IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs May 21, 2003

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JEFFREY DOUGLAS STRATTON

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Blount County

No. C-13828, 13829 D. Kelly Thomas, Jr., Judge

No. E2002-02485-CCA-R3-CD

 July 22, 2003

Defendant, Jeffrey Douglas Stratton, was indicted on two counts of burglary. Defendant entered

guilty pleas to both counts. Defendant was sentenced to two years for each conviction, to be served

concurrently with each other and consecutively to his sentence for a prior conviction. Defendant

contends that the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of incarceration. After reviewing the

record, we conclude that a sentence of confinement was supported by the record. The judgment of

the trial court is affirmed. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed

THOMAS T. WOODALL, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOE G. RILEY and JAMES

CURWOOD WITT, JR., JJ., joined.

Julie A. Rice, Knoxville, Tennessee (on appeal) and Raymond Mack Garner, District Public

Defender; and Stacy Nordquist, Assistant Public Defender, Maryville, Tennessee (at trial) for the

appellant, Jeffrey Douglas Stratton.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Braden H. Boucek, Assistant Attorney General;

Michael L. Flynn, District Attorney General; and Edward P. Bailey, Jr., Assistant District Attorney

General, for the appellee, the State of Tennessee.

OPINION

At the September 23, 2002, sentencing hearing, Defendant testified that on the date of the

offense, he got off work at approximately 12:00 noon and went to the Party Pub, where he played

cards and drank alcohol. He left the Party Pub at 12:00 midnight. He walked around the corner and

entered Bill’s Hair to use the restroom. Defendant “got on the computer, just messing around. Had

all the lights on and everything.” Defendant did not remember whether he took anything from Bill’s

Hair. He testified that “a lot of my recollection of what happened is what I’ve been told [by police

officers].” He left Bill’s Hair and went inside Just So Decorating through the back door, which was

open. Defendant “just walked in there and got on the computer. Just – I mean, just basically, you
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know, drinking still.” When police officers arrested Defendant, he was standing against the back

of the building. Defendant did not attempt to run. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, and

he refused to answer any questions and requested the presence of a lawyer. 

Defendant entered guilty pleas to both offenses as a Range I standard offender. At the

conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a two- year sentence for each conviction

and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently with each other, but consecutively to his

sentence for a prior conviction. The trial court emphasized Defendant’s extensive criminal history,

finding that the presumption favoring alternative sentencing was “overcome by the fact that these

offenses were committed while you were on bond for several other felony offenses.” The trial court

further found that Defendant’s potential for rehabilitation was poor, stating that “[Defendant has]

not been able to get a hold on [his alcohol] problem, in spite of being involved in some treatment

[programs], and continue[s] to commit crimes.” The trial court therefore ordered Defendant’s

sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. 

Defendant complains that the trial court erred by refusing to order alternative sentencing.

Our review of a defendant’s sentence is de novo with a presumption that the trial court’s

determinations are correct. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d) (1997); State v. Imfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698,

704 (Tenn. 2002). For this presumption to apply to the trial court’s determinations, however, there

must be an affirmative showing in the record that the trial court considered sentencing principles and

all relevant facts and circumstances. State v. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 540, 543-44 (Tenn. 1999). 

If the trial court has imposed a lawful sentence by following the statutory sentencing

procedure, has given due consideration to the factors and sentencing principles, and has made

findings of fact adequately supported by the record, this Court may not modify the sentence even if

it would have preferred a different result. State v. Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1991). However, if the trial court fails to comply with the statutory directives, our review of the

sentence is de novo without a presumption of correctness. State v. Winfield, 23 S.W.3d 279, 283

(Tenn. 2000). 

When determining a defendant’s suitability for alternative sentencing, the sentencing court

may consider the following factors: (1) whether confinement is necessary to protect society by

restraining a defendant who has a long history of criminal conduct; (2) whether confinement is

necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense; (3) whether confinement is

particularly suited to provide an effective deterrent to others likely to commit similar offenses; (4)

whether measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently been applied

unsuccessfully to the defendant; and (5) whether the defendant has poor potential for rehabilitation.

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1) (1997); State v. Housewright, 982 S.W.2d 354, 356–57 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1997). 

Although a Range I standard offender convicted of a Class D felony is normally presumed

to be a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing, the trial court correctly concluded that the

presumption was overcome by Defendant’s lengthy criminal history and his poor potential for
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rehabilitation. This determination is supported by the record. At the time of sentencing, Defendant

was thirty-five years old. Defendant testified at the sentencing hearing that he began drinking

alcohol at the age of fifteen. That is also the age at which Defendant’s extensive record of criminal

offenses began. The presentence report reveals that Defendant has forty-three prior arrests and

convictions, including seven felony convictions for forgery in 2001, four prior convictions for

driving under the influence of an intoxicant, and numerous prior misdemeanor convictions, many

of which are alcohol related. Defendant’s previous attempts at rehabilitation have failed.

Furthermore, Defendant committed the felony offense in this case while he was free on appeal bond

for his prior felony convictions. The trial court properly sentenced Defendant. 

Defendant also argues that mitigating factor (11), that he committed the offense under such

unusual circumstances that it is unlikely that a sustained intent to violate the law motivated the

criminal conduct, weighs against incarceration. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113(11) (1997).

Defendant argues that his “exaggerated state of intoxication combined with a need to urinate”

qualifies as an “unusual circumstance.” We disagree. Defendant is not entitled to relief on this

issue. 

CONCLUSION

After a careful review of the record before us, we conclude that Defendant received an

appropriate sentence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

___________________________________ 

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE