U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

99–555PDF 2016

HEZBOLLAH’S GROWING THREAT AGAINST

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN

THE MIDDLE EAST

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 22, 2016

Serial No. 114–163

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Matthew Levitt, Ph.D., director and Fromer-Wexler fellow, Stein Program 

on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Washington Institute for Near East 

Policy ..................................................................................................................... 6

Mr. Tony Badran, research fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies ...... 23

Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D., professor, Security Studies Program, Edmund A. 

Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University ................................ 39

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Matthew Levitt, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 9

Mr. Tony Badran: Prepared statement .................................................................. 25

Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ....................................................... 41

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 58

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 59

(1)

HEZBOLLAH’S GROWING THREAT AGAINST 

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN 

THE MIDDLE EAST 

TUESDAY, MARCH 22, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, I will then recognize other 

members seeking recognition for 1 minute. 

We will then hear from our witnesses and without objection, witnesses, your prepared statements will be made a part of the record 

and members may have 5 days in which to insert statements and 

questions for the record subject to the length limitations in the 

rules. 

Before we begin today, I would just like to say, and I’m sure that 

I’m speaking on behalf of all of the members, that we condemn in 

the strongest terms the terrorist attacks in Brussels today and our 

condolences are with those impacted by this evil and with all of the 

people of Brussels. 

We stand ready, willing and able to assist our European allies 

with whatever they need to root out these terrorists and hold those 

responsible accountable. 

I think today’s attacks and the subject matter of today’s hearing 

only serve to further underscore the need for all of us—the U.S., 

our allies, all—to do more to combat and destroy ISIS and other 

terrorist groups like Hezbollah and it has to start with finding a 

comprehensive plan for Syria that includes defeating all the terror 

groups and seeing Assad removed from power. 

We certainly have trying times ahead but I’m confident that 

these terrorists will not change our way of life and that freedom 

and democracy will ultimately triumph over this radical extremism 

and hatred. 

The chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Israel—the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and the Arab 

states and Iran—these are all some of the top priorities for U.S. 

national security interests in the Middle East. 

2

And one of the common denominators here, one thing at the center of all of this, is the U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization—FTO—Hezbollah. 

This Shi’ite Islamist group is an Iran proxy group that is known 

to be one of the world’s most dangerous and capable terror organizations trained and equipped and funded by Iran’s Quds Force. 

Hezbollah has been responsible for some of the world’s most infamous terror attacks including the 1983 U.S. Marine barracks 

bombing in Beirut, the 1994 AMIA Jewish community center in 

Buenos Aires and the bombing of a bus in Bulgaria which targeted 

Israeli citizens. 

But this is just a small fraction of the terror activities as 

Hezbollah is present around the world including an alarming presence right here in our own hemisphere where it is involved in drug 

trafficking, smuggling networks and terror operations. 

This U.S.-designated FTO has been responsible for provoking 

war with Israel most recently in the 34-day conflict in 2006 which 

saw the militant group launch over 4,000 rockets indiscriminately 

into northern Israel. 

Hezbollah is responsible for destabilizing Lebanon’s political 

scene and is growing its influence and presence there, much to the 

detriment of Lebanon and her people. 

Hezbollah was found to be responsible for the assassination of 

the former prime minister in 2005 and, of course, Hezbollah has 

been used by the Iranian regime as ground forces to protect the regime’s interest in Syria. 

With all of this it is clear that Hezbollah represents a growing 

threat to our national security interests, especially in the wake of 

the sanctions relief that the Iranian Government has received as 

part of this weak and dangerous nuclear agreement. 

Hezbollah receives financial and materiel support from Iran and 

now with the regime receiving this financial windfall of over $100 

billion, it is not only reasonable to expect that Iran will increase 

its support for its proxy, it is as near of a guarantee as one can 

have. 

With the terror group being such a vital arm of Iran’s foreign 

policy agenda we would be silly and ignorant to expect that it 

wouldn’t use this as an opportunity to strengthen this vital extension of its damaging apparatus. 

This is likely one of the major driving forces behind the Gulf 

countries and the Arab League making the decision to designate 

Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. 

This designation, regardless of the motivations, was a step in the 

right direction and we’d like to see more of that from our GCC 

partners in fighting terror groups like Hezbollah and that includes 

doing more to combat terror financing in those countries. 

But it is encouraging and we should seek to work with them in 

an effort to cut off Hezbollah’s support from Iran and eliminate the 

threat that it poses. 

Saudi Arabia has cut its military assistance to Lebanon in part 

because of Hezbollah’s undue influence in Beirut and the Lebanese 

Government. That undue influence led the Lebanese justice minister to resign. 

3

This should be sounding alarm bells for the administration. Not 

only is it allowing Iran and Hezbollah to push us around in Syria 

but it is allowing Iran to grow its influence in Lebanon and extend 

its grasp in the region. 

Now we have Hezbollah on the border with Israel in Lebanon 

and we have Hezbollah in the Golan Heights, and just because it 

is preoccupied with the fight in Syria doesn’t mean it has turned 

a blind eye on Israel. 

Make no mistake about it. The cease fire between Israel and 

Hezbollah has nothing to do with Hezbollah not wanting to fight 

Israel. It has everything to do with the terror group restocking and 

building up its missile and rocket stockpile so that it can once 

again launch an all-out attack against the Jewish state. 

In fact, with all the chaos going on in Syria right now, it has 

helped Iran and the Assad regime in their efforts to smuggle more 

weapons and more ammunition and more sophisticated weapons 

systems to the terror group and that includes some advanced Russian-made weapons systems, which could seriously jeopardize 

Israel’s security. 

Anytime we have Russia, Iran and Hezbollah operating in the 

same theater with the same objectives, it cannot be good for the security and the stability of the region. 

It is an imminent threat to our friend and ally, the democratic 

Jewish state of Israel, and it is a great threat to our national security interests in the region as the proxy war between Iran and 

some of our GCC allies threatens to escalate. 

The Obama administration needs to do more to counter 

Hezbollah and Iran in Syria, which means delivering a comprehensive strategy to defeat ISIS and the Assad-Hezbollah-Iran nexus. 

