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i 

94–100 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–13] 

OUTSIDE PERSPECTIVES ON THE 

PRESIDENT’S PROPOSED AUTHORIZATION 

FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE 

AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE OF 

IRAQ AND THE LEVANT 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 26, 2015 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

ALEX GALLO, Professional Staff Member 

SPENCER JOHNSON, Counsel 

BRITTON BURKETT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Chesney, Robert M., Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Charles I. Francis 

Professor in Law, University of Texas ............................................................... 6 

Keane, GEN Jack, USA (Ret.), Former Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army .............. 4 

Wittes, Benjamin, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, The Brookings Institution ........................................................................................................................ 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Chesney, Robert M. .......................................................................................... 66 

Keane, GEN Jack ............................................................................................. 55 

Wittes, Benjamin .............................................................................................. 84 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

General James N. Mattis letter ....................................................................... 99 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[No answers were available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. O’Rourke .................................................................................................... 105 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 105 

(1) 

† Also referred to as ISIL, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. 

OUTSIDE PERSPECTIVES ON THE PRESIDENT’S PROPOSED AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY 

FORCE AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND 

THE LEVANT 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC, Thursday, February 26, 2015. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. 

Committee meets today to hear testimony on the President’s proposed authorization for the use of military force [AUMF] against 

ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria].† This hearing is just the 

first committee event on this issue, but given the expertise of the 

witnesses today, I think it will raise many of the issues and considerations that we will need to follow up on in the future. 

Previously we have heard testimony that the threat posed by Islamic jihadists is growing. Last September President Obama said, 

and I want to quote here, ‘‘Our objective is clear. We will degrade 

and ultimately destroy ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy.’’ 

Many people, including me, are concerned, however, that we do 

not really have a clear strategy that will accomplish that goal. 

An AUMF is not a strategy. It is only an authorization to use 

military force against a particular enemy. 

In spite of the fact that the President ordered military action 

against ISIS to begin several months ago and only now has submitted a request to Congress to authorize such action, I believe it 

is still important for the United States Congress to do its constitutional duty. But I have a number of questions and concerns about 

the President’s language. 

First, as we have experienced with the 2001 AUMF, defining the 

enemy is difficult, especially as they adapt and form new allegiances and seek to manipulate our system. 

Second, we already put too many encumbrances on our troops in 

carrying out the missions they are assigned, in my opinion, so 

going into battle with a lawyer nearby to decide whether a par-
2 

ticular action is enduring or offensive or a ground combat operation 

seems problematic. 

Third, I know that some are concerned about the time limitation 

included in this draft. I think a forcing action that requires Congress to consider and possibly update an AUMF may be useful, but 

I want to hear from our witnesses their views because I recognize 

the drawbacks of unintentionally telegraphing a timeline to the 

enemy. 

A vote to authorize a President to send American men and 

women into battle is as serious and sobering a vote as any vote 

cast by a Member of Congress. Our country has always been incredibly fortunate to have had individuals of outstanding bravery 

and dedication defending our Nation and the American way of life. 

We are facing a cruel and savage opponent. Our service members 

must know that their mission carries the full weight of approval 

under our constitutional system and that the administration, this 

Congress, and the American people will stand with them and support them as long as it takes to accomplish the missions which they 

have been assigned. 

That will be my goal as we go through this process. 

Mr. Smith. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it was really two 

topics for this morning’s hearing. One is the basic details of the 

AUMF with regards to Syria and Iraq and ISIL, and it is a very, 

very difficult thing to do because Congress wants to strike the balance. 

We do not want to give the President a blank check and take 

away any of our authority. On the other hand, we don’t want to 

restrict the executive branch in a way that hampers his ability to 

carry out the mission. That, from a language standpoint, can be 

virtually impossible. 

And I think the chairman mentioned some of the areas of tension 

there—the timeline. I think the timeline is fine, because, as the 

chairman mentioned, Congress can come back and reauthorize. It 

sort of makes sure that we stay as part of the process, that we 

don’t let our constitutional authority slip. 

The tougher questions are, you know, how do we define military 

engagement without simply giving the President the right to do 

whatever whenever. And I will get more into this in the strategy 

session, but I, for one, think that it would be a mistake strategically to excessively rely on U.S. military force to try and solve this 

problem. 

So I am looking for ways to limit that, to make sure that we 

don’t have an executive that thinks that the military is the solution 

to this problem, because we should all keep in mind, whatever 

President Obama’s personal position on this is, this AUMF would 

carry over to another President, which we can’t be sure of. So I 

think those limitations are important, but difficult to articulate, 

which brings me to the real issue here today, which I think is the 

broader strategy. 
3 

What is the broader strategy? I think it can be fairly simply defined in the sense that we need to get to the point where the Muslim world rejects this type of violent extremism. 

And I think one of the things that makes the strategy so difficult 

is it is a moving target. Back in, you know, 9/11 it was all about 

Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda senior leadership in Afghanistan, but the 

ideology is so much broader than that, as everybody here knows. 

It crops up in all manner of different places, from al-Shabaab to 

Boko Haram to Ansar al-Sharia. 

It is an ideology that is becoming far too deeply rooted in that 

part of the world. How do we stop it? 

Well, the short answer is we don’t stop it, because the most dependable part of the message that Al Qaeda has is to basically say 

that they are defending the Muslim world against Western aggression. The last thing in the world we want is either, you know, a 

whole bunch of U.S. troops to show up to try to fix the problem, 

or just as bad, you know, a whole bunch of U.S. policymakers going 

over there and telling Muslim countries and Muslim governments 

how they should conduct themselves. They are not going to be responsive to that. 

This is a problem that has to be solved internally by these countries. And the real strategic challenge for us here is, how can we 

help without making the problem worse? 

It is a very delicate balance, and I would be very interested in 

hearing from the three of you on how we can engage in that, because this is an ideological struggle. This isn’t about defeating 

AQAP [Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] or defeating Al Qaeda 

senior leadership, or even primarily about defeating ISIL. It is 

about stopping this just horrific ideology that has spread to too 

many parts of the Muslim world. 

How do we stop it? How do we get that to be turned around? Because the truth is the overwhelming majority of the Muslim world 

rejects this ideology and rejects this strategy. 

And yet, it marches on. How do we work with that to change 

that? 

And then the final key piece of this is—that makes it very difficult to develop a strategy, is we keep tripping over another aspect 

of conflict in that world, and that is the Shia-Sunni divide. 

You know, we may well be in there fighting ISIL, but if ISIL is 

fighting Shia, as they were in Iraq, and the main reason they were 

so successful in Iraq is because the Sunni Iraqis looked at Baghdad 

and said, ‘‘That is not my government. That is a government that 

is sectarian, that is protecting Shia, that is doing nothing for us.’’ 

So they basically sided with ISIL not so much because they loved 

ISIL’s ideology, but because they found it preferable to Shia rule. 

If somehow, some way, Saudi Arabia and Iran could find a way 

to peacefully coexist tomorrow, a huge chunk of this problem would 

go away. Now, that is obviously easier said than done, but it is part 

of the equation is figuring out this—the Shia-Sunni split. 

So I think part of the reason people are confounded sometimes 

on the strategy level is because this is a moving target with lots 

of complicated pieces. It defies a two-sentence strategy. 
4 

And in fact, I don’t think we would be well served by coming up 

with that two-sentence strategy. It is a dynamic problem. We have 

to be flexible in terms of how we respond to it. 

But one piece of it is, with the U.S. engaged militarily against 

ISIL, as I think it should be, Congress should play its role. We 

should authorize that use of military force within whatever parameters we as a body decide. 

With that, I yield back, and I look forward to the testimony and 

the questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

I ask unanimous consent that a letter that Mr. Smith and I received from retired General James Mattis, former CENTCOM 

[Central Command] commander, on the AUMF be made part of the 

record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 99.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered. 

And without objection, each of your written statements will be 

made part of our record, as well. 

Let me welcome our witnesses. We are very fortunate today to 

have retired General Jack Keane, former Vice Chief of staff for the 

U.S. Army; Robert M. Chesney, Associate Dean for academic affairs 

and Charles I. Francis professor of law at the University of Texas 

School of Law, an outstanding institution, I would add; Benjamin 

Wittes, senior fellow of government studies at Brookings Institution. 

And, as many of you all know, Mr. Chesney and Mr. Wittes are 

both associated also with the Lawfare Blog, which is widely read 

on these constitutional national security issues. 

So thank you all for being here. 

General Keane, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JACK KEANE, USA (RET.), FORMER VICE 

CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY 

General KEANE. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Minority Smith, 

members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify 

today on the President’s request for authorization of the use of 

military force. I am honored to be here again and to share the 

panel with my distinguished colleagues. 

I have been testifying here for 15 years before this committee, 

and I just want to tell you once again how much I appreciate the 

support that you provide to our Armed Forces through all these 

years and what you are doing currently. I have always appreciated 

your serious and thoughtful approach to the Nation’s business regardless of who has been the majority in this committee. 

Please reference the map that I provided at the end of my testimony when I discuss the enemy and its geography. It was prepared 

by the Institute for the Study of War where I am the chairman. 

This was a part of a recent intelligence summary and is useful to 

understand how ISIS looks at the world. 

My remarks will be brief, highlighting the essential observations 

only, permitting the focus to be your questions. 

In principle I agree with a President who desires to use military 

force beyond a short-term contingency, requests an AUMF from the 
5 

Congress. The current AUMFs, 2001 and 2002, which are obviously 

still in use, are, in their design, good documents in that it is clear 

why military force is being authorized and provides latitude for the 

President to determine how to use that force. 

Indeed, an argument can be made that the President’s current 

AUMF request is unnecessary in that the previous AUMF provides 

sufficient authorization for the use of force against ISIS. Nonetheless, I do believe it is better public policy for a new AUMF based 

on the reality that ISIS is a different threat in terms of its scale, 

mode of operation, location, and near-term intent. 

As to the President’s current AUMF request, I would like to 

make a few observations. 

The strategy: Strategy is how the military force is used. This is 

the President’s lane, along with his senior military commanders. 

As much as I and some Members of Congress are critical of the 

administration for not having a comprehensive strategy to defeat 

radical Islam nor an adequate strategy to defeat ISIS, the AUMF 

is not the appropriate document for that expression. A President 

needs maximum flexibility to adapt to the enemy and the battlefield environment, which at times may demand a change in strategy. 

The enemy: The enemy is ISIS, and the proposed AUMF describes it as ‘‘ISIS and associates.’’ 

ISIS has claimed contractual agreements and a written plan approved by ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to form satellites in 

Libya, Egyptian Sinai, Afghanistan, and also Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Some of these affiliations are likely aspirational, 

to be sure, but ISIS is exporting military capability to make affiliates in Sinai and Libya stronger. All that said, defeating ISIS does 

not mean that U.S. forces are needed to defeat ISIS satellites. 

The geography: Core ISIS is principally located in Iraq and 

Syria, but it covets territory in a broader region, including Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and lands that are part of historic caliphates, like the Caucasus. As such, there should be no geographical limitation in the AUMF. 

The time constraint: It makes no sense to me to tell our allies 

and the enemy that we are uncertain of this commitment of force 

by our unwillingness to extend it beyond 3 years. Congress has the 

authority to provide continuous assessments through its oversight 

committees, which is far more appropriate than a 3-year sunset. 

The ground force constraint: ISIS cannot be defeated in Iraq and 

Syria without a decisive ground force victory. There is no ground 

force in Syria, and no one knows if the Iraq ground force can defeat 

ISIS. 

Why put limits on the use of a ground force when it is widely 

recognized as the only means to defeat ISIS? Indeed, it may be necessary for a coalition ground force, with the United States likely in 

the lead, to ultimately defeat ISIS. The ground force constraint 

should be removed from the AUMF if the true goal is to defeat 

ISIS. 

In conclusion, the proposed AUMF is not an acceptable document. The time and ground force constraint must be removed. This 

President as well as our next President deserves latitude in the use 

of military force. 
6 

Additionally, how to use the military force, or strategy, is not an 

appropriate topic for this document, as I previously stated. But it 

is essential for the Congress to provide oversight and, in so doing, 

understand the feasibility of the strategy actually working. 

I believe it is a matter of conscience to only support an AUMF 

if there is confidence that the strategy our troops execute will indeed succeed in defeating ISIS. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Keane can be found in the 

Appendix on page 55.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Professor Chesney. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. CHESNEY, ASSOCIATE DEAN FOR 

ACADEMIC AFFAIRS, CHARLES I. FRANCIS PROFESSOR IN 

LAW, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 

Mr. CHESNEY. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, 

and members of the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today. And I associate myself with General 

Keane’s remarks about the tremendous history of this committee 

and the way it conducts its business. 

I would like to make six points this morning. 

First, the draft AUMF lacks a stated purpose in its operative sections. This is in contrast, for example, to the 2001 AUMF, and it 

is potentially significant. 

To be sure, the question of purpose is for policymakers to decide 

ultimately, not lawyers. But the lawyers, in drafting an AUMF, 

need to know what the purpose is in order to make sure their work 

product is suited to accomplishing the mission. 

And the public needs to know the purpose, as well. And so, as 

you improve upon the draft, I hope you will insist upon a clear 

statement of purpose in it. 

Second, the draft’s attempt to forbid ‘‘enduring offensive ground 

combat operations’’ is a grossly indeterminate phrase on its face 

and it should be dropped. Notwithstanding examples given by the 

White House in its transmittal letter accompanying the draft, the 

language inevitably will cast a shadow of uncertainty over commanders’ operational decisions. 

The statement by Secretary Kerry this past Tuesday explaining 

a bit about what it means in his understanding, referring to overnight embedding being okay but weeks upon weeks of some form 

of ground presence not being okay, I think underscores rather than 

assuages this concern. Simply put, commanders should not be left 

to guess where the boundaries lie. 

Third, at no point in American history has Congress ever simultaneously authorized the use of force to destroy an enemy militarily 

while at the same time purporting to forbid the Commander in 

Chief from using ground forces towards that end. 

In fairness, there have been several authorizations in our history 

that have been narrow in various ways. But in all such cases, the 

objective was much narrower than the military destruction of the 

enemy. Instead, these were cases in which the objective involved 

important but limited things, such as ending piracy against our 

shipping or participation in a peacekeeping operation. 
7 

Of course, if the actual objective with respect to ISIL is not its 

military destruction, but instead something relatively more narrow 

yet still important, then the analogy to past narrow authorizations 

may work much better. But this simply underscores my earlier 

point about the need for clarity regarding the purpose of the AUMF 

and our mission. 

All that said, I can’t say that Congress would lack the authority 

to enact such a limitation if it truly wishes to do so. I am simply 

pointing out that it would be unprecedented in a particular way, 

and it is certainly closer to the constitutional border line than 

things we have seen in the past. 

Fourth, I want to share my thoughts on what we usually call 

sunsets, although I am beginning to think that we should get away 

from the sunset language because of the connotation it has for 

many people that it suggests that it is predetermined that there 

won’t actually be a renewal. Perhaps it is better to talk about them 

as renewal or forcing function provisions. 

The idea, of course, is to create an occasion after a certain period 

of time when the authorization, if appropriate, will receive the 

fresh imprimatur of a Congress and a President acting on the most 

recent conditions. And in this respect I would just point out where 

we are with the 2001 AUMF, which, of course, is still a critical instrument; it supports our anti-Al Qaeda operations around the 

world, from Yemen, to Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq, 

as well. 

It has been 13 years-plus since it was enacted, and the passage 

of time has led many to criticize it on the grounds that it has somehow become stale, that it has become attenuated as Al Qaeda has 

evolved. And it is a shame, I think, that we haven’t had a past occasion where it has been clearly refreshed by a more recent Congress in order to avoid these kinds of problems, which create friction in the reliance upon the AUMF. 

