Present: All the Justices 

DAVID AUERBACH, ET AL. 

OPINION BY JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

v. Record No. 960062 November 1, 1996 

COUNTY OF HANOVER, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HANOVER COUNTY 

Richard H.C. Taylor, Judge 

 This appeal arises from the trial court's judgment reversing 

the denial by a county subdivision agent of a proposed 

subdivision plat for a tract of land owned by Hubert C. and 

Pamela M. Mentz (the Mentzes). The agent refused to approve the 

proposed subdivision by the Mentzes primarily on the ground that 

an easement of right-of-way across an adjoining servient estate 

did not serve the entire subdivision and was, therefore, 

inadequate to provide the access required under a local zoning 

ordinance. The appellants, owners of the servient estate and 

intervenors below, assert that the trial court erred in finding 

that the easement serves the entire proposed subdivision and 

directing the County to approve the plat. Finding no error, we 

will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 In 1986, the Mentzes acquired title to a tract of land 

consisting of approximately 122.5 acres in Hanover County (the 

1986 tract) by deed recorded in the clerk's office of the circuit 

court in deed book 659 at page 707. Access from the 1986 tract 

to State Route 606 was provided by an easement granted to the 

Mentzes' predecessors in title across an adjoining servient 

estate. The record shows also that the easement originally 

attached to the 1986 tract was limited to farm vehicles and 
vehicles for the residences on the 122.5 acres at the time the 

easement was created. In 1991, the Mentzes acquired a portion of 

a tract adjoining the 1986 tract consisting of approximately 10 

acres (the 1991 tract) with direct access to State Route 606. 

 In 1992, the Mentzes entered into a contract to convey a 

section of the 1991 tract to David Auerbach and Susan C. Ortmann 

(the Auerbachs). The deed conveying "Parcel A" and recorded in 

deed book 972 at page 340 includes the following language: 

 [The Mentzes] . . . convey unto [the Auerbachs] 

. . . the following described property, to-wit: 

 ALL that certain piece and parcel of land 

. . . being more particularly described as 

Parcel A on a plat of two parcels of land 

. . . dated January 9, 1991 and revised on 

August 18, 1992 and recorded herewith. 

 . . . . 

 [The Mentzes] hereby reserve an easement of 

right-of-way 50 feet in width along the western line of 

Parcel A leading from State Route 606 to Parcel B as a 

means of ingress and egress to and from Parcel B and 

State Route 606, said easement being shown as lying on 

the westerly side of Parcel A on the hereinabove 

described plat. 

 [The Mentzes] do further grant and convey unto 

[the Auerbachs] a first right of refusal to purchase 

Parcel B consisting of 7.422 acres should [the Mentzes] 

sell that parcel of land. 

 [The Mentzes] do hereby correct a certain plat 

drawn by Goodfellow, Jalbert, Beard and Associates Inc. 

dated January 9, 1991 and recorded in Deed Book 934, 

Page 653, Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of 

Hanover County, which plat contains a description of 10 

acres including Parcel A hereinabove described. The 

aforesaid plat recorded herewith is substituted for the 

plat recorded in Deed Book 934, Page 653 and the 

description is corrected to refer to two parcels, A and 

B. Parcel B containing 7.422 acres is added on to the 

property described in Deed Book 659, Page 707 as an 

add-on, not for the purposes of creating additional 

building lots. 
(Emphasis added.) 

 Shortly after this deed was recorded, a dispute arose 

between the Mentzes and the Auerbachs over the scope of the 

easement. The Mentzes instituted a chancery suit for declaratory 

judgment and other equitable relief against the Auerbachs seeking 

to establish that the easement over Parcel A was servient to the 

1986 tract by virtue of Parcel B being added on to the larger 

tract, thus creating a single unitary tract (the combined tract) 

of approximately 129 acres. 

 During the pending dispute over the scope of the easement, 

the Mentzes proceeded with having the subdivision of the combined 

tract, including an access road over the Parcel A easement, 

platted. This subdivision plat was submitted to Hanover County 

for zoning approval on June 17, 1994. The plat was disapproved 

on July 22, 1994. A resubmitted plat was also disapproved later 

in 1994. In each case, the zoning authority cited the limited 

access provided by the Parcel A easement as one of the reasons 

for disapproving the subdivision plat. 

