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JPRS-SSA-86-093

11 SEPTEMBER 1986

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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JPRS-SSA-86-Q93

11 SEPTEMBER 1986

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

CONTENTS

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

USSR Training Figures Given, Cooperation Stressed

(JORNAL DE ANGOLA, 24 May 86) 1

Finida Funds Meteorological Services of SADCC Countries

(NOTICIAS, 1 Jul 86) ••••

2

ANGOLA

Factors Affecting Possibility for Dialogue Discussed

(Xavier de Figueiredo; SEMANARIO, 5 Jul 86) 4

Factions Within MPLA, Popular Discontent Viewed

(Carlos Da Matta; SEMANARIO, 5 Jul 86) 7

Minorities, 'Racial Weapon' Discussed

(Carlos da Malta; SEMANARIO, 12 Jul 86) 9

LIBERIA

Loss of Press Freedom, Closing of Newspapers Deplored

(DAILY STAR, 10 Jul 86). U

Statements by Two Veteran Journalists H

International Body Expresses Concern 12

Telecommunication Corporation Investigating Paycheck Scandal

(Ephraim Johns; DAILY STAR, 10 Jul 86) .

13

Compulsory Elementary, Primary Education Proposed

(Gabriel S. Nyanfor; NEW LIBERIAN, 1 Jul 86). 14

- a -
NIGERIA

Soviet Union Plans To Import Cocoa, Other Products

(Victor Attai; NEW NIGERIAN, 4 Aug 86) 16

National Seminar on Traditional Rulers Ends in Disagreement

(NEW NIGERIAN, 7 Aug 86) 17

Decrees on NLC Affiliations, Universities, Customs Issued

(NEW NIGERIAN, 5 May 86) 18

Tactics of Nigerian Labor Congress Discussed

(Umoh James Omoh; DAILY TIMES, 6 Aug 86) 20

Smuggling of Kerosene, Rice Causes Shortages

(SUNDAY TIMES, 3 Aug 86) 22

Kerosene to Benin 22

Rice Diverted, by Kunle Odufuwa 23

Alternative to Commodity Boards Advised

(NEW NIGERIAN, 11 Aug 86) 25

Government Reviewing Petroleum Legislation

(NEW NIGERIAN, 8 Aug 86) 26

Natural Gas Production Reported Higher in March

(DAILY TIMES, 6 Aug 86) 27

Agricultural Production Down in 1985

(NEW NIGERIAN, 7 Aug 86) 28

Domestic Fish Production Declines, Demand Increasing

(Jackson Imafidon; BUSINESS TIMES, 4 Aug 86) 29

Badagry Telephone Exchange Inaugurated

(DAILY TIMES, 5 Aug 86) 30

Road Money Allocations Announced, Sokoto, Borno Lead

(NEW NIGERIAN, 2 Aug 86) 31

Anambrä Phasing Out Almost All Teacher Training Schools

(Gil Ugwu; DAILY STAR, 4 Aug 86) 32

Statistics on Airports Passenger Traffic Issued

(Roseline Umesi; BUSINESS TIMES, 4 Aug 86) 33

Paper Praises Modification of Death Penalty

(NEW NIGERIAN, 29 Jul 86) 34

b -
Alkai Courts Said To Discredit Sharia Law

(Ibrahim Salihu; NEW NIGERIAN, 1 Aug 86) 35

Muslim Women's Seminar Raises Issues

(THE TRIUMPH, 28, 29 Jul 86) 36

Religion in Schools, by Olu Ojewale 36

Babangida's Wife's Address 36

Islamic Conference Rejects Secularism

(NEW NIGERIAN, 5 Aug 86) 38

Archbishop Criticizes Religious Council Proposal

(DAILY TIMES, 4 Aug 86) 39

SENEGAL

LD/MPT Paper Criticizes Government Agricultural Policy

(Editorial; FAGARU, Jun 86) 40

LD/MPT Paper: Press Campaign Against Party Charged

(FAGARU, Jul 86) 42

SOUTH AFRICA

AFRIKANER/GOVERNMENT

Information Chief Defends Regime to Liberal German Weekly

(Louis Nel Interview; DER SPIEGEL, 16 Jun 86) 44

Author Talks to AWB Leader Eugene Terre' Blanche

(Wessel Ebersohn; LEADERSHIP, No 3, 1986) , 54

Professor on Afrikaans Students' Challenges, Frustrations

(Mike de Vries; LEADERSHIP, No 3, 1986) 58

Black Sash Official Deplores Government's Regulatory Powers

(Sheena Duncan; LEADERSHIP, No 3, 1986) 61

Possibilities of Proposed National Statutory Council Weighed

(David Welsh; LEADERSHIP, No 3, 1986) 64

Ability To Cope With Guerrilla, Conventional War Assessed

(Mike Hough; LEADERSHIP, No 3, 1986) 67

SADF Short Service System Termed Helpful to Economy

(Helmoed-Romer Heitman; PARATUS, Aug 86). 71

\

- c -
SOCIOPOLITICAL/OTHER

Journalist Discusses Nation's 'Special' Ties With Israel

(Dan Sagir; THE WEEKLY MAIL, 18-21 Jul 86) 75

New Member of Transvaal Executive Committee -Spells Out Views

(Ismail Fakir Hassen Mayet Interview; POST NATAL,

6-9 Aug 86) 77

Millenarian Theology Seen Inflaming Black, White Radicalism

(Andreas Graf Razumovsky; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 14 Jun 86). 80

Local Families Opposed to New Township

(Andrew Thomson; THE CITIZEN, 12 Aug 86) 88

Farm Family on Northern Border Lives in State of Siege

(Vivienne Walt; THE WEEKLY MAIL, 25-31 Jul 86) 89

ECONOMIC

Views of Anglo-American's Deputy Chairman on National Issues

(Julian Ogilvie Thompson Interview; LEADERSHIP, No 3,

1986) 92

Employer Groups Submit Memo on Privatization

(SAPA, 19 Aug 86) 98

Briefs

Floating Exchange Rates System 100

Funds to Israel Monitored 100

Energy Official Speaks on Sanctions 100

Business Professor: Nation Profitable Market 101

GST May Be Abolished 101

President's Economic Powers Amendment 101

Survey: Business Committed to Reform 102

De Kock: Loan Installment 102

Official: Country Self-Sufficient 102

INDUSTRIAL/S&T

Effect of Sanctions on Coal, Steel, Iron Ore Industries Noted

(BUSINESS DAY, 6 Aug 86) 103

Briefs

Richards Bay Not To Close 105

/6539

- d -

/

/
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

USSR TRAINING FIGURES GIVEN, COOPERATION STRESSED

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 24 May 86 p 4

[Text] In its relations with Africa, the Soviet Union regards the African

countries as its friends and equal partners, according to Aleksandr Dzassokhov,

first vice president of the Soviet Committee of Solidarity with African and

Asian Countries, speaking at a press conference dedicated to African liberation day.

At the press conference he emphasized that training local people was one of

the most important parts of Soviet-African cooperation.

The USSR cooperates on the basis of intergovernmental agreements with 27

African countries, contributing to the development of the main branches of

the nationalized sector.

About 50,000 specialists were trained at specialized institutions of middlelevel and higher education in the Soviet Union under cooperative agreements

with African countries.

During the same time, the USSR trained around 450,000 skilled workers and

laborers for Africa, where it built over 100 middle- and higher-level schools.

During the current 5-year period, about 50 technical and professional schools

are scheduled to be built.

The Soviet Union has trained over 4,700 medical specialists for African

countries. More than 2,500 physicians in various specialities are studying

in the USSR at the present time.

The participants in the press conference pointed out that Soviet cooperation

with African countries is based on an understanding of the basic development

problems in these countries.

9805/12859

CSO: 3443/272
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

FINIDA FUNDS METEOROLOGICAL SERVICES OF SADCC COUNTRIES

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 1 Jul 86 p 1

[Text] The Finnish Development Agency (FINIDA) has earmarked $4 million to

finance the rehabilitation of and supply equipment to meteorological service

networks in nine SADCC member countries. The funds will be used in the next

2 years, and may be increased depending on the needs of the countries in the

region and additional agreements signed with FINIDA.

This information was disclosed to our reporter by Martti Makela, representing

the Finnish Meteorological Institute, who recently visited some of the nine

SADCC member countries.

Makela said that this initial financing, valued at $4 million, would be formally committed at the next meeting of the Directors of Meteorology of the

"Nine" South African Countries, to be held in Malawi in September of this

year. This meeting will be held under the aegis of the Transportation and

Communications Commission (SATCC), of which the meteorology group is a member

on a regional plane.

The recent visit by the FINIDA representative to some of the SADCC member

countries, including our country, was, according to Makela, scheduled to obtain data from the countries in the region on their needs in the fields of

telecommunications, meteorology, and the processing, collection and exchange

of information between the countries belonging to this regional organization.

Mozambique's Director of Meteorological Services Sergio Ferreira is already in

Finland to discuss with FINIDA the details of the agency's financing of SATCC

projects. Following negotiations with FINIDA, the SATCC representative will

have further talks in Geneva with authorities of the World Meteorological

Organization.

In making these contacts, the Mozambican director of meteorological services

is representing the Transportation and Communications Commission (SATCC), of

which our country is president. Our country is coordinator of meteorological

services for the region.

The FINIDA representative told our reporter that his agency became involved

in SADCC regional projects as a result of contacts initiated about a year ago

by a joint FINIDA/WMO mission.
The same source said that negotiations would be held between SADCC member

countries and potential project financing sources with a view to setting up a

regional center to monitor the drought, also known as a large regional

"weather bank."

This regional center would provide supplementary information every 10 days on

various climatic factors such as the amount of humidity, atmospheric pressure

and amount of rainfall in the countries of the region.

He added that this center is of particular importance in the area of agriculture, since it will facilitate a continuous exchange of information in this

field among the countries belonging to this organization for regional cooperation.

Another area in which FINTDA is interested in providing financing is the rehabilitation of the Regional Telecommunications Center in Lusaka. Because of

technical and maintenance problems, this center has not been operating at the

level it was designed to.

Still in the field of meteorology, the F1NIDA representative said that his

agency would also help train meteorologists and weather observers in the

countries of the region.

In this connection, FINIDA is prepared to finance courses and apprenticeships

abroad, using for this purpose the regional training center in Nairobi, Kenya.

There is presently another regional center to train meteorological technicians

in Luanda. However, this center has not yet been equipped to operate as a

regional center. Xt was established to serve the Portuguese-speaking countries belonging to SADCC, i.e., Mozambique and Angola.

9805/12859

CSO: 3443/272
ANGOLA

FACTORS AFFECTING POSSIBILITY FOR DIALOGUE DISCUSSED

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 5 Jul 86 p 27

[Article by Xavier de Figueiredo]

[Text] An eventual agreement with UNITA will knock down the Soviet-Cuban

protective shield guarding the MPLA. It is also for this reason that if a

peaceful solution to the war in Angola depends on dialogue, the war is going

to continue.

Is the MPLA regime going to decide at some point to hold talks with UNITA as

a way of putting an end to a war which has mercilessly devastated one of the

richest and most promising countries in Africa? The answer is pure conjecture,

since it depends on factors which at this stage are imponderable.

More realistic is the view that, in current circumstances, the possibilities

of a dialogue between the MPLA and UNITA are very remote. If a peaceful solution to the Angola problem depends on this step, then there is no doubt that

the war will continue—especially since neither MPLA nor UNITA is in a position to win militarily over the other.

Whatever the solution is, it would be difficult to conceive of a peaceful solution to the Angola problem without some understanding between the MPLA and

UNITA. But not between this MPLA and this UNITA. Besides, there are too many

doubts as to the intentions and capacity of the two to coexist in a country

where the national conscience is precarious and their causes are sharply divided.

The bridges that could lead to a dialogue between MPLA and UNITA are cut off

at present. The meetings, many of them by chance or scheduled for personal

reasons, which were reported between members of the two organizations in Lisbon, Paris or London do not have much meaning. In order for a dialogue of this

sort to have the desired effect, the current situation would have to take a

somewhat dramatic turn.

This could perhaps take the form of a coup d'etat, bringing about a change in

the current balance of power within the MPLA and putting into power circles

that favor dialogue with UNITA. At the present time, because of their isolation and their relative inability to wield political influence, these circles

are very limited.
A second scenario, equally critical, would be to remove UNITES current

leadership, and especially its head, Jonas Savimbi. The MPLA's refusal to

hold talks with UNITA is not so much, influenced by the rebel movement itseli

as it is by the political and intellectual stature of its leader, who most

certainly is the most charismatic figure in Angola.

Finally, a third situation that might lead to negotiations between the MPLA

and UNITA is an arrangement between the superpowers, so that they (and espec

ially the Soviet Union) would be involved in the affair and could exert influence in one sense or another in line with their strategic interests. The

situation in.South Africa must also be taken into account, because it is

closely linked with the Angola problem.

Outside Influences

The Angolaproblem has in recent years been complicated by powerful outside

influences, particularly the USSR and, by extension, Cuba. It is impossible

to conjecture oh how it will develop without considering the real weight and

behavior of these influences. The commitments, especially the political and

military ones, that these influences agree to affects to a great extent the

behavior of the MPLA regime.

The USSR has always exploited any tension spots as quickly and effectively as

possible as part of its strategy to penetrate Africa. Peace and stability do

not justify the massive military supplies and advisors being sent to Angola—

and they are an excellent way of ensuring the MPLA's dependency on it.

At the same time, the tension prevailing in Angola also makes the MPLA particularly vulnerable to a political and ideological shift that would push it

towards a radical and orthodox stance to Moscow's liking.

Whatever peaceful solution is found to the problem of Angola among all the

possibilities, none of them would leave the current Soviet influence intact,

precisely because this is the objective of all those, including the United

States and South Africa, that insist on a policy of dialogue and national reconciliation for Angola.

The USSR would always be the loser with a peaceful solution to the Angola

problem. And if i^ has to lose, it prefers that its losses be confined to the

enormous erosion that its image and reputation have suffered, creating a huge

wave of anti-Soviet feeling amoqg the Angolan people (Gorbachev recently told

Jose Eduardo dos Santos of hi;? concern over this phenomenon).

For the rest, with a people that is already by nature resigned and long-suffering, living by rules set in accordance with the unquestionable interests of a

single party and controlled by a sophisticated, repressive apparatus, the complaints of Angolans will never give rise to demonstrations of protest capable

of embarrassing the Soviets.

Internal Factors

Among the Angolan governing class, there are very few who could properly be

regarded as structurally pro-Soviet. If they are it is out of pure convenience,

associated with a\concept of survival. Without the USSR's "protective wing,"

the power of the MPLA regime would rapidly decline.
The view is widely held that without Soviet and Cuban aid, the MPLA regime

would not be able to stay in power for long. That is not exactly true—or it

is with one qualification. The MPLA army has the means now to enable it to

contain UNITA, with the provisos inherent in a guerrilla war.

What is uncertain is whether without the Cuban "protectors" and the "vigilance"

of the USSR, there might not be devisiveness and chaos that would undermine

the armed forces—and in this case it would be a matter of shifting over to

the military the division and disputes already existing in the MPLA's political

leadership, almost all of which are motivated by political and personal ambition, taking advantage of the regime's weak leadership.

What is now working to reduce this divisiveness is precisely the existence of

a "Pretorian guard," mainly made up of Cubans. It is not by chance that at

Futungo de Belas, where President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and his closest staff

live and work, the security is completely provided by Cubans.

Aware that negotiations with UNITA under present circumstances would sooner or

later erode this "protective shield," how can the MPLA possibly agree to negotiate? A move of this sort would involve risks of undermining its already

fragile unity, completely opening the field to the "enemy."

It is also true that the current governing class in Angola, even at middle

levels, is now one of the wealthiest in all of Africa—in shocking contrast to

the regime's official ideology. Without speaking of corruption, the Angolan

governing class lives surrounded with privileges and in a display of wealth

that is shocking in the face of the hunger prevailing in the country.

The governing class is instinctively opposed to the idea of an understanding

with UNITA also because it does not want to share with it its privileges and

wealth. Despite the tremendous disorder in the country, the towers of the

oil wells continue at night to illuminate Angolan seas and land

Moreover, one must not lose sight of the fact that the MPLA is a MarxistLeninist party, with the self-invested role of "force to govern the nation and

the state." The MPLA's power is rooted in the nature of the party and in the

order it establishes. Because of all this, negotiations with UNITA are doubtful.

In the tangled web the Angolan problem has become, there is a last thought to

reflect on: If the Cubans or Soviets were to redefine their strategy in relation to Angola, to what extent might not they be the ones to precipitate (or

cover for) events aimed at unblocking the current situation?

It is difficult to see them giving up their influence in Angola, as it is related to interests of political, economic and military strategy. But they

country to preserve this influence by encouraging a sort of "compromise solution for Angola, on the basis of a dialogue between a different MPLA and a

different UNITA.

It is not surprising that Savimbi is one of the best protected men in the

world today and that increasing signs of friction between the USSR and the •

current MPLA leadership are being seen.

9805

CSO: 3442/271
ANGOLA

FACTIONS WITHIN MPLA, POPULAR DISCONTENT VIEWED

Lisbon SEMÄNARIO in Portuguese 5 Jul 86 p 29

[Article by Carlos Da Matta]

[Text] If the military struggle in this country is continuing in a haphazard

way» the internal struggle within the MPLA-PT leaves no room for doubt: The

victorious participants at the 2nd Congress want to complete the victory, in

this year of "renewed mandates," both in terms of intermediate party structures

and the People's Assembly. Moreover, there has been some reshuffling of ministers, and quite a few changes at the level of commissars.

The problem right now is one of knowing who really are the ones who came out

on top at the Congress, or in other words what forces make up the so-called

president's group, since it is now clear that it is not homogeneous. Its defenders say that it is an alliance of patriots "ready to take energetic steps

to ensure discipline in the country and move it forward," but those left out

or demoted say that what came out of the Congress was "a mixture of former

followers of Nita Alves and Zairians."

According to the Luandan "mujimbo," President Jose Eduardo learned of the Soviet's concern over "the reduced popular base of support for the government"

during his recent trip to the USSR, a concern that was made clear to Afghan

leaders not so long ago.

Reflecting the seriousness of the internal conflict is the continued imprisonment of dozens of agents and directors of the political police, defended by

figures regarded as Stalinists. Also to be considered is the fact that some

persons under arrest warrants are in hiding and being sought.

Another privileged area of dissension is the State entrepreneurial sector,

where directors spar with each other or with their ministers. In some cases

it is the consequence of the party struggle and an attempt not to be made

"scapegoats," which is always a popular practice when public criticism mounts.

In other cases the reason is financial austerity caused by the drop in oil

prices, which results in reduced privileges, especially in less frequent trips

abroad.
Air this gives rise to a bitter struggle to gain posts in the party, administrative, military and economic apparatus, both among the president's followers

and between them and others.

The Vicious Circle

But as far as major political and economic decisions are concerned, the country

is really paralyzed, and with the announcement after the 2nd Congress that the

president of the Republic now has the necessary power to act, he is in danger

of being blamed for the lack of action. Slogans repeated incessantly, such as

"Angola—the firm foothold of the revolution in Africa" lose their meaning in

the face of the people's living conditions, while others such as "let's build

the economy to support the war and build the war effort to defend the economy"

reflect acceptance of a fatal vicious circle.

A well-known figure among the "winners" of the 2nd Congress told us that "the

dominant group is going to camouflage their responsibilities and incompetence

and accuse us of everything that is bad," while the president's backers accuse

the others of "holding onto posts in the party and government as lifetime positions in which they perpetrate a practice that separates us from the masses.":

In the midst of this, Roberto de Almeida, who despite his support for the

president continues to have his own designs, is watching over the ideological

line, for which he is responsible in the BP, and Antonio Jacinto, another member of the BP, is in charge of maintaining internal discipline as the head of

the strict control commission.

Despite rumors of contacts in London between leaders of the MPLA-PT and UNITA,

the war goes on, and has reached an intensive level in Benguela following a

UNITA initiative. The road from Lobita to Huambo, which has been very dangerous since 1975, has been the stage of serious confrontations and, according to

"The Voice of the Black Rooster" (UNITA1s radio station), its forces have taken

the town of Monte Belo between Bocoio and Balombo, not far from where part of

the provincial government of Beneguela was captured last year. Tormented by

food shortages, alarmed at the prospect of having their children drafted into

the military, irritated by the despotism of those who have the weapons, afraid

of being kidnapped, and fearing retaliation and stray bullets, the people for

the most part react to the war in one of two ways: as a spectator or a fugitive, in both cases with an obvious desire to see this "suffering end." Conversations we have had or heard all run along these lines, and are turning into

a clamor from the most remote parts of the country, one that both national

leaders and foreign officials from big and small nations want to see taken more

seriously.

If the London contact is confirmed, it will probably lead to better days, preventing a continued escalation of the war and probable sacrifices in the clandestine struggle of democratic forces needed to rebuild the country. But even

so, is it good to be prepared for new military trials, even in the knowledge

that they will not lead to anything that could resolve the situation and that

sooner or later, through internal forces or as a result of the world situation,

an accord is inevitable. Unfortunately, it appears that there will be many

more wasted opportunities.

9805

CSO: 3442/271
ANGOLA

MINORITIES, 'RACIAL WEAPON' DISCUSSED

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 12 Jul 86 p 31

[Article by Carlos da Malta]

[Text] The ongoing series of party meetings—from assemblies of the basic

organs to municipal and provincial conferences of the MPLA-PT—still do not

make it possible to form a definitive view as to the new composition of the

intermediate structures. But there is one point on which the forces supporting

the president of the Republic agree: to get rid of the "Algerians," an expression used by some to refer to mestizo and white militants in general, and by

others to refer to a group "that adopts incorrect positions and Coincidentally

includes many light-skinned compatriots," usually accused of radicalism.

In any case, it is obvious that the racial weapon will be increasingly used in

the internal struggle, although in society in general the opposite trend has

been noted, except for the so-called "Zarian" group and some subgroups in regions speaking Kikongo and Kimbundo. Despite this, outside the party structures, many people are afraid that at the next "People's Assembly," selected

on the basis of the unification of forces into a single party, the situation

will be ripe for an amendment to the Nationality Law in a discriminatory sense,

as was attempted unsuccessfully 2 years ago.

The "Algerians" are a minority in the party, but they are even more so in their

own community, in which they remove themselves with a series of demagogic positions. This community is visibly seeking an alternative. UNITA, with its

slogan "socialism and negritude" inspires distrust not only among mestizo and

white citizens, but also among those negros who have a non-racial concept of

Angola.

At times, however, a virtual alliance among these three groups is seen, and

their affinities seem to be reinforced. If the situation becomes radicalized,

we will see an additional problem in Angola: the rights of minorities, which

have almost always been attacked by repressive means in Africa, if not massacred. One leading advocate of democracy even told us that "a large part of

the State bourgeoisie claims to follow the same path here."
As for the war effort, there has not been any spectacular offensive action on

the part of FAPLA, but a communique from the Defense Ministry on 2 weeks in

June said that 119 "armed bandits" had died in Moxico Province alone. Even

discounting possible exaggeration, this reflects the military tension in the

East, where the soldiers are mounting more patrols and ambushes, which have

led to enormous increases in small but lethal battles, to which are added attacks by FALA (the armed branch of UNITA) on towns in Huarabo, Benguela, KuanzaSul and Kuanza-Norte.

It does not seem, however, that FAPLA can attack Jamba, for various reasons.

Another major focus of conflict within the regime is the matter of "State Security." In practice, this agency is virtually powerless and a large number

of its former directors and agents are still being held prisoner and have not

been heard from for over 3 months. Now there is renewed talk of a merger with

the Ministry of the Interior, as the Cubans have suggested. However, the Cuban

proposal does not envisage keeping current Interior Minister Alexandre Rodrigues Kota at the head of this super-ministry, as he is regarded as "on the

Americans' side."

The President's decision will give us an excellent idea of his margin to maneuver and of the direction he intends to give an agency that has many times

been accused of fascist behavior.

Another concern of the government is the attitude of the people who, even outside areas supporting UNITA, are showing signs of discontent. They have not

resigned themselves to the imposed conditions and they have become so critical

that the authorities are unable to silence them, unless they seize whole regions.

9805

CSO: 3442/271

10
LIBERIA

LOSS OF PRESS FREEDOM, CLOSING OF NEWSPAPERS DEPLORED

Statements by Two Veteran Journalists

Monrovia DAILY STAR in English 10 Jul 86 p 8

[Text!

Two veteran Liberia journalists,

the Managing Director of the Liberia Observer

Corporation, Mr.

Kenneth Y. Best

and the Managing

Editor Of the Sunrise Incorporated,

Mr. Rufus M. Darpoh, have been

explaining obstacles to press free

dorn in Liberia.

Speaking early

yesterday morning

on the BBC radio

programme:"Network

Africa", Mr. Best

noted that those

responsible for

the closure of the

Daily Observer are

doing them "injustice and denying" them their

basic human rights.

For his part,

the Managing Editor of the Sunrise

Incorporated, Mr.

Rufus Darpoh, informed "Focus On

Africa" that they

are not anti-government as is being speculated by

authorities, rather, "we are here

to serve the general public."

When contacted

later by this paper for elaboration, Mr. Darpoh

urged those wishing to enter the

journalistic profession, not to be

discouraged* by the

many mounting problems" Liberior

journalists are

currently facing.

ConcerninB t-.hr

printing problem

which his paper

was struggling

with, Mr. Darpoh

said "very soon

that will be dealt

with".

One of the journalists, Mr. Best,

told * "Network

Africa" that "the

Constitution of

this country

doesn't say that

one should receive

a letter from the

Ministry of Information or any individual to print

a legally recog-

.nized and registered ( newspaper..."

He said when the

nation returned

to constitutional

rule this year,

followed by the

subsequent re-opening of his paper,

he was informed

by his printers

CSABANON) that to

enable them print

the paper, the Observer Management

should > obtain, an

official .letter

from the Ministry

of Information authoritizing them

(SABANON) to do

so. Since then,

Mr. Best said, "we

have not been able

to print, as SABANON fears that

there would be action against them

from the authorities."

The Daily Obser-

' ver was closed

down by police

officers on January 16, 1986 on

orders of Justice

Minister Jenkins

Scott. There was

no official communication at the

time to the effect

of the closure.

However, when

the nation returned to civilian rule this year, the

late Albert Porte,

Chairman of the

Board of Directors, at a brief

{ceremony held at

the headquarters

of the paper, announced the re-

.opening of the paper.

11
International Body Expresses Concern

Monrovia DAILY STAR in English 10 Jul 86 pp 8, 7

[Text]

The Committee for

the Protection of

Journalists, based

in New York, USA,

has expressed its

concern over the

condition of the

press in Liberia.

In a letter to

the Ministry of Information, copy of

which was released

to this newspaper,

the committee referred specifically to the DAILY

OBSERVER and FOOTPRINTS TODAY newspapers which have

not been able to

publish, the former since January

last year and the

latter for more

than two months.

The Committee noted that it understands that THE

DAILY OBSERVER attempted to re-open

in early March,

but was disturbed

that a fire was

apparently or deliberately set to

the offices, causing several thousand dc?.lar worth

of damage, which

prevented the paper from doing so.

The letter noted

that FOOTPRINTS was

forced to cease

publication after

it was alleged that

its printers had

received threats

warning them against printing the

paper.

The Committee revealed that it had

cabled its concern

to the Ministry of

Information about

both the fire at

the DAILY OBSERVER

and the alleged

threats against

FOOTPRINTS.

The Committee noted, however, that

the Ministry of Information had remained "silent".

As an organization working to uphold the rights of

our colleagues

worldwide...we were

very much heartened by the promulgation of a new

Constitution in

Janaury 1986 that

specifically provides guarantees

of press freedom",

the letter said.

It • v.erefore,

called oh the ministry to take

steps towards the

resumption of publication by the

papers. This would

do much to signify

both domestically

and internationally, that Liberia's

real commitment to

press freedom, the

letter went.

The letter signed

by Mr. Michael Massing, a member of

the Board of Directors of the Committee, had cabon copies sent to several international

press organizations, including the

Newspaper Guild,

the World Press

Freedom Committee,

the Society of Professional Journalists and the International Federation of Journalists, among many.

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12
LIBERIA

TELECOMMUNICATION CORPORATION INVESTIGATING PAYCHECK SCANDAL

Monrovia DAILY STAR in English 10 Jul 86 pp 8, 5

[Article by Ephraim Johns]

[Text]

There are reports that several persons at the Liberia Telecommunication

Corporation (LTC) are undergoing investigation following . the disappearance of an unspecified number

of salary checks owned by personnel

of the Corporation's out-station department .

According to the

. reportsi the scandal was unearthed

when employees of

the out-station

departments complained that they

had not been paid

for the months

of February and

April, 1986.

In an interview

with the DAILY

STAR, some of the

affected employees

who asked not to

be named, said in

May, this year,

it was learnt that

the Corporation

had paid all of

its Monrovia based

employees for the

months of February

and April but did

not pay those in

the rural areas.

/9274

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The employees

said because of

the "global financial constraints

of which the Corporation is no

exception, there

was *no need to

approach the management since they

had the belief

that their salaries would be paid

at a later date.

It was not until

it was learnt by

them that their

salaries were paid

that they had to

approach the outstation boss to

ascertain the

truth surrounding their pay.

.The employees

who appeared disappointed, further

added that after

it was confirmed

13

that their checks

were sent to the

various counties,

they informed the

Managing Director,

Hon. Samuel

Richlieu Uatkins,

who ordered an

immediate investigation in the

racket.

When contacted,

Mr. Uatkins, confirmed the check,

scandal and said

that an investigation is being conducted but no report on the findings have been

submitted to his

office for scrutiny

and action.

Meanwhile, the

employees are

appealing to the

LTC authorities

for an immediate

redress.
LIBERIA

COMPULSORY ELEMENTARY, PRIMARY EDUCATION PROPOSED

Monrovia NEW LIBERIAN in English 1 Jul 86 pp 1, 6

[Article by Gabriel S. Nyanfor]

[Text]

Deputy Information

Minister for administration, G. Moses K.

Washington, has appealed to authorities

to make elementary and

primary education compulsory in order to

reduce the high illiteracy rate which has

reached an alarming

proportion ip the

country.

Minister Washington

made the appeal at the

Monrovia College _on

Camp Johnson Road at

' the week-end whan he

delivered the keynote

address during the congraduation exercises

of the Hilton Van Elementary School.

He observed that

when the scheme is introduced throughout

the nation, parents

would be encouraged

to send their children

to school rather than

using them as farmers

in the early stages.

Stressing the importance of Education in

the second Republic

he also urged the authorities to strive

ror achieving better

quality education by

involving other curriculum activities within the system such as

competitions in many

fields including English, Social Studies

among others.

He added that social

organizations must

again take their roots

in the schools like

the Young Men's Christian Association (YM--

CA), Young Women, t5

[Christian]

Association (YWCA),

as well as the Boy

Scouts and the Girl

Guides Movement and

other charitable organizations geared towards encouraging students to be batter citizens.

He said, to achieve

sound and quality education, authorities

must invest; more monay

into education to enhancer, the schema. Ha

then urg§d authorities

to restore subsidies

to private schools to

assist them prepare

youth for the future.

Minister Washington

used tha occasion to

call on authorities

to also reconsider

their decision and re-

-?tora._Jtb1

a

_ scholarship

program to assist deserving students who

want to learn but have

no means to do so.

Ha lauded the school

system for preparing

Liberian youth for

tasks ahead - of their,

and admonished school

authorities to do

everything possible

to bring sound education to the nation rather than engaging in

political activities

that could ratard the

efforts of tha students.

He than told the

congraduate's to impress upon their parents the need for higher education. Ha

pointed out that elementary education is

only the beginning of

14
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the struggle and cautioned parents to sand

their children forward, noting that Siberians need to pursue

thosa things that will

bring about sound education, social progress, economic advancement and moral ,

reawakening.

At the and of the

program about 56 students wara awarded

certificates for the

successful completion

of prescribed courses

in the sixth grade.

