# Nicaragua - United States Department of State

- Department Press Briefing – April 29, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing &#8211; April 29, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing &#8211; April 29, 2024																																																					April 29, 2024																																																								1:10 p.m. EDTMR PATEL: Good afternoon, everybody.QUESTION: Good afternoon.QUESTION: Starting early.MR PATEL: Try – always like to keep you all on your toes. I have a little bit of a hard out today, guys, so I will try to get through as many of you I can, but I’m going to be mindful of the time.Ellen, would you like to kick us off?QUESTION: Sure, thank you. On – Secretary Blinken has made a decision to give Israel more time to rectify the situation with the IDF unit that – after deeming that it was guilty of gross abuses of human rights, and that Israel has not held it accountable. And separately, there are the four other cases where there was, I believe, a staff recommendation, according to ProPublica, that these other groups had also committed gross human rights violations and should – the Leahy Law should apply to them. And Secretary Blinken waited five months, according to the ProPublica article, to make a decision on that.So this – is there – the one unit, Netzah Yehuda, is, according to the Israeli military, still operating, and operating in Gaza sometimes. There’s not much of a sign of urgency from the State Department that there are these Israeli units accused of gross human rights violations, extrajudicial killings, killing – torture, rape, and the death of a U.S. citizen.MR PATEL: Is there a question there, Ellen? (Laughter.)QUESTION: Yes, I’m getting there. There doesn’t seem to be – that there needs to be any urgency to protect the Palestinian civilians who are being exposed to these gross human rights violations, including with the postponed decision on Netzah Yehuda.MR PATEL: So to take a step back, I take it you are referring to some of the things that were publicly reported at the tail end of last week in reference to some correspondence that the Secretary had with congressional leadership? Is that what you’re referring to?QUESTION: Yes. Yes.MR PATEL: Okay. So let’s – I think important that we take a little bit of a step back here. First, when it comes to the Leahy Law, we have a careful and very deliberate process when it comes to implementing the Leahy Law. And I want to reiterate what you’ve heard me, the Secretary, Matt, and others say before, which is that the same standards when it comes to the implementation – or, sorry, the same standards of the application of this law applies to every country that receives U.S. security assistance.What I can say in terms of where the process is right now is that after a careful process, we found five Israeli units responsible for individual incidents of gross violations of human rights. All of these were incidents much before October 7th, and none took place in Gaza. Four of these units have effectively remediated these violations, which is what we expect partners to do. It is consistent with what we expect all countries whom with we have a security relationship with. For a remaining unit, we continue to be in consultations and engagements with the Government of Israel; they have submitted additional information as it pertains to that unit. And we’re continuing to have those conversations consistent with the memorandum of understanding that we have with the Government of Israel that was entered into in 2021.When conclusions are made under actions that fall under the auspices of the Foreign Assistance Act, we are required to consult with officials from the Government of Israel, and that is ongoing. We are engaging with them in a process, and we will make an ultimate decision when it comes to that unit when that process is complete.I would also just want to note that the remediation standard is consistent, and it is the same for all countries. And what we ask of host governments in that situation is effective steps being taken consistent within their processes and systems to bring respective parties to justice. So as it relates to the process here, that’s all of the update that I have for now, but we’re going to continue to engage with the government on that and we will have more to share, I’m sure, at some point in the future.QUESTION: There doesn’t seem to be a sense of urgency in the meantime; concern for Palestinian civilians exposed to these units doesn’t factor into the timeline of &#8212;MR PATEL: Let me just – I would 100 percent dispute the premise of that question. This is a deliberate process, it is a detail-oriented process, and it is a rigorous process. It is easy to sometimes want things to happen as quickly as possible, but it is more important to ensure that these processes are happening in the most robust and rigorous way possible, because we are ultimately dealing with facts, and we want to make sure that we can follow the facts and make sure that we are appropriately engaging with appropriate stakeholders, including, in this case, the Government of Israel. There is a clear process on this that we intend to follow, and that is the same process for determining these things, the standards of which are consistent with all countries.Go ahead, Kylie.QUESTION: I just want to follow up on what you’ve been saying about the standard being a typical process that you follow and remediation being standard across the board. So what is the remediation standard here? How long are you going &#8212;MR PATEL: So that’s the point that I was making, is that the standard of remediation is that the – these respective countries take effective steps to hold the accountable party to justice. And that is different on a country-by-country basis. I’m not going to be prescriptive of that on here, including in this incident. But it is &#8212;QUESTION: So then – I’m sorry, but then it’s not a standard if you’re saying it’s different on a country-by-country basis.MR PATEL: It’s a standard in the sense that we expect to see remediation in – but each country in which we have a security relationship is different. There are different protocols and procedures in place in those respective countries, and those respective countries can speak to what accountability measures they have within their systems. I’m not a spokesperson for those components.QUESTION: So you won’t speak to what the process you’re expecting to play out here is? How long you’re giving Israel for remediation in this?MR PATEL: Correct. Absolutely. I’m not going to get into that, beyond saying that we are engaging with the Government of Israel on these things. And I’m sure we’ll have more to share in the time ahead.QUESTION: And then the Secretary said ten days ago that a determination on the Leahy front with Israel had been made, and that we would see results. So I’m wondering if the determination that he made ten days ago is this determination that you guys are now making public, or if that changed due to engagements with the Israelis.MR PATEL: What we were talking about was the gross violations of human rights. As it relates to this one particular unit, I will say that this process continues to be ongoing, given this additional information that we’re engaging with the Government of Israel consistent with the memorandum of understanding that we have with them.QUESTION: Can I follow up?MR PATEL: Simon.QUESTION: Okay &#8212;MR PATEL: I’ll get to you, I’m sure.QUESTION: So no answer as to if it’s changed?MR PATEL: What – sorry, what?QUESTION: The determination ten days ago. Is this – you won’t say if it’s the same determination as &#8212;MR PATEL: What we were speaking about was the gross violations of human rights. That’s what the – the Secretary was alluding to. I will say that this process, though, with the Government of Israel broadly, continues to be ongoing, especially as it relates to this one unit.QUESTION: Just to clarify &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; where we are, because this is a bit complicated: The U.S. Government has concluded that five different Israeli units committed gross human rights violations, but as of now all of those units can still continue to receive U.S. arms, weapons, ammunition.MR PATEL: Well, in the – in four of those instances, as I just said, we have seen remediation of those violations. And that is, of course, what we expect of partners. Beyond that, as it relates to this fifth unit, that is a process that is still ongoing.QUESTION: Right.MR PATEL: But let me just say, Simon, since you gave me the opportunity, when we’re talking about the Leahy Law, what we are talking about are unit and component restrictions when they are found in violation. It does not have bearing on the broader security relationship that we may have with a country, especially a country like Israel in which we have a longstanding security relationship, the provision of bulk assistance that’s gone back many, many years.QUESTION: But as of now, even the fifth unit, where you’re unsure whether there’s been remediation, they are still eligible to receive U.S. arms?MR PATEL: That is – that is – that is the interpretation of the law, correct.QUESTION: Okay, yeah. And to sort of – I wonder, the public might listen to you say that you’ve concluded that that there are gross violations of human rights, but is there any detail you can give us? What are these incidents? What kind of things are we talking about? Some of the reporting has involved sexual assaults, murder. Are these – is there anything you can tell us about what this conclusion is that &#8212;MR PATEL: So I’m not going to get into the specifics of these incidents from up here because overall, the totality of the situation continues to be an ongoing process. But I am – have no doubt that we will have more to share in the time ahead that is consistent with the appropriate congressional pieces as well as the engagements with the host government on this going forward.QUESTION: And you’re not going to tell us – you’re not going to tell us what the units are in question?MR PATEL: Again, that is not something that we generally make public beyond through appropriate consultations with legislative bodies as well as the host government.QUESTION: So the U.S. Government has conducted a process, found these units have conducted grave violations of human rights; that sounds very serious, but you won’t tell us what those violations were, who committed them, and you’re going to continue to send weapons to them?MR PATEL: That is a process that is consistent with the standards that we have with other countries as well. You have to remember, Israel is a country in which we have a longstanding security relationship with. Other countries similar in this grouping, I would say, would include the government – in terms of the kinds of relationship we have – include Ukraine, include Egypt. And in those kinds of countries, there is a proactive vetting of the whole security universe, a constant evaluation in close consultations with our embassies and consulates, NGOs, civil society, media reporting on the ground, as to assess what is happening in those countries. And so consistent with that process, we – not in a place to share publicly the specific components of their security services that – in which this is applicable to.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR PATEL: Sorry, hold on. Is this on this, or &#8212;QUESTION: On this.MR PATEL: Okay. Let me get to Olivia, then I’ll come to you, Leon. I’m so sorry.QUESTION: Can you talk about within what timeframe this new information from the Israeli Government reached the State Department?MR PATEL: I’m just not going to speak to that specificity on diplomatic engagements. What I can say is that they provided additional information to us, and that is a process that’s going to continue to be ongoing.QUESTION: But was that additional information supplied after the Secretary made his – revealed that some determinations had been made (inaudible) &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m just not going to get into the diplomatic engagements that we have. What I can say is that this is consistent with the memorandum of understanding and which we have with Israel to talk about these things, prior to any conclusions that are made under things that fall under the Foreign Assistance Act.QUESTION: Generally speaking, are governments under Leahy that we have relationships with bound by a certain amount of time &#8212;MR PATEL: They are not.QUESTION: &#8212; with which they need to provide evidence or sort of confirm that they have taken steps on accountability or &#8212;MR PATEL: They are not. They are not.QUESTION: So this is a completely open-ended process &#8212;MR PATEL: Correct.QUESTION: &#8212; and violations can stretch on for an indeterminate amount of time? And at what point then does the department actually take any punitive measures?MR PATEL: Well, again, you have to – it’s important to remember, Olivia, that each country is different, so it’s difficult to talk about these circumstances with a broad-brush stroke. What I can say is that there is not a stipulation on timing, but we’ll continue to have these engagements and we will press directly with governments and countries about sharing applicable information.Again, in the context of Israel, this is a government in which we have a longstanding security relationship with. There is constant around-the-clock evaluation and vetting ongoing as it relates to the security parameters and circumstances on the ground. So we are looking at reports, we are looking at public reporting, we are looking at media reporting, just as we would do in any conflict zone, ensuring that there are no violations of international law, no violations of humanitarian law.QUESTION: But that seems to be at the core of the problem here, is that Israel is a unique country being offered unique treatment in this circumstance.MR PATEL: They are not being offered unique treatment. There is nothing that I have outlined here that is inconsistent with the Leahy process that is – when it comes to the countries that which we have security relationships with.QUESTION: You’ve cited the longstanding security relationship and how it might &#8212;MR PATEL: Because there are some countries in which the relationship we have with them would require us to approach this just slightly differently – Ukraine being an example, Egypt being an example, Israel being another example. But there is not a special treatment. There is not a different standard to &#8212;QUESTION: So what does “slightly differently” mean?MR PATEL: So Israel is a country that – in which we have a longstanding security relationship. There is a lot of bulk assistance that is going whether – to use an example, things like bulletproof vests or something – in which the Government of Israel may choose to want something like that. And then it is then on the central government to disseminate that to specific units or components within their security system.So for countries in which we have that kind of longstanding deep relationship – in Israel’s case, it’s called the Israel Leahy Vetting Forum – there is around-the-clock, proactive, constant vetting and evaluation of the circumstances that are on the ground to assess whether there are international – there – whether there are violations of international humanitarian law, violations of international law. That is a process that is ongoing. There is no such thing as special treatment or double standards here. The standards of the Leahy Law are applied consistently to all countries.Now, in some countries, like the ones that I stipulated, the security relationship is such as that there is this additional forum vehicle, but that is not a double standard or any kind of special treatment.QUESTION: I want to defer to my colleagues, which is – I mean, it just seems hard to countenance there’s no double standard with this as a special arrangement and set of circumstances that Israel &#8212;MR PATEL: It’s not a special arrangement, the standards of which – in fact, it is taking a closer look at the situations on the ground. It’s not a double standard; the standards are the same. It is a forum created to allow for the – for an assessment that is comparable to the kind of security relationship that we have with that particular country. Israel is not the only one that – in which this model exists.QUESTION: My last question on this is that – does the State Department believe that actually taking punitive measures under Leahy in this instance with regard to this one unit would somehow damage diplomatic relations with Israel?MR PATEL: I’m not going to get ahead of that process, Olivia, and we would certainly hope not, because throughout this whole process, we have been clear-eyed and consistent. You’ve heard the Secretary, you’ve heard the President, you’ve heard me, you’ve heard Matt – that throughout the course of this conflict, you have – we have reiterated our unwavering commitment to Israel’s security. That was true then; it is true now. And is Leahy unit-specific. It is not a bearing on the broader security relationship that we have with that particular country.I will also note that this is – continues to be an ongoing process. And if at any point remediation efforts or things like that are found to be inconsistent with the standards that we find, there of course will be restriction on applicable U.S. assistance. We intend to be an administration that’s going to follow the law as prescribed.QUESTION: Vedant?MR PATEL: Tom – oh, sorry, let me go to Leon, because he’s had his hand up, and then I’ll come to you.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR PATEL: Said &#8212;QUESTION: Just &#8212;MR PATEL: &#8212; of course you’re going to get a question. Has there ever been a briefing where you’ve not gotten a question on this issue?Leon.QUESTION: Thank you. We agree that all this is pre-October 7 and involves the West Bank, abuses in the West Bank, okay? So quite a while ago – I don’t know exactly how long depending on which of the units you’re talking about, but I find it a little bit strange that in four of those units, you – they have the remediary corrections that they did, and you accept that evidently. And in this fifth unit, what sort of additional information could have come through all of a sudden in the last couple of weeks that would make it that you are not able to make the determination yet?And then second question: What kind of remediary decisions are we talking about? I mean, disciplinary – or what kind of corrections? Can you speak to that?MR PATEL: So on the second point, that’s up to the host government. The standard that we expect is that they bring the relevant parties to justice. We cannot have some kind of prescriptive metric given that each country is different and their procedures as it relates to their own government systems and military systems are different, but our standard for remediation, we expect that of all countries in this case. But beyond that, Simon – I’m sorry, not Simon, Leon – it is an ongoing process so I’m not going to get more prescriptive or specific on the relevant details.Tom, go ahead.QUESTION: To follow up – can I just follow up on that?MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: I mean, I’m confused. Do you know whether or not the Israelis have remediated this unit?MR PATEL: That is – that is essentially what we are engaging with them on as it relates to this. Again, I can say that in these five individual incidents of gross violations of human rights, for four of these units they have effectively remediated those violations, which is, again, something we expect and want from the countries that – which we have security relationships with. It’s what we expect of our partners. As it relates to this remaining unit, the Government of Israel has submitted additional information. We are currently reviewing it, which is consistent with the memorandum of understanding we have with them. We’re engaging with them in a process, and we’ll make a decision from there when that process is complete.QUESTION: Okay. But the answer is you don’t know. You don’t know if they’ve remediated this unit on these places and we don’t know what the cases are because you’re not &#8212;MR PATEL: When I say something is mid-process, it’s safe to assume that. Yeah.QUESTION: Yeah, but the law – the law is really clear. So the law says, “No assistance shall be furnished...to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.” So you’ve made that determination that they have committed a gross violation of human rights. The exception is that that prohibition “shall not apply if the Secretary determines and reports” – to the appropriate congressional committees – “that the government of such country is taking effective steps to bring responsible members of the security forces to justice.” So has the Secretary notified Congress that they are taking effective steps?MR PATEL: So I’m not a legal or technical expert.QUESTION: No, because you don’t – you don’t know, and you just said you don’t know if they’ve remediated so &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m happy to check on the specifics of the legal process for you, Tom, and get back to you.QUESTION: But that is the legal process. So according to the legal process, you’ve determined that they have carried out gross violations of human rights, but you haven’t determined that they’ve remediated. And yet the Secretary said on April the 19th you had made the determinations. So I’m – I’m just really confused about what changed after April the 19th?MR PATEL: As I was pretty clear, what I shared was that the Government of Israel has shared additional information with us, and we are &#8212;QUESTION: But that – according to the law, that is not an effective remediation. So at the moment, you have a situation where you have – you have determined there was a gross violation, but you don’t have remediation. And I can’t see any part of the law which says you might decide over a couple of days that it’s been remediated and therefore keep security assistance going.MR PATEL: So like I said, this is an ongoing process. I’m not going to speak to it more specifically, but consistent with the memorandum of understanding that we have with the Government of Israel, we are engaging with them, consulting with them as it relates to not just this broader process but additional information that they’ve shared. And we’ll have more to share in the time ahead.Said, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you – thank you, Vedant. By the way, did – can you share with us the outcome of the investigation of the death of Omar Assad that was – that actually died while in the custody with this unit, Netzah Yehuda? Do we know what was the outcome of that investigation?MR PATEL: I don’t have any specifics to offer right now.QUESTION: Okay. Could you look into it?MR PATEL: I’m happy to check for you, Said.QUESTION: Yeah, please, thank you.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: The other thing is it seems that Israel has rebuked the United States call or your call the other day for investigating the mass grave, the mass burial and all these things. Do you have any comment on that?MR PATEL: So Said, there has been some – and if you’ll allow me a quick second, I don’t have – make sure this is the right thing here. As it relates to this Said, the IDF has been pretty public in that in its search for Israeli hostages &#8212;QUESTION: Right.MR PATEL: &#8212; they uncovered graves in the area where Palestinians had previously buried their dead.QUESTION: They excavated – you mean excavated – yeah.MR PATEL: There has been some pretty consistent public reporting dating back to January that that is an area that Palestinians had to bury some bodies, but the IDF can speak more specifically about that process. But you heard me speak to this, you heard the National Security Advisor say – and consistently across this administration, I’d say that the facts matter and, of course, if there is any kind of inconsistency that needs to be looked into – but I believe that the IDF has spoken publicly about what this is and what this isn’t.QUESTION: Okay. So you accept their answer? I mean, their answer was we did not do that; we don’t do this. I mean that’s what – and they consider the matter to be over. Do you consider the matter to be over?MR PATEL: Said, I just said if there are in fact any inconsistencies, then that should be looked into. But based on even just the public reporting, the IDF has been clear about what this is and what this isn’t. That being said, we engage with the Government of Israel and the IDF around the clock. This is something we’ll continue to discuss with them if we need to raise any further issues.QUESTION: Okay. A couple more questions, if you allow me. It has reported that the U.S. is working with Israel to prevent any kind of ICC warrant of arrest of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Are you aware of that? Is that true? Can you confirm that?MR PATEL: It’s important to take a step back here, Said, that since this president has come into office, we have worked to reset our relationship with the ICC. And we are in contact with the court on a range of issues, including in connection to the court’s important work on Darfur, on Ukraine, on Sudan as well. But on this investigation, our position is clear. We continue to believe that the ICC does not have jurisdiction over the Palestinian situation.QUESTION: Yeah, but you did welcome the warrant of the arrest for Vladimir Putin, correct? I mean, you welcomed that. I’m just asking. You did.MR PATEL: Said, these are two very different – first of all, I actually – I really – I don’t appreciate &#8212;QUESTION: I’m not making a comparison. I’m &#8212;MR PATEL: You literally are, though. You literally are. There is no moral equivalency between the kinds of things that we see President Putin and his – and the Kremlin undertake in comparison to the Israeli Government, Said.QUESTION: I’m not asking for a justification. I’m saying you did – you did welcome it, right? Okay.MR PATEL: This is also not – the ICC, as you know, is not – we are not party to the Rome Statute on this.QUESTION: Right, that’s true. Let me ask you one last question on the Saudi trip.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: On the Secretary’s trip to Saudi Arabia. It has been said that the Saudis suggested or came up with a proposal that basically said let’s focus on the security issues, arrangement on security issues and the civilian nuclear program, whatever, and leave the normalization, the Palestinian state, to another time when things are more propitious to discuss these things. Can you confirm that to us?MR PATEL: Said, I’m &#8212;QUESTION: Did the Saudis submit a new proposal that delinks &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m not going to get into – I’m not going to set into the specifics of our ongoing diplomatic engagements, but we remain committed to the long-term goal of a more stable and prosperous and integrated Middle East region, including through normalization and of course also including through the advancement of a two-state solution. The Secretary just addressed this in Capri that this is something that we have continued to be working on as part of a potential normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia. It’s been something that he himself has been intensively engaged on. But beyond that, I’m – we’ll just defer to our Saudi partners to speak to that.QUESTION: Yeah. As far as your – you know, there has been no proposal delinking these issues, focusing on the security issue versus the Palestinian normalization issue?MR PATEL: Said, we think that an integrated Middle East region should include normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia but also the advancement of a two-state solution as well.Go ahead, Guita.