J-S49039-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

MANUEL MARTINEZ

Appellant No. 122 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered February 15, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County

Criminal Division at No: CP-48-CR-0002021-2012

BEFORE: OLSON, OTT, and STABILE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 14, 2014

Manuel Martinez (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed on February 15, 2013 in the Court of Common Pleas of 

Northampton County. Upon review, we affirm. 

Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of robbery, simple 

assault, theft by unlawful taking and recklessly endangering another 

person,1for robbing taxicab driver Angelo Villamil at gunpoint on April 8, 

2012. Mr. Villamil’s girlfriend, April Nieves, was with him in the cab at the 

time of the robbery. Both she and Mr. Villamil testified for the prosecution 

at trial. 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii) and (iv), 2701(a)(3), 3921 and 2705.
J-S49039-14

- 2 -

Appellant received an aggregate sentence of six years and five months 

to twenty years in state prison. He filed post-trial motions on February 25, 

2013, which the trial court denied by order entered on December 3, 2013. 

This timely appeal followed.

In his statement of errors complained of on appeal filed pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), Appellant raised three issues:

1. [Appellant] believes, and therefore avers, that the Trial Court 

erred in denying [Appellant’s] counsel the opportunity to 

introduce Ms. Nieves’ admitted criminal conduct to the jury;

2. [Appellant] believes, and therefore avers, that the verdict as 

to all charges is against the weight of the evidence; [and]

3. [Appellant] believes, and therefore avers, that the evidence 

produced at Trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction on all 

charges.

Appellant’s Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, 1/24/14, at ¶ 9. 

In presenting the Statement of Questions Involved in his brief, 

Appellant does not repeat his Rule 1925(b) issues but instead sets forth the 

following sole issue: “Whether [the] Trial Court committed reversible error 

requiring an arrest of judgment and/or the granting of a new trial?” 

Appellant’s Brief at 1.2

____________________________________________

2 We remind Appellant’s counsel that Pa.R.A.P. 2116 (Statement of 

Questions Involved) directs, inter alia:

a) General rule. The statement of the questions involved must 

state concisely the issues to be resolved, expressed in the 

terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S49039-14

- 3 -

Appellant alleges trial court erred by denying him the opportunity to 

introduce certain conduct of Ms. Nieves to the jury. As the trial court 

explained: 

Ms. Nieves testified at Trial that she was with Mr. Villamil when 

Appellant robbed them at gunpoint. Ms. Nieves further testified 

that she knew it was Appellant who robbed them because she 

was familiar with him from the neighborhood. Ms. Nieves 

testified she called Appellant’s girlfriend in an attempt to get the 

money back but that Appellant called Ms. Nieves and told her he 

was not returning anything. Ms. Nieves further testified that she 

was intimidated by both Appellant and his girlfriend at the 

preliminary hearing and that is why she testified that she was on 

heroin at the time of the robbery and did not remember 

anything. However, at Trial, Ms. Nieves emphatically testified 

that Appellant was the person who robbed them.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

detail. The statement will be deemed to include every 

subsidiary question fairly comprised therein. No question will 

be considered unless it is stated in the statement of 

questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby. 

The issue as presented in Appellant’s brief is overly broad and does not shed 

any light on the issue to be resolved. As such, it fails to comply with Rule 

2116. “Generally, questions not presented in the ‘Statement of Questions 

Involved’ are deemed waived.” Bailey v. Storlazzi, 729 A.2d 1206, 1210 

(Pa. Super. 1999) (citation omitted). However, because the wording of 

Issue 1 in Appellant’s 1925(b) statement embodies the argument presented 

in his brief, we are willing to overlook this shortcoming, finding that 

Appellant’s violation of Rule 2116, while egregious, does not impede our 

ability to address the merits of the issue relating to the trial court’s 

evidentiary ruling. 

Although we are willing to consider Appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s 

ruling, we note that Appellant’s brief does not address the weight and 

sufficiency of evidence challenges asserted in Issues 2 and 3 of his 1925(b) 

statement. Because Appellant has abandoned those issues, we shall not 

address them further.
J-S49039-14

- 4 -

There was further evidence presented at Trial that Appellant was 

the person who robbed the victims, Angelo Villamil and April 

Nieves. Mr. Villamil also emphatically testified Appellant robbed 

him at gunpoint by tapping on his taxi-cab window, putting a 

gun to this face and saying “give me the money.” Mr. Villamil’s 

testimony corroborated Ms. Nieves’ testimony regarding the 

events that transpired at the time they were robbed and in the 

moments following the robbery. Mr. Villamil also testified that 

he felt threatened at the preliminary hearing and that is why he 

testified at that time that he could not identify the Appellant as 

the person who robbed him. 

