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SETTING NEW COURSES FOR POLAR WEATHER

SATELLITES AND EARTH OBSERVATIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND 

OVERSIGHT 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 29, 2010

Serial No. 111–102

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov 
(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chair 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio 

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL D. TONKO, New York 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

JIM MATHESON, Utah 

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

BARON P. HILL, Indiana 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio 

KATHLEEN DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

VACANCY 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California 

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

HON. BRAD MILLER, North Carolina, Chair 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee 

CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio 

KATHY DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California 

VACANCY 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

DAN PEARSON Subcommittee Staff Director 

JAMES PAUL Democratic Professional Staff Member 

TOM HAMMOND Republican Professional Staff Member 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

June 29, 2010

Page 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 2

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Brad Miller, Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House 

of Representatives ................................................................................................ 13

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 14

Statement by Representative Paul C. Broun, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and 

Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ....................................................... 15

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 16

Witnesses:

Hon. Sherburne B. ‘‘Shere’’ Abbott, Associate Director, Energy and Environment Division, Office of Science and Technology Policy 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 17

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 19

Biography .......................................................................................................... 27

Ms. Mary M. Glackin, Deputy Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere, 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 27

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 29

Biography .......................................................................................................... 34

Mr. Christopher J. Scolese, Associate Administrator, National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 35

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 36

Biography .......................................................................................................... 38

Mr. Gil Klinger, Director, Space and Intelligence Office, Under Secretary 

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Department of Defense 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 39

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 40

Biography .......................................................................................................... 43

Mr. David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues, 

Government Accountability Office 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 44

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 46

Biography .......................................................................................................... 64

Appendix: Additional Material for the Record

GAO Report, Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act 

Quickly to Address Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and 

Climate Data, May 2010: GAO–10–558 ............................................................. 78

GAO Report, Environmental Satellites: Strategy Needed to Sustain Critical 

Climate and Space Weather Measurements, April 2010: GAO–10–456 .......... 126

(1)

SETTING NEW COURSES FOR POLAR WEATHER SATELLITES AND EARTH OBSERVATIONS 

TUESDAY, JUNE 29, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT, 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad Miller 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
2

1 As set forth in the Memorandum of Agreement governing the NPOESS program, the Air 

Force managed the acquisition of the satellites. NPOESS was therefore subject to Department 

of Defense regulations for major defense programs. When such programs exceed approved baseline costs by more than 25 percent, recertification is required by 10 U.S.C. 2433 et seq. 2 In concert with the Office of Management and Budget and the National Security Council. 

3 NOAA took on operating responsibility for Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) 

satellites in 1998. 4Mr. Dave Powner, GAO’s witness, has testified at five of the seven previous hearings. 

HEARING CHARTER

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT 

Setting New Courses for Polar Weather Satellites

and Earth Observations 

TUESDAY, JUNE 29, 2010

10:00 A.M.–12:00 P.M.

2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

Purpose

Since 2003, there have been seven hearings before the Science and Technology 

Committee or its subcommittees on the subject of the National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program. Established in 1994, 

the program was intended to design, develop, construct and launch satellites into 

polar orbits so that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 

and Department of Defense (DOD) would continue to receive daily data necessary 

for civilian and military weather forecasting needs. In the 2003 hearing, the lifecycle cost for NPOESS stated in the March 2003 budget request was $6.1 billion,

with the first of six satellites expected to be launched in 2009. In last year’s 

hearing, the life-cycle cost estimate had grown to at least $14.9 billion, was intended to purchase only four satellites with a first launch pushed back to 2014.

The key reasons for this situation include major performance problems and schedule delays for the primary imaging instrument, spawning cost overruns, all tied to 

a management structure that delayed rather than fostered decisions at critical moments. In 2005, the growth in cost estimates exceeded statutory limits triggering 

a Nunn-McCurdy 1 recertification, the elimination of two satellites and removal or 

downgrading of sensor capabilities—decisions driven by the Pentagon. Last year, 

witnesses testified before this Subcommittee that program leadership had deteriorated to the point that only White House intervention would assure that there 

would ever be any NPOESS satellites at all. 

Rather than trying to satisfy the needs of three agencies with one satellite design, 

the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) 2 instructed that the program 

be cut in two. Satellites flying in orbits to collect early-morning observations would 

be developed and launched by DOD. NOAA would do the same to collect observations in the afternoon. NOAA would operate all the satellites while in orbit,3 and 

would manage the common data system to receive, store and share all data. These 

changes will be the focus of Administration witness testimony. 

From the outset of the Committee’s oversight,4 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has delivered valuable insight on the status of the polar satellite program. Its reports have documented the steady deterioration in the program’s condition. Today’s hearing builds off two reports that GAO is testifying to today. The first 

focuses specifically on the decisions surrounding the NPOESS program and how the 

program is progressing. The second examines the unfinished attempts to restore important sensor capabilities, many of which were jettisoned in the Nunn-McCurdy 

program restructuring. Without these sensors, or similar capabilities, our ability to 

strengthen our Earth observation networks as a whole will be compromised. 

Before turning to the issues raised by GAO in their two new reports, it is useful 

to get a perspective on how the cost and schedule on NPOESS have evolved (table 

from GAO).
3

5The Committee consisted of the NOAA and NASA Administrators, and the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, who normally delegated responsibility for 

ExCom attendance to the Secretary of the Air Force. 6 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Continuing Independent Assessment of the National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System. Hearing 

before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight (Washington: Government Printing 

Office). Serial 111–36. June 17, 2009; p. 19. 7 Ibid.; pp. 120, 125. 8 Restructure of the NPOESS Program. Memorandum from the Director of OSTP, Director of 

OMB and the National Security Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and the Administrator of NASA, March 2, 2010.

GAO’s NPOESS Report—Leadership Paralysis

A dominant theme in the Committee’s hearings of the last three years, and a bipartisan concern, was the ineffectiveness of the chief leadership arm, the so-called 

Executive Committee (ExCom).5 Particularly revealing was the fact that it took 

more than a year to agree on documents needed to implement the changes from the 

Nunn-McCurdy process. 

By June of last year, this leadership dysfunction was so pronounced that both 

GAO and an independent review team (IRT) commissioned by the ExCom concluded 

that the program could not succeed if it was left in place. In the Subcommittee’s 

previous hearing GAO’s Mr. Powner testified that the ExCom ‘‘. . . has not effectively fulfilled its responsibilities and does not have the membership and leadership 

it needs to effectively or efficiently oversee and direct the NPOESS program.’’ 6 The 

Independent Review Team report stated, ‘‘The IRT believes that this program 

will not survive if this particular problem is not addressed immediately’’

[emphasis added] and that the problems ‘‘. . . can only be resolved at the White 

House level.’’ 7 The IRT recommended that the program, in its entirety, be assigned 

to NOAA or DOD; the team felt that NOAA was the better choice given that the 

agency could not execute its fundamental missions without these satellites. 

A task force to devise a solution, chaired by OSTP’s Associate Director Shere Abbott, began work last August. In October, Chairman Gordon and Mr. Miller wrote 

OSTP Director John Holdren to advocate for the IRT’s proposed solution assigning 

program responsibility to NOAA. With decisions relating to NOAA’s Fiscal Year 

(FY) 2011 budget request looming, the letter also urged the task force to expedite 

its work. 

On January 5, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provided direction 

on restructuring to the agencies.8 The decision became public with the release of a 

White House fact sheet on February 1 in conjunction with the release of the President’s budget. Key points from the fact sheet were: 

• ‘‘. . . NOAA and NASA [the National Aeronautics and Space Administration] will take primary responsibility for the afternoon orbit, and 
4

DOD will take primary responsibility for the morning orbit. The agencies will continue to partner in those areas that have been successful in the 

past, such as a shared ground system. The restructured programs will also 

eliminate the NPOESS tri-agency structure that that has made management 

and oversight difficult, contributing to the poor performance of the program. 

[emphasis added]

• ‘‘NOAA and the Air Force have already begun to move into a transition period during which the current joint procurement will end. A 

detailed plan for this transition period will be available in a few 

weeks. [emphasis added]

• ‘‘NASA’s role in the restructured program will be modeled after the 

procurement structure of the successful POES and GOES programs, 

where NASA and NOAA have a long and effective partnership. Work 

is proceeding rapidly with NOAA to establish a JPSS program at NASA’s 

Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). [emphasis added]

• ‘‘. . . NOAA and NASA will strive to ensure that all current NPOESS requirements are met on the most rapid practicable schedule without reducing 

system capabilities.

• ‘‘. . . Cost-estimates will be produced at or close to the 80% confidence level.

• ‘‘DOD remains committed to a partnership with NOAA in preserving the Nation’s weather and climate sensing capability. For the morning orbit, the 

current DOD plan for deploying DMSP satellites ensures continued 

weather observation capability. The availability of DMSP satellites 

supports a short analysis (in cooperation with the partner agencies) 

of DOD requirements for the morning orbit and solutions with the 

start of a restructured program in the 4th quarter of fiscal year 2011. 

While this study is being conducted, DOD will fully support NOAA’s 

needs to ensure continuity of data in the afternoon orbit by 

transitioning appropriate and relevant activities from the current 

NPOESS effort. [emphasis added]

• ‘‘We expect much of the work being conducted by Northrop-Grumman and 

their subcontracts will be critical to ensuring continuity of weather observation in the afternoon orbit. DOD will work closely with the civil partners to 

ensure the relevant efforts continue productively and efficiently, and ensure 

the requirements of the national weather and climate communities are taken 

into consideration in building the resultant program for the morning orbit.’’

OSTP, on March 12, described the implementation plan for the new program. The 

requirements for data to be collected did not change. NASA and NOAA were to continue preparing the NPOESS Preparatory Program (NPP) satellite for launch in 

2011 to avoid losing data coverage in the afternoon. NOAA will reimburse NASA 

to manage the JPSS program at the Goddard Space Flight Center, as recommended 

by the IRT report discussed earlier. The Air Force will assume the responsibility for 

managing its program with the management office at Space and Missile Systems 

Center at the Los Angeles Air Force Base. In an Acquisition Decision Memorandum 

issued on March 17, the NPOESS Integrated Program Office (IPO) was ordered to 

facilitate the necessary actions.

GAO’s NPOESS Report—Early Transition issues

A. NPP Satellite Status 

Preparation and launch of the NPP satellite is the immediate critical item in the 

polar satellite program. GAO notes the delivery of the long-awaited VIIRS instrument and its integration on the satellite. The report also notes that the Cross-Track 

Infrared Sounder (CrIS) suffered its own technical problems late in development, involving damage to the instruments structure during vibration testing and questionable circuit card manufacturing. Resolving the issues and additional testing had the 

effect of delaying the NPP launch yet again, to September 2011. NOAA will testify, 

however, that CrIS has met its revised delivery date. 

NPP was never intended to be an operational satellite. Rather it was more of a 

‘‘proof of concept’’ satellite that would allow NOAA time to practice incorporating 

data collected by the new sensors into its operational activities and to cross-compare 

sensor performance against those on board existing satellites. However, last year, 

when the continuing sensor trouble led to another delay in the predicted launch 

date for the first NPOESS satellite, the program decided to compensate by using 

the NPP as a quasi-operational stopgap. As GAO notes, NPP was not designed to 

use the full NPOESS ground system and so will not approach the improvements in 
5

data delivery time that were expected from the next-generation satellites. Further, 

only NOAA and the Air Force weather center will have direct NPP data readouts; 

the two Navy centers without such capability will find that NPP data may not arrive in time to be used in their operations. Both DOD and NOAA are seeking fixes 

for this issue.

B. Initial Planning

As GAO notes, the transition is moving at different rates within DOD and NASA. 

NOAA indicated to GAO that transition activities would begin in July and be 

complete by September. NOAA received approval from the Committee on Appropriations for an April request to reprogram $73.8 million in NPOESS funds to fund 

establishment of the Goddard office and other transition activities. GAO reported 

that the DOD was expecting to complete a requirements review and determine 

whether to employ the NPOESS spacecraft by the end of June 2010, then make instrument selections by October 2010. The target for starting the program was FY 

2013. 

GAO included the following table to compare the new program with NPOESS:

Based on this information, GAO projects that the final life-cycle cost for the new 

polar satellite constellation will be more than the current approved spending baseline for the NPOESS program. Based on previous experience, launch delays can be 

expected. Decisions are still lacking on which sensors will fly and the platform they 

will be carried on in orbit. GAO recommends that the Departments of Commerce 

and Defense seek expedited decisions on these issues. 

Some of the unknown items have been addressed by decisions made last week by 

DOD and NOAA. Mr. Klinger should testify about the Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) subsequently issued on June 22. In it, DOD indicates it expects the 

newly-christened Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS) to launch its first satellite in 2018. DOD intends to also use the VIIRS sensor as its imager, and the satellite will carry the Space Environment Monitor originally intended for NPOESS. 
6

9 Ashton B. Carter. Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) for Department of Defense responsibilities under the restructure of the National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental 

Satellite System (NPOESS). June 22, 2010; p. 1. 10The original NPOESS spacecraft had to be increased in size in order to accommodate 

growth in the Conical Microwave Imaging Sounder, an instrument that was later removed from 

the spacecraft during the Nunn-McCurdy restructuring due to design challenges. 11The last current model, NOAA–19, has been in on-orbit storage since its launch February 

6, 2009. 12Sec. 913, Public Law 111–884; October 28, 2009. 

However, more information was requested on the anticipated microwave sounding 

instrument and its selection was postponed until August 2010. 

The other major decision that was deferred until August concerned the spacecraft 

‘‘bus’’ to fly in the morning orbit. The ADM states, ‘‘Implement the above actions 

to maximize use of the Government’s investment in NPOESS, and in a manner that 

offers maximum opportunities for collaboration with the NOAA JPSS program.’’ 9 A 

major debate between DOD and NOAA at this point is whether both agencies 

should use the spacecraft design originally intended for NPOESS. DOD’s platform 

choice is likely affected by the final configuration of the microwave sounder it will 

choose.10 For NOAA, on the other hand, the issue was time. Having no spare satellites in ground storage,11 NOAA is focusing on avoiding schedule delays. 

This time pressure can be seen in NOAA’s decision on June 23 to obtain a ‘‘clone’’ 

of the NPP satellite to serve as JPSS–1. Ms. Glackin should testify that this satellite will be purchased from Ball Corporation, NASA’s contractor on the NPP satellite, on a sole-source basis. The instruments will be supplied by NASA, and will 

be much the same as those aboard NPP. However, NOAA’s decision has the effect 

of reopening the debate about how to maintain continuity in the records of solar energy incidence, a critical climate variable, because the new satellite will not have 

space for the Total Solar Irradiance Sensor (see the discussion below in the discussion of GAO’s second report). International obligations to maintain search-and-rescue communication transponders may also be affected. 

With this decision, NOAA hopes to be able to maintain an opportunity to launch 

JPSS–1 in 2014. As GAO notes, NPP only has a five-year design life, and NOAA’s 

current plan envisions a 2015 launch for JPSS–1. Assuming that timeline, adding 

in the time needed to bring the new satellite into service, NPP might well fail before 

JPSS–1 is fully operational.

C. The Funding Squeeze

The March 12 implementation plan lays out an anticipated funding profile. It is 

consistent with cost numbers GAO quotes: $11.929 billion for NOAA through the 

end of 2024; $5 billion for DOD through the end of FY 2015:

According to the plan, the FY 2010 funds are intended to maintain progress toward an NPP launch, to fund the transition and to initiate the purchase of the JPSS 

spacecraft bus. As noted earlier, NOAA has reprogrammed $74 million into a new 

JPSS appropriation account. DOD will not change its requests for FY 2010 and FY 

2011 funds to minimize problems in the transition; changes in the later years await 

final DWSS definition. 

GAO notes that DOD is operating under Congressional restrictions in the use of 

its funding, which limited FY 2010 funds available to the Air Force until the submission of a strategy and implementation plan.12 The March submission fulfilled 
7

13 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Report to Accompany H.R. 5136, the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Washington: Government Printing Office). H. Rpt. 111–491. May 21, 2010; p. 179. 

those conditions, although GAO expresses concern that funding recessions might 

still force termination of the NPOESS contract by the end of September. So far the 

funds remain available. However, the House Armed Services Committee, dissatisfied 

with DOD’s somewhat vague transition plan, proposes only $25.5 million for FY 

2011.13 According to the June 22 ADM, the August meeting is to consider the 

‘‘schedule, estimated costs, and risks to a successful launch and deployment of the 

capability in FY 2018,’’ and develop a rough-order-of-magnitude’’ cost estimate. 

With the program changes, the agencies will submit separate funding requests in 

the future. NPOESS operated under a directive from the Appropriations Committee 

that both agencies contribute equally to the program. With the new JPSS/DWSS, 

NOAA will likely submit requests higher than those of DOD, reflecting the fact that 

NOAA is responsible for the ground system. NOAA’s decision to prepare its requests 

with more conservative assumptions, thus leading to higher confidence that it will 

more closely approximate actual spending, will also play a role. This is likely to be 

small comfort to appropriators already pressed to reduce spending.

D. The Northrop Grumman Contract

Central to the funding squeeze, GAO says, is a requirement in the NPOESS prime 

contract awarded to the Northrop Grumman Corporation in 2002. According to the 

report, the contract requires full funding of termination liability (i.e., the penalty 

to be paid by the government if it decides to end the contract) in the current year 

budget. NOAA and DOD are carefully watching expenditures to assure that FY 

2010 funds would be sufficient to pay an estimated $84 million in such costs (the 

agencies have agreed they share the liability equally). 

At the rate of spending in the NPOESS program, the agencies would have been forced to bring the program to a halt in August to have $84 million available, according to GAO. In April, steps began to ‘‘slow down work on all development activities so that work could continue through the end of the fiscal year.’’ The risk therefore remains that, if the agencies misjudge fund management, there could be an immediate impact on NPP preparations or the transition might come to a halt. 

Northrop also has keen interest in the outcome of the agency debate on bus options for their satellites. Despite NOAA’s decision to develop JPSS–1 using the NPP 

bus, there is still the possibility that the DOD satellites and NOAA’s JPSS–2 could 

be using Northrop’s NPOESS bus or a variant thereof. The government’s decision 

on what buses it will buy will do much to determine its answer to Northrop’s basic 

question: how much we will participate in the new program?

GAO’s NPOESS Report—Maintaining Direction

Looking at the history of NPOESS and similar program, GAO cites other issues 

that may prove problematic as the agencies proceed to organize their respective programs.

A. Negotiating Change

Northrop Grumman’s contract includes the responsibility for managing the subcontractors producing the various instruments. In the new program, each of these 

subcontracts will be transferred to NASA. There will also be changes resulting from 

the final choices on the satellite buses. Program restructuring also entails reworking 

budget and schedule plans, a process which took months to complete after the 

Nunn-McCurdy decisions in 2006. GAO warns that there may be similar problems 

in this transition. Indeed, some of these negotiations cannot even begin until the 

new program offices are in place or until decisions like those on the microwave 

sounder are finalized.

B. NASA’s Increased Responsibilities

In the NPOESS program, NASA was distinctly a junior partner. For JPSS, it will 

return to its more traditional role as NOAA’s technical support arm. Ms. Glackin 

and Mr. Scolese will refer to the long history the two agencies share, from the original Television Infrared Observation Satellite of 1960 to the current Geostationary 

Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) program now underway. 

GAO points out, however, that NASA procurement remains on its list of high-risk 

concerns. It warns that unless NOAA establishes a strong system for obtaining information from and providing direction to NASA, there is a possibility for replaying 
8

14Government Accountability Office. WEATHER SATELLITES: Action Needed to Resolve Status of the U.S. Geostationary Satellite Program. NSIAD–91–252. July 24, 1991. 15Dr. Marburger testified before the Energy and Environment Subcommittee about this process on June 7, 2007. See U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. The Status Report on the NPOESS Weather Satellite Program: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment (Washington: Government Printing Office). Serial 110–36. June 7, 2007. 

the unhappy example of the GOES I–M program.14 Simply shifting program elements to NASA, GAO warns, is not a guarantee problems will no longer occur. 

