F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

S T A T E O F H A W

A I I , ex rel. David M. L o uie, Attorney

General, Plaintiff-Appellant
,

v

.

HSB C B A

N K N E V A D A , N.A., Defendant in 1:12-cv-00266-LEKKSC; HSB C C A R

D S E R V I C E S , I NC., Defendant in 1:12-cv-00266-LEKKSC; C A P I T A L O N E B A N K (USA), N.A., Defendant in 1:12-cv-00268- L E K-KSC; C A P I T A L O N E S E R V I C E S , L L C, Defendant in 1:12-cv-00268- L E K-KSC; C I T I G R

O U P , I N C ., Defendant in 1:12-cv-00271-LEKKSC; C I T I B A

N K , N.A., Defendant in 1:12-cv-00271-L EK-KSC; D E P A R T M E N T S T O R

E S N A T I O N

A L B A N K , Defendant in 1:12-cv-00271- L E K-KSC; D O E , 1-20,

Defendants-Appellees

. N o. 13-15611

D.C. No. 1:12-cv-00263- L E K-KSC

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii L eslie E. Kobay ashi, District J udg e, PresidingS T A T E O F H A W A I I V

. HSB C B A

N K N E V A D A 2

Arg ued and Submitted

J une 10, 2014—Honolulu, Hawaii

F iled Aug ust 1, 2014

B efore: W illiam A. F letcher, Sandra S. I kuta, and Andrew D. Hurwitz , Circuit J udg es.
Opinion by

J udg e Hurwitz

SUMMARY *

National Bank Act / P reem ption

Reversing the district court’s denial of a moti o n for a remand to state court, th e p a nel held that neither the federal question statute nor the Class Action F airness Act provid ed
t he district court with subject matter jurisdiction over t h e Hawaii Attorney General’s complaints ag ainst six credit card providers, a lleg ing that each v iolated state law by d e ceptively marketing a n d improperly enrolling cardholders in add-on credit card products.

J oining the F ifth Circuit, the panel held that the Attorney General’s c laims were n o t p r eempted by National B ank A ct provisions c ompletely p reempting state law c laims challeng ing interest rates charg ed by nation a l banks. The panel h el d t h a t the district court did not err by rely ing on declarations submitted by the card providers describing their

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.S T A T E O F H A W A I I V

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pay ment p rotection plans. The panel declined to decide whether pay

ment protection plan fees are interest on a loan under NB A § 85, rather than charg es for an i n d e pendent

se r vice, because the complaints did not alleg e that the card providers charg ed ex cessi v e interest r ates. The panel h eld that NB A § § 85 and 86 do not preempt only c l a i ms that

ex p licitly invoke a s t ate usury law. Nonetheless, the complaints’ state law claims were not pree m p ted because they did n ot c h a l leng e the “rate of interest” that the card providers charg ed. I nstead, the state l a w claims were in d e pendent of §§ 85 and 8 6; the complaints’ unfair a nd deceptive practice claims targ eted all eg ed marketing misrepresentations, and their unjust enrichment claims arose from the purported failure to obtain consent before enrolling consumers in debt protection products.

Ag reeing with the Second, Third, and F ourth Circuits, the panel held that CAF A did not provide an alter n ate basis for jurisdiction because the Attorney G eneral b r o ug ht civil enforcement actions or c ommon law parens patria e s u i ts, rather than class actions, and the co m p laints specifically disclaimed class status.

COUNSEL

L aura J

. B aug h m a n , J

. B urton L eB lanc, I V, and Sherri A nn Saucer (arg

u ed), B a ron & B u d d, P.C., Dallas, Tex as; Richard Golomb and Kenneth J

. Grunfeld, Golomb & Honi k
, P

. C., Philadelphia, Pennsy lvania; L

. Richard F ried, J r. and Patrick F. M c Ternan, Cronin, F ried, Sekiy a, Kekina & F airbanks
, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Plaintiff-Appellant.S T A T E O F H A W A I I V

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N K N E V A D A 4

Michael C. B ird, Summer H.M. F erg erstrom, and Tracey L y nn Kubota, Watanabe I ng L L P, H onolulu, Hawaii; J ulia B

. Strickland, David W

. Moon, and J ason Sung

- Hy uk Yoo, Stroock & Stroock & L avan L L P, L os Ang eles, California, for Defendants-Appellees HSB C B ank Nevada, N

. A

. a nd HSB C Card Services, I

nc.

J ames F

. McCabe (arg

ued) and J ames R. McGuire, Morrison & F oerster L L P, S an Francisco, California; Marg ery S. B r onster and Andrew L

. Pepper, B ronster Hoshibata, Honolulu, H awaii, for Defendants-Appellees Ca p ital One B ank (USA), N.A. and Capital One Services, L L C.

Michael Purp u r a and Michael J

. Scanlon, Carlsmith B all L L P, Honolulu, Hawaii; N o a h A. L evine and Robert W. Trenchard, W ilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr L L P, New York, New Y ork, for Defendants-Appellees Citig roup I n c., Citibank, N.A., and Department Stores National B ank.

OP INION

HURW I TZ , Circuit J udg e:

The Hawai i A t torney G eneral f iled complaints in state court ag ainst six credit car d p r o v iders, alleg ing that e ach violated state law by deceptively mark e t i n g and improperly enrolling cardholders in add-on credi t card products. The card providers removed the cases to f ed e ral court, and the A t t o rney General moved to remand. The district court concluded that the Class Action F airness Act o f 2 0 0 5 (CAFA )
, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), did n ot afford a basis for federal jurisdiction. T h e c o urt, however, found at least o ne of the Attorney General’s claims ag a inst each provi derS T A T E O F H A W A I I V

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completely preempted by section 30 o f the National B ank A ct of 1864, 12 U.S.C. §§ 85–86. The court thus held that it h ad jurisdiction over the completely preempted claims under the f e d e ral question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and electe d t o

ex e r cise jurisdiction ov e r the r e maining claims under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

W e hold t h at n either the federal question statute nor CAF A provides the district c ourt with subject matter jurisdiction

. W e therefore reverse with instructions to remand the actions to state court.

I. Background

A.

