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JPRS-SSA-87-022

13 MARCH 1987

Sub-Saharcm Africa Report

19980611 157

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JPRS-SSA-87-022

13 MARCH 1987

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

CONTENTS

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Inexperience, Tradition Deter European Investment in West Africa

(FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT,

5 Dec 86) 1

International Aid To Modernize, Expand Textile Production

(FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT,

9 Dec 86) 4

ANGOLA

Union of Angolans Abroad Issues Peace Call

(0 DIABO, 6 Jan 87) 7

French Secret Service Role in Support of UNITA Cited

(AFRICA CONFIDENCIAL, Oct 86) 9

Country's Lisbon Embassy Under Surveillance

(AFRICA CONFIDENCIAL, Oct 86) 11

Results of Van Dunen's Visit to Portugal Discussed

(TEMPO, 24 Dec 86) • 13

BPV Activities in Huambo Described

(JORNAL DE ANGOLA, 6 Jan 87) 16

Situation in Kuando-Kubango Assessed

(JORNAL DE ANGOLA, 7 Jan 87) 18

29 Counterrevolutionaries on Trial

(Luis Ferreira; JORNAL DE ANGOLA, 7 Jan 87) 19

- a -
RSA Operations in Cunene Cited by ANGOP

(JORNAL DE ANGOLA, 9 Jan 87) 21

Armed Forces Conduct Census of Draft-Age Youth

(JORNAL DE ANGOLA, 14 Jan 87) 23

Angolan Students' Life in Czechoslovakia Described

(JORNAL DE ANGOLA, 17 Jan 87) . 24

Cooperation With USSR To Increase

(TEMPO, 15 Jan 87) 27

Briefs

MALI

Dissension Between Ministers 28

UNITA's Activities in Lubango Off 28

'Negritude* Removed From UNITA Logo 28

Proposal Rejected by Zaire, Zambia 29

Students Courted by MPLA, UNITA 29

Bulgarian Agricultural Efforts Criticized 29

Government-Meridien Disagreement Cited 30

Country's Debt to USSR 30

Foreign Technical Assistants 30

Additional Cuban Military Personnel 31

Electrical Supply System Improved 31

Cubans Complete Bridge/Dock Construction 31

Ship Chartering Firm Founded 32

ANGOP Agreements Cited 32

Traore's New Year Message to Nation

(Moussa Traore; L'ESSOR, 3-4 Jan 87). 33

Reasons for Treasury Crisis Examined

(Yalla Sidibe; L'ESSOR, 7 Jan 87). 37

MOZAMBIQUE

Foreign Minister Meets Envoys, Affirms Solidarity

(Maputo Domestic Service, 17 Feb 87). 41

Mocumbi Meets International Groups' Representatives

(Maputo Domestic Service, 18 Feb 87)... 42

FRELIMO Alleged To Commit More Atrocities Than RENAMO

(0 DIABO, 10 Feb 87) 43

Authenticity of Veterans' Document Questioned

(DIARI0 DE N0TICIAS, 6 Feb 87) 46

- b
Currency Devaluation, Other Economic Measures Discussed

(EXPRESSO, 7 Feb 87) ... 48

Zambeziafe Tea Industry Affected by Civil War

(Luisa Ribeiro; AFRICA HOJE, Jan 87). . 50

Briefs

Trade Union Official in Moscow 52

SENEGAL

TOGO

Secretary General Diouf Delivers Report to Party Congress

(LE SOLEIL, 22 Dec 86) 53

Wade Opening Address to PDS Convention

(Moustapha Mbodj; LE SOLEIL, 16 Jan 87) 78

Status of Senegambian Confederation Examined

(LE DEVOIR, Jan 87) 80

New Education Seeks To Reach More Students

(El Bachir Sow; LE SOLEIL, 2 Jan 87) 83

Privatization of State-Owned Industrial Enterprises Advances

(FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT,

15 Dec 86) 86

SOUTH AFRICA

BLACKS

ANC's Nzo Says Way Open for Further U.S. Talks

(PANA, 21 Feb 87) ..., 89

ANC Official Predicts Demise of Botha Regime

(Harare Domestic Service, 21 Feb 87) 90

UDF President Holds News Conference in London

(SAPA, 19 Feb 87) 91

Azapo Leader on Black Consciousness

(Patrick Laurence; THE WEEKLY MAIL, 20-26 Feb 87) 93

WEEKLY MAIL Explores Make-Up of Township Gangs

(Eddie Koch; THE WEEKLY MAIL, 20-26 Feb 87) 96

c -
Bophuthatswana Hopes To Resolve Botswana Border Problem

(SAPA, 23 Feb 87) 99

Commentary Examines Black Education Status

(Johannesburg Domestic Service, 26 Feb 87) 101

Briefs

ANC Condemns U.S., UK Veto of UN Sanctions 103

3,000 Blacks Regain Citizenship 103

SOWETAN News Editor Refused Passport 103

Aid to Homelands Detailed 104

UDF Criticizes Government, NP Manifesto 104

Reporter Questioned on Organization Affiliation 104

U.S. 'Not Impressed1by Tambo 104

SOCIOPOLITICAL/OTHER

Soviet Weapons Buildup in Region Termed 'Aggression'

(Johannesburg Domestic Service, 20 Feb 87) 105

Commentary Affirms Greater White Acceptance of Reform

(Johannesburg International Service, 19 Feb 87) 107

Commentary Affirms Government Commitment To Reform

(Johannesburg International Service, 18 Feb 87) 108

PFP MP Accuses Education Minister of 'Smear Campaign'

(SAPA, 17 Feb 87) 109

Transvaal Indian Congress Issues Ad on Mixed Schools

(SOWETAN, 19 Feb 87) 110

Commentary Notes Danger of Sanctions, Reform Commitment

(Johannesburg Domestic Service, 19 Feb 87) 112

Briefs

Athletics Row Linked to NP Policies 114

ECONOMIC

Commentary Points to Economic Recovery Trend

(Johannesburg Domestic Service, 18 Feb 87) 115

Official Predicts Reduced Corn Production

(SAPA, 18 Feb 87) 117

/12223
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

INEXPERIENCE, TRADITION DETER EUROPEAN INVESTMENT IN WEST AFRICA

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT in German

5 Dec 86 p 2

[Article by C.K., Dakar: "West Africa Waiting for Better Cooperation

With Europe; Thus far Only Few Projects Achieved; Seventh Industrial

Forum in Dakar"]

[Text] For the seventh time since 1974 about 500 European and West

African business people and representatives of small and medium-sized

industry are now meeting in Dakar for the West African Industry and

Trade Forum. The four-day conference, which is being arranged by Unido,

the West African Economic Community, the European Community, and the

Brussels Center for Industrial Development, is primarily an information

and contact exchange; first business ideas and plans for projects are

discussed which, following detailed later negotiations, could lead to

joint investment projects, equity participations, licensing contracts or

simply only to technical assistance.

Since the first event in 1974, the participants from the 16 states of

the West African Economic Community have presented over 500 industrial

projects in the field of food and metal processing, of the production of

textiles, construction materials and lumbering as well as of the

production of textiles, construction materials and lumbering as well as

of the production of chemical and pharmaceutical products. Thus far 44

projects have materialized, an additional 108, according to the

organizers of the event, are still in the negotiating stage. This time,

too, over 100 projects were submitted, for which the majority of the

African entrepreneurs would like to get not only equity investment or at

least long-term financial aid but also the technical know-how for the

production from the potential European partner. Furthermore, the

foreign partner is supposed to open up the thus far closed foreign market

and take care of the marketing of the products.

The modest number of the projects thus far implemented probably best

demonstrates the difficulties connected with European-African industrial

cooperation, since the mutual expectations in most cases do not coincide.
Although it is true that the key to step-by-step industrialization and

the creation of the urgently needed jobs lies especially in the

development of a small and medium-sized industry in the developing

countries, but thus far most of the West African countries lack an

economic climate that strengthens entrepreneurial drive and readiness to

take risks. Credit facilities are as underdeveloped as is the readiness

to save or also the capability to adapt suitable technologies to the

situations at hand. The general level of technical knowledge is low, the

training of the labor force is inadequate, the business mentality meets

only in very few cases European ideas as regards reliability,

punctuality, and quality standard.

The goal prevailing among the European entrepreneurs to find sales

possibilities for their products in the African market does nothing to

promote industrial cooperation. The Europeans shy away from making

investments in view of the narrowness of the markets with little

purchasing power of the West African states whose numerous supraregional

economic unions have produced much paper but little liberalization

concretely stimulating trade. Africa's negative crisis image also deters

many a potential investor, as does the language barrier or the at least

partially erroneous assumption that West Africa is exclusively the domain

of the French or of the multinational and bilateral aid organizations.

Most middle class enterprises, in the opinion of a German industrial

expert, moreover lack the necessary personnel and the capital to risk

an investment project with an African partner. State assistance for

financing of enterprise partnerships, as has been successfully practiced

in Mali by the Cologne Chamber of Handicrafts in cooperation with the

Bonn Ministry for Development Aid could provide a remedy and seed money.

This year 21 prospective investors from Germany responded to the

invitation to come to Dakar. Two years ago there were still over 30 who

had hopes for sales markets or plant cooperations. The decline in the

number of participants partly reflects the competition of other fairs and

forums, but partly also the quite deeply rooted pessimism concerning the

economic future of the West African region and its ability to overcome

the economic crisis. The confidence in the region does not improve if

even the special office for private investments in Africa founded by the

World Bank affiliate ISC, the UNDP, and the African Development Bank stay

away from the forum.

This turning away from West Africa is also reflected in the

participation in the Seventh International Fair in Dakar which was held

parallel to the industrial forum. Only 36 states went to Dakar this year,

while two years ago there were still 44 nations, including the United

States, Japan and Austria, that exhibited their products. The FRG could

only be induced to even modest participation by a personal letter from

President Diouf to Federal Chancellor Kohl, since there is little

interest in the region on the part of German industry because of the lack
of Hermes coverage for Senegal, but especially also for Nigeria. GermanAfrican trade, which declined by one third during the first half of 1986

as compared to the comparable period in 1985, also confirms the rather

discouraging picture. For the West African region as a whole, the

decline in exports during the first half of 1986 even reached almost 40

percent. At the same time, German experts declined by 22 percent. For

Senegal the results are even worse; the Senegalese exports, which had

declined by 48 percent already in 1985, declined another 49.4 percent

during the first half of 1986.

From Mauretania to Nigeria nearly all states of the region are undergoing

economic reforms which, at least viewed over the long term, create hopes

for growth and a clear revival of the private sphere. With the

rediscovery of agriculture the West African states have also gained the

understanding that the all-pervasive power of the state paralyzes private

initiative and that high customs walls are by no means helpful to the

domestic industry and the consumers. Also the costs for the economy of

excessive exchange rates have been very widely recognized. However,

liberalization and privatization of the West African economies do not

occur overnight. The decades-old tradition of French state capitalism, and xn

the case of Senegal going back even for centuries, has lastingly shaped

the thinking and mentality of the people and administrations, and has

stunted the willingness to take risks and private entrepreneurship. The

West African states willing to reform need time to implement the assistance

from the outside assistance and to carry out the adjustment to the

changed economic structure as quickly and completely as possible. Special

importance is attached in this connection to events such as the Seventh

Industrial Forum since the multitude of the contacts and of the information

can strengthen and support the young inexperienced African entrepreneur on

his path.

12356

CSO: 3420/8
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

INTERNATIONAL AID TO MODERNIZE, EXPAND TEXTILE PRODUCTION

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ZEITÜNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT in German 9 Dec

86 p 2

[Article by W.An., Frankfurt: "New Textile Projects in East Africa;

Modernization, Expansion and New Construction of Production

Plants/International Aid"]

[Text] In several countries in East Africa, investments are being carried out

at the present time, especially through international aid, which concentrate

on the modernization and expansion of existing plants and the construction of

new ones. The financing of these projects is therefore ensured, which means

that favorable marketing opportunities are available to suppliers in the

industrial nations. Domestic cotton cultivation usually provides the raw

material basis.

This is also true of Ethiopia, where the textile mill near Bahar Dar will be

renovated and modernized with the help of the European Investment Bank (EIB),

Luxembourg, which has granted a conditional loan of 12 million ECU (1 ECU =

about DM 2.10). For the second phase of the project, from 1987 to 1989, an

expansion of production capacity is planned. The textile factory, which is

located 550 km northwest of Addis Ababa, produces solely for the domestic

market. Its product line includes undyed, dyed and imprinted fabrics and raw

yarn for hameworkers.

In October 1986, the European Investment Bank approved a loan of 3.25 million

ECU to the Societe Textile de Mahajanga (Sotema) in Mahajanga, located in the

northwestern part of the island nation of Madagascar. The money is to be used

to modernize the textile mill, which has an annual production capacity of

about 30 million meters of fabric. Also participating in the financing of

this project, the total cost of which is put at about 11 million ECU, are the

International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group (3.25 million

ECU), the German Financing Corporation for Investments in Developing Countries

(DEG), Cologne, with 3.85 million ECU and Madegascan banks with 0.2 million

ECU. The Sotema is contributing 0.45 million ECU of its own funds. Sotema is

managed by the Seditex Gesellschaft fuer Entwicklung von Textilindustrie GmbH,

Hamburg. The new project includes delivery of four open-end machines with 768

rotors for the spinning mill, 40 jet-weaving machines and other auxiliary and

secondary facilities. The project is scheduled to be completed by 1988.
Previously, in the summer of 1985, the EIB had granted a loan of 6 million ECU

for the modernization of the second-largest textile factory in Madagascar.

This is operated in the middle of the country by La Cotonniere d'Antsirabe

(Cotona) in Antsirabe. This company also owns cotton plantations with an area

of about 2,200 ha, and in 1984 it produced some 39 million meters of fabric.

The IFC and the Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique (CCCE) of the French

government in Paris also contributed to the financing of the modernization

project, the cost of which has been estimated at about 120 million French

francs.

The Swiss company Gulf Tradifi in Geneva recently put up 49 percent of the

funding for the reorganized textile company Societe de Filature et de Tissage

de Madagascar (Fitim) in Mahajanga. As a result of this direct investment of

1.5 million Swiss francs, Fitim is now able to resume its production of jute

sacks, which had been shut down. Other Fitim partners are the Malagasy

government with 37.5 percent, the inland Bankin'ny Indostria (BNI) with 10.04

percent and the local corporation Cie Naps with 3.56 percent. In order to

meet the raw material needs of Fitim, domestic jute production is to be

considerably stepped up.

The EIB is also supporting a textile project in the island nation of

Mauritius. In October 1986, the bank approved a loan of 10.5 million ECU to

the Socota Textile Mills Ltd., Port Louis, for construction of a textile mill,

the total investment cost of which was put at 25.4 million ECU. The IFC

granted a credit of 5 million ECU. Domestic moneylenders participated in the

financing to the tune of 9.4 million ECU. The firm has committed 1.9 million

ECU of its own funds. The product line of the textile mill is to include

cotton fabric and cotton-polyester blends, which are used to manufacture

shirts and pants. The annual capacity will amount to about 7 million meters

of fabric. The British firm Iproma, which has invested in Socota, was brought

in as a consultant. Approximately 60,000 people are employed in the textile

industry in Mauritius.

Plans are underway in Swaziland for the development of an integrated textile

industry. A new cotton spinning mill was recently officially opened in

Matsapha by the National Textile Corporation of Swaziland (Natex), which

required investments amounting to 25 million rand (1 rand = ca CM 0.90). Of

this amount, 16 million rand were used to purchase equipment from the FRG,

Great Britain and Switzerland. Other investments are to be undertaken to

finance construction of a weaving mill and for acquiring facilities for the

bleaching and imprinting of fabric.

In Zimbabwe, the firm David Whitehead Textiles, which belongs to the sphere of

Lonrho Ltd., a British company based in London, was quite successful during

the 1985/86 year (30 September 1986) covered by this report. Its net proceeds

increased to 9.2 million Zimbabwe dollars, as compared with 5.4 million in the

previous year. Its production plant was enlarged by a new spinning mill. The

development in fiscal 1986/87 largely depends on the allocation of foreign

currency for the import of spare parts, dyes and other chemicals. In 1985/86,

David Whitehead Textiles increased its exports to 11.2 million Zimbabwe

dollars (1984/85: 6.6 million).
In the spring of 1986, a new cotton gin was opened in Bindura, northeast of

the capital city of Harare, by the Cotton Marketing Board, which cost ca 12

million Zimbabwe dollars (1 Zimbabwe dollar = ca EM 1.2). The plant employs

some 200 workers. Another cotton gin was recently opened in Zambia by Ionrho

Zambia Ltd. in Mumbwa, to the west of Lusaka. Investment costs of this plant

amounted to between 40-45 million kwacha (1 kwacha = ca DM 0.4). Its annual

capacity is estimated at 1800 tons of cotton. At a later date the plant is to

be turned over to the state-owned Lintco, which is responsible for the

cultivation, processing and marketing of cotton.

12792

3420/9
ANGOLA

UNION OF ANGOLANS ABROAD ISSUES PEACE CALL

Lisbon 0 DIABO in Portuguese 6 Jan 87 p 18

[Text] The appeal for peace in Angola made a few days ago by the movement known

as UNANGOLA, or "Union of Angolans Abroad," will probably not have any practical

repercussions. If this be the case, as everything would lead one to believe,

it will not, on that account, fail to represent a valuable requisite for judging the Angolan issue.

In the first place, a genuinely Angolan initiative was involved. The first

signer of the document, Andre Franco de Sousa, was leader of the former "African

National League," and one of the founders of MPLA. Other signatories are, like

him, individuals who appear as mere patriots, dissociated from any ideological

position. A possible link between UNANGOLA and UNITA was categorically denied

during the press conference sponsored by that movement, to make public the text

of its appeal.

This being the case, it is noteworthy that the "Union of Angolans Abroad" has

given a reminder that Angola was left by the Portuguese with solid basic

structures, "specifically, in agriculture, trade, industry, transportation,

health coverage, and educational development," and that all this "was quickly

reduced to ridiculous levels, if not totally destroyed by demagoguery, excessive ambition, subservience, and interests contrary to the national ones."

Also noteworthy is the confirmation that Angola has been turned into "an international colony," and that "a minimum of integrity should prompt the current

rulers to admit their incompetence," as well as to "seek the end of the war...

so as then to withdraw with some dignity still left."

Dignity Is Something That MPLA Lacks

However, it so happens that MPLA has never had integrity, and dignity is something that it has now lost completely.

If a report disseminated by the nationalized Angolan agency ANGOP is true, the

worsening of the situation created for the Luanda Marxist regime by the UNITA

guerrillas has led to the absurd conduct of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos

who, when interviewed by a group of American reporters, is said to have

declared himself "willing to accept military aid from the United States, which

would be welcome."
Military aid from the United States is being provided without secrecy to UNITA

and, just recently, the assistant secretary of state, Chester Crocker, made a

point of stressing that the movement led by Jonas Savimbi "is an authentic

national movement." In view of this, what would befit Jose Eduardo dos Santos

and his clique was to denounce, as in the past, "the brutal capitalist, imperilist aggression" against their regime, and to threatent to expel from Angola

the American companies exploiting its oil; although such a threat would make

almost everyone smile, because without those companies paying it, MPLA would

already have disappeared from the political scene long ago.

However, despair has prompted Jose Eduardo dos Santos to want something absurd

as becoming the beneficiary of the same military aid that the United States

is giving to UNITA. This might be termed a useless humiliation.

Appeal Without Response

The appeal for peace made by the "Union of Angolans Abroad".will not receive

any response from the Luanda government, just as it will obviously not receive

any from the government of Fidel Castro, to which this message of good will

was extended.

The response on the part of UNITA was given in advance (and it is a positive one)

because President Savimbi has been reiterating for months his proppsal to hold

dialogue with the adversary. As for the United Nations secretary general and

other entities positioned on the highest international level, also recipients

of the appeal from UNANGOLA, one need not be a pessimist to anticipate that the

only reaction will be silence. However, we would not, on that account, claim

that this initiative was not worthwhile.

It is worthwhile, primarily, because it represents the fulfillment of an obligation: The Angolans sponsoring the appeal have started from the principle that

"a passive attitude toward the injustices, lies, unwarranted war, genocide,

famine, torture, arbitrary pressure, shootings, and death penalty frivolously

imposed is criminal"; in other words, it is criminal in the face of a state

of affairs such as the one created by communism in Angola. And it is also

worthwhile because it will prove that the only one to blame for the continued

war in Angola is the Soviet-type party established in Luanda and maintained

there by communist internationalism, by the stupidity of various so-called

progressive or liberal oligarchies, and by the rent paid by the plutocrats who

are supplying themselves with oil there. All good people, as everyone knows

2909

CSO: 3442/81
ANGOLA

FRENCH SECRET SERVICE ROLE IN SUPPORT OF UNITA CITED

Lisbon AFRICA CONFIDENCIAL in Portuguese Oct 86 p 10

[Text] SDECE, the French Secret Service, played a decisive role in French

policy on Angola, particularly the continuation of support for UNITA from 1974

to 1981 during the Giscard d'Estaing administration, in which connection the

SDECE director even travelled to rebel-held areas.

Revelations made recently in the French media by the former director of the

SDECE claim that under his direction the agency tried to "prevent Third World

countries from slipping from colonialiam into an even worse form of colonialism." Former Director Marenches said that contacts beteen Jonas Savimbi and

the SDECE were "held regularly in Europe and Morocco," and he even eventually

assigned a plane to the UNITA leader to facilitate his trips.

Marenches himself made a secret visit to the Angolan resistance movement's

operational bases in the course of an intensive correspondence. The Secret

Service thus played an important role in French foreign policy toward the

region, a role which Marenches considered "challenging" to reports written by

the French ambassador in Luanda, whom the SDECE accused of "never venturing

out of the Angolan capital."

Marenches divulged certain actions intended to overcome the French president's

hesitation, who "showed signs of deviating from recommendations" on the matter

made by the SDECE.

For example, Marenches sent an agent into Angola through the Caprivi Strip in

the southeast with a three-month assignment to shoot photographs along the

Benguela Railroad, accompanying UNITA troops on sabotage missions in order to

evaluate the capacity of Savimbi*s forces. The former SDECE director said

that this photographic evidence made a graphic impact on Giscard d'Estaing and

brought about continued French support for UNITA.

Among other collaborations between UNITA and the SDECE, Marenches remembered

one operation whose mission was to ship 130 metric tons of military equipment

made in China, which had been delivered to an African country on the Atlantic

Coast. The SDECE was to pack it in crates weighing 15-20 kilos for shipment

to Pointe-Noire in the Congo. The equipment was then taken into UNITA territory by porters.
Marenches based his Angolan plan of action on three considerations: an antiSoviet inclination; a chance for France to establish a sphere of very strong

cultural influence extending practically from Tangier on the Strait of Gibraltar to the southern border of Angola; and Savimbi's personality, whom the

former French Secret Service director could not priase enough.

8844

CSO: 3442/50

10
ANGOLA

COUNTRY'S LISBON EMBASSY UNDER SURVEILLANCE

Lisbon AFRICA CONDIDENCIAL in Portuguese Oct 86 p 10

[Text] Since the beginning of this year, Portuguese authorities have been

aware of information indicating the involvement of Angolan Embassy authorities

in activities which are unrelated to their office. This has led to the need

to place certain suspect embassy officials under surveillance. Espionage is

involved, with known attempts to penetrate two agencies having a policy interest in Angola, in addition to incidents involving common crimes.

Two investigations by the judicial police are under way: one concerns the

recent death of a security official, Venancio Luis Gordurosa, and the other

concerns an Angolan citizen whose body was found floating early this year in

the Tejo River near the Almeirim bridge. He was a former official of the Angolan government who had fled Angola because he knew that his links with UNITA

were about to be discovered. It is theorized that he was murdered by an embassy official who has since been transferred.

Also, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Department for Foreigners have

long been aware of reports about violent currency extortion perpetrated on

Angolan and Portuguese citizens on 23 November 1985 at an office on Rua de

Arroios in a deal involving the conversion of kwanzas to escudos. Venancio

Luis has been identified as one of the three persons who, armed with two

pistols and a machine gun, broke into the office and stole the money, about

400,000 kwanzas.

Venancio Luis died on 18 August, and pulmonary edema was given as the cause of

death. An autopsy was performed at the Forensic Medicine Institute, but the

final report is pending "preliminary tests." The judicial police investigation, which was opened because the death was not witnessed, will remain open

unless resolved by the autopsy. The body was returned to Luanda after the

autopsy.

