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ASSESSING THE STATE OF IRAQI CORRUPTION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 4, 2007

Serial No. 110–64

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman

TOM LANTOS, California

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland

PETER WELCH, Vermont

TOM DAVIS, Virginia

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

BILL SALI, Idaho

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

PHIL SCHILIRO, Chief of Staff

PHIL BARNETT, Staff Director

EARLEY GREEN, Chief Clerk

DAVID MARIN, Minority Staff Director

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C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on October 4, 2007 ............................................................................ 1

Statement of:

Butler, Ambassador Larry, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East

Affairs, U.S. Department of State ............................................................... 88

Rosett, Claudia, journalist in residence, Foundation for the Defense of

Democracies ................................................................................................... 112

Walker, David, Comptroller General of the United States, U.S. Government Accountability Office; Judge Radhi Hamza Al-Radhi, Commissioner of Public Integrity in IRAQ; and Stuart Bowen, Special Inspector

General for IRAQ Reconstruction ................................................................ 26

Al-Radhi, Judge Radhi Hamza ................................................................. 43

Bowen, Stuart ............................................................................................ 54

Walker, David ............................................................................................ 26

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Al-Radhi, Judge Radhi Hamza, Commissioner of Public Integrity in

IRAQ, prepared statement of ....................................................................... 56

Bowen, Stuart, Special Inspector General for IRAQ Reconstruction, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 45

Butler, Ambassador Larry, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East

Affairs, U.S. Department of State, prepared statement of ........................ 91

Davis, Hon. Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia, prepared statement of ........................................................................ 24

McHenry, Hon. Patrick T., a Representative in Congress from the State

of North Carolina, prepared statement of ................................................... 129

Rosett, Claudia, journalist in residence, Foundation for the Defense of

Democracies, prepared statement of ........................................................... 117

Sali, Hon. Bill, a Representative in Congress from the State of Idaho,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 141

Walker, David, Comptroller General of the United States, U.S. Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of .................................... 29

Watson, Hon. Diane E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of California, prepared statement of ........................................................... 131

Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the State

of California:

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 14

Staff memorandum .................................................................................... 4

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ASSESSING THE STATE OF IRAQI

CORRUPTION

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 4, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry A. Waxman

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Waxman, Davis of Virginia, Cummings,

Tierney, Clay, Watson, Lynch, Higgins, Yarmuth, Braley, Cooper,

Van Hollen, Hodes, Murphy, Sarbanes, Welch, Burton, Shays,

Mica, Platts, Turner, Issa, and Sali.

Staff present: Phil Schiliro, chief of staff; Phil Barnett, staff director and chief counsel; Karen Lightfoot, communications director

and senior policy advisor; David Rapallo, chief investigative counsel; Roger Sherman, deputy chief counsel; John Williams, deputy

chief investigative counsel; David Leviss, senior investigative counsel; Suzanne Renaud and Steve Glickman, counsels; Earley Green,

chief clerk; Teresa Coufal, deputy clerk; Matt Siegler, special assistant; Caren Auchman and Ella Hoffman, press assistants;

Leneal Scott, information systems manager; Kerry Gutknecht and

William Ragland, staff assistants; Sheila Klein, assistant to staff

director and office manager; David Marin, minority staff director;

Larry Halloran, minority deputy staff director; A. Brooke Bennett,

minority counsel; Christopher Bright, minority professional staff

member; Nick Palarino, minority senior investigator and policy advisor; Patrick Lyden, minority parliamentarian and member services coordinator; Brian McNicoll, minority communications director;

Benjamin Chance, minority clerk; and Ali Ahmad, minority deputy

press secretary.

Chairman WAXMAN. The committee will come to order.

Today’s hearing is one of the most important that we will have

this year.

President Bush has made Iraq our Nation’s top foreign policy priority. We all know that has meant extraordinary sacrifices from

our troops and their families. Over 3,800 of our soldiers have been

required to make the ultimate sacrifice in Iraq and another 28,000

have been wounded, and we have already spent over $450 billion

on the war with hundreds of billions of more still to come.

The Iraq War is the No. 1 issue in all of our congressional districts and the issue that we have spent the most time debating

here in Congress.

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Most of our attention has been focused on military questions. Is

the surge working? Can we reduce the number of troops? Should

we set a redeployment date?

These are all important questions, but they aren’t the only ones

that matter. As General Petraeus has observed, ‘‘There is not a

military solution to a problem like Iraq.’’’

Political reconciliation is the key to achieving lasting peace in

Iraq, and one of the keys to political reconciliation is combating

corruption. That is why we are holding today’s hearing. An honest

assessment of corruption in Iraq will provide insight into whether

political progress is possible.

We are very fortunate that David Walker, the Comptroller General of the Government Accountability Office, and Stuart Bowen,

the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, will share

their expertise with us this morning.

I want to give special thanks to Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi for

agreeing to testify. Judge Radhi was the commissioner of Iraq’s

Commission on Public Integrity. He was appointed to this post by

Ambassador Bremer, and his job was to identify and prosecute corruption in Iraq.

Judge Radhi knows too well the horrors of life under Saddam

Hussein. He was one of Saddam’s torture victims, and he never

hesitated when our government asked him to take the dangerous

job leading the fight against corruption in Iraq.

Christopher Griffith, the Senior Advisor to the U.S. Office of Accountability and Transparency, told our committee that Judge

Radhi is ‘‘the most honest government of Iraq official that I have

met in my 21 months in this country.’’

Another senior Embassy official told us that Judge Radhi has a

reputation as ‘‘courageous, honest and effective.’’

From everything I can tell, Judge Radhi did exactly what we

asked the Iraqis to do. He stood up for freedom, he stood for democracy, and he stood up for honest government.

Now he finds himself without a country. Judge Radhi is under

attack by the Maliki government and he and his family are the targets of serious and persistent death threats. Thirty-one of Judge

Radhi’s employees and 12 of their family members have been assassinated. He can’t return to Iraq, and he is seeking asylum in the

United States.

Judge Radhi will tell us there is an epidemic of corruption in

Iraq. While he served as the head of the Commission on Public Integrity, he opened 3,000 corruption cases. He found extensive corruption throughout the government, especially in the Ministries of

Defense, Interior and Oil. In all, his efforts identified $18 billion,

a staggering sum, lost to corruption.

Judge Radhi will tell us that corruption is undermining political

reconciliation, turning ordinary Iraqis against the government and

fueling the insurgency.

The Maliki government is our ally in Iraq, but we need to ask:

is the Maliki government too corrupt to succeed? If the Maliki government is corrupt, we need to ask whether we could in, good conscience, continue to sacrifice our blood and tax dollars to prop his

regime.

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These are important questions, but they are questions that Secretary Rice and the State Department do not want us to raise.

For the last several weeks, the committee staff has been interviewing the State Department officials in charge of anti-corruption

efforts in Iraq. What we have learned is that these efforts appear

to be in a complete state of disarray. The committee’s investigation

has revealed that anti-corruption efforts are dysfunctional, underfunded and a low priority.

The officials we interviewed told us on the record that the State

Department has no coordinated strategy for fighting corruption. At

key meetings of the Embassy’s Anti-corruption Working Group, almost no one shows up. One official told us: ‘‘I would like to be able

to say that we have done quite a bit in this area, but unfortunately

we have not.’’

Another officials, Judge Arthur Brennan, the former Director of

the Office of Accountability and Transparency at the U.S. Embassy

in Baghdad, said, ‘‘I think Ambassador Crocker was serious about

going forward on this, but I don’t think everybody is serious about

it, and if they are serious about it, then somebody else should have

been doing their job.’’

Incredibly, Secretary Rice directed these officials not to answer

any questions about the extent of corruption in Iraq and its effect

on political reconciliation and the insurgency. Her position is that

all information that reflects poorly on the Maliki government is

classified.

At one point, my staff asked an official whether he agreed with

a public statement of Secretary Rice praising the anti-corruption efforts of the Iraqi Interior Ministry. The official told us, and this is

a U.S. official, ‘‘I cannot discuss this in an open forum.’’

The State Department even retroactively classified memos about

corruption in Iraq after the committee requested them. These efforts to silence debate are an absolute embarrassment.

My staff prepared a memorandum that summarizes both what

these officials told us about the state of U.S. anti-corruption efforts

and what they could not tell us about the state of corruption in

Iraq, and without objection, I will make this memorandum part of

today’s hearing record.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Sometimes this committee breaks down

along party lines during hearings, and I hope that won’t be the

case today. Whether one supports or opposes the President’s policy,

we can’t ignore the reality of corruption in Iraq, and we can’t ignore the reality that corruption is undermining the political

progress our troops are fighting and dying for.

If we are going to invest more lives and billions more dollars in

Iraq, we need to know whether there is a political will in Iraq to

succeed. That is why today’s hearing is so essential.

I want to recognize the ranking member, Tom Davis, for his

opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Henry A. Waxman follows:]

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Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is a sovereign responsibility of every democratic government to

root out and prosecute official corruption. Sustaining the trust and

confidence of the governed requires proactive visible programs to

deter and punish those who would plunder the public resources for

private gain.

We need to be vigilant about fighting corruption here at home as

the chairman often reminds us, and we should help emerging democracies build their capacity to combat for pervasive deep-rooted

malfeasance.

This hearing an important and timely opportunity to assess U.S.

Government efforts to nurture anti-corruption capabilities in the

fledgling government of Iraq, but I have some concerns about the

majority’s stated intention to investigate the status of Iraqi corruption and the functioning of Iraqi government ministries.

Good government and, small d, democrats in Iraq don’t need to

be lectured by this committee on the extent of corruption in their

country. They need our help in building the structures, policies and

processes to fight it, and we can’t afford to be naive or wear cultural blinders when looking at ways to address a longstanding,

deeply ingrained problem.

We didn’t bring corruption to Iraq, and it won’t stop when we

leave. Saddam Hussein’s looting of the United Nations Oil for Food

Program was emblematic of the leaky economic systems and corrupt habits the current government inherited.

Coalition Provision Authority Order 55, establishing the Iraqi

Commission on Public Integrity, acknowledged the battle against

corruption is a long term struggle that requires lasting commitment to change behavior at all levels of government. Today, despite

creation of national enforcement systems in Iraq and U.S. Embassy

programs to mentor inspectors and judges, it seems that commitment has yet to materialize either in their government or ours.

According to the same CPA order, anti-corruption programs in

Iraq have long been viewed as arbitrary and intermittent. Apparently, they still are. The former head of Iraq’s main anti-corruption

investigatory body, Judge Radhi, joins us this morning to describe

the many challenges he faced trying to investigate corruption

claims in a society splintered by sectarian violence and political

score-settling.

Our efforts so far don’t appear to have helped much. A very cogent Embassy-consolidated anti-corruption strategy was put together but just a year ago. It looks good on paper, but like other

capacity-building programs in Iraq our anti-corruption assistance

has suffered from missed deadlines, shifting priorities, structural

instability and lack of strong leadership.

In fact, evidence of that organization disarray triggered this

hearing. A draft statistical report commissioned by the U.S. Embassy Office of Accountability and Transparency on corruption investigations by Iraqi agencies was embellished with hearsay and

anecdotes about blocked cases and official favoritism.

Before being vetted or finalized, it was leaked to the media. The

State Department then turned light comedy into high farce by

classifying the report which was already on the internet because it

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said things everyone had already heard about lax anti-corruption

enforcement in Iraq.

But there are serious questions we need to address today. What

should we do to help the Iraqis fight corruption, mindful that they

are a sovereign nation? What can we do, given the current security

environment, and what will we do to implement an effective strategy to help the Iraqis help themselves?

