# Vietnam - United States Department of State

- Vietnam HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Vietnam				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Vietnam																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuse Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Vietnam in the past year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of:  arbitrary or unlawful killings by the government; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and punishment by government agents; involuntary or coercive medical or psychological practices; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners; transnational repression against individuals in another country; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, and the enforcement of criminal libel laws; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental and civil society organizations; restrictions of religious freedom; restrictions on freedom of movement, including exit bans and denial of issuance of passports; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; serious government restrictions on human rights organizations; trafficking in persons; and systematic restrictions on workers’ freedom of association.The government occasionally took corrective action, including prosecutions against officials who committed human rights abuses, but security authorities and other state officials frequently acted with impunity.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.  Media reported at least five deaths in custody.  Authorities stated one died of “corporal punishment” by a security officer and two died due to medical problems.On January 5, Dinh Diem, a pastor held prisoner at No. 6 Detention Center in Nghe An Province, died after hospitalization.  Authorities attributed his death to a medical problem.  Diem’s family disputed this finding and told media he had numerous bruises on his body.On May 25, Nguyen Tan Duong died while in the custody of Bu Dang District public security authorities in Binh Phuoc Province.  State media reported Duong was detained with two other suspects in the early morning May 25.  By 10 a.m. Duong was declared dead; when his body was taken to the hospital, it was covered in bruises on the head, limbs, and buttocks.There were reports that authorities harassed and intimidated families who questioned the official determinations of cause of death.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution and law prohibited torture, violence, coercion, corporal punishment, or any form of treatment harming the body and health, or the honor and dignity of persons detained or incarcerated.  Nevertheless, detainees commonly reported mistreatment and torture by security officers during arrest, interrogation, and detention.Activists reported Ministry of Public Security officials assaulted political prisoners to extract confessions or used other means to induce written confessions, including instructing fellow prisoners to assault them.  Abusive treatment was not limited to activists or persons involved in politics.  Human rights monitoring groups issued multiple reports of security forces using excessive force while on duty and investigators allegedly torturing detainees.In February, human rights groups reported Dak Lak security officers detained and physically assaulted two ethnic minority H’mong leaders from Subdivision 179 in Lam Dong Province after the leaders spoke to foreign diplomats.  Similarly, on June 23, human rights groups reported authorities in Soc Trang Province detained a Khmer Krom activist for disseminating UN publications on human rights.  Security officers reportedly assaulted him while he was in custody.Authorities held at least four activists at institutions for the mentally ill as a form of punishment or coercion, according to human rights groups.  Family members of prisoners and former prisoners also reported officials of medical institutes performed unnecessary medical procedures on prisoners and detainees.Le Anh Hung reported medical staff and patients beat him during his detention at National Psychiatric Hospital No. 1 in Hanoi from 2019-2023.  He reported staff injected him with a drug that caused hallucinations and lethargy and tied him to a metal bed for resisting injections.Although impunity in the security forces was a significant problem, and police, prosecutors, and government oversight agencies seldom investigated specific reports of mistreatment, authorities did punish or prosecute some police and security officers for abuse of authority.  On July 4, My Hao Town police suspended a Hoa Phong Commune public security officer, Tong Hong Nui, for three months during an investigation into his alleged July 3 beating of a detainee while on duty at the public security office.In a small number of cases, the government held police and other security officials responsible for a death in custody, typically several years after the death.  Despite guidance from the Supreme People’s Court to charge police and other security officers responsible for deaths in custody with murder, officers who were held responsible typically faced lesser charges.  Public security authorities conducted their own internal affairs investigations under the supervision of prosecutors to determine whether police and other security officers were responsible for deaths in custody.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prison conditions varied substantially from province to province and by prison.  Former convicts, family members, and lawyers reported that most had austere conditions but were generally not life threatening.Abusive Physical Conditions:  Insufficient and unclean food, inadequate health care, overcrowding, lack of access to potable water, poor sanitation, and excessive heat during the summer remained serious problems.  Prison officials failed to prevent prisoner-on-prisoner violence.There were reports many prisoners suffered from deteriorating health due to psychological abuse, poor diet, and denial of medical treatment.  For example, authorities at Gia Trung Prison denied Nguyen Truong Ton access to adequate healthcare for severe medical conditions related to his eyesight and post-COVID-19 complications, according to a human rights NGO.Authorities placed prisoners in solitary confinement for standard periods of three months, reportedly only after less rigorous punishments had been imposed.Families of many political prisoners expressed concerns regarding poor detention conditions and health-care services for aged and weak prisoners.  Authorities often delayed or denied requests for medical care outside the prison system.  There were reports of inmates dying in custody, or shortly after their release, due to the poor prison conditions and lack of access to adequate medical care.Administration:  There was no system by which prisoners could file uncensored complaints.  The Ministry of Public Security reported prisoners could file formal complaints with a prosecutor’s office.  These, however, had to go through the same prison officials who were often the focus of the complaint.Independent Monitoring:  The Ministry of Public Security, the government entity that managed prisons, generally did not allow access to independent domestic or international monitors, although at times it permitted visits by diplomats.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The constitution prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention, but authorities did not respect this prohibition.  The law allowed the government to arrest and detain persons “until the investigation finishes” for particularly serious crimes, including national security cases.  Detainees or their representatives had no right to challenge the lawfulness of an arrest before a court.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						By law, authorities generally required a warrant approved by a prosecutor or a decision from a court to arrest a suspect.  The law also allowed authorities to hold an individual without a warrant in “urgent circumstances,” such as when evidence existed a person was preparing to commit a crime or when police caught a person in the act of committing a crime.  Human rights lawyers, however, claimed that detention without warrants was a common practice.  There were numerous instances in which activists were taken into custody without an arrest warrant.In addition to actual arrest, lawyers and human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported that, in many cases, authorities “invited” individuals to present themselves at public security offices without being given a clear reason.  These individuals could be held for hours, questioned, or pressured to write or sign statements.The law allowed the investigating agency to hold a suspect for 36 hours without an arrest warrant.  The investigating agency had to issue an emergency custody order within 12 hours of the arrest, and then had to notify the prosecutors within 12 hours of issuing the emergency custody order.  The prosecutor was required to approve or disapprove the arrest within 12 hours of receiving notice from the investigating agency.  The investigating agency could extend custody twice, each time for three days, with the approval of the prosecutors.  Especially in politically motivated cases, these procedures were not applied consistently or strictly.Although the criminal procedure code set time limits for detention while under investigation, the law allowed the Procurator General of the Supreme People’s Procuracy (prosecutor) to decide on temporary detention of an individual “until the investigation finishes” in cases of particularly serious crimes, including national security cases.While a suspect was detained during investigation, authorities at times denied family visits to those arrested on national security charges or in politically motivated cases not related to national security charges.  The law allowed for bail in the form of money or property as a measure to replace pretrial detention, but it was seldom granted.The law required authorities to inform persons held in custody, or accused of or charged with a crime, of their legal rights, including the right to an attorney within three days of arrest.  By law the government was required to assign a lawyer to a criminal defendant in cases in which the defendant was charged with offenses punishable by death, was a child or person with physical disabilities, or was deemed mentally incompetent, or if the defendant (or their lawful representative) did not seek legal assistance.Despite the law, authorities used bureaucratic delays to deny timely access to legal counsel.  In politically sensitive national security cases, the government routinely prohibited defense lawyers’ access to their clients until after officials completed their investigations and formally charged the suspect.  At times authorities only permitted attorneys access to their clients or the evidence against them immediately before the case went to trial, denying them adequate time to prepare a defense.  Investigators reportedly coerced detainees not to hire certain lawyers or to accept lawyers assigned by authorities.  There were also reports of authorities forcing lawyers not to defend activists or to refrain from providing substantive arguments and evidence in court in favor of activist clients.Political dissident Tran Van Bang was sentenced to eight years in prison and three years on probation for “propaganda against the State.”  One of two lawyers who defended Bang in the first-instance trial withdrew from the appeal trial, citing pressure from an undisclosed source.Detainees had the right to notify family members of their arrest, but it was not always observed.  Although police generally informed families of detainees’ whereabouts, the Ministry of Public Security in many cases held bloggers, activists, and others suspected of political or national security offenses incommunicado for extended periods.  Authorities arrested Hoang Van Vuong on January 3, but only informed his family four months after his arrest.  Vuong’s trial occurred on April 18 without a defense lawyer or his family present.Arbitrary Arrest:  Arbitrary arrest and detention, particularly for political activists and individuals protesting land seizures or other matters deemed politically sensitive, remained a serious problem.Authorities subjected activists and civil society organizers to varying degrees of arbitrary detention in their residences, in vehicles, at public security offices, at “social protection centers,” or at local government offices.Authorities detained Phan Tat Thanh July 5-12 without a warrant, according to his family.  On July 25, police provided the family a temporary custody order authorizing his detention from July 13.On July 31, authorities took Le Xuan Dieu to a public security office in Ho Chi Minh City for questioning without a warrant.  Dieu’s family reported that authorities beat Dieu during the interrogation, resulting in bruises on his face, soft tissue injuries, and a cracked rib.  On August 1, authorities forced Dieu to admit ownership of two Facebook accounts and fined him 7.5 million dong ($300).  Authorities also forced Dieu to sign a pledge to not disclose information about his questioning and assaults, and to not write about politics on his Facebook accounts, according to his family.Pretrial Detention:  The maximum pretrial detention was nominally 23 months in cases of “particularly serious offenses.”  Authorities, however, ignored requirements governing pretrial detention with impunity, and police and prosecutors used lengthy pretrial detention to punish or pressure human rights defenders to confess to crimes, activists claimed.  On August 30, political activist Le Anh Hung was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment “for abusing democratic freedoms,” after being held in pretrial detention for four years.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The law provided for an independent judiciary, but the judiciary was effectively under the control of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV).  There were credible reports of endemic corruption through the abuse of political influence and bribery and of judicial inefficiency that significantly compromised judicial independence.In July the Supreme People’s Procuracy indicted the former chief judge of Bac Lieu People’s Court, Chau Van My, for soliciting bribes.  According to the indictment, My coerced a young woman defendant to give him money and sex on numerous occasions in exchange for a more lenient sentence in a trial over which My presided.Most, if not all, judges were members of the CPV and were screened by it and local officials during their selection process to determine their suitability for the bench.  The party’s authority was particularly notable in high-profile cases and when authorities charged a person with corruption or challenging or harming the party or the state.  Defense lawyers routinely complained that, in many cases, it appeared judges determined the guilt of defendants prior to the trial.Harassment of defense attorneys continued during and after trials.  In March, Long An Province authorities reportedly summoned five lawyers who defended members of a religious community because of their public discussions about the case on social media.The law required attorneys to violate attorney-client privilege in national security cases or other serious crimes by revealing the content of attorney-client discussions to investigators and in court.																Trial Procedures						While the constitution provided for the right to a fair and public trial, this right was not evenly enforced.  Judges presiding over politically sensitive trials generally did not permit the defense to exercise their legal rights.The law stated that defendants were innocent until proven guilty.  Defendants’ right to prompt, detailed information concerning the charges against them was rarely respected.  Defendants’ right to a timely trial was ignored with impunity, and although trials generally were open to the public, judges closed trials or strictly limited attendance in sensitive cases.  There were several cases, particularly of political activists, in which authorities denied requests for relatives or other observers to attend trials despite the trials being ostensibly open to the public.The court sometimes denied suspects the right to their own choice of attorney and assigned one.  Defendants’ right to communicate with a lawyer when on trial for a criminal charge that could result in a 15-year or longer sentence, including capital cases, was often not respected.Although the defense had the right to cross-examine witnesses, there were multiple instances in which the defense did not know which prosecution witnesses would be called and were not allowed to cross-examine those witnesses or otherwise challenge their statements.  In many political trials, the defense was not allowed to examine or review prosecution evidence.  A defendant had the right to present a defense, but the law did not expressly state the defendant had the right to call witnesses; lawyers were discouraged from calling witnesses or witnesses were barred from testifying.Defendants’ right not to be compelled to testify or confess guilt was not respected.  The law required video or audio recording of interrogations during the investigation, prosecution, and sentencing phases of cases.  