UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 15-1034 (TJK) APPRILL WALDEN, Plaintiff , v. PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Defendant

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MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Apprill Walden alleges that her former employer, Defe ndant Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (“PCORI”), violated the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code § 2-1401.01 et seq. , by discriminating against her on the basis of her disability and retaliating against her after she requested acco mmodations for that disability, a protected activity under the stat ute. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”); EC F No. 26 (“Opp.”). PCORI denies these allegations and move s for summary judgment. ECF N o. 23 (“Mot.”). For the reasons set forth below, PCORI’s motion will be granted. Background A. Factual Background PCORI is an independent, non-profit organization established bythe Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (20 10). Mot., Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Def.’s SOF”) ¶ 1. The organization ’s mission is to help patients, clinicians, and others make informed health care decisions by, among other things, funding “patient-centered comparative cl inical effectiveness research” and disseminating the results of that research to the public. Id. ¶ 2. PCORI’s in-house communications department is2 responsible for publishing researc h results, interfacing with the media, and keeping the organization’s staff members apprised of any relevant news. Id. ¶ 4; ECF No. 23-1 (“Stencel Decl.”) ¶ 7. In May 2014, PCORI hired Walden to s erve as the communications department’s “Senior Media Relations Specialist,” a position it created to reduce th e amount of work it typically outsourced to an external communica tions firm. Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 7 -8. The position’s responsibilities incl uded assisting in the da y-to-day managemen t of media relations activities, responding to press inquiries, p reparing staff for interviews, and monitoring news coverage. Id. ¶ 14; ECF No. 26-1 (“Walden De p.”) at 24-25. The position paid an annual salary of $75,000. Def.’s SOF ¶ 9. Walden was expected to “complete assignments with suffici ent levels of accuracy on or before deadlines.” Stencel Decl. ¶ 125. As a f ull-time employee, she was entitled to 240 hours of paid time off (“PTO”) per year, accrui ng semi-monthly, to use on vacation, sick leave, medical appointments, or for other reason s. Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 16-17. In June 2014, prior to starting he r job at PCORI, Walden was i nvolved in a car accident, resulting in injuries to her neck, back, and spine. Opp., Stat ement of Disputed Facts (“Pl.’s SOF”) ¶ 2. These injuries limited her ability to “work, walk, stand, drive and sit for long periods.” Id. After starting work on June 16, 2014, Walden informed her dir ect supervisor, Christine Stencel, that she need ed to attend regular medical ap pointments and physical therapy sessions as part of her rehabil itation. Walden Dep. at 43-44; Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 10, 12. During Walden’s first two weeks, Stenc el allowed her time off to atten d medical appointments and to move into a new apartment, desp ite the fact that she had not ye t accrued any PTO. Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 21-22.3 From June through November 2014, Walden took time off to go to medical appointments and physical therapy sessions. Id. ¶¶ 29, 31. During this time peri od, according to her medical records, she attended at leas t twenty-four such sessions. Id. ; ECF No. 28 (“Pl.’ s Med. Rec.”) at 29-30, 33-34, 36-39, 41, 43-44. But Walden asserts that Stencel occasionally denied her request s to use PTO to attend to these m atters. Pl.’s SOF ¶ 10. Stence l claims that Walden was often given permission to leave for me dical reasons during normal working hours without having to use her PTO. Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 29-30. Stencel also claims tha t she made “every effort” to grant Walden’s requests for PTO, whether her reasons were medical or non-medical. Stencel Decl. ¶ 110. In any event, Walden also asserts that Stencel was “uncom fortable” with her disability, Pl.’s SOF ¶ 8, and sent her a “b arrage of emails to distract he r” while she attended these appointments, id. ¶ 13. Walden also claims that Stencel t old her to “skip” medical appo intments “multiple times,” and that this happene d on “at least ten” occasions. Wa lden Dep. at 76-77. In particular, Walden cites one incident where Stencel allegedly stated that s he should “probably skip” her physical therapy session because a project was due the next day

. Id. at 78-79. Walden states that “most of the time” she was not able to make up the physical the rapy appointments she skipped and was sometimes “charged a fee for not showing up” or “a late fee for arriving there late.” Id. at 77-78. For her part, Stencel de nies ever asking Walden to s kip medical appointments and, in fact, claims to have discourag ed her from doing so. Stencel De cl. ¶ 113. According to Walden’s medical records, during her tenure at PCORI, she missed seven p hysical therapy sessions (in August and September 2014), at leas t four of which she appears to have cancelled to complete work assignments. Pl.’s M ed. Rec. at 36, 38-39, 41, 43; Def.’s SOF ¶ 32. But Stencel asserts4 that, at the time, she was not a ware that Walden missed these s essions for that reason. Stencel Decl. ¶¶ 114-115. Walden asserts that when she bega n working at PCORI, the amountof work she was assigned was manageable. Pl.’s SOF ¶ 5. But according to PCO RI, at that time Walden was assigned discrete tasks that com prised only a subset of her pos ition’s full responsibilities. Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 42-44, 51. Stencel asserts that she intended to—and did —assign Walden additional responsibilities over time as Walden became more familiar with PCORI. Id. ¶ 44. One of Walden’s job responsibilities wa s tracking news coverage about PCORI, which the parties call “media monitoring.” Id. ¶¶ 14, 48; Walden Dep. at 144. Around “ the July timeframe,” Wa lden received additional media-monitoring tasks that she characteriz es as duplicative. Walden Dep. at 141-142. For example, Walden asserts that she was asked to tra ck media mentions of PCORI using two different electronic formats. Id. at 142-43. According to Walden, after she had already completed the assignmen t in one of the two formats, Ste ncel said that “it was no longer needed.” Id. at 142. PCORI asserts that Walden did not d emonstrate proficiency in th e tasks that were assigned to her in her first fe w months, and that Stencel was d issatisfied with Walden’s performance. Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 45- 50. Stencel often rewrote docum ents Walden drafted, identified mistakes Walden made, and sent Walden detailed feedback about h ow to improve. Id. ; see Stencel Decl., Exs. 2-18, at 17-123. Nonetheless, Walden asser ts that, during this time period, Stencel “on occasion” told her that she “was doing a good job.” Walden Dep. at 189; Pl.’s SOF ¶ 11. PCORI admits that, throughout the course of her employme nt, Walden received “some positive comments about her work,” but asserts that much of the feedback she received was negative. Def.’s SOF ¶ 66.5 In early October 2014, Walden met w ith PCORI’s Director of Communications, William Silberg, and Director of Hum an Resources, Mitch Eisman, to voic e several concerns, including that Stencel had unduly increase d her workload and required her to skip medical commitments. Pl.’s SOF ¶ 13. Later that m onth, on October 28, Walden met wi th Eisman and Stencel to request accommodations for her disa bility: an arrangement where she could work at home parttime, and an ergonomic chair and standing workstation for her u se when she was in the office. Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 33-34; Walden D ep. at 45. Walden’s doctor had re commended that she work at home three days per week for at least eight weeks. ECF No. 26- 4; Pl.’s SOF ¶ 16; Walden Dep. at 45. Eisman and Stencel agreed t o Walden’s requests, but aut horized her to work at home only two, not three, days per week. Def.’s SOF ¶ 36. On November 13, Stencel and Walden discussed the work-at-home arrangement in greater detail. Id. ¶ 35. Walden claims that Sten cel used this discussion to “int errogate” her and demand that the arrangement incl ude “periodic check-ins.” Opp. at 19-20. But in any event, the next day, Stencel formally approved the arrangement, and it wen t into effect three days later. Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 35-36. The arrangement was originally s cheduled to end in January 2015 , but PCORI allowed it to continue indefinitely, and it remained in e ffect until Walden’s last day working there in April 2015. Id. ¶ 37; Walden Dep. at 118. Once the work-at-home arrangement began, Walden was generally a ble to attend her physical therapy sessions, which w ere usually twice per week. Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 38-39; Pl.’s SOF ¶ 18. However, Walden alleges thatafter the meeting to discus s her accommodation, she began receiving an increased workloa d, including assignments that wer e duplicative. Walden Dep. at 139-141. But, during her deposition, the only example of such duplicative work that she could recall—additional media-monitori ng tasks—occurred in the July t imeframe. See id. at 141-42.6 At other times, Walden described a n increased workload interfer ing with her medical appointments before her work-at-home arrangement was implemente d. Id. at 75-77. In addition, she claimed to have disc ussed her increased workload at the very meeting in which she requested her work-at-home arrangement in October. Id. at 105. Again, at least according to PCORI, Walden’s increased workl oad over time was a result of th e fact that she was being eased into her job. Def .’s SOF ¶¶ 42-44, 51. PCORI asserts that, after the w ork-at-home arrangement began, W alden continued to struggle to complete her wor k in a timely fashion, and her written work product frequently contained errors. Id. ¶¶ 52-55. Walden claims that this criticism was new—a marked c ontrast to the earlier, positive feedback she had received from Stencel. See Pl.’s SOF ¶ 19. On or about November 25, 2014, one week a fter the arrangement b egan, Walden and Stencel met to discuss Stencel’s concerns about Walden’s performance and Walden’s concerns about her workload. Def.’s SOF ¶ 52. Shortly after the meetin g, Stencel suggested that they revisit these issues again, on ce Walden had spent about six mon ths working at PCORI. Id. ¶ 54. Although this sort of “six-month r eview” is not mandatory, PCOR I states that its managers are encouraged to conduct them where appropriate. Stencel Decl. ¶ 86. On January 16, 2015, Stencel conducted Walden’s six-month revie w. Pl.’s SOF ¶ 25. During this discussion, Stencel a gain stated specific reasons w hy Walden’s performance was lacking, and Walden again expres sed concerns about her increase d workload. Id. ; Def.’s SOF ¶ 58. After the discussion, and at Walden’s request, Stencel s ent Walden a list of specific errors that she had made that month. Def.’s SOF ¶ 60. On February 26, 2015, Stencel conduct ed Walden’s annual perform ance review. Id. ¶¶ 61-62; Pl.’s SOF ¶ 26. Walde n had been working at PCORI for less than a year at that point,7 but annual performance reviews fo r all employees were conducted at around the same time, regardless of the employee’s start date. Def.’s SOF ¶ 62. In her evaluation, Stencel rated Walden’s performance at 2.19/5.00 (a rating between “Inconsiste nt” and “Proficient”), and expressed concerns about Walde n’s time management, the quality of her work product, and the fact that she often left tasks incomplete before taking time of f. Id. ¶ 63. In contrast, Walden rated her own performance at 3.42/5.00. Id. About a month after receiving he r annual evaluation, in mid-Mar ch 2015, Walden was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”). Id. ¶ 64. The PIP called f or Walden to: (1) assume the full responsibilities of her position as Senior Medi a Relations Specialist; (2) improve her accuracy and eliminate errors in her work product; and (3) improve her time management.
Id. ¶ 65. In a meeting with Eisman, Ste ncel, and Silberg to discus s the PIP, Walden claims that Silberg “indicated to Wal den . . . that they had ‘done enough i n providing accommodations for [her] disability.’” Pl.’s SOF ¶ 27. Moreover, Walden claims t hat Eisman, Stencel, and Silberg all “threatened [her with] term ination” if she did not comply w ith the PIP within four weeks. Id. Soon afterward, on March 25, 2015, Wald en resigned. Def.’s SOF ¶ 67. In her resignation letter, Walden accused Stencel of giving her low pe rformance reviews and placing her on a PIP because Stencel “disl ike[d] that [she had] a serio us medical condition and required accommodations for it.” Id. ¶¶ 67-68. Upon receiving Walden’s email, Stencel immediately forwarded it to Eisman, who tri ed to speak with Walden about he r allegations. Id. ¶ 68; Mot. at 27. Walden, however, declined to s peak with him. Def.’s SOF ¶69. Walden’s last day of work at PCORI was April 7, 2015. Id. ¶ 70. During her time at PCORI, Walden took a substantial amount of t ime off, both for medical and non-medical reasons. Id. ¶¶ 26, 28. By her last day at PCOR I, she had fully utilized8 her accrued PTO and, in fact, had ov erdrawn her PTO by thirty-f our hours. Id. ¶ 25. Moreover, aside from Walden’s regularly sch eduled work-at-home days, she was absent from the office for some or all of the workday for a pproximately half of the total days she worked at PCORI. Id. ¶¶ 26, 31, 40, 41. After Walden resigned, PCORI pos ted advertisements for two open positions in the communications department: “Senior Media Relations Specialist” (Walden’s former position) and “Media Relations Specialist” (a newly created position). P l.’s SOF ¶ 28; ECF No. 26-11 at 4-7. Some of Walden’s responsibilities as Senior Media Relatio ns Specialist were reassigned to this new position. Compare ECF No. 26-11 at 4-7, with ECF No. 26-2 (“PCORI Offer Ltr.”) at 7-8. PCORI asserts that it creat ed the new position to fully “ reduce and eliminate” its reliance on its external communications firm. ECF No. 29 (“Reply”) at 18; see also Stencel Decl. ¶¶ 12-13,
127.
B. Procedural Background Walden filed her complaint on July 1, 2015. Compl. PCORI file d a motion to dismiss on August 18, 2015. ECF No. 8. On March 31, 2016, the Court gran ted the motion in part and denied it in part, dismissing Wal den’s hostile-work-environment and constructive-discharge claims but allowing her disparat e-treatment and retaliation cla ims under the DCHRA to move forward. ECF No. 11; Walden v. PCORI, 177 F. Supp. 3d 336 (D.D.C. 2016). PCORI answered Walden’s complaint on Apr il 18, 2016. ECF No. 15. After the c lose of discovery, on September 16, 2016, PCORI moved for summary judgment. Mot. On October 1 4, 2016, Walden filed her opposition to PCORI’s motion. Opp. On November 4, 2016, PCORI filed a reply in support of its motion. Reply.9 Legal Standard Summary judgment must be granted if “the movant shows that ther e is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to j udgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “mater ial” if it is capable of aff ecting the outcome of the litigation under the relevant substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” if the evi dence is such that a reasonabl e factfinder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Once the movant meets its “initia l responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,” the non-movant has the “burden to go bey ond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that the re is a genuine issue for trial. ” Grimes v. District of Columbia , 794 F.3d 83, 94-95 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks o mitted). “In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must draw all justifiable inferen ces in the nonmoving party’s favor and accept the nonmoving pa rty’s evidence as true.” Light v. DOJ , 968 F. Supp. 2d 11, 22 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 255). However, the non-movant cannot “rely in opposing summary judgment on mere allegations.” Veitch v. England , 471 F.3d 124, 134 (D.C. Cir. 2006). She must do more than simply “show that ther e is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “[I]f the non-movant’s evi dence is ‘merely colorable’ or ‘not significantly probative,’ summary judgment may be granted.” Bradley v. D.C. Pub. Sch. , 222 F. Supp. 3d 24, 28 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 249-50). In addition, where the non-mova nt bears the burden of proof at trial, she must make an evidentiary showing “sufficient to establish the existence of [ each] essential element to [her]
case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Otherwise, “the plain language of10 Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment.” Id. Indeed, a “complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case n ecessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. Also, “the non-moving party cannot rely upon inadmissible evidence to survive summary judgment; rather, [she] must rely on evidence that would arguably be admissible at trial.” Evans v. Sebelius , 674 F. Supp. 2d 228, 238 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Greer v.