C. Avoiding the Brain Drain

Finding qualified people capable of managing complex technical development programs is difficult for NOAA, NASA and DOD. Having to staff the management offices needed to winnow the valuable elements of the NPOESS program while gearing up its successors will pose challenges to the agencies’ human resource personnel. 

GAO states that the existing Integrated Program Office staff, beset with turmoil 

and uncertainty, has been leaving or preparing to do so. Steps should be underway 

to prevent hard-earned experience from slipping out the door.

D. Preserving Cooperation

Even with the divergence of procurement responsibility, there are still areas 

where the JPSS and DWSS staffs will continue to cooperate, says GAO. In managing the data system, DOD and NOAA will have to assure that cooperation on 

transmission protocols and formatting is preserved. Instrument selection must consider the full spectrum of agency needs. Preserving the process for requirements development would be beneficial.

GAO’s Earth Observation Strategy Report

A. Preserving Climate and Space Weather Continuity

When the NPOESS program underwent restructuring in 2006 after its NunnMcCurdy recertification, the decision was made to support only those components 

that contributed to weather observations. Accordingly, a set of sensors intended for 

monitoring climate parameters was removed. Additionally, improved versions of instruments designed to expand the ability to monitor emissions from solar activity 

were canceled in favor of flying copies of the existing instruments. 

At a time where concern about climate change had real political and economic 

consequences, the loss of the climate sensors threatened to disrupt the ability to answer a pressing issue—which changes were the result of human actions, and which 

were caused naturally? Doing so requires technology that can discriminate between 

small differences in temperature and other conditions. Such data must be collected 

for decades or longer. Without the NPOESS sensors, the interruptions in the data 

records would make it difficult if not impossible to properly identify climate trends. 

Dr. John Marburger, Dr. Holdren’s predecessor at OSTP, asked NASA and NOAA 

in June 2006 to find alternatives for putting the climate instruments into service.15

As a result of that effort, the Total Solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS) was identified 

as top priority, which measured the amount of energy the Sun was providing to the 

Earth. As this represents the major source of energy powering the Earth’s physical, 

chemical and biological systems, precise knowledge of the amounts arriving and the 

changes in that amount over time is fundamental to climate science. Second priority 

went to the Earth Radiation Budget Sensor (ERBS) which tracked the amount of 

energy the Earth returned to space. 

Based on this analysis, NOAA has obtained appropriations to build one of each 

sensor. The TSIS sensor was intended to fly on the first NPOESS satellite. The NPP 

‘‘clone’’ NOAA now intends to buy, however, does not have sufficient space to accommodate TSIS and so the question of maintaining continuity of this data is again 

open. Earth radiation budget data will be collected using a copy of the existing 

Clouds and the Earth’s Radiant Energy System (CERES) sensor on both NPP and 

JPSS–1. The ERBS upgrade will likely fly on JPSS–2. NOAA has also decided to 

restore the full capability of the Ozone Monitoring and Profiler Suite on NPP, but 

whether it will also fly the Limb component aboard the follow-on satellites has not 

been finally determined. 

GAO was asked to evaluate the efforts NOAA and NASA expended in restoring 

the full complement of climate sensors, leading to this second report. GAO had recommended in 2008 that a long-term strategy for a climate observation network was 

needed. GAO states that recommendation has not been satisfied:
9

16 Advancing the Frontiers of Space Exploration, Barack Obama 2008, August 16, 2008. 

Accessed at http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.htmi?cid=28880 (June 24, 2010).

Since June 2006, the agencies have taken steps to restore selected capabilities 

that were removed from NPOESS in the near-term; however, they do not yet 

have plans to restore capabilities for the full length of time covered by the 

NPOESS program . . . . Both DOD and NOAA officials reiterated their commitment to look for opportunities to restore the capabilities that were removed 

from NPOESS and GOES–R. However, agency officials acknowledge that they 

do not have plans to restore the full set of capabilities because of the complexity 

and cost of developing new satellite programs.

The report tells a very similar story for the instruments devoted to so-called 

‘‘space weather,’’ a colloquial term referring to the effects generated in Earth’s atmosphere and magnetic field by events on the Sun. The power of such events was 

demonstrated in 1998 when a solar geomagnetic storm affected the power grid of 

Quebec and caused a regional blackout. Similar storms today, in an era where Global Positioning Satellites keep offshore oil rigs from drifting out of position, pipelines 

may be damaged by currents induced as magnetic fields shift, and airlines shorten 

international flights by flying in the polar region (exposing passengers to charged 

particles from the ‘‘solar wind’’), make it important to know what is happening on 

our nearby star. Again, however, there is no long-term strategy to provide for these 

observations. 

GAO recommends that the Office of Science and Technology Policy direct the completion and release of three reports, one prepared by the United States Group on 

Earth Observations and two by the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology. With those reports in hand, these interagency groups can move forward with 

the process of developing the strategies called for by GAO two years ago. Ms. Abbott’s testimony does not indicate completion dates for the reports.

B. Pieces of a Global Puzzle

During the 2008 Presidential campaign, President Obama issued a position paper 

entitled ‘‘Advancing the Frontiers of Space Exploration.’’ It stated, in part:

‘‘Understanding how Earth supports life and how human activities affect its 

ability to do so is one of the greatest challenges facing humanity . . . . Given 

the urgency of climate-related monitoring, and considering the time required to 

design, develop, and deploy Earth observation satellite systems, the Obama administration will lean forward to deploy a global climate change research and 

monitoring system that will work for decades to come.’’ 16

Across the globe and in space, the United States has for decades deployed increasingly sophisticated instruments capable of following environmental change and collecting data to assist in predicting such changes. Satellites such as NOAA and 

DOD’s weather satellites and the three NASA Earth observation platforms Terra, 

Aura and Aqua are daily watching the evolution of weather, land use changes and 

shifting currents in the ocean. In 1900, thousands in Galveston, Texas died because 

there was no way to know a massive hurricane was bearing down on the city. In 

contrast, when Hurricane Ike struck Galveston in September 2008, authorities were 

able to order evacuation of the island two days before. Loss of lives was limited to 

fewer than 200. The difference was the ability to follow Ike almost from birth to 

death with the GOES satellites, and to predict where it was likely to go using data 

supplied by data from buoys, ships and planes. 

The strategies discussed in GAO’s report are smaller pieces of the effort that will 

be needed to accomplish the President’s broader goal. Such a network must extend 

across four major environments: the interplanetary medium (the region between the 

Sun and the Earth affected by the ‘‘solar wind’’ and other emissions), the atmosphere, the oceans and the land surface. Among the questions that need answers: 

What information should be collected in each environment? What instrument is 

needed to collect that information? Should that information be collected in space or 

on the ground? 

Satellites make their primary contributions collecting data at a global scale, but 

equally vital are sensor webs such as the 3000 free-drifting floats of the Argo network, moving through the oceans where winds and currents drive them. The hurricane forecasters of NOAA’s Tropical Prediction Center fiercely object if cutbacks are 

proposed for ‘‘hurricane hunter’’ aircraft or their specialized ocean buoys. Since 

1996, the Department of Energy has supported the AmeriFlux network studying the 

flow of carbon dioxide, water and energy through ecological systems during various 

time scales. Satellite operators compare their data to those from these ground-based 
10

17 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science. NASA Earth Science. Hearing before the 

Committee on Science (Washington: Government Printing Office). Serial 109–12. April 28, 2005; 

p. 30.

counterparts in order to be sure they understand exactly what they are seeing. It 

may sometimes produce better scientific outcomes and be a better use of resources 

to collect data on the ground instead of from orbit. 

Many agencies have invested in or are contemplating projects that might serve 

well as parts of a global observing system. GAO’s report indicates that the coordination of the disparate efforts may not be occurring within OSTP, OMB or the Council 

on Environmental Quality. There are important questions which cannot be answered by one agency: Is a proposal duplicating observational activities or can it 

close a gap for another agency? How are these deployments coordinated? In an era 

of fiscal austerity, which networks collect information that we cannot afford to lose? 

Who assures that data from different sources is compatible so that hidden connections can be identified by comparing, for example, river flow records to estuarine 

production? Where do we store the data so that it can be found later and used to 

answer questions not even considered when it was originally collected? 

As a specific issue, consider the so-called ‘‘research-to-operations’’ gap that regularly opens up between NASA and NOAA. Part of the benefit from NASA’s application of its technology to looking at Earth is that it may open a new window on what 

is happening on land or in the air or water. In the specific case of NPOESS, the 

VIIRS sensor is an advanced version of the Moderate Resolution Imaging 

Spectroradiometer flying on NASA’s Terra and Aqua satellites. Too often, however, 

technological improvement languishes because NOAA’s satellite operators and 

NASA’s scientists fail to communicate about the value in applying new techniques. 

This disconnection showed itself in examples such as NASA’s decision to shut down 

the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) because it had succeeded in accomplishing its goal of demonstrating the technology. NASA’s announcement came 

at the outset of the 2004 hurricane season, which left NOAA disconcerted when it 

turned out that TRMM data was being used in some forecasting models. TRMM is 

still operating as a result. This year has seen the scatterometer instrument die on 

NASA’s QuikSCAT satellite before NOAA could arrange for new versions to continue collecting the wind data that made it possible to issue alerts to shipping about 

high-wind threats. NASA’s Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE) is well past its 

design life at its position between the Sun and Earth. From where it sits, ACE can 

detect solar emissions that are heading for Earth and offer enough warning to protect critical systems from damage. Yet this ‘‘fire alarm’’ may soon fail just as the 

Sun may be emerging from the ‘‘quiet period’’ in its 11-year cycle and there is no 

replacement ready. One of the reports GAO recommends releasing, prepared by the 

National Space Weather Program, discussed options for replacing ACE. NOAA now 

intends to retrieve the Deep Space Climate Observatory (DSCOVR) from storage and 

outfit it to serve as ACE’s successor. 

In 2005, the National Academies issued an interim report relating to their decadal 

survey of the Earth sciences. It noted that, following the Vision for Space Exploration articulated by President George W. Bush in 2004, NASA’s budget request had 

included a guiding national objective ‘‘to study the Earth system from space and develop new space-based and related capabilities for this purpose.’’ Yet the Academy 

panel went on to note that ‘‘. . . the priority for Earth observations, which have direct and immediate relevance to society, appears greatly diminished in terms of the 

projected declining budgets that are proposed for FY 2006.’’ When this Committee 

met for hearings on the NASA Earth science program, Chairman Gordon (at the 

time Ranking Member on the Committee), made a direct connection between the 

concerns expressed by the Academy panel and the lack of an agency strategy:

. . . [T]he fact is that when the President cut $2.5 billion from NASA’s funding 

plan for fiscal year 2006 through 2009 relative to what he had promised just 

a year earlier, NASA imposed 75 percent of the cut on NASA’s Science and Aeronautics program and only ten percent on NASA’s Exploration Systems 

program . . . . 

It is no wonder that the Earth science program is canceling and delaying missions. And the problem has been compounded by NASA’s apparent unwillingness or inability to date to develop a long-term vision for Earth science and application programs. 

So where does all of this leave us? 

Let me quote the National Research Council once again: ‘‘Today the Nation’s 

Earth Observatory program is at risk.’’ 17
11

In its final report, the Academy panel made a recommendation particular to 

OSTP:

The committee is concerned that the nation’s institutions involved in civil space 

(including NASA, NOAA, and USGS) are not adequately prepared to meet society’s rapidly evolving Earth information needs. These institutions have responsibilities that are in many cases mismatched with their authorities and resources: institutional mandates are inconsistent with agency charters, budgets 

are not well-matched to emerging needs, and shared responsibilities are supported inconsistently by mechanisms for cooperation. These are issues whose solutions will require action at high-levels of the government. Thus, the committee makes the following recommendation: Recommendation: The Office 

of Science and Technology Policy, in collaboration with the relevant 

agencies, and in consultation with the scientific community, should develop and implement a plan for achieving and sustaining global Earth 

observations. This plan should recognize the complexity of differing 

agency roles, responsibilities, and capabilities as well as the lessons 

from implementation of the Landsat, EOS, and NPOESS programs. [emphasis in original]

GAO concludes with similar recommendations, calling on OSTP to direct the 

Group on Earth Observations and the National Space Weather Program to produce 

long-term strategies for observations in their particular disciplines.

Witnesses

Hon. Shere Abbott

Associate Director, Energy and Environment Division

Office of Science and Technology Policy

Ms. Abbott directed the task force established by Dr. John Holdren, Director of 

OSTP, to evaluate changes in the management of the NPOESS program. She will 

testify on the task force’s recommendation to divide responsibility for polar weather 

satellite coverage so that agencies will meet their own requirements. Ms. Abbott will 

also address the recommendations in a second Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) report that Dr. Holdren should expedite the completion of planning reports 

for climate and space weather observations in order to advance the development of 

a national earth observation strategy.

Ms. Mary Glackin 

Deputy Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Polar-orbiting satellites supply vital data for the computer models used for weather forecasting. Success in completing and launching the NPOESS satellites was 

therefore of paramount importance to NOAA. NOAA has launched the last of its existing series of polar satellites and would therefore be the principal beneficiary of 

a solution to the persistent deadlock in the NPOESS program. Ms. Glackin is now 

supervising NOAA’s transition to the follow-on Joint Polar Satellite System and the 

expanded cooperation with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 

developing afternoon-orbit satellite coverage.

Mr. Christopher Scolese 

Associate Administrator 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Originally, NASA had a secondary role in the NPOESS program. With the 

changes now underway, it will adopt its more traditional role as technical support 

arm and program manager for NOAA in the new JPSS effort. NASA will assume 

management of the instrument contracts from the prime contractor, Northrop 

Grumman. The NPOESS Preparatory Program (NPP) satellite, which NASA funded 

and has managed as a testbed to allow early experience in operating the new 

NPOESS satellites, will instead serve as an interim operational satellite to avoid 

loss of data between NOAA’s existing polar-orbiting satellites and launch of the first 

JPSS satellite. Mr. Scolese will testify regarding NASA’s new responsibilities in the 

JPSS effort.

Mr. Gil Klinger, Director, Space and Intelligence Office 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 

Department of Defense

Mr. Klinger provides oversight for all Department of Defense space and intelligence programs within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisi-
12

tion, Technology and Logistics. As the Air Force was responsible for managing the 

NPOESS acquisition, Mr. Klinger’s office had the responsibility to approve major 

program decisions under the terms of DOD acquisition management regulations 

(one of the major aspects of the ExCom’s ineffectiveness). Mr. Klinger is currently 

elaborating what changes—if any—DOD will make to its plans for polar weather 

satellite coverage in the wake of the decision to transfer responsibility for acquiring 

morning orbit satellites to DOD.

Mr. David Powner 

Director, Information Technology Management Issues 

Government Accountability Office

Mr. Powner has directed GAO’s team monitoring the NPOESS program for the 

Committee since 2001. GAO’s report last year and Powner’s testimony at the Subcommittee’s previous hearing was central to the convening of the Administration’s 

task force. Powner will testify on two reports completed at the request of the Committee:

• POLAR–ORBITING ENVIRONMENTAL SATELLITES: Agencies Must Act 

Quickly to Address Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate Data

• ENVIRONMENTAL SATELLITES: Strategy Needed to Sustain Critical Climate and Space Weather Measurements
13

Chairman MILLER. Good morning. This hearing will now come to 

order. Welcome to today’s hearing entitled Setting New Courses for 

Polar Weather Satellites and Earth Observations. This is a familiar 

topic to this committee and subcommittee. Since 2003, there have 

been seven hearings before the Science and Technology Committee 

or various subcommittees on the subject of the National Polar Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System. Mercifully 

there is an acronym, NPOESS. 

Established in 1994, the program was intended to design, develop, construct, and launch satellites into polar orbits so that the 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, NOAA, and the 

Department of Defense, DOD, would continue to receive daily data 

necessary for civilian and military weather forecasting needs. 

In the 2003 hearing the life cycle costs for NPOESS in March, 

2003 budget was $6.1 billion, with the first of six satellites expected to be launched in 2009. In last year’s hearing the life cycle 

cost estimate had grown to at least 14.9 billion, was intended to 

purchase only four satellites with a first NPOESS satellite launch 

pushed back to 2014. 

NPOESS has continued to suffer from major performance problems and schedule delays for the primary imaging instrument and 

those spawned cost overruns. The program has undoubtedly been 

snake bit, but at least we thought we knew the snake that bit it. 

The real problem appeared to be that the program was crippled by 

management structure that delayed decisions at critical moments. 

The tri-agency management board proved incapable of making decisions and taking action when most needed. 

Last year’s witnesses testified before the subcommittee that program leadership had deteriorated to the point that only White 

House intervention would assure that there would ever be any 

NPOESS satellite at all. At that hearing we were told that one 

agency should be put in charge of managing the program, either 

DOD or NOAA. 

OSTP did take responsibility for intervening to rescue the drifting program, but instead of putting one of those two agencies in 

charge, OSTP adopted the Solomonic solution of cutting the program in two. Satellites flying in orbits to collect early-morning observations were developed and launched by DOD with their newlychristened Defense Weather Satellite System. NOAA would do the 

same thing with their renamed Joint Polar Satellite System to collect observations in the afternoon. NOAA would operate all the satellites while in orbit and would manage the common data to receive, store, and share the data. 

With this decision OSTP has removed the block over which we 

had been stumbling in the last few years—the snake that appears 

to have bitten this program repeatedly—but that is not all that will 

be required to guarantee success. There was a reason for having a 

single program in the first place, and splitting the program in two 

may simply create two programs with the same old problems. 

There are plenty of reasons to keep attention fixed on these new 

programs. For example, even though we now have clarity about 

what agency is responsible for which mission, this clarity apparently comes at the cost of delay and confusion about which instru-
14

ments will be flown on which satellite and when will the satellite 

launch. 

There is a contractor that still has continuing work for the old 

NPOESS program and subcontractors with instruments in various 

states of development. What is to be the fate of those work efforts, 

and when will those decisions be made? 

Our other discussion today grows out of the experience, our experience with NPOESS. Back in 2006, all the climate sensors being 

prepared to fly on NPOESS were removed. If we anticipate having 

to deal with climate change or—I am sure Dr. Broun will say the 

possibility of climate change—for decades to come, how can we 

eliminate a means for knowing how well we are doing. It has been 

clear that this decision was ill-thought through and would have to 

be reversed. 

Without these sensors or similar capabilities our ability to 

strengthen our earth observation networks as a whole will be compromised. We asked GAO to examine the current state of the strategy for gathering necessary climate data. GAO’s answer is that we 

don’t have one, at least not a comprehensive strategy. That is a 

subject that we hope the Administration witnesses can discuss 

today. 

We have spent almost $6 billion already on the NPOESS program, the original projected cost of the whole program. There is not 

a single completed satellite to show for that time and money. We 

do have, however, two signs that read, ‘‘now under new management.’’ I know it is the hope of everyone here that the new management for the now two agencies, two programs will be the solution 

to what has ailed NPOESS. 

I now recognize Dr. Broun from Georgia, the Ranking Member 

of the Investigation—of this subcommittee for his opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Miller follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BRAD MILLER

Since 2003, there have been seven hearings before the Science and Technology 

Committee or its subcommittees on the subject of the National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program. Established in 1994, 

the program was intended to design, develop, construct and launch satellites into 

polar orbits so that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 

and Department of Defense (DOD) would continue to receive daily data necessary 

for civilian and military weather forecasting needs. 

In the 2003 hearing, the life-cycle cost for NPOESS in the March 2003 budget request was $6.1 billion, with the first of six satellites expected to be launched in 

2009. In last year’s hearing, the life-cycle cost estimate had grown to at least $14.9 

billion, was intended to purchase only four satellites with a first NPOESS satellite 

launch pushed back to 2014. 