In multiple criminal trials, authorities used such videos to manipulate the court and public perception of the suspect and the case, according to human rights activists.In most trials defense attorneys were given time to address the court and question their clients.  In trials involving individuals charged under national security articles, judges occasionally silenced defense lawyers who were making arguments on behalf of their clients.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						Based on reports by media, NGOs, and other observers, authorities as of October 31 held at least 187 persons for political or human rights activism, including 162 convicts and 25 in pretrial detention.  According to media and human rights groups, from January 1 to October 31, authorities detained 25 individuals and convicted 23 who were exercising internationally recognized human rights such as the freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, and association.  Most of these arrests and convictions were linked to online blogging, and defendants were charged with “making, storing, spreading, or propagating information, materials, or items” for the purpose of “opposing” the state and “abusing democratic freedom.”NGOs said in prior years authorities at times subjected political detainees to examination and treatment of alleged mental illness.According to family members of prisoners, prison officials often held political prisoners in small groups separate from the general inmate population and treated them differently.  In many cases, political prisoners’ daily schedules differed from those of the general inmate population, and they were not afforded the opportunity to leave their cells for work or interaction with the general prison population.  Some political prisoners enjoyed better material conditions than nonpolitical prisoners but were subjected to more psychological harassment.  In other cases, political prisoners were harassed by prison authorities and other inmates, the latter sometimes at the instigation of officials.  Officials subjected some political prisoners to longer periods of solitary confinement than the three months given to other prisoners.In some cases, rations appeared to be more limited for political prisoners than others.  Former political prisoners reported they received only two small bowls of rice and vegetables daily, often mixed with foreign matter such as insects or stones.  Some complained prisoners who were on a diet for medical reasons could not get enough suitable food.  Family members of many imprisoned activists who were ill claimed medical treatment was inadequate and resulted in long-term health complications.Political prisoners and their family members reported prison authorities at times revoked, reduced, denied, or delayed visitation rights and did not allow visitors to provide items to family members.  Family members of political prisoners reported authorities frequently limited them to two telephone calls per month, each normally five to seven minutes in length.  Prison authorities often held political prisoners far from their homes, making family visits difficult, and routinely did not inform family members of prison transfers.  Authorities often did not allow political prisoners in pretrial detention to meet their families and lawyers until the investigation finished, and in some cases political prisoners could not meet family members until after their appellate hearings.  For example, authorities denied family visits to political prisoner Bui Tuan Lam for two months after his appeal on August 31.  Prison authorities denied family visitation in September without justification and later transferred Lam to a prison away from his home province on October 20 without informing the family.  Lam’s family learned of the transfer only when Lam called home on October 27 from the new prison.Courts routinely handed down severe sentences to the most prominent activists or those linked to overseas groups.Amnesty:  On May 12, the government granted amnesty to environmental activist Nguy Thi Khanh, approximately six months prior to her expected release date.On July 10, authorities released and deported Australian citizen Chau Van Kham, reportedly a member of the banned group Viet Tan.  In 2019 he was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment on a subversion charge.On September 9, authorities amnestied social advocate Mai Phan Loi, approximately 18 months prior to his expected release date.																										f. Transnational Repression										Extraterritorial Killing, Kidnapping, Forced Returns, or Other Violence or Threats of Violence:  In April, Duong Van Thai, a blogger who fled Vietnam to Thailand in 2019, went missing in Bangkok, according to his family.  Although Ha Tinh provincial authorities announced they detained a man named Duong Van Thai on April 14 for “illegally crossing the border,” NGOs and media reported Thai was abducted by Vietnamese authorities in Thailand and forcibly returned to Vietnam.  The Ministry of Public Security stated Thai was accused of distributing antistate propaganda; as of December, he was in detention.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										By law all land belonged to the government (“all the people of Vietnam”), which granted considerable decision-making authority for land pricing, allocation, and reclamation to local people’s committees and people’s councils, whose decisions regarding land often lacked transparency and due process.Disputes over land expropriations for development projects remained a significant source of public grievance.  Many individuals whose land the government forcibly seized protested at government offices for unaddressed complaints.Expropriation of land owned by ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands was common.  Preferential government treatment for domestic and foreign companies that invested in highland areas populated predominantly by ethnic minorities as well as government-supported infrastructure and agricultural development programs in those areas tended to benefit nonindigenous residents.The government prohibited class-action lawsuits against government ministries, thus rendering ineffective joint complaints in land rights disputes.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The law prohibited arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, home, or correspondence, but the government at times violated them.By law, authorities needed warrants to enter homes forcibly, but Ministry of Public Security officers regularly entered or surveilled homes, particularly of activists, without legal authority.  They often intimidated residents with threats of repercussions for failure to allow entry.On March 14, members of the Zen Hermitage on the Edge of the Universe reported authorities broke into their compound without a warrant and forced some members to go to the public security office for interrogation.  On July 26, authorities forcefully entered the compound without a warrant again; they conducted a search and filmed the prayer hall.In late 2022 and early 2023, local authorities in northern provinces such as Cao Bang, Bac Can, Tuyen Quang, and Thai Nguyen without warrants broke into residences of the followers of Duong Van Minh (who died in 2021).  They reportedly destroyed altars and replaced Duong Van Minh decorations with Ho Chi Minh portraits and national flags.Without legal warrants authorities regularly opened and censored targeted private mail, confiscated packages and letters, and monitored telephone conversations, email, text messages, blogs, and fax transmissions.  The government cut telephone lines and interrupted cell phone and internet service of several political activists and their family members.The Ministry of Public Security maintained a system of household registration and block wardens to monitor unlawful activity.  The ministry closely monitored individuals engaged in or suspected of engaging in unauthorized political activities.Activists and their family members reported harassment by provincial authorities.  Representatives from state-run organizations and progovernment groups visited activists’ residences and attempted to intimidate them into supporting government policies, according to social media and activists’ reports.  Family members of activists also reported numerous incidents of physical harassment, intimidation, and questioning by Ministry of Public Security officials.On March 30, Ho Chi Minh City authorities asked Nguyen Thi Hue, mother of imprisoned political prisoner Huynh Duc Thanh Binh, to report for questioning on April 4.  At the police station, Hue reported the head of ward police and five city police told her to encourage her son to plead guilty and threatened her with prosecution if she continued to meet with monks from the independent Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam.The family of Bui Tuan Lam (also known as “Green Onion Bae,” a social media commentator) reported authorities surrounded their house three days before Lam’s public trial for “propaganda against the State” on May 25.  After the trial, a group of security officers physically assaulted Lam’s wife and his brothers then detained them for several hours at the Hoa Cuong Bac Ward police station, Hai Chau District, according to the family and a diplomat who attempted to attend the trial.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The constitution and law provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media; however, the government did not respect these rights, and laws specifically encroached on freedom of expression.  The government also continued to use broad national security and antidefamation provisions in the law to restrict freedom of expression.  Such provisions established crimes such as “sabotaging the infrastructure of socialism,” “sowing divisions between religious and nonreligious people,” and “propagandizing against the state” as serious offenses against national security.  The law also expressly forbade “taking advantage of democratic freedoms and rights to violate the interests of the state or lawful rights and interests of organizations or individuals.”Freedom of Expression:  The government restricted speech that criticized individual government leaders or the party, promoted political pluralism or multiparty democracy, or questioned policies on sensitive matters, such as human rights, religious freedom, sovereignty disputes with the People’s Republic of China, or coercive land seizure.  Authorities regularly questioned, imposed fines, and prosecuted individuals for speech deemed unacceptable.On July 11, Lam Dong Province authorities arrested Duong Tuan Ngoc for “spreading information against the state.”  State media reported on July 21 that Ngoc posted and shared articles and video clips with content that “distorted reality, defamed the people’s administration, slandered the socialist regime in Vietnam, and insulted leader Ho Chi Minh.”On August 8, a court in Huong Khe District, Ha Tinh Province, sentenced Hoang Thi Son and Thai Thi Be to 15 months in jail for “abusing democratic freedoms.”  According to local authorities, the two individuals produced and shared on social media complaints and reports about land seizures implicating local officials in corruption and wrongdoings.Authorities prevented the display of the flag of the Republic of Vietnam, the former government in southern Vietnam.Foreign academic professionals temporarily working at universities in the country could generally discuss nonpolitical topics widely and freely in classes, but government observers regularly attended classes taught by both foreigners and nationals.The government prohibited any public criticism of the CPV and state policy, including by independent scientific and technical organizations, even when the criticism was presented to a purely academic audience.  The government exerted influence over exhibits, music, and other cultural activities by requiring numerous authorizations.Violence and Harassment:  Independent journalists faced restrictions on freedom of movement, other forms of harassment, and physical attacks if they reported on sensitive topics.  The government also monitored journalists’ meetings and communications.  The government punished journalists for failing to self-censor, including by revoking journalists’ press credentials.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media:  Although the law allowed organizations to run their own media outlets, CPV-, government-, and party-controlled mass media organizations exercised legal authority over all major print, broadcast, online, and electronic media, primarily through the Ministry of Information and Communications under the overall guidance of the CPV Information and Education Commission.The government could fine journalists and newspapers for failing to cite their sources of information or for using “documents and materials from organizations and personal letters and materials from individuals, without clearly stating the sources of such information.”  The law allowed the government to punish publishers if they published false information or content the government deemed objectionable.On July 14, the Ministry of Information and Communications suspended publication of the digital magazine Zing News, fined it 243.5 million dong ($10,200), and revoked its press operating license.  The suspension came after an investigation by the ministry; the ministry ruled the magazine did not “conform to the principles and purposes of the operating license” and “published and broadcast false information that caused serious impact.”Authorities frequently intervened directly with media to dictate or censor a story, and permitted media outlets to report only on predetermined topics; the Ministry of Information and Communication fined outlets that reported unapproved political and socioeconomic news.  Pervasive self-censorship, including among independent journalists and bloggers, due to the threat of dismissal and possible arrest, assisted the party and government to control media content.Media independent of government authority operated on a limited basis online, primarily via blogs and social media, but independent journalists faced government harassment.Journalists employed by foreign-based media outlets operated under significant restrictions.  For example, foreign journalists required formal permission to travel outside Hanoi, and “live” foreign television programming was required to run on a 30- to 60-minute delay to enable content monitoring.The law limited satellite television access to senior officials, foreigners, luxury hotels, and some members of the press, but persons throughout the country accessed foreign programming via home satellite equipment or cable.Viewers reported interruption of coverage of various commentaries, documentaries, and movies on human rights incidents in the country, the Vietnam War, the Cold War, the Soviet era, or reports involving trade tensions.Libel/Slander Laws:  Defamation was a criminal offense, and the laws were enforced, especially against critics of the Communist Party and government.National Security:  The law provided for significant fines against journalists, newspapers, and online media that published or broadcast information deemed harmful to national interests or for disseminating information considered to distort history and the revolution’s achievements.  In some cases, these “violations” could lead to criminal proceedings.  No such cases were reported as of September, but editors noted that publications and journalists had to be careful of national security laws, contributing to self-censorship.Citing laws protecting national security, police arrested and ordered journalists to restrict criticism of government policies or officials.																Internet Freedom						The government restricted and disrupted access to the internet and censored online content.  The law imposed criminal sentences for online expression, and authorities routinely monitored online communications.  The government limited licensed internet service providers to fully or substantially state-controlled companies.  The government monitored Facebook and other social media and punished those who used the internet to organize protests or publish content critical of the government.The government blocked websites it deemed politically or culturally inappropriate, including sites operated by overseas Vietnamese political groups in addition to the websites of Radio Free Asia, Voice of America, the BBC Vietnamese news service, and 88 Project.  State-owned internet service providers routinely blocked domestic Vietnamese-language websites that contained content criticizing the CPV or promoting political reform.  According to Nikkei Asia, an organization that tracked online censorship, half of its 1,000 tested sites in 2022 were inaccessible in the country.  Websites barred were mostly related to politics (33 percent), news outlets (27 percent), and human rights (15 percent).A regulation compelled owners of all websites and social networking sites to cooperate with the Ministry of Information and Communications to prevent the spread of “bad, toxic news.”Another rule required all companies and organizations operating websites providing content on “politics, economics, culture, and society” or operating social networks, including blogging platforms, to register with the government.  