It needs to do more to take action to combat the weapons transfers from Russia to Iran and to Hezbollah in Syria. The President 

needs to use the tools at his disposal to sanction Hezbollah and cut 

off its network, and the President needs to realize that foregoing 

old alliances in the region to legitimize relations with and legitimize itself, the Iranian regime, is a strategic calamity that will 

have terrible consequences for the region and for our national security interests for years to come. 

With that, I’m pleased to recognize the ranking member, my 

friend, Mr. Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you very much, Madame Chairman. 

I’d also like to just take a moment to say that we stand with the 

people of Brussels, the people of Belgium and all those who are resolute in battling ISIS and the terrorist groups that cowardly launch 

attacks on innocent civilians. 

It will not win, not in Belgium, not in Turkey, not in Cote 

d’Ivoire, not in Israel, nowhere, and our thoughts and prayers go 

out to the victims—today’s victims and to their families. 

Thank you to our witnesses. It’s a pleasure to welcome you all 

back to our subcommittee and I thank the chairman for convening 

today’s hearing to examining the terrorist organization Hezbollah 

whose dangerous behavior poses a threat in nearly every corner of 

the globe. 

Hezbollah was founded as a resistance group against Israel, a 

group dedicated to the destruction of the state of Israel. 

4

Today, its activities are broad and they are wide. Hezbollah has 

become Iran’s proxy terrorist using Iranian dollars to launch attacks around the world just as they use Iranian weapons to kill 

Syrians. 

Hezbollah is responsible for the 1992 Israeli Embassy bombing in 

Argentina which killed 29 people, the 1994 bombing of the AMIA 

Jewish center that killed 85 people. It attacked a bus of tourists 

in Bulgaria in 2012. 

Since 2008, attacks plotted by Hezbollah have been foiled in Cyprus, in Azerbaijan, in Georgia and in Turkey. And in 2012 a 

Hezbollah plot to assassinate the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia 

right here in Washington was uncovered. 

This attack, had it gone forward, would have resulted in the 

deaths of innocent civilians here in our nation’s capital. And while 

Hezbollah has been a designated U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organization since 1997, it still operates freely around the world as a socalled political group—a political group. 

The distinction between Hezbollah’s political and military wings 

allows the group to fundraise throughout Europe and Latin America. 

The Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act, which I 

was proud to introduce with Chairman Royce, Ranking Member 

Engel and my friend, Mr. Meadows, has been signed into law and 

would help crack down on Hezbollah’s use of the banking system 

as well as its other funding sources from narco-trafficking to money 

laundering. 

Now, today’s hearing comes on the heels of two surprising announcements—the designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization by the Gulf Cooperation Council followed by the same designation by the Arab League. 

These actions are a clear indication of just how dangerous 

Hezbollah has become as it does Iran’s dirty work throughout the 

Middle East. 

Iran has a long history of meddling in neighboring countries with 

hopes of destabilizing governments and inciting unrest among Shi 

’ite populations. 

After the conclusion of the nuclear agreement, there is increasing 

concern about the kind of damage an Iran with access to billions 

of dollars in sanctions relief could do. 

But Hezbollah is not just a threat to Israel and to Arab states. 

This murderous group has a history of attacking American citizens 

and American interests. 

Since its inception in 1982, Hezbollah has attacked American 

citizens in the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in 1983, killing 63 including 17 Americans, the U.S. Marine barracks bombing 

in October 1983 which killed 241 American and 58 French servicemen, the bombing of the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut in 1984 

which killed 24, the hijacking of TWA 847 in 1985 in which a Navy 

diver was shot in the head and his body dumped on the Tarmac, 

and the Khobar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia in 1996 that killed 

19 U.S. airmen. 

Desperate to hang on to its best friend, Bashar al-Assad, Iran 

dispatched Hezbollah mercenaries to Syria nearly 5 years ago. 

Hezbollah has sustained the regime’s grip on power and aided in 

5

the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of innocent Syrians by providing Assad with somewhere between 6,000 and 8,000 fighters. 

Just this week, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah vowed that 

his fighters would press on in Syria even as Assad loses his support from the Russian air force. 

The conflict in Syria has delivered an influx of new weapons into 

the region, increasing the chances that dangerous chemical or advanced precision weapons had fallen into Hezbollah’s hands. 

Already Hezbollah is reportedly in possession of Russian-designed surface-to-air shoulder-mounted missile systems and with 

an arsenal of well over 100,000 missiles, which are, according to 

Nasrallah, capable of reaching every corner of Israel, it is troubling 

to imagine these rockets with precision capabilities or Hezbollah 

with a stockpile of chemical weapons that could one day be used 

against Israel. 

The U.S. must lead the efforts to interdict Iranian weapons as 

they make their way to Hezbollah for use in Syria and against 

Israel. We have tremendous cooperation with Israel in these efforts 

but the international community under the mandate of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, which calls for the de-arming of 

Hezbollah, must step up these efforts. 

The Security Council must do more to ensure that Security 

Council resolutions are implemented. The U.N. peacekeeping mission in Lebanon does not have the ability to de-arm Hezbollah. 

There is no enforcement mechanism. 

Hezbollah has a stranglehold on Lebanon, the country is paralyzed because Hezbollah essentially functions as a state within a 

state. The political stalemate has persisted for nearly 2 years with 

the government unable to select a President. 

Moreover, the Lebanese Armed Forces must be the sole security 

apparatus in the country. I was pleased to see the Security Council 

reaffirm this last week reiterating their strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon and underscoring the crucial role played by the Lebanese 

Armed Forces and security forces in extending and sustaining the 

authority of the state in supporting the country’s stability. 

As long as Hezbollah remains in Syria, a threat to Lebanon remains. Retaliatory bombings have struck Beirut, the country is 

buckling under the weight of over 1 million refugees and Hezbollah 

is desperate to see its lifeline to Iran preserved. 

This makes a political solution that removes Bashar al-Assad 

from power all the more important for regional international security. Without Assad, the Hezbollah-Iran nexus is inherently weakened. 

Madam Chairman, it is time for the world to call Hezbollah what 

it is—a terrorist organization that murders innocent civilians at 

the behest of Iran. 

I hope today will give us new insight into how we can beat Iranian support for Hezbollah and curb the menacing group’s activities in the Middle East and around the world, and I yield back. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. 

6

And seeing no member request for time, we are so pleased to get 

to our witnesses and I thank the witnesses and the audience for 

their patience, as we had a series of votes. 

