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S. HRG. 108–1004 

LESSONS LEARNED FROM SECURITY 

AT PAST OLYMPIC GAMES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMPETITION, FOREIGN 

COMMERCE, AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 4, 2004 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon 

PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, 

Ranking 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

JEANNE BUMPUS, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel 

ROBERT W. CHAMBERLIN, Republican Chief Counsel 

KEVIN D. KAYES, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

GREGG ELIAS, Democratic General Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMPETITION, FOREIGN COMMERCE, AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon, Chairman 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota, Ranking 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on May 4, 2004 ................................................................................. 1 

Statement of Senator Smith ................................................................................... 1 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 2 

WITNESSES

Camillo, Mark, Director, Homeland Security, Washington Operations Offices, 

Lockheed Martin Corporation ............................................................................. 13 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 16 

Lewis, Carl, U.S. Olympic Athlete in Track and Field ......................................... 28 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29 

Lopez, Steven, U.S. Olympic Athlete in Taekwondo ............................................. 26 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 27 

Maples, David G., Johnson, Maples, and Associates ............................................ 19 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 22 

Romney, Hon. Mitt, Governor, The Commonwealth of Massachusetts ............... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

(1) 

LESSONS LEARNED FROM SECURITY 

AT PAST OLYMPIC GAMES 

TUESDAY, MAY 4, 2004 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMPETITION, FOREIGN COMMERCE, 

AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Gordon Smith, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON SMITH, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON 

Senator SMITH. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I’ll call to 

order this subcommittee hearing, Commerce Committee. This is the 

Competition, Foreign Commerce, and Infrastructure Subcommittee. 

And today, our topic is Olympic security. 

I thank the witnesses for being here today. The purpose of today’s hearing is to learn more about the lessons of past Olympic 

Games with respect to security, so that we can ensure that future 

Olympic Games will be safer still. 

Today’s hearing will examine the evolution of Olympic security 

over the past 30 years, the advancement of technological and operational security tactics employed by domestic and foreign Olympic 

organizing officials to secure the Games as well as the cost and effectiveness of all of their measures. We’ll also hear from two Olympians to get their perspective about how security has evolved over 

the years and how it affects the athletes who participate in the 

Games. 

The Olympic security changed forever as a result of the tragic 

events of 1972’s Summer Olympic Games in Munich, Germany. On 

September 5, 1972, eight Palestinian terrorists broken into the 

apartments of the Olympic Village housing, of the Israeli athletes, 

and took nine hostages. In the end, five of the eight terrorists and 

all nine of the hostages and a German police officer were dead. 

Since the Munich Games, no major Olympic security incident occurred until 1996, in the Olympic Games of Atlanta, Georgia. Notwithstanding the heightened security in the wake of the World 

Trade Center and the Oklahoma City bombings, on July 27, 1996, 

a pipe bomb filled with nails and screws exploded in a crowd at 

Olympic Centennial Park, killing one person, and injuring more 

than one hundred. 

2 

I suppose most ominous is that in a post-9/11 world, security for 

events of this magnitude becomes all the more important. But, in 

fact, security became a primary concern after 9/11 for the organizers of the 2002 Salt Lake Winter Olympic Games. In preparation for the Salt Lake Games, a consortium of 60 Federal and state 

law enforcement agencies crafted a $310 million security plan that 

included the deployment of 12,000 security personnel. As a result, 

no major security incidents occurred in the Salt Lake Games. 

While it’s true that there exist global security concerns heading 

into this summer’s Olympic Games in Athens, I’m confident that 

the Greek officials are working in conjunction with security officials 

from around the world to ensure that the athletes and spectators 

who attend the Greek games will be well protected. It is a great 

credit to the Greek government that they have budgeted $1.2 billion for security. They have reached out to our Nation for lessons 

learned, as well as to the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance to provide 

military support for the security of our athletes and our spectators. 

Again, I want to thank the witnesses for being here, and I’d like 

to remind Members that immediately following today’s hearing, 

should they come, we will also have a closed classified briefing with 

Federal officials on the security preparations and operational 

issues relating to the 2004 Summer Olympic Games in Athens, 

Greece. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON H. SMITH, U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON

I thank the witnesses for being here today. The purpose of today’s hearing is to 

learn more about the lessons of past Olympic Games with respect to security so that 

we can ensure that future Olympic Games will be even safer. 

Today’s hearing will examine the evolution of Olympic security over the past 30 

years, the advancement of technological and operational security tactics employed 

by domestic and foreign Olympic organizing officials to secure the Games, as well 

as the cost and effectiveness of such measures. 

We will also hear from two Olympians to get their perspective about how security 

has evolved over the year and how it affects the athletes who participate in the 

Games. 

Olympic security changed forever as a result of the tragic events of the 1972 Summer Olympic Games in Munich, Germany. On September 5, 1972, eight Palestinian 

terrorists broke into apartments in the Olympic village housing Israel athletes and 

took nine hostages. In the end, five of the eight terrorists, all nine of the hostages, 

and a German police officer were dead. 

Since the Munich Games no major Olympic security incident occurred until the 

1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, Georgia. Notwithstanding the heightened security 

in the wake of the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings, on July 27, 

1996, a pipe bomb filled with nails and screws exploded in a crowded Olympic Centennial Park killing one person and injuring more than 100. 

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, security became the primary concern 

for the organizers of the 2002 Salt Lake Winter Olympic Games following the attacks of September 11, 2001. In preparation for Salt Lake Games, a consortium of 

federal and state law enforcement agencies crafted a $310 million security plan that 

included the deployment of 12,000 security personnel. As a result, no major security 

incidents occurred during the Salt Lake Games. 

While it is true that there exist global security concerns heading into this summer’s Olympic Games in Athens, I am confident that the Greek officials are working 

in conjunction with security officials from around the world to ensure that the athletes and spectators who attend the Games will be well protected. 

Again, I would like to thank the witnesses for being here, and I would remind 

members that immediately following today’s hearing we will conduct a closed classified briefing with federal officials on the security preparations and operational 

issues related to the 2004 Summer Olympic Games in Athens, Greece. 

3 

Senator SMITH. It’s a great privilege for this Committee to have 

as our first witness the Honorable Mitt Romney, Governor of the 

Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In one of his earlier roles—in 

fact, his immediate role prior to becoming Governor—Governor 

Romney was the president of the Salt Lake City Organizing Committee and was ultimately responsible for a spectacular success in 

Salt Lake without a security lapse. And, Governor, we thank you 

for coming, and we invite your testimony now. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MITT ROMNEY, GOVERNOR, 

THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 

Governor ROMNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s an honor to be 

here, and an honor to also be in attendance with noted Olympians 

and those that helped organize the entire effort in the United 

States, the United States Olympic Committee. Their work and contribution to the world of sport and to our Nation and our heritage 

is something of which I think we’re all appreciative. 

I appreciate this chance to address you, as well. I have prepared 

some comments that I hope might be part of the record, and be 

read into the record at some point, but—— 

Senator SMITH. We’ll include them fully, and invite any part of 

them you wish to give. 

Governor ROMNEY. Fine. Let me, then, just run through a couple 

of things that I thought might be of interest to this Committee. 

First, and let me say this in foremost manner, the Olympics, at 

least in my view, is greater than a sporting event. It means more 

than just sport. It is sport, but, through sport and through the 

Olympians, we see some of the great qualities of the human character. We see loyalty, we see passion, pride, determination, perseverance. Hosting an Olympic Games, seeing the Olympics on the 

world stage, is something which betters our Nation, betters our 

athletes, betters our kids, and improves the world. It’s a demonstration of peace, a demonstration of some of the greatest qualities of the human spirit, and, therefore, every effort to assure that 

the Olympics are safe and that they proceed is an effort, I think, 

very well worth undertaking. 

Second, I’d note that security is a huge portion of putting on the 

Olympics. As a matter of fact, it was our largest single budget 

item. While we did not spend the full amount that was appropriated for Olympic security—that was, of course, largely a Federal 

Government and state government effort—the amount of money 

that’s spent on security today is greater than the amount spent for 

venues, spent for information technology, or spent for employees. 

Another point. The Olympics, of course, is a target of international terrorism, and we know that by virtue of the fact that it 

has been twice attacked, as you mentioned, both in Munich and in 

Atlanta. We have learned from our failures, and the failures have 

taught us things that we can do to improve the level of security, 

not only for Olympics, but for other national special-security 

events, and potentially for homeland security on the most broad 

basis. 

In Munich, for instance, we saw perhaps the demonstration of 

what not to do on almost every dimension, everything from the lack 

of coordination between the security agencies, the lack of coordinaVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:55 Jul 13, 2016 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\20674.TXT JACKIE
4 

tion between the organizer and the security agencies, the lack of 

preparation and drills prior to the Games. All of the elements really that were seen in the Olympic security effort in Munich demonstrate the worst demonstrated practice. 

In Atlanta, there was a great deal of improvement. Atlanta had 

a very strong security program. Many agencies worked very hard 

to secure the Games. But a lesson that came out loud and clear for 

us as we prepared for our Games in Salt Lake from the—and, in 

part, in our discussions with organizers in Atlanta—was that there 

needed to be a higher degree of coordination among the various 

Federal, state, and local agencies, that there needed to be a more 

central command structure, that plans needed to be integrated between the different agencies, and that the gaps between agencies 

were severe enough that there was the potential for those that 

would attack us to find those holes, those spaces between the various agencies. That was, in large measure, corrected by the time 

Salt Lake City came around. Thanks to Presidential Decision Directive 62 and the establishment of a Utah Olympic Public Safety 

Command, we had a unified structure. 

Another point. At least from my perspective, there are four 

phases of an effective Olympic security program. And generally we 

only think of three. One phase is the prevention phase. That’s 

where the intelligence is, the embedding of personnel, the wiretaps, the surveillance, and so forth. Another phase is protection of 

assets. That’s magnetometers and barriers and the like. Another 

phase is response—SWAT teams, officers willing to move in quickly, fire teams, rescue teams, a detection of biological agents in the 

air, and so forth. And then the final phase is the consequence management, which FEMA manages quite effectively. 

Of those four phases, one is typically underinvested in and 

underappreciated, and it happens to be, at least in my view, the 

most important, and that is prevention. We spent a lot of time 

thinking about barriers, magnetometers, and detection equipment. 

We spent a lot of time thinking about how we can quickly move in, 

and have great communications between the first responders in the 

event of an incident. We, likewise, effectively consider consequence 

management and where vaccines might be needed in the case of a 

biological attack and the like. But very little discussion, effort, 

funding, and focus is addressed to prevention. And if I were assessing the safety of a national special-security event like an Olympic 

Games or like a national convention, it would be that area, the intelligence area and the prevention area, that I would want to devote most of my attention. 

Finally, let me just note that from my written testimony, I have 

put together a checklist of how, if I were asked to evaluate the effectiveness of a security program for an event like an Olympics, 

what questions I would ask. And I’ll just read them off here, because I think they’re important. 

First, is there an integrated and coordinated security plan that’s 

been adopted by every entity, public and private, with a clear delineation of roles each will be playing during the Games? So is there 

a single, unified plan? 

Two, is there a clear chain of command for security and safety? 

Do we know who’s in charge? Vice President Gore was reported to 

5 

have asked, in Atlanta, ‘‘Who’s in charge of the security program?’’ 

and the answer was, ‘‘Well, that depends.’’ That’s the wrong answer. 

Number three, is there an aggressive intelligence operation, and 

will the information gathered from it be provided to all the parties 

that need to know it? 