NPOESS suffered from major performance problems and schedule delays for the 

primary imaging instrument and these spawned cost overruns. However, the real 

problem with the program was that it was crippled by a management structure that 

delayed decisions at critical moments. The tri-agency management board proved incapable of making decisions and taking action when most needed. Last year, witnesses testified before this Subcommittee that program leadership had deteriorated 

to the point that only White House intervention would assure that there would ever 

be any NPOESS satellites at all. At that hearing, we were told that one agency 

should be put in charge of managing the program-either DOD or NOAA. 

OSTP did take responsibility for intervening to rescue this drifting program. However, instead of putting just one agency in charge, OSTP adopted the Solomanic solution of cutting the program in two. Satellites flying in orbits to collect early-morning observations would be developed and launched by DOD with their newly-chris-
15

tened Defense Weather Satellite System. NOAA would do the same with their renamed Joint Polar Satellite System to collect observations in the afternoon. NOAA 

would operate all the satellites while in orbit, and would manage the common data 

system to receive, store and share all data. 

With its decision, OSTP has removed the block over which we’ve been stumbling 

for the past few years. This does not guarantee success. There was a reason for having a single program in the first place, and splitting the program in two may simply 

create two new programs with the same problems. There are plenty of reasons to 

keep attention fixed on these new programs. For example, even though we now have 

clarity about what agency is responsible for which mission, this clarity comes at the 

cost of delay and confusion about which instruments will be flown on what satellite 

and when will the satellite launch? There is a contractor that still has continuing 

work for the old NPOESS program, and subcontractors with instruments in various 

states of development-what is to be the fate of those work efforts and when will 

those decisions be made? 

Our other discussion today grows out of our experience with NPOESS. Back in 

2006, all of the climate sensors being prepared to fly on NPOESS were removed. 

If we anticipate having to deal with climate change for decades to come, how can 

we eliminate a means of knowing how well we are doing? It has been clear that 

this decision was ill-thought through and would have to be reversed. Without these 

sensors, or similar capabilities, our ability to strengthen our Earth observation networks as a whole will be compromised. We asked GAO to examine the current state 

of the strategy for gathering necessary climate data. GAO’s answer is that we don’t 

have one, at least not a comprehensive strategy. This will be a subject that we hope 

the administration witnesses can shed some light upon. 

We have spent almost $6 billion already on the NPOESS program. There is not 

a single completed satellite to show for the time and money. We do however have 

two signs that read, ‘‘now under new management’’. I know it is the hope of everyone here, that this new management will be the solution to what has ailed the 

NPOESS program.

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just for your record, 

what I questioned is that of human-induced global warming. 

Chairman MILLER. Okay. 

Mr. BROUN. So, anyway, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

welcome our witnesses here today at this important hearing, and 

thank you for your participation. This is the Committee’s first 

hearing on the Joint Polar Satellite System but the seventh time 

we have looked into the previous program, the NPOESS program, 

National Polar Orbiting Operational and Environmental Satellite 

System. 

NPOESS was originally planned to create synergies and cost savings by combining the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 

within the Department of Defense and the Polar Orbiting Environmental Satellite System at NOAA. Instead, the program doubled in 

cost, shrunk from six to four satellites, degraded its sensor capabilities, and its schedule slipped six years. Now, 15 years later we 

are back where we started. 

At last year’s hearing I asked questions. How did we get here, 

and where do we go from here? My question today is where are we 

going? The Administration announced plans to restructure the program last winter, but as Mr. Powner points out in his testimony, 

‘‘Because neither agency has finalized plans for its acquisition, the 

full impact of OSTP’s decision on the expected cost schedule and 

capabilities is unknown.’’

Until we receive this information we can’t fully review this new 

program. While it is understandable that it will take time to restructure, I hope the Administration consults with Congress and 

with this Committee in particular given its history with the program. 
16

I look forward to working with the Administration and with the 

Chairman as we move forward. As I said at last year’s hearing, 

every American is impacted by this program whether they know it 

or not. It is our responsibility to ensure that the farmers, fisherman, warfighters, and everyday commuters continue to receive 

weather and climate information, but we must not forget to be good 

stewards of the taxpayers’ money and route out waste, inefficiency, 

and duplication where we can. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Broun follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE PAUL C. BROUN

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our witnesses here today and thank 

them for participating in this important hearing. This is the Committee’s first hearing on the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS), but the seventh time we have looked 

into the previous program, the National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental 

Satellite System (NPOESS). 

NPOESS was originally planned to create synergies and cost-savings by combining the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) within the Department 

of Defense (DoD) and the Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellite (POES) System at 

the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Instead, the program doubled in cost, shrunk from six to four satellites, degraded its sensor capabilities, and its schedule slipped six years. Now, 15 years later, we are back where 

we started. 

At last year’s hearing I asked the questions, ‘how did we get here?’ and ‘where 

do we go from here?’ My question today is ‘where are we going?’ The Administration 

announced plans to restructure the program last winter, but as Mr. Powner points 

out in his testimony ‘‘[b]ecause neither agency has finalized plans for its acquisition, 

the full impact of OSTP’s decision on the expected cost, schedule, and capabilities 

is unknown.’’ Until we receive this information, we can’t fully review this new program. While it is understandable that it will take time to restructure, I hope the 

Administration consults with Congress, and this Committee in particular given its 

history with the program. 

I look forward to working with the Administration and the Chairman as we move 

forward. As I said at last year’s hearing, every American is impacted by this program whether they know it or not. It is our responsibility to ensure that the farmers, fisherman, war-fighters, and everyday commuters continue to receive weather 

and climate information. But we must not forget to be good stewards of taxpayers’ 

money and root out waste, inefficiency and duplication where we can. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Broun. I now ask unanimous 

consent with all additional opening statements submitted by members be included in the record. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

It is now my pleasure to introduce our witnesses. Dr. Shere Abbott is the Associate Director of the Energy and Environment Division in the Office of Science and Technology Policy. Ms. Abbott directed the taskforce established by Dr. John Holdren, Director of 

OSTP, to evaluate changes in the management of the NPOESS program. 

Ms. Mary Glackin is the Deputy Director Under Secretary for the 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, NOAA. Ms. 

Glackin supervises NOAA’s transition to the follow-on Joint Polar 

Satellite System and the expanding cooperation with the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration to develop afternoon orbit 

satellite coverage. 

Mr. Christopher Scolese is the Associate Administrator for the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA. NASA will 

resume its traditional role of supporting NOAA in developing the 
17

JPSS weather satellites, and Mr. Scolese will testify today about 

the changes that will be needed to bring NASA into the program. 

Mr. Gil Klinger is the Director of the Space and Intelligence Office providing oversight for all Department of Defense space and intelligence programs within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Mr. Klinger is currently elaborating what changes, if any, DOD plans to make for 

polar weather satellite coverage in the wake of the decision to 

transfer responsibility for acquiring morning orbit satellites to 

DOD. 

And then, finally, Mr. David Powner is the Director of Information Technology Management System Issues at the Government Accountability Office, GAO. Mr. Powner has directed GAO’s team 

monitoring of the NPOESS program for this committee since 2001. 

GAO’s report last year and Mr. Powner’s testimony at the subcommittee’s previous hearing was central to the convening of the 

Administration’s task force, and he has two reports to share with 

our subcommittee today. 

As our witnesses should know, you will have—each have five 

minutes for your spoken testimony. Your written testimony will be 

included in the record for the hearing. When you have all completed your spoken testimony, we’ll begin—we will begin with questions, and each member will have five minutes to question the 

panel. 

It is the practice of the subcommittee to—because we are an investigations and oversight subcommittee—to receive our testimony 

under oath. Do any of you have any objection to taking an oath? 

The record should reflect that all the witnesses said that they had 

no objection to taking an oath. 

You also have the right to be represented by counsel. Do any of 

you have counsel here? The record should reflect that all of the witnesses indicated that they did not have counsel here. 

Please now stand and raise your right hand. Do you swear to tell 

the truth and nothing but the truth? 

Okay. The record should reflect that all of the witnesses took the 

oath. 

I should say for purposes of understanding the flow, there is a 

likelihood that we will be called for votes at an awkward time, 

probably in the middle of the opening statements, but we will go 

as far as we can, and we will break and come back after our votes. 

So let us now begin with Ms. Abbott. You are recognized for five 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SHERBURNE B. ‘‘SHERE’’ ABBOTT, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT DIVISION, 

OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 

Ms. ABBOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear today to discuss 

the decision to restructure the NPOESS program and the Administration’s efforts to improve capabilities for earth observations. 

As you, Mr. Chairman, noted, the NPOESS program was created 

16 years ago to combine civil and military operational weather satellite capabilities that would provide global weather coverage, 

storm tracking, and climate monitoring requirements. 
18

The tri-agency construct of the NPOESS program was intended 

to integrate the talent, technology, and resources of the agencies 

into a single, converged, operational system. DOD was responsible 

for major program acquisitions and contract administration, NOAA 

was responsible for satellite operations, and NASA was responsible 

for developing new technologies. 

In spite of this vision of coordination and efficiency and in spite 

of multiple attempts to improve its execution, the program has consistently been behind schedule, over budget, and underperforming. 

At the request of Dr. Holdren, Assistant to the President for 

Science and Technology, I convened an Executive Office of the 

President taskforce on this matter starting in August, 2009, with 

participation from the Office of Management and Budget and the 

National Security Council. 

Working closely with the three agencies, the taskforce performed 

a thorough analysis of the program, its content, cost projections, 

budgeting, acquisition issues, and related management options. 

The taskforce found that the major challenge of NPOESS was its 

structure, jointly funding and executing common ground on a single 

program with a single, common platform and a uniform set of instruments. 

This is because the three agencies of different technical objectives, acquisition procedures, engineering and management philosophies, risk tolerance, and approaches to managing budget adjustments. These differences led to continued developmental challenges, escalating costs, and increasing risks. 

In consultation with the agencies the EOP leadership decided to 

disaggregate management of the satellite programs by proceeding 

with separately managed acquisitions. The key elements of the restructured program will retain the observational requirements of 

the NPOESS program; however, NOAA and DOD will be responsible for meeting these requirements through their assigned orbits. 

NOAA, with NASA acting as the acquisition agent, will be responsible for the afternoon orbit. DOD will be responsible for the 

early morning orbit. The European Organization for Exploitation of 

Meteorological Satellites will continue to provide observations in 

the mid-morning orbit. The agencies will continue to partner in 

those areas that have been successful in the past, such as the 

shared ground system. 

The NOAA portion of the restructured program is called the 

Joint Polar Satellite System. The DOD portion will be called the 

Defense Weather Satellite System. This structure is codified in the 

sector guidelines in the National Space Policy released yesterday. 

The program restructure accomplishes the following goals. First, 

it reduces the risk of schedule slips and cost increases by clarifying 

acquisition authorities. Second, it allows each agency to manage its 

program within its own agency culture and environment. Third, it 

provides clear accountability, responsibility, and authority for each 

orbit. Fourth, it allows for greater government control over the development process. Fifth, it retains strategic coordination across 

the civil and defense programs, and sixth, it aligns with proven acquisition centers. 

I want to be clear. We are not canceling the program but merely 

restructuring the procurements to put the program on the pathway 
19

to success, taking maximum advantage of government expertise. 

We will be using all of the taxpayer-funded investments for the future satellite programs. The decision is supported by the long history of reviews called for by the Congress and the agencies as well 

as independent reviews of the program. 

Plans for continuity of a number of earth observations from space 

have been tied to NPOESS at one point or another in the program’s 

history. With the NPOESS decision behind us, the Administration 

is focusing on the broader issue of the development of a comprehensive strategy for earth observations. We are working internationally through the Group On Earth Observations toward the development of an integrated earth observing system with leadership from 

the U.S. provided by the agencies through the U.S. Group on Earth 

Observations. 

In addition, the substantial increases in funding as part of the 

President’s proposed FY 11 budget for NASA’s Earth Sciences Program will be used to address the pressing issues related to the Nation’s climate research and monitoring capabilities and climate 

data continuity. 

And the Administration will be drawing on the analysis of the 

USGEO as a first but very significant step in the development of 

a comprehensive strategy for earth observations. 

In conclusion, OSTP will continue to play an important role in 

coordinating interagency satellite observation policy, successfully 

restructuring the NPOESS program and ensuring continuity of 

weather and climate data has been a high priority for the Administration’s leadership team. We will continue to meet regularly with 

NOAA, NASA, and DOD to ensure a smooth transition of the program to meet the nation’s need for weather forecasting, storm 

tracking, and climate monitoring. 

I look forward to working with the committee as we move the 

NPOESS program down the pathway to success and as we move 

forward with a broader national strategy for earth observations. I 

will be pleased to try to answer any questions that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Abbott follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SHERBURNE B. ‘‘SHERE’’ ABBOTT

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, Members of the Committee: I appreciate the opportunity to testify today at this important hearing. In what follows I 

will address the questions posed in the Chairman’s letter of invitation regarding 

both the process and the findings that led to the decision to restructure the National 

Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program, as 

well as the efforts within the Administration to improve capabilities for Earth observations to examine, monitor, and model our planet.

Brief History of NPOESS

The tri-agency [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Department of Defense (DOD)] NPOESS program was created sixteen years ago by Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) to deliver operational weather satellites that would provide 

global weather coverage, storm tracking, and climate-monitoring requirements. All 

weather forecasts, including detection and forecasting of tropical storms in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, depend on data from these observations. The program had 

been slated to operate from 2009 through 2020, but was extended to 2024 (and then 

again to 2026) due to delays. The tri-agency construct of NPOESS was intended to 

integrate the talent, technology, and resources of the agencies, thereby ‘‘. . . establishing a single, converged, operational system (that) can reduce duplication of efforts (and competition for resources) in meeting common requirements while satis-
20

fying the unique requirements of the civil and national security communities.’’ DOD 

was responsible for major program acquisitions and contract administration (implemented through the Air Force); NOAA was responsible for satellite operations; and 

NASA was responsible for developing new technologies. To facilitate the convergence 

of civil and defense weather observational capabilities, DOD, NOAA, and NASA created an NPOESS Executive Committee (EXCOM), which included senior officials 

from the three agencies, in order to provide oversight for the joint effort and to help 

ensure that the program as a whole met the needs of the three agencies. An 

NPOESS Integrated Program Office (IPO) was also established to manage hardware 

development and related activities. 

In spite of this vision of coordination and efficiency, and in spite of multiple attempts to improve its execution, the program has consistently been behind schedule, 

over budget, and underperforming. The most serious of cost increases and scheduling delays occurred in late 2005, when projected cost overruns triggered a breach 

of the Nunn-McCurdy statute, requiring DOD to recertify the program (otherwise 

the program would have been terminated). As part of this process, DOD worked 

with NOAA and NASA to restructure NPOESS in order to decrease costs and reduce 

program risk. Concluded in June 2006, this effort assigned highest priority to preserving continuity of operational weather measurements, which ultimately led to a 

decision to remove several key climate and space weather capabilities from the 

NPOESS satellites. In addition, the number of planned satellites was reduced from 

a total of six satellites (flying in three orbits) to four satellites (in two orbits), while 

relying on European weather satellite systems for data in the third orbit. Despite 

this restructuring, development and acquisition costs (i.e., life cycle costs) for the 

program nonetheless rose from $7B (in 2002) to approximately $12B in 2006. By 2009 the official cost estimate had risen to $13.9B. Faced with these additional 

cost increases and further delays, the three agencies requested that a high-level 

Independent Review Team (IRT) examine the program. The team was led by A. 

Thomas Young, former President and Chief Operating Officer of Martin Marietta, 

and included aerospace experts from industry, academia, and government. The IRT 

concluded that the NPOESS program ‘‘. . . as constructed had an extraordinarily 

low probability of success.’’ (A. Thomas Young testimony to House Science and Technology Committee, June 17, 2009) In addition, the Government Accounting Office 

(GAO) has conducted eight reviews of the program, including one reported on today, 

all showing serious lapses in capabilities that, in turn, threaten the continuity of 

weather and climate data.

The EOP Analysis of the NPOESS Program and Findings

Supporting the Nation’s weather-forecasting and climate-monitoring capabilities is 

of great importance to the Administration, and we recognize the critical role that 

NPOESS was intended to play in providing these vital capabilities. Because of the 

extensive difficulties that this program has experienced in recent years, Dr. John 

Holdren, Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and Director of the 

Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), began to meet with the heads of 

agencies soon after his confirmation last year in order to assess what potential 

changes needed to be made. 

At his request, I convened an Executive Office of the President (EOP) Task Force 

on this matter starting in August 2009, with participation from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the National Security Council (NSC), as well as 

from the three lead agencies: NOAA, NASA and DOD. The goal of the Task Force 

was to determine suitable options for structuring the program for success in order 

to ensure continuity of the Nation’s weather and climate observational needs. With 

close agency cooperation, the Task Force performed a thorough and careful analysis 

of a number of aspects of the program, including content, cost projection and budgeting, and acquisition issues. The Task Force also examined options for changing 

the management and governance, taking into account the recommendations of the 

IRT noted above, as well as the concerns raised by numerous Members of Congress. 

The EOP Task Force met regularly over a period of two months and assembled 

working groups with senior staff from the lead agencies who met weekly to assess 

the current difficulties with the program and to provide guidance on options for 

structuring the program for the greatest benefit for the Nation. The goals of the 

Task Force were to resolve issues in the following areas:

1) Aligning Priorities and Requirements. The Task Force identified significant 

commonality among agency interests and priorities, but found important differences as well (e.g., in defining acceptable risk levels for data continuity 

and in determining whether program schedules could be slipped further to 

accommodate cost/budget constraints).
21

2) Determining the Available Options for Reducing Risk. The Task Force conducted analysis of options for mitigating program risks, improving the probability of success, and enhancing constellation robustness in terms of both 

program content and schedule).

3) Budget and Costing Methodologies. The Task Force analyzed the costing 

methodologies and budgeting philosophies of the agencies in an attempt to 

reach a common understanding of the financial state of the program, the projected costs of options under consideration, and the necessary funding reserves.

4) Program Management and Acquisition Issues. The Task Force looked at possible improvements in program oversight and governance, such as the functioning of the EXCOM, the alignment of the IPO with a space acquisition 

center, and contractual issues.

The details of the Task Force analysis, deliberations, and findings are discussed 

below.

Cost-estimates

The most apparent challenge of the program was the rising cost-estimates and astounding life-cycle cost growth. The Task Force found disagreement among the 

agencies on both cost-estimating methodology and levels of risk tolerance, which resulted in differing agency conclusions on costs of the program at any given point 

in time. In addition to developing an understanding of the assumptions and outputs 

of these costing methodologies, the Task Force analyzed cost-estimates for various 

changes in management options. These options included possible continuation of the 

program under the current IPO structure, as well as alternatives such as moving 

the management function for the program to a single acquisition centereither the 

Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) or the NASA Goddard Space 

Flight Center (GSFC). 

During the analysis in the fall of 2009, the Task Force concluded that the lifecycle cost of the program would exceed the official 2009 estimate of $13.9B regardless of cost methodology or changes in management. Recent analyses conducted by 

external groups supported this finding—for example, in 2009, both the IRT and the 

GAO concurred with the agencies’ assessment of cost growth and estimated that this 

figure would increase by at least $1B to $2B. The DOD estimates presented in October 2009 for the NPOESS program of record showed an increase of approximately 

$1B, and in November 2009, the IPO provided a revised cost-estimate showing an 

increase of approximately $2.5B over the official estimate. NASA had also previously performed various cost-estimates for the NPOESS program of record, but 

these estimates assumed that the program had been conducted within NASA from 

the beginning, and thus were not directly comparable to the official cost estimates. 

The increasing cost estimates and the absence of consensus among the agencies 

on the appropriate estimate to use reflected a fundamental problem with the program—namely, that there were significantly divergent views among the agencies as 

to the overall requirements of the program. The inability of the agencies to compromise on this basic matter highlighted a further conclusion of the Task Force—

that over time, the goals of the agencies associated with the program had drifted 

apart significantly. The risk of further escalating cost, on a program with approximately $5B invested through FY 2009 (and which had a life cycle cost originally estimated as $7B in 2002), was notable and concerning.

