NUREG-0654 

FEMA-REP-1 

Rev. 1 

Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of 

Radiological Emergency Response Plans and 

Preparedness in Support of 

Nuclear Power Plants 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission 

Federal Emergency Management 

Agency 
Available from 

GPO Sales Program Division of Technical Information and Document Control 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, D.C. 20555 

and 

National Technical Information Service 

Springfield, Virginia 22161 
Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of 

Radiological Emergency Response Plans and 

Prepareaness in Support of 

Nuclear Power Plants 

Manuscript Completed: October 1980 

Date Published: November 1980 

NUREG-0654 

FEMA-REP-1 

Rev.1 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, D.C. 20556 

Federal Emergency Managtment Agency 

Washington D.C. 20472 
FOREWORD 

The purpose of this guidance and upgraded acceptance criteria is to provide 

a basis for NRC licensees, State and local governments to develop radiological 

emergency plans and improve emergency preparedness. The guidance is the 

product of the joint FEMA/NRC Steering Committee established to coordinate 

the agencies• work in emergency preparedness associated with nuclear power 

plants. The interim version of this document was published in January 1980, 

and subjected to public comment under Federal Register Notice 44 FR 9768 of 

February 13, 1980. Based upon the comments received, meetings with the 

Interorganizational Advisory Committee {made up of State and local representatives) and later at a September 1980 Workshop sponsored by FEMA for State 

officials, the final version was prepared for publication. The principal 

changes in the document consist of clarification of intent and accommodation 

of many of the unique situations which arise in State/local/utility interfaces. 

Therefore, plans prepared using the interim guidance should not require 

substantial revision. This document is consistent with NRC and FEMA regulations 

and supersedes other previous guidance and criteria published by FEMA and NRC 

on this subject. It will be used by reviewers in determining the adequacy of 

State, local and nuclear power plant licensee emergency plans and preparedness. 

October 1980 

Brian K. Grimes, Pro am Director 

Emergency Preparedness Program Office 

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 

u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Co-Chairmen 

of the 

FEMA/NRC Steering Committee 

i 
Co-Chairmen: 

FEMA/NRC STEERING COMMITTEE 

September, 1980 

Brian K. Grimes 

John w. McConnell 

NRC 

FEMA 

H. E. Collins 

K. Perkins 

s. Schwartz 

J. Sni ezek 

J. Thomas 

s. Wengrovitz 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 

NRC 

NRC 

FEMA (detailed from NRC) 

NRC 

FEMA 

FEMA 

The Steering Committee acknowledges with thanks the contributions of the 

Interorganizational Advisory Committee on Radiological Emergency Planning 

and Preparedness (IOAC) of the Conference of (State) Radiation Control 

Program Directors. Members of this Committee also include representatives 

of the National Emergency Management Association and the u. s. Civil Defense 

Council. The Steering Committee also acknowledges with thanks the contributions 

made by other Federal agencies, State and local governmental organizations, 

members of the public, and the nuclear industry. 

i i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. Introduction 

A. Purpose 

B. Background 

c. Scope D. Planning Basis 

E. Contiguous - Jurisdiction Governmental Emergency Planning 

F. Integrated Guidance and Criteria 

G. Funding and Technical Assistance 

H. Nuclear Facility Operator Response Organization 

I. Federal Response J. Form and Content of Plans 

II. Planning Standards and Evaluation Criteria 

A. Assignment of Responsibility (Organization Control) 

B. Onsite Emergency Organization C. Emergency Response Support and Resources 

D. Emergency Classification System 

E. Notification Methods and Procedures 

F. Emergency Communications 

G. Public Education and Information 

H. Emergency Facility and Equipment 

I. Accident Assessment 

J. Protective Response 

K. Radiological Exposure Control 

L. Medical and Public Health Support M. Recovery and Reentry Planning and Post-accident 

Operations N. Exercises and Drills 

0. Radiological Emergency Response Training 

P. Responsibility for the Planning Effort: Development, Periodic Review and Distribution of Emergency Plans 

Appendices 

1. Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear 

Power Plants 

2. Meteorological Criteria for Emergency Preparedness 

at Operating Nuclear Power Plants 

3. Means for Providing Prompt Alerting and Notification 

of Response Organizations and the Population 

4. Evacuation Time Estimates Within the Plume Exposure Emergency Planning Zone 

5. Glossary 

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u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Federal Emergency Management Agency 

CRITERIA FOR PREPARATION AND EVALUATION OF 

RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS 

IN SUPPORT OF 

NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 

I. INTRODUCTION 

A. Purpose 

The purpose of this document is to provide a common reference and 

guidance source for: 

1. State and local governments and nuclear facility operators in 

the develoment of radiological emergency response plans and 

preparedness in support of nuclear power plants. 

2. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC), and other Federal agency personnel engaged 

in the review of State, local government and licensee plans 

and preparedness. 

3. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission and other Federal agencies in the development of the 

National Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan. 

B. Background 

The NRC and FEMA staff have prepared this document as part of their 

responsibiliti_s under the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, and the 

President's Statement of December 7, 1979, with the accompa~ing 
- 2 -

B. Background (continued) 

Fact Sheet. These responsibilities include development and promulgation of guidance to nuclear facility operators, States and 

local governments, in cooperation with other Federal agencies, for 

the preparation of radiological emergency response plans and 

assessing the adequacy of such plans. 1/ 

This guidance is classified as final guidance. The interim version 

of this guidance, published in January, 1980, was commented upon by 

interested parties during the formal public comment period solicited 

by the Federal Register Notice 44 FR 9768 of February 13, 1980. 

Additionally, comments received on 11Draft Emergency Action Level 

Guidelines", (September 1979), NUREG-0610 solicited by Federal 

Register Notice 44 FR 55446 of September 26, 1979 were also considered 

in the revision to Appendix 1 of the criteria document. A separate 

document has been prepared by NRC and FEMA which lists the comments 

received and which indicates the NRC and FEMA response to these 

comments. FEMA, NRC, and other involved Federal agencies intend 

to use the guidance contained in this document in their individual 

and joint reviews of State and local government radiological emergency 

response plans and preparedness, and of the plans and preparedness of 

NRC facility licensees. The NRC Final Rule on Emergency Planning 

1/ In light of the President's Statement of December 7, 1979, the agency responsibilities assigned on January 24, 1973 by the Office of Emergency Preparedness, (and later reassigned on December 24, 1975 by the Federal 

Preparedness Agency/GSA) are being revised and will be promulgated in the 

near future by FEMA. 
- 3 -

B. Background (continued) 

(45 FR 55402) of August 19, 1980 has an effective date of November 3, 

1980. This document is supportive of the NRC Final Rule and is 

referenced therein. This document is also supportive of the proposed 

FEMA Rule concerning the review and approval of State and local 

radiological emergency plans and preparedness, which at this writing 

is in the process of revision as a result of comments received during 

the public comment period. 

NRC has now established a schedule for the implementation of the 

"Minimum Staffing Requirements for NRC Licensees for Nuclear Power 

Plant Emergencies" set forth in Table B-1, (see II.B.5), and for 

Appendix 2, "Meteorological Criteria for Emergency Preparedness 

at Operating Nuclear Power Plants" (see Annex to Appendix 2). 

C. Scope 

This document is concerned with accidents at fixed commercial nuclear 

power reactors which might have impact on public health and safety. 2/ 

2/ Many of the planning elements contained in this guide may be useful for 

planners in the vicinity of test and research reactors, fuel processing plants, or other facilities using or producing large quantities of radioactive material. None of the numerical values in this document need be 

used for planning at such facilities. Similarly, while some planning 

elements presented here may apply to transportation accidents involving radioactive material, such accidents have unique characteristics which 

warrant separate guidance. These accidents are not specifically covered 

in this document and will be the subject of future guidance. 
- 4-

c. Scope (continued) 

The guidance intended for use by NRC licensees and operators of 

commercial nuclear power reactors is based upon several existing 

documents familiar to such operators: first, NRC Regulatory Guide 

1.101 (March 1977); second, NRC's letters of October.lO, 1979 and 

November 29, 1979 to its power reactor licensees; third, NRC's · 

final rule including the revised Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 

fourth, NRC's NUREG-0610, "Draft Emergency Action Level Guidelines 

for N~clear Power Plants," September 1979, the revised version· of 

which is Appendix 1 to this document. 

The guidance intended for use by State and local governments has 

been drawn in large part from existing documents alreaqy familiar 

to planners: first, the NRC Guide and Checklist for the Development 

and Evaluation of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency 

Response Plans in Support of Fixed Nuclear Facilities, NUREG 75/111 

(1974) and its Supplement No. 1 (March 1977); and second, guidance 

on the planning basis contained in the Report of the NRC/EPA Task 

Force on Emergency Planning, NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016 (December 

1978). The Guide and .Checklist, its supplement and the NRC/EPA 

Task Force Report, were subjected to very broad State and local 

government reviews prior to publication, in both draft and final 

form. NRC specifically endorsed the guidance contained in each 

of these documents. NRC's formal policy statement on the Emergency 
- 5 -

c. Scope (continued) 

Planning Zone concept was published in the Federal Register of 

October 23, 1979, (44 FR 61123). EPA's endorsement of the Emergency 

Planning Zone concept was published in the Federal Register of 

Januar,y 15, 1980 (45 FR 2893). This document supersedes NUREG 75/111 

and Regulatory Guide 1.101. As in the January, 1980 version of this 

document, FEMA formally endorses this guidance concerning Emergency 

Planning Zones and urges its immediate use by States ana local governments 

and by NRC licensed nuclear power plant operators. Also included in this 

document are some obvious lessons learned during and after the accident 

at Three Mile Island. The criteria put added emphasis on the following 

elements: Notification Methods and Procedures, Emergency Communications, 

Public Education and Information, Emergency Facilities and Equipment, 

Accident Assessment, and Exercises and Drills. FEMA and NRC regard all 

of the planning standards identified and contained herein as essential 

for an adequate radiological emergency plan. 

D. Planning Basis 

1. Background 

The NRC/EPA Task Force Report on Emergency Planning, 11 Planning Basis 

for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological 

Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power 

Plants, NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-01611 provides a planning basis 
- 6 -

D. Planning Basis (continued) 

for offsite emergency preparedness efforts considered necessary 

and prudent for large power reactor facilities. The NRC's policy 

statement of October 23, 1979 (44 FR 61123), directs the NRC staff 

to incorporate the guidance in the report into emergency preparedness 

documents. Additionally, the guidance in the NRC/EPA Task Force 

Report on Emergency Planning is now reflected in the NRC Final 

Rule on Emergency Planning. FEMA has also concluded that the 

guidance in NUREG-0396 should be used as the planning basis for 

emergency preparedness around nuclear power facilities. 

The overall objective of emergency response plans is to provide 

dose savings (and in some cases immediate life saving) for a 

spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doses in excess 

of Protective Action Guides (PAGs). 3/,4/ No single specific 

accident sequence should be isolated as the one for which to 

plan because each accident could have different consequences, 

both in nature and degree. Further, the range of possible 

selection for a planning basis is very large, starti~g with 

a zero point of requiring no planning at all because significant 

offsite radiological accident consequences are unlikely to occur, 

31 Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear 

Incidents, EPA-520/l-75-001, September 1975, U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency. 

41 Accidental Radioactive Contamination of Human Food and Animal Feeds, U. S. 

Department of Health, Education and Welfare (now U. s. Department of Health 

and Human Services), 43 FR 58790 of December 15, 1978. 
- 7 -

D. Planning Basis (continued) 

to planning for the worst possible accident, regardless of 

its extremely low likelihood. The NRC/EPA Task Force did 

not attempt to define a single accident sequence or even a 

limited number of sequences. Rather, it identified the bounds 

of the parameters for which planning is recommended, based 

upon knowledge of the potential consequences, timing, and 

release characteristics of a spectrum of accidents. Although 

the selected planning basis is independent of specific 

accident sequences, a number of accident descriptions were 

considered in the development of the guidance, including 

the core melt accident release categories of the Reactor 

Safety Study. 

The most important guidance in the Report for planning officials 

is the definition of the area over which planning for predetermined 

actions should be carried out. 

Information on the time frames of accidents is also important. 

The time between the initial recognition at the nuclear facility 

that a serious accident is in progress and the beginning of the 

radioactive release to the surrounding environment is critical 

in determining the type of protective actions which are feasible. 

Knowledge of the potential duration of release and the time 
- 8 -

D. Planning Basis {continued) 

available before exposures are expected several miles offsite 

is important in determining what specific instructions can be 

given to the public. 

A knowledge of kinds of radioactive materials potentially 

released is necessary to decide the characteristics of 

monitoring instrumentation, to develop tools for estimating 

projected doses, and to identify the most important exposure 

pathways. 

The need for specification of areas for the major exposure 

pathways is evident. The location of the population for whom 

protective measures may be needed, responsible authorities 

who would carry out protective actions and the means of 

communication to these authorities and to the population are 

all dependent on the characteristics of the planning areas. 

Emergency preparedness should be related to two predominant 

exposure pathways. They are: 

a. Plume exposure pathway -- The principal exposure sources 

from this pathway are: (a) whole body external exposure 

to gamma radiation from the plume and from deposited 

material; and (b) inhalation exposure from the passing 

radioactive plume. The duration of the release leading 

to potential exposure could range from one-half hour to 
- 9 -

D. Planning Basis (continued) 

days. For the plume exposure pathway, shelter and/or 

evacuation would likely be the principal immediate 

protective actions to be recommended for the general 

public. When evacuation is chosen as the preferred 

protective measure, initial evacuation of a 360° area 

around the facility is desirable out to a distance of 

about two to five miles although initial efforts would, 

of course, be in the general downwind direction. This 

concept is indicated in Figure 1. The precise boundaries 

of such evacuations and sectors evacuated at extended 

downwind distances would be largely determined by political 

boundaries and would not fit the precise pattern of Figure 1. 

The possible administration of the thyroid blocking agent, 

potassium iodide, should also be considered.5/ The u. s. 

Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is preparing 

guidance on the potassium iodide issue which will be 

considered by NRC and FEMA. The ability to best reduce 

potential exposure under the specific conditions during 

the course of an accident should determine the appropriate 

response. 

b. Ingestion exposure pathway -- The principal exposure from 

this pathway would be from ingestion of contaminated water 

or foods such as milk, fresh vegetables or aquatic foodstuffs. 

5/ Potassium Iodide as a Thyroid-Blocking Age~t in a Radiation Emergency, 

u. s. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (now u. s. Department of Health and Human Services), 43 FR 58798 of December 15, 1978. 
- 10 -

D. Planning Jasis (continued) 

The duration of potential exposure could range in length 

from hours to months. For the ingestion exposure pathw~, 

the planning effort involves the identification of major 

exposure pathw~s from contaminated food and water and the 

associated control and interdiction points and methods. 

The ingestion pathw~ exposures in general would represent 

a longer term problem, although some early protective actions 

to minimize subsequent contamination of milk or other supplies 

should be initiated (e.g., remove cows from pasture and put 

them on stored feed). 

Separate guidance is provided for these two exposure pathw~s, 

although emergency plans for a particular site will include 

elements common to assessing or taking protective actions for 

both pathw~s. 

2. Emergency Planning Zones 

With regard to the area over which planning efforts should be 

carried out, "Emergency Planning Zones" (EPZs) about each nuclear 

facility must be defined both for the short term "plume exposure 

pathway" and for the longer term "ingestion exposure pathw~s." 

The Emergency Planning Zone concept is illustrated in Figure 1. 

EPZs are defined as the areas for which planning is needed to 

assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect 

the public in the event of an accident. The criteria in NUREG0396 are to be applied by the response organizations in these 
- 11 -

D. Planning Basis {continued) 

zones as applicable. The NRC/EPA Task Force Report on Emergency 

Planning {NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016) anticipates that State, 

rather than local, response organizations will be principally 

responsible for the planning associated with the ingestion 

exposure pathway. 

The choice of the size of the Emergency Planning Zones 

represents a judgment on the extent of detailed planning which 

must be performed to assure an adequate response base. In a 

particular emergency, protective actions might well be restricted 

to a small part of the planning zones. On the other hand, for 

the worst possible accidents, protective actions would need to 

be taken outside the planning zones. 

The Task Force selected a radius of about 10 miles for the plume 

exposure pathway and a radius of about 50 miles for the ingestion 

exposure pathway, as shown in Figure 1 and in Table l. 6

1 

Although the radius for the EPZ implies a circular area, the 

actual shape would depend upon the characteristics of a particular 

site. 

6/ These radii are applicable to light water nuclear power plants, rated 

at 250 MWt or greater. The FEMA/NRC Steering Committee has concluded 

that small water cooled power reactors {less than 250 MWt) and the 

Fort St. Vrain gas cooled reactor may use a plume exposure emergency planning zone of about 5 miles in radius and an ingestion pathway 

emergency planning zone of about 30 miles in radius. In addition, 

the requirements for the alerting and notification system {Appendix 3) 

will be scaled on a case-by-case basis. This conclusion is based on 

the lower potential hazard from these facilities {lower radionuclide 

inventory and longer times to release significant amounts of activit~ 

for many accident scenarios). The radionuclides considered in plann1ng should be the same as recommended in NUREG-0396/EPA-520/l-78-016. 
- 12 -

D. Planning Basis (continued) 

The size (about 10 miles radius) of the plume exposure EPZ was 

based primarily on the following considerations: 

a. projected doses from the traditional design basis 

accidents would not exceed Protective Action Guide 

levels outside the zone; 

b. projected doses from most core melt sequences would not 

exceed Protective Action Guide levels outside the zone; 

c. for the worst core melt sequences, immediate life threatening 

doses would generally not occur outside the zone; 

d. detailed planning within 10 miles would provide a 

substantial base for expansion of response efforts 

in the event that this proved necessary. 

The NRC/EPA Task Force concluded that it would be unlikely that 

any protective actions for the plume exposure pathway would be 

required beyond the plume exposure EPZ. Also, the plume exposure 

EPZ is of sufficient size for actions within this zone to provide 

for substantial reduction in early severe health effects (injuries 

or deaths) in the event of a worst case core melt accident. 

The size of the ingestion exposure EPZ (about 50 miles in radius, 

which also includes the 10-mile radius plume exposure EPZ) was 

selected because: 
- 13 -

D. Planning Basis (continued) 

a. the downwind range within which contamination will 

generally not exceed the Protective Action Guides 

is limited to about 50 miles from a power plant because 

of wind shifts during the release and travel periods; 

b. there may be conversion of atmospheric iodine (i.e., 

iodine suspended in the atmosphere for long time periods) 

to chemical forms which do not readily enter the ingestion 

pathway; 

c. much of any particulate material in a radioactive plume 

would have been deposited on the ground within about 50 

miles from the facility; and 

d. the likelihood of exceeding ingestion pathway protective 

action guide levels at 50 miles is comparable to the 

likelihood of exceeding plume exposure pathway protective 

action guide levels at 10 miles. 

3. Time Factors Associated with Releases 

The range of times between the onset of accident conditions and 

the start of a major release is of the order of one-half hour to 

several hours. The subsequent time period over which radioactive 

material may be expected to be released is of the order of one-half 

hour (short-term release) to a few days (continuous release). 

Table 2 summarizes the guidance on the time of the release, which 
- 14 -

D. Planning Basis (continued) 

has been used in developing the criteria for notification capabilities 

in Part II. (Other reasons for requiring prompt notification capabilities include faster moderate releases for which protective actions 

are desirable and the need for substantial lead times to carry out 

certain protective measures, such as evacuation, when this is indicated 

by plant conditions.) 

4. Radiological Characteristics of Releases 

Planners will need information on the characteristics of potential 

radioactivity releases in order to specify the characteristics of 

monitoring instrumentation, 71 develop decisional aids to e~timate 

projected doses, and identify critical exposure modes. 

For atmospheric releases from nuclear power facilities, three 

dominant exposure modes have been identified: (a) whole boqy 

(bone marrow) exposure from external gamma radiation and from 

ingestion of radioactive material; (b) thyroid exposure from 

inhalation or ingestion of radioiodines; and (c) exposure of 

other organs (e.g., lung) from inhalation or ingestion of 

radioactive materials. Any of these exposure modes could 

dominate (i.e., result in the largest exposures) depending 

upon the relative quantities of various isotopes released. 