The answers matter, not just to accountants and lawyers, but to

all Iraqis and every American there. Funds stolen from the people

of Iraq sap the growth of civil society and fuel lawlessness and violence.

Finally, there is no avoiding the unmistakable subtext of this

hearing, the premise that a corrupt Iraqi government doesn’t merit

further American sacrifice or life or treasure.

By that measure, some would have the United States cede our

sovereignty to groups like Transparency International and disavow

anyone too far down their annual list of corrupt states, but that is

far too narrow a view of how the most powerful Nation on Earth

determines who to befriend and where to pursue our interests.

As one political veteran observed, having discovered an illness, it

is not terribly useful to prescribe death as a cure. We can help the

Iraqis treat the disease of official corruption without killing their

chance to stand as an independent sovereign nation.

Let me thank you, Mr. Chairman, for agreeing to our request to

invite Ms. Claudia Rosett to testify. We are disappointed that she

is not in the first panel, and we have to go to a third panel to hear

her.

All our witnesses today bring important information to this discussion, and their unique perspectives will add depth and context

to our oversight.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Tom Davis follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Davis.

For our first panel, we have Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi,

former head of the Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. Yes. Does the gentleman seek recognition?

Mr. MICA. Point of order, I would ask regular order so that Members be allowed to present opening statements. I did have one if I

could be allowed.

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, I am sorry the rules do not require

that Members give opening statements. The practice of this committee under Chairmen Burton and Davis was not to give the right

to all Members to offer opening statements, so we will proceed

under the rules.

Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi, former head of the Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, Mr. David Walker, Comptroller General of

the United States, and Mr. Stuart Bowen, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, we are pleased to welcome all of you

to our committee today.

The practice of this committee is to take all testimony under

oath. So if you would please rise and raise your hands. I would like

to administer the oath to you.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman WAXMAN. The record will reflect the fact that each of

the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Mr. Chairman, could we have the translator identified for the record please?

Chairman WAXMAN. Yes. Could the translator identify herself?

Ms. BEHRENS. Nina K. Behrens, the Department Interpreter.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much.

I would like to suggest that when we get to questions, because

we do have a translator, that each Member be given 7 minutes because it will take time for translation.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Mr. Chairman, I would just insist on regular order. We had asked that our witness be put in the first panel

which would have expedited and, I think, allowed for that, but

since we are not going to get to our witness until the third panel,

we want to move things along.

Chairman WAXMAN. OK, then we will go to 5 minute intervals.

We did accommodate the minority at their request for the witness,

but apparently not exactly where they would like to have her.

We would like to hear from each of you, starting with General

Walker if we might.

STATEMENTS OF DAVID WALKER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL

OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; JUDGE RADHI HAMZA AL-RADHI, COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY IN IRAQ; AND STUART

BOWEN, SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

STATEMENT OF DAVID WALKER

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Chairman Waxman, Mr. Davis. Pleasure to be back before the House Oversight and Government Reform

Committee.

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I am pleased to be here today to discuss the GAO report that we

issued today on U.S. Efforts to Build the Capacity of Iraqi Ministries. It is my understanding it has been provided to this committee.

The development of competent and loyal government ministries

in Iraq is critical to stabilizing that country. Iraq’s 34 ministries

are responsible for ensuring security through the armed forces and

police and providing essential government services such as electricity, water and health care. The ministries are Iraq’s largest employer with an estimated 2.2 million government workers.

U.S. efforts to build the capacity of Iraqi ministries include programs to advise and help Iraqi government employees to develop

the skills to plan programs, execute budgets, and deliver effective

services.

In 2005 and 2006, the United States provided $169 million for

programs to help build the capacity of key civilian and security

ministries. The administration received an additional $140 million

fiscal year 2007 and requested $255 million for fiscal year 2008.

In doing this report, we traveled to the region including Baghdad, interviewed officials from U.S. Government and other international organizations and collected other information that was

available for us to review.

In summary, we found the following: U.S. efforts to help the capacity of the Iraqi national government have been characterized by,

first, multiple U.S. agencies leading efforts without overarching direction from a lead agency or a strategic plan that integrates these

various efforts and, second, shifting timeframes and priorities in response to varying and sometimes deteriorating conditions in Iraq.

U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi ministerial capacity face four key

challenges that pose risk to their success and long term sustainability. These include significant shortages of Iraqi ministry employees with the necessary skills and knowledge to conduct key

tasks, sectarian influence over the militia infiltration of some ministries, corruption within the ministries and poor security conditions that endanger employees and cause skilled workers to leave

the country.

The U.S. Government is beginning to develop an overall strategy

for ministerial capacity development although agencies have been

implementing separate programs since 2003.

GAO’s work in this area shows that the overall strategy for capacity development should include, first, a clear purpose, scope and

methodology; second, a delineation of U.S. roles and responsibilities

in coordination with other donors including the United Nations;

third, clear goals and objectives linked to Iraqi priorities; and,

fourth, performance measures and milestones; and last, fifth, the

costs, resources needed and assessment of program risk.

Individual U.S. capacity development efforts have included some

but not all of these components. All are necessary for sustainable

success.

We, therefore, have recommended to the State Department that

it, in conjunction with the Iraqi government, complete an overall

strategic and integrated strategy for U.S. capacity development efforts. Congress, we believe, should also consider conditioning future

appropriations on the completion of such a strategy.

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Two other things, Mr. Chairman, first, we at GAO are attempting to lead by example in providing capacity-building assistance to

our counterpart organization, the Board of Supreme Audit in Iraq.

I have met with my counterpart on more than one occasion, both

in Iraq and in the United States.

We are providing a lot of technical support and training, and we

are also encouraging other countries in the region to be able to provide support to the Board of Supreme Audit as well. I am pleased

that progress has been made there.

Second, I think it is also important to recognize that while it is

unrealistic to expect that the United States is going to have more

allies provide troops in Iraq, that it is very important and appropriate that our allies do more to try to help with regard to this capacity-building effort, especially with regard to civilian ministries

because there is significant expertise available among our allies

and among international organizations, and hopefully that will be

forthcoming in the future.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Walker follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Walker.

Mr. Bowen, let’s hear from you next.

STATEMENT OF STUART BOWEN

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Waxman,

Ranking Member Davis, members of the committee. Thank you for

this opportunity to testify before you today on the important subject of this hearing, the State of Iraqi Corruption.

This past August, I visited Iraq for the 17th time since my appointment 31⁄2 years ago as the Special Inspector General for Iraq

Reconstruction. While in Baghdad, I met with key Coalition and

Iraqi officials on the subject of corruption within the government

of Iraq.

SIGIR has regularly reported on this issue over the course of our

14 quarterly reports, and we conducted 2 audits on the subject of

U.S. support for Iraqi anti-corruption and, in a word, found that

support has been disappointing.

Corruption within Iraq’s government is a significant and serious

problem. It is an Iraqi problem which the government of Iraq has

recognized. A recent report submitted by Iraq pursuant to the requirements of the recently enacted International Compact for Iraq

identified ‘‘high levels of corruption and an immature accountability framework’’ within the government of Iraq. So it is something

that the Iraqi government on the record recently has recognized.

As the ranking member pointed out, we did not bring corruption

to Iraq, and it will not be gone whenever we leave, but it is an

issue that fundamentally can undermine our efforts to build a democracy, a fledgling democracy.

Since mid-2003, Iraq has struggled against a violent insurgency.

Corruption has concomitantly afflicted the Iraqi government, exerting a corrosive force upon its growing democracy.

SIGIR has described that force as a second insurgency. Prime

Minister Maliki recently echoed that sentiment when he referred to

the struggle against corruption as ‘‘the second war in Iraq,’’ and

Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih told my office that corruption

‘‘threatens the state.’’

So there is a recognition, but is there a response?

That is the subject, I think, of an important aspect of this hearing. What response is forthcoming, both within the U.S. program

and within the Iraqi government?

Within the Iraqi government, there are three key entities who

have charge of fighting this second insurgency. The Board of Supreme Audit has been around since 1927. It is the analogue to the

Government Accountability Office and its focus is on the audit of

Iraqi ministries.

The Commission on Public Integrity and the Iraqi Inspector General system was created in 2004 by the Coalition Provisional Authority. Judge Radhi, who was the commissioner until recently of

the CPI, is someone with whom I have met on every trip I have

made to Iraq, virtually every trip, and his office and my office work

very closely on our investigations and exchange information as relevant.

His office along with the 29 IGs and the Board of Supreme Audit

comprise 4,000 officials assigned to fight corruption, but the tide of

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corruption continues to rise, and the problem is as bad today as it

has ever been although they may have deterred some crime and

there have been some prosecutions. Over the past year, the number

of corruption cases under investigation by the CPI has increased by

70 percent. Similarly, individual Iraqi ministries have reported

dramatic increases in corruption cases.

There are three significant challenges confronting the effort of

Iraqi ministries, these Iraqi corruption-fighting entities, to fight

corruption within their ministries: security, politicization of the

rule of law and capacity.

Security afflicts and inhibits everything that Iraqi tries to accomplish in recovering from the attack. The first president of the Board

of Supreme Audit was murdered 21⁄2 years ago.

President Abd el-Basit succeeded him, but his office itself has

also been under direct attack. This last May, Ministry of Interior

guards came and had a standoff with President Basit’s security

guards. It resulted in a peaceful resolution, but that is the kind of

intimidation that is going on in Iraq.

At least 31 employees of the CPI have been killed, and judges

and judicial investigators are also subject to threat. This last trip

I met with a chief judge of a district in Iraq, and he complained

to me that his investigators are not permitted to carry weapons.

Thus, his judges and the judges across Baghdad are subject to continual threat and attack for that matter.

The politicization of the rule of law reflected in provisions like

Article 136(b) of the Iraqi Criminal Code which permits any minister to exempt any employee accused of corruption from prosecution for that crime, and also that same provision protects any member of the military and any member of the police force. That sort

of provision is incompatible with a growing democracy.

Exacerbating that legal provision is the directive from the Prime

Minister’s Office issued this spring that required Judge Radhi with

the Commission on Public Integrity to seek permission from the

Prime Minister’s Office before instituting any investigation of any

minister or former minister.

U.S. assistance to the anti-corruption effort in Iraq amounts to

around $65 million as our audit last year pointed out, less than one

half of 1 percent of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. This

is a disappointing investment.

More important, notwithstanding the funds invested, the planning has been weak, and that is what the core finding of our audit

of last July pointed out.

We had 12 recommendations. Out of that audit, the Office of Accountability and Transparency was formed. There has been some

progress. An advisor to the IGs was appointed. An advisor to the

Board of Supreme Audit was appointed.

Those are good steps, but more needs to be done. Most of those

recommendations stand open, and we continue to work and hope

to work with the CPI under its new leadership with the Inspectors

General and the Board of Supreme Audit. I will meet with each of

them in November when I return to Iraq.

Thank you for this time to address you, and I look forward to

your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bowen follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Bowen.

Judge al-Radhi, there is a button on the base of your mic.

STATEMENT OF JUDGE RADHI HAMZA AL-RADHI

Mr. AL-RADHI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the

U.S. Congress.

I would like to read my statement to you in English so you can

hear it directly from me.

I am Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi, commissioner of the Commission on Public Integrity [CPI], Republic of Iraq. I have the honor

to be here among you today to discuss with you the most important

problems facing Iraq after the elimination of the dictator, Saddam

Hussein.