Now, it is true that it did partially get refreshed in the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, but that refreshment, unfortunately, was limited to reference to the detention authority and—rather than being a full refreshment. But the point is, 

the experience with the 2001 AUMF illustrates how there is something to be said in favor of being able to continue to operate under 

an AUMF if you ensure that Congress will, in fact, come back to 

it after a certain number of years. 

I recognize, however, that you cannot create a sunset or renewal 

provision that signals to the enemy that we are starting off with 

one foot already out the door. And so, in thinking about how you 

strike the balance here, my conclusion is that the better way to go 

is not a 3-year but a 5-year sunset, which also has the virtue of 

not landing this particular renewal provision on the doorstep of a 

newly elected President who may still be getting fully acclimated 

into the office and getting personnel into place. 

My next point is about the silence of the draft AUMF on matters 

of detention, which is rather striking, if you ask me. Another lesson 

of the past 13 years is that the silence of an AUMF on detention 

is itself a cause for great legal friction if and when the United 

States may decide that in addition to using lethal force against 
8 

ISIL targets, heaven forbid we actually detain some in military 

custody for the duration of our conflict. 

If and when we come to that point, we will regret, I think, not 

having said something in the AUMF clarifying detention authority. 

So at a minimum, I hope Congress will consider that issue. 

Last, there is the question of whether all this is moot because the 

administration, though asking for this ISIL-specific AUMF, it does 

continue to assert that it has the authority to do what it is doing 

already under color of the 2001 AUMF, and possibly as well under 

Article 2 of the Constitution. I don’t think it is entirely moot. 

As a municial matter, the 2001 AUMF argument and the constitutional argument that have been the backdrop up to this point, 

up to this very moment, are not without their detractors. They are 

far from obviously correct arguments, and that, in itself, creates a 

lot of legal friction. In so far as we are putting our Armed Forces 

into harm’s way, they deserve a clear legal endorsement for what 

they are doing from this body. 

As to the particular constraints in the draft AUMF being moot, 

again, at one level, yes, as a lawyer I can explain to someone if 

they have the time and patience to listen to me as to why the constraints in the new AUMF, since they aren’t present in the old one, 

don’t really matter. But I think that, while true as a legal matter, 

it is different as a political and rhetorical matter, and the existence 

of these constraints in the new AUMF will cast a shadow back over 

the old one and create more legal friction. So for that reason alone 

I think this proposal really does have to be taken quite seriously. 

So let me stop there. I thank you for your time and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Chesney can be found in the Appendix on page 66.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wittes. 

STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN WITTES, SENIOR FELLOW, 

GOVERNANCE STUDIES, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Mr. WITTES. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member 

Smith, and members of the committee, for inviting me to present 

my views on the President’s proposed authorization for the use of 

military force against the Islamic State. 

I want to advance, I am more modest than Bobby on this, I want 

to advance only two basic arguments today, and the first is that 

the administration’s draft ISIL AUMF, while it is a significantly 

flawed document, is flawed in ways that are somewhat different 

from many of the criticisms being advanced against it. So I want 

to start by separating what, from my vantage point anyway, is the 

wheat from the chaff, and sort of dispensing with a number of the 

criticisms of the draft that are, to my judgment at least, meritless 

or having significantly less merit than their presence in the conversation. 

So, many critics have worried that the draft AUMF would limit 

the President and his successor in prosecuting the war, and some 

in this regard, some have worried about the limitation on the use 

of ground forces; others have argued that the problem is chiefly the 

3-year proposed sunset. I think both concerns are actually mis-
9 

placed, at least as a legal matter, though Professor Chesney’s point 

that they may have political—operate as political constraints is certainly a valid one. 

I think it is misplaced as a legal matter for largely the same reason, which Professor Chesney just alluded to, which is that this authorization, at least as the administration proposes it, is not the 

President’s only source of authority to use force. And so limitations 

in the authorization don’t limit Presidential power to the extent 

that some other authority exists for the contemplated action. 

The proposed authorization leaves in place untouched the 2001 

AUMF, which the administration has construed quite broadly, 

which does—including to cover all of its operations today, and 

which doesn’t contain a sunset provision. So the result is that you 

actually have these optical restraints that don’t, in fact, do what 

they seem to say they are doing. 

So, moreover, I think it is implausible, and both of my co-panelists have mentioned this, that the ground force limitation in the 

AUMF is, you know, quite what it seems to be even if it were the 

only source of authority, and the reason is the elasticity of the word 

‘‘enduring’’ and ‘‘offensive.’’ And I think all—the resolution does not 

define either word. 

And there is just a lot of room for elastic interpretation there, 

and I can’t imagine that an administration that wanted to use 

ground forces in any significant way would not be able to either define them as not offensive or define them as something less than 

enduring. 

A number of commentators have also complained that the draft 

resolution contains no hard geographic limitations that would contain it to Iraq and Syria. I think this is a—this criticism actually 

denigrates what is one of the virtues of the administration’s 

AUMF. 

ISIL is a fluid enemy. It is by no means likely to restrict its activities to Iraq and Syria. And, as General Keane points out, it is 

already developing relationships with countries elsewhere, with 

groups elsewhere that, you know, would be off limits if a hard geographical limit were—limitation were in the document and the document were legally operative. 

I ask you to consider that if a similar geographic limitation had 

been inside the original 2001 AUMF we would never have been 

able to undertake, under that authorization, operations against 

AQAP, which have been so vital to American counterterrorism. 

All that said, I do think the administration’s draft has serious 

problems, which mostly have their roots in the proposal’s breadth 

and failure to grapple with the relationship with the underlying 

2001 AUMF. Now, as a lot of people have noted, the document, on 

its face, does not appear broad. It seems to have all these limitations. 

But it is actually written very carefully to make the—create the 

impression of significant limitations without the reality. And the 

administration’s lawyers have succeeded in this to a degree that 

they are being denounced for the breadth, for the restrictions in the 

proposal rather than developing anxiety about its actual breadth. 

In fact, the real problem is that, despite the appearance of accepting restraint, the document contains virtually no meaningful 
10 

restraints at all. And the reason for that is the failure to grapple 

with the underlying 2001 AUMF, which it leaves in place without 

any—I also have developed anxieties about the word ‘‘sunset,’’ but 

without any forcing mechanism for reconsideration. 

So under the administration’s proposal, at least as a legal matter, the President would have all the authority he has today, including all the authority to fight ISIL under the 2001 AUMF. And 

in addition to that, he would also be granted 3 years of even broader authority to target ISIL and its associated forces. And by the 

way, the draft defines ‘‘associated forces’’ quite broadly. 

Thus, the limitations on ground forces is entirely meaningless, 

since the 2001 AUMF remains in place. This doesn’t concern me 

particularly because I don’t actually favor a ground force limitation, 

but for those who do favor a ground force limitation, I think you 

should be particularly concerned by one that is there in appearance 

but not in reality. 

The 3-year sunset is also largely meaningless because the 2001 

AUMF doesn’t sunset. And the reporting requirements, which are 

quite anemic on their own terms, are similarly empty, and I think 

that should be a particular concern to this committee. 

Second point I want to advance is that there is an alternative to 

this approach. In November of last year my co-panelist Robert 

Chesney, Jack Goldsmith, Matt Waxman, and I jointly drafted a 

possible AUMF, which we sort of imagined as a way of sort of kickstarting a discussion on the subject. 

It did, and actually a lot of consensus developed between our author group and a group over at the Just Security website about the 

components of a new AUMF. Unlike the President’s recent proposal, our proposal aimed to integrate authorization for the fight 

against ISIL into authorization for the larger conflict, and we tried 

to supplant the existing AUMF with a more modern document to 

respond to exactly the concerns that Professor Chesney just laid 

out. 

So I want to identify a few aspects of this proposal that are relevant, in light of the criticisms that the President’s AUMF has received both from the right, left, and center. 

So first, unlike the President’s draft, our proposal would subsume the current AUMF, which covers, as the administration and 

the courts interpreted, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated 

forces, and it would then repeal the underlying document. The result is that there would be a single authorization for fighting Al 

Qaeda, the Taliban, ISIL, and all of their associates. 

Second, because there would be no duplication in the authorization, the proposal’s sunset provision would actually means something. It would actually serve the forcing function that the chairman was referring to. 

Third, while the draft does not contain specific geographic limitations, as the President’s does, like the President’s, it does not contain that, but it does authorize force only where it could be used 

consist with applicable international law concerning sovereignty 

and the use of force, thus giving some territorial guidance. It would 

allow the sort of things we did with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; it would not allow, say, the use of force or authorize the 

use of force, you know, in France. 
11 

And fourth, the proposal contains significantly more robust reporting requirements than does the administration’s draft, and I 

would urge you, even if you are proceeding off of the administration’s draft, to look at the disparity between what we would have 

asked them to report and what they want to have reported. I think 

that difference alone is very substantial. 

So look, I have no doubt that our proposal could stand significant 

improvement in any number of areas, and there are aspects of it, 

actually looking back at it 5 months after we wrote it, that I would 

change. But our—I think our draft offers an approach that is far 

less susceptible than the administration’s draft to the concerns that 

many scholars across the political spectrum have raised. 

And as this body considers how to authorize the conflict against 

ISIL and how—and really importantly, how that authorization 

should interact with the existing AUMF, our proposal may offer an 

alternative way forward that might attract a broader swath of support. 

So thank you very much. Look forward to taking any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittes can be found in the Appendix on page 84.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

And I appreciate, again, testimony from each of you. 

I guess I would like to have each of you comment on kind of a 

basic question, which is how important do you think it is for Congress to authorize a use of military force? I am not really talking 

about whether the 2001 covers ISIL, that is—although that is an 

interesting question I would hope we get to today. 

What I am talking about is some people argue that Article 2 

means the President can do whatever he needs to do to protect the 

country, and terrorism is a threat so he can take action whenever 

and however he wants to. On a more practical level, some folks say, 

‘‘He has been bombing for 6 months. Why do you need to act now? 

You know, just don’t worry about it. Let it go on.’’ 

So, Mr. Wittes, starting with you, I would like to hear your views 

about the constitutional and legal importance of Congress acting to 

authorize a President’s use of military force. 

And then, General Keane, by the time we get back to you I would 

like to hear how that affects our troops, how they see Congress acting or not acting to authorize the missions on which the Commander in Chief sends them. 

So if we can just go backwards up the line. 

Mr. Wittes. 

Mr. WITTES. Sure. I mean, look, at a practical level—at a basic, 

brass tacks, practical level, the military is going to do what the 

Commander in Chief orders it to do, assuming, you know, it is lawful order, irrespective of whether this body passes a document or 

not. And so at that level it is probably true that in some very tangible, immediate way it doesn’t matter all that much. 

I would say, however, that it matters very much for three reasons. One is, I just have a moral problem with the idea of asking 

U.S. troops in a—to engage in a long-term set of military operations without them knowing that the political branches of their 

government are behind them, and I think it is just not an appro-
12 

priate thing for—it is not an appropriate message to send to our 

own people. 

Number two, at the level of—I don’t know if it is constitutional 

law, but it is certainly constitutional hygiene. Relying on a more 

than 13-year-old document that is about a different organization in 

a different part of the world to conduct military operations now for 

a different reason, you know, is I think that is a very bad way for 

Congress and the administration to behave. 

It is not good to have legal authorities that you have to stretch 

and torture to have them reach the problems that you face. We 

should go through the exercise, as a democratic polity, of describing 

the war that we actually want to fight and doing so. 

And then the third reason, which I think is a defense of this 

body’s prerogatives with war powers you know, if you all believe 

that, in fact, the definition of the parameters of a war is not something that this body has, that is not something you have a stake 

in, it is not, you know, part of why you got elected to office, then 

fair enough. You know, maybe you shouldn’t be involved in the conversation. 

But if that sounds like a sort of insulting thing to say, and of 

course this body has a role in defining the parameters of—scope of 

military action overseas, and of course it has an oversight function, 

then this is a critical aspect of this body’s engagement with its own 

constitutional responsibilities in this area. 

Mr. CHESNEY. Mr. Chairman, passage of an AUMF specific to 

ISIL will signal resolve and commitment of this country both to our 

allies, which is a critical matter, and to the enemy itself, which is 

an even more critical matter. It will also signal to our troops and 

our commanders this institution’s investment of its own political 

capital—all of you and all your colleagues, all of your political capital being put on the table in support of what they are being asked 

to do. 

And I think all that matters as a practical matter very much in 

terms of that critical function, the legitimacy of the effort and the 

perception that it is going to be sustained over time to accomplish 

the mission. 

Turning to the particular angle the chairman mentioned, how 

does this interact or what does it say if we don’t do it and Article 

2 authorities are being relied upon in the background separate 

from the 2001 AUMF? Article 2 national self-defense authorities of 

the President to use military force in defense of the country are 

broad and important, but they are far less capable of marshalling 

the credibility of this government and crystalizing public support 

than the ability that this body has, that Congress has, to pass an 

AUMF. 

And it is also clear, as been alluded to, with the passage of time 

strict reliance on Article 2 alone, if there is no authorization that 

plausibly supports what is happening, begins to become more and 

more problematic with time’s passage and generates legal friction, 

as I mentioned in my opening remarks. 

I think that at this stage, now that the issue has been put to 

Congress, a failure to act, a failure to authorize would put us in 

an even worse spot than we were—in terms of the degree of signals 

of unity by this government supporting this mission—than where 
13 

we were a month ago when we were carrying on these operations 

strictly on the President’s combination of Article 2 authorities and 

the 2001 AUMF. 

At this stage I do think Congress needs to step up with some appropriate endorsement if, indeed, it believes in the mission. 

General KEANE. Yes. Mr. Chairman, it is indisputable the President has the authorities to do what he needs to do in terms of military force. And look, and our troops, they are always going to respond to the orders of their officers, take on the most difficult 

tasks. 

Something has really happened in the use of military force and 

our troops’ reaction to it, in my judgment, because I transcended 

from the pre-9/11 military to the post-9/11 military; I have been 

very close to both of it. And, you know, pre-9/11 we were, to include 

much of World War II, this was always about helping somebody 

else. And incredible expenditure of national treasure by the American people to make the world a better place and achieve security 

and stability for others, even though maybe we may not have been 

directly involved. 

And morale was always high. When the troops were off doing 

something they have a sense of purpose about it, they have a sense 

of accomplishment, they have an incredibly intense shared 

comradery with each other, and being associated with people that 

are drawn—that not only have the motivation to do what we are 

asking them to do, but actually have the wherewithal to do it. And 

that is very different. 

Post-9/11, quite different, because this has been and is today all 

about the American people. And our troops get it. We have a 9/11 

generation in the United States military as a result of it. The Central Intelligence Agency has a 9/11 generation in it as a result of 

this. 

They have a dogged determination to succeed and make this 

right for the American people. So that aspect of our troops and 

their commitment to do what is asked of them is quite extraordinary. And I know you know that; I am just reinforcing what I 

think you know and trying to find my own words to explain it. 

But this is a pluralistic, democratic society, more democratic 

than any other society on Earth. This government is not just about 

the executive branch. 

You are the representatives of the people of this great country. 

It would never be lost on our troops that you are part of the authorization for the use of military force when we are conducting a 

campaign that will be protracted, and that is what this is. 

So I absolutely believe this is the right thing to do, to come together, to show the determination and resolve, and to back the orders of the President of the United States, and certainly back the 

execution of those orders by our troops. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to focus on the broader strategy question, because I think 

that is really, I mean, that bleeds into the controversy over the 

AUMF is the disagreement over strategy, you know, how limited 
14 

should it be, how open should it be? This is a moving enemy, as 

has been noted by many. 

The 2001 AUMF morphed in a variety of different directions, primarily because the enemy morphed. And the enemy here is the 

broader ideology. 