Number four, have exercises been conducted with all the participants? 

Number five, has the process for communications in the event of 

an incident been agreed to by all the parties? 

Number six, have security precautions been put in place for all 

large gatherings around the time of the Games, not just the Olympic venues themselves? 

Number seven, is there real-time public health monitoring and 

response planning? Has it been tested? 

And, finally, have all security precautions been taken at the 

Olympic venues, in the transportation system, and at the Olympic 

Village, including background checks of everyone who is working in 

the Games? 

Now, my guess is we could easily come up with a list of a hundred tests, but those are the categories of areas that I would find 

most interesting and most revealing about the preparation of an 

Olympic site, perhaps also the most revealing about the preparation for any type of national special-security event. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I’d be happy to respond to any questions that you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Governor Romney follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MITT ROMNEY, GOVERNOR, 

THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

Chairman Smith, Senator Dorgan, Members of the Committee, 

Thank you for inviting me to talk with you today about the unique security and 

public safety experience we had in Salt Lake as we prepared for and hosted the 

2002 Winter Olympic Games. It’s an practice for the management of each Olympics 

to pass on to succeeding Games their ‘‘lessons learned’’—both successes and mistakes. Although security and safety planning and implementation varies greatly 

from country to country depending on the structure of law enforcement, there are 

operational lessons that we learned in Salt Lake from those who came before us and 

there are pragmatic lessons that we have endeavored to pass on to those who come 

after. I appreciate the opportunity to share some of those with you today. 

I am going to limit my comments today to a number of broad principles that were 

critical to our security planning and implementation. Mark Camillo, who led the 

Federal public safety planning effort in his role as lead for the U.S. Secret Service 

and can more appropriately address the operational aspects of the Salt Lake security and public safety plan. 

First, a quick review of primary lessons we incorporated into our planning in Salt 

Lake from the Games that came before us. There have been several extremely thorough reports written on the terrorist attack at the Munich Games, each of which 

helped inform our approach to Olympic security. The lack of basic security measures 

and cooperation between the Organizing Committee and law enforcement was stunning by today’s standards. This allowed the terrorists easy access to their targets 

at the Olympic Village and meant that, once the hostages were taken, there was 

no set crisis-management procedure to fall back on. In part due to the lack of planning for a security crisis, the person who negotiated with the terrorists, at their request, was the head of the organizing committee—my counterpart. For the first critical communications with the terrorists, an untrained chief executive negotiated for 

the lives of athletes. Today, it seems incomprehensible that this ever happened. Although there were many hard lessons learned from the tragedy of Munich, and the 

6 

repercussions of that attack are felt to this day, there are two I want to focus on 

here. 

First, communication and coordination between law enforcement and the organizing committee are essential. Although it is often difficult to maintain a true public/private partnership—particularly between law enforcement and the private sector—when you are securing the Olympics Games, it is critical. The relationship 

must be seamless and the two must work as one team—practicing together, clarifying roles and responsibilities, and communicating constantly. 

In Salt Lake, the organizing committee worked hand-in-glove with federal, state 

and local public safety from day one. The teams that designed the venues, laid out 

locations of everything from tickets booths to parking lots to seats and trailers met 

regularly with law enforcement and took their input every step of the way. Our goal 

was to design security into our Games, instead of just putting a security overlay on 

the venues when they were done. Putting together a public safety plan that could 

anticipate and prevent attacks at ten different venues, the Village, Opening and 

Closing Ceremonies and our downtown Olympic Square was a painstakingly detailed effort. It required thinking through potential terrorist scenarios and devising 

workable procedures to prevent them in all types of weather and crowd conditions. 

Finally, these procedures had to be coordinated with all the other Games plans. 

After all, it’s easy to secure a venue if you simply shut down the roads—but then 

how do we get the people in, particularly when vehicles are the most commonly used 

terrorist weapon? Transportation and public safety have to work hand-in-glove—and 

many times there are no easy solutions. There are always concerns about securing 

the athletes in transit, and concerns about limiting vehicle access to any Olympic 

venue. Every road closure, every decision about which route buses would take, 

where the athletes would be dropped off and where the spectators would park and 

ride was made in close consultation with law enforcement. During the Games, a 

video feed from our transportation center of all the major roads and interstates fed 

directly into the Public Safety Command Center—and law enforcement sat side-byside with the transportation operators to ensure that response and monitoring were 

smooth. 

We faced many barriers in achieving this level of integration and coordination between law enforcement and the private sector, primarily because we have too many 

unnecessary firewalls that prevent real coordination between government and private companies. We were fortunate in Salt Lake that all the senior participants 

from Secret Service, FBI, FEMA and DOD were willing to break new ground and 

take the risk of letting the organizing committee into the day-to-day planning. That 

effort paid off and the seamlessness of our coordination was one of our greatest successes in Salt Lake. 

The second lesson we took to heart from Munich was to take every precaution 

when securing locations where large numbers of athletes would gather—especially 

the Olympic Village. I won’t detail all the steps we took in securing the Village. 

However, our deterrents included double-fencing the perimeter, judicious use of 

cameras, motion detectors, screening people and goods through magnetometers 

twice before letting them in, and an inner, even more secure location that only the 

athletes could access. High-threat delegations, such as the Israelis, were given the 

most secure locations within the village and were allowed to bring their own security. Drills were run repeatedly on how to deal with an attack on the village—any 

scenario that can be dreamed up was planned for and rehearsed. Again, securing 

the Village was a joint project from day one between law enforcement and the organizing committee. 

One of the major lessons we learned from the Los Angeles Games was the need 

to do background checks on all employees and volunteers. This can be quite difficult 

unless the process is begun well in advance. Those who were in Los Angeles told 

us that, because many background checks weren’t completed before the Games 

began, convicted felons were holding critical posts—even security posts—at Games 

time. I heard from the public safety leadership in LA that they had more problems 

during their Games with crimes committed by volunteers and employees who turned 

out to have records than they did from any other source. So, we started the screening process early and anyone who didn’t pass a background check couldn’t work or 

volunteer for our Games. That meant that we had to have over 40,000 background 

checks performed—and for those who would have Olympic Village access, the check 

was quite intensive. 

From Nagano, we learned a lesson that became even more valuable to us after 

9/11. You may remember that the flu hit that region of Japan during the Nagano 

Games, and had a devastating impact on both the athletes and those attending the 

Games. Nagano was a relatively small geographic area, with tens of thousands of 

people from all over the world tightly gathered for several weeks—with bad weather 

7 

on top of it. We learned how critical it is to put in place a public health operation 

that can immediately spot an outbreak and move to contain it. In a confined geographic area, sickness can spread like wildfire. Working with CDC, FEMA, Department of Energy, and DOD, Utah and the Salt Lake Organizing Committee (SLOC) 

prepared a state-of-the-art public health monitoring and response plan and created 

the in-state capability to rapidly analyze biological and chemical samples. We received constant reports not only from Olympic areas, but non-Olympic locations as 

well. We also had environmental monitors that tested the air in key locations. Our 

biggest concern may have been a possible biological or chemical terrorist attack, but 

it was Nagano that brought home to us the importance of quick identification, reaction, containment and treatment in the crowded Olympic environment. 

But it was the lessons learned from Atlanta that had the most impact on security 

and public safety preparations for Salt Lake. 

Other witnesses here today will be able to talk in more detail about security and 

public safety planning in Atlanta. The after-action reports we received from Atlanta, 

and the lessons that were passed on to us by the public safety community, indicated 

that many of the problems in Atlanta reflected how slow we were as a nation to 

begin to recognize that terrorism was becoming a security issue inside the United 

States. When Atlanta began preparing for the 1996 Games, there had not been a 

successful foreign terrorist attack on U.S. soil. Then, in 1993, the first World Trade 

Center bombing happened, and most of us heard of Osama Bin Laden for the first 

time. Not long thereafter, Timothy McVeigh stunned us all by his brutal attack on 

innocent people in Oklahoma City. Meanwhile, in Japan, terrorists used Sarin gas 

in the subways—showing how easy it was to wreak havoc and death in what had 

previously been regarded as a safe urban area. The reports we received indicated 

that with each new incident, the planners would develop ways to prevent and respond to these types of attacks. However, the planning effort faced an incredible obstacle due to the dozens and dozens of federal, state and local law enforcement and 

public safety entities involved in Games security and safety—with no clear command and control structure for Games planning. There was relatively clear understanding of who was in charge after an incident occurred—but there was no structure establishing who was in charge of planning for Games safety and preventing 

a terrorist incident from happening. 

And that was the crux of the problem. In the United States, we have a unique 

public safety structure. It evolved from our desire as a country to make sure that 

power is always retained at the most local level of government possible and that 

we never create the all-powerful law enforcement arms that viciously rule in other 

countries. But, in meeting this admirable goal, we sometimes sacrifice coordination—one of the key ‘‘lessons learned’’ from Munich. In Atlanta, where there were 

over 50 different public safety agencies—federal, state and local all ‘‘in charge’’ of 

securing a piece of the Games, the attempt to voluntarily pull everyone together to 

develop a coordinated plan apparently didn’t work. We were told afterwards that, 

about a year out from the Games, Vice President Gore came to Atlanta for a security briefing and asked a straight-forward question—‘‘Who’s in charge’’. The answer 

back was ‘‘it depends’’. Not a good answer. Accurate, but when you are holding the 

largest peacetime event in history and terrorism has begun to rear its ugly head 

in your country, you want someone who can tell you that they are responsible for 

the overall effort. In Atlanta, no one was. So the primary lesson from Atlanta was 

that coordination among government agencies was just as critical, if not more critical, than coordination between government and the organizing committee. 

With one year to go, the Federal Government began to infuse massive resources 

into Atlanta—over 14,000 troops were sent in. Federal law enforcement agents came 

in by the hundreds. They hardened the Olympic Villages, increased security on the 

athlete transportation system, and put multiple layers of security on most of the 

sports venues and Opening and Closing Ceremonies. But, the Olympics is more than 

just sport—it is the gathering of world in celebration of peace and the human spirit 

at festivals, concerts, art shows and more. And one of the major celebration points, 

Centennial Olympic Park, became the target of a bomber. Another bitter lesson— 

sports and the athletes are not the only targets of terrorists—sometimes it can be 

the celebration itself that becomes the target. 

Both of these lessons would have enormous impact on our planning in Salt Lake. 

Following Atlanta, the White House decided to create a structure that would clarify who was in charge and make someone accountable for ensuring that a coordinated security and safety plan was put in place. President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 62 which set out a hierarchy for all so-called ‘‘National 

Special Security Events.’’ It put the U.S. Secret Service in charge of planning and 

operational security, the FBI in charge of intelligence and the immediate response 

to a terrorist incident, and FEMA in charge of handling the consequences of an 

8 

event with mass casualties. Even more important to SLOC, in terms of getting work 

done on a day-to-day basis, this meant there were just three easily-accessible individuals in charge of making sure that everything came together in their areas of 

responsibility. 

On the state level, Utah also put in place a structure that would produce a coordinated and integrated public safety plan and—just as importantly, put someone in 

charge. The Utah Olympic Public Safety Command (UOPSC) was created by the 

state legislature in 1998 with the authority to plan and direct the Olympic security 

and public safety efforts of various state and local police agencies in a unified way. 

At Games time, all of the personnel would work as part of a unified Olympic command—under direction of the Olympic Public Safety Commander and not under the 

command of individual sheriffs and police chiefs. 