Such companies and organizations were required to locate at least one server in the country to facilitate government requests for data or other information and to store posted information for 90 days and certain metadata for up to two years.The government forbade direct access to the internet through foreign internet service providers and required them to provide technical assistance and workspace to public security agents to allow the agents to monitor internet activities.  The Ministry of Public Security required “internet agents,” including cybercafes, to register the personal information of their customers, store records of internet sites visited by customers, and participate in government investigations of online activity.  Internet cafes used government-approved software to monitor customers’ online activities.The government requested firms such as Facebook and Google eliminate “fake accounts” and content deemed “toxic,” including “antistate” materials.  The Ministry of Information and Communications requested social media platforms comply with political-speech takedown requests, especially for posts critical of senior CPV officials.On September 7, Facebook suspended author Ta Duy Anh’s Facebook page was suspended for 180 days.  Anh’s novel The Termite Queen was banned temporarily in 2017.  He frequently provided commentaries on current affairs on his Facebook page, which had more than 45,000 followers.On September 11, environmentalist and Life Foundation’s founder Pham Thi Huong Giang reported Facebook suddenly restricted her page, which had 37,000 followers, after she shared articles about forest protection in Binh Thuan Province and Da Lat City.  On September 13, she reported altered versions of her comments were being shared on Facebook to hurt her credibility.Authorities also suppressed online political expression by direct action against bloggers, such as arrests, short-term detentions, surveillance, intimidation, and the illegal confiscation of computers and cell phones from activists and their family members.  The government continued to use national security and other vague provisions of the penal code against activists who peacefully expressed their political views online.  Dissidents and bloggers reported the Ministry of Public Security periodically ordered the disconnection of their home internet service.Users of state-sponsored social networks and blogs were required to provide their full name, national identification number, and address before creating an account.  In-country website and social network operators were required to allow authorities to inspect local servers upon request and to have a mechanism to remove prohibited content within three hours of detection or notification by authorities.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The government restricted the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						Although the constitution permitted freedom of peaceful assembly, the government restricted this freedom.  Laws and regulations required permits for group gatherings, which authorities issued or denied without explanation.  Only those arranging publicized gatherings to discuss matters the government considered “sensitive” appeared to require permits.  The government generally did not authorize any demonstrations that could be perceived as political.  The law permitted authorities to detain individuals gathering or protesting outside of courthouses during trials.  Persons routinely gathered in informal groups without government interference so long as the gathering was not perceived as political or a threat to the state.  For example, the government allowed small groups of individuals to protest land rights concerns for short periods in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City; however, no major demonstrations against the government were permitted.						Freedom of Association						The constitution provided for the right of association, but the government severely restricted the establishment of associations involved in what it considered “sensitive” fields such as politics, religion, and labor rights.  The country’s legal and regulatory framework included mechanisms particularly aimed at restricting the freedom of NGOs, including religious organizations, to organize and act.  The government generally prohibited the establishment of private, independent organizations, insisting that persons work within established, party-controlled mass organizations, usually under the aegis of the CPV’s Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF).Laws and regulations governing NGOs restricted their ability to engage in policy advocacy or conduct research outside of state-sanctioned topics and prohibited organizations focused on social science and technology from operating in fields such as economic policy, public policy, political matters, and a range of other areas considered sensitive.  Authorities also did not permit NGOs generally to publicly advocate specific policy positions.According to some recognized groups and others attempting to register, implementation of the law varied from province to province.  They reported the process was burdensome, lengthy, and that authorities often did not respond to their applications.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The constitution provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, but the government regularly imposed limits on the movement of individuals, especially those released after serving sentences under national security or related charges or outspoken critics of the government.In-country Movement:  Government restrictions required citizens and resident foreigners to obtain a permit to visit border areas, defense facilities, industrial zones involved in national defense, areas of “national strategic storage,” and “works of extreme importance for political, economic, cultural, and social purposes.”Citizens (or their hosts) were required to register with local public security authorities when staying overnight in any location outside their own homes.  Foreign passport holders also had to register to stay in private homes, although there were no known cases of local authorities refusing to allow foreign visitors to stay with friends or family.Authorities did not strictly enforce residency laws for the general population, and migration from rural areas to cities continued unabated.  Moving without permission, however, hampered persons from accessing public education, health care, and other government services.Authorities restricted the movements of several political activists on probation or under house arrest, along with others not facing such legal restrictions.  Authorities also monitored and selectively restricted the movement of prominent activists and religious leaders.  Authorities prevented activists from leaving their houses during events that might draw public attention.Several NGO leaders and activists, such as Nguyen Tien Trung and Bui Thi Minh Hang, reported security agents prevented them from leaving their houses, especially during holidays or visits by senior foreign officials.Foreign Travel:  Prospective emigrants occasionally encountered difficulties obtaining a passport or exit permission.  The law allowed authorities to confiscate passports or postpone the departure of any person on various broad grounds, including for national security and defense.  There were multiple reports of individuals crossing the borders with Laos or Cambodia illegally because they were unable to obtain passports or exit permission; in some cases, this included persons wanted for crimes and political or other disapproved activities.The Ministry of Public Security used foreign travel prohibitions against certain government critics, activists, and religious leaders.  Authorities banned and prevented dozens of individuals from traveling overseas, withheld their passports on vague charges (at times indefinitely), or refused to issue passports to certain activists or religious leaders without clear explanation.  Activists believed they were not authorized to travel abroad to reduce their opportunities to speak out against the government.  Authorities also refused to issue passports to the family members of certain activists.  Many ethnic minority Christians in the Central Highlands reported local authorities denied their passport applications.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government sometimes cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other organizations regarding treatment of refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern.Access to Asylum:  The law did not provide for granting asylum or refugee status, and the government had no system for providing protection to refugees.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										Not applicable.																																				g. Stateless Persons										According to the UNHCR, there were approximately 30,000 recognized stateless persons and persons of undetermined nationality in the country.  In recent years the government increased efforts to identify stateless persons.  The bulk of this population were ethnic H’mong living in border areas and undocumented ethnic Vietnamese from Cambodia migrating to Vietnam, but it also included women who lost their Vietnamese citizenship after marrying a foreign national but then lost their foreign citizenship due to divorce.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						Citizens could not choose their government through free and fair elections based on universal and equal suffrage and conducted by a secret ballot that guaranteed free expression and the will of the people.  Although the constitution provided the ability to elect representatives to the National Assembly, people’s councils, and other state institutions directly, constitutional and legal provisions established a monopoly on political power for the CPV, which itself oversaw all elections.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections:  National Assembly elections in 2021 were neither free nor fair, and the government did not allow NGO monitoring.  The CPV’s VFF chose and vetted all candidates, and CPV candidates won 485 of the 499 seats.According to the government, 99 percent of eligible voters cast ballots in the 2021 election, a figure activists and international observers considered improbably high.  Officials charged local authorities with ensuring that all eligible voters cast ballots by organizing group voting and verifying that all voters within their jurisdiction had voted.Political Parties and Political Participation:  Political opposition movements and other political parties were illegal.  Although the constitution stated that “all Party organizations and members of the CPV operate within the framework of the constitution and the laws,” the CPV politburo functioned as the supreme national decision-making body, although technically it reported to the CPV Central Committee.On July 3, Phan Son Tung, a YouTuber with hundreds of thousands of subscribers, was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment on charges of “spreading information against the state.”  In September 2022, Tung posted a call on social media for the establishment of a new political party.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups:  No laws limited participation of women or members of marginalized or vulnerable groups in the political process, and they did participate.  Expectations that women should be caregivers and manage family affairs, and cultural beliefs that men were better suited for leadership positions, were barriers to women’s participation in politics.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						Although the law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials and there were multiple arrests and convictions for corruption, the government did not implement the law effectively, and officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices.  This included existing and retired officials from the politburo, central party, military, and public security services.Corruption:  The lack of public consultation on land-use plans and government land compensation frameworks was a driver of corrupt land transfers.  Corruption in financial, banking, natural resource mining, public investment, education, healthcare, and judicial sectors was a significant political and social problem.On June 7, the Ministry of Public Security arrested Minister of Health Nguyen Thanh Long and Hanoi People’s Committee Chairperson Chu Ngoc Anh for involvement in a scheme to sell COVID-19 test kits at inflated prices.In July Hanoi People’s Court convicted 28 state officials from different ministries and local governments for receiving, offering, or being complicit in bribes, fraud, and abusing positions of power over repatriation flights during the COVID-19 pandemic.  Among the sentences were 16 years’ imprisonment for Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs To Anh Dung, and life sentences for Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Consular Department Nguyen Thi Huong Lan; Pham Trung Kien, a former secretary to the deputy minister of health; and Ministry of Public Security Immigration Department officer Vu Anh Tuan.For additional information about corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						The government did not permit independent, local human rights organizations to form or operate, nor did it tolerate attempts by organizations or individuals to criticize its human rights practices publicly.  Authorities often asserted that human rights and democracy advocacy were acts against the Communist Party and state.Retribution against Human Rights Defenders:  Authorities intimidated registered NGO leaders who advocated for human rights as well as NGO leaders who worked on other issues, including through frequent questioning and inspections by police.  In May authorities arrested environmental NGO leader Hoang Thi Minh Hong for alleged tax evasion, charges many human rights groups believed were unfounded.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence:  The law prohibited acts or threats of gender-based violence, including rape, spousal rape, “other sexual contacts,” and “forced sex crimes.”  Conviction for rape was punishable by imprisonment of up to 15 years, depending on the severity of the case.The law specified acts constituting domestic violence and stipulated punishments for convicted perpetrators ranging from a fine as a civil violation or discipline to criminal prosecution.  In July an expanded law on domestic violence prevention and control came into effect providing for better protection and support for survivors and harsher punishments for perpetrators.  The new law gave more additional agencies and organizations the ability to receive reports of domestic violence and provided for a national hotline dedicated to receiving and processing reports relating to domestic violence.  It also created new measures to prevent domestic violence and assist survivors, including providing shelter, necessities, legal aid, and psychological counseling.The government did not enforce laws on rape and domestic violence effectively.Domestic violence was common.  Officials acknowledged domestic violence was a significant social concern, and media discussed it openly.  Social stigma and fear of harassment from spouses and family prevented many survivors from coming forward.While police and the legal system generally remained unequipped to deal with domestic violence, the government, with the help of international and domestic NGOs, continued to train police, lawyers, community advocates, and judicial officials in the law; supported workshops and seminars that aimed to educate women and men regarding domestic violence and women’s rights; and highlighted the problem through public-awareness campaigns.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment:  The law specifically prohibited sexual harassment only in the workplace; the government did not enforce the law effectively.  The law allowed workers to terminate a labor contract immediately without prior notice if the worker was sexually harassed in the workplace; employers were required to include sexual harassment as grounds for dismissal.  Perpetrators of sexual harassment outside of the workplace could be fined.  A decree provided for administrative penalties for sexual harassment in public.In serious cases, survivors could sue offenders under a law that dealt with “humiliating other persons” and specified punishments for conviction that included a warning, noncustodial reform for up to two years, or a prison term ranging from three months to two years.Discrimination:  The law provided for gender equality, but women continued to face societal discrimination.  Despite the large body of law and regulation devoted to protecting women’s rights in marriage and the workplace, as well as provisions that called for equitable treatment, women did not always receive equal treatment in employment, education, or housing, particularly in rural areas.Although the law provided for equal inheritance rights for men and women, a son was more likely to inherit property than a daughter, unless otherwise specified by a legal document such as a will, according to observers.Discriminatory hiring practices related to gender and marital status existed.  The retirement age for most employees was 60 years and three months for men, and 55 years and four months for women.  According to a research center, women lost six to eight years in career development due to maternity leave and childrearing.Women workers earned approximately 8 percent a year less than men.  