And I am wondering if any of you could shed some light on the 

sort of damned-if-we-do, damned-if-we-don’t situation of—this is a 

military issue. You know, I have heard people say, you know, 

‘‘There is going to be no military solution to this problem.’’ 

And I know what they mean. I also know that they are wrong. 

What they mean is that the broader, you are not going to win 

the ideology, you are not going to kill your way to victory. I mean, 

many generals have said it, General McChrystal most notably. 

But there is a clear military element to it. We have got to stop 

the various groups from gaining ground, from launching terrorist 

attacks, and killing people. And the military is going to be part of 

it. But at the same time, the more we engage, the more that helps 

recruitment. 

What can we do to begin to help turn around this ideological 

problem? Now, I know that the answer to that is to have strong, 

moderate Muslim voices that reject this ideology and offer a reasonable alternative, but I am not exactly holding my breath waiting for that to happen because they have struggled. 

So what can we do in the U.S. to help the broader ideological 

struggle? Because otherwise we are just going to be—you know, it 

started in Afghanistan and Pakistan and Yemen, it is Libya, it is 

Somalia, it is Nigeria, it is, you know, Mali. I mean, it is going to 

be everywhere and it is going to pop up. 

You know, people have been criticized, the whole whack-a-mole 

strategy. Sometimes there are moles that need to be whacked, and 

I have got no problem with that, particularly if they are getting 

ready to whack you first. 

But that doesn’t get to that broader ideological struggle of how 

we get the Muslim world to comprehensively reject this ideology, 

or more to the point, what we can do to help with that. Even the 

own—my own phrasing of that question was wrong—how we can 

force them to change their mind. 

They are not going to like that, because historically the Muslim 

world is not fond of the West. They have got some decent reasons 

for that and some not-so-decent reasons for that. But the bottom 

line is, they are not going to listen to us coming in and telling them 

what to do. 

But what role can we play in winning that broader ideological 

struggle? Otherwise, you know, 20 years from now, you know, a 

new Armed Services Committee is going to be talking about some 

other country, I won’t name one because I don’t want to, you know, 

predict the future in that way, but it is going to just keep evolving 

and moving and moving and moving as long as this ideology is not 

defeated and it is broadly acceptable. 

So what can we do to nudge it towards, well, if not disappearing, 

at least reducing? 

General KEANE. Well, I will take a run at it. 

You know, I have felt since 9/11 we have never had a comprehensive strategy to defeat radical Islam. I always felt the Bush admin-
15 

istration made a strategic error in wanting us all to go back and 

watch the New York Yankees. I am a hometown New Yorker, I 

apologize, not for the New York Yankees. 

But the fact is we have never, ever dealt with the broader issue. 

And the reality is, yes, you are absolutely right, we have ISIS in 

front of us just like we had core Al Qaeda in Pakistan initially and 

Afghanistan, and there will be somebody else after that if we don’t 

come to grips with the larger issue itself, and that, I mean, I think 

is a comprehensive strategy to deal with radical Islam and—— 

Mr. SMITH. Got that. What I am asking for is that comprehensive 

strategy—— 

General KEANE. Yes, and I am talking about it. So if you look 

at a map and you see that radical Islam has morphed into a global 

jihad, it goes from Western Africa to Northeastern Africa all 

through the Middle East into the—into Afghanistan, Pakistan, 

Southern Asia, and Southeast Asia in varying different degrees of 

depth and violence. 

But the one thing that they all have in common is a commitment 

to an ideology, the central point that you are making. Most of these 

movements are about overthrowing the host country government 

because of the grievances that they have, but they use jihad to 

achieve those ends. 

So when I look at it—and this is Fordham University Jesuit 

training, which you are familiar with, sir, and just take a logical 

approach here. If you have got a global problem on your hands, 

what I think this is, we should have a global response to that problem. 

This isn’t about just the United States. There is no way that we 

can deal with this problem without enlisting a global response to 

it. 

I think what we can do here is, what we have historically done, 

is provide leadership. Not telling people how, but setting the framework and the stage to move forward in global—in a global alliance 

to deal with this. 

And that is understanding the ideology. That is working against 

it. 

You know, I believe strongly that we are making a serious strategic mistake in not dealing with radical Islam and letting the 

moderate; when you understand what is the struggle, the struggle 

is inside Islam, dealing with these—with the radicals who take a 

very literal interpretation of the Quran and the Prophet’s writings, 

some of it going back to medieval times, as we know, and they are 

battling against the moderates and the traditionalists, which is the 

overwhelming majority. 

When we refuse to deal with this, the name of it, which I have 

less problem with, but more problem with explaining it, and really 

laying out what this is, we permit the moderates and traditionalists not to have to explain it themselves. They are the theologians 

here. 

We are actually dealing with people whose ideology is steeped in 

theology. We need those clerics who are opposed to that radical theology to explain why this is wrong, and it doesn’t get done. 

And that is a serious mistake, and we are tolerating that mistake. We should not let them off the hook in dealing this. I think 
16 

that is what al-Sisi was trying to do as a national leader is to reach 

into them and to get their attention and say, ‘‘This is our problem, 

but it is more your problem.’’ 

Mr. SMITH. I am sorry. That is a great answer. We have got a 

lot of other people to get into—to have the opportunity to ask questions. 

I am sorry, gentlemen. If you have an answer to that, if you 

could submit it for the record that would be great. I want to let 

some other folks ask some questions. 

Thank you, General Keane. 

[No answers were available at the time of printing.] 

The CHAIRMAN. And I just have to reflect that at least as far 

back as 2007 and 2008, when Mr. Smith chaired the what we now 

have Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee and I was 

a ranking member, he was on this issue, how do we battle this ideology, which I share the frustration of both of you. We really 

haven’t been able to do that yet. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

And I thank the panelists for being here today to talk about the 

President’s AUMF. 

And I would like to make a couple points, and then probably, 

Dean Chesney, I am going to come back to you. 

You know, the fact is it is so vague, and y’all have already commented on that, and whether it should be expanded beyond ISIL, 

as to what groups could be a threat, what groups need to be fought 

and defeated. Let me make that point. 

Also, the issue of sunset, whether it should be sunset or not. I 

was in the Congress—I have been here 20 years—I was here at 

9/11. I was part of this committee at that time. I remember the 

anxiety of the American people—and also those of us in Congress, 

by the way, that we had to do something, we had to give President 

Bush the authority to fight this enemy that had done so much 

damage to America. So we passed the AUMF for 2001 and then a 

year or two later we passed another AUMF for Iraq. 

Well, I bring that up because we are still there. If there had been 

a sunset with either of the two, do you think, Dean, that President 

Obama would have thought he had the authority to bomb Libya? 

Bob Gates, the Secretary of Defense, was sitting exactly where 

you are when my good friend Randy Forbes, who has now left the 

committee for another meeting, asked Secretary Gates, ‘‘If Libya 

had dropped a bomb on New York City, would that be an act of 

war?’’ He never answered. He never answered. 

So the point is that Mr. Obama did not come to Congress in any 

way to say to the Congress, this committee or any other committee, 

that we have got a problem with Gaddafi and Libya and we are 

going to attack. That is what has got the American people concerned not just about Mr. Obama, but any President that has any 

type of authority that he or she can turn their nose up to the Constitution. 

And we are complicit, as a Congress, if we give them such authority that there are no limits to that authority, and actually, 

there are no end points to the strategy that an administration—forget whether it is Obama administration or another administra-
17 

tion—that we become complicit, as Members of Congress who uphold our hands and say, ‘‘We will support the Constitution of the 

United States,’’ and we know the requirement of the Constitution 

as it—excuse me—as it reflects to war powers. 

So my question to you is that if these 2001 and 2002 had had 

a sunset, do you think that Mr. Obama would have felt that he 

could bypass Congress and bomb a foreign country? Because my belief is, as a non-attorney, that if he had done that then we get into 

international law, that I don’t think any nation, as great as America is, should have the power to just decide to go in and bomb another country because we don’t like their leadership. 

And so, therefore, I think the AUMF needs to be vetted very 

carefully as we move forward. But I want to ask you—if you got 

a minute, give it to you, I want to ask you that if we had sunsetted 

those two AUMFs, do you think Mr. Obama would have felt he had 

the justification to bomb Libya? 

Mr. CHESNEY. Sir, you are raising a number of great questions. 

If there had been sunsets for the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs, and if 

those moments came and for whatever reason those authorizations 

were not renewed so that they had gone away, and we reached 

2011, when, as we did, the administration deployed our military to 

use force in Libya, I actually don’t think it would be any different 

than what actually happened, because at that time there was no 

claim by the administration that what it was doing in Libya was 

under color of either of the existing AUMFs. 

Instead, it was a pretty broad claim of Article 2 authority inherent in the President. So I think we would have seen that same 

claim being made, for better or worse. 

That claim does illustrate the breadth with which this administration understands its Article 2 authority to act without your participation to be. That was not a situation where there had been an 

attack on the United States, or at least that that was being 

claimed as the basis for it. 

Instead, it was about the enforcement of the U.N. Security Council resolution, foreign policy interests that were very important, humanitarian interests that were important, but none of which are 

traditional bases for Article 2 claims of authority to deploy the 

military. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlemen. 

And just to alert members and witnesses, because we are the 

largest committee in Congress I have to be pretty strict about the 

time limit, so I appreciate your understanding on that. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all very much for being here, for your service, 

particularly General Keane, and for your insights. 

I want to actually turn to something that maybe we have a little 

more control over, and that is the reporting mechanism. 

And, Mr. Wittes, you talked about that. 

General Keane, you yourself mentioned in your remarks or in the 

article that we were 3 years into a failing strategy with the war 

in Iraq, and you talked about the adaptiveness, and I appreciate 

that, in terms of our military. 
18 

But I guess I am looking for what language you think is appropriate in terms of the reporting mechanism to the Congress? Because there are a few of us who were here at that time and, I don’t 

know, how do you think we did? 

How did we do in terms of that oversight role? Because if we 

were 3 years into a failing strategy, had difficulty asking the questions, and, frankly, a great deal of difficulty getting answers, what 

is it that we need to do now? 

Mr. WITTES. I am very glad you asked that question, because I 

actually think the reporting requirements that the administration 

wrote into its draft AUMF should reasonably be regarded as insulting to—probably less to the committees of jurisdiction than to the 

larger Congress, and certainly to the public. 

For the last number of years there has been a quiet but occasionally erupting tension between—I see—sometimes see it—I don’t 

know if it has arisen on this committee, but it has certainly come 

up on—with your Senate counterparts, where people have wanted 

to get a list of groups that are covered by the AUMF, and the administration has actually not produced a list of groups that the 

AUMF authorizes force against. And I think this is kind of a mindboggling thing that you have a 13-, 14-year-old war in which the 

position of the executive branch is that there is no—you know, 

there is no public list of the group of people that we are at war 

with. 

And so I think, at a minimum, the reporting requirements should 

require public reporting of the list of organizations that the administration considers affiliates, associates, co-belligerents of the organizations that it is authorizing force against. 

One of the reasons to integrate the existing AUMF into the old 

AUMF is so that you can apply those reporting requirements to Al 

Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. And in a way, I mean, we are saying associated 

forces, but not including persons, as in the 2001, as well. 

Mr. WITTES. Well, there is a—there is some pretty broad language here about who counts as an associated forces, but I am saying, you know, that is a separate fight. The question, once you have 

decided somebody is an associated force, who gets to know that, 

right? And I think this—the Congress should be advised of who is 

an associated force, and unless there is some compelling national 

security reason to keep it secret from the public, that should be 

provided in public forum, as well. 

Secondly, the administration’s draft talks about—I don’t have the 

language of it in front of me, but it talks about a semiannual report 

or a twice-annual report on specific actions taken under the authorization. Now, again, there is no clarity about what ‘‘specific actions’’ 

mean, and there is some question if you have duplicative authorizations whether you are taking it under this authorization or 

under the other one that doesn’t have the reporting requirements. 

So I think that, you know, in the draft that Professor Chesney 

and our co-authors and I wrote, we laid out what we thought were 

a sort of robust and reasonable set of reporting obligations. The 

text of that is in my prepared statement, and I still think those 

make sense, honestly. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes. 
19 

Time is running out. Mr. Chesney, I appreciate that you would 

agree with that. 

General Keane, can you comment on the reporting and the role 

of the Congress, and again, these 3 years into a failing—— 

General KEANE. I don’t have any problem with reporting requirements. I do believe the mechanism for oversight of military force 

being applied is already here, and your committee is central—central to that. I think it really has much to do with the rigor of that. 

The 3-year failed strategy we had in Iraq, I don’t suggest that 

the committee probably would have uncovered initially that the 

strategy was not going to work, but I think when the evidence was 

there that it was not working I think the committee does bear 

some responsibility to do thorough assessments. If these are the 

goals and objectives we are trying to achieve, how are we doing 

against these goals and objectives? And then that kind of analysis 

was there and there was evidence that the strategy was failing. 

So I think the mechanism is really already here. I think it has 

to do with rolling up the sleeves and doing rigorous assessment 

and analysis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank each of you for being here today. 

And, General Keane, I want to thank you for your service on 

cable news. It is always really so solid, the information you provide; it is so meaningful, and so important to the American people. 

It is particularly meaningful to me. I have four sons currently 

serving in the military of the United States, and every time I see 

you on the air it is a reminder to me of how capable and competent 

the American military is. And so I want to thank you for that. 

I also would like your input on what suggestions do you have for 

the AUMF, and what language should there be for the flexibility 

for our President to be able to lead us to victory? 

General KEANE. Well, I think the language in the—that we found 

in the other two AMFs—AUMFs, excuse me, where we are talking 

about using the appropriate and necessary force, a very short statement to that effect, really is appropriate. 

As I stated in oral statement, I don’t believe we need, nor should 

we have, a time constraint in it. Why cast any doubt about our resolve? Why do that? 

This administration has a pattern of doing that in the past, as 

we recognized when the President I think rightfully made the commitment to escalate our forces in Afghanistan. In the same public 

policy statement he announced the termination of that force, as 

well. I think that is an unnecessary flag to our enemy about our 

lack of commitment, and I also think it does much the same with 

our allies. 

So I would avoid that for those reasons. And I do believe that, 

given the authorities the Congress has and the oversight responsibilities, you can get at this another way. 

I would agree with Mr. Chesney that if you kick this thing down 

the road a little bit, a few more years, then some of that does go 
20 

away, in terms of the lack of resolve and commitment. But 3 years 

I think is unacceptable. 

The ground force constraint I think has to be absolutely removed 

because of what we are dealing with. We are facing an enemy that, 

in the front of us, we have to deal with largely militarily. At the 

same time we are trying to counter their finances, undermine their 

ideology, but this right now it is a central military problem. 

And we already know that the only way that we can defeat this 

force is with effective ground operations. So anything in this document that would cast doubt on our ability to conduct decisive and 

effective ground force operations seems to me to be misguided and 

it should not be in the document. 

I would bow to my—Mr. Wittes on my left knows far more about 

the intricacies of the legality of this than I do, but I—and the fact 

that the President would still have the authority even though the 

appearance of it would be that he does not. I would not want that 

confusion. I don’t want our troops to have that kind of confusion. 

It doesn’t make any sense to me. 

And those are the essential issues for me. I am for a President 

having the latitude to conduct military operations without these 

constraints on it. 

Mr. WILSON. And it does appear to be a limitation on ground 

troops, but with loopholes, that certainly has to be of concern to the 

American people. 

And, Dean Chesney and Mr. Wittes, it has been indicated that 

y’all have provided the language for AUMF. Has that been provided to the American people and can you give a summary? 

Mr. WITTES. So this was written back in November in a post on 

Lawfare by the four of us. We had written a draft AUMF, a much 

more complicated draft, about a year and a half earlier than that, 

and so this was a response to some of the criticisms that we had 

received, and also a response to ISIL, which had emerged in the 

meantime. 

