alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2006048EN.01002201.xml

| 25.2.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 48/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.2.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 48/22

---

Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 14 December 2005 — FIAMM and FIAMM Technologies v Council and Commission

(Case T-69/00) (1)

1

(Non-contractual liability of the Community - Incompatibility of the Community regime governing the import of bananas with the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) - Imposition by the United States of America of retaliatory measures in the form of increased customs duty levied on imports from the Community, pursuant to a WTO authorisation - Decision of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body - Legal effects - Community liability in the absence of unlawful conduct of its institutions - Causal link - Unusual and special damage)

(2006/C 48/40)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicants: Fabbrica italiana accumulatori motocarri Montecchio SpA (FIAMM) (Monteccchio Maggiore, Italy) and Fabbrica italiana accumulatori motocarri Montecchio Technologies, Inc. (FIAMM Technologies) (East Haven, Delaware, United States) (represented by I. Van Bael, A. Cevese and F. Di Gianni, lawyers)

Applicants:

Defendants: Council of the European Union (represented by G. Maganza, J. Huber, F. Ruggeri Laderchi and S. Marquardt, acting as Agents) and Commission of the European Communities (represented initially by P. Kuijper, L. Gussetti, V. Di Bucci, C. Brown and E. Righini, and subsequently by P. Kuijper, L. Gussetti, V. Di Bucci and E. Righini, acting as Agents)

Defendants:

Intervener in support of the defendants: Kingdom of Spain (represented initially by R. Silva de Lapuerta, and subsequently by E. Braquehais Conesa, acting as Agents)

Intervener in support of the defendants:

Application for

compensation in respect of the damage allegedly caused by the levying by the United States of America of increased customs duty on imports of the applicants' stationary batteries, as authorised by the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), following a finding that the Community regime governing the import of bananas was incompatible with the agreements and understandings annexed to the Agreement establishing the WTO

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1) | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1)

Dismisses the action;

| 2) | Orders the applicants to bear, in addition to their own costs, the costs incurred by the Council and the Commission; |
| --- | --- |

2)

Orders the applicants to bear, in addition to their own costs, the costs incurred by the Council and the Commission;

| 3) | Orders the Kingdom of Spain to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3)

Orders the Kingdom of Spain to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 135 of 13.5.2000.

1

---
# Table 1. Ogallala WL

# Table 2. Edwards-Trinity WL

# Table 3. Dockum WL

# Table 4. Ogallala DS

# Table 5. Ogallala nitrate

# Table 6. Edwards-Trinity DS

# Table 7.Edwards-Trinity Nitrate

# Table 8. Dockum DS

# Table 9. Dockum Nitrate

# Table 10. WL Hydrographs

# Table 11. QW Charts
Exhibit 32.2





Certification of CFO Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350





Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned certifies that (1) this Quarterly Report of Capital City Bank Group, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (this "Report"), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and (2) the information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition of the Company and its results of operations as of and for the periods covered therein.








/s/ J. Kimbrough DavisJ. Kimbrough DavisExecutive Vice President andChief Financial Officer





Date:  May 7, 2010
# C_2006131EN.01004003.xml

| 3.6.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 131/40 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.6.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 131/40

---

Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of 4 April 2006 — Tesoka v EUROFOUND

(Case T-398/05 R)

(Proceedings for interim relief - No need to adjudicate)

(2006/C 131/76)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Sabrina Tesoka (Overijse, Belgium) (represented by: J.-L. Fagnart, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (EUROFOUND) (represented by: C. Callanan, lawyer)

Defendant:

Re:

Application for interim measures, essentially seeking that EUROFOUND be ordered, first, to make an interim payment to the applicant and, second, to return to the applicant the documents necessary to enable her to obtain unemployment benefits in her country of residence.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | There is no need to adjudicate on the application for interim measures. |
| --- | --- |

1.

There is no need to adjudicate on the application for interim measures.

| 2. | In the interlocutory proceedings, the defendant shall bear her own costs and pay half the costs incurred by the applicant. |
| --- | --- |

2.

In the interlocutory proceedings, the defendant shall bear her own costs and pay half the costs incurred by the applicant.

---
# C_2005156EN.01000302.xml

| 28.6.2005 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 156/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.6.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 156/3

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.3806 — Telefonica/Cesky Telecom)

(2005/C 156/04)

(Text with EEA relevance)

On 10 June 2005, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in Spanish and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | from the Europa competition web site (http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This web site provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

from the Europa competition web site (http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This web site provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32005M3806. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex) |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32005M3806. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex)

---
#### Sandford D. Stockton, Plaintiff, *v.*Michael F. Kenney, Defendant.

