Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2878 | June 24, 2020 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

R. Brian Woodward

Appellate Public Defender

Crown Point, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Tina L. Mann

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ralpheal Deleon Chambliss,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

June 24, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-2878

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable Diane Ross Boswell, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

45G03-1705-F5-43

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2878 | June 24, 2020 Page 2 of 10

Case Summary

[1] Ralpheal Deleon Chambliss (“Chambliss”) appeals his sentence, following a 

plea agreement, for making a false statement on a criminal information form, a 

Level 6 felony.1 We affirm.

Issues

[2] Chambliss raises two issues on appeal which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its sentencing discretion in 

its finding of aggravating factors.

II. Whether Chambliss’s sentence is inappropriate in light of 

the nature of the offense and Chambliss’s character.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In March of 2017, Chambliss went into Westforth Sporting Goods in Gary,

Indiana, with his nephew, Damon Hill, and the two shopped for guns. Hill

chose three guns, and Chambliss and Hill left the store without purchasing 

anything. Later, Hill gave Chambliss money which Chambliss used in March 

of 2017 to purchase a J.A. T-380 Jimenez Arms handgun—one of the three 

guns Hill had chosen previously—at Westforth Sporting Goods. To purchase 

the gun, Chambliss was required to, and did, fill out and sign ATF Form 4473. 

1

 Ind. Code § 35-47-2.5-12.
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Chambliss indicated on the form that he was purchasing the gun for himself 

when, in fact, he was not.2 On March 21, 2017, Hill used the gun purchased by 

Chambliss to shoot and kill C. B., one of Chambliss’s other nephews. 

[4] On March 30, 2017, Chambliss reported to the Merrillville Police Department 

that his handgun had been stolen. On April 6, 2017, the police asked 

Chambliss to give them a statement about his allegedly stolen gun. Chambliss

agreed and first told the police that he had purchased the gun because he was a 

security guard and needed it for his employment. Chambliss then admitted that 

he had bought the gun for Hill. 

[5] On May 2, 2017, the State charged Chambliss with use of false information to 

obtain a handgun, a Level 5 felony,3 and false informing, a Class B 

misdemeanor.4 On August 30, 2019, the charging information was amended to 

include a charge of making a false statement on a criminal history information 

form, a Level 6 felony. Chambliss subsequently entered into a written plea 

agreement with the State, under which he agreed to plead guilty to making a

false statement on a criminal history information form, a Level 6 felony, in 

exchange for the State dismissing the other two counts against him. The plea 

agreement allowed for argument of the parties and capped the aggregate 

2

 The form Chambliss signed is not in the record. However, Chambliss admits on appeal that he completed 

the form and indicated on it that “he was the intended recipient of the gun when in fact he was not.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 6.

3

 I.C. § 35-47-2-17.

4

 I.C. § 35-44.1-2-3(d)(1).
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sentence that could be imposed by the trial court at a maximum of eighteen 

months. At the August 30, 2019, guilty plea hearing, Chambliss admitted to a 

factual basis for the Level 6 felony.

[6] At Chambliss’s November 8, 2019, sentencing hearing, the trial court accepted 

Chambliss’s guilty plea to the Level 6 felony false statement on a criminal 

history information form, and the State dismissed the other two counts. The 

trial court sentenced Chambliss to eighteen months in the Department of 

Correction, to be served in Lake County Community Corrections with initial 

placement in the Kimbrough Work Release Program. The trial court 

recognized the defendant’s lack of criminal history to be a mitigating factor and 

“the nature and circumstances of the crime” to be an aggravating factor. 

Chambliss now appeals his sentence.

Discussion and Decision

Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing

[7] Chambliss maintains that the trial court erred in sentencing him.5 Sentencing 

decisions lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. Cardwell v. State, 895 

N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is 

5

 The State asserts that Chambliss has waived his sentencing challenge because he did not provide us with a 

record adequate to fully review the issues; specifically, it notes Chambliss did not file the transcript from the 

suppression hearing regarding police notes from an interview with Chambliss. However, Chambliss 

subsequently did provide that transcript, which did not contain information necessary to our review. We find 

no waiver here.
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“clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the 

court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn 

therefrom.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation 

omitted), trans. denied. A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it does 

any of the following:

(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a 

sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a 

sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating 

factors if any[ ]—but the record does not support the reasons;” 

(3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are 

clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” 

or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”

Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-491 (Ind. 2007), clarified on 

reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). So long as a sentence is within the statutory 

range, the trial court may impose it without regard to the existence of 

aggravating or mitigating factors. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 489. However, if 

the trial court does find the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors, it 

must give a statement of its reasons for selecting the sentence it imposes. Id. at 

490. But the relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found, or 

those which should have been found, is not subject to review for abuse of 

discretion, Gross, 22 N.E.3d at 869, and a trial court is under no obligation to 

explain why a proposed mitigator does not exist or why the court found it to be 

insignificant, Sandleben v. State, 22 N.E.3d 782, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. 

denied.
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[8] The sentencing range for a Level 6 felony is from six months to two-and-a-half 

years, with an advisory sentence of one year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). The trial 

court imposed an eighteen-month sentence on Chambliss and, in its sentencing 

statement, found his lack of criminal history to be a mitigating factor and the 

nature and circumstances of his crime to be an aggravator. Specifically, as to 

the latter, the trial court stated it was an aggravating factor that Chambliss “was 

fully aware of his intentions to purchase a gun for someone who had a criminal 

history.” Appealed Order at 1. Chambliss first contends that the court was not 

permitted to consider that aggravator as it was a “material element of the 

offense.” Appellant’s Br. at 9. However, the offense to which Chambliss pled 

guilty and for which he was convicted is only that he knowingly made a 

“materially false statement” on the form used to purchase a firearm. I.C. § 35-

47-2.5-12. That offense does not specify what the false information must be. 