 On October 13, 1994, the Mentzes filed an appeal in the 

trial court challenging the zoning authority's denial of the 

plat. On December 19, 1994, the Auerbachs filed a petition to 

intervene in that proceeding. In their petition, the Auerbachs 

contended that their interest in the proceeding arose out of the 

pending chancery suit for declaratory judgment filed against them 

by the Mentzes. The petition asserted that the resolution of the 

appeal in favor of the County essentially would moot the claims 

in the other suit. The motion to intervene was granted on March 
23, 1995 and the pending declaratory judgment suit was stayed. 

 The parties submitted briefs including substantial 

appendices of extrinsic evidence and argued their positions 

before the trial court on July 25, 1995. The parties agreed, as 

they do here, that the dispositive issue was whether the easement 

served the combined tract or merely Parcel B. Thereafter, the 

trial court issued a final order directing that the County 

approve the subdivision plat stating, "After a thorough 

examination of the Deed and Plat it is clear to the Court that 

the 50 foot easement reserved benefits the whole 129, more or 

less, acre tract [the combined tract] belonging to the 

[Mentzes]." We awarded the Auerbachs this appeal. 

 The Auerbachs contend the language of the deed restricts the 

use of the easement serving the 7.4 acres of Parcel B because the 

specific language creating the easement makes no mention of the 

larger 1986 tract. However, we are not permitted to read the 

language creating the easement in isolation from the remainder of 

the deed. To ascertain the intent of the grantors, the deed is 

to be examined as a whole and effect given to all of its terms 

and provisions not inconsistent with some principle of law or 

rule of property. See Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 194 Va. 925, 

929, 76 S.E.2d 204, 207 (1953). 

 In Faison v. Union Camp Corporation, 224 Va. 54, 294 S.E.2d 

821 (1982), we held that where a deed incorporates a plat by 

reference, "that plat must be considered 'part of the instrument 

itself.'" Id. at 59, 294 S.E.2d at 824 (quoting Richardson v. 

Hoskins Lumber Co., 111 Va. 755, 757, 69 S.E. 935, 936 (1911)). 
Moreover, references on the plat to deeds recorded incorporate 

the legal descriptions of those deeds into the plat and, thus, 

into any subsequent deeds referencing the plat. Id. 

 The same principles apply to the facts of this case. The 

terms "Parcel A" and "Parcel B" are nowhere sufficiently 

described in the text of the deed itself. Without reference to 

the incorporated plat, there would be an ambiguity in the deed. 

However, the clear and unambiguous language on the incorporated 

plat and its depiction of the perimeter metes and bounds of these 

parcels resolves any possible ambiguity and establishes the 

grantors' intent. 

 Read together, the deed and the plat incorporated therein 

establish that the 1991 tract was divided into two separate 

tracts. Parcel A, the smaller of the two tracts, was conveyed by 

the deed subject to a fifty-foot-wide easement of ingress and 

egress along its westerly edge between State Route 606 and the 

remainder of the 1991 tract. Both the deed and the plat make 

clear that this remainder, designated as Parcel B, is an "add-on" 

parcel to the 1986 tract, described on the plat both in the metes 

and bounds depiction and in a marginal note by reference to the 

deed recorded in deed book 659 at page 707. 

 Since "add-on" is not a term of art with a recognized 

meaning in law, we must assume that it has its usual and ordinary 

meaning. Conner v. Hendrix, 194 Va. 17, 25, 72 S.E.2d 259, 264 

(1952). In the present context, we think such a meaning is 

something added on or an addition to something which creates a 

larger whole. Thus, by the express language of the deed and its 
incorporated plat, Parcel A was conveyed to the Auerbachs subject 

to an easement in favor of Parcel B. However, as described by 

the deed and the incorporated plat, Parcel B is not merely the 

remaining 7.4 acres of the 1991 tract, but that acreage added 

onto the 1986 tract and creating the combined tract of 

approximately 129 acres. 