15
NIGERIA

SOVIET UNION PLANS TO IMPORT COCOA, OTHER PRODUCTS

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 4 Aug 86 p 2

[Article by Victor Attai]

[Text]

About 20,000 tonnes

of cocoa beans worth

over 69 million

Naira to be imported

irom Nigeria by the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republic

(USSR) in 1986, the head of the

Department of Foreign Trade,

West Africa', Mr. Sergeu

Lototsvy has said.

Mr. Lototsvy who disclosed

this in an interview with the

New Nigerian at the Business

Information Exhibition of

Soviet Foreign Trade Association in Lagos recently said

Nigeria's cocoa beans producl

has a very high quality which

attracted his country's interest.

He said his country will also

import goods worth 200 million

Naira into the country

especially machineries, spare

parts for the Ajaokuta Steel

Rolling MU1.

Mr. Lototsvy also said over

300 million Naira worth of

trade was recorded between

Nigeria and the USSR in 1984.

Bulk of their export from

Nigeria was cocoa beans.

In 1985 the trade dropped tc

about 270 million dollars but

with cocoa as the major article of trade from Nigeria.

In his speech while delcaring open the exhibition the

president of the Nigerian

Association of Chamhprs of

Commerce, Industry, Mines

and Agriculture (NACCIMA)

Chief J. Akin-George said

despite the growing relationship between Nigeria and the

USSR the volume ot trade between the two countries hag

regreiably beer. On the decline

Since 1975.

The NACCIMA president

called for the improvement of

more trade relations between

the two countries. He also invited the Soviet businessmen

and companies to come and

participate in this year's

Lagos International Trade

Fair due to take place from

November 8 to 16.

/9274

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16
NIGERIA

NATIONAL SEMINAR ON TRADITIONAL RULERS ENDS IN DISAGREEMENT

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 7 Aug 86 pp 1, 3

[Text]

THE national seminar

on traditional rulers and

politics organised by the

University of Sokoto

ended on Tuesday on a

note of disagreement

resulting in two communiques.

One was issued by the

chairman and the secretary

of the organising committee,

Dr. Hussalni and Malam Ahmed Baku respectively and the

other by 29 lecturers who

claimed to be the majority.

The participants disagreed

on the resolutions of the

seminar and they split.

The communique signed by

the cf.airman and secretary of

the organising committee called for the reorganisation of

the structure of traditional

leadership with a view to making it more, effective by specifying their roles and functions

now and in the future.

II also observed the need to retain the traditional leadership

and its insulation from partisan

politics to maintain the ethics

which in the past had made them

effective and efficient. -

The communique further said

traditional rulers should not remain mute whenever government deviated from its responsibilities to its citizens, adding

that a national council of traditional rulers be created to advise

government^ issues of interest

both at state and federal levels

It also observed that traditional

rulers had remained key figures

of government from pre-colonial

Nigeria, adding that the rulers

were only used by successive

governments in getting to the

grassroots but were subsequently

relegated to the background and

rendered powerless.

The communique by the 29 lecturer* said .the other communique by the organising committee

neither reflected the views of the

majority of the papers presented

nor the content of the discussion

which took place.

They called for either the abolition of the traditional institution

in its entirety or its democratization to reflect the tradition of the

people.

The lecturers felt that traditional institutions had no

relevance to the need of our society now and in the future.

They noted that since traditional rulers derived their

legitimacy from tradition not

from Islam or the mandate of the

people through open elections,

traditional institution was an

anachronism that the people had

been forced to accept, norture

and sustain.

The lecturers said while there

were some calls for the retention

of the institution of traditional

.rulers during the seminar, they

were only by a few participants.

/9274

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17
NIGERIA

ÜECREES ON NLC AFFILIATIONS, UNIVERSITIES, CUSTOMS ISSUED

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 5 May 86 pp 1, 9

[Text] THE Academic Staff

Union of Universities

(ASUU) and "35 other

unions and associations

are not to be affiliated to

the central labour

oraanisation, the

Nigeria Labour Congress

<NLC).

This was contained in

Decree No. 17, Trade Unions

(Miscellaneous Provisions)

Decree 1986 which appeared

along with pine other decrees

h the official gazette No. 34

volume 73 released yesterday in Lagos.

The decree amends the list

of trade unions recognised

and registered by the registrar

of trade unions whose

members are takqn from

workers as defined and those

whose members are drawn

from the senior staff and

employers association.

The decree also forbids deductions, except on voluntary basis,

from wages and salaries ofsenior

employees as contributions to

trade unions.

Under the decree 43, industrial

unions are recognised as workers

union in Part A, while 18 senior

staff unions are listed under Part

B which cannot be affiliated to

the NLC. . They include, the National

Association of Aircraft Pilots and

Engineers, Electricity and Gas

Senior Staff Association,

Nigerian Union of Pharmacists,

Medical Technologists and Professions Allied to Medicine,

Academic Staff Union of Univer-.

sities, Association of Senior Civil

Servants of Nigeria, Association

t>t Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions and Food, Beverages and

Tobacco Senior Staff Association.

Others are Shop and

Distributive Trade Senior Staff

Association, Construction and

Civil Engineering Senior Staff

Association,' Petroleum and

Natural Gas Senior Staff Association, Chftmical and Non-Metallic

Products Senior Staff Association, Footwear, Leather and Rubber Products Senior Staff

Association. Senior Staff Association of Shipping, Clearing and

Forwarding Agencies; Textile,

Garments and Tailoring Senior

Staff Association; Automobile,

Boatyard, Transport Equipment

and Allied Senior Staff Association: Metallic and Non-Metallic

Mines, Corporations and Goverri-

: ment owned Companies.

Alsp included are Senior Staff

•Association of Universities

Teaching Hospitals, Research Institutes and Associated Institutions; Metal Products Senior

Staff Association of Nigeria-

-Precision, Electrical and Related

Equipment Senior Staff Association; Hotel and Personal Services

Senior Staff Association; Paper

and Paper Products Senior Staff

Association; Agricultural and

Allied Senior Staff Association;

National Union of Agricultural

18
and Allied Employers; National

Union of Dock Labour

Employers; Nigeria Employers'

Association of Banks, Insurance

and Allied Institutions.

Others are Association of Food,

Beverage and Tobacco

Employers, Hotel and Personal

Services Employer's Association; Construction and Civil

Engineering Employers'

Association of Nigeria; Koad

Transport Employer's Association; National Association of Con

servancy Employers; Nigeria

Mining Employers' Association;

Precision, Electrical and Related

Equipment Employers' Association; Water Transport Senior

Staff Association and any other

.unions of senior staff registered

latter the commencement of the

Trade Unions (Amendment) Act

,22 of 1978.

The other decrees are Federal

Universities of Technology

Decree No. 13; Customs, Immigration and Prisons Services

Board Decree No. 14; Motor

Vehicles (Third Party Liability

Insurance (ECOWAS) Brown

Card Scheme» Decree No. 15;

Nigerian Institute «i 'nternational Affairs (Amendment)

Decree No. 16 and Trade Unions

(Miscellaneous) Provisions

Decree No. 17.

Others are Instruments Constituting the Visitation Panels

into the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, S.I. No: 16; The University of Lagos S.I. No. 17. University of Ife, S.I. No. 18 and the

University of Benin S.I. No. 19.

The Federal Universities of

Technology Decree provides for

the. establishment of the three

federal univesities of.technology.

Apart from its orientation to

science and technology, each of

the universities has largely the

same configuration as any other

federal universities.

The decree, which now dissolved the provisional councils set up

in 1980 envisages the appointment of more than one deputy

vice-chancellor to enable the

vice-chancellor concentrate

more on policy, rather than

routine matters.

The Customs. Immigration and

Prisons Services Board Decree

establishes a joint board to administer the Customs and Excise

Immigration and Prison laws,

while the motor vehicle.

ECOWAS brown card scheme,

enacts a municipal laws to bring

into effect in Nigeria the provisions of a protocol signed between all memlxT states <>l Ute

ECOWAS

The protocol seeks to provide

third party liability insurance

cover for victims of road accidents occurring within territories of member states

It also provides penaIt \ for any

person using .or diking ä motor

vehicle on., a Nigerian road

without the possession i.} valid

•ECOWAS brown card

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19
NIGERIA

TACTICS OF NIGERIAN LABOR CONGRESS DISCUSSED

Lagos DAILY TIMES in English 6 Aug 86 p 9

[Article by Umoh James Omoh]

Laare

perthe

[Text]

V^OMK Nigerian

^-^ bour leaders

weeping — privately.

Imps — because

Federal Government has

kicked the Academic Staff

Union of Universities

(ASUU) out of the

N i geri an Labo ur Congress

(NLC).

Hut. many labour

lenders have been jubilating and laughing

openly and praising the

Federal Government for

rescuing .the NLC from

ASUU and regaining the

Congress for the real

Nigerianworkera

If the Federal Ministry

of Labour had been alive

to its responsibilities, the

ASUU and senior staff

association in the distributive trade, would not

have been admitted into

the NLC, in the first instance.

On December, 1975, the

then Federal Commissioner for Labour, Major

General Henry Adefope,

announced a new national

labour policy which the

administration he served

intended to adopt.

He said this policy

would be based on

"Limited Government Intervention" and "Guided Democracy" in labour matter.

In his statement of December 4, 1975, General Adefope said the policy would

involve ban on international affiliation; restructuring of trade unions; trade

union education; trade union finance; labour inspection and the enforcement

of labour laws.

On the basis of this policy statement of 1975, the following laws emerged:

--A decree restructuring 1,000 house unions into 42 industrial unions.

—A decree inaugurating and registering the Nigeria Labour Congress as the

only central labour organisation in the country and the 42 industrial unions,

the founding membership of the NLC.

—A decree making payment of check-off dues by workers automatic and compulsory.

—A decree for the establishment of National Institute for Labour Studies.

No law was enacted on international affiliation. The 42 industrial unions

registered legally as founding affiliates of the NLC were clearly named and

20
gazetted. The Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) was listed as one

of the senior staff associations. That was how the trade union structure took

off in 1978.

Then came the ideological interest of the Marxists in the Nigeria Labour Congress.

The Marxist doctrine proclaims that, in preparing for a socialist revolution,

the workers who should be in the vanguard of this revolution, must be led by

what they term as the "progressive intelligentia."

In practice, this will

theoretical guidelines

wrap those

mean that the progressive intelligentia will provide

and the ideological leadership for the revolution and

guidelines around the

niH-kn of innocent

Nigerian workers and

then push the workers

into a revolutionary

bloodhath with the ruling

pew er.

If the revolution succeeds, then the progressive intellectuals will

emerge to lead the government — afterall it was

they who provided the

theoretical guidelines and

ideological leadership.

Tlie workers will then

remain still workers with

no improvement in their

welfare. But this time, the

workers will not complain

about anything — afterall, it was they who made

the revolution.

if, on the other hand,

the revolution fails, the

workers will face the

wrath and might of the

ruling power. The progressive intellectuals will

sneak out of the country

and become lecturers in

foreign countries.

The Marxists in the

Nigeria Latour Congress

recruited ASUU into the

congress to provide thee- '-

refical guidelines and

ideological leadership

within the Nigerian

labour movement in preparation for a socialist revolution.

It was not surprising

that soon after admission

of ASUU, the NLC began

to shed its original purpose as the umbrella of

Nigerian workers and

wore the garment of a

broad based revolutionary

movement. Soon

students, farmers and

market women became

associate members of Hie

NLC.

The real Nigerian

workers no longer had a

say in the affairs of the

congress.

Frustrated and disappointed, three-quarter

of industrial unions withdrew their support and

loyalty from the NLC and

stopped paying dues to

the congress.

'.", That made matters

worse The tiny minority

of Marxists took full con-

•: trol of alT organs of the

NLC and began the rapid

drift to the ideological left

and disaster.

The performance of the

NLC between May and

June, 1986 gave the impression that some

leaders of the congress

were up to something

dreadful.

On May 10, 1986, the

NLC pressurised the

Ministry of Labour to ban

an African transport

workers seminar and conference which five

industrial unions in the

transport industry had intended to host.

The congress had hoped

that the five, transport

unions would react

bitterly to theban on their

conference and would

sponsor industrial action

to show Uieir strong resentment and create confusion in the country. But

leaders of the five transport unions, as believers

in democratic trade

unionism, took the matter

calmly.

The transport unions

did not organise any

strike because they had no

dispute with the government and none with their

employers. So:the NIX)

had no opportunity to use

the transport workers to

cause trouble.

Shortly after the NLC

had secured the ban on

transport workers

seminar, we heard the

NLC publicly supporting

a strike action by petrol

tankers drivers — despite

the fact that it is workers

who would be the most

hurt when commercial

vehicles could not find

fuel and when kerosene

could not be found for

domestic use at thenhomes.

Before the end of the

petrel tankers jtrücc,

came the student crisis

and the involvement of

NLÖ leaders as alleged by

the Federal Government.

It was the student crisis

which made i,he government take a deeper look

into the affairs of the

NLC.

If, in the past, the

'. ministry had been active,

the NLC could not have

been allowed to admit

ASUU and senior staff

associations. Managers

and workers cannot belong to the same union

because discipline wiD not

be . maintained in the

office.

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21
NIGERIA

SMUGGLING OF KEROSENE, RICE CAUSES SHORTAGES

Kerosene to Benin

Lagos SUNDAY TIMES in English 3 Aug 86 pp 1, 3

[Text] The reported scarcity of kerosene in parts of Nigerian may not improve

unless the Federal Government takes immediate steps to curb the smuggling of

the product into neighbouring republic of Benin.

Investigations have revealed that Kerosene has become a major stock in trade

by Beninoise citizens.

Seven out of every ten Beninoise passing through the Seme Border on foot carry

jerry cans containing kerosene on their onward march to Benin Republic,

The rush for kerosene is not limited to adults alone, children have also been

mobilised in the procurement of kerosene which although sells for about 50

kobo a litre In Nigeria, sells for higher than that In Benin Republic. A ten

litre jerry can sells for as much as 700 francs or over N7 according to the

black market rate.

They were seen dodging through footpaths with basins of kerosene loaded jerry

cans making their way across the border.

Some women and young girls were also seen strapping jerry cans with kerosene

on their back disguised as babies in order to beat security checks.

Our investigations who revealed that most of the kerosene smugglers work as

agents for influential Benlnoise-based businessmen and women who [word indistinct] crossing the border to the Beninoise side with their cans, empty

them in drums from where they are carted to Cotonou and other major towns.

The kerosene traffic, Investigations revealed, are usually very high at dawn

and dusk.

Although they don't buy from nearby petrol stations at the border post, investigations revealed that various kerosene depots had emerged in neighbouring

villages on

22
the Nigerian end_ from

where they get tEelr stock.'

The trend is hot limited

to Kerosene alone, the;

; smuggling of Nigerian

'Petroleum fuel has also

resumed in full scale.

The method used is that

vehicles plying the

international rout« fill their

tanks at the Nigerian end

before crossing over only to

empty them at Benin,

leaving them with

sufficient fuel to return to

Nigeria for another round

of purchase.

At the Dantokpa motor

park, petroluent purchased

from Nigeria is openly sold

in jerry cans while rubber

hoses are also openly üs«d

to siphon fuel from vehicle

tanks. ,

A ten-litre jerry can ot

fuel sells for 1,100 French

Tranes at the Dantokpa

Motor Park which converts.

to"almostNlTliccöraTngto

black market, rate. ,,

This tnfact leaves the

illegal dealers with a high

maginaJ profit.

_

The illegal kerosene and

petroleum traffick is actively

supported By some

Nigerians in neighbouring

villages who serve as

contactmen for the

Beninoise couriers.

Rice Diverted

Lagos SUNDAY TIMES in English 3 Aug 86 pp 1, 3

[Article by Kunle Odufuwa]

[Text] WITH importation of rice into the country banned, and its

cost skyrocketing, thousands of bags of rice meant for

the Federal Government of Nigeria are daily being offloaded

at various markets in the Republic of Benin.

Investigations conducted by SUNDAY TIMES at Dantokpa

and Bogbamu markets in Cotonou and the popular Ifonyin

market all in the Republic of Benin revealed that bags of rice

marked "Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources

and Rural Development",

and "Federal Government

of'Nigeria" are dailybeing

offloaded from lorries into various warehouses in

Benin Republic.

The bags qf rice, were

offloaded at the

Beninoise port from

where they found their

ways into the various

markets.

The 50 kilogram bags, are

sold for 6,000 French

Francs which according to

rate

0&O»

the black market,

converts to about

Seventy naira.

As at the weekend the

naira was converting at

1,500« to N20 in the 1

market a phe

which reflects a terrible fall

in the value of the naira

which was about 400S to

the naira twoyears back.

In some coses the traders

who refused to accept the

naira from some

prospective Nigerian rice

buyers, insisted on

accepting the Francs.

Apart from the "Federal Government Rice" investigations revealed that some

Nigerian businessmen have for some time now been making use of the Republic

of Benin ports in the offloading of their imported rice since it had been

banned from entering Nigeria,

A reliable source close to one of the clearing agents who handled the clearing

of some of the privately owned rice revealed that they belonged to some released

23
wealthy politicians who

could not effect their

importation before they

were clamped into

detention by the ousted

jBuhari/Idiagbon regime.

Some of the rice ships

already heading for Nigeria

with rice then, were said to

have been asked to return

on the advise of their

importers.

To conceal the identity of

the Federal Governmentowned rice some of the

retail traders have formed:

the habit of rebagging them

in sacks with no visible

identity.

Some of them would not

reveal the source of their

stock but only said "they

wore bought from our

customers".

Investigations also

revealed that a.f.ter

offloading privately owned

rice at Benin Ports, the

businessmen cleverly

smuggled them into the

oouiitrj and sold ut very

exorbitant "costs to the

N)Julian traders who must

make their own profits.

The question on the lips

of most Nigerians who daily'

visit the Benin Republic'

was how consignment^ of

rice meant for the Federal

Government of Nigeria

managed to get to foreign

market without reaching

their destinations.

Already some Nigerian;

businessmen are known to,

have opened offices in:

Cotonou and Port Novo to'

facilitate the easy clearing

of their consignment of rice

according to very reliable!

sources.

BEN DURU reports ml

Lagos> < Investigation,show

that at Daleko Retail Market, Isolo a 50kg bag of rice

was at the week-end sold for

»i60, "while the 1ÖÖ

kilogram bag for between,

»260 to »276.

It was learnt that the rice

was among those that had

come into the country

sometime this year by both

private importers and the

stock of the Nigeria

.National Supply Company

which will have to be

disposed of before the

proposed winding up of

their operation by the end

ofthe year.

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24
NIGERIA

ALTERNATIVE TO COMMODITY BOARDS ADVISED

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 11 Aug 86 pp 1, 9

[Text] AN alternative body to tne

jscrapped commodity boards

should be set up to grade and

fix "minimum prices" for

agricultural products, the

seminar of the Nigerian Institute of Bankers held inKaduna has recommended. . A communique released at

the weekend said the proposed

body would ensure quality of

our exports.

It also recommended that

the Standard Organisation of

Nigeria (SON) be "properly

equipped" to grade and fix

prices of manufactured export

products.

The communique suggested

that exporters of invisible exports be allowed to keep25 per

cent of their foreign exchange

proceeds. At present only exporters "of visible! exports enjoy that concession.

It implored tne government

not to neglect tne promotion of

invisible expprts like tourism,

insurance and banking as wel"

as shipping.

The seminar believed that

since exports would now

receive special attention,

loans to that subsector should

be excluded from the credit

cejling.

It called on the government

to publish without any further

delay the decree on export

procedures and ^incentives,

adding that an export credit

guarantee and insurance

scheme should be established

urgently and managed by an

independent body other than

Central Bank of Nigeria

(CBN).

The Nigerian Export Promotion Council (NEPC)

should be strengthened and

made to function independently with defined guidelines, the

seminar also recommended.

Its other recommendations

were an intelligence unit

within the NEPC vio collect

and collate data which would

guide exporters and financial

institutions as well as the involvement of all those institutions in the provision of

finance for export trade.

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25
GOVERNMENT REVIEWING PETROLEUM LEGISLATION

NIGERIA

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 8 Aug 86 pp 1, 9

[Text]

FEDERAL Government is

reviewing its petroleum-related

legislations to ensure increased

oil exploration activity. Minister

of Petroleum Resources, Alhaji

Rilwanu Lukman, has said in

IilgOS.

In an address lie sent to Ihe open-.

ing of the 10th annual conference

of the Nigerian section of the

Society of Petroleum Engineers,

m Wednesday. Alhaji Kilwanu

said~Nie review would enable the

government to "see where

appropriate changes are needed"

The Nigerian National

Petroleum Corporation fNNPC),

he said, was currently taking steps

to .Maintain, the interest df its

joint venture partners, adding

that the country's petroleum tax

profit scheme was also being

reviewed to enable producing

companies to have funds which

could be ploughed back into the

Country's oil industry.

The minister, who is Ihe current

OPEC President, urged the producing companies, which had

been guaranteed a two-dollar

margin per every barrel of crude

produced, to maintain a

healthy'' exploration programme in order to find new oil

wells and to beef up'the country's

oil reserves, estimated at 16

billion barrels.

He said because of the current

collapse in oil prices, producers

had embarked on a "soul searching experience" of finding new

crude buyers, and noted that a

diversification of the oil industry

was necessary in order to maintain current level of oil earnings.

Alhaji Rilwanu advised the

conference to work out strategies

that would help the country in

evolving an aggressive

marketing policy for the future.

jMiiniingnui thai the lirst phase of

the petrochemical project would

soon come onstream, while the

government would still go ahead

with the liquefied natural gas

project.

The minister further called on

the oil companies to evaluate how

some government policies, such

as the second-tier foreign exchange market and commercialisation would affect the oil industry.

In an address, the guest of

honour. Governor Gbolahan

Mudasiru of Lagos, said (he

petroleum engineers should

maintain a sustained growth in

•he- inriiis.irx <n ci.vVlili' !•

maximise its economic development benefits.

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26
NIGERIA

NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION REPORTED HIGHER IN MARCH

Lagos DAILY TIMES in English 6 Aug 86 pp 1, 13

[Text]

jVTlGERlA's produo

* ' tion of natural gas,

mainly associated gas,

increased from 47.77

million standard cubic

feet (MSCF)—about

1.35 million cubic

metres — in January to

60.4 MSCF-about 1.7

million cubic.metres —

in March, the Nigerian

Petroleum News has

reported.

The journal states in

its August edition that

natural gas production,

which totalled about 50

million MSCF in

February, had

continued to increase

along wkh crude oil production during the

. quarter.

It reports that

although the utilisation

of the associated gas

showed an upward trend

in March, a considerable

amount of gas was still

being flared daily.

"In each of the three

months, more than 70

per cent of the gas

produced was flared.

The percentage actually

topped 75 per cent in

March, the publication

•notes.

Petroleum News also

reports that the NNPC

and the country's oil

producing companies

produced a total of 36.9

million barrels in

January or an average of

1.2 million barrels per

day (MBD), 39.3 million

barrels in February or

an average of 1.4 MBD

and 51.76 million barrels

in March or an average

of about 1.67 MBD.

It states that

although the figures for

April to June have not

been published by the

NNPC, production of

crude must have been

maintained at the

. March level or above it

in spite of the current

slump in oil prices.

The journal notes that

the falling oil prices

might, however, dissuade the producing

companies which had

earlier signed an

incentive agreement

with the NNPC,

guaranteeing them a

two-dollar margin for

every barrel of crude

produced.

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27
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION DOWN IN 1985

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 7 Aug 86 pp 1, 3

NIGERIA

[Text] AGRICULTURAL production in Nigeria rose by 2.5 per

cent last year compared with

a more favourable growth

rate of 4.2 per cent in 1984, according to the Central Bank of

Nigeria annual report for 1985

just released.

The report attributed the

lower rate of growth to the

sharp decline of about 40 per

cent in fish production which,

it explained, helped to offset

the significant rates of growth

in the other component items.

The report said output of

stable food crops rose by 9.1

per cent, compared with 12.3

per cent in the preceding year,

while rice and beans production rose by 24.8 per cent and

28.1 per cent, compared with

an increase of 8,3 and a

decline of 28.2 per cent respectively in 1984.

It said cash crop production

also rose last year by a reduced rate of 3.2 per cent, compared with 6.9 per cent in 1984,

with the deceleration in the

growth rate attributed to a

decline of 36.4 per cent in

cocoa production.

In the manufacturing subsector, the report said the

value of output rose by 6.8 per

cent to .2,604.7 million Naira

in 1985.

The increase, it said, was

mostly reflected in grain milling, sugar confectionery, baking products, printing and

publishing, paper and paper

products, vehicle assembly

and chemicals.

The report indicated,

however, that the val-'e of production of certain s> ^toral

groups declined from »*»eir

Revels in the preceding yet».-,

stating that the brewery,

leather products'and textiles

declined by ltf.5 per cent, 26.1

per cent and 1.5 per cent

respectively.

The value of imported goods

rose sharply last year by 754.6

million Naira or 10.5 per cent

to 7,932.9 million Naira according to the report.

This, it said, was ä reversal

of the downward trend recorded in the previous years.

.It noted however, that

receipts from exports rose by

2,126.2 million Naira or 23.4

per cent to 11,214.8 million

Naira inercty generating a

trade surplus of 3,281.9 million

Naira in 1985 as against a

surplus of .1,909.7 million

Naira in 1984.

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28
NIGERIA

DOMESTIC FISH PRODUCTION DECLINES, DEMAND INCREASING

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES In English 4 Aug 86 pi

[Article by Jackson Imafidon]

[Text]

T^JIGERIA'S do1.^1 mestic fish production dropped

from 373,755 tonnes

in 1984 to 240,220 in

1985 according to

sources from Federal Department of

Fisheries.

Projected domestic

fish demand for 1985

was 1,018,000 metric

tonnes. To make for

the short fall in 1984,

137,713 metric tonnes.

Even though, the

figures for imported'

fish for 1985 were not

available, it is stronglj

believed that the wide

gap between the

domestic fish production and fish importation still exists.

Sectoral production

for 1984 shows that

fishermen using

canoes caughC 349,223

metric tonnes of fish as

against 214,977 tonnes

caught last year. Fishing Companies using fish

trawlers caught 24,532

metric tonnes of fish 1984

as agains 25,253 tonnes in

1985.

Projected per capita

consumption of fish in

Nigeria is 10.59 kilogramme in 1985 and this

has risen to 10.85 kilogramme this year. A

/9274

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census of artisanal fie^er'

men is approximately;.

470,000 with about

320,000 of them engaged,

in full time fishing, the

rest being on part time. .-'

Fish get to the market

in different forms-fresh

chilled for froren, Crustacea salted or dried Crustacea or Bunded. Growth

rate of fish supply is

about 1.5 per cent as

against an annual growth

supply rate of 9.5 per

cent.

At a recent workshop

on taxation and economy,

it was disclosed that

about 50 per cent of tha

fish produced. in the

remote coastal centres

and- in the hitherland

perish as a result of poor

processing and packaging

facilities available to the

fish farmers. The low rate

of fish caught by artisanal

, fishermen was traced to

the inadequacies of fish-;

; ing equipment and techni- <

|ques. It has been noticed;

that there have been

increased rate of shift of ,

fishermen from remote '

fish settlements to urban'

areas for more 'paying

jobs. Continuity in the

fish fanning particularly,.'1

the artisanal fishermen, is.

being interrupted as

young persons shun the

industry, obviously because ofpoor earnings.

Fishermen are also.'

known to be at a disad-l

vantage in return for their29

efforts because ofthe wide

difference between the'

i price at which they sell to

I traders and what the

' traders in turn sell to the

i final consumers.

Fishermen, it was disclosed at the workshop,

are not willing to invest

and procure modern

'. equipment for their opera-

: tions because of the high

;

risk associated with sea

fishing. Fishermen and

fishing companies have

persistently protested

against the high cost of

fishing equipment such as

out board engines, canoes

and nets. Cost of maintenance of fishing vessels, are

also prohibitive and the

same is trace fuel for

' vessel operation.

' Access to funds from

commercial and agricultural banks are also very

tight making almost

impossible for fishermen

to obtain loans to modernise their operations.

Deep sea fishing, so far

has remained an exclusive

reserve for the few shipping companies with

modem fishing trawlers.

It has been suggested

that Nigeria enters into

agreement with some

African countries for fishing rights in their coastal

territories and some royalties in return. This has

been seen as a more viable

alternative to the direct

importation of .fish from

European and Scandinavian countries.
NIGERIA

BADAGRY TELEPHONE EXCHANGE INAUGURATED

Lagos DAILY TIMES in English 5 Aug 86 p 3

[Text] THE Badagry Telephone

Exchange built at the

cost of N2.21 million was

yesterday commissioned by

the Chief of Naval Staff,

Rear-Admiral Augustine

Aikhomu.

The naval chief said that

the exchange would serve

for a long time the purpose

for which it was built.

Minister of Communications, Tanko Ayuba in his

address said the exchange

"is 1,000 lines mobile

exchange with 400

subscribers now

connected".

Col. Ayuba explained

that contract for the

provision of the exchange

was awarded to Messrs,

Marubeni West African

Limited in 1977 while

Messers Semens/Eltec

Nigeria Limited ' were

responsible for the

provision of the associated

"external line plant".

He said similar

commissioning of exchange

in "other states of the. federation would also take place

during the year.

The Badagry Exchange

commissioning, he said, "is

a fulfilment of this administration's efforts to extend

telecommunication services

to all local government

headquarters in the

country".

Col. Ayuba expressed

awareness that the existing

cable distribution did not

provide for service at Ajara

and Ibereko since the areas

were not developed when

the exchange was planned.

"However a comprehensive survey and design of

external line plant net-work

have been undertaken to

cater for the areas he said.

The minister disclosed

that his ministry, to

combat NITEL delays in

sending bills regularly

would soon instal two large

computers in Kaduna and

Lagos for prompt

processing of bills and other

information matters.

He added that similar

computers would be

installed in zonal

headquarters at Bauchi,

Enugu and Ibadan.

Earlier, the sole

administrator of Badagry

Local Government, Mr.. O.

L. Odunaiya had requested

"extension of telephone

facilities to Mowo, Iworo,

Ajido, Ibereko and Ajara

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30
ROAD MONEY ALLOCATIONS ANNOUNCED, SOKOTO, BORNO LEAD

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 2 Aug 86 p 8

[text]

NIGERIA

SOKOTO and Borno

states clinched the lion

share of the »200 million allocated to all the 19 states of

the federation for the construction 'maintenance

and utilisation of nationwide rural feeder roads by

the Federal Government.

Borno State got

Ml 1,500,000 and Sokoto

Nl 1,200,000 followed by

Gongola with »10,500,000.

Oyo and Bauchi states

got «9,800,000 and

N9.600.000 each closely

followed by Kaduna,

»9.400,000 and Kano

»9,400.000.

Others are Anambra,

»8.900,000; Bendel,

»8,900,000; Benue

»8.400,000; Cross Rivers,

.»8.400.000; Imo

»8,600,000; Kwara,

»8,900,000; Lagos.

»6,200,000; Niger.

»8,400,000; Ogiyi,

»6,900,000; . Ondo

»8,100,000; Plateau,

»8,900,000 and Rivers,

»7,100,000.

According to guidelines

for the construction, maintenance and utilisation of

nation-wide rural feeder

roads released in Lagos yesterday, all the states got

»4,900,000 each out of the

»98,280,000 on equality of

About »45,720,000 was

also distributed on a 22.86

per cent basis on the number of local government

areas in each state while

»30,720,000 was distributed on a 16.36 per cent

land area and »26,280,000

on ecological and special

problems of each state.

GUIDELINES for the

construction, maintenance and utilisation of

nation-wide rural feeder

roads were released in

Lagos yesterday.

"About »200 million was

earmarked for the first

phase of 30,000 kilometres

roads to be constructed or

rehabilitated throughout

the country.

The concept of operation,

according to the guideline

showed that the criteria for

allocating funds to each

state and Abuja included

equality of states (49.14 per

cent) number of local

government areas (22.86

per cent) land mass (16.36

per cent), and ecological and

special problems (12.64 per

cent).

It stated that selection of

roads for construction was

based on the two overriding guidelines that each

local government area

should benefit from the

exercise and that priority

should be given to roads

that would open up foodproducing areas.