Qualitative Analysis

The Task Force’s examination of the management structure and challenges revealed that the current governance structure was the major impediment to program 

success. As described in the IRT report, and affirmed in other analyses (including 

that of the Task Force), the Tri-agency EXCOM had not proven effective for making 

timely decisions and resolving technical challenges on this extremely complicated 

and dynamic program. Despite attempts at improved management and oversight, 

such as more frequent EXCOM meetings, deputies-level commitments and meetings, 

and reviews with the IPO, the EOP leadership did not see adequate gains in effectiveness resulting from this governance arrangement, nor did it see any possible 

substantial gains from improvement of the IPO that would move the program toward success. In large part, this was a failure of governance architecture. When presented with decisions affecting rising costs, schedule delays due to failed tests, required redesigns or inconclusive failure analyses, the EXCOM principals provided 

perspectives for guidance that were not in alignment. 
22

These differences in desires and expectations meant, in effect, that the Program 

Executive Officer (PEO), a NOAA employee, answered to three decision bodies-the 

EXCOM, NOAA management, and DOD—each with their own visions of program 

imperatives. Senior program leaders were presented with challenges, often developed exhaustively by their deputies and staff, reflecting different perspectives on 

how NPOESS progress was or was not satisfying agency-unique goals. The processes 

associated with making major decisions across three agencies were onerous and inadequate to provide timely resolution of curative measures, even after more than 

eight years of these agencies trying their level-best at compromise (and 16 years 

since the inception of the program). In addition, the IPO team, although dedicated 

to the mission, highly motivated, and led by a capable leadership team, was not 

structured with the right numbers of highly experienced acquisition and engineering 

personnel, despite some improvements following the 2005–06 restructure. 

Furthermore, the Task Force found chronic problems in the contract management 

structure with few obvious solutions. For example, the prime contractor had continuing difficulties managing individual sensor projects, especially the Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS). These sensors are among the most exquisite 

in the field of remote sensing and are challenging to develop. Although the prime 

contractor’s senior leadership applied seasoned manpower to better manage the activities, there was no probable path to building adequate and timely capacity within 

the contractor workforce of the magnitude needed to effectively manage the technical challenges of the program. 

One fundamental qualitative question the Task Force addressed was whether 

merging civilian and defense weather observation requirements, while also adding 

requirements of continuity of certain climate data records, all onto one common platform, was the optimal or a sustainable approach for the long term. (Note that the 

original 1994 PDD did not specify converging to one common platform, just to one 

‘‘system.’’) The IRT recognized that the major challenge of NPOESS was joint execution of the program by three agencies with different technical objectives, acquisition 

procedures, engineering and management philosophies, risk tolerance, and approaches to managing budget adjustments. Trying to find common ground on a single program (with a single common platform and a uniform set of instruments) 

proved to be an extraordinarily difficult task. The NPOESS program was initiated 

under the pretext that cost savings and efficiencies could be achieved through consolidation of military and civilian weather observation requirements; however, these 

cost savings and efficiencies have not been realized to date. The possibility of continued developmental challenges, escalating costs, and increasing risk, led the Task 

Force to conclude that the program would not be able to succeed as currently structured, and that it would be better to shift the NPOESS program away from the existing management paradigm sooner rather than later. 

Thus, the decision to restructure the program to split the responsibility of procurement was rooted in a success-based, simplified management scheme that addressed the systemic problems identified by the IRT, and subsequently confirmed 

by the Task Force’s own analysis. in addition, separate procurements allowed for the 

civilian and military entities (NOAA/NASA and DOD) to develop and fly satellites 

more ideally focused for their needs, while still reducing redundancy, and maintaining a converged ‘‘system’’ of satellite data through a shared ground and data system 

operated by NOAA, an area of proven success.

External Views in Support of the Task Force’s Conclusions

The EOP Task Force’s conclusion that significant changes needed to be made to 

the management structure matched the conclusions of external reviewers. The IRT 

report stated that ‘‘the NPOESS EXCOM process is ineffective and must be fixed,’’ 

and that ‘‘the IPO [does] not have sufficient space systems acquisition expertise and 

process’’ necessary for a program of this size. The IRT report stated that the program ‘‘is being managed with cost as the most important parameter and not mission 

success.’’ The IRT suggested that ‘‘an established space acquisition center, such as 

[SMC or GSFC]’’ would provide ‘‘the institutional knowledge, robust infrastructure 

support, and a cadre of seasoned space system acquisition experts’’ to ensure success 

of the program. The report recommended that the parties agree to a cost-estimating 

approach that is based on an 80% confidence level. (DOD currently estimates cost 

to a 50% level based on schedule that is more conservative than the IPO.) Finding 

the then-current ($13.9B) cost estimate of the program unrealistic, the IRT noted 

that while a significantly more conservative (e.g. 80% confidence) cost estimate 

would be judged by the DOD to be unaffordable, a program which would fit within 

the then-current budget would perform at such a reduced level that it would be unacceptable for NOAA and NASA. Believing that the EXCOM would be unable to re-
23

solve this difference, the IRT report stated that ‘‘this will require the White House 

to define the NPOESS program that is in the national interest.’’

These views were not just held by the IRT. The final conference report for the 

FY 2010 Commerce Justice and Science (CJS) Appropriations bill (House Report 

111–366, to accompany H.R. 3288 or Public Law 111–117) stated that ‘‘the budget 

request does not reflect the true need and the program’s long-term projections for 

success remain in doubt. In fact, to date this experiment in combining disparate elements has been a horrendous and costly failure.’’ Noting that ‘‘this situation has 

been developing for some time and is the result of a dysfunctional tri-agency management approach,’’ the conferees went on to state that ‘‘nothing short of an immediate and out-of-the-box solution will do.’’ The conferees stated that ‘‘the program 

needs a cooperative solution that will take advantage of the strengths of the three 

agencies involved, sustain the integrated operations of the various satellites, and 

should not be based on financial projections that have proven to be consistently and 

abysmally unreliable.’’ The Task Force took this and other direction of CJS appropriators into account when determining the best path forward.

Restructuring the NPOESS Program for Success

EOP leadership reviewed the Task Force’s analysis and, in consultation with the 

agencies, decided to restructure the process through which the three agencies collaborate to implement the Nation’s polar-orbiting environmental satellite program—

specifically, by proceeding with separately managed acquisitions. The Task Force 

had reviewed the full range of ramifications and risk mitigation to ensure the decision was indeed prudent. The February 1, 2010 restructuring decision was made by 

the leaders of the relevant offices in the EOP, specifically by the OSTP Director, 

the OMB Director, and the National Security Advisor, after an intensive interagency 

process involving the EOP Task Force and top officials and supporting staff from 

NASA, NOAA, and DOD. 

The agencies will rely upon the civil and defense establishments to construct, 

manage, and operate their respective tailored systems with proactive approaches to 

controlling cost, meeting schedule needs, and achieving performance goals. The key 

elements of the restructured program will retain the observational requirements of 

the NPOESS program; however, NOAA and DOD will be responsible for meeting 

these requirements through their assigned orbits:

• NOAA, with NASA acting as the acquisition agent, will be responsible for the 

afternoon orbit.

• DOD will be responsible for the early-morning orbit.

• The European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites 

(EUMETSAT) will continue to provide observations in the mid-morning orbit.

• The agencies will continue to partner in those areas that have been successful 

in the past, such as a shared ground system and operation of both the earlymorning and afternoon orbit platforms by NOAA.

The NOAA portion of the restructured NPOESS program is called the Joint Polar 

Satellite System (JPSS). EUMETSAT retains the name Meteorological Operational 

satellite (MetOp) for its polar-orbiting assets in the mid-morning orbit. The DOD 

program development will flow from established processes. Remaining DOD Defense 

Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) satellite capabilities provide enough time 

for DOD to study priorities and alternatives for the early-morning orbit program. 

All three agencies are still closely collaborating on aspects of developing a next generation polar-orbiting environmental satellite system. 

In summary, the restructure was driven largely by the Task Force’s recognition 

of the inability of the current tri-agency governance structure to effectively manage 

the acquisition process, which contributed to cost growth and schedule delays. Maintaining this structure would likely have continued the history of schedule slips and 

cost increases, jeopardizing the availability of critical weather and climate data. 

The program restructure, therefore, accomplishes the following goals:

(1) It reduces the risk of schedule slips and cost increases by clarifying acquisition authorities through splitting the procurements and making a single 

agency responsible for each orbit.

(2) It allows each agency to manage its program within its own agency culture 

and environment. The platforms for the respective orbits will be developed 

and procured so as to leverage the strengths of each agency, and also to best 

harness the experience each agency has in continuing and improving on legacy measurements.
24

(3) It provides clear accountability, responsibility, and authority for each orbit, 

and simplifies the complicated tri-agency decision processes that made management and oversight difficult and contributed to the prior poor performance of the program. The agencies will continue to partner in those areas 

that have been successful in the past, such as a shared ground system and 

operation of both early-morning and afternoon platforms by NOAA.

(4) It allows for greater government control over the development process. This 

will enable NOAA (with NASA as its acquisition agent) to have greater control over setting the pace of work that is required to develop the instruments and space and ground segments for the afternoon orbit.

(5) It retains strategic coordination across the civil and defense programs. The 

civil and defense weather and climate communities are critically dependent 

upon data from all the orbits.

(6) It aligns with proven acquisition centers. As noted by the IRT the program 

lacked timely access to technical expertise, broad mentoring and development opportunities for staff, and rigorous checks and balances of engineering and program processes. The Administration followed the recommendation of the IRT concerning alignment of the program with an established acquisition center—in this case, NASA’s GSFC will be NOAA’s acquisition 

agent for the afternoon orbit, and the Air Force SMC will be DOD’s acquisition agent for the early morning orbit.

While the NPOESS program restructure has the potential for adding some nearterm risk to NOAA and DOD associated with a transition, the improved management structure of the follow-on programs will enable the agencies to proceed in a 

more effective and efficient manner in the mid to long term. The ability to recover 

lost schedule and rebuild critical spares will not occur overnight, and it will take 

some time to recover the robustness of the past national polar satellite missions. 

However, the ability to use different spacecraft as well as international and commercial platforms will provide more flexibility to achieve improved continuity of observation in the near term. 

I want to be clear that we are not ‘‘cancelling’’ the program, but merely restructuring the procurements. We will be taking maximum advantage of the investments 

made to date, by maintaining almost all of the hardware that has been developed 

for use on future platforms. The Administration believes it was in the best interest 

of U.S. taxpayers to restructure the NPOESS program. The decision is supported 

by the long history of reviews called for by House and Senate authorizers and appropriators and completed by GAO, by other reviews completed by the Department of 

Commerce Inspector General as well as senior-level independent reviews of the program.

A Strategy for Improving Earth Observation Capabilities

With the NPOESS decision behind us, I believe it is essential to focus on the 

broader issue of the development of a comprehensive strategy for Earth observations, both from space and in situ. We live in an era of unprecedented stress on our 

planet. The combination of population growth, climate change, resource demand, 

and the continuing development of coastal and built areas creates unparalleled challenges for our health, economic, and natural resource management and maintaining 

our National security. A robust infrastructure of Earth observations about the 

Earth/ocean system and how it is changing over time will best support our Nation’s 

need to inform decisions and policy. Additionally, in this ever-more global society, 

information and understanding derived from Earth observations are important in 

sustaining the U.S. role in global leadership. 

The myriad of Earth observations from space taken today vary widely in purpose 

and scope and are appropriately distributed among numerous programs under the 

purview of Federal agencies and other institutions and individuals. To a large degree, these observations have been only loosely coupled, coordinated, and integrated. 

The critical leap forward can only be achieved with a synergy between remotely 

sensed and in situ observations supported by robust data systems. The Administration recognizes that a coordinated approach is needed to sustain and build on the 

current set of Earth observations.

System of Systems Approach to Earth Observations

Increasingly the promise of a coordinated approach to Earth observations is being 

realized, and seemingly disparate observations are being combined in new ways to 

produce benefits across multiple societal areas. The concept of an integrated Earth 

observing system is being articulated internationally by the Group on Earth Obser-
25

vations (GEO), with leadership from the United States provided by the agencies 

through the U.S. Group on Earth Observations (USGEO), which is a standing subcommittee of the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), and by the EOP 

through OSTP. In 2005, GEO initiated a ten-year plan to implement a Global Earth 

Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) to coordinate observations at the international level. Eighty-one countries, the European Commission and over 50 international organizations are currently engage in this effort. As U.S. co-chair of GEO, 

I chaired the Sixth Plenary Session of GEO hosted by the United States here in 

Washington last November. I continue to work with the other co-chairs from the European Commission, China, and South Africa and the GEO Secretariat to realize the 

vision of the ‘‘system of systems’’ approach to Earth observations. 

The U.S. contribution to GEOSS is the Integrated Earth Observation System 

(IEOS). GEOSS and IEOS will facilitate the sharing and applied usage of global, 

regional, and local data from satellites, ocean buoys, weather stations, and other 

surface and airborne Earth observing instruments. The end result will be access to 

an unprecedented amount of environmental information, integrated into new data 

products benefiting societies and economies worldwide. USGEO is continuing to help 

ensure the coordination between our national assets and the emerging international 

architecture for Earth observations.

Status of Earth Observations in the United States

The state of the U.S. space-based observational system in 2009 was largely unchanged from that of 2005, when an interim report of the National Research Council’s committee that produced the Earth Science and Applications from Space 

‘‘Decadal Survey’’ Report described the national system of environmental satellites 

as ‘‘at risk of collapse.’’ Later, in 2007, the Decadal Survey Report concluded the 

outlook had significantly worsened. The likelihood of a degradation in land imagery 

capability, affecting multiple societal needs (e.g., agriculture, biodiversity, climate, 

ecosystems, water, etc.), was almost a certainty. In addition, no plans had been developed to continue some of the valuable observations demonstrated by the NASA 

Earth Observing System (EOS) program that benefit the disaster preparedness, 

human health, climate, and water areas. Continuity of the weather observing system was also threatened by reductions and delays in the NPOESS program, and 

plans for climate measurements on NPOESS had been scaled back. 

In an overall sense, deployments of new and replacement satellites were not keeping pace with the termination of older systems, even though many existing satellites 

are operating well past their nominal lifetimes. A number of satellites built as research missions were seen to have ongoing societal benefit, but there were no plans 

for continuity of many of these. Given the long development times associated with 

fielding new systems, particularly satellite systems a sustained commitment to sensor system development is necessary to avoid a loss of observing capability in the 

next decade. 

In addition to global observations made from space, in situ measurements provide 

critical data at fine spatial and temporal scales and of parameters and in places not 

achievable from space. Our observational infrastructure for some in-situ measurements has been aging and investment in monitoring programs has declined despite 

growing demand. And, there still remains the grand challenge and promise of using 

geospatial information to link the broad coverage and context of our top-down remote-sensing view with the comprehensive and detailed measurements made in situ

in order to best characterize and understand environmental resources. 

These realities reinforce the need to address the challenges and recommendations 

in the NRC’s Decadal Survey. The Administration has taken decisive steps to begin 

reversing the trend of declining observational capabilities. The longer term need is 

the development of an overall national strategy for Earth observations. 

The initial step was to put the Nation’s system of polar-orbiting operational environmental satellites on a path to success, as plans for continuity of a number of 

Earth observations from space had been tied to NPOESS at one point or another 

in the program’s history. There was first a need to ‘‘bound’’ the capabilities of the 

polar-orbiting operational environmental satellites in order to avoid the problem of 

having large, monolithic platforms responsible for obtaining an overly broad set of 

measurements, which contributed to the fragility of the constellation of Earth observing satellites by having a ‘‘single string’’ failure mode. Once the ‘‘bounds’’ of the 

future platforms were determined, only then could the Administration focus on 

where the agencies needed ‘‘to fill in the gaps’’ in terms of continuity of key climate 

observations. 

For the near-term, the Administration has recently made a significant step in regards to continuity of key climate data from space with the substantial increases 
26

in funding as part of the FY 2011 budget for NASA’s Earth Sciences program. 

NASA will be using this augmentation to address pressing scientific and national 

issues associated with climate change and the Nation’s climate research and monitoring capabilities. As recommended by the NRC’s Decadal Survey, this budget returns NASA Earth Science funding to the approximate level that it had in FY 2000, 

an increase of more than 30% from recent levels. This funding allows for the acceleration and expansion of activities across the entire, coordinated Earth Science program-in the areas of flight missions, research, applications, and Earth Science mission technology development-thus advancing the balance and scope that have been 

hallmarks of NASA Earth System Science. In addition to building the Orbiting Carbon Observatory-2 mission for launch in 2013, NASA will: accelerate development 

of the four NRC Decadal Survey Tier 1 missions so that they are all launched by 

2017; accelerate and expand the Venture-class line of competed, innovative small 

missions; initiate new space missions to address continuity of high-priority climate 

observations; and bring two Decadal Survey Tier 2 missions forward to allow launch 

by 2020. Complementing the flight portfolio expansion, NASA will advance climate 

research, multiply applications using the full set of available (NASA and non-NASA) 

satellite measurements for direct societal benefit, and develop/mature technologies 

required for the next generation of Earth observing missions. 

As part of the U.S. Global Change Research Program’s (USGCRP) role in coordination of the Federal climate change research portfolio across all the relevant agencies, the principal agency representatives to USGCRP reviewed NASA’s draft plan 

for the FY 2011 augmentation, and these reviews will be taken into account as 

NASA moves forward in implementing the plan. I anticipate that the details relating to NASA’s implementation of the augmentation for FY 2011 will be available 

in the coming weeks. We intend to utilize USGCRP in a similar manner in the future as a mechanism for ensuring broad Federal coordination on climate observations.

Progress Toward a National Strategy

The Administration will be drawing on the analysis of USGEO to assist in the 

development of a comprehensive strategy for Earth observations, as called for in the 

recent GAO report Environmental Satellites: Strategy Needed to Sustain Critical Climate and Space Weather Measurements. OSTP is utilizing analysis from USGEO as 

input for reporting requirements to Congress (specifically the FY 2010 CIS Appropriations Conference Report language) which directed OSTP to develop a strategy 

on Earth observations. This report will be a first (but very significant) step in developing a larger strategy for Earth observations. 

Working toward a national strategy will be a priority for the Administration in 

the coming year, including the coordination of multi-agency initiatives and budget 

submissions from individual Federal agencies. Other elements of that strategy are 

already in development, and they include articulating high-priority environmental 

policy priorities that can be directly advanced through improved Earth observations, 

identifying Earth observation-derived information requirements held in common 

across Federal agencies, evaluating existing and imminent gaps, preserving the continuity of existing critical observing systems, and recommending new systems as appropriate.

Concluding Remarks

OSTP will continue to play an important role in coordinating interagency satellite 

observation policy. We must increase government oversight and improve the interagency partnerships central to the management of civilian satellite programs, which 

among other things are critical to the Nation’s climate and weather forecasting. We 

need to proactively manage our programs to avert future cost and schedule overruns. Agencies must work together to manage the contractors building these satellites and demand cost and schedule accountability. Successfully restructuring the 

NPOESS program and ensuring continuity of weather and climate data has been 

a high priority for the Administration’s leadership team. We will continue to meet 

regularly with NOAA, NASA, and DOD to ensure a smooth transition of the program to meet the Nation’s need for weather forecasting, storm-tracking, and climate 

monitoring. 

As Associate Director for Environment for OSTP, I regard one of the primary 

functions and principle challenges of OSTP to be providing the leadership and needed coordination of Earth observations to ensure that our decision makers, our businesses, our farmers, our health care workers, and all our citizens have the information they need to take actions to improve human well-being and environmental 

management, particularly as the climate changes. Working in partnership with the 
27

OMB and the Congress, we aim to pull together the expertise across the government, drawing from each agency’s distinctive capacity, to construct the relationships 

and interactions among the agencies that will result in a program for Earth observations that contributes to both our national prosperity and our national security. 

The Administration obviously will need the support of the Congress in moving forward with a broader strategy for Earth observations. I look forward to working with 

the Committee in this effort. I will be pleased to try to answer any questions the 

Committee may have.