Speculative purchases of kwanzas are frequently made in Portugal, especially

by companies from various countries that have operations in Angola. A thousand kwanzas bought in Portugal for 100 to 160 escudos can be exchanged officially at practically the inverse of this rate. This Angolan currency is then

sent to Angola, where the companies use it to pay local expenses or report

transferable profits.

The presumed involvement of Angolan embassy officials in at least one of these

murders remains unproved, since the dead cannot cooperate. But there are

11
indications that Ambassador Mawete Joao Batista is not implicated. A skilled

security official (he is not a diplomat), Batista is nonetheless discomfited

by the revelation of these incidents.

At a recent meeting with Kito Rodrigues, who in fact runs Angolan security,

the ambassador had to provide an explanation and was reprimanded for his

public statements that led to the transfer and dismissal of some officials

(AFRICA CONFIDENCIAL, No 11, p 7) because of corruption. The ambassador, who

has never shown any great interest in purely diplomatic functions as long as

he has been in Lisbon, nevertheless bragged about the results of his efforts

to neutralize UNITA in Portugal at a meeting of Angolan ambassadors.

8844

CSO: 3442/50

12
ANGOLA

RESULTS OF VAN DUNEN'S VISIT TO PORTUGAL DISCUSSED

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 24 Dec 86 p 20

[Text] Portugal and Angola are becoming closer together and some of the misunderstandings that exist between the Luanda and Lisbon governments may have been

cleared up as a result of the official 3-day visit paid to our country last

week by the Angolan minister of external relations, Afonso Van Dunien.

There was no official communique at the conclusion of the visit, nor were any

spectacular decisions announced. Actually, everything was postponed until

the meeting of the joint Portuguese-Angolan commission due to take place in

Luanda within a month; and also until the visit to Lisbon by the president

of the People's Republic of Angola, Eduardo dos Santos. Nevertheless, Van

Dunen's statements are peremptory: Angola wants rapprochement with Portugal.

And the foreign minister, Pires de Miranda, was no less clearcut: He said

that they would undertake to find "satisfactory solutions," and that "there

are no unsolvable problems."

Minister Van Dunen's Meetings

This was the first time since Angola attained independence on 11 November 1975

that a member of the Luanda government paid an official visit to Portugal.

Minister Van Dunen met with the president of the republic and the prime minister,

holding several working meetings with his Portuguese colleague. He visited the

Gulbenkian Foundation and the Portuguese Industrial Association; and he also

visited the LNETI (National Industrial Engineering and Technology Laboratory),

meeting with the ambassadors of the other countries whose official language

is Portuguese, discussing the situation in Southern Africa with them.

In the view of Minister Pires de Miranda, the main decision reached was for an

increase in political and commercial consultations between the two countries.

According to Minister Van Dunen, this visit will help to improve.the bilateral

relations. He stressed that it should be a sign that such improvement in

relations and cooperation on all levels, both economic and cultural, is possible.

He precluded the possibility that this cooperation might involve the military

area, commenting only that "we did not discuss military affairs," With regard

to the messages that he brought from President Edüardo dos Santos to the Portuguese head of state and to the prime minister, he disclosed that they contained

13
greetings and expressed the RPA's desire to heighten relations with Portugal,

also including information on "the efforts expended by Angola to achieve peace

in Southern Africa."

What Was Decided

Reverting to concrete events, Van Dunen admitted the possibility that Portugal

might participate in the recovery of the Benguela railroad; a subject that he

claimed to have been discussed "slightly" in the talks. He noted that the

number of Angolan grant-holding students in Portugal would be raised, that

the Portuguese consular staff in Angola would be improved,:that construction

would be started on the Portuguese Cultural Center in Luanda, and that the new

phase of operation for the Portuguese school would also be initiated.

At the meeting set for the end of January in Luanda, the matter of the Angolan

debt to Portugal, estimated at nearly $60 million, will be renegotiated; and

the same thing will occur in the case of "other problems that, we still have

with Portugal."

In connection with the meeting at the AIP [Portuguese Industrial Association],

President Rocha de Matos said that methods of economic cooperation were analyzed, including "diversification of products, investment activities, and joint

business ventures, the implementation of Portuguese know-how, occupational

training programs, and technological renovation." Rocha de Matos was also of

the opinion that this cooperation "is quite compatible with our obligations

in the context of the EEC," and favored "preferential attention to the Portuguese speaking African countries. He commented: "We must prevent the business

relations between our countries from tending to fall into the necessarily

inflexible, generalized pattern of the Lome Accords."

UNITA in Portugal

The UNITA movement in Portugal is still viewed with apprehension by the Luanda

government, as Minister Van Dunen disclosed at the press conference which he

granted at the end of the visit, together with Minister Pires de Miranda.

Moreover, this issue was discussed at length during the meeting, and the

Angolan chief diplomat reaffirmed the fact that UNITA is "a gang of bandits"

and "assassins, created by the PIDE [International and State Defense Police]/

DGS [Security Directorate General]," and that it is engaged In "a policy of

destabilization in the service of South Africa."

However, Van Dunen explained that UNITA1s free circulation in Portugal was not

discussed with his Portuguese counterpart; inasmuch as it was not part of the

purposes of the visit. But he stressed that it is an organization which "exists

only because it has the external backing of South Africa and its allies," and

that "it will, therefore, disappear as soon as that backing ends," just as

occurred with another movement, FNLA.

14
RPA Diplomatic Offensive in. the West

When queried by TEMPO, the RPA minister denied that there were groups in his

government opposed to diplomatic rapprochement with Portugal, and to a visit

to our country by President Eduardo dos Santos. He added: "We are a government, and we do not allow factions," describing that report carried by certain

newspapers as a "big lie." And he gave as evidence of its lack of grounds

the fact that he had brought messages from President.Eduardo dos Santos to

President Mario Soares and Prime Minister Caväco Silva.

It should be added that the report was not contrived, but emerged as a result

of two ANGÖP news agency communiques distributed in Lisbon during the first

2 days of Van Dunen's visit, which began causing him problems, because they

were interpreted as a hostile expression of the MPLA radical line.

At this meeting with reporters, he confirmed to some extent that President

Eduardo dos Santos is planning a series of visits to the West, including France

and possibly Great Britain, as well as Portugal. Several observers have

interpreted these visits as a Luanda diplomatic counteroffensive to the backing

that the UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi* has gained, specifically, upon being

received by the EEC and in France. They include Eduardo dos Santos* proposals

that the U.S. president Ronald Reagan, visit Angola, or that he himself travel

to the United States, within that same policy line.

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15
ANGOLA

BPV ACTIVITIES IN HUAMBO DESCRIBED

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 6 Jan 87 p 1

[Text] Huambo (from our bureau)—The provincial preparatory committee for the

First National Conference of Popular Vigilance Brigades (BPV) was formed

last October, along with its subcommittees. It has already held all the

assemblies at the rank-and-file and intermediate levels in all the municipios,

at which time 40 members were proposed for the BPV Provincial Committee, as

well as 4 members of the National Committee and 21 delegates to the National

Conference, JORNAL DE ANGOLA learned recently from Franca Eusebio, BPV provincial coordinator.

Those nominated in the municipal assemblies will be elected in the provincial

conference to be held soon in this city, in which 180 delegates will take part.

As part of the preparations, various cultural, sports and recreational activities and voluntary work campaigns are taking place throughout the province.

"The preparations are going forward successfully. We have creatßd all the

conditions to hold the provincial conference, because the Party Provincial

Committee is keeping fully abreast of [the preparations]," said the BPV provincial coordinator, who added that the provincial coordinator of the preparatory committee is Paulo Gimy, second secretary of the party.

In this province, popular participation in the popular brigades is intensive.

The provincial directorate now supervises 148,075 brigade members, 20,737 of

whom are youths, 22,060 are party members, 34,750 are women and 51,127 are

factory workers.

As Franca Eusebio pointed out, the provincial directorate includes a sector for

political-ideological training, including primary schools, to train and

mobilize its brigade members.

On the other hand, our speaker noted the need to divide the city into blocks

and to increase the system of popular vigilance in all the areas, particularly

the economic centers; he also assured that, despite some failings that have

been observed in some brigades, they have already demonstrated their role in

defense of the people's revolution.

"The brigade members have contributed greatly in keeping the enemy offguard

and neutralizing enemy action, even capturing puppet gangs, for example, in

16
Mungo, Catchuingo, Londuibale and Caala municipios, among others," Franca

Eusebio said at one point.

On the other hand, the provincial directorate has met with several problems

preventing better control and efficient execution of its activities in

accordance with party guidelines.

Prominent among these problems is the shortage of transport means, making it

difficult to conduct activities outside the city.

According to Franca Eusebio, several problems have been surmounted because

of the success of the municipal assemblies.

Municipal Assemblies in Namibe

The municipal assemblies in preparation for the First National Conference of

Popular Vigilance Brigades ended last weekend in this province, with the

election of 40 candidates to the Provincial Committee.

According to Jose Chinana, provincial coordinator of the BPV, the process was

successful, enabling the popular masses to elect 100 delegates to the BPV

Provincial Assembly.

Chinana reported that once the municipal conferences are held, the committees

will improve the operations of this mass organization in defense of the people's

revolution and the country's territorial integrity, particularly in areas of

the province where the brigade members have played a decisive role.

For the BPV Provincial Conference, to be held on 15 January, 3 candidates for

the National Committee, 11 delegates to the National Conference and the new

Provincial Committee will be elected.

Kwanza Norte Receives Donation

A donation from the Huambo Province BPV to the residents of the town of

Camabatela, seat of Ambaca Municipio, was recently presented in this city to

Joauuim Robeiro de Almeida, commissioner of that municipio.

The donation, valued at 337,000 kwanzas, includes various articles of clothing

and household utensils. According to Joaquim Almeida, this is a patriotic

gesture which reflects the national unity that exists among the Angolan people.

It is noted that, in February 1986, the residents of the town of Camabatela

were victims of a criminal attack by a puppet gang, culminating in the murder

of defenseless civilians, including elderly people, women and children.

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17
ANGOLA

SITUATION IN KUANDO-KUBANGO ASSESSED

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 7 Jan 87 p 12

[[Text] The political, economic, social and military situation in KuandoKubango Province was assessed a few days ago by Manuel Francisco Tuta,

"Batalha de Angola," provincial commissioner and member of the MPLA-Labor Party

Central Committee, in his New Year's message to the forces for defense, security

and domestic order and to the local population.

The provincial commissioner also advised the forces for defense, security and

domestic order to increase their vigilance, to counter any type of enemy

aggression, domestic or foreign.

"Batalha de Angola" also made favorable mention of the internationalists who

are working for national reconstruction in that province.

Meanwhile, the third conference of the JMPLA-Party Youth of Kuando-Kubango

Province, which has been proceeding for several days under the leadership of

Domingos Bartolomeu, first national secretary of the Party Youth, elected its

provincial committee and respective secretariat.

During the proceedings, the progress reports of the Party Youth Provincial

Committee and the committee for control and revision were analyzed, as well as

the proposed central topic of the second JOTA [.not further expanded ]| Congress,

which will be held next April in Luanda. Tasks were also outlined for the years

1987/1988.

On the same occasion, 3 nominees for the JMPLA National Committee and 12

delegates to the Second Congress were selected.

At the end of the meeting, Domingos Bartolomeu recommended that all young

people engage more fully in the tasks of national reconstruction.

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18
ANGOLA

29 COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES ON TRIAL

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 7 Jan 87 p 1

[Report by Luis Ferreira]

[Text] A group of 29 counterrevolutionaries accused of conspiring against the

party and Government of the People's Republic of Angola went on trial yesterday

morning in the People's Revolutionary Court (TPR).

The TPR, with Chief Justice Augusto de Costa Carneiro presiding, assisted by

associate judges Garcia Bires and Salomao Tito, spent about 5 hours yesterday

hearing the testimony of defendant Moises Andre Lima ("Moshe Eleison"), leader

of the group, who confirmed some of the charges contained in the indictments.

The defendant, aged 34, married, completed the seventh year in the old school

system. A native of Kivemba N'na Vemba (Uige Province) and a pilot, he is

also charged with carrying false documents.

In yesterday morning's session, Agostinho Luis Gaspar, prosecuting attorney of

the TPR, read the charges contained in the indictments, in which it was alleged

that the objectives advocated by this group involve "terrorist actions which

include the abduction of provincial officials and attacks against civilian

polulations, to produce psychological effects calculated to^earn the group

greater recognition and adherence among the popular masses."

The charges also state that one of the goals of the group was "to extend its ^

theatre of operations to all fronts, as a way of generalizing their struggle,

since most of its action was launched in the north of the country, specifically

in Zaure Province. According to statements by group leader Moises Lina to the

Angolan authorities, "these tasks would be executed in tandem «i^ the great

•SIROCO« operation, which would make it possible to achieve more resounding

results on a broader scale."

The defendant testified that he had belonged to the MPLA-Movement and had

participated in the First War for National Liberation in 1971, later benefiting from a 1-year scholarship in the USSR, where he had attended a course for

political commissars, and that he had resided in Portugal, where he took a

civil aviation course and also "conducted intensive propaganda and diplomatic

action against our country."

19
Also during his stay in Portugal, the defendant is alleged to have maintained

"contacts with a series of Western countries," including'Prance, the FRG,

England, Belgium, Japan, Israel, South Africa and the United States of America,

among others, seeking political, military, financial and other types of support."

The charges also state that the defendant "illegally entered Angola via the

neighboring Republic of Zaire in 1981 and took up residence in Soya, Zaire

Province, making a series of furtive trips to Luanda to lure individuals into

service in the cause of his group."

According to information contained in the indictments, this counterrevolutionary

group included Portuguese Jose August© Vieira, aged 62, married, a native of

Lourissal (Pombal), who is a planning technician and a resident of Samba

Municipio, in Luanda Province. The clandestine group was created on 25

September 1977, in Ponta Negre, in the People's Republic of the Congo, and began

to develop its activities in 1981, when the gang leader "Moshe Eleison" returned

to Angola.

The trial will continue at 0900 hours this morning, in the TPR hearing room.

Among others, the court will hear testimony from defendant Alfredo Sumbo

("Tarantula"), charged with being second in command of the group, replacing the

late Manuel Dembe.

Sumbo, the second to testify in this trial, is alleged to have been recruited

by the group in 1981, having previously belonged to the "military horde of the

defunct UPA/FNLA [Union of Angolan peoples/Angolan National Liberation FrontJ."

It is noted that one of the defendants is being tried in absentia» she is

Margarida da Conceicao Pires, single, aged 58, a native of Caconda (Huila

Province), matron and hospital nurse in the Soyo Mission.

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20
ANGOLA

RSA OPERATIONS IN CUNENE CITED BY ANGOP

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 9 Jan 87 p 1

[Text] The racist South Africans are again developing intensive provocative

activity inside the sovereign and independent territory of the People's Republic

of Angola, more precisely, in Cunene Province. An official military source

s o informed the Angolan news agency ANGOP yesterday.

In the period from 13 December to 5 January, the forces of the racist South

African Army violated our air space four times and conducted six land movements

in the localities of Chitumbo, Baia dos Tigres, Chicuco, Anhanca, Nenhone,

Evale, Xangongo, Mutado, Chiede, Ndova, Mulondo, Omupanda, Namacunde, Mongua

Mupa and Ondjiva.

According to the same source, during the incursions in the above-mentioned

locales, the South African forces used as many as 150 vehicles, in groups of

15 to 40, as well as 4 planes and 4 helicopters.

The source also noted the presence of "mixed" troops (South African Regular

Army and UNITA), engaged in further destabilizing actions against the people's

Republic of Angola, once again clearly proving that they are in collusion.

The following actions and movements of the racist South African Army have been

recorded!

—On 13 December, a South African plane violated Angolan air space, overflying

50 kilometers in the south of Mulondo.

—On 18 December, 10 Kasper-type vehicles from Chitumbo patrolled the area of

Hango, 17 kilometers east of Ondjiva, and then withdrew to the area of Mutado,

27.5 kilometers east of Ondjiva. On the same day, 30 vehicles of the same type

crossed at Marker 20, passing to the north of Chiede in the direction of Ndova,

They had air support from two helicopters of the Puma type.

—On 19 December, South African forces captured a FAPLA [People's Armed Forces

for the Liberation of Angola] soldier assigned to the territorial troops in

Cuvelai, stationed in the communal village known as Jose Lugome, 5.5 kilometers

east of Mupa. On the same day, the FAPLA engaged with mixed (South African

Army/ UNITA) forces in the area of Namacunde, 25 kilometers from Xangongo,

where a Mercedes troop transport vehicle was recaptured.

21
—On 20 December, South African troops moved 20 kilometers north of Mupa, in

a convoy of 30 Kasper-type vehicles.

—On 26 December, from 2100 to 2200 hours, a South African plane overflew the

locale of the Baia dos Tigres. On the same day, a South African column moved

through the area of the Bola River, 57.5 kilometers east of Tchamutete.

—On 28 December, South African ground forces, supported by helicopters,

penetrated the areas of Anhanca, Nenhone and Evale, intimidating the residents.

—On 29 December, South African troops captured two soldiers of the TGFA

(Angolan Border Guard Troops), with their respective weapons, in areas of

Omupanda, 16 kilometers from Ondjiva, and then withdrew to the area of Chicuco

21 kilometers east of Ondjiva, with about 16 Kasper-type vehicles.

—On 31 Decmmber, at 1100 hours, a South African column, in a convoy of

15 Kasper-type vehicles, entered at Marker 25 and patrolled areas of Namacunde,

withdrawing in the direction of Namibia at 1600 hours.

—On 3 January, at 1500 hours, South African forces attacked positions of the

FAPLA forces which were protecting the Ondjiva-Mongua road, 25 kilometers from

Ondjiva.

~0n 4 January, at 1300 hours, the South African forces returned to attack the

Angolan forces stationed 21 kilometers from Ondjiva, on the road to Mongua.

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22
ANGOLA

ARMED FORCES CONDUCT CENSUS OF DRAFT-AGE YOUTH

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 14 Jan 87 p 1

[Text] The Luanda Provincial Recruitment and Mobilization Center has announced,

through a note which arrived at our editorial offices yesterday, that, based

on the terms of the General Law on Military Service (No 12/82, of 9 October),

covered by Chapter V and the provisions of the defense minister's order No

0156/86, all citizens of the male sex born between 1 January and 31 December

1971 must appear for purposes of a military census.

Moreover, and for the same purpose, all those born in previous years who have

not rectified their military status thus far must also appear.

For this purpose, all the young men must appear at the municipal commissariats

in their respective districts, starting tomorrow arid until 28 February.

It should be stressed that, on the.occasion of the census, all those involved

must have with them their respective identity cards, certificate of residence,

and record of reading, writing, and occupational qualifications, and those of

their family group, as well as five passport-type photos and proof of their

education or service.

The same note also announces that all the citizens involved who fail to appear

without justified cause will be subject to liability, in accordance with the

legislation currently in effect.

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23
ANGOLA

ANGOLAN STUDENTS' LIFE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA DESCRIBED

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 17 Jan 87 p 2

[Excerpts] Prague—The Angolan student community in the Socialist Republic of

Czechoslovakia totals approximately 400 grant holders, 45 of whom are female,

as we were told recently by the head of the Angolan Students Union (UEA) in

that country, Francisco da Silva Chack.

Francisco Chack also informed us that, during the last academic year, 47 intermediate and higher-level technicians were trained. Meanwhile, during the

academic year 1986-87, over 70 Angolan students have arrived at the Czech

and Slovak language learning centers.

When invited to give a description of the work being done, he began by saying

that the current association leadership is new.

Included among the activities planned and carried out are the reorganization

of the provincial records, the introduction of new methods for paying dues,

the organization of the finalists' celebration, the creation of collaborative

duties in households, and the participation in the vacation plan (volunteer

work brigades) to occupy the large amount of spare time.

Noteworthy in the area of short and medium-term plans are the discussion of

the new bylaws, the study of the internal regulations, the planning for the

UEA annual assembly, and the organization of a trip to the GDR, a tour that

will serve as an incentive for the students who were most prominent in academic

and associative activities last year.

That association official noted that the lack of information is a real problem

for the agency that he heads; because the newspapers and magazines (for example,

ENERGIA and NOVEMBRO) appear only sporadically, and the students want to have

regular news about our country.

Francisco da Silva Chack praised the good relations that the UEA has with the

Socialist Union of Czechoslovak Youth, which has supported our association

materially.

The Czechoslovak educational authorities have also provided financial aid, on

the occasion of the 11 November celebrations and the holding of main assemblies

to elect the Angolan Students Union leadership bodies.

24
On this occasion, Francisco Chack informed us of the creation of the SAEP

(Party Students Support Section). This is a new agency which is exclusively

subordinate to the Cadres Department of the MPLA-<Labor Party's Central

Committee, but which, however, cannot be considered an organization parallel

to the association, because the latter includes all the gränt-hölders (who

have been sent by the party or the state).'

He said that the Angolan Students Union in Czechoslovakia was created in 1979.

It currently has 11 provincial commissions and, after the one in the USSR,

it is the second largest group of Angolan grant-4iolders in Europe. And, as

we already have had occasion to stress, the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia has for a long time been one of the source's of training for Angolan

cadres.

Subsequently, that head of the UEA made a point of mentioning that more

problems are arising with the increased numbers of students; and they are

accumulating, because they are not always easy to solve.

He claimed that this situation requires more and better contacts with the

National Institute of Study Grants (INABE), because there are questions the

settlement of which entails this organization's intervention with the local

authorities. He said that, to tell the truth, in certain instances the UEA

is not considered to be a suitable spokesman.

Meanwhile, he paused to underscore the good work done by the Angolan Embassy

in the GDR, particularly by Ambassador Mendes de Carvalho, who has been

untiring in his search for solutions to the problems besetting Angolan

students in Czechoslovakia.

The UEA head revealed to us that on many occasions the ambassador had to

intervene directly in order to solve some specific problems (changes in

courses, financial problems, replacement of passports, etc.).

The subject of our interview expressed real anger at the fact that, during

the academic year 1985-86, there was a considerable number of failures to

pass among the Angolan grant-holders.

In most instances, a low level of basic knowledge was noted among the students

going abroad; which, once again, proves that the "PUNIV" has poorly prepared

many students who have had to continue their studies in institutions of

higher learning.

He claimed that there have also been instances prompting us to believe that

there is a certain amount of negligence and lack of responsibility among the

grant-holders themselves.

In addition, he told us that many students, primarily in Prague, are not

participating in activities scheduled by the UEA, whether they be meetings,

lectures, or cultural tests on the occasion of national celebrations. For

25
example, on the last 17 September, only half of the Angolan community studying in the Czechoslovak capital deigned to commemorate that important date

together.

He admitted that there is a real situation marked by lack of discipline, which

should not be tolerated.

All this is conceivable only when one considers the fact that there are no

penalties. Perhaps, with the emergence.of new UEA bylaws, within a few

months, the current problems may be solved.

The situation should not be considered surprising, because many grant-holders

tend to lack discipline. Some have already been expelled to Angola by the

school administrations. Francisco Chack noted that, nevertheless, when

assigned in Luanda, they remain unpunished.

Moreover, it should be made quite clear here that students over 18 years of

age should not benefit from grants for intermediate courses in Czechoslovakia,

because on that educational level, everyone is considered a minor. The

boarding houses have strict regulations (silence is required after 2100 or

2200 hours, they are not allowed to spend the night outside of the boarding

house on working days of the week, etc.). And, of course, not every adult

understands a school system such as this.

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26
ANGOLA

COOOPERATION WITH USSR TO INCREASE

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 15 Jan 87 p 64

[Text] Greater and more intense cooperation between the CEMA [Council for

Mutual Economic Assistance] countries and the People's Republic of Angola is

the goal of the joint commission that has now been created, in an agreement

signed recently in Moscow. In this way, an attempt is being made to increase

the economic and cultural relations between Angola and the socialist countries.

As stipulated in the Moscow agreement, the Bulgarian geologists will continue

the prospecting of the phosphate deposits begun nearly 3 years ago, the results

of which, however, are unknown. The USSR will participate in the construction

of the Kapanda hydroelectric power plant on the Kwanza River, with power

exceeding 500 megawatts. And 70 Soviet technicians will carry out the

electrification plan in Malanje Province, to be accomplished by 1990.

The organization of agricultural and livestock enterprises to help improve

the food supply of the inhabitants of Angola is another goal of this cooperation; for which purpose the Bulgarian enterprise, Agrocomplect, has already

started planting fruit trees near Luanda, also providing machinery, fertilizer,

and pesticides.