I want to thank the American people who have given their lives

and money in order to achieve noble goals in Iraq such as ending

the suffering and spreading democracy. Thank you thousands of

times.

In my written testimony, I highlighted the reasons for an Iraqi

Commission on Public Integrity, my appointment as Commissioner

and my background and discussed much of our work.

Our work has been noteworthy, but I must report that corruption

in Iraq today is rampant across the government, costing tens of billions of dollars, and has infected virtually every agency and ministry including some of the most powerful officials in Iraq.

Corruption has stopped possible advances by the government on

the political level, on economic reconstruction, on basic services,

amenities and infrastructure, and on the rule of law.

Corruption has contributed to the failure of the government of

Iraq to control the militias that control parts of the government. In

fact, corruption has helped fund sectarian militias and violence

even from those in the Iraqi military and police who are supposed

to maintain order and protect the Iraqi people.

Unfortunately, today in Iraq, corruption has infected our biggest

source of money: oil. Corruption has also infected those who have

the guns to restore law and order and the leadership who promise

a new, better Iraq.

I have led my life governed by these few words: law is above all,

no one is above the law.

This guiding principle should apply to all government departments and ministries neutrally, fully and without regard to sect,

ethnic or party affiliation, tribe or religion. That is how we have

tried to operate the Commission on Public integrity in Iraq. Unfortunately, we have been met with great problems. First and foremost is the violence and personal attacks directed on us.

Since the establishment of the Commission on Public Integrity,

31 employees have been killed as well as at least 12 family members. In a number of cases, my staff and their relatives have been

kidnapped or detained and tortured prior to being killed.

Many of these people were gunned down at close range. This includes my staff member, Mohammed Abd Salif who was gunned

down with his 7 month pregnant wife.

In one case of targeted death and torture, the security chief on

my staff was threatened with death many times. His father was reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:52 Sep 03, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\43601.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
55

cently kidnapped and killed because of his son’s work at CPI. His

body was found hung on a meat hook.

One of my staff members who performed clerk duties was protected by my security staff, but his 80 year old father was kidnapped because his son worked at CPI. When his dead body was

found, a power drill had been used to drill his body with holes.

Waleed Kashmoula was the head of CPI’s Mosul branch office. In

March 2005, a suicide bomber met with Waleed in his office, wearing a suicide vest. He greeted Waleed and then set off his vest, killing Waleed. This was a targeted killing of CPI leadership.

These are just a few examples. There are many more which were

directed to my staff, me and our families. Personally, for example,

my family’s home has been attacked by rockets. I have had a sniper bullet striking near me as I was outside my office.

We have learned the hard way that the corrupt will stop at nothing. They are so corrupt that they will attack their accusers and

their families with guns and meat hooks as well as counter charges

of corruption. I and many of my people have been so attacked, so

too have others who have tried to stop the corruption.

It is a sick method when the person fighting corruption is falsely

accused of corruption. Justice loses and corruption wins.

The Prime Minister and his government have refused to recognize the Commission’s and the Judiciary’s independence under the

law to investigate corruption in a non-sectarian and non-political

manner.

Further, the government did not appoint leaders, particularly

ministers and inspectors general, that would fight corruption within ministries. In order to promote sectarian agendas, professional

technocrats who were qualified to perform vital government services and administration were not appointed.

Worse, the government has formally blocked actions against the

Presidency, the Council of Ministers and former and current ministers; used the executive law to allow ministers and the Prime

Minister to stop specific corruption cases against their own corrupt

employees and officials; and has promoted sectarian agendas over

the rule of law.

Importantly, it has been impossible for the Commission on Public

Integrity to safely and adequately investigate oil corruption where

Sunni and Shia militias had control of the metering, transport and

distribution of Iraqi oil. This has resulted in the Ministry of Oil effectively financing terrorism through these militias.

And, my small group of investigators investigated the largest

number in the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior. As you

might imagine, investigating the security forces of Iraq is very difficult but necessary for an Iraqi future of transparency and the rule

of law.

Thank you for your attention and patience and feel free to ask

any questions.

[The prepared statement of Judge al-Radhi follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Judge Radhi.

I am going to start off the questions, and then we will follow the

regular order.

I want to thank all three of our witnesses for your presentation

in this panel.

I think it is very important for us to understand that corruption

is a problem in Iraq, and it is not a problem that we can think is

only unique to their culture and we should dismiss, but it is undermining our very mission in Iraq. It is keeping the possibility of a

political reconciliation from taking place which is the only way we

are going to end this war in Iraq successfully.

Judge Radhi, I want to specially thank you for coming here

today. It is not easy to come to speak before a foreign country’s representatives in a foreign language, and I appreciate your taking the

time to read your statement in English, but I know that in response to questions you will want to answer us in Arabic and have

it translated.

It is very courageous for you to be here. You have already told

us that your life and the lives of your family members have been

threatened, and you can’t take that casually when you have already seen 31 people that work for you already killed for the anticorruption efforts that your commission has undertaken.

You have undertaken this effort at the U.S.’ request. Ambassador

Bremer asked you to take on this responsibility. The United States

understood from the very beginning that it was essential to stop

corruption in order to have Iraq succeed as a stable and independent country.

Let me ask you this question. You have been there for a number

of years in this position as head of the Commission on Public Integrity. Based on your experience over the last 3 years, is corruption

in Iraq getting better or worse?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Yes, it is getting

worse because of the sectarianism in the country and the lack of

the rule of law in the country.

Chairman WAXMAN. You indicated in your statement that $18

billion is a sum that you feel has gone to the costs of corruption;

$18 billion is a lot of money. It could have gone to electricity

projects, hospitals, police training or a lot of things that could have

helped the Iraqi people.

How much does corruption affect the reconstruction efforts in

Iraq?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] I believe that it has

stopped the process of reconstruction in Iraq.

Chairman WAXMAN. You have indicated that some of the money

has gone to the sectarian militias. How would that have happened?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] In areas where oil

is present, such as Bayji and it is a Sunni-controlled area and

Basrah which is a Shia-controlled area, the militias do control

these areas, and they sell oil and take the revenues of oil to finance

the purchase of weapons to the militias, respective militias.

Chairman WAXMAN. I would think that the Iraqi government

would want you to investigate money that would go from the sale

of its oil. After all, this is a revenue for the government of billions

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of dollars. Yet, you are not allowed to investigate corruption relating to the sale of oil.

Why would the national government stop you from stopping the

corruption of oil sales which then go to the militias that are fighting the government?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Because these militias are from the parties, from the blocks, and therefore this is a

financial source or financial revenue for them, and that is why they

forbid us from investigating such cases.

In addition, that those who manage who direct these directorates

are from their own political affiliations.

Chairman WAXMAN. So it is your statement to us that around

$18 billion, maybe more, has been used for corruption instead for

proper purposes like reconstruction, hospitals, electricity and fighting against terrorism in Iraq. Is that your statement?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Can you repeat the

question, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman WAXMAN. Is it your view that $18 billion is not being

used for hospitals, reconstruction, electricity and to even fight terrorism because it is being siphoned off by corruption? It is going

to corruption?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] All these amounts

were spent over the 3-years, but when you go to the field or you

go to the ground, you don’t see signs of reconstruction. You only see

2 percent to 5 percent of reconstruction happening.

When you go to the field and you don’t find water nor electricity

nor fuel and Iraq is the country of oil, then Iraq is importing oil

now. So you don’t see reconstruction.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you.

General Walker, you feel so intense about this corruption issue

that you have even recommended to us that we should limit our

money to Iraq, requiring them before they get the money to stop

the corruption. Is that your view?

Mr. WALKER. Slightly different, Mr. Chairman. The United

States has been trying to help fight corruption and build capacity

in the Iraqi ministries since 2003, but we haven’t had a strategic

and integrated plan. We haven’t had appropriate metrics and milestones. We haven’t had appropriate responsibility and accountability noted.

Therefore, we believe that the Congress should consider conditioning future appropriations for this effort to making sure that

plan is done and effectively implemented so that we can achieve

some results rather than just have more efforts.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Bowen, do you agree from your observations in Iraq that corruption is increasing rather than decreasing in Iraq?

Mr. BOWEN. That is what I said. The rising tide is in part attributable to the politicization of the rule of law, specifically the directive from the Prime Minister’s Office requiring permission to be obtained before initiating prosecutions of any minister, former minister and the like.

One distinction I want to draw here, though, is that Judge Radhi

is talking about his oversight of Iraqi money and the $18 billion

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in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund is taxpayer money that

is not within his jurisdiction, within mine.

Chairman WAXMAN. As I understood his statement, he thought

over a 3-year period, there has been a waste of $18 billion of Iraqi

funds.

Mr. BOWEN. Right. I just want to be sure that the $18 billion,

it is the same number as the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund.

Chairman WAXMAN. Just happens to be the same number.

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, I want to draw the distinction between the two

so there is not confusion as has occurred in the past. On the U.S.

side, corruption has not been a significant component to date that

we have uncovered.

Chairman WAXMAN. If I asked how high up in the Iraqi government this corruption goes, Judge Radhi, does it go all the way to

the Prime Minister? Do you think that Prime Minister Maliki is involved in corruption himself?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] As a judge, I cannot

say that someone is engaged in something unless I have evidence

and proof. However, Maliki has protected some of his relatives that

were involved in corruption endeavors and especially some of his

relatives.

Chairman WAXMAN. And he has allowed other ministers to protect their employees from any investigation?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Yes, and for that

reason the Council of Ministers, the Prime Minister has closed

cases related to 100 billion Iraqi dinars and, in Iraqi currency, such

an amount is not a small amount.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, let me ask unanimous consent that all Members have

5 legislative days to submit opening statements for the record.

Chairman WAXMAN. Without objection, that will be the order.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Mr. Walker, the GAO report released

today discusses corruption in Iraq and references to a State Department Embassy report from December 2006.

Mr. WALKER. That is correct.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Can you tell us anything about this 2006

report which is now classified?

Mr. WALKER. What I can tell you is that the 2006 report, based

upon publicly available information, noted serious concerns with

regard to the nature and extent of corruption in Iraq, also noted

that there had been significant diversion of oil and fuel, both fuel

and oil that is produced within Iraq as well as that is purchased

from outside of Iraq, and then stolen and sold on external markets.

So the bottom line is that the State Department report noted

that the United States is trying hard to try to build capacity, including to try to fight corruption, but corruption is a serious problem involving large sums of money.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Do you know what data were used to

prepare the report?

Mr. WALKER. I don’t have that available to me, Mr. Davis, but

I am happy to try to find out for you.

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Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Would it surprise you to learn that during our committee interviews of staff, we learned that this report

‘‘was started as a statistical analyses, and then the drafter said

let’s go interview the CPI investigators and get their subjective reactions of what it is like in the various ministries and that some

of the conclusions were, you know, it was pulled out of the air. So

it is not statistically based, that discussion about particular cases

were added by the sole drafter for ‘‘flavor?’’

It is not the practice of GAO to reply upon reports embellished

for flavor, is it?

Mr. WALKER. No, not at all. I might note for the record we were

not asked nor did we assess the methodology that the State Department used in preparing that report.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. According to the State Department, this

report was a working draft and it was not a formal Embassy report, that neither this report nor the followup in July 2007, was

vetted by any senior staff at the Embassy.

Let me just ask this. Corruption in Iraq is not a new phenomenon. Do you agree?

Let me start with Judge al-Radhi. Do you agree that Iraq has a

culture of corruption going back many years?

Mr. AL-RADHI. Yes.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Do you think that corruption is pervasive

throughout the Middle East?