Paulson , 505 F.3d 1306, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). Analysis A. Discrimination (Count I) The DCHRA forbids covered employers from discriminating against any individual “wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based upon [an ] actual or perceived . . . disability.” D.C. Code § 2-1402.11(a). 1 To demonstrate discrimination in violation of the DCHRA, a plaintiff must prove tha t (1) she had a disability, (2 ) she was qualified for her position with or without a reasonable accommodation, and (3) sh e suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. Giles , 794 F.3d at 5.

1 The Court looks to case law inte rpreting federal anti-discrimi nation statutes when analyzing Walden’s claims under the DCHRA. Such claims are “consistentlytested using the analytical framework announced in federal court decisions under federal an ti-discrimination statutes.” Mitchell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. , 407 F. Supp. 2d 213, 247 (D.D.C. 2005). For example, “[w]hen evaluating claims brought under the DCHRA, ‘decisions c onstruing the [Americans with Disabilities Act] are considered persuasive.’” Giles v. Transit Emps. Fed. Credit Union , 794 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Grant v. May Dep’t Stores Co. , 786 A.2d 580, 583-84 (D.C. 2001)). “[C]ourts [will al so] look to Title VII and its jurisprudence” in analyzing DCHRA claims. Stevens v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. , 517 F. Supp. 2d 314, 320 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d , 275 F. App’x 14 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see Elhusseini v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc. , 578 F. Supp. 2d 6, 18 (D.D.C. 2008) (collecting cases).11 In evaluating the third element , where there is no direct evide nce of disability discrimination, 2 the Court utilizes the burden-sh ifting framework established i n McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973), to analy ze any circumstantial ev idence cited by the plaintiff. See Giles , 794 F.3d at 5; Hollins v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n , 760 A.2d 563, 571 (D.C. 2000). Under this framewo rk, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing a prima facie case of discrimination. Giles , 794 F.3d at 6 (citing Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981)). If the plaintiff is successful, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reas on” for the action challenged by the plaintiff. Id. “If the defendant does so, then the question on summary judgm ent becomes whether, based on the totality of the parties’ evidence, a reas onable jury could determine that the defendant’s proffered explanation w as pretext for discriminatio n.” Conn v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross , 149 F. Supp. 3d 136, 143 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms , 520 F.3d 490, 494-95 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that no reasonabl e jury could find for Walden on her discrimination claim under the DCHRA because she has failed to meet her initial burden of showing a prima facie case of discrimination. In particular, she has failed to demonstrate that she suffered an adverse employment action. Mo reover, even if she had met her

2 “Direct evidence of discrimina tion is evidence that, if believ ed by the fact finder, proves the particular fact in question without any need for inference . Such evidence includes any statement or written document showing a discriminatory motive on its face .” Manuel v. Potter , 685 F. Supp. 2d 46, 60 n.11 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Lemmons v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp. , 431 F. Supp. 2d 76, 86 (D.D.C. 2006)). “[D]irect evidence is rare.” Sims v. District of Columbia , 33 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Portis v. First Nat. Bank , 34 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1994)). Walden has failed to provide any di rect evidence to show that P CORI discriminated against her on the basis of her disability. The evidence that she characte rizes as “direct,” Opp. at 17-18, does not show a discriminatory motive on its face, and is consi dered alongside her other alleged circumstantial evidence of discrimination, see infra Section III.A.2.12 burden of demonstrating a prima facie case, no reasonable jury could conclude that PCORI’s proffered reasons for its actions were pretext for unlawful dis crimination.
1. Walden’s Prima Facie Case of Disability Discrimination To make out a prima facie case of disability discrimination, a plaintiff must show that she (1) had a disability w ithin the meaning of the statute; (2) was qualified for the position with or without a reasonable accommoda tion, and (3) suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. Swanks v. WMATA , 179 F.3d 929, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1999). An adverse employment action “constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing t o promote, reassignment with s ignificantly different responsibilities, or adecision causing a si gnificant change inbenefits.” Blackwell v. SecTek,
Inc. , 61 F. Supp. 3d 149, 158 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth , 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)). Such an action must “materially affect . . . the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . . such that a reas onable trier of fact could fin d objectively tangible harm.” Id. (quoting Douglas v. Donovan , 559 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). “In most circumstances, an adverse employment action will ‘inf lict direct economic harm,’” such as decreasing an employee’s grade or salary. Id. (quoting Burlington Indus. , 524 U.S. at 762). “[W]hile adverse employment actions extend beyond readily quant ifiable losses, not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adve rse action.” Russell v. Principi , 257 F.3d 815, 818 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Otherwise, “[m]inor and even trivial employment actions that ‘an irritable, chip -on-the-shoulder employee did n ot like [could] form the basis of a discrimination suit.’” Id. (quoting Smart v. Ball State Univ. , 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996)). “An employment decision does not r ise to the level of an action able adverse action . . . unless there is a ‘tangible change in the duties or working condition s constituting a material employment disadvantage.’” Dorns v. Geithner , 692 F. Supp. 2d 119, 131 (D.D.C. 2010)13 (quoting Walker v. WMATA , 102 F. Supp. 2d 24, 29 (D.D.C. 2000)). T he requirement that an adverse employment action be tangi ble “guards against ‘judicial micromanagement of business practices’ and ‘frivolous suits over insignifican t slights.’” Id. at 132 (quoting Mungin v. Katten, Muchin & Zavis , 116 F.3d 1549, 1556 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and Russell , 257 F.3d at 818). Notwithstanding this threshold, “a series of independent action s, none of which are adverse actions standing alone, m ay constitute an adverse actio n collectively.” Id. at 134. However, “there is no ‘bright lin e rule’ for determining when s uch impact has occurred.” Id. (quoting Baloch v. Norton , 517 F. Supp. 2d 345, 363 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d , 550 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). Ultimately, when determining whether individual a ctions in the aggregate should be considered an adverse employment action, “courts must exercise their judgment carefully on a case-by-case basis.” Baloch , 517 F. Supp. 2d at 363. Walden claims, in scattershot f ashion, that the following actio ns taken by PCORI amount to adverse employment actions, e ither individually or in the ag gregate: (1) Stencel “consistently” denying her requests for PTO; (2) Stencel “occasionally” orderi ng her to “skip” physical therapy sessions; (3) her incr eased workload; (4) her “preliminary” six -month review and six-month review; 3 (5) her negative annual performance review; (6) her “unfair” p erformance assessments; and (7) her PIP. Opp. at 16. Even c onsidering all the evidenc e in the light most favorable to Walden, the Court finds that no rea sonable factfinder could con clude that she suffered an adverse

3 Walden refers to the discussi on that she had with Stencel on o r about November 25, 2014, as a “preliminary” six-month review, Walden Dep. at 117, a character ization that PCORI disputes, Reply at 17 n.15. Both parties agre e that the discussion betwe en Walden and Stencel on January 16, 2015, was, in fact, a six-month review. Def.’s SOF ¶ 58; P l.’s SOF ¶ 25.14 employment action. The Court will address each of these potent ial adverse employment actions in turn. 4 First, Walden’s claim that Stenc el “consistently ” denied her re quests for PTO does not constitute an adverse employment action. Id. Walden testified that her PTO requests were denied on “at least a few occasions.” Walden Dep. at 28. Sign ificantly, however, Walden does not assert that these denials kept her from ultimately using al l the PTO that she accrued, even if she was not able to use it pr ecisely as she preferred. In fact , the uncontroverted documentary evidence shows that, by the time s he left her job at PCORI, Wal den had used thirty-four more PTO hours than she had accrued. Def.’s SOF ¶ 25; ECF No. 23-3 (“Eisman Decl.”) at 10-11. Thus, her allegation that she was denied PTO on some occasions, without more, could not have had a materially adverse impact on the terms of her employment. See Lumpkins-Benford v.