(Supreme Court, Ulster Special Term,

July, 1898.)

Denial on information and belief — When not frivolous.

. A verified denial, by the maker of a note, of any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief of the truth of the allegations of the complaint of the payee that he made it is not frivolous, although ” it may be false.

Motion to strike out defendant’s answer as frivolous.

Arthur C. Connelly, for motion.

Michael F. Kenney, defendant in person, opposed.

Clearwater, J.

The action is upon a note alleged to have been made by the defendant, a lawyer, to the order of the plaintiff. The answer denies any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief, as to the truth of any. of the allegations contained in the ■complaint. The pleadings are verified. ' The plaintiff moves to ■ strike out the answer as frivolous, and for judgment on the pleadings, claiming that as the defendant is charged with making the note, he' knows whether he made it or not, and a denial of any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation that he did make it, is frivolous..

*301The answer may be false, but it is not frivolous within the construction given to that expression by the decisions under the Code. Shearman v. New York Central Mills, 1 Abb. Pr. 187, cited by the plaintiff, and the earlier cases to the same effect are now regarded as overruled. The modem and present rule is, that a general or specific denial which raises a material issue cannot be stricken out when pleaded in a form permitted by the Code. The denial here is in the prescribed form, and that which is legally permissible cannot be regarded as frivolous. Robert Gere Bank v. Inman, 51 Hun, 97, is a fair example of the later cases to which I refer, and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 115 N. Y. 650.

The motion is denied, but without costs.

Motion denied, without costs.
#### Henry Lee URQUHART, Sr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. MM-401.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 31, 1979.

Michael J. Minerva, Public Defender, and Thomas S. Keith, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

*457Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

On the authority of *Page v. State,*363 So.2d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), the revocation of appellant’s probation for failure to pay child support payments is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent therewith.

ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., Acting C. J., and ERVIN and BOOTH, JJ., concur.
# C_2005217EN.01006206.xml

| 3.9.2005 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 217/62 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.9.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 217/62

---

Removal from the Register of Case T-57/97 (1)

1

(2005/C 217/127)

(Language of the case: Dutch)

(Language of the case: Dutch)

By order of 16 June 2005, the President of the Fifth Chamber of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities has ordered the removal from the Register of Case T-57/97, R. Dusselaar v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities.

---

(1)  OJ C 142 of 10.5.1997.

1

---
H. R. 3055

One Hundred Fourth Congress

of the

United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,

the third day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-six

An Act

To amend section 326 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 to permit continued

participation by Historically Black Graduate Professional Schools in the grant

program authorized by that section.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. FINDINGS.

The Congress finds the following:

(1) The Historically Black Graduate Professional Schools

identified under section 326 of the Higher Education Act may

receive grant funds if the Secretary of Education determines

that such institutions make a substantial contribution to the

legal, medical, dental, veterinary, or other graduate opportunity

for African Americans.

(2) The health professions schools which participate under

section 326 train 50 percent of the Nation’s African American

physicians, 50 percent of the Nation’s African American dentists, 50 percent of the Nation’s African American pharmacists,

and 75 percent of the Nation’s African American veterinarians.

(3) A majority of the graduates of these schools practice

in poor urban and rural areas of the country providing care

to many disadvantaged Americans.

(4) The survival of these schools will contribute to the

improved health status of disadvantaged persons, and of all

Americans.
H. R. 3055—2

SEC. 2. ELIMINATION OF GRANT RENEWAL LIMITATION.

Section 326(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1063b(b)) is amended by striking the second sentence.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
Editorial Note on Part 414
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 414 appear at 60 FR 50442, Sept. 29, 1995, and 60 FR 53877, Oct. 18, 1995.