And what we tried to do was to authorize force against the 

Taliban, Al Qaeda, ISIL, and their associated forces. We did not 

have a ground force restriction, in which I don’t think any of us 

particularly believed, and we did have a sunset provision that was 

also 3 years. 

But I think there is a very simple solution to the problem of triggering, flagging for the enemy a lack of resolve: Make the thing 

longer and don’t call it a sunset. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And a big 

thank you to you for conducting this hearing and, I understand, another hearing coming up next week or thereafter on the military 

side of this, what might be necessary. 

We are doing exactly what we should be doing as Members of 

Congress. In my view it is absolutely essential for Congress to act. 

To use the 2001 or the 2002 AUMF as a reason for a new war, actually, a war that was declared over in Iraq is, in my estimation, 

just dead wrong. 

And we have a responsibility. We represent the American people, 

535 of us plus one, the President, and we have the obligation to 
21 

deal with this. Not easy. Easier to duck. But it is our responsibility. 

With regard to the 2001 AUMF still being in place and the sunset, the 2001 AUMF proves the reason for a sunset; an unending 

war can’t continue it. We have got to deal with this, and the sunset 

seems to me to be absolutely appropriate in that. 

And 3 years requires that the next Presidential election be about 

war. And that is a really good thing for the United States to debate 

and to discuss. 

With regard to the issue of, and this is coming to a question, the 

issue of limitations of the use of boots on the ground, which the 

President says he wants to limit but then writes in such a way as 

probably not limiting, is there any debate between our two esteemed lawyers and general about the ability of Congress to use 

the purse to limit the use of ground troops, for example, no money 

for infantry brigades, Army brigades, artillery, and et cetera, but 

perhaps money for special forces and the like? Is there any doubt 

about the ability of Congress to limit using the purse? 

Mr. CHESNEY. I don’t think there is any serious doubt about that. 

I think amongst those who debate these war powers issues, one 

common touchstone is that the power of the purse, there is very little Congress can’t accomplish with it. 

We can imagine a bizarre hypothetical where somehow that 

power is leveraged to say that the President is not the Commander 

in Chief but instead fill-in-the-blank will have command. But obviously nothing like that sort is being contemplated or talked about 

here. So as long as you are away from that core superintendent’s 

function, I think the power of the purse gives you a lot of leverage 

if it can be used in a particular way. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Any debate about that amongst the—— 

General KEANE. No debate from me. I mean, you have done it before. The Congress stopped a war in Vietnam. It unauthorized, no 

longer authorized our advisors, no longer authorized the use of air 

power, and that war ended. 

I think it is the most powerful mechanism that you actually 

have. 

Mr. WITTES. I have nothing to add to that. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, given that, and given the debate which 

will go on forever about how you define ‘‘boots on the ground’’ or 

limitations on what can actually be done, it just seems to me that 

we could very simply say, ‘‘You have the power to bomb; you have 

the money to bomb; you have the money to do special operations 

or all of the other things, but there is no money for the brigades, 

infantry, artillery, et cetera.’’ And I think that is a good, clear way 

to limit it. 

It also gives this committee and the Congress the opportunity at 

any moment to change its mind and appropriate the money for 

those purposes. So we would be constantly and appropriately, 

therefore, engaged in the ongoing issue of the war and its outcome. 

The other issue that is, I think, one that we are going to have 

to deal with is this issue of limitation. As I said before, I think it 

is absolutely essential. Three years is perfect, in my view. 

I know you disagree, that maybe the next President ought not 

have to deal with it immediately. I strongly disagree, that the next 
22 

President must deal with this up front in the campaign, tell the 

American people whether they want war or not and how they 

would conduct it. 

The other issue is the geography here. We are going to go round 

and round on geography, and I again, my personal view of this is 

it must be limited, and probably doing that by clearly stating who 

we are at war with. 

And a final point, and I guess this won’t be a question but rather 

a comment, and that is, General, you are absolutely correct about 

the ideological war that we must be engaged in also. It is not just 

going to be a military war; this is a question about ideology and 

our necessity of dealing with that reality. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for the clarity on the power of the purse. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Franks. 

Dr. Fleming. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. 

General Keane, one of my primary concerns above what is contained within the AUMF is the fact that I still don’t know a clear 

and coherent strategy upon which we will use the AUMF. The 

President has not outlined—in fact, at one point he even said we 

didn’t have a strategy, so I have a deep concern about whatever the 

AUMF ends up being, what is going to be the strategy that goes 

along with that. 

I would love to hear what you have to say about that. 

General KEANE. Well, you know, I agree with you. And it is pretty frustrating about what is being said and also what is not being 

said. 

I think, clearly, just dealing with ISIS and dealing with Iraq and 

Syria, what is the strategy to degrade and destroy, defeat is a 

much better word than destroy, ISIS? We are saying to ourselves 

that we have an Iraq strategy first, which is to reclaim the territory that is lost. 

To do that, we know we need ground forces to do it. The air 

power has largely stalled, effective air power has largely stalled 

ISIS offensive campaigns, no longer really taking territory in any 

large way in Iraq. 

It has taken territory in Syria since the bombing campaign 

began. That is another story. 

We are depending on local indigenous forces to be that ground 

force, but then we also know that we have problems with this force, 

that it is not a homogeneous force. It is Peshmerga, it is Shia militia, it is Iraqi Security Forces, it is Sunni tribes. 

And we also know that we want air power to be effective, but we 

are not going to put any boots on the ground to help that force be 

more effective. My simple way of dealing with this: If you think you 

have a weak hand, do what you can to strengthen that hand. 

What we want to avoid doing is what the Congressman from 

California would like to constrain the President from doing. We all 

want to avoid using combat brigades to go deal with this. We want 

these people, the Iraqis, to bear the burden of this, not us, on the 

ground. You won’t get anybody in the military signing up for sending large combat brigades in there. 
23 

But that strategy, I think, is flawed because we are not providing 

enough assistance to this local indigenous force that is weak, and 

by that I mean is special forces who can go with them on the 

ground, forward air controllers to help them, significant amounts 

of Apache helicopters, AC–130 gunships, JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command] direct action forces to go kill leaders like we do 

in Iraq and Afghanistan very successfully, on the ground, I may 

say. And these are questions I think that you can ask the military 

leaders when they come forward. 

In Syria, sir, there is no ground force. 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay. And I appreciate that and—— 

General KEANE. There is no strategy in Syria to defeat ISIS. We 

do not have a strategy to defeat ISIS in Syria. 

Dr. FLEMING. So it really is kind of based on a fantasy ground 

force. I get that, yes, we want to stand up or re-stand up the Iraqi 

forces, and that might work. But in Syria, and now I believe ISIS 

has moved into Libya, you know, we voted last year for the Free 

Syrian Army. We still don’t know who the Free Syrian Army that 

we are arming and training, which could take years and it is small 

in number—even the President himself said they were pharmacists 

and doctors. 

So the question here is, without leadership from the United 

States and without boots on the ground that we can trust from an 

army that is well-trained and well-equipped, how in the world does 

this vague strategy work? 

General KEANE. Well, it is not going to work. We have a plan to 

reclaim the territory that was lost in Iraq and hopefully return the 

sovereignty of Iraq to its borders. There is a plan for that. 

But what you are not being told is that the strategy in Syria is 

really only to degrade ISIS and only—and to contain it, because 

that is really what is on the table. The Free Syrian Army, we lost 

the opportunity to help them when they were—when they had the 

momentum in Syria and when they needed our help. 

They are down to several brigades. We are going to train 3,000 

to 5,000 a year of new recruits. Heck, ISIL gets that in a few 

months. It doesn’t even match. 

There is no reality to that strategy if you accept the President 

at his word that he intends to destroy ISIS. What he intends to do 

is degrade it in Syria, contain it, and defer that problem to his successor. That is the strategy in Syria. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I thank you for being here today. 

And, of course, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for bringing this hearing—this issue to our hearing. 

I am encouraged by the fact that we are finally having this debate because I think Congress failed last fall to not only have an 

honest discussion about our overall strategy to defeat ISIS, but we 

also failed to discuss the underpinning authorities for that strategy. I think regardless of where you come down on this issue, it 

is important that we have the discussion, so I am glad that we are 

here. 
24 

I want to first off just say that the paramount importance is to 

make sure that our troops who are sent into harm’s way know that 

all of America is behind them. When they go to battle and they go 

to fight and they go to potentially lay down their lives for this Nation, they need to know that we are behind them and that they— 

that we will be there to help provide them with the resources that 

they need to do the job that we ask them to do. 

That said, I think the AUMF is critically important. I actually 

voted against the repeal of both the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs in the 

past when they came up on the floor as amendments to NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] and defense appropriations not 

because I fully support them, but because there was no alternative 

at the time. 

Now that we are looking at this new alternative, I like the fact— 

the proposal that this new AUMF should subsume and we should 

get rid of the 2001, and I agree with that. 

What I do want to do is to drill down on the geographic boundaries portion of it, and specifically the Brookings Institution’s proposal to, instead of having a geographic boundary, a legal boundary, one that is in conjunction with international laws for the use 

of force and sovereignty. 

So could you—is it Wittes or Wittes? 

Mr. WITTES. Wittes. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. I apologize. 

Mr. WITTES. No worries. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Mr. Wittes, could you sort of drill down on that 

for me a little bit? Let me just give you a specific example and see 

if I understand this correctly. 

This legal boundary would basically say to American commanders on the ground, whom we should trust, by the way, because we put them in charge and they know what they are doing 

when it comes to military, the use of military force, so we are telling them that in Iraq and Afghanistan, because we have the cooperation of those nations’ governments, ‘‘You can be in there, you 

can do your job,’’ but you can’t go and invade Pakistan without 

coming to Congress and Congress authorizing that first because 

there is—we don’t have the invitation of the government of Pakistan to come conduct operations within their territory. 

What does this do for countries or failed states; places like 

Yemen, places like Somalia back in 2001? You know, if these guys 

run into—or in Yemen, does this then put constraints on our military commanders and on our troops to not be able to go after ISIS 

forces in Yemen, for example? 

Mr. WITTES. So I have got 2 minutes to answer this question—— 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Go ahead. 

Mr. WITTES [continuing]. And I am going to do my best. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. You have the full 2 minutes. 

Mr. WITTES. So, look, the—what we said in the proposal was that 

Congress authorizes action in any location that it—that action— 

military action would be appropriate and lawful under international law of sovereignty and the use of force. Now, in circumstances, for example, where you would implicate the President’s Article 2 self-defense authorities, of course he wouldn’t have 

to rely on this authorization. So in the exigent, imminent defense 
25 

situation, he can operate under his own authority to the extent 

that he needs to. 

There are two ways to satisfy the sovereignty barrier under 

international law. One is if you have the consent of the country in 

question. Yemen tolerates our conducting drone strikes against 

AQAP; Pakistan has sometimes permitted our, you know, our use 

of drones to strike targets in Pakistan. That alleviates—ends the 

sovereignty problem. 

The other way is that the U.S. position is that it has the authority to use force against a—on the—against—on the territory of a 

non-consenting state when that state is either unwilling or unable 

to contain and deal with the threat that is emanating from its soil 

against us. 

And so what this would say is if one of those two, that is if that 

is your position as the administration on your international authority to use force, if you are within it then you are within Congress’ 

blessing and authorization. But we are not giving you authorization to do stuff that would otherwise violate international law as 

you understand it. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Very good. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. That was impressive. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, one of the things that we are being asked to do is 

to repeal the 2002 authorization for the use of military force. As 

you know, the 2002 AUMF with—concerning Iraq found that Iraq 

poses a continuing threat to the national security of the United 

States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region, and because members of Al Qaeda are known to be in Iraq. 

I would like your opinion, because it would seem to me that even 

though the Saddam Hussein regime has been removed from power, 

that the objectives in the 2002 resolution remain: protecting both 

United States and Iraqi minority groups as well as ending terrorism in Iraq. All of those objectives are still in doubt, and therefore it does seem that there may be a compelling legal rationale for 

keeping the 2002 AUMF in force since the President obviously is 

finding that he has very broad authority under it currently. 

So do you believe that leaving the 2002 AUMF concerning Iraq 

in place would be a conflict, and would you recommend removing 

the text that repeals the 2002 AUMF? Any thoughts? 

Mr. CHESNEY. So when the administration revealed that it was 

relying on the 2002 Iraq AUMF as part of its basis for its operations in Iraq, this precipitated a lot of debate amongst folks about 

whether this is a persuasive claim under that authority. The objectives, as you say, the objectives of the 2002 authorization are still 

present. 

The question is, the authorization was specific to the threat 

posed by Iraq. What do we mean by that? What is the best reading 

of that authorization? 

If it means threats to the United States that are emanating from 

within, or that involve something happening within the borders of 

the state of Iraq, that is an argument for saying that it fits, and 

I guess that is the argument that the administration adopted. If it 

is read, instead, to mean that Iraq in 2002—that is referring to 
26 

Saddam Hussein’s regime and the government of Iraq as the 

threat—then it doesn’t fit well. And that was a view that was a little bit more plausible to me, but reasonable lawyers, including 

some of my colleagues on Lawfare, we disagreed on this point. 

The interesting question today is, is there anything you get only 

with the 2002 authorization that isn’t separately covered either by 

the 2001 authorization against Al Qaeda or a new authorization 

that this body may produce against ISIL? And I am hard-pressed 

to think of what that might be. 

We would have to imagine a situation in which force needed to 

be used against some entity that was not plausibly an associated 

force of ISIL nor an associated force of Al Qaeda. We might imagine falling into that category Shiite militia, Hezbollah, the groups 

that are on the Shiite Iran-sponsored side of things. 

We are not, to the best of my knowledge, at least in the public 

record, we are not currently using force or contemplating the use 

of force against them. Indeed, in some respects we are fighting in 

the same direction against ISIS with those entities. 

You can imagine, though, a situation where it does seem appropriate, a new fact pattern. In that circumstance, the President’s Article 2 authorities would be ample to at least initially respond, and 

I think the wiser course would be to come back to this body at that 

point if something more than Article 2 were needed. 

Mr. TURNER. Other thoughts? Any other thoughts on the panel? 

Mr. WITTES. I mean, I very much agree with that. 

Mr. TURNER. Excellent. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to start by 

thanking you and the ranking member for holding this hearing. 

I can think of no more important decision that we will make as 

Members of Congress than whether or not to send our Armed 

Forces into harm’s way, and I appreciate the fact that we have got 

the subject matter experts before us to help us make a more informed decision. I hope that we will have more hearings on this 

subject. It certainly warrants it. 

And I also want to agree with the fundamental questions asked 

by the chairman, you know, what is our strategy? And the ranking 

member, how do we help out without making the problem worse? 

I think those are the questions of the day, and I realize very difficult to answer. 

General Keane, I couldn’t help but agree with you when you said 

that we shouldn’t put limitations on our military if we are asking 

them to go in and do a very difficult job, if we want to acknowledge 

that there are no ground forces today in Syria that we can rely on. 

It is very questionable whether there are ground forces in Iraq that 

we can rely on that are not our own. 

And so if we are going to go in, and if we want to win, then we 

need to do whatever is necessary to do that. 

But I also think about the service members at Fort Bliss, whom 

I have the honor of representing, the veterans who have come back 

from wars throughout our history, including the most recent engagements in the Middle East. And while I agree with Ms. Duck-
27 

worth that they want to know that we have their back and that 

we support them, I think what they want to know even more than 

that is that we have a plan and we have a strategy before we send 

them into harm’s way. 

So I would like to ask you to do this, I don’t know that in the 

3 minutes remaining we can define what that strategy should look 

like. If you can, go for it. 

But how about this: Can you define what winning looks like? 

Can you define the conditions that would be necessary in Iraq and 

Syria or vis-a-vis ISIS for us to conclude military operations? 