BIOGRAPHY FOR SHERBURNE B. ‘‘SHERE’’ ABBOTT

Sherburne ‘‘Shere’’ Abbott serves as the Associate Director for Environment of the 

Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the President. She 

manages a portfolio of S&T policy that ranges from energy and climate change to 

environmental quality and sustainability. 

Prior to her confirmation for this position by the Senate on April 30, 2009, Ms. 

Abbott was a faculty member of the College of Liberal Arts at the University of 

Texas at Austin and served as the Director of the Center for Science and Practice 

of Sustainability in the Office of the Executive Vice President and Provost. Previously, Ms Abbott served as Chief International Officer of the American Association 

for the Advancement of Science. Prior to that appointment, over a 17 year period 

at the National Academies’ National Research Council she served as Executive Director of the Board on Sustainable Development, the Director of International Organization Programs for the Office of International Affairs, and the Director of the 

Polar Research Board of the National Academies’ National Research Council. Ms. 

Abbott also served as Assistant Scientific Program Director of the U.S. Marine 

Mammal Commission. 

Ms. Abbott earned her A.B. from Goucher College and her M.F.S. from Yale University’s School of Forestry and Environmental Studies.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Ms. Glackin for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MS. MARY M. GLACKIN, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION 

Ms. GLACKIN. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, and 

distinguished members and committee of the—members and staff 

of the committee, I, too, appreciate the opportunity to testify in 

front of you today. I have been working closely with Secretary 

Locke and Under Secretary Lubchenco to ensure the continuity of 

the critical weather and satellite data that this nation needs. 

As has been highlighted here by the opening statements, it was 

imperative that a decision be made to address the acquisition chal-
28

lenges facing the NPOESS program. NOAA’s follow-on program to 

NPOESS, the Joint Polar Satellite System, or JPSS, will address 

our requirements to provide global environmental data and support 

our mission. 

Since the Administration’s decision to restructure the program, 

NOAA has taken several steps to ensure that there is uninterrupted, reliable weather and climate data. We have established a 

transition team, including members from the Department of Commerce, NOAA, and NASA with participation of the Department of 

Defense. We have made significant progress moving forward, including defining the organizational structure and beginning the 

process of locating and staffing the JPSS office. 

NOAA and NASA are assuring that we have high-performing 

teams working on the program and, in particular, leveraging and 

the placement of the civil workforce that we have at the Integrated 

Program Office today. 

Concurrent with these activities we have already—we have also 

moved forward to ensure that the NPOESS requirements for the 

afternoon orbit are appropriately translated into program-level requirements for JPSS. 

The Integrated Program Office oversight has been reassigned to 

the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center. We have a NOAA 

senior engineer with significant experience that’s been assigned to 

work with the Center for close coordination. The IPO has issued 

guidance outlining priorities for work stoppage and, in particular, 

ensuring that we maintain the NPOESS Preparatory Project, NPP, 

cost and schedule as a top priority. 

Due to the delays in the NPOESS program, it has been necessary 

to repurpose the NPP satellite from a research mission to an operational satellite. All the instruments have been delivered for integration onto the NPP satellite, and NOAA is supporting NASA’s efforts for launch of this satellite. 

The JPSS afternoon orbit will maintain observations that were 

planned for NPOESS in the afternoon orbit. We anticipate that 

NASA will assume management control of these sensor acquisitions 

in early fiscal year 2011. NOAA will continue the development and 

fielding of the ground system network that was to support 

NPOESS and its users. The President’s budget provides adequate 

resources to support NOAA’s efforts for completing the development of the ground system which will be used by both DOD and 

NOAA for both the morning and the afternoon orbits. 

As I have mentioned, continuity of data is a top priority and a 

basis for all of our considerations. After careful analysis of technical costs, schedule, and programmatic risks, with input and advice from NASA, NOAA has decided to procure a clone of the NPP 

spacecraft bus to support the JPSS–1 launch readiness date of 

2014. We believe an NPP clone will carry the same suite of instruments and collect the same data as NPP, provides a proven solution for placing these sensors in orbit. 

This will allow us to meet our launch readiness date in 2014, and 

minimize the potential of an observation gap. We are still working 

with NASA and DOD regarding the spacecraft decisions for the second spacecraft that will support a 2017 launch readiness date. 
29

During this transition phase our ability to make final decisions 

are still coupled with the Department of Defense. Due to DOD’s decision making timeline on the spacecraft bus, a level of uncertainty 

still exists regarding the resolution of the Northrop contract. Until 

the contract is resolved, NOAA will continue to be exposed to additional procurement, schedule and cost risks. 

I would like to briefly address the two GAO reports that are subject of this hearing. NOAA agrees with the recommendations in 

both reports, and I would be remiss if I didn’t acknowledge the tremendous effort OSTP has undertaken over the years to address the 

importance of continuing critical space-braced climate observations. 

With respect to the GAO report released at this hearing addressing risks that jeopardize continuity of weather and climate data, 

we appreciate the perspectives of the GAO professionals in their 

regular reviews of the NPOESS program. The report provides recommendations to both the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, 

and NOAA agrees with all recommendations in this report. 

In conclusion, NOAA appreciates the committee’s continued interest in the success of the agency’s satellite programs. It is widely 

acknowledged that satellites are very complicated and difficult systems to design, build, and operate. However, NOAA is acting quickly to support the February 1, 2010, decision to restructure this program, and I, too, would be happy to answer any questions you may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Glackin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARY M. GLACKIN

Introduction

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am Mary Glackin, the Deputy 

Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) within the Department of Commerce (DOC). NOAA’s 

mission is to understand and predict changes in Earth’s environment and conserve 

and manage coastal and marine resources to meet our Nation’s economic, social, and 

environmental needs. NOAA’s satellite systems are tremendously important for 

global monitoring of environmental conditions in direct support of the agency’s mission. 

Data provided by NOAA’s satellites are used in its numerical weather prediction 

models, which are in turn used by National Weather Service forecasters to inform 

severe weather warnings, such as tornadoes and flooding, and to support the detection and spread of wild fires, as well as the monitoring and forecasts of hurricanes. 

NOAA’s satellites are also critical to providing uninterrupted climate data and information to support scientific assessments and climate change predictions. In the Gulf 

of Mexico, NOAA’s satellites continue to provide important data to support weather 

and oceanographic forecasts and oil spill response efforts. Given the importance of 

these satellite systems to NOAA’s mission, it was imperative that a decision be 

made to address the acquisition challenges within the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program. I appreciate the opportunity to testify about the steps NOAA has taken to implement its responsibilities 

as outlined in the decision to restructure the National Polar-orbiting Operational 

Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program.

Decision to Restructure the NPOESS Program

On February 1, 2010, after an exhaustive review and assessment process, the Administration announced its decision to restructure the NPOESS program. This decision reaffirmed the importance of meeting the Nation’s space-based environmental 

needs and revised agency responsibilities for implementation of observational assets 

and the sustainment of weather and climate observations from polar-orbiting satellites.
30

NOAA was assigned responsibility for the afternoon orbit and for fielding of the 

shared ground system. The NOAA Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) will support 

this effort by delivering observations in the afternoon orbit. The Department of Defense (DOD) was assigned responsibility for the early morning orbit. Responsibility 

for the mid-morning observations remains unchanged, and will be provided by the 

European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites 

(EUMETSAT) which operates the MetOp polar-orbiting satellites. NOAA is also responsible for cooperative activities with international partners who will assist with 

implementation of the NPOESS restructure. This coordination involves close contact 

with EUMETSAT, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, the Centre National 

d’Etudes Spatiales, and the Department of National Defence-Canada. 

The February 1 decision addresses three major recommendations of an independent review of expert satellite executives that are required for the program to 

be successful:

• Alignment with a proven acquisition center

NOAA will work with its long standing partner, the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration (NASA), as its acquisition agent for JPSS. NOAA and 

NASA have aligned the JPSS program with the Goddard Space Flight Center, 

which has very successfully implemented NOAA’s Geostationary Operational 

Environmental Satellite and Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite programs. JPSS will benefit from the technical and programmatic resources of NASA, as well as its rigorous acquisition processes.

• Realistic cost confidence at the 80 percent level 

The NPOESS Integrated Program Office was often forced by near term funding limitations into decisions that were not cost efficient. A budget that realistically reflects the complexity of the program affords NOAA with sufficient 

resources to address issues that may arise during the development of JPSS 

without adding risk to overall life cycle cost or delays to launch readiness 

dates. A higher confidence cost estimate benefits JPSS by improving NOAA’s 

ability to manage the program more effectively. The President’s FY 2011 

Budget requests $1.060 billion to implement the JPSS program within a life 

cycle cost of $11.9 billion.

• Clear lines of authority and responsibility 

The division of orbits and observations provides clear accountability to a single agency responsible for each acquisition. Decision authority for JPSS lies 

within the Department of Commerce/NOAA, rather than multiple agencies 

(DOD, DOC/NOAA, and NASA). The NOAA Program Management Council, 

which I chair, is NOAA’s management oversight mechanism for the JPSS 

Program. Membership is comprised of Senior Executives at NOAA and NASA. 
31

Similarly, decision authority for DOD acquisitions will be handled within 

DOD.

Status of NOAA’s Implementation of the February 1, 2010 Decision

Notwithstanding the acquisition challenges that the NPOESS program faced, we 

appreciate the hard work of the many persons who have worked on the NPOESS 

program since its inception in 1994. All the agencies recognize that transition is a 

very difficult period. We believe that the transition process related to the February 

1, 2010 decision to restructure the NPOESS program may take many months to be 

fully implemented, but in the long run, the decision to transition to JPSS will be 

the right one for the United States and its need for uninterrupted, reliable weather 

and climate data from space.

Transition Team

NOAA has established a Transition Team which includes members from DC. 

NOAA, and NASA, with participation from DOD. The three agencies have made significant progress and are moving forward in implementing the transition. Concurrent with the Transition Team’s activities, NOAA has asked the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology to ensure that NPOESS requirements for the afternoon orbit are appropriately translated into program level requirements for JPSS. 

This requirements review team also maintains membership from all three agencies.

NPOESS Components being Transitioned to JPSS

Space Segment—Instruments

NOAA’s JPSS afternoon orbit will maintain the observations that were planned 

for NPOESS in the afternoon orbit. The JPSS Program will consist of:

• Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite

• Cross-track Infrared Sounder

• Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder (ATMS)

• Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS) Nadir

• Advanced Data Collection System (A–DCS)

• Satellite-assisted Search and Rescue (SARSAT)

We anticipate that NASA will assume management control of these sensor acquisitions in early FY 2011. NOAA and NASA continue to coordinate with DOD and 

the NPOESS prime contractor, Northrop Grumman Aerospace System (NGAS) to 

transition the management of these instrument contracts from NGAS to NASA 

management control. 

With respect to the other measurements that had been part of the NPOESS Program:

• DOD responsibilities under the restructure of the NPOESS program defines 

the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) successor sensor suite 

to include a Space Environment Monitor package.

• Observations for microwave imaging and sounding are planned to be provided 

by international partnership. NOAA has initiated discussions with the Japan 

Aerospace Exploration Agency to collaborate in its Global Change Observation Mission (GCOM) missions. The GCOM’s Advanced Microwave Scanning 

Radiometer (AMSR) instrument will satisfy the Key Performance Parameters 

that the Microwave Imager Sounder instrument would have supported and, 

along with the JPSS ATMS, will continue the legacy microwave capability in 

the afternoon orbit established by the Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite sounders and the AMSR on the NASA Earth Observing System (EOS) Aqua mission. DOD’s June 22, 2010 Acquisition Decision Memorandum also provides for a to-be-determined microwave sensing capability for 

the DMSP successor.

The JPSS Program will also fly instruments that are being procured with funds 

from the NOAA Climate Sensor Program:

• Cloud and Earth Radiant Energy System and the follow-on Earth’s Radiation 

Budget Sensor

• Total Solar and Spectral Irradiance Sensor (TSIS)

• OMPS–Limb
32

Space Segment—Spacecraft

In order to ensure the lowest risk of an observational gap, NASA, at the request 

of NOAA, will procure a clone of the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) spacecraft 

bus to support the JPSS–1 launch readiness date of 2014. NOAA believes an NPPclone that will carry the same suite of instruments and collect the same data as 

NPP provides a proven solution for placing core weather and climate sensors onorbit in the afternoon. This will allow us to meet a launch readiness date in 2014 

that minimizes the potential of a data gap. This decision was made after careful 

analysis and consideration of technical, cost, schedule, and programmatic risks, 

which included input and advice from NASA. NOAA is seeking an alternate platform to carry the TSIS instruments, and international partnerships to provide 

SARSAT, and A–DCS data since they will not fit on the NPP-clone. NOAA is still 

working with NASA and DOD regarding the spacecraft decision for the JPSS–2 

spacecraft bus which will support a 2017 launch readiness date.

Ground segment

NOAA, via the JPSS program, will continue the development and fielding of the 

ground system network that was to support NPOESS and its users. The JPSS 

ground system allows us to implement an enterprise solution rather than the current stovepiped ground systems. 

The President’s FY 2011 budget for JPSS provides adequate resources to support 

NOAA’s efforts for complete development of the ground system which will be used 

by DOD and NOAA for both the morning and afternoon orbits. NOAA believes the 

challenges that remain to field and deploy the ground system are manageable. 

There will be a period of time when NOAA and DOD will operate legacy satellites 

that are ending their useful life, while at the same time operating the JPSS satellites. NOAA’s ground system network will support these legacy systems and JPSS 

satellites, and will be able to ingest and utilize all sources of data. Having access 

to data from legacy and JPSS systems at the same time will allow for calibration 

and validation activities of the new data to occur in a measured and deliberate manner and will support enhancement of numerical weather prediction models and climate models. 

The advanced observational capabilities planned for the JPSS satellites will provide significantly improved data that will benefit all users. The more accurate JPSS 

data will support improved weather forecasts and alerts, and will further our understanding of climate to enable informed decisions to mitigate or adapt to climate 

change.

Risk of Data Gaps In the Afternoon Orbit Remains

NOAA recognizes that the risk of data gap in the afternoon orbit still exists and 

will likely continue until we have recovered lost schedule and rebuilt critical spares 

for the afternoon constellation. NOAA’s final satellite in its Polar Operational Environmental Satellite series, NOAA–19, was launched in February 2009 and is the 

primary operational satellite in the afternoon orbit. NOAA also operates, at the request of DOD, the Air Force’s Defense Meteorological Satellite Program satellites. 

By the end of the year, NOAA will have delivered to EUMETSAT all the NOAA instruments that will fly on the MetOp A, B, and C satellites. The NPP satellite, 

which NASA expects to launch in 2011, had originally been planned as a demonstration of the key NPOESS instruments. NOAA has included funds in the JPSS budget 

to support use of the NPP data for operational purposes and as a mitigation measure for a data gap in the afternoon orbit. 

I would like to now address the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommendations.

GAO Recommendations for Executive Action

There are two GAO reports that are the subject of this hearing. The report entitled ‘‘Environmental Satellites: Strategy Needed to Sustain Critical Climate and 

Space Weather Measurements’’ contains a number of recommendations directed at 

the Executive Office of the President’s Office of Science Technology Policy (OSTP) 

to initiate high-level coordination of earth and space weather observations across 

the Executive Branch. NOAA agrees with the recommendations and its general comments were included in the report’s Appendix. I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the tremendous effort that OSTP has undertaken over the years to address the importance of continuing critical space-based climate observations in 2006 

after the Nunn-McCurdy certification of the NPOESS program. Again in 2009, 

OSTP was a major driver of the review and decision-making that supported the Feb-
33

ruary 1, 2010 announcement to restructure the NPOESS program. Balancing these 

critical space-based observations is complex, and NOAA is ready to support OSTP 

in its task. 

With respect to the report that GAO is releasing at this hearing, ‘‘Polar-orbiting 

Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act Quickly to Address Risks that Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate Data,’’ NOAA appreciates the perspective GAO professionals have provided during its regular reviews of the NPOESS 

program. NOAA has met with GAO and provided information and feedback on its 

most recent report. 

The draft GAO report states, ‘‘In order to ensure that the transition from [the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)] to its 

successor programs is efficiently and effectively managed, we recommend that the 

Secretaries of Defense and Commerce take the following four actions:’’

Recommendation 1: Direct their respective NPOESS follow-on programs to expedite decisions on the expected cost, schedule, and capabilities of their planned 

programs.

NOAA agrees with this recommendation. A transition team has been formed to 

manage the activities of transitioning the NPOESS activities to the Joint Polar 

Satellite System (JPSS) program. This team includes representatives from 

NOAA, NASA, and DOD, who are working together to transition the NPOESS 

activities to JPSS and DOD (U.S. Air Force) no later than December 31, 2010. 

NOAA and NASA have signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to begin 

transition activities, which will focus on the cost, schedule and performance capabilities of the JPSS program. As I mentioned earlier, our ability to make final 

decisions are still coupled with DOD during this transition phase. Pending the 

adjudication of all the NPOESS elements into the successor programs, a level 

of uncertainty will remain regarding resolution of the NGAS contract. Until the 

NGAS contract is resolved, NOAA will continue to be exposed to additional procurement, schedule and cost risk.

Recommendation 2: Direct their respective NPOESS follow-on programs to develop plans to address key transition risks, including the loss of skilled staff, 

delays in contract negotiations and setting up new program offices, loss of support for the other agency’s requirements, and oversight of new program management.

NOAA agrees with this recommendation. Under the NOAA NASA Transition 

MOU, the agencies will define the system concept for JPSS, set the level-1 requirements, establish the acquisition plans, determine the organization and 

staffing needed to run the program and establish a schedule and cost baseline. 

These will all be subject to internal program management councils and to external independent review teams. NOAA and NASA are working to ensure that the 

high performing teams that worked on the NPOESS program are provided an 

opportunity to continue with the JPSS program. Placement of the civil workforce among the three agencies is being finalized. The transition team is still 

carefully assessing the skill mix and capabilities that the contractor task support must possess to support the government in its efforts to make JPSS program a success.

Recommendation 3: Direct the NPOESS program office to develop priorities 

for work stoppage to allow the activities that are most important to maintaining 

launch schedules to continue.

NOAA agrees with this recommendation. On March 17, 2010, DOD signed the 

ADM, ‘‘National Polar-orbiting Operational Satellite System (NPOESS) Program Restructure’’ with a revised ADM which was signed on June 22, 2010 that 

directs the Air Force to ‘‘maximize use of the Government’s investment in 

NPOESS, and (to do so) in a manner that offers maximum opportunities for collaboration with the NOAA JPSS program.’’ In turn, the NPOESS Program Executive Officer (PEO) provided ADM implementation guidance to the NPOESS 

System Program Director (SPD) on March 26, 2010. This guidance outlines priorities for work stoppage and provides transition guidance for those activities 

most important to maintaining launch schedules. Subsequently, the PEO and 

SPD have worked to refine the specifics of implementing the ADM. The Integrated Program Office oversight has been assigned to the Air Force Space and 

Missile Systems Center (SMC) at Los Angeles AFB, California. A NOAA senior 

engineer with significant experience in satellite acquisition has been assigned 

to liaise with SMC to ensure close coordination. This coordination complements 

ongoing coordination among NOAA, NASA, and DOD.
34

Recommendation 4: Direct NOAA and DOD officials to develop timeframes for 

making key decisions on-or accepting the risks related to-the timeliness of 

[NPOESS Preparatory Project’s (NPP’s)] data.

NOAA agrees with this recommendation. The NPP data will be collected once 

per orbit and provided to users with timeliness comparable to the data from the 

current Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites and MetOp satellites. NOAA continues its preparation to use NPP data on an operational 

basis. NOAA is also working to increase the number of products, from 19 to 54, 

that will be available to users within the first 18 months from launch. Notwithstanding the NPOESS restructure, all the instruments have been delivered for 

integration onto the NPP satellite and NOAA is supporting NASA’s efforts for 

the launch of NPP.

