# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 7, 2018 * Decided December 20, 2018

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 17-3299

BENNY L. WILLIS, Plaintiff-Appellant

,

v

.

KENNETH ROSS, et al., Defendants-Appellees

. Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 12 C 1939

J oan H. Lefkow, J udge

.

O R D E R

While Benny Willis was in jail awaiting trial on a charge of armed robbery, a warrant to arrest him for violating his paro le was also pending. He received his parole-revocation hearing after he was co nvicted of armed robbery, about two years after the parole-violation warrant was issued. Willis has sued correctional officials over

* Willis has moved the court for oral argument, but we deny the motion and decide the case without oral argument becaus e the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argum ent would not significantly aid the court.

F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited onl y in accordance with Fed. R. A pp . P. 32.1No. 17-3299 Page 2

this delay, and the district court dismissed th e suit for failure to state a claim. The judge correctly ruled that due process did not requ ire a parole-revocation hearing while Willis was validly detained on the charge for armed robbery. See Doyle v. Elsea , 658 F.2d 512, 516 (7th Cir. 1981). Therefore, we affirm.

Six months after Willis began parole from state prison for drug crimes, he was arrested and detained in jail on a criminal warrant for armed robbery. The Illinois Department of Corrections also issued a war rant to arrest Willis for violating his parole, but the warrant was not executed. Willis alleges that, because that warrant remained pending, he was not released from jail while he awaited trial for armed robbery.

Willis spent 29 months in pretrial detent ion, followed by two sentencings. The first sentencing occurred after he pleade d guilty to armed robbery. He received a 72-month sentence, which allowed for 36 months of parole. The state court credited Willis with the 29 months that he spent in jail awaiting trial, leaving only 7 more months to serve before he began parole in August 2010. The next sentencing occurred soon after the first, when Willis went before the Illinois Prisoner Review Board for his parole-revocation hearing. The Board revoked his parole and sentenced him to 15 months in prison. It did not credit any of the 29 months that he served before his armed-robbery conviction, so the 15-month term postponed his release to April 2011, about 8 months after his estimated release on parole from the armed-robbery sentence.

After his release, Willis brought this suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. With the aid of recruited counsel, Willis alle ged that officials from the Department of Corrections denied him due process and viol ated state law by not holding a parolerevocation hearing promptly after his arrest for armed robbery. In his view, had he received a prompt hearing, one of two favorab le outcomes would have occurred: either his parole would not have been revoked and he would have been released on bond for the charge of armed robbery, or, if his parole had been revoked, he would have served his 15-month revocation sentence during his 29 months of pretrial detention and thereby been released 8 months sooner. Willis also alleged that Michelle Littlejohn, an employee of the Parole Revocation Board, ne gligently computed his ultimate release date. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. (The defendants did not argue that, under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), Willis may not proceed under Section 1983 because he di d not first petition to invalidate his allegedly wrongful detention by seeking a writ of habeas corpus, so we do not consider that issue.)No. 17-3299 Page 3

The district court dismissed the suit. Firs t, the judge ruled that Willis failed to state a due-process claim. She reasoned that his guilty plea supplied probable cause for his 29-month detention; thus, under Doyle v. Elsea he had no right to an earlier parolerevocation hearing. The judge also ruled that she “lacks supplemental jurisdiction” over Willis’s related state-law claim. She then dismissed both claims with prejudice and gave Willis leave to amend his complaint to al lege an Eighth Amendment claim against Littlejohn. Willis amended his complaint pr o se and moved for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, arguing that th e judge had incorrectly assumed that the Department of Corrections learned about his armed-robbery warrant after his arrest. The judge denied that motion because the a ssumption was irrelevant: regardless of the timeline, the armed-robbery warrant rendered the arrest and pretrial detention lawful. Finally, the judge dismissed the proposed Eighth Amendment claim against Littlejohn because Willis had not alleged that Littlejohn wrongly calculated his release date with
deliberate indifference.