And I will start with General Keane and then we can move to 

your left across the panel. 

General KEANE. Well, ISIL is a little different organization than 

Al Qaeda because owning territory, it provides them a legitimacy 

and it is part of their belief system. So you fundamentally, to defeat them, have to begin by taking their territory away from them. 

They will largely stay and fight. We found that when we went 

into Afghanistan, where Al Qaeda was initially at post-9/11, when 

they were met with some sizeable force—not necessarily a decisive 

force—they ran into the mountains and hills of Pakistan. They fled 

to fight another day. This organization will not do that. 

So what we must do is take the territory away from them which 

provides them their legitimacy. And by returning Iraq to its sovereignty, to its borders, that is a good thing and that is what winning looks like. 

The same thing in taking the territory away from them in Syria. 

That would not stop ISIS from conducting terrorist activities in 

those same countries from outside the country or from a small safe 

haven in it, or using terrorist activities in cyber terrorism, which 

they are also doing, in other satellite countries. But where core 

ISIS is, we must take the territory away that they own, and that 

begins to look like we are winning. 

That doesn’t mean ISIS goes away, because as the map I showed 

you, they have affiliates out there in satellites that they are trying 

to establish governance with and relationships with. But this is 

central to ISIS. 

And let’s face it: ISIS has quite an appeal in the world today, 

and why is that? Because they have the appearances of winning. 

They are standing up to the United States and powerful nations; 

they are humiliating these nations by how—the barbarism and 

butchery that they do on the Internet. And they have had some impact with citizens in other countries killing their fellow citizens, as 

well. 

When you start to take this territory away from them, and you 

start to kill and capture them, and you find them in shackles, and 

they are moving into detention centers by the scores, this image, 

this attractiveness of ISIS begins to fade because now it is a losing 

organization. And it starts to impact on its ability to recruit people. 

Nobody wants to be a part of a losing, failing organization. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Yes. 

I am not going to have time to hear from the other witnesses, 

but I would love to get your responses for the record: What does 

winning look like? What conditions will have to prevail for us to 

withdraw military forces from that region? 
28 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Keane, Mr. Chesney, Mr. Wittes, thanks so much for 

joining us today. 

General Keane, I wanted to ask you, from your perspective, and 

examining all the issues around an authorization of the use of military force, what would be some of the questions that you would 

suggest that we ask of our military leaders, with all the conditions 

that have to be considered here: the controversy of timeframes, the 

extent of which—how we identify the adversary, how we go after 

them, what should the scope and breadth of that be? Give me your 

perspective on some of the aspects that we should get the military 

leaders’ perspective on? 

General KEANE. Certainly. Well, first of all, I think you are 

bringing General Austin in here, CENTCOM commander. I have 

known him for years, worked with him, a very fine officer, and certainly with his depth of experience I think you are going to get all 

the answers you want, but here are a couple of suggestions. 

Number one, we are so dependent on this indigenous force in 

Iraq, I mean, it is appropriate to find out—get an assessment of the 

quality of that force and its reliability. After all, we did see this 

Iraqi army, despite all the years of investment in it, painfully 

watched it collapse in the face of ISIS, which wasn’t that much of 

an overwhelming force. The Iraqi army outnumbered ISIS somewhere in the neighborhood of eight-to-one, but yet it collapsed in 

the face of it. 

So what has happened in the last year or so that changed that? 

This is crucial to our success. And what could we do, as the coalition, not just the United States, to help that force be better; not 

just in training, but advising it and also giving it military capability to assist in that force? 

What kind of timeframe are we really talking about here? Is this 

sometime this year, as the media seems to be reporting, and also 

CENTCOM gave us an awful lot of information on that themselves, 

which I was a little surprised with, in terms of the qualitative approach and quantitative approach to the force itself. But that is an 

important issue. 

In dealing with Syria itself; let me come back to Iraq. 

One of the key dimensions in Iraq is clearly the Sunni tribes, and 

where are we in the growth and development of the Sunni tribes’ 

willingness to participate under arms? And I know we are doing— 

we are conducting some assistance of them. 

Most of them are reconcilable, and we know these leaders very 

well from our association with them. There are a few irreconcilables from the previous Saddam Hussein regime, and they are supporting ISIS; they always will. Where are we with that in—and the 

Abadi government’s willingness to be politically inclusive with 

them? 

Another issue deals with Shia militia itself. The Shia militia is 

a very strong force. The cleric Sistani asked for popular support for 

it. 
29 

It goes well close to 100,000-plus, maybe close to 200,000 volunteers who have thickened the Iraqi Security Forces. The best of the 

Shia militia forces are those that are backed by Iranians and have 

had a role in training them. What does this mean to us as we go 

forward in terms of the Shia militia’s role in helping to reclaim territory? 

Also, are we finally equipping the Peshmerga with what they 

need? They have been complaining to every one of you and to anybody that visits them that they still haven’t got the equipment they 

need. 

In Syria the real issue, as I have tried to point out, is the ground 

force itself. What will be the ground force that will eventually defeat ISIS in Syria? And I think if the answer is the Free Syrian 

Army, I think you need to push pretty hard on that, because it 

doesn’t seem to be viable to me. 

I believe it is an Arab coalition that will have to be put together. 

They will probably ask us to lead it, and I think it is likely we 

probably should. I don’t think we could do that unless we shut 

down Assad’s air power. 

And I also believe that the administration doesn’t want to do any 

of that. And even though Turkey, the UAE [United Arab Emirates], 

Saudi Arabia, and Jordan want the administration to do that, in 

other words, shut Assad’s air power down so that finally we can 

start to do something against ISIS and you are not bombing the 

Free Syrian Army force every day. That is what he is doing. 

I think the elephant in the room there, quite frankly, is the nuclear deal with Iran, that the administration does not want to push 

on Assad because of the relationship with Iran. Iran propped that 

regime up; it rescued that regime from failure. 

And if we pushed on it I think it would jeopardize the pending 

potential deal on nuclear weapons, which I think the administration believes is its number one priority. Probably wouldn’t say that, 

but I believe it is. 

I don’t think General Austin will get much involved in that because that is a policy question above his head, but certainly these 

other things he would be prepared to answer, and I think you will 

get some very straight answers from him. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Norcross. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Thank you, Chairman. Certainly appreciate it. 

And, you know, one of the duties that we have is to make decisions on these very difficult items, and it weighs heavily certainly 

on my mind and those of the people that I represent. 

Certainly I have to agree with the witnesses when they talk 

about three reasons that we are even considering this: obviously 

the moral reason, which I agree with; the age and scope of the old 

AUMF; and certainly, it is our job, which actually brings me to the 

point of the question. 

King Abdullah was here 2, 3 weeks ago, and it was the day that 

the video was released of his pilot being burned to death in a cage; 

that barbaric video. He stated, ‘‘This is our war,’’ indicating that 
30 

he and his partners in the Gulf. It can’t be America against them. 

‘‘We need your help, but it is our war.’’ 

And the other item which really resonates with me: I have been 

fighting this for 1,400 years, and brings me back to what Mr. 

Smith had said is beating down the mole. So we heard the question 

earlier talking about what is a win, and certainly the nuts and 

bolts of a win can be debated. But I think those who we are targeting, it is not a team sport that they win and lose; it is a way 

of life. 

And I think we have heard ample evidence of that, that they are 

willing to give everything up because they believe in this at a core 

level. Whether we think it is insane or not is immaterial. 

But you had talked rather, General, directly against a timeframe. Couldn’t the same argument be spoken about the timeframe 

is, each year we authorize a budget, and in many ways that is a 

timeframe. 

I think it is the responsibility of the next President and next 

Congress to review what we are doing. And I don’t think anybody 

in this room or in America doubts the resolve of the American people to back up our troops. 

So I want to get your opinion on where we are going with the 

timeframe again, given that at any point they could point to the 

fact that we wouldn’t fund this or the budget and appropriations. 

How is that different than the resolve of a 2- or a 3-year AUMF? 

General KEANE. Well, in my mind, I mean, the budget is an annual process, and that is quite different even though there are 

plenty of authorities in a budget, obviously, to fund military operations. But that is quite different from the AUMF, where you are 

authorizing military force for a specific purpose and then tying a 

timeframe to that authorization. 

I am suggesting that why do that when you have plenty of authority yourselves in your normal oversight of the Department of 

Defense and the executive branch to make certain that you understand what is taking place and the progress that is taking place 

and you have the power of the purse in any event, which is your 

ultimate authority? I think it sends a message of a lack of resolve. 

You know as well as I do that our friends in the region, and if 

you are speaking to them you know what I am about to say, that 

they have been questioning America’s resolve in this region for 

some time now. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Exactly why we are here today. 

General KEANE. And why add to that? Why add to that doubt 

about our resolve? After all, we are going to be largely depending 

on them dealing with this problem for years to come. 

And secondly, I think it sends a message to the enemy that, well, 

America is not that serious. We are going to take a look at this in 

3 years and see if we should be doing this. When anybody who is 

looking at this, I mean the reason why we have an authorization 

for military force is because I think it is an unstated, it is an 

unstated understanding that this—it will be protracted, that this 

is going to go on for years. 

Mr. NORCROSS [continuing]. Like a budgetary issue that we 

would be discussing each year. Couldn’t they look at that from the 

very same perspective as you are suggesting? 
31 

General KEANE. The normal oversight that takes place and the 

tough questions that are asked of, you know, the Department of 

Defense leadership, both civilian and military, that kind of rigorous 

analysis is never going to get communicated in the same way that 

the authorization for military force and the time constraint that is 

associated with it would be. I mean, that is a headline, and rigorous analysis in terms of the progress we are making is not. I 

think those are two very different things and quite separate, frankly. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank all of you for being here. 

General Keane, I don’t ever want to let a general stand before 

this committee without expressing gratitude for your service and 

for just your commitment to protect human freedom, especially my 

little babies. I appreciate it. 

I was especially moved by your comments related to the resolve 

that I think the enemy tries to consider as much as anything else. 

And the administration’s AUMF mentions using American forces, 

‘‘in support of partners on the ground and local forces to combat 

ISIS.’’ 

One of my concerns is that there is an ancillary effect that it 

might end up where we are even indirectly funding Shia militia 

proxies of Iran, and it might actually increase their standing in the 

world to the extent that it might actually increase their opportunity to one day gain a nuclear weapons capability. And do you 

think that the AUMF, as it stands now, opens us up to the potential of the ancillary effect of fighting alongside Iran? 

General KEANE. Well, clearly we cannot disguise the fact that 

there are Shia militia that is largely protecting Baghdad and also 

the shrines, the Shia shrines, north and south, that are present 

there, and some of them have been trained by the Iranians. And 

they also have been effective, and they will continue to be effective. 

So that reality is on the ground and it is not going to change. 

That does not mean that when Iraq gets its total territory back 

and its sovereignty is returned to its borders that Iran is going to 

have a grip on Iraq that is totally dysfunctional. The Iraqis don’t 

want that. Certainly Abadi wants no part of that. 

He also did not turn down, his predecessor didn’t turn down, 

when he asked for help, airplanes started arriving day one. And we 

put off help for a few months, if you will recall that. And he was 

not about to turn that help down from a practical matter. 

When you look at it geopolitically, Iraq wants to stand on its own 

two feet. Iran will always have an influence there, given its neighbor and also given the fact that they have helped them here. 

But I do think that the coalition that is coming together to help 

Iraq and to return its sovereignty, we will have a long-term strategic relationship with Iraq on a path that we had intended to do 

back in 2009, when we had driven this Al Qaeda in Iraq into their 

rat holes. So I think those opportunities are still there. 

I don’t think that the Shia militia backed by the Iranians forecloses on a strategic relationship with Iraq over the long term that 

makes sense to us in terms of a country that has wealth, an edu-
32 

cated class of people, and is a force for stability in the region. 

Those opportunities are still there. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you. It occurs to me that emphasizing 

our relationship to the Kurds and helping them as much as possible might be a safer alternative there, but one of the great concerns that I think all of us have is that we—you know, one of the 

gentlemen mentioned here, we have been fighting this radical 

Islamist ideology for 1,400 years. And so without defining our 

enemy or essentially by that ideology, it is difficult for me to know 

how that we engage them strategically. 

I mean, we have fought terrorism tactically very successfully. We 

have had unprecedented success. But I think that we have failed 

to engage them strategically. 

And so I guess I would ask what would your thoughts be to some 

language in an AUMF that might sort of—I know it is deep water, 

but to holistically identify this ideology so that we are able to confront it where it emerges instead of just kind of coming up with 

some fuzzy associational definitions? 

General KEANE. You know, I sympathize, you know, with your 

desire to do that because you are frustrated, like I am, that we 

don’t have a comprehensive strategy to deal with this and it has 

gone on far too long. And when you watch the growth of—the continued growth of Al Qaeda, and now watching the growth of ISIS, 

it is particularly difficult to recognize that we still haven’t come to 

grips with it. 

But this is not the document to put those means in there, even 

though you are frustrated and you are tempted to want to do that. 

It is just inappropriate to do it. 

I think it would set a terrible precedent for authorizing military 

force. I think you would get significant pushback from the—and 

justifiably so—from the President and his team. 

I think bringing the national leadership in here and putting 

them in front of you and asking them to explain what is the strategy to deal with radical Islam, and evaluating that and assessing 

that, and pushing on them, I think that is much more appropriate 

to deal with than to try to put some expression of it in this document—in the authorization for military force. I think it is inappropriate. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Takai. 

Mr. TAKAI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and really thank you very 

much for having this hearing. As many have mentioned, this is a 

very important issue for all of us here and definitely for our constituents back at home. 

I looked at the request from the President in the form of this 

joint resolution, and under section (c) limitations it says the authority of the grant does not authorize the use of the United States 

Armed Forces in, ‘‘enduring offensive ground combat operations.’’ 

So my question to you on the panel is, what does that mean? 

Does it actually refer to the length of time during which the operations will be ongoing for 3 years? What is the scope of the operation, from your perspective? And is it, in fact, some undefined relationship between time and scope? 
33 

Mr. CHESNEY. It is not well defined. It is a severe problem with 

the language in section 2(c). And it is not just one problem of lack 

of clarity; it is multiple problems. 

‘‘Enduring’’ has no particular legal meaning. That, in some people’s minds, could reasonably refer to years; in other people’s 

minds, the Secretary of State the other day, on Tuesday, referred 

to a couple of weeks or a few weeks. You know, reasonable people 

can disagree about what ‘‘enduring’’ means. 

‘‘Offensive’’ is difficult to describe. So, for example, the upcoming 

operation to liberate the city of Mosul, is that an offensive operation? You can see where someone would view it that way. 

But on the other hand, it is not like ISIL was in that city all 

along. ISIL came in and took it. Is it defensive to drive them back 

out? 

‘‘Ground combat.’’ If you have forward air controllers who are on 

the ground and they are directing air strikes or assisting with the 

direction of air strikes, is that a ground combat operation? 

There are ways to try to handle this by offering statements, like 

the President’s transmittal letter, referring to, well, here is a list 

or an enumeration of particular types of activities that we mean to 

be okay. But at the end of the day, none of that gets enacted in 

the AUMF. The AUMF’s text will say, ‘‘No enduring offensive 

ground combat operations,’’ and that language should be dropped. 

Mr. TAKAI. Okay. I have another question, and maybe you can 

help me with this. 

So there have been many mentions, I mean, if you take a look 

at the language it also repeals the 2002 AUMF, but my reservations are in regards to the still-in-effect 2001 AUMF. So my question is, and in fact, many people have already said it, the conflict 

that we are in right now, what is happening right now is based on 

the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs, so what is your perspective with the 

fact that the 2001 AUMF will still be in effect based on this draft? 

What does that mean? 

I mean, we are currently operating with those two AUMFs. Is, 

in fact, this particular draft necessary to continue operation? 