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant. On the ceasefire aspect of the Gaza war, the Secretary in Riyadh today said that, and I quote, “...between the people of Gaza and a ceasefire is Hamas,” unquote. He met with the Arab foreign ministers. He met with the Turkish foreign minister there. Does the State Department see a role for the Islamic Republic of Iran on this decision by Hamas that everybody is waiting on whether to take the proposal or not, one way or another?MR PATEL: I cannot think of any actions in the past I don’t know how many years that the Iranian regime has taken that – one, that has been actually beneficial to the Palestinian people. What I would just say broadly, any country is welcome to play a positive role, but actions speak louder than words. And when it comes to the actions of the Iranian regime, the track record is pretty clear: they continue to be one of the largest exporters of terrorism; they continue to be a backer and funder of groups that have been focused on destabilizing and bringing violence to the region. So their actions are pretty clear here.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Go ahead in the back. Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you very much. On Friday, State Department strongly commended the attack on the on the Khor Mor gas field in Kurdistan, but my question is how the United States can protect Kurdistan Region from militia groups where there is also U.S. investment in the region.MR PATEL: So we do strongly condemn the attack on the Khor Mor gas field, and we offer condolences to the families of those who were killed, and we wish for a quick recovery of those who were injured. And as we’ve said previously, attacks like this on civilian infrastructure, they’re an affront to Iraqi sovereignty.QUESTION: A follow-up on that?Go ahead, Sam.QUESTION: Yeah, thank you. Let me try to approach the whole Leahy Law thing in one or two different ways. You say that U.S. law is applied systematically throughout. Does Israel have nuclear weapons? Because there is U.S. law that says that there should be a funding cutoff under the Arms Export Control Act and the Glenn-Symington Amendments that says that there shouldn’t be aid to nuclear proliferators, and Israel is a damn sure nuclear proliferator. But last time I asked, you folks won’t even acknowledge the existence of Israel’s massive nuclear arsenal.MR PATEL: Yeah, I don’t – I still don’t have a comment for you on that, Sam.QUESTION: But U.S. law is applied systematically, but you won’t even acknowledge the existence of &#8212;MR PATEL: Of course U.S. law is applied systematically.QUESTION: But you won’t even acknowledge the empirical reality of a nuclear weapons arsenal.MR PATEL: Don’t have anything for you on that.QUESTION: Okay, all right. Let me try a different fact then. Tomorrow there will be a decision issued by the International Court of Justice. Nicaragua invoked the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide – not just simply to punish genocide but to attempt to prevent it in real time. Nicaragua’s lawsuit says that it is, quote, “enabling Israel to  genocidal acts.” Quote, “Germany has provided political, financial and military support to Israel fully aware at the time of  authorization that the military equipments would be used in the commission of  breaches of international law by this State and in disregard of its own obligations.”As I understand it, Nicaragua is doing this against Germany and not the U.S. because the U.S. has a reservation in the Genocide Convention saying that it will not adhere to any judgments by the International Court of Justice. But it doesn’t have to invoke that. My question to you is: Would the United States invoke that; or, if a state wanted to go to the International Court, will the United States actually adhere to international law and say we will not invoke this way of bailing out of the legal system, we will actually abide by a court decision?MR PATEL: Sam, let me say a couple of things there. First, we’ve been incredibly clear on this dating back to a number of months that we find allegations of genocide in this current, ongoing conflict in Gaza to continue to be unfounded. That was the case previously when similar matters were brought before the ICJ, and that continues to be the case. And let me just say when it comes to our partners in Germany, they share our convergence on the importance of doing everything we can to make sure hostages are released, to make sure that there is more humanitarian aid going into Gaza, and that everything can be done possible to make sure that this conflict ends as quickly as we can.QUESTION: But I’m not asking you for your alleged assessment. I’m asking you: Will you adhere to a court ruling from the world court?MR PATEL: I’m just not going to engage in hypotheticals, Sam.Go ahead, Ellen.QUESTION: No, no, it’s not a hypothetical.MR PATEL: Ellen.QUESTION: It’s a “will you adhere?”MR PATEL: Go ahead, Ellen.QUESTION: I was just wondering if the – Secretary Blinken himself has made clear that there is not remediation by this unit. The letter to the House Speaker says that Blinken will work to identify steps to get Israel on a path of remediation for this unit. And as my colleague here pointed out, that’s not in the Leahy Law. The Leahy Law doesn’t say you can enter one – you enter negotiations to try to bring a country into remediation.MR PATEL: First, I would not call it negotiations. We are engaging with the Government of Israel on facts and on information that is consistent with the memorandum of understanding that we have with them. I think it’s also important to remember we want to see remediation when it comes to our partners and countries in which we have longstanding security partnerships with.Rabia, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: On Gaza university protests, which have intensified across American campuses over the past week with the students making several demands, including calls for policy changes and calls for a ceasefire in Gaza, and according to a poll by CNN over the weekend, young Americans under 35 disapprove the administration’s handling of Israel’s war on Gaza. And many countries, including your allies in the region, also expect you to change course and put more pressure on Israel. So are these objections and protests considered on – in policymaking process in this building? And specifically I’m wondering: Will U.S. policy be changed or affected by these protests in any way?MR PATEL: Look, Rabia, when it comes to people protesting and sharing their opinions, making their voices heard, that is something that is consistent with the First Amendment. It is consistent with things we see in this country, and certainly people have every right to do so, including people who may have differing viewpoints on foreign policy that we’re pursuing. The same would be applied to employees of the federal government. They, of course, have every right to express their opinions and points of view. I’ve said a number of times before that the Secretary, at least when it comes to the workforce, he is incredibly receptive to different points of view. He believes that that makes him a stronger policy maker, and the outcomes include better and more well-thought-out policy. And we’ll continue to encourage the mechanisms that we have for people to share their points of view.When it comes to protests, though, people continue to have every right to do so. We would just continue to press that they be nonviolent and that they remain peaceful.QUESTION: But will the U.S. policy be changed or affected in any way by these protests?MR PATEL: When it comes to – when it comes to the policy that we’re pursuing, Rabia, the only real metric for us is what is in the interests for the American people and what keeps the American people safer and more secure.QUESTION: So you don’t take into account &#8212;MR PATEL: And in our point of view – and what – and in our point of view, more humanitarian aid going into Gaza is also good for the United States. The defeat of Hamas is also good for the United States. Ensuring that Gaza can no longer be a springboard for terrorism is also good for the United States. And a two-state solution that brings about greater peace and stability and integration in the Middle East region is also good for the United States.We are pursuing these policies because we believe they are in the interest of the American people. It will bring about greater peace and stability in the region, and it will keep our country and other countries in the region safer. People are allowed to disagree. It is a free country and they have every First Amendment right to express their points of view and to make them heard, and we encourage people to do so in a peaceful and nonviolent way.Diyar, go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah, thank you, Vedant. A question on the attack on the Khor Mor gas field in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, as you could speak of moments ago about it. Last time, in January, when a field – when that field was attacked, you request the Iraqi Government to investigate and bringing to justice those who were responsible. And this time we saw the same statement from State Department on that attack. In your assessment, who was or is responsible for this attack, and have you ever get back by the Iraqi Government why they are not bringing those responsible into justice? And are they willing or they can’t do it? Is that something of your concern?MR PATEL: So I don’t have any assessment to offer when it comes to a responsible actor there, and so I will just refrain from commenting.QUESTION: And one more question on that. As you are pushing or helping or wanting Iraq to get its energy independence from Iran and that’s why you are waivering the sanctions to get electricity from Iran, and this field is one of the alternates for the Iranian energy supply to Iraq, do you think that this attack – these kinds of attack – is a warning to all the stakeholders and parties, including the United States, that getting Iraq independence energy from Iran is not an easy and – it’s not easy to divest Iraq from Iranian independence? Are you considering these attacks in your – into your calculations when you’re speaking of Iraqi independence energy from Iran?MR PATEL: So I’m certainly not going to speculate on why or why not someone chose to strike an electricity – or a gas field. What I can say, though, is that this kind – these kinds of affronts to civilian infrastructure, they are a direct attack on Iraqi sovereignty, and that’s why you saw us condemn them, but I don’t have anything else beyond that.Michel, go ahead.QUESTION: On the normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, Secretary Blinken said that we’re getting close to an agreement on bilateral things. Can you elaborate on that?MR PATEL: I can’t, Michel. I’m not going to get ahead of the process here, but the Secretary just last weekend in Capri was – laid out that this is something that we’ve been working on, including as part of a potential normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia. It’s something that we’ve been intensely engaged on, and we believe that this is something that is key to what is our long-term goal, which is a more stable, prosperous, and integrated Middle East region.Olivia.QUESTION: One quick question on hostages.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Public comments by the Secretary this morning – he indicated that a new offer by Israel on the table was extraordinarily, extraordinarily generous. Is there a sense that a deal is closer than it has been in recent weeks, or is Hamas the same unknown that is has been?MR PATEL: So our hope is that – our hope is that – of course that some kind of progress can be made. We remain committed to reaching a deal for an immediate ceasefire that secures the release of hostages and takes some additional steps for the surge of humanitarian aid. To echo the Secretary, a generous deal has been put on the table, and it’s now on Hamas to accept the deal. I will just say that currently what is standing in the way between a ceasefire and some progress for the Palestinian people is Hamas.Go ahead.QUESTION: Can I have a clarification on this one, please? On this?MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: Now, the Secretary was talking about sustainable calm, sustainable calm. What we heard today from the foreign secretary of United Kingdom, David Cameron, he was – he was talking about 40 days of ceasefire. Could you – could &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m not going to be prescriptive about this process, Said, beyond saying that we’re committed to reaching a deal that includes an immediate ceasefire, that includes the release of hostages and additional humanitarian aid. It’s something that we’re continuing to work towards. As the Secretary said, a generous deal has been put on the table, and really the responsibility now is for Hamas to accept it.QUESTION: But it includes no time, no 30 days &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m not going to be prescriptive about the process, Said.Go ahead. Go ahead.QUESTION: I just want to follow up on Said’s question regarding Omar Assad now. Netzah Yehuda has been cited for violations – gross violations of human rights, including for being responsible for the death of an 80-year-old American citizen, Omar Assad. So that took place almost two years ago, 2022, and now you’re saying that Israel presented new information and that there’s a discussion of – or remediation of that military unit. What kind of new information provided almost two years later could make the family of Omar Assad, an American citizen, feel like they’ve received any kind of justice?MR PATEL: So I’m not going to speak to the specifics of this process because it is ongoing, but remediation is what we want to see in as many of these instances as possible. That is what we expect of our partners and that’s what we expect of countries that we partner with. But beyond that, I’m not going to get ahead of this.I will also note that if at the end of our engagements and discussions in this process with the Government of Israel it is found that processes are inconsistent with what is laid out in Leahy or if information is inconsistent with what is expected under Leahy, there will of course be a restriction on applicable U.S. assistance. As I said to one of your colleagues, we intend to be an administration that follows the law, and that is also true in this case here.Janne.QUESTION: Are you in touch with the family to explain all this to them?MR PATEL: I don’t have any specific conversations to read out.Janne, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant. Two questions on Russia, North Korea, and China. It has been reported that the Russian ship transporting North Korean weapons is using a Chinese port and is currently docked. What measures is the United States taking in response to North – China’s toleration of arms trade with Russia and North Korea?MR PATEL: So look, Janne, we have – this is something that we take incredibly seriously. You saw the Secretary and Matt and myself speak about the closening that – of the relations we are seeing between Russia and the PRC, especially as it relates to ongoing endeavors as it relates to the Russian defense industrial base. We think that that is not just risky to the region, but it is directly an affront to Ukraine. So we’re going to continue to take appropriate steps to hold relevant actors accountable.Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: On China, quick &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Secretary Blinken last week and urged the United States not to step on the – cross forbidden line against China’s sovereignty. What specifically does the forbidden line on sovereignty mean? Is this Chinese red line?MR PATEL: So this is not a new position of ours, Janne. Over the course of our engagements with the PRC since Russia’s aggressive, unjust, and illegal infringement on Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty, we have made clear – including to the PRC – that any kind of provision of lethal assistance from the country, from the PRC, would be unacceptable to the United States, and we would take appropriate steps to hold them account should that happen. We reiterated that and will continue to reiterate that in every engagement that we have.Alex, go ahead, and then we’re going to wrap.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant. Staying on Russia, then I have a couple more on the South Caucasus.MR PATEL: You can get one. Go ahead.QUESTION: Over the weekend – yeah, thanks so much – over the weekend, Russia arrested two more international reporters – one working for AP, another one for Reuters. What do you know about their cases, and do you have any response yet?MR PATEL: So I don’t – I don’t have specifics that I can get into, Alex, again, when – in any of these situations involving detention, we’re dealing with privacy areas as well. But to take a step back, the Kremlin has an egregious track record when it comes to its crackdown on media freedoms, its crackdown on journalists, its detention of journalists. I would point you no further than the case of Evan Gershkovich, who continues to be wrongfully detained by the Russian Federation, and we’re going to continue to do everything we can to ensure the release of both Evan Gershkovich and Paul Whelan.All right, thanks, everybody.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)QUESTION: And then – I have a couple more &#8212;MR PATEL: Thanks.(The briefing was concluded at 1:56 p.m.)						Tags																					China																								Germany																								Iran																								Iraq																								Israel																								Nicaragua																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Saudi Arabia																								The Secretary of State
- G7 Italy 2024 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on Addressing Global Challenges, Fostering Partnerships Office of the SpokespersonThe text of the following statement was released by the G7 foreign ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the High Representative of the European Union.I. INTRODUCTIONAs the international community faces multiple crises we, the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, renew our commitment to upholding the rule of law, humanitarian principles and international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and to protecting human rights and dignity for all individuals.We reiterate the need to take collective action to preserve peace and stability and to address global challenges such as climate change, pollution, biodiversity loss, global health, education, gender inequality, poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition, violent extremism and terrorism, information integrity and a digital transition that respects, protects, and promotes human rights and fundamental freedoms.We affirm our commitment to free societies and democratic principles, where all persons can freely exercise their rights and freedoms. Human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.We reaffirm our commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) and to re-energize efforts towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as multidimensional crises, and particularly the pandemic and ongoing major conflicts, have set back progress towards their achievement.We will continue to work in close cooperation with our partners and with relevant multilateral fora such as the G20. Global challenges require solidarity and a cohesive international response, looking for shared solutions for peace, stability, and development, leaving no one behind.II. FOSTERING PARTNERSHIP WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN AND AFRICAWe will continue to deepen the partnership with African countries and regional organizations, including the African union (AU). We welcome the AU participation in the G20 as a permanent member and reiterate our support for the G20 Compact with Africa. The G7-Africa partnership is guided by the objectives of the AU Agenda 2063, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement.The consequences of the Russian aggression and its weaponization of food supplies and energy resources have affected notably many vulnerable countries, particularly in Africa. In this perspective, Russia’s war is proving not just a war against Ukraine but against the world’s poorest and most vulnerable.We reiterate our strong partnership for just, green transitions to net zero emissions as core to sustainable development, and we are ready to inject new momentum into the pursuit of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Together with the entire international community and stakeholders beyond government, we need to urgently work in partnership to accelerate progress towards the 2030 Agenda and SDGs, consistent with the unanimous commitment reaffirmed at the UN General Assembly last September.Debt vulnerabilities are a significant challenge. We fully support the G20’s effort to improve the implementation of the “Common Framework” in a predictable, timely, orderly, and coordinated manner, providing clarity to participants. We recognize the importance of effective and long-term solutions, promoting coordination between official bilateral and private creditors. We call upon Multilateral Development Banks and development finance institutions to continue to play a key role to foster sustainable development through increased financing, policy advice and technical assistance for the benefit of developing countries, particularly the poorer and more fragile countries across the continent. In particular central to economic development is ensuring access to sustainable and resilient food systems, health care and health security, and clean, affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.We reiterate our commitment to supporting African governments as they address conditions leading to terrorism, violent extremism, and instability, while respecting human rights and the rule of law. Development and democracy are mutually reinforcing, and we underscore the importance of free and fair elections to meet the citizens’ needs and expectations.We are concerned about the activities of the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group and other emerging Russia-backed forces, which are producing a destabilizing impact, notably in North Africa, Central Africa, and the Sahel. We call for accountability of all those responsible for human rights abuses.1. LibyaWe will continue to help Libya put an end to its protracted internecine conflict, also fueled by foreign forces, fighters and mercenaries, in order to build a more peaceful and prosperous future and support its stability, independence, territorial integrity and national unity. The political stalemate leaves Libya extremely vulnerable to third state actors pursuing control over Libya’s security, politics and economy, sowing instability throughout the country and wider region.We therefore call on all Libyan political actors to engage in meaningful dialogue in order to break the current impasse and move towards a credible roadmap to free, fair and inclusive national presidential and parliamentary elections without delay. The international community must also be united in the pursuit of these goals.We take note with regret of the recent announcement by UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, Abdoulaye Bathily, regarding his decision to resign. We thank him for his dedicated service and renew our full support to the United Nations and the key role it continues to play in Libya. We call on the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint his successor without delay.2. SahelWe express our grave concern for the deterioration of the security situation in the Sahel, compounded by the backsliding of the principles of constitutional rule of law, democracy and good governance and regression in the regional cooperation frameworks.Such an increasingly precarious and unpredictable political scenario requires renewed efforts by all relevant actors and stakeholders in reconfiguring international and regional responses to the challenge of growing political tension, confrontation, and instability in the Sahel.We are also deeply concerned by the spread of terrorist threats and activities, leading to conflict and causing widespread misery and displacement of the civilian population. We are appalled by the grave human rights violations committed by multiple parties, including Russian proxies in the region.We look forward to strengthening further our cooperation with the African Union, regional organizations and the UN in fostering stability, security, good governance and development in the Sahel, preventing a “spill-over” of insecurity towards the Gulf of Guinea and North Africa, as well as irregular migration flows towards North Africa, Europe and the Western Hemisphere.We congratulate Mauritania on its taking over the rotating Presidency of the African Union and we commend its commitment to the rule of law, good governance, refugee inclusion and constitutional values. We stand ready to assist States of the Sahel in accelerating the pace of the transition towards the return of the constitutional order.3. Horn of AfricaWe reaffirm our strong commitment to promoting peace, security, and stability in the Horn of Africa. We continue to provide humanitarian support to those most affected by food insecurity, widespread poverty, armed violence, the impact of extreme weather events and displacement.We express our concern regarding the Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and the Somaliland region of Somalia announced in January 2024. We encourage both the Ethiopian and the Federal Government of Somalia to keep all channels of dialogue open to prevent further escalation, working with regional partners, in the framework of the African Union and through bilateral contacts, in accordance with international law and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity as enshrined in the UN Charter.4. SomaliaWe commend the important progress in the institutional, macroeconomic and security sector in Somalia. We encourage the Somali Authorities to continue to make meaningful progress in the fight against Al Shabaab and in the consolidation of the institutional framework, including completion of a transparent and inclusive constitutional reform process.The process of transitioning security responsibilities to the Somali security forces needs to be closely followed, especially in view of the termination of the mandate of the African Union Transitional Mission (ATMIS) in Somalia at the end of 2024. We welcome planning underway by Somalia and the African Union for a multinational mission to follow ATMIS to help maintain stability while Somalia continues to develop its security capabilities.5. EthiopiaWhile we welcome developments in the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement between the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, we express concern for the persistent and violent tensions in many areas of the country, as well as reports of human rights violations and abuses, the severe economic crisis and widening food insecurityWe encourage further and lasting developments in the protection of human rights, protection of civilians, political dialogue to resolve