Conclusion

NOAA appreciates the Committee’s continued interest in the success of the agency’s satellite programs. It is widely acknowledged that satellites are very complicated and difficult systems to design, build, and operate. However, their capabilities play a key role in NOAA’s mission to observe and predict the Earth’s environment and to provide critical information used in protecting life and property. NOAA 

is acting quickly to support the February 1, 2010 decision to restructure the 

NPOESS program. While significant risk exists, NOAA is confident that the restructured program offers greater chances for success than the NPOESS program provided. DOC and NOAA remain committed to pursuing a program that will provide 

continuity of data for the Nation’s weather and climate prediction needs. I would 

be happy to answer any questions you may have.

BIOGRAPHY FOR MARY M. GLACKIN

Mary M. Glackin has been the Deputy Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere since December 2007. In this role she is responsible for the day-to-day management of NOAA’s national and international operations for oceanic and atmospheric services, research, and coastal and marine stewardship. 

Mary has worked at NOAA 33 years with nearly 20 years of senior executive level 

experience working in numerous NOAA line offices. She served as the acting Assistant Administrator for Weather Services and Director, National Weather Service in 

2007. Before that, she was the Assistant Administrator for the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Office of Program Planning and Integration. 

From 1999 until 2002, she served as the Deputy Assistant Administrator for the National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service of NOAA. 

From 1993 to 1999, she worked as the Program Manager for the Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System (AWIPS) with the National Weather Service 

(NWS), NOAA. Prior to this, Ms. Glackin was both a meteorologist and computer 

specialist in various positions within NOAA where she was responsible for introducing improvements into NWS operations by capitalizing on new technology systems and scientific models. 
35

She has twice received the Presidential Rank Award (2001 and 2009). She is also 

the receipient of the Charles Brooks Award for Outstanding Services to the American Meteorological Society, the NOAA Bronze Medal (2001), the Federal 100 Information Technology Manager Award (1999), the NOAA Administrator’s Award 

(1993), and the Department of Commerce Silver Medal Award (1991). She is a Fellow of the American Meteorological Society and a member of the National Weather 

Association and the American Geophysical Union. 

Ms. Glackin has a B.S. degree from the University of Maryland.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Ms. Glackin. 

Mr. Scolese for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. CHRISTOPHER J. SCOLESE, ASSOCIATE 

ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. SCOLESE. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss NASA’s 

role in and commitment to the JPSS program. This program is crucial to the Nation’s ability to make important weather and climate 

measurements. 

NASA’s role will be to manage the acquisition and integration of 

the JPSS program elements on behalf of NOAA. As the nation’s 

civil space agency, NASA is fully prepared to support JPSS. 

NASA, and more specifically NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, has over 40 years of experience developing large-scale operational space systems for NOAA. NASA Goddard developed the 

first operational weather satellite, TIROS–1, launched in 1961, and 

has continued to support NOAA through development and deployment of the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites 

and the Polar Orbiting Environmental Satellites. 

Further, NASA has decades of experience developing and supporting earth observation system research satellites. Many of these 

capabilities serve as prototypes for operational missions such as the 

Aqua satellite, launched in 2002, that demonstrated the capabilities intended for JPSS. 

At present NASA is developing the NPOESS Preparatory ProjectNPP-to serve as a gap filler for the afternoon orbiting weather satellites. I must emphasize that NPP was originally intended to be 

a risk-reduction mission for the NPOESS-provided instruments, so 

the lifetime and data—excuse me. So the lifetime and data delivery 

requirements are not the same as for JPSS. 

However, the experience that NASA and Goddard have obtained 

working with the NPOESS program and its contractors on NPP 

have provided considerable knowledge of the critical systems required for JPSS. Therefore, the acquisition of JPSS, while a large 

task, is extremely well aligned with the existing capabilities and 

experience of Goddard. 

The JPSS program at Goddard will lead integration across all of 

the elements of JPSS to ensure delivery of the required data products for weather and climate. This activity includes spacecraft, 

ground systems, and instruments, including the critical Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer, Cross-Track Infrared Sounder, Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder, and Ozone Mapping and 

Profiling Suite of instruments. 

All three agencies remain committed to a partnership that preserves and enhances the nation’s weather and climate measure-
36

ment capabilities. The three agencies have established a joint team 

to transition the NPOESS contracts and activities to the responsible agencies with as little disruption as possible, and we expect 

to have contracts or contract modifications in place by early fiscal 

year 2011. 

NASA is working with NOAA to establish a high-caliber team of 

experienced personnel to implement JPSS. The team will be a combination of NASA and NOAA employees with significant experience 

in acquisition, spaceflight development, and earth remote sensing. 

For NASA in particular, the JPSS program team will be composed 

of personnel from NPP as well as members from the successful 

Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission-4, the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter, Solar Dynamics Orbiter, and the recently-launched 

GOES–N series of geostationary satellites and missions. 

Last, I would like to report that all of the instruments for NPP 

have been delivered for integration with the spacecraft, including 

the NPOESS-provided VIIRS and CrIS instruments. With now a 

full complement of instruments we are beginning testing with the 

ground system and anticipate a launch date of late 2011. 

In summary, NASA is committed to a successful JPSS program. 

NASA will build on its long relationship supporting NOAA, and our 

experience with operational and research earth observation satellites, to minimize data gaps and provide the nation with the critical operational observations—observation capability it needs. 

Once again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I appreciate the support of Congress and this committee and would be 

pleased to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Scolese follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER J. SCOLESE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity 

to appear today to share with the Subcommittee information regarding NASA’s role 

in and commitment to NAAA’s Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) Program. JPSS 

is crucial to the Nation’s ability to make important weather measurements and is 

critical to the Nation’s climate monitoring and climate research activities. As the 

Nation’s Civil Space Agency, NASA is fully prepared to support JPSS.

Background

On February 1, 2010, the Executive Office of the President (EOP) released the FY 

2011 budget request, which contained a major restructuring of the National Polarorbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) in order to put this 

critical program on a more sustainable pathway toward success. This satellite system is essential to meeting both civil and military weather forecasting and climatemonitoring requirements. 

The EOP recommended a restructured program with the agencies sharing common elements where that has proven successful in the past, and developing separate 

elements where conflicting perspectives and priorities made the tri-agency managed 

program unsuccessful. 

As you know, the Independent Review Team led by Tom Young made a number 

of recommendations to improve the viability of the NPOESS program. Specifically, 

Mr. Young recommended that the acquisition of the NPOESS system be done by an 

experienced spaceflight hardware acquisition center, such as the Department of Defense (DOD) Space and Missile Command or NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center 

(GSFC). NASA, and more specifically NASA’s GSFC, has over 40 years of experience 

developing large-scale operational space systems for NOAA. NASA GSFC has developed a series of Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites (GOES) and 

Polar Orbiting Environmental Satellites (POES) for weather forecasting and climate 

monitoring. GSFC also developed the Landsat series of satellites for the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). In addition, NASA has extensive experience developing 

Earth Science research missions, such as those that are part of NASA’s Earth Ob-
37

serving System (EOS). JPSS is very similar to EOS satellites, which GSFC developed and has been supporting for years. Hence, adding the acquisition of JPSS to 

the GSFC portfolio, while a large task, is extremely well aligned with GSFC’s existing capabilities and experience. 

GSFC will manage the acquisition and integration of the JPSS program elements 

and has the necessary depth and technical expertise to do the job. GSFC has developed many successful missions for NOAA with a demonstrated track record of success. The Program Manager and senior leadership team will be a combination of 

GSFC and NOAA employees with significant spaceflight and Earth remote sensing 

experience. The JPSS program at GSFC will develop the flight mission elements for 

the afternoon orbit which includes multiple spacecraft and the Visible-Infrared Imaging Radiometer (VIIRS), Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS), Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder (ATMS), and Ozone Mapping and Profiling Suite (OMPS) 

instruments. NASA will also develop the ground system for both the NOAA and 

DOD systems prior to handover to NOAA for operations. The JPSS program will 

also lead integration across all of the elements to ensure delivery of the data products.

Steps Taken to Date to Accomplish the Transition

All three agencies remain committed to a partnership that preserves and enhances the Nation’s weather and climate measurement capabilities. NASA is working closely with DOD and NOAA to allow for a smooth transition. NASA’s role in 

the restructured program will follow the model of the successful POES and GOES 

programs, where NOAA and NASA have a long and effective partnership. NASA 

program and project management practices have been refined over decades of experience developing and acquiring space systems and these practices will be applied 

to JPSS. NOAA and NASA will strive to ensure that weather and environmental 

monitoring requirements are met on the most rapid practicable schedule without reducing system capabilities or further increasing risk. 

The three agencies have established a joint team to transition the NPOESS contracts and activities to the responsible agencies with as little disruption as possible, 

and we expect to have contracts or contract modifications in place by early FY 2011. 

NASA is working with NOAA to establish a high caliber team of experienced personnel to implement JPSS. This team will be composed of personnel from the 

NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) mission, as well as members from the following 

successfully completed missions: Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission-4; Lunar 

Reconnaissance Orbiter; Solar Dynamics Orbiter; and the NOAA GOES-N-series 

(N–P) geostationary satellites. NOAA personnel from the NPOESS IPO will also fill 

key positions in the JPSS program. GSFC is also hiring additional staff to directly 

support JPSS or backfill others who assume that role. Staffing and supporting 

projects at GSFC is a continual process as missions are completed and new projects 

are initiated. As such, JPSS is in line with GSFC’s normal operating practices. All 

projects at GSFC are being supported appropriately, and none will be deleteriously 

impacted by JPSS. 

Current cost estimates provided for JPSS are consistent with similar missions developed by NASA. As NASA continues to negotiate contracts with the instrument, 

ground system, and spacecraft suppliers, the cost confidence will mature as the contracts are put in place. The program cost estimates will be produced at or close to 

the 80 percent confidence level.

NPP Instruments Are Complete/Some Risk Remains

The NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) was originally designed to provide continuity between the EOS Terra mission and the first NPOESS satellite in the morning orbit. The NPP mission was intended to provide risk reduction for the key sensors and the ground system prior to the first NPOESS launch and was not intended 

to be an operational asset. However, the delays in the delivery of the NPOESS system have required that NPP be shifted from the morning orbit to the afternoon orbit 

to minimize the potential for a data gap in the operational weather forecasting and 

environmental monitoring requirements. 

The concern about operational data gaps in weather forecasting drove the need 

for the Administration to establish the EOP task force on the restructuring of 

NPOESS. The concerns about availability of weather forecasting data in the afternoon orbit and for continuity of climate records are driving the launch of NPP as 

soon as practicable, and will drive the JPSS program to deliver JPSS–1 as soon as 

possible. 

The final instrument delivery for NPP occurred June 15, 2010, and the NPP 

spacecraft is on track for launch in 2011. The ground system development to sup-
38

port the NPP launch remains a major challenge, and NOAA and NASA are working 

to address this in time to support the NPP launch. 

Although the first flight models of these instruments will be flown on NPP, the 

remaining development of these sensors is not considered low risk. These are highly 

complex Earth remote sensing instruments that require a significant amount of 

oversight and careful testing to ensure success. NASA has a great deal of experience 

in developing these types of instruments on EOS, NOAA POES and GOES missions. 

NASA is adept at managing the risk and providing the needed oversight to successfully deliver these instruments. The lessons learned from the development, test, and 

flight of NPP will be incorporated into later flight models for the JPSS program.

Conclusion

NASA and NOAA are committed to a successful JPSS program. NASA will work 

closely with NOAA in establishing the path forward for JPSS and to identify the 

right leaders. In addition, we will work closely with DOD to ensure that the civil 

and defense programs take advantage of the respective skills of each agency and to 

ensure that the common elements of the program meet the needs for all three agencies. 

The existence of NPOESS (now JPSS) was assumed when the National Academy 

of Sciences (NAS) developed the priorities specified in the recent Earth Science 

Decadal Survey. NASA is ready to support JPSS as a partner with NOAA and as 

a part of fulfilling the scientific goals set forth by the NAS. Ensuring the success 

of JPSS is of the highest importance to NASA and the Agency has the requisite expertise and experience to take on this task. 

Once again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I appreciate the support of this Committee and the Congress for NASA’s programs and would be pleased 

to answer any questions.

BIOGRAPHY FOR CHRISTOPHER J. SCOLESE

Christopher Scolese is the Associate Administrator of the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration, and oversees the planning, directing, organization and 

control of the day-to-day Agency technical and programmatic operations. He has direct oversight of the Agency’s mission directorates, field centers, and technical mission support offices, and is responsible for integrating the technical and programmatic elements of the Agency. 

Scolese was formerly the NASA Chief Engineer. In that position he was responsible for the overall review and technical readiness of all NASA programs. NASA’s 

Office of the Chief Engineer assures that the development efforts and missions operations are being planned and conducted on a sound engineering basis with proper 

controls and management. 

Formerly, Scolese was the Deputy Director of the Goddard Space Flight Center 

where he assisted the Director, Dr. Edward Weiler, in overseeing all activities. He 

also served as the Deputy Associate Administrator in the Office of Space Science 

at NASA Headquarters. In this position, he was responsible for the management, 

direction and oversight of NASA’s space science flight program, mission studies, 

technology development and overall contract management of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 

Scolese also served as the EOS Program Manager and the Deputy Director of 

Flight Programs and Projects for Earth Science at the Goddard Space Flight Center. 

In this position he was responsible for the operation and development of all Earth 

Science missions assigned to the Goddard Space Flight Center. At Goddard, he also 

served as the EOS Terra Project Manager responsible for the development of all 

EOS–AM instruments, the CERES instrument for TRMM, the EOS–AM spacecraft, 

the interface with the Earth Science Data and Information System and the integration and launch of these elements. In addition, Scolese was the EOS Systems Manager responsible for the EOS system architecture and the integration of all facets 

of the project. During his tenure at Goddard, which began in 1987, he chaired the 

EOS Blue Team that re-scoped the EOS Program; he supported the EOS investigators in the development of the EOS payloads in the restructured EOS; and he has 

been responsible for the adoption of common data system architecture on EOS and 

some other earth orbiting spacecraft. 

Prior to his 1987 appointment at Goddard, Scolese’s experience included work in 

industry and government. While a senior analyst at the General Research Corporation of McLean, Va., he participated in several SDIO programs. He was selected by 

Admiral Hyman Rickover to serve at Naval Reactors where he was associated with 
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the development of instrumentation, instrument systems and multi-processor systems for the U.S. Navy and the DOE while working for NAVSEA. 

Scolese is the recipient of several honors including the Presidential Rank Award 

of Meritorious Executive, Goddard Outstanding Leadership, two NASA Outstanding 

Leadership Medals and the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 

(AIAA) National Capital Section Young Engineer/Scientist of the Year award. He 

was recognized as one of the outstanding young men in America in 1986, was a 

member of college honor societies including Eta Kappa Nu and Tau Beta Pi, and 

was recipient of the 1973 Calspan Aeronautics award. He is an Associate Fellow of 

the AIAA and a member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. He 

also served as a member of the AIAA Astrodynamics Technical Committee and 

chaired the National Capitol Section Guidance Navigation and Control Technical 

Committee.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. I believe we can get the opening 

testimony in. We will be called to vote during it, but we have 15 

minutes, which really turns out to be 25 minutes. So at least—so 

we can complete the testimony. Then I suspect we will break. You 

will be at ease, and we will return to ask for our questions. 

Mr. Klinger for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. GIL KLINGER, DIRECTOR, SPACE AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 

ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS, DEPARTMENT 

OF DEFENSE 

Mr. KLINGER. Mr. Chairman, Dr. Broun, members of the subcommittee, I am honored to appear before you today to discuss the 

Department of Defense’s role in assuring continuity of the nation’s 

environmental monitoring mission in light of the restructuring of 

National Polar Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System program. 

As the director of the Space and Intelligence Office for the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, I 

am pleased to join my colleagues here at the table today. 

I think our presence here today reflects our collective commitment to continue to work together to meet our nation’s weather 

needs and that is certainly the Defense Department’s position. 

The environmental monitoring mission serves a critical role in 

day-to-day weather forecasting and provides critical support for 

nearly all defense and national security users. So I share your concerns about preserving continuity of environmental data for all 

users. 

In this regard I am pleased to report that the Department of Defense, in close coordination with our interagency partners, has 

made considerable progress in executing the Administration’s direction to restructure NPOESS and to continue to pursue capabilities 

needed to meet the nation’s environmental monitoring needs. 

Since receiving the EOP direction the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has chaired three 

Defense Acquisition Board reviews to assess follow-on options and 

acquisition approaches to address DOD responsibilities under the 

restructure and ensure transition of former NPOESS elements to 

the appropriate acquisition agencies. 

At a minimum, the DOD program designated the Defense Weather Satellite System, or DWSS, will be available for launch in 2018, 

and will meet or exceed Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, 

or DMSP, legacy performance while ensuring mission continuity in 
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the early morning orbit. The DOD is deliberately studying available options to ensure that we strike the right balance of cost, performance, and technical risks while staying within current budgetary constraints. 

To meet the on-orbit timeline required, the DOD will leverage 

technology and previous investments in the NPOESS program. The 

DWSS and JPSS programs will share a common ground system 

based on that design for NPOESS. Under the restructure, ground 

system development is a NOAA/NASA responsibility. NOAA will 

operate DOD satellites on a reimbursable basis as it does today for 

the Defense Department with respect to DMSP. 

Additionally, the Visible Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite, or 

VIIRS, and Space Environmental Monitor-NPOESS, SEM–N, are 

prominent in our plans for use on the DWSS program. The Air 

Force is also developing an implementation plan addressing the 

most appropriate microwave sensor and satellite bus to meet DOD 

requirements and the attendant procurement strategy. 

Further, the procurement strategy will seek to maximize the government’s investment in NPOESS. It will focus on the best mix of 

costs, technical risks, and capability and, where applicable, support 

NOAA’s JPSS program. We plan to finalize our procurement strategy not later than August 10 of this year. 

Weather observation and forecasting is greatly improved over the 

last four decades due in large part to space-based environmental 

sensing. Global, high-resolution measurements of atmospheric temperature, density, and humidity populate mathematical models for 

weather prediction. Our warfighters need accurate, time-sensitive 

weather data as a key enabler for maneuver planning, weapons 

employment, and intelligence collection. DWSS will continue to provide critical global environmental information to effectively employ 

military capabilities and aid in the protection of national resources. 

Thank you for your time today, and I look forward to answering 

any questions that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Klinger follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GIL KLINGER

INTRODUCTION

I am honored to appear before you today to address this Committee. I am also 

pleased to be joined today by my colleagues from the Executive Office of the President, Ms. Shere Abbott, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA), Ms. Mary Glackin, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA), Mr. Chris Scolese. 

On February 1, 2010, the Executive Office of the President (EOP) directed the restructuring of the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program, assigning each agency responsibility for their highest priority orbit. Accordingly, the Department of Commerce (DOC) will populate the afternoon orbit through the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS); the Department of Defense (DOD) will populate the early morning orbit. We will rely on capabilities from 

our European partners for the mid-morning orbit, upon the conclusion of the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) operations in that orbit. 

For the morning orbit, DMSP continues to provide key terrestrial forecasting and 

space environmental sensing for defense and civil uses. DMSP Flight 17 was 

launched into the early morning orbit on November 2006 and continues to perform 

very well. There are two DMSP satellites remaining with Flight 19 and 20, and they 

are currently undergoing a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) to refurbish, replace, and test components that have exceeded their shelf life and upgrade components which are known life-limiters. Flight 19 is scheduled to launch in October 

2012 with Flight 20 serving as a back-up. 
41

Mission data requirements for environmental monitoring remain unchanged. Additionally, the agencies will continue to share data and work together where possible. The DOD, in cooperation with NOAA/NASA, is completing an analysis for fulfilling the morning orbit requirements, and the outcome will serve as the basis for 

the restructured program. While progressing on this effort, we have continued to 

work closely with the civil agency partners to ensure our plans will support and enable continuity of the JPSS afternoon orbit.

