IN THE SUP ERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DE LAWARE IN AND FOR KENT COUNTY
JEFFREY A. KNOTT, : : C.A. No: K13C-05-006 RBY Plaintiff, : : v. : : DEBOR AH A. COVE RT, and : NATIONW

IDE GENE RAL INSURA NCE : COMPANY, a foreign co rporation , : : Defenda nts. :

Submitted: Novembe r 20, 2014 Decided : January 15

, 2015
Upon Consideration of Defendant Deborah A. Covert’s

Motion in Limine GRANTED

ORDER Jeffrey J. Clar k, Esquir e, Schm ittinger &Rodriguez , P.A ., Dover, Del aware for Plaintiff. Robert W. Hartnett, Jr. , Esquire, Law O ffices of Chrissinger & Baumberger, Wilmington, Delaware for Defendant Deborah A. Cove rt. Sean A. Dolan, Esquire, L aw Office of Cy nthia G. Beam, Newark, Delawa re for Defendant Nat ionwide Gen eral Insuran ce Company.
Young, J.Knott v. Cov ert, et. a l. C.A. No.: K13C-05-006 RBY January 15, 2015

2 SUMMARY On September 20, 2011, Jeffrey Knott’s (“Plaintiff” ) automobile was rearended by Deborah Covert’s (“ Defendant Covert”) vehicle. On May 6, 2013, Plaintiff filed a laws uit against

Defenda nt Covert a

nd Nationw ide Gene ral Insurance Compan y (“Defendant Natio nwide”), who was his insu rer at the time of th e accident. Defenda ntCovert claims that the cause of the re ar- end accident was another unnamed vehicle, which str

uck her au

tomobil e from

behind, c ausing a domi

no effec t. De fendan t Nationw ide enliste d the servi ces of William C. Cam lin (“ Caml in”) to prepare an expert

report r egarding th e accid en t. Camlin’s r eport disputes whether Defendant Co vert was ind eed invol ved in a rear- end crash o f her own. Defenda ntCovertmoves to exclude this report, contending that it fails to meet the admis sibility

requirem ents of D.R.E. 702. Specif

ically, Defendant Covert ar gues Camlin’s report is form ed upon lay and not ex pert o pini on. Hen ce, Camli n’s report is not of aid to the t

rier of f act. This is correct. Ca

mlin’ s report is based la

rge ly i n
comm on sense, and the observations contained therein, are cap able of f ormul ation by the lay expertise of the j ury. Defenda

nt Covert’ s motio n is GRANTED. FACTS AND PROCEDUR ES The motion before the Court stems f rom an automobile ac cident between Plaintiff and Defendant

Covert, occurrin g on Septem ber 20, 201 1. At the

timeof the accident , Plaintiff wa s in sured by Defendant Nationwide, w hich provided uninsured/underinsured motor ist protectio n. Plaint

iff was driving in a rente d vehicle from Enterprise RAC Com

pany of Baltimore , LLC (“ De fendant E nterprise ,” and togetherwit h Covert, and Natio nwide, “ Defenda nts”). P laintiff filed a C ompla intKnott v. Cov ert, et. a l. C.A. No.: K13C-05-006 RBY January 15, 2015

1 Enterprise was added as a Defe ndant by Order

dated August 12, 2013.

2 996 A.2d 1262, 1267 (Del. 2010).