We are pleased to welcome back Dr. Matthew Levitt, Director of 

the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence for the 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 

Previously, Dr. Levitt has served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis at the U.S. Department of the 

Treasury, a branch chief under the Director of National Intelligence and a Counterterrorism Advisor to the State Department’s 

Special Envoy to the Middle East. Welcome, Dr. Levitt. 

We would also like to welcome back Dr. Tony Badran, a research 

fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Dr. Badran 

focuses on Lebanon, Syria and Hezbollah. 

As an expert on U.S. foreign policy toward Syria and nonstate actors and terrorist groups, Dr. Badran has—well, I made you a doctor, that’s not bad—has written extensively—my arm hurts, maybe 

you could take a look at it—extensively in Hezbollah. 

And lastly but not least, we would like to welcome back Dr. Daniel Byman, who is a professor in the Security Studies Program at 

Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and the research 

director for the Saban Center for the Middle East Policy at the 

Brookings Institution. 

Dr. Byman previously served as a professional staff member for 

the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States 

and the joint 9/11 inquiry staff of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. 

Thank you, gentlemen. Your prepared remarks will be made a 

part of the record and please feel free to summarize. Dr. Levitt, we 

will begin with you. 

STATEMENT OF MATTHEW LEVITT, PH.D., DIRECTOR AND 

FROMER-WEXLER FELLOW, STEIN PROGRAM ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE 

FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. LEVITT. Thank you very much, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and 

Ranking Member Deutch, members of the committee. 

It’s a pleasure to be here. I, too, would like to just make a comment about Brussels. I was in Brussels last week meeting with 

counterterrorism officials including with officials as they were planning the first raid last Tuesday. 

But I also had the opportunity while there to talk to them about 

Hezbollah and there is some silver lining here, because due to 

Hezbollah’s tremendous investment in international organized 

crime, going up to the highest levels of Hezbollah, we now have an 

opportunity to work with Europeans, even within the context of a 

European Union designation of Hezbollah that is partial, just the 

military and terrorist wings, as if such a distinction exists. 

Hezbollah will be the first to tell you it does not, and so maybe 

this is something we should push on again. 

But even where things are, we are seeing tremendous cooperation with them on these cases. The fact is that Hezbollah has 

branched out and experienced a regional transformation. 

7

We see the designation by the GCC and Arab League and it’s because of an increased amount of Hezbollah activity in the region, 

not just the long history of Hezbollah in the Gulf, and to be clear, 

for example, just 2 months after the finalization day of JCPOA we 

had the arrest of Mughassil who was one of the masterminds of the 

Khobar Towers bombing that you both mentioned. 

Hezbollah’s transformation has, clearly, taken it to Syria. It has 

taken it to Iraq in small numbers. But, for example, the Treasury 

Department designated al-Inmaa Group, a Beirut-based engineering company which has been opening up basically fronts to finance 

and support Hezbollah activities, a small footprint in Yemen, which 

is most noticeable for the very high ranking Hezbollah operatives 

that they have sent there. 

When Hezbollah sends a special operations commander like Abu 

Ali Tabatabai to Yemen, that means that Yemen means something 

to them, even if they’re not sending large numbers of people. 

Hezbollah’s global criminal networks are on the increase and it’s 

important to note that they rely sometimes on what we call these 

criminal super facilitators who can move and launder tremendous 

amounts of money in and out of Europe, in and out of the United 

States. 

It’s important to note that the Department of Justice, the U.S. 

Drug Enforcement Administration, has been targeting a whole host 

of these actors. 

To be clear, we don’t actually know what this unit within 

Hezbollah calls itself. But U.S. law enforcement, for lack of a better 

term, came up with a name called the Business Affairs Component—the BAC—which to be clear is not operating on behalf of 

Hezbollah’s political wing, for its social welfare wing, but it is specifically under and providing facilitation and finance for the terrorist wing, the Islamic Jihad organization, the external security 

organization, and was founded, according to the GOA, by Imad 

Mughniyah himself before he was killed in 2008. That’s how far 

back this organization goes. 

In terms of the Western Hemisphere, the BAC has established 

working relationships according to DOJ with South American drug 

cartels that supply cocaine to drug markets in both the U.S. and 

Europe. 

The BAC then launders these drugs through well-known black 

market peso exchange and other vehicles. This has come close to 

the United States as well. One of the most important arrests we’ve 

made was of an individual who we lured to Atlanta, Imam Kubaisi, 

in October 2015, just 3 weeks after the end of the 60-day congressional review period for JCPOA. She was arrested in Atlanta. 

She was arraigned on money laundering conspiracy charges, unlicensed firearms dealing, conspiracy for laundering funds she believed to be drug money and for arranging for the sale of thousands 

of firearms including military assault rifles, machine guns and 

sniper rifles to criminal groups in Iran and Lebanon, including 

Hezbollah. She also was trying to procure airplane parts for Iran. 

And meanwhile, as associate of hers, Joseph Asmar, was arrested 

in Paris—again, underscoring the tremendous law enforcement cooperation we’re seeing with key European allies. 

8

According to the Department of Justice, Kubaisi and Asmar explained that they could arrange for places from South America—

planes, that is, from South America laden with multi-ton shipments of cocaine to land safely in Africa as a transit point before 

the drugs were smuggled to the United States and to Europe. 

DEA recording of the conversation of these two individuals with 

a DEA undercover discussing their money laundering network and 

the services they provided to drug traffickers, terrorist organizations and other criminal groups including places—in places like 

Lebanon, Iran, France, Belgium, again, Bulgaria, Benin, the DRC, 

Ghana, Nigeria, Cyprus and, yes, across the United States. 

We see Hezbollah not only engaging in facilitation but also operational activity, the latest plot to be thwarted in Cyprus with Hussein Bassam Abdallah, a dual Lebanese-Canadian citizen involved 

in the stockpiling of over eight tons of ammonia nitrate, and according to intelligence officials that was intended not just for Cyprus but for further operations in Europe. 

The fact is that there are activities here in the Western Hemisphere we need to be extremely cognizant of. The most recent plot 

to be thwarted was in Peru. The individual who was arrested, 

Mohamad Amadar, had married a dual Peruvian-American citizen 

who was a resident in Miami. 