tensions, reconciliation and national dialogue, transitional justice and accountability for crimes committed during the conflict.We call for a similar commitment by those involved in conflicts in other regions of Ethiopia to pursue peace through dialogue.We underscore the importance of delivering peace dividend quickly for conflict-affected populations through recovery and reconstruction support, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants, and implementation of durable solutions for Internally Displaced People (IDPs).6. SudanWe strongly condemn the ongoing fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, where the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate more than one year into the war. We especially note the impact of the crisis on women and girls, and condemn the ongoing atrocities being committed by both sides of the conflict, including using rape and other forms of gender-based violence including conflict-related sexual violence. We are concerned by the increasing numbers of displaced people.Obstruction of humanitarian access by the Sudanese Armed Forces and rapid Support Forces is resulting in the starvation of the Sudanese people. We urge both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces to agree and implement a lasting ceasefire without pre-conditions and to establish safe and stable humanitarian cross border and cross line access channels, including from multiple points of entry to the most devastated areas of Sudan. We urge all actors to return to negotiations and to engage in a national dialogue inclusive of women and the composite Sudanese civil society and aimed at re-establishing civilian and representative institutions. An active African role and the continued support of the international community remain essential to help Sudan to restore the democratic transition process.We commend the outcomes of the Paris Conference for Sudan and the Neighbouring countries during which over 2 billion Euros have been pledged to support civilian population in Sudan and those who sought refuge in neighbouring countries in 2024.7. Democratic Republic of the CongoWe strongly condemn the resumption of attacks by the March 23 Movement (M23) in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). We are very concerned by the worsening of the humanitarian situation, and the increasing serious human rights violations and abuses the population is being subjected to. We also condemn all armed groups operating in the country. We demand the immediate cessation of hostilities and of any further advances by the M23 and its withdrawal from all occupied areas as agreed through the African Union-endorsed Luanda process. We demand all armed groups to cease hostilities, withdraw from the areas they are controlling and disarm.We expressed deep concern at the reports of the Group of Experts on the DRC on foreign military support for M23 and direct military interventions on DRC territory. We condemn any such support provided to M23 and any other armed group operating in the DRC and demand its cessation and the immediate withdrawal of any unauthorized foreign military presence from the DRC. We also condemn support, notably provided by military forces, to certain armed groups such as the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), and demand the cessation of such support.We stress that any violations of the UN arms embargo is unacceptable and urge all States to stop any support to these armed groups.We remain committed to the Luanda and Nairobi processes to reach a negotiated diplomatic solution to the conflict. We encourage an effective Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery, and Stabilization programme and the meaningful participation of women and youth in all their diversity. We also stand ready to work with the nations of the Great Lakes region to address the root causes of the cycles of violence in eastern DRC in a manner that takes into account the concerns and interests of the whole region, including by promoting accountability for all actors responsible for violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law.III. ADDRESSING IRREGULAR MIGRATION, FOSTERING HOPE AND OPPORTUNITYWe recognize that forced displacement and irregular migration have to be addressed in an integrated, comprehensive, and balanced manner, in a spirit of joint responsibility and commitment, and in accordance with international law and in full respect of human rights.We will support our partners in addressing the root causes of instability in Africa and other regions and countries of origin, while promoting a cycle of growth grounded in the huge potential of the Continent, particularly in view of the just and clean transition and growth in access to electricity, offering alternative solutions to irregular migration. Collectively, we will address migration drivers including through: better leveraging and coordinating our development and climate finance; supporting fragile and conflict afflicted states; and strengthening international capacity to address climate change, conflict, learning poverty and other drivers of migration. We are ready to build synergies among initiatives from all partners and institutions. We will also continue to support African countries hosting large number of displaced populations.We acknowledge that climate change is a risk multiplier already having a strong impact on human mobility. We see the need to further strengthen disaster risk reduction, adaptation, and resilience measures to counteract the drivers of involuntary displacement in the context of climate change.Human traffickers and people smugglers must be stopped from continuing their nefarious activities and we need to disrupt their business models. We recognize that women and girls are especially impacted by human trafficking, particularly trafficking for sexual exploitation. The UN and its Agencies have a role to play in this respect. Countries of origin, transit and destination must work together to stop migrant smuggling and human trafficking and uphold the dignity and worth of the human person – in line with the UN Charter.We will work towards reducing irregular migration and envisioning regular, safe and orderly migration on the basis of relevant national sovereign regulations. We are committed to find ways to better address challenges posed by irregular migration, within the framework of our international obligations.  We will enhance cooperation against migrant smuggling and human trafficking. In this respect, we acknowledge the “Rome Process” started in July 2023 with an International Conference on Migration and Development” with the dual objective of fighting human traffickers and smugglers and supporting economic development. We also acknowledge the “Mattei Plan for Africa” launched by Italy. We also recall the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and protection and the multilateral legal framework on migration and refugee protection. Legal migration pathways can contribute to economic growth and decent work in line with international standards in countries of origin and destination.We need to inject consistency and coherence in our investment in areas of shared priority for Africa, including food security, nutrition, sustainable rural development, energy transition, sustainable, inclusive, resilient, and quality infrastructure development, bridging digital divides, education, training and skilling, gender equality and good governance. Based on a mutually beneficial exchange, approaching issues on an equal footing, and ensuring alignment with Africa’s needs and priorities as identified by the African Union, African Governments and their peoples, we must step up efforts to achieve concrete sustainable development outcomes, contribute to the stabilization of areas of crisis, fight fundamentalism and address the root causes of irregular migration flows.IV. PROMOTING A FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC, MANAGING ENGAGEMENT IN ASIAThe Indo-Pacific region is a key engine for global growth, with more than half of the world’s population.  We reiterate commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, based on the rule of law, which is inclusive, prosperous, secure, grounded on respect for international law, notably the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms, and human rights. We underscore that peace and stability of the region also contributes to prosperity and development of the entire international community. Developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.We reaffirm individual initiatives of the G7 members and welcome those of our partners, such as ASEAN, IORA, Australia, Republic of Korea, India and other South Asian as well as Pacific Island countries, to enhance their engagement in the region. We underscore our commitment to further strengthening our coordination among the G7. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of working together with all regional partners.We reaffirm our thorough support to ASEAN centrality and unity, as well as to initiatives aimed at fostering regional cooperation in line with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.We underscore our commitment to further strengthen our partnership with the Pacific Island countries, by supporting their needs and efforts in the implementation of the Pacific Islands Forum’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. We look forward to the 4th International Conference on Small Island Developing States under the theme “Charting the course towards resilient prosperity” (St. John’s, Antigua and Barbuda 27th-30th May 2024). We will broaden our support to civil society, private sector, and academia’s plans for the promotion of a free and open Indo-Pacific.8. ChinaWe recognize the importance of constructive and stable relations with China.  We reaffirm the need to engage candidly with and express our concerns directly to China. China is a key interlocutor in addressing global challenges, and we stand ready to cooperate with China on areas of common interest.We reaffirm our interest in a balanced and reciprocal collaboration with China aimed at promoting global economic growth, with a view to enabling sustainable and fair economic relations and strengthening the international trading system. Our policy approaches are not designed to harm China, nor do we seek to thwart China’s economic progress and development. However, we are concerned that China’s non-market policies and practices are leading to harmful overcapacity that undermines our workers, industries, and economic resilience. A growing China that plays by international rules would be of global interest. We are not decoupling or turning inwards.We reiterate the importance of ensuring a level playing field and a transparent, predictable, and fair business environment. Respect for the rules-based multilateral trading system based on market principles needs to be the hallmark of our relations, to protect our workers and companies from unfair and non-market policies and practices, including forced technology transfer or illegitimate data disclosure, which distort the global economy and undermine fair competition. We will protect our workers and business communities from unfair practices, including those that lead to overcapacity, create supply chain vulnerabilities and increase exposure to economic coercion, as we recognize that economic resilience requires de-risking and diversification where necessary.We reaffirm the need to uphold the principles of the UN Charter in their entirety.  In this respect, we call on China to press Russia to stop its military aggression. We express our strong concern about transfers to Russia from business in China of dual-use materials and components for weapons and equipment for military production.We are seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas and reiterate our strong opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. We continue to oppose China’s dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia in the South China Sea and its repeated obstruction of countries’ high seas freedom of navigation and we express serious concern about the increasing use of dangerous maneuvers and water cannons against Philippines vessels in this regard. There is no legal basis for China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea, and we oppose China’s militarization, coercive and intimidation activities in the South China Sea. We re-emphasize the universal and unified character of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and reaffirm UNCLOS’s important role in setting out the legal framework that governs all activities in the oceans and the seas. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on July 12, 2016, is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties.We restate the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to security and prosperity for the whole international community and we call for peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. We support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations, including in the World Health Assembly and WHO technical meetings, as a member where statehood is not a prerequisite and as an observer or guest where it is. There is no change in the basic position of the G7 members on Taiwan, including stated one China policies.We remain concerned about the human rights situation in China, including in Xinjiang and Tibet. We express our concerns about the deterioration of pluralism and civil and political rights in Hong Kong since the 2020 National Security Law. We reemphasize these concerns following the recent passage of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance under Article 23 of the Basic Law, which will further erode autonomy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong. The new law will make it harder to live, work and do business in Hong Kong and undermine the ability of Hong Kong people to maintain free and open exchanges with the wider world. We reiterate our call on China to uphold its commitments under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, which enshrine rights and freedoms and a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong. Furthermore, we urge China and the Hong Kong authorities to act in accordance with their international commitments and applicable legal obligations.We call on China not to conduct or condone activities aimed at undermining the security and safety of our communities and the integrity of our democratic institutions, and to act in strict accordance with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. We encourage China to uphold its commitments to act responsibly in cyber space.9. North KoreaWe reiterate our strong condemnation of North Korea’s escalatory development of its unlawful weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programmes. We further reiterate our call for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and demand that North Korea abandon all its nuclear weapons, existing nuclear programs, and any other WMD and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. We urge North Korea to return to, and fully comply with, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and IAEA safeguards and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We reiterate that North Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon state in accordance with the NPT. We urge North Korea not to conduct any further nuclear tests. We urge all UN member states to implement all relevant UNSCRs fully and effectively and demand Security Council members to follow through on their commitments. We urge North Korea to cease activities that generate revenue for its unlawful ballistic missile and WMD programmes, including malicious cyber activities.In this context, we condemn in the strongest possible terms the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, including North Korea’s export and Russia’s procurement of North Korean ballistic missiles in violation of UNSC resolutions, as well as Russia’s use of these missiles against Ukraine. We are also deeply concerned about the potential for any transfer of nuclear or ballistic missiles-related technology to North Korea, in violation of the relevant UNSC resolutions. Russia’s veto of the UN Security Council resolution to renew the mandate of the UNSCR 1718 Committee Panel of Experts makes it easier for North Korea to evade the UN sanctions that Russia had previously voted for. We urge Russia and North Korea to immediately cease all such activities and abide by relevant UNSCRs. We reiterate our commitment to counter sanctions evasion and strengthen enforcement. We will increase efforts to maintain the Panel of Experts.We strongly condemn North Korea’s systematic human rights violations and abuses and its choice to prioritize its unlawful weapons development programs over the welfare of the people in North Korea. We call upon North Korea to resolve the abductions issue immediately and to meaningfully engage with the UN human rights system. We take note of the progressive re-opening of North Korea’s borders and call upon North Korea to take this opportunity to re-engage with the international community including through the return of all diplomatic and humanitarian personnel to North Korea.We are disappointed by North Korea’s continued rejection of dialogue and call on North Korea to accept repeated offers of dialogue, in order to enhance regional peace and security.10. MyanmarWe reiterate our strong condemnation of the military coup in Myanmar and reaffirm our support and solidarity with the people of Myanmar in their quest for peace, freedom, and democracy. The continuing attacks by the military destroying civilian infrastructure (including homes, schools, places of worship and hospitals), the repeated and serious violations of human rights and the alarming humanitarian situation &#8211; which particularly affect those in most vulnerable situations, including children, women and members of minority religious and ethnic groups &#8211; are unacceptable. We also condemn the recent implementation of the 2010 conscription law by the military regime. The forced recruitment of young people can only lead to further violence and trigger a massive exodus to neighboring countries.We urge the Myanmar military to immediately cease any violence, release all prisoners arbitrarily detained &#8211; starting from the democratically elected leaders- and establish an inclusive dialogue with all stakeholders, in view of restoring the path towards a meaningful and durable democratic process. We also reiterate our call on the Myanmar military to respect human rights and international humanitarian law, to desist from any form of forced labour and to allow prompt, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to all displaced persons and people in need.We continue to support ASEAN’s efforts to promote a credible and inclusive process to achieve the swift implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. We highlight the importance of a comprehensive implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 2669 (2022) and support the UN’s further engagement in the crisis, including through the leadership of the newly appointed UN Special Envoy on Myanmar and through the designation of a Resident Coordinator in country. Accountability for serious crimes committed in Myanmar remains essential.We reiterate our call on all States to prevent or to cease the flow of arms and other dual-use materiel, including jet fuel, into Myanmar. We stress the need to create conditions for the voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable return of all Rohingya refugees and displaced persons and justice and accountability for atrocities committed against Rohingya and other ethnic communities.V. ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES11. Development Finance and InfrastructureWe reaffirm our commitment to promoting sustainable, resilient, inclusive, and quality infrastructure as a key element for achieving sustainable development by addressing the infrastructure investment gap in low- and middle-income countries. The G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment and initiatives such as the EU Global Gateway offer a framework we will use to promote our vision of sustainable and economically viable infrastructure, underpinned by transparent project selection, procurement and finance.We reaffirm our commitment to advancing high standards for quality infrastructure as a means to spur sustainable and inclusive economic development.We intend to work together to accelerate progress towards the commitment to mobilize up to 600 billion USD by 2027 by enhancing the strategic dimension of the Partnership for the Global Infrastructure and Investment  We propose to act in close cooperation with partner countries, multilateral development banks and development finance institutions, including through de-risking, co-financing initiatives and enhanced coordination mechanisms, including at country/regional level, to further promote the development of a pipeline of bankable projects in close cooperation with the private sector, as well as to reinforce project preparation.Infrastructure development should also encompass a wide range of initiatives (i.e. on regulatory frameworks, jobs market, energy access, training and research and health systems) to support partners in order to offer opportunities to the most marginalized and vulnerable and with a view to strengthening social cohesion and inclusion.We will promote a transformative shift towards quality investment, in key areas that drive inclusive and sustainable development and resilience, including food security, climate and clean energy, biodiversity and reducing pollution, connectivity including ICT and transport networks, global supply chain resilience, health and education, and mainstreaming gender equality. We will prioritize efforts to deepen partnerships with Africa and based on the continent’s investment needs, consistent with the goal of accelerating progress towards the SDGs, through concrete deliverables, such as ongoing work along the Lobito Corridor.  Given its global mandate, G7 countries will also continue to deploy investment while bringing forward the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment global strategy in other strategic regions, such as work on the Luzon Economic Corridor.Recognizing the insufficient progress towards the 2030 Agenda and the urgency to address the financing gaps in the context of a growing number of low-income countries and middle-income countries facing higher risk of debt distress and constrained fiscal space to invest in their own development and futures, we will work together with our partners and with international finance institutions to create the conditions to scale up long-term financing for the countries in need.  In that regard, we welcome the launch of infrastructure certification schemes, such as the Blue Dot Network and the Finance to Accelerate the Sustainable Transition Infrastructure initiatives, which aim to mobilize increased private investment in emerging markets. We will strive to enhance the development finance toolkit, to mobilize additional financing from international financial institutions, bilateral partners and the private sector to more effectively reduce poverty and protect the planet.12. Food Security and Nutrition SecurityWe express concern about rising food insecurity and malnutrition stemming from the combined impact of climate change, loss and degradation of ecosystems, the growing number of conflicts, inflationary pressures, and the reduced fiscal space in many developing economies. We are committed to addressing, with partners, the worsening hunger crisis affecting parts of Africa. Strengthening the resilience of agri-food systems is necessary to effectively address food insecurity and malnutrition. That makes internationally coordinated action more urgent than ever. Ensuring food and nutrition security remains a challenge for the international community and affected countries, especially in known hunger hotspots in Africa and beyond, that are vulnerable to climate and conflict-related shocks.We reaffirm our intention to increase investments to build more resilient and sustainable food systems, to help mitigate against future food shocks and diversify food supply chains. To that end, we reaffirm our commitment to contributing to sustainable and resilient food systems transformation, in the spirit of the Roadmap for Global Food Security-Call to Action and the UN Secretary General’s Call to Action for Accelerated Food Systems Transformation, issued at the UN Food Systems Summit +2 held in July 2023 in Rome. We recall the Hiroshima Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security, issued by G7 Leaders and invited countries. We also reaffirm our support for the G20 Matera Declaration on Food Security, Nutrition and Food Systems and the G7 Global Alliance for Food Security. We acknowledge the importance of supporting fertilizer use efficiency and value chains, including local fertilizer production. The G7 is committed to the success of the next Nutrition for Growth Summit in 2025.We also reaffirm our commitment to work with the Rome-based agencies FAO, IFAD and WFP. We recognize the role of the Committee on World Food Security as an inclusive and multi-stakeholder platform to work together on food security and nutrition.In continuity with the UAE Leaders Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems, and Climate Action, endorsed at the COP28 by 159 Countries, including all the G7, we will enhance our efforts to address the food security-climate change nexus in a coherent and pragmatic manner, including through initiatives like the Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils (VACS).We stress the need for better coordination of international initiatives and projects aimed at countering food insecurity and malnutrition in order to maximize the delivery and impact of already existing resources. We continue to need innovative financial solutions for food systems, especially involving responsible private investment.13. Economic Resilience and Economic SecurityEconomic resilience and economic security are critical for the proper functioning of the G7 and wider global economies. We will foster cooperation in accordance with the G7 Leaders’ Statement on economic Security issued at Hiroshima last year. To this end, we remain committed to making global supply chains more resilient and reliable especially for critical products and technologies.We will continue to co-ordinate work on de-risking, diversification and reduction of critical dependencies and systemic vulnerabilities, actively engaging the private sector.We emphasize the importance of honoring international norms and obligations to safeguard global economic security and resilience and reaffirm our commitment to building global economic resilience and responding to harmful practices that undermine the rules-based multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core. We will continue working within the G7 and with trusted partners towards resilient supply chains, built in a transparent, diversified, secure, sustainable, trustworthy, and reliable manner.We reiterate our concern about increasing threats to economic security for all global economies, notably economic coercion, and comprehensive strategies that use non-market policies and practices, as well as other practices in the pursuit of market dominance that lead to harmful overcapacity and supply chain concentration, thereby creating vulnerabilities and dependencies. We remain committed to enhancing our coordination and cooperation within the G7, while at the same time