3 Id. 3 against D efendants on May 6, 2013. 1 In defense o f the action, Def endant Covert claims she was struck fr om beh ind by an unknown v ehicle, causing her to rear-end the Plaintiff’s automobile. In support of its defens e, Defendan t Nationwide retained Camlin to provide an expert report regardin g the incide nt. This r eport wa s issued on A

ugust 29, 2014. De fendant Covert
moves to excludethis repor t by her Motion in L imine . Plainti ff joi ns Defen dant Nationwide in oppos ing this Motion. DISCUSSION By her Motion

in Lim ine, De fendant

Covert moves to exclude the expert report of Cam lin, Def

endant Na

tionw ide’s wi tness. D efendant Covert m oves pursua

nt to D.R. E. 702 , arguing that Mr. Cam lin’s opin ion is neithe r scientif ic, tec hnical, o r specializ ed, nor w ill it assis t the trie r of fac t. As a star ting point, this Court r

ecognizes the Dela

ware S uprem e Court’ s exposition

in Perry v. Berkley

regarding the proper role of a tria l court in
con templ ating D.R.E. 702 challenges: “ the trial court acts as a gatekeeper ” i n determ ining the admissibility of expert evidence. 2 The Court furthe r has “broad latitude” in ma

king such rul ings. 3 In Dela ware, the analy sis surround in g the admis sionof expert

testim ony has been larg ely dis tilled from D. R.E. 702, and theKnott v. Cov ert, et. a l. C.A. No.: K13C-05-006 RBY January 15, 2015

4 See M.G. Bancorp., Inc. v. LeBeau , 737 A.2d 513 (Del. 1999) (officially adopting Daubert as the correct interpretation of D.R.E. 702).

5 In re Asbestos Litigation , 911 A.2d 1176, 1199 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006).

6 Spence r v. W al-Mart St

ores East, LP , 930 A.2d 881, 889-890 (Del. 2007).

7 Spencer , 930 A.2d at 890 (excluding proffered expert testimony as the “expert opinions were more commons sense than formulated opinions...expert testimony is [not] required to argue to a jury that a pile of snow in a parking lot is going to melt”)(internal quotations omitted).

8 “if scie ntific, te chnical , or other

special ized knowle dge wil l assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fa ct in issue...” D.R.E. 702 (2001). 4 U.S. Supreme Court’ s decision in Daubert v. Merrell D ow Pharm aceuticals , Inc

. 4 D.R.E. 702 provides in relevant part that a witness may

testify as an expe rt, “ if scientific, technica l, or othe r special ized knowl edge will assist the t rier of f

act to understand

the evidenceor to deter

mine a fact in is sue... ” The fo cus of this first tier of analy sis has bee n charac terized a s a “r elevancy ” require ment –

mea ning that th e “evidence ha[s] a valid sci entific co nnection to the pertinent inquiry” or, more succinct ly, whether the ev idence “fit[s].” 5 Included i n this inquiry

is the distinction betweentestim ony wh ich is“ comm on sense,” and that

which “provide[s].. .additional understand

ing of the issues o f fact confro nting th e jury.” 6 Courts have held that when the jury is equally

competent to form

an opinion about the ultimate fact issues or the exper t’s testim ony is w ithin the comm on knowledge of the jury, the trial court should
exc lud e th e ex per t te sti mony. 7 Defenda ntCovert argues thatCamlin’s report provides nothing beyond what

a lay j uror could discern. Defenda nt Covert c ites only

the introductorypart of D.R.E. 702 8 , though the Co urt recog nizes also the questio n of the “reliability” of an exper t’sKnott v. Cov ert, et. a l. C.A. No.: K13C-05-006 RBY January 15, 2015

9 D.R.E. 702(2001); see also Price v. Blood Bank of Delaware, Inc., 790 A2d. 1203, 1210 (Del. 2002) (“D.R.E. 702 imposes a special obligation upon the trial judg e to ensure that any and all sc ientific

testimony ...is not on

ly r elevant , but reliable ”)(emphasis added)(internal quotation s omitted) ; Ward , 847 A.2d at 376 (“[b]oiled down to its essence, Daubert requires the Court to answer two fundamental questions before admitting expert testimony : (1) is the testimony relevant?; and (2) is the testimony reliable? ”) (emphasis added).