The Cuban Government, in turn, has given study grants to enable Angolan young

people to receive intermediate education. It is fitting to note that over

2,000 Cuban physicians, nurses, specialists in civil construction, and teachers

are working in Angola. We should add that, meanwhile, the third Technical

Education Center has started operating, to train mechanics to be assigned

to the agricultural sector, with a capacity for 600 students.

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27
ANGOLA

BRIEFS

DISSENSION BETWEEN MINISTERS—Dissension within the Angolan government between

Pedro van Dunem, minister of state for production, and Maria Mambo Cafe, minister of state for socioeconomic issues, has worsened. An upcoming shuffling

of government posts will be used to good advantage to straighten out problems

of this nature. The spheres of activity of these two ministers of state overlap considerably, and the differences in their understanding of the problems

and how to solve them are sharp. To make matters worse, as Central Committee

secretary for the economy and finance, Mambo Cafe has power over Van Dunem although Van Dunem outranks her in the Party hierarchy (he is a member of the

Politburo). Van Dunem is generally considered pragmatic, stubborn and shrewd.

Mambo Cafe, who is not rumored to be highly intelligent, is an advocate of

applying Marxist-Leninist ideology to economic issues. When the offices of

the ministers of state were created and practically all the sectorial ministries were placed under them, the subordinated ministers saw the reorganization

as decreasing their decision-making role. This is the root of the main obstacles to government operations. [Text] [Lisbon AFRICA CONFIDENCIAL in

Portuguese Oct 86 p 3] 8844

UNITA'S ACTIVITIES IN LUBANGO OFF—In contrast to the situation in the neighboring provinces of Huambo, Cunene, Namibe and Cuando-Cubango, UNITA'S military

activities in Lubango Province have been considerably curtailed. Since Lopo

do Nascimento was appointed Lubango provincial commissar, life in the province

has increasingly normalized, and Lubango has become the best provisioned province against a general background of shortages. Lopo de Nascimento enjoys a

considerable degree of administrative autonomy, even in the area of currency

exchange. The local branch of the National Bank has its own dollar funds,

which make it possible to obtain consumer goods through direct access to foreign

markets. From the military point of view, Lubango is a fortress. The contingent of Cuban troops is quite large, batteries of antiaircraft missiles are

stationed at critical locations, and an airbase with underground concrete bomb

shelters was built two years ago adjoining the city's airport. [Text] [Lisbon

AFRICA CONFIDENCIAL in Portuguese Oct 86 p 3] 8844

'NEGRITUDE' REMOVED FROM UNITA LOGO—At UNITA'S last congress (AFRICA CONFIDENCIAL, No 11, p VIII), the decision was made to remove the word "negritude"

from the organization's logo because it was felt that it lent itself to negative racial interpretations. Until recently, UNITA tried to capitalize on the

mestizos' discontent at not having progressed in Angola. But use of this term

led to misgivings on the part of the mestizos. UNITA also removed all refer28
ences to "non-alignment" from its logo and platform. The reasoning behind

this change is that the real meaning of non-alignment has now been corrupted.

[Text] [Lisbon AFRICA CONFIDENCIAL in Portuguese Oct 86 p 3] 8844

PROPOSAL REJECTED BY ZAIRE, ZAMBIA—Although using different arguments, the

presidents of Zaire and Zambia declined to provide troops from their respective countries for a force which Angola wants to put in place to ensure security for the Benguela Railway. Angola's proposal was made by Jose Eduardo dos

Santos on 19 October at a meeting in Mbala, Zambia, which was attended by

President Kenneth Kaunda, President Mobutu Sese Seko and the late President

Samora Machel. The Zairian head of state rejected the proposal out of hand,

arguing that it would be tantamount to further internationalizing the Angolan

conflict. Kaunda said the proposal was not feasible, citing logistical difficulties. Apart from its strategy to reopen the Benguela Railway, the Luanda

regime saw acceptance of the proposal as a subtle way of wooing Zaire and

perhaps changing Zaire's policies toward UNITA. Angolan authorities (AFRICA

CONFIDENCIAL, No 10, p 10) remain convinced that Zaire will lend considerable

assistance to UNITA and allow use of its territory to conduct other operations.

At the Mbala meeting, Dos Santos also proposed setting up a joint commission

to patrol the Angolan border with Zaire, which got an evasive response from

President Mobutu. [Text] [Lisbon AFRICA CONFIDENCIAL in Portuguese Oct 86 p 4]

8844

STUDENTS COURTED BY MPLA, UNITA—The MPLA, in keeping with its plans to penetrate the large Angolan community in Portugal (which by definition is largely

hostile to the MPLA), has been giving special attention to student circles.

Angolan security officials at the embassy in Lisbon are specially assigned to

win over undecided students and even those with links to UNITA. Angolan student circles in Portugal, "infiltrated" by fifty or so UNITA student activists,

are now one of the sectors best penetrated by Jonas Savimbi's organization.

Portuguese student groups, which are particularly conservative, support UNITA's

efforts. Angola recently sent about 150 scholarship winners to Portuguese

schools in Lisbon, Porto, Coimbra and Covilha in a further effort to contain

UNITA's ascendancy. The majority of them are girls, and their scholarships,

which are well paying, are funded by Angola. Scholarships for the Angolan

students sent to Portugal by UNITA are funded by UNITA itself, but cases are

known in which companies regularly subsidize scholarships. It is also known

that the Service for Foreigners has sometimes caused difficulties for UNITA

students. [Text] [Lisbon AFRICA CONFIDENCIAL in Portuguese Oct 86 p 4] 8844

BULGARIAN AGRICULTURAL EFFORTS CRITICIZED—Experiments in Angola by Bulgarian

specialists in growing rice and citric fruit have failed repeatedly, due to the

introduction of varieties (hybrids in the case of citric fruit) which turned

out to be poorly suited to the local climate and soils. Under the cooperative

program which the East bloc countries have worked out among themselves to aid

African countries, the agricultural area in particular has fallen to Bulgaria.

But they have had enormous failures due to their insistence in ignoring studies

and experience accumulated over several centuries. Rice production in the Limpopo Valley in Mozambique was about 90,000 metric tons in 1975, but has never

29
been more than 15,000 metric tons since the Bulgarians, using their own lowquality equipment, started providing technical assistance to CAIL, the stateowned company set up at the time to experiment in the area. [Text] [Lisbon

AFRICA CONFIDENCIAL in Portuguese Oct 86 p 4] 8844

GOVERNMENT-MERIDIEN DISAGREEMENT CITED—Meridien may soon withdraw as manager

of the Presidente Hotel in Luanda due to a disagreement marked by mutual accusations between the hotel chain and the Angolan government. The situation

recently worsened when the hotel's management objected to a meeting which Minister of State Kundy Paiama held with the hotel's employees, which the hotel

described as "meddling." The authorities accuse Meridien of poor management

and practices harmful to the national interest. Meridien was awarded the management contract in bidding in which Estoril-Sol lost out. [Text] [Lisbon

AFRICA CONFIDENCIAL in Portuguese Oct 86 p 4] 8844

COUNTRY'S DEBT TO USSR—Angola's debt to the Soviet Union now amounts to $2

billion. Due to hard currency difficulties because of the drop in the price

of oil, Angola must now ask for a moratorium on the payment of overdue debts.

An official classified forecast by the Angolan government indicates that 1986

oil export receipts are under $900 million, which is 60 percent less than 1985

revenues. A substantial part of these revenues is earmarked for arms purchases

from the USSR. At the lowest point of the oil price crisis, Angola had to

sell crude at $6 a barrel and divert shipments of contracted oil to East bloc

countries to help pay its debts. Angola's debt to the Soviet Union is overwhelmingly due to military purchases. Depending on the type of equipment purchased, the country assumes short-, medium- and long-term credit arrangements.

For example, munitions are purchased on short-term credit. [Text] [Lisbon

AFRICA CONFIDENCIAL in Portuguese Oct 86 p 5] 8844

FOREIGN TECHNICAL ASSISTANTS—The enforcement of legislation approved by Angola

in early 1986, which drastically affects privileges that had been enjoyed until

now by technical assistants and so-called resident foreign workers (mostly from

Portugal and Cape Verde), has been postponed. Authorities fear that effective

imposition of the new statutes on technical assistants and resident foreigners

would force thousands of technicians and skilled workers to leave the country,

further aggravating the economic and governmental vacuum. The greatest fears

concern the foreign residents (former colonists), who generally play a very

active role in the operations of a number of sectors in national life. They

are also a highly experienced group thoroughly familiar with local conditions.

Until now, foreign residents have been remitting abroad an average of about

$1,000 a month from their salary. Under the new legislation, they would only

be entitled to remit $1,200 a year. In addition, they would be paid the same

wage scale as Angolan workers. Admittedly, authorities will be very flexible

in the case of foreign residents, applying selective criteria. The provisions

will be followed more strictly in the case of technical assistants, about whom

attitudes are very critical. The new legislation was also approved in an effort to blunt the complaints of Angolans who considered themselves discriminated against in the areas of wages and salaries, remittances abroad and other

privileges when they had equivalent technical or professional training. There

are also doubts in Angola about the actual effectiveness of the technical

assistants (AFRICA CONFIDENCIAL, No 3, p 1). [Text] [Lisbon AFRICA CONFIDENCIAL in Portuguese Oct 86 p 7] 8844

30
ADDITIONAL CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL—The Cuban presence in Angola will extend

until 1989, and it has emerged in another country: in Burkina Faso (Upper Volta),

a geographical area which separates "white Africa" from "black Africa." Insofar as Angola is concerned, a new cooperation agreement was signed with Cuba,

covering the period from 1986 to 1989, and reinforcing the bilateral relations

between the two countries. Signing the agreement on behalf of the Luanda government was Roberto de Almeida, of the MPLA hard line, and one of the opponents of

rapprochment with Portugal. As for Upper Volta, the Cuban military advisors

are traveling from Havana to the airport on the island of Sal, in Cape Verde,

and from there to Luanda. The president of this country, under French influence,

Thomas Sankara, who came to power through a coup d'etat last August, wants to

become allied with other countries outsideof the French-speaking zone. [Text]

[Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 24 Dec 86 p 20] 2909

ELECTRICAL SUPPLY SYSTEM IMPROVED—Menongue--The provincial energy agency and

the community services department are engaged in an.effort in this town to

improve the electrical system, after a general inspection of the generating

sets installed in the thermal power plant in the capital city of Kuando Kubango.

During the past 2 weeks the work to recover lamp-posts has proceeded at a fast

pace, with the installation of light bulbs, oil lamps, and other items essential

for the improvement of the electrical system. According to souces associated

with the energy sector in the province, the poor lighting in the town was

caused by certain senseless drivers who knocked down lamp-posts; because, until

mid-1982, the urban center and surrounding districts had electric power. The

municipalities of Cuchi and Cuito Cuanavale, which also have generating sets,

will be included in this improvement effort as well, when the technicians from

the Sorel enterprise have undertaken the maintenance of the sets and the number

of electricians in the province is increased. It is noteworthy that these

activities are occurring after the recommendations emanating from the sessions

of the Provincial People's Assembly and the meetings of the commissariat, aimed

at creating better conditions for the province's population. [Text] [Luanda

JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 10 Jan 87 p 3] 2909

CUBANS COMPLETE BRIDGE/DOCK CONSTRUCTION—Cabinda—ANGOP learned on Monday from

a source associated with the Cabinda port enterprise that the work on the Vila

da Juventude (formerly Cacongo) bridge and dock, which began in August of last

year, is due to be completed during the second half of this month. The finishing of the aforementioned bridge and dock, for which the Cuban construction

enterprise, UNECA, was responsible, according to the terms of a contract

amounting to $350,000 ($1.00 is equivalent to approximately 35 kwanzas), should

put an end to the province's dependence on the port of Ponta Negra (Congo).

According to the same source, when the bridge and dock have been completed,

the province will have another port available, the initiation of which has

been set for next month. Meanwhile, the same source noted, they are awaiting

the arrival of the equipment to be installed in that port, namely, hoists,

gantreys, pontoons, barges, and tugboats. It should be recalled that the lack

of a port capable of ensuring the rate of exports and imports in the province

has been one of the most significant problems. According to provincial

officials, its solution has assumed major importance in the forestry sector,

wherein the volume of lumber exports depends largely on the Congolese port of

Ponta Negra; [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 14 Jan 87 p 3] 2909

CSO: 3442/82

31
SHIP CHARTERING FIRM FOUNDED—Angola has just founded Anctangol in London, a

company which will be active in chartering ships to transport liquid and dry

cargo to and from Angola. Working capital for the new company will be provided

by revenues from the resale of oil made available by Sonangol. The two companies will thus be partners. Management of Anctangol, which will also function

as a trading company, will be in the hands of Victor de Carvalho, formerly a

high Sonangol official. Angola markets its oil and coffee in London. [Text]

[Lisbon AFRICA CONFIDENCIAL in Portuguese Oct 86 p 7] 8844

ANGOP AGREEMENTS CITED—In the latter part of September, ANGOP, the Angolan

news agency, signed cooperative agreements with counterpart news agencies: ADN

(GDR), CTK (Czechoslovakia), and VNA (Vietnam), and National Radio renewed its

agreement with Cuban Radio Broadcasting. On almost the same level, a Soviet

information and propaganda delegation visited the Angolan capital, while TASS

and Prensa Latina signed cooperative agreements in Luanda with the news agencies of Vietnam and Cambodia. In an effort to maintain their influence in

Angola, the Communist countries are devoting special attention to the information sector, relying on the complacency or outright support of many of the

sector's officials. Angolan officials such as Alexandre Rodrigues (Kito) and

even President Jose Eduardo dos Santos are very critical of Angolan information, which is often fed a line that causes embarrassment to official policy.

[Text] [Lisbon AFRICA CONFIDENCIAL in Portuguese Oct 86 p 7] 8844

CSO: 3442/50

32
MALI

TRAORE'S NEW YEAR MESSAGE TO NATION

Bamako L'ESSOR in French 3-4 Jan 87 p 2

[Gen Moussa Traore's New Year message to nation]

[Text] My fellow Malians:

In a few hours, 1986 will come to an end. It has been a difficult year economically and financially, but the seeds of hope it has sown leave our faith in

the future intact.

Many of you have felt the acuteness of its economic difficulties in the form

of delays in the payment of wages, difficulties in marketing farm products or

a slump in business.

Our economic problems are first of all the result of structural factors whose

effects have built up over the past 26 years.

The relative burden of the government and its disruption in economic life and

burdensome administrative procedures largely explains the slowdown in economic

activity.

The structures and methods of government intervention must be adapted in order

to help the government play its essential role, to wit: establishing guidelines and priorities; determining the framework within which the activities

of producers and operators must fit; ensuring the development of strategic

sectors by its intervention when necessary; ensuring a fair distribution of

income; and enforcing respect for the rules of play by applying the proper

sanctions where required.

Our problems also result from outside factors that we cannot control, particularly world prices for raw materials.

Finally and above all, our economic problems result from the negative behavior

of certain Malians vis-a-vis their duty. Such types of behavior have checked

the implementation of the policy of recovery, accentuating existing economic

and financial difficulties.

33
This is one of the main lessons we must learn from the year coming to a close,

just as we were asked to do by the National Council since its fourth session

in March.

The fourth session of the National Council of the UDPM [Democratic Union of

Malian People] marked an important phase in the life of our country.

It pointed up the virtues of objective, constructive self-criticism and the

need for strict application of this cardinal principle within the Democratic

Union of Malian People.

My fellow countrymen:

The history of our country shows that our nation is capable of facing the

worst adversity.

No handicap is insurmountable for a determined people when that people mobilizes all its energies effectively to meet it.

The Malian people, especially in the rural areas, have kept intact the noble

virtues of our ancestors: courage, discipline, attachment to their homeland.

The results obtained in protecting the environment and food self-sufficiency

are eloquent proof of their willingness. Bush fires are fewer in number.

There are more improved homes. Reforestation is moving ahead and the people

are doing more and more to improve farm production and improve their living

conditions.

They have largely responded to the party's appeal and to the government's

action in these domains.

Grass-roots efforts deserve to be supported by suitable leadership and

strict management and supervision of their accomplishments.

My fellow countrymen:

The basic role which government employees have to play in the work of nationbuilding escapes no one.

On their commitment, the honesty with which they manage public holdings, the

effectiveness with which they work to implement programs will depend the

success of action taken for our economic and financial recovery, as well as

the success of the efforts made by our working people.

The economic problems facing our country are complex. Better management of

the public holdings, more effective organization of the people and economic

activity and an effective application of reforms undertaken would have made it

possible to reduce their acuteness and even solve them. But the effectiveness of such measures depends on the men who apply them.

34
Unfortunately, many failings or inadequacies have been recorded. Changing

ways of thinking at all levels of government and a collective awareness are

therefore more than ever necessary.

My fellow countrymen:

All the party sections now have documents on the Charter of National Orientation and the Conduct of Public Life, as well as proposed amendments to the

basic texts of the Democratic Union of Malian People.

The stakes are considerable. It is in fact a matter of enabling all the

nation's live forces, including women, young people, workers, peasants, farmers, herders, fishermen, merchants, manufacturers and civilian and military

officials to share the same vision of our history, current events and the

very future of Mali.

It is also a matter of improving the basic party texts in order to enable it

to assume its complete vocation as a crucible rallying all Malian men and

women, open to all ideas and abilities, a center of continuing, fertile

dialogue, the center of the advancement of economic and social progress, and

an effective recourse of Malian members.

My fellow countrymen:

I ask you to make your maximum contribution to the national debate that has

just been initiated and to make constructive criticism of the analyses and

propositions that are submitted to you, so that the process begun nearly a

year ago will lead to a common platform of action.

You will enliven debates with courage and lucidity, with a spirit of openness and dialogue, a sense of justice and tolerance characterizing our people.

My fellow countrymen:

It will be by building a strong and prosperous Malian nation that we shall

have the best chance of making the ideals of peace and justice guiding our

foreign policy prevail.

In this respect, Mali will remain ever intransigent on its policy of nonalignment and faithful to its good-neighbor policy and to the ideal of African

unity. We remain open to cooperation with all those who respect our sovereignty and dignity.

The Malian people have just proved their attachment to the cause of peace and

African unity, accepting, the verdict of The Hague International Court of

Justice.

Respect for this order and its application constitute a victory for the Malian

and Burkinabe brothers.

35
Once a bone of contention, the border will henceforth be a factor of rapprochement for the two peoples and a common development zone.

Mali will always give its support to peoples fighting for their freedom,

particularly in southern Africa and the Middle East, for there can be no

progress for mankind without peace.

There can be no peace without freedom and there can be no freedom as long

as there are oppressed peoples and as long as a large part of the world remains subjected to the existing international economic order.

Thus it is that peace in the world remains largely dependent, not only on

disarmament, but also on international cooperation and the success of the

fight against underdevelopment.

Hope placed in international cooperation must not make us lose sight of the

fact that the fight against underdevelopment is above all the fight of the

developing countries themselves.

Success of the African Economic Recovery Plan depends on the effectiveness

of the fight which each African country will wage within its territory and

within the framework of intensified subregional and regional cooperation.

I am convinced that Mali will face the challenge in order to remain faithful

to its traditions and the idea of African unity. Despite its handicaps, it

will have the means to do so.

It is enough for the Maiian people to mobilize and concentrate all their

energies, all their abilities, with vigor and tenacity, to attain the objectives set.

The best signs of this assertion are: the results obtained by farm producers

since the winter season of 1985; the success registered by the young college

graduates and government employees who have dedicated themselves with courage

and ingeniousness to setting up their own businesses; and finally, the rapid

rehabilitation of certain units that have enjoyed a proper takeover of

their system of management.

My fellow countrymen:

We shall definitely have to face new difficulties in 1987, but the challenge

is within our range.

We shall take it up, with the certainty of victory, as long as we remain

united and determined.

In conclusion, I should like to address to all Malian men and women, at home

and abroad, as well as to all foreigners who for any reason live with us and

share our joys and sorrows every day, my sincere wishes for the New Year.

May our courage and efforts be justly rewarded! May our fervent desires be

fulfilled for the happiness and welfare of our dear Mali!

Long live Mali! Long live the republic!

11,464

CSO: 3419/70 36
MALI

REASONS FOR TREASURY CRISIS EXAMINED

Bamako L'ESSOR in French 7 Jan 87 p 3

[Article by Yalla Sidibe: "Why Money Goes Out Faster Than It Comes In"]

[Text] The 1987 Budget is balanced in receipts and spending at over 78.5 billion CFA francs and shows an increase of 11.8 percent for receipts and 13.6

percent for spending. By way of comparison, the 1986 Budget amounted to over

70 billion CFA francs.

Some 23.3 percent of the spending in this budget is devoted to education and

12 percent to health, while the growth in the material chapter of government

offices goes from 18.9 percent in 1986 to 20 percent in 1987. Personnel

charges will represent 54 percent, compared with 66.9 percent in 1985.

However, one must note that the 1986 Budget was put together in an economic

and financial context marked by dwindling foreign resources, a drop in export

receipts, inadequate mobilization of saving and the weakening of the banking

system.

In order to understand the current situation better, one must take a look

at the evolution of our public finances from 1982 to 1985, when results were

quite satisfactory. The gradual reduction in the budgetary deficit since

1982 and even a slight provisional surplus in 1986 bears witness to the efforts made in the way of courageous structural adjustment measures through

programs arranged with the IMF and the World Bank.

The financial situation on 30 September 1986 also reveals that the government

budget is executed under good conditions and one may think that estimates at

the end of December will be met in a satisfactory way.

Proper execution of the budget may make it difficult to understand the ever

greater delays in the payment of public obligations. In fact, the public

in general views the Treasury as a mere cashier for the budget and generally

considers the Treasury situation to be an exact reflection of the budget

situation. If the Treasury experiences difficulties in balancing its operations, it can be only in proportion to the volume of the deficit it is made

to bear by execution of the budget.

37
Consequently, certain questions have to be asked: What is the cause of the

crisis? When will it end? These are complex, delicate questions to which it

is difficult to give answers.

Before proceding to an analysis of the origin and causes of the Treasury

crisis, one must make a careful distinction between the notion of a balanced

Treasury and that of balanced public finances, so as to avoid a serious error

in judgment. Experience in fact shows that management of the Treasury cannot

be summed up as mere figures concerning the budget balance.

The Treasury crisis that became more acute during the last quarter of 1986

essentially stems from the persistence of certain economic imbalances, as

well as profound distortions in public finances. The crisis must therefore

not be perceived as the sudden appearance of a circumstantial phenomenon, but

rather, as the effect, the consequence, of those imbalances.

Experience shows that management of the Treasury cannot be reduced to the mere

matter of the budget balance. Rather, it has to do with phenomena that are

much more varied and complex. This is all the truer because it can be clearly

seen in the summarized situation of Treasury operations and rather sizable

financing differences which the Treasury, lacking resources, cannot Cover.

The budget situation on 30 September shows that the 1986 Budget is being

carried out quite correctly with respect to predictions, despite a continuing

difficult context. There is no substantial gap between receipts and spending.

It is therefore not from execution of the budget that the crisis stems.

One must understand here that the element determining the Treasury balance

mainly rests on the Treasury's ability to find the resources needed to cover

its spending flow.

The reasons why this department cannot play its role as a banker correctly

are many, but for a better study of the subject, one can classify them in two

main groups: internal and external causes.

The first classification includes all those linked to operation of the system

as a whole and the country's internal structures.

Until only recently (1981), execution of the budget always ended in deficits.

In 1980, the deficit was over 20 billion Malian francs. Major back payments

(over 25 billion Malian francs in 1981) had also built up over the preceding

years. It was also during that period that the public Treasury, in order to

finance the large deficits, drew upon the deposits of its largest correspondents.

What is the source of such Treasury tension when deficits are now minimized?

Partially from a gap between the rate of collecting budget receipts, on the'

one hand, and the execution of spending, on the other. To put it simply,

in order to avoid spending money faster than it comes in, one must somehow

spread tax payment deadlines throughout the year, while at the same time

controlling the speed at which warrants for payment are issued.

38
In this area, there has been slippage, worsened by 3 billion francs paid

before ordered and over 6 billion in fiscal compensations. Add to that all

kinds of exemptions granted (special privileges, cooperation agreements,

investment code), which in 1981 removed 15.7 billion from the Treasury (out

of a total of 17 billion). Note also in this field that this year, customs

duty exemptions amounted to 12 billion, while settlements of that same department amount to 60 percent of the total.

