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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 15-2349

T E L E DYN E T E C H N OL O G I E S I N C ORP OR

AT E D, a Delaware Cor porat i on, doing bu siness as Teledyne ElectronicManufacturing Ser vic es, Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v.

R A J S H E K AR , Defen dant-Appellant.

Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the Nor thern Distri ct o f Il l i noi s, Eastern Di v i sio n. No. 15 C 1 39 2 — Ronald A. Guz man , Judg e.

A RGU E D M A

Y 23, 2016

— D E C I D E D A UGUST 5, 2016

Before B AU E R

, P O S N E R , and W I L L I AM S

, Circ uit Judges.
B AU E R , Cir cui t Ju dg e

. T

eledyne T

echnologies, Inc. (“T

eledyne”) obtained a tempor ary restr aining or der and, later , a prelim i nary injuncti on again st i ts former employ ee, Raj Shekar (“Shekar ”). Bo th required S heka r t o ret urn T eledyne’s equi pment and electro ni c i nformation, whi ch he ret ained following2 No. 15-2349

hi s ter minati on. Sinc e Shekar refused to comply wi th eit he r
or der , T eledyne fi led a motion for rule to show ca us e why Shekar should not be held in contempt. The di stric t court gr anted the motion and sch edul e d a n evidenti ary hearin g. Pri or to the hearin g, Shekar fi led a motion to v acate the prelim i nary injunc tion. Ultim ately

, the di stric t court i ssu ed an or der holding Shekar i n contempt and denyi ng hi s motion to v acate the prelim i nary injunc tion. Shekar appeals both r ulings.

I. BACKGRO UND
On Februar y 3, 20 1 5 , T

e l e d yne te rm in a te d She ka r’ s employment. On Februar y 13, 2015, T eledyne fi led a v erifi ed complaint for i njuncti v e relief agains t Shekar in t he Uni ted S t a t e s Di stric t Co urt for the Nor thern Di stric t of Illinoi s. Accordi ng to the v e r ifie d complaint, as a T eledyne emplo yee , Shekar had acces s to T eledyne’s serv ers, whi ch contai ned the company’s confi denti al information

. After T eledyne fi red S he k a r

, Shekar “acces sed or atte mpted to

acces s” T

eledyne’s serv ers. There w as also “a large data t ransfer betw een T

eledyne EMS’ s serv er 20 and Shekar ’ s laptop computer” on the d a y he w as ter minated. Furt her , in the months prior to hi s te rm inati on, Shekar emai led T eledyne’s confi denti al i nformation to hi s personal e mai l addresses and

sav ed i t on his computer’s hard driv e. In ad di tion, T

eledyne’s v erifi ed complaint states that Shekar had w or ked from home and used equi pment prov i ded by T eledyne. Thi s i nclu ded a “laptop computer , a VPN tok en,No. 15-2349 3

a proj ector

, and a prin ter /scanner .” After hi s ter minat ion, Shekar refused to r eturn any o f the equi pment.
T eledyne’s v erifi ed complaint names sev eral ca uses of acti on again st Shekar

, such as violati ons of the Computer Fr aud and Abuse Act, the Illinoi s T rade Secret s Act, and the Illi noi s U niform Decepti v e T rade Practi ces Act. T eledyne 1 sought i njuncti v e relief that w ould require Shekar to ret urn all of T eledyne’s electro ni c information and equi pment, as w ell as produce hi s personal computers and electro ni c stor age devic es to be i nspec ted for T eledyne’s confi denti al information. T eledyne also sought damages and other relief.
On Februar y 17, 2015, the di stric t court i ssu ed a tempor ary restr ai ning or der r e q uir ing Shekar to ret urn all of T eledyne’s electro ni c i nformation and equi pment. It also or dered hi m to i denti fy i n v erifi ed inte r ro gato ry responses all devic es he owned t hat w ere capabl e of stor ing electro ni c information. Furt her , Shekar had to submi t a declaration certif yin g that he had ret urned all of T eledyne’s proper ty

, and that he had ret ai ned al l relev ant devic es and electro ni c information wi thout any alter ations

. On Mar ch 5, 2015, T

eledyne fi led an amended motion for a pre l i minary i njuncti on. On Mar ch 10, 2015, the di stric t court held a hearin g on the motion, whi ch Shekar di d no t a t t e nd (although the di stric t court found that he had notic e). The di stric t court gr anted T eledyne’s motion for the prelim inary i njuncti on, noting that Shekar had “fai led to comply wi th any aspect of the [temporar y restr aining or der].” Most of the

The unde rl ying case i s stil l pendi ng in the d i stric t co urt. 14 No. 15-2349 prelim i nary i njuncti on’s di rectiv es mi rr or ed the earlier tempor ary restr ai ning or der