I n A pril 2012, the Hawaii Attorne y G eneral filed complaints in state co urt a g ainst six financial institutions—J P Morg an Chase & Co. a n d Chase B ank U SA, N.A. (collectively
, the “Chase defendants”); HSB C B ank Nevada, N.A. and HSB C Card Services, I nc. (collectively
, the “HSB C defendants”); Capital One B ank (USA)
, N

. A

. and Capital One Services, L L C (collectively
, t h e “ Capital One defendants”); Discover F inancial Services, I nc., D iscover B a n k
, DF S Services
, L .L .C., and A merican B ankers Manag ement Company
, I nc. (collectively
, the “Discover defendants”); B ank of America Corporation a n d F I A Card Services, N.A. (collectively
, the “B ank of America defendants”); a nd Citig roup I nc., Citibank, N.A., and De p a r tment Stores National B ank (collectively
, the “Citig roup defen d ants”). Discov e r B ank is a federally insured, state-chartered bank; the other defendant banks are nationally chartered.S T A T E O F H A W A I I V

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T h e complaints, identical as relevant to this appea l
, alleg ed that the defendants d eceptively marketed and enrolled Hawaii cardholder s i n various d ebt protection p roducts. These products include pay ment protection plans, ex tended warranties fo r p u

r c h a s ed items, identity theft protection plans, stolen card protection, credit score tracking
, and pay ment warranties.

The complaints primarily targ e ted the pay ment protection plans. These plans suspend or cancel a l l o r part of a cardhol d e r ’ s oblig ation to repay an outstanding credit card balance, limit interest charg es, or waive late f e es upon a qualify ing event, such as disability
, death, or unemploy ment. A cardholder purchases a pay ment p r otection plan b y pay ing the provider a percentag e of the o u t s t anding monthly card balance.

The complaints a lleg ed that the provi d e r s: (1) enrolled cardholders in protection plans without their consent; (2) enrolled cardholders who d o not qualify f or protection p lan benefits; ( 3 ) confu s ed p lan purchasers with deceptive marketing
, contract lang uag e, and billing ; and (4) targ eted “vulnerable” populations, including subprime b orrowers a nd the elderly

. The complaints asserted three state law causes of action. Count I alleg ed that the credit card providers violated sections “480-1 et seq.” of the Hawaii Revised Statutes. Althoug h not limited to violat i o ns of the U niform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. c h. 481A, t h e complaints specifically a verred that d efendants eng ag ed in “deceptive trade practices” forbidden b y that statute. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-2 (declaring “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the con duct of any trade o r commerce

. . . unlawful”); id.S T A T E O F H A W A I I V

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§ 481A- 3 ( a ) ( 2), (5), ( 9 ), (12) (listing deceptive trade practices). C ount I I contended that the card providers violated section 480-13.5 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes, which imposes a penalty of u p to $10,000 for each deceptive
act that is “ directed toward, targ ets, or injures” an elderly
person. Count I I I a lleg ed u njust enrichment because Hawaii

consumers “unknowing ly pa[ id] unautho r iz ed or otherwise improper charg es to Defendants.”

The complaints requested declaratory and injunctive relief, civ i l penalties, disg org ement, restitution, attorney s’ fees, interest, and “ o ther r elief as provided by law.” The actions were “broug ht b y the State of Hawaii in its sovereig n

c a p acity

. . . on behalf of the State and its citiz e ns,” a s authoriz ed by sections 480- 2 ( d) and 661-10 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes, and also under the State’s “ parens patriae authority .” I n each complaint, the Attor n e y G eneral

ex p licitly disavowed that he filed a class action a nd disclaimed “any such claims that would s upport removal on the basis of diversity
, Class Action F a i r n e s s Act of 2005 (28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715), f e d eral question jurisdiction, or any

other basis.”

B.

The defendants filed n o t i ces of removal in the district court, invoking §§ 1331, 1332(d ) (2 )
, and 1367 as the bases for federa l jurisdiction. The Attorney General moved to remand each case.

The d istrict court denied the motions to remand. The
court first held that CAF A did not afford it jurisdiction. The district court acknowledg ed that in order to recover damag e s on behalf of consumers, subsection 4 80-14(b) of the HawaiiS T A T E O F H A W A I I V

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Revised Statues likely requires the Attorney General to bring

a class action. 1 H

awaii ex rel. Louie v. JP Morgan Chase & Co.
, 907 F

. Supp. 2d 1188, 1204 (D. H aw. 2012). Rely ing on W ashington v. Chimei Innolux Corp.
, 659 F

. 3d 842 (9th Cir. 2011), however, the district judg e held that CAF A req u i r e s that a plaintiff “actuall y i n voke” a class action rule o r “ot h erwise label the c ase a ‘class action.’” Louie
, 907 F

. Supp. 2d at 1205. B e c ause the complaints ex pressly disclaimed class status, inv o k ing instead only common law
parens p a t riae and section 661-10 civil enforcement authori t y , t he district court c oncluded that it lacked CAF A jurisdiction. Id. at 1206–07.

B u t, the district court held that it had jurisdiction over at least one o f the claims in each complaint under the complete preemption doctrine. The district c ourt reasoned that b y alleg ing the card providers had charg ed “sig nificant fees” for “minimal benefits” and had “increased profits by substantial sums,” the Attorney General implicitly challeng ed the “rate of interest” o n outstanding credit card b a l a n c es. Id. at 1210–12. B e cause t h e National B ank A ct completely preempts state laws reg ulating t h e interest rates charg ed b y

1 Su b sectio n 4 8 0

- 1 4 (b ) states:

T h e atto rn ey g en eral o f t

h e State sh all b e au th o rized to b rin g a class actio n f

o r i n d irect pu rch asers assertin g claim s u n d er th is ch ap ter. T h e atto rn ey g en eral o r th e d irecto r o f th e o f

f ice o f co n su

m er p ro tectio n m ay b rin g

a class actio n o n b eh alf o f co n su m ers b ased o n u n f

air or d ecep t iv e acts o r p ractices d eclared u n law f u l b y sectio n 4 8 0

- 2

. A ctio n s b ro u g h t u n der th is su

b sectio n s h all b e b ro u g h t as p aren s p a t riae on beh alf of n atu ral p erso n s

r e si d in g in th e State to secu re th reef o ld d am ag es fo r in j u ries su stain ed by th e n atu ral p er s o n s to th eir
p ro p erty b y reaso n o f an y v io latio n o f th is ch ap ter.S T A T E O F H A W A I I V

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nationally chartered b a n ks, Beneficial Nat’l Bank v

. Anderson
, 539 U.S. 1
, 10–11 (2003)
, the district c ourt h eld that it had jurisdiction over “ a t l e a st some” of the c laims
ag ainst the national defendants, and elected to ex ercise supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims. Louie
, 907 F . Supp. 2d at 1212–13.