§ 414.1260 Composite scores. ( a ) ( 1 ) The standardized score for each quality of care measure is classified into one of the following equally weighted domains to determine the quality composite: ( i ) Patient safety.
( ii ) Patient experience.
( iii ) Care coordination.
( iv ) Clinical care.
( v ) Population/community health.
( vi ) Efficiency.
( 2 ) If a domain includes no measure or does not reach the minimum case size in § 414.1265, the remaining domains are equally weighted to form the quality of care composite.
( b ) ( 1 ) The standardized score for each cost measure is grouped into two separate and equally weighted domains to determine the cost composite: ( i ) Total per capita costs for all attributed beneficiaries: Total per capita costs measure and Medicare Spending per Beneficiary measure; and
( ii ) Total per capita costs for all attributed beneficiaries with specific conditions: Diabetes, coronary artery disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, or heart failure (four measures).
( 2 ) Measures within each domain are equally weighted.
[77 FR 69368, Nov. 16, 2012, as amended at 78 FR 74821, Dec. 10, 2013]
§ 1008.5 Matters subject to advisory opinions. ( a ) An individual or entity may request an advisory opinion from the OIG regarding— ( 1 ) What constitutes prohibited remuneration within the meaning of section 1128B(b) of the Act;
( 2 ) Whether an arrangement, or proposed arrangement, satisfies the criteria set forth in section 1128B(b)(3) of the Act for activities that do not result in prohibited remuneration;
( 3 ) Whether an arrangement, or proposed arrangement, satisfies the criteria set forth in § 1001.952 of this chapter for activities that do not result in prohibited remuneration;
( 4 ) What constitutes an inducement to reduce or limit services under section 1128A(b) of the Act to Medicare or Medicaid program beneficiaries; and
( 5 ) Whether any activity, or proposed activity, constitutes grounds for the imposition of a sanction under sections 1128, 1128A or 1128B of the Act.
( b ) *Exceptions.* The OIG will not address through the advisory opinion process— ( 1 ) What the fair market value will be, or whether fair market value was paid or received, for any goods, services or property; or
( 2 ) Whether an individual is a bona fide employee within the requirements of section 3121(d)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
[62 FR 7357, Feb. 19, 1997, as amended at 63 FR 38324, July 16, 1998]
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3021 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 3021

  To guarantee the continuing full investment of Social Security and 
        other Federal funds in obligations of the United States.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 6, 1996

  Mr. Archer introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To guarantee the continuing full investment of Social Security and 
        other Federal funds in obligations of the United States.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES.