Both of these structures, the Federal NSSE designation and the Utah Olympic 

Public Safety Command, were new and I will admit we faced difficulties over the 

years as these new reporting relationships were evolved and refined. However, by 

the beginning of 2001, both structures were working extremely well and most if not 

all of the problems had been resolved. These structures ensured that our final public 

safety plan truly was coordinated and integrated at every level—federal, state, local 

and the organizing committee. One of the greatest lessons that we pass on to future 

Games is this model for creating a coordinated effort—even in the unique structure 

of U.S. law enforcement and public safety. 

We took the second lesson of Atlanta—that all large gatherings could be the target of terrorist attacks—to heart as well. First, we decided in consultation with the 

Secret Service that rather than spreading our Olympic celebrations, concerts and 

medals presentations around the city, we would create one multi-block area which 

would hold all the events and create a single site to secure. Admittedly, Salt Lake 

Olympic Square was an enormous site—stretching over eight city blocks. But, it is 

easier to secure a single perimeter and have limited points of entry for nagging and 

bagging the public than it is to duplicate this effort in multiple sites. And, it allowed 

us to truly concentrate our resources where they could be most effective. 

We revisited this lesson from Atlanta in the weeks after 9/11. In addition to 

events held by the Organizing Committee, there were many events being held by 

the State, Salt Lake City, and others—some expected to draw thousands of 

attendees. Each event was reviewed by the Federal Government and for those where 

there was some concern that the event could be an attractive target, the event was 

either cancelled or a more robust security plan was put in place. We recognized the 

reality that you can never harden every target—to do that you would literally have 

to shut down the state. However, we also decided that there was no reason for us 

to create additional targets by having more events than we could secure appropriately. 

Another lesson we learned in Salt Lake that we have passed on to future Games 

is the importance of having a very clear communications plan—both before and during the Games. Obviously, the media is going to ask questions about the security 

plan for a Games and, just as obviously, the people answering need to be aware that 

there answers may be read or heard by those looking to plan an attack. This was 

initially a problem for us in Salt Lake. We had dozens of local public safety officials 

involved in planning for the Games, and the media soon learned that they could go 

to these individuals and often get dramatic or sensational answers to their questions. It was one of my greatest frustrations. Particularly when it was televised on 

national TV which venues were the safest and what the vulnerabilities were of other 

venues. The public safety community was unable to reach agreement on how much 

should be made public and who should talk until just months before the Games. 

Honestly, the horrible events of September 11 probably did more to convince some 

of our officials that communications during a crisis should be handled by the leadership of the public safety organization than any of the theoretical conversations we 

had earlier. 

In my opinion, the most important lesson we learned in Salt Lake, and the one 

that I repeat whenever I get the opportunity, is the critical nature of intelligence 

in preventing an attack. Most Games focus on two security aspects—preventing an 

attack by hardening the venues and transportation system and ensuring that the 

resources are in place to respond to an attack. In Salt Lake, there was also tremendous emphasis put on gathering information from all levels and sources and sharing 

that information between federal, state and local officials. While I can’t speak in 

this setting to the different methods employed by the federal, state and local governments to gather intelligence, I can tell you that it was a highly coordinated and aggressive effort. Jurisdictional issues didn’t appear to come into play; instead, each 

level of government used its people in every way appropriate to gather information—then all levels of government shared in the data once it was analyzed. 

9 

Why do I think this was so important? As I said earlier, it is impossible to harden 

every target—even the Olympic venues. Remember that many of our venues were 

literally mountains—mountains which could easily receive several feet of snowfall 

in a night and where the temperatures dropped below zero after dark and the winds 

could reach storm force. We couldn’t put fencing all over those mountains; cameras 

and other equipment aren’t reliable in that cold; and there aren’t enough people to 

stand perimeter duty over hundreds of square miles in the freezing cold twenty-four 

hours a day. So, the Secret Service designed an effective effort—using the latest 

technology and surveillance methods and some very hardy agents. But, in the end, 

our best offense was to know about a possible attack on a venue like that before 

it happened. Good intelligence, effectively shared and utilized, was critical. 

The final lesson learned from Salt Lake that I want to focus on is the importance 

of putting the security and safety team in place as far out as possible, and then exercise, exercise, exercise. In Salt Lake, we had our final team from the Secret Service, FBI, FEMA, DOD and SLOC in place over a year out. This team had to manage 

as one unit during the Games, and they spent over a year meeting and talking daily 

until working together became second nature. That broke down many of the usual 

barriers to a truly integrated operational effort. 

We also held exercise for all levels of personnel involved—from the local cop on 

the street to the senior management at SLOC. And we didn’t hold one or two exercises—we held dozens. And with each we learned. I remember clearly one of the 

first I participated in where, instead of letting the venue manager and the law enforcement lead at the venue make the decisions, I ordered the evacuation of the 

building because of smoke—theoretically sending hundreds of people into an area 

where a car had just exploded. Lesson learned—let the operational decisions be 

made by those on the ground. And with each exercise, we all learned—and we fixed 

the problems we found and then went looking for more. We tell all future Games 

to start exercising early and to make sure that they conduct their exercises in conjunction with the government agencies that they will be working with during the 

Games. It’s the only way to make sure that when the real thing starts, you’re ready. 

Mr. Chairman, all of these lessons have been passed on to Greece, Turin, and 

China. In some cases, the problems we addressed are uniquely American—in others, 

they are applicable to any country hosting an Olympics and trying to ensure that 

the Games are safe from terrorist attack. I would urge you as you look into security 

and safety planning for those Games, that you ask the following questions: 

• Is there an integrated and coordinated security plan that has been adopted by 

every entity—public and private—with a role to play in securing the Games? 

• Is there a clear chain of command for security and safety? 

• Is there an aggressive intelligence operation and will the information be shared 

with those on the ground that need to know it? 

• Have exercises been conducted with all participants? 

• Has the process for communications during an incident been agreed to? 

• Have security precautions been put in place for all large gatherings around the 

time of the Games—and not just the Olympic venues? 

• Is there a real-time public health monitoring and response plan? Has it been 

tested? 

• Have all security precautions been taken at the Olympic venues, in the transportation system, and at the Olympic Village, including background checks of 

everyone working in the Games? 

Clearly, the upcoming Games in Greece will have a different level of coordination 

and communications challenges from those we faced due to the assistance that is 

being provided by other countries to the security effort. Therefore, understanding 

the steps that have been taken to ensure that all security and safety related operations are well-integrated and closely coordinated is all the more important. 

I’d like to close with a personal comment. During the three years that I served 

as CEO of the Salt Lake Organizing Committee, I was asked many times whether 

or not it made sense to continue holding the Olympics, considering the increased 

security risks and the enormous expense of hosting the Games. My answer then, 

as now, is that it is more important than ever that the Games continue and that 

the United States play a major role in the continuation of the Olympic movement. 

For the athletes, the Olympic Games represent the culmination of years of effort 

and sacrifice. But for the rest of us, the Olympics are about far more than sport. 

Sport is merely the stage on which the athletes perform—and in them we see the 

qualities of the human spirit that inspire us all. The Games reaffirm that, no matter 

what country or culture, the human spirit can triumph and achieve through hard 

10 

work, dedication, persistence, loyalty and commitment. In this time when the children of our Nation and our world need real heroes, real role-models, the Olympics 

provides those heroes. 

In Salt Lake, hundreds of millions of dollars were spent by the federal, state and 

local governments and SLOC to secure the Games. Literally thousands of people— 

cops, soldiers, firemen, Federal agents, public health workers, and volunteers—put 

in hundreds of thousands of hours in harsh weather and cold to keep the Games 

safe. Was that investment worth it? Absolutely. Because the Olympics also carries 

the dreams we have of a world at peace—the world we are trying to create for our 

grandchildren and those who come after. It is dream shared by all nations who send 

their finest to compete in the Olympics. And it is a dream we saw and felt on February 8, 2002 when, in spite of the threat of terrorism, every nation invited to our 

Games still sent their Olympic team and the athletes of the world marched together 

into opening ceremonies. Now, more than ever, the Olympic athletes are lights of 

inspiration and hope in our world—we cannot let terrorists put out that light. 

I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

Senator SMITH. Governor, you said if you were asked, that’s what 

you would share. Have you been asked? 

Governor ROMNEY. I’ve not been asked to assess the readiness of 

the Games in Athens. I certainly am asked whether we’re ready in 

Boston for the Democratic National Convention coming our way. 

And you can be sure that these are the same questions which I 

have already asked and which the state and local authorities, together with the Federal authorities, I think, are pretty well on 

track to answer affirmatively. 

Something which happened with Presidential Decision Directive 

62 was that the Secret Service, prior to our Games, was put in 

charge of planning for a national special-security event. And in the 

person of Mark Camillo, who you’ll be hearing from in a moment, 

we found a person highly capable in bringing together all of the 

agencies—the intelligence agencies, the prevention agencies, the 

protection agencies. All of these folks came together and worked together on a very collaborative, unified basis. Having an agency in 

charge, with a person responsible, made an enormous difference for 

us. And if I were to attribute our success in having an effective security program at the Games to any one thing, it would be that 

centralized command and centralized responsibility, where everyone knew who was in charge of putting the plan together, and got 

buy-in among the various agencies that were involved. 

Senator SMITH. The checklist you shared with us, was it developed before the Salt Lake Games, or was it just the lessons you 

took away from the Salt Lake Games? 

Governor ROMNEY. It’s the lessons I’d take away from the Salt 

Lake Games. We went into the Games with those things very much 

in mind, and each of those areas were covered to a certain degree. 

I think, as time went on, we recognized that intelligence should 

play a more and more important role in the work that we were 

doing to secure the Games. And given the nature of a public hearing, I’m not at liberty to describe the intelligence effort that was 

carried out. But the intelligence effort was virtually under the 

management of the FBI, and they did a superb job of bringing together teams of personnel across the Nation, and carrying out the 

kind of in-depth, well-in-advance intelligence work that you’d hope 

would precede an event of that nature. And that is the real deterrent for terrorist activity, is finding the bad guys before they attack. And the concrete barriers and the perimeters, those are imVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:55 Jul 13, 2016 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\20674.TXT JACKIE
11 

portant, as well; but we recognize that no number of concrete barriers, no number of perimeter personnel, no number of mag-andbag checks will prevent a determined terrorist that decides to attack a particular area. But if intelligence work has been done effectively, we can find those people and keep them away from the 

event. 

Senator SMITH. Governor, as you can imagine, even holding this 

hearing, for which—the Commerce Committee has jurisdiction over 

the U.S. Olympic Committee—but in holding this hearing, there 

are a lot of people nervous about us even discussing this in the 

open. But it is certainly our hope that by shedding a little light 

and, where necessary, creating a little heat, that we can do our responsibility, in terms of oversight. 

And you may have already heard, there are some athletes—even 

Mark Spitz—who have openly expressed concern about security in 

Athens. Do you have reason to allay those concerns and fears from 

what you have seen? Based on your procedures, are procedures 

going ahead that ought to give athletes and spectators some confidence? 

Governor ROMNEY. Well, I know that following 9/11, we had a 

number of athletes around the world that were very concerned 

about coming to the United States. And we, then, invited the security directors of the respective Olympic committees of various countries to come in and meet with the Secret Service and meet with 

our own planning team, and we took them through what our preparations had been. Following that review, the athletes said, ‘‘OK, 

we’re comfortable with what you’ve done.’’ 

And prior to that review, of course there was some concern. So 

I wouldn’t be surprised that some athletes who had not seen the 

full extent of the preparations would have concern, and that may 

well be a valid and appropriate state of mind. 