Allstate Ins. Co. , 987 F. Supp. 2d 807, 824 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (finding no adverse employment action where plaintiff claimed she was “denied the privilege of being able to utilize the days in her Paid Time Off Bank wheneve r and however she [chose]” becaus e she used all the PTO days available to her), aff’d , 567 F. App’x 452 (7th Cir. 2014).

4 The Court notes that it disreg ards the hearsay evidence provid ed by Walden, as it must. The “general rule is that ‘hearsa y evidence cannot be considered ona motion for summary judgment.’” Bortell v. Eli Lilly & Co. , 406 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Wiley v. United States , 20 F.3d 222, 226 (6th Cir. 1994)). I n particular, Walden rep eatedly refers to an Equal Employment Opportunity C ommission (“EEOC”) intake file, w hich was created after she left her job at PCORI, containi ng the EEOC investigator’s notes , Walden’s intake questionnaire, and attachments to that questi onnaire. ECF No. 26-3. As PCORI points out, this intake file is hearsay that the Court cannot consider. See EEOC v. Howard Univ. , 70 F. Supp. 3d 140, 148-49 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding that an EEO C investigator’s “unsworn” no tes were hearsay); Fox v. Leland Volunteer Fire/Rescue Dep’t, Inc. , No. 12-cv-354 (LWF), 2015 WL 1058954, at *7-8 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 11, 2015) (concludi ng that plaintiff’s EEOC inta ke questionnaire was hearsay), aff’d in part , vacated in part on other grounds , 648 F. App’x 290 (4th Cir. 2016); Cruz v. Aramark Servs., Inc. , 213 F. App’x 329, 332-33 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding “unsworn” s tatements and letters in plaintiff’s EEOC file to be hearsay).15 Second, Walden’s assertion that Stencel “occasionally” ordered her to “skip” physical therapy sessions does not rise to the level of an adverse emplo yment action. Opp. at 16. Walden testified that she was told by S tencel to skip physical therapysessions “multiple times,” and later clarified that this occurred on “at least ten” occasions. Wald en Dep. at 76-77. But she describes only one of those occasions, on which Stencel told her that she should “probably skip” a physical therapy session to finish aproject due the next day. Id. at 75-76, 79. It is not c lear from her testimony how many times she actua lly heeded Stencel’s requests to skip therapy. Walden’s uncontroverted medical records s how that she missed seven physi cal therapy sessions (all in August and September 2014) during he r almost ten months working at PCORI, although they do not, of course, show what portion of the seven were missed at S tencel’s urging. Pl.’s Med. Rec. at 36, 38-39, 41, 43; Def.’s SOF ¶ 32. The documentary evidenc e also shows that, from June until mid-November 2014, prior to the start of her work-at-home arrangement, Walden attended at least twenty-f our physical therapy sessions. Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 29, 31; Pl.’s Med. Rec. at 29, 30, 33-34, 36-39, 41, 43-44. And Walden con cedes that, after her w ork-at-home arrangement began in mid-November 2014, she was gene rally able to attend her phys ical therapy sessions through the end of her employment in April 2015. Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 38-39; Pl.’s SOF ¶ 18. Even viewed in the light most fa vorable to Walden, this evidenc e does not demonstrate an adverse employment action. Of course, as a threshold matter , mere requests by Stencel to Walden to skip physical therapy—w ithout Walden actually having done so—do not constitute adverse employment actions. Such requests could hardly “materi ally affect . . . the terms, conditions, or privileges of emp loyment . . . such that a reaso nable trier of fact could find objectively tangible harm.” Douglas , 559 F.3d at 552.16 Walden’s cancellation of seven (or even ten) appointments durin g her employment at PCORI, even if at Stencel’s dir ection, is simply not significan t enough for a reasonable factfinder to consider it a change to the terms and conditions of her empl oyment; it is therefore not material. See Ramsey v. Moniz , 75 F. Supp. 3d 29, 54 (D.D.C. 2014) (fi nding a denial of medi cal leave on three occasions “was de minimis and, consequently, not material”); see also Dorns , 692 F. Supp. 2d at 133 (“[E]ven assumi ng that the denial of . . . s ick leave is actionable, the amount in question here is too de minimis to be considered ‘material’ or ‘significant.’”). That is especially true here, where W alden has not challenged PCORI’s a ssertion that part of her job required completing assignments “on or before deadlines.” Sten cel Decl. ¶ 125. Walden herself testified that Stencel asked he r to miss physical therapy sessi ons occasionally in order to meet those deadlines. Walden De p. at 75-77, 79. That is hardly sur prising, and it is consistent with the terms and conditions of Walden’ s employment, rather than a change to them. In addition, Walden has also not d emonstrated that these cancel lations materially affected the terms of her employment by causing her harm. For example, she has not shown, especially in light of the work-at-home arrangement she was subsequently a fforded, that missing these appointments caused any setbacks in the rehabilitation of her i njuries. See Gurley v. LaHood , 504 F. App’x 498, 501 (7th Cir. 2013) ( finding a denial of medi cal leave was not a “significant change in benefits” because plai ntiff admitted that his hand wa s “adequately” treated in the leave he was granted). She does allege that she was sometimes “charg ed a fee for not showing up” to a physical therapy session or “a late fee for arriving there late .” Walden Dep. at 77-78. However, she offers no specifics as to how much the fees were, or how fr equently she had to pay them. Id. at 77-78. And in any event, such indi rect economic harm, unlik e “a reduction in salary or17 benefits,” is not typically a cha nge to terms of employment. Blackwell , 61 F. Supp. 3d at 160 (internal quotation marks omitted). Third, Walden’s claim that her wo rkload was incr eased does not constitute an adverse employment action. Walden asserts that she was given more medi a-monitoring tasks, and that those tasks were duplicative. W alden Dep. at 144-45. However, according to PCORI’s offer of employment dated May 19, 2014, Wald en’s job responsibilities in cluded “[m]onitor[ing] coverage of PCORI by traditional and new media outlets in both trade and consumer media arenas.” PCORI Offer Ltr. at 7. So even by her own account, W alden was merely asked to do more of the same tasks she was already assigned. Ordinarily, if “not accompanied by some other adverse change in the terms, conditions or privileges of employment,” an “increased workload does not cons titute an actionable injury.”
