CLD-047 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 23-2712

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JAMIEL L. WILLIAMS;

KEVIN WILLIAMS

v.

C.O. DIVEN; C.O. PLOCINIK;

C.O. BRINDLE; SGT. WEAKLAND

Jamiel L. Williams,

 Appellant 

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-23-cv-00667)

District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

December 20, 2023

Before: KRAUSE, FREEMAN, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 9, 2024)

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OPINION*

__________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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PER CURIAM

Jamiel Williams, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the 

District Court’s dismissal of his civil rights action. We will summarily affirm.

I

In April 2023, Jamiel Williams filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging 

that Department of Corrections employees had retaliated against him for filing a Prison 

Rape Elimination Act complaint against one of their colleagues. DC ECF 1. This 

retaliation took the form of intentionally giving another inmate, Kevin Williams, legal 

mail intended for Jamiel Williams. Id. The District Court screened and dismissed the 

complaint for failure to state a claim by Order entered July 13, 2023. DC ECF 13. The 

District Court dismissed the complaint against defendants Rivello and Grassmyer without 

leave to amend, but otherwise dismissed the complaint without prejudice. Id.

In July 2023, Jamiel Williams filed his amended complaint. He asserted, inter alia, 

that the remaining defendants had violated his First Amendment rights by giving his legal 

mail to inmate Kevin Williams in the aforementioned incident. DC ECF 14. He did not 

reassert the retaliation claim. Id. On September 6, 2023, the District Court dismissed the 

complaint with prejudice because Williams’ complaint arose out of a single incident and 

did not allege facts suggesting malice or prejudice. DC ECF 16. This appeal followed. 

CA ECF 1. 

Williams filed a document in support of his appeal in which he argues that 

opening, but not reading or damaging, a single piece of legal mail outside the inmate’s 
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presence violates his rights under the First Amendment. CA ECF 9. Williams also seems 

to reallege the First Amendment retaliation claim. Id.

II

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In considering a dismissal under 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, we apply the same de novo standard of review as when 

reviewing dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Allah v. 

Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). Since Williams is proceeding in forma 

pauperis, we must dismiss the appeal if it is frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). We may 

summarily affirm a District Court’s decision “on any basis supported by the record” if the 

appeal fails to present a substantial question. Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d 

Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.

III

The District Court properly dismissed Williams’ amended complaint alleging 

violations of his First Amendment rights based on the opening of his mail outside of his 

presence. While a demonstrated pattern or policy of opening legal mail outside of an 

inmates’ presence can constitute a First Amendment violation, Williams’ allegations 

concern an isolated incident in which his legal mail was given to and opened by an 

inmate who shares his last name. DC ECF 14 at 4-6; Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 358 

(3d Cir. 2006). A single instance in which an inmate’s legal mail is mishandled is 

insufficient to support a claim under the First Amendment. See Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 
4

1445, 1452 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 

(1996); Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003).

Williams’ First Amendment retaliation claim also fails.1 To state a prima facie 

case of First Amendment retaliation, a claimant must allege that (1) he engaged in 

constitutionally protected conduct, (2) he suffered an adverse action “sufficient to deter a 

person of ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional] rights,” and (3) the 

constitutionally protected conduct was “a substantial or motivating factor” for the adverse 

action. Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). While Williams baldly alleges that he suffered hardship 

because of the misdelivery of his mail, he received the legal mail in question on the same 

day it was delivered to Kevin Williams. See DC ECF 1-1, DC ECF 14 at 5. He claims the 

mail incident somehow caused him to miss a court deadline, but his case is still being 

litigated on the merits. See DC ECF 14, citing Williams v. Pennsylvania Department of 

Corrections, No. 1:22-cv-01337 (M.D. Pa. filed August 26, 2022).2 Accordingly, we 

cannot conclude that the mishandling of Williams’ mail amounts to an adverse action 

“sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his rights.” Rauser, 241 

1 Although Williams’ amended complaint did not repeat his First Amendment retaliation 

claim, he raises it on appeal and we consider it here out of an abundance of caution in 

light of his pro se status. CA ECF 9.

2

In screening a case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a court may examine the complaint, 

attached exhibits, and matters of public record, including judicial records. Schmidt v. 

Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 

(3d Cir. 2010).
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F.3d at 333. As a result, Williams’ First Amendment retaliation claims were properly 

dismissed, and we need not consider the remaining elements of the Rauser standard.

The District Court opinion did not directly address Williams’ denial of access to 

courts claim, but it fails as well. To succeed on an access to courts claim, a prisoner must 

show (1) an actual injury, such as a lost opportunity to pursue a nonfrivolous or debatable 

underlying claim, and (2) that no remedy other than the present civil rights action could 

possibly compensate for that lost opportunity. Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d 

Cir. 2008). Williams’ complaint fails on the first prong, because as noted above, the case 

in question is still being litigated on the merits. Williams v. Pennsylvania Department of 

Corrections, No. 1:22-cv-01337 (M.D. Pa. filed August 26, 2022).

IV

Finally, the District Court’s July 13 Order dismissed with prejudice all claims 

against Facility Manager Rivello and C.O. Grassmyer for lack of personal involvement. 

DC ECF 15. To the extent that captures his claims against Rivello and Grassmyer, we 

agree. However, we read Williams’ complaint to assert a violation of his due process 

rights based on their alleged mishandling of his grievance. 

Specifically, Williams alleges that Grassmyer had lied about investigating the mail 

incident, and Rivello had refused to review video evidence and ruled against Williams in 

a grievance hearing. DC ECF 1. While prisoners have a right to “meaningful” process 

when their property is destroyed or seized, Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 210 (3d Cir. 

2008), citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984), Williams experienced no such 
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loss, as he received his legal mail the day it was delivered to Kevin Williams. Even if the 

mail incident did qualify as such a loss, Williams availed himself of a meaningful postdeprivation remedy, namely the prison grievance procedure, in the course of which 

Williams received lengthy written statements explaining why his grievance was denied.

Monroe, 536 F.3d at 210; see also DC ECF 1-1. To the extent Williams implies that the 

remedy was not “meaningful” because Grassmyer and Rivello had lied or acted on 

personal animus, his allegations in that regard are too vague and conclusory. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). Williams’ complaint thus fails with 

regard to Rivello and Grassmyer as well. 

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.