71 An interagency Task Force on Emergency Instrumentation (offsite) is now 

preparing guidance on offsite radiation measurement systems, accident 

assessment techniques, and the type and quantity of instruments needed 

for the various exposure pathways. Federal agencies represented on the 

Instrumentation Task Force include FEMA, NRC, EPA, HEW, and DOE. 
- I~ -

D. Planning Basis (continued) 

Radioactive materials produced in the operation of nuclear reactors 

include fission products, transuranics and activation products 

generated by neutron exposure of the structural and other 

materials within and immediately around the reactor core. The 

fission products consist of a very large number of different 

kinds of isotopes (nuclides), almost all of which are initially 

radioactive. The amounts of these fission products and their 

potential for escape from their normal places of confinement 

represent the dominant potential for consequences to the public. 

Radioactive fission products exist in a variety of physical and 

chemical forms of varied volatility. Virtually all activation 

products and transuranics exist as non-volatile solids. The 

characteristics of these materials show quite clearly that the 

potential for releases to the environment decreases dramatically 

in this order: (a) gaseous materials; (b) volatile solids, and 

(c) non-volatile solids. For this reason, guidance for source 

terms representing hypothetical fission product activity within 

a nuclear power plant containment structure emphasizes the 

development of plans relating to the release of noble gases 

and/or volatiles such as iodine. Consideration of particulate 

materials, however, should not be completely neglected. For 

example, capability to determine the presence or absence of key 

particulate radionuclides will be needed to identify requirements 

for additional resources. Table 3 provides a list of dominant 

radionuclides for each exposure pathway. 
CV PLANNING ZONE 

t,RGEN ---- ~;,z:.NGESTIONI --...,~ tiOMI. "-......._ 

(80KMl '-. 

I 

I 

I 

I 

.. 

\ 

\ 

~' 

ftgure 1 Concept of Emergency Planning Zones 

PLUME 

TRAVEL 

DIRECTION 

EXAMPLE RESPONSE 

AREA FOR THE 

PLUME EXPOSURE 

PATHWAY. 

THE RESPONSE 

AREA FOR THE 

INGESTION EXPOSURE 

PATHWAY WOULD 

HAVE THE SAME 

RELATIVE SHAPE 

BUT WOULD BE 

LARGER. 

TRANSPORT OF 

MILK TO DAIRY 

PROCESSING CENTER 

• INDICATES VARIABLE 

RESPONSE BOUNDARY. 
- 17 -

TABLE 1 

GUIDANCE ON SIZE OF THE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE 

Accident Phase 

Plume Exposure Pathway 

Ingestion Pathway 

Critical Organ and 

Exposure Pathway 

Whole Boqy (external) 

Thyroid (inhalation) 

Other organs (inhalation) 

Thyroid, whole boqy, bone marrow (ingestion) 

EPZ Radius 

about 10 mile radius* 

about 50 mile radius** 

* Judgment should be used in adopting this distance based upon considerations 

of local conditions such as demography, topographY, land characteristics, 

access routes, and local jurisdictional boundaries. 

**Processing plants for milk produced within the EPZ should be included in 

emergency response plans regardless of their location. 

0 

TABLE 2 

GUIDANCE ON INITIATION AND DURATION OF RELEASE 

Time from the initiating event to start 

of atmospheric release 

Time period over which radioactive material 

may be continuously released 

Time at which major portion of release 

may occur 

Travel time for release to exposure point (time after release) 

0.5 hours to one day 

0.5 hours to several days 

0.5 hours to 1 day after 

start of release 

5 miles -- 0.5 to 2 hours 

10 miles - 1 to 4 hours 
Table 3 

RADIONUCLIDES WITH SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO DOMINANT EXPOSURE MODES 

Radionuc1ides with Significant 

Contribution to Thyroid Exposure 

Half Life 

Radionuclide (dals) 

I-131 8.05 

I-132 0.0958 

I-133 0.875 

I-134 0.0366 

I-135 0.280 

Te-132 3.25 

Radionuclides with Significant 

Contribution to Whole Body Exposure 

Half life 

Radionuc1ide (dals) 

I-131 8.05 

Te-132 3.25 

Xe-133 5.28 

I-133 0.875 

Xe-135 0.384 

I-135 0.280 

Cs-134 750 

Kr-88 0.117 

Cs-137 11 sOOO 

Radionuclides with Significant 

Contribution to Lung Exposure* 

(Lung only controlling when 

thyroid dose is reduced by iodir.~ 

blocking or there is a long delay 

2rior to releases). 

Half life 

Radionuclide (days) 

I-131 8.05 

I-132 0.0958 

I-133 0.875 

I-134 0.0366 

I-135 0.280 

Cs-134 750 

Kr-88 0.117 

Cs-137 11,000 

Ru-106 365 

Te-132 3.25 

Ce-144 284 

*Derived from the more probable Reactor Safety Study core melt categories and from postulated design basis 

accident releases. 

__, 

()) 
- 19 -

E. Contiguous-Jurisdiction Governmental Emergency Planning 

The concept of Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) necessarily implies 

mutually supportive emergency planning and preparedness arrangements 

by several levels of government: Federal, State and local governments, 

including counties, townships and even villages. For the purposes 

of this document, it is not necessary to outline the varied governmental 

and jurisdictional situations that can and do exist throughout the 

United States, nor is it necessary to describe in detail the varied 

emergency planning and preparedness mechanisms that can be developed 

among these governmental entities. 

It would be useful to offer several generally representative governmental-jurisdictional situations relating to the Emergency Planning 

Zone concept. There are obvious permutations and combinations of 

these situations, but these are examples of what is desirable in 

terms of cross-jurisdictional emergency planning. The important point 

is that integrated emergency planning will benefit all of the 

communities within the Emergency Planning Zones. 

Example No. 1 Local Government Jurisdictions Within the Plume 

Exposure Pathway (lO miles) Emergency Planning Zone 

A variety of local government jurisdictions may be found 

within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway Emergency 

Planning Zone (EPZ). In some situations several 

county-level governments and municipal or township 
- 20 -

E. Contiguous-Jurisdiction Governmental Emergency Planning (continued) 

governments will have jurisdictional authority within 

the EPZ and these separate governmental entities 

will control their own emergency response organizations 

and resources. In multi-jurisdictional situations 

like this, an integrated multi-county level emergency 

response plan is preferable. The response organizations and resources of municipal or township governments 

can be integrated -- by mutual agreement -- into the 

overall multi-county emergency response plan. 

In other situations, a municipal or township government 

might have a larger emergency response organization 

than its parent county. Under these circumstances, the 

municipality or township government might be mutually 

designated the 11 lead 11 emergency planning and response 

organization, incorporating the resources available to 

the county in the overall emergency plan. 

Local government plans and response mechanisms are 

particularly important for the 10-mile EPZ. This is 

because relatively shorter times may be available to 

implement immediate protective measures associated 

with the plume exposure pathway (sheltering, thyroid 

blocking, evacuation), as opposed to the generally 
- 21 -

E. Contiguous-Jurisdiction Governmental Emergency Planning (continued) 

longer times available for implementing protective 

measures for the ingestion exposure pathway. State 

government resources may be too far away from the 

involved local jurisdictions to be of much immediate 

help for a plume exposure problem in the early hours 

of an accident. Local government emergency plans 

should be made a part of the State emergency plan. 

Example No. 2 

Example No. 3 

Local Government Within the Plume Exposure Pathway (10-mile) Emergency Planning Zone Whose Boundaries 

Are Also a State Boundary 

This situation will normally be found where the nuclear 

facility is situated on a river which forms a boundary 

between States and local governments. In this case, the 

fact that a State boundary is now involved within the 

EPZ makes it necessary to have contiguous State emergency 

planning within the EPZ, involving cooperative planning 

at a higher level of government. This should not 

preclude cooperative planning between adjacent counties, 

municipalities or townships located in different States. 

State vs. Local Government EmerTency Planning Within 

the Ingestion Exposure Pathway 50-mile) Emergency Planning Zone 

The 50-mile EPZ for the ingestion (agricultural products 

consumption) exposure pathway may encompass one or 
- 22 -

E. Contiguous-Jurisdiction Governmental Emergency Planning (continued) 

several States, as well as many local government, 

municipal or township jurisdictions. Planning for 

the implementing of protective measures associated 

with the ingestion exposure pathway is best handled 

by the State governments, with support from local 

governments, particularly at the county level, with 

backup from the Federal Government. This is because 

the involved areas could be quite large, crossing many 

jurisdictional boundaries and involving the use of 

relatively sophisticated radiological analysis 

equipment generally found only at State and Federal 

Government levels. Further, the time available to 

implement protective measures associated with the 

ingestion exposure pathway is generally greater 

than the time available to implement protective 

measures associated with the plume exposure pathway. 

The State, with support from the Federal Government, 

should be able to respond quickly enough to implement 

any desirable protective measures for the ingestion 

exposure pathway. 
- 23 -

E. Contiguous-Jurisdiction Governmental Emergency Planning (continued) 

Example No. 4 State and Local Government Jurisdictions Near An 

Internat1onal Boundary 

At present, the only U. S. situations involving 

emergency planning considerations across an international boundary involve Canada. Both the U. S. 

and Canada have nuclear facilities near their common 

borders. Mutual emergency planning with Canada is 

desirable and the NRC and FE~~ are pursuing this 

matter through appropriate channels. 

F. Integrated Guidance and Criteria 

NRC and FEMA have deliberately consolidated in this document guidance 

intended for use by State and local governments and that intended to 

guide the emergency planning and preparedness activities of NRC licensees 

because of a shared belief that an integrated approach to the development 

of response plans to radiological hazards is most likely to provide the 

best protection of the health and safety of the public. NRC and 

FEMA recognize that plans of licensees, State and local governments 

should not be developed in a vacuum or in isolation from one 

another. Should an accident occur, the public can be best protected 

when the response by all parties is fully integrated. Each party 

involved must have a clear understanding of what the overall level 

of preparedness must be and what role it will play in the event of 
- 24 -

F. Integrated Guidance and Criteria (continued) 

a nuclear accident. This understanding can be achieved best if 

there is an integrated development and evaluation of plans. There 

must also be an acceptance by the parties and a clear recognition 

of the responsibility they share for safeguarding public health 

and safety. 

Although the guidance indicates that the criteria are appliable to 

one or more specific organizations, the intention throughout has been 

to provide for an adequate state of emergency preparedness around 

the facility. If weaknesses in one organization are identified, but 

compensated for in another organization, the reviewers can still find 

that an adequate state of emergency preparedness exists. 

This consolidated guidance should also allow the parties to recognize 

and understand each other•s capabilities, responsibilities and 

obligations. The guidance makes cle~r which party has responsibility 

for which essential element. In many cases, the NRC licensee, the 

State and the local governments are all called upon to produce 

material for the same essential element. The consolidated guidance 

will allow reviewers to do a more thorough analysis and to probe 

the relationship of one plan with another. This document has been 

designed to assist reviewers in their work. 
- 25 -

G. Funding and Technical Assistance 

While funding and technical assistance are not addressed in this 

document, it is a subject which must be discussed between the 

individual nuclear utilities and the involved State and local 

governments who must prepare emergency plans to support the nuclear 

facilities. The nuclear utility may have an incentive based on 

its own self interest as well as its responsibility to provide 

electric power, to assist in providing manpower, items of equipment, 

or other resources that the State and local governments may need 

but are themselves unable to provide. The Federal Regional Assistance 

Committees, now under the chairmanship of FEMA, will play an 

increasing role in the development of these plans. Training 

programs for State and local officials formerly sponsored by NRC 

and now sponsored by FEMA will continue without interruption. 

H. Nuclear Facility Licensee Response Organization 

NRC and FEMA agree that the licensees of nuclear facilities have a 

primary responsibility for planning and implementing emergency 

measures within their site boundaries. These emergency measures 

include corrective actions at the site and protective measures and 

aid for persons onsite. Since facility licensees cannot do this 

alone, it is a necessary part of the facility emergency planning to 

make advance arrangements with State and local organizations for 

special emergency assistance such as ambulance, medical, hospital, 

fire and police services. 
- 26 -

H. Nuclear Facility Licensee Response Organization (continued) 

An additional emergency activity for which facility licensees have 

primary responsibility is accident assessment. This includes prompt 

action to evaluate any potential risk to the public health and safety, 

both onsite and offsite, and timely recommendations to State and local 

governments concerning protective measures. In some situations, 

there could be a need for protective measures within short time 

intervals -- a half-hour or perhaps even less -- after determination 

that a hazard exists. For this reason, licensee emergency planners 

must recognize the importance of prompt accident assessment at the 

source. The criteria in this document reflect the identification 

and classification of accidents and the notification of offsite 

agencies by the facility licensee consistent with NRC rules as set 

forth in Appendix 1. 

Emphasis on inplant identification of potential hazards is a change 

from the previous emphasis in many licensee response plans on measurement 

of actual levels of radioactivity before notifications of offsite 

organizations are made and actions to protect the public recommended. 

Because of the potential need to take immediate action offsite in 

the event of a significant radiological accident, notifications to 

appropriate offsite response organizations (State or States and local 

government organizations) must go directly from the facility licensee. 

The response organizaiions which receive these notifications should 
- 27 -

H. Nuclear Facility Licensee Response Organization (continued) 

have the authority and capability to take immediate predetermined 

actions based on recommendations from the facility licensee. These 

actions could include prompt notification of the public in the offsite 

area, followed by advisories to the public in certain areas to stay 

inside (take shelter) or, if appropriate, evacuate to predetermined 

relocation or host areas. State agencies, which are likely to have 

greater radioprotective resources than local agencies, would bring 

their resources to bear and make decisions with regard to whether 

the recommended protective measures are adequate. 

In the longer time frame, substantial corporate and private sector 

organization resources should also supplement the initial response 

of the nuclear facility licensee. A facility licensee organization 

is therefore required to have a 11 recovery organization .. similar to the 

one recommended by the Atomic Industrial Forum, which can use and 

absorb Federal and private support which in all likelihood will be 

available following any radiological accident. 

I. Federal Response 

The Department of Energy•s current Radiological Assistance Program (RAP), 

the Federal Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan (!RAP), other 

radiological emergency assistance plans, and DOE 1

s National Laboratories 

capabilities as well as those of the U. S. Environmental Protection 
- 28 -

I. Federal Response (continued) 

Agency and the Department of Health and Human Services and other Federal 

capability, are being incorporated in a Federal Radiological Monitoring 

and Assessment Plan. Response plans should contain provisions for 

integration of this important Federal assistance. 

The facility licensee must make provisions for an NRC presence onsite 

following an accident and for supplying information to and receiving 

advisories from NRC regional or headquarters operations centers. In 

addition, the plan should provide for communication between State 

authorities, NRC and FEMA. 

The interrelationships of the Federal agencies and their roles during 

a radiological emergency will be defined in a National Radiological 

Emergency Preparedness Plan now being developed by FEMA, and in an 

NRC agency plan. These plans will be compatible with State, local and 

licensee plans developed using the "Planning Standards" of this guidance 

and criteria document. 

J. Form and Content of Plans 

The criteria in this document are organized under the topic headings 

of NUREG-75/111 (the principal previous NRC guidance to State and 

local response organizations) wherever possible. That format may 

be followed by planners. 
- 29 -

J. Form and Content of Plans (continued) 

The guidance does not specify a single format for emergency response 

plans but it is important that the means by which all criteria are 

met be clearly set forth in the plans. All plans should contain a 

table of contents, and a cross-reference to the criteria contained 

in this document is also needed. Applicable supporting and 

reference documents and tables may be incorporated by reference, and 

appendices should be used whenever necessary. The plans should be 

Kept as concise as possible. The average plan should consist of 

perhaps hundreds of pages, not thousands. The plans should maKe 

clear what is to be done in an emergency, how it is to be done and 

by whom. 

In addition to addressing the substance of all criteria, the plans 

must, of course, define the facility or facilities and area to which 

the plans apply. The plans should include definitions of any terms 

that are unique to the facility under consideration or are given 

connotations that differ from normally accepted usage. 

Findings by FEMA and NRC with regard to the adequacy of emergency 

preparedness will be related to the capability of the facility 

licensee, State and local response organizations, to respond in 

a coordinated manner to emergencies at or related to particular 

nuclear facilities. 
- 30 -

J. Form and Content of Plans (continued) 

A continued state of readiness must be maintained by all organizations. Periodic reviews by FEMA and NRC will verify the capability 

of response organizations to implement various aspects of the response 

plans. This will include observation of exercises and certain drills 

by NRC, FEMA and other Federal agencies participating in the Regional 

Assistance Committees. 
- 31 -

II. Planning Standards and Evaluation Criteria 

A. Assignment of Responsibility (Organization Control) 

Planning Standard 

Primary responsibilities for emergency response by the nuclear facility 

licensee, and by State and local organizations within the Emergency Planning 

Zones have been assigned, the emergency responsibilities of the various 

supporting organizations have been specifically established, and each principal 

response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial 

response on a continuous basis. 

Evaluation Criteria Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

l.a. Each plan shall identify the State, 

local, Federal and private sector organiza- tions (including utilities), that are 

intended to be part of the overall response 

organization for Emergency Planning Zones. 

Licensee 

(See Appendix 5). X 

b. Each organization and suborganization 

having an operational role shall specify its concept of operations, and its relation-

------

ship to the total effort. X 

------

c. Each plan shall illustrate these 

interrelationships in a block diagram. X 

d. Each organization shall identify 

a specific individual by title who shall 

------

be in charge of the emergency response. X 

~----

e. Each organization shall provide for 24-hour per day emergency response, 

including 24-hour per day manning of 

communications links. X 

------

State Local 

X X 

X X 

X X 

X X 

X X 
- 32 -

A. Assignment of Responsibility (Organization Control) (continued) 

Evaluation Criteria 

2.a. Each organization shall specify the 

functions and responsibilities for major 

elements and key individuals by title, of 

emergency response, including the following: 

Command and Control, Alerting and Notification, Communications, Public Information, 

Accident Assessment, Public Health and 

Sanitation, Social Services, Fire and 

Rescue, Traffic Control, Emergency Medical 

Services, Law Enforcement, Transportation, 

Protective Response (including authority 

to request Federal assistance and to 

initiate other protective actions), and 

Radiological Exposure Control. The 

description of these functions shall 

include a clear and concise summary such 

as a table of primary and support 

responsibilities using the agency as 

one axis, and the function as the other. 

(See Section B for licensee). 

b. Each plan shall contain (by reference 

to specific acts, codes or statutes) the 

legal basis for such authorities. 

3. Each plan shall include written agreements referring to the concept of operations 

developed between Federal, State, and local 

agencies and other support organizations 

having an emergency response role within 

the Emergency Planning Zones. The agreements shall identify the emergency measures 

to be provided and the mutually acceptable 

criteria for their implementation, and 

specify the arrangements for exchange of 

information. These agreements may be 

provided in an appendix to the plan or 

the plan itself may contain descriptions 

of these matters and a signature page in 

the plan may serve to verify the agreements. 

The signature page format is appropriate for organizations where response functions 

are covered by laws, regulations or executive 

orders where separate written agreements 

are not necessary. 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

X X 

X X 

X X X 
- 33 -

A. Assignment of Responsibility (Organization Control) (continued) 

Evaluation Criteria 

4. Each principal organization shall be capable of continuous (24-hour) operations for a 

protracted period. The individual in the 

principal organization who will be responsible for assuring ~ontinuity of resources 

(technical, administrative, and material) shall be specified by title. 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

X X X 
B. Onsite Emergency Organization 

Planning Standard 

- 34 -

On-shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency response are 

unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident 

response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation 

of response capabilities is available, and the interfaces among various onsite 

response activities and offsite support and response activities are specified. 