Mack v. Strauss , 134 F. Supp. 2d 103, 113 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d , No. 01-5122, 2001 WL 1286263 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 28, 2001); see Rattigan v. Gonzales , 503 F. Supp. 2d 56, 73 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[I]ncreased workload[]” is a “f amiliar complaint[] in virtual ly every workplace and every industry,” but it does not typical ly “give rise to a discrimina tion claim”). Indeed, “courts have recognized that increases in workload or changes in responsibil ity are not [typically] adverse employment actions, but rather c onstitute only the ordinary tri bulations of the workplace, which employees should expect.” Lester v. Natsios , 290 F. Supp. 2d 11, 29-30 (D.D.C. 2003) (collecting cases) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, W alden’s vague allegation that some of the media-monitoring work s he was asked to do was duplicativ e does not come close to demonstrating that her increas ed workload was accompanied by or led to an adverse change, financial or otherwise, i n her terms of employment.18 Fourth, PCORI’s six-month revie w and preliminary six-month revi ew of Walden’s performance are not adverse e mployment actions. Opp. at 16. W alden claims that these reviews were a departure from the terms of her employment offer letter from PCORI, which she alleges “states that she was subject to an annual review only.” Id. at 11. But she mischaracterizes the letter, which states merely that “PCORI will conduct formal per formance reviews annually,” leaving open the possibility of addi tional reviews. PCORI Offe r Ltr. at 5. Thus, these additional reviews were not a material cha nge to the terms of Walden’s emp loyment. See Ransom v. Ctr. For Nonprofit Advancement , 514 F. Supp. 2d 18, 25-26 (D.D.C. 2007) (employer’s nine meetings with plaintiff to rev iew her unsatisfactory job perfor mance did not constitute an adverse employment action); cf. Hunter v. Clinton , 653 F. Supp. 2d 115, 122 (D.D.C. 2009) (employer’s “increased scrutiny” of plaintiff’s work was not anadverse employment action). To the extent that Walden argues her additional reviews were adver se because they were critical of her performance, it is well es tablished (as discussed in greate r detail below) that negative performance evaluations are not adverse employment actions. Donovan , 559 F.3d at 553. Fifth, a negative performance ev aluation, such as the one that Walden received, Opp. at 16, does not ordinarily constitute an adverse employment actionwithout some link to a tangible economic harm. “There is a ‘th ick body of precedent [that] . . . refutes the notion that formal criticism or poor performance ev aluations are necessarily adver se actions.’” Dorns , 692 F. Supp. 2d at 133 (quoting Brown v. Brody , 199 F.3d 446, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). The “effect of a poor evaluation is ordinarily too sp eculative to be actionable.” Donovan , 559 F.3d at 553. A negative evaluation is not typically consid ered an adverse employment ac tion “unless [it is] tied to the employee’s bonus, or result[s] in some other material employmen t action.” Turner v. Shinseki , 824 F. Supp. 2d 99, 116 (D.D.C. 2011); see also Stewart v. Evans , 275 F.3d 1126, 1135 (D.C.19 Cir. 2002) (noting that “formal cr iticisms or reprimands withou t additional disciplinary action” are not adverse employment actions), but see Russell , 257 F.3d at 819 (finding an adverse employment action where a lower performance rating led to a red uced bonus). Because Walden does not claim that her annual perf ormance evaluation resulted in a reduction of her compensation, or otherwise show ho w the evaluation effected a s ignificant change in her employment status, her negativ e annual performance evaluation d oes not qualify as an adverse employment action. Sixth, the “unfair” informal perf ormance assessments that Walde n received did not constitute adverse employment actions. Opp. at 16. Walden ass erts that Stence l and Silberg, after granting her requ est for a work-at-home arrangement in Oc tober 2014, became “severely critical” of her work and perf ormance. Pl.’s SOF ¶ 22. She ma kes no attempt to explain why she considers this criticism “unfair.” Opp. at 16. Regardless , like negative performance evaluations, informal criticism is not ordinarily considered an adverse action unless it affects the employee’s grade or salary. See Burton v. Batista , 339 F. Supp. 2d 97, 110 (D.D.C. 2004). “Certainly employers are permitted to criticize an employee’s w ork without giving rise to a . . . cause of action.” Id. Given that Walden does not claim that these “unfair” performanc e assessments affected her grad e or salary, and does not otherwis e show a material change in her employment status, they do not amount to adverse employment act ions. Finally, Walden’s PIP does not r ise to the lev el of an adverse employment action. PIPs are not typically adverse employment actions without some addit ional effect on an employee’s grade or salary. See Taylor v. Small , 350 F.3d 1286, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ( finding that a PIP was not an adverse employment action because plaintiff did not present evidence suggesting she suffered any significant change i n employment status). Beyond the mere fact that she was placed20 on a PIP, Walden claims that Sil berg, Stencel, and Eisman all threatened to terminate her if she did not comply with it within four weeks. Pl.’s SOF ¶ 27. And , in fact, Walden’s PIP explicitly stated that improvement was exp ected within four weeks, and tha t “termination [was] a possible consequence.” ECF No. 26-9. 5 But this argument gets Walde n no further. It i s not uncommon for a PIP to include a warning that non-compliance could lead t o termination—but such warnings alone do not give rise to an adve rse employment action. See, e.g. , Kelly v. Mills , 677 F. Supp. 2d 206, 217, 222 (D.D.C. 2010) (no adverse employment action where PIP was accompanied by a letter stating that improvement was necessary in order to avoid “reassignment, reduction in grade or removal from the Federal Service”), aff’d , No. 10-5049, 2010 WL 5110238 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 14, 2010). Rather, “placement on the PIP must have resulted in an adverse action.” Chowdhury
v. Bair , 604 F. Supp. 2d 90, 96 (D.D.C. 2009). In other words, “an un realized risk of a future adverse action, even if formali zed, is too ephemeral to constitute an adverse employment action.”
Russell , 257 F.3d at 819-20. PCORI’s acti ons did not result in an adv erse employment action here, since Walden eventually resigned on her own accord. Def. ’s SOF ¶ 67. In summary, each action challenge d by Walden, for reasons discu ssed above, falls short of an adverse employment acti on. The Court also concludes that these actions, even if taken together, still do not amount to an adverse employment action. See, e.g. , Dorns , 692 F. Supp. 2d at 132-34 (finding that refusal of arequest for transfer, a po or performance review, a refusal to grant permission to attend tra ining sessions, and a denial of a n advancement for sick leave did not, in the aggregate, constitute an adverse employment action) ; Brodetski v. Duffey , 199 F.R.D.

