UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

EDWARD BRIGHT,

Petitioner,

v.

STEVENS SHIPPING & TERMINAL

No. 96-2484

COMPANY; DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF

WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

LABOR,

Respondents.

On Petition for Review of an Order

of the Benefits Review Board.

(No. BRB-95-0992)

Submitted: April 17, 1997

Decided: May 1, 1997

Before NIEMEYER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and

BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

E. Paul Gibson, Allison A. Stover, RIESEN LAW FIRM, L.L.P., N.

Charleston, South Carolina, for Petitioner. Bert G. Utsey, III, Joseph

D. Thompson, III, SINKLER & BOYD, P.A., Charleston, South Carolina, for Respondents.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Edward Bright appeals from the summary affirmance by the Benefits Review Board ("BRB") of the Administrative Law Judge's

("ALJ") denial of benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers'

Compensation Act (the "Act"), 33 U.S.C.A.§§ 901 to 950 (West

1986 & Supp. 1996).* The ALJ denied Bright's claim for permanent

partial disability, and Bright appeals. Because the ALJ's decision was

supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.

A claimant seeking disability benefits under the Act must establish

his inability to return to his former employment. See v. Washington

Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). Bright

worked as a longshoreman for twenty years. He injured his back on

August 2, 1992, when he fell backwards onto a "peg eye." He

returned to work on March 7, 1993, performing light duty until June

1993. He then stopped working, claiming that he was unable to return

to longshore duty because of pain and numbness in his back and leg.

From 1992 through 1994, Bright was examined by five doctors: Dr.

Steven Poletti, an orthopaedic surgeon; Dr. John Davis; Dr. Gregory

Jones, a physical medicine and rehabilitation specialist; Dr. Marilyn

Schimenti, a medical disability consultant; and Dr. James Aymond, an

orthopaedic surgeon. Dr. Poletti, Bright's primary treating physician,

_________________________________________________________________

*The BRB never addressed the merits of the appeal. On September 12,

1996, the BRB sent the parties a notice stating that pursuant to the provisions of Public Law Number 104-134, enacted on April 26, 1996, all

appeals to the BRB relating to claims under the Act were deemed to have

been affirmed if the case had been pending before the BRB for one year

by September 12, 1996. Because Bright's appeal met these criteria, the

BRB informed the parties that the ALJ's decision had been effectively

affirmed by the BRB on September 12, 1996, for purposes of their rights

to obtain review in the court of appeals.

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concluded that Bright had incurred a "minor injury," and both he and

Dr. Aymond noted that there was no objective physical evidence to

support a finding that Bright was unable to return to his duties as a

longshoreman. Dr. Aymond further found that Bright's complaints of

pain were not supported by the radiographic and physical findings.

Nevertheless, in response to a questionnaire by a rehabilitation specialist, Dr. Aymond stated that, although Bright was cleared for "restrictive duty" longshore work, he was not approved for regular duty

longshore work due to the difficulty of the lifting involved.

Although Dr. Jones concluded that Bright suffered from a lumbar

spine impairment, he stated that the impairment would not prevent

Bright from working. However, neither Dr. Jones nor Dr. Davis discussed whether Bright could return to longshore work specifically.

Finally, Dr. Schimenti concluded that Bright was permanently and

totally disabled from performing longshore work.

In finding Bright able to work, the ALJ discredited only two items

of evidence: Dr. Schimenti's opinion that Bright was permanently and

totally disabled and Dr. Aymond's statement that Bright could not

return to regular longshore duty. The ALJ discredited Dr. Schimenti,

because while both she and Dr. Aymond examined Bright for disability assessment rather than treatment purposes, Dr. Aymond's opinion

was corroborated by Dr. Poletti. Dr. Schimenti, on the other hand,

was the lone doctor concluding that Bright was totally disabled. We

must defer to the ALJ's credibility determinations and inferences

from the evidence. See, 36 F.3d at 380.

Next, the ALJ discredited Dr. Aymond's statement to the rehabilitation specialist, because this conclusory statement directly contradicted Dr. Aymond's medically supported report finding "no

impairment rating" and releasing Bright for longshoreman duties. Further, in his statement to the rehabilitation specialist, Dr. Aymond specifically cleared Bright for "restrictive duty" longshore work. Because

the information Dr. Aymond provided on the rehabilitation specialist's form conflicted with his own examination notes and medical

reports, the ALJ's decision to discredit the information on the form

was not "inherently incredible or patently unreasonable." Cordero v.

Triple A Mach. Shop, 580 F.2d 1331, 1335 (9th Cir. 1978) (quotation

omitted); see also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971)

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(holding that medical testimony was substantial evidence for administrative finding of nondisability, despite presence of opposing medical

testimony and claimant's testimony).

The medical evidence provided in the examination notes and medical reports of Drs. Poletti and Aymond constituted more than substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding that Bright is not

permanently disabled. See 36 F.3d at 380 (standard of review).

Accordingly, we need not address Bright's claim regarding wageearning capacity, and we affirm. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED

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