Evaluation Criteria 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

1. Each licensee shall specify the onsite 

emergency organization of plant staff personnel for all shifts and its relation to the 

responsibilities and duties of the normal 

Licensee 

staff complement. ;..:.X __ _ 

2. Each licensee shall designate an 

individual as emergency coordinator who shall 

be on shift at all times and who shall have 

the authority and responsibility to immediately and unilaterally initiate any emergency actions, including providing protective action recommendations to authorities 

responsible for implementing offsite 

emergency measures. _X __ _ 

3. Each licensee shall identify a line of 

succession for the emergency coordinator 

position and identify the specific conditions 

for higher level utility officials assuming this function. X .;,.;__ __ 

State Local 
- 35 -

B. Onsite Emergency Organization (continued) 

Applicability and Cross 

Evaluation Criteria Reference to Plans 

4. Each licensee shall establish the functional 

responsibilities assigned to the emergency coordinator and shall clearly specify which 

responsibilities may not be delegated to 

other elements of the emergency organization. Among the responsibilities which may not be 

delegated shall be the decision to notify and 

to recommend protective actions to authorities 

Licensee 

responsible for offsite emergency measures. _X ____ _ 

5. Each licensee shall specify the positions 

or title and major tasks to be performed by the persons to be assigned to the functional 

areas of emergency activity. For emergency situations, specific assignments shall be 

made for all shifts and for plant staff 

members, both onsite and away from the site. 

These assignments shall cover the emergency functions in Table B-1 entitled, 11Minimum 

Staffing Requirements for Nuclear Power Plant 

Emergencies ... The minimum on-shift staffing levels shall be as indicated in Table B-1. 

The licensee must be able to augment on-shift 

capabilities within a short period after 

declaration of an emergency. This capability shall be as indicated in Table B-1. The 

implementation schedule for licensed operators, auxiliary operators and the shift technical 

advisor on shift shall be as specified in the 

July 31, 1980 letter to all power reactor 

licensees. Any deficiencies in the other 

staffing requirements of Table B-1 must be 

capable of augmentation within 30 minutes 

by September 1, 1981, and such deficiencies 

must be fully removed by July 1, 1982. _X __ 

State Local 
- 36 -

B. Onsite Emergency Organization (continued) 

Evaluation Criteria Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

6. Each licensee shall specify the interfaces 

between and among the onsite functional areas 

of emergency activity, licensee headquarters 

support, local services support, and State and 

local government response organization. This 

shall be illustrated in a block diagram and 

shall include the onsite technical support 

center and the operational support (assembly) 

center and the licensee's near-site Emergency 

Licensee 

Operations Faci 1 ity (EOF). .;....X __ 

7. Each licensee shall specify the corporate 

management, administrative, and technical 

support personnel who will augment the 

plant staff as specified in the table 

entitled "Minimum Staffing Requirements for Nuclear Power Plant Emergencies," (Table B-1) and in the following areas: X .;..;.._ __ a. logistics support for emergency personnel, 

e.g., transportation, communications, 

temporary quarters, food and water, 

sanitary facilities in the field, and 

special equipment and supplies 

procurement; .;..;.._ X __ b. technical support for planning and 

reentry/recovery operations; ~X ___ _ 

c. management level interface with govern- mental authorities; and X 

--- d. release of information to news media during 

an emergency (coordinated with governmental authorities). X 

8. Each licensee shall specify the contractor 

and private organizations who may be requested 

to provide technical assistance to and 

---

augmentation of the emergency organization. ~X __ _ 

State Local 
Major Functional Area 

Plant Operations and 

Assessment of 

Operational Aspects 

Emergency Direction and 

Control (Emergency Coordinator)*** 

Notification/ 

Communicatio~*** 

Radiological Accident 

Assessment and Support 

of Operational Accident 

Assessment 

Plant System 

Engineering, Repair and Corrective Actions 

Location 

Table B-1 

MINIMUM STAFFING REQUIREMENTS FOR NRC LICENSEES 

FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCIES (See B.5.) 

Major Tasks 

Notify licensee, State 

local and Federal 

personnel & maintain 

communication 

Emergency Operations 

Facility (EOF) Director 

Offsite Dose 

Assessment 

Offsite Surveys 

Onsite (out-of-plant) In-plant surveys Chemistry/Radiochemistry 

Technical Support 

Position Title 

or Expertise 

Shift Supervisor (SRO) 

Shift Foreman (SRO) 

Control Room Operators Auxiliary Operators 

Shift Technical Advisor, 

Shift Supervisor or 

designated facility 

manager 

Senior Manager 

Senior Health Physics (HP) Expertise 

HP Technicians 

Rad/Chem Technicians 

Shift Technical Advisor 

Core/Thermal Hydraulics 

Electrical 

Mechanical 

Repair and Corrective Mechanical Maintenance/ 

Actions Rad Waste Operator 

Electrical Maintenance/ 

Instrument and Control 

(I&C) Technician 

On 

Shi ftk 

1 

1 

2 

2 

1** 

1 

1 

1 

1** 

1** 

Capabil1ty for Additions 

30 min 60 min 

1 

2 

1 

l 

2 

2 

l 

l 

1 

1 

1 

1 
Table 8-1 (contd) 

Position Title 

or Expertise 

On 

Shift* Capability for Additions 

Major Functional Area 

Protective Actions 

(In-Plant) 

Firefighting 

Rescue Operations and First-Aid 

Site Access Control 

and Personnel 

Accountability 

Notes: 

Major Tasks 

Radiation Protection: 

a. Access Control 

b. HP Coverage for repair, 

corrective actions, 

search and rescue firstaid & firefighting 

c. Personnel monitoring 

d. Dosimetry 

Security, firefighting 

communications, personnel 

accountability 

HP Technicians 

Security Personnel 

Total 

2** 

Fire Brigade 

per Technical 

Specifications 

2** 

All per 

Security plan 

10 

30 min 60 min 

2 2 

Local Support 

Local Support 

1i 15 

* For each unaffected nuclear unit in operation, maintain at least one shift foreman, one control room operator and 

one auxiliary operator except that units sharing a control room Tilay share a shift foreman if all functions are 

covered. 

** 

*** 

May be provided by shift personnel assigned other functions. 

Overall direction of facility response to be assumed by EOF director when all centers are fully manned. Director 

of minute-to-minute facility operations remains with s~nior manager in technical support center or control room. 

**** May be performed by engineering aide to shift supervisor. 

w 

(X) 
- 39 -

B. Onsite Emergency Organization (continued) 

Evaluation Criteria 

9. Each licensee shall identify the services 

to be provided by local agencies for handling emergencies, e.g., police, ambulance, medical, 

hospital, and fire-fighting organizations shall be specified. The licensee shall 

provide for transportation and treatment 

of injured personnel who may also be 

contaminated. Copies of the arrangements and agreements reached with contractor, 

private, and local support agencies shall 

be appended to the plan. The agreements shall delineate the authorities, responsi- bilities, and limits on the actions of 

the contractor, private organization, and 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

local services support groups. ~X ____ _ 
- 40 -

C. Emergency Response Support and Resources 

Planning Standard 

Arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources 

have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the 

licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and 

other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been 

identified. 

Evaluation Criteria Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

1. The Federal government maintains in-depth capability to assist licensees, States and 

local governments through the Federal 

Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan 

(formerly Radiological Assistance Plan (RAP) 

and Interagency Radiological Assistance 

Plan (!RAP). Each State and licensee 

shall make provisions for incorporating the Federal response capability into its 

operation plan, including the following: 

a. specific persons by title authorized 

to request Federal assistance; see 

A.l.d., A.2.a •. , 

b. specific Federal resources expected, including expected times of arrival 

at specific nuclear facility sites; 

and 

c. specific licensee, State and local 

resources available to support the 

Federal response, e.g., air fields, 

command posts, telephone lines, 

radio frequencies and telecommunications centers. 

Licensee 

X 

X 

X 

State Local 

X 

X 

X X 
- 41 -

C. Emergency_ Response Support and Resources (continued) 

Evaluation Criteria 

2.ao Each principal offsite organization 

may dispatch representatives to the licensee•s 

near-site Emergency Operations Facility. 

(State technical analysis representatives 

at the nearsite EOF are preferred.) 

b. The licensee shall prepare for the 

dispatch of a representative to principal 

offsite governmental emergency operations 

centers. 

3. Each organization shall identify radiological laboratories and their general 

capabilities and expected availability 

to provide radiological monitoring and 

analyses services which can be used in an 

emergency. 

4. Each organization shall identify nuclear 

and other facilities, organizations or 

individuals which can be relied upon in an 

emergency to provide assistance. Such 

assistance shall be identified and supported 

by appropriate letters of agreement. 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

X X 

X 

X X 

X X X 
- 42 -

D. Emergency Classification System 

Planning Standard 

A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases 

of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the 

nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance 

on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum 

initial offsite response measures. 

Evaluation Criteria 

1. An emergency classification and emergency action level scheme as set forth in Appendix 1 

must be established by the licensee. The 

specific instruments, parameters or equipment 

status shall be shown for establishing each 

emergency class, in the in-plant emergency procedures. The plan shall identify the 

parameter values and equipment status for 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

each emergency class. ~X ____ _ 

2. The initiating conditions shall include 

the example conditions found in Appendix 1 

and all postulated accidents in the Final 

Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the 

nuclear facility. ~X ____ _ 

3. Each State and local organization shall 

establish an emergency classification and 

emergency action level scheme consistent 

with that established by the facility 

licensee. 

4. Each State and local organization should 

have procedures in place that provide for 

emergency actions to be taken which are 

consistent with the emergency actions 

recommended by the nuclear facility licensee, taking into account local 

offsite conditions that exist at the 

time of the emergency. 

X X 

X X 
- 43 -

E. Notification Methods and Procedures 

Planning Standard 

Procedures have been established for notification, by the licensee of 

State and local response organizations and for notification of emergency personnel 

by all response organizations; the content of initial and followup messages to 

response organizations and the public has been established; and means to provide 

early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure 

pathway Emergency Planning Zone have been establishedo 

Evaluation Criteria 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

1. Each organization shall establish procedures which describe mutually agreeable bases for 

notification of response organizations consistent 

with the emergency classification and action 

level scheme set forth in Appendix 1. These 

procedures shall include means for verification 

of messages. The specific details of verifiLicensee 

cation need not be included in the plan. .;..;.X __ _ 

2. Each organization shall establish procedures for alerting, notifying, and mobilizing 

emergency response personnel. .;_X __ _ 

3. The licensee in conjunction with State 

and local organizations shall ~stablish the 

contents of the initial emergency messages 

to be sent from the plant. These measures 

shall contain information about the class 

of emergency, whether a release is taking place, potentially affected population and 

areas, and whether protective measures 

may be. necessary. .;..;.X __ _ 

State Local 

X X 

X X 
- 44 -

E. Notification Methods and Procedures (continued) 

Applicability and Cross 

Evaluation Criteria Reference to Plans 

4. Each licensee shall make prov1s1ons for followup messages from the facility to 

offsite authorities which shall contain the 

following information if it is known and 

Licensee 

appropriate: .;.:X __ _ 

a. location of incident and name and 

telephone number (or communications 

channel identification) of caller; 

b. date/time of incident; 

c. class of emergency; 

d~ type of actual or projected release 

(airborne, waterborne, surface spill), and estimated duration/impact times; 

e. estimate of quantity of radioactive 

material released or being released and 

X 

X 

X 

X 

the points and height of releases; .;.:X __ _ 

f. chemical and physical form of released 

material, including estimates of the 

relative quantities and concentration 

of noble gases, iodines and particulates; .;.;.X __ _ 

g. meteorological conditions at appropriate levels (wind speed, direction (to and 

from}, indicator of stability, precipi- tation, if any); _x __ _ 

h. actual or projected dose rates at site 

boundary; projected integrated dose 

at site boundary; .;.;.X __ _ 

i. projected dose rates and integrated dose 

at the projected peak and at 2, 5 and 

10 miles, including sector(s) affected; .;.,:_ X __ 

State Local 
- 45 -

E. Notification Methods and Procedures (continued) 

Applicability and Cross 

Evaluation Criteria Reference to Plans 

j. estimate of any surface radioactive 

contamination inplant, onsite or offsite; 

k. licensee emergency response actions 

underway; 

L recommended emergency actions, including protective measures; 

m. request for any needed onsite support by offsite organizations; and 

n. prognosis for worsening or termination 

of event based on plant information. 

5. State and local government organizations shall establish a system for disseminating to 

the public appropriate information contained 

in initial and followup messages received from 

the licensee including the appropriate notification to appropriate broadcast media, e.g., 

Licensee State Local 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS). X X 

6. Each organization shall establish administrative and physical means, and the time 

required for notifying and providing prompt instructions to the public within the plume 

exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone. 

(See Appendix 3.) It shall be the licensee's 

responsibility to demonstrate that such 

means exist, regardless of who implements this requirement. It shall be the responsi- bility of the State and local governments 

to activate such a system. X 

---

X X 
- 46 -

E. Notification Methods and Procedures (continued) 

Evaluation Criteria 

7. Each organization shall provide written 

messages intended for the public, consistent 

with the licensee•s classification scheme. 

In particular, draft messages to the public 

giving instructions with regard to specific 

protective actions to be taken by occupants of affected areas shall be prepared and included 

as part of the State and local plans. Such 

messages should include the appropriate 

aspects of sheltering, ad hoc respiratory 

protection, e.g., handkerchief over mouth, 

thyroid blocking or evacuation. The role 

of the licensee is to provide supporting 

information for the messages. For ad hoc 

respiratory protection see 11Respiratory 

Protective Devices Manual 11 American 

Industrial Hygiene Association, 1963 

pp. 123-126. 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

X X X 
- 47 -

F. Emergency Communications 

Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response 

organizations to emergency personnel and to the public. 

Evaluation Criteria 

1. The communication plans for emergencies 

shall include organizational titles and 

alternates for both ends of the communication 

links. Each organization shall establish 

reliable primary and backup means of communication for licensees, local, and State response organizations. Such systems should be 

selected to be compatible with one another. 

Each plan shall include: 

a. provision for 24-hour per day notification 

to and activation of the State/local emer~ 

gency response network; and at a minimum, a 

telephone Jink and alternate, including 24-

hour per day manning of communications links 

that initiate emergency response actions. 

b. provision for communications with 

continguous State/local governments 

within the Emergency Planning Zones; 

c. provision for communications as needed 

with Federal emergency response 

organizations; 

d. provision for communications between 

the nuclear facility and the licensee's 

near-site Emergency Operations Facility, 

State and local emergency operations 

centers, and radiological monitoring 

teams; 

e. provision for alerting or activating 

emergency personnel in each response 

organization; and 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

X X X 

X X X 

X X X ---

X X X ---

X X X 
- 48 -

F. Emergency Communications (continued) 

Evaluation Criteria 

f. prov1s1on for communication by the 

licensee with NRC headquarters and 

NRC Regional Office Emergency Operations Centers and the licensee's near-site 

Emergency Operations Facility and 

radiological monitoring team assembly 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

area. X 

2. Each organization shall ensure that 

a coordinated communication link for fixed 

and mobile medical support facilities 

exists. 

3. Each organization shall conduct periodic testing of the entire emergency communications system (see evaluation criteria H.lO, 

N.2.a and Appendix 3). 

---

X 

X 

X X 

X X 
- 49 -

G. Public Education and Information 

Planning Standard 

Information is made available to the public on a periodic basis on how 

they will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency 

(e.g., listening to a local broadcast station and remaining indoors), the principal 

points of contact with the news media for dissemination of information during 

an emergency (including the phYsical location or locations) are established 

in advance, and procedures for coordinated dissemination of information to the 

public are established. 

Evaluation Criteria 

1. Each organization shall provide a coordinated 

periodic (at least annually) dissemination of 

information to the public regarding how they will 

be notified and what their actions should be in 

an emergency. This information shall include, 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

but not necessarily be limited to: X X X 

a. educational information on radiation; 

b. contact for additional information; 

c. protective measures, e.g., evacuation 

routes and relocation centers, 

sheltering, respiratory protection, radioprotective drugs; and 

d. special needs of the handicapped. 

Means for accomplishing this dissemination may include, but are not necessarily limited to: 

information in the telephone book; periodic information in utility bills; posting in public 

areas; and publications distributed on an 

annual basis. 

------
- 50 -

G. Public Education and Information {continued) 

Evaluation Criteria 

2. The public information program shall provide the permanent and transient adult population within the plume exposure EPZ an adequate opportunity to become aware of the information 

annually. The programs should include 

provision for written material that is likely 

to be available in a residence during an 

emergency. Updated information shall be 

disseminated at least annually. Signs or 

other measures (e.g., decals, posted notices 

or other means, placed in hotels, motels, 

gasoline stations and phone booths) shall 

also be used to disseminate to any transient 

population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ appropriate information that would be 

helpful if an emergency or accident occurs. 

Such notices should refer the transient to 

the telephone directory or other source of 

local emergency information and guide the 

visitor to appropriate radio and television 

frequencies. 

3.a. Each principal organization shall 

designate the points of contact and physical locations for use by news media during 

an emergency. 

b. Each licensee shall provide space which may be used for a limited number of 

the news media at the nearsite Emergency Operations Facility. 

4.a. Each principal organization shall 

designate a spokesperson who should have 

access to all necessary information. 

b. Each organization shall establish 

arrangements for timely exchange of information among designated spokespersons. 

c. Each organization shall establish 

coordinated arrangements for dealing with 

rumors. 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

X X X 

X X X 

X 

X X X 

X X X 

X X X 
- 51 -

G. Public Education and Information (continued) 

Applicability and Cross 

Evaluation Criteria Reference to Plans 

5. Each organization shall conduct coordinated 

programs at least annually to acquaint news media 

with the emergency plans, information concerning radiation, and points of contact for release 

Licensee 

of public information in an emergency. X 

------

State 

X 

Local 

X 
- 52 -

H. Emergency Facilities and Equipment 

Planning Standard 

Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency 

response are provided and maintained. 

Evaluation Criteria Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

1. Each licensee shall establish a Technical 

Support Center and an onsite operations 

support center (assembly area) in accordance 

Licensee 

with NUREG-0696, Revision 1. X 

2. Each licensee shall establish an 

Emergency Operations Facility from which 

evaluation and coordination of all 

licensee activities related to an 

emergency is to be carried out and 

from which the licensee shall provide information to Federal, State and 

local authorities responding to 

radiological emergencies in accordance 

------

with NUREG-0696, Revision 1. X 

3. Each organization shall establish 

an emergency operations center for use 

in directing and controlling response 

functions. 

4. Each organization shall provide for 

timely activation and staffing of the 

facilities and centers described in the 

plan. 

------

X 

State Local 

X X 

X X 
- 53 -

H. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (continued) 

Evaluation Criteria Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

5. Each licensee shall identify and establish 

onsite monitoring systems that are to be used 

to initiate emergency measures in accordance 

with Appendix 1, as well as those to be used 

Licensee 

for conducting assessment. X 

--- The equipment shall include: 

a. geophysical phenomena monitors, (e.g., 

mete oro 1 ogi ca 1 , hydro 1 ogi c, seismic); """X __ _ 

b. radiological monitors, (e.g., process, 

area, emergency, effluent, wound and 

portable monitors and sampling equipment); """X __ _ 

c. process monitors, (e.g., reactor coolant 

system pressure and temperature, containment pressure and temperature, liquid levels, flow rates, status or lineup of 

equipment components); and _x __ _ 

d. fire and combustion products detectors. X 

6. Each licensee shall make provision to 

acquire data from or for emergency access 

to offsite monitoring and analysis equipment including: 

a. geophysical phenomena monitors, (e.g., 

---

meteorological, hydrologic, seismic); X 

~--

b. radiological monitors including ratemeters 

and sampling devices. Dosimetry shall be 

provided and shall meet, as a minimum, the 

NRC Radiological Assessment Branch Technical 

Position for the Environmental Radiological Moni taring Program; and """X __ _ 

c. laboratory facilities, fixed or mobile. .....;__ X __ 

State Local 
- 54 -

H. Emergency Facilities_ftnd Equipment (continued) 

Evaluation Criteria 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

7. Each organization, where appropriate, shall 

provide for offsite radiological monitoring 

equipment in the vicinity of the nuclear 

faci 1 ity. 