But perhaps the most—the thing we need to be most concerned 

about and which perhaps you haven’t heard is that the person who 

was the handler for Mohamad Amadar, who met with him personally in Turkey, was Salman Al-Redda. 

Salman Al-Redda has been indicted for his role in the 1994 

bombing of the AMIA attacks. He came and went throughout South 

America in the years followed, never arrested, and he has become 

one of the absolute top—perhaps the top three or four Islamic jihad 

organization Hezbollah terrorist wing operatives personally in 

charge of operations in South America, and those operations continue. 

My time is over, but I’d like—if you’re interested I’m happy to 

tell you about some of the other things that Treasury, the State 

Department and the Department of Justice are doing. 

There’s good things happening from the United States regarding 

Hezbollah. But my time is over. I want to thank you for having me 

once more. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Levitt follows:]

9


99555a-1.eps
10


99555a-2.eps
11


99555a-3.eps
12


99555a-4.eps
13


99555a-5.eps
14


99555a-6.eps
15


99555a-7.eps
16


99555a-8.eps
17


99555a-9.eps
18


99555a-10.eps
19


99555a-11.eps
20


99555a-12.eps
21


99555a-13.eps
22


99555a-14.eps
23

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We’ll make sure that we ask you that. Thank 

you. 

Mr. Badran. 

STATEMENT OF MR. TONY BADRAN, RESEARCH FELLOW, 

FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. BADRAN. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Ranking 

Member Deutch and for the members of the committee for allowing 

me to testify today. 

I’m going to just briefly talk about, as Matt has talked about, 

Hezbollah’s global operations. I want to talk specifically more about 

how that relates to their position in Lebanon and Syria specifically. 

On the one hand, the Syrian uprising 5 years ago posed a significant challenge to Iran and Hezbollah by—as you noted, by threatening to sever their bridge to Lebanon and thereby denying 

Hezbollah their strategic depth as well as their logistical pipeline. 

Unfortunately, 5 years on the trend is moving in the opposite direction. Hezbollah and Iran have secured their core interests in 

Syria, albeit at significant cost. 

They have managed to secure contiguity between Lebanon and 

the regime-controlled areas in western Syria, thereby securing the 

ability to continue to move weapons from Damascus to Lebanon. 

A key partner in this effort has been the Lebanese Armed Forces. 

In fact, one of the interesting things to note and troubling things 

to note over the past 5 years has been the growing partnership between Hezbollah and the LAF, which has allowed Hezbollah to protect its domestic flank when it was facing some backlash for its involvement in Syria. 

The partnership between Hezbollah and the LAF, however, is not 

the only point of Hezbollah control and domination of the Lebanese 

state. 

It has placed its members or sympathizers in key government positions which like, for instance, the Lebanese customs office as well 

as its financial auditor which allows it all this activity that we’re 

hearing about globally to be processed domestically with little oversight or backlash. 

In fact, Lebanon has become a critical hub in Hezbollah’s criminal activities. Hezbollah has made Lebanon complicit both financially and economically as well as militarily because of all the 

weapons that it’s moving from Syria that it’s getting from Iran and 

is storing the majority of it in civilian areas. 

Hezbollah has essentially painted a big target on the back of all 

of Lebanon and this is, unfortunately, has not been countered by 

U.S. policy over the last 5 years. 

What this threatens to do is to—in addition to all these strategic 

weapons that are being moved to Lebanon as well as the 

Hezbollah’s entrenchment in Syria and its expansion into the 

Golan along with the IRGC and the building of new infrastructure 

on Syrian soil, it creates a situation for Israel that will, I think, 

accelerate an upcoming future conflict which, as the IDF has been 

saying to anybody who will listen for the last few years, is going 

to be far bloodier than anything that we’ve ever seen on both sides. 

24

You talked about the 4,000 rockets that they launched in the previous war. Now they have the capacity to launch anywhere between 1,000 to 1,500 a day. 

So the IDF is very clear that there’s going to be a lot of dead civilians both in Israel but also in Lebanon. The problem also has 

been that Hezbollah has gained operational expertise in Syria, 

working alongside the Russian military in combined weapons operations and in different urban and rural settings. So it’s actually be 

able to offset its losses with this experience. 

All of this creates a situation on the border of Israel in the northern border that now combines the Syrian front as well as the Lebanese front and soon to be not just swimming in Iranian cash but 

also potentially soon with an Iranian nuclear umbrella. This creates an unacceptable position for Israel. 

But it’s not only Israel’s security that has been challenged by 

this development. It’s also the Arab states and we’ve seen the 

Saudis leading the charge in this regard in designating Hezbollah 

but also in pulling the $3 billion aid that they gave to the Lebanese 

Armed Forces, citing the fact that the Lebanese Armed Forces have 

become an ‘‘auxiliary’’ of Hezbollah and I think this is an accurate 

assessment. 

And although the—there’s a tendency on the part of the administration at least to kind of pressure the Saudis to go back on that 

decision, I think actually we should stop and take and pause and 

reassess what exactly U.S. materiel support to the LAF and intelligence sharing—how that can actually go to sustain and help 

Hezbollah entrench its grip on Lebanon. 

In addition, we should not—because of—the nature of 

Hezbollah’s control over Lebanon—think about it in the way that 

the IRGC is in Iran. It’s tentacles are everywhere in the economy 

and security apparatus. 

So when pushing for the implementation of H.R. 2297, I think we 

should be very, very clear about not being taken hostage by the 

prospect that this is going to somehow collapse Lebanon’s economy 

or the assistance to the LAF is going to collapse Lebanon’s security, 

we have to also be cognizant of the fact that any nook and cranny 

and any safe haven that’s provided in the Lebanese system ultimately is going to benefit Hezbollah because of its dominant position in the state, both in the security sector as well as in the economic sector. 

So I’ll stop right here and I’ll be happy to flesh this out in the 

conversation. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Badran follows:]

25


99555b-1.eps
26


99555b-2.eps
27


99555b-3.eps
28


99555b-4.eps
29


99555b-5.eps
30


99555b-6.eps
31


99555b-7.eps
32


99555b-8.eps
33


99555b-9.eps
34


99555b-10.eps
35


99555b-11.eps
36


99555b-12.eps
37


99555b-13.eps
38


99555b-14.eps
39

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, sir. 