Hopefully, after they’ve had the chance to review the provisions 

that have been taken in preparation for the Games, they’d have a 

much higher degree of confidence and sense of security. 

I would note that in our own preparations we placed a great deal 

of attention on protecting the athletes—in the village, in their 

transportation, and then at the venue itself, where they competed. 

We were relatively highly confident that athletes were safe in the 

village, in transportation and in the venue. Where our concerns 

grew is when the athlete left the village on their own, or perhaps 

their event was over and they decided just to mingle with the population-at-large or go to a celebration site or a concert site. In those 

places, the level of security could not, by definition, reach as high 

a level as we had in the village itself. So we literally had a system 

that gave us a very high degree of confidence that the athletes 

themselves would be secure. And, of course, there’s no such thing 

as a hundred-percent guarantee in the world of security, but the 

athletes came as close to that as I think we thought was humanly 

possible. 

Senator SMITH. I think you mentioned, Governor, that your budg- et for security was in excess of $300 million, but you did not spend 

all of that. Is that the accurate number? 

Governor ROMNEY. Actually, the number is one I’ll look to the 

GAO to actually prepare for us, because the bulk of the spending 

12 

for security was spent by the Federal Government, and they did 

not write us a check. They, instead, provided security resources. So, 

for instance, we had an air CAP, a military aircraft, in the air to 

assure that no aircraft would come into the Salt Lake City area 

during key times that was on an inappropriate mission. We had 

military personnel that were searching vehicles and doing checks 

on bomb presence. We had Secret Service personnel throughout 

Salt Lake City. Literally thousands of Federal agents moved into 

Salt Lake City, FBI agents and Forest agents, and so forth—Forest 

Service agents. These individuals were being paid for by their respective agencies and departments, and the funding came from 

Congress. So none of that money actually came through our books. 

Senator SMITH. So you don’t fully know exactly what would be 

the total cost. Maybe it can’t even be calculated—— 

Governor ROMNEY. That’s right. I—— 

Senator SMITH.—in terms of man hours. 

Governor ROMNEY.—I think that’s really true. So, for instance, 

we know that the Federal Government pays a pretty modest stipend to the members of the National Guard. What is the true cost 

of a National Guardsman being there? Their uniform, their housing, their equipment, their radios, and so forth—it probably exceeds even the amount that is spent by the Department of Defense. 

So I think it’s fair to say that we know that figure was in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Our estimate is in excess of $300 million was spent for the security for our Games, and some estimates 

place it as high as a half a billion dollars. 

Senator SMITH. Well, assuming the high number of a half a billion dollars, certainly the Greeks are commended for budgeting 

$1.2 billion for security. And who knows how that will fully be calculated, in terms of its implementation, because they have reached 

out to NATO. There’ll be lots of European and American forces 

there to be helpful. And yet I think even—well your point is, even 

with all the money that’s there—and clearly the money is there to 

provide security—there’s no such thing in life as a hundred-percent 

guarantee. 

Governor ROMNEY. I think that’s absolutely right. And each individual makes the assessment of whether they’re going to participate in an event or participate in a lifestyle when they recognize 

that there is risk involved. These athletes, what they do day to day 

in some of their sports is so scary to me, I can’t imagine doing it. 

Those that go off the ski jump, can you imagine doing something 

like that? 

Senator SMITH. I’ve done men’s aerials before, but never on purpose. 

[Laughter.] 

Governor ROMNEY. So, you know, people will assess, you know, 

the risks that they will take in their life, but I think they—what 

they expect from organizers, and from a country hosting something 

like an Olympics, is that everything that’s humanly possible to be 

done has been done to provide for their safety. And what they don’t 

want to hear about is that efforts were uncoordinated, that intelligence wasn’t shared, that there were gaps in the security program, that measures weren’t taken that could have been taken. 

That’s what I think people have a right to expect, is that governVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:55 Jul 13, 2016 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\20674.TXT JACKIE
13 

ment will provide a safety net which has no flaws and no major 

seams or gaps. And I think we came close to achieving that in Salt 

Lake City. I hope we did. And I hope that the folks organizing the 

Games in Athens are doing that. But it’s clear that they’re spending the money. They’re asking for help. 

The person who helped organize our security effort in Salt Lake 

City is also working in Athens to help organize their effort. He 

knows how it worked in Salt Lake. He can certainly take lessons 

learned and apply them in Athens. And I would look to people like 

him and others to make that assessment: Is everything in place 

that can be in place to provide for the safety of athletes and spectators? 

Senator SMITH. And if the answer is yes, your encouragement to 

our athletes is, ‘‘Focus on athletic success. Don’t worry about your 

personal security.’’ 

Governor ROMNEY. You know, every athlete has to make their 

own assessment as to what’s right for them. My estimation is that 

the athletes will be the safest individuals that one could possibly 

imagine at an Olympic event, and if they ever expect to compete, 

they recognize that there will be security risks. But if the organizers are ready, and they’ve spent the money, as they have in Athens, and the plan is complete, then I’d focus on the toughest challenge they’ll have, and that’s beating the rest of the world. 

Senator SMITH. Governor, thank you for your time, but, even 

more, for your expertise and your history in this great issue. We’re 

mindful you’ve got other things to do, and we appreciate that you 

would share your history with the U.S. Senate. 

Thank you, Governor. 

Governor ROMNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator SMITH. We’ll call, now, our next panel. It consists of Mr. 

Mark Camillo, the Director of Homeland Security, Washington Operations, of the Lockheed Martin Corporation; Mr. David Maples, 

Johnson, Maples, and Associates, of Atlanta, Georgia; Mr. Steven 

Lopez, a U.S. Olympic Athlete in Taekwondo—we appreciate this 

great athlete being with us; and, also, the world-renowned Carl 

Lewis, U.S. Olympic Athlete in Track and Field, perhaps our most 

decorated athlete in recent history. Gentlemen, we thank you all 

for your time. 

And, Mr. Camillo, we’ll start with you. The Governor spoke of 

you and all the great work you did in Salt Lake, and I hope you 

can tell us what you’re contributing to what’s going to happen in 

Athens. 

STATEMENT OF MARK CAMILLO, DIRECTOR, 

HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON OPERATIONS OFFICES, 

LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION 

Mr. CAMILLO. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. It’s a delight to be 

here, and I hope what I offer to you in the next 5 minutes or so 

is of value. 

I am currently serving at Lockheed Martin in a capacity of concentrating on homeland security, but of particular interest, I believe, to the panel, is my role before I retired from the Secret Service. And one of those roles was, particularly, the Winter Olympic 

Coordinator for the 2002 Salt Lake Winter Olympics. And I’d like 

14 

to underscore some things that Governor Romney mentioned, because it would be in my best interest to leave some of the things 

he said where they are. He captured the feeling that we left with 

there. 

I’m going to touch on six different areas. And, in the theme of 

this hearing, sir, I would like to put a corresponding lesson learned 

for the Committee to consider. 

The areas that I intend to go over will be—leadership roles, is 

the first, followed by partnerships, operational security, human resources, the theater of operation, and military support. And this is 

all in the context of the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City 

and the nine counties in Utah. 

A general note for the group is, I would highly encourage you to 

go to school on previous events; and if there’s an opportunity for 

Olympic planners to go visit and get a feel for the energy that surrounds actual Olympic Games, that they should do it. We did it. 

We went to Sydney, Australia, Nagano, Japan, and we also went 

on to give after-action briefings for the Italians and others who are 

going to be hosting Games in the future. 

The leadership roles, as you might wonder—again, it was mentioned why the Secret Service was there, in addition to protecting 

the President and other world leaders. The decision directive that 

Governor Romney mentioned, Presidential Decision Directive 62, 

put the Secret Service in a leadership role for operational security 

at the Federal level. That, in addition to the FBI’s leadership role 

in crisis response and intelligence, and FEMA’s leadership role, in 

consequence, gave you the trio, if you will. 

My lesson learned there, to offer, is, if you have a Class A or an 

extraordinary event, it’s in your best interest to put together an extraordinary team that has the complementary skills and the institutional experience to tackle the event. 

And I qualify that by adding my next point, and that would be 

partnerships. Because although the Federal team that I just mentioned would be what would be considered a national special-security-event package, it can’t be complete unless it’s integrated with 

the other components, particularly the state and local public safety 

officials and others, such as the military support, and certainly the 

Salt Lake Organizing Committee. 

We learned, in Utah, that partnerships were critical. And the ultimate responsibility of the Games, in our view, there was the Salt 

Lake Organizing Committee. The glue that held all these partnerships together consisted mainly of trust and mutual respect. And 

that was our theme. We know that the Organizing Committee 

never left sight of what it needed to do to encourage communication and cooperation. Anytime we had an opportunity, there would 

be a meeting scheduled, organized by the Organizing Committee. 

Conference phone calls were done. And we found that any rumors 

or concerns could be quickly put to rest, allowing more time to 

move collectively forward. 

There were committees formulated. Governor Romney mentioned 

the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command. It was an extraordinary 

gathering of approximately 20 public safety officials of the state, 

local, and Federal. But, also, the Organizing Committee was there 

15 

at the table, which was, again, another example of promoting partnerships by key public safety stakeholders. 

And, of course, the lesson learned there is, forming partnerships 

at all the levels is what needs to happen to really promote communication. And it does reduce suspicion and distrust. 

The operational security portion of this, sir, is what I would view 

as one of the cornerstones to the whole operation. It was mentioned: prevention and preparedness. And I couldn’t emphasize 

more what Governor Romney mentioned, particularly having a very 

pronounced prevention and preparedness theme to the security operations around the official venues. The core components would include physical security, hazardous materials detection, as well as 

explosive-ordnance detection, and access control. And, as long as 

when you were working in partnership with organizations such as 

the host committee—in this case, Salt Lake Organizing Committee—our planners worked closely with their planners so that opportunities to put security features in a site—in this case, a 

venue—was done early enough so that they were done efficiently 

and not in an obtrusive way. So with all security components in 

place before the gates opened, the venues were virtually transformed into an operationally clean, secure environment. And this 

is, in essence, a filter for preventing acts of terrorism and criminality for that part. 

The lesson learned, of course, is to have a robust prevention-preparedness capability at the official venues in order to dramatically 

reduce any chances of terrorism. 

The fourth item of our six is human resources. With a very limited number of law enforcement officers available in Utah at the 

time, and a projected need of approximately twice the size of the 

officer strength in the state, it was very clear that the Federal Government would have to come and work in concert with the state 

and local to create a comprehensive plan. And what we ultimately 

did there was secure the ten competition venues and selected noncompetition venues with Federal officers. 

We were faced with challenges such as different job classifications. We brought officers from five different Federal departments, 

consisting of 13 different agencies, together. Some were officers, 

some were agencies—different job classifications. We had Interior 

Department National Park Service rangers coming in from Wyoming. We had DEA agents from Miami. We had to find ways so 

that we could match their requisite skills and their interests and 

their abilities to the different security posts. And we did that. And 

that really helped. It kept the morale up. 

We had pre-advanced learning CDs that were sent out to get 

them ready. We had cold weather gear already designed and issued 

when they got there. There was a lot of things we did to make sure 

that they were happy, well fed, and rested, and eager to work. 