8. Each licensee shall provide meteorological instrumentation and procedures which 

satisfy the criteria in Appendix 2, and 

provisions to obtain representative current 

meteorological information from other 

Licensee 

X 

sources. X 

9. Each licensee shall provide for an 

onsite operations support center (assembly area) which shall have adequate capacity, 

and supplies, including, for example, respiratory protection, protective clothing, 

portable lighting, portable radiation 

monitoring equipment, cameras and 

communications equipment for personnel 

---

present in the assembly area. _X __ _ 

10. Each organization shall make provisions 

to inspect, inventory and operational"ly 

check emergency equipment/instruments at 

least once each calendar quarter and after 

each use. There shall be sufficient 

reserves of instruments/equipment to 

replace those which are removed from 

emergency kits for calibration or repair. 

Calibration of equipment shall be at 

intervals recommended by the supplier of the equipment. 

11. Each plan shall, in an appendix, 

include identification of emergency kits 

by general category (protective equipment, 

communications equipment, radiological 

monitoring equipment and ~nergency 

supplies). 

X 

X 

State Local 

X X 

X X 

X X 
- 55 -

H. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (continued) 

Evaluation Criteria 

12. Each organization shall establish a 

central point (preferably associated with 

the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility), for the receipt 

and analysis of all field monitoring data and coordination of sample media. 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

X X X 
- 56 -

I. Accident Assessment 

Planning Standard 

Adequate methods, systems and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual 

or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use. 

Evaluation Criteria Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

1. Each licensee shall identify plant system and effluent parameter values characteristic 

of a spectrum of off-normal conditions and 

accidents, and shall identify the plant 

parameter values or other information which 

correspond to the example initiating conditions of Appendix 1. Such parameter values and the corresponding emergency class shall be included in the appropriate facility emergency procedures. Facility 

emergency procedures shall specify the 

kinds of instruments being used and 

Licensee 

their capabilities. X 

---

2. Onsite capability and resources to 

provide initial values and continuing 

assessment throughout the course of an 

accident shall include post-accident sampling capability, radiation and 

effluent monitors, in-plant iodine 

instrumentation, and containment 

radiation monitoring in accordance 

with NUREG-0578, as elaborated in the 

NRC letter to all power reactor 

licensees dated October 30, 1979. .;c.:.X __ _ 

3. Each licensee shall establish 

methods and techniques to be used for 

determining: 

a. the source term of releases of radioactive material within plant systems. An example is the relationship between 

the containment radiation monitor(s) 

reading(s) and radioactive material 

available for release from containment. X 

---

State Local 
- 57 -

I. Accident Assessment (continued) 

Evaluation Criteria 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

b. the magnitude of the release of radioactive materials based on plant system 

parameters and effluent monitors. 

4. Each licensee shall establish the 

relationship between effluent monitor 

readings and onsite and offsite exposures and contamination for various meteoroloLicensee 

X 

gical conditions. X 

5. Each licensee shall have the capability of acquiring and evaluating meteorological information sufficient to meet the criteria 

of Appendix 2. There shall be provisions for access to meteorological information by 

at least the nearsite Emergency Operations Facility, the Technical Support Center, 

the Control Room and an offsite NRC center. 

The licensee shall make available to the 

State suitable meteorological data processing interconnections which will permit independent analysis by the State, of facility generated data in those States with the resources to 

---· 

effectively use this information. X 

---

6. Each licensee shall establish the 

methodology for determining the release 

rate/projected doses if the instrumentation 

used for assessment are offscale or 

inoperable. .:..;.X __ _ 

7. Each organization shall describe the 

capability and resources for field monitoring within the plume exposure Emergency Planning 

Zone which are an intrinsic part of the 

concept of operations for the facility. X 

State Local 

X X 
- 58 -

I. Accident Assessment (continued) 

Evaluation Criteria 

B. Each organization, where appropriate, shall 

provide methods, equipment and expertise to 

make rapid assessments of the actual or 

potential magnitude and locations of any radiological hazards through liquid or 

gaseous release pathways. This shall 

include activation, notification means, 

field team composition, transportation, communication, monitoring equipment and 

estimated deployment times. 

9. Each organization shall have a capability 

to detect and measure radioiodine concentrations in air in the plume exposure EPZ as 

low as lo-7 uCi/cc (microcuries per cubic 

centimeter) under field conditions. Interference from the presence of noble gas and 

background radiation shall not decrease the 

stated minimum detectable activity. 

10. Each organization shall establish means 

for relating the various measured parameters 

(e.g., contamination levels, water and air 

activity levels) to dose rates for key isotopes (i.e., those given in Table 3, page 18) and 

gross radioactivity measurements. Provisions 

shall be made for estimating integrated dose 

from the projected and actual dose rates and 

for comparing these estimates with the 

protective action guides. The detailed 

provisions shall be described in separate procedures. 

11. Arrangements to locate and track the 

airborne radioactive plume shall be made, using either or both Federal and State resources. 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

X X X 

X X 

X X 

X 
- 59 -

Jo Protective Response 

Planning Standard 

A range of protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public. Guidelines for the choice of 

protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are 

developed and in place, and protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway 

EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed. 

Evaluation Criteria 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

1. Each licensee shall establish the means 

and time required to warn or advise onsite 

individuals and individuals who may be in 

areas controlled by the operator, including: 

Licensee 

ao Employees not having emergency assignments; ~X ____ _ 

b. Visitors; ~X ____ _ 

c. Contractor and construction personnel; and ~X ____ _ 

d. Other persons who may be in the public 

access areas on or passing through the site 

or within the owner controlled area. .:..:.X __ _ 

2. Each licensee shall make provisions for 

evacuation routes and transportation for 

onsite individuals to some suitable offsite 

location, including alternatives for inclement 

weather, high traffic density and specific 

radiological conditions. 

3. Each licensee shall provide for radiological monitoring of people evacuated 

from the site. 

X 

X 

State Local 

X X 
- 60 -

J. Protective Response (continued) 

Evaluation Criteria Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

4. Each licensee shall provide for the 

evacuation of onsite non-essential personnel in the event of a Site or General Emergency and shall provide a decontamination capability 

at or near the monitoring point specified 

Licensee 

in J.3. _x __ _ 

5. Each licensee shall provide for a capa- bility to account for all individuals onsite 

at the time of the emergency and ascertain 

the names of missing individuals within 30 

minutes of the start of an emergency and 

account for all onsite individuals 

continuously thereafter. X 

6. Each licensee shall, for individuals 

remaining or arriving onsite during the 

emergency, make provisions for: 

a. Individual respiratory protection; 

---

X 

b. Use of protective clothing; and X 

---

c. Use of radioprotective drugs, (e.g., individual thyroid protection). X 

7. Each licensee shall establish a mechanism 

for recommending protective actions to the 

appropriate State and local authorities. 

These shall include Emergency Action Levels 

corresponding to projected dose to the 

population-at-risk, in accordance with 

Appendix 1 and with the recommendations 

set forth in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 of the 

Manual of Protective Action Guides and 

Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents 

(EPA-520/1-75-001). As specified in 

Appendix 1, prompt notification shall be 

made directly to the offsite authorities 

responsible for implementing protective 

measures within the plume exposure pathway 

---

Emergency Planning Zone. X 

---

State Local 
J. Protective Response (continued) 

Evaluation Criteria 

B. Each licensee•s plan shall contain time 

estimates for evacuation within the plume 

exposure EPZ. These shall be in accordance 

- 61 -

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

with Appendix 4. ~X __ _ 

9. Each State and local organization shall 

establish a capability for implementing protective measures based upon protective action 

guides and other criteria. This shall be 

consistent with the recommendations of EPA 

regarding exposure resulting from passage of 

radioactive airborne plumes, (EPA-520/l-75-001) 

and with those of DHEW (DHHS)/FDA regarding radioactive contamination of human food and 

animal feeds as published in the Federal 

Register of December 15, 1978 (43 FR 58790). 

10. The organization•s plans to implement protective measures for the plume exposure pathway shall include: 

a. Maps showing evacuation routes, evacuation 

areas, preselected radiological sampling and 

monitoring points, relocation centers in host 

areas, and shelter areas; (identification of 

radiological sampling and monitoring points 

shall include the designators in Table J-1 

or an equivalent uniform system described in 

the plan); 

b. Maps showing population distribution 

around the nuclear facility. This shall be 

by evacuation areas (licensees shall also 

present the information in a sector format); 

c. Means for notifying all segments of the 

transient and resident population; 

d. Means for protecting those persons whose mobility may be impaired due to such 

factors as institutional or other 

confinement; 

X X 

X X X 

X X X 

X X X 

X X 
TABLE J-1 

SECTOR AND ZONE DESIGNATORS FOR RADIOLOGICAL SAMPLING 

AND MONITORING POINTS WITHIN EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONES 

SECTOR NOMENCLATURE ZONE NOMENCLATURE 

CENTERLINE OF SECTOR 

IN DEGREES TRUE NORTH 22 1/2° MILES FROM 

FROM FACILITY SECTOR FACILITY ZONE 

0 & 360 *A N 0-1 1 

22 l/2 B NNE 1-2 2 

45 c NE 2-3 3 

67 1/2 D ENE 3-4 4 

90 E E 4-5 5 

112 F ESE 5-6 6 

135 G SE 6-7 7 

157 H or SSE 7-8 8 

180 J s 8-9 9 

202 1/2 K ssw 9-10 10 

225 L sw 10-15 15 

247 1/2 M WSW 15-20 20 

270 N w 20-25 25 

292 l/2 p WNW 25-30 30 

315 Q NW 30-35 35 

337 1/2 R NNW 35-40 40 

40-45 45 

45-50 50 

AREA SEGMENT - An area is identified by a Sector and Zone designator. Thus, area NL is that area which lies 

between 348 3/4 and 11 1/4 degrees true north from the facility out to a radius of 1 mile. 

Area SE4 would be that area between 123 3/4 to 146 l/4 degrees and the 3- and 4-mile arcs from 

the facility. 

*The letters I and 0 have been omitted from these sector designators so as to eliminate possible confusion 

between letters and numbers. 

C)) 

N 
J. Protective Response (continued} 

Evaluation Criteria 

e. Provisions for the use of radioprotective 

drugs, particularly for emergency workers and 

institutionalized persons within the plume 

exposure EPZ whose immediate evacuation may be infeasible or very difficult, including quantities, storage, and means of 

distribution. 

f. State and local organizations• plans should include the method by which decisions 

- 63 -

by the State Health Department for administering radioprotective drugs to the general population 

are made during an emergency and the pre- determined conditions under which such drugs 

may be used by offsite emergency workers;l 

g. Means of relocation; 

h. Relocation centers in host areas which 

are at least 5 miles, and preferably 10 miles, 

beyond the boundaries of the plume exposure 

emergency planning zone; (See J.l2). 

i. Projected traffic capacities of evacuation 

routes under emergency conditions; 

j. Control of access to evacuated areas 

and organization responsibilities for 

such control; 

k. Identification of and means for dealing with potential impediments (e.g., seasonal 

impassability of roads) to use of evacuation 

routes, and contingency measures; 

1. Time estimates for evacuation of various 

sectors and distances based on a dynamic analysis (time-motion study under various 

conditions) for the plume exposure pathway 

emergency planning zone (See Appendix 4); and 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

X X 

X X 

X X 

X X 

X X 

X X 

X X 

X X 

1/ See DHEW (new DHHS) Federal Register notice of December 15, 1978 (43 FR 58798) 

entitled 11 Potassium Iodide as a Thyroid-Blocking Agent in a Radiation Emergency ... Other guidance concerning the storage, stockpiling, and conditions for use of 

this drug by the general public, is now under development by the Bureau of 

Drugs, DHHS. 
J. Protective Response {continued) 

Evaluation Criteria 

mo The bases for the choice of recommended 

protective actions from the plume exposure pathway during emergency conditions. This 

shall include expected local protection afforded2 in residential units or other 

shelter for direct and inhalation exposure, 

as well as evacuation time estimates. 

- 64 -

11. Each State shall specify the protective 

measures to be used for the ingestion pathway, including the methods for protecting the 

public from consumption of contaminated foodstuffs. This shall include criteria for 

deciding whether dairy animals should be 

put on stored feed. The plan shall identify procedures for detecting contamination, for 

estimating the dose commitment consequences of uncontrolled ingestion, and for imposing protection procedures such as impoundment, decontamination, processing, decay, product diversion, and preservation. Maps for 

recording survey and monitoring data, key land use data (e.g., farming), dairies, food 

processing plants, water sheds, water supply intake and treatment plants and reservoirs 

shall be maintained. Provisions for maps showing detailed crop information may be by including reference to their availability and location and a plan for their use. The 

maps shall start at the facility and include 

all of the 50-mile ingestion pathway EPZ. 

Up-to-date lists of the name and location 

of all facilities which regularly process milk products and other large amounts of food 

or agricultural products originating in the 

ingestion pathway Emergency Planning Zone, 

but located elsewhere, shall be maintained. 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

X X 

X 

2/ The following reports may be considered in determining protection afforded. 

{1) "Public Protection Strategies for Potential Nuclear Reactor Accidents'' 

Sheltering Concepts with Existing Public and Private Structures" (SAND 

77-1725), Sandia Laboratory. 

(2) "Examination of Offsite Radiological Emergency Measures for Nuclear Reactor 

Accidents Involving Core Melt" {SAND 78-0454), Sandia Laboratory. 

{3) "Protective Action Evaluation Part II, Evacuation and Sheltering as Protective 

Actions Against Nuclear Accidents Involving Gaseous Releases" {EPA 520/1-78-0018). 

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency. 
J. Protective Response (continued) 

Evaluation Criteria 

12o Each organization shall describe the 

means for registering and monitoring of 

evacuees at relocation centers in host 

areas. The personnel and equipment available should be capable of monitoring within about a 12 hour period all residents 

and transients in the plume exposure EPZ 

arriving at relocation centers. 

- 65 -

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

X X 
- 66 -

K. Radiolbgical Exposure Control 

Planning Standard 

Means for controlling radiological exposures, in an emergency, are established 

for emergency workers. The means for controlling radiological exposures shall 

include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA Emergency Worker and Lifesaving 

Activity Protective Action Guides. 

Evaluation Criteria 

1. Each licensee shall establish onsite 

exposure guidelines consistent with EPA 

Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity 

Protective Actions Guides (EPA 520/1-75/001) 

for: 

a. removal of injured persons; 

b. undertaking corrective actions; 

c. performing assessment actions; 

d. providing first aid; 

e. performing personnel decontamination; 

f. providing ambulance service; and 

g. providing medical treatment services. 

2. Each licensee shall provide an onsite 

radiation protection program to be implemented 

during emergencies, including methods to 

implement exposure guidelines. The plan 

shall identify individual(s), by position 

or title, who can authorize emergency workers 

to receive doses in excess of 10 CFR Part 20 

limits. Procedures shall be worked out in 

advance for permitting onsite volunteers to 

receive radiation exposures in the course of 

carrying out lifesaving and other emergency 

activities. These procedures shall include 

expeditious decision making and a reasonable 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

consideration of relative risks. X 

------
- 67 -

K. Radiological Exposure Control (continued) 

Evaluation Criteria 

3.a. Each organization shall make provision for 24-hour-per-day capability to determine 

the doses received by emergency personnel involved in any nuclear accident, including volunteers. Each organization shall make 

provisions for distribution of dosimeters, 

both self-reading and permanent record devices. 

b. Each organization shall ensure that 

dosimeters are read at appropriate frequencies and provide for maintaining dose records 

for emergency workers involved in any nuclear 

accident. 

4. Each State and local organization shall 

establish the decision chain for authorizing 

emergency workers to incur exposures in 

excess of the EPA General Public Protective 

Action Guides (i.e., EPA PAGs for emergency workers and lifesaving activities). 

5.a. Each organization as appropriate, shall specify action levels for determining the need for decontamination. 

b. Each organization, as appropriate, shall establish the means for radiological decontamination of emergency personnel wounds, supplies, instruments and equipment, and for waste disposal. 

6. Each licensee shall provide onsite 

contamination control measures including: 

a. area access control; 

b. drinking water and food supplies; 

c. criteria for permitting return of 

areas and items to normal use, see 

Draft ANSI 13.12. 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

X X X 

X X X 

X X 

X X X 

X X X 

X 

X 

X 
- 68 -

K. Radiological Exposure Control (continued) 

Applicability and Cross 

Evaluation Criteria Reference to Plans 

7. Each licensee shall provide the capability for decontaminating relocated onsite personnel, including provisions for extra clothing and 

decontaminants suitable for the type of 

contamination expected, with particular attention given to radioiodine contamination 

Licensee 

of the skin. X 

~---

State Local 
- 69 -

L. Medical and Public Health Support 

Planning Standard 

Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated injured 

. d. "d 1 1 

1n 1v1 ua s. 

Evaluation Criteria 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

1. Each organization shall arrange for 

local and backup hospital and medical services 

having the capability for evaluation of 

radiation exposure and uptake, including 

assurance that persons providing these 

services are adequately prepared to handle 

contaminated individuals. X X X 

2. Each licensee shall provide for onsite 

first aid capability. X 

3. Each State shall develop lists 

indicating the location of public, private and military hospitals and other emergency medical services facilities within the 

State or contiguous States considered 

capable of providing medical support for 

any contaminated injured individual. 

The listing shall include the name, 

location, type of facility and capacity and any special radiological capabilities. These emergency medical services should 

be able to radiologically monitor contamination personnel, and have facilities 

and trained personnel able to care for 

contaminated injured persons. X 

4. Each organization shall arrange for 

transporting victims of radiological accidents to medical support facilities. X X X 

1/ The availability of an integrated emergency medical services system and a 

public health emergency plan serving the area in which the facility is located and, 

as a minimum, equivalent to the Public Health Service Guide for Developing Health 

Disaster Plans, 1974, and to the requirements of an emergency medical services system 

as outlined in the Emer enc Medical Services S stem Act of 1973 (P.L. 93-154 and 

amendments in 1979 P.L. 96-142 , should be a part of and consistent with overall 

State or local disaster control plans and should be compatible with the specific 

overall emergency response plan for the facility. 
- 70 -

M. Recovert and Reentry Planning and Postaccident Operations 

Planning Standard 

General plans for recovery and reentry are developed. 

Evaluation Criteria Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

lo Each organization, as appropriate, shall 

develop general plans and procedures for reentry and recovery and describe the means by which 

decisions to relax protective measures (e.g., allow reentry into an evacuated area} are 

reached. This process should consider both 

existing and potential conditions. 

2. Each licensee plan shall contain the 

position/title, authority and responsibilities of individuals who will fill key positions in the facility recovery organization. This 

organization shall include technical personnel with responsibilities to develop, evaluate 

and direct recovery and reentry operations. The recovery organization recommended by the 

Atomic Industrial Forum• s ••Nuclear Power 

Plant Emergency Response Plan 11 dated 

Licensee 

X 

October 11, 1979, is an acceptable framework. X 

--- 3. Each licensee and State plan shall 

specify means for informing members of the 

response organizations that a recovery operation is to be initiated, and of 

any changes in the organizational 

structure that may occur. 

4. Each plan shall establish a method for 

periodically estimating total population 

exposure. 

X 

X 

State Local 

X X 

X 

X 
- 71 -

N. Exercises and Drills 

Planning Standard 

Periodic exercises are (will be) conducted to evaluate major portions of 

emergency response capabilities, periodic drills are (will be) conducted to 

develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies identified as a result of 

exercises or drills are (will be) corrected. 