Therefore, the type of false statement made—i.e., that the gun was bought for 

the purchaser when in fact it was knowingly bought for someone else with a 

known criminal history—is not a material element of the crime of which he was 

convicted. 

[9] Chambliss next contends that there was no factual basis in the record to support 

the aggravator upon which the trial court relied; i.e., that he was aware he was 

purchasing a gun for someone who had a criminal history. However, the 

record shows that Hill gave Chambliss money to purchase a gun for Hill and 

Chambliss did so. From those facts the trial court could reasonably infer that 

Chambliss knew there was some reason why Hill legally could not purchase the 
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gun himself. The fact that Chambliss chose to purchase the gun for Hill despite 

that knowledge is a permissible aggravating factor supported by the record.6 

See, e.g., Caraway v. State, 959 N.E.2d 847, (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that, 

although a trial court may not use a material element of the offense as an 

aggravating circumstance, it may find the nature and circumstances of the 

offense to be an aggravating circumstance), trans. denied. And we will not weigh 

the relative weight or value the court decided to attribute to that permissible 

aggravating factor. Gross, 22 N.E.3d at 869. The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in imposing the eighteen-month sentence that was within the 

statutory range for the crime committed.

Appellate Rule 7(B)

[10] Chambliss contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of 

the offense and his character. Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana 

Constitution “authorize[] independent appellate review and revision of a 

sentence imposed by the trial court.” Roush v. State, 875 N.E.2d 801, 812 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2007) (alteration in original). This appellate authority is implemented 

through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Id. Revision of a sentence under Rule 

7(B) requires the appellant to demonstrate that his sentence is “inappropriate in 

6

 To the extent that aggravating circumstance was a material element of one of the dismissed charges against 

Chambliss, it is nevertheless permissible for the trial court to consider it. See, e.g., Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 

1134, 1145 (Ind. 2013) (holding that, if a plea bargain lacks language limiting the facts a trial court can 

consider, it is not necessary for a trial court to “turn a blind eye to the facts of the incident that brought the 

defendant before them”).
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light of the nature of his offenses and his character.”

7

 Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B);

see also Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We assess 

the trial court’s recognition or non-recognition of aggravators and mitigators as 

an initial guide to determining whether the sentence imposed was 

inappropriate. Gibson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 

However, “a defendant must persuade the appellate court that his or her 

sentence has met th[e] inappropriateness standard of review.” Roush, 875 

N.E.2d at 812 (alteration original). 

[11] Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate 

sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court’s judgment “should 

receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. The principal 

role of appellate review is to attempt to “leaven the outliers.” Id. at 1225. 

Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on 

“our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the 

damage done to others, and myriad other facts that come to light in a given 

case.” Id. at 1224. The question is not whether another sentence is more 

appropriate, but rather whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. 

7

 The parties disagree about whether this Court has interpreted Rule 7(B) as requiring a defendant to 

establish inappropriateness in light of both the nature of the offense and the character of the offender or only 

one of those two prongs. Different panels of this Court have reached different conclusions on that issue. 

Compare, e.g., Landske v. State, 19A-CR-2528, 2020 WL 2479704, at *4 (Ind. Ct. App. May 14, 2020)

(defendant must establish entitlement to relief under both prongs), with, e.g., Denham v. State, 142 N.E.3d 514, 

517 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (defendant need only establish entitlement to relief under one prong). However, we 

do not address that conflict as Chambliss has failed to establish that he is entitled to relief under either prong 

of Rule 7(B). 
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State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court 

“prevail[s] unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive 

light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and 

lack of brutality) and the defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous 

traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 

111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[12] Chambliss contends that the nature of his offense does not support his one-anda-half-year sentence. We disagree. When considering the nature of the offense, 

we look at the defendant’s actions in comparison to the elements of the offense. 

Cannon v. State, 99 N.E.3d 274, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). Not only was 

Chambliss’s underlying offense a crime of dishonesty, but he continued to lie 

after the fact by reporting the gun as stolen from him and telling the police he 

had bought the gun for himself for his work. And there is no compelling 

evidence showing any particular restraint in the commission of Chambliss’s

crime or otherwise casting the offense in a better light. Rather, Chambliss lied 

on a required firearm form and knowingly helped a person who could not 

otherwise legally obtain a weapon obtain a gun. Furthermore, the “damage 

done to others” as an ultimate consequence of Chambliss’s crime was death.

Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. That is, Hill used the gun Chambliss bought him 

to kill a person. We see nothing in the nature of this offense that suggests the 

sentence—which is within the statutory boundaries and is a year less than the 

maximum sentence allowed—is too harsh for the crime committed.
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[13] Chambliss also maintains that the sentence is inappropriate in light of his 

character. However, Chambliss has shown himself to be a dishonest person, 

both in the offense for which he was convicted and in his later actions 

attempting to cover up his crime. Moreover, Chambliss was given the 

opportunity for pre-trial work release rather than incarceration, but that 

placement was revoked for his failure to abide by the work release program 

rules on three separate occasions within a thirty-day period of time. 

Chambliss’s dishonesty and repeated failure to follow rules of the work release 

program reflect poorly on his character. 

[14] Although Chambliss points out that he is married, a father, and employed, he 

has not pointed to evidence compelling enough to overcome the deference we 

owe to the trial court regarding its sentence. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

Conclusion

[15] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Chambliss to an 

eighteen-month sentence that was within the statutory range for the crime he 

committed. And his sentence is not inappropriate given the nature of his 

offense and his character.

[16] Affirmed.

Crone, J., and Altice, J., concur.