On appeal, Willis first challenges the di smissal of his claim that due process required corrections officers to give him to an earlier hearing on his parole-revocation charge. We review de novo the judge’s dismissal for failure to state a claim. Alexander v. McKinney , 692 F.3d 553, 555 (7th Cir. 2012). To comply with due-process rights, parole officials may not revoke parole without fi rst providing a hearing to determine if a
violation has occurred. Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). Willis’s parole was
revoked after a hearing, so the officials resp ected this due-process right.

Willis replies that due process entitled him to receive this hearing two years earlier—shortly after his arrest for armed robbery—because that is when he was charged with violating parole. Bu t we rejected this theory in Doyle v. Elsea , 658 F.2d at 516. Doyle was a parolee who, like Willis, was arrested for a new crime and, based on that new crime, was also charged with vi olating his parole. Also like Willis, Doyle remained validly in custody until he was co nvicted for that new crime, at which point he received a parole-revocation hearing. Id. at 513–14. We ruled that Doyle’s delayed hearing did not violate due process because he was validly incarcerated for the new crime during the time that his pa role-violation charge was pending. Id. at 515

– 16. Willis, too, was validly in jail for armed robbery while he awaited his parole-revocation hearing because his criminal warrant for armed robbery justified his pretrial detention.
See Baker v. McCollan , 443 U.S. 137, 143–44 (1979). Therefore, under Doyle

, due process did not require that Willis receive an earlier parole-revocation hearing.No. 17-3299 Page 4

Willis next challenges the district judge’ s decision to dismiss his claim that the delay of his parole-revocation hearing violated state law, but this challenge also fails. Generally, when all federal claims are dismisse d before trial, the district court should relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over st ate-law claims, unless (1) the statute of limitations has run; (2) the claim has already consumed substantial judicial resources; or (3) the resolution of the claim is obvious. Davis v. Cook Cty. , 534 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2008). Here, the resolution of this state-law claim was not clear (the court did not even analyze it), and he arguably had at least a ye ar from the district court’s dismissal to sue
in state court, see 735 IL. C OMP

. S TAT . 5/13–217; Davis , 534 F.3d at 654. We are mindful that the judge wrote that she “lacks” jurisd iction over this state-law claim and then
dismissed it with prejudice. We read this as the judge properly exercising her discretion to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction. Thus , the dismissal of this state-law claim should have been without prejudice, an d we modify the judgment on this claim accordingly.

Willis next argues, incorrectly, that the di strict court wrongly dismissed his claim against Littlejohn for miscalculating his releas e date. To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment against an official who allegedly incarcerated an inmate beyond the proper release date, a plaintiff must allege that th e official knew or recklessly disregarded the
correct release date. See Werner v. Wall , 836 F.3d 751, 760 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied , 137 S. Ct. 2213 (2017); Figgs v. Dawson , 829 F.3d 895, 902–03 (7th Cir. 2016). But Willis never alleged this state of mind, even after he amended his complaint and even though the Federal Rules permit plaintiffs to allege states of mind generally. See F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 9(b).

Willis also contends that the district judge improperly construed his Rule 59
motion as a motion for “reconsideration.” Bu t he does not articulate any prejudice that occurred from this relabeling of his motion , and we review rulings on both types of motions for abuse of discretion, see Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West , 791 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2015); Obriecht v. Raemisch , 517 F.3d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 2008). The judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the moti on; she correctly concluded th at, regardless of when the Department of Corrections learned about W illis’s armed-robbery warrant, the existence
of that warrant meant that Willis was validly arrested and detained. See Cook v. O’Neill

, 803 F.3d 296, 300-01 (7th Cir. 2015).

Finally, Willis argues that the district judge abused her discretion when she recruited counsel who was not an expert in criminal procedure. But plaintiffs do not have a right to recruited counsel in federal civil litigation, see Olson v. Morgan , 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014), and it follows that withou t a right to recruited counsel, there canNo. 17-3299 Page 5

be no right to counsel with a certain subs tantive expertise. What is more, recruited counsel is an agent of the client, not of the court, see Fuery v. City of Chicago , 900 F.3d 450, 467 (7th Cir. 2018); Lombardo v. United States , 860 F.3d 547, 552 (7th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases), and the judge is not resp onsible for monitoring how expertly counsel handles the case. Therefore, the judge did no t abuse her discretion in recruiting Willis’s
counsel.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.