Many women older than 35 found it difficult to find a job, and there were reports of women such as factory workers in the garment and electronics sectors being fired at age 35.  Legal restrictions existed against women in certain occupations and tasks considered to be harmful to their reproductive health, including jobs deemed “hazardous” in industries such as mining, construction, and transportation.  The lower retirement age, combined with hiring discrimination and the gender pay gap, lowered women’s overall earning potential.Reproductive Rights:  Coercive population policies restricted reproductive rights.  The constitution stipulated that society, families, and all citizens implement “the population and family planning program.”  By law, couples or individuals were limited to giving birth to one or two children, with exceptions based on government decree.  Regulatory penalties applied to CPV members and public-sector officials.The CPV, certain ministries, and some localities issued their own regulations, applicable only to party members and government officials, regarding family size.  A politburo decree subjected party members to reprimand if they had three children, removed them from a ranking position if they had four, and expelled them from the CPV if they had five.  Violating the decree also decreased the likelihood of promotion and could lead to job termination.  The CPV did not enforce these provisions consistently.Access to sexual and reproductive health services was provided to all persons, including survivors of sexual violence, and included emergency contraception and postexposure prophylaxis as part of the clinical management of rape.According to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), although the country made substantial progress in improving the sexual and reproductive health status of the population, disparities existed.  UNFPA also reported the maternal mortality rate increased from 46 per 100,000 live births in 2019 to 124 per 100,000 live births in 2020.  UNFPA assessed that there was a higher rate of maternal deaths among ethnic minority women due to poor quality health-care access for both family planning and maternal health services, geographic isolation, limited education on reproductive health, and socioeconomic factors that limited the utilization of sexual and reproductive health services in ethnic minority localities.Young persons were particularly vulnerable, with unmet need for modern contraceptives at 29.6 percent, and the adolescent birth rate at 29 per 1,000 in 2023.  According to UNFPA, young persons lacked adequate and comprehensive information and services about contraception.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The law prohibited violence and discrimination against ethnic minorities, but societal discrimination was longstanding and persistent.  The government did not enforce the law effectively.  The law did not prohibit discrimination in hiring based on ethnicity.Ethnic minority group members constituted a sizable percentage of the population in certain areas, including the northwest, the Central Highlands, and portions of the Mekong Delta.  The constitution recognized the rights of members of ethnic minorities to use their languages and protect and nurture their traditions and cultures.  There were reports, however, that not all members of ethnic minorities were able to engage in decisions affecting their lands, cultures, and traditions.International human rights organizations and refugees continued to allege that authorities monitored, harassed, and intimidated members of certain ethnic minority groups, particularly ethnoreligious minorities in the Central and Northwest Highlands, including Christian H’mong.Authorities used national security laws to impose lengthy prison sentences on members of ethnic minorities for connections to overseas organizations the government claimed espoused separatist aims.On April 8, authorities in Dak Lak Province arrested Y Krec Bya for “undermining unity policies.”  On May 18, authorities in Phu Yen Province arrested Nay Y Blang for “abusing democratic freedom.”  Bya and Blang were ethnic Ede leaders of the independent Evangelical Church of Christ whom security agents frequently questioned and detained due to their religious affiliation and for reporting human rights abuses internationally.Projects under a 2021-2031 National Assembly plan to promote the social and economic development of ethnic minorities and residents of mountainous areas, focused on improving livelihoods, education, infrastructure, healthcare, on cultural preservation, particularly for women and children.																																				Children										Birth Registration:  The law required a birth certificate to access public services, such as education and health care.  Nonetheless, some parents, especially from ethnic minorities, did not register their children.  Local authorities prevented some parents from registering children to discourage internal migration, according to observers.Education:  By law education was free, compulsory, and universal through age 14, but school fees were common.  Under a government subsidy program, ethnic minority students were exempt from paying school fees.  Authorities did not always enforce required attendance laws or enforce them equally for boys and girls, especially in rural areas, where government and family budgets for education were limited and children’s labor in agriculture was valuable.Child Abuse:  The law prohibited child abuse and provided for fines and imprisonment for perpetrators.  The government did not effectively enforce laws on child abuse, and physical and emotional abuse were common.Observers concurred that violence against children occurred in many settings including schools and homes and was usually inflicted by someone known to the child.  The most common types of school violence were bullying and corporal punishment by teachers.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage:  The legal minimum age of marriage was 18 for girls and 20 for boys, and the law criminalized organizing or entering an early marriage.  Early marriage remained prevalent in many remote areas where there were high concentrations of ethnic minorities.  According to the most recent national survey conducted in 2019, early marriage among ethnic minorities was nearly 22 percent.  The rate in certain ethnic minority communities was particularly high:  H’Mong, 51 percent; Clao, 48 percent; Mang, 47 percent; Xinh Mun, 45 percent; and Ma, 39 percent.  Rates were highest in the Northwest highlands, Central Highlands, and central coastal provinces.  Authorities conducted communication campaigns against underage marriage and fined those who organized early marriages.Sexual Exploitation of Children:  The law prohibited using, procuring, and offering children between 13 and 18 for commercial sex.  No provision of law, however, specifically criminalized the commercial sexual exploitation of children under 13; sexual intercourse with children under 13 was statutory rape, with no additional penalty for having paid for sex.The law insufficiently criminalized the use, procurement, and offering of children for pornography because the definition of sexual exploitation covered only coercion of others to engage as an object to produce pornographic performances.  Moreover, while the Criminal Code prohibited “persuading, enticing, and forcing under 16 to participate in pornographic performance,” it did not cover children ages 16 and 17.The law also prohibited all acts of cruel treatment, humiliation, abduction, sale, and coercion of children into any activities harmful to their healthy development.The law specified prison sentences for acts related to the exploitation of children in commercial sex, including harboring commercial sex or commercial sexual exploitation of children, brokering commercial sex, and paying for sex with children.  The production, distribution, dissemination, or sale of child pornography was illegal, but the government did not effectively enforce the law.  The country was a destination for child sex tourism.The minimum age for consensual sex was 18.  Conviction for statutory rape could result in life imprisonment or capital punishment.  The law considered all cases of sexual intercourse with children younger than 13 to be child rape.  The government enforced the law and convicted child rapists received harsh sentences.  Media reports noted an increase in child sexual exploitation on social media.																																				Antisemitism										There were small communities of Jewish foreigners in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.  There were no known reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuse Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization:  No law criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults.Violence and Harassment:  There were no reports of the government inciting, perpetrating, condoning, or tolerating violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) persons.  Research indicated 79 percent of LGBTQI+ persons questioned in one study reportedly suffered at least one instance of sexual or gender-based violence in their lifetime.  LGBTQI+ persons reported suffering mostly psychological violence at schools, such as bullying by peers, teachers, and school staff.  Other types of violence reported included physical and sexual violence.Discrimination:  The law did not prohibit discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons in housing, employment, nationality laws, or access to most government services.  The law did not recognize same-sex marriage or the families of LGBTQI+ couples.  According to LGBTQI+ activists and NGOs, inaccurate information regarding sexual orientation and gender identity remained pervasive and there was widespread social stigma and discrimination associated with being LGBTQI+ at schools, home, and in workspaces.Research released during the year showed discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons, while decreased considerably since a similar study in 2018, remained pervasive.  Transgender persons reported experiencing the most discrimination among LGBTQI+ groups.  Negative comments against LGBTQI+ persons were common in schools and workplaces.  Many LGBTQI+ persons’ families coerced them to change their appearances, behaviors and attitudes to align with normative gendered forms of expression or to marry against their will.  In the workplace, some transgender women were denied promotions, paid less than others at the same position, or coerced into wearing uniforms not in alignment with their gender identity.  Some transgender men were denied employment-related benefits, such as health insurance for family members.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition:  The civil code gave individuals who underwent gender-affirming surgery the right to change their name and gender in their personal papers and have the personal rights in conformity with the transformed gender, but the government had not developed regulations to realize these rights.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices:  The belief that same-sex attraction was a diagnosable and curable mental health condition was common, and some lesbians reported so-called corrective rape and forced marriages.  Some families forced LGTBQI+ relatives to undergo medical or psychological examinations and treatment.  A 2022 Ministry of Health official dispatch to provincial health departments and medical institutions nationwide instructed that LGBTQI+ identities were not a disease to be cured; the dispatch prohibited involuntary treatments, stating that mental health services could be provided only by experts on sexual orientation and gender identity, and stipulated the ministry’s policy opposing “conversion therapy.”  The ministry dispatch also stated that education should be strengthened so that all medical providers had correct knowledge concerning LGBTQI+ persons, and that they be treated equally in medical environments.  According to LGBTQI+ activists and NGOs, medically unnecessary “gender normalization” surgeries were performed on intersex children.Restrictions on Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly:  The country’s restrictions on freedom of expression, association, or peaceful assembly applied to LGBTQI+ groups and topics, although there were no reports of them being targeted like other advocacy groups.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Although the law protected the rights of persons with disabilities to access education, employment, health services, information, communications, buildings, transport, the judicial system, and other state services, most persons with disabilities were not able to access education, health services, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others.  For example, while the law required new construction or major renovations of government and large public buildings to include access for persons with disabilities, enforcement was sporadic, particularly outside major cities.Persons with disabilities faced widespread social stigmatization.Social barriers and the limited accessibility of many workplaces remained problems in the employment of persons with disabilities, and although the law banned it, persons with disability faced discrimination in hiring.  Companies with a workforce composed of at least 51 percent employees with disabilities could qualify for special government-subsidized loans.Access to education for children with disabilities, particularly deaf children and those with intellectual disabilities, remained limited.  More than 90 percent of elementary and secondary schools did not have appropriate infrastructure for persons with disabilities.  The education system also lacked sufficient trained teaching professionals for persons with disabilities.  According to a 2018 study (latest statistics available), the literacy rate of persons with disabilities 16 years and older was 76 percent, compared to a 95 percent literacy rate for persons without disabilities of the same age group.  According to data from UNICEF and Vietnam’s National Survey on People with Disabilities 2016-2017, the school attendance rate for children with disabilities was 82 percent at the primary level, 68 percent at the lower secondary level, and 34 percent at the upper secondary level.There was no legal restriction on the right of persons with disabilities to vote, but many polling stations were inaccessible to persons with physical disabilities.Some NGOs reported they continued to face problems applying for funding and offering training for disability-related programs from certain provincial governments, which hampered access for international experts to conduct training.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for the right of workers who were citizens to form and join unions under the Vietnam General Confederation of Labor (VGCL), a CPV-run organization.  The VGCL, however, answered directly to the VFF, which did not protect trade unions from government interference in or control over union activity.The law limited freedom of association by not allowing trade unions full autonomy in administering their affairs.  All unions had to follow the organizational and operational guidelines prescribed by the CPV and law.  The law conferred on the VGCL ownership of all trade union property and gave it the right to represent lower-level unions.  By law trade union leaders and officials were appointed rather than elected by union members.  The labor code allowed workers to form or join an independent employee representative organization of their choice that did not have to be affiliated with the VGCL, but the government did not issue the necessary implementing decree.The law required that if a workplace trade union did not exist, the next level “trade union” organization had to perform the tasks of a grassroots union, even where workers did not so request or voluntarily elected not to organize.  The labor code included provisions for collective bargaining on any matter of concern to both parties to regulate working conditions and relationships between the parties and to develop progressive, harmonious, and stable labor relations.  The law required bargaining to commence within seven days of a party’s request and provided 90 days to reach an agreement.Collective bargaining was allowed at the enterprise, multi-enterprise, and sectoral levels but required establishment of a collective bargaining council by the people’s committee of the province where the headquarters of the enterprise was located.  Under the labor code, parties involved in multi-enterprise collective bargaining could request such a collective bargaining council, which comprised representatives nominated by each party as well as representatives from the provincial people’s committee; such councils were to disband after a collective bargaining agreement was signed.The law prohibited strikes by workers in businesses the government considered essential to the national economy, defense, or public order.  “Essential services” included electricity production; post and telecommunications; maritime and air transportation; navigation; public works; and oil and gas production.  The law also granted the chairmen of provincial people’s committees the right to suspend a strike considered detrimental to the national economy or public safety.  