On the method of

construction/rehabilitation,

the states were advised to

use direct labour for the

project.

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31
NIGERIA

ANAMBRA PHASING OUT ALMOST ALL TEACHER TRAINING SCHOOLS

Enugu DAILY STAR in English 4 Aug 86 p 16

[Article by Gil Ugwu]

[Text]

NINETEEN teacher training

colleges in Anambra State have

been phased out, and the

colleges converted to senior

and junior secondary schools.

Disclosing this in an interview with the DAILY STAR,

the stale commissioner for

education, Mrs Grace Obayi,

said that only two of the 21

teacher training colleges were

to be left to operate, but to be

restructured to produce the

desired stuff of teachers.

She however declined to

•disclose the two colleges.

According to Mrs Obayi, the

colleges were phased out

because studies conducted by

her ministry revealed that in the

next ten years, the state would

be suffering from surplus

trained, but unemployable

teachers.

"About 11,000 candidates

sat for the last TC 11 examination in the state, and at least

6,000 would pass out

successfuly added to about

5,000 qualified ones waiting to

be employed", she declared.

Furthermore, she said, the

National Certificate of

Education (NCE), would soon

be the minimum qualification

for teachers in primary schools.

Commissioner Obayi said

that five of the colleges have

been selected to run as special

science schools, while a

competitive examination would

be conducted for admission,

into them:

Others would be converted

to vocational schools to be

called "community skilled

centres" which would be used

in training the people in various

skills while still others would be

used as remedial schools designed to improve on the difficulties of students seeking admission into higher institutions.

Commissioner Obayi said

that emphasis was now on

science education, and

predicted that in the next three

years complaints of not filling

vacancies for science students

in universities would be over.

She announced that the state

ministry of education had

introduced adult literacy

programme for illiterate civil

servants to commence next

month.

Successful candidates would

be awarded proficiency certificate at the end of the course,

while the programme would be

extended to other ministries in

duecourse.

Mrs Obayi disclosed that

students presently in teacher

training colleges would be

allowed to graduate, after

which the schools would phases

out.

She also disclosed that

rationalisation of secondary

schools in the state has been'

completed and a number of

schools pegged down to junior

and senior secondary schools,

or merely junior secondary

. schools.

On the implication of the

adoption of the new policy on

education, Mrs Obayi

concecded that students of

Anambra State like other II

states which are currently

operating the new system

would not seat for JAMB

examination till 1989, except

private candidates because the

students would not be allowed

to seat for the GCE examination, "since their syllabuses are

miles apart".

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32
NIGERIA

STATISTICS ON AIRPORTS PASSENGER TRAFFIC ISSUED

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 4 Aug 86 p 24

[Article by Roseline Umesi]

[Text]

A TOTAL of 7.2

million . passengers

were handled by all

the airports in the;

country in 1985.

According to

statistics from the

research department

of the Nigeria Airport

Authority, the figure

of passenger traffic in

1985 represented an

increase of 1.3 million

people when

compared with that of

1984 when a total of

5.9 million passengers

were handled by all

the 15 airports at that

time.

Both the domestic

and international

wings of the Murtala

Muhammed airport

Lagos handled the

highest number of

passengers of 3.6

million passengers.

For arrival, 3.5

million passengers

were handled, while

for departure 3.7

million passengers

were handled.

Port Harcourt Airport

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was the next airport

which handled the

highest number of

690,410 passengers and

of these number 342,484

Eassengers were

andled on arrival, while

347,926 were handled on

departure.

Kano Airport was the

next, it handled 592,079

passengers and out of these

266,517, passengers

were handled on arrival,

while 325,562 were

handled on departure.

Kaduna airport followed

with 580,798 passengers

and out of these 290,900

passengers were,

handled on arrival, while

289,892 on departure.

Benin Airport handled a

total of 368,841 passengers,

and of these 183,564 were

handled on departure while

185,287 were handled on

arrival. Enugu Airport

handled a total of 286,928

passengers, out of these

142,191 were handled on

larrival while 144,737 were

| handled on departure.

Jos Airport handled

211,700 passengers and out

of these 109,019 were

handled on arrival while

102,681 passengers- were

handled on departure.

Maiduguri Airport

handled a total of 233,300

passengers and out of these

114,540 were handled on

arrival while 118,769

passengers were handled on

departure. Ilorin airport

handled a total of 178,011,

and of these number 88,922

were handled on arrival,

while 89,089 passengers

were handled on departure.

Calabar Airport handled«

172,742 passengers, and of

these number, arrivals

accounted for 86,737'

passengers while 87,005

passengers were handled on

departure.

Sokoto Airport handled a

total of 105,360 passengers.

And out of these numbers

arrivals accounted for

62,534 passengers . while

departure accounted for

52,826 passengers.

Other airports which

handled passengers in the

review were Abuja which

started operation in 1983

and handled a total of

27,820 in 1985, and out of

these 14,687 passengers

were handled on arrival,

while 13,133 were handled

on departure.

Ibadan Airport also

started operation in 1983

and . handled a total of

21,765 passengers in 1986.

Makurdi Airport handled

57,022, and out of these

29,327 passengers were

handled on arrival, while

27,695 passengers were

handled on departure.

Yola airport • handled a

total of 59,782 passengers,

and out of these 29,374

•were* handled on arrival

while 30,408 passengers

were handled on departure.

Although the analysis did

not give the breakdown of

the group of passengers

traffic on international routes, in 1985, however,

previous statistics

indicated a steady growth

of passenger traffic handled

for international routes.

For example according to

statistics . a total of 1.5

million passengers were

handled by the three international airports in 1983.

The airports are Lagos,

Kano, and Port Harcourt.

And in 1984 international

passengers handled were

2.3 million. The total

number of passengers

handled by all the airports

in 1983 were 6 million

people. And in 1982 and

1981 they were 5.2 million

and 5.3 million passengers

respectively.

Passengers carried by

unscheduled flights were

included in the analysis.

There was a slight

reduction in the number of

passengers handled which

were 77,401 in 1984 when

compared with 1983. And

this was associated with the

temporary closure of the

borders in 1984. The reduction in the number ol

passengers handled in 1984

could not be associated

with the N100 special

airport levy because

passenger traffic rather

increased as has been

indicated.'

33
NIGERIA

PAPER PRAISES MODIFICATION OF DEATH PENALTY

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 29 Jul 86 p 1

[Text] AMONG the decrees recently

reviewed by the Armed Forces

Ruling Council. (AFRO the

(Miscellaneous Offences)

Decree No. 20, 1984 easily

stands out. Under the decree

the death penalty (by firing

squad) was prescribed for such

offences as arson, drug

pushing, unlawful dealing in

petroleum products and unlawful tampering with public electrical, telecommunications

cables.

Many Nigerians agreed that

the offences were heinous

enough to warrant stiff

penalties. But certainly not the

dealth sentence. That aspect of

the decree elicited strident

Eublic opposition. However, the

uhari regime did not see any

sense in the public appeals.

In April 1985 therefore,

before a bewildered nation

Batholomew Owoh, Benard

Opedengbe and Lawal Ojulope

became the first victims of

public execution for drug

pushing. It says a lot for the

Babangida administration's

commitment to human rights

and a willingness to heed public

opinion that the table has now

been turned. With the review,

all those convicted under its

firovisions would now serve life

ail sentences. It has been the

consistent opinion of the New

Nigerian that the death

sentence for the offences was

too harsh. Capital punishment

/9274

CSO: 3400/156

should in our view be reserved

only for those offences that involve the life of another person.

Equally significant was the

reamendment to the state

Security (Detention of Persons)

Decne No. 2. An amendment to

the 1984 decree last May had

extended the initial detention

period from three to six months.

Besides, detention powers

were given to two persons: the

Chief of General Staff and the

Inspector-General of Police.

With the reamendment the

power to detain can only be exercised by the Chief of General

Staff, while initial detention

period has been restored to

three months. No matter how

much it tried, the administration s argument that the amendments aid not make the decree

more draconian simply did not

wasn. nappily trie authorities

have heeded the public criticism

of the decree's drastic nature.

There are indeed those who

would want the decree abrogated entirety. But as WR said in our

editorial of 16—5—86 that would

not be Wise; there is no country

which has faced certain drastic

problems or drastic times that

has not resorted to drastic solutions. And no one can deny that

Ihese are extra-ordinary times.

The important thing is that such

decrees are not abused and on

the record of the Babangida administration, we are confident

that the decree will be applied

only sparingly.

34
NIGERIA

ALKAI COURTS SAID TO DISCREDIT SHARIA LAW

Kadutia NEW NIGERIAN in English 1 Aug 86 pp 1, 13

[Article by Ibrahim Salihu]

[Text] THE first vice-chancellor of the

University of Sokoto, Professor

Shehu Ahmed Saidu Galadanci,

has said many Nigerians, including a few "Muslims" detest

sharia simply because of the bad

conduct of the Alkali courts.

He said many of the alkalis,

now renamed area court judges,

were not properly trained in

either the Sharia or the common

law and were therefore "incompetent". He said "it is also

alleged that corruption is very

rampant in some of these courts,

this should have nothing to do

with the Sharia.

Professor Shehu, now of the

Bayero University Kano (BUK),

was delivering a paper titled

"The role and relevance of

Sharia in Nigeria's future

political order" at a national

seminar on the plurality of law

and "future political order in

Nigeria at the University of

Sokoto.

He said it was the retained colonial conspiracy still undermining the sharia which made it

possible for people who knew

very little about sharia to recruit,

promote and supervise the area

courtjudges.

He said the incompetence

which resulted from this arrangement should not therefore be

ascribed to sharia.

The don said other factors were

the neglect of the alkalis for

many years, such that they v *re

not being given training opportunities in the same way as

magistrates.

He said the sharia had evidently been "persistently misinterpreted and misunderstood by

many Nigerian», including

muslims," which resulted in the

call for the retention of the common law system.

He said contrary to such ignorant views, the sharia surpassed all existing legal systems and

was capable of solving our present legal problems and curing

oursociety of its evils.

In another paper. Dr. Auwalu

H. Yadudu of the Faculty of Law,

BUK said it was a misnomer to

claim there was anything as a

Nigerian legal system. He said

there were but plural legal

systems in the country.

He wondered why the validity

and application of Islamic laws

and many customary laws in the

country were being determined

by the Englishman's notion Of

what was wrong or right.

He said a law could not apply

now if by the Englishman's view,

"it is repugnant to natural

justice, equity and good conscience or it is contrary to public

policy."

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35
NIGERIA

MUSLIM WOMEN'S SEMINAR RAISES ISSUES

Religion in Schools

Kano THE TRIUMPH in English 28 Jul 86 pp 1, 12

[Article by Olu Ojewale]

[Text]

THE Federal Military

Government has been

called upon to stop all

educational institutions

from forcing muslim

students to observe

Christian devotional

prayers.

The Federation of

Muslim Women's

Associations in Nigeria

(FOMWAN) made this

call in Lagos at the weekend at the end of its

three-day seminar on

Family and Society.

The association said

the practice should step

in line with Section 33 of

the Nigerian Constitution which provided for

'freedom of worship and

therefore appealed to the

government to make

provision for the

teaching of Islamic

religious knowledge in

institutions.

It further appealed to

the government to allow

schools to close at 12

noon on Fridays while

offices should close at 1

p.m. to allow muslims to

ohserve Friday prayers.

The association viewed with concern the

grave consequences arising from child marriage

in some parts of the

country and therefore

reminded parents that

educating their children

was obligatory.

It also appealed to

Islamic scholars to

educate parents about

the undesirability of

child marriage which it

said was not in the interest of the minors.

Babangida's Wife's Address

Kano THE TRIUMPH in English 29 Jul 86 p 12

[Text] THE negligence of

women's education has

been described as an

anti-thesis to the Islamic

culture and its traditions.

This observation was

made by the First Lady,

Mrs. ' Maryam

Babangida, in her address at the opening of

the international seminar

on Family and Society

organised by the Federation of Muslim Women's

Associations in Nigeria

(FOMWAN) in Lagos.

Mrs Babangida said

"no parent should

36
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therefore assume that it

is Islamic to withdraw

daughters from schools

and conscript them into

early marriages".

The first lady reminded all muslims that the

search for knowledge irrespective of sex was

mandatory.- She

therefore urged the

FOMWAN members to

continue to propagate

the teachings of Islam

because "it is the religion

of the informed and it is , also the basis of good

upbringing of the family

in particular and the society in general".

In her key-note address the President o^ iiv.

associatiun, Hajiya

Aisha Lemu, observed

that until recently the

voice of muslirr women

speaking on an Islamic

platform had been

almost unheard of in the

country.

" The president .'attributed this to tf.e

dearth of knowledgeable

and outspoken muslim

women..

Hajiya Aisha ch uosea

that the FOMWAN

literacy scheme hf.s successfully taken eff m dsf

ferent pans of the country.

Hajiya Aisha disclosed

that the FOMWAN

literacy scheme has successfully taken off in different parts of the country.

37
ISLAMIC CONFERENCE REJECTS SECULARISM

NIGERIA

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 5 Aug 86 pp 1, 3

[Text]

THE national conference on

Nigeria's political future, has rejected secularism because it

believed that it was only intended

to blackmail muslims and stifle

Islam.

The conference "organised by

the Muslim Forum of ABU,

Zaria, said it was gravely

disturbed by attempts of successive governments to undermine the Islamic educational

system, in particular, attempts

by a number of state governments to curtail the operation of

Koranic schools.

The conference expressed the

belief that the similarity between

the various legislations by some

state governments and those in

French speaking countries was

not a mere coincidence, but

might be a global strategy to

undermine Islam.

The conference affirmed that

Koranic schools formed the basis

of Islamic education, a

r

<i regarded government's policy to

destroy this systdm as an assault

on the integrity of Islam.

It enjoined muslims not to

relent until a relevant system of

education which satisfied the requirements of Islam and the

yearnings of muslims came into

effect.

The conference also affirmed

that living by and submitting

totally to file' Shari'a was the

right and an obligation of every

muslim in Nigeria, adding that

all restrictions on the application

of Shari'a and its observance by

all muslims be removed.

The conference also expressed

its disgust on the existence and

perpetuation of an unjust

economic system, the escalating

scale of poverty, the dispossession of the poor of their land on a

scale unacceptable to any decent

society, and the continued operation of the economy on the basis

of 'riba', monopoly and hoarding.

It called for the evolution of the

Islamic economic system which

guaranteed the security of all and

enjoined the introduction of the

system and welfare-oriented

Islamic banks.

The conference also noted that

the military was an alien institution, 'whose roots lie elsewhere

and represents a continuity of

colonialism', adding that in

'Nigeria, the military constitutes

inly a problem, a heavy and

unbearable burden. A new moral

and ideological basis is therefore

needed to build a military force

worthy of Nigeria.'

It affirmed that the muslim

umma was one and indivisible,

umma "was o;ie and indivisible, the parochial nation

the exclusion of Islam as a factor

in foreign policy, and the hostile

posture of the. Nigerian stale

against Islam and therefore rejected all calls for a normalisation of relations with Israel.

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38
NIGERIA

ARCHBISHOP CRITICIZES RELIGIOUS COUNCIL PROPOSAL

Lagos DAILY TIMES in English 4 Aug 86 p 1

[

TextJ TVT° government

J^ should control religion, Catholic Archbishop Anthony Olu- emerge at the Unlverbunmi Okogie said Airing his views on sity of Lagos where a

yesterday. the proposed establish- cross is also facing the

Speaking on a Radio ment of the national mosque.

Lagos current affairs council on religious He said the whole

programme. "The News- affairs by the Federal ja8ue may have

maker", he said "I for Government, Arch- emanated from those

one do not see the reason bishop Okogie said the wno suddenly found

why a government council was not what the themselves in the

should try to control panel ön OIC recom- corridors of power and

religion and I think it is ropnded. felt they could move

very wrong for anybody Rather, he stated, mountains and anything

to control religion". what was suggested was ( they say must come

a forum whereby through '

moslems and Christians

would sit at a roundtable and argue out

issues.

He said that cases like

the cross at tne University of Ibadan could be*

tabled before such a

forum and everybody

would be free to give his

own views.

On means of solving

the present crisis at

Unibadan, the Archbishop observed that

unless the moslcm

fanatics at the university were curbed a

similar issue might

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39
SENEGAL

LD/MPT PAPER CRITICIZES GOVERNMENT AGRICULTURAL POLICY

Dakar FAGARU in French Jun 86 p 1

[Editorial: "Political News: Check and Mate!']

[Text] The CREA-sponsored seminar on the new agricultural policy

met and confirmed what everybody already knew about this latest

dagger Abou Diouf and the "Socialist" party has plunged into the

heart of the nation's peasant farmers. The researchers, the university gurus, and the decision-makers have just discovered that

the agricultural policy pursued hitherto by this government is a

complete and utter disaster.

They also came up with a grim and incontrovertible diagnosis of

the New Agricultural Policy: it is doomed, beyond the shadow of

a reasonable doubt, to abysmal failure. Actually, it is transparent euphemism to say, as LE SOLEIL did, writing about the NPA,

that "the risks and costs at the political and social level are

very high, and could very well bring about the collapse of the

entire undertaking."

Even so, Abdou Diouf and his "socialist" party, citing the State's

withdrawal and its shifting all responsibility onto the farmers is

still going on, and the evidence is telling: they refuse to provide the peasant farmers with seed-grain. That is tantamount to

saying that they have decided to sentence the rural population

to famine and beggary. The NPA's real goal is to privatize the

farmland and turn it over to foreign capitalists. The NPA means

that Senegal's peasant farmers are doomed at best to become simple farmhands and, in the short or the long run, homeless ones.

Under NPA, the Senegalese peasant farmer, driven off his land, not

to mention his village, exploited, oppressed, and despised, will

be relegated to no more than alien status, an outcast in his own

country, But that is not all. The minor bureaucrat who was already rubbing his hands at the notion of becoming a petty rural

overlord with the government's promise to let him buy seed-grain

on credit, has been pitilessly weaned away from his illusions.

For Diouf's government, there is no intention of encouraging the

unfair competition threatened by these frugal farmers at the expense

of big capital. The government, though, is determined above all

to withold seed grain from the peasant farmers and to give it to

the petty officials, themselves of peasant stock, means giving the

40
peasant farmers exactly nothing, and there can be no question as

to that. When you want to batten on somebody else's slavery, you

do not offer freedom to his children, unless you are determined

to commit suicide, and that is certainly not the preference of

the IMF and the World Bank, which imposes its policies on Abdou

Diouf's government.

And that is why the Democratic League/Labor Party movement calls

on the government to give the peasant-farmers seed-grain, fertilizers, and the other things they need for production.

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41
SENEGAL

LD/MPT PAPER: PRESS CAMPAIGN AGAINST PARTY CHARGED

Dakar FAGARU in French Jul 86 p 2

[Article signed "Political Bureau," 24 Jun 86, Dakar]

[Text] For some time now, secretly funded and defamatory attacks

from a certain sector of the kept press have been leveled at our

Party and at some of our leaders, including Abdoulaye Bathily, our

Secretary General, and Mamadou Ndoye, Secretary to the Central

Committee in charge of Foreign Relations.

This campaign of calumny and lies, which clearly the output of an

invasion by POLITICIEN as of 13 June 1986, was a nuisance we

should have simply ignored had it not been clearly evident that it

was part of an obvious attempt at destabilization and mounting

discredit against the democratic opposition, and, currently centered almost exclusively on our Party, the LD/MPT.

The facts are there for any observer endowed with a modicum of curiosity and good faith.to see. The Socialist Party and its government have been crying from the rooftops that the Senegalese communists cannot possibly become a significant force on the national

scene. Our Party, LD/MPT, has come up with hard evidence that the

communist movement has become an active force in our country, and

a force that must be reckoned with from now on, as an irreversible

reality.

Abdou Diouf and his regime have opted, in obedience to the orders

of those who pump in their funds, to sacrifice the vital interests

of the Senegalese people on the altar of international capital by

deciding to implement the medium- and long-term restructuring

sponsored by the IMF and the World Bank.

Contemplating this situation, our Party, LD/MPT, has deployed its

people across the land in concert with other democratic forces to

put an end to the Macchiavellian plot to sell off the people's assets. The consequence of all this is that the consensus the Socialist Party and its government were counting on to restore "Labor peace," that would smoothe implementation of its anti-social

42
policy of liquidating public enterprise, lead to layoffs, to an assault on workers1

purchasing power, and on freedom of organized labor, has been temporarily aborted and is now in imminent danger of

of permanent dismissal as a misshapen freak.

There you really see the unforgivable sin the socialist party and

its government cannot and will never be able to forgive the democratic forces in general—let alone our Party, LD/MPT.

Against this background, the lies and slanderous smears flung at

our organization amount to only a particular phase in a vast operations aimed at challenging and destroying democratic achievements.

History teaches us that whenever somebody tries to discredit the

communists, in the end it is democracy that suffers. Whenever the

communists are weakened, it is democracy that pales, shrivels, and

ultimately withers away. That is why it is of the utmost importance

for all Senegalese democrats to understand that the stakes in the

war between the LD/MPT and the neocolonial government are nothing

less than the destiny of democracy and freedom in our country.

That is why this campaign of lies and slander cannot in any way disturb the serene confidence of our Party's leaders and members.

Accordingly, the LD/MPT remains more than ever firmly determined

to organize and lead, along with all our country's democratic and

patriotic forces, a many-sided, all-encompassing offensive to put

an end at last to the socialist Party's policy of national ruin ad

poverty.

In these grim and menacing times that threaten the survival of democracy in our country, the Political Bureau calls upon all Party activists to double and redouble, as well as further to diversify their

action and their initiative in the struggle against the neocolonial

government.

The Political Bureau calls upon all comrades, its sympathizers, and

and all sincere democrats to maintain constant vigilance, and thus

to respons immediately to any provocation from the regime and its

agents, be they avowed or "camouflaged,"

The LD/MPT Political Bureau calles on all the democratic forces in

our country to take a long look at the imminent perils that threaten democracy in Senegal, and conjures them to work with our Party

on a broad unitarian basis, for the triumph of the National Democratic Revolution.

In closing, the Political Bureau of the LD/MPT would remind all of

you that history, in Senegal as everywhere else in the world, invariably keeps scrupulous track of events.

Long Live the LD/MPT!

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43
SOUTH AFRICA

INFORMATION CHIEF DEFENDS REGIME TO LIBERAL GERMAN WEEKLY

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German. 16 Jun 86 pp 110-115

[Interview with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Louis Nel, conducted by

SPIEGEL editors Dieter Wild and Paul M. Schuhmacher in Cape Town, date not

given: "There Is No Country We Could Go To."]

[Text] Louis Nel belongs in his capacity of chief of information with the

title of deputy minister of foreign affairs to the inner circle of advisors

to South Africa's State President Willem Botha. Like Botha, Nel, age 48, belongs to the liberal ("verligte") wing of the National Party of the Boers

which has ruled since 1948. His career was arrested in the mid-seventies by

the conservative ("verkrampfte") party majority. His rise did not take place

until Botha attempted a cautious liberalization of apartheid after 1978. This

reform resulted in a sharp confrontation between the liberals and the ultraconservative Boers who seceded from the party. However, the reform was halfhearted and too late to prevent the black revolt which broke loose in the fall

of 1984 and has since had almost daily victims.

SPIEGEL: Mr Nel, when will a black person occupy your office of deputy minister of foreign affairs?

Nel: Even now, it would be possible for a Colored or Indian person to hold my

office, but for a black person to do so would require a new constitution.

Such a constitution must be negotiated—but the revolutionary assault of today

against the government delays this process. It also depends on whether or not

this revolutionary assault can be put down.

SPIEGEL: Do you really believe you can strike down this revolutionary assault?

Nel: Yes, we are motivated and determined.

SPIEGEL: When will South Africa have a black president?

Nel: A Colored or Indian could be president even today, but I cannot venture

to guess about a black. Right now this is an academic question which I do not

care to discuss any further.

44
SPIEGEL: In February when Minister of Foreign Affairs Roelof Botha speculated

about such prospects, he was chastised personally by the state president. Does

that mean that the president excludes such a possibility?

Nel: If you read what the state president has said, you will see that he has

not excluded a single possibility. He has simply said that as far as this

question goes, the National Party—as a party—has not yet taken any positions.

SPIEGEL: With or without a black president—as long as you refuse to grant an

appreciable governmental participation to the black majority of South Africa,

the country-wide unrest of the last twenty months will continue. More than

1,700 people have been killed, and the revolution has taken over the black

townships. How can you check the revolt and at the same time promote reform?

Nel: The present revolt has nothing to do with political reform; that is why

your observation is incorrect. We feel it is our obligation to negotiate a

process which will lead to a sharing of power with the black population. The

revolutionary assault comes from people who simply do not want political reform—they want revolution.

SPIEGEL: They just simply are no longer interested in your reform.

Nel: The revolutionaries are afraid that we, together with reasonable black

leaders of this country, will negotiate a constitutional order acceptable to

most black people. They are afraid that those leaders would be recognized as

the real leaders of the black majority in this country by both the Western

World and the blacks of South Africa. In order to keep that from happening,

they try everything to sabotage the reform.

SPIEGEL: But is it not understandable that the black majority does not want

to wait for the day when your reform may or may not come?

Nel: That is the nature of revolutionaries. They do not want reform, they

want total, violent overthrow. Should that happen, this country will face

great difficulties. This will affect all South Africans as well as the

Western world also, because the party which pushes for revolution int South

Africa—the ANC—is allied with the Communist Party of South Africa.

SPIEGEL: Why do you still believe you can accelerate reform by fighting the

revolutionaries with arms?

Nel: It is the only way to reach a peace which will accelerate the reform.

That is how simple it is. We have to check the efforts of these people by

using police and security forces. They have no support among the black

majority for their violent acts—for their intimidation, their house burnings,

their "necklace" methods (radical blacks punish real or assumed collaborators

by hanging fuel-filled tires around their necks which they then ignite), and

for all those means with which they are trying to bring black people under

their control.

SPIEGEL: Some parts of the country are already under their control—namely

the black townships.

45
Nel: That can be argued. Propagandists accounts have claimed that law and

order have completely collapsed, as for example in the Alexandra township which

revolutionaries had apparently taken over. But when police and security forces

moved in they found not a bit of resistance, and law and order were restored.

SPIEGEL: At the opening of parliament, the president made the amazing statement that apartheid is "an outdated concept." What exactly does your government mean by that?

Nel: I believe that apartheid is dead, but we still need some time to bury it.

SPIEGEL: You want to mitigate apartheid, but you want to stay in power. Is

that not so?

Nel: Nonsense

SPIEGEL: A few pillars of apartheid have fallen, such as the pass laws and

obscenity laws; yet other laws, such as the Group Areas Act (which determines

where a certain population group can live based on skin color), are declared

non-negotiable.

Nel: That is not entirely true. The government has taken two steps. First,

it has referred the Group Areas Act to the president's council to be examined

and reported on. That is exactly what we did with the pass laws. Second,

the president has categorically declared before parliament that he does not

view the Group Areas Act as a holy cow. It is important that all groups in

South Africa feel secure. That is what we have to negotiate with black leaders.

SPIEGEL: But the Population Registration Act (used to officially determine

each citizen's race), for example, is not open for negotiation and it is

certainly an apartheid law.

Nel: Maybe to you it sounds like apartheid, but it is not discriminatory.

SPIEGEL: It is not discriminatory to categorize people according to the color

of their skin?

Nel: The Population Registration Act simply recognizes the fact that different

population groups exist in this country. We have ethnic distinctions. You

people in Germany cannot imagine what goes on in this country because you have

only one language, namely German. The South African radio network, for

example, broadcasts in eleven languages. We have different communities as well

as different black communities: Zulu, Xhosa, Shangaan, Shota and Tswana. Each

is as different from the other as Germans are from the French. Nobody can ignore that fact and the Population Registration Acts confirms it.

SPIEGEL: But black communities do not want to be classified by whites. True,

changes in apartheid are not without importance, but most blacks are not impressed that they are now to be permitted to have sexual relations with whites

or to acquire property in urban regions—something they cannot afford anyway.

They are interested in knowing when a black person will finally be equal to a

white person. '

46
Nel: The government desires immediate equality between black and white. The

government pursues a policy which encourages the progress of blacks in South

Africa in every respect.

SPIEGEL: And the black man is such a fool that he simply cannot see that?

These days, people of different race are allowed to marry in South Africa and

to have children of mixed race, but where are these children supposed to live

and where will they go to school, since living areas and educational institutions continue to be segregated?

Nel: Naturally the situation is in flux, the scenery in South Africa is

changing and society is in a state of transition. We are no longer the rigid

society of the past; however, we are basically still an ethnically-oriented

society with many recognized cultures. Even a man like Bishop Tutu speaks

neither Afrikaans nor English with his wife; he speaks his own language—

Tswara.

SPIEGEL: It is true that the level of prosperity between black and white is

noticeably different. A black miner who previously earned an average of only

an eighteenth of the pay of a white miner now received a quarter. But doesn't

this black miner expect to earn just as much according to the principle of

equal pay for equal work?

Nel: The principle of equal pay for equal work is a government policy and is

already in effect in South Africa for civil servants and educators. The private sector shows a very fast development in the same direction. The different average pay for blacks and whites is not due to a legal obstacle related

to color, but to different qualifications. This is the same as in a country

like the united States of America. There, the average income of blacks

equals only 56 percent of average white income. Even if our government were

to be removed overnight, the situation would not change.

SPIEGEL: But then power would reside in other hands, and you are obviously

trying to prevent that. Can you imagine a day when the election of an entire

parliament is based on the principle of one man, one vote, provided minority

rights are protected?

Nel: It is very important to protect the rights of minorities. But how to

protect the minorities is a practical question which needs to be decided.

There are various ways in the West to do just that. You Germans have the

federal system and the Swiss the cantonal system. It is official policy in

South Africa for each person to have one vote.

SPIEGEL: With each vote counting equally?

Nel: The vote has to be used to secure the interests and rights of the minorities. This principle has been disregarded in the rest of Africa. Democracy

has failed in each African multinational state; there are either one-party

states or military dictatorships.

SPIEGEL: Have we understood you correctly to say, then, that you do not exclude the principle of one man, one vote in a single parliament?

47
Nel: I cannot comment on any point of a future constitution. We have not yet

published a draft. We want to discuss the constitutional order of South

Africa in an open way.

SPIEGEL: How would you assess the following evaluation of the situation:

After twenty years of violence, South Africa has reached a kind of stalemate.

The black revolt cannot bring down the white-dominated power structures, and

the system cannot stamp out the revolutionary fire despite its tremendous

power. How long is the stalemate likely to last?

Nel: I do not believe that there is a stalemate. The ANC has declared the

year 1986 to be the year of "Umkhonto we sizve" (spear of the nation). That

is the name of the military wing of the ANC. In 1986, they want to help the

revolution succeed in the entire country. Right now, the government is requesting parliament to extend additional authorization to the police so they

can master the situation.

SPIEGEL: Do you believe further police authorizations will help in the

present dramatic situation?

Nel: Yes, they can change a lot. We have got to check violence. We owe it

to the black majority of this country and also to the interests of the Western

world, even though the West has a different view on the subject.

SPIEGEL: Indeed, the last thing the West wants are further police authorizations, especially when one remembers the protests against the state of emergency declared last year.

Nel: The state has to take measures which work, and we ourselves have to decide on those measures. These days, no country in the West has to fight off

a revolutionary assault of the kind which takes place in South Africa. That

is why Western countries are in no position to pass judgment.

SPIEGEL: During the first months of 1984, it looked as if real progress were

taking place in South Africa. You started a very limited power participation

for colored South Africans. There also seemed to be progress in your relations with neighboring states, especially after the ratification of the treaty

of Nkomati with Mozambique. What went wrong since?

Nel: Because of the very fact of our progress, the revolutionaries stepped up

their struggle.

SPIEGEL: Did you not expect that to happen?

Nel: Yes, we had anticipated it and during the last twenty months we have

learned a lot. Today we are in a better position to cope with the situation

that we were, let us say, a year ago.

SPIEGEL: But even at the time of the ratification of the Nkomati agreement,

people wondered if you had not put the cart before the horse. You wanted to

reach an understanding with independent black neighboring states instead of

coming to terms with the black majority within your own borders.