CURRENT STATUS

Since receiving EOP direction, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics (USD/AT&L) has chaired three Defense Acquisition Board 

(DAB) reviews to assess follow-on options and acquisition approaches to address 

DOD responsibilities under the restructure and ensure transition of former 

NPOESS elements to the appropriate acquisition agencies. At a minimum, the DOD 

program, designated the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS), will be available for launch in 2018, and meet or exceed DMSP legacy performance while ensuring mission continuity in the early morning orbit. The DOD is deliberately studying 

available options to ensure the DOD strikes the right balance of cost, performance, 

and technical risk while staying within current budgetary constraints (the PB 11 

DOD NPOESS budget). 

To meet the on-orbit timeline required, the DOD will leverage technology and previous investments in the NPOESS program. The DWSS and JPSS programs will 

share a common ground system based on that designed for NPOESS. Under the restructure, ground system development is a NOAA/NASA responsibility. NOAA will 

operate DOD satellites on a reimbursable basis, as it does today for the DMSP. Additionally, the Visible Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) and Space Environmental Monitor-NPOESS (SEM–N) are prominent in our plans for use on the 

DWSS program. The Air Force is also developing an implementation plan addressing the most appropriate microwave sensor and satellite bus to meet DOD requirements, and procurement strategy. Further, the procurement strategy will seek to 

maximize the Government’s investment in NPOESS; it will focus on the best mix 

of cost, technical risk, and capability, and where applicable, support NOAA’s JPSS 

program. DOD plans to finalize its procurement strategy not later than August 10, 

2010. 

The DWSS program office will be established under the Program Executive Officer/Space (PEO/SP) at the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC), Los Angeles 

Air Force Base. This location will afford the DOD the best opportunity to leverage 

our procurement expertise, resources and location to maximize success on this program. We have begun the process of staffing the program office with the requisite 

skills (program management, systems engineering, contracting, etc) to enable program execution. SMC is also working with NOAA/NASA management to transition 

key sensors from the NPOESS contract to support the JPSS in meeting its afternoon 

mission requirements. Our firm goal for completing the transition is the end of calendar year 2010.

GAO REPORTS

I would now like to address the recent GAO reports. Regarding GAO report 10–

456 ‘‘Environmental Satellites: Strategy Needed to Sustain Critical Climate and 

Space Weather Measurements’’, the GAO had no specific actions for the DOD. However, I want to ensure you that the DOD team will fully support OSTP efforts to 

consider Earth and Space Weather monitoring from an enterprise and systems-ofsystems standpoint. This support includes both full sharing of environmental monitoring data with our civil agency partners as well as exploration of opportunities to 

have this data supplied by commercial and foreign sources. We look forward to continued participation in OSTP-sponsored activities and initiatives to ensure we, the 

agencies, act to satisfy our collective needs in a reasonable and cost-effective manner, and that we coordinate our investments to the benefit of the users of this information and the taxpayers. 

Regarding draft GAO report 10–558 ‘‘Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: 

Agencies Must Act Quickly to Address Risks that Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate Data,’’ the DOD thanks the GAO for their informed and expert insights and recommendations. The draft GAO report states, ‘‘In order to ensure that 

the transition from [the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 

System (NPOESS)] to its successor programs is efficiently and effectively managed, 

we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce take the following 

four actions:’’ We concurred with the four recommendations, as follows:
42

RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the DOD National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 

System (NPOESS) follow-on program expedite decisions on the expected cost, 

schedule, and capabilities of their planned programs (p. 38/GAO Draft Report)

We concur. The DOD agrees that expedited decisions are necessary to ensure FY 

10 funds are applied where most needed. Decisions on the DOD early morning orbit 

program will be executed per established acquisition guidelines. USD(AT&L) issued 

Acquisition Decision Memorandums on March 17th, May 10th, and June 22nd 2010. 

The most recent ADM directs the Secretary of the Air Force to immediately begin 

acquisition efforts to support a 2018 launch for a DMSP successor program and to 

consider maximum use of the Government’s investment in NPOESS, and in a manner that offers maximum opportunities for collaboration with the NOAA JPSS program.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the DOD NPOESS follow-on program to develop plans to address key 

transition risks, including the loss of skilled staff, delays in contract negotiations 

and setting up a new program office, loss of support for the other agency’s requirements, and oversight of new program management. (p. 38/GAO Draft Report)

We also concur with this recommendation. The DOD is assessing numerous risks 

associated with the transition. We will ensure personnel for this effort have the requisite experience and skills (e.g. contracting, program management, systems engineering) to effectively manage the program. The DOD will continue to work with 

NOAA to ensure that common areas (such as the satellite control, data processing 

and dissemination capabilities) are arranged as necessary to support other agency 

needs.

RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the NPOESS program office to develop priorities for work stoppage to 

allow the activities that are most important to maintaining launch schedules to 

continue. (p. 38/GAO Draft Report)

We concur. On 17 March, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics signed the ‘‘Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM), National Polar-orbiting Operational Satellite System (NPOESS) Program Restructure.’’ 

In turn, the Acting Program Executive Officer for Environmental Satellites (PEO/

ES) provided ADM implementation guidance to the NPOESS System Program Director (SPD) on March 26, 2010. This guidance outlines priorities for work stoppage 

and provides transition guidance for those activities most important to maintaining 

launch schedules. Subsequently, the PEO and SPD have worked to refine the specifics of implementing the ADM. The June 22nd ADM extended the transition deadline to the end of calendar year 2010 and plans for a decision by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics not later than August 

10, 2010 on a) microwave sensing capability and performance, b) optimal bus configuration to host selected DOD payloads, c) recommended procurement strategy to 

provide capabilities, and where appropriate, support NOAA’s need in filling an afternoon orbit, d) rough-order-magnitude cost estimate, and e) necessary staffing and 

organization.

RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 

direct DOD officials to develop timeframes for making key decisions on—or accepting the risks related to—the timeliness of NPP’s data (p. 38/GAO Draft Report)

We concur and we have accepted the current limitations on the timeliness of NPP 

data. Further, we will continue to work with our agency partners to make sure all 

NPOESS follow-on data is made available in a timely a manner to support 

warfighter missions.

CONCLUSION

Weather observation and forecasting has greatly improved over the last four decades primarily due to space-based environmental sensing. Global, high resolution 

measurements of atmospheric temperature, density, and humidity populate 

mathematic models for weather prediction. Our warfighters need accurate, time-sensitive weather data as a key enabler for maneuver planning, weapons employment, 

and intelligence collection. DWSS will continue to provide critical global environmental information to effectively employ military capabilities and aid in the protection of national resources. Thank you for your time today.
43

BIOGRAPHY FOR GIL KLINGER

Mr. Gil Klinger is the Director of the Space and Intelligence Office for the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics where he is responsible for acquisition oversight of all space and intelligence programs executed by the 

Department of Defense. 

Immediately prior to assuming leadership of SIO, Mr. Klinger was the Assistant 

Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Architecture Engineering and Integration where he led intelligence community activities assessing the adequacy of the 

Intelligence Collection enterprise, identified shortfalls and solutions, managed teams 

focused on specific short- and long-term issues in response to Director of National 

Intelligence taskings, and provided domain and subject matter expertise to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence across a broad range of disciplines and 

collection areas. 

Immediately prior to his role as Assistant Deputy Director, Mr. Klinger was the 

Director of Space Policy, National Security Council Staff, where he was the lead 

member of the Executive Office of the President on all space issues and the principal author of five new national space polices, including the first new U.S. space 

exploration vision in more than a generation. 

His previous assignments included serving as Director of Policy, National Reconnaissance Office; Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (DUSD) for Space, and 

the position of Principal Assistant (DUSD/Space), within the Office of the Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, where he received the 

1997 Presidential Rank Meritorious Executive Award, one of the two highest awards 

given to civil servants within the U.S. government; Director, Space and Advanced 

Technology Strategy, also within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy; and Staff Assistant Deputy Director for Strategic Forces Policy, Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, where he was awarded the Distinguished Civilian Service Medal, the highest award given to civil servants within the Department of Defense. 

Mr. Klinger began his career in government service with his competitive selection 

to the Presidential Management Internship Program with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

Mr. Klinger graduated Phi Beta Kappa and summa cum laude from the State 

University of New York at Albany with an undergraduate degree in European History and Political Science. He received his master’s degree in Public Policy from the 

John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. 

Mr. Klinger has been a member of the Senior Executive Service since 1992 and 

a member of the Senior Intelligence Service since 1999.

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Klinger did not use all of his time. Outstanding. 

Mr. Powner for five minutes. 
44

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID A. POWNER, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT ISSUES, GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. POWNER. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, and 

members of the subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity to 

testify on the disbanding of the NPOESS program and our broader 

report on the need for long-term strategy for climate and space 

weather observations. 

First, NPOESS. When the taskforce led by the White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy decided in February of this 

year to disband the NPOESS program and go back to separate satellite acquisitions for NOAA and DOD, many viewed this as fixing 

the problem. As our report being released today points out, we are 

far from fixing the problem. 

First, both NOAA and DOD’s programs are not completely defined, nor are the detailed costs and launch schedules. Although, 

to their credit, last week both NOAA and DOD announced the key 

sensors they plan to pursue in their separate acquisitions. 

Transition risks are significant. These include loss of key staff, 

supporting the other agency’s requirements, and litigation costs. 

Near-term budgetary challenges are also a major issue as the agencies are continuing work on NPOESS while starting their new programs. 

In addition, they are slowing work because contractor termination liability payments and other litigation costs are still unknown. Because of this we are recommending that NOAA and DOD 

expedite decisions on the capabilities of the separate satellite acquisitions and the associated costs and launch schedules, and to effectively manage the transition risks. 

In addition to the major issues—in addition, the major issues 

that led to NPOESS’s failures are still relevant to the new programs, and neither NOAA, NASA, or DOD should lose sight of 

these. These include technical complexity. Specifically, the VIIRS 

instrument plan for the first JPSS satellite is high risk. Contractor 

and subcontractor oversight and performance should be a major 

focus area, as should rigorous program management. 

In addition, an executive-level oversight structure still needs to 

be defined for the new programs. Finally, the agencies can’t repeat 

the past poor interagency coordination that plagued NPOESS. 

NOAA and NASA will need to work together effectively on the new 

civilian satellite acquisition. 

Failing to effectively manage these transition risks in the separate satellite acquisitions could result in the combined programs 

costing more than NPOESS. In addition, further launch delays are 

likely to jeopardize the continuity of weather and climate data. Of 

particular concern is keeping the demonstration satellite known as 

NPP on schedule as it is to replace the final operational POES that 

is expected to reach the end of its lifespan at the end of 2012. All 

indications are that NPP will slip further than the nine months indicated in our report. 

Turning to the larger data continuity issue. In 2006, when the 

NPOESS program was restructured, several climate and space 

weather instruments were removed to save costs, knowing that 

these could be addressed later or on other satellites. This com-
45

plicated an already chaotic approach to our nation’s long-term environmental satellite observations. There is no overall strategy to ensure continuity of climate and space weather observations, despite 

the fact that for over a decade Federal agencies and the climate 

community at large have clamored for one. 

Interestingly a White House-sponsored interagency working 

group has worked on a short-term strategy and has even drafted 

a report that identifies and prioritizes these climate observations. 

This could form the basis for a long-term strategy that ensures our 

nation adequately monitors the Earth’s atmosphere, oceans, land, 

and space environments. As we heard this morning from Ms. Abbott, OSTP plans to work on this strategy. 

In summary, Mr. Chairman, NOAA and DOD need to define and 

effective manage their separate satellite acquisitions now that 

NPOESS has been disbanded. But in the near term the transition 

risks need to be effectively managed. Once the scope of the respected programs are agreed to, any additional gaps in environmental observations will need to be addressed in the strategic planning efforts currently being led by OSTP. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Powner follows:]
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID A. POWNER
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BIOGRAPHY FOR DAVID A. POWNER

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Powner. 

Mr. Broun is recognized for a unanimous consent request. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Chairman. I ask unanimous consent that 

Mr. Rohrabacher, who is a member of the full committee but not 

this subcommittee, be allowed to participate as if he is a member. 

Chairman MILLER. I will wait longer than I usually would for an 

objection to that. 

All right. Without objection, that is so granted. 

Mr. BROUN. Mr. Chairman, if I could yield for 30 seconds, I 

would like to thank Mr. Powner for y’all’s hard work, and I particularly want to thank you for your yearly reports and all that you 

have done for this committee. Without your hard work and participation it would be very difficult for us to do our job. So thank you 

very much. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MILLER. All right. We now need to go vote. You all are 

at ease. We will be back. 

[Recess.] 
65

Chairman MILLER. I will recognize myself now for five minutes 

of questions. 

I know this isn’t fair, and it is a lot more complicated than this, 

that DOD had different needs from NOAA, but the solution of having NOAA have one satellite with the afternoon orbit and DOD 

having its own satellite for the morning orbit felt a little like a kindergarten teacher sending one child to—two children to different 

corners because they can’t stop arguing. 

And we do need you all to get along. The DOD needs to get data 

from NOAA, NOAA needs to get the data from DOD, and we need 

to make sure that you all play nice in the future. 

Mr. Klinger, what plans does DOD have to work with NOAA to 

make sure they get the data that they need and to make sure that 

you get the data from NOAA that they have that you need? 

Mr. KLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I think it’s not just the plans that 

we have. We actually have ongoing interaction right now with both 

NOAA and NASA. Start with one point. We are going to continue 

the relationship we have had that I mentioned in my opening 

statement with respect to ground operations. The ground system 

and the on-orbit operations, the Defense Department will be dependent, just as it has been, on NOAA for the ground system and 

for the operations, day-to-day operations as we are with our current generation, the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program. 

But, looking forward, one of the reasons we are moving very deliberately within the Defense Department is to ensure that we do 

not take an action unilaterally that inadvertently places any of 

NOAA or NASA’s equities, and specifically the NPP program, in a 

disadvantaged position. So everything that we are doing with respect to the Defense Weather Satellite System is measured and assessed not just through the lenses that we would normally use on 

a DOD-only satellite system, which would be defense and/or intelligence equities—but, in fact, we thoroughly ensure first within the 

Department that we are not going to do something that has — disadvantages one of our civil partners, whether that’s in terms of 

thinking through what we want to do in the morning orbit—but absolutely with respect to what changes we end up making, if any, 

to the existing contract. 

So, we—and NOAA and NASA, in my view—are inextricably tied 

together in terms of how we move forward, though—as you pointed 

out—there will be separate spacecraft programs provisioning the 

morning and afternoon orbits. 

Chairman MILLER. Okay. Ms. Glackin, how about NOAA’s plans 

to play nice? 

Ms. GLACKIN. We are very comfortable with the arrangement we 

are moving into. We have literally, again, decades worth of history 

in cooperating with the Department of Defense and sharing meteorological data. We work closely with the Air Force. I personally established a working relationship with General Sheridan, who is the 

director of satellite and missile command out in California that will 

have oversight of Defense Weather Satellite System, and we have 

been talking back and forth, as has Mary Kicza, my director of our 

satellite line office. 

So I think that we have this experience doing this, we have a lot 

of commonality among our users for sharing of data there. We work 
66

closely through the Office of Federal Coordinator for Meteorology 

as a central focus for coordinating requirements and things like 

this. 

So I am quite comfortable moving forward. 

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Abbott, does OSTP plan to play a continuing role in assuring the necessary cooperation, information 

sharing, et cetera, between DOD and NOAA? 

Ms. ABBOTT. Yes, we do, because it is of great interest to Dr. 

Holdren and myself to see this decision through to an end point. 

And I would add that, all along, from the beginning of the 

taskforce’s operations until reaching a decision, the communication 

and coordination across the agencies has been extraordinarily good. 

We’ve had a lot of difficult moments in which we have had to deal 

with some issues that were hard to decide, but in fact, the cooperation has been quite good, and we have been able to negotiate 

through a lot of challenging moments. And I think, at the end of 

the day, we’ve got a program going forward that is consistent with 

the visions of the agencies and their particular programs, and it 

makes some sense for the nation. 

Chairman MILLER. My time has expired. I now recognize myself 

for a second round of questions. 

Mr. Powner, you—in your testimony in the GAO reports you said 

that there are still challenges and uncertainties in a polar satellite 

program. What is your take on the importance of agency cooperation and what must be done to address any issues there effectively? 

Mr. POWNER. Well, just to reiterate, touching base on some of the 

points that were made, I agree with Ms. Glackin that there is decades of experience, but if you look at the NPOESS program, that 

was not a model for interagency coordination. So it’s great that we 

are—Mr. Klinger is making comments that we are going to work 

together. I think the key thing moving forward is, if you look at 

the first satellites that are planned, the NOAA satellite, JPSS, is 

almost identical to NPP. I mean, that is the plan, and when you 

look at the initial plan for DOD, you clearly see their requirements 

when you look at the microwave sensing capabilities, the SEM instrument that Mr. Klinger mentioned. 

I think it will be very important as they go forward with the four 

satellites that there’s a sharing of the sensors that will be included 

so that the different agencies’ requirements are considered. That 

was clearly one of the transition risks that we mentioned in our report, that taking into consideration the other agencies’ requirements is still vital moving forward. 

Chairman MILLER. Okay. Mr. Powner, you testified that we still 

do not have a comprehensive plan, strategy for climate observation. 

What is—who is your—who is it that you think should be in charge 

of developing that comprehensive policy, that comprehensive plan? 

How should we go forward and make sure that we correct that deficiency? 

Mr. POWNER. Well, I think there’s been some initial steps 

through the Office of Science and Technology Policy. There is an 

interagency working group, and they’ve put together some initial 

plans that lay out the climate observations that we need to ensure 

that there is continuity. I think there is 17 key observations that 

they are focused on, and the key going forward is that OSTP con-
67

tinues to exercise that leadership role so that we have the appropriate interagency coordination for continuity of all those key climate observations. 

Chairman MILLER. Okay. Ms. Abbott, you, of course, heard the 

testimony earlier and know the GAO’s view on this. What role does 

OSTP plan to play in making sure there is a comprehensive plan 

for climate observation? 

Ms. ABBOTT. So, as I said in my testimony, what—now that the 

NPOESS decision is behind us, we actually are going to focus attention on the follow-on to that U.S. Group on Earth Observations 

report, and to try to turn some of those considerations of the 17 priority areas into real priorities, aligned with budgets, aligned with 

agency cooperation and coordination and developing a strategy 

from that. 

Chairman MILLER. We will take just a two-minute recess. I think 

there are members who are planning to come back—or there were, 

and I think we are going to—we need to check on their status. If 

not, we will be done, but we will be in recess for a couple minutes. 

And you all can talk among yourselves. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman MILLER. I understand Mr. Bilbray is on his way, but 

I will now recognize myself for a third round of questions until he 

gets here. 

And these are questions, I think, that Mrs. Dahlkemper had intended to pursue had the hearing today not been disrupted. 

Undoubtedly the reason that there are so many well-behaved 

people in the room today is that there are still a lot of unresolved 

questions about contractors, and certainly Northrop Grumman has 

been waiting with bated breath for the resolution of some of these 

issues and perhaps others as well. 

GAO has criticized the program as not having made the transition decisions necessary. What is now—what role do you see for 

Northrop Grumman in the now two new programs, now two programs, and what can be done to expedite any decisions made with 

respect to Grumman? 

Ms. Glackin. 

Ms. GLACKIN. Well, I think that what I would comment on is 

NOAA and Department of Defense, I believe, are both very interested in leveraging the expertise and experience and investments 

that the government has with Northrop Grumman; however, we 

have made no final decisions in going forward at this point. 

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Klinger. 

Mr. KLINGER. I would echo what Ms. Glackin said. As I mentioned in my opening statement one of the things that is a priority 

to us within the Department and also to our civil—our agency 

counterparts and partners is to maximize the degree to which we 

can take advantage of the investment that we made in NPOESS, 

and that at the first order includes the expertise that Northrop 

Grumman as the prime has gained. 

In general at the moment I would just offer the following that 

the contract right now is under the purview of the Air Force and 

its contracting officer. We’re still working through what the specific 

changes that will attend the restructuring will have and that may 

or may not require some renegotiation and changes to the contract. 
68

I don’t think, as a result, it is appropriate for me, nor are we really 

ready at this point to provide those details. 