Mr. WITTES. So what it means very simply is that the additional 

authorization here is purely additive, not there is no, you know, the 

interaction between this and the underlying document is that this 

merely adds authority. It does not tailor authority. It doesn’t really, 

despite the optics, at least as a legal matter it doesn’t limit authority. 

And I think if I have one message for this committee it is, think 

about the new authorization in interaction with the prior authorization, because otherwise you end up talking about restrictions 

that aren’t real restrictions, and you also end up imposing, you end 

up doing all kinds of things that you don’t know you are doing or 

you don’t mean to be doing because there are these other documents out there. 

And so think, think about it as though you had to today answer 

the question, what force do we want to be authorizing overseas in 

general against the groups that we might want to use force 

against. And some of that involves rewriting the old AUMF, and 

some of it involves the discrete expansion of it into the ISIL and 

associated forces department. 
34 

But think about that question holistically. Don’t try to think 

about it as, you know, hey, what can we add that is on ISIL in particular, because then you end up with restrictions that don’t seem 

to mean what they say. 

Mr. TAKAI. Okay. And then one more question, and I guess we 

will have to wait for your response in writing, but I am just questioning why you think there was no geographical limitations put in 

this current draft. So if you can think about that and maybe send 

us the information, I—— 

Mr. WITTES. I can give you a 2-second answer to that: because 

the administration wanted to maintain flexibility. 

Mr. TAKAI. All right. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here. 

And the authorization that the President submitted to Congress 

lists one terrorist group in two countries. I have got a Defense Intelligence Agency report right here that is unclassified that says 

that we are chasing 41 terrorist groups in 24 countries. And I think 

that one of my concerns, or I know one of my concerns, and I think 

other people’s concerns, with the way the authorization is drafted 

is, what if they simply change their name or what if they simply 

cross borders into another country? 

The other thing that I would point out is that the President had 

the authority several months ago, when we first saw the ISIL convoys, to take action at that stage and he chose not to, and I think 

that one of the reasons that we are in the situation we are today 

is because they were indecisive at that point, and quite honestly, 

it is almost like they let them kill enough people that now all of 

a sudden they have to do something about it. 

I want to go back to 2011 for a second. The decision was made 

to take Gaddafi out, yet the United States did not secure the weapons in Libya. I would like to know what do you think happened to 

the weapons in Libya when Gaddafi was removed, since we did not 

go into the country and secure them? 

The other thing I would suggest is that the U.S., through the 

State Department, for years has been undermining Assad and the 

central government of Syria. That, to me, seems to have been one 

of the things that has allowed these terrorist groups to grow. 

And then finally, I would like—and, General, this may be more 

of a question for you because of your military experience, what does 

the hold force look like? I have no idea that we can move these terrorists out of any territory that we choose to move them out of, but 

what does the hold force look like to hold that territory? Because 

if we can’t hold it this time, we are simply going to be right back 

in there again. 

General KEANE. Okay. Well, that is a mouthful. Let me try to get 

to you with some of it and hopefully leave some time for others. 

But, you know, in terms of the enemy itself, I think saying ‘‘ISIS’’ 

and also putting the word ‘‘associates’’ in there clearly sends a message that this is—ISIS, as I tried to show you on ISW’s map, clearly has intent and is moving outside of ISIS, the Islamic State of 

Iraq and al-Sham, which is essentially the Levant. And you would 
35 

not want to restrict the President geographically or in terms of 

what this enemy calls itself and who it is affiliated with. 

It doesn’t mean that on that map that is in front of you that we 

would obviously be dealing with ISIS in all of those countries. I 

think we would have to give the President a lot more credit than 

that. But the fact of the matter is, if we wanted to conduct a 

counterterrorism operation against ISIS in Libya because al-Sisi 

asked us to do that, and we want to do it together, and we have 

got good reason to do it, that may be something the President 

would want to consider and we would want him to have the flexibility to do that. 

Mr. SCOTT. Do you agree that he has the authorization to do that 

today? 

General KEANE. He could do it today. 

Mr. SCOTT. Absolutely. I agree with you—— 

General KEANE. I agree with that, but I also think that this document, because this is a protracted war and because of who this 

enemy is and the scale of it, I do believe the AUMF is appropriate. 

And weapons in Libya, look at three times we have made the 

same mistake. We went into Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, deposed 

a government, and never had very good plans—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, sir. 

General KEANE [continuing]. To deal with the aftermath of that 

in terms of establishing security and stability. We have made the 

same mistake three times. 

In Libya the only thing that—and we had a moderate government that took over, much to our surprise. The only thing that 

moderate government asked of us is, ‘‘Help me put together an effective security force so I can tamp down the militant organizations 

that are in my country.’’ 

Our answer to that was, ‘‘No.’’ And look where we are now. Our 

embassy is gone, they have killed our Ambassador, they burned our 

consulate down, and we have got chaos in that country. 

The weapons in Libya we did take control, I mean, some—I can’t 

get into the classified aspect of it, but the Central Intelligence 

Agency did have an operation that they conducted in Libya to take 

control of a lot of sensitive weapons. I am not talking about AK– 

47s and RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades]; talking about WMD 

[weapons of mass destruction] and other weapons. 

Mr. SCOTT. I am out of time. I would suggest that a better word 

for what happened to our Ambassador in Libya was an assassination. The idea that that just kind of happened is absolutely ridiculous, and the facts show that that was an absolute assassination 

of a United States Ambassador. 

General KEANE. Quickly, on the hold force: If all we do is clear 

out ISIS from Mosul, Tikrit, and Fallujah, and don’t have a force 

that stays there to protect it and that is effective, this is the number one lesson we learned prior to putting in play the counterinsurgency operations in Baghdad and the environs around it. We would 

routinely clear forces out and then they would come back in because we did not hold control of the territory and maintain influence and control over the people. 
36 

If we don’t do that, they for certain are going to come back. This 

is a determined, resolute force. They are not going to go someplace 

else. They are going to come back. 

And we have to have that capability there, and that is—I think 

that is something you can explore with General Austin. I am sure 

he has got a plan for it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. 

There are so many different points and angles, and difficult to 

address them quickly in less than 5 minutes, but I want to touch 

on the point that many have made about the need to address and 

come up with an effective strategy to defeat this threat not only 

militarily but simultaneously ideologically; that, as you said, General Keane, as we saw with Al Qaeda, because this was never addressed up front we find ourselves in the situation that we are in 

today. 

So my question is about how we deal with this issue within the 

construct. Each of you believe that there should be an AUMF 

passed to deal with this, and how that issue of ideology is addressed within this document. 

And secondly, as we talk about what is coming in Mosul but also 

generally, as we look at the military strategy to defeat this enemy, 

why it is so important to address the ideology is, for example, if 

we had a primarily U.S.-led ground force it would play directly into 

the ideology and major recruiting propaganda that groups like ISIS 

are using, that this is a war between the West and Muslims, as opposed to supporting what President al-Sisi is calling for, this Arab 

regional ground force. 

So specifically with the AUMF, I am wondering if you can address that question with regards to the fact that this must have a 

military and ideology component to the strategy. 

We can start with General Keane. 

General KEANE. Well, you know I have very strong feelings about 

the fact that we have to recognize it for what it is. What we have 

failed to do is name the movement properly, then we don’t define 

it, and we certainly have done a terrible job in explaining its ideology. 

And by putting a magnifying glass on that ideology and then 

having the moderate and the traditionalist Muslims explain why 

the Islam that they are following is powerful and why 95, 97 percent of the Muslims in the world are following it, and why that 

should shape and define people’s lives and why this other following 

is absolutely antithetical to it, that has to take place. And I would 

suggest that we are not the best to do that. This is about Muslims 

doing this, educating not only Muslims about it, but educating the 

rest of us about this. 

And I do think the United States can play a leadership role here 

in terms of encouraging this and getting the majority of the Muslims, and there are many of them that speak out, but getting their 

clerical leaders to really speak out in a theological way to deal with 

this issue. 
37 

Certainly the military component here is what is right in front 

of us. We have a marauding enemy that is killing people every single day; most of it is not being exposed on the Internet. 

And this kind of brutality and barbarism has to be stopped. The 

only way you can stop that killing is you have to kill the people 

who are doing it and—or you have to capture them. 

All that said, we don’t want to fight another movement like this 

5 years from now or 8 years from now, and that is what brings in 

your comment about the ideology and countering that entire narrative. We need a longer-term issue to get at that. 

And yes, there are conditions in this region that helped to grow 

some of this movement. Political reform, social justice, and some of 

the economic repression in the region are conditions that contribute 

to it. They are not necessarily central to it, but they are there contributing it and we have to have those kind of sensible dialogues 

with our friends in the region who, in fact, contribute to some of 

these problems. 

Ms. GABBARD. Right. Sorry, I have got 1 minute. 

I wanted to just ask Mr. Chesney both to address this but also 

the first point that you made about this AUMF lacking a purpose, 

a directly stated purpose, and how you could see that an effective 

winning strategy can be achieved and outlined, really, in this. 

Mr. CHESNEY. So, taking these in reverse order, it certainly 

makes sense to talk about the strategy on the ground most likely 

being best effectuated by an Arab regional ground force, properly 

supported, and led and resourced and punched up by U.S. forces. 

Trying to tweak the AUMF’s language in a way that allows for 

that yet doesn’t somehow allow for a larger ground force where it 

is just the U.S. I think is not going to be easily done and shouldn’t 

be attempted. That should be left to the Commander in Chief to 

figure out how to do this without trying to tie his hands legislatively. 

As to what you say about the purpose, very difficult to make a 

granular statement there, but there needs to be at least some guidance at a high level of generality. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brooks. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

During my time I would like to emphasize the very broad nature 

and scope of the war resolution that we are being asked to support. 

In particular, and this has been mentioned by some of the other 

Congressmen and by the witnesses, there are no geographic limitations. And as I understand it from the information I have, you can 

make the case that the Islamic State is active of course in Iraq and 

Syria, but also Jordan, Libya, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Yemen, 

Saudi Arabia, and other nations. 

Under the war resolution that we are being asked to support, in 

section 2 it states, ‘‘The President is authorized to use the armed 

forces of the United States as the President determines to be necessary and appropriate against ISIL or associated persons or forces 

as defined in section 5.’’ 

You go down to section 5: The term ‘‘associated persons or forces’’ 

means individuals and organizations fighting for, on behalf of, or 

alongside ISIL, which is, as we know, covering virtually every con-
38 

tinent on Earth, with the possible exception of Antarctica, and 

many of the countries that are on each of those continents, because 

the Islamic State has done a fairly good job of recruiting its people 

from all corners of the globe. 

In that vein, then, I want to emphasize a couple of questions but 

ask you to ask one of them. 

First, how is America going to pay for it? This is an extraordinary cost, and we have had witnesses where you are sitting now 

who have already said that the greatest national security threat 

that the United States of America faces is our deficit and accumulated debt that ultimately has the potential of exposing us to a devastating insolvency and bankruptcy, which would eliminate our 

ability to have a national defense. Those words, in effect, came 

from Admiral Mike Mullen when he was Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. 

Second, how does diversion of defense money to this effort to 

fight the Islamic State undermine our defense capabilities and the 

rest of the needs for America’s national security? 

The question I want you to answer, though, is, if Congress adopts 

this war resolution or a similar one, how does that action affect the 

willingness of the rest of the world, and Europe in particular—Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, and the like—to shoulder 

more of the burden, to spend their treasury, to risk the lives of 

their young men and women now that they know that the United 

States of America is once again willing to pay the price for the 

world’s security? So if we pass this war resolution, how does that 

impact the willingness of other nations that are at risk to spend 

their money and risk their young men and women? 

Mr. WITTES. I mean, I think I am overwhelmingly unqualified to 

address any of those questions, frankly. I am not an expert on fiscal matters. I am actually not an expert on European-U.S. relations. And, you know, I—you guys asked me to address the merits 

of the President’s proposal, and I have tried to give some technical 

guidance on that. 

Mr. BROOKS. All right. Thanks. I appreciate your succinctness 

and candor in that regard, and maybe the other two witnesses—— 

General KEANE. Okay. 

Mr. BROOKS [continuing]. Are not prepared either—— 

General KEANE. I am here. 

Mr. BROOKS [continuing]. But if we are going to shoulder the 

whole burden, which is what this resolution seems to suggest we 

are willing to do, how does that affect the willingness of other nations to sacrifice as we would be sacrificing? 

General Keane. 

General KEANE. Well, I knew we were going to have this discussion, and I think it is very difficult to put a price tag on security 

of the American people. We know this is a threat to our interests 

and national security objectives in the region, and we know it portends to be a long-term threat to the American people. 

This ideology is clearly having some impact. I am not suggesting 

for a minute that terrorism is going to break out across the United 

States. I don’t wring my hands about things like that. 

But I do take seriously when the director of the FBI said he has 

got homegrown terrorism investigations going on in every State in 
39 

the United States. I am not suggesting that there is going to be a 

terrorist attack in every State, that every one of those people who 

he is investigating have the means to do it or the will to do it. But 

just the fact that it is ongoing itself I think is alarming in and of 

itself that how many people have been attracted to this ideology. 

So secondly, the security of the American people are involved 

here, and should we be prudent about the expenditure of funds to 

do this? Of course we would be. But one of the things we have to 

do, to be frank about it, Mr. Congressman, is we have to deal with 

sequestration. 

While we are talking about the authorization of military force, 

the Budget Control Act is decapitating the capabilities of the 

United States military. And you know that as well as I do when 

these service chiefs come in front of you and lay out, you know, 

what their challenges are as they look down the road at the Budget 

Control Act or sequestration. 

We are taking the Army down to something that is pre-World 

War II, and the Navy and the Air Force down to something that 

is 1950s. That doesn’t make any sense to anybody, but that is the 

path that we are on. So I think the Congress can play a significant 

role here in dealing with sequestration. 

The Europeans? Listen, the Europeans I don’t think they have 

ever recovered from the fact we bailed them out of World—from 

post-World War II. Year after year after year they have pushed the 

burden of their security more on us, and this has been generational. 

Many of these European nations are feckless in the face of real 

security challenges. You can see it in their budget and you can see 

it in their will. And look at how they are dealing with Putin and 

the redesign of Europe that he is imposing on them and the feckless response that we are getting from them. 

It is predictable that we will, by comparison to our European 

friends, bear a greater burden. I think it goes with the leadership 

role the United States plays in the world, that the United States 

believes in stability and security, and helping to raise the prosperity level among people in the world, and dealing with the thugs 

and killers who are out there who would impose our will, and we— 

it is not that we have to be the answer to all of it, but where our 

national interests are involved, that we should be involved. 

And we shouldn’t judge that based on—look around and say, 

‘‘Are our European friends going to be with us or not?’’ We should 

do everything to get them involved with us, but if they choose to 

be halfhearted about it, if our interests are at stake and the security of the American people is at stake then I think we have got 

to be there. And I don’t think you put a price tag on it. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moulton. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, thank you very much for joining us here this 

morning. 

General Keane, I want to specifically thank you, because I was 

an infantry officer in the surge, I am greatly appreciative of what 

you did to help turn that war around. 
40 

I respectfully disagree with an earlier statement one of my colleagues made that the most important thing for the troops on the 

ground is to know that all of America is behind them. I knew that 

all of America wasn’t supportive of what I was doing in Iraq, but 

you, with the help of General Petraeus and others, gave us some 

hope, some faith that we had a plan, that our effort, our sacrifice, 

our loss would not be in vain. 

And so I, among many others, come back to this fundamental 

issue that we don’t seem to have a strategy here. 

I just returned from a CODEL [congressional delegation] to Iraq 

and Afghanistan and received countless briefs on a three-phased 

plan. And we all know that phase four was what was missing back 

in 2003, and it seems like it is missing again here. 