5 Insinuating that her termination was likely, Walden asserts th at a colleague from one of her prior jobs told her that “not eve n the most seasoned media rela tions professional could overcome [this] PIP.” Opp. at 12 (citing W alden Dep. at 150-51). Howev er, the Court cannot credit this statement because it is hearsay. Greer , 505 F.3d at 1315.21 14, 21 (D.D.C. 2001). As a result, t he Court need not determin e whether Walden has met the other elements required for a pr ima facie case of discriminatio n. 2. Whether PCORI’s Stated Reasons for its Actions Were Pretext for Disability Discrimination Even if Walden had shown that sh e was subjected to an adverse e mployment action, she would also have to rebut any leg itimate, non-discriminatory rea son that PCORI claimed justified its actions. To do so, she must “produce[] sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-disc riminatory reason was not the a ctual reason and that the employer intentionally discrimin ated against the plaintiff on aprohibited basis.” Adeyemi v. District of Columbia , 525 F.3d 1222, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 2008). PCORI argues that Walden perf ormed poorly throughout the course of her employment. Mot. at 16-17. The uncontroverted record evidence shows that S tencel routinely rewrote documents Walden drafted, pointed out mistakes Walden made, and sent Walden detailed feedback about how she could i mprove. Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 45-50; see Stencel Decl., Exs. 2-25 at 17-149. PCORI offers at least sixt een examples, from June (whe n Walden began work there) through November 2014, where Walden’s work product required sub stantial revisio ns. Reply at 20 n.17; see Stencel Decl., Exs. 2-18 at 17-123. PCORI also cites numerous occasions when Stencel gave Walden feedback on he r work product or guidance wi th respect to her job duties. See, e.g. , Stencel Decl. ¶¶ 31, 42-43, 52, 59, 74. M oreover, according to PCORI, Walden struggled with time manageme nt, took too long to complete routi ne tasks, and left projects unfinished before taking PTO or attending her medical appointme nts. Mot. at 36; Stencel Decl. ¶¶ 35-36. Stencel met with Wal den on several occasions to disc uss how Walden might better manage her time and more effectively perform her duties. See, e.g. , Stencel Decl. ¶¶ 74-76, 93; Eisman Decl. ¶¶ 27, 30. Yet, according to PCORI, Walden’s job performance still did not22 improve, resulting in Walden receiving low marks on her annual performance review and, not long afterward, placement on a PIP. Mot. at 36. PCORI’s dissatisfaction with Walde n’s work is a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for many of the actions it took, including conducting Wa lden’s additional performance reviews, giving her a negative annual performance review, and p lacing her on a PIP. See
Robertson v. Dodaro , 767 F. Supp. 2d 185, 191-92 (D.D.C. 2011); see, e.g. , Dews-Miller v.
Clinton , 707 F. Supp. 2d 28, 52 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that supervisor s’ dissatisfaction with employee’s work was a legitimat e, nondiscriminatory reason for rating employee as “minimally successful” on her performance evaluations); Hussain v. Gutierrez , 593 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2008) (failure “to perform routin e duties in a timely fashion” constitutes “a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termi nating” an employee). PCORI has also offered other legitimate reasons for the other actions it took. For example, PCORI clai ms that Walden’s workload increased only because she was asked to do all the tasks in her job description, not just some of them (as she was allowed to do i nitially). Stencel Decl. ¶¶ 25 -26. Because PCORI has provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reaso ns for its actions, to survive summary judgment, Walde n must “point to facts that woul d demonstrate that the employer’s explanation was not w orthy of belief, or there was a nother, discriminatory motive at work.” Giles v. Transit Employees Credit Union , 32 F. Supp. 3d 66, 73 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d , 794 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied , 136 S. Ct. 1171 (2016); see also Nichols v. Billington , 402 F. Supp. 2d 48, 65 (D.D.C. 2005). Walden has not provided sufficient evidence that would allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons PCORI offered for its actions were pr etext for discrimination. She points to the following: (1) tw o statements by PCORI that it ha d “done enough” in providing her23 with accommodations for her disability; (2) Stencel’s “behavior ” during two discussions about her disability; (3) Stencel’s de nials of PTO requests and order s to “skip PTO;” (4) Stencel’s refusal to agree to Walden’s re quest to work at home three days per week; (5) her “substantially increased workload;” (6) Silberg’ s “behavior” after meeting wit h Eisman and Walden; (7) her preliminary six-month review and six-month review; and (8) her “unfair performance assessments” after her request for accommodations. Opp. at 17- 24. The Court will consider each of Walden’s arguments, and the record evidence supporting them, in the light most favorable to her. First, Walden asserts that in ameeting to discuss her PIP, Sil berg told her that PCORI had “done enough in providing accomm odations for [her] disabili ty,” Pl.’s SOF ¶ 27, and her PIP stated that, “PCORI [had] made every reasonable effort to a ccommodate [her] requests for an alternative work schedule as w ell as frequent PTO requests,” ECF No. 26-9 at 4; see also Opp. at 18. However, these stateme nts—made in the context of e valuating Walden’s job performance—merely reflected P CORI’s belief that it had provide d Walden with the accommodations she had requested in accordance with the law. See Rashad v. WMATA , 945 F. Supp. 2d 152, 163 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding that employer’s statem ent that “[d]espite the burden . . . [it] has granted [plaintiff’ s] accommodation request” did not support claims of discrimination and retaliation). These stateme nts would not permit a reasonab le factfinder to conclude that Walden’s PIP, or any of PCORI’s actions, was the result of disc riminatory animus. Second, Walden claims that Stenc el’s “behavior” while discussin g her disability is evidence of pretext. Opp. at 19. I n particular, she asserts that Stencel appeared “uncomfortable” and “squirmish” on two occasions—when she first disclosed her d isability and when she requested a work-at-home arrangement. Id. ; Walden Dep. at 97-100. However, Walden’s24 “subjective belief” that Stencel ’s “body language communicated discriminatory i ntent . . . is not sufficient to overcome summary judgment.” Yue Yu v. McGrath , 597 F. App’x 62, 67 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Johnson v. Perez , 66 F. Supp. 3d 30, 42 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding no evidence of pretext where employer was pur portedly “tense and uncomfortable ” around plaintiff, who was black, but not around her white co-workers), aff’d , No. 15-5034, 2015 WL 5210265 (D.C. Cir. July 1, 2015). Third, Walden claims that Stencel “at times denied and ordered Walden to ‘skip’ PTO.” Opp. at 19. But there is nothing a bout this allegation that a reasonable factfinder could find demonstrates discriminatory pret ext. In terms of her PTO use, as already discussed, the evidence shows that Walden was permitted to use thirty-four more PTO hours than she actually accrued. Def.’s SOF ¶ 25; Eisman Decl. at 10-11. Moreo ver, Stencel’s denial of Wal den’s PTO request in December 2014 (the only denial of her PTO that Walden identifie s with specificity) is wholly unconnected to Walden’s disability ; that request was apparentlyfor a vacation, not for a physical therapy appointment. Walden Dep. at 160-61. To the extent that Walden suggest s that Stencel ’s telling her t o skip her medical appointments (whether or not s he had to use PTO to attend them) was a pretext for disability discrimination, Opp. at 19, she stands on even weaker ground. Walden herself testified that Stencel’s actions in this regard were not motivated by disability discrimi nation. She testified that Stencel generally told her to “sk ip” physical therapy for work- related reasons, such as the completion of “priority assignments.” Walden Dep. at 75-77. F or example, on the one occasion she described, Stencel told her that she should “probably skip” her physical therapy session “because this [project] is something that’s due tomorrow.” Id. at 78-79. Walden has not called into question PCORI’s evidence showing that her job required he r to meet these deadlines.25 Stencel Decl. ¶ 125. Accordingly, on this record, a reasonable factfinder could not conclude that Stencel’s alleged requests for Walden to miss these physical th erapy appointments give rise to an inference that PCORI was motiv ated by discriminatory animus. Fourth, Walden points to the wa y in which PCORI accommodated he r disability as evidence of pretext. Opp. at 19-20. As mentioned above, PCORI granted Walden’s request for an ergonomic chair and a standing workstation. Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 3 3-34; Walden Dep. at 45. And for purposes of the work-at-hom e arrangement, Stencel permitted Walden to work at home two days per week, rather than the three days per week that her doc tor recommended. Def.’s SOF ¶ 36. This accommodation is plainl y not evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that PCORI’s actions w ere pretext for discrimination. See, e.g. , Swann v. Office of Architect of Capitol , 73 F. Supp. 3d 20, 30-31 (D.D.C. 2014) (f inding that employer ’s decision to place a lock on a unisex locker room, in place of providing the separate female locker room requested by plaintiff, could not be considered pretext evidenc e for discrimination or retaliation), aff’d , No. 15-5001, 2015 WL 5210251 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 18, 2015). In f act, as already described, PCORI’s accommodation was in some ways more generous than what was recommended by Walden’s doctor. The doctor reco mmended that the arrangement l ast eight weeks, yet PCORI allowed it to continue for a pproximately five months, up until Walden’s last day working there. Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 36-37. Walden also asserts that Sten cel endorsed this work-at-home ar rangement only after “interrogating” Walde n and insisting that the arrangement be ac companied by “periodic checkins.” Opp. at 20. She suggests th at this is a “departure from established proce dures,” which can be probative of a pretext for discrimination, Allen v. Johnson , 795 F.3d 34, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2015), but she utterly fails to produce ev idence of what those procedures were. For its part, PCORI26 asserts that holding such discussions preceding the establishme nt of a work-at-home arrangement, and having “periodic check-ins,” are standard prot ocol. Reply at 16. PCORI’s claim finds confirmation in the a greement memorializing Walden’ s arrangement, which specifically states that “[t]he most successful flexible work arrangements occur when the manager and employee discuss a nd work through the details of th e proposed arrangement in advance.” Stencel Decl., Ex. 42 a t 241. It also states that the “employee’s role” is to “[r]egularly evaluate the arrang ement with [his or her] supervi sor and implement agreed upon changes.” Id. at 240. In the end, of course, Sten cel approved the work-at-ho me arrangement. Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 35-36. There is si mply no basis here from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that PCORI’s actions wer e pretexts for discrimination. Fifth, Walden claims that, aft er she had requested a work-at-h ome arrangement, she was given a “substantially increased ” workload that “one person cou ld not handle.” Opp. at 20. She asserts that this increase d workload included additional me dia-monitoring tasks, and that such tasks were duplicative. Walden Dep. at 143. To demonstra te that this added workload was overly burdensome, Walden points t o the fact that, shortly afte r her departure, PCORI created a second position to assume several of the responsibilities origi nally assigned to Walden’s position. Opp. at 22-24. For its part, PCORI responds that th e new position was created to account for the additional work P CORI would take on to fully “r educe and eliminate” its reliance on its external communications firm. Reply at 18; Stencel Decl . ¶¶ 12-13, 127. With respect to a pretext analys is, Walden fails to show how he r allegations of increased workload—which she describes only in the most opaque way—sugges t that PCORI was motivated by discriminatory ani mus. The only example of increa sed workload that Walden described involved performing medi a-monitoring tasks that were included in the description of27 her job when she applied for it. Walden Dep. at 141-42, 144. Simply put, she provides no evidence that would cast doubt on PCO RI’s explanations for (1) her increased workload (that she was given additional media-monitoring assignments over time bec ause she had been performing only a fraction of her assigned dut ies), or (2) the creation of a new position after she resigned (to fully eliminate its reliance on an external communications firm ). To the extent that Walden argues that the timing of this increa sed workload is significant, “[t]iming standing alone is not su fficient absent other evidenc e of pretext.” Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. , 798 F.3d 222, 240 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Boyd v. State Farm Ins. Cos. , 158 F.3d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 1998)). Moreover, Walden disclosed her disability to PCORI immediately after the start of her employment in June. Walden Dep. at 43-44. So there is little, if any, temporal link between PCO RI’s knowledge of her disabili ty and Walden’s allegation of increased workload after she req uested a work-at-home arrangeme nt in late October. In fact, the evidence does not e ven support Walden’s claim that she received an increased workload only after requesting a work-at-home arrangement. Opp . at 20-21. She did make this claim at one point during her de position. Walden Dep. at 139-1 41. But the only specific example of her increased workl oad she recalled—the duplicative media-monitoring tasks— occurred in the “July timeframe.” Id. at 142. At other times, Walde n described an increased workload interfering with her medical appointments before her work-at-home arrangement was implemented. Id. at 75-77. In fact, she claims to ha ve discussed her increased workload at the very October meeting she now claims precipitated her increased workload. Id. at 105. Taken as a whole, her testimony is broadly c onsistent with PCORI’s asser tions that her workload was increased gradually over time, t o permit her to learn about PCO RI. There is simply no basis to28 conclude that the timing of her increased workload in relation to her request for a work-at-home arrangement suggests discrimination. Sixth, Walden claims that Silber g’s “behavior” after she met w ith him and Eisman in early October 2014 is evidence of a discriminatory motive. Opp . at 21. Walden asserts that she voiced concerns about Stencel at th e meeting; in particular, sh e relayed that Stencel had increased her workload and requi red her to skip medical appointments. Pl.’s SOF ¶ 13. But there is nothing about Silberg’s su bsequent conduct from which a reasonable jur or could infer discriminatory intent. Walden poi nts to two instances that too k place after the meeting—one where Silberg revised her draft “media update,” Stencel Decl., Ex. 15 at 108-11, and another where Silberg stated that Wald en had circulated the wrong draft “e-alert,” Stencel Decl., Ex. 18
