student is under control of the school.” Id. at 339, 24 P.3d at 

774, citing In re Josue T., 128 N.M. 56, 989 P.2d 431 (N.M. 

App. 1999).

We agree. In T.L.O., the Court recognized that students 

have a legitimate expectation of privacy, which must be 

weighed against the interest of teachers and administrators 

in maintaining discipline within the classroom and on the 

grounds of the school. The school-needs standard of reasonableness was intended to “ensure that the interests of students 

will be invaded no more than is necessary to achieve the 

legitimate end of preserving order in the schools.” T.L.O., 

469 U.S. at 343. It was not intended to overlap the authority of law enforcement officers to enforce order on the public streets.

We agree with the Pennsylvania Superior Court that adopting a “nexus to the school” standard would lead to confusing inquiries whether the student’s off-campus conduct was 

sufficiently connected to maintaining school order. And it is 

not hard to see how a nebulous nexus standard could lead 

to school officials’ gathering evidence for the police even 

when police officers could not have conducted the search. See 

Com. v. Williams, 749 A.2d 957 (Pa. Super. 2000). Under the 

district’s argument, school officials could search a student’s 

vehicle parked off campus whenever a student had driven 

the vehicle to attend school and the school had a reasonable 
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suspicion that a search would show the student had violated 

the law.

Thus, we believe that under § 76-267(6), the Legislature 

has wisely limited a school district’s jurisdiction to discipline 

students for possession of a controlled substance to conduct 

occurring (1) on school property, (2) at a school-sponsored 

activity or athletic event, or (3) in a vehicle owned or used by 

the school for a school purpose. We conclude that the school 

district did not have implied authority to search a student’s 

vehicle parked off campus.

Search of J.P.’s Truck

The District argues that T.L.O. permits the search of J.P.’s 

truck, because contraband kept in a student vehicle off school 

grounds still threatens the school environment and it is part of 

the duty of the District to maintain order and discipline in the 

school environment. It argues that because the initial search of 

J.P.’s person and backpack in Grimminger’s office was authorized, it could search J.P.’s truck. It claims that because J.P. 

had keys to the truck, drove to school, broke school rules by 

accessing his truck, and lied to school officials, Grimminger 

had a reasonable basis to search J.P.’s truck. But the authority 

to search the truck is not expanded, because officials could 

search J.P. at the school.

In support of its claim that it could search J.P.’s truck, the 

District relies upon In re Interest of Michael R., 11 Neb. App. 

903, 662 N.W.2d 632 (2003). That case is readily distinguishable. The School Discipline Act specifically recognizes the 

District’s authority to discipline this conduct, which occurred 

on school grounds. See § 79-267. Michael R.’s vehicle was 

located in the school parking lot on school grounds. A school 

official overheard slang indicating that Michael might possess 

illegal drugs. Michael admitted to speaking to another student 

about “‘big bags,’” a slang term for marijuana. 11 Neb. App. at 

905, 662 N.W.2d at 634. Because none of these facts are present in the case at bar, the precedential value of In re Interest of 

Michael R. is limited.

The District also relies on cases in which the search of a student vehicle was found to be reasonable after a personal search 
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of the student disclosed no contraband. See, Bundick v. Bay 

City Independent School Dist., 140 F. Supp. 2d 735 (S.D. Tex. 

2001); Anders ex rel. Anders v. Fort Wayne Commu. Schools, 

124 F. Supp. 2d 618 (N.D. Ind. 2000); State v. Best, 403 N.J. 

Super. 428, 959 A.2d 243 (2008), affirmed 201 N.J. 100, 987 

A.2d 605 (2010); State v. Slattery, 56 Wash. App. 820, 787 

P.2d 932 (1990).

In each case, there was a link between the student and contraband allowing school officials to reasonably suspect that 

the student possessed contraband. More important, in each 

case, the student’s vehicle was on school grounds when it 

was searched.

In the case at bar, the district court did not directly address 

school personnel’s authority to search J.P.’s truck. Instead, it 

found that “Grimminger had no reason to believe contraband 

or evidence of a crime would be found in [J.P.’s] vehicle” 

and, therefore, lacked probable cause to search J.P.’s truck. 