Mr. AL-RADHI. Yes.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Mr. Bowen, would you agree with that?

Mr. BOWEN. I would say that Iraq has a history of corruption, absolutely. That characterized Saddam’s regime.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Let me, during my time here, yield to

Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you.

Judge, I commend you for your diligence at great personal risk.

I think Ranking Member Davis said it very well, that we are not

surprised that a country that was run by a corrupt dictator who

doled out moneys in order to maintain power would have a pattern

of corruption.

How much of the corruption in your opinion, do you believe,

comes from that legacy of Saddam in how corruption was part of

the structure of maintaining authority and power?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Corruption is corruption whether it was under Saddam’s regime or under the current government. Corruption is bad, and it is undermining my

country.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you.

I am going to call your attention to a letter, but while it is being

brought up, I want to ask are you aware that there are about

750,000 Iraqi refugees in Jordan at this time?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Yes.

Mr. ISSA. And probably another 500,000 or more in Syria, is that

your understanding?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Yes, sure.

Mr. ISSA. To your understanding, in both of those countries in

general, are Iraqis safe when they are living there?

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Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] It is better than the

daily killing that takes place in their original country.

Mr. ISSA. I appreciate that.

I want to call your attention, Judge, to a letter written on September 20th to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service concerning your family and their welfare, naming some nine members

of your family. Have you seen this letter before?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Yes, this is a private

matter, and I do not wish to talk about it, especially that my family

is subject to private circumstances.

Mr. ISSA. Now I certainly understand that, but in order to understand the workings of this committee, I think it is important that

we ask some very limited questions.

We are not going to name any names other than to note that the

letter is signed by Chairman Waxman, Chairman Lantos, Chairman Conyers and Chairman Thompson, Bennie Thompson, the

Chairmen of Homeland Security, House Judiciary, House Government Oversight and Reform and the Foreign Affairs Committees.

Chairman WAXMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Is there

a question pending?

Mr. ISSA. Yes, very briefly. When were you first involved in the

request for this letter to ask that your family, your entire family,

be brought to the United States as a refugee and particularly was

that prior to or after you came here under a diplomatic visa?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] I came to the United

States under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Justice on a

workshop, on a training workshop along with 10 of my employees.

The Prime Minister, to get rid of me, so I don’t return to my

country, has put forth this issue, this issue of prosecuting me.

Chairman WAXMAN. Please, if you have more to say.

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] I love my family. I

love my country. I love to serve my country. However, these threats

have been an obstacle for me.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. First of all, I want to thank you, all the witnesses, but you, Judge Radhi, thank you very much for your bravery and your integrity.

Can you tell us about the threats that you and your family have

faced, briefly?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] After I referred several cases pertaining some of the political blocs governing there to

the courts in corruption cases, they referred me to the Parliament,

charged me with this issue, and I would say that I was successful

in combating corruption there.

They were unable to remove confidence in me in front of the Parliament.

They also accused me in courts with the same charges, and again

in courts they were unable to successfully get something against

me.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Judge Radhi, let me ask you this.

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] In addition to what

I said in my testimony, in my deposition.

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Mr. CUMMINGS. Judge Radhi, who is Salam al-Maliki? Was he

the former Iraqi Minister of Transportation?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Yes, he is the former

Iraqi Minister of Transportation. He is a relative of the Prime Minister. We had referred this person to the courts for corruption.

However, the Prime Minister has resorted to closing this case.

Mr. CUMMINGS. You got a letter in regard to that, did you not?

I am going to show you a document on the screen. What does

this letter tell you to do in regards to the investigation of Prime

Minister Maliki’s cousin, Mr. Salam?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Not to followup on

the case and not to investigate, and there was a request to close

the case.

Knowing that Salam had violated the constitution and the Prime

Minister has approved that.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Did he ever grant you permission to reopen the

case?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] No. We have attempted to move the case forward, but the Prime Minister had

closed it.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Why do you think he closed it?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] First, because Salam

al-Maliki is affiliated with one of the parties of the Shiite alliance

or coalition and, second, because this gentleman is one of his relatives.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Walker, when Judge Radhi testified a little

bit earlier, he basically said he didn’t even have the power to audit

the oil revenues. Is that correct?

In other words, he has the power, but he doesn’t get the opportunity to do so.

Mr. WALKER. Well, my understanding is that the judge’s responsibility is not to conduct audits. It may be to conduct investigations. Audits typically are done by the Board of Supreme Audit

which is our counterpart organization, and Dr. Abd el-Basit is

President of that organization.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Are you able to do it? You said it comes under

you.

Mr. WALKER. Well, we cannot audit Iraqi funds. We can only get

involved where it involves U.S. funds, and obviously the Special Inspector General for Iraq has been set up to try to be able have an

on the ground presence in Iraq to do certain types of activities. But

we do do audit work in Iraq, but it is on U.S. funds, not Iraqi

funds.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you.

Mr. WALKER. I might note that, as I said before, Mr. Cummings,

we have worked very closely, meaning GAO, with our counterpart

organization in Iraq, and corruption is rampant in Iraq. It is a serious problem. It has been for a while, continues to be a problem.

We have a situation, as was mentioned by Stuart Bowen, that

while there hasn’t been massive corruption that he has found with

regard to U.S. activities in Iraq, there is huge waste there.

I might also note that security is a real concern. When I went

to visit my counterpart in 2006, we couldn’t meet where we were

69

supposed to meet because a U.S. bomb-sniffing dog found a bomb

in the area where we were supposed to meet.

The United States also, U.S. Army, went into the home of my

counterpart in November 2006 and took the weapons of his security

guards, without any explanation, and I have been trying to get an

explanation for that for him. So there is real challenging situations

that exists in that country.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. Your time has

expired.

Mr. Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

We didn’t get a chance for opening statements, but I just wanted

to put on the record a couple of comments, first of all, about the

conduct not only of today’s hearing but the conduct of yesterday’s

hearing. I did get a chance yesterday when I moved to adjourn the

meeting, it was based on request by the Department of Justice and

also the Department of State to ask us not to not hold a hearing

but to delay a hearing.

It brought to mind my request to Mr. Davis. This is during the

Sandy Berger incident when we found out that he had taken classified documents, stuffed them in his trousers or whatever and just

actually destroyed them. I requested Mr. Davis—Mr. Davis may recall this—that we undertake an investigation. Department of Justice asked us not to do that, and he did not do that.

Then we came back, and I asked him during the sentencing time

to conduct an investigation and hearing in this committee. You

might recall, Mr. Davis, that you also denied that because of the

Department of Justice request.

That is a difference in the way this committee operated with Mr.

Davis and the current Chair.

Additionally, I have been on the committee for 15 years. I have

never received, and my staff gave me this. They said the majority

memo for today’s hearing given to the minority was received 9 minutes before the hearing.

I don’t mind participating. In fact, I enjoy participating in this.

I think this is one of the most important responsibilities in Congress. But to have the minority receive this memo and our information about the hearing 9 minutes before, in my knowledge, is unprecedented, let alone isolate our witness at the end. I just have

never seen anything like the conduct today.

Mr. Walker, corruption is a problem not only in Iraq but just

about every democratic society and throughout the Third World, is

that correct?

Mr. WALKER. Corruption is a problem in much of the world, in

some places, a lot more than others.

Mr. MICA. I asked the staff. Well, of course, I am in the Congress, the U.S. Congress, one of the most respected institutions in

the world. Right now, we have probably more Members of Congress

under scrutiny, criminal investigation, than any other body and

probably more in prison.

Then I said, corruption. I said, what about some of the past administrations, and I have the record from the Clinton administration.

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We have the record set: the only President ever impeached on

grounds of personal malfeasance, the most number of convictions

and pleas guilty by friends and associates, the most number of cabinet officials to come under criminal investigation, the most number of witnesses to flee the country to refuse to testify, the most

number of witnesses to die suddenly, the first President sued for

sexual harassment. The list goes on and on of the last administration.

Now let me be fair. Forty Government officials were indicted or

convicted in the wake of Watergate.

Another number, 47 individuals in business association with the

Clinton administration were convicted or pleaded guilty to crimes,

with 33 occurring during the Clinton administration itself.

Now, this also talks about the Reagan administration. There is

a total of 31 Reagan administration convictions. So my point is that

no administration is left without corruption.

Additionally, I want to ask the Judge a question. Mr. Clinton

gave a pardon to a gentleman by the name of Mr. Rich. Mr. Rich

was involved in an Oil for Food scandal which I understand that

money went to prop up the Saddam Hussein regime.

Are you aware of any of the Oil for Food scandal incidents or Mr.

Rich?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Corruption is found

all over the world, and I have heard about corruption in the file

of the Oil for Food program. Iraqi is cooperating with other countries to gather information about this issue.

However, I believe the issue is different in Iraq for many reasons. First, the infrastructure in Iraq is almost equal to zero. Services in the country are almost equal to zero. Iraq is a wealthy country. Imagine that the budget of 2007 is $41 billion and $30 billion is what remains from the previous and earlier years. Don’t you think that $71 billion, such an amount that

can build an entire country, don’t you think that it deserves a followup and attention?

Corruption is corruption in all times, and I am a professional and

I fight corruption because this is my profession to do so.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. I appreciate it.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Judge Radhi.

I just wanted to inform the gentleman. I don’t want to make any

comments, although I would like to make comments, but I won’t

make comments on his round of questioning. When we were requested by the Justice Department not to inquire with

Blackwater’s recent episode in September, we honored that request. We have always honored requests from the Justice Department.

Mr. Lynch.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I want to thank the chairman and the ranking member for holding this hearing.

I also want to thank Comptroller General Walker and also Inspector General Bowen for your great work on our behalf, and I

also want to thank the Judge. I appreciate the risk to yourself, and

I offer the prayers of our country for 31 employees of your ministry

that have been killed and also their families.

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Judge Radhi, your testimony says that your investigators identified about $18 billion as the estimated cost of corruption in Iraq.

There is so much to go on here. I have to pick just one case so I

can ask some questions about it.

This is a case involving Aiham Alsammarae. I hope I have that

right. He was the head of or very high in the electricity industry.

The Ministry of Electricity, I guess it is called.

I want to ask you. Do you recall the facts surrounding Aiham

Alsammarae?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Response in foreign language.]

Mr. LYNCH. Just briefly, I am trying to get the facts. You don’t

need a long explanation. Just basically tell me what he was being

investigated for. What were the allegations against Mr.

Alsammarae?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Response in foreign language.]

Mr. LYNCH. How about a leading question? How much money

was Mr. Alsammarae accused of embezzling, stealing?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] It is not embezzlement. It is a waste of public money.

Mr. LYNCH. OK. Corruption involving how much money, hundreds of millions?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] In each ministry, a

particular, a certain amount of money, and the total across all ministries is $18 billion; for electricity, $2 billion.

Mr. LYNCH. $2 billion, OK.

Mr. Alsammarae, I understand, was arrested and held in prison

inside the Green Zone, but he somehow escaped. Do you know the

facts surrounding that?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] I know some of the

facts that surround this case, and I know that a U.S. protection

company has helped him get away.

Mr. LYNCH. Do you know what the name of that U.S. protection

agency might have been?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] I believe it is

DynCorp.

Mr. LYNCH. OK, Blackwater.

Now, with the assistance of Blackwater, do you know where?

Chairman WAXMAN. He said DynCorp.

Mr. LYNCH. Oh, DynCorp, I am sorry. I am sorry, DynCorp.