The total break with the OPT [Postal and Telecommunications Office] has also

affected the Treasury situation, depriving it of OPT deposits, especially

in the districts and regions. Another factor increasing tension is the level

of personnel spending, which amounts to 66 percent of the government's budget.

All countries with a similar rate never fail to have problems paying wages.

Regarding the banks, in its relations with the BCEAO [Central Bank of the

West African States], the Treasury is treated like a regular customer.

In other words, there is no mechanism of automatic aid between the BCEAO and

the Treasury when the Treasury's liquid assets drop. The Treasury can only

draw to the extent of its "personal" deposits.

As for the other primary banks, their aid is within the limits of the monthly

tax ceilings on what they owe to the Treasury. These are operations outside

the realm of the budget.

The Malian Treasury is characterized by an atrophy of its banking sector

that does not allow it to ensure a correct return to its available domestic

savings funds. Based on the decline of special receipts, this consequently

results in major delays in the payment of public expenditures.

The imbalanced situation of the Treasury's main correspondents, meaning organizations which deposit their funds in the public Treasury either by choice or

because they are required to do so, absorbs a large part of the Treasury's

liquid assets. This situation stems from the massive drain of most accounts

and special funds because of major withdrawals which the Treasury made to

finance the large budget deficits observed from 1960 to 1980. In other words,

the Treasury has been drained of its substance and the unity of funds profoundly altered, preventing the government from being able to have in its

hands all its resources, now scattered in a thousand and one special accounts

and funds deposited everywhere but in the Treasury!

It is often argued that one must avoid a blockage or stoppage of certain

vital or strategic activities contained in these related budgets, but basically, it is a question of restoring the central financial balance before

that of satellites. The public will to integrate into the government budget

all of these special accounts and funds has been repeatedly affirmed. The

Ministry of Finance is actively seeking means and procedures to do so without

too many obstacles.

One must also note the growing weight of operations of the Malian Retirement

Fund (CRM) on Treasury assets, not only because of the very rapid increase in

39
spending (over 3 billion a year), but also because of the structure of these

receipts, 90 percent of which include transfers without any counterpart in

real liquidity. These, then, are the main causes of the existing Treasury

crisis on the domestic level.

Special receipts have always been used to cover most of Mali's financing

needs, but one can note a drop in the level of that foreign aid in the form of

gifts and loans starting in 1985. In fact, from 1982 to 1984, the Treasury

greatly benefited from drawing upon the IMF within the framework of the different confirmation agreements. In 1985 and 1986, such drawing upon the IMF was

almost totally allocated to the Autonomous Amortization Fund in order to

meet repurchases. In addition, there has been a decline in foreign aid due to

the unfavorable international situation.

11,464

CSO: 3419/70

40
MOZAMBIQUE

FOREIGN MINISTER MEETS ENVOYS, AFFIRMS SOLIDARITY

MB171322 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 1030 GMT 17 Feb 87

[Text] The Mozambican minister of foreign affairs, Pascoal Mocumbi, this

morning received a group of African ambassadors accredited to Maputo and

representatives of national liberation movements. Pascoal Mocumbi is now

meeting diplomatic representatives of the socialist countries; this afternoon he will hold a similar meeting with ambassador from Western nations.

In this meeting, classified as formal by the dean of Mozambican diplomacy,

Mocumbi introduced himself and made the individual acquaintance of African

government representatives accredited to the People's Republic of Mozambique

and of representatives of the national liberation movement.

The Mozambican minister of foreign affairs briefed those present on the

causes and consequences of current political, military, and economic situation in Mozambique, He blamed the racist South African regime for military

destabilization, destruction of economic infrastructure, and social chaos.

Military efforts being undertaken [words indistinct] economic rehabilitation

were analyzed by Minister Pascoal Mocumbi, as the means adopted by the

Mozambican government to positively and effectively reverse the current situation. He appealed to the African ambassadors to maintain their solidarity

with the Mozambican people in the attainment of their objectives. The minister of foreign affairs added that Mozambican foreign policy remains unchanged.

He further stated that we fight for lasting peace, we are against the arms

race, we are a nonaligned country, and we will continue our struggle for the

abolition of apartheid in South Africa. This was said by Minister Pascoal

Mocumbi in his first meeting with African ambassadors accredited to the

People's Republic of Mozambique.

/9274

CSO? 3400/59

41
MOZAMBIQUE

MOCUMBI MEETS INTERNATIONAL GROUPS' REPRESENTATIVES

MB181221 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 1030 GMT 18 Feb 87

{Text] Foreign Minister Pascoal Mocumbi this morning held a formal meeting

with representatives of international organizations accredited to the People's

Republic of Mozambique. The Mozambican foreign minister wanted to familiarize

himself with the people he will have to work with in his capacity as foreign

minister. Pascoal Mocumbi briefed those present on the political, military,

and economic reality in Mozambique. He also told them of the Mozambican

government's efforts to solve national problems, namely the military offensive against armed banditry and the practical application of economic rehabil«-

itation program. As he did yesterday, at his meetings with the diplomatic

corps accredited to Mozambique, the foreign minister reaffirmed Mozambique's

foreign policy which, as he said, continues unchanged.

/9274

CSO: 3400/59

42
MOZAMBIQUE

FRELIMO ALLEGED TO COMMIT MORE ATROCITIES THAN RENAMO

Lisbon 0 DIABO in Portuguese 10 Feb 87 p 18

[Commentary]

[Text] A very complete—tragically complete—picture has been supplied to us

in the last issue of ALEM-MAR magazine, an organ of the mission of the

Cambonian Fathers, in an article signed by Joao Tepenga. It is testimony

which is so important that we feel it is our duty to bring it to the attention

of our readers, above all, because it can in no way be linked to the Mozarabican National Resistance [RENAMO].

It is testimony based on this opinion heard by Tapenga in the area under

FRELIMO control» "Now it is the government soldiers who are robbing, pillaging

and murdering; they are behaving worse than the RENAMO guerrillas."

Recounting the history of the rise of the Resistance and referring to the

violence laid to it in the initial phase, the article in ALEM-MAR states»

"It was precisely the hide-bound behavior of the government which ended by

creating a reaction of rejection, even among the former freedom fighters.

The discontented and the persecuted fled and swelled the ranks of the new

guerrillas forces. It is no coincidence that Afonso Ndjakama, current president of the RENAMO, is an old FRELIMO soldier."

It adds»

"The guerrilla zones were considered areas in which a general sweep was necessary, a sweep code-named 'Operation Broom.'

"Thus the government entered a phase characterized by massacres, imitating

RENAMO, which was continuing its senseless violence.

"By 1979, the war was already eating up about 40 percent of the nation's production. It is estimated that, by 1985, the military expenses were using

up 60 percent of this production. The USSR is still supplying weapons and

they are certainly not free. After each attack in force against the RENAMO

bases, the guerrillas come back stronger than ever. The chaos is still growing, the people are becoming more and more alienated from the government, the

country is falling apart and the famine is already being intensely felt."

43
60,000 Exiled in 'Operation Production*

ALEM-MAR then takes up the matter of "Operation Production,** one of the most

shameful pages in the history of the FRELIMO.

"Those responsible for the operation treated anyone found without documentation or working papers as a criminal. Housewives, students, young people and

old people were loaded on trucks and taken to collection centers. From there,

they were loaded on planes and shipped (for the most part) to Niassa Province,

in the north of the country. The agencies responsible for conducting the

operation were more concerned with meeting the quota of [internal] exiles

than with the problems that this exile could create. The operation was conducted by plane, for the simple reason that the roads were controlled by the

guerrillas. There were 60,000 [internal] exiles. The government has never

supplied complete data on this matter. Mozambique had three planes available.

It was necessary to suspend all domestic flights and use up a huge quantity of

fuel to carry out this operation. The planes came and went, day and night,

unloading the exiles at the Lichinga airport. From there, they were taken

into the jungle and abandoned. No one will ever know how many men, women and

children were snatched from their families—sometimes just because some local

chief had a grudge—or how many of them died."

Guerrillas Stronger

Regarding the current situation, the article later statesi

"After 1984, international solidarity came to the aid of Mozambique, destroyed

by the war and by famine, with great quantities of goods. Because of the war,

the situation is still worsening today. The army is practically out of control and has frequently become a band of thieves, devastating the country.

At the same time, RENAM0 has experienced major modifications; although it

continues to act with violence here and there, in many areas it has begun to

win the sympathy of the inhabitants. When all is said and done, it is behaving better than the army. The troops themselves confirm that the guerrillas

are stronger in combat than they are. Today's RENAM0 is no longer the 'Free

Africa' movement of yore. Now it attacks with assurance and determination,

using weapons from the army depots, which it raids constantly. It is using

practically the same uniforms and the same weapons as the FRELIMO."

Church Endangered

In an article recently published here, we had occasion to call attention to the

risk which the Catholic Church runs in Mozambique, of being forced to nationalize itself and separate from the Church body; there was reason to fear when

the prelate of Maputo delivered the homily at the funeral services for the

late dictator Samora Machel.

The author of the ALEM MAR article shares this feeling.

"The Mozambican episcopate has repeatedly denounced the abuses and massacres

on both sides, pleading for dialogue to resolve the conflict.

44
"The missionaries want to remain with the people, despite the problems.

Many of them have been slain, many of them have even been abducted by the

guerrillas, but they are all seeking to live among their people to the extent

possible. They know their lives are in constant danger.

"The government has abandoned the aggressive attitudes of the early years.

It has been more open to dialogue with the Church, at least outwardly. And

there is another danger lurking here« that the Church will close its eyesto

the oppression, for fear of again jeopardizing its relations with the government. Some signs of this have been noted already."

In conclusion, commenting on Joaquim Chissano's statement that he will continue the struggle against the rebels, Joao Papenge asks what the FRELIMO

president will do to restore discipline to the Mozambican army, which is

responsible for so many cruel actions.

His conclusion, incidentally, is in keeping with one of the statements cited

in the same article! "When there is an attack against a civilian target and

there are no survivors, it is almost certain that the massacre was perpetrated

by the army itself."

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45
MOZAMBIQUE

AUTHENTICITY OF VETERANS' DOCUMENT QUESTIONED

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 6 Feb 87 p 10

[Text] In Mozambique, photocopies are being circulated of a document allegedly

written by former combatants, proposing an exclusively black government,

negotiations with RENAMO to share the power, revocation of the constitution

and a different way of viewing the war in the context of southern Africa.

The document was drafted in October, a few days after the death of Samora

Machel, and, according to the text to which LUSA had access, it is addressed

to Joaquim Chissano, Alberto Chipande, Armando Guebuza and Mariano Matsinhe,

in their capacity as former combatants and generals of the Armed Forces of

Mozambique.

"We, veterans and founders of this republic, firm and steadfast in the search

for peace, progress and prosperity for our country, offer this message to

you on the occasion of the untimely death of the first president of the republic," the text reads.

The document even proposes Joaquim Chissano as president of the republic and

Armando Guebuza as prime minister, but with the capacity to form his government.

The letter is unsigned and there is some doubt about its authenticity and

representativity.

A source linked to the military services denied that the document was at all

representative and said he was "absolutely certain" that not a single superior

officer in the Armed Forces had had a hand in drafting it.

The Mozambican government minister, who said he was unfamiliar with the text,

was given a copy to read. "It could, in fact, have been written by some former combatants, because there are some who are very confused—confusion which

could serve the enemy's purpose," he said.

The minister did not devote particular attention to the text, stressing that

it could be, purely and simply, a hoax.

"We of the FRELIMO are going to exclude all non-native Mozambicans from

political, economic and military power," state the authors, for whom the

46
criterion of "native-born and natural" citizenship should be an essential

condition for access to power.

In the context of the document, "native-born and natural" means black.

The document goes into detail, indicating names for the various government

and state functions, but does not even mention Marcelino dos Santos, the

current president of the People's Assembly.

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47
MOZAMBIQUE

CURRENCY DEVALUATION, OTHER ECONOMIC MEASURES DISCUSSED

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 7 Feb 87 p 15

[Text] Last Friday, the Government of Mozambique announced the 420-percent

devaluation of the national currency relative to the U.S. dollar, as the

"kick-off" for the relaunching of the nation's economy, 12 years after independence. The U.S. dollar, valued officially at between 37 and 40 meticals

before the end of last month, is now worth about 200 meticals.

For economic recovery to make itself felt, the Maputo authorities plan further

gradual devaluations of the metical until it reaches the goal of 1,000 meticals

per dollar, which will drive up even further the already escalating prices of

most of the goods and services in Mozambique, from basic food items, such as

grains and sugar, to the cost of transportation and social services.

Another measure planned by Maputo is the reprivatization of about 40 manufacturing companies, in an attempt to stimulate the production of goods to

replace some imports, particularly agricultural equipment.

According to information gathered from various sources in Maputo, the Mozambican Government has also launched a type of program to shift and relocate

surplus manpower, which will now be employed in agricultural undertakings,

following a shakeup of some sectors of the state apparatus and also of some

state companies in which production rates are exceedingly low. in this regard,

it is thought that the government is already giving thought to the probable

accelerated return of some thousands of mine workers who are now in South

Africa and who will have to revert to a family economy based on agriculture.

Our informants estimate that about 200,000 families will be affected in this

restructuring of functions, with the inevitable dislocation of families throughout the country.

The post-Samora era ushered in by the presidency of Joaquim Chissano is apparently based on ambiguity, fed by the careful management of information and by

silence, as well as the distancing by which the Mozambican leader managed to

survive the various stages of Machelism.

The confusion of the observers lies in the supposition that the model of

society envisioned by Chissano bears some likeness to the policies which,

by force of circumstances, prevailed in the 1974/1875 transition period, when

he was prime minister of a government in which Lisbon also intervened.

48
In a survey conducted between March and July 1986, with the aid of religious

groups and taking in about 400 respondents (heads of househ•"»)• «^J»«

various "professional activities" in the rural environment, it was asked»

"What is provoking the famine in Mozambique?" and "Why?"

Most of the respondents pointed to the wan the mobilizations, the action of

specialized troops who were not supplied with food rations (and hence robbed

settlements), the abuses of the militias, the military ^J«1» «J^ *?8

("which seized foodstuffs which the people were transporting to the city )

and the flight of the people from the villages.

All this, according to the results of the survey, raises questions, such as»

"Who is perpetrating the banditry? The uniform is the same. The people are

catching it from both sides."

Next to the war, problems related to the economic system are mentioned, methods,

criteria privileges, favoritism based on ideological opinions. An appeal

Sas Sso'directefto'the late president by a peasant in Nampula» "Dear president, the people are being destroyed. Without the people, you couldn t be

president."

Another document which has been passed from hand to hand in ^f^1«"* ***

recentlv created some popular expectations regarding the urgent need for peace

anHconoSc development? This is a "letter" alleged to have been written by

"former combatants and veterans" to four officials in the Political Bureau,

dated in October or November.

Meanwhile, with reference to an article published in EXPRESSO in mid-January

on the situation in Mozambique, it should be noted that Armando Panguene has

not left the FRELIMO Central Committee but rather its secretariat; this is

significant, but not as serious as if he had left the Committee itself.

Pinallv according to indications from Maputo, the information is still hazy

^Uh regaS to fS?eign Initiatives of a financial nature, including the case

of the debt renegotiation with Lisbon.

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49
MOZAMBIQUE

ZAMBEZIA'S TEA INDUSTRY AFFECTED BY CIVIL WAR

Lisbon AFRICA HOJE in Portuguese Jan 87 p 33

[Article by Luisa Ribeiro, of the Portuguese news agency ANOP]

[Text]] Some 9,000 tons of tea are warehoused in Zarabezia Province, in the

central north of Mozambique, without any packaging materials or means of

transport. Even if these were available, there is no certainty that the war

situation would not prevent shipment of the tea.

The guerrilla actions in Zambezia have been viewed with alarm in Maputo for

several weeks. There had been rumors—impossible to confirm—that the land

had been occupied by strong contingents of RENAMO [Mozambican National Resistance]] and was under their administrative control.

The gravity of the situation was then confirmed by the Mozambican news agency

AIM, which reported that hundreds of children were murdered by the RENAMO in

incursions from Malawi, in early October.

According to the RENAMO, the guerrillas are in control of the terrain, except

for Quelimane, the provincial capital, Pebane, Chinde, Mocuba and Luabo.

Some 80 percent of the territory in Zambezia Province, the largest in Mozambique, is under RENAMO control, according to the same source.

Shortly after the death of President Samora Machel on 19 October, a joint

offensive was launched by the province by the FPLM (People's Force for the

Liberation of Mozambique), FRELIMO's armed force, and about 15,000 Zimbabwean

soldiers. If RENAMO information is reliable, 12,000 Zimbabwean soldiers were

already serving in the zone.

It is difficult to estimate the size of the antigovernment guerrilla force in

the province, the source said, but he suggested a fifth of its members, calculated at 25,000 men.

The FPLM-Zimbabean military operations are being conducted on two axest that

of Inhaminga (north of the area of the old Transzambezia line) and that of

Mungari, from Changara, in Tete Province.

50
In Mozambique, it is impossible to obtain official data regarding the ground

situation, but the RENAMO source said he foresaw "an initial FRELIMO advantage, because it has the means of attack, but the problem is one of holding

the positions it captures."

The last census in Zambezia (which has 20 to 35 inhabitants per square kilometer, the densest population in the country), in 1983, refers to 2.4 million

inhabitants, speaking 13 dialects, predominantly Lomwe, Chuabo and Marendje.

About 12,500 people spoke Portuguese.

Most of the inhabitants af the province are engaged in agriculture! more than

1 million workers, most of whom are women.

In terms of natural resources, Zambezia has prospects of important reserves of

tantalum pentoxide and a recorded 130,000 tons of nephelitic syenite (bauxite).

The second largest [as published] province in Mozambique, Zambezia has the

highest birth rate in the country (54.6 per 1,000) and a life expectancy of

34.4 years (compared to 52.4 years in Maputo). In an official comparative

study from 1975 to 1980, the mortality rate was 24.3 per 1,000 and the infant

mortality rate was 22.6 per 1,000.

Tea is grown in the highlands of Zambezia Province. Production rose from

59,000 tons in 1975 to 109,000 tons in 1982, but it stood at 25,000 tons in

1986. This year, if the figures divulged privately in Maputo are confirmed,

production will reach 9,000 tons, but the prospects for distribution are poor.

Tea exports amounted to 11,000 tons in 1975 (177,000 contos) and rose to

30,000 tons in 1980 (938,000 contos), but they declined to 1.8 tons [as published] last year (104,201 contos).

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51
MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

TRADE UNION OFFICIAL IN MOSCOW—Jose Correla Ganancio, deputy secretary general of the Mozambique Workers Organization, arrived in Moscow this morning

to take part in the Eighth All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions Congress.

Correia Ganancio is accompanied by Pedro Joaquim Mandlate, secretary general

of the National Textile, Clothing, Leather and Shoe Union. The Mozambican

trade union delegation was welcomed at the airport by Soviet trade union

officials said Rafael Goncalves Mozambican ambassador to the USSR. [Text]

[Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 1730 GMT 19 Feb 87 MB] /9274

CSO: 3400/59

52
SENEGAL

SECRETARY GENERAL DIOUF DELIVERS REPORT TO PARTY CONGRESS

Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 22 Dec 86 pp 10-15

[Excerpts] My dear comrades:

Today our party is holding its 11th Regular Congress. This is a major event

in the life of our great political organization, which is the majority party

in Senegal.

Thus the nation is widely involved, because, on the one hand, the Socialist

Party (PS) represents a major portion of the active forces in the nation, and

on the other hand, our political structure is the locomotive force in the

democratic process under way in our country.

For these important reasons, I invite you to make of this congress one

characterized by profitable contemplation of all of the aspects of interest to

the party and the nation. The work commissions which will be appointed

shortly will have to go deeper into the problems to which we devote our

attention and the urgent needs which require our energies.

I invite you all to reflect, to criticize and to make suggestions, so that our

conclusions will outline the prospects for our future actions for the

development of Senegal.

In this connection, I will take up in turn, in this general policy report:

I. The crisis, the stakes in, the results of and the prospects for our

policy;

II. The background for our foreign policy; and

III. Our political battle within Senegal and within the Socialist Party.

I. The Crisis, the Stakes in, the Results of and the Prospects for Our Policy

My dear comrades:

The sessions of our 11th Regular Congress are being held at a crucial time for

the economic and financial future of our country. The crisis in the world

53
economy continues. Our economy, underdeveloped and fragile, continues to

experience the physical and financial shocks caused by the relations among the

nations of the world. The levels of economic and financial solidarity on a

world scale still fall far below what is necessary in order to penetrate the

vicious circle of protectionist barriers, economic egotism, and where we are

concerned, poverty.

Let us remember first that despite some signs which, like lightning flashing

in the sky, still trouble international economic relations, the crisis is

still affecting the development of our society, as it has for a decade

already. As a result we have seen a reduction in the real long-term resources

resulting from domestic savings which, as you know, are the indispensable base

and prerequisite for any policy of independent development. In terms of

proper financial logic, borrowed resources should serve to supplement those

mobilized on the national level. Naturally, then, there can be no doubt that

the paucity of our national resources increases the dependence of our

economies, which are very open to foreign countries.

In Senegal, after several consecutive years of demand control using the

classic tools (limitation of public expenditures, strict domestic credit

structure, foreign loan ceiling), we have obtained satisfactory results on the

financial level. By way of illustration, let us note that the deficit in the

current foreign account, which had reached 17.7 percent of the gross domestic

product in 1980, declined to 10.5 percent in 1984 and 8.2 percent in 1985.

Along the same lines, a substantial improvement in the public financial

deficit in terms of commitments was seen. The figure dropped from 8 percent

of the gross domestic product in 1982-83 to 4.5 percent in 1983-84 and 3.2

percent in 1984-85, and will probably be about 1 percent in 1985-86.

The rate of economic growth, on the contrary, has remained at a relatively low

level, and the consequences of this restrictive policy, along with a number of

adverse factors, have caused real economic stagnation and a substantial drop

in our fiscal and customs income in particular.

In this connection, it became indispensable to guarantee the resumption of

production and other activities by an appropriate supply policy, while at the

same time working to correct the imbalances in the large economic aggregates.

This seemed to us to be the best way, in these difficult times, to correct our

economic and financial situation and to develop our production capacity.

It is the full logic of the stakes in our new economic policy that we are

implementing with perseverance, methodical care and conviction.

The Impact of Our Corrective Policy

In order to consolidate our gains, it is first of all vital to organize a

change in our production structures, through the conception and implementation

of effective medium- and long-term sectorial policies.

The goal, of course, remains to give our economy a greater competitive

capacity and the ability to negotiate more effectively on the international

level.

54
The new policies drafted in the agricultural and industrial realms are already

adequate responses to the structural challenges of our economy in the two

sectors, primary and secondary, which bring about growth.

Let us look for a moment at these new policies.

The new farm policy was defined in the course of 1984 with a view to creating

the conditions for getting production going again in order to ensure greater

advancement for the rural sector. In the new farm scheme, the producer must

become a veritable economic operator bearing full responsibility.

This policy is based on sectorial goals and strategies which give priority to

an integral approach to development by product. This involves:

—Reorganizing and redynamizing the cooperative movement such as to make

community development possible on the base level through economically viable

village structures which are capable of managing the interests of the producer

and ensuring his close involvement;

—Readapting the method of staffing the rural sector and reorganizing the

rural development societies, whose tasks will be better defined;

--Supplying the rural sector with production factors more judiciously, and

transferring their management to the producers themselves; and finally,

—Reducing the losses due to depredation and losses after harvesting, by means

of greater plant health and stock protection measures.

Let us remember, comrades, that the implementation of this policy during the

1984-85 and 1985-86 farm seasons justified real hopes for success, despite

some hesitation.

In order to establish this policy more firmly, it appears useful to translate

the guidelines and strategies established in advance into plans and programs

for action by product line.

Senegalese agriculture should, in fact, play three basic roles within the

context of the planning for our economic and social development.

—It should work gradually but steadily toward self-sufficiency in food.

—It should create jobs and more substantial revenue.

—And it should produce for export. \

The complementary linking of production lines should give rise, with the

contribution of tbe various protagonists in the rural sector supported by the

state, to a truly integrated farm policy.

The factors which should contribute to the optimization of production were

evaluated and taken into account in establishing each production line, based

on a plan of intervention containing the following aspects:

55
—Allocation of agricultural species, with the expansion, reduction or

substitution of areas;

—Establishment of a system of exploitation, taking rotation into account;

—Completion of infrastructure and equipment projects, including access roads,

storage facilities, etc.;

—Organization of the producers in multifunctional and multisectorial groups

and cooperatives;

—Management training through education and literacy courses;

—Encouragement of research and development;

—Aid in farm credit, supplies and equipment;

—Preservation and storage policy;

—Health campaign to protect crops and stock;

—And marketing with a policy of price encouragement.