Requiring that school officials have probable cause to search 

the truck implies that the District had authority to search if it 

had probable cause.

Within its claim that it had authority to search J.P.’s truck, 

the District argues that the location of J.P.’s truck is irrelevant 

because the search of his person and the truck were both reasonable. We disagree. In order for the search to be reasonable, 

the District must have the authority to search.

[12] Implicit within the T.L.O. school-needs exception, 

requiring only reasonable suspicion for the search of students 

on school grounds, is that school officials have the authority 

to conduct the search. It is important to point out that T.L.O.

did not extend the District’s authority to search to a student’s 

vehicle parked off school grounds. See Stuart C. Berman, 

Note, Student Fourth Amendment Rights: Defining the Scope 

of the T.L.O. School-Search Exception, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 

1077 (1991). The expansion of the authority to search beyond 

the search of a student’s person has evolved from various 

court decisions applying the two-step analysis set forth in 

T.L.O. These courts have extended T.L.O.’s reasonable suspicion standard to searches of student vehicles parked on school 

grounds. See Annot., 31 A.L.R.5th 229 (1995), and cases cited 
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therein. And Nebraska law does not expressly authorize such 

a search.

The District cites to federal cases from the Fifth, Sixth, 

and Eighth Circuits as well as a New York federal district 

court which have recognized that the T.L.O. special-needs 

exception is not dependent solely on location. See, Shade 

v. City of Farmington, Minnesota, 309 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 

2002); Hassan v. Lubbock Independent School Dist., 55 F.3d 

1075 (5th Cir. 1995); Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151 

(6th Cir. 1987); Rhodes v. Guarricino, 54 F. Supp. 2d 186 

(S.D.N.Y. 1999). We find that those cases are distinguishable 

on their facts.

In those cases, the school remained in control of the student 

and was responsible for the safety of the student during the 

event. The courts did not address the specific question whether 

school officials had the authority to search a student vehicle 

parked off school grounds.

Courts have supported the logical inference that school 

grounds include the school parking lot. See State v. Schloegel, 

319 Wis. 2d 741, 769 N.W.2d 130 (Wis. App. 2009), citing 

Myron Schreck, The Fourth Amendment in the Public Schools: 

Issues for the 1990s and Beyond, 25 Urb. Law. 117 (1993). 

They have recognized the authority of school personnel to 

search a student’s vehicle parked in the school parking lot. 

See State v. Best, 403 N.J. Super. 428, 959 A.2d 243 (2008), 

affirmed 201 N.J. 100, 987 A.2d 605 (2010).

The District also cites examples in which courts have upheld 

actions by school officials on school-sponsored trips conducted off school grounds, specifically Hassan v. Lubbock 

Independent School Dist., supra, and Webb v. McCullough, 

supra. But these cases leave unanswered whether the District’s 

authority to search a student’s vehicle extends to searches of 

off-school-grounds vehicles.

As further support of its claim that it could search J.P.’s 

truck, the District relies upon Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 

393, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 168 L. Ed. 2d 290 (2007). We find that 

case readily distinguishable. The Court held that the student 

could not claim to be outside the school’s authority. The student could not stand in the midst of his fellow students, during 
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school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity, and claim he was 

not at school.

The District argues Morse establishes that “students cannot 

claim to be beyond the reach of school authorities simply by 

stepping off school property . . . when such conduct occurs during school hours and is intimately connected with the school’s 

educational environment.” Brief for appellants at 25. It claims 

that J.P.’s truck was associated with a school-sponsored event 

because J.P. drove the truck to school, he was attending school 

under Nebraska’s mandatory education law, and the search 

occurred during school hours.

We disagree. J.P.’s driving to school and parking off school 

grounds was not a school-sponsored event, nor was it associated with a school-sponsored event. Morse v. Frederick, supra, 

and Shade v. City of Farmington, Minnesota, supra, described 

school-sponsored events. At those school-sponsored events, the 

school created an environment for students, gave them permission to enter that environment, and took responsibility for their 

safety in that environment.