The Attorney General soug ht leave to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1292(b), raising two questions: (1) “Do the fees charg ed f or the pay ment protection plans a

nd other ancillary s e rvices constitute ‘interest’ u n der the National B ank Act? ” (2) “Can the Atto r n e y G eneral’s alleg ations only be characteriz e d as a usury claim challeng ing
t h e r ate or a mount of interest

. . . ? ” The district cou r t certified both q

uestions, Hawaii ex rel. Louie v. JP M organ Chase & Co.
, 921 F

. Supp. 2d 1 0 59 (D. Haw. 2013), we g ranted permission to a p p eal, and t he Attorney General timely perfected the appeal. 2

II. Standard of Review

“W e review d e novo a district court’s denial of a motion
to remand to state court for l a c k o f federal subject matter jurisdiction.” Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co.
, 651 F

. 3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Removal and subject matter jurisdiction statutes are “strictly construed,” a

nd a “defendant seeking removal has the burden

2 T h e district co u r t a l s o h e ld th at sectio n 5 2 1 o f t h e D ep o sito ry In stitu tio n s D ereg u latio n an d Mo n etary C o n t ro l A ct o f 1 9 8 0
, 1 2 U.S.C. § 1 8 3 1d
, c o m

p l etely preem

p t ed at least so m e o f th e claim s ag ain st th e state- ch artered Disco v er d ef en d an ts

. T h e Disco v er d ef en d an ts settled

w h i l e t h is ap peal w as p en din g (as d id th e Ch ase an d B an k o f A m erica d ef en d an t s). B ecau se th e rem ain in g d ef en d an t ban k s are n atio n ally ch artered , th e p reem

p tiv e ef f ect o f th e 1 9 8 0 act is n o lo n g er at issu e.S T A T E O F H A W A I I V

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to establish that removal is proper and any doubt is resolved
ag ainst removability

. ” Luther v. Countrywid e Home Loans Servicing LP , 533 F .3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008).

III. Com plete P reem ption

The g eneral removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), g rants district c ourts jurisdiction over state court acti o n s that orig inally could have been broug ht in federal court. Section 1331 provides district c ourts orig inal jurisdiction over “civil actions a rising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”

Under the canonical w ell-pleaded c o mplaint rule, “ a suit ‘arises under’ federal law for 28 U .S.C. § 1331 purposes ‘only when the plaintiff’s sta t em e n t of his own cause o f action shows that it is based upon federal law.’ ” V a d en v

. Discover Bank
, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) (a l teration omitted) (quoting Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley
, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908)). Notwithstanding this rule, when a federal
statute wholly displaces state law and provides the ex clusive

cause of action for a plaintiff’s requested relief, we must “recharacteriz e a state law complaint

. . . as an action a rising under federal law.” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor , 481 U.S. 58, 64 (1987). I n such cases, fede r a l law “completely preempts” the state law claims. Franchise Tax Bd. v

. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust
, 463 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).

Two provisions in the N ational B ank Ac t , 12 U .S.C. §§ 85–86, completely p reempt state law claims cha l leng ing interest rates charg ed by national banks. Bene f i cial Nat’l
, 539 U .S. at 10–11. Se c t i o n 8 5 allows a n ational bank to impose interest at the rate authoriz e d by the state in which the bank is “located” or “at a rate of 1 per centum in ex cess of theS T A T E O F H A W A I I V

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discount rate on ninety -day commercial paper in effect at the F ederal reserve bank in the F e d eral reserve district where the bank is located, whichever may be the g r eater.” I f a n ational bank knowing ly charg es a rate that ex c eeds this limit, section 86 authoriz es the borrower to recover d ouble damag es on the

ex c e ss interest paid, a

n d the lender forfeits any ri gh t t o outstanding interest pay

ments.

A.

The Attorney General f i r st contends that in finding
comp l e t e preemption, the district court erred by rely ing on declarations submitted by the card providers describing their
pay ment protection plans. 3 W e disag ree.

F ederal courts ty

pically may only look to the plaintiff’s complaint to determine federal question j u risdiction. See Coleman v. E

stes E xpress Lines, I

nc ., 6 3 1 F. 3 d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 2011). However, when a defen d a n t asserts that a

c l a i m is completely preempted, ex a mination o f e x t r a

- p l e a d i n g material is permitted. See Aetna Health Inc. v

. Davila
, 542 U.S. 200, 211 (2004) (reading the complaint and “various plan documents” to de t e r m i n e if a c laim was completely preempted); Schroeder v. Trans W orld Airlines, Inc.
, 7 0 2 F .2d 1 89, 191 (9th Cir. 1983) (reviewing “ additional facts i n the petition for removal” to find a claim completely preempted), o v erruled on o ther grounds by Moore-Thomas v

. Alaska Airlines

, Inc
., 553 F .3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2009).

3 T h e A t t o r n e y Gen eral also arg u es th at o n ly th e th ree b an k s th at

su b m itted d eclaratio n s can rely o n th em

. Bu t, th e d i s trict co u rt d i d n o t ab u se its d iscretio n in f in d i n g th at “ Def

en d an ts h av e p resen te d j o i n t arg u m en ts reg ard in g th e n atu re o f th e p lan s o f

f ered b y all o f th e b an k s.” Lo u ie , 9 0 7 F. Su

p p . 2 d at 1 21 1

.S T A T E O F H A W A I I V

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N K N E V A D A 12

This makes doctri n a l sense—the complete preemption doctrine is “an ex ception

. . . to the well-pleaded co m p l a i nt rule.” Davila , 542 U.S. at 207.