As a result, specific goals were defined for the five following product lines.

1. Grain and Self-Sufficiency in Food

Since the present situation involves a rate of 50 percent coverage of needs by

domestic production, the goal for the year 2000 is to achieve a rate of

between 75 and 80 percent, or a volume of 1,800,000 tons of gross grain

production, all species taken together.

To achieve this goal, it was decided to pursue certain actions.

a. Resumption of Production

This policy will be focused on the potential of zones where grains can be

grown, and will be carried out on a number of fronts:

—Intensification of rain-dependent crops, from the north to the south, as a

function of the isohyets and the use of selected short-cycle seeds adapted to

the ecological conditions, crop-raising techniques and mineral and organic

fertilizers;

—Increase of areas planted to grain, in particular corn, in the South SineSaloum, Casamance and Senegal-Oriental ecological zones where the

precipitation reaches about 700 mil limeters;

—Intensification of production in the areas under irrigation or to be

irrigated, using the double-crop system thanks to water control, along with

widespread popularization of crop-raising techniques and the use of quality

seeds and sufficient quantities of fertilizer; and

56
—Establishment of new irrigated areas, with the goal by the year 2000 being

the irrigation of 7,200 hectares for rice and corn, mainly in the valley of

the Senegal River (55 to 60,000 hectares), Casamance (10,000 hectares) and

Senegal-Oriental (1,000 hectares).

b. Organization of the Marketing of Local Grains

To guarantee the harmonious and continuous development of grain cultivation,

it has been deemed necessary to organize its sale within the framework of a

free market, which the state will regulate by setting base prices for the

producer and establishing reserve stocks to protect consumer rates.

The producers will make a parallel contribution to the regulation of prices by

organizing their own storage.

The processing of local grains (so that they will be ready for direct

consumption in urban areas) and their marketing, with priority over imported

grains, will serve as incentives for the producers.

2. Peanuts

The peanut oil subline should be balanced by reducing the industrial grinding

capacity from 920,000 to 720,000 tons per year. This presumes stabilization

of annual production at between 800,000 and 950,000 tons, with an area of 1

million hectares under cultivation.

With a view to achieving this production goal, it was decided to undertake:

—Reorganization of soil areas, in view of the weather situation in the

northern part of the country, eliminating the rotation of peanut crops in that

zone and expanding the cultivation of this crop in the southeast, better

favored by rainfall;

—Improvement of cultivation techniques by means of adequate farm equipment;

—Fertilization of the soil with mineral and organic fertilizers; and

—A campaign to eliminate nematodes.

For the peanut subline, the goal sought is to increase production from the

present 18,000 tons per year to 90,000 tons by the year 2000.

In order to raise the value of this export product, it will be necessary:

—To expand the arable areas in the suitable zones in the peanut-growing basin

in the southern and southeastern parts of the country;

—To increase the economic profitability of this crop; and

—To create modern processing units in order to offer a quality product on the

market.

57
3. Cotton

Despite the drastic decline in world cotton prices, which is a temporary

phenomenon, the development of this line should be extended (in terms of

arable areas) in the Kedougou zone. Moreover, it will be necessary to

increase yields further everywhere and to improve processing conditions,

because the zones with ecological potential are already under cultivation.

the production estimates established for the end of the Seventh Plan (1985-

1989) call for 66,200 tons of cotton seed on areas totaling 55,200 hectares,

or a yield of about 1.2 tons per hectare.

4. Sugar Cane

With the activity of the Senegalese Sugar Company, this line is attempting to

meet domestic needs assessed at 140,000 tons by the year 2000.

While the current yield is 11 tons of raw sugar per hectare over 7,000

hectares, the goal sought is to reach 13 tons per hectare on 15,000 hectares

under cultivation.

5. Fruit and Vegetable Crops

Senegal should, in this line which has a tremendous potential for irrigated

cultivation, acquire enough of a second wind to improve its trade balance,

along with peanuts.

The Niayes Region, the basin of the Senegal River within the irrigated area,

and the Casamance Basin, in particular justify these speculations. The

overall fruit and vegetable production goals are estimated at 400,000 tons,

including 100,000 tons for export, by the year 2000.

The various types of activity in the fruit and vegetable line will be dictated

here by the following specific development strategies:

—Family gardening on small plots will supply products for self-consumption or

sale in the market towns;

—Semi-intensive market gardening will meet the needs of the cities for

potatoes, onions, carrots, tomatoes, etc.; and

—Intensive industrial truck gardening and orchard cultivation of crops for

export will move into the irrigation phase, with a notable increase in yields.

The control projects on the Senegal River, the Cayor Canal and minor projects

in Casamance and the valley of the Gambia River will provide the needed areas.

I repeat that the implementation of this policy for the development of crops

by line will, for total success, require making the production agents

responsible, such that they will be veritable economic agents whose actions

are consistent with an intersectorial approach, that is to say an integrated

agricultural sector.

58
It goes without saying that the transfer of production activities from the

state structures to the economic agents requires new strategies, of which the

following series of measures will be the basis.

a. Implementation of an Agricultural Incentives and Aid Policy

The establishment of incentive prices will encourage the producers, while

taking prices to the consumer and prices for export into account.

The marketing of processed products and the policy of incentive prices will

make it possible to transfer added value to the producers, which will increase

their investment capacity and solvency, making them more eligible for credit.

The accompanying technical measures which will contribute to agricultural

intensification are of several sorts.

We might mention:

—Education and training to complete the transfer of responsibility to the

producers;

—The twin research and development project designed to improve productivity

through the diffusion of technologies appropriate to the production systems;

—Environmental understanding achieved through a study of all of the physical

parameters (weather, soils, typology of farm operations), so as to draft a

consistent program for management and intensification;

—Distribution of supplies (fertilizers, seeds) based on private procedures,

with the state taking responsibility for the seeds, so as to guarantee

varietal quality by supplying preselected seeds, as well as quality control;

—Establishment of a soil office to study the uses of each type of soil,

optimal use of fertilizers and improvement of the cost-efficiency ratio;

—Agricultural equipment and mechanization, which represent an important

aspect of the projects planned, particularly in the implementation of the

grain plan, with the expansion of areas to the south and southeast and the

development of new irrigated areas—all these are factors which make the

reactivation of the Farm Machinery Committee urgent, in order to undertake a

better selection of types of equipment and thus to establish a proper farm

mechanization policy;

—Storage and preservation will be guaranteed on the peasant level with the

establishment of village warehouses and the creation of grain banks, and on

the national level by the Food Guarantee Commissariat, within the framework of

the national strategy for food guarantees; and, finally

—The protection of crops and harvests will be made more systematic so as to

make it a decisive factor in our policy of increasing production, through

greater reduction in preharvest and postharvest losses, with the state

continuing to undertake this task, working closely with the producers.

59
The plans for action which have been established in each of these realms, by

vertical and horizontal lines, reflect the concern with eliminating all of the

negative constraints hindering the development of the rural sector, since they

create the tools which will enable the producers to have optimal conditions

for developing fully and maximizing their productive force.

It is thus and only thus that the new policy will achieve its full

significance and will more certainly achieve the goals established. This then

is why, with the lenders who are aiding us to take up this agricultural

challenge, the government has undertaken to identify, in detailed fashion, the

methods of implementing the new policy, subsector by subsector, with the

joint, determined and resolute commitment to spare no effort to carry out the

program as a whole.

This solid commitment to us from the lenders is the product of our will to

change the world landscape drastically by a veritable rehabilitation of our

agricultural sector, which can be the source of growth and advance for the

whole of the national economy.

The results already obtained argue our cause. It is a question of persevering

and working still harder. I urge you all to complete the actions undertaken,

with the same will and dedication to success.

Where the new industrial policy is concerned, about which there has been much

discussion, it is important that its meaning and the stakes be assessed.

In order to evaluate it, it is best to adopt the point of view of the

collectives and, in this connection, to recognize that the system of

protection which was fully justified during the early years of our

independence is no longer suitable. In a new situation, new methods are

needed. Our industrialists must, beginning now, place their actions within a

new dynamic context, that of adjustments based on technical advances,

competitive capacity and productivity.

Any other attitude might confine us for longer to the past situation.

As to the workers, they must remain confident, because we will never sacrifice

them and we will always remain faithful to our political doctrine, that is to

say to democratic socialism.

But what in fact are the justifications and the axes of the new industrial

policy?

In fact, despite the imaginative spirit we have seen in the course of this

last quarter of a century, the annual rate of growth in the manufacturing

industry, not including the oil plants, where there have been extensive

situational fluctuations, remained at about 2 percent in volume between 1976

and 1984. During this period, the overall growth of the secondary sector

(including construction, public works and energy) was 6.1 percent.

This substantial difference was the result of a recession in the activities of

a number of branches. The diagnostic studies made have led to the following

60
conclusion: industrial recovery, giving industry back its potential for

development, has become a national imperative, because it can make a basic

contribution to employment and to the major macroeconomic balances. Now the

national situation is less favorable than in the years between 1960 and 1970.

It would be illusory, moreover, to hope to find a powerful source of recovery

in domestic demand. Therefore the new industrial policy is based on a new

model of development, still more open to the world.

It also involves the basic choice of disengagement of the state from

production, depending broadly on the private sector.

The various constraints and limitations have been made clear in the earlier

developments. It is a question now of advancing despite everything, and of

removing the obstacles which the old policies contributed to creating. They

include:

—Underproductivity at the enterprises;

—Low export capacity; and

—Insufficient integration.

It is necessary first of all to create the conditions necessary for great

competitive capacity.

The system of protecting local industries has been pursued for 25 years

through quantitative restrictions on imports and the application of

prohibitive customs tariffs.

This has produced serious distortions in the use of resources. In addition,

it comes down to indirectly subsidizing enterprises, through lack of earnings

in the customs receipts area. These enterprises find themselves in fact

established in almost monopolistic situations, with the consequent abuses both

in terms of product quality, which can no longer be supervised with the

necessary rigor, and in prices, which constantly develop upward for sometimes

debatable reasons.

The consumers, who are thus deprived of the opportunity to choose and who pay

high prices for what they buy, must willy-nilly make a heavy financial

sacrifice. Thus they are directly subsidizing producers who would certainly

have been forced by healthy competition to sell at lower prices. And because

their income does not increase at the same rate as prices do, they grow poorer

while others maintain their standard of living. This is contrary to the

principle of social justice, which is a characteristic of the socialist and

democratic path we have chosen.

It is necessary therefore to establish a regulatory framework in common law in

which the enterprises which show evidence of innovation and management

capability will be compensated by the market. The majority of the

quantitative restrictions will be eliminated within the framework of a program

spread out over 2 years and taking specific sectorial aspects into account.

The National Assembly has now approved texts modifying the Customs Code,

61
bringing the tariffs on industrial supplies down to more reasonable levels.

The SENELEC, for its part, reduced electricity rates as of 1 July 1986 in a

proportion consistent with its own profitability.

These measures should make it possible for industrialists to reduce their

production costs and to compete with confidence with foreign rivals.

Consumers, when they see prices decline, should also benefit thereby.

Moreover, these prices will be liberated in order to return the domestic

market to health.

Development of Export Capacity

If phosphates, peanuts and fish are excluded, exports account for less than 20

percent of industrial sales. Despite the preferential customs agreements

where the EEC and CEAO [West African Economic Community] markets are

concerned, our sales are neither diversified nor extensive. They can also be

seen to be vulnerable to supply conditions up the line, and to the development

of international prices down the line.

It is thus necessary to export more and better goods. This is why the effort

made in the energy sector regarding prices will be extended insofar as

possible to other production factors. I am able to inform you that where

energy is concerned, an investment of $80 million has already been arranged,

and talks have been begun with lenders to obtain the necessary financing

means. The effort being made in other sectors, telecommunications in

particular, is patent and will be pursued.

The sectors of activity likely to become heavy exporters will be those which

have been able to free themselves from the constraints of the relative weight

of technical factors. Naturally, it is urgent that industrialists orient

their activities toward those with a sufficiently high technological content

to offset the cost of scarce and expensive factors. We will encourage export

schemes based on development toward activities with high added value and

products with high unit prices. This is why added industrial value, and no

longer the FOB price which prevailed previously, was taken as a base, in the

text of the law approved last July by the National Assembly, for the

modification of the method of calculating export premiums.

I have not yet spoken about our main resource—labor. The potential for

improving the productivity of manpower is substantial. In the past, the low

cost of labor, in relation in particular to sales linked with imports, failed

to push enterprises toward a training effort or the establishment of

compensation procedures linked with productivity. This is a situation which

must be altered.

Our comparative advantage lies in our manpower, which is insufficiently taken

into account in enterprise management. We should note in particular that our

educational system has produced skilled manpower in the technical and

scientific realms which remains underutilized and is paid on a relatively low

level. I therefore appeal to industrialists to move farther ahead in .pa

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vocational training. The national vocational training office we have decided

to establish will be the structure designed to meet this demand, and wil 1 be

very useful to them.

The regulations governing relations between employers and workers wil 1 be

improved. The changes planned will, however, be no challenge to the social

gains of the workers. They are simply dictated by the desire for greater

efficiency.

Within the framework of the current crisis, it is categorically

counterindicated to continue with practices which may threaten the economy.

It serves no purpose in fact to compromise the future of an enterprise,

desiring, whatever the cost, on the basis of mere juridical considerations, to

retain personnel for whom one no longer has work, particularly when one no

longer has the means of paying them.

But I affirm that the state will remain as vigilant as in the past, although

it must avoid the laxity which threatens the proper development of our

operations.

As a last aspect of the new industrial policy, it is necessary to increase the

rate of integration in our industry.

The majority of the Senegalese enterprises process imported raw materials,

because the policy of replacing impor-ts .of intermediary goods and equipment

goods has, despite protection, not yielded tangirble^resul ts.

Our interindustrial trade chart remains singularly limited. I cannot help but

repeat, in this connection, what I said to the Economic and Social-Council

last 24 March. I said then that it seemed wrong to allow continued imports^of

leather from foreign countries, for example, in order to manufacture shoes>

when our potential for leather and hides is substantial, if only we knew how

to improve the quality.

The ranches capable of growth are numerous, from the agrofood to the

mechanical chains and including chemistry, textiles, and who knows what else.

The task of drafting reorganization plans adapted to the mobilization of the

resources needed will henceforth be assigned to the Interministerial

Industrial Reorganization Secretariat (SIRl), which will be supported by the

lenders. The World Bank, in particular, has made clear its desire to support

the actions of the SIRI by granting us a credit line which will go to the

Central Bank, to be redistributed to the primary bank. This credit line can

be mobilized by enterprises in difficulty, either in the form of

reorganization loans or shared loans, a concept little known as yet in

Senegal, but one of great interest.

It seems that the government has contemplated all of the necessary preventive

measures to ensure that the industrial economy will be able t:o tolerate the

shocks which the new policy will certainly provoke. The aid provided for

reorganization will involve a whole complex of complementary measures designed

to maintain both employment and the domestic productive apparatus. There is,

then, no threat to be anticipated.

63
The encouragement of exports will certainly create new job opportunities both

in industry and in the service sector. Transportation, maintenance and trade

enterprises will see the effects of the intensification of foreign trade

reflected in their activities. The inevitable increase in imports will make

it possible for merchants to revive businesses which a harsh situation had

caused to dwindle.

It is a happy fact, moreover, that the new industrial policy was conceived

during a particular period in the history of the economic development of

Senegal. We are in fact on the threshold of a great change in the

agricultural activity of our country, with the commissioning of the Diama Dam

and then the Manatali Dam, and the irrigation of substantial areas of land

along the river.

New cultivating methods will soon emerge, based on more or less intensive

mechanization. An extremely important fleet of machines will be established,

and their maintenance will make the establishment of a multitude of small

mechanical and electrical and maintenance enterprises near these areas

necessary. From all appearances, there is no lack of prospects, particularly

since the Institute of Food Technology (ITA) will contribute its support to

the new undertakings by making the results of the studies it has been pursuing

for almost two decades in the realm of agroindustry available to the promoters

of industrial ideas. The ITA uses tested scientific methods. The tests

carried out by specialized foreign bodies on the products it has developed

reveal knowledgeability beyond challenge. It is the task of the economic

operators, to whom I now appeal, to dare to take the risk of agreeing to work

with the ITA, in order to make better use of its research for industrial and

trade purposes.

The new industrial policy does not overlook the aspect of the welcome to be

given potential investors, above all those who come from abroad and who are

displeased by the bureaucratic red tape involved in our traditional

organization. Instead of sending them from one ministry to another to

complete the formalities required before they can establish themselves, a

single office will be created where they can find all of the administrators

with whom they must deal. It is known that this simplification of the

procedure is highly valued. It will be paralleled by a series of actions,

negotiations and information provided abroad, carried out by an investment

promotion center, with the amended Investment Code as its main tool.

Let us add that in addition to the recovery in production (agricultural,

industrial), a change in our fiscal and customs systems and our trade policy

is broadly contemplated and is even beginning to be drafted.

All of these economic changes imposed by the desire for efficiency,

productivity and competitive capacity (which, let us say in passing, we can no

longer avoid) will without a doubt require immediate adjustments which will be

difficult for the enterprises affected.

The efforts made should be profitable in the end for the economy as a whole

and should eventual ly benefit the enterprise itself, which is the nucleus and

the spearhead of economic activities.

64
Let us note that the reduction in our customs tariffs, long desired by the

national representation, could not be carried out before the end of the first

half of this year because of budget limitations, on the one hand, and on the

other, because of the need to replace this activity within the framework of

the medium- and long-term adjustment plans, consistent with the other changes

in sectorial po 1 icy orientation which we have just discussed, both in the

industrial and agricultural sectors and in telecommunications, energy and

infrastructure.

In the short run, the consequence of the lifting of customs and noncustoms

barriers will be to strengthen the purchasing power of the consumer and, for

the performing industries, it will be yet another incentive to great

efficiency in production and the winning of foreign markets. A further

contribution was made in this last respect by the implementation of a policy

of export subsidies based on the national industrial added value.

Focused on the enterprise which has been made more sound and has been provided

with an environment which promotes its full prosperity and development, the

structural and institutional reforms are designed to liberate the creative

capacity of Senegalese man, made fully responsible for his destiny and

sovereign in his choices in the realms of production and consumption and

within the limits of the dictates of our development strategy.

While in the past the state has had to intervene to launch the process of

development in sectors which had been neglected but had a potential for

growth, it must today encourage dynamic and motivated economic operators to

take over, establishing for them the rules of the game, for which it will

ensure respect with the calm which characterizes the arbiter.

The state will keep all of the strategic sectors under its authority and

direct management. Its presence is the more sensible today, since the

encouragement of private enterprise, domestic in particular, and of the small

and average enterprises which must constitute the basis of our new policy,

demands perfect mastery of the tools of encouragement and constant control of

the process. Less and better state intervention—this is the formula, more

current today than ever, which we have had occasion to develop under other

circumstances.

Along this line of thinking, the banking system should be subjected to the

necessary modifications in order to make it capable of playing its role in the

agricultural, industrial and financial changes which are underway, and in

particular, in the urgent redistribution of the workers who will have to lose

their jobs following the needed reorganization. The effort required of all is

a major one. It is as great as are our ambitions in the name of the national

interests. The state has provided itself with institutions for intervening in

the financing of innovations and supporting private undertakings. They have

been functioning since independence was won with limited results, and today

they are supporting the weight of this policy almost alone.

Henceforth, the banking system as a whole must no longer limit itself to socalled traditional positions and clients, safe from all risks and merely

administering the status quo, while we are promoting change. The results in

65
the farm chain, within the context of the former ONCAD, and domestic

administrative factors were at the origin of the current imbalance in the

system. The fact nonetheless remains that the banks as a whole must

contribute to the financing of domestic economic activities, including, of

course, the marketing of the main export crop, peanuts. In this connection,

certain hesitations noted in the course of recent seasons should be taken

very seriously by the public authorities, and solutions must be found, in

mutual understanding and such as to safeguard the interests at stake.

It will be a question in the future of establishing the primary financing

system more firmly in the domestic economy and encouraging the development and

diversification of our production. This will necessarily require the

alteration of the methods utilized to date and the development of an

atmosphere of mutual trust between the banks and their clients, excluding any

involvement of the public authorities, consistent with the banking law, which

is the reflection of the government policy. A new credit system must

necessarily underlie our new economic and financial policies.

But, comrades, what might the prospects for our policy of development be?

We should not be quick to forget the saddening television reports on the

famine in Africa in 1984 and 1985. At the July 198 5 OAU Summit Meeting,

during which the heads of state and government entrusted me with the task of

presiding over the destiny of our continental organization, the economic

situation of our countries was at the center of our discussions, and the goal

of self-sufficiency in food was confirmed and assigned to all the states,

which must devote 20 to 25 percent of their investments to the rural sector in

the next 4 years. The special session of the UN on the critical economic

situation in Africa led to precise programs for action, which should be

reflected in the development policy of each African nation.

Where our country is concerned, the program for mastering water resources, a

necessary prerequisite for self-sufficiency in food, is being pursued at an

accelerated rate. Where drilling is concerned, the national survey is well

along.

It has thus been learned that there are today nearly 4 million inhabitants in

the rural sector in Senegal, distributed among 12,000 localities, to which are

added herds totaling 2,500,000 head of cattle, 2,800,000 sheep and goats,

340,000 horses and 220,000 asses.

For food supplies, there were as of January 1986:

—281 motor-powered drill holes operated by state services, with the

cooperation of the village populations organized in management committees;

—900 drilled and modern wells, of which nearly 120 are equipped with hand or

wind-driven pumps; and

—40,000 traditional wells, the majority of which dry up regularly.

66
The goal of the government, therefore, is to see that without relaxing the

efforts to benefit the urban sector, the gap between it and the rural sector

can be narrowed.

To do this, it is necessary to guarantee the rural population a minimum of 25

liters of water per capita by 1990, in accordance with the recommendations of

the Inter-African Hydraulic Studies Committee, which met from 1 to 9 February

1982 in Yaounde, and to reach the level of 35 liters per capita by the end of

the century.

The goal of 25 liters by 1990 and 35 liters by the year 2000 obviously takes

into account the demographic growth which will bring the total rural

Senegalese population to 4,500,000 in 1990 and 5,300,000 in the year 2000.

The government has launched a vast program in order to achieve these results:

—Multiplication of the water holes, which should have the beneficial effect

of slowing the exodus of the rural and frontier population and, as a result,

promoting livestock and crop production;

—The equipping of new pumping equipment projects capable of producing the

required flow, and also adapted to the environmental conditions; and

—The establishment of a maintenance and storage policy with the willing

assistance of the village users.

In the long run this will be reflected in the completion and equipping of

1,800 drill holes, the digging of 4,500 wells and the deepening of 4,300

others.

The investment involved is estimated at nearly 100 bil lion CFA francs, of

which 26 billion have already been utilized within the various programs since

1981.

The pumping equipment differs with the size and special requirements of the

localities involved. For example:

—For concentrations of 200 to 500 inhabitants, plans call for hand, animal or

wind-powered pumps;

—For concentrations of 500 to 1,000 inhabitants, there will be motor pumps,

with a small reserve;

—For concentrations of 1,000 to 2,000 inhabitants, motor-driven pumps will be

used to supply a ground-level reservoir; and

—Finally, for concentrations of 2,000 to 5,000 inhabitants, a veritable

distribution network with a water tower has been developed, in addition to the

installation of motor-driven pumps.

Thanks to these mechanisms for intervention, and insofar as the credit made

available to it will allow, the government will succeed in completing this

67
ambitious program, the basic portion of which is already underway in every

corner of our territory.

For the cities, a vast program of renewal and strengthening of the

distribution networks is in the process of being implemented.

It involves 15 cities in the interior (in addition to Dakar and its suburbs),

in which operations are being undertaken regularly on the basis of the project

and renewal funds.

The Ministry of Water Resources, working with the SONEES, is studying the

possibility of establishing a second renewal and strengthening program to

cover some of the 26 other centers in the interior not included under the

first program.

To this is added the major operation to strengthen and renew the production,

treatment, delivery and distribution installations in Dakar. Its first phase,

involving the establishment and equipping of 10 drill holes in the

Maestrichtian stratum, is about to begin.

Other equally important measures will follow.

The cost of the project as a whole is estimated at nearly 22 billion CFA

francs.