But under the facts of this case, parking a vehicle off school 

property was not a school-sponsored event. The District did not 

sanction J.P.’s drive to school, give him permission to travel to 

school in his truck, or take responsibility for his safety while 

he drove to school. Driving to school and parking off school 

property is readily distinguishable from the activities in those 

cases in which courts have allowed school officials to search 

off-school premises based upon a school-sponsored activity or 

event. The cases relied upon by the District are distinguishable 

because they all involved school officials exercising control 

of the students during a school-sponsored activity or event.

In contrast, in Com. v. Williams, 749 A.2d 957 (Pa. Super. 

2000), which involved the search of an off-school-grounds 

vehicle, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the search 

was invalid because school officials lacked statutory authority 

to search.

The District argues a school official’s ability to search is 

based on the relationship between the school official and the 

student, rather than the location of the search. But this relationship must be examined under the facts of the case. The relevant 
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conduct (having contraband in the truck) occurred off school 

grounds. And there was no event that would tie J.P.’s conduct 

to a school activity. How or when the contraband was placed 

in the truck is unknown. There was no evidence that the contraband was ever on school property.

[13] On school grounds, school officials have authority to 

regulate and control student conduct. See, § 79-262; State 

v. Best, 403 N.J. Super. 428, 959 A.2d 243 (2008), affirmed

201 N.J. 100, 987 A.2d 605 (2010). They have the authority 

to discipline students for certain conduct occurring on school 

grounds. § 79-267. But school officials are not given express 

or implied authority to search on a public street, at a student’s 

home, or on other premises off school grounds, including an 

off-school-grounds vehicle that is not associated with a schoolsponsored event or activity.

School officials and police officers both enforce order as 

agents of the state. School officials regulate and control student 

conduct on school grounds and at school-sponsored events and 

activities occurring off school grounds. But school officials 

are not given greater authority than police officers to regulate student activity outside the school context. The court in 

Com. v. Williams, supra, refused to expand statutory authority of school officers in a way that would allow such officers 

to gather evidence for police that the police could not gather 

for themselves.

[14] The District urges us to apply an analysis similar to 

the nexus to the school analysis rejected by Williams, arguing it may search an off-school-grounds vehicle because the 

vehicle is sufficiently connected to the school environment. 

We decline to adopt this analysis. Permitting school officials 

to search a student’s vehicle based upon a nexus to the school 

because a student drove the vehicle to school is overly broad 

and would lead to confusing inquiries into whether vehicles 

parked off school grounds were sufficiently connected to 

the school.

The District cannot create the authority to search where 

none is given by statute. Section 79-267 makes a clear distinction between conduct that occurs on school grounds and conduct that occurs off school grounds. The Student Handbook 
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recognizes the distinction between “on school grounds” and 

“off school grounds.” But, these definitions do not extend the 

authority of school officials to search J.P.’s truck parked on 

176th Avenue.

Lack of authority to search off school grounds does not 

leave school officials without a means to deal with student 

conduct off school grounds. Section 79-293 requires the principal or principal’s designee to notify appropriate law enforcement authorities of a student’s conduct or act described in 

§ 79-267 which the principal or designee suspects is a violation of the Nebraska Criminal Code. School officials who 

report an alleged violation are not civilly or criminally liable 

for reporting such conduct unless the report is false or made 

with negligent disregard for the truth or falsity of the report. 

See § 79-293. Succinctly stated, if school officials suspect a 

student’s conduct occurring off school grounds is a violation 

of the Nebraska Criminal Code, they are required to notify the 

appropriate law enforcement authorities.

Grimminger’s personal search of J.P. disclosed no contraband, and no one claimed to have seen J.P. with contraband 

or overheard him talking about possessing or selling drugs. 

School officials had not received a student report or other 

information that J.P. possessed or was distributing contraband. 

The contraband was found in J.P.’s truck, which was not in the 

school environment or under the dominion and control of the 

school. In short, there is no evidence J.P. possessed drugs or 

drug paraphernalia on school grounds.

For the search of J.P.’s truck to be reasonable, the District 

must have authority to conduct the search. The District’s 

authority is based upon the Student Discipline Act, which 

does not authorize the District to search J.P.’s truck off school 

grounds unassociated with a school activity or athletic event.

Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, our recognition 

of this limitation upon the authority of school officials will 

not permit students to “violate important school rules without consequence” or “hide” from school authority, nor will 

it impair the ability of school officials to maintain a safe 

environment. The facts of this case demonstrate the fallacy of 

the dissent’s suggested “parade of horribles.” As the dissent 
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acknowledges, the misconduct at issue was J.P.’s act of leaving and then reentering the school building with another 

student without permission to do so. School officials dealt 

with that conduct by confronting J.P. when he reentered the 

building and determining that he had no contraband on his 

person or in his backpack. At that point, school officials had 

all the information they needed to impose discipline on J.P. 

for his unauthorized absence. And they knew that J.P. was not 

endangering the school environment by bringing contraband 

on campus.

The Legislature has not deputized school officials to act 

beyond the boundaries of their authority. If they still suspected that there was contraband in J.P.’s truck parked off 

campus, despite finding none on his person, they should have 

notified law enforcement authorities, who are trained in the 

principles of when and how to conduct a lawful warrantless 

vehicle search.

And Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 

168 L. Ed. 2d 290 (2007), relied upon by the dissent, has no 

application. In that case, no search took place. At a schoolsponsored event, the student was disciplined for displaying 

a banner promoting drug use. The student could not stand 

in the midst of his fellow students during school hours at a 

school-sanctioned activity and claim he was not subject to 

school rules.

Remedy

The district court ordered that the offenses of possession of 

drug paraphernalia and disruptive behavior be removed from 

J.P.’s record. We review the district court’s decision to determine whether it conforms to the law, is supported by competent 

evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. See Busch v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 261 Neb. 484, 623 

N.W.2d 672 (2001). The search of J.P.’s truck was invalid, and 

therefore, the only question remaining is whether the district 

court’s decision ordering removal of the offenses from J.P.’s 

record was an appropriate remedy.

“The court may . . . reverse or modify the decision [of 

the board] if the substantial rights of the petitioner may have 
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been prejudiced because the board’s decision is . . . [i]n violation of constitutional provisions.” § 79-291(2)(a). The Student 

Discipline Act specifically grants the district court the power to 

reverse the Board’s decision if J.P.’s constitutional rights were 

violated. See Kolesnick v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 251 Neb. 

575, 558 N.W.2d 807 (1997). The district court exercised that 

power and reversed the decision of the Board.

Here, however, the search of J.P.’s truck was unauthorized 

and violated J.P.’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from 

unreasonable searches. J.P. had served his suspension by the 

time the district court issued its ruling. Removing the offenses 

from J.P.’s record was the only meaningful relief the court 

could grant. The court’s decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.

Remaining Arguments

The district court ordered that the suspension for alleged disruptive behavior be removed from J.P.’s record. The disruptive 

behavior charge and suspension were based upon the intervention required by school officials and were not dependent on the 

search of the truck.

[15] The District claims the court erred in reversing the 

suspension upheld by the Board. The District has not argued 

the issue of suspension based upon J.P.’s disruptive behavior 

on appeal. In order to be considered by an appellate court, 

an alleged error must be both specifically assigned and specifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error. 

Bedore v. Ranch Oil Co., 282 Neb. 553, 805 N.W.2d 68 (2011). 

Therefore, we do not consider whether the district court erred 

in ordering the offense of disruptive behavior removed from 

J.P.’s school record.

Based on our resolution of this case, we do not address the 

parties’ remaining assignments of error.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the district court’s 

order which reversed the decision of the Board and ordered the 

suspension and offenses expunged from J.P.’s school record.

Affirmed.
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Heavican, C.J., dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s finding that the 

school district did not have authority to search J.P.’s vehicle, 

which was parked directly adjacent to the school. I would find 

that the school had the statutory authority to discipline J.P., 

that such disciplinary authority included the power to search 

both J.P.’s person and his vehicle, and that the search should 

be measured by the reasonable suspicion standard set out in 

New Jersey v. T. L. O.1 I would remand this cause to the district 

court to determine if the school had reasonable suspicion to 

search J.P.’s vehicle.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On the day of the search at issue, J.P. arrived at school 

around 7:45 a.m. and went to his first class. Afterward, he tried 

to leave the building. Lori Bishop, a hall monitor, saw J.P. 

and a classmate approach the front door. Bishop asked where 

they were going, and the classmate said he had to get a book. 