The fifth item out of six, sir, is the theater of operation. We had 

nine counties, so it was a tremendously large area that we had to 

work in. And the Organizing Committee maintained an official list, 

sir. And this is something that has to be adhered to. One of the 

things we found is that there will be a lot of cultural events and 

activities that will pop up around an Olympic event. The charter 

of the Olympic security at the Federal level is working primarily— 

16 

when it comes to operational security—would be the operational security at the respective venues. So before those in outlying areas 

decide to host a cultural event or an event of Olympic significance, 

I would strongly encourage them to look at the existing security resources and public safety resources, because when it comes down 

to the end, when we’re matching resources with dollars and actual 

people to come in and do these jobs, there might not be enough to 

go around. And, let’s face it, when we are looking for potential terrorism acts, it’s a mass gathering of significant events that draws 

attention that’s what they’re interested in. 

The last item, sir, is military support. We know that the military 

is generally perceived as a quick fix when you have an extraordinary—or a size event that exceeds anything you’ve ever seen. But 

we do know, and we did learn, that the military can support, in 

limited ways, based on law and based on availability. So we found 

that working closely and early with the military, and distinguishing the regular military forces, under Title 10, versus the National Guard Forces, in Title 32, was very beneficial. 

My lesson learned to show you there, sir, is that they are valuable, but they do have restrictions. And it’s imperative to have a 

commanding officer of a Joint Task Force onsite early to make decisions; otherwise, you might not see the Olympic support when you 

need it. 

And having said that, sir, I hope my comments and my lessons 

learned that I shared were of value, and I applaud what you’re 

doing here, and I’d be happy to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Camillo follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK CAMILLO, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY, 

WASHINGTON OPERATIONS OFFICES, LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, I am Mark Camillo, currently serving as a Director in the Washington Operations Offices of Lockheed Martin Corporation, working 

in the area of Homeland Security, here in the National Capitol Region. Although 

my exposure to advanced technologies, systems and services since joining Lockheed 

Martin have added to the depth of my knowledge relative to public safety and security, one of my previous assignments while serving in the U.S. Secret Service will 

hopefully be of particular value to this hearing. 

From 1999 through 2002, I served as the Secret Service Winter Olympic Coordinator for the 2002 Salt Lake Winter Olympics. This assignment entailed the designing, planning and implementing of the Federal operational security plan for the 

Games. 

Protecting Olympic games was not viewed as a new idea as the security plan was 

being contemplated for Salt Lake. Protocols and traditions passed on from previous 

Olympic security planners lent credence to studying after action reports from previous games and visiting/interacting with Olympic security officials who were either 

preparing or actually executing their plan. Hence, traveling to observe an actual 

Olympic event was extremely beneficial. 

Leadership Roles 

You might wonder what actual role the agency responsible for protecting the 

President and other key Government Officials had for the Salt Lake Games. The 

Secret Service had a significant role in the security operations of the Games, due 

a Presidential Decision Directive executed in 1998, which put the Secret Service in 

the lead Federal role for operational security at National Special Security Events 

(NSSE). When any event is designated a NSSE, the Service is joined by the FBI, 

who has the crisis response lead, and FEMA, who has the consequence lead. 

LESSON LEARNED: Have a team selected with complementary skills and the institutional experience to tackle an event of this proportion. 

17 

Partnerships 

Although the Federal team mentioned in the NSSE ‘‘package’’ sounds complete, 

they become integrated components, after joining the state and local public safety 

planners, who have an equally vested interest in a safe and successful event. 

We learned in Utah that partnerships were also critical with the Salt Lake Organizing Committee (SLOC), who had the ultimate responsibility for the Games, and 

other key planners such as the Military and others in the public and private sector. 

The glue that held all these partnerships together consisted mainly of trust and mutual respect. 

Although Federal and State efforts to create sanctioned gatherings were largely 

successful, SLOC never lost sight of the value of communication and went to great 

efforts to ensure that all those who represented the key entities had ample opportunities to communicate, whether it was at a weekly scheduled meeting or a daily conference phone call. What we found was that rumors or concerns could be quickly 

put to rest, allowing more time to move collectively forward. 

Many committees were formulated. Some were in a steering capacity, and some 

were in a working capacity. The most prominent one was the Utah Olympic Public 

Safety Command. A State legislated entity that had representation from all the 

counties affected by the Games. Additionally, key Federal partners were participants, as well as a representative from SLOC. Again, another example of promoting 

partnerships with all key public safety stakeholders. 

LESSON LEARNED: Forming partnerships at all levels and providing the opportunity to communicate reduced suspicion and distrust. 

Operational Security 

What might be viewed as a new approach to securing the 2002 Winter Olympics 

was the inclusion of a very pronounced prevention and preparedness theme to the 

security operations in and around the official venues. Core components including 

physical infrastructure, HAZMAT/Explosive Ordinance Detection and access control 

were weaved into the general design plan of the venues. SLOC understood and 

worked in unison with the security planners to place security elements where they 

provided most value. The security planners in turn, studied existing site plans developed by SLOC in the early stages to find ways to introduce security elements into 

the venues in the least obtrusive way. With all security components operational before the gates opened, the venues were transformed into ‘‘operationally clean security environments’’ that provided in essence a filter for preventing acts of terrorism 

or criminality within the site. 

LESSON LEARNED: Having a robust prevention and preparedness capability at 

the official venues dramatically reduced the chances of terrorism or criminality disrupting the event. 

Human Resources 

With a very limited number of state law enforcement personnel available, and a 

projected requirement of approximately twice the size of the state law enforcement 

workforce for overall public safety, a decision was made to turn to Federal agencies 

for assistance. We were faced with challenges such as different job classifications 

(Officer vs. Agent) and commissioned authority. Also, equally challenging was drawing from all over the United States, which potentially meant assigning a Deputy 

U.S. Marshal from Miami to a security post on the side of a mountain, or placing 

a U.S. Park Ranger from Wyoming at a checkpoint in an ice skating venue. The 

solution to this problem was identifying representatives from each agency who 

worked in advance with the Olympic planners to match skills and interests with 

Olympic security assignments. Consequently, Federal officers who had skills and 

abilities conducive to the alpine venues were assigned accordingly. Distance learning CDs were developed and forwarded to pre-selected officers to prepare them for 

their assignments. Cold weather gear was also procured and issued once Officers arrived for duty. This also added to boosting morale since most assignments lasted 

on average of three weeks. 

LESSON LEARNED: Once security posts are identified, matching officers who have 

the requisite skills, experiences and providing equipment greatly increases job performance and satisfaction. 

Theater of Operation 

What distinguished the Olympic activity across the nine Utah counties was 

whether an event was an official venue or possibly a related event of a cultural significance that would also draw a mass gathering of participants and/or spectators. 

When determining the status of a venue, SLOC maintained an official venue list. 

18 

This consisted of the ten competition venues and approximately four other venues 

that were critical to the functioning of the Games. When determining the resources 

needed for the Olympic security plan, the funding required was matched to the official Olympic venues. Consequently, there were no surplus resources for discretionary usage. With valid concerns raised by those local authorities who’s ‘‘Olympic 

events’’ could be viewed as possible terrorist targets, last minute efforts were made 

to find resources that would provide an enhancement to their respective security 

plans. 

LESSON LEARNED: Review all events either in proximity to the official venues or 

in the region and determine as early as possible if existing security resources can adequately secure the event. Public officials must weigh the potential consequences of a 

lack of adequate security when encouraging the hosting of an Olympic related event. 

Military Support 

The use of the Military seems at face value like an obvious solution when there 

is a large requirement for personnel or equipment. Requests made to the Defense 

Department would presumably be met with an enthusiastic response to assist in the 

Olympic Mission. This, however, was not the case. Reviews of U.S. Military personnel and equipment in previous U.S. hosted Olympics revealed support that in 

retrospect could not be justified. The Salt Lake Winter Olympics was armed with 

a supporting team of Military professionals primarily from both the U.S. Joint 

Forces Command (JFCOM) and the Utah National Guard (UNG). Legislation provided tight controls over what could be provided. In some cases, specialized support 

was provided in areas like air space security, but generally speaking, the greatest 

areas of support provided for operational security were in the areas of equipment 

assistance and explosives detection support. Both of which became critical to the enhancement efforts set in motion after the attacks of September 11th. While the 

Title 10 forces (JFCOM) had strict rules prohibiting their involvement in law enforcement functions, the Title 32 Forces (UNG) had more flexibility in the area of 

law enforcement support. The flow of military communication and support increased 

significantly when a Joint Task Force—Olympics was ultimately established. 

LESSON LEARNED: The military can provide valuable support, but has restrictions on the types of duties they can perform. Having a command level officer with 

decision-making authority on site is imperative if there is any expectation that military support will be provided. Military and civilian planners should jointly review 

requests before assistance is authorized. 

In closing, I hope my comments and the six noted lessons learned provided value 

to the hearing. 

I applaud the Committee’s efforts to bring to light past security practices that 

might be useful for future Olympic games. 

I would be happy to answer any questions. 

Thank you. 

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mark. And I’m aware you’re no 

longer with the Secret Service. Is that correct? 

Mr. CAMILLO. Yes, sir. Recently retired. 

Senator SMITH. But are you mindful of—the lessons you’ve 

learned, that they have been sought out in Greece, and that they’re 

being implemented? Do you have any such knowledge? 

Mr. CAMILLO. I can tell you that there is a transfer of institutional knowledge that had occurred. I can tell you that there were 

officials from Greece that were onsite in Utah. That is a tradition. 

It’s a protocol, and they adhered to it. And I do know, I believe, 

that there are elements within the Federal Government that are 

working as a conduit to make sure that that information, as Governor Romney mentioned, has been passed, to help them. Although 

a Summer Games is different than a Winter Games, so there are 

some nuances that they won’t be able to take complete advantage 

of. 

Senator SMITH. I only mention that because we will hear in detail, specifics, what is being done, between our Nation and Greece, 

in preparation for these Games, and lessons learned, but I do 

19 

want—I don’t want to lay the impression that a lot of work is being 

left undone, because it is being done. 

But one of the things you hear of, over here in our media, is, 

much of the construction work that needs to be completed is still 

undone in Greece, and I wonder if you have any concern about stadiums uncompleted and things yet to be done, cement to dry as 

athletes are lining up. What kind of problems does that present, in 

terms of security? Is that of concern to you? 

Mr. CAMILLO. Well, as I mentioned in my comments, sir, the earlier that security features can be weaved into the plan of the event, 

the less intrusive they will be, the more efficient they will likely 

be. So if it has to come in late, it’s recognized generally as a retrofit. Now, I certainly can’t comment on if that that happens to be 

the case with the Greek Games, but I will say that if the security 

planners can partner with the architects of the event early on and 

get the security features on the blueprints at the design level, that 

is when you’ll have a clean, efficient plan. 

We, in Utah, were facing one venue that was coming up late for 

construction, but it was the Medals Plaza. We had complete faith 

that it would be done on time, and it was done on time. And, fortunately, we stayed on target with the blueprints and were able to 

achieve that security plan toward the end of our planning effort. 

Senator SMITH. It’s interesting to note that even in Atlanta, 

where the security was wonderful, that there was this one explosion at a soft target. Did you try to minimize soft targets in Salt 

Lake? 

Mr. CAMILLO. The soft target that I recognized that term to be 

occurring, some were outside of the recognized secure zones. In the 

case of Atlanta, I understand that that occurred in an area that 

was not a part of the secure zones. 

Senator SMITH. That’s correct. 

Mr. CAMILLO. I do know that the state and local public safety departments have the responsibility to cover an area out and around 

the official venues. That’s why it is so critical to give them the ability to develop a strength in their plan around the official venues. 

If the state and locals would have to secure the official venues and 

all the outlying areas adjacent to or in between the official venues, 

it would be an almost impossible task. 

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Camillo. We appreciate your time and your testimony here today. 