    (a) In General.--In addition to any other authority provided by 
law, the Secretary of the Treasury may issue to each Federal fund 
obligations of the United States under chapter 31 of title 31, United 
States Code, before March 30, 1996, in an amount not to exceed the sum 
of--
            (1) the amounts deposited in such fund after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act and before March 30, 1996, and
            (2) the face amount of obligations held by such fund which 
        mature during such period.
    (b) Obligations Exempt From Public Debt Limit.--
            (1) In general.--Obligations issued under subsection (a) 
        shall not be taken into account in applying the limitation in 
        section 3101(b) of title 31, United States Code.
            (2) Termination of exemption.--Paragraph (1) shall cease to 
        apply on the earlier of--
                    (A) the date of the enactment of the first increase 
                in the limitation in section 3101(b) of title 31, 
                United States Code, after the date of the enactment of 
                this Act, or
                    (B) March 30, 1996.
    (c) Federal Fund.--For purposes of this section, the term ``Federal 
fund'' means any Federal trust fund or Government account established 
pursuant to Federal law to which the Secretary of the Treasury has 
issued or is expressly authorized by law directly to issue obligations 
under chapter 31 of title 31, United States Code, in respect of public 
money, money otherwise required to be deposited in the Treasury, or 
amounts appropriated.
    (d) Extension of Existing Authority.--Subparagraph (B) of section 
1(c)(2) of Public Law 104-103 is amended by striking ``March 15, 1996'' 
and inserting ``March 30, 1996''.
                                 <all>
```
[675 NYS2d 756]

#### Samuel Schoenthal, Plaintiff, v Beth Jacob Teachers Seminary of America, Inc., Defendant.

Supreme Court, Kings County,

March 17, 1998

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Allen L. Rothenberg*for plaintiff. *Judah Dick*for defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Joseph J. Dowd, J.

Plaintiff moves for entry of a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215. Defendant cross-moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion and cross motion are consolidated for purposes of disposition and determined as follows:

*959Plaintiff commenced the instant “slip and fall” action by filing the summons and complaint in the Kings County Clerk’s Office on July 1, 1996. An affidavit of service submitted upon the instant motion reveals that defendant was served on July 8, 1996 by delivering the summons and complaint to the Secretary of State pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 307 pertaining to service of process upon a foreign corporation. Plaintiff now moves for entry of a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215 on the ground that defendant has failed to timely answer. Defendant cross-moves for dismissal of the complaint due to lack of personal jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs motion for entry of a default is *denied.*In the first instance, the motion has not been timely made as more than one year has elapsed from the time of the default to the date the instant motion was made (see, CPLR 3215 [c]). In any event, defendant has submitted proof that it is a religious corporation. Section 2-b (3) of the Religious Corporations Law specifically provides that the General Corporation Law, much of which has been subsumed by the Business Corporation Law, does not apply to religious corporations. Moreover, although the Not-For-Profit Corporation Law is generally controlling with respect to religious corporations, section 304 of the Not-For-Profit Corporation Law authorizing service of process upon a domestic or authorized foreign corporation by serving the Secretary of State is not applicable to religious corporations (see, Religious Corporations Law § 2-b [1] [c]). Accordingly, service of the summons and complaint at bar by service upon the Secretary of State was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the defendant and, therefore, the motion for a default judgment is *denied.*The cross motion is *granted*and the complaint is *dismissed.*
#### Ployer P. HILL, Appellant, v. Patricia O. HILL, Appellee.

No. 78-379.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Nov. 7, 1979.

Michael N. Gomes of Week, P. A., Pompano Beach, for appellant.

S. Robert Zimmerman, P. A., Pompano Beach, for appellee.

HERSEY, Judge.

This is an appeal from an order directing the husband in a dissolution of marriage proceeding to pay the wife’s attorneys’ fees in the sum of $3,500 and her costs of $452.80. The sole issue on appeal is the appropriateness of this order.

The record discloses that subsequent to dissolution of the marriage the wife had assets in the range of $73,000 to $96,000, the difference resulting from conflicting estimates of value. The wife had income from the husband of approximately $10,400, and could reasonably expect a small return from her own investments. The husband has assets worth $7,800 and income of $32,000, from which he was required to pay the wife’s alimony.

The social utility behind the no-fault divorce law is expressed in the following language of *Thigpen v. Thigpen,*277 So.2d 583, 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973):

> The new concept of the marriage relation implicit in the so-called “no-fault” divorce law enacted by the legislature in 1971 [Chapter 71 — 241, Laws of 1971; Chapter 61, F.S.] places both parties to the marriage on a basis of complete equality as partners sharing equal rights and obligations in the marriage relationship and sharing equal burdens in the event of dissolution.

In augmentation of the same social philosophy, the Supreme Court, quoting from *Mertz v. Mertz,*287 So.2d 691 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1973), held in *Cummings v. Cummings,*330 So.2d 134, 136 (Fla.1976):

> . the purpose of awarding attorney fees under the new dissolution of marriage law has not changed, in our view, from the purposes contemplated by its predecessors; that purpose is to insure that both parties will have reasonably the same ability to secure competent legal counsel.

*473The foregoing rule was adopted by this Court in *Scattergood v. Scattergood,*363 So .2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).

The record discloses that the wife was in an equal or perhaps better position financially to pay attorneys’ fees and costs than was the husband.

Accordingly, the order appealed from is reversed and the cause remanded with directions that an amended judgment be rendered consistent with this holding.

For the same reasons we deny appellee’s Motion For Attorneys’ Fees on this appeal.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

DOWNEY, C. J., and LETTS, J., concur.
N O T F O RP U B L IC A T IO NIN W E S T ' S H AWA I # I RE P O R T S A N D P A C IF IC RE P O R T E R



### NO. CAAP-20-0000266

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
O F THE STATE OF HAWAI # I

NAM KI HOON, YONG CHANG HA, BERNARD TABLADILLO, PAUL PESTILLI,

Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants/Appellees, v. JH WAIPAHU, LLC, domestic limited liability company; HC DRIVE-IN INC., a domestic profit corporation, Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs/Appellants; JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; DOE UNINCORPORATED ORGANIZATIONS 1-10;

and DOE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES 1-10, Defendants

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT

(CIVIL NO. 1CC171000924)

O RDER APPROVING STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL OF APPEAL ( By: Chan, Presiding Judge, Hiraoka and Wadsworth, JJ.) Upon consideration of the Stipulation for Dismissal of Appeal ( Stipulation ) , filed September 11, 2020, by DefendantsCounterclaim Plaintiffs/Appellants JH Waipahu, LLC, and HC DriveIn Inc., the papers in support, and the record, it appears that (1) the appeal has been docketed; (2) the parties stipulate to dismiss the appeal and bear their own attorneys' fees and costs; (3) the Stipulation is dated and signed by counsel for all Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-20-0000266 16-SEP-2020 08:47 AMN O T F O RP U B L IC A T IO NIN W E S T ' S H AWA I # I RE P O R T S A N D P A C IF IC RE P O R T E R



### parties appearing in the appeal; and (4) dismissal is authorized by Hawai # i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 42(b).

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Stipulation is approved and the appeal is dismissed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai # i, September 16, 2020. /s/ Derrick H.M. Chan Presiding Judge /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka Associate Judge /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth Associate Judge

2