Bishop allowed the classmate to leave but told J.P. to remain 

in the building.

Later, Dennis Huey, a parking lot security staff member, 

saw J.P. walk from the school building with a female student. 

Huey drove up next to the two students and asked them where 

they were going and why they were outside. They responded 

that they needed to get some things out of J.P.’s vehicle. Huey 

followed them to the vehicle and observed them until they 

reentered the building.

J.P. and the female student returned through the front doors 

of the school at 9:46 a.m., and Bishop asked why they had 

been outside. J.P. took his wallet from his back pocket and said 

he had to go out and get it. The students said Huey had given 

them permission to leave the building. However, when Bishop 

asked Huey whether he gave J.P. permission to leave the building, Huey replied that he had not.

Following these events, a school official searched J.P.’s person and extended the search to his vehicle. The search of the 

vehicle revealed that J.P. had marijuana in his vehicle.

1 New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 

(1985).
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NEW JERSEY v. T. L. O.

The U.S. Supreme Court discussed school-related searches 

in the case of T. L. O.,

2

 in which the Court fashioned the 

standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by 

public school officials. Of course, the Fourth Amendment’s 

prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures generally requires a law enforcement officer to have probable 

cause to conduct a warrantless search without consent.3 But 

in T. L. O., the Court relaxed the Fourth Amendment’s 

search-and-seizure standard for school searches in an effort 

to balance a student’s legitimate privacy interests with the 

substantial need of teachers and administrators to maintain 

order in the schools.4

T. L. O. established a two-part test for determining the 

reasonableness of school searches. First, the search must be 

justified at its inception. Second, the search must be reasonably related in its scope, considering all of the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.5

 The 

Court noted:

Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by 

a teacher or school official will be “justified at its inception” when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting 

that the search will turn up evidence that the student 

has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of 

the school.6

After establishing this school search exception to the Fourth 

Amendment in T. L. O., the Court applied the exception to the 

facts of the case, and ultimately upheld the constitutionality 

of an assistant principal’s search of a female student’s purse 

which took place inside the school building during regular 

school hours.

In T. L. O., the Court did not discuss the boundaries of when 

and where a school official may utilize his or her authority to 

2 Id.

3 State v. Borst, 281 Neb. 217, 795 N.W.2d 262 (2011).

4 T. L. O., supra note 1.

5 Id.

6 Id., 469 U.S. at 341-42.
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conduct searches without a warrant or without having probable 

cause to conduct the search. The Court provided only that the 

reasonableness of such searches should be determined after 

considering all of the circumstances of the search.

The case before this court raises the question of the parameters for the use of this authority by school officials. The 

Nebraska Court of Appeals held in In re Interest of Michael R.7

that pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in T. L. O., 

a school official may search a student’s vehicle parked in 

the school parking lot. But no Nebraska court has addressed 

whether a school official may search a car parked adjacent to 

the school. This case presents that question.

MORSE v. FREDERICK

Relevant to the question presented in this case is the Court’s 

decision in Morse v. Frederick.

8

 Though dealing with the First 

Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme 

Court discussed a school’s authority to discipline students. In 

that case, students at a school-sanctioned and school-supervised 

event displayed a banner stating “‘BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.’”9

The students had been allowed to gather just off campus during 

normal school hours to watch the Olympic Torch Relay. The 

event was sanctioned and supervised by the school. The school 

principal approved the event as a class trip or social event, and 

school district rules stated that district conduct rules applied to 

such events.

The principal interpreted the banner as promoting illegal 

drug use. When she directed the students to take down the 

banner, one of the students who had brought the banner to the 

event refused to do so and was suspended.

The Court held on these facts that students could not claim 

to be beyond the reach of school authorities simply by stepping 

off school property when such conduct occurs during school 

hours and is intimately connected with the school’s educational 

7 In re Interest of Michael R., 11 Neb. App. 903, 662 N.W.2d 632 (2003).

8 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 168 L. Ed. 2d 290 

(2007).