Mr. CAMILLO. You’re welcome. 

Senator SMITH. David Maples, former FBI agent, and also intimately involved with these preparations, and we thank you for 

your presence and invite your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID G. MAPLES, 

JOHNSON, MAPLES, AND ASSOCIATES 

Mr. MAPLES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I do appreciate your invitation to appear before you and discuss 

Olympic security measures taken by organizing committees and 

public officials on behalf of those who have attended or participated 

in past Olympics. 

I have listened to Governor Romney and Mark, and I heartily 

concur with all the recommendations that they have set forth and 

20 

the lessons that they have learned. So I think I would like to take 

my 5 minutes and maybe put a historical perspective of the development of security during the Summer Games and the recent 

events. 

My view is that there are many factors that govern or influence 

security planning and operational security measures taken by 

Olympic Games host nations that cause each one to be unique. National customs and culture, governmental structure, applicable 

laws, jurisdictional authorities, available assets, and world events 

play a large role in the approach to, the scope of, and the final 

operational structure given to any Olympic security program. 

As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, prior to 1972, Olympic security was more a regulatory policing in nature than one of secure 

screening and preparation to respond to worst case scenarios, as we 

know the preparation to be today. The attack on the athletes in 

Munich precipitated changes that affected security planning in 

more ways than just having stronger perimeter controls in the village and the venues. 

The 1996 Olympic Games in Montreal lost money and caused 

heavy public debt, as all well know. Moscow was already committed to host the Games in 1980, but only two cities bid for the 

1984 Games, and Los Angeles won those by default. Los Angeles 

citizens were not willing to chance having to shoulder Olympic debt 

costs, and the IOC was forced to award the financial liability of the 

Games to a private organizing group, which was unprecedented. 

Certainly for Olympic Games held in the United States, I believe 

that these events set the stage for the organization of security and 

the expenditure of funds and assets supporting security for those 

in subsequent Games because it set a relationship for years to 

come between public safety, the government, and the Organizing 

Committee, which I believe that Salt Lake undertook to modify to 

advantage. 

Also, in a historical sense, the makeup of organizing committees 

varied greatly from host to host. In many countries, the governments from those countries are integrally involved in the organization of the Games through the Organizing Committee itself, and 

that generally is reflected by increased integration of government 

security forces in the overall security plan. And I believe that’s the 

case in Athens. 

World events and the fact that Olympic Security Games—excuse 

me—the Olympic Games have increased in size and the number of 

countries participating, have caused each succeeding Olympic security program to consider protection from, and response to, threats 

not previously considered in Olympic Games. More technology, 

more personnel, more assets and logistics, more expense, and more 

need for national and international support and cooperation has 

been the trend in Olympic security, and necessarily so. Now host 

nations direct their most sophisticated public safety assets to support security efforts for the Olympic Games, and the international 

cooperation and support is critical to the host. Integration of medical, mass care, shelter, and emergency-management capabilities 

into security considerations is now necessary. 

During recent Olympic Games, the security apparatus, in its 

final form, however conformed, has represented virtually all servVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:55 Jul 13, 2016 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\20674.TXT JACKIE
21 

ices that the public safety community of that locality is capable of 

providing. Providing security coverage for the Olympic Games is 

complex, and it is ever-escalating for the responsible officials. 

And I might add, Mr. Chairman, that my first Olympics was 

1984 in Los Angeles. And, like other planners, we decided that we 

should view Games prior to those for their experience and what we 

might do. The previous Games, in Atlanta, was 1932. The security 

at the 1932 Games in Atlanta consisted, as we understood, of a 

squadron of motorcycle officers for traffic control, and a cowboy on 

horseback to ride around the Olympic Village to shoo the autograph-seekers away. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MAPLES. I think that our involvement in security, either unfortunately or necessity, has increased through the years to the 

case now where you’ve mentioned that Athens will probably be 

spending in excess of $1 billion for security, and employing not only 

all their national assets, but assets of other nations, as well. 

In addition to what Governor Romney and Mr. Camillo mentioned, there are just a couple of lessons learned that I would like 

to mention to you, sir. One is that it is absolutely imperative to obtain the intelligence and distribute it to users who need to have 

that information at the Games. We all know that collecting intelligence is one thing, distributing intelligence is another problem. 

And the distribution is the most difficult side of that equation, I 

do believe. 

Another thing is that public safety officials have to be very flexible, because the Organizing Committee is constantly changing 

what it’s doing, what its plans are, even what venues will be employed, sometimes even going so far as to what towns will be 

hosting specific events. It’s imperative that public safety be brought 

in on the front end and that senior officials from government have 

the necessary interest and involvement from the very beginning— 

and I believe that means four to 5 years ahead of the Games—in 

order to keep the public safety abreast of what is an ever-changing 

situation around them from the organizers. 

I believe that the government officials should have, at least in 

the United States, probably a greater say in how the accreditation 

is run. Accreditation is the—of course, the badge that allows athletes and other members of the Olympic family and official guests 

and necessary support people into the venues. That is a system 

that is administered by the International Olympic Committee, 

sometimes without very much input from law enforcement or public safety. And I believe that public safety officials should be more 

involved in that particular process. 

As Mr. Camillo mentioned, integrating military in security, because of our different historical roles, can be problematic. And setting up the system for that integration on the front end of planning, rather than, as he mentioned making a quick fix out of it, I 

believe is imperative. 

And the last thing that I would mention, Mr. Chairman, is that 

I believe that for public safety officials to obtain information from 

the national Olympic committees regarding their delegation’s specific needs and VIPs that they have attending that would affect 

governmental security forces, should be made available probably 

22 

more quickly that it is now, recognizing that in many cases the national Olympic committees themselves don’t know who will be attending until the last minute. But I think that a mechanism for increasing that flow of information would be something necessary for 

future Games. 

So I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you, sir, and I’d answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Maples follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID G. MAPLES, JOHNSON, MAPLES, AND ASSOCIATES

Chairman Smith, Members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the invitation to appear before you to discuss security measures 

taken by organizing committees and public officials on behalf of those who attended 

or participated in past Olympic Games, and how lessons learned from these past 

events may serve to ensure better security for future Olympic Games. 

Given the enormity of the Games, including the extraordinary number of nations 

that participate, and its worldwide audience, the Olympic Games present a tempting 

target for a wide variety of disruptive activities, from simple demonstrations to violent acts of terrorism. 

Of course, the goal of the host country is to provide a secure environment for the 

staging of the Olympic Games. The success of this endeavor is critical to the presentation of the world’s largest and most widely viewed sporting event. 

There are factors, such as applicable laws, governmental structure, jurisdictional 

authority, available assets and culture, that govern or influence planning and ultimately the security measures taken by federal, state and local level officials of any 

host nation. Additionally, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) is an international non-government, non-profit organization that owns all rights to the Olympic Games and dictates specific rules under which the Games are organized and presented. It is also the umbrella organization of the Olympic Movement which includes the National Olympic Committees, International Sports Federations, and various other organizations and institutions recognized by the IOC as well as the host 

city organizing committee. 

The makeup of past organizing committees has varied greatly, from including direct government representation to that of being solely private, as is done in the U.S. 

During the course of its planning, the organizing committee makes many decisions, 

such as venue selection, venue design, policies regarding admission to events or access to athlete housing and training sites, pre-event protection of property and assets, Olympic family housing, accreditation, and use of private security, that impact 

security planning measures. The host country government structure and its representation, or lack thereof, in the organizing committee affects the degree of authority and participation government security forces exercise inside properties and 

facilities owned, contracted to or used by the Olympic family. 

Government Olympic security efforts are focused on issues of public safety. In 

general terms, preparations are divided into topics of Intelligence, Investigation, 

Physical Security, Emergency Response to Incidents, and Mitigation of Incidents. 

Due to unique jurisdictional, legislative and budgetary issues as well as widely different capabilities, all agencies recognize that planning and operational execution 

requires an immense amount of interagency communication and cooperation. 

The tragic incident during the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, Germany certainly changed the world’s view of the standard of security necessary for the Games. 

The subsequent expectations of the IOC, athletes, delegations and spectators for extraordinary security at Olympic Games have been met by successively increased 

government commitment to security and expenditures. In recent years, as terrorist 

activity has increased, and the methods used to strike have become more sophisticated, efforts to protect the Games have become more complex and expensive. 

I would like to briefly illustrate this to you using examples of four recent summer 

Olympic Games. 

Los Angeles—1984 

When Tehran, the only other city bidding for the 1984 Olympic Games, withdrew, 

Los Angeles was awarded the Games by the IOC, but the issue of financing became 

an obstacle to the city signing a contract. In an unprecedented move by the IOC, 

the financial liability for the Games was removed from the City of Los Angeles and 

placed on a private organizing committee. The Los Angeles Olympic Organizing 

23 

Committee (LAOOC) was the first private committee, without official ties to government, to organize and operate the Olympic Games. As such, LAOOC’s philosophy 

was to be as economic as possible while still presenting a complete Olympics. The 

presentation of the Games was financed by the private sector, without government 

subsidies or taxpayer contributions, but the costs of protecting the Games greatly 

exceeded agencies normal operating budgets. 

This greatly impacted federal, state and local organizations that had a duty to 

provide for the public safety. Use of as many existing facilities as possible spread 

the core of the Games over seven southern California counties, with preliminary soccer events in Massachusetts and Maryland. By and large, LAOOC did not request 

specific security services from government and therefore was not obligated to pay 

for them. Only a small portion of local governments’ security costs were financially 

assumed by LAOOC. 

Before the Organizing Committee was actively involved in security planning for 

the Games, the Los Angeles Police Department, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 

Department, and the FBI took the lead and coordinated security planning. The cornerstone of the planning, which continued through the Games, was the recognition 

of jurisdictional autonomy. Sixteen topics formed the basis for the security planning 

structure. They were Accreditation, Air Support, Bombs/Explosive Devices, Communications, Community Relations, Crime Prevention, Criminal Justice, Dignitary Protection, Emergency Response, Intelligence, International Entry, In Transit Security, 

Olympic Village Security, Traffic Control, Training, Transportation and Venue/Vital 

Point Security. 

The Federal Government supplemented local law enforcement agencies with approximately $50 million of logistical support equipment that they needed to provide 

adequate security for the Games, including communications equipment, helicopters, 

intrusion detection systems for the villages and miscellaneous medical equipment. 

The security department of LAOOC, which had no law enforcement authority, 

took the responsibility for protecting property and assets belonging to LAOOC, providing accreditation control at the villages, venues and training sites, providing security for IOC officials, and protecting special interest areas such as press and 

broadcast zones and accreditation, illegal substance control and computer centers. 

Recognizing that many more agencies had need for Olympic related intelligence 

than were involved in intelligence collection, the FBI hosted a center that received 

information from national, state and local agencies, and distributed pertinent information to agencies and organizations with protection responsibilities. 

In all, some 7,000 law enforcement officers were committed to the Games, with 

substantial Federal assets poised to respond to breaches of security, mass medical 

emergencies or threats that were beyond the capacity of local or state agencies. 

The Los Angeles Olympics established the public safety-organizing committee relationship that has in large measure carried through subsequent Olympic Games 

hosted in the United States. 

Seoul—1988 

The presentation of the XXIVth Olympiad was fully supported and directed by the 

Republic of Korea Government. The Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee (SLOOC) 

was formed in 1981. 

The organizational structure of security for the Olympic Games was divided into 

two parts. The SLOOC had a security department that was responsible for overall 

coordination between the SLOOC Games Operations Division and the government 

security. It had planning responsibility in areas of opening and closing ceremonies, 

34 competition venues, 72 practice sites, the cultural events and the Olympic torch 

relay. 