. But the prelim inary injuncti on also required Shekar to prov ide T eledyne wi th “unrestric ted

acces s” to all of hi s devic es that we r e capabl e of stor ing electro ni c information.
On Mar ch 17, 2015, T

eledyne fi led a motion for rule to show

caus e why the court should no t hold Shekar in contempt for violati ng the tempor ary restr aining or der and the prelim inary injuncti on. T

eledyne arg ued that Shekar had refused to c om p l y wi th the prelim i nary i njuncti on’s prov i si ons. The di stric t court gr anted the motion and sch eduled a hearin g for April 30, 2015.
O n April 27, 2015, Shekar fi led a motion to v acate the prelim i nar y i njuncti on. He clai med that he di d not receiv e notic e of ei ther the tempor ary restr aining or der or the prelim i

nary injuncti on unti l after the or ders w ere enter ed. Shekar also st a t e d that hi s lawy er had turned ov er all of T eledyne’s equi pment that w as i n hi s possess i on and that he di d not hav e any of T eledyne’s electro ni c information. Follo wing tw o evidenti ary hearin gs, on June 17, 2015, the di stric t court enter ed a wri tte n or der fin d ing Shekar in contempt for violating the tempor ary restr aining or der a nd the prelim i nary i njuncti on. The di strict co urt found that Shekar had violated both or ders by not produ cin g sev eral of hi s devic es that w ere capabl e of stor ing electro ni c information (i .e. hi s personal computer

, at least three ext ernal hard driv es, and hi s T eledyne i Phone accompan i ed wi th the corr ect pass w or d), by no t turnin g ov er or accoun tin g for all of T eledyne’s electr oni c information that he possess ed, by not pr o v i ding complete and tr uthful answers to T eledyne’s interr ogat or i es, andNo. 15-2349 5 by not sub mi tting a complete and tr uthful declaration of compli ance. I n a d di tion, the di stric t court deni ed Shekar ’s motion to v acate the prelim inary injunct io n because i t found that Shekar had actual notic e of both the tempor ary restr aining
or der and the prelim i nary injuncti on. On June 24, 2015, Shekar appealed the di stric t court ’s rulings.

II. DISCUSSION Shekar arg ues that the di stric t court abus ed i ts di screti on in ho lding hi m in contempt and err ed in denyi ng hi s motion t o
v acate the prelim i nary injuncti on. Before w e address the m e ri ts of Shek ar’s appeal, w e mus t fi rst deter mine whether w e hav e jurisdi cti on. In gener al, an or der holdi ng a party in ci vil contempt i s not appealabl e wh ile the li tigati on i s pending. E.g. , SEC v

. McNamee, 481 F .3d 451, 454 (7th Ci r

. 2007) (ci tations o mi tte d). There i s an exception, how ever , in whi ch w e may hav e jurisdi cti on i f t he o r d e r that the party in cont empt violated i s i tself appealable. Id. (ci tations omi tte d); see also In re Rimsa t, Ltd. , 9 8 F .3d 956, 963 (7th Ci r

. 1996) (“Whether a judgment of ci vil contempt i s appealable at the tim e enter ed, rat her than later

... depends on the appealabi li ty of the underlyin g order , the or der that the judgment of ci vil contempt i s intended to

coerce the contemnor to obey .”). In thi s case, the di stric t court held Shekar in contempt for violati ng the preliminary injunc

tion. Furt her

, the underlyin g li t ig a tion i s sti ll pending. As a result, Shekar can only appeal t he d istric t court’s contempt

or der if he can als o appeal the pr eli minary injunc tion. Congr ess gr anted federal appellate courts jurisdi cti on ov er certain i nterlo cutory appeals, as enumerated in 2 8 U.S.C.6 No. 15-2349 § 1292(a). The statuto ry li st inclu des “gr anti ng, conti nuing, modi fyi ng, refusing or di ssolvi ng injunct io ns, or refusing to di ssolv e or modi fy i njuncti ons.” 28 U.S

. C

. § 1292(a)( 1). But i nterlo cutory appeals m ust sti ll conform wi th Feder al Rule of Appellate Pro cedure 4. Erb v. All. Capital Mgmt., L.P

. , 423 F .3d 647, 6 5 0 (7th Ci r

. 2005) (ci tin g Otis v

. City of Chicago , 29 F .3d 1159, 1167 (7th Ci r

. 1994) ( en banc )). Thi s Rule requires li tigants to fi le a notic e of appeal “wi thi n 30 days after en t r y of the judgment or or der appealed from.” Fed. R. App. P

. 4(a)( 1)(A);

see also People of State of Ill. ex rel. Hartigan v

. Peters , 8 7 1 F

. 2d 1336, 1339 (7th Ci r

. 1989) (“T o obtain r e v ie w of a di stric t judge’ s deci si on to gr ant an injuncti on, the defendant mu st seek rev i ew thro ugh a di rect appeal wi thi n [30] days of the di stric t judge’ s deci si on or giv e ext rao rdin ary reasons for not havin g done so.”). Here, the di stric t court i ssu ed the prelim inary injuncti on on Mar ch 10, 2015. Shekar fi led a notic e of appeal of the dist ric t court’s contempt or der o n Ju ne 24, 2015. By that tim e, more than 30 days had pass ed since the preli minary injunc tion w as enter ed. As a result, Shekar ’s appeal i s un tim ely