I n any e vent, the supposed error was harmless; the declarations restated facts already recited in the compl ai n t s

. Cf. H.K. Supermarket v. Kizer
, 830 F .2d 1078, 1 0 80 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987) (considering e x tra-pleading material is h armless if dismissal u n d e r F ederal Rule o f Civil Procedure 1 2(b)(6) would be proper when reviewing the complaint alone).

B.

The A ttorney General next a r g ues that pay

ment protection plan fees are not “in t e re s t ” o n a loan under § 85, but rather charg es for an independent s e r vice. This arg ument has somewhat more purchase.

The Office of the Comptroller o f the Currency (OCC) has defined “interest” in § 85 as:

any pay ment compensati n g a creditor o r prospective creditor for an ex tension of credit, making available of a line of credit, or any default or breach by a borrower of a condition upon which credit was ex tended. I t includes,
among other thing s, the following fees

c o n n e c t e d w i t h c r e d i t e x t e n s i o n o r availability : numerical perio d ic rates, late fees, not sufficient funds (NSF ) fees c harg ed when a b o rr ower tenders pay ment on a debt with a check d

rawn on insufficient fund s, overlimit fees, annual fees, cash advance fees, and membership fees. I t d oes no t o r d inarilyS T A T E O F H A W A I I V

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inclu d e a p p r a i s a l f

e e s, premiums a

nd

c o m m i s s i o n s a t t r i b u t a b l e t o i n s u r a n c e g uaranteeing repay

ment of any ex tension o f credit, finders’ fees, f ees for document preparation or notariz ation, or f ees incurred to obtain credit reports.

12 C.F .R. § 7.4001(a). The Supreme Court ap p r o v ed this definition in Smiley v. Citibank ( South Dakota)

, N.A
., holding that the ex amples in § 7.4001(a) drew a reasonable distinction between (a) ex penses that “are a ssessed for simply making
t h e l o an, o r for the borrower’s default,” and (b) f e e s

“ specifically a ssigned

” to services incidental to the loan, such

as reimbursements for processing an application, premiums tied to loan insurance, and appraisal costs. 517 U.S. 735, 741–42 (1996).

L ike the F ifth Circuit and the OCC, w e d o u bt that
pay ment protection plan fees a re interest. See H

o o d e x rel. Mississippi v. JP Morgan Chase & Co
., 737 F .3d 78, 90–92 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) ( sug g esting that pay ment protection plan fees are not interest); D e b t Cancellation Contracts and Debt Su s p en s ion A g reements, 67 F ed. Reg

. 58,962, 5 8,6 9 4 ( Sept. 19, 2002) (“The OCC’s reg ulations

re f l ect the fact that national banks may set [ pay ment protection plan] fees

. . . . S e c t ion 7.4002 of our rules authoriz es n ationa l b anks to establish n on-interest charg e s and fees ‘according to sound banking judg ment a nd safe a nd sound banking principles.’” (emphasis added) (quoting 12 C.F

. R. § 7.4002)). B ut we leave this question for another day

. Even assuming that protection p lan fees are interest, the complaints here did not alleg e that the card providers charg ed

ex c e ssive interest rates.S T A T E O F H A W A I I V

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N K N E V A D A 14

C.

F or the c omplete p reemption doctrine to apply
, o ne of the Attorney General’s sta t e l aw claims must be g o v erned b y §§ 85 and 86. Beneficial Nat’l
, 539 U.S. at 7–8. The Attorney General arg u e s this is not the case here, b ec a u s e those sections only p r e e mpt claims that ex plicitly invoke a state usury

law.

A t f irst g lance, this arg ument h as some attraction. I n Beneficial National
, the plaintiffs “ex p ressly charg ed” that a national bank violated state usury laws. 5 3 9 U

. S

. at 9. The Supreme Court held th a t §§ 85 and 86 “supersede both the substantive and the r emedial p rovisions of state usury la w s and create a federal remedy for overcharg es that is ex c lusive,

even when a state complainant, as here, relies entirely on state law.” I d. at 11.

B u t, on close analy sis, the Attorney Gener a l ’ s arg ument founders. Section 85, without using the word “usury ,” sets the rate of interest that a national bank may charg e

. Section 86 uses the word “usurious” to define a limitations period, but
creates a rig ht of action for p l a intiffs charg ed “a rate o f interest g reater than is a llowed b y s e ction 85.” Cong ress enacted these provisions so that a national bank could “ charg e its out-of-state credit-card cus tomers an interest rate on unpaid balances allowed by its home State, when that rate is
g r e a t e r t han that permitted by the State of the bank’s nonresident customers.” Marquette Nat’l Bank of M inn. v

. First of Omaha Serv. Corp

. , 439 U.S. 299, 301 (1978). Thus, when a plaintiff alleg es that a national b ank c harg e d “a rate of interest g reater than is allowed,” the c laim falls within the

sc o p e o f §§ 85 and 86, reg ardless of the state law term invoked.S T A T E O F H A W A I I V

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N K N E V A D A 15

That the plaintiffs in B e nefi c i al National happened to invoke “ ex pressly ” Alabama’s usury statute d o es not mean that the National B ank Act only preempts complaints that c ite
a state usury law. F ederal c o urts are not bound by the labels that litig ants attach to co m p l etely preempted claims. I n Davila
, for ex ample, p l a intiffs attempted to evade complete preemption under section 502(a) of the Employ ee Retirement I ncome Security Act (ERI SA), 2 9 U.S.C. § 1132( a )
, b y insisting that their actions sounded in tort. 5 4 2 U.S. at 2 1 4 –15. The Supreme Court declined the g ambit, h old i n g that “disting uishing b e tween pre-empted and non

- pre-empted claims based on the particular label a ffix ed t o t h e m would ‘elevate form over substance and a llow parties to evade’ the pre-emptive s c o pe o f E RI SA simply ‘by relabeling their
contrac t claims.’” I

d. at 214 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp.

v. Lueck
, 471 U.S. 202, 2 1 1 ( 1 9 8 5 )); see also Dishman v

. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am
., 269 F

. 3 d 974, 983 (9th Cir. 2 0 01) (holding that claimants cannot escape complete preemption by

“dressing up” their claims).