Thank you for that correction. So DynCorp, a U.S. contractor,

helped this person get out of jail in the Green Zone.

Do you know where Mr. Alsammarae is right now?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] This is not important to me. What matters to me is there is absentia order or court

order against this man, and that is a sentence for 3 years.

Mr. LYNCH. It may not be important to you, but it is important

to this committee.

Is it your understanding that this gentleman is in Chicago, in

the United States right now?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Three years sentence awaiting him, and there are 11 other charges against him

fielded through the Interpol.

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Mr. LYNCH. All right, my understanding, and I will offer it for

testimony, is that our staff did talk to this gentleman. He is in Chicago.

I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Lynch.

Let me explain that on the House floor, we have votes, and we

have a number of votes. So we are going to recess now for around

40 minutes. I would request that Members come back here as

quickly as possible after the last vote, so we can continue the questions.

We thank you for your patience.

We stand recessed.

[Recess.]

Chairman WAXMAN. Before Mr. Burton arrives because he is

next, Mr. Lynch, you were asking a question and you were in the

middle of your question. Do you want to complete your last question?

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am going to ask Mr. Bowen. I have tried to establish that the

former Iraqi Electricity Minister was accused of corruption of potentially hundreds of millions of dollars. He was arrested. He was

brought to the Green Zone. I believe it was a DOD facility. We are

talking the Unites States Military.

He was then broken out of that jail or removed from that jail by

a U.S. contractor. We have evidence it was DynCorp or testimony

that it was DynCorp.

Mr. Bowen, is that your understanding of the facts of this case?

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, but with the one additional fact that he was

convicted by that Iraqi court and was awaiting sentencing.

Mr. LYNCH. Is there an investigation ongoing relative to the handling of this case?

Mr. BOWEN. I can’t comment on our ongoing investigations.

Mr. LYNCH. OK, so if it is an ongoing investigation, it must be

ongoing.

Can you tell, Mr. Bowen? Look, I have followed your work in

Iraq, and I appreciate greatly what you are doing tremendous

work, and I appreciate.

Can you tell me, the allegation that this gentleman is in Chicago,

is that correct? Is that your understanding?

Mr. BOWEN. That is what I have heard, yes.

Mr. LYNCH. OK, I will let it go at that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. Yes, Mr. Lynch.

Mr. Burton, I think you are next.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Was there any corruption under Saddam Hussein?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Yes, sure. Oil was

for Saddam and for Saddam’s family only.

Mr. BURTON. Were you ever prosecutor when Saddam Hussein

was in power?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Yes.

Mr. BURTON. How long were you a prosecutor when Saddam

Hussein was in power?

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Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] After I graduated

from the Judicial Institute, he did not consider as a member of the

prosecution, but he dealt with me as a regular employee.

Mr. BURTON. You were not a prosecutor from 1979 to 1992?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Response in foreign language.]

Mr. BURTON. It shouldn’t be that difficult to answer. Either you

were or you weren’t.

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] I graduated from the

Institute as a prosecutor.

Mr. BURTON. So you were a prosecutor from 1979 to 1992.

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Only the last 3

years.

Mr. BURTON. What did you do before that from 1979 to 1992?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] I was managing the

funds of the juveniles or the orphans. Those were under 18 years

old.

Mr. BURTON. You were a prosecutor for over 3 years under Saddam Hussein. How did you get appointed to these positions?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] I have worked as an

attorney until the change.

Mr. BURTON. But you were a prosecutor for the government.

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] In the court of misdemeanors, yes.

Mr. BURTON. How did you get that job?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Yes, when I graduated from the Judicial Institute, they did not appoint me, but because I was a non-Baathist. But afterwards because of my work

managing the funds of the orphans, I was appointed to that. Then

in 1992, because of great pressure, I left.

Mr. BURTON. Well, the record shows that you were in the Saddam Hussein regime from 1979 to 1992 and that you were a public

prosecutor and that you did work under Saddam Hussein. Now it

is laudable that you worked for the children that were damaged

during the Iran-Iraq War, but you were in fact an official of Saddam Hussein, were you not?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] What was your last

question, Mr. Burton?

Mr. BURTON. You were an official in the Saddam Hussein regime

and how did you get those jobs?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] I obtained those jobs

with my hard work, my studying and my work at the Judicial Institute.

Mr. BURTON. Well, let me just finish, Mr. Chairman. I know you

have given others just a little bit of extra time.

Saddam Hussein was a brutal dictator who even cut people up

and put them in chippers. They did everything, buried hundreds of

thousands of people in mass graves. If you had been an opponent

of Saddam Hussein, I cannot figure out how you got those jobs.

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Of course, under

Saddam Hussein, I refused to do what he was asking, and therefore they put me in prison and they broke the bones of my head.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Burton.

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Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman, point of inquiry, under our rules, I believe from my past experience, those who are advising, specifically

providing testimonial input, are also supposed to be identified and

sworn. Could we at least have the identification of those who are

obviously contributing considerably to the answers.

Chairman WAXMAN. We did have the translator identify herself.

Mr. ISSA. No, no, the gentleman behind.

Chairman WAXMAN. Oh, the attorney?

Mr. ISSA. Yes, and the one next to him. They are obviously providing a significant amount of these answers.

Chairman WAXMAN. I don’t recall that is the practice of the committee to ever ask who is advising people. They are not testifying.

Ms. Watson.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry.

Ms. WATSON. Yes, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. May I make a parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman WAXMAN. Just a minute, Ms. Watson.

Yes, you have a parliamentary inquiry?

Mr. BURTON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. It is a fact, is it not, that when

we were doing investigations under my leadership that we did

identify the people behind those who were testifying?

Chairman WAXMAN. I understand that was not the general practice. I know of no rule that requires it. If you want to find out, I

don’t have any reason why you shouldn’t find out, but that hasn’t

been the way this committee has operated in the past.

Mr. BURTON. You have selective memory loss like the White

House did.

Ms. WATSON. Resuming my time.

Chairman WAXMAN. No, you haven’t started your time, but you

will now.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate

that.

Judge Radhi, were you tortured under Saddam Hussein?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Yes, I was tortured

twice, in 1970 and in 1977.

Ms. WATSON. Do you still bear the marks of that torture on your

body?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] A break in my head

skull is still visible.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you so very much.

Judge Radhi, in your written testimony, you said that Prime

Minister Maliki has refused to recognize the independence of the

Public Integrity Commission.

You also said that officials and agencies in the Iraqi government

sent us formal letters forbidding us to take any action ‘‘against the

Presidency, the Council of Ministers and former or current ministers,’’ is that right?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] This is right and

this is a letter that would demonstrate to you in front of you that

they prohibited us from conducting investigations touching the

Presidency, the Council of Ministers, current and former ministers.

Ms. WATSON. Yes, that letter is up on the screen. The press

might want to get a copy of it.

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The document says, and I will read it because the wording is so

small: ‘‘It has been decided not to refer any of the following parties

to the court until approval of His Excellency, the Prime Minister,

is obtained: Presidential Office, Council of Ministers, current and

previous ministers.’’

This is a secret order from Prime Minister Maliki’s office saying

that you cannot investigate the Iraqi President, the Prime Minister

or any current or past Iraqi ministers without the Prime Minister’s

position, is that right?

We have a copy of it here, both in your language and English.

You are nodding that is correct.

Is this order allowed under the Iraqi constitution?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] This is an illegal

order and the Iraqi, that goes against the constitution, and the constitution considers the CPI an independent entity, and that would

only be subject to orders of the Parliament.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you.

Judge, did you have any cases that you were investigating that

were stopped by this order?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Tons of cases were

stopped because of this letter would go to the courts and the courts

would stop looking into examining the cases.

Ms. WATSON. Did you have cases that involved current and past

ministers?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Yes, current and

former ministers.

Ms. WATSON. I would say that this letter, this secret letter, illustrates and demonstrates to me that there are violations of your

own constitution going on under this administration.

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] That is true.

Ms. WATSON. To me, I interpret it as corruption.

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Yes.

Ms. WATSON. If this is a new developing democracy, we need to

attack corruption wherever we find it, and that is the reason for

this hearing today.

I appreciate your response. Maybe you want to translate that.

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Thank you.

Ms. WATSON. I appreciate one of your responses to one of our

Members when you said corruption is corruption and I am a professional, and I go after corruption wherever it may be.

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Thank you.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you so much for your testimony today.

I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Ms. Watson.

We now turn to Mr. Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding

this hearing, and I appreciate the bravery, particularly, of Judge

Radhi.

As Members of Congress know and hopefully the public knows,

General Jones, the Marine Corps General, issued a bipartisan report just last month. It was called the Report of the Independent

Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq. Of course, there are

two missions we have been training the Iraqi folks for, military and

police.

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I trust all the witnesses are familiar with this report because it

says, ‘‘Sectarianism and corruption are pervasive in the Ministry of

Interior and cripple the ministry’s ability to accomplish its mission

to provide internal security of Iraqi citizens.’’

Things are apparently so bad at the Interior Ministry that this

report by General Jones, the Marine Corps General, recommends

that the entire national police be disbanded.

Here is exactly what the report concluded: ‘‘Conclusion: The national police have proven operationally ineffective. Sectarianism in

its units undermine its ability to provide security. The force is not

viable in its current form. The national police should be disbanded

and reorganized.’’

That is a pretty damning conclusion.

Mr. Bowen, as the Inspector General, what is your opinion? Have

corruption and sectarianism really gotten to this point that the

Jones’ recommendation is appropriate, to scrap the national police

and start all over?

Mr. BOWEN. I am very familiar with that issue and that report,

and indeed I met with members of the Multinational Security

Transition Command-Iraq that is in charge of training the national

police, and they independently confirmed to me the problem of infiltration in the national police, as well as other problems in the

IPS and other Iraqi security forces and the facility protection services as well.

But the national police is a very serious issue. It is managed

quite directly from the MOI. The corruption that grew within it,

which is really a sectarian infiltration that was condoned over several years, has produced the situation that General Jones quite accurately addressed, and his solution, I think, is on point.

Mr. COOPER. Judge Radhi knows the situation better than any

of us do. One of the most disturbing elements of this conclusion of

the report was that the previous Minister of the Interior was a

man named—forgive me if I mispronounce it—Bayan Jabr.

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Bayan Jabr.

Mr. COOPER. Bayan Jabr, it was under his leadership that the

ministry became so heavily politicized.

The report, for example, says that Mr. Jabr gave key ministry

posts to members of the Badr Brigade, and the Badr Brigade Militia infiltrated Iraqi police units throughout Iraq.

Judge Radhi, to your knowledge, was Mr. Jabr, a member of the

Badr Organization?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] This issue, of course,

I know about it from the media because I do not have a political

relationship with them.

However, I can say that these security ministries are now divided among the sectarianism and the sectarianism influence, and

therefore you see that their performance is not a good performance.

Mr. COOPER. The amazing thing to me is it is my understanding,

even though Mr. Jabr, was the previous Minister of Interior, instead of being punished or reformed or in any way changed, now

it is my understanding he has been promoted to be Minister of Finance, which is truly astonishing.

77

Judge Radhi, given Mr. Jabr’s record at the Interior Ministry, do

you have any concerns about what he is doing as Minister of Finance?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] My concern is toward the ministries themselves because the sectarian quotas are

ongoing, and therefore these ministries are not protecting the Iraqi

people. Therefore, you see that the security is continuously deteriorating.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Cooper.

Have you completed what you wanted to say?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Yes.

Mr. Sali. Are you not going to go at this time?

Mr. SALI. Can I yield my time to Mr. Issa?