. Al th ou gh Shekar cannot appeal the und e rlyin g p re l i m in a ry i njuncti on, he arg ues that he can sti ll appeal the contempt

or der becau se he i s also appealing the di stric t court’s deni al of hi s motion to v acate the prelim inary injuncti on. But i t i s w ell establi shed that “a party se e k ing rev i ew of an interlo cutory

or der cannot enlarge the tim e for notic ing an appeal by fi ling
a suc cess i v e motion and appea l ing the deni al of the latter motion.” Erb , 423 F .3d at 650 (ci tations omi tte d).No. 15-2349 7

F urther , although 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)( 1) gr ants fede r a l appellate jurisdi cti on ov er or ders that refuse t o “di ssolv e” an i njuncti on, we noted in Secu rities and Exchange Comm i ssion v

. Suter that there are li mi ts to thi s jurisdi cti on. 832 F .2d 988 (7th Ci r

. 19 8 7 ). I n Suter, the di stric t court enter ed a permanent i njuncti on again st the appellant on Februar y 6, 1986. Id. at 990. Rather than tim ely appeal the injuncti o n, t he appellant fi led three motions to v acate the injuncti on. Id

. The last of these three motions w as deni ed on Nov ember 7, 1986, whi ch the appellant then appealed. Id. W e stated:
If

... the only purpose of the motion [to v a cate the i njuncti on] w as to take a belated appeal from the or der ente ring the injuncti on, w e penetrat e thro ugh form to sub stance and treat the appeal from the deni al of the motion t o v acate as an unti mely appeal from the injuncti on, and di smi ss the appeal for lack of jurisdi cti on. Id . (ci tations omi tte d). In Suter, w e found that i t w as a belated appeal because t he appellant had no t arg ued t hat the facts or law had changed sin ce the injuncti on w as or i gin ally enter ed, but only that the injuncti on should not hav e been i ssu ed in the fi rst place. Id.
In thi s case, Shekar arg ues that the di stric t court err ed in denyi ng hi s motion to v acate the prelim inary injuncti on becau se i t di d not apply t he corr ect “cri ter i a governing prelim i nary i njuncti v e relief” and becau se “there i s no basi s in the evidenti ary recor d for finding that prelim inary injuncti v e relief w as appropr i ate.” Shekar ’s clai m that the di strict court di d not apply the corr ect cri ter i a for i ssu ing a prelim inary8 No. 15-2349

i njuncti on i s wrong; the di st ric t court did apply the corr ect cri ter i a when i t or i gin ally i ssu ed the prelim inary injuncti on on Mar ch 10, 20 1 5. Furt hermor e, Shekar ’s latter arg ument i s 2 essenti ally that the prelim inary injuncti on sh o uld not hav e be en enter ed i n the fi rst place; whi ch i s analogo us to t he appellant’s fai led argument in Suter

. Therefore , w e do not hav e jurisdi cti on ov er Shekar ’s appeal of hi s motion to v acate the prelim inary injuncti on becau se i t i s merely a “belated appeal” of the ini tial prelim inary injuncti on. Sut e r, 832 F .2d at 990; see also Peters , 871 F .2d at 1339 (“[i ]n

rev i ewing a deni al of motions to di ssolv e an injuncti on ... w e
are not called upon to exami ne the di stric t judge’ s or i gin al deci si on to i mpose an injuncti on”). Sinc e Shekar cannot appeal the prelim i nary i njuncti on, he also cannot appeal the contempt

or der whi le the un d e r l y ing li tigati on remain s pending in the di stric t court

. 3

In the June 17, 20 15 , or der, the di stric t cour t di d not revisi t the cri teri a fo r 2 issuing the prel i minary i njuncti on. It i nstead fo cu s ed on Shek a r’ s a rg u m ent s raised i n his mo tio n to vaca te the pr el i minary i njuncti on.

Shekar ci tes Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Heal t h & Welfare 3 Fund v. Lewis , 74 5 F.3d 2 8 3 (7 th Ci r. 20 14 ), to suppor t his appell ate b ri ef’s juri sdi cti onal statem ent. Al though pro cedur all y simi l ar, the cour t i n Lewis di d not address any i s s ues i nv ol v i ng Feder al Rule of Appe l l ate Proc edure 4. Theref or e, i t i s not b i nding i n this case. See R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. FTC , 93 1 F.2d 43 0, 43 3 (7 th Ci r. 19 91 ) (“ Issues, even juri sdi cti onal i ssues, l urki ng i n the reco rd b ut not addressed do not bi nd t he c our t i n l ater cases.”) (Ci tatio ns omi tted).No. 15-2349 9

III. CONCLUSION
Thi s appeal i s DISMIS SED.