engaging other interested international partners about joining our efforts. We will continue work, principally through the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion to improve our assessment, preparedness, deterrence, and response to economic coercion, in accordance with our respective legal systems and in conformity with international law.We acknowledge the key role of semiconductors as a critical part of supply chain resilience and economic security. To that end, we welcome the establishment by the G7 Industry, Technology and Digital Ministers of a semiconductors Point of Contact (PoC) Group dedicated to facilitating information exchange and sharing best practices among G7 members.14. Climate, Energy Security and EnvironmentWe are facing the unprecedented triple global crises of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution that are mutually reinforcing and intrinsically linked, as well as an ongoing global energy crisis, health threats, and environmental damage, including those caused or exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.The international community needs to come together and act decisively, irrespective of geographic or political divides, taking concrete steps collectively to achieve the global target to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and achieve global net zero (CHG) emissions by 2050.To this end, we reaffirm our commitment, and we reiterate the call on all countries to contribute to global efforts to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly, sustainable and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science and to accelerate low and zero-emission technologies.We recognize the primary need to accelerate the transition to net-zero emissions by 2050, while ensuring policies to diversify energy sources and supplies to address potential security risks to energy systems, in a manner consistent with our climate and sustainability goals.We are determined to promote energy efficiency as the “first fuel”, and fast-track clean, safe, and sustainable energy development and deployment, while reducing our dependency on fossil fuels. Moreover, actions must be taken to increase access to electricity and clean cooking as well as to accelerate sustainable, just and inclusive clean energy transitions in emerging and developing countries and to continue efforts to swiftly implement the Just Energy Transition Partnerships.We are determined to promote affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy in Africa. With this objective, under the Italian Presidency we look forward to continuing discussions on how the G7 can concretely advance and contribute to Africa’s industrial advancement and to its sustainable, resilient, and inclusive growth.The connection between climate, environment and energy is critical to making progress towards our climate change and environmental goals while implementing economically sustainable, just, and rapid transitions. Seizing the opportunities presented by innovative technological solutions and the alignment of global financial flows to support the goals of the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework will be critical to ensuring prosperity and environmental sustainability, while simultaneously fostering development and poverty alleviation, especially in developing countries.We underline the G7 role in advancing implementation of the CMA5 global effort to triple renewable energy capacity globally and double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements, globally by 2030, considering national circumstances, and welcome the consensus reached at CMA5 calling on all Parties to contribute to its achievement.We need to play a key role in defining secure, sustainable, and affordable energy systems, ensuring just and inclusive clean energy transitions. We therefore commit to achieving concrete steps forward in strategic areas. Among these, we recognize the key role of renewables, including from sustainable biological origin, nuclear energy for those who opt to use it, including advanced and small modular reactors, energy efficiency, methane emissions reduction in line with the Global Methane Pledge, industrial de-carbonization, most innovative technologies such as renewable and zero-emission hydrogen, and carbon management technologies.  We will pursue secure, resilient, affordable and sustainable supply chains for critical minerals and raw materials, including through the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and MSP Forum, and pursue implementation of the Five Point Plan for Critical Minerals Security adopted by G7 Climate Energy and Environment Ministers. We also underline the opportunities offered by circular economy, including recycling and resource efficiency, as well as innovative technologies. Investing in innovation should also help us in addressing the key topic of reducing GHG emissions in heavy-emitting sectors and promoting the development of a circular economy.Leveraging private sector financing as well as innovative financing mechanisms are important steps to support energy transitions in developing countries, increase resources for adaptation and resilience and enable actions for responding to loss and damage to assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, especially SIDS and LDCs.The transition to a net zero-emissions, sustainable, climate resilient and nature positive, pollution free and circular economy will necessarily need to involve all the members of society, to ensure just and inclusive transitions, leaving no one behind. Women, youth, and Indigenous Peoples s tend to bear the brunt of climate change-related disasters. In this context, we place particular emphasis on need to empower these societal sectors and include them in efforts to address climate change and environmental degradation. We highlight the importance of nature-based solutions in this context. Plastic pollution is a global problem that requires urgent attention. We look forward to an ambitious and effective global agreement to end plastic pollution.Biodiversity loss is an equally serious threat. Climate, biodiversity, and human health are interrelated and interdependent. We recall our commitment to implement the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework fully and swiftly and to achieve each of its goals and targets, which is the landmark plan to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. We also underline the G7 role in advancing implementation of the CMA5 global effort halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030.We will work to mobilise nature finance from all relevant sources and to align financial and fiscal flows, as appropriate, including international development assistance, with the GBF. We also call on Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to increase and report nature finance by CBD COP16.  We welcome the Global Stocktake Decision’s recognition of the importance of nature for achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal, including through halting, and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030.Given the risk of a global water crisis and continued lack of universal access to water and sanitation, we call for stronger collaboration at multilateral level in line with the UNEA-6 Resolution on Water. We welcome the UN System-wide Strategy on Water and Sanitation and are committed to the implementation of the Water Action Agenda as a key outcome of the UN Water Conference 2023. We also call for prompt appointment of a UN Special Envoy on Water.15. Global HealthGlobal health is a pre-requisite for sustainable development. Building on the lessons learned during the COVID -19 pandemic, we will continue to promote global health, knowing that health emergencies are a global challenge that need a global response.We support a reform of the Global Health Architecture fostering a more coordinated approach, strengthening Pandemic Prevention Preparedness and Response (PPR) including sustainable financing for capacity strengthening and for health emergency response, especially through the Pandemic Fund. We recognize the importance and reiterate our commitment to reaching a successful, equitable outcome of the ongoing negotiations for a new WHO convention, agreement, or other international instrument on pandemic PPR and targeted amendments to the International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR 2005) by May 2024. Completing the negotiations in time is critical to leverage political attention, strengthen future pandemic responses and improve equity.We commit to redouble our efforts to advance universal health coverage, including by supporting countries to restore access to essential health services and reduce mortality rates to be better than pre-pandemic levels by 2025. We also reaffirm our commitment to invest in resilient health systems, primary health care service delivery, and a skilled health workforce &#8211; including through the WHO Academy &#8211; as essential to reclaiming lost ground due to COVID-19 and promoting Universal Health Coverage as essential elements of pandemic preparedness.We acknowledge that climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution are   having a dramatic impact on global health and both noncommunicable and infectious disease threats. We are therefore addressing these challenges in a coherent and strategic manner, through the “One Health” approach that recognizes that the health of people is linked to the health of animals, plants and our shared environment.In this framework, we reaffirm that antimicrobial resistance is a key priority, and we will work closely for a successful upcoming UN High Level Meeting on AMR in September 2024.16. Gender EqualityWe reiterate our commitment to give a new impetus to gender equality. We recall the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the outcome documents of its review conferences and confirm our determination to deliver on the 2030 Agenda relevant Sustainable Development Goals.We reaffirm the G7’s continued global leadership on gender equality and the promotion and protection of the rights of women and girls in all their diversity as well as LGBTQIA+ persons. We express our strong concern over the global rollback of all women’s and girls’ rights, including sexual and reproductive health and rights, and the disproportionate impact of conflict and crisis on them.Gender equality and women’s empowerment is a fundamental pre-requisite to eradicate poverty, to stimulate prosperity and sustainable and inclusive growth, and to build peaceful, just, and inclusive societies.  We recognize that unpaid care and domestic work are major obstacles to the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women and negatively impact women’s economic empowerment by impairing their ability to work full-time or in leadership positions.  We reaffirm the significant value of the World Bank Invest in Childcare initiative and aim by 2035 to support 200 million more women to join the workforce by investing in efforts to close the global childcare gap.We must pursue gender equality as a cross cutting priority to promote and protect the rights of women and girls and members of minority groups, including their ability to exercise their human rights, by ensuring freedom from all forms of discrimination and gender-based violence.  We need to strengthen their economic security and empowerment by increasing and addressing barriers to their participation and building their resilience against the impacts of climate change, including by advancing their access to jobs in green and blue industries critical to our future and the future of our planet. We will promote comprehensive sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR, including at the UN General Assembly and Summit of the Future.Women and girls are disproportionately affected by conflicts and crises which can exacerbate existing gender inequalities and expose women and girls, to heightened risks of violence, exploitation, and discrimination. The involvement of women and girls in all areas related to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts as well as disaster risk reduction is crucial to creating and ensuring sustainable and inclusive peace and address the root causes of conflicts. In line with UNSCR 1325 and subsequent Resolutions on Women Peace and Security (WPS), we underscore the importance of women’s full, equal, and meaningful participation and leadership in all areas of policy decision-making spaces and tangible implementation, and through women’s civil society organizations, non-government partners, and throughout the political, security and development spheres. We remain committed to protecting women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence before, during, and after conflicts, ensuring accountability for perpetrators, and providing support and services to survivors.17. Disaster and Risk ReductionWe reaffirm our commitment to strengthen and accelerate the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the &#8220;Early Warning for All&#8221; Initiative by scaling up international cooperation.We acknowledge the interrelated causes and effects of disasters, particularly climate change-induced disasters, on different aspects, including peace and stability, local, regional, and international security, health, education, gender equality, and vulnerability. We renew our commitment to act ahead of disasters by working across the Humanitarian, Development Peace Nexus. Our aim is to reduce risks, anticipate and prepare for disasters, minimize the impacts of disasters on communities and infrastructure in order not to hamper development progress.We stress the importance of the outcome of COP28 in terms of operationalizing new funding arrangements to respond to loss and damage, including the fund. We welcome the pledges to the fund that have already been made and we encourage further support, to be provided on a voluntary basis and from a wide variety of funding sources. This is part of our wider commitment to assist those developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.19. Global GovernanceWe reiterate the significance of maintaining and strengthening the free and open international order based on the rule of law, respecting the UN Charter, and the paramount importance of international and multilateral cooperation in promoting peace, stability, and prosperity. We share the UN Secretary General’s ambition for inclusive, networked, and effective multilateralism, as outlined in the “Our Common Agenda” Report. We look forward to the UN Summit of the Future as an opportunity to accelerate these efforts, to tackle global challenges and accelerate progress on the SDGs.To restore a sense of common purpose among UN Members States and to make international and multilateral cooperation stronger, more effective, more inclusive, more democratic, more efficient and more transparent, we commit to actively contribute to the Summit of the Future as an opportunity to foster dialogue and to find shared solutions to common problems. Human rights as one of the founding pillars of the UN system will be our common compass throughout the Pact for the Future. We welcome the latest report of the UN Secretary General on human security. We are committed to working with all UN Member States to strengthen the roles of the UNSG as well as the UNGA. We also recommit to the reform of the UNSC.We reaffirm the need for strengthened international financial institutions and underscore the role of multilateral developments banks (MDBs) in the SDGs achievement, including in crisis affected contexts. We support the ongoing efforts for MDBs reform, including the World Bank Group (WBG) evolution roadmap, to better address global challenges. In this respect, we look forward to the WBG and International Monetary Fund annual meetings.We stress the key role of MDBs in addressing global challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and fragility and conflict, which are critical to achieving poverty reduction and sustainable development that is inclusive and resilient.19. Conflict Prevention and Management, Support to UN Peace OperationsWe renew our commitment to strengthening peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts to address increasingly complex and interconnected security challenges. We need to build resilient societies, uphold human rights, support good governance, and invest in people to achieve sustainable peace. We condemn sexual and gender-based violence, especially when related to armed conflict situations.We highly value the role of the UN and support an integrated approach to peacebuilding and peacekeeping. We support the Peacebuilding Commission in its role as a convener of relevant stakeholders and an advisory body to other UN organs and we support the Peacebuilding Fund as a critical tool to help to ensure adequate financing for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.We reaffirm that the UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions are valuable tools to prevent escalation and the recurrence of conflicts and to protect civilians where mandated to do so.We further reaffirm our general support for the UN Secretary General’s ‘’New Agenda for Peace’’, “Action for Peacekeeping” and “Action for Peacekeeping Plus” to reform and strengthen such operations, based on a conflict prevention approach to crises. We will enhance capabilities and work to ensure the safety and security of those deployed, for example through the UN Triangular Partnership Programme.We underscore the importance of strengthening the global implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS), Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) and Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) agendas.20. A Global Resilient Cyberspace, Artificial IntelligenceWe reiterate our commitment to an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure cyberspace. We highly value the role of the Ise-Shima Cyber Group to define common ground.While relying on the leadership of governments and international organizations, we recognize the importance of the multistakeholder model, with the invaluable contribution of the private sector in promoting technological development and of civil society in advancing a common understanding of threats and providing solutions to improve cybersecurity.As the international community is increasingly confronted with disruptive activities carried out through Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems, we reiterate that international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, apply in cyberspace. We call for the full implementation of existing norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace, and we encourage States to deepen their understanding of how international law applies to cyberspace.We condemn malicious cyber activity, and we will continue to work together at the national level and in multilateral fora to increase accountability in cyberspace. We will increase our cooperation against malicious cyber activities, including state-sponsored ones. We are determined to protect our democratic systems and critical infrastructures from malicious cyber threats. We express our concern for the increasing number of ransomware attacks , particularly  targeting hospitals and healthcare facilities, and in this regard we recall relevant norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, which emphasize states’ commitment to not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICT and to respond to appropriate requests to mitigate malicious ICT activity emanating from their territory aimed at  the critical infrastructure of another state.  We welcome significant international initiatives, such as the Counter Ransomware Initiative and the Pall Mall Process, which contribute to increase awareness and improve oversight coordination.We urge countries to enact legislation in line with the provisions of the Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe (Budapest Convention) and engage in accession to the treaty. We also urge countries to fully utilize the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime as a tool to combat cybercrime.We call on the international community to be guided by the framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace to reduce risks to international peace and stability and make cyberspace a less contested domain. We underline the importance of confidence building measures, international cooperation, and capacity building. We affirm our support for the “Programme of action to advance responsible State behavior in the use of ICTs in the context of international security”, as the permanent and action-oriented mechanism to hold discussions on cybersecurity at the UN from 2025 onward.We reaffirm the G7 support to Ukraine’s cyber resilience, and we welcome multilateral initiatives aimed at providing assistance, such as the Tallinn Mechanism.We will continue to coordinate and, where possible, unite our efforts to assist countries to improve their capacity to address the multiple challenges of cybersecurity and resilience. Exchanging information on respective national projects may help identify best practices. We will be inspired by a demand driven approach and aim to fully integrate cybersecurity into digital development, as highlighted by the Accra Call for Cyber Resilient Development. To this end, we will continue to cooperate where it is relevant with International Financial Institutions, for instance the World Bank, and the private sector.Malicious cyber activities are disrupting critical services in G7 countries – including hospitals, energy companies and water companies – and costing our economies billions of dollars in disruptions. We commit to taking concrete steps to improve our collective cyber resilience.Considering the key and complementary role played by high-level policy makers and the National Agencies for Cybersecurity in ensuring a safe cyberspace and in fostering international collaboration at a policy and technical level, we also welcome the first meeting at G7 level, scheduled in Rome on 16-17 May, and we look forward to the outcome of their discussions.  We resolve to keep analyzing the multifaceted applications of artificial intelligence and other new and emerging technologies, in such a way as to strike an effective balance between the advantageous uses for people and the need to mitigate the potential negative impacts in certain domains, including cyberspace. With this regard, we acknowledge the importance of advancing our efforts to ensure safe, secure and trustworthy AI, which is human-centric and human rights-based, including through advancing the outcomes of the Hiroshima AI Process, and foster interoperability between AI governance frameworks to support our common vision.As new technologies are defining the future of our societies, we endorse the UN General Assembly resolution “Seizing the Opportunities for Safe, Secure and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence Systems for Sustainable Development” that was adopted by consensus and co-sponsored by 123 countries. We will also endeavor to provide contributions to the Global Digital Compact and  WSIS+20 Review and the UN Pact for the Future, in order to protect an open, free, secure and inclusive Internet for future generations, governed through multi-stakeholder processes, and by protecting the ability  for all to share information and communicate freely and securely, making sure the voices of younger generations, emerging economies and developing countries are properly heard.We recognize the nexus between AI and cybersecurity, and we commit to countering the risks posed to cybersecurity by AI. We also underscore the importance of ensuring the cybersecurity of AI systems and note the publication of the Guidelines for secure AI system development.21. Countering hybrid threats, including foreign information manipulation and interferenceMalign foreign influence operations, including malicious cyber activities, and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), are a growing challenge to democratic societies around the world, threatening to undermine democratic values, human rights, governmental processes, political stability, and international partnerships. These operations aim at misleading and deceiving our citizens, interfering in our democratic processes, destabilizing our governments and democratic institutions, and undermining our shared values, creating, and exploiting cultural and societal frictions, as well as negatively affecting our ability to conduct foreign and security policy. FIMI threatens to destabilize the very fabric of our rules-based international system and is exacerbated by the exploitation of emerging technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI).We are committed to addressing the potential risk of the misuse of new technologies for purposes of disinformation, and the role of AI in FIMI, especially in the context of forthcoming elections.AI has the potential to strengthen democracy by advancing resilience, openness, civic engagement and participation, and access to government services and information. But AI can also be used as a tool to undermine democracy, including through voter suppression, information manipulation and curtailment of civic engagement. We are concerned with the potential for authoritarian states and non-state actors to misuse current and emerging technologies to undermine democracy and confidence in elections and to erode the information environment.FIMI negatively affects the ability of citizens to take rational, informed decisions, which lies at the very heart of our democratic institutions and aims at undermining confidence in democratic governments and societies. Disinformation can be used to polarize society; it often supports violent extremist activities and is fuelled by malicious foreign players. Online disinformation campaigns are being widely used by a range of malign actors to create or exacerbate tensions.State and non-state actors are increasingly adopting hybrid tactics, also through their proxies. In particular, Russia, since beginning its war of aggression against Ukraine, has been augmenting military efforts on the ground with hybrid tactics, including cyberattacks and foreign information manipulation and interference. We condemn the widespread use of FIMI and AI by the Russian Government and its proxies to support its war of aggression against Ukraine and fuel further tensions globally. Building our resolve to promote information resilience, we will enhance coordination to establish a common operating picture and develop coordinated responses to information manipulation. A whole-of-society and whole-of-government effort is required to combat FIMI and foster information integrity.We are committed to protecting our information environment and democratic values against any attempt of foreign manipulation. We commit to championing free and independent media at home and around the world and promote pluralism and freedom of expression. Together we seek to strengthen public resilience to and awareness about FIMI, through education, including digital, media and information literacy initiatives and awareness-raising campaigns, also addressing gendered disinformation.We plan to strengthen our coordinated effort to better prevent, detect, respond to, and mitigate FIMI threats, addressing the impact of hybrid threats at the earliest stage possible. As billions of citizens will cast their ballots globally in 2024, the protection of free and fair elections from foreign interference is a central focus of the G7 Agenda.We also call on tech companies, in particular social media platforms, to intensify their efforts to prevent and counter FIMI campaigns and to reduce the potential abuse of AI technology for this purpose, also by increasing their transparency.Through the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) we are strengthening our coordination to identify and respond to diverse and evolving threats to our democracies. We are determined to intensify our efforts, to protect our democratic systems and open societies from foreign information manipulation and interference, including through sharing information and analysis, and identifying opportunities for coordinated response.22. Digital and Transnational RepressionAdvances in surveillance technology, including AI and commercial spyware, can enable foreign governments and their proxies to monitor, track, and target individuals more effectively and invasively. We are committed to countering the misuse of technology to target human rights defenders, journalists, perceived political opponents, and other civil society members.Transnational repression (TNR), which involves reaching across state borders to intimidate, silence, attack, and/or murder dissidents, human rights activists, and others for peacefully exercising their human rights and fundamental freedoms, has a detrimental impact to free speech, freedom of expression and other fundamental freedoms. It is one of the most harmful manifestations of authoritarian governments that aims to export repressive forms of governance extraterritorially.  