48
Nel: That is not correct. The government has been negotiating for quite some

time with the black population in our own country. Reform, even constitutional

reform, must evolve if it is to have any permanence. Reform is a painful

process even for whites, because they have to accept it as well. You cannot

do such a thing over night. The process is in motion and we won't let ourselves be distracted.

SPIEGEL: Did you have an ulterior motive in mind when you closed your agreement with the neighboring states? You surely hoped blacks within your borders

would be forced to approve of your reform movement.

Nel: I cannot follow your reasoning. Bilateral relations have nothing to do

with internal relations. The black majority approves of our reform efforts.

SPIEGEL: Are you sure?

Nel: Believe me, it is only a minority that conducts itself as a noisy mob

and uses radical methods. This minority turns against the reforms so that it

can foment a revolution. Remember that more than 500 blacks have been killed

by black radicals.

SPIEGEL: But more than double that number have been killed by security forces.

Nel: Security forces have to take action against violence to protect life and

property. It is unfortunate that people get killed in the process. This year,

however, more blacks have been killed by blacks and through black violence

than through the actions of security forces. More than 4,400 black residences

and 1,400 black stores have been burned down by blacks. Up to now, violence

has been mostly directed against blacks. The West simply does not understand

that fact, or does not seem to appreciate it. Recently, black violence directed against blacks has once again increased terribly; it has grown out of

bounds.

SPIEGEL: Since the time you attacked Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana all in one

night, whites in South Africa have had to face even stronger hostility from

Africans inside and outside of the country's borders. Those attacks have been

the most serious incursions into foreign countries in years. How can you even

hope to regain the trust of your neighbors?

Nel: The economic existence of our neighbors depends on us. They know it and

we know it. The day South Africa goes under, they will collapse and the knowit-alls in the West won't save them. Millions of blacks have perished in

Africa without the West having been able to do anything about it. As we are

sitting here today, blacks are starving all over Africa.

SPIEGEL: But that can never justify aggression against your neighboring

states.

Nel: We are not guilty of aggression against our neighbors. We have warned

our neighbors that they must not tolerate ANC operations originating in their

respective territories. Also, they must not permit the ANC to pass through

their countries in order to commit violent acts in South Africa. We have not

49
attacked Zambia, Zimbabawe and Botswana. We have attacked ANC headquarters

and transit camps, and we have made that clear. We had no conflict with the

governments or the people of those countries.

SPIEGEL: Now you do have a conflict. Did South Africa consider that the

world would react with indignation?

Nel: We are aware at all times of the negative reaction of the West. But we

are above all responsible to the people of South Africa. What we have done,

we did to deter the ANC from attacks against South Africa. To be precise, it

was an operation to protect orderly people in South Africa.

SPIEGEL: In what way have your incursions protected people in South Africa?

They have destroyed a handful of buildings in far-away countries.

Nel: We have destroyed installations that were the property of the ANC. The

ANC is after all a terrorist organization that kills indiscriminately in

South Africa—it kills blacks as well as whites. With our action we have sent

a message to the ANC, namely that we know where they are and that we are not

afraid to confront them.

SPIEGEL: You claim you are opposed to violence, but you commit violent acts

even outside your borders. Are you not afraid you will have to pay dearly

for such news?

Nel: We have acted in self-defense according to article 51 of the United

Nations charter. The ANC must realize that this government does not lack

energy to act against the ANC or anyone else's revolutionary assault.

SPIEGEL: Since your incursions, you have been threatened more than ever with

economic sanctions, even by friendly countries like the United States.

Nel: The United States has threatened us often with sanctions. President

Reagan has even applied limited sanctions against South Africa in the past.

SPIEGEL: Your incursions have wrecked the peace efforts of the "Eminent

Persons Group" (a group formed by politicians of seven Commonwealth states

which was supposed to find possibilities for a compromise in South Africa).

This is why you are threatened for the first time with world-wide economic

sanctions. If South Africa still had the healthy economy of 3 years ago, you

could perhaps laugh at it, but meanwhile your currency has lost two-thirds of

its value against the most important Western currencies. Doesn't the prospect of an economic boycott give you the shivers?

Nel: The currency exchange losses have also brought advantages, because our

products are now more competitive internationally. Sanctions can possibly

hit the economy of South Africa, but they mostly affect the human and personal

sector. It is first and foremost the population of South Africa which suffers.

The ones to suffer first when sanctions succeed are workers who lose their

jobs.

50
SPIEGEL: Yet the situation has now come to such a climax that many blacks

desire sanctions. ' . '"

Nel: Those blacks who advocate sanctions, such as Bishop Tutu, do not lose

their income in case sanctions are ordered. Only those people who won't lose

their job are ready to live with the bitter results of sanctions. I have not

heard one single black person say, "I favor sanctions even if I cannot feed my

children anymore."

SPIEGEL: Nevertheless, even leaders of influential black labor unions support

the call for sanctions.

Nel: They won't lose their jobs in case of sanctions either.

SPIEGEL: Another argument by whites against sanctions says that even enlightened Boers would be driven back to their "Laager." But maybe this historical "Laager mentality" does not even exist anymore, because many Boers

have become wealthy members of industrial society.

Nel: That is true to a certain degree. Yet sanctions would not only lead to

greater unity among the Afrikaners, but among all whites. Apart from that,

many influential black leaders such as the Zulu chief Gatsha Buthelezi are

radically opposed to sanctions.

SPIEGEL: Your government is not only facing a black revolution, but it is

also severely attacked by white ultra-rightists. They accuse President Botha

of having betrayed the white man. Do you expect these extremists to gain increasing strength?

Nel: It is not unlikely that they will gain a bit in influence, but I must

say that the government has made its policy toward allowing other groups to

share power very clear, and the country's white population has already made

up its mind whether they are for or against sharing power.

SPIEGEL: Eugene Terreblanche, the leader of the right-wing "Afrikaner

Weerstandsbeweging" [Afrikaner Resistance Movement] (AWB), has reportedly^

said: "If necessary, we will regain our country by force if Botha hands it

over to the blacks." Is that not a clear announcement of white violence?

Nel: No, it is not. He was referring to a complete collapse of law and

order. In such a revolutionary situation, as I understand him, the Boers

would stand united to fight the revolutionaries. This is not a military

threat against the government.

SPIEGEL: It almost sounds as if you were groping for an excuse for

Terreblanche.

Nel: I am simply trying to remain fair and reasonable. Recently, as we were

preparing a booklet with the title "Communicating with the ANC", I insisted

that we must also be fair and reasonable towards the ANC. We must be fair

towards all our adversaries.

51
SPIEGEL: Your police and your security forces, however, shoot their black

adversaries exclusively. There was even the charge that the security forces

are secretly sympathetic to the white ultras, while they show much less

patience with black extremists.

Nel: Our security forces have moved against those who have committed violent

acts whether they are black or white. And in Pietersburg we have used tear

gas against the AWB. We have a large police force consisting of blacks and

whites. Naturally, it is not impossible that a few individuals harbor certain

sympathies for a particular political cause, but as a whole, the police will

execute the policy and the orders of the government. The force is loyal to

the government.

SPIEGEL: Yes, there is actually little doubt about that.

Nel: I think that one cannot compare black and white radicals on the same

level. Black radicals have pledged themselves openly to violence and revolution.

SPIEGEL: But white extremists have been found guilty in court of having

planned terrorist acts.

Nel: Well, okay! But there is absolutely no evidence that this occurred because of a political program or because of some obligations towards the AWB.

By comparison however, violence is a part of the political program of the ANC.

That is the reason why I would like to repeat that one cannot compare the two

in this respect.

SPIEGEL: Mr Nel, your country is in a state of revolution....

Nel: No, no—only in a few parts.

SPIEGEL: Revolution is a fact. Even people as well-meaning toward you as

the American president have advised you to free the ANC leader Nelson Mandela

after more than 20 years in prison, to lift the ban against the ANC, and to

start talks with the nationalists of the ANC. Why is it so difficult to follow that advice?

Nel: First, Mandela can be free today if he is prepared to abandon violence.

He has got to submit to traditional values.

SPIEGEL: He must submit to your value system.

Nel: Our point of view is not out of the ordinary and is quite justified.

The West should support us in this respect. And second; yes, we will lift

the ban against the ANC. But it also has to renounce violence. Here, we are

on firm ground too. What would you have thought if I had told you that the

German chancellor should negotiate with the Baader-Meinhof gang?

SPIEGEL: There is at least one major difference. The ANC is an organization

which represents a broad political movement in your country, while the

52
Baader-Meinhof people never were an organization representing such a movement

in our country.

Nel: Terrorists have been locked up in Germany, Italy and France. I insist

that in South Africa too there be no support for the violence of the ANC. Why

should we give in to the ANC, and by so doing legitimize its actions?

SPIEGEL: South Africa is approaching a fateful date, namely 16 June when

blacks commemorate the 10th anniversary of the great uprising in Soweto. Back

then the police killed more than 500 blacks. With an eye to this anniversary,

the Minister of Police Louis le Grange has forbidden all public assembly. Are

you afraid of a new outburst of violence of historic proportions?

Nel- Many protest events and marches have been planned with the intent to

trigger further violence. Hence, we fear indeed that new violence might erupt

on 16 June. We have taken the necessary measures in anticipation thereof.

SPIEGEL: The Boers call themselves the white tribe of Africa. Has it ever

crossed their minds that one day their only choice might be to submit to the

blacks or to leave Africa altogether?

Nel: We are Africans. We have been here for more than 300 years. There is

no country we could go to. Our future is with South Africa. Black and whxte

have to work together. The issue is not submission, but sharing.

SPIEGEL: Mr Nel, we thank you for this interview.

13196

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53
SOUTH AFRICA

AUTHOR TALKS TO AWB LEADER EUGENE TERRE' BLANCHE

Cape Town LEADERSHIP In English Vol 5 No 3, 1986 pp 50, 52-56

[Article by Wessel Ebersöhn]

[Text]

"I am a son of this people, a product of the generation

before my father. I am precisely what the Fatherland

expects of me. I am a realist, a product of this earth as

a place where the farmers must struggle and survive. I

understand survival well. I am a pure Afrikaner nationalist."

The leader of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging

was answering mv question: "Who is Eugene Terre'

Blanche?"

Since their success in preventing a cabinet minister

from addressing a gathering in Pietersburg, the AWB

has been receiving more attention from the media than

at any other time since they tarred and feathered Professor Floors van Jaarsveld six years ago. At this moment

the public perception is probably overwhelmed by colour

photographs of swastika-like banners, storm trooper

uniforms and the television coverage ofthe Pietersburg

brawl.

But the key to the AWB does not lie in the colourful

regalia or the quasi-military appearance ofits members.

It lies in the personality of its leader.

I believe Terre'Blanche's answer to my question

was as honest as he was capable of making it. He sees

himself not primarily as a citizen of earth, a human

being, a husband, a lover or even a farmer. Essentially

he sees himself as a son, a child of his people, an Afrikaner nationalist first: all else is secondary.

Terre'Blanche is a charming host, friendly and eager

to please, answering questions slowly and reasonably,

seemingly determined to show that his position is fair

and devoid of extremism. He is short ofstature, a fact

that seems to cause him some dismay and he often

wears built-up shoes to disguise it. During our interview

he interrupted himself at one point to tell me how he

wished that he was as tall as I am.

What he might lose in height he more than compensates for with a magnificent bass/baritone voice of

almost operatic dimensions. The sound of his voice,

especially when speaking slowly and with restraint,

might in part be the reason for his success. It has a

rich and resonant quality that holds the attention the

moment he starts speaking.

Despite his fine speaking voice Terre'Blanche is not

a good orator. His opening remarks, pitched in a low

key and spoken in a dignified and measured manner,

are undeniably impressive. The effect is always spoiled

a little deeper into the speech when the emotion ofthe

subject matter becomes too much for him to bear and

the rest of the oration pours out in an ear-splitting

cacophony. There are no pauses, no restrained passages,

no contrasts of any sort, only a protracted assault on the

hearing faculties that has many of the outward appearances of hysteria.

While he is quick to discount the effect of heroes on

his development, Eugene Terre'Blanche's childhood

seems to have been freely sown with them. The legendary figures of the Anglo/Boer war, President Kruger,

General de Wet and General Koos de la Rev, who he is

quick to tell you is buried just a few kilometres from his

home, have places of honour, while the world's great

men of power, Alexander the Great, Julius Ceasar,

Napoleon Bonaparte and Adolf Hitler have all been

sources of inspiration to him.

The young Terre'Blanche grew to adulthood in a

home that he remembers today with great fondness.

He speaks warmly of his parents and grandparents. It

was his father particularly who had the ability to create

in him the emotional intensity through which he views

Afrikaner history today.

But the true heroes ofthe Terre'Blanche mythology

are not the generals or commandos. The women and

54
children of the nineteenth century who suffered and

often died in the search for freedom have affected him

most deeply of all. "Imagine," he says, "a lurching ox

wagon, passing through a sea of savages, and under

these circumstances the boer wife must lie down and

give birth..." His speeches are laced with boer women

and children, dying in British concentration camps or

at the hands of savages, their spilt blood sanctifying

the African earth, and all of it described in startingly

sentimental terms. His preoccupation with suffering

children becomes all the more interesting when he

tells you of his regret that he has none of his own.

It is the African earth itself that Terre'Blanche sees

as his main source of inspiration and the shed blood of

Afrikaners that gives him the right to it. "I am jealous

ofthe rights ofthis people," he says. The impression is

created that it is a small and lonely people to whom he

is referring, a suffering and struggling minority. His

Afrikaner is to a far greater extent that ofthe nineteenth

century than the powerful twentieth century figure of

black perceptions. "I am jealous of the rights of this

people, the only white nation indigenous to Africa, the

possessors of the world's youngest language."

The extent of his reading.is surprising. You are

as likely to have Albert Schweitzer quoted to you as

Marshall Ney of Napoleon's army. But it is his knowledge of Afrikaner history that is particularly formidable.

And. perhaps predictably, the historical incident to

which he attaches greatest significance is the battle of

Blood River.

Every aspect of this battle seems to be familiar to

Terre'Blanche. He can take the listener through even'

moment, describing the action in reverent detail, he

knows the names of the Zulu generals, he can tell you

how many blacks were within the laager and he can

support his views with what appears to the layman to

be comprehensive historical documentation. At Blood

River lies the core to the religious aspect of his politics.

"The relationship of a people with their God must be

right," he tells you. "The people bowed themselves

down in prayer for seven days and God gave us the

victory." He recounts that during the battle the animals

in the laager were immobile, showing no fear, a sure

sign that God was in their midst. When he refers to

God it is often to "the God who gave us Blood River".

It was this reverence for Blood River that brought

his anger down on the introspective head of Pretoria

University's Professor Floors van Jaarsveld. The professor's sin was that he dared to suggest that the Day of

the Covenant, at which Blood River is remembered, is

nothing more than a man made holiday. The professor

went so far as to produce his own comprehensive historical documentation. I doubt that there could be any

greater heresy in Eugene Terre'Blanche's eyes than

the suggestion that the Day of the Covenant is not a

holy day. The error was compounded by the fact that it

came from within the heart of Afrikanerdom.

At a historical seminar being held in Pretoria in the

presence of a number of overseas guests, Terre'Blanche

and about 30 of his supporters tarred and feathered

Van Jaarsveld.

In the prosecution that followed he and some of his

friends paid fines ofa few hundred rands each. Outside

the court a group of supporters sang, "Lord, let your

blessings fall upon them".

While in private he makes no excuses for his action,

he is at pains to explain that the minimum amount

of violence was used to demonstrate the maximum displeasure at an act of aggression tar more reprehensible

than his. By means of blatant lies and coldblooded

omissions Van Jaarsveld had made light of a people's

promise to (Jod. Eugene's own people and his own (Jod.

In public his defence of the tarring and feathering

takes a somewhat different line. "Thirty-six men, a small

group, stood firm like an iron rod in the wind . . ." In his

retelling, the incident achieves an heroic status that is a

little difficult for the dispassionate mind to comprehend.

The fines that were paid are elevated to part ofthe legacy

of Afrikaner suffering. A point that seems to escape him,

when he identifies his fine with their truly immense

sacrifices, is the degree to which he insults the Afrikaners

who really did suffer for their freedom.

The religious aspect of Terre'Blanche's thinking

also provides the rationale for excluding Jews and

Indians from all forms of government. "If you do not

believe in Christ you are anti-Christ. There will be no

>lace forJews in an AWB government." To the best of

ny knowledge he has never explained publicly whether

>r not those of us who do not subscribe to his religious

>eliefs will enjoy civil rights, or what else might be in

core forJewish South Africans and other non-Christians.

One of the liberal myths of the Fifties and Sixties

as the belief that Afrikaner nationalism was closely

.lated to National Socialism. There were certainly

areas of similarity. The National Party's insistence on

rigid racial segregation, especially the Mixed Marriages

and Immorality Acts, their fondness for detaining

political opponents without the nuisance of legal proceedings and a tendency to want every aspect of life

categorised, catalogued and covered by suitable legislation: all seemed to indicate a certain family relationship with National Socialism.

There were however a number of important differences. Afrikanerdom had never been unusually enthusiastic about flags and uniforms. The only exclusively

Afrikaner armies of our history, those of the old Boer

republics, were the least fomial and regimented fighting

forces imaginable. Contrary to the thinking of most of

their political opponents it is not easy to get all of Afrikanerdom standing in line and saluting in unison. The

current discontent on the right of nationalist politics is

an indication of this.

Until the emergence of Eugene Terre'Blanche and

the AWB the revolt on the right had been led by men

55
who were nothing more than old-style Nationalists,

Verwoerd and Strydom men. Terre'Blanche's appearance has added a new and, although he will deny this,

alien element to what up to this time has had the appearance of a family revolt. One wonders what went

through the minds of I)r Andries Trcumicht, Jaap

Marais and Professor Card Boshoff when they arrived

at the recent Voortrekker Monument Republic Dav

meeting to share the platform with Terre'Blanche, and

were left waiting, for him to arrive late, surrounded by

uniformed storm troopers, banners waving, and himself

looking sternly ahead, his right arm outstretched in

salute, playing his adopted role to perfection.

This is perhaps the major difference between traditional Afrikaner nationalism, on the one hand, and

National Socialism and the AWB on the other. The

National Party has always been a movement ofthe volt.

Leaders were revered, but only because they were the

leaders of the people. When the time came for one to

go there was always more than one candidate, all

equally suitable, to fill the top spot.

The AWB, like the National Socialist German Workers Party, is run on thefihrerprinzip. There is only one

leader, one main speaker at political rallies, one source of

wisdom. Without Terre'Blanche there can be no AWB.

He is the cog around which the entire movement revolves. No matter who holds the rank ofdeputy leader

there is no replacement if he should go. And should he

ever unite with the otherforces ofthe extreme right there

will still be only one leader. Treurnicht, Marais and

Boshoff will have to learn to salute.

A quality that Terre'Blanche shares with the leaders

ofthe extreme left is the idea thatthe will ofthe people,

that indefinable conglomerate of conflicting views,

somehow coincides with his own. When speaking of

the future under an AWB government he describes a

land of peace and tranquility in which the divisiveness

of party politics will be outlawed, whites will be in

charge and blacks will seek their own salvation in the

homelands.

And as with the extreme left, there seems to be no

room in this perfect state for the dissident. Questioned

about his attitude to detention without trial, Terre'

Blanche says that it should never be used against one's

own people or to subvert the will of the volk.

On many occasions in public meetings he has said

that anyone who wants to turn this country into a

Zimbabwe or a Mozambique will be flattened with the

earth. Questioned as to whether this was meant literally

he answered with disarming simplicity. "Yes. We are

going to hit them hard, physically, violently. They will

be levelled with the earth."

The future scenario by which he is going to accede

to power is romantic beyond belief. When the present

government, by its misguidedly liberal actions, has

finally reduced the country to chaos, the AWB will step

in and restore order and heaven help the black man

who has other ideas.

Terre'Blanche's view of life is not dominated by

ideas offreedom, justice or even power. Central to his

every thought and action seems to be his overwhelming

preoccupation with survival, not the simple matter of

suburban survival where the main problem lies in

bringing home the monthly pay packet and trying to

get by on it. To Terre'Blanche all oflife is a struggle for

survival. The wild creatures of the veld struggle against

nature. The fate ofpeople hangs in the balance as they

struggle with each other. His is a strong elemental creed

that, when applied to his own people, has the black man

as the threat to their survival. I have no doubt that he

believes that if the Afrikaner loses power in South Africa

he will find himself facing genocide. He says that the

battle that is going to come will not be about the composition of a government. It will be about the total elimination ofthe white man. It is a matter ofsimple survival.

Ifwe lose the last battle, we will not be going into bondage, we will be on the brink of obliteration.

At work here is a sort ofprimitive Darwinism strongly reminiscent of the National Socialist idea that it is the

natural order for the strong to survive and the weak to

die. So strong was Hider's beliefin might and right being

synonymous that in the last days ofhis life he felt thatit

was right that Germany should be destroyed. They had

shown that they were not strong enough to meet the

challenge ofsurvival.

When questioned directly about his attitude to Hitler,

Terre'Blanche says that the German dictator was an

unusually adept statesman. He accepts unreservedly

the popular myth that it was Hitler who saved the German economy in the Thirties. He says that Hitler '

changed a dying people into a fighting people. This is

what is important: not that they should have been a

contented people, an industrious people or a free

people. They were a fighting people.

The three-legged swastika emblem on his movement's flag is in fact three sevens, we are told, the

Biblical number for perfection, which stands in opposition to the Book of Revelations' three sixes, the mark

of the beast. The black on the flag stands for the black

race, the white for the white race, in sharp juxtaposition

to each other (no grey areas here) and the red for the

blood ofChrist. But whatever Terre'Blanche's explanations, his flag is all but identical to that of National

Socialism, the only difference being that his swastika has

three legs.

The AWB's imitation of National Socialism extends

beyond the flags, banners, uniforms, salutes, the love

of pageants, to their well-known enthusiasm for breaking up other people's meetings. In this respect it is the

National Party members who are their enemies. It is

they who have betrayed Afrikanerdom. At the battle of

Pietersburg Terre'Blanche employed the undeniable

56
force of his personality, the force that comes from the

complete conviction that what he is doing is right in

every respect and in the interest of his people,even to

persuade the policeman in charge to escort him into the

hall. The officer's will, even reinforced by his rank and

uniform and the knowledge that he was protecting a

cabinet minister, was no match for that of the AWB

leader.

He shows little concern for his own personal comfort

and sometimes seems to be trying to provoke the government. The importance to Hitler of the time spent

in Landsberg prison would not have escaped him. It

could be that a part ofTerre'Blanche is seeking martyrdom in the form of his own Landsberg, anticipating

that this might be an alternative route to power. I am

sure that the parallels between Germany's ravaged

economy ofthe Twenties and our own current problems

have also not escaped him.

But the overriding impression is one of unreality. It

is notjust Hitler's methods or doctrines that have been

adopted. It is almost every outward aspect and symbol,

right down to the way of saluting. There is reason to

wonder ifwhat we are seeing is notsimply an imitation.

That the emotions are real there can be no doubt, but

it is possible that beyond the emotion and the facade,

there is no substance to the AWB.

One December the 16th, the anniversary ofthe very

battle that so affects Terre'Blanche's thinking, I stood

on the pavement in Paul Kruger Street in Pretoria and

watched the AWB march from Church Square to the

city hall. I have rarely been more disappointed. The

much-publicised motor cycle storm troops seemed to

be made up of pimply youths and paunchy prematurely

ageing blue collar workers. Vlany of the motor cycles

were of the 50cc variety used by high school boys.

They spluttered and whined their way up Paul Kruger

Street while their unprepossessing riders did their best

to look grim faced and determined, their leader, in

Voortrekker dress and mounted on a horse, galloped

ahead. I had expected something a little more menacing.

On another night at a gathering of his people in the

Fountains picnic spot just outside Pretoria, I watched

them staging simple, almost childish one act plays

about important moments in Afrikaner history. Trie

treaty of Vereeniging, the concentration camps and

other similar subjects were depicted in little sketches,

each no more than five or 10 minutes in length. And

there was Eugene himself, surrounded by his adoring

followers, playing the lead in each ofthe plays. It is the

picture that stays most vividly in my mind, an actor

playing a part, a cardboard imitation ofreality.

It could be that when the final analysis of this complex man is undertaken there is found to be more of

Hitler's flamboyant ally, Benito Mussolini, in his

make-up than there is of the German dictator himself.

/9274

CSOj 3400/430

57
SOUTH AFRICA

PROFESSOR ON AFRIKAANS STUDENTS' CHALLENGES, FRUSTRATIONS

Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English Vol 5 No 3, 1986 pp 74, 75, 76

[Article by Professor Mike de Vries, director and vice-chancellor at Stellenbosch University]

[Text]

In the peaceful complacency of the Sixties, the South

African community - and its student community - hopelessly misjudged events on campuses in Europe and the

United States. More than 80% of the demonstrations of

those years were against the inefficient administration of

universities; only 20% were in protest against the Vietnam war, or genuinely Communist inspired. The

realities ofAfrica, of which we in SA are an inseparable

part, also largely passed Us by because of the büffer

formed by Angola, the then Rhodesia and Mocarribique. The Verwoerd era generated a feeling of political assurance and moral peace of mind, and the structures ofthis era were accepted, largely uncritically, by

students on Afrikaans-language campuses. Most of

them had no doubts about the road ahead.

The early and middle Seventies brought a dramatic

swing away from the peaceful self-assurance ofthe Sixties. The collapse of the "right-wing" regimes on our

borders (Angola, Mocambique and Rhodesia), the

Soweto riots of 1976, the Information Scandal (which

seriously shook the confidence of many young people in

their leaders and figures of authority) had a shock effect

which undermined many certainties and especially

forced young people to reconsider oursituation and the

direction which we were taking. One could call this a

transitional period.

These events eventually brought about an important

shift among many Afrikaans students. Until then, the

governing party was supported because of ideological

considerations, traditional affiliations and the authority

exercised by the politicians. Since the Seventies, this is

often no longer true. Like other voters, many students

now only support the National Party because they regard

it as the only available instrument for practical constitutional reform.

In contrast to the fiery actions ofstudents in the US

and Europe in the late Sixties and early Seventies, students at Stellenbosch remained relatively calm. There

were signs of a greater critical involvement, but a constructive rather than a destructive one - in sharp contrast to the effects of student unrest elsewhere in the

Western world. The severing of ties with the ASB

(Afrikaähse Studentebbnd) after this organisation was

hijacked by followers ofS E D Brown, was an important

development furtherstrengthening the tradition ofmoderate thought and action for which Stellenbosch was

known. Petitions calling on the authorities to open the

Nico Malan opera and theatre complex to all races did

elicit a strong counter-reaction and created the image of

Stellenbosch as a liberal university among Afrikaners.

Even though this cannot be ascribed solely to student

pressure, the later opening ofthe Nico Malan confirmed

that Stellenbosch students often played a pioneering role

in the Afrikaner community.

In the Seventies, student organisations offered speakers ofother races and divergent beliefs the opportunity

to address enthusiastic audiences on the Stellenbosch

campus. Many other Afrikaners found this strange and

unusual, and the fundamentalists ofapartheid thought

saw this as an undermining action from within their own

ranks. When, in 1978, the first students of other races

were admitted to undergraduate courses - even though

this was on a very small scale -it occurred with the enthusiastic co-operation of student leaders, and this

swiftly led to further representations for the complete

opening, not only ofthe university, but also ofstudent

residences. -

58
Student influence was being felt on a level other than

protest and demonstration, and perhaps precisely because of this, their contribution was constructive and

effective. Now, many years later, the divisions, argu

ments and actions are often different. The average student oftoday on the Stellenbosch campus is still opposed

to violence as a solution for social and political problems.

He is also everything but anti-government-in fact, the

reform measures are strongly supported.

Nevertheless, there has been a change in attitude

since the Seventies. The insistence on peaceful change

has become more intense, and students' calls for political

and social reform are characterised by a sense ofurgency.

This difference in attitude should not be interpreted

as a rebellious protest against the institutions and policies

of the authorities. For example, the students who

wanted to travel to Lusaka for discussions with the youth

wing ofthe ANC were not expressing a spirit ofdefiance.

Rather, they were motivated by a serious concern for the

coming years, and by the conviction thatthe current pace

and priorities of reform would not ensure a relatively

peaceful and stable future. In the Seventies, there was

a reasonably widespread confidence among students in

the ability of the authorities to solve the political problems. This confidence has reduced markedly. Students

feel increasingly that they should undertake initiatives

themselves, in areas where they alone can make a contribution. As a student put it: "It is ourfuture which is

at stake. Ifwe have to fight for our future on the borders,

we also want to fight for it on other fronts."

The young student oftoday-and I referspecifically to

the Afrikaner student at Stellenbosch - has an acute

awareness that we, in a changing SA, are irrevocably on

our way to a post-apartheid era and that we are involved

in a strenuous process ofadaption and reorientation. The

outcome ofthis process ofchange -the social, economic

and political structures of the future in terms ofWhich

they will have to live their lives -is of the utmost importance to them.

For them, it is a case of a ship, which has been on a

certain course for 300 years, having to take a new bearing.

The Stellenbosch student of today justly asks how he

can help change the ship's direction, because he knows

he is a fellow traveller. This new direction is seen as no

longer having any room for discrimination on the grounds

of race or colour. Discriminatory practices which Were

statutorily entrenched and regulated will have to disappear completely, and an ideological framework which

tries to justify such practices will be out ofplace. For the

vast majority of students, group privilege or group

domination based on the presupposition of group

superiority is simply out ofthe question in the new SA.

What, in contrast, is of the utmost importance to them

is how they can proceed towards a common destiny in

which different groups can live and work in peace with

one another, mutually respecting each others' human

dignity.

That there are centrifugal forces such as group fears,

group aspirations, group loyalties and group prejudices is

well and truly realised. In fact, there is a strong awareness of the potential contained by these centrifugal

forces to further divide and polarise our already fragmented society, and eventually plunge it into the chaos

of total conflict. The emphasis on uniting forces, the

promotion of a common loyalty and an awareness of a

broad South African solidarity, these are the urgent

priorities for the Stellenbosch student oftoday. It is for

this reason that they are increasingly involving themselves in dialogue and contact across traditional boundaries.

It is true that many young people, students included,

still take their stand along traditional political dividing

lines which contributes to the further entrenchment of

prejudices and grievances. But there are also increasing

numbers ofstudents who are in fact attempting to transcend these traditional political divisions, to propose alternative alignments and to strive in their thought, actions and attitudes for a society in which the harm and

hurt caused by apartheid will be left behind for good.

As regards current developments among Afrikaans

students, it may be useful to look at what happened at

Kent State University in the US. In his book on events

there in 1970 when 13 students were shot by the National Guard, James Michener found that only about 3% of

the whole student community could be classified as

being on the radical and revolutionary left or the reactionary right. The great majority ofliberal and conservative thinkers were leaderless. The results were catastrophic. The leftist radical groups and rightist reactionary

groups could hardly be distinguished in their attempts

to destroy all order-only their philosophical points of

departure differed drastically.

Sometimes I get the impression that the majority in

the political middle on the Stellenbosch campus fearthat

they may be hijacked by left-wing radicals or right-wing

reactionaries. It sometimes appears as ifclear guidance

for this middle group is still lacking-from the church,

political movements as well as its own ranks. In this

regard it will be important to ensure that the guidance

provided will be in the right style.

Authoritarian and prescriptive leadership imposed

from above has little chance of impressing students.

What is needed is the kind ofleadership which will not

seek to conceal the problems ofthe transitional period,

but in fact combine a realistic assessment of these problems with an Inspiring and imaginative vision of the

future and with creative, innovative thinking.

The leadership students are seeking, especially from

within their own ranks, is that which will recognise the

rich but unexploited potential ofthe values which SA's

people share with one another, despite their differences

and the alienation between them. We cannot really talk

of self-assured "student power" on an Afrikaans campus - at any rate, not to the extent that this is found in

59
Europe and the US. What prevails is rather a deep

uncertainty about the future. This uncertainty can, however, become the source of a new social dynamism. Students concerned about the future can be mobilised to

constructive action. At the same time one must bear in

mind that, if the concern and uncertainty about the

future is not met with purposeful and visionary leadership, many students will seek their certainty elsewhere.