Evaluation Criteria 

l.a. An exercise is an event that tests the 

integrated capability and a major portion of 

the basic elements existing within emergency 

preparedness plans and organizations. The 

emergency preparedness exercise shall simulate 

an emergency that results in offsite radiological releases which would require response by 

offsite authorities. Exercises shall be 

conducted as set forth in NRC and FEMA rules. 

b. An exercise shall include mobilization of 

State and local personnel and resources adequate 

to verify the capability to respond to an 

accident scenario requiring response. The 

organization shall provide for a critique of 

the annual exercise by Federal and State 

observers/evaluators. The scenario should be 

varied from year to year such that all major elements of the plans and preparedness organizations are tested within a five-year period. Each organization should make provisions to 

start an exercise between 6:00 p.m. and midnight, and another between midnight and 

6:00 a.m. once every six years. Exercises 

should be conducted under various weather 

conditions. Some exercises should be 

unannounced. 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

X X X 

X X X 
- 72 -

N. Exercises and Drills (continued) 

Evaluation Criteria 

2. A drill is a supervised instruction period aimed at testing, developing and maintaining skills in a particular operation. A drill is 

often a component of an exercise. A drill 

shall be supervised and evaluated by a 

qualified drill instructor. Each organiza- tion shall conduct drills, in addition to 

the annual exercise at the frequencies indicated below: 

a. Communication Drills 

Communications with State and local governments within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone shall be tested monthly. Communications with Federal emergency response organizations and States within the ingestion pathway shall be tested quarterly. Communications between the nuclear facility, State 

and local emergency operations centers, and 

field assessment teams shall be tested 

annually. Communication drills shall also 

include the aspect of understanding the 

content of messages. 

b. Fire Dri 11 s 

Fire drills shall be conducted in accordance 

with the plant (nuclear facility) technical 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

X X X 

specifications. X 

--- c. Medical Emergency Drills 

A medical emergency drill involving a simulated 

contaminated individual which contains 

provisions for participation by the local 

support services agencies (i.e., ambulance 

and offsite medical treatment facility) shall 

be conducted annually. The offsite portions of the medical drill may be performed as part of the required annual exercise. X X 
- 73 -

No Exercises and Drills (continued) 

Evaluation Criteria 

d. Radiological Monitoring Drills 

Plant environs and radiological monitoring 

drills (onsite and offsite) shall be conducted 

annually. These drills shall include collection and analysis of all sample media (e.g., 

water, vegetation, soil and air), and pro- visions for communications and record keeping. The State drills need not be at each site. 

Where appropriate, local organizations shall 

participate. 

e. Health Physics Drills 

(1) Health Physics drills shall be 

conducted semi-annually which involve 

response to, and analysis of, simulated 

elevated airborne and liquid samples and 

direct radiation measurements in the 

environment. The State drills need 

not be at each site. 

(2) Analysis of inplant liquid samples 

with actual elevated radiation levels 

including use of the post-accident 

sampling system shall be included in 

Health Physics drills by licensees 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

X X X 

X X 

annually. X 

~----

3. Each organization shall describe how 

exercises and drills are to be carried out to 

allow free play for decisionmaking and to meet 

the following objectives. Pending the development of exercise scenarios and exercise evaluation guidance by NRC and FEMA the scenarios for 

use in exercises and drills shall include but 

not be limited to, the following: 

a. The basic objective(s) of each drill 

and exercise and appropriate evaluation 

criteria; X X X 
N. Exercises and Drills (continued) 

Evaluation Criteria 

bo The date(s), time period, place(s) and 

participating organizations; 

c. The simulated events; 

d. A time schedule of real and simulated 

initiating events; 

e. A narrative summary describing the 

conduct of the exercises or drills to 

include such things as simulated 

casualties, offsite fire department 

assistance, rescue of personnel, use 

of protective clothing, deployment of 

radiological monitoring teams, and 

public information activities; and 

f. A description of the arrangements for 

and advance materials to be provided 

to official observers. 

4. Official observers from Federal, State 

or local governments will observe, evaluate, 

and critique the required exercises. A 

critique shall be scheduled at the conclusion of the exercise to evaluate the ability 

of organizations to respond as called for in 

the plan. The critique shall be conducted 

as soon as practicable after the exercise, 

and a formal evaluation should result from 

the critique. 

5. Each organization shall establish means 

for evaluating observer and participant 

comments on areas needing improvement, 

including emergency plan procedural changes, 

and for assigning responsibility for 

implementing corrective actions. Each 

organization shall establish management 

control used to ensure that corrective 

actions are implemented. 

- 74 -

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

X X X 

X X X 

X X X 

X X X 

X X X 

X X X 

X X X 
- 75 -

0. Radiological Emergency Response Training 

~lanning Standard 

Radiological emergency response training is provided to those who may be 

called on to assist in an emergency. 

Evaluation Criteria Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

1. Each organization shall assure the 

training of appropriate individuals. 

a. Each facility to which the plant applies 

Licensee 

X 

shall provide site specific emergency response 

training for those offsite emergency organizations who may be called upon to provide assistance in 

the event of an emergency.l/ X 

~----

b. Each offsite response organization shall 

participate in and receive training. Where 

mutual aid agreements exist between local 

agencies such as fire, police and ambulance/ 

rescue, the training shall also be offered to 

the other departments who are members of the 

mutual aid district. 

2. The training program for members of the 

onsite emergency organization shall, besides 

classroom training, include practical drills 

in which each individual demonstrates ability 

to perform his assigned emergency function. 

During the practical drills, on-the-spot 

correction of erroneous performance shall be 

made and a demonstration of the proper performance offered by the instructor. X 

------

State Local 

X X 

X X 

1/ Training for hospital personnel, ambulance/rescue, police and fire departments 

shall include the procedures for notification, basic radiation protection, and their 

expected roles. For those local services support organizations who will enter the 

site, training shall also include site access procedures and the identity (by 

position and title) of the individual in the onsite emergency organization who will 

control the organizations• support activities. Offsite emergency response support 

personnel should be provided with appropriate identification cards where required. 
- 76 -

0. Radiological Emergency Response Training {continued) 

Evaluation Criteria 

3. Training for individuals assigned to licensee 

first aid teams shall include courses equivalent 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

to Red Cross Multi-Media. X 

4. Each organization shall establish a training 

program for insttucting and qualifying personnel who will implement radiological emergency response plans.2/ The specialized initial training and periodic retraining programs {including the scope, nature and frequency) shall be 

provided in the following categories: 

a. Directors or coordinators of the 

response organizations; 

b. Personnel responsible for accident 

assessment; 

c. Radiological monitoring teams and radiological analysis personnel; 

d. Police, security and fire fighting personnel; 

e. Repair and damage control/correctional 

action teams (onsite); 

f. First aid and rescue personnel; 

g. Local support services personnel including Civil Defense/Emergency Service 

personnel; 

h. Medical support personnel; 

io Licensee's headquarters support 

personnel; 

j. Personnel responsible for transmission 

of emergency information and instructions. 

---

X X X 

X X * 

X X * 

X * X 

X 

X * X 

X X 

X X X 

X 

X X X 

2/ If State and local governments lack the capability and resources to accomplish this training, they may look to the licensee and the Federal government {FEMA) for 

assistance in this training. 

*NRC and FEMA encourage State and local governments which have these capabilities 

to continue to include them in their training programs. 
- 77 -

0. Radiological Emergency Response Training (continued) 

Evaluation Criteria 

5. Each organization shall provide for the 

initial and annual retraining of personnel with emergency response responsibilities. 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

X X X 
- 78 -

P. Respdnsibility for the Planning Effort: Development, Periodic Review 

and Distribution of Emergency Plans 

Planning Standard 

Responsibilities for plan development and review and for distribution of 

emergency plans are established, and planners are properly trained. 

Evaluation Criteria 

1. Each organization shall provide for the 

training of individuals responsible for the 

planning effort. 

2. Each organization shall identify by title 

the individual with the overall authority and 

responsibility for radiological emergency 

response planning. 

3. Each organization shall designate an 

Emergency Planning Coordinator with 

responsibility for the development and 

updating of emergency plans and coordination 

of these plans with other response organizations. 

4. Each organization shall update its plan and agreements as needed, review and certify it to be current on an annual basis. The 

update shall take into account changes identified by drills and exercises. 

5. The emergency response plans and approved changes to the plans shall be forwarded to 

all organizations and appropriate individuals 

with responsibility for implementation of the 

plans. Revised pages shall be dated and 

marked to show where changes have been made. 

6. Each plan shall contain a detailed 

listing of supporting plans and their source. 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

X X X 

X X X 

X X X 

X X X 

X X X 

X X X 
- 79 -

P. Res onsibilit for the Plannin Effort: 

and Distribution of Emergency Plans 

Evaluation Criteria 

7. Each plan shall contain as an appendix listing, by title, procedures required to 

implement the plan. The listing shall 

include the section(s) of the plan to be 

implemented by each procedure. 

8. Each plan shall contain a specific table of contents. Plans submitted for 

review should be cross-referenced to these 

criteria. 

9. Each licensee shall arrange for and 

conduct independent reviews of the emergency preparedness program at least every 12 

months. (An independent review is one 

conducted by any competent organization either internal or external to the 

licensee's organization, but who are 

not immediately responsible for the 

emergency preparedness program). The 

review shall include the emergency plan, its implementing procedures and practices, training, readiness testing, equipment, 

and interfaces with State and local 

governments. Management controls shall 

be implemented for evaluation and correction 

of review findings. The result of the 

review, along with recommendations for 

improvements, shall be documented, reported 

to appropriate licensee corporate and plant 

management, and involved Federal, State 

and local organizations, and retained for 

Applicability and Cross 

Reference to Plans 

Licensee State Local 

X X X 

X X X 

a period of five years. X 

10. Each organization shall provide for 

updating telephone numbers in emergency procedures at least quarterly. 

------

X X X 
APPENDIX 1 

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL GUIDELINES 

FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 

1-1 
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1-2 
BASIS FOR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES 

Four classes of Emergency Action Levels are established which replace the classes 

in Regulatory Guide 1.101, each with associated examples of initiating conditions. 

The classes are: 

Notification of Unusual Event 

Alert 

Site Area Emergency 

General Emergency 

The rationale for the notification and alert classes is to provide early and 

prompt notification of minor events which could lead to more serious consequences 

given operator error or equipment failure or which might be indicative of more 

serious conditions which are not yet fully realized. A gradation is provided 

to assure fuller response preparations for more serious indicators. The site 

area emergency class reflects conditions where some significant releases are 

likely or are occurring but where a core melt situation is not indicated based 

on current information. In this situation full mobilization of emergency personnel in the near site environs is indicated as well as dispatch of monitoring 

teams and associated communications. The general emergency class involves 

actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with the potential for loss of containment. The immediate action for this class is sheltering 

(staying inside) rather than evacuation until an assessment can be made that 

(1) an evacuation is indicated and (2} an evacuation, if indicated, can be 

completed prior to significant release and transport of radioactive material 

to the affected areas. 

The example initiating conditions listed after the immediate actions for each 

class are to form the basis for establishment by each licensee of the specific plant instrumentation readings (as applicable) which, if exceeded, will initiate 

the emergency class. 

Potential NRC actions during various emergency classes are given in NUREG-0728, 

Report to Congress: NRC Incident Response Plan. The NRC response to any notification from a licensee will be related to, but not limited by, the 

licensee estimate of severity; NRC will consider such other factors as the 

degree of uncertainty and the lead times required to position NRC response 

personnel should something more serious develop. 

Prompt notification of offsite authorities is intended to indicate within about 

15 minutes for the unusual event class and sooner (consistent with the need 

for other emergency actions) for other classes. The time is measured from 

the time at which operators recognize that events have occurred which make 

declaration of an emergency class appropriate. 

1-3 
__, 

I 

~ 

Class 

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT 

Class Description 

Unusual events are in process or 

have occurred which indicate a 

potential degradation of the level 

of safety of the plant. No 

releases of radioactive material 

requiring offsite response or 

monitoring are expected unless 

further degradation of safety 

systems occurs. 

Purpose 

Purpose of offsite notification 

is to (1) assure that the first 

step in any response lat~r found 

to be necessary has been carried 

out, (2) bring the operating staff to a state of readiness, 

and (3) provide systematic handling of unusual events 

information and decisionmaking. 

Licensee Actions 

1. Promptly inform State and/or local 

offsite authorities of nature of 

unusual condition as soon as 

discovered 

2. Augment on-shift resources as 

needed 

3. Assess and respond 

4. Escalate to a more severe class, 

if appropriate 

or 

5. Close out with verbal summary to 

offsite authorities; followed by written summary within 24 hours 

State and/or Local Offsite 

Authority Actions 

1. Provide fire or security assistance if requested 

2. Escalate to a more severe 

class, if appropriate 

3. Stand by until verbal 

closeout 
EXAMPLE INITIATING CONDITIONS: NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT 

1. Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) initiated and discharge to vessel 

2. Radiological effluent technical specification limits exceeded 

3. Fuel damage indication. Examples: 

a. High offgas at BWR air ejector monitor (greater than 500,000 uci/sec; 

corresponding to 16 isotopes decayed to 30 minutes; or an increase of 

100,000 uci/sec within a 30 minute time period) --

b. High coolant activity sample (e.g., exceeding coolant technical speci- fications for iodine spike) 

c. Failed fuel monitor (PWR) indicates increase greater than 0.1% equivalent fuel failures within 30 minutes 

4. Abnormal coolant temperature and/or pressure or abnormal fuel temperatures outside of technical specification limits 

5. Exceeding either primary/secondary leak rate technical specification or 

primary system leak rate technical specification 

6. Failure of a safety or relief valve in a safety related system to close 

following reduction of applicable pressure 

7. Loss of offsite power or loss of onsite AC power capability 

8. Loss of containment integrity requiring shutdown by technical specifications 

9. Loss of engineered safety feature or fire protection system function 

requiring shutdown by technical specifications (e.g., because of malfunction, 

personnel error or procedural inadequacy) 

10. Fire within the plant lasting more than 10 minutes 

11. Indications or alarms on process or effluent parameters not functional in 

control room to an extent requiring plant shutdown or other significant loss of assessment or communication capability (e.g., plant computer, Safety Parameter Display System, all meteorological instrumentation) 

12. Security threat or attempted entry or attempted sabotage 

13. Natural phenomenon being experienced or projected beyond usual levels 

a. Any earthquake felt in-plant or detected on station seismic instrumentation 

b. 50 year floor or low water, tsunami, hurricane surge, seiche 

c. Any tornado on site 

d. Any hurricane 

1-5 
14. Other hazards being experienced or projected 

a. Aircraft crash on-site or unusual aircraft activity over facility 

b. Train derailment on-site 

c. Near or onsite explosion 

d. Near or onsite toxic or flammable gas release 

e. Turbine rotating component failure causing rapid plant shutdown 

15. Other plant conditions exist that warrant increased awareness on the part of a plant operating staff or State and/or local offsite authorities or require plant shutdown under technical specification requirements or involve other 

than normal controlled shutdown (e.g., cooldown rate exceeding technical 

specification limits, pipe cracking found during operation) 

16. Transportation of contaminated injured individual from site to offsite 

hospital 

17. Rapid depressurization of PWR secondary side. 

1-6 
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1-7 
State and/or Local Offsite 

Class Licensee Actions Authorit~ Actions 

ALERT 1. Promptly inform State and/or local 1. Provide fire or security authorities of alert status and assistance if requested Class DescriEtion reason for alert as soon as 

discovered 2. Augment resources and bring 

Events are in process or have primary response centers and 

occurred which involve an 2. Augment resources and activate EBS to standby status 

actual or potential substantial on-site Technical Support Center 

degradation of the level of and on-site operational support 3. Alert to standby status key 

safety of the plant. Any center. Bring Emergency Operations emergency personnel including 

releases expected to be Facility (EOF) and other key monitoring teams and 

limited to small fractions emergency personnel to standby associated communications 

of the EPA Protective Action status 

Guideline exposure levels. 4. Provide confirmatory offsite 

3. Assess and respond radiation monitoring and 

PurEOSe ingestion pathway dose 

4. Dispatch on-site monitoring teams projections if actual releases 

Purpose of offsite alert is and associated communications substantially exceed technical 

to (1) assure that emergency specification limits 

personnel are readily available 5. Provide periodic plant status __, 

I to respond if situation updates to offsite authorities 5. Escalate to a more severe 

ex:> becomes more serious or to (at least every 15 minutes) class, if appropriate perform confirmatory radiation 

monitoring if required, and 6. Provide periodic meteorological 6. Maintain alert status until 

{2) provide offsite authorities assessments to offsite authorities verbal closeout or reduction 

current status information. and, if any releases are occurring, of emergency class 

dose estimates for actual releases 

7. Escalate to a more severe class, 

if appropriate 

8. Close out or recommend reduction 

in emergency class by verbal summary 

to offsite authorities followed by written summary within 8 hours of 

closeout or class reduction 
EXAMPLE INITIATING CONDITIONS: ALERT 

1. Severe loss of fuel cladding 

a. High offgas at BWR air ejector monitor (greater than 5 ci/sec; corresponding 

to 16 isotopes decayed 30 minutes) 

b. Very high coolant activity sample (e.g., 300 uci/cc equivalent of I-131) 

c. Failed fuel monitor (PWR) indicates increase greater than 1% fuel failures 

within 30 minutes or 5% total fuel failures. 

2. Rapid gross failure of one steam generator tube with loss of offsite power 

3. Rapid failure of steam generator tubes (e.g., several hundred gpm primary 

to secondary leak rate) 

4. Steam line break with significant (e.g., greater than 10 gpm} primary to 

secondary leak rate (PWR) or MSIV malfunction causing leakage (BWR) 

5. Primary coolant leak rate greater than 50 gpm 

6. Radiation levels or airborne contamination which indicate a severe 

degradation in the control of radioactive materials (e.g., increase of 

factor of 1000 in direct radiation readings within facility) 

7. Loss of offsite power and loss of all onsite AC power (see Site Area 

Emergency for extended-rDss) 

8. Loss of all onsite DC power (See Site Area Emergency for extended loss) 

9. Coolant pump seizure leading to fuel failure 

10. Complete loss of any function needed for plant cold shutdown 

11. Failure of the reactor protection system to initiate and complete a scram 

which brings the reactor subcritical 

12. Fuel damage accident with release of radioactivity to containment or fuel 

handling building 

13. Fire potentially affecting safety systems 

14. Most or all alarms (annunciators) lost 

15. Radiological effluents greater than 10 times technical specification instantaneous limits (an instantaneous rate which, if continued over 

2 hours, would result in about 1 mr at the site boundary under average meteorological conditions) 

16. Ongoing security compromise 

1-9 
17. Severe natural phenomena being experienced or projected 

a. Earthquake greater than OBE levels 

b. Flood, low water, tsunami, hurricane surge, seiche near design levels 

c. Any tornado striking facility 

d. Hurricane winds near design basis level 

18. Other hazards being experienced or projected 

a. Aircraft crash on facility 

b. Missile impacts from whatever source on facility 

c. Known explosion damage to facility affecting plant operation 

d. Entry into facility environs of uncontrolled toxic or flammable gases 

e. Turbine failure causing casing penetration 

19. Other plant conditions exist that warrant precautionary activation of 

technical support center and placing near-site Emergency Operations Facility and other key emergency personnel on standby 

20. Evacuation of control room anticipated or required with control of shutdown 

systems established from local stations 

1-10 
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1-11 
I 

-' 

N 

Class 

SITE AREA EMERGENCY 

Class Description 

Events are in process or have 

occurred which involve actual 

or likely major failures of 

plant functions needed for 

protection of the public. Any releases not expected 

to exceed EPA Protective 

Action Guideline exposure levels except near site 

boundaryo 

Purpose 

Purpose of the site area 

emergency declaration is to 

(1) assure that response 

centers are manned, (2) assure 

that monitoring teams are 

dispatched, (3) assure that 

personnel required for 

evacuation of near-site 

areas are at duty stations 

if situation becomes more 

serious, (4) provide consultation with offsite 

authorities, and (5) provide updates for the public through offsite authorities. 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

Licensee Actions 

Promptly inform State and/or local 

offsite authorities of site area 

emergency status and reason for 

emergency as soon as discovered 

Augment resources by activating on-site Technical Support Center, 

on-site operational support center 

and near-site Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) 

Assess and respond 

Dispatch on-site and offsite monitoring 

teams and associated communications 

Dedicate an individual for plant status 

updates to offsite authorities and 

periodic pressure briefings (perhaps joint with offsite authorities) 