Mr. ISSA. The gentleman yields his time to me, I guess.

A couple of quick questions, Mr. Bowen, has the Iraqi government, at any time, given us authority, the United States, the executive branch or the Congress authority over corruption of the use

of Iraqi funds?

Have we asked Iraq to allow us to investigate the use of their

funds?

Mr. BOWEN. No.

Mr. ISSA. So we have never asked?

Mr. BOWEN. No, sir.

Mr. ISSA. Have we ever asked any government whether we could

investigate the corruption in their government to your knowledge?

Mr. BOWEN. No, not to my knowledge.

Mr. ISSA. Is it unusual for the U.S. Congress to investigate a sovereign nation’s utilization of their own resources in your experience?

Mr. BOWEN. This is the first time I have been at a hearing on

that matter.

Mr. ISSA. Do you think it is appropriate in your own judgment?

Mr. BOWEN. I think addressing, assessing the state of Iraqi corruption is appropriate for oversight and review because it amounts

to an economic undermining of this fledgling democracy. Corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain, and it has occurred on a large scale in Iraq.

Mr. ISSA. I appreciate that. The question really isn’t do we analyze it. The question is what do we do about it after we all agree

on this dais that it was rampant under Saddam and it is rampant

under Maliki and that, in fact, it goes far, far, far down?

It doesn’t flow just to the top the way it once did where you only

stole with the permission of top. Now you have little fiefdoms that

are stealing all along.

I guess one of my questions is has the GAO ever investigated another sovereign nation’s utilization of its resources?

Mr. WALKER. No. The only thing that would be close is you recall

the Coalition Provisional Authority was set up by the United

States. The Coalition Provisional Authority had access to both U.S.

funds as well as Iraqi funds.

Mr. ISSA. Your organization oversaw how we spent their funds

while we were in control.

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Mr. WALKER. Actually not. What we did was we were involved

in expenditure of U.S. funds, and we facilitated the release of

records from the U.S. Government to the Board of Supreme Audit

of Iraq so that they could hopefully do the audit work with regard

to Iraqi funds. So we have not audited Iraqi funds, but we facilitated the Board of Supreme Audit hopefully being able to do the

same.

Mr. ISSA. So that the record be complete on one thing, I know

you are not going to find one person on the dais, under any circumstances, that is satisfied with the level of integrity, transparency or lack of corruption in Iraq. That is something that, from

the chairman going both directions on the dias, it is very clear that

this is not a government that works to the best interest of their

people, particularly if they are Sunnis in Anbar or Kurds in the

north.

Mr. Bowen, your written testimony states the number of corruption cases under investigation by the Iraq Commission on Public

Integrity was 1,861 in 2006 and 3,158 in 2007. Can you describe

essentially how we got to this increase?

It looks good on paper. Tell me about it.

Mr. BOWEN. One is an increased effort under Judge Radhi’s leadership to push forward, try to push back the tide of corruption that

has been rising, as he testified today. It is also indicative of that

rising tide itself, that the corruption efforts have increased because

the work is to be done.

Mr. ISSA. I appreciate that.

To your knowledge, how many convictions have there been in

Iraq?

Mr. BOWEN. I don’t know what the total number is. There have

been hundreds of convictions.

Mr. ISSA. So they do get convictions.

Mr. BOWEN. Yes.

Mr. ISSA. What is the typical penalty when convicted? Are they

the equivalent of a U.S. felony conviction?

Mr. BOWEN. It depends on the nature of the crime, of course. The

challenge in Iraq, especially with the ministries, is that there is selective prosecution because there is by fiat, the authority with

every minister to protect any ministry employee from any corruption investigation.

And so, I am aware of some cases wherein most of the defendants were protected under Article 136(b), but one of the lower level

ones was permitted to be prosecuted and imprisoned because of

their sectarian identity.

Mr. ISSA. Always please your boss, I guess, is the rule in Iraq.

Judge, one question I have for you is when did you decide that

you needed to leave Iraq and get your family out of Iraq to a permanent place such as the United States for safety?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] For 2 years, there

were continuous threats, and I did send letters and petitions to the

Parliament about this issue of threats, and then they started hitting my residence with missiles. Then it has become very difficult

for me.

Mr. ISSA. I only wanted a date if that could be provided, just a

calendar date, if possible, for the decision.

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Chairman WAXMAN. You can submit it for the record if you don’t

recall a date at the moment.

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] I decided only when

the Prime Minister warned me through an interview on [phrase in

foreign language].

Mr. ISSA. And the date?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] The beginning of

September this year.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Issa.

Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank all of our witnesses here this morning for their

testimony, for their consistent help with the committee, and Judge

Radhi, particularly, I want to thank you for the courage that you

have shown and integrity of coming forward.

Mr. Chairman, just for the record, I don’t know as I had to go

in and out of other meetings, but if nobody has brought it up yet,

I think that we ought to make a statement that the State Department’s attempt to indicate that even broad statements and assessments that anyone might make characterizing the quality of Iraqi

governance or corruption and saying that shouldn’t be discussed, I

think is a little bit bizarre, if nothing else, given the fact that there

is $600 billion of the United States invested in that country and

the importance of the Iraqi people of having those investments

come out to reconstruction and safety and security and other

things. So this is a very germane issue that we are investigating

and talking about here this morning and important to delve into.

Judge Radhi, we have talked about your statement that some

$18 billion has been lost as a result of corruption, but if we can

take just a minute to talk about corruption at the Ministry of Oil,

an area where I understand that you have not yet been able to

even have an audit on that basis.

You made a statement: ‘‘It has been impossible for the Commission on Public Integrity to safely and adequately investigate oil corruption where Sunni and Shia militias have control of the metering, transport and distribution of oil.’’

So we are talking about billions and billions of dollars worth of

Iraqi oil revenues, basically the lifeblood of the country, and a central obstacle to obtaining any political reconciliation. Are you saying, sir, that given that importance you have not been able to have

audits or investigations into that ministry?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Out of this $18 billion total amount, only half a billion is related to issues pertaining

to the Ministry of Oil.

With respect to the Ministry of Oil, the Inspector General of that

ministry had issued a report that contains three sections. The Inspector General of that ministry spoke about trafficking in oil,

about the amount of funds of these revenues and about the amount

of oil that was involved in this in addition to the reports by U.S.

and British authorities.

There were two cases about a current and former minister, and

these cases were closed.

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Mr. TIERNEY. Let me back up a second. The reports on the Oil Ministry would have added to that $18 billion or were already incorporated in the $18 billion figure?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] It would have added.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Bowen and Mr. Walker, is it your understanding also that militias are likely in control of a substantial amount

of money from the oil industry?

Mr. BOWEN. There are a number of sources that report that, yes,

sir.

Chairman WAXMAN. Yes. There is more information available on

a classified basis, Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Walker.

Judge Radhi, in your statement, you say, ‘‘This has resulted in

the Ministry of Oil effectively financing terrorism through these

militias.’’

Can you tell us what you mean by that? Are you saying that

these oil revenues were given directly to the terrorists?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Yes, such as in Bayji

in the central part of Iraq, there are Sunni militias that control

this region, and they take a great share of these revenues, and

they use some of the amounts to finance their militias. The same

goes to Basrah where the region is under the control of the Shiite

militias.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.

My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Tierney.

Mr. Sarbanes.

Mr. SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am sort of reeling here because the testimony from everybody

is such that I have virtually no hope left that any meaningful

progress is being made in terms of rebuilding the infrastructure in

Iraq in a way that represents true progress, and I think everyone’s

testimony puts a lie to assertions that progress is being made.

I would ask the Judge, whose testimony is courageous but he is

clearly a man of courage innately, what can you point to that

would give me hope that real progress is being made in combating

the corruption that you are talking about today?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] As I said in my testimony, that the government has closed many cases and intervened

in our matters, and that goes against the constitution. That was

the thing that impeded concrete, good results in fighting corruption.

Mr. SARBANES. So you really can’t point to anything that would

give me hope.

Let me ask Mr. Walker or Mr. Bowen to take that question.

Maybe if you could just, either one of you, start by describing

where you have seen a comparable level in your experience or from

what you know or have studied, if you could cite a comparable level

of corruption in terms of the impact that it is having on infrastructure and services within any society that you have looked at in the

recent past. What can I look to get a frame of reference on what

we are talking about here?

Mr. WALKER. I don’t know if I can give you a frame of reference,

Mr. Sarbanes, but I would have some comments that are directly

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relevant to your line of inquiry. First, I think we have to keep in

mind that corruption, as has been mentioned, involves the abuse

of public office for private gain. Corruption happens all over the

world in differing degrees. It has happened in Iraq for a long time.

There is, however, a difference. The United States is dedicating

a lot of lives and a lot of money in Iraq and, in general terms, I

don’t think it is any of our business to investigate corruption of

other sovereign nation’s money. However, when the United States

has 160,000 troops on the ground and billions of dollars invested,

I think we need to be concerned with it, not to investigate it, to

be concerned with it because I think it can have a direct impact

on the ability of the Iraqi government to achieve the 18 benchmarks that have been laid out for political, security and economic

progress in Iraq.

So that is why I think it is important, but I think there is a line

that ought to be drawn as to how far we should go.

Mr. SARBANES. You cited four elements that are impacting

progress. One was employee shortage. The other was sectarian influence. The third was the corruption within the various ministries,

and the other was security.

Let’s take employee shortage. Any prospects any time soon that

the employee shortage aspect of this will be fixed or remedied or

progress much in a positive direction from what you have seen?

Mr. WALKER. Well, there are several angles there, one of which

there has been a brain flight outside of the country because the security situation. The question is whether and to what extent that

might be able to be reversed. I think it is going to take a more stable security question for that to be reversed in any significant numbers.

Second, you have the de-Baathification policy and if political

progress can be made on that such that there might be a possibility

to be able to tap some expertise from the former regime that may

have been Baathist but not hard line Saddamist, if you will, you

might be able to achieve some progress there.

But then I would ask Mr. Bowen whether he has any perspective

because he is on the ground.

Mr. BOWEN. First of all, it is an employment issue. The real

problem in Iraq is unemployment which ranges up to 40 percent

by some estimates, and that provides a breeding ground for insurgent recruitment.

With respect to the corruption effort or the attempt to stem the

tide, we have issued two audits in the last 13 months that have

found that the U.S. effort has not been well planned, well coordinated or well funded. Notwithstanding that, we created two thirds

of the anti-corruption bulwark, the IGs and the CPI.

I spent a good portion of the first third of my time in this job

taking on the support of the IGs because of a vacuum of support

and pushing their growth, pushing their interest, trying to. I

pushed for an anti-corruption summit which Ambassador Khalilzad

held in November 2005.

But, notwithstanding those efforts, the plan, the coordination,

the funding never came about, unfortunately. It is disappointing as

our audits point out.

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Mr. SARBANES. My time is up. I want to thank the witnesses, and

I just want to highlight a comment that the Judge made which was

to suggest that the infrastructure in Iraq is almost equal to zero

and that the key services being provided by ministries in Iraq are

almost equal to zero, which I think is a very damning assessment

of where things stand.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Sarbanes.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just ask you, how many Members do you

have, because I came here a little later and I would be happy to

wait a few more. How many more do you have?

Chairman WAXMAN. There are two more.

Mr. SHAYS. I would be happy to wait for one more and then I will

go.

Chairman WAXMAN. There are two more.

Mr. SHAYS. Then I will go.