We strongly condemn the targeting of activists, critics and journalists in this respect.23. Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Outer SpaceWe remain firmly committed to uphold the international non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. We intend to maintain and strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation efforts for a more secure, stable, and safer world and endorse the statement of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors’ Group.We are greatly concerned by Russia’s continuing war of aggression against Ukraine and its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and actions, North Korea’s and Iran’s continued advancement of nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. These developments pose serious challenges for international peace and security and require our united resolve in defense of the global disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.Recalling the G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, we reaffirm our commitment to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all, achieved through a realistic, pragmatic, and responsible approach.In this spirit, we remain resolved to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and advance the NPT’s implementation across all three of its mutually reinforcing pillars. We reaffirm the centrality of the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear technology.We underline the urgent need to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force and to provide sufficient resources to ensure the continued operation and the long-term sustainability of all elements of the CTBT verification system. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, we call on all states that have not yet done so to declare new or maintain existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. We deeply regret Russia&#8217;s withdrawal of its ratification of the Treaty and we are gravely concerned by Russian statements with respect to nuclear explosive testing. We urge Moscow to continue to adhere to its moratorium on nuclear tests.We call for the immediate commencement of long-overdue negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT)  while urging all states that have not yet done so to declare and maintain voluntary moratoria on the production of such material.We adhere to the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation. We underscore the IAEA&#8217;s crucial role in upholding the international non-proliferation architecture, enhancing nuclear safety and security, and safeguards, and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear technology for the benefit of all Member States. We recall the G7 Leaders’ commitment to evaluate measures to reduce reliance on civil nuclear-related goods from Russia and to assist countries seeking to diversify their supplies. We support Japan’s safe, transparent and science-based process to responsibly manage the discharge of Advanced Liquid Processing System treated water and in proactively coordinating with scientists and partners as well as the IAEA.The G7 is committed to working with all States to further identify and implement measures to minimize the risk of nuclear weapons use and to strengthen arms control. We recall the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States issued on January 3, 2022, on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, and reaffirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. We call on Russia to recommit – in words and deeds – to the principles enshrined in that Statement. We welcome the transparency of G7 nuclear-weapon States in providing data on their nuclear forces and the objective size of their nuclear arsenals. We call on others that have not yet done so to follow suit.We reiterate our deep regret over Russia’s purported suspension of the New START Treaty and we call on Russia to return to its full implementation and to engage with the U.S. on reducing nuclear risks. We are also concerned about China’s ongoing and accelerating expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and development of increasingly sophisticated delivery systems, without transparency – including providing data and objective size of its nuclear arsenal &#8211; or good faith arms control and risk reductions measures. The G7 urges China to engage in concrete strategic risk reduction discussions with the U.S. to promote stability through greater transparency of China’s nuclear weapon policies, plans, and capabilities.We underscore the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education, while encouraging other leaders, youth and others to also visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We recognize the important role that f conventional arms control, confidence-building measures and regional risk reduction have in reducing the risk of armed escalation or miscalculation, improving trust and transparency, and promoting strategic stability between states.Conventional weapons continue to be used for regional coercion, raising international tensions, and in acts of military aggression that have resulted in disproportionate civilian casualties.  This highlights the urgency of implementation agreements and commitments relating to conventional arms control and disarmament that take into account humanitarian factors.Reaffirming our strong commitment to effective multilateral action against the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, we underline the need for the universalization and full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).We will actively seek to advance efforts in the working group on the strengthening of the BTWC to examine and develop concrete measures to enhance the implementation of the Convention.We recognize the high priority of addressing biological threats worldwide as an utmost priority. With rapidly advancing technology and more acute biological risks, it is crucial to ensure that biological research, development, and innovation are conducted in a safe, secure, responsible, transparent, and sustainable manner. Strengthening domestic measures, engaging international organizations, academia, and the private sector remains paramount to promote and establish effective regulatory biosafety and biosecurity measures for the life sciences and global health.We reaffirm the key importance of addressing biosecurity challenges in the African continent, strengthening preparedness, and empowering the African scientific community, involving women and youth. We recognize the important progress made through the Signature Initiative to Mitigate Biological Threats in Africa (SIMBA), a flagship effort pf the G7-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity, national frameworks, surveillance and epidemic intelligence and non-proliferation capacities in Africa.In this overall effort, we will work together across the G7, the G7-led 31-member Global Partnership against the spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the BTWC, the WHO and other appropriate international fora to raise the bar globally on biosafety and biosecurity.We commit to maintaining and updating export controls on materials, technology and research that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including through multilateral export control regimes and in cooperation with all responsible international actors.We reaffirm the key role of the G7 Global Partnership in addressing threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and CBRN materials and supporting vulnerable countries around the world in to build security capacity to better mitigate all manner of CBRN threats. We welcome the launch of the Global Partnership’s new initiative to counter WMD disinformation.Working with partners, we e will continue to assess the risks posed by exports of rapidly advancing dual-use technologies.  Where necessary and according to our respective legal frameworks, we will cooperate and promote efforts to implement export controls to address risks to international security.We celebrate in 2024 the tenth anniversary of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), in which all G7 members participate. The development of realistic processes and technologies by IPNDV will help ensure future agreements contain robust verification provisions.Space-related services, data and activities are increasingly key for the functioning of our economies and the implementation of public policies for the welfare of our citizens. However, we see globally an intensification of threats and the development of capabilities directed at disrupting the peaceful use of space.We reiterate the importance of upholding the existing legal framework for activities in outer space, notably the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty”). We remain committed to fostering international cooperation, transparency, and confidence-building measures to promote responsible behavior with the goal of improving space security for all states. In parallel, we will also remain vigilant and invest in the resilience of space-related services against potentially hostile activities.We affirm the obligation of all States Parties to fully comply with the Outer Space Treaty, including not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.24. Countering terrorism and transnational crimeWe condemn terrorism in all its forms, and we reiterate our determination to protect freedom and security in our societies, upholding democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights &#8211; including the right to be free from arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy &#8211; freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief.Terrorist networks know no borders and countering terrorism requires a strong collective and internationally aligned approach that includes combating the financing of terrorism and terrorist propaganda. We need to recognize and tackle new threats emanating from malign actors’ use of emerging technologies, such as drones and artificial intelligence, while the risk of chemical, biological, and radiological attacks remain a serious threat. The potential use of technologies to counter terrorism and violent extremism must be recognized as well.Countering terrorism needs a holistic approach, aimed also at preventing violent extremism. It is imperative that we prevent radicalization to violence online and offline, in prison as well as in societies, through work with civil society, women-led organizations, local leaders and communities. We should work to promote rehabilitation and reintegration efforts for former terrorists in order to reintegrate them back into society with a reduced risk of recidivism. We intend to step up information sharing and international cooperation, promoting capacity building domestically and with partners, including in border management. All our efforts are based on respect for human rights and the principles of the rule of law.Organized crime is also a major threat to our societies and citizens and also knows no borders. Organized crime can take advantage of the insecurity, instability and conflicts caused by terrorism and it can also be a way that terrorist groups support their activities. Terrorism can leverage organized crime, too. Human trafficking, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, crimes that affect the environment, trafficking of cultural property, money laundering and corruption can find a fertile ground when exploiting war and conflicts. Capacity building in justice and security measures to counter the illicit economy can help to foster inclusive and peaceful societies.We reaffirm our commitment to fight organized crime and its illegal profits, focusing on new risks such as cybercrime. Trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants have become major sources of income for organized crime, together with drug trafficking. We are firmly committed to stop the criminal exploitation of vulnerable peoples, breaking the business model of organized criminal groups.We also reaffirm our commitment to fight against the illicit production and distribution of synthetic drugs including fentanyl. Trafficking of illicit fentanyl and other synthetic drugs props up large, adaptable, and resilient transnational criminal organizations that operate across the globe – with the financial means and capacity to corrupt society, undermine governance, and weaken government institutions around the world.  Together, we reaffirm our commitment to countering the production, distribution, and sale of illicit narcotics; to sharing threat information and engaging in joint investigations and enforcement efforts; to scheduling precursor chemicals and other drugs, in accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations and other international entities; to collectively coordinating efforts with key international partners, especially with countries where synthetic drugs  are produced; to participating in multilateral fora, such as the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, that unite countries and key institutions in fighting the scourge of deadly drugs; and to advancing public health interventions and services to those who need it.  Individually and collectively, we will crack down on the global criminal networks that fuel overdose deaths, disrupt the illicit financial mechanisms that support these networks; seize deadly drugs before they enter our communities; and deliver life-saving medication and care. We are ready to work with other governments to tackle these transnational challenges and to support the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.We welcome the valuable input of the G7 Roma-Lyon Group’s work on preventing and combating terrorism and transnational organized crime.25. Fight against CorruptionWe recognize that corruption and related illicit finance and proceeds of crime drain public resources, can often fuel organized crime and undermine democratic governance. Corruption and illicit finance also undermine progress across all the Sustainable Development Goals.We reaffirm the fundamental role that the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and its supporting bodies play in the global fight against corruption. We will strive to further support and enhance the effectiveness of its Implementation Review Mechanism, especially with a view to its next review phase.We also reaffirm our commitment to timely and effective implementation of the FATF standards on transparency of beneficial ownership of legal persons and legal arrangements, underscoring the importance of accountability tools that will deny corrupt actors access to our territories and our financial systems.We also recognize the challenges faced by some developing countries in meeting international standards designed to combat corruption and illicit finance, and we encourage the international financial institutions to coordinate and increase their efforts to support countries in their efforts across their operations, particularly in fragile and conflict affected countries.26. Threats to maritime securityWe reiterate our commitment to promoting a cooperative system of international governance for the ocean and seas and to maintaining the rules-based maritime order based on international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms and human rights. In this context, we recognize the importance of the role of international courts and tribunals including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.We firmly reiterate our condemnation for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, terrorism and transnational organized crime in the maritime domain, trafficking of human beings, smuggling of migrants, trafficking of weapons and narcotics, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and other illegal maritime activities. We reaffirm the importance of national and regional ownership in pursuing the fight against illegal activities at sea.V1.  TACKLING REGIONAL ISSUES27. Western BalkansWe reaffirm our shared commitment to the security, economic prosperity, and European perspective of the six Western Balkans countries as a crucial investment for peace and stability. We emphasize the importance of advancing the necessary internal reforms, particularly on rule of law, including tackling organized crime, illicit finance, and corruption.We fully support further progress on regional cooperation and integration, including by implementing the Common Regional Market, and we encourage local political elites to make decisive progress on regional reconciliation. To this aim, we call on Kosovo and Serbia to implement without further delay the Agreement on the Path to Normalization and its Implementation Annex adopted in 2023. We urge both sides to engage constructively in the framework of the EU-facilitated dialogue, refraining from provocations, inflammatory rhetoric, and uncoordinated actions.We firmly reject any attempt from internal or external actors to undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity and multiethnic character of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We fully support the executive mandate of the EUFOR ALTHEA operation to support the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina in maintaining a safe and secure environment in the country.We urge all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina to put aside divisive and inflammatory rhetoric, to avoid any act that could destabilize the country and to focus on internal reforms that would move the country closer to realizing its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.We welcome the European Council’s decision in March 2024 to open negotiations for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession to the European Union.  We support the mandate of High Representative Christian Schmidt.28. South CaucasusWe urge Armenia and Azerbaijan to remain fully committed to the peace process to achieve a dignified and durable peace based on the principles of non-use of force, respect for sovereignty, the inviolability of borders, and territorial integrity. We recall the Joint Statement issued by the sides on December 7th, 2023, and encourage them to uphold that spirit of cooperation in their future interactions. Further escalation would be unacceptable.We call on Azerbaijan to fully comply with its obligations under international humanitarian law and encourage appropriate steps to ensure the safe, dignified, and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons wishing to come back to their homes.The G7 and its members are ready to facilitate further constructive contacts at all levels, notably within the established negotiating frameworks provided by the EU and the USA, whose enduring efforts we commend.We reiterate the importance of the commitment to the Alma Ata 1991 Declaration through which Armenia and Azerbaijan recognize each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. We encourage greater regional cooperation and the re-opening of all borders, including the border between Armenia and Türkiye.29. Central Asian countriesWe remain resolved to support the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and the right of self-determination of the Central Asian countries.We are committed to enhancing our cooperation with the Central Asian countries to tackle regional challenges, including the consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the enduring impact of the situation in Afghanistan, the regional terrorist threat, as well as managing water resources and climate change and promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms.We encourage the further strengthening of regional cooperation, especially in the field of connectivity and infrastructure, including the Middle Corridor, to improve ease of trade between the Central Asian countries, bolster global supply chains, foster trade, forge investment and energy links, provide economic diversification and enhance resilience, while upholding labor rights and environmental protection.We will continue to support the implementation of the socio-economic and political reforms announced in the Central Asian countries. Throughout the region, we support the expansion of civic and political participation, the strengthening of the rule of law, and the safeguarding of human rights.30. AfghanistanWe remain committed to supporting the people of Afghanistan. We condemn the continued and systemic abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Taliban, notably of the political, economic and social rights of women and girls, as well as the rights of members of ethnic and religious minorities. We deeply regret that the Taliban has taken no serious step to initiate an inclusive political process with fellow Afghans regarding the future of the country. Peace and stability in Afghanistan will require the establishment of an inclusive and representative political process which allows Afghanistan to fulfill its international obligations and includes full, equal, safe, and meaningful participation of Afghan women, upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms.We intend to remain vigilant against the risk of Afghanistan serving as a base for hosting or exporting terrorism to other countries.The safe and secure departure of all Afghans wishing to leave the country must be guaranteed, as well as humanitarian access and the possibility to effectively provide humanitarian aid.We support the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan.We are committed to the swift appointment of a UN Special Envoy in line with the recommendations of the UN’s Independent Assessment and as mandated by Security Council Resolution 2721.VII. COOPERATION WITH LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEANStronger cooperation with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean is of paramount importance as we have common values and shared interests. We commit to further partner with the Region to address global challenges, including by protecting the international system based on international cooperation and international law, tackling natural disasters and climate change, countering transnational organized crime, and promoting trade and investments aimed at improving socio-economic resilience.31. HaitiWe express our solidarity to the Haitian population, which is suffering from unprecedented levels of gang violence. We reiterate our support to the ongoing international efforts aimed at strengthening public institutions and law enforcement, as well as combating criminal gangs, whose illegal activities have led to a marked deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation of the country.We encourage the international community to scale up its humanitarian support to the Haitian population. We note the urgent need to protect women and children in Haiti, who are suffering disproportionately from the recent and rapid escalation in violence.We welcome UNSCR 2699, authorizing the deployment of a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, in close cooperation and coordination with the Government of Haiti, to support the efforts of the Haitian National Police to re-establish security in Haiti and build security conditions conducive to holding free and fair elections. We commend the Government of Kenya for its readiness to lead the mission. Every effort should be made to expeditiously provide robust financial support to the mission so that it may deploy as soon as possible.  The people of Haiti cannot wait.We also welcome UNSCR 2700, which renews the sanctions regime for Haiti for an additional year. The sanctions regime promotes accountability by extending the territorial arms embargo and ability to sanction individuals and entities who are responsible for, or complicit in, actions that threaten the peace and security in Haiti.We commend the outcome of the CARICOM Summit held in Kingston, Jamaica, on March 11 and the commitment taken by Haitian stakeholders to implement an inclusive transitional governance arrangement.We support the ongoing efforts of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti and call on the political actors to bridge their differences and commit in a forward-looking, transparent, and fair national dialogue, which is essential to stabilize the Country.We reiterate the importance that the process to find lasting solutions to the ongoing security and humanitarian crisis be Haitian-led and owned.32. NicaraguaWe call on the Nicaraguan government to end its human rights violations as well as widespread repression and related violations and abuses against civil society, Indigenous Peoples, academics, students, the independent press, and political and religious actors.We urge authorities to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners and abide by their international obligations. We condemn the closure of CSOs and the systematic attacks on religious institutions and organizations, including the Catholic Church and its ministers, many of whom have been arrested and then sent into exile, along with hundreds of political actors and civil society members – and moved to strip them of their citizenship.  We call on the Government to restore their citizenship under international conventions.We further call on the Nicaraguan Government to hold free and fair elections, allowing the members of the opposition to exercise their rights to the freedom of assembly, and to free speech.33. VenezuelaWe are deeply concerned about the ongoing political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. We call on Venezuela to swiftly implement the Barbados Agreements of October 2023, with particular regard to electoral guarantees, and the deployment of international electoral observations missions in order to ensure free and fair elections.We are deeply worried by the recent decisions to prevent members of the opposition from exercising their core political rights and the continued detention and harassment of opposition members. We call for the immediate release of political prisoners still detained.We follow closely developments between Venezuela and Guyana over the Essequibo region and we demand Venezuela to refrain from destabilizing initiatives. The matter must be resolved in line with international law.