W e , therefore, must decide whether the c o m plaints challeng ed the “rate of interest” that th e c a rd providers charg ed, reg a

rdless o f the state law monikers affix ed to the Attorney General’s claims. W e conclude that they did not.

Coun t s I and I I alleg ed that the card providers v iolated sections 480-2(d), 4 80-13.5, and 4 81A-3 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes, which g overn b u sines s disclosure,
contractu al terms, a

nd trade practices. None of these provisions prosc r i b es the interest that a financial institution
may charg e

.

Nor did the third count—the unjust enrichment c laim— challeng e the card providers’ interest rates. This countS T A T E O F H A W A I I V

. HSB C B A

N K N E V A D A 16

merely alleg e d th a t Hawaii residents unjustly enriched their card p r o viders by “unknowing ly pay ing unauthoriz ed o r otherwise improper charg es.” I ndeed, the Attorney Gene r al could not, under Hawaii law, a s s ert that the card providers unjustly charg ed ex c essive interest rates. See Caraa ng v

. PNC Mortg.
, 795 F

. Supp. 2d 1098, 1117–18 (D. Haw. 2 011) (ho l d i n g t hat under Hawaii law, “ex p ress contracts

. . . preclude an unjust enrichment claim” when plaintiffs alleg ed that banks ch a r ged ex cessive interest rates); Porter v. Hu
, 169 P.3d 994, 1006 ( Haw. Ct. App. 2007) (“[ A] n a ction for unjust e nrichment cannot lie in the face of an ex press contract . . . .”).

The monet ary r emedies r equested for these violations— civil penalties and restitution—may well require the card providers to disg org e any financial g ain from the fees. B ut if

a plaintiff asserts a u sury claim simply by virtue of requesting damag es, the states’ settled authority “ to reg ulate n ational banks in areas such as contracts, debt collection, acquisition and transfer of property , and tax ation, z o ning
, criminal, a nd
tort law” would be rendered meaning less. Ban k of Am. v

. City & Cnty. of S.F. , 309 F .3d 551, 559 (9th Cir. 2002).

The defendants n evertheless insist that the complaints implied that Hawaii consu m e rs were charg ed e x cessive interest r ates. They n o t e t h e complaints alleg ed that card holders received “vi r t u a lly no benefit” from the card providers’ debt protection p rodu c t s , that the providers purposefully marketed these products to make “su b stantial

sums of money ,” and that the providers charg ed “o ver-thelimit fees.”

Read in c o n t ex t, however, these alleg ations are most consistent w ith a Uniform Deceptive Trade Pr a c t ice A ctS T A T E O F H A W A I I V

. HSB C B A

N K N E V A D A 17

claim. Subsection 4 8 1 A -3(a)(5) defines a deceptive trade practice a s “ [ r] epresent[ ing ] that g oods or services have

. . . uses, benefits or quantities that they do not h ave.” I n pleading a violation of this subsection, the Attorney General properly alleg ed that the c ard providers represented that their services would prevent co n s u mers from defaulting
, but, in fact, the plans did not provide that benefit.

The Attorney G ene r a l could have claimed that the card providers charg ed ex cessive fees. B ut h e did not; even if the facts in the complaints mig ht support a § 86 claim, that does
not mean the Attorney General p l e a d e d one. Ag ain, Davila provides useful g uidance. The Court there he l d that ERI SA completely preempts a state law claim “if an individual, at some point in time, could have broug ht his claim under” the federal statute, and “there is no other independent leg a l duty that is implicated by a defendant’s a ctions.” Davila
, 5 42 U.S.
at 210; see also Caterpillar Inc. v

. W illiams
, 482 U

. S. 386, 394–95 (1987) (holding the same under s e c t i o n 3 01 of the L abor Manag ement Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185).

The state law claims here were independent of and did not “merely duplicate[ ] rig hts and remedies a vailable u n d e r” §§ 85 and 86. Fossen v

. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mont., Inc.
, 660 F .3d 1102, 1111 (9th Ci r

. 2 0 1 1). The unfair a nd deceptive practice claims targ eted a lleg ed marketing misrepresentations. The unjust enrichment claims a rose from the p urpor t e d failure to obtain consent before enrolling

consumers in debt protection products. Reg ardle s s of the

ra t e s c harg ed, the banks had independent state law obl i gations to obtain c onsent from a nd not to deceive

consumers. These claims are not p reempted by the National B ank Act.S T A T E O F H A W A I I V

. HSB C B A

N K N E V A D A 18

I n reaching this conclusion, w e join the F ifth Circuit. 4 I n H o o d
, the Mississippi Attorney General alleg ed that cred i t card providers violated the Mississippi Consumer Protection A c t

. 7 3 7 F

. 3d at 82–83. The c omplaints asserted t h at pay ment p rotection plans “have little value to c ertain customers” and that “the P lans c an trig g er over-the-limit fees.” Id. a t 93 & n.14. The F ifth Circuit held that §§ 85 a nd 86 did not completely preempt the claims, as “there is a difference between alleg ing that certain customers are being

4 A n u m b er o f d istrict co u rts also ag ree. See, e.g

. , W est Virg in ia ex rel. McGra w v. JPMo rg a n Ch a s e & Co

. , 8 4 2 F. Su p p

. 2 d 9 8 4
, 9 9 3 (S.D.W

. Va. 2 0 12 ) (“ [E]v ery alleg atio n th at an in terest ch arg e is im p ro p er n eed n o t b e an alleg atio n th at it is u su rio u s; su ch a ru le w o u ld co n su m e a n y state f r au d actio n in v o lv in g an ‘ i n terest’ p ro d u ct.”); Yo u n g v. W ells Fa rg o & Co

. , 6 7 1 F. Su

p p

. 2 d 10 0 6
, 1 02 1 (S.D. Io w a 2 00 9 ) (“ [T ]h e b asis o f th e alleg ed ex cessiv en ess is t h at W ells Farg o ch arg ed f ees w h en th ey sh ou ld

n o t, a w h o lly d if f eren t claim f

ro m a claim th at W ells F arg o ap p lied an il l e g a l i n t erest rate.”); An d erso n v. Ocwen Fin