 The provision for a right of first refusal to purchase 

"Parcel B consisting of 7.422 acres" in the deed does not alter 

our conclusion. That provision is expressly limited to the 7.422 

acre tract for the purpose of the right of first refusal to 

purchase should the Mentzes sell that tract. Nothing in the 

right is inconsistent with Parcel B being added onto the 1986 

tract to create the combined tract. Rather, this right merely 

prohibits the Mentzes from selling the Parcel B portion of the 

combined tract at a later date without first offering it to the 

Auerbachs. See Lake of the Woods Assoc. v. McHugh, 238 Va. 1, 5, 

380 S.E.2d 872, 874 (1989) ("the right of first refusal only 

becomes operative if and when the owner decides to sell"). 

 Nor does the deed's restriction on the add-on of Parcel B as 

"not for the purposes of creating additional building lots" 

exclude a finding that the easement serves the combined tract. 

To the contrary, this restriction clearly contemplates that the 

combined tract may be subdivided into building lots. The 

restriction on the use of the portion of the combined tract 

added-on from the 1991 tract clearly connotes that the add-on 

parcel serves some other purpose--namely to permit creation of 

the easement servient to the combined tract. 
 We hold that the grantors' intent, express and unambiguous 

on the face of the deed, its incorporated plat, and all the 

references thereon, was to establish an easement over Parcel A 

servient to the combined tract of approximately 129 acres rather 

than merely to the 7.4 acres of "Parcel B."* Accordingly, we 

will affirm the order of the trial court. 

Affirmed. CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO, with whom JUSTICE HASSELL and JUSTICE 

KEENAN join, dissenting. 

 Obviously uncertain that the Mentz to Auerbach deed is 

sufficient in its own terms to impose upon Parcel A the extra 

burden of an easement appurtenant to the 122.5-acre Mentz tract, 

the majority strives to convince the reader that any uncertainty 

is removed when the deed is read together with the incorporated 

plat. But the plat does not aid the position taken by the 

majority; all the majority can point to on the plat is the "addon" language similar to the language contained in the deed. So, 

if the deed is not sufficient in and of itself, it is not 

sufficient even with the plat. 

 Be that as it may, the deed, in unmistakable terms, reserves 

"an easement of right-of-way 50 feet in width along the western 

line of Parcel A leading from State Route 606 to Parcel B as a 

 

 *Appellants further assert that the trial court erred in 

receiving and considering parol evidence in interpreting the deed 

creating the easement when there was no ambiguity in that deed. 

Because we hold that the deed, when properly examined, grants an 

easement serving the entire area of the subdivision, we need not 

consider whether the trial court's judgment was influenced by the 

parol evidence. See, e.g., Doswell Ltd. Partnership v. Virginia 

Power, 251 Va. 215, 222, 468 S.E.2d 84, 88 (1996). 
means of ingress and egress to and from Parcel B and State Route 

606." (Emphasis added.) Nothing in this language even suggests 

that the easement shall also be appurtenant to the 122.5-acre 

tract. Furthermore, the plat graphically depicts the easement 

exactly as it is described in the deed, with the easement shown 

touching Parcel B at a point several hundred feet from the 

nearest line of the 122.5-acre tract. Nothing in this depiction 

indicates that the easement is also appurtenant to the 122.5-acre 

tract. 

 Then comes the language that is so crucial to the result 

reached by the majority, viz., "Parcel B . . . is added on to the 

[122.5-acre tract] as an add-on." This language is contained in 

a paragraph which states that it is included in the deed for the 

purpose of correcting a certain plat and which also states that 

the correction is made "not for the purposes of creating 

additional building lots." 

 Now, one would think that if it were the intention of the 

parties to make the easement in question appurtenant to the 

122.5-acre tract, a most important result to all concerned, they 

surely could have found clear and direct language to express 

their intention, rather than the incomprehensible "added on . . . 

as an add-on" language. As it is, I think that the language used 

adds nothing even remotely connecting the use of the easement to 

the 122.5-acre tract. At least, I hope we have not yet reached 

the point where we will allow such meaningless language to be 

considered sufficient to affect estates in land. I would reverse 

the judgment of the trial court and enter final judgment here in 
favor of Auerbach and Ortmann.