I have not seen a good plan to deal with the Sunni tribes, to deal 

with the Shiite militias, and that is just in Iraq. I agree with your 

assessment that we don’t seem to have much of any plan at all for 

Syria. 

So my question is, how do we, how do you try to influence this 

debate to actually get a strategy? Somehow you were able to take 

a failing war in Iraq and help turn it around by bringing a workable strategy into the discussion and then eventually getting it enacted. If you could comment on that, maybe we could see a path 

forward. 

General KEANE. Well, thank you, and appreciate your service, as 

well. Semper Fi. 

Mr. MOULTON. Semper Fi. 

General KEANE. This is very difficult. To change the failing strategy in Iraq, to be frank about it, the leaders, the military leaders 

who were prosecuting that strategy did not want to change. The 

leaders of the Department of Defense also, civilian leadership, the 

senior military leaders in Washington did not want to change. 

But I think what happened there is it appeared to me that the 

evidence was compelling that the strategy was not working, and I 

think we had one person that understood that that was willing to 

do something about it, and that was the President of the United 

States. I mean, he just instinctively saw it and said, ‘‘This is a real 

problem.’’ 

I don’t think he knew necessarily what should be done about it, 

but he knew instinctively we had to do something about it and he 

threw politics aside, certainly, because his own party was almost 

as much against him as the opposition party was, and certainly 

most of his generals were. But he reached for something that 

turned out to be the right answer. 

So this is very hard to do. 

We have a different problem here, I think, is we have a strategy 

that we put together and it is in the beginning of its execution, and 

so it is very difficult to get someone to change it based on the fact 

that when you look down that at long term it is not going to work. 

Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Chesney, do you have anything to add to 

this? 

Mr. CHESNEY. No. I will simply say that it will be difficult to 

make any progress on this through the lens of the AUMF itself, but 

the right way to think about the AUMF’s relationship to this question is to make sure that the Commander in Chief has the author-
41 

ity that he may judge necessary and not to tie his hands. Even if 

he is asking for you to tie his hands, his hands shouldn’t be tied. 

Mr. MOULTON. I agree with that statement, and I think that 

what was most frustrating to me about returning to Iraq was seeing so much of the effort that we had carried out during the surge 

really gone to waste. And the operative question in my mind is not, 

how do we have a military strategy to defeat ISIS? I think we do. 

The question is, how do we prevent what happened from 2010 to 

2013, where all that effort went to waste? 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the panelists and want to begin just by associating 

myself with the remarks that General Keane made earlier today 

with regard to calling things for what they are: Islamic extremists. 

And I have been saying this for some time. 

First of all, it is the reality. The second point is is that it really 

then lays bare what our enemy is trying to do. This extremist 

group, this Islamic extremist group, is trying to deceive the Muslim 

world that somehow they are advancing their cause. This is how 

they are trying to recruit and fundraise. 

So when we label it as it is we lessen their ability, especially 

now, when you see Muslim nations and people standing up to this 

Islamic extremism in Iraq, Kurds, and then Jordan and Egypt, 

when we are supporting them we lessen our enemies’ ability to recruit and fundraise, and that is the key point here. We can militarily engage at this moment, and, you know, for every one that we 

kill we end up, you know, dealing with issues of multipliers in 

terms of recruiting and fundraising; why it is so important to have 

clarity. 

So I just want to associate myself with those remarks. 

My question for the panel has to do with, and by the way, I want 

to thank General Keane. He has always been a source of inspiration and great mentorship to many of those in uniform. 

My question is on Syria. Last fall I was not able to vote for arming the so-called Syrian—moderate Syrian army. I gave it a fair 

hearing. I looked at all briefings and looked at the briefing papers, 

and at the end of the day I believe that that force was militarily 

incompetent, politically untrustworthy, and it was going to fail. 

So that put me in a—I mean, ethically, morally I felt in a tough 

spot because I knew that this is an enemy that can’t be deterred; 

they have to be defeated. Question is, how? And we were proposing 

a strategy that was, in my view, going to fail. And now we are seeing the problems of it. 

You know, how do we get anything done of significance in Syria 

without a political foundation? In Iraq you could argue about the 

efficacy of that foundation, but you have Iraq, the Kurds, you have 

a foundation from which to support taking certain action. 

In Syria we have really no foundation, so what is the way forward there, from anyone in the panel? Very interested to hear. 

General KEANE. Well, I will take a stab at it. I mean, Syria is 

really a tough problem, and there are very good arguments on both 
42 

sides, on many sides of this issue because it is so challenging. I just 

want to provide you a couple of data points. 

Remember back when the—this was part of the Arab Spring, the 

people stood up against Assad and, because he was so violently— 

he used violence to push that—the people back, many of his officers 

and his troops that—underneath him joined the opposition forces 

because he was killing his own people in the streets, unlike what 

took place in Egypt. As a result of that, that opposition force 

gained momentum and they were—people in this town were predicting it was just a matter of time before Assad falls. Remember 

that? 

And what happened is the Iranians came in, propped up the regime, so did the Russians, and then the Free Syrian Army asked 

for our help. And this goes back in the 2011 timeframe. 

In 2012 ISIS moves into Syria, and would things have been different if we had helped the Free Syrian Army then to maintain 

that momentum against the regime? I think so; I don’t know for 

sure. But I think we made a huge policy mistake. 

And then in 2012 Clinton, Petraeus, Panetta, and Dempsey advocate the same thing as a matter of policy—not just the Free Syrian 

Army asking; now they are advocating it, and we say no again. 

In 2012 the radical Islamists are in Syria, and they are growing 

in size and scale and adding to the complications of this problem. 

What they do—they didn’t start the Arab Spring but they have always seen it as opportunity, when you have political and social upheaval like this and chaos, they want to take advantage of that because they want to have a seat at the table at the end of it. 

That is what we are facing. So it adds to the complications that 

we have in Syria. 

When I put my head on that and try to work out an answer to 

what needs to be done, I do believe we need to get a political solution in Syria. But how do you get it when Assad has the momentum? You are not going to get it, and the Iranians and the Russians are not going to permit it. 

The only thing you can do is change that momentum, and that 

begins with military, to change the momentum he has. Shut down 

his air power by the use of no-fly zones and buffer zones. Would 

he contest that? Unlikely, because we would then destroy his air 

power. 

That begins to change the political situation, because now he is 

no longer dominating. And it puts pressure on people around him 

to look for a solution that is beyond Assad. 

That, I think, is the general thought process, that you have to 

get past Assad and you have to see a political solution there—not 

necessarily the removal of this entire regime, but the removal of 

Assad, and to some kind of accommodation with its own people— 

not the radicals, but with its own people that are fighting them. 

I don’t think you can get there unless you took some kind of military action to balance the military situation. 

Then you can put together—then I think our friends in the region—I can’t say and guarantee you this would happen, but they 

are all urging us to do what I just said. Then I think you get the 

makings of an Arab-Turkish coalition, which the United States 

would participate in, to drive and defeat ISIS in Syria. 
43 

Those are kind of the steps, I think, that should be undertaken. 

But we have no plan to do any of that. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thank you, General. My time is expired. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Aguilar. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for joining us. 

Mr. Chesney and Mr. Wittes—I am sorry, can you say it one 

more time? 

Wittes. Okay. I was close. 

Mr. Chesney and Mr. Wittes, you mentioned during your opening 

comments the silence that the AUMF has on detention protocols. 

So, Mr. Wittes, if you could start, how would the alternative 

AUMF draft that you created treat detention protocols moving forward, in addition to the current detainees held under the 2001 

AUMF? 

Mr. WITTES. Right. So this is an excellent question. 

Under the draft that we wrote you also have a notional silence 

about detention operations except that the language that we used 

to authorize force is the exact same language that the D.C. Circuit 

has used to describe the—in the current—under the current AUMF 

the detention authority that it embeds. And so what we were trying to do there was not change the status quo as to detention except to add ISIL to the list of groups that you—ISIL and its associated forces—that you could apply the AUMF’s detention authority 

to. 

I suppose we can be criticized along the same lines that Professor 

Chesney criticized the administration for sort of doing it elliptically 

rather than directly. As you know, as this committee knows, I 

have—I am all for being explicit about detention authorities, which, 

you know, has been a big theme of a lot of my work, and so if there 

were any inclination in the broader political community to make 

detention authority under this AUMF explicit, I think that would 

be a wonderful, wonderful thing and a very appropriate thing for 

the committee to do. 

My concern about the way the administration has worded this 

draft is that because it is not piggybacking off of the existing 

AUMF, the moment you detain somebody under it you would have 

a habeas litigation in which you would have to, and I think the administration would win, by the way, but you would have to litigate 

the question, does this detention authority, does detention authority exist under this AUMF. I think under our draft it is a lot, lot 

clearer what the answer to that question would be. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Mr. Chesney. 

Mr. CHESNEY. I agree with everything Ben said. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Thank you, gentlemen. And that doesn’t take away 

anything from the broader strategic discussions that my colleagues—some incredible questions that have been asked, but I did 

want to delve into that piece because it was common between your 

testimonies, the written and the public, and I appreciate it. 

But going back to Congressman O’Rourke’s comments, you two 

gentlemen didn’t get to answer that piece, and I know he mentioned possibly putting it in writing, but if you could discuss what 
44 

you feel winning looks like and what the conditions for us to 

achieve success would look like. 

Mr. CHESNEY. I will just offer a few preliminary thoughts, and 

these are similar to what General Keane said earlier. I think a big 

part of success involves ensuring that ISIL does not have a safe 

haven within which it can conduct first of all its own external operations, and that doesn’t necessarily mean operations against the 

United States, though obviously that would be our first and foremost concern, but it could be operations in Europe, it could be operations against Jordan, it could be operations in Turkey, in any 

number of other places. 

Secondly, and slightly distinct from that, a safe territorial haven 

from within which they are able to attract and train foreign fighters who then go back and, even if not in any way subject to ISIL’s 

direction and control, nonetheless going back and, as local homegrown terrorists, then carrying out attacks and destabilizing our allies in the area. These are things that we need to prevent ISIL 

from being able to do. 

Mr. WITTES. I don’t really have much to add to that. I mean, I 

think the focus on safe havens and ungoverned territories is critical. These lead to very bad outcomes, and the last 20 years is just 

one example of that after another. And I think the instinct to create, to remove, to allow sovereign power from reasonable governments—you know, non-exporting of violence governments—over 

what are now ungoverned territories is a pivotal objective both in 

this area and in other parts of the world where we are dealing with 

similar problems. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your patience and yield 

back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate your patience in waiting to get in 

very good questions. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I too want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today. 

Your insights have been invaluable and I think this is a very important discussion. I think there is certainly no greater responsibility that any of us have here on this committee or in government 

when the decisions come up as to when or whether or not to send 

our men and women in uniform into harm’s way and to get it right 

when we do. 

You all have made clear very important points about why an 

AUMF is important, again, sending the signals to our allies and 

our enemies as well as our troops that the law-making branch of 

government, were going to stand behind their efforts to defeat 

ISIL. 

I want to give each of you an opportunity, and this has been a 

pretty thorough discussion already, but give you an additional opportunity to talk about and point out the important points that 

should be left in an AUMF, which—in this as it is drafted, and 

which should be removed and within the time that we have, and 

if you can’t get to everything, perhaps additional points in writing, 

if you would. 
45 

Some of the first points that we need to see in the theater right 

now to signal that there has been a turn. Clearly nature hates a 

vacuum, and there is a vacuum right now there that ISIL is filling, 

and there is also the saying that, you know, if they are strong they 

have to be with you, and I think that is why you are seeing this 

growing support of ISIL, because they are strong and getting 

stronger right now. 

What would indicate an initial tactical success within the theater 

of conflict that would show that the tide has turned—is turning 

that would hopefully lead and then indicate that we are on the 

road to achieving strategic success? 

And then finally, if you could, long term, how do we defeat this 

radical, violent ideology? Because in many ways this is an ideological war as well as a violent military one. 

So I understand I have asked a lot there, and if you can’t get to 

everything I understand, but perhaps some additional thoughts in 

writing would be helpful, too. 

General, should we start with you? 

General KEANE. Okay. Thank you. 

Well, certainly in terms of some near-term tactical success that 

would indicate that we are beginning to turn the tide against ISIS 

is to capitalize on what we have already achieved in Iraq. We have 

stalled their offensive in Iraq largely through the use of air power. 

We have retaken some territory, some modest territory back in 

Baiji and also up in Sinjar in the north. 

But what is coming next, and I think you are very much aware 

of is largely a counteroffensive military campaign to retake the 

major environs of Mosul, Tikrit, Fallujah, and part of Anbar Province, essentially fighting up the Tigris and Euphrates River Valleys 

is what we are really talking about here. 

And that counteroffensive will be a major campaign and, if successful, clearly that will demonstrate that the tide has truly turned 

against ISIS. They will have to flee into Syria, which is their de 

facto capital now. It is where they maintain many of their—much 

of their resources. It is where their recruiting and training is taking place. And it will be a—continue to be something of a safe 

haven to them because there is—at least in the near term there is 

no ground force to act against them, although we will try to find— 

continue to find targets against them. 

But that will send a huge message in terms of initial tactical success against ISIS. And I think it would have some impact, don’t 

know for certain, but my judgment tells me it would begin to have 

some impact on whether people want to join this organization or 

not when they see it largely beginning to be destroyed right before 

their eyes. 

So I think that is very important to us. And as we have said 

many times here, and I think everybody sitting at the table here 

is in agreement, that is an immediate military strategy, but we 

need a longer-term strategy that deals with the ideology or we will 

be dealing with ISIS-like enemies again. And that truly should be 

avoided. 

We have an incredible lexicon of learning experience here after— 

you know, it will be 14 years this September of dealing with this 
46 

radical Islamic issue and we still, still, as we sit here now, do not 

have a comprehensive strategy to deal with it. 

Undermining their ideology in a global alliance is what I suggested, and I think that is largely dealing with the people in the 

region who have to do this because the ideology is tied to the Islamic religion. But it also, from a practical sense, an alliance like 

that would share intelligence, it would share training, it would 

share technology so that people in it are all benefitting from it. 

And I don’t think we would craft that strategy. I think we would 

bring that alliance together and the alliance would craft it. And the 

input we would get from the participating nations who are dealing 

with this would be very significant, in my judgment, in terms of 

how to approach it and what practical means are there to do it. 

And I will stop right there so others have an opportunity to talk. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. My time is expired and I wish we had time, 5 

minutes goes by too fast. 

I would appreciate input from the other witnesses on the things 

that I raised, but I do thank you all for your input here today. 

I also want to make a point that I am encouraged that this needs 

to be a multinational coalition and that we need to see the nations 

in the Arab world also step up, which I see that, I see that they 

are doing. We need to see more of that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Ashford. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you. And I appreciate the opportunity to be 

the last questioner. But I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to just make a few points. I also was in Afghanistan and 

Iraq with Congressman Moulton and Congresswoman Stefanik and 

Congressman Wilson. It was an extremely important trip. We went 

everywhere, pretty much, and these answers have been right in 

line with the thinking at least I come back with. 

And it was very important to have Congressman Moulton there 

because of his work with General Petraeus. He was able to really 

zero in and—laser-like on the questions that—many of which have 

been asked today. 

Let me just say, I absolutely agree with the panel, General 

Keane for sure, and that is that the number one goal here is to destroy ISIS and that we need to refresh, rewrite, do again, whatever 

it is, the resolution that is there. 

We had several conversations—I did and I know Congressman 

Moulton did and others—with members of the military and leaders—King Abdullah and the prime minister in Iraq and so forth. 

And everyone said the same thing: We need to have a clear resolve. 

I was on a C–130 and the navigator said, ‘‘Congressman, do you 

think you can get a resolution?’’ You know, and I said, ‘‘Well, we 

will see if we can,’’ but, I mean, it is clearly the case. 