Make senior technical and management staff onsite available for consultation 

with NRC and State on a periodic basis 

Provide meteorological and dose estimates to offsite authorities for actual 

releases via a dedicated individual or 

automated data transmission 

Provide release and dose projections based on available plant condition 

information and foreseeable contingencies 

Escalate to general emergency class, 

if appropriate 

or 

Close out or recommend reduction in 

emergency class by briefing of offsite 

authorities at EOF and by phone followed 

by written summary within 8 hours of 

closeout or class reduction 

State and/or Local Offsite Authorit~ Actions 

1. Provide any assistance requested 

2. If sheltering near the site 

is desirable, activate public notification system within 

at least two miles of the plant 

3. Provide public within at least 

about 10 miles periodic updates 

on emergency status 

4. Augment resources by activating primary response centers 

5. Dispatch key emergency personnel including monitoring teams and 

associated communications 

6. Alert to standby status other 

emergency personnel (e.g., those needed for evacuation) 

and dispatch personnel to 

near-site duty stations 

7. Provide offsite monitoring results to licensee, DOE and 

others and jointly assess them 

8. Continuously assess information 

from licensee and offsite 

monitoring with regard to 

changes to protective actions 

already initiated for public and 

mobilizing evacuation resources 

9. Recommend placing milk animals 

within 2 miles on stored feed 

and assess nee~ to extend 

distance 

10. Provide press briefings, perhaps with licensee 

11. Escalate to general emergency class, if appropriate 

12. Maintain site area emergency 

status until closeout or 

reduction of emergency class 
EXAMPLE INITIATING CONDITIONS: SITE AREA EMERGENCY 

1. Known loss of coolant accident greater than makeup pump capacity 

2. Degraded core with possible loss of coolable geometry (indicators should 

include instrumentation to detect inadequate core cooling, coolant activity and/or containment radioactivity levels) 

3. Rapid failure of steam generator tubes (several hundred gpm leakage) with 

loss of offsite power 

4. BWR steam line break outside containment without isolation 

5. PWR steam line break with greater than 50 gpm primary to secondary leakage and indication of fuel damage 

6. Loss of offsite power and loss of onsite AC power for more than 15 minutes 

7. Loss of all vital onsite DC power for more than 15 minutes 

8. Complete loss of any function needed for plant hot shutdown 

9. Transient requiring operation of shutdown systems with failure to scram 

(continued power generation but no core damage immediately evident) 

10. Major damage to spent fuel in containment or fuel handling building (e.g., large object damages fuel or water loss below fuel level) 

11. Fire compromising the functions of safety systems 

12. Most or all alarms (annunciators) lost and plant transient initiated or in 

progress 

13. a. Effluent monitors detect levels corresponding to greater than 

50 mr/hr for 1/2 hour or greater than 500 mr/hr W.B. for two 

minutes (or five times-rhese levels to the thyroid) at the site 

boundary for adverse meteorology 

b. These dose rates are projected based on other plant parameters (e.g., radiation level in containment with leak rate appropriate for existing containment pressure) or are measured in the environs 

c. EPA Protective Action Guidelines are projected to be exceeded 

outside the site boundary 

14. Imminent loss of physical control of the plant 

15. Severe natural phenomena being experienced or projected with plant not in 

cold shutdown 

a. Earthquake greater than SSE levels 

l-13 
b. Flood, low water, tsunami, hurricane surge, seiche greater than design 

levels or failure of protection of vital equipment at lower levels 

c. Sustained winds or tornadoes in excess of design levels 

16. Other hazards being experienced or projected with plant not in cold shutdown 

a. Aircraft crash affecting vital structures by impact or fire 

b. Severe damage to safe shutdown equipment from missiles or explosion 

c. Entry of uncontrolled flammable gases into vital areas. Entry of 

uncontrolled toxic gases into vital areas where lack of access to 

the area constitutes a safety problem 

17. Other plant conditions exist that warrant activation of emergency centers 

and monitoring teams or a precautionary notification to the public near 

the site 

18. Evacuation of control room and control of shutdown systems not established 

from local stations in 15 minutes 

1-14 
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1-15 
I 

...... 

~ 

Class 

GENERAL EMERGENCY 

Class Description 

Events are in process or have 

occurred which involve actual 

or imminent substantial core 

degradation or melting with 

potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can 

be reasonably expected to 

exceed EPA Protective Action 

Guideline exposure levels 

offsite for more than the 

immediate site area. 

Purpose 

Purpose of the general emergency declaration is to (1) initiate 

predetermined protective actions 

for the public, {2) provide continuous assessment of 

information from licensee and 

offsite organization measurements, (3) initiate additional 

measures as indicated by actual 

or potential releases, (4) 

provide consultation with 

offsite authorities and 

(5) provide updates for the 

public through offsite 

authorities. 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

Licensee Actions 

Promptly inform State and local offsite 

aut orities of general emergency status 

and reason for emergency as soon as 

discovered (Parallel notification of 

State/local) 

Augment resources by activating on-site 

Technical Support Center, on-site 

operational support center and nearsite Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) 

Assess and respond 

Dispatch on-site and offsite monitoring 

teams and associated communications 

Dedicate an individual for plant status 

updates to offsite authorities and 

periodic press briefings (perhaps joint with offsite authorities) 

Make senior technical and management staff 

onsite available for consultation with 

NRC and State on a periodic basis 

Provide meteorological and dose estimates 

to offsite authorities for actual 

releases via a dedicated individual or 

automated data transmission 

Provide release and dose projections based on available plant condition 

information and foreseeable contingencies 

Close out or recommend reduction of 

emergency class by briefing of offsite 

authorities at EOF and by phone followed 

by written summary within 8 hours of 

closeout or class reduction 

State and/or Local Offsite Authorit~ Actions 

1. Provide any assistance 

requested 

2. Activate immediate public notification of emergency 

status and provide public periodic updates 

3. Recommend sheltering for 2 

mile radius and 5 miles downwind and assess need to extend 

distances. Consider advisability of evacuation 

(projected time available vs. 

estimated evacuation times) 

4. Augment resources by activatin 

primary response centers 

5. Dispatch key emergency personn including monitoring teams and 

associated communications 

6. Dispatch other emergency personnel to duty stations 

within 5 mile radius and alert 

all others to standby status 

7. Provide offsite monitoring results to licensee, DOE and 

others and jointly assess them 

8. Continuously assess information from licensee and offsite 

monitoring with regard to 

changes to protective actions 

already initiated for public and mobilizing evacuation 

resources 

9. Recommend placing milk animals 

within 10 miles on stored feed 

and assess need to extend 

distance 

10. Provide press briefings, perhaps 

with licensee 

11. ~aintain general emergency 

status until closeout or 

reduction of emeraencv cla~~ 
EXAMPLE INITIATING CONDITIONS: GENERAL EMERGENCY 

1. a. Effluent monitors detect levels corresponding to I rem/hr W.B. or 

5 rem/hr thyroid at the site boundary under actual meteorological 

conditions 

b. These dose rates are projected based on other plant parameters (e.g., radiation levels in containment with leak rate appropriate for existing 

containment pressure with some confirmation from effluent monitors) or 

are measured in the environs 

Note: Consider evacuation only within about 2 miles of the site boundary unless these site boundary levels are exceeded by a factor of 10 

or projected to continue for 10 hours or EPA Protective Action 

Guideline exposure levels are predicted to be exceeded at longer distances 

2. Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of 3rd barrier, 

(e.g., loss of primary coolant boundary, clad failure, and high potential 

for loss of containment) 

3. Loss of physical control of the facility 

Note: Consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation 

4. Other plant conditions exist, from whatever source, that make release of 

large amounts of radioactivity in a short time period possible, e.g., any 

core melt situation. See the specific PWR and BWR sequences below. 

Notes: a. For core melt sequences where significant releases from 

containment are not yet taking place and large amounts of 

fission products are not yet in the containment atmosphere, consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation. Consider 5 mile 

downwind evacuation (450 to goo sector) if large amounts 

of fission products (greater than gap activity) are in the 

containment atmosphere. Recommend sheltering in other parts 

of the plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone under this 

circumstance. 

b. For core melt sequences where significant releases from 

containment are not yet taking place and containment failure 

leading to a direct atmospheric release is likely in the 

sequence but not imminent and large amounts of fission 

products in addition to noble gases are in the containment 

atmosphere, consider precautionary evacuation to 5 miles and 

10 mile downwind evacuation (450 to 90° sector). 

c. For core melt sequences where large amounts of fission 

products other than noble gases are in the containment 

atmosphere and containment failure is judged imminent, 

recommend shelter for those areas where evacuation cannot 

be completed before transport of activity to that location. 

1-17 
d. As release information becomes available adjust these 

actions in accordance with dose projections, time available 

to evacuate and estimated evacuation times given current 

conditions. 

5. Example PWR Sequences 

a. Small and large LOCA 1s with failure of ECCS to perform leading to severe 

core degradation or melt in from minutes to hours. Ultimate failure 

of containment likely for melt sequences. (Several hours likely to be 

available to complete protective actions unless containment is not 

isolated) 

b. Transient initiated by loss of feedwater and condensate systems (principal 

heat removal system) followed by failure of emergency feedwater system 

for extended period. Core melting possible in several hours. Ultimate 

failure of containment likely if core melts. 

c. Transient requiring operation of shutdown systems with failure to scram 

which results in core damage or additional failure of core cooling and 

makeup systems (which could lead to core melt} 

d. Failure of offsite and onsite power along with total loss of emergency feedwater makeup capability for several hours. Would lead to eventual 

core melt and likely failure of containment. 

e. Small LOCA and initially successful ECCS. Subsequent failure of containment 

heat removal systems over several hours could lead to core melt and 

likely failure of containment. 

NOTE: Most likely containment failure mode is melt-through with release 

of gases only for dry containment; quicker and larger releases 

likely for ice condenser containment for melt sequences. Quicker 

releases expected for failure of containment isolation system for 

any PWR. 

6. Example BWR Sequences 

a. Transient (e.g., loss of offsite power) plus failure of requisite core 

shut down systems (e.g., scram). Could lead to core melt in several 

hours with containment failure likely. More severe consequences if 

pumps trip does not function. 

b. Small or large LOCA•s with failure of ECCS to perform leading to core 

melt degradation or melt in minutes to hours" Loss of containment 

integrity may be imminent. 

c. Small or large LOCA occurs and containment performance is unsuccessful 

affecting longer term success of the ECCS. Could lead to core degradation 

or melt in several hours without containment boundary. 

1-18 
d. Shutdown occurs but requisite decay heat removal systems (e.g., RHR) 

or non-safety systems heat removal means are rendered unavailable. 

Core degradation or melt could occur in about ten hours with subsequent containment failure. 

7. Any major internal or external events (e.g., fires, earthquakes, substantially beyond design basis) which could cause massive common damage to plant systems resulting in any of the above. 

1-19 
Introduction 

APPENDIX 2 

METEOROLOGICAL CRITERIA FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 

AT OPERATING NUCLEAR POW~R PLANTS 

10 CFR Part 50.47 requires that the Emergency Plan shall provide 11 (A)dequate 

methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential 

offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition ... 11 

The basic functions needed to comply with the meteorological aspects of these 

requirements are: 

1. A capability for making meteorological measurements. 

2. A capability for making near real-time predictions of the atmospheric effluent 

transport and diffusion. 

3. A capability for remote interrogation of the atmospheric measurements and 

predictions by appropriate organizations. 

A staged schedule is provided in Annex 1 to this appendix for implementation 

of the meteorological elements addressing emergency preparedness requirements. 

Meteorological Measurements 

The emergency facilities and equipment as stated in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 

50 shall include 11 (E)quipment for determining the magnitude of and for 

continuously assessing the impact of the release of radioactive materials 

to the environment. 11 To address this requirement, in part, the nuclear power 

plant operator shall have meteorological measurements from primary and backup 

systems. 

2-1 
Each site with an operating nuclear power plant shall have a primary meteorological 

measurements system. The primary system shall produce current and record 

historical local meteorological data. These data will provide a means to 

estimate the dispersion of radioactive material due to accidental radioactive 

releases to the atmosphere by the plant. The acceptance criteria for meteorological measurements are described in the proposed Revision 1 to U. S. NRC 

~egulatory Guide 1.23. 

Each site with an operating nuclear power plant shall have a viable backup 

meteorological measurements system. The backup system shall provide meteorological 

information when the primary system is out of service and, thus, assurance that 

basic meteorological information is available during and immediately following 

an accidental airborne radioactivity release. The acceptance criteria for 

the backup meteorological measurements system are described in the proposed 

Revision 1 to U. S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.23. 

Atmospheric Transport and Diffusion Assessment 

Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 states that 11 (T)he means to be used for determining 

the magnitude of and for continually assessing the impact of the release of 

radioactive materials shall be described ..... To address this requirement, 

in part, all licensees with operating nuclear power plants shall provide the 

description of their system for making current, site-specific estimates and 

predictions of atmospheric effluent transport and diffusion during and immediately 

following an accidental airborne radioactivity release from the nuclear power 

plant. The purpose of these predictions is to provide an input to the 

assessment of the consequences of accidental radioactive releases to the 

atmosphere and to aid in the implementation of emergency response decisions. 

2-2 
Near real-time, site-specific atmospheric transport and diffusion models shall 

be used when accidental airborne radioactive releases occur. Two classes of 

models are appropriate. The first, Class A, is a model and calculational 

capability which can produce initial transport and diffusion estimates for 

the plume exposure EPZ within 15 minutes following the classification of an 

incident. The second, Class B, is a numerical model which represents the 

actual spatial and temporal variations of plume distribution and can provide 

estimates of deposition and relative concentration of radioactivity within 

the plume exposure and ingestion EPZs for the duration of the release. 

The Class A model shall use actual 15 minute average meteorological data from 

the meteorological measurements systems maintained by the licensee. The 

selected data shall be indicative of the conditions within the plume exposure 

EPZ. The Class A model shall provide calculations or relative concentrations 

(X/Q) and transit times within the plume exposure EPZ. Atmospheric diffusion 

rates shall be based on atmospheric stability as a function of site-specific 

terrain conditions. Site-specific local climatological effects on the 

trajectories, such as seasonal, diurnal, and terrain-induced flows shall 

be included. Source characteristics (release mode, and building complex 

influence) shall be factored into the model. The output from the Class A 

model shall include the plume dimensions and position, and the location, 

magnitude, and arri~al time of (1) the peak relative concentration and (2) 

the relative concentrations at appropriate locations. The bases and justification 

for these model(s) and input data shall be documented. The performance and 

limitations of the model(s) shall also be included in the documentation. 

2-3 
The essential elements of the input, of model components, and of output to be 

incorporated in the Class A model are given to provide guidance for meteorological 

system implementation. Additional guidance will be prepared to outline the 

staff position on dose assessment capabilities to be used for emergency response. 

Remote Interrogation 

Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 states that there shall be 11 (P)rovisions for 

communications among the nuclear power reactor control room, the onsite technical 

support center and the near-site emergency operations facility •••• 11 There 

shall also be 11 (P)rovisions for communications by the licensee with the NRC 

Headquarters and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations Center from 

the nuclear power reactor control room, the onsite technical support center, 

and the near-site emergency operations facility .. and 11 ••• among the nuclear 

facility, the principal State and local emergency operations centers •••• 11 

To address this requirement with respect to the meteorological information, 

all systems producing meteorological data and effluent transport and diffusion 

estimates at sites with operating nuclear power plants shall have the capability 

of being remotely interrogated. This will provide current meteorological 

data and transport and diffusion estimates to the licensee, emergency response 

organizations, and the NRC staff, on-demand, during emergency situations. 

Proposed Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.23 identifies the meteorological 

data that shall be available. The information that shall be available from 

the transport and diffusion assessment include the model outputs, input 

variables, model identification and data source information, plant identification, and data from other sources, as available. 

2-4 
The capability to make transport and diffusion calculations with specific 

inputs shall be provided. The primary and backup communications systems 

shall have a data transmission rate of 1200 BAUD and the rate(s) and other 

specifications indicated in proposed Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.23. 

Documentation for procedures to access and use the system shall be provided 

to the emergency response organizations and the NRC, and shall be available 

in the control room, the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Emergency 

Operations Facility (EOF). 

2-5 
ANNEX 1 TO APPENDIX 2 

SCHEDULES TO IMPLEMENT THE METEOROLOGICAL ELEMENTS 

ADDRESSING EMERGENCY PLANNING RULES 

Schedule for Operating Reactors -- For operating reactors the following 

implementation milestones shall be met to address the functional requirements. 

Milestones are numbered and tagged with the following code; a-date, b-activity, 

c-minimum acceptance criteria. They are as follows: 

(1} a. January 2, 1981 

b. Submittal of radiological emergency response plans 

c. A description of the emergency plan which addresses the meteorological 

functions shall be provided 

(2} a. March 1, 1981 

b. Submittal of implementing procedures 

c. Methods, systems, and equipment to assess and monitor actual or 

potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition 

shall be provided 

(3} a. April 1, 1981 

b. Implementation of radiological emergency response plans 

c. Three functions of Appendix 2 with the exception of the Class B 

model of the assessment capability 

2-6 
Alternative to milestone (3) requiring compensating actions: 

A meteorological measurements system which is consistent with the 

existing technical specifications as the baseline or a primary 

system and/or a backup system of Appendix 2, or two independent 

backup systems shall provide the basic meteorological parameters 

(wind direction and speed and an indicator of atmospheric stability) 

on display in the control room. An operable dose calculational 

methodology (DCM) shall be in use in the control room and at 

appropriate emergency response facilities. The following compensating 

actions shall be taken by the licensee for this alternative: 

(i) if only a primary or a backup system is in use: 

o The licensee (a person who will be responsible for making 

offsite dose projections) shall check communications 

0 

0 

with the cognizant National Weather Service (NWS) first 

order station and NWS forecasting station on a monthly 

basis to ensure that routine meteorological observations 

and forecasts can be accessed. 

The licensee shall calibrate the meteorological 

measurements at a frequency no less than quarterly 

and identify a readily available source of meteorological 

data (characteristic of site conditions) to which they 

can gain access during calibration periods. 

During conditions of measurements system unavailability, 

an alternate source of meteorological data which is 

characteristic of site conditions shall be identified 

to which the licensee can gain access. 

2-7 
o The licensee shall maintain a site inspection schedule 

for evaluation of the meteorological measurements system 

at a frequency no less than weekly. 

o It shall be a reportable occurrence if the meteorological 

data unavailability exceeds the goals outlined in 

Proposed Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.23 on a quarterly 

basis. 

(ii) The portion of the DCM relating to the transport and 

diffusion of gaseous effluents shall be consistent with 

the characteristics of the Class A model outlined in 

the assessment capability of Appendix 2. 

{iii) Direct telephone access to the individual responsible for 

making offsite dose projections (Appendix E to 10 CFR 

Part 50(IV)(A)(4)) shall be available to the NRC in the 

event of a radiological emergency. Procedures for 

establishing contact and identification of contact 

individuals shall be provided as part of the implementing 

procedures. 

This alternative shall not be exercised after July 1, 1982. Further, 

by July 1, 1981, a functional description of the upgraded capabilities 

and schedule for installation and operation shall be provided (see 

milestones 4 and 5). 