Dr. Byman. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL L. BYMAN, PH.D., PROFESSOR, SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF 

FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 

Mr. BYMAN. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, members of the committee, thank you very much for having me here 

today. 

Hezbollah is in a time of transition and this is in large part because of the Syrian civil war. Hezbollah forces have been involved 

in several of the most important battles in the war and they have 

proven a vital ally to the Syrian regime due to their skill and their 

discipline, which are often much greater than those of the Syrian 

army forces. 

Hezbollah has had to expand the overall size of its military wing, 

and although it was cautious about entering the fray, many Lebanese Shi’a now see it as a defender of their community. 

They look at the atrocities that the Islamic State is perpetrating 

against their co-religionists and believe that a strong Hezbollah is 

necessary to protect their community. 

We see extreme voices within the Lebanese Sunni community including jihadists tied to the Islamic State or al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s 

affiliate. They see Hezbollah as the leading or top foe they face and 

they’ve conducted terrorist attacks on Hezbollah targets in Lebanon and Iranian targets there as well. 

Perhaps the biggest negative consequence for Hezbollah though 

has been the collapse of its regional reputation and the associated 

prestige it’s had in the Arab world. 

Almost 10 years ago in 2006, Hassan Nasrallah was one of the 

most popular men in the Arab world for Hezbollah’s military efforts 

against Israel. 

Today, he’s widely hated. Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian 

civil war has largely made it more cautious about taking on Israel. 

It’s taken close to 1,000 causalities and that’s a huge number for 

a relative small group, and this is putting a strain on the organization. 

In addition, the organization’s Lebanese constituents have little 

appetite for yet another confrontation, yet another draining conflict. 

This could change, though, for several reasons. One is that if 

there are setbacks in Lebanon or elsewhere the group would have 

an incentive to restore its past reputation, and fighting Israel 

might be one way to do so. 

Also, Israel regularly attacks Hezbollah targets in Syria and Lebanon to stop the transfer of advanced weapons, as Tony mentioned, 

and these strikes have at times killed senior Hezbollah officials and 

even a senior Iranian official. 

This has the potential to escalate though, fortunately, we haven’t 

seen that happen yet. And finally, Hezbollah is loyal to Iran and 

if there were a collapse in the U.S.-Iran nuclear deal or another 

source of tension, Hezbollah would be seen as part of the Iranian 

response. 

40

In my judgement, the close relationship between Hezbollah and 

Iran is not likely to change with the U.S.-Iran nuclear deal. It is 

possible that Iran might step up support to Hezbollah, taking advantage of the sanctions relief. But at the same time we must recognize that Iran is diplomatically over stretched. 

It’s deploying considerable forces in Syria to prop up the Assad 

regime. It maintains a large and clandestine force in Iraq and it’s 

even established limited ties to the Houthis in Yemen. These are 

considerable financial commitments. 

You couple that at home with the collapse in oil prices and add 

to that decades of economic mismanagement and this has all come 

at the same time when ordinary Iranians are expecting an increase 

in economic prosperity due to the deal. 

So those sanctions relief will put more money into Iran’s coffers. 

Iran has many, many demands on these scarce funds and in my 

judgement the level of support for Hezbollah is not likely to change 

significantly barring a significant change in the regional situation. 

For the United States we face a dilemma. Washington, of course, 

doesn’t want Hezbollah’s influence to grow. But at the same time, 

Hezbollah is one of the most formidable foes of the Islamic State 

and it is fighting the group effectively in Syria. 

A standard recommendation is to build up the Lebanese Armed 

Forces and to otherwise strengthen the Lebanese state to help it 

counter Hezbollah and I’ve argued that for quite some time. 

For the most part, though, I think we need to recognize that U.S. 

efforts to do this have failed. In part, this is linked to some general 

problems with U.S. training programs. But the bigger problem is 

that Lebanese leaders don’t want to exacerbate tension with 

Hezbollah right now and as a result they’re hesitant to go for any 

efforts to try to push them in that direction. 

Part of this is due to fear but Lebanon’s situation right now is 

quite precarious and the country is, I would say, on edge because 

of the neighboring unrest in Syria. 

The million plus Syrian refugees in Lebanon are a potential destabilizing force and I think U.S. aid for the refugees in Lebanon 

is vital. 

We really don’t need another failed state in the Middle East and 

Lebanon, unfortunately, is a fairly strong candidate to be the next 

one should things get worse. 

And finally, as the United States steps up its intervention in 

Syria and Iraq, continues its efforts to fight Hezbollah, coordination 

with Israel is going to be essential. 

The two countries work well together on this and we need to redouble cooperation to make the most of everything. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Byman follows:]

41


99555c-1.eps
42


99555c-2.eps
43


99555c-3.eps
44


99555c-4.eps
45


99555c-5.eps
46


99555c-6.eps
47


99555c-7.eps
48


99555c-8.eps
49

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much to all of you. I’ll start 

the questions. When the Lebanese justice minister resigned he 

stated that Hezbollah’s undue influence was ruining Lebanon’s relations with Arab nations. 

Saudi cut its military aid to Lebanon. Hezbollah still wields considerable clout in the Lebanese Government. How can the U.S. ensure that Iran and Hezbollah do not gain even more influence in 

Lebanon and given Hezbollah’s relationship with the Lebanese 

Armed Forces should the United States reassess the President’s 

budget request for $105 million in foreign military financing for 

Lebanon? Dr. Levitt. 

Mr. LEVITT. I think one of the significant steps that U.S. agencies have taken recently is an effort to take the financial fight to 

Beirut where Hezbollah until recently has been banking with impunity. 

The Treasury Department has been targeting designations that 

go right back to the heart of Beirut and we know that that’s having 

an impact because Hassan Nasrallah is telling us so. 

So in several of his last speeches including in particular in December in that speech he used I think 23 out of 55 minutes to deny 

that Hezbollah has any businesses whatsoever which, of course, it 

does. They’re just not listed as Hezbollah, Incorporated. 

Now, armed with the Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act, U.S. agencies are really truly empowered to, in the administration’s words, thwart the group’s network at every turn by imposing sanctions on financial institutions that deal with Hezbollah 

or key elements. 

Tony hit the nail on the head. The ability of Hezbollah to use 

Beirut as the core, as the hub of its literally international organized criminal activities threatens Lebanon’s financial system, 

which is the backbone of its economy. 