I have been struggling with, and I also would just say this: I absolutely reject the idea that somehow these Muslim Arab countries 

cannot, with our help, be successful. I think that is just not correct. 

I know you are saying the opposite, but I, you know, hear that, 

and that it—and that we are an exceptional nation and that we are 

going to have to maybe play a role that maybe somewhat outweigh 

those of others. And also that the ideological work, which clearly 
47 

every leader we talk to—King Abdullah was emphatic about the 

need to address, you know, sectarian education, to deal with economic development. And he did talk about a Syrian strategy, and 

it is a little more long-term. 

Let me just ask this. I know in Nebraska, you know, what I get 

asked is, you know, ‘‘Are we going to need boots on the ground,’’ 

and I know you have answered this. My sense is that we haven’t 

defined that yet, we don’t know exactly what the assistance is 

going to be. We are in an assist role at the brigade level now and 

we have—intelligence support as well as our Air Force and Navy 

pilots, whatever. 

I think you are right. I think we have to have a broader resolution, but boots on the ground does not necessarily mean a brigade, 

but if there is something going on in the field where Americans 

need to, I am sorry for the long question, need to get involved, that 

would—that is also boots on the ground, technically. They are on 

the ground. 

So, General, could you—if you would? 

General KEANE. Well, let me just—well, first of all, I appreciate 

your comments and you going to the region like that. It is insightful listening to you. 

We do create a false narrative here, and it is this, and rightfully 

so. We don’t want to be involved in a protracted war like Iraq or 

Afghanistan, certainly. We all understand that. But also, nobody is 

talking about that here either. 

So we get a choice between—we don’t want to have boots on the 

ground that will lead us to a protracted war where hundreds of 

thousands of U.S. troops are involved. I don’t know anybody that 

is making such a proposal or recommendation. Certainly nobody in 

the Pentagon, to be sure. 

And I don’t know anyone who is opposed to the President’s strategy is suggesting such a thing either. But we are suggesting what 

is reasonable. And it is reasonable that the coalition lead and we 

help. 

So we do need some boots on the ground to make them more effective, and I think that is reasonable. So what are we really arguing over here? We are arguing over scale. 

The present policy is nothing below brigade level. I am saying 

you got to get down to battalion level where the fighting is going 

on. And maybe we will eventually get there because as we begin 

to do this General Austin and his team will want the same thing. 

And then we need Apache helicopters, and AC–130 gunships, and 

et cetera, et cetera. 

This is modest improvement, in my judgment, that gets you an 

exponential better result. 

Now, let me throw something out that maybe you would disagree 

with. If this offensive fails, we try it and it fails, do we wring our 

hands and say, ‘‘Okay, we are going to come back next year with 

the same force, with more boots on the ground, better-trained force 

and we will give it a try in 2016,’’ or, if this is truly in our national 

interest, maybe a reasonable alternative is to have an Arab coalition force that the United States is part of form in Kuwait and we 

put that force on the ground, which would mean some brigade combat teams to do that. 
48 

Is that something we should do now? Absolutely not. We want 

the burden to be borne by the Iraqis. 

But if it is failure and we can’t seem to get there, should that 

be an alternative that we should at least consider? I think it is. 

Mr. ASHFORD. If I may, and I don’t—my clock isn’t working so 

I may be over—is—I agree with you, and I think that is the kind 

of definition, because Mosul is tough, and it may be—or these other 

operations. 

And quite frankly, 2016, we were told, that is in play. It is going 

to take—it may take 2016, with other efforts, and it may take more 

American forces. So that is—as we draft this thing I think that advice has to be taken into consideration. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Y’all have answered a wide range of questions and I think you 

can tell members are very serious and very concerned about this. 

I don’t want to try your patience too long. I have got one other 

thing I want to get comments from our legal experts, if I may, because it continues to bother me in some ways. 

And my question is, can the way an enemy define itself or affiliate itself matter when it comes to an AUMF? Because we have 

stretched the meaning of the 2001 AUMF so far that anyone who 

has a connection with the attacks of 9/11, it is just hard to even 

believe those words have much meaning. 

And we have this situation where there have been incidents 

where al-Nusra and ISIS have disassociated themselves from each 

other and actually fought with each other, and yet the claim is once 

you are under the—affiliated with Al Qaeda you are always affiliated with Al Qaeda no matter what you do or say. 

So we don’t want people to be able to change their name and 

thus not be subject to attack. On the other hand, is there nothing 

that you do or say that ever changes your affiliation? 

I mean, I don’t know, do y’all have legal opinions about the way 

that works or doesn’t work? 

Mr. WITTES. So I think the—at the polar levels the answer to 

your question is, I think, pretty clear, which is to say—let’s say, 

you know, I am a member of Al Qaeda and I openly and publicly 

renounce and break my affiliation with the group, I think there is 

a pretty good argument under those circumstances that, to the extent that the AUMF once covered me, it may no longer cover me. 

And similarly, if you imagine a faction of Al Qaeda that breaks 

off and says, you know, ‘‘We want to start a peace process,’’ right, 

I think you could make an argument that you might think about 

that group very differently under the AUMF. 

Both of those are somewhat fantastical examples, but I think the 

other side of it is if Al Qaeda changes its name tomorrow to Greenpeace, no one would seriously argue that we then lack the authority to, you know, attack, you know, the Greenpeace front in Syria. 

Where the question gets very hard is where you have these ever 

splintering groups that are historically affiliated but may be no 

longer affiliated, or may be offshoots of groups that are themselves 

offshoots. 

And here I think, you know, I go back to the point that, you 

know, we started with, which is that the underlying document is 
49 

aged. It is very appropriate, given that, to write a document that 

describes the war that we are fighting rather than, in fact, rather 

than the war that we thought 13 years ago we would be fighting. 

By the way, that document will have a shelf life and a half-life 

too, and it will start degrading almost as soon as you pass it, which 

is another reason that the idea of whatever you call it—the renewal or the sunset or the reengagement, no pun intended—is a 

good one, and it forces you to come back and say, ‘‘Does this document still describe what we want to be doing?’’ 

The core of the problem you identify is unsolvable because, unlike, you know, the Third Reich, which doesn’t morph, right? It asserts a sovereignty; it is what it is; it is—you know, this is not— 

this is more fluid than that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. 

Mr. Chesney. 

Mr. CHESNEY. So I think this underscores one reason why the 

oversight provision that our draft had emphasized, specifically including a requirement that when the administration, or when the 

Pentagon, whoever, identifies a group as an associated force or a 

successor force, that there be some, certainly at least to Congress 

and preferably to the American public, that that decision has been 

made. In other words, Ben is right, there is a level at which this 

is unsolvable with crafting of language, so you shine a spotlight on 

it and make sure that people are aware of how it is being interpreted. So that is one thing I would say. 

And then the second thing I would say is this is both a problem 

for the removing—a group removing itself from the scope of the 

AUMF, but also coming into it. And so to give a concrete example 

of this, in the Sinai there is a group, ABM—I am going to mispronounce this but it is something along the lines of Ansar Bayt 

al-Maqdis. It had been an Al Qaeda-affiliated group but the Egyptians have done a tremendous job of taking out their leadership, 

and one consequence of all that is that the people now in charge 

apparently were open to tying in with ISIL instead, and they have 

made formal claims to affiliation with ISIL, so now you have this 

ISIL franchise in the Sinai. 

Well, you know, would they count, if they have not taken any action or shown any inclination to take action against the United 

States, merely by virtue of that formality? These are the debates 

we have been having for 13 years under the 2001 AUMF. This is 

an occasion to think more systematically about how to define 

things, and if there is no better way to define it then you shine a 

spotlight on it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Great point. 

Thank you again, all. Y’all have really been helpful, I think, to 

the committee, and we appreciate your time and patience over 

these last 3 hours. 

With that, the hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. Do you believe the Authorization for the Use of Military Force 

(AUMF) the President is proposing gives our military the flexibility they need to 

succeed in their mission of destroying the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 

(ISIL)? 

President Obama’s proposal for a new AUMF ‘‘does not authorize the use of the 

United States Armed Forces in enduring offensive ground combat operations.’’ How 

do you interpret the phrase ‘‘enduring ground operations’’ and do you believe that 

statement will be clear to our commanders on the ground? 

Do you believe that the lack of clarity in the phrase ‘‘enduring ground operations’’ 

will lead to delays in military action as commanders seek legal guidance on whether 

certain operations go outside the scope of the President’s AUMF? 

Given that in the past, premature withdrawal of U.S. Armed Forces in the Middle 

East has resulted in regional instability and allowed terrorist groups to gain power, 

are you concerned that the administration is not planning appropriately for U.S. action after the defeat of ISIL with a limited 3-year AUMF? 

The President has placed a 3-year limitation in his proposed AUMF. Do you believe that his current strategy will result in the defeat of ISIL in that timeframe? 

General KEANE. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chesney, your testimony highlighted that President Obama’s 

proposed Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) fails to address several key areas such as defined objectives, adversary detention, and applicability of 

the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Which omissions do you think should be of 

greatest concern to this panel as we continue to evaluate the AUMF? 

Mr. CHESNEY. The most troubling aspect of the proposed AUMF is the language 

that attempts, in an indeterminate way, to draw a line between the sort of groundforces presence that would be lawful and that which would not be. As I testified 

at the hearing, the nature of the line thus drawn is very far from clear, and would 

leave commanders uncertain as to the scope of their authorities. 

I would also note that, if the last fourteen years have taught us anything about 

AUMFs, it is that AUMFs going forward ought to contain specific language addressing the metes and bounds of authority to use military detention. The 2001 AUMF 

did not have such language, and it launched a decade’s worth of litigation. Eventually, Congress in an NDAA at last codified the concepts that the courts and the administration had jointly sorted out during those years, but that legislation (like the 

2001 AUMF) has a muddy connection to the ISIL scenario. If our use of force 

against ISIL warrants a new AUMF, then so too should it warrant fresh legislation 

speaking to detention authority. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Do you believe the Authorization for the Use of Military Force 

(AUMF) the President is proposing gives our military the flexibility they need to 

succeed in their mission of destroying the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 

(ISIL)? 

President Obama’s proposal for a new AUMF ‘‘does not authorize the use of the 

United States Armed Forces in enduring offensive ground combat operations.’’ How 

do you interpret the phrase ‘‘enduring ground operations’’ and do you believe that 

statement will be clear to our commanders on the ground? 

Do you believe that the lack of clarity in the phrase ‘‘enduring ground operations’’ 

will lead to delays in military action as commanders seek legal guidance on whether 

certain operations go outside the scope of the President’s AUMF? 

Given that in the past, premature withdrawal of U.S. Armed Forces in the Middle 

East has resulted in regional instability and allowed terrorist groups to gain power, 

are you concerned that the administration is not planning appropriately for U.S. action after the defeat of ISIL with a limited 3-year AUMF? 

The President has placed a 3-year limitation in his proposed AUMF. Do you believe that his current strategy will result in the defeat of ISIL in that timeframe? 

Mr. CHESNEY. There have been AUMFs in the past that have authorized only a 

certain degree of force to be used towards a particular end, but never in our history 

has this been the case when the specific purpose for using force is supposed to be 

the utter destruction of an enemy military force. In this instance, the proposed 
106 

AUMF precludes the use of ground forces in most circumstances (though just where 

the line lies is, as noted above, unclear). While it may or may not be wise at any 

given point in time in fact to deploy U.S. ground forces against ISIL (one can and 

should be wary of the risks of doing so, particularly if the best estimate is that the 

American public will not in fact be adequately supportive of such an effort for it to 

be sustained for a long-enough period to have its full intended effect), it seems unwise to attempt by legislation to preclude the option altogether. Better to leave such 

judgments to the President to determine in accordance with evolving circumstances, 

perhaps in conjunction with a sunset clause to ensure ongoing Congressional engagement. 

The phrase certainly will not be clear to commander on the ground. It is wide 

open to reasonable disagreement amongst lawyers who will have to determine 

whether the line has been crossed by particular proposed operations. 

Definitely yes. 

The proposed three-year sunset is not the problem (though it may be that some 

other period aside from three years would be best). If there is a good case for continuing U.S. involvement in this conflict as the expiration of a sunset draws near, 

Congress and the President should be prepared to take the steps necessary to renew 

the authority. Put simply, a sunset is not a promise to stop engaging at that point. 

It may be, of course, that there is not adequate planning taking place for that eventuality. I would not connect that issue to the proposed sunset, however. 

It seems very unlikely that ISIL will be destroyed within the next three years. 

Whether ISIL will be so degraded as to no longer pose a strategic threat is a different question. My instinct is to be skeptical, but I certainly would not claim to 

have a strong sense of just where ISIL will be in three years. Again, however, this 

is no reason to reject the idea of using a sunset as a vehicle to ensure continued 

and refreshed Congressional engagement on the AUMF issue. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Wittes, you made an argument that President Obama’s Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) does not hinder the flexibility of military operations based on the reasoning that the 2001 AUMF can be leveraged to 

employ ground troops or extend operations. Do you foresee challenges at the execution level in simultaneously executing multiple authorities and do you have any concerns regarding the perceived implications of current AUMF limitations by our allies or enemies? 

Mr. WITTES. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SHUSTER. Do you believe the Authorization for the Use of Military Force 

(AUMF) the President is proposing gives our military the flexibility they need to 

succeed in their mission of destroying the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 

(ISIL)? 

President Obama’s proposal for a new AUMF ‘‘does not authorize the use of the 

United States Armed Forces in enduring offensive ground combat operations.’’ How 

do you interpret the phrase ‘‘enduring ground operations’’ and do you believe that 

statement will be clear to our commanders on the ground? 

Do you believe that the lack of clarity in the phrase ‘‘enduring ground operations’’ 

will lead to delays in military action as commanders seek legal guidance on whether 

certain operations go outside the scope of the President’s AUMF? 

Given that in the past, premature withdrawal of U.S. Armed Forces in the Middle 

East has resulted in regional instability and allowed terrorist groups to gain power, 

are you concerned that the administration is not planning appropriately for U.S. action after the defeat of ISIL with a limited 3-year AUMF? 

The President has placed a 3-year limitation in his proposed AUMF. Do you believe that his current strategy will result in the defeat of ISIL in that timeframe? 

Mr. WITTES. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. O’ROURKE 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Please explain what a U.S. victory against the Islamic State of 

Iraq and the Levant would look like in your opinion, and the best way to go about 

achieving that goal. 

Mr. CHESNEY. I confess I am somewhat reluctant to weigh in on this particular 

question, as my expertise is better directed at the legal questions associated with 

this matter. That said, I will venture the following observations: First, that which 

counts as victory depends very much on what the United States determines to define as its goal. There are several possibilities: 

• We might aim to destroy ISIL altogether, period. 

• We might aim to prevent ISIL from toppling the government of Iraq. 
107 

• We might aim to prevent ISIL from prevailing in the Syrian war to the extent 

that it can control a meaningful amount of territory or population. 

• We might aim to prevent the further spread of ISIL to new locations (Egypt, 

Libya, Afghanistan, etc.). 

• We might aim to tamp down the appeal of ISIL’s propaganda attempting to 

spur lone wolves to violence abroad. 

We might, of course, aspire to some combination of the above. And whatever the 

mix of aspirations, they will intersect (and sometimes have to be traded off against) 

a wide range of related (but distinct) sets of policy goals, such as those relating to 

the larger Syrian conflict, relations with Iran, and so forth. Finally, one must bear 

in mind that some of these potential goals are (or would be) easier than others for 

the administration to embrace and emphasize publicly. 

As an outsider I am not in a good position to weigh either the relative desirability 

of these possible goals, or the extent to which various ones of them are within our 

realistic reach now or over the long term. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Please explain what a U.S. victory against the Islamic State of 

Iraq and the Levant would look like in your opinion, and the best way to go about 

achieving that goal. 

Mr. WITTES. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

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