To this will be added the collection, purification and recycling of the water

used. The general goals established in the purification sector are known.

What we have already achieved is far from negligible, if the difficult

situation and the reluctance of lenders to become involved in such operations

are taken into account.

The policy of building small reservoir dams and the storage of runoff water in

a number of regions (in particular Ziguinchor, Kolda, Tambacounda) will give

new impetus to agricultural activity and production. Using adapted

technologies, the peasants are already achieving remarkable things. Freed

from the bureaucratic context which served in the end to hinder their

undertakings, they are regaining confidence in themselves, and, feeling

directly involved, are plunging with resolution into the battle to achieve

self-sufficiency in food.

All along the valley of the Senegal River, small catchment areas with easily

operated pumps are already giving residents access to the surplus temporarily

available in the cities, more for family plots than for areas raising true

market products. But the path has been blazed toward development on a large

scale in the very near future, strengthened and maintained by the potential

downstream.

For as you know, comrades, two dams are under construction on the Senegal

River. The first, the Diama Dam, is practically finished, and it proved its

usefulness last year during the rise of the salt-water level. The second, the

Manantali Dam, should be completed by August of 1988.

68
Their cost wi 11 total about 240 bil lion CFA francs, of which Senegal wil 1

cover nearly 46 percent.

It goes without saying that in view of such a sizable investment, the absolute

rule should be to make the capital committed profitable, using every means

possible.

Apart from halting the rise of the salt-water level, these dams will make it

possible to irrigate 240,000 hectares of Senegalese land, to produce

hydroelectric energy at a very accessible price and in large quantities, to

navigate almost a thousand kilometers of the river course, and to supply the

people with drinking water.

The Cayor Canal is certainly the project which has aroused the greatest

interest among the residents of Dakar, and also those of the Louga, Diourbel

and Thies regions, since it contemplates the irrigation of 8,350 hectares of

land over a distance of 200 kilometers, restoration of the Paleocene waterbearing strata and supplying Dakar with water.

The feasibility study for this major project has been under way since 1

September 1986. A prefeasibility study made by the technicians at the

Ministry of Water Resources made it possible to estimate the cost of the

operation at 85 billion CFA francs.

If this canal is completed, Dakar will be safe from any water shortages until

2020 or 2030.

Explained in this way, the dam operation may appear simplistic. In reality

the situation is quite different, particularly if we realize that such major

infrastructures and Diama and Manantali are but the first links in a long

chain, senseless unless other achievements follow.

For all practical purposes, we might remember that the development scheme

calls for the irrigation of 50,000 hectares in the first phase, estimated at

140 bil lion CFA francs; the building of the Manantali hydroelectric power

plant and the installation of high tension lines, at a cost of 110 billion CFA

francs; and the construction of works which will make the river navigable,

costing 150 billion CFA francs.

It is true that the cost will be shared, but let us not forget that Senegal

alone has committed itself to a substantial part of the community loans. Our

country, more than any other, therefore, must seek to make the operation

profitable. This is what the government has dedicated itself to doing through

the National Post-Dam Committee we have appointed.

Let us note that the Cayor Canal will go down in the annals of our history as

the grandiose project which symbolizes our national will and unity. It will

provide life and prosperity to the people of the regions through which it

passes, and it will carry to the capital an enlivening breath from a back

country which has now entered into the great production era. To this hydroagricultural fresco, we can add the revitalization of the Ferlo Valley, the

harnessing of the resources of the rivers and the basin of the Gambia in the

69
southern part of the country, the development of livestock breeding and

fishing, and you can easily imagine how, thanks to the will of God, who gives

courage and determination to the men he chose to put on this land of our

forefathers, Senegal by the year 2000 will be covered with green, with fields

and trees as it never was before, nurturing its people and engaging in

prosperous trade with foreign countries. And indeed, this is not just a

dream, but depends on our will, our determination, our unity and our

willingness to sacrifice for the most just cause a nation could defend in

peacetime.

II. Background of Our Foreign Policy

My dear comrades:

I would like in this period of time characterized by tumult and violence to

reaffirm the fact that the final goal of our foreign policy has always been,

and remains today, to encourage friendship and understanding among the

peoples, invariably and tirelessly using dialogue and negotiation in good

faith as our method.

This is the reason for the importance we assign to cooperation among nations

on the basis of the principles of equality, sovereignty and mutual respect.

It is in this regard that the policy of nonalignment with blocs is a healthy

one. Senegal has made it a basic principle of its foreign policy.

Nonalignment is a search for identity, and not an ideological or political

balancing policy.

It is a state of mind and a method of thinking and action, not a dogma. In

its category, it constitutes an excellent method of cooperation and expression

for a group of countries which should express their differences and their

identities and propose their views of this world to which, after all, all

countries and al1 men are a part.

I expect of our party a commitment, more resolute with every passing day, to

this battle, the most important battle, for the liberation of Africa at this

end of our second millennium.

III. Our Political Battle Within Senegal and the Socialist Party

Dear comrades:

The Senegalese citizen, for whom all of the development policies we have

discussed were conceived, is in our view the protagonist in his fate and the

future of his society. He is at the same time the tool and the end goal of

the choices made and the multiple actions pursued by those he has freely

chosen as his leaders.

What can be said about our democracy, then?

70
Since 1981, we have in our country pursued a political system built around a

widespread party pluralism and total freedom of the press and of opinion.

It must be admitted that this political experiment, a pioneering one in black

Africa, has not developed without difficulties, although overall we can all

rejoice in the establishment of our democratic model, which truly corresponds

to the basic aspirations of the Senegalese people.

It is, in this connection, above all a question of consolidating and allowing

our democracy to flourish further, associated as it is with the economic

demands which face us, and all of the surrounding tendencies toward

dictatorship. The basic threat which weighs upon a young democracy is the

gregarious inclination to believe that only the majority must defend the

system. Now then, the minorities have a major role to play in terms of

objective and also constructive criticisms, whenever the problem being dealt

with is more nearly one of national interest.

For democracy is impoverished and disparaged when the discourse on both sides

is limited to the path of denigration, cryptopersonal issues and systematic

criticism.

This is because as a political system, democracy is based on the rules of the

game which regulate political and moral behavior, and the resurgence of the

interests of the nation and respect for one's fellow citizens are not the

least of these.

I would point out that our democracy has already reached a certain level of

maturity. Because it can still be perfected, it is necessary to help it

develop and to become further established in the conscience of the people and

their everyday behavior.

The political parties, in the majority as well as the opposition, and all of

the active forces in the nation are involved in this primary task of

safeguarding our model of democracy. This is so true that the potential

gravediggers of democracy and the congenital power seekers are recognized and

rejected by the people, who know how to distinguish and choose lucidly.

The Socialist Party of Senegal should remain in the vanguard of the battle to

strengthen democracy, that rich asset of modern times. The Socialist Party

will thus continue to wage its battle for the building of a developed,

socialist, democratic and independent Senegalese society. It must always seek

the best ways and means of providing the people with water, food, health,

education and infrastructures, within a context of peace, sacred respect for

the differences within the system and acceptance of the choices of the people.

For, comrades, the Socialist Party does believe in political alternation! But

it warns against anarchy, illegality and the crushing of the will of the

people, who alone can delegate power to those they choose, within the context

of the laws and regulations which govern the life of this country.

In a little more than a year, the people will be called upon again to choose

their representatives on the occasion of the February 1988 presidential and

71
legislative elections. These events, which come around with regularity in the

life of our young nation, should be the focus of preparations by all, in the

ardent political spirit which suits the occasion, with the people alone being

given the task of making democratic, clear-thinking and absolutely honest

choices of those they deem fit to guide the destiny of the collective, because

of their programs and projects for society, their patriotic commitment and

their capacity to achieve the popular aspirations.

These elections, which will serve as the barometer of political life in

Senegal, will also be serious test of the maturity of our democracy. I urge

all Senegalese citizens to make an additional pledge here of our will for

democratic progress and qualitative social improvement.

What is the situation of our party?

The renewal of elected officials on the base level of our party has also been

characterized by factional struggles in many areas. If the desire to

democratize the internal life of the party is making its way timidly, there

can be no doubt that hindrances (on the part of the majorities as well as the

minorities), personal issues and money are factors still seen in the normal

operation of our structures.

The sale of cards, which has replaced the assignment of cards since the

special congress in January 1984, generally involves numerous problems, above

all in the years of renewal, such as that we have just had. It has been

necessary to rely on the subtlety and intelligence of the National Commission

for Control of the Sale of Cards in order to establish convincing results.

The examination should be continued further, particularly where the sale of

cards and our renewal procedures are concerned, so that our rules can always

take the realities in the field into account.

Internal democracy will require that we ensure that cards can be sold without

malice or hindrance everywhere, to all of the militants who request them.

With the advance of party pluralism, we will need to study the possibility of

organizing a party card file, which in turn will require that the problems of

location and the multiple purchase of cards be dealt with precisely.

Internal democracy will demand that we consistent ly count the votes of the

militants at the base, without hindrance or desire for exclusion, loyally

accepting the decision of the militants, free of any spirit of vengefulness or

animosity.

But comrades, as is also customary on such occasions, I want to speak to you

about the actions pursued by the movements affiliated with and integrated in

the party, and also about training, education and study within the party.

1. The Youth Movement

It must be recognized that this movement has undertaken major work since the

special congress in January 1984.

72
Multiple activities (training, civic education, reforestation) have been

planned and carried out in this period.

The party has granted young people, at their request, the right to speak and

vote in the process of renewal at the base level. Young people, then, have a

status identical to that of the Women's Movement. This is certainly a

substantial gain which the young people must consolidate, year after year, in

order to contribute a life-giving breath of constructive criticism and

dynamism. They must help the party to succeed in internal democracy

everywhere, and to implement the new advance of the party in all sectors.

I therefore ask of them two basic things:

a. To expand the base of their movement in order to cover the whole of our

national territory.

Recruiting should not be quantitative alone. It should also be accompanied by

planned efforts to cover the political ground on a permanent basis through the

activities pursued (lectures, seminars, development of the youth press, etc.).

b. Also to aid the party to accomplish the change which will make it into a

party devoting its essential efforts to the tasks of development.

I congratulate the young people most warmly for their dynamism, and would

encourage them to remain in the vanguard of our battle, because a party

without dynamic youth is doomed to ossification.

2. The Women's Movement

In practical terms, the great achievements of the party come basically from

the actions of its women.

They constitute more than half of the party membership. Their exemplary

discipline and their fidelity to our choices make of them the most certain

element in our social body.

I am delighted, in this connection, with the increase in their role in the

party and the responsibilities which they are ever increasingly assuming in

our various structures.

I urge them, at the outset, to draft a national program of activities each

year (economic activities, tours, training, sponsorship). The party must

continue to help them to play their spearhead role.

And, finally, I urge them to outdo themselves in the crucial periods which lie

ahead of us between now and February 1988.

3. The National Confederation of Senegalese Workers (CNTS)

The CNTS, affiliated with the Socialist Party, has made itself notable through

the serious work of its leaders and members. Faithful to the ideals of

73
democratic socialism, the CNTS is contributing, without any complacency, to

establishing the dignity and prosperity of Senegal through serious cooperation

with the social partners.

In these times of profound economic crisis, the responsibility of the CNTS is

a determining factor in the preservation of social peace in Senegal. I would

like to convey to it my congratulations and encouragement, asking it to

consolidate trade-union unity, to show evidence always of maturity and

nationalism, and, on the African and international levels, to play the

vanguard role which has enabled it to get the Organization of African Trade

Union Unity (OATUU) going again.

The relations between the party and the CNTS should be enlivened by constant

and fruitful contact within the framework of responsible participation, with a

view to the happiness of the Senegalese working class.

4. The Party Press

The party press is called upon to play an increasingly active role in the

functioning of the party.

I would note with satisfaction, first of all, the remarkable work done in this

sector by the youth movement through its periodical LE SURSAUT, and by the

enterprise committees with the journal COMBAT.

LE SURSAUT and COMBAT have given us real cause for pride.

Those responsible for them merit the congratulations and encouragement of the

party. They have henceforth the obligation to persevere and to improve the

content and form of their products steadily.

As to L'UNITE AFRICAINE, it has not measured up fully to our expectations. It

has appeared most irregularly and the production costs of the journal are

excessive.

As the central organ of our party, L'UNITE AFRICAINE should be the business of

all of the members and officials.

I urge that the reform of the party press, which the Political Bureau approved

some months ago, be completed rapidly, in order to guarantee regularity and

consistency in the publication of all the party press organs.

5. The Socialist Party School

This is certainly a body which is functioning satisfactorily. It drafts

regular programs affecting all components of the party on the national and

regional levels, in the form of seminars, study sessions, improvement

workshops, night courses and analyses of teaching tools.

The subjects dealt with at the Party School have to do with the program,

doctrine and life of the party and all of the questions which underlie the

actions of the government, in addition to

problems pertaining to organization.

74
To strengthen the effort undertaken, the Political Bureau has taken important -

steps to consolidate the resources of the regional branches of the Party

School, which will therefore be able to provide training down to the village

committee level.

I ask that the officers and militants of the party regard training and

education äs a priority party activity, as is the sale of cards. My Circular

No 0014 did indeed go into this subject in depth, and it established the ways

and means of training the militants, which should be based on a teaching

method giving priority to mutual exchange and group dynamics, such as the

Party School is already using.

6. The Studies and Research Group (GER)

At the 1984 congress, you approved the decision to replace the contemplation

group with the Studies and Research Group. This change in name reflected the

will of the party to provide itself with a body with the advancement of

consideration of the leading problems of the party and the nation as its

purpose. But this is a matter of specific study based on reality, and not

abstract speculation unrelated to the concerns of the militants.

Conscious of its new task, the Studies and Research Group has devoted itself

to promoting the ideological sponsorship of the party and refining the new

advance of the party.

Ideological promotion, which is very important, is carried out in coordination

with the Party School. For example, a sustained study was made on factions

and clans, democratic centralism and disarmament. Seminars for the members of

the Central Committee were organized in this connection.

In the same spirit, I want to emphasize the positive work done in the

enterprise committee sector.

The party revised this important sector, thus mobilizing all of the socialist

workers within the enterprises, while encouraging them to be the best in the

production sector.

The work already done merits our approval and congratulations, particularly

since the enterprise is the axis of our policy of economic and financial

adjustment.

I urge all of the members of the collectives and promoters of the enterprise

committees to continue their actions.

But, comrades, I could not complete this political section without mentioning

a problem which is worthy of the attention and thought of the party members

and officials—the support associations.

What has not been said on this subject!

In this connection I would like to be brief but specific.

75
Since 1981 we have seen the birth of a number of movements for the support of

the actions of the president of the republic (the COSAPAD, CONAGRI-SAPAD,

Friends of Jean Collin, Friends of Mrs Elisabeth Diouf, etc.). These

associations, it must be recognized have evidenced *^5" "^te

accordance with their duty, have supported the actions of the chief of state.

With a system of party pluralism, this is an attitude which should be praised

as should the support of individuals, not necessarily party^milltans. for the

policies implemented by the president of the republic above all since our

laws authorize the right of association for private individuals. The original

aspect of the matter in Senegal derives from the fact that only the parties

and the trade unions are known.

There are some thinkers who have seen in this an effort to expand the

Socialist Party, whereas others see it as a preparation for replacing or

absorbing the Socialist Party. Nothing of the sort is the case.

While I can be pleased with the positive actions of the support movements, I

have never contemplated effecting assimilation. The support associations are

one thing, and the party is another. The process of winning and maintaining

power in the Socialist Party will be based solely on the rules of the

Socialist Party.

The fact remains that we must look into the reasons for the existence of these

associations, particularly since it is known that the majority of their

sponsors are PS members known for their commitment.

This is because blocs and hindrances have often prevented many Senegalese

citizens who accept our ideals from expressing themselves easily within the

party.

From this point of view, the support associations represent good desires which

should be encouraged.

Once again, let me state unmistakably, the power lies with the Socialist

Party, remains with the Socialist Party and is transmitted in the Socialist

Party.

The Socialist Party and the support movements are not opposed to each other,

but each has its separate tasks and specific internal dynamics.

My dear comrades:

In conclusion, our great party has clearly defined its program for a socialist

and democratic society, while at the same time establishing its new path and

defining itself in terms of a break with the old practices and burdens of all

kinds.

You have entrusted me with the achievement our plan for society, together with

the Socialist Party and all of the patriotic forces in our country.

76
Let us unite, let us mobilize, let us work unceasingly. Let us occupy the

political and economic terrain. To paraphrase La Fontaine's laborer, let us

see that there is no area where the Socialist Party fails to act and react.

For the future is still more promising in terms of development, peace, freedom

and social justice.

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77
SENEGAL

WADE OPENING ADDRESS TO PDS CONVENTION

Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 16 Jan 87 p 8

[Article by Moustapha Mbodj]

[Text] "I repeat here that if a minimum of guarantees of regularity is not

assured, then the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] will not participate in

the (1988 legislative and presidential) elections and, I hasten to say, will

not stand idly by or take a passive attitude." It was amidst an atmosphere

easy to imagine that the secretary general of the Senegalese Democratic Party

(Wade) read that portion of his report devoted to political life arid the coming

elections, at the opening session of his party's Fourth Convention.

It was a report encompassing all aspects of national life: political, economic, social, and so on, but the great current international issues as well,

in order for political life to return to normal, Abdoulaye Wade said, relations between the government and the opposition must be normalized, "meaning,

in the final analysis, that two principles be respected": The opposition must

recognize the government's right to govern and the government, for its part,

must recognize the opposition's right to be opposed. Concerning the next

elections, the secretary general of the PDS recommended that all political

parties come to an understanding on a number of principles: "We have considered all possibilities," Wade said, adding that "if we are beaten in honest

elections, you will not see a more loyal opposition than that of the PDS."

What are the principles on which parties must agree? In the opinion of Wade,

all political parties should sign a national charter in which they pledge to

respect the people's will and therefore, subscribe to the organization of free

and democratic elections. These parties could set up a national commission

responsible for drafting such a charter. "And the PDS sees nothing wrong with

the chief of state proposing a text to be discussed, amended and adopted by

the national commission before being signed by all parties."

Election Commission

For the leader of the Senegalese Democratic Party, elections should be the

concern of the political parties and not the administration, particularly the

prefects and subprefects. A national election commission should supervise

them. As for the election code, in Wade's opinion, it should be drafted by a

78
commission including representatives of the different political parties. "I

am willing to talk with the president of the republic and guardian of the

constitution," Wade added, for if "Paris is worth a mass," then "Senegal is

worth a little movement at the Palace."

The Fourth National Convention of the Senegalese Democratic Party, which

began yesterday at the El Mansour movie theater, attended by representatives

of the opposition parties and a crowd of militants, immediately took up the

matter of the coming elections, clearly setting forth the conditions advanced

by the main opposition group for participating in the 1988 elections.

In the economic field* the report of the secretary general of the PDS dwelt

at length on the disengagement of the government, in short, on this "less

government" in vogue in recent years. In Africa, Wade noted, one has to observe the failure of the different types of socialism, whether they be democratic, as in Senegal, or Marxist or even African. "They are the root of

wrenching revisions and abjurations, without thereby authorizing the application of this 'less government and more markets'," a slogan that should be

adapted to our circumstances to become "less socialist government, but more

interventionist government and more markets." The leader of the PDS spoke

at length on this topic.

Wade is there, absolutely there, as he recalled in response to those who

accused him of having fled the country at the height of the storm. He therefore logically congratulated Deputy Boubacar Sail, new No 2 man in the PDS,

"for having held the wheel with such a firm hand during [my] absence."

It was an absence during which party life did not come to a stop; far from it,

if one is to believe the activity report read by Ousmane Ngom to members.

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79
SENEGAL

STATUS OF SENEGAMBIAN CONFEDERATION EXAMINED

Dakar LE DEVOIR in French Jan 87 p 9

[Article: "When Gambia Awakens"]

[Text] Having now turned against a confederation he once personally wanted,

Dawda Jawara of Gambia is now beating a clever retreat: He is turning the

confederative bond against Senegal in order to achieve unanimity around

himself and make Senegal solely responsible for the improper presence of the

"Senegalese army of occupation," while failing to admit to those under him

that he and his ministers have trembled every time they did not see a Senegalese soldier at their door. And that they have implored Senegal to keep

its soldiers in the country.

The Gambian people also have a grudge against Senegal, which they blame for

keeping Jawara on the throne even though his people have had their fill of

him. They are not willing to tolerate the "tyrant from Banjul" for 5 more

years.

When Gambia awakens, the local Senegalese will definitely risk facing tough

times, quite simply because Senegal has refused to address the new situation

prevailing in Gambia by adopting a new strategy.

Banjul—"In the minds of the (Gambian) people, the memory of Kukoi Samba Sagna

is getting blurred. The Senegalese Army is no longer perceived as the result

of the 1981 affair, but simply as an army ofoccupation."

This official reasoning about the existing sociopolitical situation in Gambia

is far-fetched. Actually, the presence of the Senegalese Army in Gambia reminds Gambians of July 1981 and the collective desire of an entire people,

concretely manifested by Kukoi Samba Sagna, to get rid of a president they

no longer want.

Because of the sudden intervention and subsequent maintenance of the Senegalese

Army in Gambia, an entire people has been frustrated in its latent aspirations

to put an end to Jawara's reign. Today, there is in every Gambian a potential

Kukoi Samba Sagna who could awaken in April, after the elections.

One has to say, in fact, that Jawara's reelection in 1987 for 5 more years

could mean bad times for the Senegalese of Banjul, mainly. The Gambians are

80
no longer willing to burn in the hell they are experiencing and for which they

blame Senegal, which lovingly incubates a president detested by his people.

Unfortunately, there is today no credible, serious alternative to the current

president of Gambia and the Confederation is a burden to the entire political

class and the big Gambian merchants and moneymen. This scarcely improves

Senegal's image, which even Jawara semi-officially makes responsible for the

presence of his army in Gambian territory.

When our neighbors awaken, it will assuredly be difficult for everyone and

only the withdrawal of the Senegalese Army could, in the present situation,

attenuate the rancor of the people of Banjul in particular, at least for the

time being.

Annex Gambia? Never!

But there it is: The Senegalese Army is in Gambia to stay, not in a spirit

of semi-official annexation — President Abdou Diouf swore he would never

annex Gambia — but because Jawara and his entire government can no longer

live without the reassuring presence of our soldiers in Gambia.

It was in fact at the express request of Jawara himself that the Senegalese

Army remained in Gambia following the events of July 19.81. And yet, in the

face of the discontent of the people frustrated by Jawara himself, a kind of

national consensus emerged around the foreign presence that could be felt within the Gambian national boundaries. And, as generally occurs in serious

crises, the Gambians first of all massively blamed their disappointment on

the foreign element, but for inversely identical reasons, contrary to the

dangerous current logic bf a Jawara, who is trying to reshape unanimity

around himself by lashing out at Senegal and the Senegalese.

Jawara is an old soldier of the breed of those old dogs one cannot teach new

tricks. For some time now, he has begun to do a soft shoe dance with the

young and naive Abdou Dious, who relied on the word given in 1981 under

special conditions. But those psychological conditions changed with the

solidification of Jawara's position with the Senegalese intervention following

the evocation at the time of the mutual defense agreement. Shrewder than

an Abdou Diouf, who scarcely worries, methodologically, about the objective

reasons and the subjective conditions under which that word was given, Jawara

has set forth a judicious plan in three points allowing him to break his

alliance with Senegal without losing face, either with his citizens or the

Senegalese "partner."

First of all, he presents himself to his people as the victim of a confederation imposed and mediatized by the presence of the Senegalese Army in Gambia.

He next semiofficially accuses Senegal of getting ahead of schedule, of

being more anxious about the confederation than the Gambians themselves and

of trying to impose it at any cost and at a speed that cannot please the

Gambians. His nickname "Ninki-nanka" (mollo-mollo [Take it easy]) is famous

even in the Senegalese circles of Dakar. Finally, he is trying to wipe away

the memory of July 1981 by erasing the objective causes of the abortive uprising of Kukoi-Samba Sagna.

81
It is a doubleplay that is both subtle and dangerous, except that Jawara

agrees to run the possible risks, unlike his Senegalese "partners" linked by

a legalism in poor taste.

Actually, Senegal never posed in 1981 the Jawara case in connection with an

alternative that would represent a solution in the case of perjury by Jawara.

Not in 1981 and not today. Naturally, there was consideration at one time

(1983) of Bakary Dabo as Jawara's possible successor. Naturally, it would

appear that until the Sountou Faty affair in November (LE DEVOIR, Nos 22 and

24), there was some hope for Assan Musa Camara. The fact nevertheless remains that Senegal would now have a difficult time finding a successor to

Jawara if the current president should disappear.