Any political or cultural organisation which seeks to

maintain the support ofour students will only be able to

do this if it offers ideas and initiatives which will capture their imagination.

Compared with their predecessors of a decade or two

ago, the students of today find themselves in a totally

new situation ofwhich they cannot always make sense.

They no longer perceive their most urgent and fundamental problem of existence as a crisis of survival, a

struggle to cope with the new forces unleashed in SA as

a result ofthe politicisation ofthe black youth, and the

challenge this presents to find a viable basis for cooperation and co-existence.

At the height ofthe apartheid era, Afrikaans students

were still, in many respects, peripheral figures-selfassured, spoilt and convinced of the academic merits of

the course the ship was taking, but without ä clearly articulated realisation oftheir'stake in the political events of

the day. Today, however, they are at the centre ofthe

boiling pot ofthe new realities, realising that they are on "

the threshold ofthe new SA, the shape ofwhich is their

own concern and responsibility. One should have an

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understanding of the unusual and sometimes confusing

situation they find themselves in, and ofthe experiments

they will be inclined to embark on as a result, no matter

how disturbing these experiments may be to an older

generation. It should also be expected that they will

question many beliefs previously regarded as self-evident certainties, and will occasionally even come forward with shocking "innovations".

At times, student actions may seem to many outsiders

as a form of student rebellion. However, in most instances it reflects rather an honest search for solutions

and a new course for the ship. Instead ofcondemnation,

attempts should rather be made to guide along constructive channels the concern and youthful energy to

which these actions attest. Students should be encouraged and assisted to make this kind ofcontribution which

can be expected from an academic milieu, namely,

the exercise of critical analyses and the promotion of

rational choices between alternative solutions.

There are, of course, also some Afrikaner students

who are being dragged along by right-wing reactionary

convictions and movements. This should not be surprising. In times ofchange and uncertainty, those who

defend the bastions ofthe past with conviction are not

without appeal. Young people are also susceptible to

them. However, I believe this group is in the minority.

The majority are still those who do not allow themselves

to be misled by either reactionary or revolutionary talk.

They are interested in justice and fairness. Unlike many

ofthe older generation, they may be the people who will

build bridges over the traditional schisms.

60
SOUTH AFRICA

BLACK SASH OFFICIAL DEPLORES GOVERNMENT'S REGULATORY POWERS

Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English Vol 5 No 3, 1986 pp 68, 70

[Article by Sheena Duncan, immediate past president of the Black Sash]

[Text]

On January 31, 1986 President PW Botha opened this

year's session of Parliament with a speech in which he

affirmed the government's faith in the sovereignty of

law as the basis for the protection offundamental rights.

He said that peace, freedom and democracy could not

exist without law and that any future system had to conform to the requirements of civilised legal order and

ensure access to the courts. The dignity, life, liberty and

property ofall had to be protected, regardless ofcolour,

race, creed or religion.

As he spoke, 335 people were beingdetained in police

and prison cells without access to the courts. They were

being held in terms ofregulations governing this year's

first state of emergency which was declared on July 20,

1985 and lifted on March 7,1986. Between July 22,1985

and January 31,1986, 7 618 people had been detained

in terms ofthose regulations.

As he spoke, a further 294 people were being held

without access to the courts in terms of the security

laws. During 1985, 3 637 people were detained under

security legislation, 1 848 ofthem in the Transkei.

In February, the Minister of Law and Order told

Parliament that more than 2 000 youngsters under the

age of 16-years had been detained since the start ofthe

emergency. Reports have been received that children

as young as seven-years have been, and are being, held.

TSe State President expressed values and principles

which are fundamental to just government and basic

requirements if people are to live in security and

peace. They are principles widely accepted in civilised

societies. They are not accepted in South Africa. In the

President's speech there was no declaration ofintentto

change South Africa's security legislation or to lift the

state of emergency.

That was only to be lifted on March 7, 1986, by

which time 7 992 had been detained.

On June 12, 1986 a state of emergency was once

again declared, this time over the whole country. It was

accompanied by regulations prohibiting news reports on

police conduct without official permission.

During the next few days hundreds of people were

detained country wide. And to disclose, without the

written consent ofthe Minister, the name or identity of

a detained person became an offence carrying a possible penalty ofimprisonment or a R20 000 fine.

White South Africans no longer respond to arguments about the rule of law and principles of justice.

Most of us have forgotten what it meant for citizens to

be safe from arbitrary arrest. Most of us do not feel

threatened because we are not black and we feel sure

that the State will not act against us.

It has been a long time since South Africa observed

the rule oflaw. We let it go bit by bit withoutsufficient

protest. We used to shoutloudly about detention without trial. We no longer do so. As an issue it no longer

pricks many consciences. We have gone on voting into

power a government which has consistently introduced

increasingly restrictive legislation granting uncontrolled

powers to the State.

During the five month state of emergency in 1960,

11 727 people were detained. When it was lifted,

South Africa returned for a few short months to the rule

of law, observing the principle of access to the courts

for arrested people.

In 1961 the rot set in. An amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act allowed detention for 12 days on the

direction of the attorney-general. This breached the

requirement that any arrested person had to be

charged or released within 48 hours. A fragile protection was lost.

From then on the decline was rapid. The General

Laws Amendment Act of 1963 contained the "Sobukwe

61
clause" for certain political offences. This allowed for

the continued detention of people even after they had

completed sentences imposed on them by the courts.

The same Act introduced 90-day detention. However, the 90 days could become indefinite because the

law stipulated that once the previous period expired a

detainee could be redetained for a further 90 days. No

court oflaw could order the release of a detainee.

Two years later a provision was introduced allowing

for the detention ofstate witnesses for 180 days. This

replaced "12-day" detention and gave an attorney

general the power to deny bail -which had previously

been a court decision.

In 1966 the General Laws Amendment Act introduced 14-day detention for those suspected ofterrorism.

In 1967 the government dropped all time limits and

controls over arbitrary police action when the Terrorism

Act was passed, allowing indefinite detention for interrogation. Then in 1976 the Minister ofLaw and Order

was given powers of "preventive detention", whereby

people could be detained, supposedly at whim, without access to the courts.

All these provisions were consolidated in the Internal Security Act of 1982. People can now be held in

detention as State witnesses ifthe Minister ofLaw and

Ordersuspects their activities, and in indefinite detention for interrogation.

Nowhere does the law prevent the authorities from

detaining someone for a lifetime. A detainee no longer

has even the protection of public knowledge about

who he is, where he is being held, and what his condition is. Every bit ofinformation about detainees is hard,

won and publication ofthe facts is hedged with prohibitions. There may be many more detainess than those

who have been publicly acknowledged. It is impossible

to know whether official figures are complete.

Since 1961 there has been no civilised legal order

which ensures detainees access to the courts. For 25

years we have lived without the rule of law.

In 1983 the Science Committee of the President's

Council reported that 43% of South Africa's African

population was under the age of 15 years. Which means

that much more than half of South Africa's population

was bom after 1961 and has never known what it means

to live under the protection of the law and the courts.

For them the law is predator and punisher rather

than protector. The consequences of such an understanding of legal order are incalculable.

A few years ago in the Johannesburg Advice Office

we learnt that a friend had been indefinitely detained

for interrogation. Our immediate response was anger

because a fundamental principle of human rights that

we had been brought up to respect had been violated.

A young black colleague, who had herself been detained in 1976, said: "Let them wait 'till we have the

power to put them in detention".

Since Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980,

whites in South Africa have criticised detentions there

without any recognition that Mr Mugabe's government is using powers inherited from the previous

white administration. This does not make detentions

in Zimbabwe any less reprehensible. But it does make

one wonder how these vocal white critics dare expect

sympathy when they introduced measures which years

ago destroyed the rule of law in that country and were

responsible for the long detention of members of the

present government.

White South Africans have a lesson to learn. We will

have little moral right to complain when other people

wield the power in the laws we created to detain our

friends and acquaintances. It is amazing how a realisation of personal danger and a total lack of protection for

ourselves, concentrates the mind on the principles of a

civilised legal order.

It is absolutely essential that we now, without delay,

take the State President's words and insistthatthey are

given real meaning. There is no time to be lost. Government money (our money) would be well spent if all

legislation allowing detention without trial were

abolished. Simultaneously, an advertising campaign

should be embarked upon to teach the principles of a

"civilised legal order" to those who have been deprived

ofsuch an understanding by our government's actions

over the last 25 years.

From time to time allegations of brutal physical torture and unimaginable cruelty meted outto detainees,

by their interrogators and by others who have uncontrolled power over them, are made in inquest courts

and during political trials. Such brutality is the inevitable result of laws which deny detainees the right of

access to the courts, to legal assistance, to their families,

to ministers of religion. The allegations have led to calls

for greater protection of detainees and for safeguards

which will prevent the abuses.

These attempts to alleviate conditions for detainees

must be made in absence of any likelihood that the

legislation will be repealed.

Too many people abdicate their concern when the

Minister ofLaw and Order announces new procedures

for the holding of detainees. It is detention without

access to the courts which is abhorrent. Torture and

physical abuse make it worse, but there should never

be provision for the arbitrary detention of persons in any

system of law.

Ironically, at a time when Bophuthatswana was still

pretending its constitutional Bill of Rights meant

something, a political opponent ofthe government was

detained in one of those well-known luxury hotels

which flourish in that country. He was not beaten or

tortured or physically abused but he was held against

his will and without access to the courts. He could have

been held there for the rest of his life. That he had a

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comfortable bed and a bathroom attached was small

consolation in the circumstances.

South Africa has an independent judiciary but that

judiciary has been excluded by Parliament from exercising its authority, in many instances, over the executive arm of the State. Independence is not enough.

The power of the Courts must be restored. This should

be a legislative priority for the current session of Parliament. Unfortunately there are no indications that the

State President intends to translate his fine words into action.

Far from it. Two new security bills have become law.

The Internal Security Amendment Act allows for the

preventive detention of people for 180 days.

The Public Safety Amendment Act allows the

Minister ofLaw and Order to impose a state ofemergency

in any area without calling it such. He will have a free

hand to make any regulation he pleases, including a

regulation of detention without trial. The bill completely excludes the jurisdiction of the courts.

The State President is correct when he says that

peace, freedom and democracy cannot exist without

law. The rule of law is fundamental to the maintenance of good order. Disorder has grown in South

Africa as laws have destroyed law. Ifwe want law to be

the foundation of South African society in the future,

we had better begin to recreate it now. There is no

time to be lost and words aboutjustice and the protection of individual freedom by the courts mean nothing

whatsoever to those who have never experienced that

protection.

63
SOUTH AFRICA

POSSIBILITIES OF PROPOSED NATIONAL STATUTORY COUNCIL WEIGHED

Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English Vol 5

[Article by David Welsh]

[Text]

Over the past 18 months the era of negotiation politics

has often seemed tantalisingly close. Indeed, with the

recent endeavours of the Commonwealth Eminent

Persons Group (EPG), it seemed as if the real breakthrough was possible, even imminent, and that South

Africans might at last have been persuaded to seek to

resolve their divisions around a negotiating table, rather

than continuing to tear the country apart.

In his speech to Parliament in January it seemed as if

the State President had taken his courage in both hands,

and was preparing to lead his country away from the

abyss of disaster into what could at least have been a

hopeful new departure. The speech struck a new note.

Gone was the emphasis on separation; completely

banished was any reference to domination or inequality.

Botha, in some respects, sounded like a born-again

liberal.

Thus, he spoke of: "an undivided Republic"; "one

citizenship . . . implying equal treatment and opportunities"; "the protection of the fundamental rights of

individuals as well as groups"; "peace, freedom and

democracy"; "equality before the law"; "human dignity,

life, liberty and property must be protected, regardless

of race, creed or religion"; "a democratic system of

government, which must accommodate all legitimate

political aspirations ofall the South African communities,

must be negotiated". To round it off Botha urged the

abolition of "the outdated colonial system of paternalism as well as the outdated concept of apartheid".

In the same speech he promised legislation to restore

citizenship to blacks who reside permanently in the

Republic, but losttheirSouth African citizenship when

Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda received

independence. He undertook to re-introduce freehold

property rights for black communities; to introduce a

No 3 1986 pp 43, 44, 46

uniform identity document for all races; to change the

discriminatory aspects of the immigration selection

policy; and to remove the unnecessary restrictions on

entrepreneurship, particularly in the informal sector.

Notice was served on influx control, one of the entrenched, historic pillars of white supremacy and the

single biggest source of vexation and anger for blacks.

Six months later even those who are professional

straw-clutchcrs and had had their hopes buoyed by

Botha's sentiments are wondering just what went wrong.

With the apparent failure of the EPG, the run-up to

Soweto Day on June 16 and the declaration of a state of

emergency, SA tragically, seems as far from an accommodation as it ever was.

Government spokesmen, including the State President, have spoken in tough terms, which imply very

strongly that they have no intention of negotiating with

the African National Congress ("we have no intention

of handing over power to a bunch ofMarxists," said Pik

Botha) and no intention ofyielding to Western demands

for more rapid change. Itseems thatthe government has

assessed the likelihood ofmore comprehensive sanctions

being imposed, and believes that a siege economy can

be rendered tolerable.

A critical factor inside the National Party and in the

wider circles ofthe Afrikaner community has been the

perception that the government has lost its way and is

unable to contain the violence. There was talk of the

"headless chicken syndrome", a wounding taunt. The

apparent incapacities of the government damaged it

among the parties of the ultra-right, who have persistently bayed for even tougher action; and it seemed also

to heighten beliefs in the more radical movements of

the left that the government was on the run, and that a

few more heaves would topple it. Such beliefs are clearly

64
illusory: the fundamental core of State power is formidably strong and has barely been extended even by the

endemic violence of the past 20 months.

No government can afford to be perceived as weakening or incapable of managing crises. That is why the

government has decided to crack the whip and try not

only to overcome the violence but also to neutralize the

ANC and what it believes to be its internal surrogate,

the United Democratic Front. It believes that at all

costs it has to demonstrate that it has not lost its capacity

for tough, decisive action.

Where does this leave the other crucial component of

Botha's reform programme, namely, "the involvement

of black communities in decision-making", to quote

him? Ministers have given assurances that reform will

continue, despite conditions in the country and the

likelihood of tightening sanctions. Everything suggests,

however, that reform will be on the government's own

terms and that it will negotiate the key political changes

only with those black leaders whom it deems acceptable.

In May the Department ofConstitutional Development and Planning published the National Council

Bill, and invited individuals, organisations or interest

groups to submit comments to it before June 30, 1986.

Clearly, the government wishes to be seen to be a

potentially willing negotiating partner, and not the

high-handed imposer of fiats.

The bill proposes to establish a National Council to

"provide for participation in the planning and preparation of a new constitutional dispensation; the granting

to black South Africans of a voice in the processes of

government, in the interim period; and the furtherance

ofsound relations among, and the human dignity, rights

and freedoms of all South Africans ..."

The intention appears to be that some black leaders

(probably no more than two or three) will be grafted on

to the existing executive as an interim measure, while

the Council itself deliberates on the longer-run constitutional questions. The Council is to consist of the

State President and the following categories of persons

appointed by him:

I I the Chief Minister of each self-governing territory

or a member of its cabinet designated by the Chief

Minister;

[~1 10 persons selected from persons nominated by

organisations, institutions and interest groups who

in their opinion are "representative ofblack persons

permanently resident in the Republic (excluding the

self-governing territories," i.e. the non-independent

homelands);

Q not more than 10 persons who, in the opinion ofthe

State President, "are able to make a substantial

contribution to the furthering of the functions of

the Council"; and

any other member or members of the Cabinet who

the State President may wish to appoint.

There are provisions enabling the State President to

act should the bodies referred to in the second condition

fail to nominate persons or nominate an insufficient

number; and he is empowered to remove from the

Council any one of their nominees should the body

which nominated him request this. Members under

category four can be removed at any time by the State

President if he believes that there are sufficient grounds

for doing so. The Bill gives the Council the function of

considering all matters, including existing and proposed

legislation and steps taken or proposed by the government which it considers to be "of national interest". It

can also make recommendations to the government on

any matter which it has considered.

The significance of the proposed Council must be

considerable, in the government's mind at any rate,

because the Bill provides that in the normal course of

events the State President will be the chairman.

The Bill gives no indication of the envisaged modus

operandi of the Council, but it is reasonably safe to

assume that the idea is that it will reach its conclusions

on the basis ofconsensus, as was hoped for in the working

of the tri-cameral Parliament. In any case, the Council

has no real powers: it is a purely deliberative and advisory

body.

The first important question to ask, assuming (which,

of course, one cannot) that the Bill is enacted in more

or less its existing form, is: which black bodies will

come forward and submit nominations, and how representative will they be?

Informal speculation has it that in the government's

thinking the big catch is ChiefMangosuthu Buthelezi,

the Chief Minister of KwaZulu. He, ofcourse, may be

a member ex officio by virtue of his status, but this is no

guarantee that he will actually be prepared to serve.

Buthelezi has-been quoted as saying that without the

unconditional release of Nelson Mandela the Council

would not get off the ground. Similarly, the articulate

and capable Chief Minister of KaNgwane, Enos Mabuza,

has expressed misgivings along the same lines. Neither,

however, has flatly and finally rejected the proposed

Council.

Representatives of urban black communities pose

even greater problems. Predictably, the more radical

black organisations have rejected the Council out of

hand as a "sham". Their hostility makes it difficult for

any but the most pliable bodies to offer co-operation.

The fate ofso many blacks who served in local authorities

is a grim reminder of what may lie in store for those

who are perceived (however unjustly) as "sell-outs".

Black suspicions about the Council should not necessarily be dismissed as merely mindless opposition.

There is an unfortunate history ofwhat have been called

"talk shops" or "toy telephones", the derisory names

given to previous advisory, but powerless bodies on

which blacks were invited to serve. The most prominent

65
of these was the Natives' Representative Council,

which was established in 1936 at the same time as legislation was enacted to remove from Cape blacks the

right to vote on the common voters' roll.

That common roll vote was probably the most dearly

cherished black right, and its abolition caused a great

deal of anger. The Natives' Representatives Council,

a partially elected and partially nominated body, was

intended as a quidpro quo for the loss of the franchise,

as well as a sounding board whereby the government

could gauge black opinion. It could comment on proposed legislation, it could consider the budget in so far

as it affected spending on black affairs, but it had no

real powers. All it could do was to make representations

and offer advice to the government.

In the light oftoday's circumstances it is extraordinary

to recall that many ofSouth Africa's most distinguished

and capable blacks were prepared to serve on the

Council, in spite of their bitter opposition to the abolition of the Cape vote. Even leading members of the

ANC tried to use the Council as a vehicle of change,

but within less than a decade they, moderates though

they were, despaired and adjourned in frustration at

the government's failure to listen to what they were

saying. (The Natives' Representative Council was

finally abolished in 1951, after having been dormant

for several years.)

Many Blacks, indeed a substantial majority, would

prefer a negotiated accommodation to the escalation and

protraction ofviolence (which, apart from its devastation,

would by no means inevitably lead to a "successful"

seizure of power). The problem is that they have yetto

be convinced of the government's bonafides that they

are not about to be inveigled into yet another powerless and useless body or, even worse, a body that contributes to the self-enforcement of the legislation and

structures that oppress them.

For the government this is more than a problem of

public relations or communication. Majority black

opinion simply does not find credible the claim that

apartheid is dead.

Ordinary citizens are not privy to the processes that

generated the National Council Bill; they do not know

whether the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning has some master plan up its sleeve

for South Africa's constitutional salvation. They see,

instead, a Bill (admittedly gazetted for public comment)

which bears all the hallmarks of a scheme cooked up in

the inner recesses ofgovernment, and published more

for information than with any real expectation that its

provisions will be fundamentally altered in the light of

representations.

Perhaps this comment is unfair and untrue; perhaps

the government does have a genuinely open-ended

approach to future constitution-making; and perhaps

there are, waiting in the wings, black leaders with

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authentic roots oflegitimacy in theircommunities who

are prepared to come forward and serve on the Council.

All of this may be so, and it may be the case that

the Council will not necessarily be the only forum for

negotiating - Chris Heunis, the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, has been quoted

as saying that talks with the ANC could be pursued

simultaneously on other levels, provided that it renounces violence as a political strategy.

This raises the fundamental question ofSouth African

politics: is any viable constitutional planning, indeed

any negotiated accommodation, conceivable without

the ANC as a party? Those observers who closely watch

black politics have little doubt about the influence of

the ANC. Even cautious analysts have suggested that

support for the ANC in an open election would exceed

the already substantial support reported by survey data

and might go as high as 70% of the black population.

This figure may astound those many South Africans

who have been falsely reassured by the blandly anodyne

words of various government spokesmen and other

propaganda organs. Rare indeed is the ruling group

with the ability accurately to gauge the strength and

durability of its opponents: even rarer is the ruling

group whose leaders have the courage and statesmanship to tell their constituencies these unpalatable truths.

Let them rather subsist on misleading booklets (like

the recent one on the ANC) and misplaced optimism

as the more common response.

I do not approve of all the ANC says and does; I like

even less its ties with the South African Communist

Party, arguably one ofthe most Stalinist ofall communist

parties; but I recognize that for millions of blacks the

ANC is as authentic a vehicle oftheir national and symbolic aspirations, as historically the National Party was

for the majority of Afrikaners.

No-one can talk glibly about how negotiations that

included the ANC could be initiated: undoubtedly

there would be monumental difficulties; but if what is

at stake is the devastation ofthe country and the death

of millions of people, then there is an obligation to try

to circumvent those difficulties. It is unfortunate for

South Africa that it declined in the end to use the good

offices of the EPG. This was potentially a golden opportunity to bring about a cessation of violence and at

least to initiate a process of talks with the ANC and to

explore whether any common ground exists. It may

not: and that might prove a tragedy for all of us.

This wider context makes the projected National

Council seem a rather piddling affair. As its draft provisions currently stand it seems inherently incapable of

providing a forum in which a bargain for a durable constitutional accommodation could be struck. Yet, it

would be unfortunate to dismiss it out ofhand as being

of no consequence or to view it simply as another timebuying (and hence stalling) device. Its publication bespeaks a commitment to bring blacks into the central

government and to do so by a process of negotiation.

Reality has an uncanny way ofcatching up with rhetoric.

That is admittedly a slender straw to clutch at: but in

the meantime it's all we've got.
SOUTH AFRICA

ABILITY TO COPE WITH GUERRILLA, CONVENTIONAL WAR ASSESSED

Cape Town LEADERSHIP In English Vol 5 No 3, 1986, pp 24, 26, 28

[Article by Professor Mike Hough, director of the Institute for Strategic

Studies, University of Pretoria]

[Text]

The effectiveness ofa state's military forces or capabilities depends on their size, composition, equipment,

logistical reach and availability for new applications.

Related to the size, equipment and reach of a state's

military forces is its military potential, that is its ability

to increase these forces in a crisis or in war, and its willingness to employ these forces in disputes.

Three broad categories determine a state's military

potential: economic and technological capacity; administrative skill; and the political foundations of

military power. Foreign inputs are, of course, also an

important factor.

Military potential is therefore a comprehensive concept, and not as limited as the concept ofwar potential,

which primarily concerns economic resources available

for mobilization in time ofwar.

Threat perception and the relative military potential

of hostile neighbours and other adversaries, are factors

that will obviously also determine the state ofa nation's

military preparedness.

How the South African government perceives any

threat to its sovereigniry can be seen in the 1986 White

Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply which divides

the source of hostility into external and internal situations. Externally, the threat is seen to be directed and

co-ordinated by the Soviet Union as chief planner and

initiator in such a way as to further Soviet interests in

Southern Africa.

The Soviet supply of sophisticated arms such as

MiG-23 aircraft, MI-25 attack helicopters, T-62 tanks,

radar systems and surface-to-air missiles, especially to

Angola, is perceived to ensure the dependence of the

recipient countries on the Soviet Union and creates a

"protective" umbrella which allows SWAPO and the

ANC more freedom of movement.

Direct Soviet troop involvement in Angola (although

still on a very limited scale) and the 40 000-odd troops

from surrogate countries, are also perceived by South

Africa as a disturbing development, especially in view of

the MPLA conventional offensive against UNITA.

As far as the African states themselves are concerned,

increased activities against SA still remains a common

objective, but due to internal conflict, deteriorating

economic conditions and leadership conflicts in these

countries, the threat emanating from them only gains

substance ifaccompanied by the large-scale involvement

ofthe Soviet Union and its satellites.

Internally, the current unrest situation in SA, and

especially the role ofthe ANC, the SACP and the UDF

in promoting unrest, revolution and terrorism, is identified as the main threat.

Considering the South African threat perception as

well as developments such as a global war into which

Southern Africa could be drawn, there are some possibilities for a conventional threat against SA.

For instance, were SA convulsed by civil war, it could

lead to a combined Soviet-proxy conventional offensive

against the country, thus dividing SA's defence between internal and external protection. The ANC

revolutionary model developed during the Sixties,

was seen to eventually culminate in conventional war.

From a strategic point of view, the fact that the

sophisticated SA economy would provide a vulnerable

target; the fact that white manpower sources could become over-stretched as the ANC campaign develops;

and the vast size ofthe country which is seen to favour

ANC military activity, was stressed. At this stage the

transition from "guerrilla warfare" to eventual "mobile

warfare" was also envisaged.

This model, culminating in conventional warfare, was

67
elaborated on in the early Eighties. It would comprise a

stage ofguerrilla warfare, ofequilibrium, and of "general

offensive". During the firststage, "hit-and-run" tactics

and "armed propaganda" would play an important role,

while a "reduction" of "enemy" personnel and material,

interalia by means ofa sabotage campaign, would complement "armed propaganda".

During the equilibrium stage, guerrilla warfare evolves

into mobile warfare where bigger "guerrilla units",

armed with advanced weapons are formed, while "lightning attacks" against the "enemy" are to be launched.

The last stage, that ofthe general offensive, is supposed to see the transition of mobile warfare into positional warfare. At this stage it is envisaged that SA will

be internationally isolated; the economy exhausted; and

the security forces demoralised. "Liberated zones"

will then be established in the rural areas and the cities

will be encircled.

Although a warning is issued that the "forces of reaction" may at this point come to the SA government's

assistance and that ANC gains will have to be "defended", external military intervention on behalfoftheANC

is not mentioned. However, during the Rivonia trial

of 1963/1964, it became clear that the ANC envisaged

direct external military assistance at this stage.

In the Eighties, especially, it has been stressed that

the ANC military campaign should not be waged by

"professional" guerrilla units, but that the main force

should be the "political army" ofthe masses supported

by organized Umkhonto We Sizwe units which would

handle "hard" military targets. A "protracted" campaign would provide time to "arm" the masses politically

and militarily.

Simultaneously, the role of workers and trade unions

in "bringing the economy to a halt", is emphasized, as

well as the need for the creation of white "anti-apartheid" movements. These movements should vigorously

oppose compulsory military service, and protest against

the war in Namibia. This is seen as "part of the struggle

for the armed forces" which is believed to be crucjal in

The necessity of civil war in this model (the insurrectionary overthrow ofthe state) is emphasized, as well

as direct damage to SA's economic infrastructure.

Current unrest in SA is viewed as being important

in the process of creating a "people's army". The

ANC should therefore "march in the vanguard ofsemispontaneous mass upsurges" and help them to form

"revolutionary organs ofself-government". The arming

ofthe masses at this stage would imply the concept of

"part-time guerrillas" receiving "weekend" training

also in SA. &'

^ Although talk of an Iranian-style "take-over" and a

"popular uprising" surfaced in the wake of the emphasis on the people's war model and the current cycle

of unrest in the country, it seems to be supplementary

to, and not an alternative to, the conventional warmodel.

The people's war model, however, seems to put more

emphasis on paralyzing the economy and on undermining the security forces, than is the case with the

conventional war model.

SWAPO has a "conventional brigade", but at time's

the movement seems to argue that SA will withdraw

from Namibia as a result of external and internal pressures, thereby eliminating the necessity for a final conventional phase in its military campaign. And although

SWAPO has supported the implementation of Security

Council Resolution 435 for a negotiated settlement in

Namibia on the one hand, it has also made it clear that

the "armed struggle" plays an important role in its

campaign.

Against this background, the ANC and SWAPO would

pose only a limited threat to the South African Defence

Force (SADF). If they concentrate prematurely for a

conventional war it would be a completely one-sided

conflict. Civil war in SA could provide certain favourable

circumstances for the ANC, but the movement would

still be no match for the SADF. There is no sign of

demoralisation of the Security Forces either. Only

massive outside intervention on behalf of the ANC

could conceivably tilt the balance, and Western reaction

to Soviet intervention in such a situation would have

to be taken into account, even though there is, at this

stage, no guarantee of direct Western military counterintervention.

During 1965, it was calculated in a US-based study,

that a successful direct invasion of South Africa would

require at least 90 000 highly trained men with the most

modem armaments, 700 aircraft and 100 ships and

transports. The cost ofeach month ofoperations would

be about $95m, and casualties on the attacking side

would run from 19 000 to 38 000 killed and wounded.

Since this calculation was made, the vastincrease in SA's

military potential would obviously greatly increase the

size and cost ofsuch an invasion.

In this context, the Soviet supply of arms to neighbouring states has also been perceived by SA as a form

of "stockpiling", disturbing the military balance in

Southern Africa, and creating a situation which the

Soviet Union could exploit, should it decide on direct

action against SA.

As far as counter-insurgency against smaller groups of

ANC insurgents is concerned, it is also clear that the

SADF has a well-balanced capability, although SA's

long borders do create certain problems.

To some extent, SA is involved in a mini-arms race

with the Soviet Union in a regional context. Although

there are limits to what the Soviet Union may be willing

to supply to Angola, for instance, SA does have technological, financial and also manpower constraints adversely

affecting the country's capability to maintain a credible

deterrent. In this sense, SA has to rely increasingly on

68
war potential, (that is a superior ability to actually wage

war if necessary) rather than on quantitative military

potential, (the numerical balance offorces and types of

weapon systems). In future this may not be entirely

dissimilar to Israel's position.

The limitation on SA's freedom ofaction to carry out

cross-border operations, and the possibility ofincreased

losses ofmilitary equipment and manpower during such

operations, is an important component of the conventional threat against the country. So far, world opinion

rather than the military capabilities of neighbouring

states has played a role in deterring SA from cross-border

operations.

Recently, the OAU Defence Commission met in

Harare for its 9th ordinary session where problems in

creating a Pan African Peace Keeping force and the

"destabilisation" of "Frontline" states by SA, were

discussed. A combination ofsurprise, quick withdrawal

and avoidance of direct large-scale conflict with the

defence forces of neighbouring states during crossborder operations, has however still given SA a clear

edge. Direct and large-scale clashes with MPLA and

Cuban troops, should SA act in defence of UNITA, do

entail some risk of escalation.

Finally, although SA has officially adopted a policy of

"qualified neutrality", an East-West conflict of global

dimensions could make it difficult for SA to remain uninvolved, given the strategic importance ofthe Southern

African region.

According to TheMilitary Balance 1985-86, published

by the London-based International Institute of

Strategic Studies, quantitative SA military strength in

1985 was:

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Regular: 106 400 (64 000 conscripts).

Terms ofservice: 24 months. Reservists: eight camps totalling up to

240 days, then commitment to age 65.

Reserves: 317 000. Army 140 000; Navy 2 000; Air 25 000. After

National Service, active reservists serve in the Citizen Force for 12

years, in which they spend 720 days in uniform. They then serve

five years in the Citizen Force Reserve (150 000) and may be

allocated to the Commando Force, where they serve 12 days a year

up to age 55.

ARMY: 76 400. Regulars: 18 400 (12 000 white, 5 400 black and

Coloured, 1 000 women). National Service: 58 000. Part-time Citizen Force and Commando.

11 territorial commands.

2 div HQ (1 armd, 1 mech inf bns).t

1 armd bde (2 tk, 1 mech infbns).t

1 mech bde (1 armd car, 2 mot inf bns).t

3 mot bdes (each 3 inf bns. 1 armd car bn).t

1 para bde (3 para bns).t

1 special recce regt.