We can help Lebanon protect that financial system, not undermine it—to the contrary protect it, and when you speak to Lebanese officials who are outside of Hezbollah they beg for that assistance. 

Mr. BADRAN. I would just add just a couple of points. First, more 

broadly, we have to understand—I mean, it’s hard to say this but 

we have to understand that there is a big level of complicity, unfortunately, with Hezbollah’s criminal acts. 

So corruption is widespread and it has affected every corner of 

the Lebanese economy down to the micro level. Think of Florida 

with the cartels, right, and the drug money that went through. It 

corrupts and it infiltrates segments—banks and other parts of the 

economy. 

It’s a similar situation, unfortunately, and they have key positions and they’re very keen on guarding these key positions that 

enable them to do this in the government. I mentioned the customs 

office, financial auditor, general security, et cetera, et cetera. 

So dealing with Lebanon as though there’s a separation between 

Lebanon and Hezbollah becomes increasingly difficult. So we cannot have kid gloves sort of when we’re dealing with this situation. 

The Lebanese have to be placed—you know, facing a tough choice 

or else this is going to continue indefinitely. With the LAF, similar 

things. Why—the Saudi recognition that ultimately the LAF is actVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:14 Jun 23, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\032216\99555 SHIRL
50

ing as an auxiliary as opposed to sort of a challenge to Hezbollah 

has made them reach the conclusion we cannot continue to fund 

this uncritically. There has to be an assessment as to how to separate operationally Hezbollah from the LAF and also to put the LAF 

in front of its own responsibilities in safeguarding the United Nations’ Security Council Resolution 1701 or simply in the way it’s 

rounding up Sunni young men and just putting them in jail and 

exacerbating tensions in the country when they’re supposed to be 

a national institution. 

So just a couple of thoughts. I think that an assessment is certainly due in this case. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. BYMAN. One concern I have is that by the Saudi withdrawal 

of aid if the U.S. were to reduce support for the Lebanese Armed 

Forces that the winner would be Hezbollah—that these institutions 

and Saudi funding that goes to various places in Lebanon have tremendous flaws—overwhelming flaws. But they’re better than the 

alternative, which is an unfettered Hezbollah. 

And so I would agree strongly that assessing this regularly is 

necessary but we should encourage the Saudis to resume their aid. 

We want countervailing forces to Hezbollah in Lebanon and I 

think U.S. ties to Lebanese Armed Forces are also necessary even 

though we need to recognize that the Lebanese army is going to be 

limited and that’s a very polite way of saying that they’re not going 

to be able to accomplish what we want. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And my last question is Russia’s 

role. Hezbollah may have advanced Russian weapon systems. Iran 

is believed to have transferred some of these to Hezbollah. 

Russia is also working with Iran and Hezbollah to support the 

Assad regime in Syria and protect its own interests. What can you 

tell us about the Russian-Hezbollah relationship and what that 

might mean for the U.S. and for Israel? 

Mr. LEVITT. If you want to be polite there’s just a de facto relationship between Russia and Hezbollah in their cooperative support 

together with Iran for the Assad regime. 

I’d argue it’s much more than that. You effectively have Russian 

air cover for the entire pro-Assad axis which very much includes 

Hezbollah, as Dan mentioned. 

But it goes much farther than that. It’s not just the obvious 

things we can see when we’re paying attention to the news and to 

what Russia is doing in the region, and while they may have removed some assets from the region they haven’t removed as many 

as they said they had and Putin himself has been quite blunt to 

the fact that they can put them back very quickly. 

I’m no less concerned about some of the illicit procurement efforts that I alluded to earlier in Europe in particular that are happening including in places like the former Soviet Union. 

Consider the case of Ali Fayyad who, at our request, was arrested by the Czechs, a dual Lebanese-Ukrainian citizen who was 

procuring all kinds of former Soviet Union arms for Hezbollah. 

Hezbollah took notice because Ali Fayyad is important to them 

and they kidnapped five people in Lebanon and eventually those 

people were released. Ali Fayyad was released. 

51

We still have fingers into this investigation because Ali Fayyad 

was arrested together with two Ivorians, dual Lebanese Ivorian 

citizens who are still in custody in the Czech Republic, and while 

it remains to be seen if anything will really happen with it, last 

week the Lebanese Government announced that they are actually 

intending to prosecute Ali Fayyad, who was sent from the Czech 

Republic back to Lebanon on arms procurement weapons trafficking charges, not mentioning the T word, terrorism, the H word, 

Hezbollah, of course. 

But this would be a step forward in demonstrating there might 

be some elements of the Lebanese Government with which we can 

partner with more than others. 

Mr. BADRAN. I mentioned earlier the Israeli concern regarding 

Hezbollah operational experience by working side to side with the 

Russians in Syrian. 

Because they have gained experience in combined arms operations and working with new weapons systems that the Russians 

introduced to the Syrian theater Russian trainers that are working 

with the Syrian military and Hezbollah sitting there and watching 

they have also with the Iranians started a joint operations room in 

Iraq last year to exchange intelligence. 

So we hear about the Russian communication with the Israelis 

on one hand to deconflict in Syria but there’s also a parallel sort 

of relationship that the Russians are maintaining with the Iranians 

who are really the ground troops of the Russian air force in Syria. 

So the Russians, you know, when they’re providing close air support in Aleppo it’s—none of the IRGC and Hezbollah were on the 

ground checking around. 

Now, if this situation transfers—the fear was that this situation 

would transfer to the south of Syria in the Golan. Now, thankfully, 

it hasn’t happened yet. Maybe it will not happen. Maybe the Russians will balance out their relationship with the Israelis and that 

with the Iranians. 

But nevertheless it’s a risk that should the Russians say we are 

going to combat terrorist groups in southern Syria near Jordan, 

near Israel, who are going to be the ground troops for such an operation? It’s going to be the IRGC and Hezbollah. 

So, clearly, the coast is not yet clear for Israel. For now, the Russian announcement that they’re going to kind of freeze their operations for a while or reorient them elsewhere it doesn’t seem to include the south of Syria yet. But it’s by no means, I don’t think, 

sort of gone—should be stricken out of our calculation that something like that is going to happen in the future. 