First, Judge Radhi, I want to say to you that you honor us by

your presence. You are a very brave and distinguished man. I have

known about you for a number of years, and I try to get to Iraq

every 3 to 4 months. So to have you here is a real honor.

I would like to say your decision to leave Iraq is understandable,

but it is a huge defeat for good government and my hope of success

in Iraq, and I am very sorry that it has come to a point where you

feel you need to leave.

I first want to say to you, Mr. Walker, I get concerned when

we—and to you, Mr. Bowen—from the outside looking in are passing judgment on circumstances that I think are known and yet

there is recognizably very little solution. I mean one solution is to

give up on Iraq because it is corrupt. That is one solution, and I

don’t think you are suggesting that.

No one can blame the U.S. Government for the fact that the Iraq

government is corrupt, no one. You could blame us for going in.

Let me just ask you, Judge al-Radhi, are you regretful that

Saddam’s regime was overthrown by the U.S. Government?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] As I said in my

opening statements, I thanked the United States because it removed a dictatorship that oppressed the Iraqi people.

Mr. SHAYS. Judge Radhi, I know you said it, but it can never be

said too much in an environment where most of Congress is critical

that we did, in fact, do that, and so it is important for people to

know as I see all the time when I go into Iraq, thank you for coming and getting rid of Saddam. But I do believe that the people of

Iraq could be very critical for what we did once we were there.

What do you think the biggest mistake was that the American

Government made?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] I am not a politician.

That is one. The second thing is that the Americans helped the

Iraqi people by removing the dictatorship. What is happening now

in Iraq is really the work of the neighboring countries.

Mr. SHAYS. The Iraqi what? I am sorry.

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] The aspirations of

neighboring countries, of regional aspirations.

Mr. SHAYS. Should we give up on Iraq and leave?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Regional aspirations.

83

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

I want to ask the Judge, should we give up on Iraq and leave?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] In reality, the Iraqi

people would hope that you continue your support to them. Otherwise, they will be suppressed by the neighboring countries.

Mr. SHAYS. You appreciate that the United States came in and

removed Saddam, and you do not want us to leave. So tell me the

bottom line issue of what we can learn by your testimony that will

help make Iraq a better place and not have your testimony be used

by some as an argument that we should leave?

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] In reality, it is a

great endeavor that you came to Iraq and to liberation. Liberation

was a great endeavor. I believe if you help the Iraqi people to be

managed and governed by an honest government, I believe that the

problem will be over.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Shays.

Mr. Yarmuth.

Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would also like to thank all the witnesses.

I would like to pursue for a minute the issue that Congressman

Tierney mentioned regarding the efforts of the administration to

muzzle any discussion about corruption in Iraq, and I would like

to address Mr. Walker and Mr. Bowen.

As I know Mr. Walker knows, I was a journalist in my former

life, and so I have a professional as well as personal interest in efforts to conceal information, a natural resistance to that.

Last week, the State Department informed this committee that

their officials would not be allowed to provide information about

corruption in Iraq unless the committee agreed to treat it as classified and withhold it from the public. The State Department sent an

e-mail to committee staff, confirming that virtually any discussion

of Iraqi corruption was now classified.

Let me show you what the State Department said was classified.

The e-mail said: ‘‘Broad statements or assessments which judge or

characterize the quality of Iraqi governance or the ability or determination of the Iraqi government to deal with corruption including

allegations that investigations were thwarted or stifled for political

reasons and statements or allegations concerning actions by specific individuals such as the Prime Minister or other GOI officials

or regarding investigations of such officials.’’

Mr. Bowen, let me ask you first. Is there anything that you said

today that would have passed muster according to this directive

other than good morning?

Mr. BOWEN. It is a pretty broad directive, and it was not and

does not apply to me or my testimony today.

Mr. YARMUTH. I understand, but if such a policy did apply to you

or your testimony, what effect would that have on what you could

do?

Mr. BOWEN. A significant effect.

Mr. YARMUTH. Would you be able to do your work if this policy

were applied to you?

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Mr. BOWEN. As testifying before this committee, I would have to

be more circumspect about what I said, but everything I have said

today, virtually everything I have said today, we have reported on

in the past, and so this is not new news. We first called the problem of corruption in Iraq a second insurgency over a year ago.

Mr. YARMUTH. Mr. Walker, did you know that the State Department would consider the broad statement in your report that characterized the ability of the Iraqi government to deal with corruption to be classified information?

Mr. WALKER. No. Several comments on that, first, my testimony

is based on this report which the State Department had an opportunity to review and comment on, and they did not classify any of

the information in this report which is the basis of my testimony.

Second, I can understand why the State Department might have

a concern if you were talking about specific individuals because,

frankly, in our own country, we would probably have concerns

about testifying with regard to ongoing investigations dealing with

specific parties. But with regard to the broader challenge, itself, I

think it would be over-reaching to try to classify discussions about

the broader overall challenge.

Mr. YARMUTH. I was going to ask you, the report that you submitted, if the State Department were to issue it, this entire report

would have been classified, wouldn’t it, under those guidelines?

Mr. WALKER. Well, we did submit it to them both for comment,

which we do under generally accepted government auditing standards, and second also for sensitive review and classification review,

and what you have before you is unclassified.

Mr. YARMUTH. As part of this new classification policy, the State

Department also went back and retroactively classified the reports

issued by the Office of Accountability and Transparency. I understand that both GAO and the Special Inspector General received

copies of these reports when they were unclassified.

Either of you, did anyone ever tell you that these reports were

classified before you received them?

Mr. WALKER. No, and quite frankly I have seen at least two circumstances within the last 2 months where both the State Department, this being one, and the Defense Department attempted to

retroactively classify something that had been made available publicly and in some cases were on the worldwide Web which is obviously, I think, highly questionable.

Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you very much.

It is pretty obvious, Mr. Chairman, that we all know what is

going on here. There is no real danger to national security from

these reports. The State Department was fine with circulating

them on an unclassified basis throughout the government, and it

wasn’t until this committee asked to see the documents that they

took this action. So it is pretty clear that the administration just

wants to muzzle any comments that reflect negatively on the

Maliki government.

Chairman WAXMAN. Will the gentleman yield to me on that

point?

Mr. YARMUTH. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. We even asked one of the people at the

State Department whether he agreed with a statement by SecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:52 Sep 03, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\43601.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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retary Rice when she praised Prime Minister Maliki for his efforts

to stop corruption. She even praised him.

We asked this fellow from the State Department, do you agree

with that, and he said, I am not allowed to discuss that in an open

forum.

I can’t believe the attitude that the State Department has taken

in this regard. It is just incomprehensible to me. We are going to

insist on our rights for the Congress of the United States to be able

to get information about corruption in the Iraqi government. Their

only excuse is that it might embarrass the Maliki government.

Well, I think that the information that is already on the record,

that is public knowledge should be a source of embarrassment to

the Maliki government and a source of concern to the U.S. Government. The levels of corruption according to General Walker and

Special Inspector General Bowen and Judge Radhi is that corruption is increasing in Iraq, and the State Department can’t keep us

from knowing that and can’t censor that just because they think it

might embarrass or hurt our relationship with the Maliki government. Too many Americans are over there fighting and dying and

too many American are paying taxes to support the efforts in Iraq

for her to pretend something is not happening when we all know

it is happening.

I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, could I real quickly? I testified that

corruption is a serious problem in Iraq, and it is, but I can’t attest

as to whether or not it is increasing or decreasing based upon our

work.

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, I am not citing you, but both Mr.

Bowen and Judge Radhi.

Mr. WALKER. You are correct. The others did. I just wanted to

be clear for the record.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.

Chairman WAXMAN. You covered yourself.

Mr. Braley.

Mr. BRALEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Walker, it is good to see you again. Do you have any ulterior

motive for being here today?

Mr. WALKER. I work for the Congress of the United States. This

is our authorization, authorizing committee. I have no ulterior motive other than to serve my client.

Mr. BRALEY. Mr. Bowen, likewise, good to see you again. Do you

have any ulterior motive for being here today?

Mr. BOWEN. No. I am responding to your invitation and thankful

for the opportunity to testify.

Mr. BRALEY. I raise that interesting question because one of the

witnesses on the panel with you has had questions raised by other

members of the committee about his ulterior motives for being here

today.

Judge Radhi, you were the top Iraq anti-corruption official for

several years. You investigated thousands of cases involving Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds. By being so persistent and evenhanded,

you made both friends and enemies.

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We have talked with many people in the U.S. Government who

are very proud to be associated with you. For example, Christopher

Griffith is a Senior Advisor to the U.S. Office of Accountability and

Transparency at the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, and he said this about

you, ‘‘I think he is the most honest government of Iraq official that

I have met in my 21 months in the country. He has never lied to

me. He has tried to be studiously non-sectarian in his efforts, and

I have worked closely with them. To the extent that I would trust

a government of Iraq official, I would trust him.’’

Judge Arthur Brennan who is the Director of the Office of Accountability and Transparency in the Embassy said this about you,

‘‘Among the people that I have worked with in the U.S. Embassy,

Judge Radhi had the reputation as a courageous, honest and effective and at least as effective as you could be under the circumstances as effective Director of CPI.’’

Of course, you know Mr. Bowen who is sitting next to you today.

When you resigned your position last month because of escalating

death threats against you and your family, Mr. Bowen stated, ‘‘It

is a real blow to anti-corruption efforts in Iraq. He was the most

prominent anti-corruption enforcer.’’

Mr. Bowen, do you stand by that statement today?

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, I do.

Mr. BRALEY. Last month, you were attacked by the Maliki government.

Mr. Bowen, from what you know about Judge Radhi and his

work in Iraq on these very important anti-corruption issues, do you

believe there was any merit to those accusations?

Mr. BOWEN. I found Judge Radhi to be my most reliable partner

in carrying out my mission in Iraq. Accusations are commonplace

within the Iraqi government, and I don’t have any information

about the merits of them.

Mr. BRALEY. Well, Judge Radhi, I just want to join the rest of

the committee in thanking you for making the difficult journey

here to share your important testimony with us. No one here understands what you have been through as a true and courageous

person standing up for truth, standing up for justice, and we appreciate your efforts and thank you for joining us.

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Thank you.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Braley.

First, I want to ask unanimous consent that the documents that

were referred to in questioning which the majority and minority

have looked at be admitted to the record.

Mr. ISSA. It has been mutually agreed to.

Chairman WAXMAN. Without objection, that will be the order.

Mr. Issa, you wanted to ask a few more questions.

Mr. ISSA. Yes. I am going to be very brief. Believe or not, this

is my first round, but if enough people yield to you, it seems like

you have been here forever.

I just want to followup on a question that I asked earlier, and I asked the question for a reason. We are putting in $6 billion a

month into Iraq by anyone’s rounding error. It is great or it is less.

It is huge.

That huge amount of money, approaching a trillion dollars that

has been spent in this theater so far, why wouldn’t we treat, and

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this is for General Walker first and then for Mr. Bowen. Why

wouldn’t we treat Iraq oversight of their corruption and of their use

of their funds as we treated the Marcos government, as we dealt

with the post-Soviet Russian period, as we have dealt with Colombia and other countries in which drug money has had an adverse

influence?

Why wouldn’t this committee look at it in terms of the leverage

of U.S. money?

I ask that because, although I don’t believe we have yet made the

case, I hope by the time we adjourn in a few minutes, we will have

made the case that, in fact, this committee in both an unclassified

and, with the chairman’s indulgence, hopefully, in a classified setting, should be learning much more than any one individual can

tell us.