9 fd, 3 med, 6 It AA arty regts.t

1 AA missile regt (3 Crotale, 3 Tigercat btys).

15fdengrsqns.t

3 sigs regts, 3 sigs sqns.

Tks: some 250 CenturionlOlifant. AFV: recce: 1,600 Eland(90mm

gun, 60mm mor); MICV: 1,500 Raul (20mm/60mm/90mm gun);

APC: 1,500 incl Buffalo, Hippo, Rhino, Lynx (wheeled). Arty: how:

30 25-pdr (88mm), 75 5.5-in. (140mm), 40 G-5 towed, (? 10) G-6 SP.

15mm, 20 Valtiri 127mm SP; mon 81mm, 120120mm. ATK: RCL:

84mm, 106mm; guns: 6-pdr(57mm), 17-pdr(76mm), M-6790mm;

ATGW: SS-11,120 ENTAC. AD: guns: 20mm, 55 K-63 twin 35mm,

25 L/7040mm, 153.7-in. (94mm); SAM: ZOCactus(Crotale), 54 Tigercat.

NAVY: 9 000, incl 900 marines, 4' 000 conscripts.

Bases: Simonstown, Durban.

Subs: 3 Daphne.

Frigates: 1 /VB«siw(BrType-12) ASW with 1 Wasp hel (trg).

FAC(G): 9 MOD (Minister of Defence) (ftwfef (Saar-4)-type) with 6

Skorpioen (Gabriel-type) SSM.

Patrol craft: 4 Br Ford, 4 mod Ton, 1 other large; 30 Namacurra

armed harbour.

MCMV: 6: 3 Br 7b» minesweepers, 3 7b» minehunters.

1 fleet replenishment ship (with hel deck; 2 hel).

1 ocean (2 hel), 1 inshore hydrographic ships. >

(On order: 3 MOD, 3 Dvora-type FAC(G).)

MARINES: (900; 600 conscripts); 9 local harbour defence units.

AIR FORCE: 13 000 (2 000 conscripts); 356 combat ac (incl 93

with Citizen Force), some 16 armed hel.

3 Territorial Area Commands; Trg, Tactical Spt, Logistics Commands.

Bbrs: 2 sqns: 1 with 5 Canberra B(I)12T 3 T-4; 1 with 6 Buccaneer^-

50.

FGA: 4 sqns with 20 Mirage F-1AZ, 82 MB-326M/K Impala I/H.

Interceptor/FGA/recce: 2 sqns: 1 AD with 20 Mirage IHCZ/EZ; 1

with 12 F-1CZ; 1 fit with 6 RZ/R2Z.

Hel: 7 sqns with 12 Super Frelon, 50 Puma, 80 Mouette III.

Tpt: 3 sqns: 1 with 7 C-130B, 9 Transall C-160Z; 1 with 4 HS-125

Mercurius, 1 Viscount781; 1 with 12 C-47.

Liaison: 3 sqns with 15 AM-3C Bosbot, 25 C-4M Kudu, 20 Cessna

185.

Recce/MR: 2 sqns: 1 with some 8 C-47; 1 with 12 Piaggio P-166SDL3MAR Albatross. Some C-130 have a MR role.

Trg: 1 sqn with C-47 and Albatross.

Attack/trg: 1 sqn with 24 Impala I/II.

ASW: 1 hel sqn with 10 Wasp HAS-1, 6 Alouette III.

Training Command (incl OCU):

6 schools: ac: 80 T-6G HarvardlWlll, 40 Impala I/II, 25 Mirage

HI (some 10 EZ, some R2Z, some 10 D2Z), 12 C-47; hel: 30Alouette

II/III.

Reserves: 93 Impala COW ac 15 L-100 (Hercules; civil freight ac).

AAM: R-530, R-SSOMagic, Sidewinder, KukriV-l (Sidewinder-type).

ASM: AS-20/30.

(On order: 4Partenavia: iSpartacus(liaison/-tpt), 1 Observer(patrol)

ac.)

Medical Corps: 8.000.

Source: IISS, London, The Military Balance 1985 - 1986. Reproduced with permission.

Compared to SA's total regular armed forces of

106 400 the "Frontline" states (Angola, Botswana,

Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania) have a

total of 166 850 men. Both these figures exclude reserves and although Angola and Tanzania have 50 000

t Cadre formations completing the 2 div» when brought to full strength on mobilization of

Citizen Force.

reserves each, only SA has a well-organized reserve

capability of 317 000 men. In Angola especially, the

Cuban and other surrogate forces must also be taken

into account.

As far as arms are concerned, SA has 356 combat aircraft as against the 290 of the "Frontline" states, and

250 main battle tanks as against the 871 ofthe "Frontline" states. When making comparisons, it is also important to rememberthat differenttypes ofaircraft and

tanks have different capabilities under different cir69
/9274

CSOj 3400/427

cumstances. Also, the serviceability of some weapon

systems in some African states is uncertain.

In pure quantitative terms, the combined "Frontline" military strength, especially ifsurrogate forces are

included, outweighs that ofSA in a number of respects.

Moreover, SA does not have the access to equipment

and replacements that the "Frontline" states have, (although it is seemingly only in Angola that the Soviets

have been willing to supply large quantities of more

sophisticated equipment), and is largely dependent on

producing its own requirements. Ingenuity has compensated for obsolescence and insufficient quantities,

but problem areas do exist.

But it is in the qualitative sphere, the economic,

technological, administrative, and strategic foundations ofmilitary power, that SA has formidable military

potential. It is not a colonial situation, and the issue at

stake is ofvital importance to SA. Manpower and equipment may be stretched in a war of long duration, but

such a conflict will also have a devastating effect on the

much more fragile economies of the "Frontline" states,

many of which are, at least economically, dependent on

SA. In addition, logistical problems, the problem ofintegrating varied forces within the "Frontline grouping",

and internal conflicts in Angola and Mozambique, make

it unlikely that SA will face a conventional threat from

these quarters ifmassive and direct Sovietinvolvementis

excluded. Speculation about a SA nuclear capability is

also a deterrent, even though the country's possession

of nuclear arms has not been verified and it is not presently SA's intention to become a nuclear power.

Internal stability and the maintenance of a wellbalanced conventional military deterrent, probably

remain SA's best investment in avoiding conventional

conflict. It is probably only an increase in internal

instability that will, at this stage, increase the possibility

of external intervention. Even then, any invading

power will still face a formidable opponent, raising the

cost of invasion to a point where only the overriding

importance of the issue at stake, and extensive international freedom of action, could possibly justify the

action.

It is also clear that in unrest and revolutionary situations, itis largely the contribution ofnon-military efforts,

the political and socio-economic dimensions, that will

ultimately determine stability and contribute towards

overall strength and legitimacy. Military strength is

only one component of national power, and not a

panacea for all problems.

70
SADF SHORT SERVICE SYSTEM TERMED HELPFUL TO ECONOMY

Pretoria PARATUS in English Aug 86 pp 52, 53, 55

SOUTH AFRICA

[Article by Helmoed-Rotner Heitman]

[Text] W

E are gradually beginning to realise that South

Africa is in fact not a First World country but rather a

Third World country which has a small but powerful

First World component. Once we have fully accepted this

reality, we will be able to tailor our economic and development policies to best harness the First World sector of the

economy to draw the rest of the country towards it. The

alternative will be that the larger Third World sector will pull

the First World sector down towards it instead.

Once we have found our way to this acceptance, we can also accept that the

SADF can play an important and valuable

role in building the economy and, indeed,

the nation. While the SADF is already involved in various civic action projects and

programmes, we can go much further in

utilising the SADF towards addressing

some of the very basic problems besetting our development.

Two typical Third World problems

which are particularly acute at present,

are unemployment—including underemployment — and a serious shortage of

skilled and semi-skilled people. While the

present high level of unemployment is in

large measure due to the slump in the

economy, the shortage of skilled people

has always meant that a large proportion

of our potentially economically active

population was un- or underemployed for

want of sufficient people able and willing

to initiate something which would generate employment.

The answer to this problem does not lie

with the large corporations but in the initiation and growth of small and even very

small business enterprises. It is these

small businesses of all types which can

absorb unskilled and semi-skilled persons effectively and efficiently and which

can show the highest growth rates. It is

unfortunately also these small businesses

whose formation is restricted by the lack

of skilled people. This aspect is already

being addressed in various ways. Examples include the Small Business Development Corporation and the present

training schemes for the unemployed.

SADF POTENTIAL — A SHORT

SERVICE SCHEME

THE SADF COULD PLAY A VALUABLE

ROLE in this area while simultaneously enhancing our. defence preparedness. The means to this end would be a

system of "short service" in the SADF

coupled with vocational training. This approach has been used successfully in a

number of countries with similar, albeit

often far more acute, problems.

The basic workings of such a scheme

would combine providing a turbulencefree pool of personnel for the SADF with

uplifting the economic potential of the

personnel concerned.

Service Period

A SYSTEM OF THIS NATURE MIGHT, for

instance, see personnel taken into the

SADF for a basic service period of five

years, after which they could be offered

extended service or be honourably discharged to enter the economy. The basic

service period could be allotted as follows:

• First Year —Military training

coupled with basic literacy and numeracy

training as required;

• Second Year— Full-time military service;

• Third Year — Full-time military service and specialist or

promotion training;

• Fourth Year — Full-time military service;

71
• Fifth Year

— Full-time vocational

training in or heara

military base while remaining on call for

military service as dictated by operational ; considerations.

Additional time for vocational training

could also be made available during the

second, third and fourth years, depending on the individual member's mustering

and posting, arid on the nature of the

training which he has requested. All members should in any event be encouraged

to further their education or training

throughout this period, be it by attendance at courses arranged for them or by

means of correspondence courses.

Vocational Training

WHILE STUDYING FORA MATRIC should

be an available option in this programme,

the emphasis should be on practical skills

and trades which the graduate can apply

in beginning his own business or in employment after completing his period of

service. The relevant government departments and the Small Business Development Corporation could give valuable

support in establishing the most viable

and useful areas in which members

should seek training and in the development of suitable curricula. Universities

could also be of enormous assistance in

carrying out basic research towards making a programme of this nature both effective and efficient. Government departments and some of the larger corporations might also be asked to predict their

personnel requirements in various suitable categories four of five years hence.

Some vocational training programmes

might well require time to be spent on

them during the first four years of service — after completion of initial military training — the fifth year building on this work.

Given the relatively low-intensity nature of

the present threat, this should not present

insurmountable difficulties and would allow a far wider scope of vocational training. Members wishing to enter trades for

which an apprenticeship is required

might, where there is an existing demand

for this trade within the SADF, be employed in their future trade. Arrangements would then have to be made for

this service to be credited towards their

apprenticeship. Similar arrangements

already apply for some artisans, although

these programmes are specifically tailored to meet the SADF requirement in

those trades and thus require longer service.

It is important to remember that this

programme would not be aimed at producing "high tech" graduates but, rather,

people with the basic skills needed in an

underdeveloped community to assist that

community to uplift itself. Examples

could include bricklayers, plasterers, carpenters, cabinet makers, electricians,

plumbers, mechanics, sheet metal workers, tailors, cobblers, etc, etc. In some of

these areas their skills might still be very

basic indeed and not up to the standards

demanded in the First World sector of the

economy. They would, however, represent a vast improvement in the Third

World sector where they are all too often

not present at all. Steps would have to be

taken to accommodate graduates of this

programme within the systems governing

various trades despite the fact that they

may only have abbreviated training and

not have served full apprenticeships. It is

essential that the First World requirements governing entrance to some trades

are not allowed to negatea programme of

this nature which is, after all, aimed at the

Third World sector of our economy.

Another possibility would lie in training

some members specifically for posts in

development work with the civil authorities. The Medical Services might thus

take in recruits to train as para-medics.

These would be employed as medics during their military service and would then

be transferred to the Department of

Health for posting as para-medics to

underdeveloped areas. Some might even

show such aptitude that bursaries could

be arranged for their further training as

nurses, medical technologists or even as

doctors. Similarly, some members might

be givena basic level of training in teaching so that they can pass on their particular skills within their community — one

might call them "para-teachers". This

could, for example, prove particularly

beneficial in the case of members interested in agricultural training. It might well

also prove possible to come to an arrangement with teacher training colleges

to provide initial teacher training asa part

of this programme. These students would

then attenda teacher training college for,

say,a further two years before graduating.

Post-Service Support

ON COMPLETION OF THEIR FIVE YEARS

SERVICE, personnel could be givena

cash gratuity and assistance in finding

employment or starting out on their own

in, for instance, small-scale farming or

beginninga small workshop or business

in an area which is not well served in that

particular trade. Such assistance could

take the form ofa long-term low interest

loan, assistance in selecting the right

area and in actually setting the business

up. This phase of the programme would

be carried out in close co-operation with

or, indeed, by the relevant government

departments and the Small Business Development Corporation to ensure the

most efficient application and employment of the graduates. There should also

bea follow-up programme to ease their

way through the dangerous early stages.

72
Most of this pase of the programme will

fall within the ambit of other government

departments, the SADF should, however,

forma small organisation to watch over

the interests of the short service graduates. The simplest approach to this

would be to suitably expand the role of

the present structure for watching over

veterans' affairs.

While the aim of the programme would

be to provide basic skills in the underdeveloped sector of the economy, there

is, of course, nothing to prevent graduates using their gratuity to finance further training which would accommodate

them to the First World sector or allow

them to expand their horizons within the

Third World sector. In some cases, graduates might be granted bursaries or be

given other support towards this end.

This aspect would have to be handled by

the Department of Education, although

the SADF agency tasked with watching

over the interests of graduates would

maintaina watching brief.

Costs

THE COSTS OF THE VOCATIONAL

TRAINING could be funded from the education budget or from a development

budget rather than the defence budget.

Similarly,a proportion of the personnel

costs of the fifth year could also quite

reasonably be funded 'under sucha heading, with the SADF perhaps only responsible for the member's salary while accommodation and related costs would be

defrayed under the other heading. Any

costs incurred in the course ofa member's operational employment during the

fifth year would naturally again accrue to

the defence budget.

Economic Impact

THE APPLICATION OFA SHORT SERVICE SYSTEM to the SADF could thus

bring considerable benefits for economic

development. It would have the additional

advantage of drawing the untrained and

unemployed out of the economy and returning them to the economy five years

later equipped to survive in the economy

and, indeed, to generatea measure of

growth themselves. This would be particularly important in the present situation of high unemployment. Another advantage at the present time would be that

sucha system would reduce the need to

draw skilled personnel out of their economic activity at this critical time to render

operational service. Both aspects would

be of considerable value should sanctions be imposed.

THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS HAVING discussed some potential

benefits to the economy, what would

sucha system offer the SADF?

The primary benefit would lie in giving

the SADFa turbulence-free pool of well

trained full-time soldiers. This would, in

turn:

1. Provide an additional force which

can be deployed without the "advance

notice" involved in calling up CF and

Commando members; . 2. Allow the more flexible, efficient and

rapid deployment of forces to deal with

short-term, low-intensity or low-level

threats and problems;

3. Reduce the need to call on CF and

Commando members for operational duties or to provide a standing force,

thereby;

a. Allowinga higher proportion of CF

and Commando service time to be devoted to training in their primary war time

roles, enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of our primary fighting force;

b. Reducing the economic disruption

attaching to the employment of CF and

Commando members for extended operational service and thereby reducing resistance to CF membership among the

business community;

c. Enhancing the morale of CF and

Commando members by facilitatinga

more stable system of call-up, which will

allow individual members to better plan

their affairs. A system of this nature would also provide an additional pool of highly trained

and experienced reserve personnel. Their

CF or Commando commitment should,

however, be structured to allow them to

establish themselves in their new civilian

careers before they are called upon to

render lengthy periods of service. A short service system would have the

additional advantage of providinga very

flexible full-time component— allowing

the creation and maintenance ofa fulltime force while it is needed, without

building upa large body of career soldiers who become an economic and financial problem when force levels can be

reduced. Wherea force of PF personnel is

difficult to reduce in size or change in

composition,a short-service component

would only havea five year cycle, allowing

a much readier matching of training, employment and force levels to changing requirements. A short service component

has the further advantage of allowing the

maintenance ofa full-time force without

the normal financial penalties of family allowances and welfare, housing and pensions.

Finally,a short service system wouId tie

in excellently with military civic action

programmes and civil/military economic

development and upliftment programmes. On the more general level, the SADF

would naturally also benefit directly and

indirectly from the benefits which sucha

system could bring to the economy.

73
Applying The Scheme

THE BASICS OF A SHORT SERVICE SYSTEM already exist within the SADF in sev-

' eral areas such as the various apprenticeship schemes and the voluntary National

Service system of the SACC. It should not

prove difficult to adapt some of these

existing systems to allow the incorporation of a short service scheme such as

has been discussed here.

The SACC would be almost ideally

suited to such a programme, which could

be initiated with the minimum of disruption. Having both infantry battalions, a

training element and a maintenance unit,

the SACC has the advantage of quite a

wide skill requirement within itself in addition to already being a short service volunteer unit. All that would be needed,

would be to make provision for an extension of the voluntary National Service

period to a short service period for those

choosing that option. Members who initially opt for the two year period, could at

the end of that period be allowed to extend their service to take advantage of the

short service scheme's benefits.

Another unit that would seem to be an

ideal application of a short service

scheme and which again already has

many of the characteristics of such a system, is 21 Battalion. Applying a short service scheme to 21 Bn would allow a comprehensive system to be built up incorporating the units which it feeds, many of

which lie in just those areas most in need

of the skills which the scheme would provide. Some members might well even

spend much of their service engaged in

practicing their particular skill in the

course of civic action programmes, before either entering the economy or taking employment with a development body

or other government department.

While the SACC and 21 Bn offer particular advantages, a short service

scheme should take in the entire SADF,

The Army and the Medical Service would,

however, tend to be the services most involved — the Army because of its manpower requirement, and the SAMS because of the special skills available there.

CONCLUSION

THE imaginative application of a short

service system coupled to vocational

training could thus bring benefits for both

the economy and the SADF. It would have

the further advantage of allowing the

SADF to realise its very considerable potential to assist national development

without the danger of becoming politicised or finding itself being sucked into

• politics. The economic and military benefits of such a scheme would also — directly and indirectly — have a positive impact on the political climate. Every Rand

spent on funding a scheme of this nature

would thus bring multiple returns.

In our present situation of economic

difficulty and continued attempts by the

ANC and PAC to initiate revolutionary warfare, a scheme of this nature would seem

to merit serious study. It would address all

three key areas: economic development

in the underdeveloped Third World sector; effective and relevant assistance,

support and administration by the state to

that sector; and military manpower needs.

The creation of a stable and positive political climate in which solutions to the ills

besetting South Africa can be intelligently

developed, would be rendered a little easier. At the same time, it would go a little

way towards expanding the economic

base essential to a healthy, advancing society.

/9274

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74
SOUTH AFRICA

JOURNALIST DISCUSSES NATION'S 'SPECIAL' TIES WITH ISRAEL

Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 18-21 Jul 86 p 6

[Article by Dan Sagir]

[Text]

AS an Israeli journalist who was

deported from South Africa (sorry,

Pretoria just did not renew my work

permit...), I am puzzled by one issue:

Is my deportation proof that the,

relationship between white South

Africa and Israel is not as good and

"special" as has been argued? Or is it

actually so good that I was deported

because my writing from

Johannesburg started to disrupt the

harmony between these two

countries?

Personally, I would like to think the

first possibility is closer to reality.

However, I am not so certain about

this.

The present level of relations dates

back to 1976, after the visit of Prime

Minister John Vorster to Israel. In

1978 Israel raised its diplomatic

representation to ambassadorial level.

Jerusalem's willingness to

strengthen its relations with Pretoria

came after the mass break-off of

diplomatic relations by black African

states in the wake of the 1973 Yom

Kippur war. The feeling in Israel at

the time was one of deep insult and

betrayal, leading later to the warming

of relations with South Africa.

However, even though Israel is now

restoring its trade links with black

Africa and renewing diplomatic

relations with some countries, it is not

seriously considering a revision of its

relations with Pretoria.

South Africa's interest in having a

close relationship with Israel is

obvious. In the light of its increasing

diplomatic isolation, it is important

for the South African regime to have a

close relationship with any country.

And Israel's interest? After all,

Israel is vehemently opposed to

apartheid.

But at the same time, it maintains

"normal" relations with South Africa.

The basis for this is a belief in the

value of relations between countries,

regardless of how much they may

disagree.

This is why Israel is trying to

establish contact with Soviet Russia,

other communist states, and Third

World countries.

But the projected image of the

Israeli relationship with South Africa

is different; it is being called

"special".

Who coined this term? Two

interested parties: Pretoria and the

South African Jewish establishment

— not Israel and not Israelis.

In recent months, many Israelis

have been acting against the "close"

relations between these two countries.

There are signs: a new group called

"Israelis Against Apartheid";

proposals in the Israeli parliament and

declarations by government ministers

opposing these relations. And there

have been positive actions, such as the

organisation of a seminar for black

75
trade union activists at the Afro-Asian

Institute of the Ilistadrut, the umbrella

body of Israeli trade unions.

Dr Naomi Chazan of the Hebrew

University of Jerusalem some time

ago published in "African Affairs" a

critical and comprehensive analysis of

the relations between these two

countries.

Arguing that the present level of

relations was not justified, she

examined various aspects, in turn,

often put forward to support the

"special relationship":

•The future of the South African

Jewish community: The argument is

because the Jewish community in

South Africa is white, its fate is linked

to that of other whites in the country.-

Israel should take this into

consideration.

Chazan believes this argument is

merely an excuse for the "special

relationship".

•Economic interest: Exports to

South Africa amount to less than one

percent of the total Israeli export

market.

"The economic advantages that

Israel receives from the contact with.

South Africa are more problematic

than they are presented (as being),"

she writes. "When taking into

consideration the economic damage

that is caused by this contact, it

becomes difficult to understand the

rationality of the Israeli economic

interest in South Africa."

•Political interest: There are those

who maintain, writes Chazan, that

because Israel and South Africa are

both states under siege, with limited

international options, it is natural that

they form a combined political axis.

But from Israel's point of view, this

axis is counter-productive.

"Realpolitiek" makes it necessary to

continue the efforts to win back black

Africa, and support the struggle

against apartheid.

•Co-operation in the nuclear area:

In recent years there has been much

talk that Israel and South Africa have

been co-operating in this field. But

there has been no substantiation.

Israelis who oppose apartheid and

the present level of relations between

Israel and South Africa do not

necessarily want a total cessation of

relations between the two countries.

This is neither realistic nor in Israel's

interests.

The goal for many is to eliminate

the stigma of a "special" relationship

and to bring the relations to a level

similar to that of Pretoria's

relationship with the West.

In this respect, one has to mention

the hypocrisy of those who attack

Israeli/South African relations.

Pretoria has close relations, trade and

military contacts with over 100

countries. Israel features very near

the bottom of the list.

I cannot see Israel changing her

policy towards South Africa until the

major Western powers do so.

•Dan Saglr wrote for the Israeli

newspaper, "Ha'Aretz" and Israeli

radio. While In South Africa, he

was' also researching a PhD

thesis on South African politics

for the Hebrew University of

Jerusalem. He was expelled

three weeks ago.

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76
SOUTH AFRICA

NEW MEMBER OF TRANSVAAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE SPELLS OUT VIEWS

Durban POST NATAL in English 6-9 Aug 86 p 8

[Interview with Ismail Fakir Hassen Mayet, member of the Transvaal

Executive Committee by Ameen Akhalwaya; date and place not given]

[Text]

QUESTION: Why do you think you were nominated to

the Transvaal Executive Committee?

MR MAYET: I don't know why. What I do know is

that I was made a special request by Mr Amichand

Rajbansi (chairman of the House of Delegates Ministers' Council), saying they wanted to recommend

someone with experience in this type of work, and

they wanted to suggest my name.

The Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC) has called on you

to resign. What is your reaction?

They've said that at every election, since 1968, and

that includes the SA Indian Council (SAIC). They have

a right as a party to say that that's their policy of

non-co-operation, non-involvement with Governmentcreated institutions.

The only problem I have with the TIC is that it is an

ethnic grouping body. It has been in existence for

many years, it was dormant for a number of years

and was then resuscitated.

In fact, I was the one to appeal to them to have a

political body going instead of having anti-something

going, which is of negative connotations.

But the TIC says it is a nonracial body with a group

base.

I concede that. The same applies with me. I make use

of the platforms made available to me and I can see

movement in our government hierarcy.

I only hope that movement penetrates to the bottom. That to me is the biggest re-education on the go

at the moment.

Re-education of the bureaucracy?

Yes. I notice this where I work.

A major criticism of nomination (to Government bodies)

of people other than white is that they are not representative.

I would concede that, except how does one know what

is representative? How does one know that the election of the TIC is representartive? Did they go to the

ballot box? Or is this the emotional thing of a meeting

where someone says this is the chairman and we all

say "aye"?

77
£»en,if «.'i„< %ycrc true, there is a difference. The TIC is a

polilicnl parly, it's not a governing body,'The people can

accept or reject the TIC in whatever it does or says. In

your case, you are not answerable to a constituency.

That's correct. But I hope and pray that even though

I'm not answerable in that sense to a constituency, I'd

like to be told whenever and wherever I'm going

wrong in my action.

But not in participation, because I want to try to get

the best for the people who have been dealt a wrong

all these years in the administration. I want to see

that wrong righted.

You have been involved with the SAIC and other Government institutions for the past 20 years, yet we are no

nearer to a political solution acceptable to the majority.

What makes you think now that you are going in to help

the process?

This new concept of "post-apartheid era" is going to

become a fait accompli in the not too distant future.

The townships that have been established under the

Group Areas Act — for that matter all the other public amenities that have been established — have been

more favourable to the ruling party, and that's the

whites.

In the transition period, we must see to it that what

we have lost out is regained — in the similarity of

facilities, whether they be health service, welfare services or whatever.

You are looking more at the social and economic structures rather than the political structures. It can be argued

that now that you are part of the Government, you are

also part of enforcing the state of emergency and detention without trial. '

People, such as TIC and Azapo leaders in Lenasia,

have been locked up. Do you see yourself as part of that

system, and if not, whether you could defend their detentions?

Even in the President's Council, on the aspect of the

emergency and the two ("Le Grange") laws put

through Parliament, I not only voted against them but

I contributed to the debate by saying that if anything

is wrong in your home, then only do you require a

whip to try to bring discipline.

But if nothing is wrong in your home, the whip is

unnecessary.

So I admit that there is something wrong not only

with our administration but also with the policy of the

Government.

In order to bring this te their attention, I find we

must use some of the platforms that are available.

How much leverage would you as an individual have when

they have rejected calls from the international community, from major black political organisations, even white

organisations, such as the PFP? How are you going to

make any difference? And if you don't make a difference,

can you be morally justified in staying on in the Government?

I would not be morally justified if I am there for an

ulterior motive, if I am there for my own personal

reasons, if I am trying to impress on the public that I

am Somebody. If I am, then naturally I pray to my

Creator to guide me.

I am using a legal platform to bring problems to the

attention of the Government, which up to now had

been put there only by whites.

I was guided into resigning (from the SAIC) when

they did not concede on more group areas for us within the Johannesburg municipal boundary.

Because of that resignation I am satisfied that some

action was takan and today our footing is still in the

precincts of the Johannesburg central area.

Yet the Group Areas Act is intact?

That's correct.

It may have been eased to some extent for so-called

coloureds and Indians, but for Africans, where the major

problem is, there is no such concession.

Sure, but I believe that when we ask for this we are

not asking just for one section alone. We ask for all

people.

Even though the CBD, which is open to all and

which is of course a sort of a local option thing, Is not

working correctly because the Group Areas Act was

formulated as a policy of the central government.

I believe that it should be for the central government to say to local authorities: "Look, now you open

up your central businesses to all members of the society."

. This is one of the delays in not getting these things

done.

In your dealing with the Government over the past 22

years, have you noticed any changes in its approach or

policy, from Mr Vorster to Mr Botha?

My feeling is that white politics is controlled by one

section of the white community, which is the Afrikaner community, because they are the ruling party. The

pity is that the other groups in the white community

have taken advantage of the benefits they have received and made the excuse that it is the Afrikaner

who is doing this, we are the goodie-goodie people.

I am inclined to believe that they did have the opportunity at the polls to show to the Government that

it is doing wrong. I believe that was not done because

it suited them at that time not to do it.

As far as comparisons are concerned, I would say

that if the thinking of some of the senior Cabinet

members that I have come to know goes right down to

the bottom bureaucracy, the administration would be

in a different set up.

But what is this thinking? We heard from the Americans

that there is a hidden agenda, from the British that the

Government is on the right road, Rajbansi says there's

lots of things going on in committees, and everybody,

including yourself, seem to have confidence In the Government. Yet the public to whom it is supposed to be

responsible is not taken into confidence. Just what is its

bottom line?

You must realise that the constituencies of the white

MPs have had elections for many many years. There

are families now within the Afrikaner community particularly who have divided themselves politically.

There are family members who have gone to the

left of the present Nationalist policy, who are more

liberal, there are members who are the present NP.

You have people of the Dr Treurnicht group, and of

course Jaap Marais's group. That is the set up in one

family.

Like it is with our families. Some of my family

members are office bearers and very active members

of the TIC. And I say they have a right to be there.

Certain members of my family are in another group.

78
So the point is that with this free thinking — which

is a good thing — I am inclined to believe that the

Government is extremely cautious in not expressing

itself so openly and open-heartedly in order not to lose

the swell support of the constituency it is supposed to

represent.

I think it doesn't wish to find itself in the position

where the feeling of the ruling party goes more towards the right of centre instead of going from the

left of centre — and the centre I am using as an

example is the NP.

This is the reason I believe everything is not being

opened up to the public as one should. Even at the

congress of the ruling party we only hear little bits.

Some of the actions administratively are taken a bit

further than for example the resolutions taken at the

Bloemfontein conference of the NP. And the actions

that have been taken since then have gone beyond

that.

You talked earlier (on the operation of the new provincial

Exco) about striving for consensus, yet Parliament has

given us an example of what we've said all along: consensus is only acceptable to the Nats so long as their will is'

reflected and that was shown in the case of the Le

Grange Bills. What do you think is going to make them

change their minds?

Aren't they just going through the motions in getting

people other than white into the system and asking them

to rubber stamp it?

I believe particularly that in the exercise that we

went through in Parliament — which was a very sad

episode — we might have jumped the gun for the

white community and they wanted to show their

strength, otherwise they would go on to the Right side.

I'm inclined to believe that in the not too distant

future the decisions will be joint decisions.

What type of solution can there be minus the acknowledged popular people's organisations, such as the ANC,

PAC and their leaders? What would your view be of their

being unbanned or continuing to be banned?

It is no secret, I have even said this in the President's

Council: Nelson Mandela should not only be released

unconditionally but he should be given the opportunity

to get his constituency going because he has been

away from the constituency for very many years.

Incidentally, I don't know if you are aware that the

fees for the last year of his studies at the University of

the Witwatersrand were paid by me.

I made him the secretary of the international Club

in Kort Street. We were aware of his ability even then

when he was completing his studies.

Without condoning violence, the argument is that the

Government itself is perpetrating violence in enforcing

the system, or if not violence at least coercion. So what

justification does the Government have in asking only

others to renounce violence? Wouldn't you be party to

such a violent or coercive government?'

If my view is the same as the Cabinet with the NP

ruling presently, then your question would be correct.

But I abhor violence.

I say it with my Creator's guidance, and they know

where I stand. I do not say it because I fear violence. I

have received lots of anonymous threats.

From people on the left?

I do not know who they are, but I still go around

without carrying any weapon or without carrying a

pin because I believe in Him.

If I've hurt anybody's feelings, I say: My door is

open. Please, whoever you are, I stay here. Why don't

you come and speak to me?

I don't mind — and I'd appreciate it particularly if

people like you who are journalists, who have the

pulse of the people with you, would also bring to my

attention and to the attention of the province or the

Government points that are hurting the people.

Each has his own strategy. My ultimate goal is to

obtain a just and equitable dispensation for all South

Africans.