There is no question that, as the Air Force sorts through that in 

the run-up to the deadline of August 10, the Air Force will prepare 

and update the acquisition strategy, including the specific contract 

issues, and those will be submitted through our office to the Under 

Secretary, Dr. Carter, and then that will become clear. 

Chairman MILLER. Okay. Mr. Powner, any observations on the 

need to—or how to expedite issues with contractors? To resolve 

those. 

Mr. POWNER. Well, clearly, I think a key decision moving forward 

will be the size of the bus and the, you know, clearly with JPSS–

1 they decided to go with an NPP-like bus, but the size of the bus 

will drive decisions. That will be a key driver going forward in 

terms of the amount of contract leverage Ms. Glackin mentioned. 

Chairman MILLER. Okay. Despite the fact I have two minutes 

left on my questioning, I will now yield back to myself the balance 

of my time and now recognize Mr. Bilbray for five minutes. 

Mr. BILBRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me sort of follow up and ask for sort of a clarification on 

something that is near and dear to a lot of us that spend a lot of 

time out in the water. You know, thousands of Americans both in 

the military and civilian depend on the EPIRB locating devices, the 

Emergency Satellite Communication Systems. And there is an assumption out there that if a mariner, if an aircraft goes down and 

that EPIRB goes off, that the authorities will be there in a very 

short period. We will know you are in trouble, know where you are, 

or whatever. 

What has happened with the search and rescue satellite-aided 

tracking system, and what is going to be the impact to the consumer on this? 

Ms. GLACKIN. I would be happy to take that one. I certainly 

agree with you, sir. Search and rescue capabilities that our satellites provide are really a tremendous benefit to society and in 

particular to mariners and aviators. 

This type of instrument we have flown or some period of time. 

It turns out to be a highly reliable instrument, and for the most 

part lasts long after the life of other instruments on a spacecraft. 

So today, for example, in the afternoon orbit we have three of these 

that are currently running and operational. 

With our decision to go with an NPP-like clone for the JPSS–1, 

that particular instrument won’t fit on that bus. However, we are 

still searching, and we will be looking at whether we, in fact, need 

to fly it because of the redundancy up there and on what platform 

we will fly that in that timeframe. 

So that remains an open question now, but you should not doubt 

our commitment to ensuring the continuity of that capability. 

Mr. BILBRAY. Well, you know, I really worry about seeing that 

get bumped on this technology because, you know, we have got an 

F–18 go down, the system is being depended on for pilots, we require it on American Flag votes, we really encourage civilian mariners to carry this, and this assumption that somehow the United 

States will keep this umbrella protection, I have the experience 

just last year of losing, being dismasted off of Nicaragua with my 
69

family. There was the assumption there that if we really, really 

needed something, we could flip that switch and within a matter 

of hours people would know where we were and we were in trouble. 

My biggest concern is what is the lag time now and should we 

be telling our consumers now that, look, maybe you want to go to 

the spot system, maybe you want to invest in a private alternative 

because the Federal Government’s facility is not going to have the 

coverage or the capability that we said it was going to have within 

the next couple of years. 

Ms. GLACKIN. Congressman Bilbray, I would like to assure you 

we will have that capability there. We are committed to providing 

that, it was part of the JPSS suite, so as we make decisions going 

forward on exactly what—how we will fly that instrument, we will 

certainly keep this committee and you informed about that. 

Mr. BILBRAY. Now, by the—without the polar sensors which are 

really the locators, I mean, our stationaries can tell us that somebody is in trouble, but trying to figure out where they are precisely 

is absolutely essential on this. How do we make that assurance if 

we are not going to have that as part of our polar system? 

Ms. GLACKIN. It will be included in the JPSS system. It is just 

not going to fly on the first bus that we have announced. So we 

have more decisions to make, and we will be making them in the 

months ahead about how to fly the one climate instrument that 

isn’t flying called TSIS, the Total Solar Irradiance, as well as 

search and rescue, and there is a third set of instruments known 

as user services, data collection capability. 

So all three of those announcements are yet to come. 

Mr. BILBRAY. That is based on the assumption that there is a 

budget for this? 

Ms. GLACKIN. That is correct, and there is. The President’s fiscal 

year ’11 budget includes all of the resources for that. 

Mr. BILBRAY. Do we have—that is a proposed budget? 

Ms. GLACKIN. It is a proposed budget. Yes. 

Mr. BILBRAY. So, you know, we are still in this thing, and I hope 

that we all remember we are still operating with a proposed budget 

from the Executive Branch, so all of this is still up in the air. 

Ms. GLACKIN. Absolutely. 

Mr. BILBRAY. And so we have got to make sure we condition that 

if we can get this thing approved, if we can go down there, you are 

showing us. 

Let me go back to this total solar, you know, sensor issue. It almost appears to somebody who would be a skeptic that why would 

the Federal Government be backing off on this sensor when we are 

talking about the potential climate change, whatever, because I 

think we all agree the greatest skepticism is coming from those 

who are saying that the impact of the solar flares and the solar impact on the temperatures is grossly underestimated by models or 

operating off that. 

To retreat from having those sensors would almost leave some of 

my colleagues, including my surfing buddy to the right here, to 

claim that there might be some cynical or conspiracy to make sure 

those—that data is not collected because it may show that the modeling have grossly underestimated the effect of solar radiation. 

What would you say to my colleague about that kind of perception? 
70

Ms. GLACKIN. I would like to assure you and the committee that 

we have not backed off from flying the sensor. We will fly the sensor in this timeframe. The announcement that we made to fly an 

NPP-like bus, which is a smaller bus, is driven by our need to 

avoid a gap in this afternoon orbit. It represents the lowest technical and schedule solution for us. 

So we are still working on our exact plans for flying these three 

sensors that do not fit on that bus, but you should not doubt our 

commitment to ensuring those will be flown. 

Mr. BILBRAY. Now, look. I am going to be very frank with you. 

The American people watch what is going on in Washington and 

what is going on with the Federal Government. There are a lot of 

people making a lot for promises that affect average Americans’ 

personal lives; their health, their lifestyle, their prosperity, and a 

lot people in this city are telling the American people trust us. We 

can get this done. Trust us. We can do the job properly. 

When we see, when the American people see the handling of this 

proposal where you have got, you know, multiple jurisdictions and 

what looks like an absolute shamble of a strategy and implementation, I mean, you understand why people really do get concerned 

when Washington extends its footprint, say we are going to manage personal lives of people better, and don’t worry about it, and 

they sit there and say, look, you know. You have got groups like 

the Federal Government who for a decade has been trying to do 

electronic medical records and are no closer now than they were 

ten years ago. Or the fact that we are talking about our satellites, 

and look what you guys did with that. You expect me to trust you 

with my family’s future? 

How do we tell the American people that, look, we can learn from 

our mistakes, and we can move forward? How can we say that—

don’t use this as an example of how the Federal Government 

screws up. What can I tell my constituents out of this experience? 

Ms. GLACKIN. Yeah. I think the restructure of the NPOESS program does three things for us. One is it really clarifies the acquisition responsibilities. Number two, it allowed us to propose a budget 

to the Congress that we think is adequate to cover what is here, 

and the third is it allows us to align with a proven acquisition center that can bring the government expertise to bear for the oversight of this. 

As part of that last part of it, I would like to highlight to this 

committee that NOAA and NASA will use independent review 

teams, so over and above what GAO might do on this program, we 

will use independent review teams to review our plans, assess our 

progress. We have been doing that with the GOES–R program, we 

will be doing that with the JPSS as we move forward. 

So we are not just allowing it to ourselves and our own oversight, 

but we are seeking independent review as well. 

Mr. BILBRAY. Thank you. 

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would like to thank my colleague for asking 

the questions in my name, of course. First of all, Mr. Chairman, 

thank you very much for holding this very significant hearing, and 
71

I think the witnesses have given us a lot to think about, and I appreciate the high caliber of witnesses that we have. 

I notice it said that we have gone from—NPOESS has gone from 

$7 billion in 2002, to $15 billion. Think what could we have done 

with all of that extra money that Brian was talking about, and I 

guess we could have given it to Goldman Sachs coalitions and 

things like that. 

So there has been a lot of money wasted here in Washington, 

DC. A lot of money over the last couple years, and I would hope 

that this was—let me put it this way. This was a try. They were 

trying to accomplish something, and they did not succeed in accomplishing what they set out to do. And I think that is less of a waste 

than some of the money that we spent in the last 18 months in the 

name of stimulus that has gone into the pockets of wheeler dealers 

on Wall Street, et cetera, et cetera. 

But back to this. Of—when we are talking about why this failed 

or how we couldn’t reach the goal that we had in mind, one of those 

things—is one of those goals the technology we needed to make the 

climate determinations? There is a difference between climate and 

weather, and the technology for this project between determining 

what weather is going to be and the whole idea of climate research, 

was the technology needed for this climate research, which I consider to be a very, very questionable, goal in the first place, was 

that part of the failure that we have here? 

Mr. SCOLESE. No, sir. I don’t think it was because there is a mission flying today that we launched several years ago called Aqua

that is flying sensors that are—that were, if you will, the predecessors of the sensors that were selected for NPOESS, and they are 

doing climate and weather measurements, although it is a research 

mission, so it is not tied into the operational stream. 

So the technology and the—for accomplishing what NPOESS was 

going to do has been demonstrated. It is flying. One of those centers has been flying for over ten years now. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But it was—so we—it would not be accurate 

to say that climate change, which some of us believe is not manmade and thus we believe frankly it is a phony issue, but that commitment to studying that and the technology needed to do that 

study was not part of the reason why we went from 7 to 15 billion 

and have not been able to accomplish the mission? 

Mr. SCOLESE. I would not say that the technology was. No. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Does anyone else have a comment on 

that? Okay. 

And what—how much was this? Okay. So what do we say is the 

cause that—of this debacle? Do we say it was—was there, in fact, 

technology that we couldn’t develop? Did we have a problem with 

procurement problems here? Was it the launch systems that we 

know there was some problem here with which launch systems 

were going to be able to do this. Or is this just a lack of—in the 

beginning it sounds like we just—we had too much confidence that 

various bureaucracies could work together. 

So what was the main driver of this debacle? 

Ms. GLACKIN. I will take a cut at that and invite my colleagues 

to chime in here, but I think as this Committee heard last year 
72

when they did a hearing on this and heard from Tom Young, the 

independent review team chair, he highlighted several things. 

One is the overall management structure and the—because of 

the agencies’ missions, responsibilities, their postures and all, the 

difficulty in being able to provide adequate oversight. He also highlighted to this committee that we were developing this satellite system in a way that neither NOAA, NASA, or DOD would develop 

one on their own, and that, in fact, meant that we weren’t using 

a proven government acquisition center. So we weren’t availing 

ourselves of talent that we had within the Federal Government to 

provide——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But the bureaucracy wasn’t right. I mean, it 

wasn’t because it hadn’t done this type of thing before, and it 

wasn’t—but it wasn’t the technology. 

But we have—didn’t I hear Mr. Powner suggest that we are 

still—there is still some technological risk at play right now? 

Mr. POWNER. Yeah. Mr. Rohrabacher, there is one sensor—that 

is, VIIRS—which has caused some problems with some of the overruns that you mentioned and with JPSS–1, the first NOAA satellite. That’s still not out of the woods. 

But I would directly answer your question and say that every 

level was at fault with NPOESS. There was issues with executive 

level oversight, with the tri-agency overseeing it. There were issues 

with program management, managing the program, and there were 

issues with contractor and subcontractor oversight and performance. 

So there was—almost every layer you look at there were issues 

when you looked back over the years with what went wrong. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We wish all of you success in trying to put this back together again so that that $15 billion that has been invested by the taxpayers aren’t just—doesn’t just go to waste. So if 

we can—so thank you very much for focusing on this and being 

very frank with us today, and we will be following this project and 

hopefully get it done so that we can get—we can salvage something 

out of this effort that is of value to the American people. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MILLER. I understand Mrs. Dahlkemper is on her way, 

but—no, she is not. Okay. My new information, she will not be 

here. 

I now recognize myself for one more round of questions. 

Mr. Powner, you mentioned the VIIRS sensor as being the one 

that was most difficult. Is that for climate research, or is that for 

weather forecasting? 

Mr. POWNER. I think when you look at VIIRS, it is probably a 

combination of a number of things, and clearly VIIRS is on NPP, 

the demonstration satellite that is going up, but it is also being 

built for the first NOAA satellite, and in our report being released 

today, we do mention that that satellite right now is viewed as 

high risk for that first NOAA satellite. 

Chairman MILLER. Ms. Glackin, what will be the effect of a continuing resolution on funding for the 2011 budget year, and will 

that affect a launch date for the two new programs? 

Ms. GLACKIN. The President’s fiscal year 2011 budget is critical 

for us being able to move forward with the JPSS program. So in 
73

the event of a continuing resolution I believe we would work 

through the Administration with Congress to see what our options 

are, to be able to move forward here. We are quite sensitive to the 

fact that this is proposed as a new program in the 2011 budget, 

and Congress hasn’t made a determination on that yet. So we have 

been working with both this committee and our appropriations 

staffs as well in that regard. 

Chairman MILLER. Okay. Mr. Klinger, same questions. 

Mr. KLINGER. I would just echo what Ms. Glackin said, which is 

that it is imperative that we get those funds to begin the DWSS 

program so we will be doing essentially mirroring what NOAA does 

in the event of a continuing resolution, which is to work through 

the Administration and secure the release and funds that are appropriate. 

Chairman MILLER. I like the two of you agreeing with each 

other. That is—all right. 

Ms. Abbott, do we have a comprehensive catalog of our existing 

assets for earth observations, and do you have an understanding of 

the set of observations that need still be obtained? 

Ms. ABBOTT. The USGEO report that I mentioned before that 

Mr. Powner spoke of in their report noted is the first step in developing such a catalog. The agencies got together and identified the 

seven—through looking through the lens of environmental policy 

requirements, what are the major observations that are needed to 

address those policy issues? 

And so we have what is close to a catalog of needs. What we 

don’t have is the articulation of that catalog against a set of priorities and budgets. And that is the next step. 

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Scolese, I understand that the new JPSS 

program will be run out of the Goddard Space Flight Center. How 

many positions, both NASA and contractor staff, do you expect to 

manage this acquisition, this new program, and how will those 

staffing levels compare to the NPOESS integrated program office, 

which was projected to have about 170 staff? 

Mr. SCOLESE. Well, let me take it backwards if you might. One 

of the reasons that Tom Young suggested that the program be put 

at an acquisition center isn’t because of the number of people that 

are on the project but because of the number of people that can 

support the project. At Goddard or at the Air Force’s SMC, we are 

procuring or building lots of satellites and lots of sensors and all 

of that technical capability with our engineering directorates and 

safety and mission assurance directorates and science organizations (in the case of Goddard) come to bear, to help that organization go off and achieve its goals. By having the ability to look 

across many projects that are—some ahead of where you are at, 

some behind where you are at, some using the same contractors—

you can identify issues that an individual project that is isolated—

as the IPO was—wouldn’t see. 

So the fact that it is at the Goddard Space Flight Center is probably the most critical element of the program because you bring all 

those resources to bear, to help the project succeed. 

As far as the size of the project, it would be about the size of the 

IPO, about 100 or so, civil servants and contractors working it, and 

the staffing is going to come from very experienced people as I 
74

mentioned in my opening statement. We are bringing some of the 

best people from our projects. The lead of it will be the very successful leader of the Hubble servicing missions. We are bringing in 

as their deputy the person who did the Solar Dynamics Observatory, who has built a number of satellites, and we will be bringing 

in people of that caliber—or have already brought people of that 

caliber—from NASA and NOAA and the IPO in to go off and manage this program and oversee it. 

Chairman MILLER. I now recognize Dr. Broun for five minutes of 

questions. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think Mr. Bilbray had 

a question. Is that correct? I would yield to him. Mr. Bilbray. 

Mr. BILBRAY. With the Chairman’s permission. 

Question about the sensors. Are we including maintaining capability to be able to detect ozone and suspended particulates? 

Ms. GLACKIN. Yes, we are. We have the OMPS sensor, both the 

Nadir and the Limb, as part of JPSS–1. 

Mr. BILBRAY. Okay. Mr. Chairman, just for the record, I know 

people on this Committee have chuckled about the whole concept, 

but I think that we really got to understand how important this aspect is of the suspended particulates and its affects and the ozone 

issue, because there have been legitimate concerns raised about 

people considering is global warming a factor we need to consider 

or not, and the argument has gone back and forth. 

But just to articulate how important this could be, if global 

warming is a significant issue as some have said, we have to totally 

reverse our policies on implementation of climate change legislation 

because rather than looking at things like coal, which should be 

the first operations, I know that makes—first operation shut down. 

There may be a whole argument to reverse that decision and have 

it as the last CO emissions shut down because there may be major 

short-term benefits there that helps, would help to mitigate. 

I just want to make sure the good science on this is out there, 

and this sensing could be a critical component. I just hope we keep 

our minds open as we develop these strategies. My biggest concern 

I seen as too many people are making assumptions based on 1970, 

concepts when there is a whole lot of new data and technology out 

there, and this data may be critical at getting those of us in Washington to rethink our entire implementation strategy and actually 

reversing our implementation strategies based on new data. 

So I am glad to hear that. I think it is critical. It will at least 

answer some questions and make sure, reassure us that our assumptions may be, may continue to be followed up rather than 

have them be reversed, and I will yield back to the gentleman. 

Mr. BROUN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Chairman, I have got some written questions that I will submit for written responses if I could get you all to do that, and so 

I will just ask one question orally today, and it is of Ms. Abbott. 

OSTP has stated that this is a restructuring and not a cancellation. How do you believe this affects the Nunn-McCurdy law which 

says that 15 percent over budget Congress has to be notified, 25 

percent it has to be reauthorized. So how do you think this affects 

the Nunn-McCurdy law? 
75

Ms. ABBOTT. I am not an expert on the Nunn-McCurdy law, but 

I think that the restructuring that we have proposed is not over 

those limits, and I think that the—as we move forward with the 

DOD portion of this program we’ll have a better sense of how—

what the costs are going forward. 

Mr. BROUN. If it does go over, is Congress going to be informed 

about this——

Ms. ABBOTT. Yes. 

Mr. BROUN. —and will you divide the programs or what is your 

plan regarding that? 

Mr. KLINGER. Dr. Broun, if I may, since Nunn-McCurdy is focused mainly on DOD acquisition, perhaps I can elaborate a little 

bit on this. 

Mr. BROUN. Mr. Klinger. 

Mr. KLINGER. Yes. Yes, sir. From our calculus right now, the restructuring does not constitute a breach under the Nunn-McCurdy 

statute, nor would, although our estimates are not final with respect to the funding profile associated with the Defense Weather 

Satellite System, we are working within the funds that we had previously planned to use for our share of NPOESS. So we believe that 

the DWSS as it moves forward would not cross any of the NunnMcCurdy breach thresholds. But if for some reason there were a 

breach, by definition we would do the necessary reporting and subsequent work for recertification. 

Mr. BROUN. Does this mark a rebaseline? 

Mr. KLINGER. There will be a new acquisition strategy for the 

DWSS, and there will be a new acquisition program baseline that 

the Air Force will bring forward to OSD as we—as part of the definition of the new program. Or of the restructured DWSS. 

Mr. BROUN. I look forward to hearing back from you guys what 

is going to go on with that, too. 

Mr. KLINGER. Yes, sir. We will be happy to do that. 

Mr. BROUN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Broun. That ends the questioning of the hearing. Dr. Broun has already said that he has 

questions he will submit in writing. I may as well. Other members 

may. 

Before we bring this hearing to a close, I want to thank our witnesses for testifying before our subcommittee today. Under the 

rules of the committee, the record will remain open for two weeks 

for additional statements from members and for answers to any follow-up questions the subcommittee may have for the witnesses. 

The witnesses are excused, and the hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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