- Nicaragua HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Nicaragua				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Nicaragua																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Indigenous Peoples																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Nicaragua during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; enforced disappearance; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by prison guards and parapolice; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detentions; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners; transnational repression against individuals located in another country; arbitrary and unlawful interference with privacy; punishment of family members for alleged offenses by a relative; serious restrictions on free expression and media freedom, including threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests and prosecution of journalists, and censorship; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental and civil society organizations; restrictions on religious freedom; restrictions on freedom of movement and residence within the country and on the right to leave the country; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; serious government restrictions on and harassment of domestic and international human rights organizations; extensive gender-based violence, including femicide; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting members of ethnic groups and Indigenous peoples such as the Mayangna and Miskito communities; trafficking in persons, including forced labor; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; significant restrictions on workers’ freedom of association; and the worst forms of child labor.The government did not take steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.Parapolice – nonuniformed, armed, and masked units with marginal tactical training and loose hierarchy that acted in coordination with government security forces and reported directly to the Nicaraguan National Police – and individuals linked to the government of President Daniel Ortega Saavedra carried out a campaign of harassment, intimidation, and violence toward perceived enemies of the regime, such as former political prisoners and their families, farmworker activists, prodemocracy opposition groups, human rights defenders, private-sector leaders, and clergy, other religious actors, and church-affiliated civil society groups. Authorities did not investigate or prosecute these actions.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were numerous reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year. Human rights organizations and independent media alleged some killings were politically motivated, an allegation difficult to confirm because the government refused to conduct official inquiries.On June 19, former Contra counterrevolutionary and known opposition member Santiago Rivera Muller was shot and killed in the Honduran border town Trojes. Reports indicated Rivera might have been a member of an armed group in opposition to the government. Individuals close to Rivera said he had received death threats in the weeks preceding his death and believed he was killed for political reasons. Rivera was the fourth former Contra killed in Trojes since 2019.Reports of killings were common in the North Caribbean Autonomous Region (RACN). Human rights groups stated that these killings illustrated a continuation of a campaign of terror against Indigenous groups by members or affiliates of the ruling Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) seeking to encroach and seize land and natural resources from autonomous Indigenous territories. On March 11, these squatters shot and killed five Mayangna Indigenous persons and wounded two in an attack in Wilu, Sauni As. The Nicaraguan National Police (NNP) arrested Rafael Mendoza Escoto and Darling Antonio Davila Escoto for this and previous attacks on Indigenous individuals, including the killing of at least 10 persons in 2021 for which four Indigenous persons had allegedly been wrongly convicted.There was no indication the government investigated crimes committed by police and parapolice groups related to the 2018 prodemocracy uprising that began due to discontent with a government decision to reduce social security benefits. The conflict led to the killing of hundreds of peaceful protesters, illegal detention and torture of hundreds more, and thousands being forced into hiding or going into exile in neighboring countries. The Ortega government continued its policy of “exile, jail, or death” for anyone perceived as opposing its rule, applying amended terrorism laws to prodemocracy activities, and using the justice system to prosecute and imprison civil society actors as terrorists, assassins, and coup mongers. Human rights organizations concluded the regime’s investigations and prosecutions did not conform to the rule of law.																																				b. Disappearance										There were reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities. Various human rights organizations inside and outside of the country claimed NNP and prison authorities committed forced disappearances against political opposition members. These organizations cited more than 30 cases in which authorities detained political opponents without informing family members or legal counsel, without providing information regarding where they were being held, without presenting the prisoners in a public court of law, and denying all access to legal recourses such as habeas corpus. In at least 30 cases, authorities kept political prisoners incommunicado for up to 40 days, occasionally moving the prisoner to different prisons without an express order from civilian authorities and without informing the prisoner’s chosen legal counsel or family.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										Although the law prohibited such practices, government officials carried out acts that resulted in severe physical or mental suffering for the purposes of securing information, inflicting punishment, and psychologically deterring other citizens from reporting on the government’s actions or participating in civic actions against the government. Members of civil society, opposition leaders, and student leaders involved in the protests that began in April 2018 were more likely than members of other groups to receive such treatment.Prison authorities subjected 59 prisoners held in the Directorate of Judicial Assistance temporary holding cells, known as El Chipote, to cruel and degrading treatment. Family members reported the prisoners were intentionally underfed and fed spoiled food, continually interrogated after conviction, subjected to extended periods of darkness or light, deprived of sunlight, prevented from speaking, subjected to psychological torment, denied access to reading material and religious objects such as rosaries and bibles, and at times kept in solitary confinement for extended periods. On February 9, the government unilaterally released these 59 prisoners and another 163 political prisoners held in other prisons and house arrest – forcing them to choose between immediate exile from the country or a return to prison – and subsequently stripped them of their nationality after they left the country.On February 9, police moved Bishop Rolando Álvarez from house arrest to La Modelo prison without a court order, apparently in retaliation for his refusal to go into exile. On February 10, the regime held a sham trial and sentenced him to 26 years in prison for “undermining national integrity, propagating false news, and treason,” accusations the regime used to sentence political opponents. Human rights organizations reported women prisoners were regularly subjected to strip searches, degrading treatment, threats, and other gender-based violence while in custody of parapolice forces, prison officials, and police. Family members of prisoners also suffered degrading treatment by police and prison guards during visits, including strip searches, forced squats, and body cavity searches.Impunity persisted among police and parapolice forces in reported cases of torture or other abuses. The government made no effort to investigate allegations regime opponents were tortured or otherwise abused.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prison conditions were harsh and potentially life threatening. Overcrowding, poor sanitation, difficulties obtaining medical care, and violence among prisoners remained serious problems in prison facilities.Abusive Physical Conditions: Prison conditions worsened due to antiquated infrastructure and an increasing inmate population. Despite relatively new temporary holding cells in the Directorate of Judicial Assistance, also known as El Chipote, the rest of the prison system was in poor condition. In 2020, the government reported overcrowding in five of the seven prisons for men, holding 15,333 prisoners with capacity for 12,600. The government did not provide updated figures. More than 1,000 inmates were held in the notorious La Modelo prison, known as the regime’s torture prison. The NNP began using a jail in the third district of Managua as a long-term holding facility for political prisoners in lieu of El Chipote jail, which was not equipped to house prisoners for long periods. Additionally, the NNP moved several political prisoners from the cities where they were arrested to this jail.Inmates suffered from parasites, inadequate medical attention, inadequate and contaminated food, contaminated water, and inadequate sanitation.Conditions in jails and temporary holding cells were also harsh. Most facilities were physically decrepit and infested with vermin; had inadequate ventilation, electricity, or sewage systems; and lacked potable water.Many prisoners suffered mistreatment from prison officials and other inmates. Human rights organizations confirmed at least six prisoners detained in connection with the 2018 protests or the 2021 crackdown on opposition were subjected to solitary confinement in maximum-security cells, in some cases for months. Ten other political prisoners from before the 2018 protests faced similar conditions.Administration: Authorities often ignored or did not investigate credible allegations of inhuman conditions.Independent Monitoring: The government did not allow most independent organizations to monitor the prison system. The government allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to perform one visit to the prison system in February but did not include access to political prisoners held in El Chipote.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of persons to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The government, however, generally did not allow those arrested during protests to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention. In cases of political opponents, judges regularly denied or ignored constitutional protections for detainees, including habeas corpus.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The law required police to obtain a warrant from a judicial authority prior to detaining a suspect and to notify family members of the detainee’s whereabouts within 24 hours, but this rarely happened in arrests related to civil unrest or perceived instances of political dissent.Police could hold a suspect legally for 48 hours before arraignment or release; however, a 2021 amendment to the criminal procedural code allowed the Public Prosecutor’s Office to request an extension for 15 to 90 days if a judge deemed the case complex. A judge then was required to order the suspect released or transferred to jail for pretrial detention. The suspect was permitted family member visits after the initial 48 hours. A detainee had the right to bail unless a judge deemed there was a flight risk. The criminal code listed crimes that could be tried by a judge without a jury and that would not qualify for bail or house arrest during the duration of the trial. Detainees had the right to an attorney immediately following their arrest, and the state provided indigent detainees with a public defender.When dealing with political prisoners, police routinely held suspects incommunicado, often in temporary holding cells in Managua, even if police arrested the suspect outside of the capital. In several instances, authorities denied having detainees in custody at a specific jail, including to their family members or legal counsel. Police routinely rejected complaints filed by prodemocracy activists. Political prisoners were not afforded legal counsel of their choosing within the first 48 hours of the arrest as prescribed by law. Instead, pro-FSLN judges handpicked public defenders for at least the first two pretrial hearings. Human rights organizations reported police and parapolice agents routinely detained and released government opponents within a 48-hour window, beyond which the Public Prosecutor’s Office was required to obtain an extension limited to no more than 90 days to continue its investigation. Police abused this provision by failing to begin investigations until an extension was granted.The NNP obligated dozens of citizens to report daily to a specific police station at a specific time while awaiting a trial date. The NNP threatened these citizens with imprisonment if they failed to follow instructions precisely. The procedure was not based on law. By October, more than 70 persons were subjected to this process.The government used money laundering laws, a foreign agents law, a cybercrime law, and a law for the defense of sovereignty to threaten, harass, and unjustly detain political opponents, journalists, and civil society activists. Human rights organizations and civil society activists asserted these laws constituted part of a larger scheme by the government to exert its own concept of sovereign security, laid out in the 2015 Sovereign Security Law, which significantly broadened the definition of state sovereignty and security, as a pretext to arrest protesters and other persons the government deemed in opposition to its goals.Arbitrary Arrest: Human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) noted cases of arbitrary arrests by police and parapolice forces, although parapolice had no authority to make arrests. In several cases, police made arrests without a warrant. Detentions of political opponents mostly occurred without a warrant or formal accusation and for causes the law did not authorize.According to human rights groups, arbitrary arrests occurred regularly, particularly of persons the government deemed active opposition members or participants in previous prodemocracy protests. The government detained several members of the Roman Catholic Church for extended periods without formal charges. Between April 1 and April 6, the NNP arrested without a warrant at least 15 persons related to political opposition or Catholics participating in religious processions during the Catholic celebration of Holy Week in the period preceding Easter Sunday.In several cases, police raided and ransacked the houses of those detained, also without court warrants. Police often took personal items from homes and businesses unrelated to the alleged crimes for which they were detaining citizens. Many arrests allegedly occurred without informing family members or legal counsel. Reports of armed, hooded men in plain clothes acting alone or together with police to arrest and detain prodemocracy protesters were common. Human rights organizations indicated delays in the release of prisoners after they finished prison terms led to many cases of arbitrary continuation of a state of arrest.Pretrial Detention: Lengthy pretrial detention continued to be a problem. Many opposition leaders and prodemocracy protesters were detained and held with no charges and without being granted due process. Observers noted that in several instances authorities deliberately imposed lengthy pretrial detentions against specific protest leaders and Catholic clergy.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The law provided for an independent judiciary, but the government did not respect judicial independence and impartiality. In October, the government purged the Supreme Court, firing or arresting an estimated 600-900 persons, including judges, magistrates, and administrative staff. In addition, the National Assembly approved a law to move oversight of all national registry documents from the courts to the office of the attorney general. The actions further cemented power in the executive branch.NGOs complained of delayed justice caused by judicial inaction and widespread impunity, especially in cases involving family and domestic violence and sexual abuse. Members of the judiciary, including those at senior levels, were widely believed to be corrupt or subject to political pressure. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) August report, in cases against political activists, judges handed down biased judgments at the bidding of the government. Lawyers for political prisoners reported judges routinely dismissed defendants’ evidence and accepted prosecutors’ anonymous sources. In many cases, trial start times were changed with no notification to one or both parties to the trial, according to human rights organizations. Authorities occasionally failed to respect court orders. On May 25, the Supreme Court canceled the licenses of 25 exiled lawyers associated with the opposition. The regime had already stripped these lawyers of their citizenship in February.																Trial Procedures						The law provided the right to a fair and public trial, but the judiciary generally did not enforce this right. The law allowed judges to deny jury trials in a wide range of cases, deny bail or house arrest based on unclear rules, and arbitrarily move a case from other judicial districts to Managua, to the disadvantage of defendants, their families, or their counsel. Defendants were often denied the right to be informed promptly of the charges against them; have a fair, timely, and public trial; be present at their trial; have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense; have representation by or access to private defense counsel; confront prosecution or plaintiff witnesses and present their own defense or witnesses; not be compelled to testify; or appeal. In at least one case, a defendant standing trial via videocall was provided no video into the courtroom, posing critical problems when the defendant was asked to confirm details of evidence shown in the courtroom the defendant could not see. While the law established specific time periods for cases to come to trial, most cases encountered long delays. Prisoners also reported a lack of immediate access to an attorney or legal counsel and were not afforded one during their detention.According to the constitution, defendants were presumed innocent until proven guilty. Observers claimed, however, that the extension of a pretrial detention from 48 hours to up to 90 days while an investigation took place posed an undue presumption of guilt against defendants. Additionally, those accused of undermining national integrity, spreading false news, or treason – accusations based on laws traditionally used by the regime to persecute political opponents – did not have access to fair trials, and FSLN judges universally convicted them.Although the constitution recognized Indigenous languages, Indigenous defendants were not always granted court interpreters or translators.The hearings for political prisoners or those deemed to be opponents of the government did not conform to legal procedures. The defendants were detained without warrants and were not afforded legal counsel of their choice or access to their family members within 48 hours after their detention or during at least two initial hearings. Their location was not disclosed, and their cases did not appear in an online system providing public access to legal cases. Judges dismissed or ignored habeas corpus writs in the prisoners’ favor, hearings and trials were closed to the public and held within the detention center, and at times prison officials denied lawyers access to their clients and refused to provide court documents to defense counsel before trial, including documents listing charges against their clients. Judges did not record hearings or provide transcripts of the hearings to defendants’ legal counsel.In her daily press briefings, Vice President Rosario Murillo frequently referred to political prisoners as “terrorists” and “coup mongers,” although the prisoners were still awaiting trial.Women’s rights organizations believed the court system continued to operate under unofficial orders not to impose imprisonment or pretrial detention in domestic violence cases. This informal policy reportedly applied only to domestic violence cases that authorities considered mild.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						Human rights NGOs characterized as political prisoners those detained for supporting or participating in prodemocracy protests, as part of the government’s crackdown on the political opposition during 2021, or for expressing perceived dissent. According to human rights organizations, the government continued to hold 91 political prisoners as of November. The government did not recognize political prisoners as an inmate category and held them with common criminals.The law allowed for family visits ranging from every eight to 21 days. Family visits for prisoners the state deemed dangerous enough to be held under maximum security were restricted to once a month.Political prisoners were severely undernourished, given no access to sunlight, and denied adequate healthcare services, including access to medicine and medical treatment for chronic illnesses, even when family members provided medications to prison authorities during prison visits. Human rights organizations received several reports of political prisoners being beaten, threatened, held in solitary confinement for weeks, and suffering from poor ventilation and poisoned or contaminated food and water.The government did not permit access to political prisoners by local human rights groups.																										f. Transnational Repression										Exiles in Costa Rica and elsewhere alleged harassment and political oppression by parapolice and FSLN sympathizers who crossed the border to target exiles, as well as by intelligence officials within the Nicaraguan embassy in Costa Rica.A cybercrimes law allowed the government to use international extradition to pursue citizens living abroad who committed so-called cybercrimes.Threats, Harassment, Surveillance, and Coercion: Family members of opposition members in exile were surveilled, harassed, detained, and wrongfully convicted as part of government attempts to force exiled opposition members to return to the country and face arrest. The government routinely denied these family members access to public documents such as birth certificates of children under joint guardianship or passports. In several cases, authorities demanded that a parent who had been forcibly exiled by the government be present to request public documents for minors.On December 1, police accused Karen Celebertti, organizer of the local franchise of Miss Universe, of inciting and financing terrorist actions and of conspiring in a foreign-backed plot to overthrow the government. Officials barred Celebertti and her daughter from returning to the country after the competition in late November. On November 27, police arrested her husband and son under similar charges, and they remained detained as of December 20.Misuse of International Law Enforcement Tools: There were credible reports the regime attempted to misuse Interpol Red Notices for politically motivated purposes as reprisal against individuals it deemed as opposition, including against clergy going into exile.Efforts to Control Mobility: There were credible reports authorities attempted to control mobility to exact reprisal against citizens abroad by denying them consular services. Migration authorities inside the country and through consular offices abroad denied access to passports to perceived political opponents and their family members, preventing them from traveling to a third country. Additionally, the government – primarily using email notifications sent by airlines – denied entry to more than 40 citizens trying to return to the country.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										The government regularly failed to take effective action with respect to seizure, restitution, or compensation of private property. Some land seizures were politically targeted and directed against specific individuals, such as business owners considered independent or against the ruling party. The government routinely seized the property of NGOs and private businesses by stripping them of their legal status or otherwise accusing them of breaking the law. In many instances, the government repurposed the property to serve party interests.The government froze the personal assets of 316 citizens it stripped of their nationality in February. In several cases, the regime seized properties of family members of those 316 individuals. On March 27, prosecutor Andrea del Carmen Salas Gomez filed an accusation against businessman Piero Coen for treason; judge Karen Vanessa Chavarria Morales found him guilty in absentia and ordered the seizure of his properties. In April, the regime seized from Coen his equity in more than 50 properties. On June 23, NNP officers seized several more properties Piero Coen owned partially or fully.The regime also canceled the operating rights of 11 private universities, including the largest remaining independent institution, the Central American University, which the State Prosecutor’s Office accused of terrorism, and judge Gloria Saavedra ordered the transfer of its assets to the state. The government refurbished the campus to become a public university within 24 hours and allowed victims no legal recourse. The Ministry of Interior canceled the legal status of the Society of Jesus, the Jesuit order operating in the country since 1995, and seized the house that was home to retired Jesuit priests. The Ministry of Interior also ordered the seizure of the association’s assets.Additionally, the regime seized the assets of the Nicaraguan chapter of the Red Cross and rebranded the nationalized assets as property of the “White Cross,” a new government organization affiliated with the Ministry of Health.Authorities routinely either rejected requests to evict illegal occupants of real property or failed to respond to the requests altogether. National and local police also routinely refused to evict illegal occupants of real property. Police often took no action against violence perpetrated by illegal occupants, while acting swiftly against any use of force by legitimate property owners. Police also enforced evictions of properties belonging to alleged opposition supporters, arriving with local government representatives to remove owners and tenants from their homes and other properties. The judicial system delayed final decisions on cases against illegal occupants. When judges issued orders in favor of landowners, local officials frequently failed to enforce court orders. In the face of government inaction, some landowners were forced to pay squatters to leave their property.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The law prohibited arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family, home, and correspondence. The government, however, failed to respect these prohibitions. Police raided homes and businesses without legal warrants, particularly against political opposition members. During the April arrest of businesswoman Anielka Garcia, the NNP and parapolice raided her business and took assets unrelated to the accusation of conspiracy to undermine national integrity and of spreading fake news.FSLN grassroots organizations such as the Citizen Power Councils colluded with parapolice or party loyalists to target the homes of prodemocracy protesters. Without a warrant and under no legal authority, these groups illegally raided homes and detained occupants, often using violence, including against family members or occupants of the household unrelated to political activities. Authorities routinely stationed police vehicles and officers outside the homes of opposition members, harassing visitors and often prohibiting opposition members from leaving their houses. These actions were widespread in large cities, particularly Managua, Bluefields, Matagalpa, Esteli, Masaya, Rivas, Leon, and Jinotega.Domestic NGOs, Catholic Church representatives, journalists, and opposition members alleged the government monitored their email, phone chats, social media accounts, and telephone conversations. Church representatives also stated their sermons and homilies were monitored. As part of a continuing social media campaign against prodemocracy protests, ruling party members and supporters used social media to publish personal information of human rights defenders and civil society members. Government supporters marked the houses of civil society members with derogatory slurs or threats and then published photographs of the marked houses on social media.Police and parapolice groups harassed and surveilled Catholic clergy and laity, including by preventing Catholic priests from leaving church property for days at a time and monitoring their homilies for alleged messages of dissent or antigovernment rhetoric. The regime revoked the legal status of two orders of foreign nuns, confiscated their property, and pressured them into fleeing the country.Inhabitants in northern towns, particularly in the departments of Nueva Segovia, Jinotega, and Madriz, as well as the RACN and the South Caribbean Autonomous Region (RACS), alleged repeated government interrogations and searches without cause or warrant. Several opposition members who were former Contras claimed they were regularly surveilled, stopped, and detained by police for questioning for several hours, usually in connection with alleged contact with rearmed groups or antigovernment protests. The individuals also said progovernment sympathizers verbally threatened them outside their homes and surveilled and defaced their houses.