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79
SOUTH AFRICA

MILLENARIAN THEOLOGY SEEN INFLAMING BLACK, WHITE RADICALISM

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE (BILDER UND ZEITEN supplement)'in

German 14 Jun 86 [unnumbered]

[Article by Andreas Graf Razumovsky: "The New Middle Ages in South Africa:

Black Children's Crusades, Mass Hysteria, Violence and the Longing for

Paradise on Earth"]

[Text] Early in this century many intellectuals, especially the Russians

around Berdjajev, were already talking enthusiastically about the "New Middle

Ages." By this they understood two interlocking ideas in a mostly positive

way: the return of religion and the end of enlightenment. If the latter is

supposed to mean the end of reason, the elimination of reasonable minds from

decision-making bodies, then the prophets of the new darkness have predicted

correctly that dervishes, ayatollahs. and wandering preachers would reach

ever increasing influence and would cause ever greater harm. All this ap->

plies particularly to the Third World. A good example is South Africa,

which sometimes is seen as a mixture of first and third worlds. After the

most recent, terrible developments, one can say that all three of such "world

categories" are present in a tightly intertwined pattern. With the socialist

revolution and its radical demands at the doorstep, many participants and observers are convinced of the dawning of the Second World.

When I use the image of the "New Middle Ages" to explain this development, I

do so mainly to use European categories to depict events which, in Africa and

in quite a few other places, seem strange only at first glance. Political

scientists are already talking of the "Cargo Cult" when they describe the

frantic gathering of children and adolescents in the townships of South

Africa, where they defy the apartheid state by throwing stones, singing,

marauding, screeching, dancing, burning and killing beyond all appeal to reason until the day their Messiah, Nelson Mandela—the leader of the ANC and

prisoner of the whites—appears. (They are opposed, as we will later see, by

increasingly blood-thirsty, conservative Boer organizations.)

This development of the last years and months seems on the verge of successfully jeopardizing every reform by the apartheid state; it is also part of

the tradition of all slave rebellions in history and is based on the revolutionary experiences of Europe, Asia and, for example, Russia. The agitators

of the South African revolution proceed with the same logic as those of the

80
Narodnaja Wolja in 19th-century Russia ("Not reform, but revolution!"—this is

why reformers like Alexander II had to be done away with). The masses, the

malleable material shaped by the agitators follow a much older pattern, however, a pattern which conforms to the cultural genes of homo sapiens, the prehistoric ancestor of us all. In South Africa though, we often meet a characteristically African variation. To us this variation may seem medieval when

we compare it with the erratic sequence of messianic revolutionaries, eschatological "millenarians" and European anarchists between the 11th and 17th

centuries. The phenomenon of mass paranoia with its roots in ignorance, fear

and religious-mystical seduction has been with us from the beginning of history. The historian Norman Cohn, who is one of the most knowledgeable persons

about these phenomena, concludes his research with a look at the present,

doubtlessly with reference to a specific type of millenarian. He says, "the

old religious idiom has been replaced by a secular one that has the effect of

obscuring what otherwise could not be overlooked. It is simply true that revolutionary millenarianism and mystical anarchism are still with us, although

it is now devoid of its original supernatural sanctions."

Bloody Retribution

The Brockhaus Encyclopedia defines millenarianism somewhat narrowly as "the

belief in the coming of a realm which is to last a thousand years" and it refers specifically to the Apostles. Messianism has been its basis for thousands of years. This tradition of mass hysteria had fallen on fertile soil in

Africa a long time ago, even before its roundabout acquaintance with "secularized approval." The "spiritual hunger," "the religious yearning for healing,

holiness, prophecy and vision," as the Nigerian theologian Appiah-Kubi has defined it, is a characteristic of all Africans and has found fulfillment in

Christian teaching only through the developments in "black theology."

Among the first women prophets was Kimpa Vita, a girl from the Kongo who in

1700 had led a protest movement against the Catholic church. Inspired by God

and ancestral spirits, she taught what white missionaries had deceptively concealed, namely that God and all his Apostles are African. "God identifies

himself with all Africans and takes their side in all their misery against

their white exploiters. Consequently, she prophesied that Christ would reconstitute the ancient Congolese kingdom and create an earthly paradise that

would last a thousand years...."

The Zulu prophets of the late 19th and early 20th centuries had evolved from

similar Christian, eschatological-revolutionary and traditionally African,

magical patterns. They are the immediate predecessors of the "black theologians" of today. The Swedish ethnologist Bengt Sundker observed that "most

Zulu prophets are revered as demi-gods by their followers. The prophet becomes a black Christ and this becomes the foundation for his tremendous influence over his adherents." Hundreds of prophets existed then, just as

there are now hundreds of sects in Soweto alone.

The most famous of these prophets was Isajah Shembe (1870-1935). He secretly

announced himself to his followers as the "promised one," the true "successor

and vicar of Christ." What Christ had once done for the whites and their

81
salvation, he was now going to do for his people, the Zulus, and for their

salvation. He announced he would soon stand at the gate of the Heavenly

Jerusalem to turn back those who were not his followers, by which he meant all

whites and all those following their churches instead of his. Norman Cohn has

noted that, as far as the works and pilgrimages of this peculiar saint—to

mention only one among many—are concerned, they are similar in all essential

traits to those of the many messiahs in medieval Central and Western Europe.

Such savior-prophets pop up in times when the masses experience a loss of

order and a sense of disorientation; "not so much among the poor and exploited

in particular, but rather among those poor and exploited who have lost their

traditional way of life and with it their faith in traditional values." The

history of mass hysteria in Europe, beginning in the 11th century, is a

history of the anguish of impoverished and uprooted masses. This is when the

prophets of eschatalogical anarchism find the opportunity to announce the millenium. As Cohn says, the conditions under which this happens are always

similar and recurrent. It happens "when population increases, industrialization progresses, traditional social ties tire and eventually snap, and when

the rift between rich and poor becomes an abyss." Such was the case with the

first crusade in 1096, which simultaneously triggered the first wide-reaching,

systematic and mass-hysteria-inspired persecution of Jews. It took place in

May and June 1096 in Speyer, Worms, Mainz, Regensburg and Cologne. The death

count ranged between 4,000 and 8,000. This occurrence continued with the

same symptoms, reminiscent of mass murder, in other crusades and children's

crusades and with the atrocities perpetrated by the "Pastoureaux" or "shepherds", eschatologically inspired hoards roaming northern France in the 13th

century. ("Before long thieves, prostitutes, bandits, renegade monks and

murderers joined up and from this pool leaders were recruited.") The picture

remains essentially the same with the actions of heretical movements (and the

way state and church rubbed them out, such as the Waldensians, Flagellants,

Anabaptists, Amauratics, Free Masons, the followers of John Ball in England

and of Konrad Schmid in Thuringia (who was called "The Drummer of

Niklashausen"), of Johann von Leyden in Muenster, of Thomas Muenzer, and of

the Hussites in Bohemia—to bring only a few examples to mind. One can say

that they and their followers have turned "this collective sense of powerlessness and anguish into an all-consuming mass impulse to destroy godlessness...

and to create out of all this endless suffering the ultimate kingdom where

saints huddle around the powerful, shelter-providing figure of the Messiah to

enjoy well-being, wealth, security and power from now on to all eternity"

(Cohn).

It is also characteristic of all these eschatological-revolutionary-anarchistic

movements which have often attracted thousands and thousands of followers, that

they have claimed thousands of lives, not unlike natural catastrophies, and

that they have with repeated regularity been drowned in oceans of blood or

suffocated by forests of smoking pyres. Death by burning, either as an act of

mob law or, more commonly, as an act of lawful punishment based on the customs

of the time, was for about 900 years the obvious and undisputed punishment for

anyone who had become a nuisance to church and state.

The most eccentric and successful of all the saintly fools in English history

is John Ball, the legendary organizer and spiritual leader of the peasant

82
uprising of 1381. He succeeded in uniting peasants suffering under serfdom

and the exploited proletariat of London in a joint revolutionary action of

spectacular atrocity. He felt a calling as king and messiah of the uprooted

peasantry and the urban underworld to take on a power which consisted expressly in "killing the aristocracy and the entire clergy." Ball has been

surpassed in his explosive radicalism and the murderous application of his

teachings, objectives and methods only by the Hussite-Taborites who came only

a few years later and shared the same anabaptist roots. They put the torch

to all of Central Europe after the Defenestration of Prague in 1419 (sic).

We are specifically interested in John Ball because South Africa's most important and in the long run most influential "black" liberation theologian,

Allan Boesak, discovered him to be a shining example and uses him as such in

his sermons: "John Ball was truly a prophet, because the vision of the prophet is always coupled with the anguished outcry of the poor and oppressed—an

outcry which moves the heart of the Lord." Boesak sees himself as a new John

Ball, a prophet of the disoriented, the disenfranchised, the oppressed. He

says, "people under severe stress can develop a destructive loss of selfesteem. That has been the fate of blacks. Slavery, oppression, total dependence, lack of civil rights, the status of an alien inside and outside of one's

own country, humiliation and disgrace—all this has had a devastating effect

on the spiritual life of blacks." Boesak concludes that South Africa's blacks

will "simply refuse the kind of brotherliness extended by the white Boer

masters which requires the black brother to be slave to the white brother."

The primary driving force behind our concept of the "New Middle Ages" is the

kind of "black theology" which wants to be a "liberation theology." Another

prominent South African fighter in a cassock is Lebamong Sebidi. His formula

is shorter and says, "as long as blacks have to suffer from double serfdom in

their own country, from racial oppression and from economic exploitation,

black theology will also attack along those lines; it will attack racist capitalism. Racist capitalism is the sin which has to be unmasked and exterminated in God's own name." Another black pastor and theologian who is one of

many agitators giving direction to South Africa's academic youth puts it even

simpler. Mokgeti Mothlabi welcomes "the introduction of Marxist analysis...as

a result of a dialogue with South American theologians and as the introduction

of a methodological element. Depending on how widely Marxist analysis has

been introduced and on how far black theological reflections have progressed,

we can talk about the beginning of the second phase of theology in this

country."

Revolutionary Mobs

Such words lead to the investigation of the second element in eschatological

anarchism that is present in South African development, namely "revolutionary

socialism," the most primitive form of popular Marxism. Its ideology doubtlessly haunts the minds of black suburban students and serves as a framework

to give direction to the much-feared "comrade" committeed. The undeniable

fact that soviet-inspired and soviet-paid organizations propagate MarxistLeninism leads to a stereotypical justification for everything the Pretoria

government does, prevents or omits with regard to black youth. Much has been

83
said about this soviet-communist-revolutionary element, and the reason we are

describing its influence as somewhat limited is because the waning of soviet

influence in Africa is irretrievably under way and because even the ANC, as

the representative of Moscow's colonial communism in this part of the country,

has recently argued that it needs not stoop to a discussion of the future of

South Africa with Botha's government because control over the revolutionary

mobs of the townships has already been lost.

It is not surprising that the "progressive" phraseology which appeals to illiterates everywhere has left its mark on the eschatological anarchism of

Alexandra, Soweto, Langa and similar places. Leadership there is tightly organized and belongs to the "comrades" or, in some places, to their leaders who

keep strict discipline. Such cadres are often inspired by an enthusiastic

idealism in their efforts to create and control—with the help of "salut

publique" committees which consist of children and adolescents—a "new and just

order of society," something that surely has been missing in the slave state

until now. After a closer look, though, one realizes that they are more likely

representatives of the third and much more problematic archaic-atavistic element which is beginning to scare the ayatollahs of all religions. They are

turning, after a period of fanatical, anti-white agitation, to a "meditative

recollection" of "the true African tradition." This is an unavoidable occurrence and enough cases prove this point. Winnie Mandela appeals to .these

traditions when she addresses the screeching, dancing mob of her followers with

the words, "we will free this country with our match boxes and our necklaces!"

The necklaces are car tires filled with gasoline; they are used to burn political victims and enemies alive—those who have collaborated with the white exploiters. Christian executors Of death by fire have justified their method

for nine hundred years by arguing that they at least could promise eternal

life because the soul had been purified of its sins by fire. Africans in contrast burn and neutralize the "spirit" of the victim so it cannot seek revenge

on its lynchers. Winnie Mandela, always the semi-ultra chic "Queen of Africa"

is half avenging angel for the injustice committed against her people and half

the millenarian prophetess of relentlessly approaching developments, and as

such she gives free reign to her emotions (or to quote Willy Brandt, "she drops

her mask"), when she says, "we (African women) are working for the whites in

their kitchens, we are raising their children, why then should we not kill

them too?

The third, and in the long run most permanent, element of the eschatological

anarchism of South Africa is the revival of the cases of traditional African

tribal rites. This element becomes by necessity stronger and more influential

as the longing for a withdrawal of white culture grows. The black population,

which as a whole, fears the emerging variant of rule by the comrades even more

than that of their current white masters, calls the comrades, their revolutionary committees and the adolescents who are abused for childrens' crusades

"Tutu's children," a designation which bodes ill for its name-sake and Nobel

Peace Prize winner. During the last 18 months, those children have, while

singing and dancing, burned an incredible number of "collaborators" (according

to conservative estimates between 500 and 1,000). Whatever reforms the government had planned, they all come too late for these children, a whole generation, as the psychologist T. Thomas of the University of Port Elizabeth explains. Their bodies and souls have been deprived, they have been neglected

84
from childhood on and also physically malnourished; thus they have grown to

become "brutal, emotionally disturbed and aggressive teenagers. Because they

expect hardly anything of life any more, they are ready to die for a just

cause."

How far the paranoia of the Tutu children has gone has already been demonstrated by the key event of Lebowa, where all the elements of the "New Middle

Ages" in their particular, mostly African variation came into focus. It happened on 9 April in the tiny neighboring villages of Pasha and Apel. Within

24 hours, 32 villagers—mostly sick, old women—were pushed into hastily dug

ditches and burned alive after the ditches had been filled with tires and set

aflame with gasoline. All this had taken place "in a ritual frenzy" as later

described by a black reporter of a Johannesburg newspaper. The perpetrators

were 180 students and children who had followed the example of their township

age groups. Nobody has been able to come up with a satisfying and rational

explanation for these ritual killings. But the chief responsible for this

region gave an explanation which came very close to that of one of his

European colleagues in 1212, the year of the Children's Crusade: "The old

generation of my village has lost control. Our children have taken over and

we are running scared. They have heard what goes on in the cities. Sometimes they read something about unrest and insurrection. I don't believe they

know what is at stake, but they have become restless...." An old woman who

had managed to escape the necklace murders said, "We get to hear such big city

words like 'comrades' or 'necklaces' from our children. We don't understand

them, but we are terribly afraid."

After these witch burnings of 9 April, the police of the homeland of Lebowa

have arrested 200 children and other suspects. They also arrested the cousin

of the chief, Peter Nchabeleng. He knew how to read and write and seemed a

likely ideological agitator or even a ringleader. While he was being

"interrogated," they (meaning the black policemen) simply beat him to death.

This circumstance might at first cloud the picture expected by the average

consumer of horror news. It does not matter whether he has the romantic

"leftist" idea of a "progressive" revolution which is hindered by the counterrevolutionary, racist-fascist reaction (the conceptually related cargo cult

would say it this way: the white devils prevent the bounty sent by the gods

or ancestral spirit from reaching the better part of mankind, or whether he is

more familiar with the phraseology of traditional African propaganda and mythology, which offers a drama no less tinged with eschatalogical notions (Boers

are depicted as bright figures and noble fighters in league with God who incessantly win against the dark and coal-black powers of communism). The roles

in the reality of our New Middle Ages (mutatis mutandis, supplying Third

World figures), are inescapably determined. The fight caused by eschatologically-motivated mass hysteria has two arenas: the slave revolt of black

against white, which is no longer interested in reform; and the defensive

struggle of white against black, which sometimes takes on a panic fear of

perdition and still awaits its mass victims. And there are also, noless ominously established, the side shows of fratricial warfare: black against

black and white against white.

The old bit of wisdom that the less legitimate and more arbitrary a government is, the more resemblance it bears to rule by a paranoid master applies

85
to the rule of the white Africaners in South Africa. Day and night, this

master sees himself surrounded by enemies and behaves in an aggressive, unpredictable and stubbornly violent manner. This behavior increases by degrees as the nightmare becomes reality and as the master perceives himself to

be an outcast in the eyes of the world. It is everyone's duty then to rally

around the fatherland in its hour of desperate need and each action—even the

most infamous—receives its justification by virtue of this state of emergency.

Then everyone becomes a patriot, well-meaning, upright men and women who fight

for the good against the bad, and when it is the government which incorporates

all evil, the eschatological anarchism turns against the government.

The rule of the Boers in South Africa has contained qualities of messianic

millenarianism from the very beginning. Ever since the battle of the "River

of Blood" on 16 December 1838, the Boers have claimed to be in league with

God himself, and they view themselves as executing the role of his new "chosen

people." Whoever still has doubts about the true determination for reform of

P W Botha's presidential era—especially after the 1983 referendum which was

held specifically in order to approve and sanction coming reforms—should read

the preamble to the newly amended reformed constitution. It still maintains

the outrageous idea that the Lord himself handpicked the ancestors of the

Boers from many different countries. He furthermore has called all of them

together to bestow upon them this entire country "as their very own." In addition, he has protected them "in miraculous ways" from impending dangers (such

as the black natives).

Countless observations by the great Boer prophet Paul Krueger show that he also

thought in messianic-millenarian terms. His great adversary and arch-enemy

Cecil Rhodes, the co-founder of the South African slave state, also thought in

gigantic millenarian dimensions of historic proportions, compared with the

fantasy of the architects of our Third Reich fades pitifully. When asked by

his closest friend and supreme commander Jameson how long he expected "to be

remembered by history," he answered modestly (and, as Jameson put it, "in no

way conceitful and simply stating an historical fact"): "I would say about

4,000 years." In a recent interview, the South African police chief Theuns

Swanepoel, who led the massacre of Soweto on 16 June 1976, answered the question of a reporter, who wanted to know how he would solve the present crisis,

with absolute consistency by saying: "Violence can only be stopped by greater

violence." He further called such weapons as tear gas, water canons, rubber

pellets and bird shot, the knickknacks and toys of sentimental reformers. He

continued to say, in the best Boer fashion, that these days one needs live

ammunition. And the police should decide, unhindered, when to use it. "If

one only would finally let the police do again as they please, then South

Africa would last for a thousand years," he said.

Part of the development of the last weeks in South Africa are battles between

blacks, such as in the notorious Crossroads "squatter" camp near Cape Town.

"Progressive comrades" and "conservative fathers" were killing each other and

burning each other's houses down. Of an estimated 60,000 inhabitants, 20,000

lost their homes. At the same time "vigilantes," black wathcmen, are taking

terrible revenge on the "comrades" of Alexandra. White secret societies,

reminiscent of the Ku Klux Klan, sneak around townships such as Kagiso near

86
Kruegersdorp in the middle of the night in order to start wild shooting parties to "kill blacks." Most often the police cannot be moved to take care of

these criminals and the suspicion is justified that the police force works

hand in hand with the secret societies and the "vigilantes."

In the long run, though, it is the polarization between white and white which

is the most dangerous. Up to now, there were only a few precursory battles,

but the fanaticism involved leads to the conclusion that very soon the main

battleground of the "Holy War" is here: a hegira by the Boer fundamentalists

against reform. Since the vigor of reformers has decreased noticeably, since

answers to all the Rubicon speeches consist of increasingly louder screams

for international sanctions, since the decline of the economy and because of

the intimidating presence of the ANC, the Afrikaner youth with its Boer sons

and daughters is turning in droves to the right-wing radicals who dream of reerecting, in shining white of course and with the express order of the Lord,

the old Boer republics (Transvaal, Orange Free State and North Natal) which

had been put there by the Lord himself in the previous century.

The three reformed Afrikaans churches of various sizes have remained true to

themselves and have turned away from the "Nationals" either openly or behind

closed doors. They are tied to apartheid until its last breath because they

are its true creators and untiring defenders. Those churches are probably

already part and parcel of the patriotic right-wing extremist alliance. Its

overall shape is still a bit fuzzy, but a few outlines are recognizable.

First there is the "conservative" party of the theologian Treurnicht. It

split from the "Nationals" in 1982-1983 and is well represented in parliament

and in the business sector. Then there is the "Volkswacht," a "cultural

organization" which is spreading among teachers, students, lower level civil

servants and the village intelligentsia. It champions the purity of language

and race and cultivates national-socialist concepts such as anti-capitalism

and also emotional anti-semitism. Last but not least is the "Africaaner

Resistance Movement," a homeguard organization patterned after the German

NSDAP [Nazi Party]. This group lead by Eugene Terreblance, which up to now

has mostly produced brawlers, screamers and guards of secret arms depots, has

recently spawned militant offspring who are unmistakingly patterned after

organizations such as "Storm Falcon" and "Boer Fireguard" (which is the successor organization to the uncomfortable memories caused during the thirties

by the "Oxcart Fireguard."

All these groups and a few others, including groups for Boer ladies and girls,

confess without much ado to the goal of "driving out the government of

traitors around Botha with all possible means and of taking over themselves."

In this regard, the word was that had the Rubicon crosser Pieter Willem Botha

only wanted to shoot blacks in his efforts to promote his reform program, he

would not have had to ask in the referendum of 1983 for advance laurels and

more extensive imperial power, because he already had the power to shoot blacks

at will. More importantly, what he needed and what was a power much harder to

justify for the reformer, was the power to shoot whites in an already dawning

fratricidal war.

13196

CSO: 3420/45

87
SOUTH AFRICA

LOCAL FAMILIES OPPOSED TO NEW TOWNSHIP

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 12 Aug 86 p 12

[Article by Andrew Thomson]

[Text]

ABOUT 30 families

living at Hiltondale,

south of Pretoria, are

to hold a meeting this

weekend to discuss the

Government's proposal to build a Black

township to the north

and east of the

Diepsloot nature reserve.

Hiltondale, a collection

of small farms, falls within the area earmarked for

development by the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning.

One of the residents,

Mrs Louise Balfour, is

opposed to the development and has submitted

representations to the

Minister of Constitutional

Development and Planning, Mr Chris Heunis.

Mrs Balfour's opposition is based on the fact

that the Diepsloot area

comprises a valuable

green belt between Pretoria and the Witwatersrand metropolis, and is

extremely rich in fauna

and flora. She and her

family are also reluctant

to sacrifice 15 years of investment in their 20-hectare farm, both in terms

of money and labour.

Mrs Balfour claims that

she and her husband were

assured there would be no

future" development in the

area when they bought

property there in 1971.

"Moreover, no-one

canvassed the opinion of

the local residents before

formulating the proposals," she told The Citizen yesterday.

"We can never be compensated for what our

farms mean to us. We

love this place, every

stone and every khakibos.

There are 90 different

species of birds on our

farm alone, and these will

all disappear if the area is

developed. Our schools

and our friends are here

— the security of home

life is everything to us.

"We're not opposed to

the township because it

will be for Blacks — we're

opposed to any development whatsoever. This is

an area with plenty of

water and a wide variety

of trees and shrubs. It

would be such a waste to

destroy it all.

"Our meeting on Saturday will also be attended

by the Black people living

in the area. They are also

opposed to the development because it will deprive them of their livelihood. Most of them are

cattle herders."

The proposal to build a

township for 250 000

people in the area was

made by the Guide Plan

Committee for the Central Witwatersrand last

week. Representations in

connection with the proposal have been invited,

and must be submitted by

early October.

/9317

CSO: 3400/401

88
SOUTH AFRICA

FARM FAMILY ON NORTHERN BORDER LIVES IN STATE OF SIEGE

Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 25-31 Jul 86 p 7

[Article by Vivienne Walt]

[Text] IT is breakfast time at Overvlaktc, the

northernmost farm in South Africa.

At the head of the table, Willie

Esterhuyse says a prayer. His wife,

Elene, and their children bow their

heads and clasp their hands in a

moment of quiet thanks. While they

eat, the ever-present handgun and the

Bible — the two items which allow the

family to live in relative peace — are

close at hand.

The front yard of the farm runs'

down to a dirt track, hemmed in by

two metres of fencing and topped with

thick coils of barbed wire. Just beyond

lies the sandy, parched Limpopo —

the Zimbabwe border and one of the

conduits for insurgents coming back

to lay mines on the farmers' land.

In the past six months, the Dongola

area has been transformed. The

community that has been led by

attractive government incentives to

farm this isolated, thomy scrubland

has been bound together by fear and

the determination to defeat the

guerrillas.

Armed by the SA Defence Force

with semi-automatic rifles, the 20

farmers and their wives living along

this section of the Limpopo have one

simple aim: to keep their land free of

insurgents, no matter what the cost

"We have to follow every spoor

now, because it could be the ANC,"

says Esterhuyse. "Until three years

ago, we crossed the border all the

time. We used to drive across the

river every Sunday during winter,

when there is no water in the

Limpopo, and visit the farmer on the

other side. Those days are gone."

; Growing up here, children get to

know their enemy at a young age. At

11, Marzanne Esterhuyse has a simple

explanation for the tight security on

the farm. "My father's told us why

it's happening. Everybody knows it's

because the ANC wants our land.

They are terrorists. They want us to

move away from the river, so they can

come into the country,"

Long beforelast December, when a

landmine placed on a nearby farm

road killed six members of a family,

the Esterhuyses had begun preparing

for a life of partial seige.

Since July last year, regional army

officers have regularly travelled the

55km to the border farms, to train the

women to shoot. The farmers,

connected by radio to each other and

to military headquarters, have formed

a civil defense commando,

But the December blast, less than

8km from the Esterhuyses' gate,

shook the conservative frontier

communities. The first blast was

followed by a series of landmine

attacks on South Africa's border

farms.

"I didn't sleep for three nights after

the attack last December," says Elene

Esterhuyse. "We expected an attack on

the house. What really worries me are

all the new weapons, like mortars.

They could stand on the Zimbabwe

side of the river, and shoot into our

house."

89
For the Esterhuyses, who arc ardent

government supporters, the issue

which has sparked nationwide

rebellion by blacks for nearly two

years is not a struggle for political

power. It is the land. In the six short

years since they moved here, the

family has carved out their cotton and

wheat fields, hectare by hectare, from

the bush.

In that time, they have taken off a

total oftwo weekends.

Some years, rainfall drops to a

meagre 15cm and the pumping of

water from deep under the Limpopo's

sands is a complex and tenuous affair.

"We've put our lives into this, our

sweat. Everything. We'll never give it

up," says Elene Estcrhuyse.

Instead, she is resigned to the

possibility that one day she will have

to fight for their survival. "I teach my

children to load the magazines. So if

we are attacked, they can help us load

the ammunition, while my husband

and I shoot. They must feel they are

part of the whole thing."

Since the December attack,

Marzanne apd her eight-year-old

brother, Piet have ridden half-way to

school in an armoured personnel

vehicle, joining other farm children in

a large military truck on the main

road to travel the rest ofthe way.

At their school in the border town

ofMessina, "The army come to show

us what landmines and grenades look

like," says Marzanne. "So if we see

them on the farm, we know they are

dangerous and we won't pick them up.

They teach us at school what to do if

the ANC attacks. We have to fall down

and pretend we're dead."

The scenario is more than an

abstract school lesson for those who

live here. On July 10, police and

suspected ANC guerrillas fought an

armed battle on a farm at AUdays, in

the district next to Dongola, in which

six insurgents were killed. In the past

year alone, there have been seven such

shootouts on the borders.

But for many would-be farmers like

Willie Esterhuyse!, accepting such

risks has meant their only chance to

buy land.

"I always wanted a farm," he says.

Then, while working in a cotton

research station in a nearby town, "I

heard the government was offering a

guud deal for farmers to move here. I

bought the land for R130 000, and

got to work.

"It's unbelievable how different this

area is now. I think the government

really needs us here for security."

Indeed, the border farmers, with

their political loyalty to President PW

Botha's administration and their

protection of the land, form one ofthe

most efficient para-military forces

available to the government.

"We're ready for anything," says

Esterhuyse. "If there's direct fighting,

we'll sort them out chop-chop, that's

for sure."

Aside from being able to call on the

help of his own family, Esterhuyse

claims to have learned a crucial lesson

from the white Rhodesians, who

found themselves dangerously isolated

by hostile farmworkers,- and easy

targets for guerrillas, in the blacks*

battle for independence before 1980.

"The way I protect my labourers,"

he says, "they'll never protect the

ANC. They ask me, 'Who are these

people who put down the landmines?

We must kill them.'" And, says

Esterhuyse, "if the local people don't

help and support them, they'll never

win."

Besides, he says, the farmworkers

need only look across the river to

discover "what freedom.means. It

means hunger," he says.

Last Sunday, 10 Zimbabweans

crossed the border äs illegal

immigrants, looking for work on the

South African side. "We handed them

over to the police, to be sent back. But

they always return," says Esterhuyse.

So sure are the local fanners of

their workers' trust that they plan to

. arm them in the near future. "We'll

select very carefully who we give

arms to," says Esterhuyse. "But they

have to be part of the whole security

thing."

Still, his own farmworkers live in a

pitiful compound of mud huts and

small brick houses, and their pay

90
offers only bare subsistance, although

it is average for the district. Women

earn R1.50 a day shifting the

irrigation pipes. The highest-paid man

on the farm earns R250 a month.

And yet for now, Esterhuyse, who

says "the government should have

moved faster with its reforms,"

appears to have the loyalty of his

workforce. 'They are just as scared of

the ANC as we are," he says. 'The

good thing about landmines is that

they can kill anybody. Not just white

people."

In the opinion of many political

observers, the Esterhuyses and their

neighbours are buying time, hoping

for a solution, but facing a

deteriorating security situation.

The government has begun

surveying the border track to tar it,

making landmine attacks on it

impossible. Last month they offered

to give the Dongola fanners mineproof vehicles in which to travel

around their farms. And the women

have been supplied by the SADF with

Israeli-made Uzi rifles.

But despite the increasing danger of

; attacks on its land, the community

lives with a quiet confidence. The

children play under the giant moshatu

trees, and ride in their father's open

pickup truck along the border fence.

; 'There are lots of dangers here,"

! says 11-year-old Marianne, "but we

know the Lord is with us."

/9317

CSO: 3400/399

91
SOUTH AFRICA

VIEWS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN'S DEPUTY CHAIRMAN ON NATIONAL ISSUES

Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English Vol 5, No 3, 1986 pp 33, 34, 37, 39

[Interview with Julian Ogilvle Thompson, deputy chairman of the Anglo American

Corporation, by Hugh Murray; date and place not given]

[Text]

Julian Offhie Thompson, chairman ofDe Beers

anddeputy chairman oftheAnglo American Corporation, has been named by AAC chairman

Gavin Relly as his likely successor.

Relly's disclosure more or less confirms what

has been commonly accepted in SA's business

community: that the brilliant career of Ogihie

Thompson should culminate in the country's top

private sectorappointment.

Off hie Thompson was educatedatthe Diocesan

College (Bishops), and was the school's Rhodes

Scholar for1953. Heproceededto WorcesterCollege, Oxford, to read politics, philosophy and

economics.

The son ofa Chief Justice ofSouth Africa, law

was obviously apossibility, but Ogihie Thompson

was instead attractedby business.

The decision seems to have been a mature one.

At32, hewas appointedto the boardof DeBeers,

and to the board ofAnglo American four years

later.

Should Relly have his wish and Ogihie

Thompson succeeds him when he retires -the new

chairman will be faced with piloting Anglo

American through difficult times, mainly in the

politicalsphere.

Hugh Murray talked to Ogihie Thompson

about national affairs, anddie role ofthe Anglo

American.

Murray: Mr Gavin Relly indicated in a

television interview the other evening that

as deputy chairmanofthe Anglo American

and chairman ofDe Beers you were his

natural successor. Is that now your official

status?

Ogilvie Thompson: I think Gavin has

probably said as much as can be said. First of

all there are no plans for him to retire. I don't

think any of us would like to see him retire.

On the contrary, we hope he will go on a

good long time. So I think he was expressing

an opinion as to what might happen at some

stage in the future. Certainly the board has

taken no decision, nor would it have been

appropriate for the matter to be discussed

by the board. So I don't think there is any

more to be said at this stage.