Furthermore, no current opponent seems credible in the eyes of the Gambians:

neither Diba with his NCP, nor Assan Musa Camara of the confederal GPP out of

opportunism, nor the younger "Doi" of Halifa Salla. Moreover, the latter

is not basically against the confederation, contrary to the hasty conclusion

to which a superficial study of political discourse might lead. Naturally,

the "Doi," as he is called here, maintains that no opposition party has truly

attacked the illegality of Senegambia and the local problems of the economic

crisis. But the Doi, who wants to socialize poverty, shades his analysis and

his discourse abroad by stating that he was not basically against African

unity and subregional regroupings. However, Halifa Salla's party believes

that a confederation must be democratic, freely consented to by the peoples

and not an alienation of national sovereignty benefiting Senegal, as in the

current situation, which, in the Doi's view, is anticonstitutional, moreover.

In General, Senegal is presented today as the big enemy against which we must

make war. There is unanimity on the right and the left around that objective-,

and the fundamental contradictions will be settled later.

Political rhetoric on the whole coincides with the results of the people's

analysis, but the paths are opposite and inversely proportionate, except that

the essential thing is the consensus obtained against Senegal.

The old political veteran which Jawara is plays on this difference, not only

to delay the process of overall integration, the end result of a confederation

that in his eyes is now outdated, but joins his own opposition and the intellectual and commercial elite of Banjul, cleverly turning the confederative

bond against Senegal. He thinks he is dealing with a young whippersnapper of

international politics, a serious mistake on his part, except that he has

played and agreed to play for big stakes.

Whatever the case, when Gambia awakens following April 1987, the problems of

the Senegambian confederation will solve themselves in one way or another and

Senegal and the Senegalese of Banjul could experience tough times.

It is not by asking Jawara to clarify his position that one could avoid major

unpleasantness for everyone, but rather, by taking up the Senegambian problem

from another angle. If we only had the courage!

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82
SENEGAL

NEW EDUCATION SEEKS TO REACH MORE STUDENTS

Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 2 Jan 87 p 9

[Article by El Bachir Sow: "Consolidating Achievements"]

[Text] New Education

"The new education is a tool of national liberation that consolidates our

independence. It ensures the training of a Senegalese citizen imbued with a

sense of his responsibilities and equipped with the means to meet the demands

of our development through a knowledge of his environment, our resources and

our possibilities and an acquisition of knowledge and know-how adapted to our

situation."

This definition of new education comes from Minister of National Education

Iba Der Thiam. Since the Assembly of Education and Training in January 1981,

the foundations of that education have been laid. In some 6 years, our system

of education has undergone profound changes. Reforms implemented have transformed the face of Senegalese schools. Nothing has been done in haste and

nothing has been left to chance. The new education is probably one of the

rare reforms whose evolution can be appreciated by the average Senegalese on

a daily basis. One thing explains it: "The new education," as Iba Der Thiam

states, "was brought about by the National Reform Committee, essentially made

up of representatives of unions of teachers, parents and government."

Anti-Apartheid Fight

"In accordance with the resolution of the 22d Summit Conference of the OAU,

the first lesson of the year was devoted to apartheid. In October 1986, the

following phrase was written on blackboards in all classrooms: 'Apartheid is

a crime against humanity.'"

This entry by the anti-apartheid fight into the universe of students is in

fact a continuation of the crusade which Chief of State . Abdou Diouf has

waged throughout his term at the head of the Organization of African Unity.

Furthermore, in taking over leadership of the fight against apartheid, new

education confirms that it is a tool of liberation.

83
Double Shifts

The problem of double shifts had a great impact on debate concerning the new

education. Many things were said and many arguments developed. At one time,

the opposition made it its major issue.

And yet, as the chief of state said, the system of double shifts is the result

of a national consensus that emerged at the time of the Assembly on Education

and Training.

But what explains the institution of double shifts in Senegal? The minister

of national education responds: "The goal pursued by the opening of these

classes is to make it possible for many children from 6 to 7 years of age to

start school and receive an education and instruction despite our limited

number of teachers and classrooms. In a word, it is a question of increasing

the rate of attendance. Let us recall that at the present time in Senegal,

53 percent of the pupils at the elementary level do not attend school."

"Can we therefore continue this policy of education that provides instruction

for the 50 percent of the privileged children or must we find another solution?" the minister of national education asks.

Reviewing the school year, Iba Der Thiam explained how this revolutionary

undertaking would be made to succeed: "The experiment will be entrusted to

the most competent, most experienced and most outstanding teachers. Above

all, they will have to be motivated, have conviction, be available and creative."

Reform of High School Diploma

Results of the high school diploma have been good on the whole, with a

threshold of success of about 50 percent regarding diplomas issued for technical and general education, part 2.

However, it is at the second level that problems arise. Results were relatively mediocre: 19.47 passage for technical subjects and 20.47 for general

education. This situation was discussed at length at the meeting held to

review the school year. Moreover, over the next 2 years, there will be a

return to the old high school system of the diploma, with elimination of the

first part and adoption of a single diploma and an oral exam.

Universities

During the past school year, the universities received subsidies of 200 million francs earmarked for back payments. The review of Gaston Berger University continued. Gradual integration of the CFPA [Adult Vocational Training

Center] into the ENAM [National School of Administration and Magistrature]

will also continue. The ENCR will modify its training program, and so on.

84
Teaching Profession

A delegation from the General Association of National Education of France

visited our country in June.

Discussions between Senegalese and French concerned the prospect of creating

an association of teachers in Senegal. Once established, such an association

would take over four priority sectors for teachers: health, housing, retirement and consumer cooperatives.

Prospects

The 1986-1987 school year will be "a year of consolidating achievements" for

Iba Der Thiam. It will also be a new phase on the new path leading to the

gradual building of a system of national, democratic, people's education, in

keeping with the wishes of the Assembly of Education and Training.

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85
TOGO

PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES ADVANCES

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT in German

15 Dec 86 p 2

[Article by W. An., Frankfurt: "Togo Privatizes State Enterprises; Six

Enterprises Already Taken Over by Foreign Firms"]

[Text] In conformance with the economic-policy guidelines of the World

Bank group, whose financial assistance for the structural adjustment

program amounted to roughly $165.4 million for 1985 alone, Togo has

started the privatization of state enterprises. By the end of 1988, 21

state enterprises are to pass into private hands, but almost 50

additional ones are to remain under state control. The latter are

enterprises which work for the government in the public service sector,

possess strategic value or provide a significant contribution to the

financing of state expenditures.

In November 1986, six enterprises were already taken over by foreign

interested parties or an early privatization is expected for them. First

of all, the acquisition of the two big textile enterprises of the country

by the U.S.. Pan Africa Textile Corporation in conjunction with the South

Korean Dukseung Trading Company is to be mentioned. They pay $20

million for the purchase of the two enterprises and thus safeguard

roughly 5000 jobs.

One of the two Togolese enterprises is the Industrie Togolaise des

Textiles (ITT) in Daja near Atakpame, which will continue to produce

printed fabrics with African design for the market in West Africa. ITT

used to have German ownership. The other, the Societe Togolaise des

Textiles (Togotex) built its textile factory in Kara in Togo's north.

The production program of Togotex is to be switched over to the export of

woven and knitted clothing to the United States. The International

Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank group presumably will also

participate in taking over the two textile enterprises.

The Compagnie Francaise pour le Developpement des Textiles (CFDT), Paris,

which thus far has been involved in the cotton industry in several West

86
African countries as a third party, is in the process of acquiring a 51

percent share in the firm of Industrie des Oleagineux du Togo (ioto).

This enterprise produces vegetable oil from cotton seeds.

A German-Dutch-Danish group as a fourth party recently acquired a 58

percent share in the firm of Industrie Togolaise des Plastiques (ITP),

which produces plastic pipes in its plant on the industrial terrain of

Lome. The European group also provided long-term credits and subsidies

valued at $1.5 million. The government, which used to hold a 90 percent

capital share, is now a minority stockholder with a remaining 42 percent

investment.

The Domo-Kemi firm, which is supported by the IFU, the Danish development

agency, as fifth party will probably conclude an agreement with the

government of Togo on the acquisition of the detergent enterprise Societe

des Detergents du Togo (Sodeto). The signing of another agreement, the

sixth, is expected with Belgian or private Togolese interested parties

for the Societe des Salines du Togo (Salinto), which is involved in salt

production.

The first step towards privatization was taken in November 1984 when a

10-year lease was granted to the U.S. entrepreneur John Moore for the

only electric steel and rolling mill of the country. The plant in the

industrial zone of the port of Lome, which had begun operations in the

spring of 1979, was shut down in 1983 after only 4 years of operation on

account of unprofitability. Since its reopening, the enterprise, which

now calls itself Societe Togolaise de Siderurgie (STS), operates again

with profit.

The modern electric steel and rolling mill with an annual capacity of

20,000 tons of steel products had been erected by an international

syndicate under the management of the BBC Brown, Boveri & Cie. AG, Baden

(Switzerland). The syndicate also included the Swiss steel construction

firm of Geilinger AG, Winterthur. This year the STS capital was raised

from $2.1 million to $3 million, of which a third of the capital increase

was subscribed to by private Togolese investors. The new funds are to be

used above all for the construction of a new rolling mill which is

planned for the processing of used rails into structural steel.

A second successful step was the granting of a lease in the spring of

1985 for the fuel depots of the crude oil refinery in Lome shut down 3

years earlier (annual throughput capacity: 2 million tons) to the

international enterprises of Royal Dutch/Shell, British Petroleum Company

Ltd. (BP), Texaco Incorporated, and Mobil Corporation. The fuel depots

of the Societe Togolaise des Hydrocarbures (STH) have a storage volume of

250,000 tons. The fuel depot is now operated by the Societe de Stockage

de Lome.

87
A dairy in Lome, which deals with the production of fresh milk from

imported milk powder, was leased to the Danish firm of Emadan. The dairy

of the Societe des Produits Laitiers du Togo (Soprolait) had to shut down

its operation in 1983. The enterprise, which was renamed Fanmilk, now

operates satisfactorily. Fanmilk has plans for expanding its production

program and also intends to produce yogurt and ice cream.

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88
SOUTH AFRICA

ANC'S NZO SAYS WAY OPEN FOR FURTHER U.S. TALKS

MB211813 Dakar PANA in English 1800 GMT 21 Feb 87

[Text] Harare, 21 Feb (ZIANA/PANA)—African National Congress (ANC)

Secretary General Alfred Nzo, yesterday said the whites-only elections to be

held in South Africa in May would mark the beginning of the end of the Botha

regime.

Nzo, who arrived in Harare yesterday on a one-day stopover on his way to

Bulgaria, told newsmen that although the election would not remove the Botha

regime, it would considerably weaken it.

He said there was much confusion among white South Africans, especially

[passage deleted] He said this confusion would be reflected in the ___

elections. ^~

Nzo added that more whites in South Africa were beginning to realize that

the ANC struggle for democracy was just.

He said: [word indistinct] that the most effective solution to the demise of

apartheid would be tougher international action against Pretoria.

The recent talks between the President of the ANC, Oliver Tambo and the

American Secretary of State, Mr George Shultz, served as an eye-opener to the

U.S. because they heard what the ANC struggle was about first hand and not

through Pretoria's propaganda, Nzo said.

He said it was made clear to Mr Shultz that the ANC struggle was against the

terror of apartheid and not a fight against the South African whites.

With this established, Nzo said, the way was open for future talks between

the ANC and the U.S.

Nzo leaves Harare Sunday on an official visit to Bulgaria where he will

receive, on behalf of jailed ANC leader, Nelson Mandela, the George Dimitrov

medal. Nzo said the medal was the highest honor offered by the Bulgarian

Communist Party. He was met at the airport by the Bulgarian ambassador to

Zimbabwe Aleksandur Atanasov.

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89
SOUTH AFRICA

ANC OFFICIAL PREDICTS DEMISE OF BOTHA REGIME

MB210914 Harare Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 21 Feb 87

[Text] The African National Congress of South Africa says the bogus elections

to be held by whites only in South Africa next May will mark the beginning

of the end of the Botha regime. The ANC secretary, Comrade Alfred Nzo, said

although the election will not remove the Botha regime for power it will

weaken it. He noted that there is confusion and division among the whites.

Comrade Nzo is in Harare on a stopover to Bulgaria, where he will receive the

[word indistinct] the medal on behalf of the jailed ANC leader, Comrade

Nelso Mandela. The medal is the highest honor offered by the Bulgarian

Communist Party.

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90
SOUTH AFRICA

UDF PRESIDENT HOLDS NEWS CONFERENCE IN LONDON

MB191452 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1448 GMT 19 Feb 87

[Text] London, 19 Feb (SAPA)--Mr Archie Gumede, a president of the United

Democratic Front, said here today whites would have an opportunity in the

election to decide whether or not they wanted apartheid to continue,

"They've got the opportunity to make up their minds whether they want peace

or war," he told a news conference, adding? "I'm not saying the ANC could

wage war—they haven't got the muscle,"

Mr Gumede delivered a familiar UDF line at the conference in the House of

Commons, which was organised by the Anti-Apartheid Movement [AAMM],

South Africa Was in a state of trauma, he said, because state power was not

being used to bring about peace, but to suppress the majority of the population,

Mr Gumede, on his first trip outside southern Africa, is due to meet British

Foreign Office representatives on Monday.

Criticising restrictions on press reporting in South Africa, he said people

inside and outside the country were not being told the whole truth.

"To rely on the media for a true picture is most dangerous," he said.

Asked how many trades union leaders were in detention in South Africa, he

said he thought the figure was about 100. But he was not specific about

the level of violence in the townships,

"You can read between the lines—would the state of emergency continue if

resistance to apartheid had been broken completely," he said.

He described the UDF's relationship with the ANC as that of organisations

which have "more or less the same alms," but they were "independent of each

other,"

Mr Gumede released a lengthy memorandum detailing "repressive" measures

adopted by the government and the activities of "vigilantes" in the townships.

91
Mr Gumede would not respond to questions about how he had left South Africa

or whether he was travelling on a passport.

Conference Chairman Mr Bob Hughes, a Labour MP, told reporters: "Those

questions cannot be answered,"

Archbishop Trevor Huddleston, the president of the AAMM, released the text

of a letter he sent today to Prime Minister Mrs Margaret Thatcher urging her

not to use the British veto to block a United Nations Security Council resolution due to be debated within the next 24 hours demanding mandatory sanctions

against South Africa,

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SOUTH AFRICA

AZAPO LEADER ON BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS

MB211000 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 20-26 Feb 87 p 15

[Article by Patrick Laurence]

[Text] It is difficult to stand in the shadow of Steve Biko, the charismatic

founder of black consciousness who died in detention 10 years ago. But Nkosi

Molala, a former political prisoner and professional football player, stands

tall—heir to a proud tradition. He was elected president of the Azanian

People's Organization (Azapo) late last year—a tough time for black

consciousness.

Within the ranks of extra-parliamentary opposition forces, it faces a serious

challenge from the United Democratic Front, which holds the center of the

political stage.

Molala, however, contends that black consciousness is stronger than seems

apparent. He said Azapo has 86 branches throughout South Africa, with a

minimum of 20 members in each branch. Against that, the UDF has more than

700 affiliated organizations.

Molala declined to quantify Azapo's individual membership, although his predecessor, Saths Cooper, recently spoke of 110,000 signed-up members. "We

don't measure strength in terms of branches," Molala says. "We believe we

have supporters who may not be members."

Jailed for sabotage between 1976 and 1983, he is based now in a dingy, crowded

office in central Johannesburg—a sign that Azapo is not exactly awash with

funds.

One eye is partially closed and stares unseeingly. It was hit by a beargas

canister during a funeral in Soweto last September, he says—but he brushes

off the loss of his eye without bitterness. His gestures suggest he considers

himself lucky not to have been called on to sacrifice his life.

Biko,.of course, was a martyr to the cause. Black consciousness, however,

has evolved since Biko's brutal death nearly a decade ago. Its core may have

changed little, but its ideological components have been rearranged.

93
From a philosophy seeking to help black people overcome "psychological

oppression"—to eradicate feelings of inferiority and the associated slave

mentality—black consciousness has become a political movement championing

socialism.

"The emphasis has changed," Molala explains. "Today the emphasis is on the

economic structure. The objective is to consolidate and understand what

socialism is all about, to expose the inequities of capitalism and to bring

socialism into sharp focus as the only relevant solution."

The majority of black people earn their living from the sale of their labor,

he says. "Abolition of apartheid would not constitute a solution to their

situation. If apartheid were abolished, black people would still have to

contend with the problems of staff reductions, rising prices and falling wages.

Only a tiny number of blacks will be able to enjoy the fruits of capitalism."

The ideological changes have seen the introduction of class as an important

factor in black consciousness. But "class analysis" in black consciousness

does not stray too far from race. Race determines class, Molala says.

"The definition of class has a purpose. It is to identify the social forces

which have potential to bring out change. In our position blacks represent

the working class."

White workers and the black middle class are anomalies not covered by the

axiom "race determines class." But, Molala says, white workers are the

beneficiaries of white rule and have become a reactionary labor aristocracy.

The black middle class, he adds, is in a state of flux—it can identify with

the black working class or turn its back on them and become co-optees of

South Africa's white rulers.

Choosing his words carefully, Molala concludes of the black bourgeoisie:

"They are an oscillating class."

While in prison, Molala had long discussions with prisoners belonging to the

African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress. But they could not

persuade him to abandon his commitment to black consciousness, which Biko saw

as an independent third force.

Molala, who matriculated in 1971 before playing professional soccer for

Pretoria Callies, feels he benefited from those talks. They served to hone

his mind.

He speaks with the quiet confidence of those South Africans who can write PG

instead of BA after their names. PG stands for prison graduate. His relaxed

style comes out in an exchange on Azapo's leadership.

Azapo identifies the black working class as the motor force for change in

South Africa, the class which will bring the hoped-for "socialist workers'

republic" into being.

94
Its leaders, however, from Molala down, are not workers who earn their

living from the sweat of their brows, I object. Molala laughs, taking the

point that he is not a worker.

"Maybe you are right," he concedes. He pauses for a moment, searching for

words to explain why he, a non-worker, is at the head of a self-defined

workers' organization.

"The vanguard of every revolutionary movement consists of professional

activists or revolutionaries," he says. But he stresses Azapo does not

espouse violence as a means of achieving its revolutionary aims. "We are

an overt, legal organization."

In pursuit of their socialist aims, Azapo leaders are handicapped by an acute

shortage of funds. Molala concedes frankly that raising money is a problem.

Azapo obtains virtually no money from overseas. Membership subscriptions

yield "very little." Few of its 110,000 signed^up members are.paid-up.

Attempts to persuade black businessmen to contribute funds provide small sums

only, Molala adds, and the organization is largely dependent on an annual

donation from the South African Council of Churches.

But, inspired by the memory of Biko and driven by their convictions, Molala

and his lieutenants soldier on, believing that one day black consciousness

will regain the dominant position it held a decade ago.

Ironically: state suppression of the UDF may help, in the same way state

repression of black consciousness organizations in 1977 created a vacuum

for the UDF.

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SOUTH AFRICA

WEEKLY MAIL EXPLORES MAKE-UP OF TOWNSHIP GANGS

MB211029 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 20-26 Feb 87 p 17

[Article by Eddie Koch]

[Text] Blanket-clad "Russians" have been accused of murdering at least four

young activists in Soweto during last year's Christmas Against the Emergency

campaign.

Guns, dynamite and mystery carloads of thugs were mentioned in a recent report

on the alleged use of "Russians" to stir up faction fighting at the Vaal

Reefs Gold Mine last year.

Not long ago, the NEW NATION newspaper uncovered an alleged plot by the Soweto

town council to hire "Russians" to break the rent boycott. These reports

have done little to explain who these sinister figures are and why they are

being accused of operating as rightwing vigilantes.

This week, two people—an academic and a former gangster—provided a glimpse

behind the blanket of secrecy that seems to shroud this "Russian" underworld.

Wits University Professor Phil Bonner, who has researched the history of

township crime, said the "AmaRasheeya" [Russians] as they were locally known,

formed themselves in strongholds in Benoni, Evaton and Newclare.

The gang was made up of laborers from Lesotho, mostly employed on the mines,

who banded together to protect themselves from the harsh and exploitative

environment and migrant system had thrust them into.

Branches of the gang developed in the different areas and each elected their

own commander and a hierarchy of lieutenants to train members in the traditional stick-fighting culture of Sotho herdboys. Each branch was distinguished

by the color of the drapped blankets that became their uniform.

"One of the principal threats to individual migrants was assaults by tsotsis

[hooligans] and urban-based youth gangs who tended to regard migrants as

country bumpkins and idiots. That is why the 'Russians' came to develop an

intense antagonism to urban youth," Bonner said.

96
Some Russian impis [warriors], which protected members against tsotsis and

the other gangs that flourished on the reef at the time, extended their

activities into organized crime, running protection rackets and forcing

shopkeepers and residents to pay a levy to stay in the area.

Don Mattera, ex-leader of a 500-strong teenage gang in Sophiatown called the

Vultures, says ethnic removals at the end of the fifties allowed the "Russian"

branch that ruled Newclare along these lines to be transferred intact to

areas of Soweto like Naledi, Mapetla and Tladi.

These are areas where much of the vigilante violence took place over Christmas

last year and where elements alleged to be collaborating with the Soweto

council are rumored to live.

Mattera, who left the underworld in the late fifties for the African National

Congress, says the "Russians" often fought teenage gangs like his own because

the "clevers" (street-wise township youth) were politically militant.

"The politicians were educated and polite. We were the street fighters on

the frontline against the police during the pound-a-day campaign and the

Sophiatown removals. Why do you think they hired AmaRasheeya to clean us up

with their armies and assortment of home-made knives, sword, sticks and

doubled-bladed axes called kwa-kwas?" Thus it is an old saying that

"Russians are Bana MaPolisi" (children of the police), he said.

"The jibe that 'die Boere eet met die ie Russians' [the Boers are eating with

the Russians] has long drawn chuckles of satirical mirth in political circles

about the marriage between 'kommies' and the police."

But both Bonner and Mattera note that the "Russians" displayed elements of

resistance that defy any view of their history as a long record of collaboration with the state.

According to one ex-member, the name of the gang was chosen because the

"Russians" were powerful nation opposed to the West. Old "Russian" informants

told Bonner that branches of the gang that collaborated with police were

looked down upon as deviating from the original purpose of the gang—to

protect members from the ravages of industrialization.

Mattera recounted how on many occasions "Russians" fought pitched battles

with police raiding for passes or illicit liquor and their strongholds often

became no-go areas for officers of the law.

In the seventies, "Russians" at the Vaal Reefs Gold Mine were involved in

organizing a wage strike, rather than undermining collective worker action.

97
Attempts, therefore, to categorize the gang as an army of rightwing

collaborators always ready to do battle with progressive forces, or as a

working class organization fighting capitalist exploitation, are both too

simple.

What the history of the "Russians" does show, however, is a clear example

of how the migrant labor system has created deep and subtle divisions in South

Africa that can be exploited to promote internecine violence in the townships.

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SOUTH AFRICA

BOPHUTHATSWANA HOPES TO RESOLVE BOTSWANA BORDER PROBLEM

MB231646 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1645 GMT 23 Feb 87

[Text] Mmabatho, 23 Feb (SAPA)—Bophuthatswana said today it looked forward

to an early resumption of talks with Botswana to enable the free movement

by road of rail of Tswana passengers across the border.

The secretary for information made the following statement in Mmabatho today

on the question of the Botswana/Bophuthatswana border situation:

"Contrary to reports in the media, Bophuthatswana has not and has no intention

of closing the border, has never demanded an office in Botswana and is certainly

not so politically naive as to attempt to coerce Botswana into politically ._

recognizing her.

"The proposed take-over of railway operations from Zimbabwe by Botswana and

particularly inconvenience and delay at the Ramatlabam border post caused by

the fact that passengers have to alight from the train in order to.complete

customs and immigration formalities led to meetings between the governments of

Bophuthatswana and Botswana at high level to discuss these and related matters.

"The Bophuthatswana Government made proposals for measures to be introduced

to facilitate all the normal immigration and customs formalities while the

train was traveling to the common order.

"Agreement was reached in principle to allow officers of the respective

countries to join the train in each others territory; the only outstanding

issue was agreement on the exact points of embarkation.