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The law provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, but the government did not respect this right. Restrictions on press freedom, the absence of an independent judiciary, and a nondemocratic political system combined to obstruct freedom of expression, including for members of media.Freedom of Expression: The government used reprisals and the law to restrict the ability of individuals to criticize the government. Persons who criticized the government, the ruling party, or its policies, including in discussion of matters of public interest, were subjected to police and parapolice surveillance, harassment, imprisonment, and abuse. Favorable expressions of the Catholic religion were similarly restricted.On April 6, the NNP arrested journalist Victor Ticay after he covered a religious event that was precluded by police. A court convicted Ticay of propagating false news and undermining national integrity, accusations the regime typically used against political opponents. Authorities denied Ticay legal counsel of his choosing and held him incommunicado for approximately 40 days.Government supporters considered the use of the national flag and the national colors of white and blue as acts of defiance and attacked opposition activists flying the flag or national colors.Violence and Harassment: Journalists were subject to government violence, harassment, cyberattacks, and death threats. In addition, some media owners and journalists were exiled and stripped of their nationality. Authorities blocked others from leaving or re-entering the country, withdrew their passports, or purposefully did not renew them. According to a March report by the Nicaraguan Independent Journalists and Communicators Group, 77 percent of independent journalists were reporting from exile, and 33 percent of them stopped reporting due to governmental threats.Authorities detained briefly and released other journalists with the threat they would be imprisoned unless they ceased publishing news counter to official narratives. By July, the regime blocked at least nine independent journalists from returning to Nicaragua after they exited the country briefly.The government seized the property and equipment of media whose licenses had been canceled. The government continued to occupy the offices of La Prensa, Confidencial, and 100% Noticias television channel.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: Independent media faced official and unofficial restrictions. The government continued to penalize arbitrarily those who expressed views counter to the ruling party’s ideology.Although the law providing the right to information could not be subjected to censorship, the government and actors under its control retaliated against the press and radio and television stations by blocking transmissions, confiscating recording equipment, blocking reentry to the country, imprisoning journalists and citizens for expressing news and opinions on social media, and committing violence against journalists. Many independent new outlets reported from exile; the few journalists remaining in the country operated clandestinely to avoid censorship, restrictions, and threats.Restrictions on acquiring broadcast licenses and equipment and arbitrary cancellation of licenses prevented media from operating freely.Independent news outlets, a few of which operated from inside the country but a majority from exile, faced restrictions on gathering information, such as not being permitted to attend official government events, being denied interviews by government officials, and receiving limited or no direct access to government information. Official media were not similarly restricted.The government cancelled the registration of at least 26 media outlets during the year, including eight radio stations and two television stations owned and managed by the Catholic Church. The government also ordered all cable television providers not to broadcast two television stations run by the Catholic Church. Additionally, five local newscasts, one nationally broadcast newscast, and five talk shows were informally ordered to avoid political news.Significant state influence, ownership, and control over most media outlets continued. National television was largely controlled either by business associates of the president or directly owned and administered by his family members. Eight of the 10 basic channels available were under direct FSLN-party influence or owned and controlled by persons with close ties to the government. Media stations owned by the presidential family generally limited news programming and served as outlets for progovernment or FSLN propaganda and campaign advertisements. Other media operating in the country significantly self-censored to avoid official retaliation.A decree obliging all private cable stations to broadcast official television and radio emergency and special interest messaging was in effect and was used regularly, even for nonemergencies. The government obligated independent press to use official media to cover presidential activities and used troll farms – groups of internet commenters paid to manipulate political opinions – to amplify its own messaging or attack independent media websites.Press and human rights organizations claimed the use of state funds for official media, as well as biased distribution of government advertising dollars, placed independent outlets at an extreme disadvantage. Some independent-media owners also alleged the government exerted pressure on private firms to limit advertising in independent media, although other observers believed the lack of advertising resulted from self-censorship by private companies. Many journalists practiced self-censorship, fearing economic and physical repercussions for investigative reporting on crime or official corruption. In addition, media outlet owners exercised self-censorship by choosing not to publish news that affected public perceptions of the government or the FSLN.Libel/Slander Laws: Slander and libel were criminal offenses, punishable by fines ranging from 120 to 300 times the minimum daily wage; however, there were no reports of the government invoking these laws against members of media. Instead, according to Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net 2022 report, the government used the 2020 special cybercrimes law to investigate and convict individuals, including opponents, journalists, and activists, for critical online speech.National Security: Human rights NGOs and civil society organizations argued the Sovereign Security Law exemplified the government’s failure to respect civil liberties. Although not cited in specific cases, the law applied to “any other factor that creates danger to the security of the people, life, family, and community, as well as the supreme interests of the Nicaraguan nation.” Additionally, Law 1055 and Article 410 of the criminal code, which were the bases for the crime of undermining national integrity, were often combined with the use and threats of further use of the cybercrimes law, which included as online crimes social media posts deemed dangerous by the regime and granted law enforcement authorities access to information systems and other data. Penalties for online crimes included imprisonment and hefty fines, disproportionate to the crimes defined in the law. Additionally, the National Assembly approved changes to the law, making it illegal for police officers to disobey orders or desert their post as detrimental to citizen security. The crimes were punishable with six months to two years of prison or two to three years of prison, respectively.In addition, a police regulation restricted criticism of government policies and officials under the guise of protecting national security.																Internet Freedom						There were credible reports the government monitored private online communications without appropriate legal authority and in some cases restricted or disrupted access to the internet or censored online content. Independent media reported the government provided logistical support for troll farms that routinely carried out cyberattacks against opposition media websites and social media accounts. Trolls and bots reportedly tracked opposition social media accounts to retaliate against users deemed opponents of the ruling party.Several NGOs claimed the government monitored their email and online activity without appropriate legal authority. Paid government supporters used social media and website commentary spaces to harass prominent members of civil society, human rights defenders, individuals affiliated with Catholic dioceses and evangelical churches, and well-known journalists.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The government restricted the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The government did not respect the legal right to public assembly, demonstration, and mobilization. Bans on prodemocracy marches and protests extended to religious processions not organized by the ruling party. Police and parapolice oppressed, harassed, and occasionally impeded private meetings of NGOs, civil society groups, and opposition political organizations. Police failed to protect peaceful protesters from attacks; they also committed attacks and provided logistical support to progovernment attackers. Human rights organizations reported police stopped traffic for and otherwise protected progovernment demonstrations.Police routinely surrounded, surveilled, and threatened meetings of political parties and civil society organizations, as well as Catholic churches. Police entered private meeting spaces to disrupt gatherings of opposition parties and civil society organizations.						Freedom of Association						The law provided for freedom of association, including the right to organize or affiliate with political parties; nevertheless, the Supreme Electoral Council, National Assembly, and Ministry of Interior used their accreditation powers for political purposes. As of August, the Ministry of Interior closed 199 NGOs by revoking their legal status. In several instances, the government used the pretext of enforcing Financial Action Task Force anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing standards, accusing the closed NGOs of posing high risks for illicit financial flows.The 2020 foreign agents law remained in force and formed the basis for many of the cancellations of NGOs. The law required anyone receiving funding from foreign sources to register with the Ministry of Interior and provide detailed monthly accounts of the intended use of the funds. Additionally, NGO legal accreditation was subject to annual renewal by the ministry. Many NGOs complained the ministry purposefully withheld or delayed accreditation renewal, which led to the loss of their legal status. Individuals who registered as foreign agents could not participate in internal politics or run for elected positions for up to one year after being removed from the registry. Failure to register could lead to fines, freezing of assets, and the loss of legal status for associations or NGOs.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, but the government often did not respect these rights.The government strictly controlled entry to the country of persons affiliated with humanitarian and faith-based organizations and citizens it deemed in opposition to the ruling party. The government could prevent the departure of travelers with pending legal cases and used this authority against individuals involved in the political opposition and media members who had not been charged with any crimes.In-country Movement: Police consistently restricted the travel of opposition members to cities other than their hometowns. In many cases, police restricted the movement of political opponents outside their homes, although the individuals did not have pending charges against them or judicially imposed restrictions on their movement.Foreign Travel: There were several reports of authorities restricting the right to leave the country. Migration authorities arbitrarily confiscated and refused to provide or renew the passports of some citizens trying to leave the country. Authorities told the individuals migration restrictions had been levied on them, although the individuals had no formal accusations or charges against them. Migration authorities analyzed incoming flight manifests to prevent citizens from returning to the country, requiring airlines to notify those citizens that authorities would not allow them to return. Citizens were left stranded with no further information and no access to legal recourses on the decision taken by these authorities.In more than 40 cases, the government denied reentry to citizens and residents after they returned from travel abroad. Indigenous leader Brooklyn Rivera was prevented from entering the country on April 23 after participating in a UN-sponsored event. Journalist and director of Radio Costeñísima Kimberly León was denied entry on August 31.Citizenship: The regime stripped 317 individuals of their citizenship and ordered them into exile, although several remained inside the country. Additionally, the regime misused the law to grant citizenship to foreigners considered allies of the ruling party.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government did not cooperate with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern. The government had not provided updated information on refugees or asylum seekers since 2015.Access to Asylum: The law provided for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government had established a system for providing protection to refugees. Only the executive branch or the country’s embassies abroad could grant political asylum.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons										There were reports of several Indigenous communities in the north Caribbean region being forcibly displaced due to non-Indigenous miners, farmers, and cattle ranchers encroaching on Indigenous communal land. The government did not take actions against this encroachment and, according to human rights advocates, occasionally sponsored it. The government did not have policies and protections for internally displaced persons in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.																																				g. Stateless Persons										The country contributed to statelessness, including through arbitrary or discriminatory denationalization and with birth registration problems. Registration of births in rural areas was difficult due to structural constraints, and the government took no measures to address this, resulting in many de facto stateless persons in the country. The regime erased all public records of the 317 citizens it stripped of their nationality. Many of these persons had no other permanent legal status abroad and were rendered effectively stateless but for citizenship offers made by other countries.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						While the law provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections based on universal and equal suffrage and conducted by secret ballot, government restrictions on freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and association, the arrest of opposition candidates, cancellation of opposition party registration, and institutional fraud, among other obstacles, precluded opportunities for meaningful choice.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: National elections were widely reported to not be fair and free of abuses and irregularities. Ortega and his FSLN party canceled the legal registration of all credible opposition political parties, jailed opposition presidential candidates on spurious charges, and committed blatant electoral fraud. The government did not allow credible, independent electoral observers into the country. The 2021 national elections also expanded the ruling party’s supermajority in the National Assembly, necessary to make constitutional changes to extend the reach of executive branch power and eliminate restrictions on reelection for executive branch officials and mayors. Independent observer groups and international organizations characterized the 2022 municipal elections, in which the ruling party won all 153 of the country’s municipalities and no other political parties were allowed to participate, as not credible.Political Parties and Political Participation: The government controlled political parties either by obtaining direct allegiance or by threatening to cancel their legal status. On October 3, Supreme Electoral Council director general of Attention to Political Parties Julio Acuña revoked the legal status of Indigenous political party YATAMA, providing no explanation and leaving no legal recourse. YATAMA’s cancellation came five days after the government arrested its leader, Brooklyn Rivera, and legal representative, Nancy Henríquez, and seized the party headquarters and its two community radio stations. The law barred from running for office anyone whom the government designated a “traitor,” defining the term so broadly that it could apply to anyone who expressed opposition to the ruling party. Judicial authorities included permanent bans on running for office in the official sentencing of Bishop Rolando Álvarez and several clergy. The government used state resources for political activities to the ruling FSLN party’s advantage in elections. Independent media and human rights groups reported the government used public funds to provide subsidized food, housing, vaccinations, access to clinics, and other benefits directly through either FSLN-led “family cabinets” (community-based bodies that administered government social programs) or party-controlled Sandinista leadership committee (CLS) systems, which reportedly coerced citizens into FSLN membership while denying services to opposition members. Observers noted the government pressured public servants into affiliating with the FSLN and participating in party activities and mass public gatherings, including sports events, political rallies, and marches.The FSLN required persons seeking to obtain or retain voter registration to present recommendation letters from CLS block captains. Such letters were provided only to FSLN party members.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, although the government did not implement the law effectively. There were numerous reports of government corruption during the year.Corruption: Executive branch officials were involved in private businesses with little to no oversight. Businesses tied to high-ranking FSLN members and former police and military members provided the bulk of government services in sectors such as security, construction, and pharmaceuticals. Nine security companies owned in part or fully by FSLN members who were also former police, military, and members of the executive branch won all government bids to provide public services. A limited number of party-linked construction businesses similarly won public bids, mainly in road construction. Private businesses complained customs authorities produced arbitrary and inflated fines and excessive revisions, primarily affecting businesses unassociated with the FSLN party. With FSLN control over oversight agencies, the NNP, and the judicial branch, corruption continued with impunity. Cases of mismanagement of funds by public officials were reportedly handled personally by FSLN members and President Ortega’s immediate family, rather than by the government entities in charge of public funds.For additional information about corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						The government did not allow international and domestic human rights organizations to operate legally in the country. In May, the government dissolved the Nicaraguan Red Cross Society. On June 6, the ICRC Regional Delegation for Mexico and Central America closed its office and discontinued activities in the country, at the request of the government. The Nicaraguan Pro-Human Rights Association operated from exile in Costa Rica and focused more on the Nicaraguan exile community. The Permanent Commission for Human Rights remained deprived of its legal status since 2022, as did the Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights, canceled in 2018.Other human rights organizations were also canceled or faced significant harassment and police surveillance. Humanitarian organizations faced denial of reentry or obstacles to operating from abroad, and government officials harassed and intimidated domestic and international NGOs critical of the government or the FSLN. Some NGOs reported government intimidation created a climate of fear intended to suppress criticism. Groups reported difficulties in moving donated goods through customs and stated government officials were rarely cooperative or responsive to their complaints.Several domestic NGOs reported the Ministry of Interior purposefully denied receipt of their compliance documentation and withheld or unduly delayed providing certifications to revoke the legal status of NGOs. Ultimately, the lack of certification led to the cancellation of the NGOs’ registration by the same ministry that withheld the required certification. NGOs under government investigation reported problems accessing the justice system and filing petitions, as well as pressure from state authorities. Several NGOs reported having their assets frozen during the process of certification, prior to being informed of their cancellation by the Ministry of Interior. Many NGOs believed comptroller and tax authorities audited their accounts as a means of intimidation. While legally permitted, spot audits were a common form of harassment and often used selectively, according to NGOs. NGOs reported difficulties in scheduling meetings with authorities and in receiving official information due to a growing culture of government secrecy.The government enforced the law requiring any citizen working for “governments, companies, foundations, or foreign organizations” to register with the Ministry of Interior, submit monthly reports on their income and spending, and provide prior notice of how the foreign funds were intended to be spent. The law established sanctions for those who did not register.Retribution against Human Rights Defenders: The government stripped several human rights defenders of their citizenship and disbarred several of them as lawyers with no recourse to appeal. The government forced most of these human rights defenders into exile and surveilled, harassed, or otherwise impeded from performing their duties freely those remaining in the country.The United Nations or Other International Bodies: The government did not allow OHCHR or the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) to send working groups to monitor the human rights situation in the country. The government did not cooperate with these groups, including the Human Rights Council’s Group of Experts on Nicaragua, as noted in OHCHR and IACHR reports.The government continued to block the entrance of the Organization of American States (OAS) high-level commission to help resolve the country’s sociopolitical crisis. The government did not send a representative to any IACHR sessions held during the year. The government did not send a representative to OAS Permanent Council meetings, based on its 2021 notification of intent to withdraw from the organization, which took effect in November. In several instances, government supporters detained or harassed human rights defenders protected by IACHR precautionary measures.Government Human Rights Bodies: The Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights, led since 2019 by Darling Rios, a sociologist with no previous human rights experience, and Adolfo Jarquin, also with no previous human rights experience, was perceived by observers as politicized and ineffective.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalized all forms of rape of men or women and domestic or intimate partner rape and other forms of domestic and sexual violence, including so-called corrective rape of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) persons. Sentences for rape ranged from eight to 12 years’ imprisonment. The law criminalized domestic violence and provided prison sentences of one to 12 years.The government failed to enforce rape and domestic violence laws, leading to widespread impunity and reports of increased gender-based violence. The government continued to use FSLN-led family cabinets and CLSs to mediate cases of domestic violence. According to observers, both entities were politicized and did not operate according to rule of law standards. Women’s rights organizations complained that FSLN mediators themselves were often perpetrators of domestic violence and that unofficial agreements existed to not prosecute domestic violence cases, especially if the cases were seen as “not serious.”The government operated 196 women’s commissariats, printed and distributed pamphlets on women’s rights, and instituted door-to-door visits led by NNP and ruling-party members, which the government claimed led to several findings of domestic violence. Women’s rights activists accused the government of a veiled attempt of social control. The government employed limited and insufficient public education, shelters, hotlines, psychosocial services, and police training in nominal and unsuccessful attempts to address the problem.Groups working on women’s issues reported that gender-based violence remained high and police generally understated its severity. The government continued cancelling the registration of NGOs working on women’s rights, including nine cancellations during the year. On July 11, police raided the headquarters of the Condega Female Construction Worker’s Association, an NGO that provided capacity building and room and board for women who worked in the construction sector in the northern part of the country.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: The law prohibited sexual harassment and stipulated penalties of one to three years in prison, or three to five years if the victim was younger than 18. No information was available on government efforts to prevent or prosecute complaints of sexual harassment. The NGO Catholics for the Right to Decide reported 36 femicides through June, the majority committed after the victims suffered sexual violence. Indigenous women were particularly vulnerable to gender-based violence, especially during attacks by outsiders encroaching on Indigenous lands. Reports of rape and sexual violence during such attacks were common. Additionally, the lack of coverage by government agencies in such territories made it particularly difficult for Indigenous women to find refuge, justice, or health care after such attacks or from domestic violence in general. There were several reports of cases of technology-facilitated gender-based violence, including the online sharing of intimate images, doxing, and trolling.Discrimination: The law provided for gender equality in access to education, labor rights, and civil rights. Nevertheless, women often experienced discrimination in employment, obtaining credit, and receiving equal pay for similar work, as well as in owning and managing businesses. While the government enforced the law effectively in the public sector, the authority of women in positions of power was limited compared with that of men. For example, despite a law requiring equal participation of men and women in elected positions, male political party leaders often made decisions on public policy without internal debate or input from female political leaders.Discrimination in employment took many forms. Although women generally had equal access to employment, few women had senior positions in business and worked in the informal sector in higher numbers than men; in the public sector or in elected positions, the ruling FSLN political party limited women’s independence and influence. In addition, women’s wages were generally lower compared with those of male counterparts, even for the same position and work performed. Enforcement was not effective in the private sector or the larger informal sector.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.Women in some areas, such as the RACN and the RACS, lacked widespread access to medical care or programs, and the number of maternal deaths was higher among poor rural women than among their urban counterparts. Widespread lack of access to medical services also affected Indigenous and Afro-descendant women in the RACN and the RACS more than non-Indigenous women in other regions. In addition, adolescents often faced social stigma when seeking contraception methods. According to the Pan-American Health Organization, the adolescent fertility rate during the year was 82.5 (per 1,000 girls ages 15-19). Machismo culture, low education levels, and difficulty accessing health care contributed to the high adolescent fertility rate. Women had access to emergency contraception to a greater extent in urban areas than in rural areas.The Ministry of Health’s protocol for the provision of health services to survivors of sexual violence stipulated the provision of clinical management of rape. Women’s rights organizations, however, claimed the ministry did not consistently provide this service.Economic hardship and a lack of social safety nets to protect young mothers often impeded continued education for pregnant girls or young mothers.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The law and regulations prohibited discrimination based on race but not on ethnic origin. The government did not effectively enforce the law and regulations.The law protected members of racial and ethnic groups and their right to decisions over their lands and customs. Neither the government nor the ruling party respected the law. Non-Indigenous persons regularly encroached on Indigenous lands and violently displaced Indigenous communities from their lands with the acquiescence of the ruling party. Many of these outsiders were retired military officers.Exclusionary treatment based on race, skin color, and ethnicity was common, especially in higher-income urban areas. Darker-skinned persons of African descent from the RACN and the RACS, along with others assumed to be from those areas, experienced discrimination, such as being subjected to extra security measures and illegal searches by police. These groups also faced discrimination in employment. Indigenous and other ethnic groups from the RACN and the RACS alleged discriminatory attitudes toward ethnic and racial minorities were responsible for the lack of government resources devoted to the regions. The government focused attention and resources on maintaining political control concerning decision-making bodies in the regions.																																				