(4) a. April 1, 1982 

b. Installation of Emergency Response Facility meteorological hardware 

and software 

2-8 
c. Three functions of Appendix 2, with exception of the Class B model 

of the assessment capability 

(5} a. July 1, 1982 

b. Full operation of milestone 4 

c. The Class A model (designed to be used out to the plume exposure 

EPZ} may be used in lieu of a Cl~ss B model out to the ingestion 

EPZ. Compensating actions to be taken for extending the application 

of the Class A model out to the ingestion EPZ include access to 

supplemental information (meso and synoptic scale} to apply judgment 

regarding intermediate and long-range transport estimates. The 

distribution of meteorological information by the licensee should 

be as follows by July 1, 1982: 

Meteorological NRC and Emergency 

Information CR TSC EOF Response Organizations 

Basic Met. Data X X X X (NRC} 

(e.g., 1.97 Parameters} 

Full Met. Data X X X 

(1.23 Parameters} DCM (for Dose X X X X 

Projections} 

Class A Model (to X X X X 

Plume Exposure EPZ} 

Class B Model or X X X 

Class A Model 

(to Ingestion EPZ} 

(6} a. July 1, 1982 or at the time of the completion of milestone 5, 

whichever is sooner 

b. Mandatory review of the DCM by the licensee 

2-9 
c. Any DCM in use should be reviewed to ensure consistency with the 

operational Class A model. Thus, actions recommended during the 

initial phases of a radiological emergency would be consistent with 

those after the TSC and EOF are activated 

(7) a. September 1, 1982 

b. Description of the Class B model provided to the NRC 

c. Documentation of the technical bases and justification for selection 

of the type Class B model by the licensee with a discussion of the 

site-specific attributes 

(8) a. June 1, 1983 

b. Full operation of the Class B model 

c. Class B model of the assessment capability of Appendix 2 

o Schedule for Near-Term OLs 

For applicants for an operating license at least milestones 1, 2, and 

3 shall be met prior to the issuance of an operating license. Subsequent 

milestones shall be met by the same dates indicated for operating reactors. 

For the alternative to milestone 3, the meteorological measurements 

system shall be consistent with the NUREG-75/087, ''Standard Review 

Plan For the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants," 

Section 2.3.3 program as the baseline or primary system and/or backup 

system. 

2-10 
APPENDIX 3 

MEANS FOR PROVIDING PROMPT ALERTING AND NOTIFICATION OF 

RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS AND THE POPULATION 

NRC and FEMA recognize that the responsibility for activating the prompt 

notification system called for in this section is properly the responsibility of State and local governments. NRC and FEMA also recognize that 

the responsibility for demonstrating that such a system is in place rests 

with the facility licensee. 

The initial notification when appropriate, of the affected population within 

the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) must be completed 

in a manner consistent with assuring the public health and safety. The design 

objective for the system shall be to meet the acceptance criteria of section 

B of this Appendix. This design objective does not, however, constitute a 

guarantee that early notification can be provided for everyone with 100% 

assurance or that the system when tested under actual field conditions will 

meet the design objective in all cases. 

The plan shall include: 

o The specific organizations or individuals, by title, who will 

be responsible for notifying response organizations and the 

affected population and the specific decision chains for rapid 

implementation of alerting and notification decisions; 

o A capability for 24-hour per day alerting and notification; 

3-1 
o Provision for the use of public communications media or other 

methods for issuing emergency instructions to members of the 

public, and 

o A description of the information that would be communicated 

to the public under given circumstances, for continuing instructions on emergency actions to follow, and updating of information. 

A. Concept of Operations 

Commercial broadcast messages are the primary means for advising the general 

public of the conditions of any nuclear accident. The primary means for 

alerting the public to an impending notification by public authorities 

may be any combination of fixed, mobile or electronic tone generators which 

will convey the alerting signal with sufficient timeliness and intensity to 

permit completion of notification by broadcast media in a timely manner. 

Since the timeliness of notification is a function of the accident severity, 

to be effective, appropriate systems, such as EBS and NOAA weather radio, 

should be placed on alert prior to the physical need for a public broadcast. 

The second or "A 1 ert" category of events in Appendix 1 wou 1 d ordi na ri ly 

trigger the placing of broadcast media on alert, pending further instructions from State and local officials. 

It is desirable for the public notification system to have a phasing 

capability. The arrangements for phasing are a function of the case-bycase population distribution or topography around each nuclear power station, 

and the details of each site-specific preparedness plan of State and local 

government. 

3-2 
B. Criteria for }cceptance 

1. Within the plume exposure EPZ the system shall provide an alerting 

signal and notification by commercial broadcast (e.g., EBS) plus 

special systems such as NOAA radio. A system which expects the 

recipient to turn on a radio receiver without being alerted by an 

acoustic alerting signal or some other manner is not acceptable. 

2. The minimum acceptable design objectives for coverage by the system 

are: 

a) Capability for providing both an alert signal and an 

informational or instructional message to the population 

on an area wide basis throughout the 10 mile EPZ, within 

15 minutes. 

b) The initial notification system will assure direct coverage of 

essentially 100% of the population within 5 miles of the site. 

c) Special arrangements will be made to assure 100% coverage within 

45 minutes of the population who may not have received the initial 

notification within the entire plume exposure EPZ. 

The basis for any special requirements exceptions (e.g., for extended water 

areas with transient boats or remote hiking trails) must be documented. 

Assurance of continued notification capability may be verified on a 

statistical basis. Every year, or in conjunction with an exercise of 

the facility, FEMA, in cooperation with the utility operator, and/or the 

State and local governments will take a statistical sample of the residents 

of all areas within about ten miles to assess the public•s ability to hear 

3-3 
the alerting signal and their awareness of the meaning of the prompt 

notification message as well as the availability of information on 

what to do in an emergency. The system plan must include a provision 

for corrective measures to provide reasonable assurance that coverage 

approaching the design objectives is maintained. The systems shall be 

operable no later than July 1, 1981. The lack of a specific design 

objective for a specified percent of the population between 5 and 10 

miles which must receive the prompt signal within 15 minutes is to 

allow flexibility in system design. Designers should do scoping 

studies at different percent coverages to allow determination of 

whether an effective increase in capability per unit of cost can be 

achieved while still meeting the objective of item 2.a. above. 

3. Public Notifications 

A prompt notification scheme shall include the capability of local 

and State agencies to provide information promptly over radio and TV 

at the time of activation of the alerting signal. The Emergency Plans 

shall include evidence of such capability via agreements, arrangements 

or citation of applicable laws which provide for designated agencies 

to air messages on TV and radio in emergencies. Initial notifications 

of the public might include instructions to stay inside, close windows 

and doors, and listen to radio and TV for further instructions. 

c. Physical Implementation 

1. Communications Supporting Alerting and Notification Systems 

Policy Objective 

Federal, State and local government and utility authorities must develop and maintain plans, systems, procedures and relationships that 

3-4 
are effective in mobilizing responsible authorities and operating 

elements in alerting and notifying the general public and in assuring 

appropriate and effective responses by the public. 

Incident Alert Notification 

The triggering of processes to mobilize forces and warn the public 

is dependent upon the communication between the nuclear power facility 

and government authorities {Federal, State and Local). The communications net must feature the following capacity: 

a. Coverage: 24 hour coverage at the facility and at the primary 

points to receive and act upon notification. 

b. Points to be Linked: Appendix 1 describes the conditions for 

assured dissemination of alert and warning information by the 

nuclear power plant to appropriate local and State warning points 

at all times and under all conditions. The system should include 

identical communications capabilities at primary and alternate 

operating locations. 

c. Net Control: To assure effective utilization, net discipline 

and availability, one location should be assigned responsibility 

for net control and an alternate designated. The primary and 

alternate location should be a State or local civil government 

activity. It should issue and update procedures on testing, net 

access, and discipline and maintenance and repair. 

d. System Availability and Reliability: All stations/points on 

the network and the communications linkage must provide a capability for immediate dissemination, receipt and acknowledgment of 

3-5 
alert and warning messages on a 24-hour basis. The system should 

be able to function notwithstanding adverse environmental conditions, such as floods and power outages. It should not be subject 

to pre-emption for lower priority purposes nor to failure due to 

traffic (subscriber) overloading. To the extent a single system 

does not meet these performance standards, alternate means must be 

in place which have dissimilar vulnerability characteristics. 

e. Information Sensitivity: The system design should take into 

consideration that alert and warning information is highly sensitive and if monitored or intercepted by unauthorized personnel, is 

subject to misinterpretation and can lead to undesirable and 

counterproductive reactions. Therefore it is desirable not to 

cite specific radio frequencies in public planning documents. 

f. System Features: Dissemination should be rapid and reliable and 

provide acknowledgment and verification of message content. It 

is desirable for voice traffic to be supported by hard copy 

verification. 

g. Multipurpose Use: Whatever system is designed and installed to 

meet all of the above capabilities for accident alerting may 

be used for co~runication in support of other response functions. 

However, systems designed for other purposes should not be adapted 

to incident alert notification unless (a) all of the criteria 

are met and (b) such adaptation does not compromise their primary 

purpose. Exception may be justified when a system designed for 

other purposes is adapted to incident alert notification to serve as 

a back-up to the primary system. 

3-6 
2. Notification of Response Organizations 

a. Assigned Responsibility: Plans should clearly designate the 

responsibility and means of notifying response organizations by 

either the nuclear power plant or by the State or local warning 

points designated to receive initial alert notification. 

b. Dissemination Time: Warning points cannot be encumbered by 

sequential call down processes nor can response organizations 

accept the time lost by such processes. This second level 

notification by warning points should be a one call process 

to all assigned organizations to be notified. Acknowledgement 

and message verification is essential. Message content must 

be clear, and brief. A preferred procedure is to communicate 

a posture code which calls for various predetermined responses 

for each organization based on its mission. 

c. Capability of Organizations to be Notified: Organizations with 

immediate response functions must also have a 24-hour capability 

of receiving and acting upon a notification. 

d. Internal Alerting: Each organization with response functions must 

develop reliable procedures for internal alerting and mobilization 

of forces. The system should account for the non-emergency nature 

of some organizations and the routine posture of key staff elements. 

3. Sirens 

Wherever proposed as part of a system, subject to later testing by 

statistical sampling, the design concept and expected performance 

3-7 
must be documented as part of plans submitted by licensees, States 

and local governments. The designs of such systems must take into 

account the demography and topography of the areas being considered. 

Some institutional alerting mechanisms are already in place (e.g., 

in schools, factories, hospitals, shopping centers, jails, and centralized offices). Siren systems should complement rather than 

substitute for these alreaqy in place. 

The basic criterion needed for the design of a siren system is the 

acceptable dissonant sound level as described in 11 0utdoor Warning 

Systems Guide, 11 Report No. 4100, by Bolt, Beranek and Newman, Inc., 

June 1979 (FEMA publication number CPG-1-17). 

As an acceptable criteria at most locations lOdb above average daytime 

ambient background should be a target level for the design of an adequate 

siren system. In cases involving industrial operations, a special 

survey to determine design sound level targets or an inside system 

may be needed to provide an audible lOdb dissonant differential. 

Sirens on vehicles may be used to supplement fixed alert systems 

outside the inner five mile radius of the plume exposure EPZ. 

Siren systems should be designed considering the demography and 

topography of an area, and taking into account other alert or notification systems in place or planned. The maxium sound levels received 

by any member of the public should be lower than 123db, the level which 

may cause discomfort to individuals. 

3-8 
a. The 10db dissonant differential is a conservative use of the 9db 

differential which is discussed in FEMA document CPG-1-17. Research 

has shown that a person is capable of being alerted by such a 

differential above or below the background ambient in the case of a 

predominately narrow band 300 to 800Hz emitted by large sirens. 

The achievement of a positive differential of 10db has been a basic 

objective (although not always attained) of a wide range civil 

defense system. 

b. In considering siren applications for nuclear power stations, 

the actual population density must be considered. The average 

population density around such stations is well below 2000 persons/ 

per square mile. Therefore, any use of population based criteria 

such as Figure 1 of CPG-1-17 is improper because the actual population density is predominately low. 

c. The 10db differential above daytime ambient is meant to provide 

a distinguishable signal inside of average residential construction under average conditions. Where special individual cases 

require a higher alerting signal, it should be provided by other 

means than a generally distributed acoustic signal. 

d. In keeping with the policy that sirens may only be a portion of 

a complete public notification system, NRC and FEMA believe that 

organizations proposing their use retain the responsibility for 

cost/benefit decisions which might ~nvolve the use alternative 

methods in thinly populated areas where such methods are cost 

effective while meeting the notification criteria for the Plume 

Exposure EPZ. Where sirens are proposed, the design may be based 

either on handbook values for background, or alternatively on 

field surveys. 

3-9 
e. For Organizations Proposing Systems Without Field Surve~ 

It may be very difficult, expensive, and time consuming to determine the average-day-time ambient for an EPZ. Sound level change 

with season, location, weather, traffic, ground cover, etc. If 

in combination with the uncertainties in siren performance, it 

is doubtful whether the predictability of detection would be 

increased above what could be obtained using existing date to 

develop standards, 50db(a) is a conservative estimate of the 

average day time ambient in areas with population below 2000 

person/per square mile. For organizations proposing systems 

without field surveys, the following requirements apply: 

That Figure 1 of CPG-1-17, 11 0utdoor Warning Systems Guide 11 

published by FEMA, be used as the design criterion for siren 

systems in areas with population densities above 2000 per-

/ .2 

sons m1 • 

For areas with population densities below 2000 persons/mi 2 

the siren system must be designed to produce a minimum of 

60db(c). An attenuation factor of 10db loss per distance 

doubled should be used to determine siren range in the absence 

of special geographical features. Those organizations applying the criteria should document the basis for their selection 

of appropriate values to include: 

* population densities, location of major transportaiton 

routes and heavy industry 

* attenuation factors with distance 

3-10 
* siren output db(c) at 100 feet vs. assumed range and acoustic frequency spect a. 

* maps showing siren location, size of coverage and any features that could affect siren performance (e.g., hills) 

* mounting heights of sirens 

* special weather conditions such as expected heavy snow 

which might modify the design assumptions 

f. For Organizations Proposing Systems With Field Surveys 

Instead of a 50db(a) estimate of average daytime background for 

areas with relatively low population (less than 2000 persons/per 

square mile), the average daytime {7 am to 10 pm) background may be 

measured. 

The 10 db above average daytime ambient background may then be 

applied against these measurements. 

Background db should be determined in a band about the siren 

signal frequency. Inclusion of background noise energy from 

outside this band could be misleading. 

Figure 1 of CPG-1-17, 11 0utdoor Warning System Guide, .. should 

be used as the design criterion for siren systems in areas 

with population densities above 2000 persons/mi2. 

Oryanizations choosing to measure background ambients should 

document the basis for their selection to include: 

* The basic requirements described in paragraph e concerning 

population densities, attenuation factors, siren output 

and spectra, and maps with terrain features 

3-11 
* Values of measured average daytime ambient background used as 

a basis for siren selection, to include survey location, how 

locations were selected, frequency range measured and measurement time span 

* How seasonal changes were taken into account 

g. Genera 1 Cons ide rations 

NRC's licensees are urged to cooperate with State and local 

governments in the use of cost effective combinations of systems, 

including those already in place, as a means of satisfying this 

objective. 

The siren signal shall be a 3 to 5 minute steaqy signal as described in Paragraph IV E of CPG-1-17 and capable of repetition. 

h. Siren Testing Guidance 

(1) Types of tests and suggested frequency are: 

* Silent Test every two weeks - log entry 

* Growl Test (or equipment) quarterly and when preventive 

maintenance is performed 

* Complete Cycle Test 

(2) Oversight 

at least annually, and as 

required for formal exercises 

* FEMA will receive an annual statement from the cognizant 

State or local authority that silent and growl tests have 

been performed. This may in turn be based on utility 

certification if the utility has directed responsibility 

for maintenance. 

3-12 
* FEMA will observe or receive a statement of the annual 

statistical sample of population in the EPZ hearing a test 

based on a field test or in conjunction with an exercise. 

FEMA will approve corrective measures necessary to provide 

assurance that siren systems are meeting the objectives for 

alerting the population (where they are the specific means 

for such alerting) approved jointly by NRC and FEMA. 

4. Other Systems 

a. The Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) 

The Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) exists to furnish an expedited means of furnishing real time communications to the public 

in the event of war, threat of war, or grave national, or regional 

or local crisis. 

To activate the EBS at the State level, a request may be directed 

to an Originating Primary Relay Station (usually an FM station 

located near the State capital) by the Governor, his desingated 

representative, the National Weather Service, the State Civil 

Preparedness or Emergency Services Office, or other designated 

State authority. 

At the local level, a request for activation may be directed to 

the Common Program Control Station (CPCS-1), by designated officials 

of local government or the National Weather Service. 

3-13 
In either case, communications facilities developed for use in 

contacting and providing emergency program material may include 

any ~f the following: telephone, remote pickup units, NOAA Weather 

Wire Service or NOAA Weather Radio, police and fire communications, 

amateur and citizens band radio. Station management at the 

Originating Primary Relay Station and/or the Common Program Control 

Station authenticates the validity of all requests to activate the 

system. Other broadcast stations may activate the EBS on an 

individual basis as needed. This is important since station management is responsible for all program material broadcast to the 

public. 

The Originating Primary Relay Station at the State level, or the 

Common Program Control Station at the local level, will take the 

following steps to activate the EBS: 

1. Take action to broadcast emergency programming which may 

include recording the emergency message for use later. 

2. Broadcast an initial statement. 

3. Transmit the two-tone Attention Signal. 

4. Broadcast the emergency announcement. 

All other participating stations, alerted via their off-the-air 

monitoring of the two-tone signal, repeat the above procedures. 

3-14 
The State and local EBS is available for public officials who have 

specifically been designated "activating officials. 11 These 

designees are responsible to the community for determining the 

appropriateness of activating the EBS for disseminating emeryency 

public information. In this regard, the activating official could 

determine that an early alert to the broadcasters was advisable, 

because rr certain actual or contemplated adverse conditions at a 

nuclear power plant. Such a decision could be implemented by the 

activating official notifying the broadcasters by available 

communications. The bottom line of the early alert would be to 

notify stations that are off the air, that there may be a need for 

activation, which in turn would cause the stations to notify 

appropriate personnel to stand by. 

Alerting and notification systems around nuclear facilities must 

be integrated with the State and local EBS Operational Area Plan. 

Operational Area EBS plans involve agreements with the Common 

Program Control Stations (CPCS-1) and local emergency preparedness 

organizations while the State EBS plan is coordinated with the 

State emergency communications chairman. It may be necessary for 

utility organizations to sign agreements with CPCS-1 stations in 

order to cove~ a cast breaking general emergency described in 

Appendix 1. He ver, actual public notices would only take place 

upon authoriz~11on of governmental authorities. 

3-15 
b. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Weather 

of Emergency Alert 

Receivers compatible with Weather or Emergency Alert transmitters can be obtained commercially. Where transmitters or 

repeaters are not available, such could be provided independently, or perhaps by negotiation with the National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric (NOAA) or the Federal Communications Commission 

(FCC). Receivers and servicing thereof could be offered as a 

service. 

c. Telephone Automatic Dialers 

Systems are available whereby pre-selected telephone numbers 

could be dialed automatically, and a recorded announcement 

played when a telephone is answered. After a fixed number of 

rings, the next number is dialed automatically; the unanswered 

numbers are redialed at the end of the quene. This system 

could be most cost-effective and secure for warning to principal response officials, school systems, selected industrial 

complexes, downstream water works or isolated farms. 

d. Aircraft with Loudspeakers 

Hiking trails and hunting areas are illustrative of areas 

where it may not be feasible to provide a prompt notification 

by any other means except by aircraft equipped with powerful 

sound systems or by dropping prepared leaflets. Such would 

not work in bad weather, of course, but such areas are less 

likely to be used in bad weather. These areas should be 

reached on a best effort basis. 

3-16 
APPENDIX 4 

EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES WITHIN THE PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY 

EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE 

The following is an example of what shall be included in an evacuation times 

assessment study and how it might be presented. The example includes a 

complete outline of material to be covered, but only a few typical tables 

and explanations are provided. The requirements are intended to be illustrative 

of necessary considerations and provide for consistency in reporting. Because 

the evacuation time estimates will be used by those emergency response 

personnel charged with recommending and deciding on protective actions during 

an emergency the evacuation time estimates should be updated as local conditions 

change (e.g., change in type or effectiveness of public notification system). 

I. INTRODUCTION 

This section of the report should make the reader aware of the general 

location of the nuclear power plant and plume exposure pathway emergency 

planning zone, and generally discuss how the analysis was done. 

A. Site Location and Emergency Planning Zone 

A vicinity map showing the plant location shall be provided 

along with a detailed map of the plume exposure pathway emergency 

planning zone (EPZ). The map shall be legible and identify 

transportation networks, topographical features and political 

boundaries. (See planning element J.lO.a.) 