"Other matters to regularize the movement of people across the border were

also raised and both countries had a freedom of a six months period within

which to work out details.

"The meetings were all cordial and positive. Documents were exchanged and a

further response from Botswana was expected by the government of Bophuthatswana.

99
"Subsequent to this amicable meeting on December 16 the media reported that

Botswana held rail meetings in Zimbabwe and then met the South African

Government in Pretoria.

"We felt compelled to introduce visa requirements for Botswana citizens

traveling into or through Bophuthatswana. This action was supported by

various security authorities.

"Many multiple visas have been issued and in consequence, trains, buses

and motor vehicles continue to cross the border every day.

"Certainly over many years Botswana and Bophuthatswana have discussed and

achieved solutions for many matters in a good-neighborly fashion and they

should be allowed to do so in this present instance without political interference from others who may have less concern for the Tswana interests.

"We look forward to an early resumption of talks that will enable the free

movement by road or rail of Tswana passengers across the frontier."

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SOUTH AFRICA

COMMENTARY EXAMINES BLACK EDUCATION STATUS

MB260530 Johannesburg Domestic Service In English 0500 GMT 26 Feb 87

[Station commentary]

[Text] The issue of black education has been at the very center of political

debate in South Africa for 3 decades and more. Since June 1976 grievances on

black education'—some genuine, others of a trumped-up nature—have occupied

center stage in unrest situations. Last year, for example, the casual reader

of newspapers could have been forgiven for coming to the conclusion that unrest

conditions had forced the closure of black schools across the country and had

denied education to millions of children.

Statistics now published show that while there is still cause for concern about

the matter, the unrest situation, in so far as it has affected black schools,

has been grossly exaggerated. The annual report for 1986 of the Department

of Education and Training—tabled with commendable promptitude in parliament

this week—reveals that at any one time last year classes at only 260 black

schools out of 7,300 in South Africa and the self-governing states were

disrupted because of unrest. That is only 3% percent of all black schools.

Moreover, of the 7,300 schools, only 73—or 1 percent—had to be closed.

Perhaps the most encouraging development to come out of the tragedy of the

township unrest of the past 2% years is that, where radical groups did

succeed in creating unrest and disruption at black schools, pupils, parents,

teachers, and the educational authorities have formed a new and constructive

partnership to expose, and counter, the harm that radicals are causing to the

young generation of black South Africans. In particular, more and more

parents are now assuming full responsibility for their children's schooling

and are becoming more involved in the educational sphere.

This year, more than 6 million black children are at school—a record number.

Almost 1,800 new classrooms for secondary schools were built last year—

equivalent to 130 new schools. The expenditure on black education has risen

eight fold in the past 8 years-r-from 143 million rands to a whopping 1,150

million rands. All this is part of a new 10-year program to bring black

education on a par—in all respects—with the far older and more established

educational systems available to other population groups.

101
Problems remain, among them the excessively high birth rate and the unacceptably high percentage of black schoolteachers who do not have professional

qualifications. But the goals have been set and the objectives defined.

With the requisite cooperation of all concerned, black communities can look

forward to a much improved educational dispensation for their children.

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SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

ANC CONDEMNS U.S., UK VETO OF UN SANCTIONS—The ANC of South Africa has

vehemently condemned Britain and the United States for their decision to veto

a resolution by the Security Council calling for selected mandatory economic

sanctions against South Africa. The ANC spokesman, Tom Sebina, described the

veto by the United States and Britain as despicable and careless. He said the

recent action was a true testimony that Britain, West Germany, and the United

States, as well as other Western allies, underwrite the abominable apartheid.

He stressed that mandatory and comprehensive sanctions are not an end to themselves but are a component in the whole struggle against the oppressed [as

heard] in South Africa. Comrade Sebina said the ANC believes that if Britain

and the United States took a pragmatic lead in ending apartheid in South Africa,

the rest of the world would follow. [Text] [Lusaka Domestic Service in

English 1115 GMT 23 Feb 87 MB] /9738

3,000 BLACKS REGAIN CITIZENSHIP—House of Assembly, 23 Feb (SAPA)—Altogether

2,909 blacks from the independent homelands regained their South African

citizenship last year, the minister of home affairs, Mr Stoffel Botha, said

today. Replying in writing to a question by Mr Ray Swart (FPF Berea), Mr

Botha said no applications were refused. Those who regained their citizehship

were 2,127 ciskeians, 129 from Venda, 257 from Bophuthatswana and 396

Transkeians. [Text] [Johannesburg SAPA in English 1444 GMT 23 Jan 87 MB]

/9738

SOWETAN NEWS EDITOR REFUSED PASSPORT~An application for a passport for the

news editor of the SOWETAN, Mr Thami Mazwai was yesterday refused by the

Department of Home Affairs minutes before an application was presented to the

Pretoria Supreme Court. Mr Mazwai, who is also the African representative of

the International Federation of Journalist [IFJ], was due to leave for Hong

Kong today for an IFJ executive meeting. He said an application was refused

late last year and he submitted another in January to which no decision had

been reached by the time he was due to leave. The application was to get the

Department of the Interior to make immediate decision on his second application. The Department of Home Affairs decision has drawn strong criticism

from the Media Workers Association of South Africa [MWASA]. A MWASA statement

said: "The decision by the government to once more deny SOWETAN news editor

and MWASA member Mr Thami Mazwai a passport to go overseas is another manifestation of the tovernment's harassment of the media." [Text] [Johannesburg

SOWETAN in English 20 Feb 87 p 2 MB] /9738

103
AID TO HOMELANDS DETAILED—The head of the Department of Economics at the

Rand Afrikaans University, Professor Nie van der Walt, says the South African

Government has provided development funds totaling $770 million to the southern

African states of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei. A further $96

million'had been loaned to other southern and central African countries.

Addressing newsmen and scholars at a news conference in Johannesburg, he said

the total of long-term credit guarantees provided to African countries was in

excess of $168 million. Professor Van der Walt said the loans were generally

used to finance the importation of essential consumer goods, spare parts, and

raw materials. [Text] [Johannesburg International Service in English 0630

GMT 24 Feb 87 MB] /9738

UDF CRITICIZES GOVERNMENT, NP MANIFESTO—In its first official statement on the

white election, the UDF has slated the. government and the NP manifesto. However, the organization has not indicated to its white supporters whether or

not they should boycott the polls. Some factions in the UDF favor a policy of

white voters following their own consciousness, and others follow a policy that

white democrats should vote for the PFP. The standard UDF position is that

there should be a blanket boycott of apartheid institutions. [Text] [Umtata

Capital Radio in English 1200 GMT 20 Feb 87 MBl /9738

REPORTER QUESTIONED ON ORGANIZATION AFFILIATION—House of Assembly, 17 Feb

(SAPA)—BUSINESS DAY reporter Sipho Ngcobo was detained to investigate his

possible involvement in the activities of a banned organization, the minister of law and order, Mr Adriaan Vlok, said today, Mr Ngcobo had been released on 23 January and no action had been taken against him, Mr Vlok said

in reply to a question by Mr Tian van der Merwe (PFP Green Point). Mr Vlok

said Mr Ngcobo had not been questioned during his detention about his work

as a journalist. He was detained on 29 December in term* of Section 29 (1)

of the Internal Security Act. A "variety" of documents, including press

reports, note books, photographs, pamphlets, paperbacks and letters, "required in the police investigation" had been removed by the police at the

time of his detention. These documents were returned to him on his release.

[Text] [Johannesburg SAPA in English 1606 GMT 17 Feb 87 MB] /9274

U.S. 'NOT IMPRESSED' BY TAMBO—The secretary general of Inkatha, Dr Oscar

Dhlomo, says Americans were not impressed with the image of the ANC as

portrayed during the discussions between Oliver Tambo and Secretary of

State George Shultz, Dr Dhlomo returned recently from the United States

where he met various government officials, among them the vice president,

Mr George Bush, and Dr Chester Crocker, [Begin Dhlomo video recording, in

English] For the first time Americans could hear from Mr Tambo, the president of the ANC, what the ANC had in mind, and what they heard they did not

like. That is the impression I got because Mr Tambo completely refused to

consider the question of suspending violence. And he spoke in a very aggressive manner and justified the ANC position on the revolution, [end video

recording] [Text] [Johannesburg Television Service in Afrikaans 1600 GMT

17 Feb 87 MB] /9274

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104
SOUTH AFRICA

SOVIET WEAPONS BUILDUP IN REGION TERMED 'AGGRESSION1

MB200521 Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 20 Feb 87

[Station commentary]

[Text] For 13 years the Soviet Union has been sending massive amounts of

military hardware and thousands of soldiers to southern Africa. An important

perspective on this huge military buildup was given to Glasgow this week by

the Director of the West European Defense Association» Mrs Evelyn Chene.

She said that it was not the mere presence of the Russians in southern Africa

that was a cause for concern for the sophistication of the weapons and the

seniority of the Soviet military officers sent to the subcontinent.

Mrs de Chene's perspective and her Concern are borne out by published

statistics on the communist penetration of southern Africa. At the last count,

there were no fewer than 65 radar installations in Angola. Angola had close

on 100 combat aircraft—about 70 percent more than in 1980—while Mozambique

had also increased her number of combat aircraft by the same margin. Most of

these aircraft are MIG jet fighters. The same pattern is to be seen in respect

of the buildup of tanks, helicopters, surface-to-air missiles and even naval

vessels in Angola and Mozambique. Each country, for example, has no fewer

than 14 naval vessels. As for military personnel, more than 40,000 troops from

communist countries, led by generals and other high-ranking officers, are in

Angola. The figure for Mozambique is much lower, at around 4,000.

The Soviet military build-up in these two countries has been accompanied by

massive infusions of communist weapons in three other states—Tanzania, Zambia

and Zimbabwe. Between 1975 and 1985 the land forces of Angola, Mozambique,

Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe increased by 120 percent, their combat aircraft

by 274 percent and their tanks by 343 percent. The huge military arsenals in

these countries is far in excess of their reasonable defense requirements.

For example, the land forces and surrogate forces of these five states stand

at 382,000—well over twice the number of 165,000 men, reserves excluded, that

South Africa could readily muster. The pretext for these excessive arsenals

105
is the supposed threat posed by South Africa, an excuse that is unacceptable,

given South Africa's standing offer of friendship and nonaggression treaties

to her neighbours. The inescapable conclusion is that the communist militarybuild up in southern Africa is for aggressive purposes—not for the legitimate

defense of the states concerned. More specifically, these states have permitted the erection on their soil of a communist umbrella of aggression

pointed at South Africa and South-West Africa. This, in turn, underscores

the imperative need for continual vigilance and preparedness by the counterinsurgency forces of South Africa and South-West Africa.

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106
SOUTH AFRICA

COMMENTARY AFFIRMS GREATER WHITE ACCEPTANCE OF REFORM

MB190956 Johannesburg International Service in English 0630 GMT 19 Feb 87

[Station commentary: "Changes in Attitude in South Africa"]

[Text] The storm of protest in South Africa over the banning of a black pupil

from a national athletics meeting at a white school in Pretoria at the weekend

is above all else a resounding victory for the process of political reform in

the country.

Only a few short years ago, the incident would have elicited only (relative)

protest from liberal quarters. Now the reaction is deafening, and it has been

characterized not only by Words of protest, but deeds as well. A high ranking

government official, the director general of finance, Dr Chris Stals, has

resigned his position as a member of the management board at the school.

Another member of the board has since resigned as a result of the banning.^

(?Still) enough teachers and pupils of the school have condemned the decision

of the management board.

It was solely the board's decision to ban the black pupil, and it has nothing

to do with government policy. This was made clear by the statements of the

minister of internal affairs, Mr Stoffel Botha, in which he deplored the

decision. He stressed that apartheid in sports was no longer government

policy and integration at school level was solely at the discretion of the school

concerned. This demonstrates the extent to which change has taken place in^

South Africa in the past 4 years. This remains unacceptable to the right-wing

of the political spectrum and demonstrates that for the process of change and

reform there is an uneven level of acceptance.

There will always be those who are sooner than others to adapt to change. This

in turn demonstrates the fact that peaceful evolutionary change cannot occur

overnight. It is a gradual process to which people have to become accustomed.

The level of protest about this particular incident shows the extent to which

white South Africans have already grown accustomed to comprehensive change.

It augurs well for the future.

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107
SOUTH AFRICA

COMMENTARY AFFIRMS GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT TO REFORM

MB180924 Johannesburg International Service in English 0630 GMT 18 Feb 87

[Station commentary: "The South African Government's Commitment to Reform"]

[Text] If there was ever any doubt about the South African Government's

continued commitment to reform in the Wake of punitive action against the

country from abroad, it has been roundly dispelled by the ruling party's

manifesto for the elections to be held in May this year. The election

manifesto, released in Cape Town yesterday, states clearly that the ruling

National Party believes in democratic systems of government. It believes

in the right of all the country's people to participate in government.

This has been proved by the fact that the country is no longer exclusively

ruled by whites. For nearly 3 years now colored people—that is, people

of mixed descent—and Asians are represented in parliament by their own

leaders. The manifesto spells out the promise that representatives of the

various black people will also participate in the running of the country.

How this is to be achieved is to be decided upon by means of negotiation

between representatives of all South Africa's peoples.

The manifesto makes it clear that South Africans will solve their own problems

in their own way, without interference or coercion from outside. There will

be no one-man-one-vote in a unitary state in South Africa. South Africa will

not repeat the mistakes of the rest of Africa and ignore the pact that it is

a country of minorities, each with its right to self-determination and group

security.

There are 13 minority groups in South Africa, and not one of them has an

absolute majority. It is not simply a question of a black majority and a white

minority. The black population is not a homogeneous group. It in fact

comprises 10 different nations, each with its own language, culture, and

traditions. The other three minorities in the country comprise the whites,

the coloreds, and the Asians. These 13 minorities have a right to selfdetermination, of having exclusive say over what affects them alone. At the

same time they are interdependent and share a common interest in many spheres.

What it amounts to is that, in moving away from white domination, South Africans

will have to decide among themselves how best to ensure that none of the 13

minorities tries to dominate others.

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SOUTH AFRICA

PFP MP ACCUSES EDUCATION MINISTER OF 'SMEAR CAMPAIGN'

MB171447 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1439 GMT 17 Feb 87

[Text] House of Assembly, Feb 17 SAPA—The minister of national education,

Mr F.W. de Klerk, was involved in a "despicable smear campaign" against

Mr Harry Schwarz [PFP Yeoville], involving allegations that Mr Schwarz

supported the ANC, the PFP member said today. Speaking during the second

reading debate on the "own affairs" mini-budget, Mr Schwarz said he would

take legal action against Mr De Klerk if he made statements outside the

house linking him with banned organisations. The PFP member said Mr De Klerk

had been one of the NP members who insisted the party put up a candidate to

oppose him in Yeoville and that NP supporters were telling Mr Schwarz'

constituents that he supported the ANC.

"I won't welcome the personal antagonism of the NP leader in the Transvaal

and the smear campaign launched against me," Mr Schwarz said.

Mr De Klerk interjected, "It's untrue," when Mr Schwarz said he was involved

in the "smear campaign." He also denied saying that Mr Schwarz supported the

ANC and that his support was "well-displayed in his speeches."

Mr Schwarz said NP supporters in Yeoville were distributing "propaganda sheets"

and in so doing, "foisting a bunch of lies on the public to mislead them."

The pamphlets included statements that the NP stood for a united South Africa

in which all people would have the right to vote for structures chosen by

themselves. Mr Schwarz challenged the statement and others in the pamphlets,

saying they were meant to disguise the real issue of the election—"the

instability brought about by this government, the inflation, and the economic

mismanagement." "No one in the NP knows where the party is going. They have

no real issue to propagate so they indulge in smear tactics. It is despicable

in the extreme."

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SOUTH AFRICA

TRANSVAAL INDIAN CONGRESS ISSUES AD ON MIXED SCHOOLS

MB200742 Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 19 Feb 87 p 10

[Advertisement sponsored by the Transvaal Indian Congress; capitalized passages

published in boldface]

[Text] OPEN OUR SCHOOLS TO ALL

This year over 300 black pupils have applied for admission to Indian schools.

Now the Indian Education Minister restricts admission with a lost of conditions,

[as printed] The House of Delegates does not speak for the Indian community.

WE BELIEVE EDUCATION SHOULD BE

Non-racial Free Equal Unitary Relevant Democratic

The following organisations unite against apartheid in education and society:

Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC) (and affiliate of the UDF), United Democratic

Front (Tvl), World Conference of Religion and Peace (WCRP),. South African Tamil

Federation, Transvaal Cricket Board (TCB), Progressive Teachers League (PTL),

Call of Islam, Lenasia Yuvak Mandal, Health Workers' Association (HWA),

Pretoria Indian Child and Family Welfare Society, Central Islamic Trust (CIT),

Federation of Residents' Association (FRA), Lenasia Youth League (LYL),

Laudium Tennis Association (LTA), Azaadville Youth Movement (AYM), Actonville

Bursary Fund (ABF), Kasigo Chamber of Commerce (KAFCOC), Via Christ Church

(Lenasia), Nur-ul-islam Centre (Lenasia), Pretoria Muslim Trust (PMT),

Laudium Inter-primary Sports Association (LIPSA), Azaadville United Sporting

Club, Pretoria and Districts Football Association (PDFA), Lenasia Students

Congress (LESCO) » Northern Transvaal Darts Association, Islamic Medical

Association (IMA), Lenasia Medical Circle, Azaadville Ratepayers and Residents

Association, Peoples Education Committee (PEC, Lenasia), Lenasia Muslim

Association (LMA), Anti Drug Abuse Society—Azaadville (ADASA), Peoples Education Committee (PEC, Laudium), General and Allied Workers' Union (GAWU),

Johannesburg Youth Congress (JOYCO), Muslim Youth Movement (MYM), Lenasia

Traders and Professionals Association, Eastern Transvaal Squash Rackets

Federation (ETSRF).

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Other organisations willing to support the campaign contact officials of

the TIC or write to the address below:

Issued by:

Transvaal Indian Congress, P.O. Box 658, Crown Mines 2025

THE DOORS OF LEARNING SHALL BE OPENED TO ALL

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SOUTH AFRICA

COMMENTARY NOTES DANGER OF SANCTIONS, REFORM COMMITMENT

MB190543 Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 19 Feb 87

[Station commentary]

[Text] South Africa's new ambassador to the United Nations, Mr Les Manley,

has maintained a tradition of polished professionalism in putting the country's

case to the Security Council this week. He was speaking in a debate on a

resolution which will call for an extension of sanctions against South Africa.

In one sense—the most obvious—Mr Manley's speech could be regarded as a futile

gesture, regardless of how persuasively he presented his arguments.

It was a plea for recognition of facts and clear-headedness in evaluating

consequences. Mr Manley pointed out that stringent economic sanctions could

be catastrophic for a large and important African region and lead to suffering

for millions of black people.

He warned his audience that sanctions could neither destroy the South African

economy nor bring the government to a fall, nor would South Africa negotiate

under pressure or threat. And he repeated the commitment that gives direction

to political change in South Africa—a commitment to a constitutional dispensation accommodating the aspirations of all people through maximum selfdetermination, and power sharing without domination in matters of common

concern.

The speech contained no new insights. It was a sober restatement of a clearcut case—an appeal to reason. Yet it is abundantly clear by now that for an

important part of the political world, in both Western and African countries,

the reasoned merit of the sanctions argument is a relatively minor consideration in the decisions taken with regard to sanctions.

The American Congress gave a blatant demonstration of this in its vote-seeking

debate that culminated in sanctions, for which it almost immediately began

approving wide-ranging exemptions. The Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY recently

commented caustically: American foreign policy is hostage to domestic

pressures, and the actions taken abroad have no sane purpose but to satisfy

those pressures.

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Nearer home, two of the most strident campaigners for sanctions—the leaders

of Zambia and Zimbabwe—have abandoned their own plans in that respect after

finally realizing what damage their countries would suffer: At the same

time they continue, albeit in a lower key, to issue the same sanctions threats

and demands.

Decisions taken on sanctions at places like the United Nations are determined

by other considerations than facts and reasoned argument. Nevertheless, it

is necessary for South Africa to continue to put its case as has been done

again this week by Mr Manley.

It is important that the sanctions hotheads should be reminded continually

of what the sanctions' consequences would be if they should have their way.

It is important that they Should know in advance that South Africa is capable

of dealing with the punitive action they demand, and will not give in to their

threats.

And it is essential that South Africa should make it clear to the world that

it will continue on its reformist course, to do justice to all its inhabitants,

and that the course will not be altered by external pressures.

Whether in the UN Security Council or anywhere else, the world should be in no

doubt about where South Africa stands and where it is going.

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SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

ATHLETICS ROW LINKED TO NP POLICIES—House of Assembly [dateline as received]--

The Menlo Park Hoerskool affair, when a black athlete had been refused permission to attend an athletics meetings, went right to the heart of the

National Party's dilemma, the leader of the official opposition, Mr Eglin,

said today. Speaking in the third reading debate on the own affairs management

board's decision but the action it had taken fell fairly and squarely within

the philosophy of the National Party. It criticised the decision, saying the

black pupils participation would have played a part in improving race relations

but it still balked at allowing a black into a white school classroom. The

minister of the budget, Dr Dawie de Villiers, interjected across the floor

that "education is a different matter." The National Party had a clear policy

on education, the minister added. [Text] [Johannesburg SAPA in English 0421 GMT

20 Feb 87] /8309

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SOUTH AFRICA

COMMENTARY POINTS TO ECONOMIC RECOVERY TREND

MB180608 Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 18 Feb 87

[Station commentary]

[Text] Cautious optimism has been expressed in a number of quarters lately

that an upswing in the economy is just around the corner. This optimism has

now been endorsed in an authoritative review of the state of the economy.

The review comes from the Bureau for Economic Research at Stellenbosch University, It says that the economy is recovering, and predicts that the

growth rate this year will be 3,4 percent—higher than most other estimates.

In another authoritative evaluation this week a leading businessman, Dr Fred

du Plessis of SANLAM [South African National Life Assurance Corporation] said

that he foresaw a definite improvement in the South African economy this

year. Statistics support these assessments. One statistic is that gold

holdings are now at their highest level since October 1985. Another is

that the current account of the balance of payments, having produced a surplus of 5,9 billion rands in 1985, is likely to have shown a surplus of

more than 7 billion rands for 1986,

The large surplus of the current account has placed both the private and the

public sectors in a position to continue meeting their foreign debts on a

large scale. Since the end of 1984 more than 7,3 billion rands of foreign

debt has been repaid. Last week the minister of finance said that the economy was clearly in moderate revival phase which could, with a little push,

gradually develop greater momentum. That little push has been provided,

with the budget proposals for a 1,000 million rand stimulation package for

the economy, On another level, an encouraging recent trend in the economy

has been for real incomes among black communities to increase substantially.

This trend has been observed in 10 metropolitan areas by a research team from

the University of South Africa. The findings of this team bear repetition.

The average monthly income of white South Africans is 2,374 rands. That of

blacks in, for example, Soweto, is 1,756 rands, or 74 percent of the figure

for whites.

The remarkable and gratifying narrowing of the wage gap has been recorded in

the face of a depressed economy, the strident disinvestment campaign, and

international sanctions. The resillience of the South African economy and

115
and its ability to advance in the face of international economic pressures is

testimony to its inherent strength. The economy afflicted by many problems,

such as inflation. But there is now concrete evidence of an upward movement in the economy. After the dark days of economic recession, South

Africans can look forward with confidence to the dawning of a new era in the

national economy,

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SOUTH AFRICA

OFFICIAL PREDICTS REDUCED CORN PRODUCTION

MB180737 Johannesburg SAPA in English 0109 GMT 18 Feb 87

[Embargoed until 1000 GMT 18 February]

[Text] Johannesburg, 17 Feb (SAPA)-»-The South African maize crop is not

going to be as big as expected. In a statement to SAPA, Mr Hennie Davel,

general manager of the Maize Board, said this could be attributed to the intense heat experienced recently in the most important maize producing areas.

Other factors had been "significant" hail damage in the eastern regions and

uneven rainfall distribution.

"The crop estimate by our cooperative agents, is now between 7.8 and 8

million tons. This is not, however, the official estimate by the Department

of Agriculture, which will be issued later in the season.

South Africa's internal consumption is about 5 million tons a year, "so it

will not be necessary to import maize this year. There should even be

enough white maize for human consumption and mixing of white and yellow

maize could be avoided,"

Mr Davel concluded by saying the cooperative agents' estimates are "as of

13 February and conditions are still fluid. More certainty will only be

possible later in the season,"

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