Mr. BYMAN. I’ll only briefly add that I’m very skeptical about the 

degree to which Russia is going to cease its operations. I think 

there will be still considerable support and the number of assets 

that have been redeployed so far have been quite limited. 

I will also add, however, that Russia has a visceral distrust and 

dislike of anything that smacks of Islamic extremism and the Russians are if anything pragmatic but at the same time they see that 

broader community as quite hostile and they are quite concerned. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madame Chairman. 

52

Dr. Byman, you had said—you described Nasrallah’s current position as one who’s widely hated. You also pointed out that 

Hezbollah is a formidable foe of Islamic State. 

Do those two things—is it likely that because they are a formidable foe of ISIS that that will have some impact on the way 

Nasrallah is viewed? 

How do those interrelate and on the ground, more broadly, how 

does the population view Hezbollah, given the role they’ve played 

in fighting ISIS? 

Mr. BYMAN. For most people in the Middle East the primary 

fight is not between the Islamic State and the United States but 

rather between the Syrian regime and what we would call the moderate opposition. 

It’s not a term I love because it means 100 different things. But 

that said, Hezbollah has been an arm of the Syrian regime, killing 

its own people including a range of groups supported by the United 

States which whom we have, I think, reasonable relations and 

Hezbollah is widely hated in the Sunni Arab world because it is 

seen as on the side of an oppressive minority regime that has killed 

several hundred thousand of its own people. It’s a staggering number. 

Hezbollah’s operations against the Islamic State for most people 

in the region are a footnote to this, right, where some would say 

that’s bad, some would say that’s good. But they would focus on 

their killing of people they regard as much more mainstream and 

much more heroic figures and much more representative. 

So that, to me, is the primary reason for its unpopularity and 

that’s, to me, why so many Arab states that are backing the moderate opposition are against Hezbollah is they see it really as an 

enemy and a tool of Iran. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And does—the decision by GCC and the Arab 

League to designate Hezbollah a terrorist organization what’s the 

impact of that in the region and do you expect another—are there 

retaliatory attacks to come from the designation? What happens 

next? 

Mr. BYMAN. I think at this point the designation is really a reflection of the political reality on the ground rather than a major 

shift. 

These states have been tremendously against Hezbollah for a 

while. The designation helps, though, right. It enables us to garner 

diplomatic support. A number of things that Matt has mentioned, 

for example, are helped diplomatically by being able to point to a 

GCC or an Arab League designation to kind of push along agendas 

we want. 

So I think it’s a relatively small impact but nevertheless symbolic 

of a bigger shift. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And does the failure—I’ll throw this open to anyone 

on the panel—does the failure on the part of Europe to designate 

Hezbollah—I mean, what does it actually mean? 

What are they able to do from a fund-raising standpoint? What 

are they able to do from an operational standpoint that could potentially be stopped if Europe actually does the right thing and 

designates them a terrorist organization? 

Dr. Levitt. 

53

Mr. LEVITT. Yes. Everything. Right now for an EU designation 

of Hezbollah you have to make a definitive link to the terrorist and 

military wing. 

But Hezbollah’s no fool. In fact, they’re quite good at layering 

and obfuscation. So they engage in all kinds of activities. They just 

don’t put a Hezbollah shingle out there. 

The only case we’ve had since the designation was not an EU action but a German action against the Orphan Welfare Foundation, 

which was a Hamas front organization and was caught making the 

mistake of openly providing some of its donations to the Martyrs 

Foundation, which can be tied, though some Europeans would even 

disagree with this, directly to militancy. 

So designation wise, the EU can’t really do very much. It does 

provide an umbrella so that if member states want to do something 

they can say well, Hezbollah is at least partially designated—if you 

can find that they’re doing arms procurement, arms procurement, 

for example, is by definition probably not for social welfare or political activity. So you can feel more comfortable doing that. 

I would argue they should feel comfortable doing it anyway since 

it’s black and white criminal activity. Quietly on law enforcement 

issues we’ve seen great cooperation. But the designation as such 

doesn’t actually empower them to do a whole lot. 

Mr. DEUTCH. But what would the full designation empower them 

to do? 

Mr. LEVITT. If they found someone or something that was doing 

anything for Hezbollah and all you’d have to prove was Hezbollah 

that entity could be designated. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And what would that mean to——

Mr. LEVITT. Asset freezes, travel bans. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Right. And in terms of—in terms of impacting their 

operations, what would the impact be? 

Mr. LEVITT. Given the huge increase in Hezbollah operations in 

Europe including a whole bunch of entities that we have designated, that the DOJ has indicted there’s very good reason to 

think that a designation in the EU would empower European nations to target those activities in Europe. 

Let me put it to you another way. Since the July 2013 partial 

designation of Hezbollah, Hezbollah activities in Europe have increased. I’m writing a study on it right now. 

So that suggests that maybe Hezbollah has kind of called that 

bluff and by activities I don’t only mean fund raising, logistics and 

procurement but operations as well as evidenced from the—not just 

the first Cyprus operation which was predesignation but the second 

one with over eight tons of explosive materiel which we believe was 

going to be sent farther into Europe. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And Mr. Badran—last question, Madam Chairman. 

Is there any—can you foresee anything that would prompt or 

what would—that would prompt the Europeans to take the necessary step, given what Dr. Levitt just laid out, to make this a full 

designation? 

Mr. BADRAN. I remain a little—I mean, Matt has expressed more 

optimism and I hope—and he would know, certainly, better than 

me on this—I hope it actually goes in this direction. 

54

But one of the things, for instance, let’s take what the GCC has 

done, right, and let’s actually help them enforce it and provide also 

reassurances for these very vulnerable nations that the United 

States will stand with them as they push against any Iranian and 

Hezbollah retaliation. 

But one of the things, for instance, that they’re looking to do and 

that could be transferred into the European context just as easily 

because it’s not just front organizations that are involved here. 

The Saudis leaked, when they made their decision—the Saudis 

leaked through the Lebanese media that one of the things they 

might consider is actually going after not just Shi’ite businessmen 

that may have ties to Hezbollah’s financial operations but also 

Christian businessmen who have interests in the Gulf states and 

those are a lot and they’re big interests, including—they even went 

so far as to leak that this includes sitting ministers in the Lebanese cabinet, okay—that they’re willing to go that far I think they 

waved it as a threat. 