Workers also had to provide five days’ prior notification to the employer and the provincial and district level people’s committee labor agents before a strike.  Strikes that did not adhere to the process outlined by law were illegal.The law stated the executive committee of a trade union could issue a decision to strike only when at least 50 percent of workers supported it.  Workers had to request and exhaust an extensive and cumbersome process of mediation and arbitration before a lawful strike could occur.  Unions or workers’ representatives could either appeal decisions of provincial arbitration councils to provincial people’s courts or strike.  The law prohibited retribution against legal strikers.  By law individuals participating in strikes declared illegal by a people’s court and found to have caused damage to their employer were liable for damages, although this was never enforced.  The law limited legal strikes to cases arising from a collective labor dispute, cases in which collective bargaining was not undertaken within the legal timeframes, or when a labor arbitration board had not been established.  There were no legal strikes.  The government recorded, but did not publish, the number of illegal “wildcat” strikes initiated without union authorization.  There were no public reports of government action against strikers.The law included provisions that prohibited antiunion discrimination and imposed administrative sanctions and fines for violations.  The law did not distinguish between workers and managers, however, and failed to prohibit employers’ agents, such as managers, from acting as union leaders or interfering in union activity.  The International Labor Organization (ILO)-International Finance Corporation (IFC) Better Work project, which monitors workers’ rights and working conditions in some apparel and footwear factories, reported that management participation in trade union activities was a significant concern.The government did not effectively enforce applicable laws providing for freedom of association and collective bargaining.  Penalties were not commensurate with those for similar crimes.There were no registered domestic NGOs involved in labor organizing.  Local, unregistered labor NGOs, however, supported efforts to raise awareness of worker rights under threat of harassment and detention.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at:   https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										The law did not prohibit all the worst forms of child labor.  Deficiencies include the lack of a law proscribing slavery.  The labor code stated a worker older than 14 and younger than 18 shall not perform work that might damage the physical or intellectual development and dignity of the child, such as lifting heavy objects or dealing with alcohol or dangerous chemicals or gases.  A worker aged 13 to 14 could perform light jobs included in a list from the Ministry of Labor, War Invalids, and Social Affairs (Ministry of Labor).  Children younger than age 13 could work in art and sports in certain circumstances for no more than 20 hours per week.  Child workers had to have the permission of their parents.The Ministry of Labor was responsible for enforcing child labor laws and policies.  Government officials could fine and, in cases of criminal violations, prosecute employers who violated child labor laws.  The government did not effectively enforce the law, and penalties were not commensurate with those for analogous serious crimes.  Penalties were sometimes applied against violators.Child labor remained prevalent.  Authorities estimated over one million children between the ages 15 and 17 worked; approximately 20 percent of them worked over 40 hours per week and nearly 50 percent of them worked in a hazardous environment.Illegal child labor was reported in labor-intensive industries, such as brickmaking, agriculture, construction, fishing, forestry, and the manufacture of footwear, furniture, garments, textiles, and leather.  Local media also reported children working as beggars in gangs whose leaders abused the children and took most of their income.  Some children started work as young as age five, and nearly 49 percent of child workers did not attend school.  There were reports during the year of the worst forms of child labor.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws:  The minimum wage varied by region.  In all regions the minimum wage exceeded the World Bank official poverty income level.The law provided for a 48-hour regular workweek, with overtime pay for additional hours.  The labor code limited overtime to 40 hours per month, and 200 hours per year, but provided for an exception in special cases, with a maximum of 300 overtime hours annually, subject to advance approval by the government after consultations with the VGCL and employer representatives.Credible reports, including the ILO-IFC Better Work 2020 Annual Report, indicated many apparel and footwear factories exceeded legal overtime thresholds.  The ILO-IFC report stated that, while a majority of factories in the program complied with the daily limit of four hours of overtime, 76 percent still failed to enforce monthly limits (40 hours).  Alleged wage and hour and overtime violations were reportedly common in footwear and garment manufacturing.Occupational Safety and Health:  The law provided for occupational safety and health (OSH) standards, described procedures for persons who were victims of labor accidents and occupational diseases, and delineated the OSH responsibilities of organizations and individuals.  The law provided for the right of workers to remove themselves from situations that endangered health or safety without jeopardy to their employment.  Migrant workers, including internal economic migrants, and workers without contracts were among the most vulnerable workers, and employers routinely subjected them to hazardous working conditions.  The labor inspectorate conducted inspections for OSH problems.On-the-job injuries due to poor OSH practices and conditions and inadequate employee training remained a problem.  Migrant workers and workers without contracts remained most vulnerable to occupational injuries and fatalities.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement:  The Ministry of Labor was the principal labor authority and its Labor Inspections Department was responsible for workplace inspections to confirm compliance with labor laws, including OSH standards.Inspectors had the authority to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions.  Inspectors could use sanctions, fines, withdrawal of operating licenses or registrations, closures of enterprises, and mandatory training in response to labor law violations.  Inspectors could take immediate measures when they had reason to believe there was imminent danger to the health or safety of workers, and could temporarily suspend operations, although such measures were rarely used.The government did not effectively enforce labor laws.  The number of inspectors was not sufficient to enforce compliance.  Labor inspectors accounted for fewer than one third of the labor inspectorate’s staff, and of these, only a small number were OSH specialists.  Most worksites went uninspected for years at a time.  Penalties for wage, hour, and OSH violations were commensurate with those for similar crimes, such as fraud, but penalties were rarely applied against violators.The informal sector included small household businesses; individual vendors in traditional markets, street side, or online; and gig workers for transportation and delivery.  The General Statistics Office of Vietnam estimated 69 percent of the country’s workforce worked in the informal economy.The government did not effectively enforce labor laws in the informal sector.  Informal workers typically had low and irregular incomes, endured long working hours, and lacked protection by labor market institutions.  Additionally, workers in the informal sector were only eligible to pay into a voluntary social insurance fund covering only retirement and survivors’ allowances.  Workers in the formal sector and their employers contributed to a system that covered sickness, maternity, labor accidents, and occupational disease as well as providing retirement and survivors’ allowances.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. 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Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																						g. Stateless Persons																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. 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Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Vietnam
- Special Representative for Commercial and Business Affairs Morgenthau’s Travel to Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia Office of the SpokespersonU.S. Department of State Special Representative for Commercial and Business Affairs Sarah Morgenthau traveled to Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia from March 11 to 22 to highlight the positive impact of U.S. investment and American companies in Southeast Asia. U.S. companies hold more than $359 billion in direct investments across the region, which support more than three million American jobs.In Singapore, the Special Representative met with government officials and U.S. private sector leaders to discuss how to increase U.S. economic presence in the region and participated in a roundtable organized by The American Chamber of Commerce in Singapore.In Hanoi, Special Representative Morgenthau joined one of the largest-ever delegations of U.S. businesses to Vietnam.  The delegation, facilitated by the US-ASEAN Business Council, included 94 representatives from 49 U.S. companies.  The delegation also included President and Chair of the Export-Import Bank of the United States Reta Jo Lewis and U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Marc Knapper.In Jakarta, the Special Representative joined U.S. Ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Yohannes Abraham to lead discussions on the importance of our shared commitment to an inclusive digital economy to ensure that benefits and opportunities flow to all people and all places.This trip highlighted the United States’ position as the largest foreign direct investor in Southeast Asia and our readiness to be ASEAN&#8217;s partner of choice.  Our shared future is bright.For further information please contact the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs at EB-Press-Inquiry@state.gov.
- On the Convictions of Vietnamese Ethnic Minority and Religious Freedom Advocates HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;On the Convictions of Vietnamese Ethnic Minority and Religious Freedom Advocates				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										On the Convictions of Vietnamese Ethnic Minority and Religious Freedom Advocates																																		Press Statement																														April 1, 2024																																							The United States is deeply concerned by ongoing convictions of Vietnamese ethnic minority and religious freedom advocates, including five convictions since January 2024.We are particularly troubled by the recent 13-year sentence of Y Krec Bya, who has been a peaceful voice for freedom of religion or belief in Vietnam. We also continue to be concerned by the multi-year prison terms of Nay Y Blang, Danh Minh Quang, Thach Cuong, and To Hoang Chuong for their peaceful advocacy on behalf of human rights, including freedom of religion or belief, in Vietnam.We call upon Vietnam to respect the rights of individuals to exercise freedoms of expression, association, and religion or belief. We reiterate our call on Vietnam to release all those unjustly detained.						Tags																					Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																																														Human Rights and Democracy																															Office of the Spokesperson																																Religious Freedom																															Vietnam
- Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Son HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Son				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Son																																		Readout																														March 25, 2024																																							The below is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son in Washington, D.C. for the inaugural Comprehensive Strategic Partnership foreign ministerial meeting.Secretary Blinken and Foreign Minister Son reaffirmed the strength of the U.S.-Vietnam relationship and reflected on progress since the elevation of ties during President Biden’s historic visit to Hanoi in September 2023. The Secretary and Foreign Minister addressed ways in which the United States and Vietnam can expand cooperation in key areas, including the semiconductor ecosystem, supply chain diversification, education and culture, security, and human rights. The Secretary and Foreign Minister also discussed shared regional priorities, including a free, open, connected, prosperous, resilient, and secure Indo-Pacific region and promoting stability and prosperity in the South China Sea.						Tags																					Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																																														Climate and Environment																																																					Economic Prosperity and Trade Policy																																							Indo-Pacific																															Office of the Spokesperson																																Seas																															The Secretary of State																																Supply Chains																															Vietnam
- Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son Before Their Meeting Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateWashington, D.C.Thomas Jefferson RoomSECRETARY BLINKEN:  Well, good afternoon, everyone.  It’s a great pleasure to be able to welcome the foreign minister here to the State Department, to Washington.  This has been a very, very significant time in the relations between the United States and Vietnam.  We – during President Biden’s visit we signed our comprehensive strategic partnership, and this is the first ministerial meeting since signing that partnership.But in the time since President Biden’s visit, we have moved forward together – moved forward together in strengthening and deepening our collaboration in critical areas, everything from semiconductors to supply chains to educational and technological exchanges, people-to-people contacts, and of course our ongoing commitment to war legacies.  So I think this is a demonstration of not only our commitment to the Indo-Pacific but our commitment to the central role that Vietnam and the relationship between our countries plays in the Indo-Pacific.I’m very much looking forward to today to continue the good work between us.  Next year we’ll be celebrating 30 years of diplomatic relations, but meanwhile, we’re using the time to really build out what our leaders put in place, which is a strategic partnership that is increasingly comprehensive, and I welcome that.  So we welcome – it’s so good to have you here.FOREIGN MINISTER SON:  Thank you very much.  Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.  I’m very pleased to be with you today here again for the first annual dialogue between the two foreign ministers after the – we upgraded our relationship to comprehensive strategic partnership.  Especially it provides me with very warm and sunny weather.  (Laughter.)  I’m very happy to see that, and it’s really bright.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam very much appreciates your personal role and contribution to the strengthening of Vietnam-U.S. relations, especially recent elaboration of our bilateral ties.  Ambassador Marc Knapper and the team of U.S. Embassy Hanoi are also excellent partners (inaudible) in this process.  Again, we agree with you that since we have upgraded our relationship to comprehensive strategic partnership, we continue to strengthen and move our relationship forward.For this year, we celebrated 30 years of the lifting of U.S. embargo against Vietnam.  Next year would be the 30th of our bilateral relations, of normalization of relations.  And more than that, as President Joe Biden has said, that CSP would – helps us to move our relationship in the next 50 years, not one or two years.  We – Vietnam’s continue to attach great importance to the relationship with the United States, and we want with you to (inaudible) and make – complete a plan of actions to move our relationship forwards in accordance with CSP, not only the high political exchange between our two countries in order to continue to foster our bilateral mutual trust and also to deepen our relationship not only in trade, investment, science, technology, innovation, education, but more than that is in semiconductor and chips.  People-to-people exchange continue to grow, especially with the big community of Vietnamese students in the U.S.  I think it would – they would be the future bridge of our relationship in the future, and ready to work with Your Excellencies the Secretary to move our relationship and discuss issues that can help us to move our relationship forwards.  Thank you.SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Thank you so much.  Thanks, everyone.