10 The Court notes that Delaware’s D.R.E. 702 standard includes a second level of expert admissibility analysis, “reliability,” which the De laware Supreme Court in Spencer has articulated as including a multi-pronged test: “( 1) whether scientific theory or technique can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether the the ory or tec hnique has been subjected to peer review a nd publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error and the existence and maintenance of standar ds contro lling the

techniqu e’s oper ation; and (4) whe

ther the techniqu e is generally accept ed.” 930 A.2d at 88 8-889 (in

ternal q uotations omitted); see also W

ard , 847 A.2d at 376 (“[b]oiled down to its essence, Daubert requires the Court to answer two fundamental questions before admitting expert testimony : (1) is the testimony relevant?; and (2) is the testim ony reliable? ”) (emphasis added). Holding that Camlin’s report fa ils the first level of analysis, the Court does not proceed with the second, multi-step inquiry

.

11 Defendant Covert’s Motion in Limine, at ¶4. 5 opinion:

a witness qu alified a s an exper t. ..may t estify ...in t

he form of an opinio n or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon suffic ient fact s or data, (2) the testim ony i s the produc t of relia ble princi ples and m

ethods, an d (3) the witness has applie d the princ iples and m ethods r el iably to the fact s of the case. 9 , 10 According to Defendant Covert, Camlin’s report is based upon

the “ statem ents and depositions o f Plainti ff and D efendant Covert, ” “th e photo gra phs o f Plai ntif f’s and Defendant Co vert’s vehic les,” and “the acci dent repo rt.” 11 From these m aterials , Caml in observed “ a slight scu ff m ark in the a pproxim ate center of t he rear bumper with slight scratches on the leading edge of the rear bumpe r in the ara of th e me etingKnott v. Cov ert, et. a l. C.A. No.: K13C-05-006 RBY January 15, 2015

12 Id., at ¶5.

13 930 A.2d 881 (Del. 2007).

14 Id. , at 890 (“expert testimony is [not] required to argue to a jury that a pile of snow in a parking lot is going to melt”).

15 Ward , 847 A.2d at 378.

16 In re Asbestos , 911 A.2d at 1199. 6 for the trunk li d. ” 12 Ca mlin further concluded that the damage to the r ear bumper could not have been caused by vehicular impact, as cl aimed by Plaintiff . It is De fendant

Covert’ s position tha

t these obse rvations a

re not “ scientifi c, techn ic a l and/or specializ ed,” and

could easi ly be gr

asped by a lay jury . As such , the testim ony is not in structiv e. Defenda ntCovert’ s point is we ll taken. In Spen cer v . Wal- Mart Stores

East, LP, 13 as in the case a

t b ar, the purported expert testimony of the witness, was more in line with “com

mon sense” than expertise. 14 Camlin’s note rega rding the lo cation of the scuff mark

on the rear of the car

is some thing “ within thecomm on knowledge of the jury,” and further something the jury is “equally com

petent to form an

opinion about.” 15 The jury, like Cam lin, is ca pable of reviewi ng the m aterials , for ex ample : the photographs, to determ

ine the posi tion of th e s cuff mark. Bereft of “helpfu lness,” Camlin’s opinion cannot be said to “assist the trier of fact t o understan d the issue o r to det ermin e a fa ct i n is sue ” as r equ ired by D.R.E. 702. 16 State d simpl y, Camlin’s report fail s the relev ancy test of th e admissibili ty analysis.. CONCLUSION The adm issibility of an expe rt opinion r ests, first, on a determ ination that

itKnott v. Cov ert, et. a l. C.A. No.: K13C-05-006 RBY January 15, 2015

7 is sci enti fic, an d beyon d the jury’s abi lity to formula te on its o wn. Camli n’s concl usio ns in his re port are ess enti ally common sens e, and well wi thin the ju ry’s ability to determ

ine. As such, the report is n either he lpful nor relevant. Defenda nt Covert’ s Motion in L imine is GRANTED

. IT IS SO ORDERED

. /s/ Rober t B. Youn g J.
RBY /l mc oc: Prothonotary cc: Counsel Opinion Di stribution File