The government security operation was headed by the Committee for Security 

Measures. This was the policy making body for security for the Games and was 

chaired by the Director of the Agency for National Security Planning (NSP) with 

members from 12 government agencies. 

Day to day planning and operations for security of the Games focused at the Security Coordination and Control Headquarters which was responsible for overall planning, coordination and control of security operations for the Olympic Games. It was 

headed by a deputy director in the NSP with assistant directors for NSP affairs, 

Korean National Police affairs and military affairs. 

There were nine security divisions to address major security topics. They were 

Planning, Counterterrorism, Technical Support, Intelligence, Venue Protection, Personnel and VIP Security, Athletes Village Protection, Traffic Coordination and 

Training. 

Physical security duties for the various sites and functions were assigned either 

to the Korean National Police or Korean military units. The Korean National Police 

24 

committed over 47,000 officers to Olympic security and the military committed over 

42,000 personnel. 

Before and during the Olympic Games, there were approximately 42,000 U.S. 

military personnel assigned in the Republic of Korea. The U.S. military Olympic security responsibilities related primarily to the protection of U.S. military personnel 

and property. It was proactive in training and exercise with the Korean military. 

The 1988 Games underscored the necessity for cooperation and mutual support 

in the international community of law enforcement, not only in training matters, 

but in the execution of the security itself. For example, air travel was, and will continue to be, a primary means of transport to an Olympic host country. In a time 

before the high level of screening that is in place today, not only did the host country have stringent security, but obtained the cooperation of other airports that 

formed the feeder system to Seoul to participate in the security envelope. 

Barcelona—1992 

The makeup of the Barcelona Organizing Committee (COOB’92) reflected the active participation of the Spanish Government in the planning and operation of the 

1992 Games. COOB’92 was composed of representatives from Spain’s Olympic Committee, Barcelona City Council, Generalitat of Catalonia and the Spanish Government. The mayor of Barcelona was the president of COOB’92. 

COOB’92 formed a security department to identify and resolve organizing committee security issues during the planning phase to develop COOB’92’s portion of 

the Master Security Plan and to implement COOB’92 security responsibilities during the Games. 

Spain constituted the Higher Commission for Olympic Security in June, 1987 with 

the Secretary of State for Security as chairman and charged with the responsibility 

of directing, planning, preparing and implementing security operations. In 1988 a 

security model was adopted that integrated public and private resources under the 

authority of the Commission for Olympic Security and integrated the efforts of the 

National Police, the Guardia Civil, the Mossos d’Esquadra (Catalan Police), the Barcelona City Police, other local police forces, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. 

The administrative instrument was the Olympic Security Master Plan which consisted of 86 security project areas from national issues, such as intelligence, frontier 

security and control of territorial waters to Games specific issues, such as Olympic 

village security, accreditation and information security. Security and emergency response capabilities to address specific risks, such as power supply, water supply, 

telecommunications, dangerous materials, transportation systems were assigned to 

the Catelonian government and Department of Public Safety. 

Due to the locations of the venues, training sites, athletes’ village and official hotels, the National Police had responsibility for about 80 percent of the Olympic facilities security. The Guardia Civil had jurisdiction at the airports, the port of Barcelona, four venues and essential public services such as water, fuel and electric 

supplies, broadcast stations, telephone relay points and transportation services. 

Mossos d’Esquadra protected two competition venues and took part in crime prevention activities. 

Barcelona City Police took charge of traffic and street public safety issues. 

The Army supported the Guardia Civil and COOB’92. The Air Force provided protection of the air space and the Navy provided security of water competition areas 

and territorial waters. 

One aspect of the Barcelona Games was the use of cruise ships in the port for 

housing of guests of the corporate sponsors. Extensive sea side as well as port side 

security measures were taken to protect the 15 large ships. 

Approximately 25,000 law enforcement personnel and numerous support personnel were committed to security of the Barcelona Games. 

Atlanta—1996 

The Olympic Games trended toward being larger and more complex each four 

years. The Atlanta organizing committee promoted their Games as being larger than 

Los Angeles and Barcelona combined. However, Atlanta had far fewer law enforcement assets than either Los Angeles or Barcelona. 

Because of the similarity of local government structures in the U.S. in 1993, Atlanta adopted the Los Angeles Olympic Security planning model, and the security 

planning topics were virtually the same. A concern from the beginning was the 

shortfall between the generally agreed number of security personnel needed for 

Games the size of Atlanta (approximately 30,000) and the number calculated to be 

available (approximately 8,000). Ultimately a combination of state, local, federal, 

military, private security and volunteers were used to staff the security functions. 

25 

Other public safety services were part of security operations which included expansion of trauma capabilities at local hospitals, coordination with area hospitals, 

coordination with public health services and the American Red Cross. The security 

plan included the integration of law enforcement, medical, mass care, shelter, fire 

and emergency management into a consolidated response capability. This planning 

was a critical factor in the organized response to the pipe bomb that was detonated 

in Centennial Park, killing one person and injuring approximately 110. 

Many Federal assets were temporarily located in Atlanta for the Games, including 

capabilities to respond to conventional explosives, chemical or biological threats and 

hostage situations. 

Closing 

The Olympic Movement tries to contribute to a peaceful better world through 

sport and to generate mutual understanding through a spirit of friendship and fair 

play. As our world becomes more complex, the challenges faced by security forces 

that have the responsibility to preserve an environment that allows participants and 

spectators alike to gather at the Olympic Games in the spirit of the Games, continue 

to escalate. 

When Los Angeles hosted the 1932 Olympic Games security consisted of police 

motorcycle officers to direct traffic near the stadium and a horseback officer to patrol around the athletes’ housing. Athens estimates its Olympic Games security 

costs will be $800 million, plus the support of security forces from several other 

countries. Security forces must prepare to prevent or respond to threats unimagined 

to previous Games. 

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Maples. 

You offer a unique historical perspective, in that you have been 

a party to the security of both U.S.-sponsored Olympic Games and 

foreign-—— 

Mr. MAPLES. Yes, sir. 

Senator SMITH.—sponsored Olympic Games. And I wonder if you 

have seen a qualitative difference, in terms of security, one versus 

the other, or if you would say that, in a post-9/11 environment, 

frankly, that qualitative difference would shrink out of national 

pride, and certainly the budgets are being reflected, in terms of history. Do you see such a difference? And do you have much fear 

about such differences? 

Mr. MAPLES. I think the approach can be quite different. I think 

the final result is more nearly the same. For instance, some countries equate Olympic security essentially to national security, as 

was the case in Seoul, 1988. The government was intimately involved in not only the security preparations, but the organizing of 

the Games themselves. In Barcelona, that involvement by the government was there, but to a lesser extent. And, of course, in the 

United States we look at it as essentially a private event, supported by the government as necessary. 

But to specifically answer the question, I think even though the 

approaches are very different, the final result is very nearly the 

same, in terms of security—physical security for the venues, security that we don’t see behind the scenes that is there to respond 

to any incidents that may happen. 

Senator SMITH. I think people take some comfort in that you 

don’t see a qualitative difference; you see a national—sort of a national pride on the line, so every effort is taken. And I hope our 

athletes take some comfort in that, too. 

We’ll now hear from our two great athletes. First, Steven Lopez, 

an Olympic Gold Medalist in Sydney—and then we’ll let Carl Lewis 

bat cleanup. 

[Laughter.] 

26 

Senator SMITH. Steven? 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN LOPEZ, 

U.S. OLYMPIC ATHLETE IN TAEKWONDO 

Mr. LOPEZ. Well, good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator SMITH. Thank you for being here. 

Mr. LOPEZ. Oh, it’s my pleasure. It’s an honor for me to be asked 

to be here. 

My name is Steven Lopez. I’m the 2000 Olympic Gold Medalist 

in the sport Taekwondo, and I’m currently pursuing winning another gold medal at the 2004 Olympic Games, in Athens, which will 

begin a hundred days from tomorrow. 

Taekwondo is an ancient martial art. It’s evolved over the centuries to become a modern day sport, which involves athleticism 

with mental discipline. And it’s been a part of my life—it’s a way 

of life for me. It’s integrity, perseverance, self control, and the indomitable spirit. And, at its core, at its foundation, there’s a strict 

moral and ethical code that stresses loyalty to God, country, family, 

and to all mankind. 

I was invited here today to speak—by the United States Olympic 

Committee—to speak on my point of view regarding security issues 

in Athens. And ever since 9/11, you can’t help but think about security—every time you board a plane, every time I travel overseas to 

a competition in a foreign country; but I still board that plane, and 

I still travel overseas to wherever I need to do. And, in the same 

respect, I feel that we should be able to pursue our dreams of representing our country at the Olympic Games, at the greatest competition in the world. 

It’s my responsibility—I feel it’s my duty—to be an ambassador 

every time I go overseas and compete, and especially at the Olympic Games. That’s what I’m in control of. I’m in control of my preparation. I’m in control of being in the best shape of my life, both 

mentally and physically. And, in the same respect that I’m confident and have faith in my preparation and in my job, I am very 

confident in those whose job it is to make sure that there’s a secure 

and safe Olympic Games in Athens—the International Olympic 

Committee, the United States Olympic Committee, and the organizers of the Olympic Games. 

Every time I do compete, it’s stressful enough to be out there and 

think about who I’m going to be competing against, especially in 

my sport of Taekwondo, where in a split second, you know, you 

could get, you know, hit or hurt. But that’s my concern. And I have 

confidence in those whose hands it is the responsibility to ensure 

safety. 

There have been some comments made, and statements made, 

that the answer to the security issues or concerns is by not attending the Athens Games at all. And that, to me, would be a detriment to our country. It would be—the Olympics is more than just 

the biggest competition in the world; it’s the purest—I think, the 

purest—it brings the world together. It’s pure, and the greatest 

sporting event of all mankind. And my greatest memory, and my 

greatest moment of my life, was to be on the first-place podium 

representing my country with a hand over my heart watching my 

flag being raised as thousands heard my national anthem being 

27 

played. And there’s nothing I want more in life to be able to go 

back in 2004 and listen to that anthem once again. 

And I just thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak on 

the security issues, on the perspective of an athlete, and I welcome 

any questions that you have for me, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lopez follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVEN LOPEZ, U.S. OLYMPIC ATHLETE IN TAEKWONDO

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. 

My name is Steven Lopez and I am a 2000 Gold Medalist in Taekwondo and hope 

to replicate that accomplishment at the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens which will 

begin 100 days from tomorrow. 

Taekwondo is an ancient martial art sport, a variation of which dates back to 50 

B.C. Over the centuries and millennia Taekwondo, which is similar to karate, has 

evolved into a modern day sport that blends athleticism with mental discipline. 

While fundamentally an athletic endeavor whose purpose is self-defense, its practice 

emphasizes the necessity of developing mental discipline and emotional equanimity, 

and a sense of responsibility for one self and for others. Further, at its foundation 

is a strict moral and ethical code that stresses loyalty to God, country and family, 

and respect for all mankind. 

I have been engaged in the sport since I was five years old. At the current age 

of 25 that is eighty percent of my life. Although my God, my family, my friends and 

my education have always taken precedence, dedication to the requirements and 

principles of Taekwondo have guided me for most of my life and have required that 

I learn to sharpen my focus to matters which I can control, and leave to others what 

I cannot. 