4-1 
B. General Assumption? 

All assumptions used in the analysis shall be provided. The 

assumptions shall include such things as automobile occupancy 

factors, method of determining roadway capacities, and method 

of estimating populations. 

C. Methodology 

A description of the method of analyzing the evacuation times shall 

be provided. If computer models are used, a general description 

of the algorithm shall be provided along with a source for obtaining 

further information or documentation. 

II. DEMAND ESTIMATION 

The objective of this section is to provide an estimate of the number of 

people to be evacuated. Three potential population segments shall be 

considered: 

facilities. 

permanent residents, transients, and persons in special 

Permanent residents includes all people having a residence 

in the area, but not in institutions. Transients shall include tourists, 

employees not residing in the area, or other groups that may visit the 

area. Special facility residents include those confined to institutions 

such as hospitals and nursing homes. The school population shall be 

evaluated in the special facility segment. Care should be taken to 

avoid double counting. 

A. Permanent Residents 

The number of permanent residents shall be estimated using the U. S. 

Census data or other reliabl'e data, adjusted as necessary, for growth. 

(See planning element J. lO.b.). This population data shall then be 

translated into two subgroups: 1) those using autos and those 

4-2 
without autos. The number of vehicles used by permanent residents 

is estimated using an appropriate auto occupancy factor. A range 

of two to three persons per vehicle would probably be reasonable 

in most cases. 

An alternative approach is to calculate the number of vehicles based 

on the number of households that own vehicles assuming one vehicle 

per household is used in evacuation. Regardless of the approach 

used, special attention must be given to those households not having 

automobiles. The public transport-dependent population must, therefore, 

be considered as a special case. 

B. Transient Populations 

Estimates of transient populations shall be developed using local data 

such as peak tourist volumes and employment data for large factories. 

Automobile occupancy factors would vary for different transient groups. 

Tourists might have automobile occupancy factors in the range of three 

to four while a factory would probably have a factor of less than 

1.5 persons per vehicle. This population segment along with the 

permanent population subgroup using automobiles constitute the general 

population group for which an evacuation time estimate shall be made. 

C. Special Facility Population 

An estimate for this special population group shall usually be done 

on an institution-by-institution basis. The means of transportation 

are also highly individualized and shall be described. Schools 

shall be included in this segment. 

4-3 
D. Emergency Planning Zone and Sub-areas 

The sub-areas for which evacuation time estimates are required must 

encompass the entire area within the plume exposure EPZ. Additionally, 

evacuation time estimates are also required for simultaneous evacuation 

of the entire plume exposure pathway. The areas to be considered 

are as follows: 

Radius 

about 2 miles 

about 5 miles 

about 10 miles (EPZ) 

about 10 miles (EPZ) 

Area 

four goo sectors 

four goo sectors 

four goo sectors 

entire EPZ 

When making estimates for the outer sectors, assume that the inner 

adjacent sectors are being evacuated simultaneously. The boundaries 

of the sub-areas shall be based upon the same factors as the EPZ, 

namely demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and 

local jurisdictions. To the extent practical, the sector boundaries 

shall not divide densely populated areas. Where meteorological conditions 

such as dominant wind directions, warrant special consideration, an 

additional sub-area may need to be defined and a separate estimate 

made for this case. The EPZ and its sub-areas shall be identified 

by mapping on United States Geological Survey (USGS) 7-l/2-minute 

series quadrant maps when available. Special facilities shall also 

be noted on these maps, to the extent that their locations can be 

geographically specified. 

4-4 
Populations shall be provided by evacuation areas as specified in 

planning element J.lO.b. For the purpose of determining evacuation 

times it may also be useful to summarize population data by sector and 

distance from the plant. Figure 1 is an example of such a summary. 

Separate totals shall be provided for the three population segments. 

Figure 2 shows the population totals translated into the number of 

vehicles estimated to be used in evacuation. 

III. TRAFFIC CAPACITY 

This section of the report shall show the facilities to be used in evacuation. 

It shall include their location, types, and capacities. A complete review 

shall be made of the road network. Analyses shall be made of travel times 

and potential locations for serious congestion in potential corridors. 

(The analyses may be simplified in extreme rural areas.) The entire 

road network shall be used but local routes shall be carefully selected 

and analyzed to minimize their impact on the major routes should queuing 

or cross traffic conflicts occur. Care shall be taken to avoid depending 

only on high-capacity interstate and similar type routes because of 

limitations of on-ramp capacities. Alternatively, special traffic 

management plans may be developed to effectively utilize available 

capacity. Evacuation shall be based on general radial dispersion. 

A. Evacuation Roadway Network 

A map showing only those roads used as primary evacuation routes 

shall be provided. Figure 3 is an example. The map need not show 

local access streets necessary to get to the evacuation routes. Each 

segment of the network shall be numbered in some manner for reference. 

4-5 
The sector and quadrant boundaries shall also be indicated. (See 

planning elements J.lO.a and b.). 

B. Roadway Segment Characteristics 

A table such as example Table 1 shall be provided indicating all the 

evacuation route segments and their characteristics, including capacity. 

The characteristics of a segment shall be given for the narrowest section 

or bottleneck if the roadway is not uniform in the number of lanes 

throughout the segment. 

IV. ANALYSIS OF EVACUATION TIMES 

As indicated previously, evacuation time is composed of several components. 

Each of these components shall be estimated in order to determine the total 

evacuation time. 

A. Reporting Format 

Table·2 shows the desired format for presenting the data and results 

for each type of evacuation. Each of the evacuation time components 

is presented along with the total evacuation time. Two conditions 

normal and adverse -- are considered in the analyses. Adverse 

conditions would depend on the characteristics of a specific site 

and could include flooding, snow, ice, fog or rain. The adverse 

weather frequency used in this analysis shall be identified and 

shall be severe enough to define the sensitivity of the analysis to 

the selected events. These conditions will affect both travel times 

and capacity. More than one adverse condition may need to be 

considered. That is, a northern site with a high summer tourist 

4-6 
population should consider rain, flooding, or fog as the adverse 

condition as well as snow with winter population estimates. 

The text accompanying the table shall clearly indicate the critical 

assumptions which underlie the time estimates; e.g., day versus night, 

workday versus weekend, peak transient versus off-peak transient, 

and evacuation on adjacent sectors versus nonevacuation. The relative 

significance of alternative assumptions shall be addressed, especially 

with regard to time dependent traffic loading of the segments of the 

evacuation roadway network. 

Some modification of the reporting format may be appropriate, depending 

on local circumstances. 

B. Methodology 

The method for computing total evacuation time shall be specified. 

Two approaches are acceptable. The simplest approach is to assume 

that events are sequential. That is to say, for example, that no 

one begins to move until all persons are warned and prepared to leave 

before anyone starts moving. The time is estimated by simply adding 

the maximum time for each component. This approach tends to overestimate the evacuation time. 

The second approach, which is more complex and will be discussed 

further, is to combine the distribution functions for the various 

evacuation time components. This second approach may result 

in reduced time estimate~ due to more realistic assumptions. The 

added complexity of analysis, therefore, may be warranted at sites 

4-7 
with long evacuation times. When distribution functions are used, 

estimates are made of the likelihood that each stage in an evacuation 

sequence will be accomplished within a given period of time. These 

conditional probabilities depend upon completion of the preceding 

stage. For example, formulation of family units or other evacuation 

groups does not commence until notification is received. Some of 

these distribution functions must be based on the judgment of the 

estimators. Computation of the joint distribution functions of 

evacuation times are made. Typically, the joint distribution assumes 

the form of an S-shape curve as shown in Figure 4. The evacuation time 

function is fairly smooth for large homogeneous population segments 

such as the general public. Special facilities, such as hospitals and 

industrial centers, produce less smooth functions, or discontinuous 

ones. The assessment of evacuation time may be easily updated should 

further analyses be conducted, assumptions changed, or new plans 

developed. 

When distributions are used, distribution functions for notification 

of the various categories of the evacuee population shall be developed. 

The distribution functions for the action stages after notification 

predict what fraction of the population will complete a particular 

action within a given span of time. There are separate distributions 

for auto-owning households, school population, and transit dependent 

populations. These distribution functions can be constructed in a 

variety of ways, depending greatly on the kinds of data available for 

the actual site being studied. The previously developed conditional 

4-8 
distributions are combined to develop the time distributions for the 

various population segments departing their home or other facility from 

which they are being evacuated. For example, for the auto-owning population segment, these vehicles are then loaded onto the roadway network 

in order to compute travel times and delays. 

Regardless of the means by which the time and amount of traffic to 

be loaded on the network is determined (i.e., sequentially or using 

distribution functions), it is necessary to calculate the on-road 

travel and delay times. In this step, traffic from each sector is 

assigned to available evacuation routes, and, if assigned volumes 

exceed capacity, delay times must be calculated using a queuing analyses. 

Traffic queue (backup) locations and estimated delay times should be 

indicated on the area map. 

An estimate of the time required to evacuate that segment of the noncar-owning population dependent upon public transport shall be made, 

in a similar manner to that used for the auto-owning population. 

This estimate shall include consideration of any special services 

which might be initiated to serve this population subgroup. Such 

services might include fixed-route departures from designated assembly 

points. 

Estimates for special facilities shall be made with consideration 

for the means of mobilization of equipment and manpower to aid in 

evacuation, and the needs for designated employees or staff to delay 

4-9 
their evacuation in order to shut down industrial facilities. Each 

special facility shall be treated on an individual basis. Weather 

conditioAs and time of day conditions shall be considered. 

Consideration shall be given to the impact of peak populations 

including behavioral aspects. 

All of the results shall be reported in the format previously indicated. 

This format summarizes the maximum time for each component and for 

each sector. The components may or may not be directly additive based 

on the methodology used and stated in the report. Where distribution 

functions are used the percentage of the population as a function 

of time should be reported (See Figure 4 for an example format). 

V. OTHER REQUIREMENTS 

The time required for confirmation of evacuation shall be estimated. 

Candidate methods includP. visual confirmation by aircraft or ground 

vehicles and telephone confirmation. 

Specific recommendations for actions that could be taken to significantly 

improve evacuation time shall be given. Where significant costs may be 

involved, preliminnry estimates of the cost of implementing these 

recommendations shall be given. 

A review of the draft submittal by the principal organizations (State 

and local) involved in emergency response for the site shall be solicited 

and comments resulting from such review included with the submittal. 

4-10 
( 

I :otal Sevment Population ] ~--'- 0 to 10 Miles _ 

POPULATION TOTALS 

RING,MILfS Rl~~- POPULATION TOTAL MILES CUMULA.!.I.Y.~ 

POPULATION 

0-2 0·2 

2·5 0·5 

5-10 0-10 

Figure 1: Example of Format for Presentating Population Data By Sector 

4-11 
w 

I 

I Total Segment V•hlcles 

'----'· 0 to 10 Miles 

RING MILES 

0·2 

2·5 

5 ·10 

N 

s 

VEHICLES 

RING 

VEHICLES 

TOTALS 

TOTAL MILES CUMULATIVE 

VEHICLES 

0·2 

0·5 

0-10 

Figure 2: Example of Format for Presenting 

Vehicle Data By Sector 

4-12 

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Figure 3: 

ExampJe Of EYacuation Roadway Network 

4-73 
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BROADCAST, # LEAVING ## •* # •' 1-::,.J 1 

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0 0-1~ 0-30 Q-4~ I 1-15 1-30 1-45 2 2-15 2-30 2-45 3 3-15 3-30 3-45 4 4-15 4-'30 

TIME FROM INITIATION OF PUBLIC NOTIFICATION 

c:=:J Alerting 

c======= : = : :. = ".:.:. ".:. = :J PUBLIC INFORMATION BROADCAST 

Figure 4: Example of Additional Reporting Format for Time Estimates 

of Population Evacuation When Probability Distributions 

Are Used 

Note: These curves are suggestive of a hypothetical 10-mile radius EPZ. 

Similar curves can be developed for sub-areas of the entire EPZ. 

The horizontal displacement of these curves along the time axis 

as well as the slope of the curves will vary depending upon the 

characteristics of the EPZ or sub-area~ of the EPZ. 

4-14 
Se gl'l'E--: 

NOTES: 1 

Table 1: Example of Roadway Characteristics 

Nurrt>er 1 

Type 2 Capaci ty 3 Comments 4 

of Lanes 

, 

Total number of through lanes in both directions. If roadway 

cross section is not uniform, use section with least number of 

lanes 

2f = Freeways and Expressways U = Urban Streets 

R = Rural Highways 

3If known 

4Indicate any special conditions that may affect roadway capacity. 

4-15 
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4-16 

AREAS 

Permanent 

Population 

Permanent Pop. 

Vehicles 

Transient 

Population 

Transient Pop. Vehicles 

Evacuation Capacity 

Per Hour 

Notification Time 

Preparation Time 

Permanent Pop. Res::>onse 

Normal Condit: ns 

·- Permanent Pop. RE:sponse 

Adverse Contitions 

Transient Pop. Response 

Normal Conditions 

Transient Pop. Response Adverse Conditions 

General Pop. Evac. Time 

Normal Conditions 

General Pop. Evac. Time 

Adverse Conditions 

Confirmation Time 

Special Pop. Evac. Time 

Normal Conditions 

Special Pop. Evac. Time 

Adverse Conditions 

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APPENDIX 5 

GLOSSARY 

Three major 11 0rgani zati ons .. are identified by the three columns headed 

11Licensee 11 , 11State 11 , and 11Local 11 in Part II of this document. 11 0rganizations 11 

are also indicated in the document generally with a modifying word preceeding 

the term 11 0rganization11

, e.g.: -

Principal (organizations): 

Federal, State, Local agencies or departments or executive offices and 

nuclear utilities (licensees) having major or lead roles in emergency 

planning and preparedness. 

Sub- (organizations): 

Any organization such as agencies, departments, offices or local 

jurisdictions having a supportive role to the principal or lead 

organization(s) in emergency planning and preparedness. 

Federal (organizations): 

Agencies, departments or their components, of the U. s. Federal government, 

having a role in emergency planning and preparedness. 

State (organization): 

The State government agency or office having the principal or lead 

role in emergency planning and preparedness. There may be more than 

one State involved, resulting in application of the evaluation criteria 

separately to more than one State. To the extent possible, however, 

one State should be designated lead. 

5-l 
Local (organization): 

The local government agency or office having the principal or lead 

role in emergency planning and preparedness. Generally this will be 

the County government. Other local government entities (e.g., towns, 

cities, municipalities, etc.), are considered to be sub-organizations 

with supportive roles to the principal or lead local government organization responsible for emergency planning and preparedness. In some cases 

there will be more than one lead organization at the local level, but 

designation of one lead local organization is preferable. 

Private Sector (organizations): 

Industry, volunteer, quasi-governmental etc. having a role in emergency 

planning and preparedness. 

It is not possible to totally specify each class or type of organization that 

may be involved in the total emergency planning and preparedness scheme. Nor 

is it possible to define the particular roles, function and responsibilities 

of .. principal organizations .. and 11 SUb-organizations ... This is a matter that 

is best defined by the various parties involved in developing plans and 

preparedness for each nuclear site. Where the guidance in this document 

indicates a function that must be performed, emergency planners at all levels, 

must decide and agree among themselves, which organization is to perform 

such function. As a minimum, one lead agency at the State level and one 

lead local government agency having 24 hour manning is required. 

5-2 
Onsite Technical Supfort Center (TSC) and Licensees Near-Site Emergency Operations Facility EOF) 

For description and functional criteria for the TSC and EOF, see 11Functional 

Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities .. (NUREG-0696), u. s. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission. 

Consequences 

Core Melt Accident 

Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) 

Ingestion Exposure Pathway 

The results or effects (especially 

projected doses or dose rates) of a 

release of radioactive material to 

the environment. 

A postulated reactor accident in which 

the fuel melts because of overheating. 

A generic area defined about a nuclear 

facility to facilitate offsite emergency 

planning and develop a significant 

response base. It is defined for the 

plume and ingestion exposure pathways. 

During an emergency response best 

efforts are made making use of plan 

action criteria without regard to 

whether particular areas are inside or 

outside EPZs. 

The principal exposure from this pathway 

would be from ingestion of contaminated 

water or foods such as milk or fresh 

vegetables. The duration of principal 

exposures could range in length from 

hours to months. 

5-3 
Planning Basis 

Planning Standard 

Plume Exposure Pathway 

Projected Dose 

Guidance in terms of (1) Size of 

Planning Area (Distance); (2) Time 

Dependence of Release; and (3) Raaiological Characteristics of Releases. 

The standard that must be met for 

onsite and offsite emergency plans 

and preparedness. (Ref: 10 CFR 50 

section 50.47 Emergency Plans, 

45 FR No. 162 pp 55409; and proposed 

44 CFR 350 section 350.5 Criteria for 

Review and Approval of State and Local 

Radiological Emergency Plans and 

Preparedness, 45 FR No. 123 pp 42344). 

The principal exposure sources from 

this pathway are: (a) whole body external 

exposure to gamma radiation from the plume 

and from deposited materials and (b) 

inhalation exposure from the passing 

radioactive plume. The duration of 

principal potential exposures could 

range in length from hours to days. 

An estimate of the radiation dose which 

affected individuals could potentially 

receive if protective actions are not 

taken. 

5-4 
Protective Action 

Protective Action Guide 

An action taken to avoid or reduce a 

projected dose. (Sometimes referred to 

as protective measure). 

Projected absorbed dose to individuals 

in the general population which warrants 

protective action. 

5-5 
NRC FORM 335 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

1 REPORT NUMBER (ASSignedbv DOC! 

(7 77) NUREG-0654, Rev. 1 

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET FEMA-REP-1 

4 TITLE AND SUBTITLE (Add Volume No, d appropnate) 2 (Leave blank) 

Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological 

Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of 3 RECIPIENT'S ACCESSION NO 

Nuclear Power Plants 

7 AUTHOR(S) 5 DATE REPORT COMPLETED 

NRC/FEMA Steering Committee MONTH I YEAR 

October 1980 

9 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS (Include Ztp Code) DATE REPORT ISSUED 

NRC/FEMA Steering Committee MONTH I YEAR 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 1980 

Washington, D. c. 20555 6 (Leave blank) 

8 (Leave blank) 

12 SPONSORING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS (Include Ztp Code) 

NRC/FEMA Steering Committee 10 PROJECT/TASK/WORK UNIT N-0 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11 CONTRACT NO Washington, D. c. 20555 

13 TYPE OF REPORT I PERIOD-COVE RED (lnclustve dates) 

Guidance report 

15 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14 (Leave blank) 

16. ABSTRACT (200 words or less) 

The purpose of this guidance and upgraded acceptance criteria document is to 

provide a basis for NRC licensees, State and local governments to develop 

radiological emergency plans and improve emergency preparedness. The guidance 

is the product of the joint FEMA/NRC Steering Committee established to coordinate 

the agencies 1 work in emergency preparedness associated with nuclear power plants. 

This document is consistent with NRC and FEMA regulations and supersedes other 

previous guidance and criteria published by FEMA and NRC on this subject. It 

wi 11 be used by reviewers in determining the adequacy of State, local and nuclear 

power plant licensee emergency plans and preparedness. 

17. KEY WORDS AND DOCUMENT ANALYSIS 17a DESCRIPTORS 

emergency preparedness 

radiological emergency planning radiological emergency response plans 

radiological emergency 

emergency response plans 

17b IDENTIFIERS/OPEN-ENDED TERMS 

18 AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 19 SECURITY CLASS (Thts report) 21 N0 ~~PAGES 

Unlimited unclassified 

20 SECURITY CLASS (Thtspage) 22 PRICE 

$ 

NRC FORM 335 (7-77) 

*U. S.GOVERNIIIENT PRINTING OF'F'IC£:19B7-1B1-6B2:6001B 
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NUREG..Q654, REV. 1 

FEMA-REP-1 

CRITERIA FOR PREPARATION AND EVALUATION OF RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY 

RESPONSE PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS IN SUPPORT OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 

NOVEMBER 1980