. C o rp

. , No

. CIVA 4 :0 5 CV2 4 3 MB
, 2 0 0 6 W L 1 5 1 5 6 8 2
, at * 1 (N.D. Miss. May 2 6, 20 0 6) (“ [A ]lleg atio n s o f ‘ [e]x cessiv ely h ig h an d /o r f alse p o in t s, clo sin g c o s t s an d

serv ice ch arg es’ w ith n o m en tio n o f ‘ u su ry ’ d o es n o t co n stitu

te a state law

u su ry claim f

o r co m p lete p reem

p tio n p u rp o ses.” (seco n d alteratio n in

o rig in al)); Co rta za r v. W

ells Fa rg o & C

o

. , No

. C 0 4

- 89 4 J SW
, 2 0 0 4 W L 1 7 7 4 2 1 9, at * 1
, * 4

– 5 (N.D. Cal. A u g

. 9
, 2 0 0 4 ) (h o l d in g th at u n j u s t

en rich m en t an d co n su

m er p ro tectio n claim s , w h ich alleg ed b an k s “i n d u ced b o rro w ers to en ter i n to u n f av o rab le lo an s w ith ‘ ab o v e- m ark e t in terest rates’ an d ‘ ex o rb itan t ’ p o i nts an d f ees,” w ere n o t co m

p letely
p reem p ted ); C ro ss-Cn ty. Ba n k v. Klu ssma n , N o

. C- 0 1

- 4 1 9 0

- SC, 2 0 0 4 W L 9 6 6 2 8 9
, at * 6 (N.D. Cal. A p r. 3 0
, 2 0 0 4 ) (“ P lain t if

f d o es n o t ch allen g e th e leg ality o f t

h e ra te o f in t erest ch arg ed b y D ef en d an ts. Rat h e r , Plain tif f claim s th at v ario u s in t erest f ees w ere n o t d isclo sed
, w ere u n w ar r a n t e d
, w ere b ased o n ch arg es th at w ere t h em s elv es im

p ro p er, an d in s h o rt, sh ou ld

n ev er h av e b een ch arg ed at all.”).S T A T E O F H A W A I I V

. HSB C B A

N K N E V A D A 19

charg ed too much, and alleg ing that they should have never been charg ed for the service in the first place.” Id. at 93. 5

W e conclude that the Atto r n e y G e n eral did not plead a

com p l e tely preempted claim and that the district court therefore erred in f

ind i n g federal question jurisdiction. W e now turn to whether CAF A provides an alternative basis for jurisdiction.

IV. CAF A

A.

The A ttorney G e neral’s certification motion r aised two questions, neither of which concerns CAF A. Section 1292(b), however, g r ants appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders, not q uestions, a

nd we “may address any issue fairly included w ithin the certifi e d o rder.” Y amaha

5 T h e district co u rt d ecisio n s m arsh aled b y th e card pro v id ers are n ot to th e co n t rary

. In th o se cases, t

h e co m p lain ts e x pressly alleg ed th at f i n an cial in stitu

tio n s h ad ch arg ed ex cessiv e in terest rates. S ee, e.g

. , Fo rn ess v. Cro ss Co u n try Ba n k, In c. , No

. 0 5

- C V- 4 1 7

- DRH, 2 0 0 6 W L 2 4 0 5 3 5
, at * 3 (S.D. Ill. J an

. 1 3
, 2 0 06 ) (n o tin g P lain tif f s ad m itted “t h at th ey d o , in p art, ch allen g e th e am o u n t o f D ef en d an ts’ f

e es”); Au stin v. Pro vid en t Ba n k
, No

. CIV.A .4 :0 4 CV 3 3 P B
, 2 00 5 W L 1 7 8 5 28 5
, at * 1
, * 5 (N.D. M i s s. J u ly 2 6, 2 0 0 5 ) (f in d i n g a claim alleg in g a b an k p ro v i ded

“ ov erp riced lo an s at in terest rates w h ich w e r e o u t sid e th e reaso n ab le

co m m ercial stan d ard s o f ap p ro p riate risk

- b ased p ricin g ” co m p letely
p reem p ted (in tern al q u o tatio n m ark s om itted )); S a n to s v. Ho u s eh o ld In t’l, In c ., No

. C0 3- 12 4 3 MJ J
, 2 0 0 3 W L 25 9 1 1 1 1 2
, at * 3 ( N.D. Cal. Oct. 2 4
, 2 0 0 3 ) (h o ld in g a cau s e o f a ctio n assertin g an “ o v er lim it f ee w as

u n co n scio n ab le b ecau se i t w as a f lat rate f ee th at w as to o h i gh ”

co m pletely p reem p ted ); Hill v. Ch em. Ba n k , 7 9 9 F. Su p p . 9 48 , 9 5 0 , 9 5 4 (D. Min n

. 1 9 9 2 ) ( h o l din g a claim alleg i n g ex cessiv e late f ees an d ov er lim it f ees co m p letely p reem p ted ).S T A T E O F H A W A I I V

. HSB C B A

N K N E V A D A 20

Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun
, 5 16 U.S. 199, 205 (1996). B ecause the certified order denied the motions to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we may affirm if the district c ourt h ad any basis of jurisdiction. See Lumber Prod. Indus. W orkers Local No. 1054 v. W

. Coast Indus. Relations Ass’n, I nc ., 775 F .2d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 1985). W e therefore ex ercise our discretion to address C A FA jurisdiction.

B.

CAF A g rants district c ourts ori gi n a l jurisdiction over “a class action” if the c lass h as m o r e t h a n 100 members, the
amount in controversy is g reater t h an $5,000,000, and the parties are minimally d i v e rse. 28 U.S.C. § 1 3 32(d)(2), (5)(B ). A “class action” is defined a s “any c i vil action filed under rule 23 of the F ederal Rule s o f Civil Procedure o r similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authoriz ing

an action to be broug ht by 1 or more repre sentative persons

as a c lass action.” Id. § 1 332(d)(1)(B ). Because these complaints were not filed under F ederal Rule 2 3, the issue is whether the Attorney G eneral filed them u n d e r a “similar” state rule or statute.