Murray: What strikes one about the Anglo

American is that people who gravitate

towards the upper echelons tend to be men

who are not purely industrialists, or

businessmen. They tend to be people who

are politically and classically schooled.

There is a very discernible culture which

appears to be quite different from anywhere

else. What goes into the making of a top

"Anglo-man"?

Ogilvie Thompson: The people that run the

centre of Anglo have come from different

roots. But I would think that there is one

unifying, important factor-a sort of ethos.

There is an ethos that runs through any

school. Certainly there could be an ethos that

runs through an organisation. To my mind

it was best summed up by Sir Ernest

Oppenheimer. He said: "The purpose of this

corporation is to make profits for shareholders

but to do so in such a way as to make a

lasting contribution to the countries in which

it operates." Apart from having what is

hopefully an exciting and worthwhile

92
business career,

I think we have all felt that

in some small way we can help to createa

better situation, certainly in Southern Africa.

It has been easier for this group to see things

ina more international way.A large

proportion of the people who come to the

centre have had spells in non-South African

offices, looking in at South Africa from the

outside, and to my mind this isa great

advantage. Then, everyone agrees Harry

Oppenheimer isa particularly remarkable

man and it is amazing how the spirit of his

actions and general approach to life has

permeated through the group.

Murray: It seems that the Anglo American

is destined (inthe way things are developing

at the moment) to find itself witha much

higher political profile than it has in the

past Is it desirable that businessmen should

now be so engrossed in politics or is it purely a consequence ofour situation?

Ogilvie Thompson:I think it has to be like

that. It is fair to say that in any Western

country there isa distinct interplay between

business and government and indeed

between government and other sections of

the community. No business can ignore

general developments in the country, and

this means no business can ignore political

developments. But business in South Africa

may have had less influence on government

or on politics because ofthe political system

and the special composition of the electorate.

Murray: It is increasingly becoming

apparent that business is going to have to

take much more ofa lead than it has in the

past-a much tougher, direct line with

government- particularly ifit wants to

retain international credibility. YetI

wonder whether businessmen really are

aware ofthe onus that is going to be on

them to keep the country's economy ina

state of relative normality?

Ogilvie Thompson: However hard anyone

tries you aren't going to get this economy

going soundly until you restore confidence,

which means that people have got to have

more faith ina satisfactory political outcome.

I think everyone is going to do what he can

to bring that about. Certainly businessmen

have been takinga more active interest in

politics and trying to influence government.

But no government is going to go faster than

its electorate, or than it thinks it can lead its

electorate. So businessmen are now saying

that the time has come to modernise the

electorate ina way which would encourage

and allow government to press ahead faster

and further with its reform programme.

Murray: Do you mean that the very

nature ofthe electorate itselfshould

change and the constituency to which the

government addresses itself could be

fundamentally different?

Ogilvie Thompson: Yes, you probably will

havea more broadly-based government.I

think that is what the country needs.

Indeed, when the government talks about

the national statutory council,I believe it

sees it asa means of moving towards

government bya broader spectrum of

people.

Murray: To accept that one has to accept

the bona fides ofthe government. Hasn't

this become increasingly difficult to do?

Ogilvie Thompson: The business community

is made up ofa broad spectrum of people

witha broad spectrum of opinions. SoI think

one can't so easily just say that business

thinks this or that should be done. It is the

case that business over the last few years

has become more co-ordinated in its views.

To some extent this is why you have been

able to get various business organisations to

make important statements. Some of us

feel that the government moves too slowly

and not far enough. But the fact is that the

government has changed this country

enormously over the last five or seven years -in many ways it is

unrecognisable. If you

add these things up they

do amount toa significant though inadequate

process. There isa

doubt in the country

and outside over what

the government actually

means about sharing

iower. There are some people who suspect

hat what the government means is that it

vill share power but will hope to keepa veto

"or the white man or the white electorate.I

personally don't think that that will be

iimctical.I think you may be able to negotiate

i constitution which hasa number of checks

.ind balances. It may be able to operate by

consensus, and you may be able to havea

number of groups or units, geographic or

otherwise, with veto powers. ButI don't

think you can expecta veto for the white

man. Now the government has not said that

this is what it is going for, but there are

neople who speculate about that. The

93
government says it does want to negotiate

with people.I personally think it is all the

more important, in view of the emergency,

that the government should reiterate their

commitment and their desire to negotiate

with authentic representatives of all

groups.

Murray: Can South Africa change its mood

of recrimination to one of constructive

development?

Ogilvie Thompson:A great deal ofapartheid

legislation has been or is being abolished.

There are certain key laws- the Group Areas

Act and the Land Act, for example, that one

would hope could be abolished before too

long. First of all that will enable and further

encourage all people to participate in the free

enterprise system and see the benefits of

this. It seems to me that government's

facilitating the availability of land for housing

is probably the crucial thing in letting private

enterprise and individuals get on with it.

This would lead people to feel that they

were participating in society and had

economic opportunity and from that we

would hope to be able to go further on

negotiating some political participation.

Murray: There seems to me, however, to be

an anomalous situation developing where

the accent is on the redistribution ofwealth,

and the creation ofwealth is being ignored.

Ogilvie Thompson: There isa whole heap of

incontrovertible evidence that if you

concentrate on redistribution only you

actually land up witha lower gross domestic

product, quite apart from lower per capita

income. What one needs to do is to facilitate

and encouragea redistribution of greater

wealth.I think one ought to facilitate share

ownership of businesses by staff and workers

at different levels andI think industry is

applying its mind to try and work out satisfactory schemes for that. These points were

touched on in Project Free Enterprise. The

other thingI think we ought to embark upon

isa programme of educating our workers at

all levels in exactly how business works. It

is extraordinary where people believe our

profits go.

Murray: That also seems to bea problem

with the ANC.

Ogilvie Thompson: Indeed. What one has

got to do is to get the ANC to realise that

this commitment to nationalisation, which is

fundamental to the Freedom Charter, may

have been the conventional wisdom in the

mid-Fifties when that was what the world

was doing. But in the Eighties everybody is

going in the opposite direction. So one has

got to encourage and make it easier for them

to change that particular view. Of courseI

doubt whether the Communist Party

clement would facilitate such change but the

others must see it that way.

Murray: Are you basically sanguine about

the future? Ifthings continue to decline at

the rate they are,I would suggest that even

something like the mighty Anglo American

Corporation could by the turn ofthe

century cease to exist in the form it takes

today.

Ogilvie Thompson: WellI can't but agree

with you that things look very bad at the

moment. Any country that has to declarea

state of emergency is obviously ina very

difficult situation. There are those that

argue this is largely due to years of inadequate, misguided Nationalist Party rule.

Others will argue it is entirely the fault of the

extremists. ButI can't help feeling that

maybe we are in the darkest hours before

the dawn. It seems to me that things look so

bad and the dangers on the horizon are so

strong and potent that maybe people are now

really going to get down to working outa

more stable future. It is extremely difficult to

assess exactly what is happening in the

townships duringa state of emergency, and

one hopes that the government is going to

use this to press ahead with reform and its

commitment to negotiatea political solution.

One hopes, too, that the seriousness of the

situation will impress itself on the electorate

and this will encourage the government to

feel that it can take bolder steps that the

electorate will go along with. It is difficult to

judge. There is no doubt that the way

we are at the moment we are going to get a measure ofsanctions this year and unless

things change substantially by next year,

we are going to get more sanctions. We

are also going to get an extremely difficult

renegotiation of our debt in the middle of

next year unless substantial steps are made

toward negotiating political reform. The

government must understand this.

Murray: Yes. But the fact at the moment is

that there are elements in the government

that have decided, for better or for worse,

to pull down the shutters.

Ogilvie Thompson: There isa concern that

there is an element in the government that

94
welcomes the idea of

a siege economy and

isolation. To my mind this is the gravest

error ofjudgement. No doubt the security

forces can maintain the situation fora

longish time but it will be extremely nasty

andI don't believe anyone in the country

will havea happy anda prosperous life on

that basis. That seems to mea disastrous

road to go down. The other road is certainly a dangerous one, and it is not going to be

easy. But if you have to choose between

danger and disaster there is no choice.

Murray: How will sanctions direcdy affect

the Anglo American Corporation?

Ogilvie Thompson: One simply doesn't

know what sort ofsanctions we are going

to get. There has already been some effect

in the coal industry. The coal exporters

from South Africa are finding that buyers of

coal want to diversifya bit away from South

Africa and they have also used the general

situations asa lever to keep prices down.

There have been specific views taken in

one or two countries.

Murray: Do you anticipate any extreme

form ofsanctions— major trade boycotts

and so on?

Ogilvie Thompson: It may come to that.

At the moment President Reagan and

Mrs Thatcher are opposed to greatly

strengthened trade sanctions or boycotts. I suspect they are going to have to agree

on certain measures. But it seems to me

that unless there is progress, and negotiation

with representatives of all races in South

Africa, they will find it that much harder

to maintain the line they are apparently

taking now. That increases the chance of

governmental sanctions from important

countries. In the meantime,I would have

thought you would seea certain number of

smaller countries going ahead with this, and a certain amount of private sanctions in

particular industries or groups.

Murray: Has life become discernibly

different, perhaps more unpleasant for you

in your dealings around the world?

Ogilvie Thompson: Certainly it is more

difficult at the moment. It is well-nigh

impossible to cement South African and

international business links while this

situation continues and.

that is obviously not

helpful for our group

and bad for the country.

There may be people in

this country to whom it

would appeal if others

simply washed their

hands of South Africa,

put us in limbo and said

we were past redemption, refusing to have

anything to do with us. That would be very

bad for South Africa becauseI don't think

we can realise the potential ofthis country,

or meet the aspirations of all the people,

except asa full member ofthe Western

community.

Murray: Does your common sense tell you

thata return to acceptable international

status isa possibility?

Ogilvie Thompson:I think it isa possibility.

It needs determined leadership, and farsightedness on behalf of the government. It

needs to take its electorate with it. Personally I would have thought it would be easier to

forma broader base instead of relying only

on an Afrikaans-speaking base.I believe

there isa majority ofthe South African

electorate willing to take the apparently

dangerous course of releasing Mandela and

unbanning political organisations so that

people can express themselves freely. You

have to continue to takea firm line about

violence, but witha view to getting all the

different groups to participate ina single

body.

Murray:A government ofnational unity?

Ogilvie Thompson: Indeed. To my mind

this might well be the sensible way to do it,

to havea government of national unity.

One has often thought of that.I think that

if we can achieve this we might be able to

get some financial help from abroad in

order to do the sort ofthings the country

would like to do in development, growth

and then redistribution ofwealth.A

government of national unity would have

other things that go along with it. If we are

going to have evolutionary change, it must

ake place through the electorate, whoever

hat may be. So you must convince the

lectorate that it is going to havea place in

he sun- maybe it won't be as sunny as it

tas been for the last 76 years but it will be

lore sunny than if we don't go down this

>ad. Certainly voters will be sharinga

Jace in the sun with others who haven't

id as much ofthe sun as they ought to

!. <ve had. This is pretty obvious. But one of : e things that worries me about the attitude i some ofthe people abroad, including the

95
I

yG, is that they don't seem to understand

t it the electorate must make the changes. . ;d they keep shifting in their demands.

They move the goalposts. You don't know

what the people abroad really want and to

that extent they make it easier for elements

in the government to say there is no point

in doing anything.

Murray: What can the outside world do to

help?

Ogilvie Thompson: At this stage,I think, it

could help in two important respects. One-

going back to my point about moving the

goalposts-is that the responsible Western

governments should make it clear that if

negotiations among the real representatives

of all groups were to result in the type of

constitutionI outlined earlier, it would be

accepted- as indeed it would have to be

accepted. Many white South Africans are .

fearful that the rest ofthe world will accept

nothing less than outright majority rule-in

other words that they are expected to commit

political suicide. The other point concerns

the ANC and others who assume that if the

price of political victory isa South African

economy in ruins, it will still come right

because the West will pour in the funds

necessary to rebuild our economic machine.

Looking at the record ofinvestment in

independent Africa, thatI think is an

illusion. Buta government here bom out of

evolutionary change and representative of

all racial groups wouldI am sure attract

considerable international investment. If

the West would consistently make these

points,I believe it could help to bring

white and black to the negotiating table.

Murray: How much longer can the

business community foot the bill for

developments under the general heading of

social responsibility? How much further

can you, ona prudent basis, dip in?

Ogilvie Thompson: We don't havea welfare

safety net in South Africa, so when you have

major unemployment there is much more

likelihood of violence or socio-economic

unrest, as it is euphemistically called.I think

that business is trying to give its black

employees the same facilities that it has for

years given whites. You simply must havea

situation where you havea completely

colour-blind job remuneration system. Many

industries have done that, the gold and coal

mining industries haven't yet achieved that.

It seems to me the only way to keep orderly

and reasonable industrial relations.

Murray: What abouta sensible sharing of

wealth, anda general acceptance ofthe

needfora mixedeconomy? Pure capitalism

seems to have taken on very unsatisfactory

connotations.

Ogilvie Thompson: There is an inadequate

welfare system and certainly there isa need

for equal education. There is going to have

to bea massive amount ofwork and effort on

this front. That is why it is important to get

money from abroad. But as far as nationalisation ofindustry is concerned, I remain

convinced that this is not the most productive

way to runa country and it will not actually

help the people it is designed to help.

Murray: What aboutthe diamondindustry,

and the difficult times you have had there?

Ogilvie Thompson: We are not entirely out

ofthe woods but we think we are very

near to normal conditions. Throughout

the Eighties, we have been encouraged by

the steadily rising retail sales of diamond

jewellery to the mass market, which is the

basic market we have always supported

and advertised and helped promote. AH

indications are that the stocks in the cutting

centres and in the pipeline beyond the

cutting centres to the retail jewellers are

back to normal levels. We have already sold

more diamonds than last year and we

believe that we are back to or very nearly at

normal, satisfactory profit conditions for

ourselves. When things got bad we withheld

those diamonds the market didn't want, we

changed our assortments, and as the market

started to broadena year or two ago we

gradually made more available. We are at

last selling all categories of diamonds. The

industry is still naturally nervous because of

the bad depression, the worst since the

Thirties that it has been through, butI

would hope that we are near normality. But

the last thing we would like to see isa

repetition of the inordinate speculation we

had at the end ofthe Seventies.

Incidentally, we will be announcing

satisfactory results on sales for the first six

months of this year.

Murray: You have moved to the upper

stratosphere ofthe Anglo operation ata

very interesting time, ata time when you

are very aware ofthe limited life ofgold,

the need for diversification, the need for

expansion ofopportunites and so on. All

this must stretch you considerably?

Ogilvie Thompson: We hope there are

further opportunities of opening new gold

96
mines or new areas of existing mines, new

shafts and so on. Some ofthese developments could be described as very large mines

on their own, though this tends to be lost on

the media. We would hope there will be

more of these so that we can both extend the

life ofthe mines and continue to employ

people.

Murray: How are things going with the

gold reclamation projects?

Ogilvie Thompson: Those have gone rather

well. In some cases they are already putting

the slimes through for the second or third

time and one would

hope that with improved

technology in the

recovery process, there

would be further scope.

On the De Beers

front we hope that prices

and costs will be such

that the new Venetia

prospect will become

payable. And I would hope that De Beers

will continue to find other mines, perhaps

in South Africa, perhaps abroad.

Murray: What about regional development,

particularly the Southern African subcontinent? How important is that?

Ogilvie Thompson: From a mining point of

view we prospect generally in Southern

Africa and would hope to find other mines

here, including South West Africa, which we

think is important for us. It is also important

for those countries, for employment and job

opportunities. From another point of view,

obviously strong economies can only help the

South African market. Take Amcar, our car

manufacturing company. Ifwe had bigger

and better markets around us, it would

obviously help make Amcar viable sooner.

Murray: There would also be the general

opening up oftrade links?

Ogilvie Thompson: Quite. If South Africa

could only get its politics right it really

could act as the locomotive for industrial

development in Southern Africa. Indeed,

this is of course how Sir Ernest always saw

it.

Murray: What is needed in South Africa to

put leadership back in the hands ofbona

fide leaders? At the moment there is

enormous despondency. People feel

leaderless, and are looking more to the

business community than ever.

Ogilvie Thompson: Don't you think there

have been many signs that P W Botha and

the government see the need for closer

business and government co-operation? I

wonder, too, if our politicians aren't seeing

more the opportunities for employment,

the opportunities that will flow from

urbanisation, not to mention deregulation.

Aren't these encouraging signs? I am

encouraged by the sort ofthings on this score

which are said by Afrikaans businessmen

who in the nature ofthings have more access

to and more influence on the government.

And I personally believe there are some

reasons for hoping that we may see a

breakthrough in housing and business

development.

/9274

CSOj 3400/428

97
SOUTH AFRICA

EMPLOYER GROUPS SUBMIT MEMO ON PRIVATIZATION

MB191036 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1035 GMT 19 Aug 86

[Text] Johannesburg, Aug 19, SAPA—Four employer organisations have submitted

a joint memorandum on privatisation and deregulation of the economy to the

government in which they stress that the overall pace of any privatisation

and deregulation programme must be dictated by the ability of the economy to

fund and absorb it.

The four are: the Association of Chamber of Commerce (ASSOCOM), the Federated Chamber of Industries (BCI), Afrikaänse Handelsinstituut [Afrikaans

Trade Institute] (AHI), and the South African Agricultural Union (SAAU).

The four have set up a permanent task force on privatisation and deregulation to establish the proper liaison base with government to draw up a

strategic plan for privatisation and deregulation, identifying priorities

and target areas and setting a timetable.

In the current chamber bulletin of the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce, it

is stated that early in the document, the four employer bodies express their

support for a programme of privatisation and deregulation saying "the country must recognise that there is a great need to redress serious structural

deficiencies which have been built into the economy over a. number of decades."

The deficiencies are slow growth, inadequate investment in the private sector

and the problem of poverty and inadequate economic opportunity.

"Privatisation and deregulation can be used as important vehicles to redress

these problems," they say in the memorandum.

A pre-condition for successful privatisation is that it should be accompanied

by planned deregulation, namely the partial or total scrapping or rewriting

of laws or regulations "inhibiting the effective operation of the private

sector in the production of goods and services previously supplied by the

state—e.g., the deregulation of transport."

A coherent strategy for privatisation implies a deliberate decision to change

the role of government in the economy and to redefine the relationships between the public and private sectors, they say.

98
It can result in spreading economic ownership more widely among the population and creating new economic opportunities in the private sector.

The key objective for privatisation and deregulation, as the four bodies see

it, are:

—To reduce and eventually reverse the upward trend in government spending

and public sector involvement in the economy to the order of 20 per cent

by the year 2000.

—To reduce the cost of services to the taxpayer, and consequently to help

reduce the tax burden, and especially the marginal rate of tax, to broaden

the tax base and to increase revenue collections as economic activity is

consequently stimulated.

—To boost the economy by increasing economic opportunities and individual

entrepreneurship and to spread economic ownership.

—To benefit consumers by way of increased competition.which will boost

efficiency and which will eventually lead to more innovation.

—To permit the market to satisfy the needs of individuals and communities

with the least intervention from the political and regulatory process.

The four organisations believe that the economic opportunities arising from

privatisation and deregulation should be spread as widely as possible, and

especially to small investors and entrepreneurs to avoid an unacceptable degree of economic power concentration.

They say that there are a number of alternative criteria for determining the

most effective targets to prioritise a programme for privatisation and

deregulation.

These include, in order or priority: the greatest economic impact to revitalise the economy and to stimulate the job and entrepreneurship creation potential of the country; areas of highest demand escalation which the state cannot meet, such as health care, education and low income housing; and most

easily saleable assets and services.

The four bodies recommend the establishment of a permanent and independent

advisory council.on privatisation and deregulation consisting of representatives of the government, the private sector, consumer organisations and

trade unions.

The council should be charged with the responsibility of assessing which

assets of the state or para-statal organisations should be leased to the

public and to recommend in each specific case, the procedures to be followed.

/6662

CSO: 3400/411

99
SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

FLOATING EXCHANGE RATES SYSTEM—House of Assembly Aug 19 SAPA—The Reserve

Bank would continue to use the system of floating exhange rates to exert a

stabilizing influence on the foreign exchange market, the deputy minister of

finance, Mr Kent Durr, said today. Replying on behalf of the minister,

Mr Barend du Plessis, to questions by Mr Louis Stofbert (HNP [Reformed

National Party] Sasolburg), Mr Durr said measures taken by the state to

strengthen the rand exchange rate had had the desired effect. No further

measures were planned. "The Reserve Bank will continually seek, through the

existing system of managed floating, to exert a stabilising influence on the

foreign exchange market." Mr Durr said it was possible that one of the main

reasons for the sharp fall in the rand exchange rate in the first half of

June was expectations of a possible increase in unrest around June 16. Once

it became clear "that the level of unrest had started to decline," market

sentiment changed and the rand recovered and had been "relatively stable"

since. Asked by Mr Harry Schwarz (PFP [Progressive Federal Party] Yeoville)

whether it was the government's policy not to strengthen the rand, Mr Durr

said: "That is correct." [Text] [Johannesburg SAPA in English 1637 GMT

19 Aug «6 MB] 76662

FUNDS TO ISRAEL MONITORED—House of Assembly, Aug 19, SAPA—There was no abnormal flow of funds from South Africa to Israel between June 10 and June 17,

the deputy minister of finance, Mr Kent Durr, said today. Replying to a

question from Mr Louis Stofberg (HNP [Reformed National Party] Sasolburg),

Mr Durr said this information had been obtained from the Reserve Bank after

radio and newspaper reports that investments in Israel by South African Jews

had increased considerably during that week. Mr Durr added that applications

by South African residents to transfer funds to Israel and other countries

were being strictly monitored in accordance with stringent measures to limit

the outflow of capital from South Africa. [Text] [Johannesburg SAPA in

English 1614 GMT 19 Aug 86 MB] 76662

ENERGY OFFICIAL SPEAKS ON SANCTIONS-^The director of energy planning in

the department of mineral and energy affairs, Dr (R. Scott), has given the

assurance that economic sanctions against South Africa would not have an

immediate effect on the country's energy supplies. Speaking at a conference

on the consequences of sanctions being held in Pretoria, Dr (Scott) said it

is unlikely that a crude oil boycott could ever be 100 percent effective,

particularly with the prevailing weak world oil market. It was therefore

100
reasonably unlikely that strict measures would be introduced immediately to

limit the use of petrol and diesel in the event of sanctions being imposed.

Dr (Scott) said if the present oil boycott became more effective, it would

become necessary to introduce measures limiting the use of liquid fuels.

This could involve a program of rationing. He said electricity could become

more expensive, because unit production costs would rise. [Text] [Johannesburg Domestic Service in Afrikaans 1400 GMT 15 Aug 86 MB] /6662

BUSINESS PROFESSOR: NATION PROFITABLE MARKET—A professor at the School of

Business Leadership at the University of South Africa, Professor (Jan Houpkes),

says South Africa remains a very profitable market to the outside world and

the country still has the power to assert itself. Addressing a seminar on

punitive economic measures in Pretoria he said that, apart from the influence

South Africa could exert on neighboring countries, South African imports of

goods and services exceeded her exports by 8.7 million rands. He said that

South Africa could have a considerable influence on some markets. Prof

(Houpkes) said South Africa could transfer her purchases from European countries to the East. This would be a telling blow for Europe. He said that

the South African public could also take part in such a boycott or sanctions

campaign by letting important products rot and gather dust on the shelves of

shops. ,,- [Text] [Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 1100 GMT 15 Aug

86 MB] /6662

GST MAY BE ABOLISHED—Sales tax could soon be abolished. As Carmel Rickard

reports, the government has indicated that it might do away with the taxation.

[Rickard] The hint the General Sales Tax [GST] could be scrapped or substantially cut comes from Finance Minister Barend du Plessis. He told the

NATAL MERCURY that GST was a wrong tax. Too many exemptions had led to it

being raised to unacceptably high levels.. Mr Du Plessis said that if GST

was retained at all, his department believes there should no longer be any

exceptions made in its application. On this issue, he also said it was only

fair that people who didn't earn enough to pay personal tax should contribute something through indirect taxation. Mr Du Plessis seemed to indicate

there wasn't much chance of separate taxation for married couples. Both

issues are expected to be dealt with by the Margo Commission which (?reviews)

the whole tax system, and Mr Du Plessis said the commission was due to finish

its reports within days. [Text] [Umtata Capital Radio in English 0600 GMT

15 Aug 86 MB] /6662

PRESIDENT'S ECONOMIC POWERS AMENDMENT—House of Representatives, Aug 19, SAPA—

The powers conferred on the state president to remove restriction from economic activities would be temporary, however the rights, privileges and

liabilities that followed would be permanent, the minister of administration

and economic advisory services, Mr Eli Louw, said today. He introduced an

amendment during the committee stage of the temporary removal of restriction

of economic activities bill which he said would do away with the uncertainty

over the legal implications of the bill because they were permanent while

the powers that the state president would enjoy were limited. The amendment

was accepted. Mr Godfrew Leeuw (LP [Labor Party] Southern Free State) said

101
during the third reading debate the effect that sanctions would have on the

country would be to render many people jobless. He supported the bill because it allowed for job creation which was needed to keep hunger and unrest

at bay. In reply Mr Louw said the object of the bill was to encourage "small"

participation in the economy. The bill was read a third time. [Text]

[Johannesburg SAPA in English 1515 GMT 19 Aug 86 MB] /6662

SURVEY: BUSINESS COMMITTED TO REFORM—A nationwide survey conducted in South

Africa has (?revealed) the private sector's commitment to political change.

A survey on manpower development conducted among 100 major businesses found

that 14 percent of employers were prepared to become actively involved in

promoting political change. Although the majority say they are prepared to

put pressure on the government through employer bodies like the Chambers of

Commerce and Industry, only 11 percent say that would not be involved at

all. [Words indistinct] contacts with trade unions are important than with

the government, although they believed that both were essential to improving

the political situation in South Africa. The survey also identified a

[word indistinct] widespread backlash among white workers against (?political)

policies. It said white workers objected to making up for production lost

during stayaways by blacks. The results have been [words indistinct] by

white workers towards right-wing trade unions. [Text] [Johannesburg International Service in English 1100 GMT 16 Aug 86 MB] /6662

DE KOCK: LOAN INSTALLMENT—The governor of the Reserve Bank, Dr Gerhard de

Kock, has told our economics news staff that all dollars obtained from the

sale of gold are being placed in the market. He said that last week South

Africa had repaid the third of eight installments on an IMF loan which

amounted to 215 million rand. The next payment was due in November and

South Africa had every intention of meeting this and other commitments.

Dr De Kock said that if gold held above $380 and market sentiment was positive

the rand could be expected to rise in the near future. He said the higher

gold price made the forecast of the surplus on the balance of payments of

46 billion rand secure. If the price of bullion held the figure could be

even bigger. [Text] [Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 1100 GMT 12

Aug 86 MB] /6662

OFFICIAL: COUNTRY SELF-SUFFICIENT—The deputy minister of finance and of trade

and industry, Mr Kent Durr, says South Africa has enough natural resources,

technological expertise, and human resources to meet its own needs if the

sanctions campaign against South Africa increases. Mr Durr said in Port

Alfred that if the country was isolated through external pressure, it would

create opportunities for the development of import replacement industries,

technological breakthroughs, and self-sufficiency in agriculture and food

processing. He said it was of the utmost importance that new export and

employment opportunities be created and that existing markets be retained

at all costs since it was very difficult to reestablish markets which have

been lost. Mr Durr said the country was ripe for economic growth and pointed

out that there was no better counter to sanctions than a growing and successful South African economy for the dynamic social and political structure

increasingly mirroring the inclusion of all South Africans. [Text] [Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 16 Aug 86 MB] /6662

CSO: 3400/411

102
SOUTH AFRICA

EFFECT OF SANCTIONS ON COAL, STEEL, IRON ORE INDUSTRIES NOTED

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 6 Aug 86 pp 1, 2

[Text]

CONCERTED action by Europe,

Japan and the US to ban imports of

SA steel, coal and iron ore could cost

more than R3bn in foreign earnings

and throw 50 000 people, mostly

blacks, out of work.

Some industry sources, however, believe contingency plans are available to

lessen the blow.

Worst-hit by sanctions would be the

coal sector. Nearly all coal exports are

bought by Japan and the European Community (EC).

Japan is by far the biggest customer,

taking 8,5-million tons of SA's total export of 44-million tons in 1985. EC nations

took up almost all the rest, with the US,

Korea, Taiwan and black Africa taking

minor tonnages.

There is disagreement on the exact

value of SA's coal exports. Official

Japanese trade .statistics say Tokyo

spent Rl,31bn in 1985 on SA coal. Local

analysts say the total value of exports,

based on world market prices of between

$22 and $24 a ton, is about R2,5bn. :

Exports make up about one-third of SA

coal production. The Chamber of Mines

warned last month that, in the face of

total sanctions, 33% of the workforce

would be laid off.

More likely, according to industry

sources, is that SA could continue to export 30-million tons a year by offering an

average 30% discount, resulting in a 50%

drop in export income.

Exports of iron ore, totalling R312m in

1984, would probably be eliminated completely under sanctions, say analysts.

The worldwide glut in pig iron production means that exports of that commodity, worth R42m in 1984, would also be

wiped out. . , ,

Thesteel industry stands to lose about

R300m a year as a result of sanctions.

However, industry spokesmen say they

are already laying plans to expand into

other markets. • .

If they failr say observers, at least

10 000 jobs could be at risk in the iron and

steel sectors.

"Losing Britain as a window for SA

steel is worrying, especially in a buyer's

market. But we intend to sell these tonnages elsewhere," says an Iscor spokesman.

Steel exports, making up more than

40% of total steel production because of

reduced local demand, are budgeted to

earn Iscor and its competitors more than

Rl,5bn this year.

Much of that will remain safe in traditional south-east Asian and Middle East

markets. However, SA stands to lose

70 000 tons of steel exports to Britain and

more than 600 000 tons as its 0,42%. share

of US steel consumption.

Middelburg Steel & Alloys marketing

director Leo Melvill says the loss of Britain and Commonwealth markets would

cost the stainless and speciality steel103
maker R15m — and a further R25m from

an EC boycott.

He declines to comment on export

prospects for the company's 3CR12 alloy,5

but analysts say the company will almost certainly maintain overseas sales

through manufacturing licensing agreements in other countries. ,:

Exports of coal and mineral fuels in

1985, including those from Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Namibia, totalled;

R3,22bn, SA trade data show. Iron and

steel exports were R2,26bn, Sapa-Reuterj

reports.

Japan imported R317m of ferro-chromium and R710m of non-monetary gold

lumps, Japanese statistics show. Total

imports from SA. in 1985. were worth

R5,86DP

Japan, SA's second-largest trading

partner, will almost certainly observe

sanctions agreed to by the West, diplomatic sources surmise.

Japanese policy is to co-ordinate with'

the US and the EC on sanctions, they say.

/9317

CSO: 3400/402

104
SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

RICHARDS BAY NOT TO CLOSE—A ban on imports of coal from South Africa was

unlikely to cause the Richards Bay harbour and coal railway line to become

a "white elephant," said Leon Els, a spokesman for Minister of Transport

Services, Hendrik Schoeman. Approached yesterday for comment on the

possible affects of such a ban on South African Transport Services (Sats)

workers in Richards Bay, Els said all plans were going ahead as normal.

"The Richards Bay facilities, and improvements to the coal railway line

are going ahead as planned and no change will be made in spite of the

speculation. "The coal exporting companies still have a certain tonnage

that must be exported and as such, work procedures will be going ahead as

normal." Els emphasised that coal exports only formed part of the job done

by port workers and that the railway line, and facilities, could easily be

adapted for other purposes. The department had also noted that the large

corporations which were the major coal exporters had said they were looking

into alternative markets and that Sats workers would still be needed to

rail and ship the coal, he said. A spokesman for Iscor has denied that

an overseas ban on South African coal exports would have any affect on

their already hard-hit Newscastle plant. "We are not involved in the coal

export market in any way," he said. [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in

English 7 Aug 86 p 4] /9317

CSO: 3400/402 END

105