Throughout the Trial the victims testified they lied at the 

preliminary hearing because they felt threatened or intimidated 

by the Appellant. Both witnesses testified they were positive it 

was Appellant who robbed them, and that they gave the same 

statement to the police the morning of the robbery. Moreover, 

the responding officer’s testimony corroborated the testimony of 

both Mr. Villamil and Ms. Nieves. Officer Albert Strydesky, of the 

Bethlehem Police Department, testified at Trial that he was 

dispatched to the scene of an armed robbery just after six 

o’clock in the morning (6:00AM) on April 8, 2012. Officer 

Strydesky testified that Mr. Villamil reported to him that they 

were “robbed at gunpoint by a Hispanic male wearing a black 

hooded sweatshirt” and both Mr. Villamil and Ms. Nieves 

reported the Appellant used a black semi-automatic gun during 

the robbery. Further, Officer Strydesky testified there was 

nothing about either Mr. Villamil or Ms. Nieves that would have 

led him to believe they were impaired in any way at the time 

they gave statements about the robbery. Officer Strydesky also 

confirmed Ms. Nieves’ testimony regarding the phone call placed 

to Appellant’s girlfriend and the phone call received from 

Appellant stating he was not going to return the money.

Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”) pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), 2/17/14, at 8-

9 (references to Notes of Testimony omitted). 

As for the conduct Appellant wanted to bring before the jury, the trial 

court explained:

Here, Appellant avers this Court erred by not allowing the 

Commonwealth’s witness, Ms. Nieves, to be questioned about an 
J-S49039-14

- 5 -

incident which occurred in the District Attorney’s Office while Ms. 

Nieves was waiting to testify at Trial. * * * She took money from 

a jar but, after being confronted by Office Staff, returned a 

portion or all of the money. The Prosecuting Attorney did not 

learn of this incident until after Ns. Nieves testified and she was 

excused. 

Id. at 5-6 (references to Notes of Testimony omitted).

Appellant argues:

The fact that [Ms. Nieves’] uncharged criminal conduct occurred 

during the trial, prior to her taking the witness stand, was 

incredibly material to the issue of her credibility. Further, the 

victim of the uncharged criminal conduct was the District 

Attorney’s Office, the very same office to whom she was 

testifying on their behalf [sic], and also the Authority who would 

prosecute her for her admitted criminal conduct. Therefore, her 

criminal conduct is at the very forefront of her state of mind and 

credibility when she took the witness stand. Ms. Nieves’ 

subjective state of mind in that she had a strong reason to lie 

and to testify in a manner that would help the prosecutor should 

have been brought to the Jury’s attention during cross 

examination. Ms. Nieves’ admitted uncharged criminal conduct 

was highly relevant and probative and should have been brought 

before the Jury. Finally, Ms. Nieves was never prosecuted for 

her admitted theft from the District Attorney’s Office which 

further solidifies her subjective state of mind and reason to lie 

and testify in a way that would help the Prosecutor.

Appellant’s Brief at 7 (citation omitted).

Appellant contends the trial court improperly prevented him from 

attacking Ms. Nieves’ credibility by introducing evidence of her misconduct. 

Generally, the credibility of any witness may be attacked by any party by 

any evidence relevant to that issue. Pa.R.E. 607(a) and (b). “Evidence is 

relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case or tends 
J-S49039-14

- 6 -

to support a reasonable inference regarding a material fact.” 

Commonwealth v. Reid, 811 A.2d 530, 550 (Pa. 2002).

This Court has stated:

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of 

evidence, our standard of review is one of deference. It is firmly 

established, questions concerning the admissibility of evidence 

lie within the sound discretion of the trial court, and [a reviewing 

court] will not reverse the court’s decision on such a question 

absent a clear abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Baker, 963 A.2d 495, 503-04 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(internal quotation and citation omitted). An abuse of discretion requires 

“not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly 

unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that 

the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” Id. at 504

(internal quotation and citation omitted).

3

____________________________________________

3 Appellant’s Statement of Scope and Standard of Review suggests that 

“[t]he standard of review herein is whether or not the Trial Court committed 

reversible error requiring arrest of judgment and/or the granting of a new 

trial.” Appellant’s Brief at iii. We remind Appellant’s counsel that:

“Scope of review” refers to “the confines within which an 

appellate court must conduct its examination.” In other words, 

it refers to the matters (or “what”) the appellate court is allowed 

to examine. In contrast, “standard of review” refers to the 

manner in which (or “how”) that examination is conducted.

Pa.R.A.P. 2111, Note (quoting Morrison v. Commonwealth, Dept. of 

Public Welfare, 646 A.2d 565, 570 (Pa. 1984)).
J-S49039-14

- 7 -

With respect to acts of misconduct, our Supreme Court has recognized 

that “[t]he admission of evidence of prior bad acts is solely within the 

discretion of the trial court, and the court’s decision will not be disturbed 

absent an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Patterson, 91 A.3d 55, 

68 (Pa. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501, 534 (Pa. 