The complaints asserted that the Attorney General broug ht these actions under: (1) subsection 480-2(d), which provides that “[ n] o person o ther than a c o nsumer, the attorney g e neral or the director of the office of c onsumer protection
may bring an action based upon unfair or deceptive acts declared unlawful by this section”; (2) section 661-10, which all o w s t he A ttorney General to “bring and maintain an action” in o r der “to collect or recover an y money or penalty

. . . o r e n force any other rig ht”; and (3) the Attorney General’s “

parens patriae authority .”S T A T E O F H A W A I I V

. HSB C B A

N K N E V A D A 21

These state procedural devices are not similar to a Rule 23 action. Subsection 4 80-2(d) identifies who m a y b r ing an action; it does not state the form an a ction must take. Section 661-10 g rants the A ttor n e y General the authority to bring

c ivil enforcement actions, which a re not class actions. S

e e Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC
, 4 46 U.S. 318, 322–25 (1980). And, a common law parens p atriae suit is not a procedural device simila r to Rule 23. Chimei Innolux
, 659 F .3d at 847–49; see also Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.
, 134 S. Ct. 736, 7 39 (2014) (holding that a parens patriae suit is not a CAF A mass action).

The card pro v i d e rs, however, contend that under subsection 480-14(b), an y action broug ht by the Attorney General on behalf of consumers is perforce a c l a ss action. That statute provides: “The attorney g eneral

. . . may bring a class action on behalf of consume r s b ased on unfair o r deceptive acts or practices declared u nlawful by section 480- 2. Actions broug ht u n der this subsection shall be broug ht a s parens patriae

. . . .” Althoug h the c omplaints “spec i f i c ally disclaim[ e d] ” class status, the card pro v i d ers insist that we ig nore those disclaimers and transmo gr i f y these suits into class actions.

W e decline the invitation. As the district court noted, the card providers may well have the better readi n g o f H awaii law, and the Attorney General’s a ttempt to bring these actions while disc laiming class status may fail under state law. N o n e t h e l e s s , w e canno t d i s re ga r d t h e co m p l a i n t s ’ unambig uous class a ction disclaimers. 6 To b e r emovable

6 A t o ral arg u m en t, th e A tto rn ey G en eral rep resen ted th at h e w ill n o t attem p t to m ak e t h i s case a class actio n , reg ard less o f h o w litig atio n p ro ceed s o n

rem an d

.S T A T E O F H A W A I I V

. HSB C B A

N K N E V A D A 22

under CAF A, a “ class a c tion” must be “filed under” Rule 23

or a state law e quivalent. § 1 332(d)(1)(B ). The appropriate inquiry i s therefore whether a complaint seeks class status. According ly
, we have h eld that a plaintiff files a class action f o r CAF A purposes by invoking a state class action ru l e, reg ardless of whether t h e p u tative class ultimately will be certified. United Steel W orkers Int’l Union v. Shell Oil Co.
, 602 F .3d 1087, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2010).

The converse is also true: F ailure to request class status o r its equivalent is fatal to C A FA j urisdiction. I n Baumann v

. Chase Investment Servi c e

s C o r p

. , for ex ample, the defendants
arg ued that California Private A ttorney General Act (PAGA) “actions are ‘class actions’ under CAF A because PAGA is a state procedural law that w ould be d isplace d b y Rule 2 3 in federal court.” 7 47 F .3d 1117, 112 4 ( 9 t h C i r

. 2014). W e

r e j e c ted the arg ument, holding that the issue “is simply o n e of statutory construction—whether the a c t i on soug ht to be removed was ‘

filed under ’ a state statute ‘ s i m ilar’ to Rule 23.” Id. As the plaintiff’s c omplaint w a s broug h t under PAGA, a statute not similar to Rule 2 3, it was irrelevant that the action mig ht later be converted to a c lass a c t i o n if removed. Id.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in AU Optronics is also instruc t i v e on this point. I n interpreting CAF A’s mass action provisions, the Court cautioned that CAF A larg ely in corporates “certain” traditional ex ceptions to the g eneral rule that the p laintiff is the master of a c omplaint for jurisdictional purposes. 134 S. Ct. at 745–46. F or ex ample, plaintiffs may not fraudulently join a non-diverse party , Morris v. Princess Cruises

, I n c

. , 236 F .3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001), collusively assig n an interest in a case, W heeler v

. City & Cnty. o

f Denver
, 229 U.S. 342, 3 49 (1913),S T A T E O F H A W A I I V

. HSB C B A

N K N E V A D A 23

improperly treat a s t a t e as a real party in interest, Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Hickman
, 183 U.S. 5 3, 61 (1901), or avoid CAF A removal by promis i ng , before class certification, to seek less than $5,000,000 in damag es, S tandard Fire I

ns. Co. v. Knowles , 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1350 (2013).

Here, the only relevant ex ception to t h e rule that “the party w ho bring s a suit is master to decid e w h at law he will rely upon,” The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co.
, 228 U.S. 2 2
, 25 (1913), is the complete p reemption doctrine. A s CAF A does n ot completely preempt st ate law, we cannot ig nore the complaints’ disclaimers and convert these cases into class actions.

Our sister circuits agree. 7 I n P urdue P h arma L.P. v

. Kentucky
, the Kentucky Atto r n ey G eneral broug ht v arious
state law c laims on behalf o f Kentucky c onsumers, invoking the State’s “

parens patriae authority ” but not a class action rule. 704 F .3d 208, 211 (2d Cir. 2 013)

. T he defendants
urg ed the court to pierce the pleading s and recog niz e that “the A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l [ w a s ] a c t u a l l y r e l yi n g , a l b e i t surreptitiously
, on [ Kentucky ’s c l a ss action rule] to assert representative claims f

o r r e stitution on behalf o f individual consumers.” Id. at 216 n.7. T h e Second Circuit rejected the
arg ument. Even if the A ttorney General “ could have utiliz ed

some other statutory or p rocedural mechanism,” the court was “hard pressed to u n d e rstand how a suit may be ‘filed under’

7 So d o a n

u m b er of d istrict co u

rts. S ee, e.g

. , N a t’l Co n su mers Lea gu e

v. Flo wers B a k

e r i es, L LC.
, No

. CV 13

- 1 7 2 5 (ESH),

- - - F

. Su p p

. 2 d

. - - - , 2 0 1 4 W L 1 37 2 6 4 2
, at * 6 (D.D.C. A p r. 8
, 2 0 1 4); In re Vio xx Pro d s. Lia b