We should encourage them to follow through on all of this because there’s a huge amount, especially in the United Arab Emirates, of financial interests for people who are on the face of it legitimate businessmen, both Shi’ite and Christian and Sunni even. In 

Kuwait especially there are Sunni Kuwaiti businessmen especially 

with tremendous ties to Hezbollah’s financial empire. 

This is an opportunity to take to squeeze and then to transfer 

the same template to the Europeans if they’re willing to go along 

with it. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. Boyle of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. BOYLE. Thank you. I just have a few questions. When I was 

in Israel last August—well, actually, a few years ago and then 

again last August, folks I talked to including Israeli generals 

talked—they said not if there’s a third Lebanon war but when 

there’s a third Lebanon war, and that really struck me. 

So my question was about the rockets because there’s been quite 

a change even since I was there 7 months ago. The Israeli military 

that was briefing us had used the figure about 85,000 rockets. 

Then it was revised upwards after that to 100,000 and now I read 

upwards of 150,000. 

So I guess two questions. First, where exactly do things stand 

now in terms of the amount of rockets and their sophistication. As 

I recall from 2006, the rockets that they had were not exactly precise. 

So that’s the number one, and then number two is what is our 

best intelligence that would be the event to trigger a third Lebanon 

war? 

So I decided to ask all my questions at once and then leave it 

to each of you to figure it out which ones you’ll want to take. 

Mr. LEVITT. Thanks for those questions. 

I don’t know any Israeli security or military official who doesn’t 

talk that way, not because they’re looking to invite a third Lebanon 

war but because you don’t stockpile—the numbers I hear are 

130,000 to 150,000 rockets—to keep them as paperweights. 

55

I don’t think that they want to initiate. I had an opportunity to 

speak to a senior Israeli official this week. He said, we will not initiate but we will not allow Nasrallah to threaten the entire country, as he puts it, not just the north with all of these weapons. 

And what we’re dealing with now are more sophisticated weapons than we saw in 2006, both an increase in the number of actual 

guided systems and also maybe even more significantly because not 

all rockets are equal and the majority of their arsenal is not this 

longer—medium and longer range guided missiles but the GPS kits 

that they are reportedly getting from Iran which you can put on 

something like which they had in the past and you can make a 

dumb rocket smarter. 

They’re trying to cope with a situation where hundreds of rockets 

are fired at specific buildings in Tel Aviv and one can understand 

why they won’t tolerate that type of a situation and as Tony said 

why they’ve made it very clear from a deterrent perspective that 

if it happens their response will be much more severe than it has 

been in the past. 

Mr. BADRAN. So Matt covered the issue of the long range rockets 

that they’ve upgraded them—they’re now precision guided. They’re 

no longer dumb rockets. Now they can hit strategic installations. 

They’ve added also the Russian-made anti-ship—the cruise missile. Now, those are very, very dangerous. They can hit strategic 

installations offshore, installation gas rigs, et cetera. 

So the Israelis have now taken this in such that it’s part of their 

doctrine, that they’re emphasizing defense of the interior, which is 

a departure from what it used to be in the past. It used to be much 

more offensive minded. 

Now they take into consideration that the population is going to 

have to suffer and there’s going to be prioritization as to what has 

to be guarded by the Iron Dome missile defense system because of 

the high density of the weapons—of the rockets that Hezbollah can 

fire on a daily basis, basically about 1,000 a day. 

Now, not all of these are long range—okay, a lot of them are actually the shorter range. But there’s 1 million other issues now. 

All of this stuff that they’re learning in Syria is going to be 

translated kinetically in the next war in maybe offensive operations into the Galilee because now they’re on the Golan Heights, 

not just in Lebanon. 

So you ask what would trigger such a war. See, this is where the 

failure of U.S. policy in Syria becomes something about much more 

than just Syria. 

The Israelis are now warning that any solution to the Syrian crisis cannot leave Iran in a position of dominance in Syria and in a 

position on the Golan Heights. 

Unfortunately, the United States—the U.S. President has said 

that any solution in Syria has to take into consideration respecting 

Iranian equities in Syria. So you can see where now our policy in 

Syria and Israel’s position in Syria are directly at odds. 

Any position, any movement in the Golan, any movement of rockets or strategic weapons across the border into Lebanon has the potential for triggering such a conflict and the more they entrench 

themselves in Syria the shorter this time period becomes of when 

56

Israel—of how long Israel can tolerate this buildup before having 

to take action. 

So the situation in Syria, I think, is critical to the security. Of 

course, I mean, it affects Turkey, it affects Jordan just the same, 

but very critical as far as Israeli security is concerned. 

Mr. BOYLE. My time has expired so I thank the chair and the 

ranking member. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

And Dr. Levitt, you wanted to say something and you had run 

out of time. So this is a great opportunity right now. Grab it. 

Mr. LEVITT. Thank you so much. 

I don’t want to take much time because I’ve actually managed to 

sneak most of it in. 

But I did want to just add just as an example of some of the 

things that are being done creatively and some of the European cooperation we’re getting, under the Counterterrorism Partnership 

Fund, the State Department together with DOJ and others have 

been able to put together a series—an international initiative to 

raise awareness about Iran and Hezbollah’s broad range of terrorist and criminal activities around the world, engaging with partners around the world, not only informing them and teaching them 

but then teaching them how to use tools at their disposal and we’re 

seeing actual cases come out of these including, for example, the 

U.S. co-led law enforcement coordination group, which we co-lead 

with EUROPOL, getting EUROPOL to focus on Hezbollah activities. 

There are EUROPOL cases now. This is not a small achievement. Clearly, there is much, much more to be done but I see an 

interest in the part of Europeans because of Hezbollah’s increased 

activities there, because of Hezbollah’s regional growth and in particular in Syria and figuring out what they can do within their system, within their designation partial regime to work with us on 

this target. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

And gentlemen, are there any parting thoughts that you would 

like to leave us with? Mr. Deutch? 

Mr. DEUTCH. No, thank you, ma’am. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, thank you very much. This subcommittee is very concerned about doing everything that we can to 

cut off the funding to this terrorist organization. 

We’re going to keep on in that track. Thank you. And with that, 

the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you to everyone. 

[Whereupon, at 4:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(57)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

58

f


99555n.eps
59

Æ


99555m.eps