at 119-23. See Opp. at 10. But Silberg had revis ed Walden’s written work prio r to the meeting as well. Stencel Decl., Ex. 8 a t 73-75. That is hardly surpri sing: Silberg was the head of PCORI’s communications department. Therefore, Silberg’s suppos edly improper “behavior” consisted merely of doing his job. Seventh, Walden asserts that she w as subjected to a preliminarysix-month review and six-month review that no other em ployees were required to under go. Opp. at 21-22. A “departure from established procedures” can be probative of a p retext for discrimination, Allen , 795 F.3d at 45, but on the record here no reasonable factfinder could conclude that such a departure occurred. Walden claims that her employment offer le tter from PCORI states that she was only subject to an annual review. Opp. at 21. But, as alr eady discussed, the letter merely states that annual reviews will be conducted, leaving open the possibility of additional performance reviews. PCORI Offe r Ltr. at 5. Walden’s only oth er evidence showing a departure from established proced ures is her own statement thatcertain unnamed colleagues had29 “never heard of a 6-month review , only an annual review.” ECF No. 26-7 at 5. However, this evidence cannot be credited at summary judgment because it is h earsay. Greer , 505 F.3d at 1315; see Hernandez v. Pritzker , 741 F.3d 129, 134 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (fi nding plaintiff’s “own statement claiming two colleagues told her about the openings” to be “‘pure hearsay” that “counts for nothing in an opposition to summary judgment” (inte rnal quotation marks omitted)). Of course, Walden could have depo sed the colleagues who had “ne ver heard of a 6-month review,” but she declined to do so. See Carter v. George Wash. Univ. , 387 F.3d 872, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (at summary judgment , no need to consider plaintiff’ s inadmissible hearsay evidence regarding a committee’s intervie w of candidates other than plai ntiff where she did not depose any of the committee members or candidates). Finally, Walden claims that Stencel became dissatisfied with h er work only after Walden met with Eisman and Silberg i n early October 2014. Opp. at 24. Walden states that, after this meeting, Stencel “became severe ly critical” of her work and gav e her “unfair” evaluations. Id. at 21-22. According to Walden, before that time, PCORI was satisf ied with her job performance. Walden Dep. at 193. She asserts, and PCORI admits, that Stence l occasionally praised Walden’s work during her tenure at the organization. Opp. at 24; Def.’s SOF ¶ 66. 6 In response, PCORI provides “uncon tradicted evidence in the rec ord that [it] harbored concerns about the quality of [Wa lden’s] performance” both befo re and after the October

6 Walden also claims that “the in -house editorial team would get back to her with minimal to no edits.” Pl.’s SOF ¶ 21; Walden Dep. at 158-59. This e vidence is not probative of pretext because Walden reported only to Stencel and (on occasion) Silbe rg, not to anyone on the inhouse editorial team. “[I]t is the supervisor’s perception of the employee that is relevant, not the perceptions of his coworkers.” Mastrangelo v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. , No. 01-cv-0582 (TFH), 2006 WL 416181, at *7 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2006); see also Gonda v. Donahoe , 79 F. Supp. 3d 284, 299 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[C]oworkers ’ beliefs about a plaint iff’s work performance are anecdotal opinions w ithout weight.”).30 meeting. Glass v. Lahood , 786 F. Supp. 2d 189, 215 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d , No. 11-5144, 2011 WL 6759550 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 8, 2011). PCO RI points to numerous examples, from June through early October 2014, where Stencel r ewrote Walden’s work or iden tified mistakes that Walden had made. Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 45-50; see Stencel Decl., Exs. 2-13, at 17- 105. Both parties agree that Stencel was critical of Walden’s work after the October meeting , and that Walden received low marks on her annual performance review and was subsequently giv en a PIP. See Mot. at 36; Opp. at 21. Even viewing this reco rd in the light most favorab le to Walden, the evidence simply does not support her claim that PCORI became dissatisfied with her work only after Walden met with Eisman and Silberg in earl y October 2014. The record is r eplete with documentary evidence showing Walden’s perfor mance deficiencies before Octob er, none of which she specifically contests. In the end, none of the evidence Wa lden cites suggests that PCO RI’s stated reasons for its actions—in particular, its dissatisfaction with her work—were p retext for disability discrimination. She has not, for e xample, contravened the spec ific evidence documenting
PCORI’s concerns. See Waterhouse v. District of Columbia , 298 F.3d 989, 995 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (plaintiff failed to show pretext where she “did not contravene —and in fact admitted—many of the deficiencies the defendants cited concerning her performanc e”). Although Stencel may have occasionally praised Walden’s work, “[i]nstances of positive fe edback do not suggest pretext” where there is “substantial evidence that her superiors were di ssatisfied with her work performance and her failure to improve.” Gonda v. Donahoe , 79 F. Supp. 3d 284, 299 (D.D.C. 2015). And there is nothing in the r ecord to suggest that PCOR I did not honestly believe in its negative assessment of Walden’s work performance. See Brady , 520 F.3d at 496. As is the case here, “[i]f the employer’s sta ted belief about the underlying f acts is reasonable in light of the31 evidence . . . there ordinarily is no basis for permitting a ju ry to conclude that the employer is lying about the underlying facts.” Id. at 495. Therefore, even if Walden had show n that she was subjected to a n adverse employment action, she has provided no basis for a reasonable factfinder t o conclude that the reasons PCORI gave for its actions were pretex t for disability discrimination . As a result, Walden’s discrimination claim under the DCHRA cannot survive summary jud gment.
B. Retaliation (Count II) Under the DCHRA, covered employers may not “coerce, threaten, r etaliate against, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or o n account of having exercised or enjoyed . . . any right granted or protected under this chapter .” D.C. Code § 2-1402.61. A prima facie case of retaliation require s a plaintiff to show, “first, that she engaged i n protected activity; second, that she was subjected t o adverse action by the employe r; and third, that there existed a causal link between the adverse action and the protected activi ty.” Broderick v. Donaldson , 437 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Smith v. District of Columbia , 430 F.3d 450, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). 7 If a plaintiff meets that burden, the burden shifts to the de fendant to articulate a legitimate and nondisc riminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See Siddique v. Macy’s , 923 F. Supp. 2d 97, 107 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Gaujacq v. EDF, Inc. , 601 F.3d 565, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). If such a reason is articulat ed, the Court considers “whether a reasonable jury could infer retaliation from all the evidence, which includes not only the prima facie case but also the eviden ce the plaintiff offers to attack the employer’s proffered explanation for its action and other evidence of retaliation.” Id. (quoting Gaujacq , 601 F.3d at 577).

7 “A DCHRA retaliation claim effectively mirrors . . . a claim ‘ under the federal employment discrimination laws.’” Lewis v. Gov’t of D.C. , 161 F. Supp. 3d 15, 34 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting McCain v. CCA of Tenn., Inc. , 254 F. Supp. 2d 115, 124 (D.D.C. 2003)).32 Even assuming that Walden has made out a prima facie case here, the Court finds that no reasonable jury could infer that she was retaliated against fro m the evidence in the record. With respect to Walden’s retaliation claim, PCORI offers the same le gitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions as it did in connection with her discri mination claim: mainly, that Walden performed poorly throughout the c ourse of her employment. And in support of her retaliation claim, Walden relies almost excl usively on the same evidence th at she proffered to show pretext in connection with her discrimination claim. Opp. at 29-30. H ere too, and for the same reasons already discussed in the discrimination context, the Court find s that Walden fails to create a material dispute as to whether PCORI retaliated against her. See supra Section III.A.2. Walden offers one new argument, but it adds little to her case. She asserts that her “wealth of experience at major companies and government organiz ations [was] recognized by PCORI before she started at the organization.” Opp. at 29. Ho wever, a “plaintiff’s subjective assessment of her own qualific ations . . . cannot serve to esta blish pretext under the law.” Young v. Perry , 457 F. Supp. 2d 13, 19 (D.D.C. 2006). In light of all of the evidence , the Court also concludes that no reasonable factfinder could find for Walden on her DCHRA retaliation claim. Therefor e, PCORI is entitled to summary judgment on it, as well.
Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, PCORI’s motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED , and the Court will enter judgment in its favor, in a separate o rder.

/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: March 30, 2018