2005)). Further, our rules of evidence provide that “the character of a 

witness for truthfulness may not be attacked or supported by crossexamination or extrinsic evidence concerning specific instances of the 

witness’ conduct.” Pa.R.E. 608(b)(1).4 

The issue of Ms. Nieves’ conduct was brought to the attention of the 

trial court and Appellant’s counsel by counsel for the Commonwealth on 

December 4, the day after Ms. Nieves testified. Notes of Testimony, 

12/4/12, at 113. Appellant’s counsel requested that the jury be told about 

the incident. Id. Counsel for the Commonwealth countered that Ms. Nieves’ 

uncharged criminal conduct was not the type of action that could be the 

subject of impeachment and argued it would inject collateral matters into 

the trial. Id. at 113-14. The trial court ruled the conduct was irrelevant and 

not probative. Id. at 114. 

The trial court explained that it did not allow cross-examination of Ms. 

Nieves concerning her misconduct because the trial court “did not believe 

____________________________________________

4

Pa.R.E. 608(b) and Pa.R.E. 609 provide an exception for evidence of 

conviction of a crime, an exception that does not apply in this case.
J-S49039-14

- 8 -

any bias existed at the time and that such cross-examination would be 

improper impeachment evidence.” T.C.O. at 5. The trial court recognized 

there were no criminal charges pending against Ms. Nieves as a result of the 

incident involving taking and returning money while she was waiting to 

testify. Id. The trial court found no reason to believe Ms. Nieves was 

biased when she testified and no reason to believe she would receive any 

favorable treatment for testifying in favor of the prosecution. Id. at 6. 

Consequently, the trial court determined that excluding evidence of the 

uncharged criminal conduct did not constitute error. Id. Again, “questions 

concerning admissibility of evidence lie within the sound discretion of the 

trial court.” Baker, 963 A.2d at 504. Moreover, “[t[he controlling 

precedent in this Commonwealth provides that specific acts of alleged 

misconduct cannot be introduced to impeach a witness.” Commonwealth 

v. Peer, 684 A.2d 1077, 1083 (Pa. Super. 1996). We find no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court’s preclusion of cross-examination relating to Ms. 

Nieves’ alleged act of misconduct. 

We recognize that generally “defense counsel must be permitted to 

cross-examine a Commonwealth witness on possible favorable treatment or 

expectations of such favorable treatment in exchange for testimony for the 

prosecution. Failure to allow cross-examination to reveal possible bias of 

this nature is error and will require a new trial unless the error can be shown 

to have had no impact on the outcome of the case.” Commonwealth v. 
J-S49039-14

- 9 -

Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1187 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). If the

error did not control the outcome of the case, the error will be deemed 

harmless. Id. 

This Court has determined that disallowing cross-examination of a 

witness relating to pending criminal charges, as well as possible bias, 

constitutes harmless error when the testimony of that witness is 

corroborated by other witnesses at trial. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 

Gentile, 640 A.2d 1309, 1314 (Pa. Super. 1994); Commonwealth v. 

Culmer, 604 A.2d 1090, 1095 (Pa. Super. 1992). As the trial court noted in 

its 1925(a) opinion, the testimony offered by Ms. Nieves was corroborated 

by the other eyewitness in the case, Angelo Villamil. T.C.O. at 6. Both Ms. 

Nieves and Mr. Villamil testified that they were in Mr. Villamil’s taxi when 

Appellant robbed Mr. Villamil at gunpoint. Id. (references to Notes of 

Testimony omitted). Both recognized Appellant as “Manny,” whom they 

knew from the neighborhood. Id. Further, the responding officer, Officer 

Strydesky, corroborated the testimony of both Ms. Nieves and Mr. Villamil 

about the robbery itself and corroborated the testimony of Ms. Nieves 

regarding the phone call placed to Appellant’s girlfriend as well as the return 

call made by Appellant to Ms. Nieves during which he stated he was not 

going to return the money. Id. at 8-9 (references to Notes of Testimony 

omitted). Therefore, even if disallowing cross-examination of Ms. Nieves 
J-S49039-14

- 10 -

was error, it was harmless in light of the corroborating evidence of other 

witnesses, including the eyewitness testimony of Mr. Villamil.5

While we do not find any abuse of discretion for disallowing crossexamination of Ms. Nieves, we also note that any error resulting from the 

trial court’s ruling was rendered harmless in light of the corroborating 

testimony of other witnesses at trial. Appellant’s claim fails for lack of merit.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/14/2014

____________________________________________

5 We also note that the testimony offered by Ms. Nieves was consistent with 

the statements she made immediately after the robbery. Therefore, there is 

no issue of establishing a motive for “fabricating evidence” through crossexamination as was the situation in cases cited by Appellant in support of 

allowing cross-examination to establish motive. See Appellant’s Brief at 6.