- Digital Press Briefing with Uzra Zeya, Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya, Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human RightsAsia Pacific Media HubMODERATOR:  Greetings from the U.S. Department of State’s Asia Pacific Media Hub.  I would like to welcome journalists to today’s on-the-record briefing with Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya.  Under Secretary Zeya will discuss U.S. participation and takeaways of the third Summit for Democracy, hosted by the Republic of Korea.  Additionally, she will discuss how the United States is advocating for democracy and human rights around the globe.With that, let’s get started.  Under Secretary Zeya, I’ll turn it over to you for your opening remarks.UNDER SECRETARY ZEYA:  Thank you, Katie, and good morning, everyone.  Thank you so much for joining us today.  I am thrilled to be in Seoul for this third Summit for Democracy, hosted by the Republic of Korea.  I want to commend the ROK for hosting a dynamic and inclusive summit these last three days that brought together hundreds of governments, civil society, private sector, and – importantly – youth leaders under the theme, “Democracy for Future Generations.”As you know, President Biden launched the first Summit for Democracy in 2021.  Last year, we were honored to co-host the second summit with Costa Rica, the Netherlands, Zambia, and the ROK, demonstrating that protecting democracy is a global responsibility not exclusive to any one region.  And we are so grateful that the ROK has carried the baton forward this year in hosting this impactful third summit.I was pleased to join the U.S. delegation led by Secretary of State Antony Blinken with senior colleagues from the National Security Council, State Department, and the United States Agency for International Development.At the March 18th opening day ministerial on AI, digital technology, and democracy, Secretary Blinken unveiled new U.S. guidelines to help online platforms better protect human rights defenders targeted online and laid out a U.S. vision for deterring disinformation and creating a more resilient information ecosystem globally.That same day, the Secretary also welcomed six new countries – the Republic of Korea, Japan, Poland, Germany, Ireland, and Finland – to a joint statement on commercial spyware, now totaling 17 nations committed to addressing the proliferation and misuse of commercial spyware, including digital repression of journalists and human rights defenders.This announcement built on a range of actions since the second Summit for Democracy, when President Biden signed an executive order restricting the U.S. Government’s use of commercial spyware, including export control, sanctions, and a new visa ban policy against spyware vendors and their leadership.Secretary Blinken also announced on Monday that the United States is launching a new National Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct that sets out more than 40 concrete actions across 16 government agencies, to help ensure that companies we work with are upholding human rights.March 19th summit proceedings included over 50 sessions focused on youth and civil society engagement on issues ranging from elevating the fight against corruption to advancing information integrity in line with this record year of elections.Yesterday, I was proud to announce the U.S. launch with the Community of Democracies of the Global Youth Democracy Network.  Young people all over the world will be invited to join the network, interact via an online platform, learn from digital programming, exchange perspectives, and engage policymakers.  And today, March 20, the Seoul summit concludes with a virtual leaders’ plenary later this evening led by ROK President Yoon, at which President Biden will offer special (inaudible).Having helped lead U.S. planning for the first summit over two years ago, carrying through to this week, three key takeaways emerged from this highly successful global Summit for Democracy.Number one, democracy endures.  A diverse grouping of democracies large and small, emerging and established, East and West, are hard at work implementing over 750 commitments since the first summit to strengthen democratic institutions, protect human rights, and accelerate the fight against corruption.  For our part, the United States has requested 345 million U.S. dollars in the Fiscal Year 2025 President’s Budget, subject to congressional appropriations, for the Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal, in support of free and fair elections, independent media, anti-corruption, democratic reformers, and rights-respecting technology globally.Number two, democracy adapts.  (Inaudible) summit expanded efforts to address the challenges and opportunities that AI and emerging technologies pose to democracies – through the new guidelines for tech platforms to protect human rights defenders online, to expanded U.S.-led and collective efforts to curb repressive use of commercial spyware, to our new Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct.  Democracies are working with a broader range of actors, especially the private sector, to advance more rights-respecting and resilient societies.And third, democracy must not be for some – it must be for all, as Secretary Blinken declared this week in Seoul.  This third summit affirmed that in this historic year of elections, we must ensure that electoral processes are inclusive and that barriers to participation of women, youth, persons with disabilities, and other marginalized individuals are dismantled.  This is the spirit behind the U.S. launch of the Global Youth Democracy Network this year.  This is also the impetus behind the convening next week in Kenya on gender disinformation, hosted by the Global Partnership for Action on Gender-Based Online Harassment and Abuse, of which the United States is a proud member along with 13 other governments.Once again, we thank the ROK and President Yoon for their global leadership hosting this highly impactful, inclusive, and successful third Summit for Democracy.With that, I’ll stop here so we have time for questions.  Katie, back over to you.MODERATOR:  Thank you so much, Under Secretary Zeya.  We will now turn to the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  Our first question came to us in advance from Jinmyung Kim of The Chosun Ilbo, based in the Republic of Korea, who asks:  “Authoritarian countries like China and North Korea are tightening their already firm grip on internet and overall information technology.  What do you think democracies can and should do in response?”UNDER SECRETARY ZEYA:  Well, thank you for this important question.  And let me say at the outset an open information environment is the bedrock of democracy.  Access to reliable, fact-based information online is essential for citizens to be able to make informed decisions and participate in democratic processes.That is why the United States is committed along with our partners to supporting the role of independent journalists and media outlets.  This includes through accurate and objective reporting, support for fact-checking and media-monitoring efforts, and exposing and disrupting foreign information manipulation efforts intended to subvert democratic processes.  And these were all points that Secretary Blinken outlined in a very important speech to the summit on the opening day, March 18th.The United States is also committed to countering disinformation by investing in media, digital, and civic literacy; strengthening institutional capabilities to counter disinformation; and enhancing and building trust in public communication.  We encourage other countries to take similar action to create a trustworthy, open, and secure information environment.And one final point here.  It’s critical to recognize and support the role of civil society, journalists, academia, and the private sector in building information integrity and support civic education and educational efforts, which enhance critical thinking through building long-term resilience to disinformation.Thank you.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Our next question came to us from Daeeui Park in the Maeil Business Newspaper, based in Seoul, Korea:  “What is the level of interest in the democracy summit in the U.S.?  What efforts has the U.S. Government made to engage the public?”UNDER SECRETARY ZEYA:  Well, in sum I would say the level of interest is strong and sustained.  President Biden launched the first Summit for Democracy in Washington in 2021 in recognition of the inflection point we are all facing, including the United States, when it comes to the future of democracy.Through our Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal, we are strengthening democracy and human rights at home and abroad.  Last year alone, the United States committed 690 million U.S. dollars to democratic renewal through that funding, and I look forward to today’s launch of the U.S. National Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct.But I also want to stress that since its inception, U.S. activists and civil society have been deeply engaged and embedded in shaping and advancing the Summit for Democracy (inaudible) and we are so proud and thankful for their partnership.  Well over 1,400 civil society organizations from the United States and all over the world contributed to the Summit for Democracy efforts since the very first one in 2021, and we have a number of civil society actors and American citizens who are helping to lead 16 democracy cohorts that include governmental, civil society, and in many cases private-sector partners working to address shared challenges.So again, to answer your question, there has been great and very strong engagement from the United States from the highest levels of our government to our dynamic civil society community, to our own democratic renewal commitments domestically, which have been a focus for us since the first summit.I also just want to highlight here our gratitude to the Republic of Korea for this third summit’s emphasis on youth inclusion and the theme of “Democracy for Future Generations,” which gave us a just ideal platform to launch this new Global Youth Democracy Network, which the United States is launching with the Community of Democracies for youth democracy actors worldwide.Thank you.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Our next question goes to the live queue to Sangho Song from Yonhap News Agency, based in Washington, D.C.  Sangho, you should be able to unmute yourself now.QUESTION:  Thank you.  Thank you very much for doing this, Ambassador.  You participated in the Summit for Democracy, and the summit took place in South Korea, very close to the tightly controlled socialist society in North Korea, where democratic principles are nowhere to be found.  What kind of message, either implicit or explicit, do you think the summit has sent to North Korea this week?And I have a second question as well.  I’m also wondering if you foresee any opportunities arising for engagement with North Korea since Western diplomats started to enter North Korea and a resident UN official has been appointed, and we heard of talk of diplomacy between Japan and North Korea.  So what is your prediction for the U.S. diplomacy with North Korea in the foreseeable future?Thank you.UNDER SECRETARY ZEYA:  Well, thank you for raising this critically important issue, and I want to say here that the DPRK is among the most repressive authoritarian states in the world and its human rights situation is absolutely deplorable.  The DPRK continues to exploit its own citizens and divert resources from the country’s people to build up its unlawful WMD and ballistic weapons programs.So on the part of the United States, we are going to continue to work with the international community and especially our closest allies, like the ROK, to raise awareness of the grave DPRK human rights situation, to document violations and abuses, to counter DPRK transnational repression when the regime reaches beyond its borders to harass and intimidate others, and we’re going to work to increase the flow of independent information into, through, and out of the DPRK.And I want to make an additional point here.  We have a dynamic ambassador dedicated to the human rights situation in the DPRK, Ambassador Julie Turner.  She has been here in Seoul twice to coordinate and increase our consultation, and she is in Geneva as we speak on the margins of the Human Rights Council, with her ROK counterpart, drawing attention to this critical 10-year anniversary this year of the landmark Commission of Inquiry on the DPRK, which found that the regime is perpetrating crimes against humanity against its own people.So that grave human rights situation could not contrast more with the affirmative vision of progress and purpose articulated in this third Summit for Democracy.MODERATOR:  Okay.  Next in the live queue we have James Griffiths, who is based in Hong Kong with The Globe and Mail.  Let’s see, James, you should be able to unmute yourself now.QUESTION:  Yeah, thank you very much, ambassador.  When we talk about promoting democracy in Asia, it tends to be in the context of countries with which the U.S. has a, let’s say, difficult relationship when – in terms of China and North Korea.  But I wanted to ask about Vietnam, which is a recently upgraded U.S. diplomatic ally but is kind of – seems no closer to democracy and is – kind of has taken steps back in terms of civil and human rights in recent years.  What’s the U.S. doing to promote democracy with allies that aren’t necessarily on board with this form of government just yet?UNDER SECRETARY ZEYA:  Well, thank you for asking this question.  I think that the U.S. has elevated its engagement with Vietnam in recent years, and President Biden has been a prime supporter of this effort and we have ongoing human rights engagement with the Vietnamese Government.  We also have been very forthright in expressing our concerns with respect to issues like freedom of expression and religious freedom in Vietnam.But our view is this engagement is part of our steadfast commitment, through diplomacy, to advancing a more free, open, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific, and our engagement with Vietnam and our forthright expressions of concerns when it comes to human rights are part of that commitment by the United States.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  Okay.  Our next question came to us in advance from Minhee Park of The Hankyoreh in Seoul, South Korea, who asks:  “Taiwan&#8217;s digital minister delivered a recorded online speech at the democracy summit.  A Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson criticized South Korea, saying that China strongly opposes Taiwan’s participation in the democracy summit.  What is your opinion on this?”UNDER SECRETARY ZEYA:  Well, thank you for asking this question.  I want to make one point at the outset:  The ROK is a sovereign state that makes its own decisions, and we again commend their leadership in hosting this highly impactful and successful summit.And with respect to Taiwan, Taiwan has remained a leading, resilient democracy.  It’s a technological powerhouse.  And in the United States view, it is a force for good in the world.  Taiwan consistently stands as a world leader in political rights, civil liberties, global competitiveness, and AI and digital technologies, which was one of the focus areas of this third summit.As a highly capable, engaged, and responsible member of the global community, we all stand to benefit from Taiwan’s expertise to address some of today’s most difficult global challenges, and we think Taiwan can meaningfully contribute to the summit’s objectives.Final point here, I would just stress that the summit is not about any one participating stakeholder.  It’s about advancing an affirmative agenda on how stakeholders can support democracy, human rights, anti-corruption, rights-respecting technology, and civil society contributions to societal (inaudible).MODERATOR:  All right, our next question is also from Park Minhee with The Hankyoreh daily in Seoul, who wrote to us via the Q&amp;A tab and asks:  “Two questions.  I agree with the principles of democracy and freedom that the United States advocates; however, the U.S.-backed Israeli army is currently attacking Gaza and many Gazans are being killed by bombs or dying of starvation.  During this conference, South Korean NGO activists protested against this situation.  This situation undermines the support for democracy and humanitarianism” – excuse me – “that the United States emphasizes.  What do you think about this?“And part two, the U.S. is discussing a bill to regulate TikTok.  Do you think China is likely to intervene via social media in elections in South Korea, the U.S., and elsewhere this year?”Over.UNDER SECRETARY ZEYA:  Well, with respect to your first question, certainly the United States is a strong supporter in freedom of association, and we absolutely commend the Korean people in their commitment to their democracy and their expressing their views.  And protests are a vital element of thriving democracies, and I think it’s a reflection of the openness and the strength of Korean democracy.With respect to the situation in Gaza, I just want to underscore that President Biden and Secretary Blinken have stressed the urgent need to significantly increase the flow of lifesaving aid reaching those in need throughout Gaza.  And Secretary Blinken announced just yesterday plans to make his sixth visit to the Middle East since the onset of the October 7th attacks on Israel perpetrated by Hamas, and we are very focused on increasing the safe and unhindered delivery of assistance throughout Gaza.We are supportive absolutely of Israel’s right to defend itself consistent with international law, and we are also working towards a political horizon.  Ultimately, the elements of a durable solution, which we believe is a two-state solution – a Palestinian state with security guarantees for Israel.  So the United States has been leading diplomatic and humanitarian efforts to respond to this crisis.  We are grateful for the support that the ROK has offered in this case, and we will continue to make this one of the highest priorities of American diplomacy.With respect to your question on TikTok, I just have to say this is not my area of responsibility as under secretary, so I would ask that that question be taken by the embassy to see if we can give you a considered response.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  I think we have time for one last question.  We had a question submitted in advanced from Kanwal Abidi of the AZB Daily in Karachi, Pakistan, who asks:  “Tomorrow, all eyes will be on the U.S. congressional committee hearing on the future of Pakistan democracy post-February 8th, 2024 elections.  In your opinion, were Pakistani elections free and fair?  Further, Donald Lu will testify before Congress, so do you think it will impact U.S. and Pakistan bilateral relations amidst the current cipher case?  Thank you.”UNDER SECRETARY ZEYA:  Thank you for asking this question, and I want to reiterate some key points.  First of all, with respect to Pakistan’s February 8th elections, millions of Pakistanis made their voices heard.  We saw record numbers of Pakistani women, members of religious and ethnic minority groups and youth registered, and we commend Pakistani poll workers, civil society, journalists, and election observers for their work to protect and uphold Pakistan’s democratic and electoral institutions.But at the same time, the United States has joined credible international and local election observers in our assessment that these elections included undue restrictions on freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly.  We also condemned electoral violence, restrictions on the exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including attacks on media workers, and restrictions on access to the internet and telecommunications services, and we’re concerned about allegations of interference in Pakistan’s electoral process.  So claims of interference or fraud should be fully investigated.My third and final point here is that the United States is prepared to work with the new Pakistani government to advance our shared interests, and we are committed to strengthening cooperation in a way that affords the Pakistani people the peace, democracy, and progress that they deserve.MODERATOR:  Okay, thank you.  And now, Under Secretary Zeya, if you have any closing remarks, I’ll turn it back over to you.UNDER SECRETARY ZEYA:  Thank you very much.  I really appreciate this opportunity to engage this dynamic global gathering, and in closing I would just like to underscore that three years of democracy summits have affirmed three core truths.  First, democracies are stronger together.  Second, civil society and independent media, like all of you on this call, are integral to successful democracies.  And third, collaboration across sectors, regions, and generations is integral to democratic renewal.So as Secretary Blinken noted in Seoul, safeguarding our democracies is a collective effort, one that depends on our government and people working together.  That is the power of the Summit for Democracy.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  That brings us to the end of our time today.  Thank you for your questions, and huge thanks to Under Secretary Zeya for taking time to join us.  We will provide a transcript of this briefing to participating journalists as soon as it is available.  We’d also love to hear your feedback, and you can contact us at any time at AsiaPacMedia@state.gov.Thanks again for your participation, and we hope you can join us for another briefing soon.  Take care.