Indigenous Peoples										Indigenous persons were subjected to violence and threats of violence due to political and environmental advocacy, particularly against Mayangna and Miskito populations in the north-central and northeastern regions. Reports of outsiders threatening to encroach on Indigenous community lands and natural resources were widespread. There were reports of violence and killings of Indigenous persons due to artisanal mining, logging, and cattle grazing by outsiders –commonly referred to as colonos– on Indigenous lands. Police officers reportedly called for Indigenous populations to accept outsiders as it was an easier and more peaceful solution than ousting them from Indigenous lands. Reporting on these incidents was difficult because the government canceled the legal status of various NGOs that performed environmental advocacy and protected Indigenous rights in the area. Despite the existence of autonomous governing bodies, government authorities or FSLN representatives made most decisions affecting Indigenous lands, cultures, traditions, or the exploitation of natural resources on Indigenous lands.Indigenous leaders alleged regional and national governments granted logging and mining concessions to private firms and to government-affiliated businesses without adequate consultation of the Indigenous community, and that logging and mining continued in violation of national autonomy laws in the RACS and the RACN.While there were no legal barriers to their participation, representatives from five major Indigenous groups – the Miskito, Sumo/Mayangna, Garifuna (of Afro-Amerindian origin), Creole, and Rama – alleged government discrimination through underrepresentation in the legislative branch. Leaders from these communities decried the national government’s sidelining of autonomous government bodies and the undue administrative burdens and other barriers to access for national electoral politics, including the establishment of political parties and party affiliates and minimum geographic representation levels.NGOs and Indigenous rights groups denounced the increasing number of killings of Indigenous persons by non-Indigenous populations encroaching on their lands in the RACN and the RACS. On March 11, outsiders killed at least five Mayangna persons in Wilu, Sauni As. The NNP arrested two outsiders and four Mayangna forest wardens. Observers said the forest wardens were innocent and outsiders not arrested had been involved. Some observers alleged government and FSLN involvement in violence against Miskito populations in the RACN along the Coco River, either by failing to defend Indigenous populations or as accomplices to non-Indigenous groups invading Indigenous lands.Indigenous persons from rural areas often lacked birth certificates, identity cards, and land titles. While the government did not deny these documents if requested, it favored the requests of FSLN party members over other constituents. Additionally, Indigenous groups alleged the government provided identity cards to colonos in the RACS and the RACN, leading to overrepresentation of FSLN-aligned, non-Indigenous persons in regional bodies. Most Indigenous individuals in rural areas lacked access to public services, and poor roads hindered access to health care for many.Indigenous women faced multiple levels of discrimination based on their ethnicity, gender, and lower economic status. For example, Indigenous women did not receive medical attention, education, police protection, or representation in government at the same level as non-Indigenous women.																																				Children										Birth Registration: Registration in rural areas was difficult due to lack of adequate infrastructure, and the government took no measures to address this, resulting in a growing number of de facto stateless persons in the country. Persons without citizenship documents were unable to obtain national identity cards.Child Abuse: The law prohibited child abuse. Government efforts were insufficient to combat child abuse and sexual violence against children.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The minimum legal ages for marriage were 18 for men and women and 16 with parental authorization. There were credible reports of forced early marriages in some rural Indigenous communities. No information was available on government efforts to address or prevent forced and early marriage.Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law prohibited sexual exploitation in general, such as the sale, grooming, or use of children for commercial sexual exploitation, and designated as an aggravating condition behavior enticing children or adolescents to engage in sexual activity. The government generally did not enforce the law pertaining to child sex trafficking. The law defined statutory rape as sexual relations with children ages 14 to 16. Any sexual relations with children younger than 14 were considered rape.The law also prohibited child pornography, and the government generally enforced it.The country was a destination for child sex tourism.																																				Antisemitism										The country had a very small Jewish population. There were few reports of antisemitic incidents. On October 21-22, unidentified subjects vandalized Jewish graves located in a small corner of Managua’s main cemetery with red paint and swastikas. Similarly, a small public monument with a menorah was vandalized with red paint and damaged. According to reports, the government removed the markings.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: The law did not criminalize consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, cross-dressing, or other sexual or gender characteristic-related behaviors.Violence and Harassment: In general, LGBTQI+ groups reported police condoned and tolerated violence against LGBTQI+ individuals, did not take complaints of violence against them seriously, and did not fully investigate such cases when they occurred.Despite government inclusivity campaigns, the government and FSLN supporters frequently targeted LGBTQI+ participants in civil protests, using online smear campaigns and physical attacks in some cases. Police, parapolice, and progovernment supporters targeted LGBTQI+ opposition members for sexual violence. The Observatory for Human Rights Violations Against LGBTQI+ Persons stated there were 20 attacks against LGBTQI+ persons in the first six months of the year; more than half were against transgender women. In April, La Mendoza, a transgender woman, was found dead in a vacant lot with visible signs of violence.LGBTQI+ activists said LGBTQI+ political prisoners hid their orientation, fearing increased abuse from prison guards. Reliable data on the breadth of such discrimination were not available. No laws existed that specifically punished hate crimes against LGBTQI+ persons.Discrimination: Although it did not mention sexual orientation and gender identity specifically, the law stated all persons were equal before the law and provided for the right to equal protection. LGBTQI+ groups reported discrimination, lack of access to justice, and no response from police. LGBTQI+ persons faced widespread societal discrimination and abuse, particularly in housing, education, and employment. LGBTQI+ persons often received slurs or were discriminated against in their employment by being requested to dress, style, or act according to their biological gender. LGBTQI+ organizations complained the law curtailed the rights of LGBTQI+ households by defining families as necessarily headed by a man and a woman; this definition particularly hindered LGBTQI+ households’ access to social security, survivor benefits, and adoption rights.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: The law did not provide for legal gender recognition.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: There were no reports of involuntary or coercive medical or psychological practices specifically targeting LGBTQI+ individuals in an attempt to change their sexual orientation, gender identity or expression. There were anecdotal reports of psychotherapy and faith-based attempts at conversion therapies, but victims were often hesitant to report such cases due to societal discrimination. There were no known attempts to perform medically unnecessary surgeries on children or nonconsenting intersex adults.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: LGBTQI+ groups deemed in opposition to the ruling party faced constraints to gather or express their views freely. The government did not give permission to local LGBTQI+ groups for a Pride march, consistent with its policy of denying permission for any large gatherings.																																				Persons with Disabilities										The law required access to education, health services, public buildings, and transportation for persons with disabilities. The government did not enforce the law effectively. Persons with disabilities faced severe problems accessing schools, public health facilities, and other institutions. There was a lack of educational opportunities and public-services positions, despite a legal requirement that a certain percentage be available to them.Children with disabilities attended schools with peers without disabilities; specialized school materials were not readily available, and on occasion the Ministry of Education refused to provide them. Anecdotal evidence suggested children with disabilities completed secondary education at a significantly lower rate than other children. Public schools were rarely well equipped, and teachers were poorly trained in providing appropriate attention to children with disabilities.Police stations and public healthcare facilities did not have staff trained in sign language. Many voting facilities were not accessible. Advocates for persons with disabilities complained of a lack of accessible public transportation. Some persons with disabilities reported taxi drivers often refused them service due to the perceived extra burden on the driver to aid customers with disabilities. Advocates for persons with disabilities claimed interpreters for the deaf were not accessible at schools and universities. Government clinics and hospitals provided care for persons with disabilities, but the quality of care was generally poor.Discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, and mental disabilities was widespread, despite being prohibited by law. Laws related to persons with disabilities did not stipulate penalties for noncompliance, although penalties could be issued under the general labor inspection code. The government did not enforce the law effectively; did not mandate accessibility to buildings, information, and communications; and did not make information available on efforts to improve respect for the rights of persons with disabilities.Advocacy organizations for persons with disabilities reported persons with disabilities accounted for fewer than 1 percent of public-sector employees, despite a legally mandated minimum representation of 2 percent. Further reports indicated public institutions did not sufficiently coordinate with the Ministry of Labor to accommodate persons with disabilities in the workplace. Although there were no official reports of violence, harassment, or intimidation against persons with disabilities by government officials, there were several anecdotal reports of violence and harassment. These incidents generally went unreported because victims did not want to face the burdensome process of filing a complaint.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										The law provided specific protections against discrimination in employment and health services for persons with HIV or AIDS, but such persons suffered societal discrimination.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for the right of all workers, except the military and police, to form and join unions without prior authorization, to bargain collectively, and to conduct strikes. The government’s control of all major unions effectively nullified the right of workers to join independent unions of their own choice. The ruling party used its control over major unions to harass and intimidate workers in several sectors, including construction, education, health care, the public sector, and free trade zones.The constitution recognized the right to strike, with restrictions. The law prohibited antiunion discrimination and provided for the right to reinstatement for workers dismissed for union activity. Burdensome and lengthy conciliation procedures and government control of all major unions impeded workers’ ability to call strikes. In smaller businesses where major unions were not present, the government created government-aligned unions to diffuse efforts to organize strikes or other labor actions. In addition, if a strike continued for 30 days without resolution, the Ministry of Labor could suspend the strike and submit the matter to arbitration.Collective bargaining agreements lasted up to two years and were automatically renewed if neither party requested their revision. Collective bargaining agreements in the free trade zone regions, however, were for five-year periods. Companies in disputes with their employees were required to negotiate with the employees’ union if one existed. By law, several unions could coexist at any one enterprise, and the law permitted management to sign separate collective bargaining agreements with each union. Although the law established a labor court arbitration process, it was subject to long wait times and lengthy, complicated procedures, and many labor disputes were resolved out of court. The government sought to foster resolution of labor conflicts through informal negotiations rather than formal administrative or judicial processes.Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining were not respected, and the government often intervened for political reasons. The government did not effectively enforce the laws. The law did not establish specific fines for labor law violations, and penalties imposed at the discretion of Ministry of Labor officials were commensurate with those for other laws involving denials of civil rights, such as discrimination. Penalties were sometimes applied against violators.Politically motivated firings occurred. Labor experts highlighted instances of public-sector employees being fired without receiving severance pay. FSLN party affiliation or letters of recommendation from party secretaries, family cabinet coordinators, or other party officials were allegedly required from applicants seeking public-sector jobs or retain employment in the public sector. The government stopped retirement pension payments to several citizens it stripped of citizenship in February. Retirement pensions accumulated over time of employment and were unseizable by law.By law, during a strike employers could not hire replacement workers, but unions alleged this practice was common. Wildcat strikes – those without union authorization – were historically common.Employers interfered in the functioning of workers’ organizations and committed other violations related to freedom of association and collective bargaining. Labor leaders noted employers routinely violated collective bargaining agreements and labor laws with impunity.Observers accused official union federations of protecting employer interests by identifying and isolating workers who attempted to organize independent unions. The government was accused of frustrating such attempts through arbitrary procedural delays.Many employers in the formal sector continued to blacklist or fire union members and did not reinstate them. Many of these cases did not reach the court system or a mediation process led by the Ministry of Labor. Employers often delayed severance payments to fired workers or omitted the payments altogether. Employers also avoided legal penalties by organizing employer-led unions that lacked independence and by frequently using contract workers to replace striking employees. There were reports FSLN party dues were automatically deducted from paychecks. Workers who disagreed with government recommendations were fired.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/ .																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The law established a statutory minimum wage for 10 economic sectors. According to independent analysts, the average legal minimum wage covered less than 50 percent of the cost of basic goods.The standard legal workweek was limited to 48 hours, with one day of rest. The law dictated an obligatory year-end bonus equivalent to one month’s pay, proportional to the number of months worked. The law mandated premium pay for overtime, prohibited compulsory overtime, and set a maximum of three hours of overtime per day not to exceed nine hours per week.Occupational Safety and Health: The Ministry of Labor’s occupational safety and health (OSH) experts actively identified unsafe conditions. The Ministry of Labor, through its Office of Hygiene and Occupational Safety, was responsible for enforcing wage, hour, and OSH laws. By law, workers could remove themselves from situations that endangered their health or safety without jeopardy to their employment. It was unclear whether authorities effectively protected employees in such cases. The National Council of Labor Hygiene and Safety, and its departmental committees, was responsible for implementing worker safety legislation and collaborating with other government agencies and civil society organizations in developing assistance programs and promoting training and prevention activities. According to labor contacts, the council was inactive throughout the year. Companies were required to form worker management OSH committees.The minimum wage was generally enforced in the formal sector. Legal limitations on hours worked often were ignored by employers, who claimed workers readily volunteered for extra hours for additional pay. Compulsory overtime was reported in the private-security sector, where guards often were required to work excessive shifts without relief.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The government did not effectively enforce minimum wage, overtime, and OSH laws. Penalties for violations of minimum wage and overtime laws were commensurate with those for similar crimes, such as fraud. Penalties were rarely applied against violators in the formal sector and even more rarely in the informal sector. The law allowed labor inspectors to conduct unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions for violations. Private businesses complained about arbitrary and allegedly targeted labor inspections and being pressured to pay bribes to avoid citations.The Ministry of Labor was the primary enforcement agency. The government did not allocate adequate staff or other measures to enable the Office of Hygiene and Occupational Safety to enforce OSH provisions. Penalties for violations of OSH laws were commensurate with those for crimes such as negligence but were rarely applied.The informal sector was estimated to be 77 percent of employment. The government did not enforce labor laws in this sector.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons																																																						g. Stateless Persons																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Indigenous Peoples																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs																								Nicaragua
- Sanctions on Nicaragua’s Attorney General Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonThe United States is designating Nicaragua’s Attorney General Wendy Carolina Morales Urbina for her role in supporting the ruthless oppression of peaceful opposition members in Nicaragua by President Daniel Ortega and his wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo.As Attorney General, Morales Urbina silenced opposition voices, and seized the property of over 300 Nicaraguans.  She supported Ortega’s move to strip exiled political prisoners of their citizenship.  She is responsible for the arbitrary shuttering of over 3,500 civil society organizations, including over 250 evangelical groups.  Morales Urbina took part in the Ortega-Murillo regime’s baseless attacks on religious institutions, which included false charges and unjust detentions of religious leaders.  We reaffirm our commitment to promote accountability for the malign conduct of the Nicaraguan regime and its collaborators.The Department of the Treasury is imposing sanctions pursuant to Executive Order 13851.  For more information on this designation, see Treasury’s press release.
- U.S. Arms Restrictions on Nicaragua HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;U.S. Arms Restrictions on Nicaragua				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										U.S. Arms Restrictions on Nicaragua																																		Press Statement																														March 14, 2024																																							The United States is today imposing restrictions on the import and export of U.S. origin defense articles and defense services destined for or originating in Nicaragua. The Department of State has amended the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to update the defense trade policy toward Nicaragua.The United States remains deeply concerned about continuing brutal repression by Ortega-Murillo authorities against the people of Nicaragua, to include recent sham elections on the Caribbean coast populated mainly by Indigenous individuals and Afro-descendants. The United States will continue to use all available diplomatic and economic tools to promote accountability for the Ortega-Murillo regime and to support the human rights and fundamental freedoms of Nicaraguans as they pursue a more just and prosperous future.Accordingly, the Department published a Federal Register notice amending § 126.1 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to include Nicaragua as a proscribed destination.						Tags																																											Arms Control and Nonproliferation																															Bureau of Political-Military Affairs																								Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs																								Directorate of Defense Trade Controls																								Nicaragua																								Office of the Spokesperson
- Promoting Accountability for the Ortega-Murillo Regime for Restricting Freedoms Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonThe Department of State today took additional actions to promote accountability for those involved in the Ortega-Murillo government’s relentless attacks on the human rights and fundamental freedoms of Nicaraguans.  We are taking steps to impose visa restrictions on more than 100 Nicaraguan municipal officials for their role in the Ortega-Murillo government, which continues to engage in a repressive campaign that silences civil society and unjustly detains courageous individuals for exercising their fundamental freedoms.We continue to work with the international community to promote accountability for those threatening democracy in Nicaragua.   We remain committed to supporting the Nicaraguan people and ensuring their human rights are protected.This action was taken pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 10309, which suspends entry into the United States as immigrants and nonimmigrants of persons responsible for policies or actions that threaten democracy in Nicaragua.
- Anniversary of Operation Nica Welcome and Continued Unjust Detentions in Nicaragua Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonOn February 9, 2023, the United States received 222 political prisoners released by Nicaragua, a group that included human rights defenders, Nicaraguan presidential contenders, political activists, clergy, journalists, students, and members of civil society organizations and business groups.Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo subsequently moved to strip the former political prisoners of their Nicaraguan citizenship in absentia.  One year later, Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo continue to unjustly detain or force into exile those who wish to exercise their human rights and fundamental freedoms in Nicaragua.The United States joins the international community in condemning such efforts to silence the voices of the Nicaraguan people, and we renew our calls for the Nicaraguan authorities to restore the full enjoyment of civil and political rights by all Nicaraguans.
- Religious Freedom Designations HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Religious Freedom Designations				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Religious Freedom Designations																																		Press Statement																														January 4, 2024																																							Advancing the freedom of religion or belief has been a core objective of U.S. foreign policy ever since Congress passed and enacted the International Religious Freedom Act in 1998. &nbsp;As part of that enduring commitment,&nbsp;I have designated Burma, the People’s Republic of China, Cuba, the DPRK, Eritrea, Iran, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan as Countries of Particular Concern for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom.&nbsp; In addition, I have designated Algeria, Azerbaijan, the Central African Republic, Comoros, and Vietnam as Special Watch List countries for engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom.&nbsp; Finally, I have designated al-Shabab, Boko Haram,&nbsp;Hayat Tahrir al-Sham,&nbsp;the Houthis, ISIS-Sahel, ISIS-West Africa, al-Qa&#8217;ida affiliate Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin, and the Taliban as Entities of Particular Concern.Significant violations of religious freedom also occur in countries that are not designated. &nbsp;Governments must end abuses such as attacks on members of religious minority communities and their places of worship, communal violence and lengthy imprisonment for peaceful expression, transnational repression, and calls to violence against religious communities, among other violations that occur in too many places around the world.&nbsp; The challenges to religious freedom across the globe are structural, systemic, and deeply entrenched. &nbsp;But with thoughtful, sustained commitment from those who are unwilling to accept hatred, intolerance, and persecution as the status quo we will one day see a world where all people live with dignity and equality.						Tags																					Algeria																								Azerbaijan																								Burma																								Central African Republic																								China																								Comoros																								Cuba																								Eritrea																																														Human Rights and Democracy																															Iran																								Nicaragua																								North Korea																								Office of International Religious Freedom																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																																Religious Freedom																															Russia																								Saudi Arabia																								The Secretary of State																								Tajikistan																								Turkmenistan																								Vietnam
- Bishop Rolando Álvarez Unjustly Detained for 500 Days in Nicaragua Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonPresident Daniel Ortega and Vice President Rosario Murillo have unjustly incarcerated&nbsp;Bishop Rolando Álvarez&nbsp;for&nbsp;500 days.&nbsp;&nbsp;During that time, Nicaraguan authorities have kept&nbsp;Bishop Álvarez in isolation, blocked independent evaluation of the conditions of his imprisonment, and released&nbsp;staged videos and photographs that only increase&nbsp;concerns about his well-being.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In addition to Bishop&nbsp;Álvarez, many&nbsp;religious leaders&nbsp;remain&nbsp;unjustly detained&nbsp;in Nicaragua, including&nbsp;fellow&nbsp;Bishop&nbsp;Isidoro&nbsp;Mora&nbsp;and several&nbsp;priests.&nbsp;The Ortega-Murillo&nbsp;regime&nbsp;continues&nbsp;to&nbsp;impose severe restrictions on religious communities and deny Nicaraguan citizens the ability&nbsp;to freely practice their religions and express their beliefs.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;We once again call&nbsp;on the Nicaraguan government&nbsp;to release Bishop Rolando Álvarez immediately and without conditions.						Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs																																Human Rights																															Nicaragua																								Office of the Spokesperson																																Religious Freedom
- New Listings Under the Section 353 Corrupt and Undemocratic Actors Report Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonThe United States today announced new listings of four Nicaraguan, four Guatemalan, three Honduran, and three Salvadoran individuals under the Section 353 Corrupt and Undemocratic Actors report.&nbsp;This report, published in the Federal Register, identifies individuals who have knowingly undermined democratic processes or institutions, engaged in significant corruption, or obstructed investigations into such acts of corruption in Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.&nbsp; Consistent with Section 353 of the United States–Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act, as amended, persons on the list are generally ineligible for visas and admission to the United States.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Promoting strong democratic governance in the region is a priority under the Administration’s Root Causes Strategy.&nbsp; Corruption and other practices that undermine democracy in Central America lead to instability and drive irregular migration.&nbsp;&nbsp;In El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, we work to promote, preserve, and restore democratic norms to build a more resilient, equitable, and prosperous hemisphere.&nbsp; We do this by tapping into a diverse set of accountability tools.&nbsp;We call on all government leaders, civil society, journalists, the private sector, and the international community to join us in strengthening democratic governance and ending corruption.The Secretary of State transmitted this report to Congress under Section 353 of the United States–Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act, as amended. This report can be found on the Department&#8217;s Section 353 Report website.						Tags																																											Anti-Corruption and Transparency																															Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs																																Corruption																																							Democracy																															El Salvador																								Guatemala																								Honduras																								Nicaragua																								Office of the Spokesperson