9 Id., 551 U.S. at 397.
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environment.10 The Court concluded that the student in Morse

could not stand in the midst of his fellow students, during 

school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity, and claim he was 

not at school or subject to school rules.11

FEDERAL COURT JURISPRUDENCE: SCHOOL 

SEARCHES AT SCHOOL-SPONSORED 

EVENTS OR ACTIVITIES

Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not specifically 

addressed whether the T. L. O. school search exception to the 

Fourth Amendment is dependent on a school official’s or a 

student’s location, various federal courts have further interpreted T. L. O. to conclude that a school official has authority 

to search a student outside of the traditional boundaries of 

school property.

As the majority acknowledged, the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth 

Circuits, as well as a New York federal district court, have 

recognized that the school search exception to the Fourth 

Amendment is not dependent on the location of a school official or student.12 These courts note that at events such as local 

school-sponsored field trips or school-sponsored out-of-state 

travel, school officials maintain the authority to search students 

pursuant to the reasonable suspicion standard of T. L. O.

During such events, it is incumbent upon school officials 

to watchfully maintain student safety in unstructured environments different from the school buildings.13 At events that 

take place off school campus, but are school sponsored, the 

school remains in control of the students and is responsible 

for the safety of the students during the event.14 Thus, at the 

events described in these cases, the school officials retained 

10 Id.

11 Morse, supra note 8.

12 Shade v. City of Farmington, Minnesota, 309 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2002); 

Hassan v. Lubbock Independent School Dist., 55 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 

1995); Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151 (6th Cir. 1987); Rhodes v. 

Guarricino, 54 F. Supp. 2d 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).

13 Webb, supra note 12.

14 Shade, supra note 12.
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their authority to search students because they maintained their 

authority to discipline and protect the students.

STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO SEARCH 

STUDENTS IN NEBRASKA

Implicit within the school search exception to the Fourth 

Amendment that requires only reasonable suspicion for the 

search of students is that school officials have the authority to 

conduct the search. The majority correctly analyzed where this 

authority comes from in Nebraska. Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 79-267 (Cum. Supp. 2012), the Legislature circumscribed 

a school district’s jurisdiction to discipline students. Section 

79-267 describes student conduct that

shall constitute grounds for long-term suspension, expulsion, or mandatory reassignment, subject to the procedural provisions of the Student Discipline Act, when such 

activity occurs on school grounds, in a vehicle owned, 

leased, or contracted by a school being used for a school 

purpose or in a vehicle being driven for a school purpose 

by a school employee or by his or her designee, or at a 

school-sponsored activity or athletic event.

Thus, a school district may discipline students for conduct 

occurring (1) on school property, (2) at a school-sponsored 

activity or athletic event, or (3) in a vehicle owned or used by 

the school for a school purpose.15 School officials are given no 

specific statutory authorization to conduct searches under this 

statutory scheme. Rather, such authorization is understood to 

be granted pursuant to the provisions of the Student Discipline 

Act, which provides school officials with the authority to discipline students.16

APPLICATION OF § 79-267 

TO THIS CASE

The majority found that the conduct in this case did not 

occur “on school property” and that thus, the school did not 

have the authority to search J.P.’s vehicle. It alternatively found 

15 § 79-267.

16 Id.
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that the conduct did not occur “at a school-sponsored activity” wherein the school was exercising control of J.P. Thus, 

the majority found inapplicable federal case law jurisprudence 

extending school officials’ authority to search students at offcampus, school-sponsored activities.

I disagree with the majority’s conclusions and instead find 

that this is both a school property and a school activity case 

and that the school had authority to search J.P.’s vehicle. Most 

of the pertinent suspicious activity in this case occurred on 

school property. During regular school hours, students at the 

high school do not have permission to leave the school. The 

“Millard West High School 2010-2011 Student Handbook” 

provides, under the “Attendance Procedures” section at page 

6, as follows:

Students Leaving the Building During the School Day

Any student leaving the building during the school 

day must be in possession of an authorized pass issued 

by the attendance office. Students will exit through the 

front door and display the pass for a security staff person 

when leaving.

Any student choosing to leave the building without a 

pass from the attendance office will be subject to disciplinary action.

Here, while on school property during regular school hours, 

J.P. lied to school officials on multiple occasions and J.P. exited 

the school without authorization and reentered the school on 

two separate occasions. During all relevant and material times, 

the school maintained control over J.P. As J.P. exited the school 

without authorization to access his vehicle and then returned 

to the school, the school was responsible for J.P.’s safety and 

maintained the ability to discipline J.P. This is so because J.P.’s 

conduct occurred at the ultimate school-sponsored activity—

attending school during regular school hours.

The school’s responsibility for J.P. was the same as if he 

was at a school-sponsored activity or event held off campus.17

Also, at all times during the suspicious conduct of this case, 

17 See cases cited supra note 12.
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the school remained not only in control of J.P. but also the rest 

of the student population affected by his conduct.18

This reading of the statute is compatible with the balanced 

approach to student discipline set out in T. L. O. and the federal case law jurisprudence allowing searches of students off 

school property while students remain under the protection 

and disciplinary authority of school officials. Moreover, as 

J.P.’s conduct occurred during school hours and was intimately 

connected with the school’s educational environment, it is 

logical to conclude the school maintained its authority to discipline J.P. during his conduct.19

Although we think of school-sponsored activities as being 

basketball games, speech contests, or field trips held off 

school grounds, it is not a strained reading of § 79-267 to suggest that the classes and activities occurring during a regular 

school day are “school-sponsored activit[ies].” The majority’s suggestion that “J.P.’s driving to school and parking off 

school grounds was not a school-sponsored event, nor was it 

associated with a school-sponsored event,” ignores the obvious. Although it is true that J.P. drove the vehicle to school 

and parked it off school grounds, this is not the activity which 

placed J.P. under the school’s control, protection, and authority. The activities of emphasis here are (1) J.P.’s act of exiting the school without permission, (2) J.P.’s decision to bring 

another student to his vehicle, and (3) J.P.’s reentrance into 

the school. It is undeniable that J.P.’s conduct occurred during 

regular school hours and was subject to the rules of regular 

school day attendance and that J.P. associated his vehicle with 

his conduct.

When considering the school’s authority to search vehicles 

parked in the school parking lot versus vehicles parked off 

campus, location may be a determinative factor regarding student’s privacy rights.20 In this case, however, J.P. associated 

his vehicle with his unauthorized exit and reentrance into the 

18 Id.

19 Morse, supra note 8.

20 See, e.g., State v. Crystal B., 130 N.M. 336, 24 P.3d 771 (N.M. App. 

2000); Com. v. Williams, 749 A.2d 957 (Pa. Super. 2000).
Nebraska Advance Sheets

J.P. v. MILLARD PUBLIC SCHOOLS 919

Cite as 285 Neb. 890

school. In turn, J.P. changed the status of privacy rights he 

had in his off-campus vehicle by associating it with a schoolsponsored activity. As such, the fact that J.P.’s vehicle was 

parked adjacent to the school, rather than in the parking lot, is 

not the material factor in determining whether the school had 

authority to search the vehicle.

As the suspect conduct in this case occurred both on school 

property and at a school-sponsored activity, I would find that 

the school had authority to regulate and control J.P.’s conduct 

and to discipline J.P for such conduct. Thus, the school had 

authority to search J.P. and J.P.’s vehicle, which vehicle was 

inherently associated with J.P.’s conduct of exiting and reentering the school building without permission.

PUBLIC POLICY

It is a fundamental understanding and expectation of parents 

and citizens that schools will provide a safe environment for 

students to learn and develop into productive adults. In today’s 

world, that especially means that parents and citizens expect 

schools will be drug free and gun-violence free. The School 

Disciplinary Act includes specific references of the duties of 

schools in regard to guns and in regard to providing a safe 

environment for students.21

The majority’s opinion allows students to violate important 

school rules without consequence. It permits students to hide 

from authority simply by parking their vehicles across the 

street. And finally, the majority opinion lessens school officials’ ability to provide students with a safe, structured environment during regular school hours.

CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, I would remand this cause to 

the district court to measure the search of J.P.’s vehicle using 

the reasonable suspicion standard set out in T. L. O.22

21 §§ 79-262 and 79-263.

22 T. L. O., supra note 1.