- United States and Vietnam Sign a Memorandum of Cooperation on Culture and People-to-People Ties HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;United States and Vietnam Sign a Memorandum of Cooperation on Culture and People-to-People Ties				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										United States and Vietnam Sign a Memorandum of Cooperation on Culture and People-to-People Ties																																		Media Note																														March 13, 2024																																							Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy Liz Allen and Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs Lee Satterfield met with Vietnamese Vice President Vo Thi Anh Xuan and Deputy Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism Trinh Thi Thuy in Washington, DC on March 13.&nbsp;&nbsp;In their meeting, Under Secretary Allen and Vice President Xuan expressed support for expanding people-to-people ties – the foundation of our enduring partnership with Vietnam – as part of the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.&nbsp; To reaffirm this commitment, Assistant Secretary Satterfield and Deputy Minister Thuy signed a memorandum of cooperation pledging further cooperation on cultural exchanges and people-to-people ties in areas such as art, sports, and tourism.&nbsp;This Memorandum of&nbsp;Cooperation on Culture and People-to-People Ties builds on a November 2023 agreement that promotes further two-way academic exchange and education cooperation, including expanding educational partnerships between higher education institutions in both countries, and paves the way for even more connections and partnerships between the people of Vietnam and the United States.Following the establishment of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Vietnam, the United States is developing a range&nbsp;of programs to promote STEM education by expanding Fulbright Student scholarships to STEM fields, supporting English training for STEM students, and increasing engagement with Vietnamese college administrators on workforce development.&nbsp;&nbsp;						Tags																					Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs																																Cultural Exchanges																																							Education																																							Fulbright Program																															Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs																								Office of the Spokesperson																																Public Diplomacy																															Vietnam
- Digital Press Briefing with Daniel J. Kritenbrink, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink, Assistant SecretaryBureau of East Asian and Pacific AffairsMODERATOR:  Greetings from the U.S. Department of State’s Asia Pacific Media Hub.  I would like to welcome journalists to today’s on-the-record briefing with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink.  Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will provide an overview of his visit to Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei.  He will also discuss the historic progress the United States has made with Southeast Asian allies and partners over the past two years in advancing an Indo-Pacific that is free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.And with that, let’s get started.  Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, I’ll turn it over to you for your opening remarks.  Thanks for joining us.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Thank you, Katie, and thank you as always for hosting me, and I’m really excited to have this opportunity to engage with journalist friends in Southeast Asia and here in the United States as well, and really grateful to all of our colleagues at the Bangkok Media Hub for setting this up.  I really am excited to have the opportunity to chat with colleagues tonight.  I’m just back from an incredibly productive five-country trip to Southeast Asia last week.  I had the pleasure of visiting Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei, and I’m eager to share how these engagements, I think, further strengthened our commitment to the region and demonstrated that commitment – again, particularly to our friends and partners in Southeast Asia.Before I dive into the specifics of each stop, let me just make a couple general framing comments about just how critical these relationships are to advancing our overall Indo-Pacific Strategy.  And I think you know that our Indo-Pacific Strategy is designed to advance a region that’s free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.And one key point that I made this past week in Southeast Asia to each and every one of my counterparts was this:  Despite the many global challenges that we collectively face, the United States remains squarely focused on the Indo-Pacific region.  I think you all know that we recently marked the second anniversary of our Indo-Pacific Strategy, and I emphasized to all of my counterparts that in accordance with that strategy, our top priority remains investing in the collective capacity of our allies, partners, and friends.  And I think we’ve made tremendous progress in advancing that strategy, especially in Southeast Asia.Just a couple of highlights.  I’ll remind friends that we held the U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit in D.C. in 2022, and we of course continue to strongly support ASEAN centrality, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, and really honored to have upgraded our partnership with ASEAN to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.I think friends are aware as well we’ve strengthened our ties with traditional allies and partners, including elevating our relationships with both Vietnam and India to Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships, and we’ve also increased engagement with other key partners in the region, including the Philippines.We signed the IPEF Supply Chain Agreement and we substantially concluded negotiations of the Clean Economy Agreement and Fair Economy Agreement under IPEF, and we look forward to continuing discussions around IPEF, including with our IPEF Southeast Asian partners Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.And of course, we continued our unwavering support for democracy in Burma.  In the three years since the coup d’etat, we have provided nearly $317 million in lifesaving humanitarian assistance and dedicated hundreds of millions of dollars to advance democracy, human rights, and justice for the people of Myanmar.Now, I could continue listing our accomplishments in the region over the last couple of years, but why don’t I spend the remainder of my time focusing more specifically on my activities in the last week across the region.In Singapore, I was absolutely delighted to join my counterpart Permanent Secretary Albert Chua to co-host the sixth U.S.-Singapore Strategic Partnership Dialogue.  And during our very productive conversations, we reaffirmed our nations’ wide-ranging partnership on defense and security, economic cooperation, critical and emerging technology, and climate and energy.  I was also honored to meet with Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan, and I took the opportunity to thank Singapore for its continued leadership in the region, including in ASEAN and in IPEF, and Singapore’s incredibly strong support for tackling today’s greatest challenges.In Phnom Penh, I had a range of productive conversations with counterparts on how the United States and Cambodia can deepen our relationship and address issues of concern.  I met with new Prime Minister Hun Manet as well as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Tea Seiha for what were really wide-ranging discussions on the whole range of issues before the United States and Cambodia.  Now, on the positive side that includes our cooperation on DPRK UN sanctions enforcement, condemning Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine, and other cooperative areas, including related to law enforcement.  We also addressed candidly other areas, including areas of difference related to issues such as human rights, trafficking in persons, and creating space for free and independent media.I also reiterated to Prime Minister Hun Manet that the United States remains committed to the Cambodian people and their aspirations for a more prosperous, democratic, and independent country where all voices are heard and respected, and where Cambodia’s sovereignty is protected.In Bangkok, my Thai counterpart Permanent Secretary Eksiri Pintaruchi and I co-chaired a very productive ninth U.S.-Thailand Strategic Dialogue.  I was also honored the next day to co-host the second U.S.-Thailand Strategic and Defense Dialogue, or 2+2, alongside Ministry of Defense Permanent Secretary Sanitchanog and my DOD colleague Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Jed Royal.  And during those two dialogues, I was really gratified that we were able to reaffirm with our Thai allies our commitment to advancing our bilateral cooperation across a whole range of areas, including economic growth, climate change, global health, security cooperation, and people-to-people ties.  We also had an opportunity to discuss with our Thai allies shared concerns, including regarding the situation in Burma.In Hanoi, I participated in the Asia-Pacific Dialogue, which was our first iteration of this dialogue since we upgraded our relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.  During the dialogue with my counterpart Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Minh Vu, we further deepened our relationship and found new ways to facilitate our shared vision for, again, a prosperous, open, resilient, and peaceful region.  We also discussed the need to maintain peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea in the face of rising challenges there.  I was also delighted to meet with Vice Foreign Minister Ha Kim Ngoc as well as Chairman of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s Commission for External Relations Le Hoai Trung, in which we were able to discuss a broad range of other issues important to our partnership with Vietnam.And last but not least, I was absolutely delighted to travel to Brunei, which was my first trip there ever.  Of course, this year marks our 40th anniversary of formal bilateral relations, and I was proud to mark the milestone with my friend Foreign Minister Dato Erywan, Minister of Finance Dato Amin, and Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense Dato Alirupendi.  I also had the opportunity to reaffirm our enduring bilateral ties and commitment to our strong partnership with Brunei.So let me just sum up this rundown of my trip with, again, a reaffirmation of how proud I am of our efforts to strengthen our partnerships across all of Southeast Asia as well as our strong relationship with ASEAN.  These relationships continue to be critical to American national security and prosperity, and as the United States we are always looking for ways to boost our cooperation and demonstrate our ongoing commitment to the Indo-Pacific.  Again, we believe the Indo-Pacific is the region where much of the history of the 21st century will be written.  And perhaps more than anything, I was incredibly gratified by the close strategic alignment between the United States and our partners in the region in tackling our shared priorities together.So, Katie, why don’t I stop there.  Sorry my opening was a little bit longer than usual, but after a five-country trip, I hope people will understand.  But now let’s get on to the main event and I’m delighted to take your questions.  Over.MODERATOR:  Thank you so much, Assistant Secretary.  So now we’ll turn to the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  Our first question came in in advance from Bui Mai of Nguoi Lao Dong newspaper in Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam, who asks:  “What will the U.S. do to demonstrate its security commitment in the Pacific region to its Southeast Asian allies, including Vietnam?  And in the context of China increasing its military presence in the area, recently a ship collision with the Philippines, will the U.S. take any specific actions such as deploying military force to this area or not?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Katie, thank you, and thanks to our friends in Vietnam for leading us off with an excellent question.  Let me say just a couple of things in response.  First thing I’ll do is reiterate what I said in my opening remarks:  The focus of the United States in the Indo-Pacific – and including in Southeast Asia – is investing in the collective capacity of our partners so as to support the rules-based regional order and to advance our shared challenges.  And we do that across a whole range of domains, from working to combat pandemic disease and climate change to investing in the economic prosperity of our partners.  But also – related to your question – in the security domain, we also invest in the capacity of our partners.And I would say in particular for many of our friends in Southeast Asia, especially the five claimant states, they are especially concerned about the situation in the South China Sea.  And our focus in our response to meeting those concerns is threefold.  First, we continue to focus on our diplomacy, including with partners in ASEAN, to make sure that all countries – including all claimants – base their claims in international law, that all claimants commit to recognizing and respecting freedom of navigation, freedom of overflight, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.We also – secondly, we spend a great deal of time, effort, and money investing in building the maritime capacity of our partners, especially building an increasing maritime domain awareness.  So the United States has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in partners’ maritime domain awareness capabilities because we believe that the more countries are able to understand what is happening in their maritime domains and defend their own interests in the maritime domains, we further promote stability across the region.And then thirdly and finally, the United States continues through our own operations to be physically present in the region on a daily basis, and we continue to fly, sail, and operate everywhere that international law allows, demonstrating thereby that all countries share those same rights.So our goal, again, is to promote peace and stability, security and prosperity, promote respect for international law, peaceful resolution of disputes, but also ensure that countries have their own ability to protect their sovereignty and their own interests.  And we think if we do that, we maximize our chances of preventing miscalculation and conflict and, again, promoting peace and stability.And I should be candid too:  I think we’ve seen in a number of instances where the People’s Republic of China has taken a number of steps in the South China Sea that both run counter to international law, but that also utilize coercion to intimidate partners in ways that we find deeply unacceptable and destabilizing.Hope that answers your question.MODERATOR:  Great, thank you.  I see we have a question from Kea Puy of Kyodo News based in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.  “During your recent meeting with PM Hun Manet, did you raise any concern about Ream Naval Base?  If so, what was the response?  Also, did you raise the South China Sea issue?  If so, what were your concerns and reply from PM Hun Manet?  Thank you.”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, thanks to our Japanese friends for asking another good question.  Look, as I hope I made clear in my opening remarks, I did have the opportunity to meet with Prime Minister Hun Manet and we had a very productive, very positive, and very candid meeting.  And we discussed a number of ways in which we would like to both deepen and expand the existing cooperation between the United States and Cambodia, but also address certain areas of concern.Now, I will state just very clearly and transparently that we did discuss issues related to Ream Naval Base, and I think that as the United States has stated very clearly and transparently before, that the United States and a number of countries in the region have expressed serious concerns about the intent, the nature, and the scope of construction at Ream Naval Base as well as the role that the PRC military is playing in this process and in the future use of the facility.But I do want to underscore while we had a very productive and candid exchange, it was a broad-ranging conversation.  Ream was one of many topics that we discussed, but again, I underscored – whether it was related to Ream or a range of other issues – again, America’s approach to the region is to ensure that our partners continue to have choice and that partners continue to be able to preserve their own sovereignty.  And that helped form the basis of my very productive conversation with Prime Minister Hun Manet.I think you also asked about the South China Sea.  Obviously, I discussed the South China Sea really in all of my stops in the region, but we did not discuss it in detail with the prime minister.  