. Litig

. , 8 4 3 F. Su

p p

. 2 d 6 54
, 6 6 3

– 6 4 (E.D. L a. 2 0 1 2 ); Arizo n a ex r el. Ho rn e v. Co u n trywid

e Fin

. Co rp

. , No

. C V- 1 1

- 1 3 1

- P HX- FJ M, 2 0 11 W L 9 9 5 9 6 3 , at * 3 (D. A riz. Mar. 2 1 , 2 0 1 1 ).S T A T E O F H A W A I I V

. HSB C B A

N K N E V A D A 24

a statute or rule that d oes not even appear on the face of the complaint.” Id. A s we do h ere, the Second Circuit noted that the A ttorney General’s claims mig ht fail without class status, but nonetheless refused to imply that the complaint was “filed under” a state rule similar to Rule 23. Id. at 220 ( “W hether Plaintiffs may proceed and ultimately recover on their c laims presents complex questions of Kentucky law, which we only

see throug h E

rie ’s g lass darkly
, and upon which we e x p ress no opinion.”).

The Third Circuit followed this line of reasoning in E rie Insurance E

xchange v. Erie Indemnity Co.
, 722 F .3d 154 (3d Cir. 2013). E r i e I n surance Ex chang e asserted state law claims “in the name of” its members, invoking Pennsy lvania Rule of Civil Procedur e 2152. Id. at 157. B ecause Pennsy lvania law p rohibits insuranc e ex chang es from suing under Rule 2 152, the defendants a r gu ed that the Ex chang e actually had broug ht a c lass action. Id. at 158–59. The Third Circuit refused to “ rew r i t e the Complaint to c reate jurisdiction under the p retense of corr e cting a state-law error,” h olding that plaintiffs “are the masters of their complaints and are ‘free to choos e t he statutory provisions under which they will b ring their c l ai m s .’ I f the case is procedurally unsound under Pennsy lvania’s rules, the Commonwealth’s courts are best suited to correct the prob l e m .” Id. at 159 (citation o mitted) (quoting P u rdue Pharma , 704 F .3d at 216 n.7).

The F ourth Circuit also ag r ees. I n W est Virgini a ex rel. McGraw v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.
, the W est Virg inia Attorney General filed a parens patriae suit ag ainst several pharmacies, alleg ing violations of state l a w

. 646 F .3d 169, 171–72 (4th Cir. 2011). The dissent w ould have f oun d the action r emovable under CAF A because the Attorney GeneralS T A T E O F H A W A I I V

. HSB C B A

N K N E V A D A 25

h a d n o t a sserted a valid parens patriae claim and “becaus e the essential requirements o f a class action [ w ere] met.” Id.
at 183 (Gilman, J
., dissenting ). The p anel majority
, however,

ex p l ai n e d that the r elevant question is not whether the suit could b e sustained as a parens patriae action under state a nd federal law. I

d. at 176 n.2. Rather, the “separate, an d m o r e

mea n i n g ful determination” was if the action was “ brought under a p rocedure ‘similar’ to Rule 23.” I d

. ( emphasis added). 8

I ndeed, were we

— a s the c ard p roviders request—to evaluate the “substance” of the pleading s, the result would be the same. “ To ma i n t a i n a class action, the ex istence of the class must be pleaded and the lim i t s o f the class must be defined with some specificity

. The g rant, sua sponte , of class action r elief when it is neither requested n o r s p e c i fied, is an obvious error.” W

ilson v. Zarhadnick
, 534 F .2d 5 5
, 57 (5th Cir. 1 976) (citations omitted); see also 7AA Charles Alan W r ig ht, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1 785 ( 3d ed. 2005) (“[ A court]
cannot c onvert an individual action into a class action on its

ow n m o t i on.”). Moreover, a p laintiff who denies h aving

8 Ad d iso n Au to m a tics, In c. v. Ha r tfo rd Ca su a lty In su ra n ce C o

. , 7 3 1 F.3 d 7 4 0 (7 t h Cir. 2 0 1 3 ), is n o t to th e co n trary . In Ad d iso n , a p lain tif

f f iled a class actio n ag ain st Do m in o Plastics. D o m in o s tip u l ated to liab ility an d assig n ed its claim s ag ain st i ts liab ility i n su rer to t h e lead plain tif

f as class
rep res e n t a t i v e. Id

. at 7 4 1

. T h e lead p lain tif f t h en f iled su it ag ain st th e liab ility in su

rer in state co u rt bu t ex p licitly d isclaim ed class statu s

. Id

. at 7 4 2

. T h e Sev en t

h C i r c u i t h eld th at th e p lain tif f h ad f iled a class actio n b ecau se h e r e m a i n ed “ t

h e rep resen tativ e o f a class th at w as actu ally certif ied ‘ u n d er Ru le 23 o r th e state eq u i v a l e nt , ’” an d an y ru lin g w ou ld

n e cessarily be in “ in f

av o r o f th e Class.” Id

. at 7 42
, 7 4 4 (i n t e r n a l
q u o tatio n m ark s om itted ) (q u o tin g LG Disp la y C o

. v. Ma d ig a n , 66 5 F.3 d 7 6 8 , 7 7 2 (7 th

Cir. 2 0 1 1 )).S T A T E O F H A W A I I V

. HSB C B A

N K N E V A D A 26

broug ht a class action surely cannot adequately represent the purported c l a s s , see E. Tex. M otor Freight Sys. Inc. v

. Rodriguez
, 431 U.S. 3 9 5, 405 (1977), and “the named plaintiff’s and class counsel’s ability to fairly a nd adequately represent unnamed [ plaint i f fs are] critical requirements in federal c lass actions under Rules 23(a)(4) and (g ),” Baumann
, 747 F .3d at 1122.

B e cause the complaints unambig uously disclaimed class status, these actions cannot be removed u nder CAF A. There is therefore no b asis for federal jurisdiction, a nd the cases should have been remanded to state court.

V. Conclusion

F or the foreg oing reasons, t he judg ment o f the district
court is REVERSED
, and we REMAND with instructions to remand these actions to state court.