I was invited here apparently to discuss security concerns in Athens and measures to ensure athlete safety. Frankly, these are matters that fall into the category 

of those that are beyond my knowledge and control, and about which I lack the experience and competency to address authoritatively. I am not concerned about security. My focus is and will continue to be on preparation for my competition, and to 

representing my countrymen in a manner that will reflect favorably upon them. Security is the last thing that I am worrying about. Instead, I am trusting the United 

States Olympic Committee, the organizers of the Athens Games, and perhaps U.S. 

Government authorities to address these matters. 

I read a newspaper article last week where a former Olympian speculated that 

there is a high probability that the U.S. team, or perhaps some of its members, will 

eventually withdraw from the 2004 Olympic Games out of concern for security. In 

all due respect, the high probability is that this individual doesn’t know the athletes 

who will make up the 2004 Olympic Team and has forgotten what motivates them. 

I and my fellow athletes have prepared much too long to forfeit the honor of participating in the greatest athletic competition in the world. The Olympic Games are not 

merely an athletic competition, but rather, a unique lifetime experience that we are 

fortunate to have the opportunity to be invited to participate in. Please don’t ask 

me whether I plan to go to Athens. Rather, ask me what can I do to bring honor 

and glory to the United States, and to my countrymen whose support and encouragement will enable me to represent them this Summer. 

Thank you for your time and for your attention. 

Senator SMITH. Steven, thank you for your words, but more for 

your courage and incredible attitude. And I just want you to know 

that we, on this Committee and Congress, and I know on United 

States Olympic Committee, are anxious to do everything possible 

to make sure that your personal security is provided for so you can 

focus on your athletic success, because we want to see that, as well, 

and hear that national anthem, and see you on that top tier. 

Mr. LOPEZ. Thank you. 

Senator SMITH. Thank you, and all the best to you. 

Mr. LOPEZ. Thank you. 

Senator SMITH. Carl Lewis. Needs no introduction. 

28 

STATEMENT OF CARL LEWIS, 

U.S. OLYMPIC ATHLETE IN TRACK AND FIELD 

Mr. LEWIS. Well, first of all, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving 

me this opportunity to speak. And, in the words of Track and Field, 

I’m the anchor leg. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. LEWIS. This is a very, very important time; this is a very 

critical issue we’re talking about. And I, myself, have had the privilege to—and the honor, actually—to represent my country to five 

Olympic teams, four Olympic Games, and—from Los Angeles all 

the way until Atlanta, in 1996. And through all of these Games, 

security was a very important part of it. But, unfortunately, now 

we live in a world where security is even more important. 

You know, as a former Olympic athlete, I am, by no means, an 

expert on security matters, and I’m not here to pull out a crystal 

ball and try to predict what will happen, or what can happen, in 

Athens. I’m simply here to encourage you to do the right thing, to 

support the most advanced, complete security possible that we can 

have. 

And, as a former athlete, I know how to prepare for competition. 

To be successful when the athlete trains, and to prepare for competition, he or she needs to focus entirely on his competition, and 

give his undivided attention to training and preparation for every 

single event, as we just heard. An athlete cannot be distracted by 

any factors or diversions. And my message and plea to all of you 

today is simple. As members of the U.S. Government, please do everything within your power to ensure the greatest level of security 

that’s available to all of the Olympians in Athens. And if that 

means more resources, I hope they’ll be provided. And if that 

means more briefings and international collaboration, I hope that’ll 

take place. 

I also have a message to the athletes who are in the midst of 

their training for Athens. Stay completely focused on your training, 

and rest assured that you will be competing in an environment 

that has the highest level of security ever provided for any athletic 

competition. 

And to help raise comfort for all of these athletes, let’s consider 

the following issues. Well over $1.2 billion will be spent on security 

in Athens, which is nearly four times the amount that was spent 

in Sydney just 4 years ago. And also, for the first time ever, the 

U.S. Government is able to provide athletes protection for the first 

time. And also, the U.S. Government has been in close contact and 

working with other countries and the Greek Government in a joint 

security program, and this program will be obviously a very, very 

international effort. 

In my experiences competing in four Olympic Games, I’ve always 

been impressed with the level of security provided for the athletes 

by the host nation. I never felt threatened or concerned with security, and that allowed me to focus on competition. And I’m both 

confident and hopeful that despite the new security concerns in 

Athens, that the extensive and well-coordinated security programs 

that will be in operation will provide all athletes a high level of 

confidence and will allow them to focus exclusively on what they 

29 

came here to do—compete on the fields of play, and connect with 

new friends from around the world. 

I know and I’m aware of all those who think that sending U.S. 

athletes to Athens is an unnecessary risk. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee that would be listening, as a member of the 

U.S. Olympic Team that will not be able to—that did not compete 

in the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games, I urge and ensure you that 

the absent will not stand a message that the—I’m sorry—being a 

member of the 1980 Olympic Team, I urge and ensure that the absence of some clear, present danger will never change that course 

of action. And our athletes have been training so much of their 

lives for this very special moment, so let’s not take it away from 

them. And I remember, also, in looking at so many athletes at the 

end of their careers, in 1980, who had to understand that they 

would never have that chance again. 

The beauty of sports and, in fact, the very foundation of this 

Olympic movement is that sport transcends all borders and political strife. Regardless of the conflicts of the world and various difficult international relations, we have a powerful and beautiful 

common interest, the competition of sports. And it is my hope that 

this Olympics will be the best ever, and that, with your continued 

support, athletes from all over the world, whatever they do, will be 

at their best and compete without any distractions. 

Thank you, and I appreciate the opportunity to be here. And if 

you have any questions, I’d be happy to answer. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lewis follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CARL LEWIS, U.S. OLYMPIC ATHLETE IN TRACK AND FIELD

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee for this opportunity 

to speak on the important matter of Olympic Security. The timing and the subject 

matter of this hearing are critical, and I applaud you for recognizing its importance. 

I have had the privilege and honor to represent my country on five U.S. Olympic 

teams and to compete in four summer Olympics: Los Angeles (1984), Seoul (1988), 

Barcelona (1992) and Atlanta (1996). In each of these games, security has been an 

important consideration and unfortunately, it is even more so now in the world we 

live in today. 

As an Olympic athlete, I am by no means an expert on security matters. What 

I am is an athlete who knows how to prepare for competition. To be successful, 

when an athlete trains and prepares for competition, he or she needs to focus his 

or her complete and undivided attention on training and preparing for competition. 

An athlete cannot be distracted by any other factors or diversions. My message and 

plea to you today is simple: as members of the U.S. Government please do everything within your power to ensure that the greatest level of security is available for 

the Olympics in Athens. 

I also have a message to the athletes who are in the midst of their training for 

Athens: stay completely focused on your training and rest assured that you will be 

competing in an environment that has the highest level of security ever provided 

to an athletic competition. To help raise your comfort level as athletes, consider the 

following: 

• Well over $1.2 billion dollars will be spent for security at Athens—which is 

nearly four times what was spent protecting the Sydney Games four years ago; 

• For the first time ever, the U.S. Government is able to provide its own protection for U.S. athletes; and 

• The U.S. Government has been in close contact and working collaboratively for 

years with the Greek and other governments on a joint security program—this 

will be an international effort. 

In my experience of competing in four Summer Olympic Games, I have always 

been impressed with the level of security provided athletes by the host nation. I 

have never felt threatened or concerned with security, and that has allowed me to 

30 

focus on competition. I am confident that despite the new security concerns about 

Athens, the extensive and well-coordinated security programs that will be in operation will provide all athletes a high level of confidence and will allow them to focus 

exclusively on what they came to do—compete on the fields of play and connect with 

new friends from around the world. 

I am aware of those who think that sending U.S. athletes to Athens is an unnecessary risk. Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, as a member of the U.S. 

Olympic Team that was not able to compete in the 1980 Summer Olympic Games 

in Moscow, I urge you to ensure, that absent some clear and present risk, we never 

take that course of action again. Our athletes have been training for much of their 

lives for this very special moment. Let’s not take that away from them. 

The beauty of sports, and in fact, the very foundation of the Olympic movement 

is that sport transcends all borders and political strife. Regardless of the conflicts 

of the world and the various difficulties in international relations, we have a powerful and beautiful common interest: the competition of sports. It is my hope that this 

Olympics will be the best ever and that with your continued support, athletes are 

able to do what they do best—compete, without any distractions. 

I appreciate the opportunity to be able to present my views and speak on this important matter. 

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Carl. 

I think as I sum up your testimony and restate it, you’re saying, 

to the athletes of our current team, go to Athens. 

Mr. LEWIS. Oh, one hundred percent. 

Senator SMITH. Would you also share with them anything that 

you did, Carl—or you, Steven, did in Sydney—about your personal 

security? I mean, were there moments where you would say, ‘‘Hey, 

don’t do this, don’t go there,’’ or, ‘‘Just focus on your sport, and 

that’ll keep you where you ought to be and away from where you 

ought not to be’’? 

Mr. LEWIS. Well, I’ll take that first. The first thing that I did 

was, I communicated with the Olympic Committee. If we had to 

leave the village or go to a different venue, they understood where 

I was going, they knew what I was doing, so that there was a communication. But most of the time, I did utilize the facilities. I 

stayed within the village confines, which I think is very important, 

and enabled them to protect me. Because if you don’t communicate, 

then they’re unable to do that with you. 

Mr. LOPEZ. Much of the same as Carl said, in Sydney, just 4 

years ago, I felt—I mean, the security was almost overwhelming 

in—I mean, just all the security they had to go through to even 

enter the Olympic Village. Anytime you wanted a family member, 

you had to give them a passport, and, 3 days before, you had to 

do all these things. But when you’re an athlete, you’re not really 

concerned about seeing monuments or buildings or much of the 

city. What you’re concerned about is doing your job, which is competing. And you have everything—the Olympic Village is a city in 

itself, and—but if you do go outside of the village, we did have security with us. We did communicate to our head-of-team, or whoever was in charge of us, that we were going to be going to that 

location. 

And heading to 2004, I feel even more confident, just because 

there’s going to be three times as much security. I think, in Sydney, there was around 15,000 security personnel, and there’s going 

to be around 45,000 personnel this time. And, as an athlete, I feel 

very secure. I feel very confident that the International Olympic 

Committee, the United States Olympic Committee, and all the organizers will do everything possible to ensure a safe Olympic 

31 

Games. And my main goal, my only priority, is to bring home another gold medal for the United States. 

Senator SMITH. And we want that very much for you. 

And, Carl, I was very intrigued by your reference to the 1980 

Olympics. And as someone who’s very much involved in politics, 

along with my colleagues on the Hill, you know, that was a troubled time, in the cold war, in which politics got in the way of sport. 

And it does seem to me that the world was the poorer for the way 

that all played out, and not just in Afghanistan, with Russia, but 

because we didn’t go, and we didn’t come together as a world community to maybe put aside politics for a while and do a lot of healing that often can happen at Olympics. 

And I think my only closing comments are that it’s important 

that we go—do all we can to be safe, but important that we go, now 

more than ever, so that the politics of those who would visit us 

with terror don’t win. We have heard that many times, in many 

other circumstances, ‘‘Go about your life as you would, or those who 

would threaten us win by our change in course.’’ 

So each of you who have contributed to this hearing today, we 

thank you. And the politics of this place are to go, and let’s do all 

we can to secure Athens, and do our part to help the Greek community, and let’s take a lot of gold medals. But let’s do a lot of healing 

in the world through the Olympic Games, where we can see the humanity of every person there, and not have, at the forefront, our 

political differences, but our common humanity, through sport. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. And, with that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:31 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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