We focused a bit more squarely on the bilateral relationship and some of the issues that I’ve outlined here this evening.  Thanks very much.MODERATOR:  Okay, next we’ll go to the live queue.  We have Sangho Song of Yonhap based in Washington, D.C.  You should be able to unmute yourself now.QUESTION:  Can you hear me?MODERATOR:  Yes, we can.QUESTION:  Okay.  Thank you very much for doing this, Assistant Secretary.  I have a question about North Korea.  Recently, U.S. senior official for DPRK Jung Pak and NSC official Mira Rapp-Hooper talked about the need for interim steps on a path towards North Korea denuclearization.  Can you comment on why officials have started to mention that expression “interim steps”?  We understand it is only natural to think that there should be interim steps towards the time-consuming denuclearization process, but interim steps are usually involving a nuclear freeze in return for sanctions relief and other incentives.  Can you elaborate on the reason why the officials started to use that expression “interim steps”?ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, look, I very much appreciate your question.  Here’s what I would say.  The United States continues to be deeply concerned, along with our close allies and partners in the region, particularly the Republic of Korea and Japan – continue to be concerned with the range of destabilizing North Korean activities, including now a large number of ballistic missile tests and other provocative behavior that we find unacceptable.  We’ve continued to demonstrate, as the U.S. Government, that we will remain absolutely committed to the security of our partners and to the security of the United States, that we will carry out a number of steps to deter North Korea.  We will also continue to strictly enforce a range of sanction measures both in the UN context and also bilaterally and trilaterally.At the same time, we have continued to indicate that the door remains open to North Korea to engage and to proceed down a better path that leads to denuclearization and stability in the region.  But I don’t have any new developments to share with you this evening, but I do appreciate your comment and I will say this too: that North Korea did feature in many of my conversations in the region, including in Southeast Asia, where I think it’s fair to say that countries across the entire Indo-Pacific remain deeply concerned about the range of actions that North Korea continues to take.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Our next question comes to us from the Q&amp;A tab, from Huong Doan of SOHA News in Vietnam, who asks:  “Would you mind telling more detail about the trip to Vietnam?  Was there any developments in IPEF negotiation and semiconductor cooperation?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, to my friend from Vietnam, I’m always delighted to talk about Vietnam, and it was a privilege to return to the country where I had the – again, the privilege of serving as America’s ambassador for three and a half years.  I would say that the conversations I had in Hanoi were – they were detailed, they were rich, they were incredibly broad-ranging and extremely candid.  We did talk about the economic and trade relationship, of course, which remains vitally important to our Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Vietnam, but we also exchanged views on a whole range of security and strategic issues from the South China Sea to the situation in Myanmar to the Korean Peninsula.  We talked about our cooperation in a broad range of other areas, including on a range of transnational and global issues, including climate change and health.Now, I would say that our economic engagement in IPEF and our cooperation in the high-tech sector also remains a really important element of the relationship.  We’ve certainly – again, in accordance with our strategy, we’ve demonstrated that we are invested in Vietnam’s success, literally and figuratively, including in Vietnam’s high-tech sector.  So we’re very grateful, actually, for the leadership role that Vietnam has played in IPEF thus far.  I think you saw from the announcements at the time we upgraded our partnership to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership last year during President Biden’s visit that our cooperation in the tech sector is really a critical, new, and exciting element of the relationship.  That will continue going forward.  Certainly it was a key element of my conversations, but I didn’t go to Hanoi to make any new announcements in that area, but I’m confident it will remain one of the most important and exciting elements of our relationship for decades to come.MODERATOR:  Okay, next we’ll go to the live queue.  We have Giff Johnson from the Marshall Islands Journal.  Giff, you should be able to unmute yourself now.QUESTION:  Thank you.  I know you’re focused on Asia because of the visit, and I’m just wondering, however, if you could comment briefly on where the Compacts of Free Association for the three North Pacific countries are headed given the holdup in congressional approval, but some developments over the last few days.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, Giff, thanks so much for your question, and I’m really delighted to be speaking with you.  Because even though my trip last week and the primary focus for this evening has been on my five-country trip in Southeast Asia, I think you know very well that the United States is committed to the entire Indo-Pacific, and in particular to the Pacific Islands.  I know President Biden was absolutely honored to host two U.S.-Pacific Island Forum summits in Washington, D.C.  He really benefitted from developing close personal relationships with leaders across the entire Pacific.And I think as you know, our approach to the Pacific is – the way we’ve termed it – meeting our partners where they live.  In other words, in accordance with the 2050 Pacific Island Forum Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, we have worked with Pacific partners to identify their key priorities, whether it’s related to combatting climate change or illegal fishing or focusing on economic development and people-to-people ties.  And then we’ve crafted a strategy to meet each of those needs and demands.Now, in the North Pacific, I think particularly for out partners in the three Freely Associated States, obviously the newly renegotiated Compacts of Free Association have been the key focus for the last couple of years.  We were really delighted to substantially complete the negotiations for the new compacts, and of course we’ve been working with our friends on Capitol Hill to make sure that the implementing legislation for the compacts is in fact passed so that the newly negotiated agreements can come into effect and, of course, the United States can continue to provide the assistance that I think has played such a key role in our partnerships.Look, we’ve engaged with our – with congressional leaders very intensively over the past several weeks and months to demonstrate the importance of the Pacific, the importance in particular of the Freely Associated States and the Compacts of Free Association.  Have been very pleased and excited to see the positive developments on Capitol Hill that you mentioned just a little while ago.  We’ll continue to watch closely work by leaders in Congress, but certainly the developments of the last week that we’ve seen are very promising and we very much look forward to early passage by the Congress of the compacts and then their full implementation.  And most importantly, once we do so, we can get back to the daily business of continuing to grow our partnerships in every possible way.I hope that’s helpful and responsive to your question.  Really delighted to have you on the call tonight.MODERATOR:  Okay, our next question goes to Pimuk, who comes to us from Radio Free Asia:  “What is the U.S. role in Thai Government efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to displaced people in Myanmar?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, this is a great question.  And look, I’ll say a couple of things.  First of all, I was really delighted to be in Thailand and to engage in the two dialogues that I did with our Thai allies – just refreshingly candid and cooperative and productive.  Those discussions were really focused on how the United States and Thailand can work together to make the region more prosperous and more secure.  I praised in great detail and repeatedly the Thai Government’s ongoing and longstanding efforts to support refugees who have fled from the violence in Myanmar, and also Thailand’s both historic strong support for providing humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar but also the more recent efforts by the Prime Minister Srettha government in the ASEAN context to, again, increase humanitarian assistance across the board.Now, the United States also provides a great deal of assistance – humanitarian assistance – both to people in Myanmar and to refugees in the region.  And again, as I said in my opening, we’ve provided nearly $317 million in lifesaving humanitarian assistance.  We’ve also dedicated, I think as you know, hundreds of millions of dollars to advance democracy, human rights, and justice.  And I will say that much of that humanitarian assistance is implemented and delivered with the Royal Thai Government’s cooperation and support.  And so we remain, again, very grateful to the leadership role that Thailand has played in the region, including on Myanmar, and in particular most helping – helping those, rather, most in need from Myanmar.So thanks for the opportunity to be able to highlight both Thailand’s role and America’s role in close cooperation with our Thai allies.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Well, we have so many great questions we could probably go another half hour, but I think we have to let the Assistant Secretary go soon.  So I’ll turn it back over to him for closing remarks.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  I’m happy – if you want, Katie, let’s do one more.MODERATOR:  Okay, maybe we’ll mix it up and go to the live queue.  Christopher Woody, independent journalist based in Bangkok.  Christopher, you should be able to unmute yourself.QUESTION:  Hi, thank you for your time this morning.  Thailand is among the U.S.’s five treaty allies in the region, but it seems like over the past three years of the administration most of the major progress on defense and security was with the other four.  I wanted to ask if after your most recent engagements in Bangkok, do you feel like the U.S.-Thai relationship is in a position to kind of pursue those – pursue that progress on defense and security that wasn’t possible previously?ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, look, I’ll state very candidly and very enthusiastically that I came away from our two days of dialogues in Thailand as optimistic as I’ve ever been about the U.S.-Thai alliance, and particularly after the 2+2 dialogue I was really struck and impressed by the depth of our security relationship and our military-to-military ties.  And look, that’s been the case for more than six decades now.  But I really do think that our two militaries are closer than ever.  I think our security cooperation is probably more robust than ever.  And look, I think you could argue across the board that the U.S.-Thai alliance is as strong as it’s ever been.But really, I was impressed by first our strategic alignment on the major issues in the region – the decades-long cooperation between our militaries; the deep and rich interpersonal relations that have developed, mainly by our operating and training together, studying in one another’s academies, and the like.  So I came away very bullish on the U.S.-Thai alliance, and again, I think you’ll see our security cooperation probably more robust than it’s ever been in the coming years.MODERATOR:  All right.  And now, Assistant Secretary, if you have any last words you’d like to sum up, please go ahead.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, I’ll just – I’ll thank you again, Katie, and most importantly I’ll thank our friends from the media in the region.  It’s always a pleasure to spend time together with you.  I really appreciate your questions.  I wish we had more time because I think you are right, we could probably go on for another few hours.  But I hope you’ve taken away my primary message that the United States of America remains strongly committed to the Indo-Pacific region.  It’s where we think, again, much of the history of the 21st century will be written, and where America’s future security and prosperity will largely be determined.  And in particular, I was delighted to spend so much time last week in Southeast Asia, where together with our – with the 10 countries of ASEAN we intend to ensure the most secure and prosperous future possible for our 1 billion people.So thank you very much for spending time with me, and I’ll look forward to the next opportunity.  And thank you again, Katie.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  That brings us to the end of our time for today.  Thank you for your questions, and big thanks to Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink for joining us.  We will provide a transcript of this briefing to participating journalists as soon as it’s available, and we’d also love to hear your feedback.  You can contact us at any time at AsiaPacMedia@state.gov.  Thanks again for your participation and we hope you can join us for another briefing soon.
- Tenth U.S.-Vietnam Asia-Pacific Dialogue Office of the SpokespersonAssistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink and Vietnam Standing Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Minh Vu recently concluded the 10th Asia-Pacific Dialogue in Hanoi, the first held under our Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.  The two sides discussed a range of regional and global issues, including ASEAN, transnational threats, economic security cooperation, and advancing our shared goals of a free, open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient Indo-Pacific region.The Assistant Secretary also held bilateral meetings with Vice Foreign Minister Ha Kim Ngoc and Communist Party of Vietnam External Relations Committee Chairman Le Hoai Trung to discuss building on the recent elevation of U.S.-Vietnam relations.
- Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kritenbrink’s Travel to Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei Office of the SpokespersonAssistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink will travel to Singapore; Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Bangkok, Thailand; Hanoi, Vietnam; and Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, February 23-March 4 to underscore the United States’ strong and enduring commitment to its allies and partners in Southeast Asia.In Singapore, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will co-lead the U.S.-Singapore Strategic Partnership Dialogue alongside Ministry of Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Albert Chua.  They will discuss the wide-ranging U.S.-Singapore partnership, including defense and security ties, economic cooperation, critical and emerging technology, and climate and energy.In Phnom Penh, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will meet with Cambodian officials to advance our shared vision of a free, prosperous, secure, and resilient Indo-Pacific.  The Assistant Secretary will also underscore U.S. commitment to the Cambodian people and their aspirations for a democratic and independent country where all voices are heard and respected, and Cambodia’s sovereignty is protected.In Bangkok, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will co-lead the 9th U.S.-Thailand Strategic Dialogue alongside Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Eksiri Pintaruchi.  He will also co-lead the Second Strategic and Defense Dialogue alongside Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Jedidiah Royal.  During these two dialogues, under the auspices of the U.S.-Thai Communiqué on Strategic Alliance and Partnership, the Assistant Secretary will work to advance bilateral cooperation in areas of shared interest including economic growth, climate change, global health, security cooperation, and people-to-people ties.In Hanoi, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will meet with Vietnamese officials and participate in the Asia-Pacific Dialogue.  Building on the recent upgrade of U.S.-Vietnam ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the Assistant Secretary will seek to further deepen U.S.-Vietnam relations and advance our shared vision of a prosperous, open, resilient, and peaceful Indo-Pacific Region.In Bandar Seri Begawan, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will commemorate the 40th anniversary of U.S.-Brunei relations.  He will also meet with senior Bruneian officials to discuss key issues in the bilateral relationship, including economic and security initiatives, efforts to tackle climate change, and regional cooperation.