I would go to General Walker first. In your opinion, your experience, is it appropriate for us to have oversight over the billions of

dollars being spent of U.S. dollars and not see the effects of the

other dollars? Because I would presume that for every dollar that

we don’t spend, the Iraqis would have to find a way to come in

many cases with those dollars, and for every dollar we contribute,

we relieve their obligation to use their oil money wisely.

General Walker.

Mr. WALKER. Well, first, I think this committee has a responsibility to aggressively oversee expenditure of U.S. funds, especially

when it deals with contracting and other related activities in Iraq.

Second, I believe that in general terms it is not the U.S. Government’s responsibility nor is it appropriate for us to investigate Iraqi

sovereign money.

However, I do believe it is in the interest of this committee, the

Congress and our country to understand the nature and extent of

corruption overall and to what extent does that undermine the ability of the Iraqi government to deliver on its promises with regard

to funding and the ability of the Iraqi government to meet the 18

benchmarks that are necessary in order to achieve ‘‘success.’’

Mr. ISSA. Right. The second part of the question, in your opinion,

would that require a followup in a classified setting for this committee to fully understand some of what you and the State Department and other sources could give us?

Mr. WALKER. I clearly think it is in the committee’s interest to

obtain access to as much information as possible and to the extent

that there is information available that is classified, then I would

encourage you to avail yourself of that classified information as I

did in connection with the Iraqi 18 benchmark report that we

issued.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Bowen.

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, Mr. Issa, the classified hearing makes sense

since those reports are now classified, and I have read them, and

they are full of details about corruption within the Iraqi Ministries,

specifically cases, case details. So I think that would be useful for

the committee.

As to the first part of your question, the United States has enormous interest in the success of democracy in Iraq, clearly. Iraqi corruption, by the Iraqi government’s own admission, threatens that

state today.

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The Coalition Provisional Authority, essentially a U.S. entity,

created two thirds of the anti-corruption effort, the CPI, which

Judge Radhi headed for the last 3 years, and the Iraqi Inspectors

General, and by creating them took on the burden to build their

capacity. They were new entities. They did not sustain that burden

as our audits have shown either through effective strategic planning or appropriate funding.

The way ahead, implicit in your question on that front, I think

is engaging those with expertise in the issues you alluded to, international corruption and the fight against it.

That is the World Bank. They have two people in Iraq right now.

I met with them in August. They have good ideas. They have no

capacity themselves to address the issue. They need to lean forward and deploy and, more broadly, other United Nations efforts.

UNAMI needs to engage, needs to be a presence, ultimately.

As with everything in Iraq, multi-lateralizing the solution will

improve the likelihood of success of this fledgling democracy.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you.

Judge, just in closing, I want to thank you for your courageous

work over the last several years. Hopefully, you understand that

even though tough questions are always asked by this Congress, it

is with great appreciation for the work that you have done in Iraq

on behalf of your country.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. AL-RADHI. [Translated by Ms. Behrens.] Thank you.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much.

Thank you, all of you in this panel, for your participation.

We have votes on the House floor. We will respond to those votes

and be back here in 10 minutes because we still have Ambassador

Larry Butler from the State Department and Ms. Claudia Rosett

from the Foundation requested by the Republicans.

So we stand in recess to respond to the votes, which I think we

should be back here in 10 minutes.

[Recess.]

Chairman WAXMAN. The meeting of the committee will please

come back to order.

For our next witness, we are pleased to welcome Ambassador

Larry Butler. He is a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs at the U.S. Department of State.

Mr. Butler, it is the practice of this committee that all witnesses

that testify take an oath.

[Witness sworn.]

Chairman WAXMAN. Your prepared statement will be in the

record in full, and I would like to ask you to proceed in around 5

minutes.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR LARRY BUTLER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EAST AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Davis, members of

the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear

before you today.

Just to digress a little bit, in the course of my 31 years with the

State Department, I have served in countries like Finland and

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Denmark where corruption is virtually unheard of. In fact, this

year, Transparency International’s Corruption Index lists those two

countries in first and second place as the least corrupt countries in

the world.

I have also served in countries that figure a little further down

in the list, namely, the countries that emerged from the breakup

of the former Yugoslavia where corruption had long been a way of

life. Thanks to sanctions, conflict and transition from totalitarian

Communist regimes, corruption and law-breaking were essential

for survival at every level of society.

Politicians sought elected and appointed office precisely to access

public resources not just for personal but also for partisan benefit.

The shift from socialist to private ownership was frequently characterized as brazen daily robbery by insiders, organized crime and regime cronies.

I may have contributed to coining the term crony capitalism to

describe Milosevic’s kleptocracy during my service in Belgrade in

the mid-1990’s.

We can, therefore, by extension and without knowing any facts,

presume that corruption should also be a serious problem in Iraq

as it is in practically every other country in the throes of emerging

from dictatorship and conflict situations. None of us should underestimate the challenges of establishing strong and transparent government institutions in the wake of a dictatorship where corruption

was woven into the very fabric of governing, and none of us should

underestimate the challenge of rooting out corruption in a combat

zone, even one where violence is diminishing as we have seen over

the past 6 months.

The Department of State has devoted considerable effort and resources to helping courageous Iraqis establish mechanisms and

procedures to investigate and prosecute corruption. This is paralleled by efforts to build the technical capacity of public institutions to execute their budgets in transparent and accountable ways.

It is fair to say we probably do not have a program in the ministerial capacity development area that does not seek to build an

environment in which corruption is less prevalent. There have

been, as we say, negative impacts due to the immutable law of unintended consequences. Mid and senior level bureaucrats have become gun shy about signing off on tenders and contracts for fear

they may later be prosecuted. A well intentioned but clumsily administered anti-corruption system can be used to punish the wrong

persons.

Our assistance ranges across a spectrum, a comprehensive spectrum, inter alia: providing training to Iraqi anti-corruption teams,

securing armored vehicles and body armor for them, recommending

changes in specific laws that we believe would help stem corruption. We are encouraged by what has been achieved to date while

fully cognizant that much more needs to be done before Iraq’s own

anti-corruption effort is self-sustaining.

This year, the Embassy established an Office of Accountability

and Transparency with responsibility for overseeing our anti-corruption programs. We continue to add staff including specialists in

anti-corruption. We have urged the government of Iraq to establish

its own interagency body to coordinate anti-corruption efforts and

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to share best practices, and they have done so by creating the Joint

Anti-Corruption Council.

We have welcomed the recommendations of Mr. Bowen of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction and

are taking steps to implement them.

Although I represent the Department of State at this hearing, it

is important to note that many other U.S. Government agencies,

including the Department of Justice and the Agency for International Development, have also made combating corruption an important part of their missions and programs in Iraq.

We pursue these efforts across the country and not just in Baghdad. At the grassroots level, for example, the Department of State

funds a number of non-governmental organizations that target corruption and are seeking to create a civil society where government

transactions are transparent and subject to the rule of law.

In conclusion, I would be happy to answer your questions. I know

you appreciate that some of the details, if discussed outside of a

classified setting, can endanger the lives of those involved as well

as impede our ability to work with the government of Iraq.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Butler follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Butler, the problems of corruption in Iraq have

enormous implications for our efforts in Iraq. It is undermining

Iraqi confidence in their own government. It is funding the insurgency, and it is fostering sectarian divisions. All of those are major

questions when it comes to what is going on in the Iraqi government and the extent of corruption that is taking place.

I believe it is essential for Congress and the American people to

understand the extent of corruption and its impact on our policy in

Iraq.

Our committee staff tried to ask the State Department officials

about the corruption issue, but the State Department refused to

allow them to provide any answers unless the committee agreed

that all answers would be considered classified information and not

discussed in public.

I am going to read to you some of the questions we tried to ask

Vincent Foulk who is a Senior Consultant for the Office of Accountability and Transparency in the Embassy.

We asked him, what effect does corruption have on the progress

of the Iraqi government and their ability to move toward political

reconciliation? He was instructed that he could not answer this

question in an open forum.

We asked him whether Prime Minister Maliki or his associates

obstructed any anti-corruption investigations in Iraq to protect his

political allies. He said, I cannot answer that question in an open

forum.

He and other State Department officials were also instructed not

to answer questions about whether the Iraqi government has the

political will to root out corruption and whether corruption is funding the insurgency.

Ambassador, we live in a democracy. Our system of government

depends on an informed public. What would be the rationale for

preventing these officials from answering the committee’s questions

in an open forum?

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, it is a fair question, and permit me

to say that every foreign service employee at the State Department

in their annual evaluation is required to, is evaluated on his or her

performance in protecting sensitive national security information

and system.

Chairman WAXMAN. I understand that. Is that sensitive national

security information to ask the questions that I just reported we

asked?

Mr. BUTLER. We heard earlier today, Mr. Chairman, graphic testimony from Judge Radhi about the risks, the very real risks and

the price that he and his associates have paid in Iraq in pursuing

and attempting to deal with the corruption that exists in Iraq.

The programs that we have contain two elements which are nationally sensitive. One is some of them are operational.

Chairman WAXMAN. We are not asking specific questions. We are

asking general questions. What I understand is that the State Department people told us that to ask questions that were critical of

the Maliki government would undermine our relationship with

them, and therefore it would be contrary to our foreign policy interests.

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Does that make it classified?

Mr. BUTLER. That very much falls under one of the provisions in

the Executive order that provides the basis for classification which

is where revelation of information would damage bilateral relationships. It is intended to be kept confidential, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, let me ask you some of these questions, and you tell me if this is something that you think has to

be kept confidential.

Has Prime Minister Maliki or his associates obstructed any anticorruption investigations in Iraq to protect his political allies?

Mr. BUTLER. I would be unable to answer that question in an unclassified setting, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. Why is that?

Mr. BUTLER. This goes to the nature of our relationship with the

government of Prime Minister Maliki, and we have repeatedly on

many occasions offered to the committee and to staff to provide answers to questions like this in a classified setting.

Chairman WAXMAN. The American people want to know whether

the government of Iraq currently has the political will or the capability to root out corruption within its government. Do you believe

that the government of Iraq has that will?

Mr. BUTLER. I am in a position to detail many of the anti-corruption efforts undertaken by the government of Prime Minister

Maliki.

Chairman WAXMAN. No, no, that is not the question I asked you.

Do you believe that the government of Iraq currently has the political will or the capability to root out corruption within its government?

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, questions which go to the broad nature of our bilateral relationship with Iraq are best answered in a

classified setting, and we are very prepared to do that. We are prepared to respond.

Chairman WAXMAN. That information would be classified?

I mean all the people we have in Iraq getting killed, all the billions of dollars we are spending in Iraq. The American people are

asking, what are we doing and what are the chances for success?

How are we going to have any chance of success if there is corruption going on in the Maliki government?

If I, as a representative of over 600,000 people and chairman of

this committee, ask you from the State Department whether he has

a chance to succeed, you can’t answer that?

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, we have repeatedly made clear our

willingness to meet with you and your committee members in a

closed session.

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, Mr. Ambassador, I think that Secretary Rice is going to have a confrontation with this committee because we are not going to accept the idea that if you say something

that could be negative about the Maliki government, it is classified;

if you say something about them positive, it is OK. That seems to

be what we have been told by the State Department.

I consider that completely unacceptable, and we are going to

have a confrontation on this because the executive branch must answer the questions of the legislative branch if we are to do our job.

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I just think that this business that this cannot be answered, even

a broad question, in a public forum or a hearing of the Congress

is absurd.

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, we are prepared at any time in the

appropriate setting to answer your questions to the best of our ability.

Chairman WAXMAN. Is it inappropriate for me to ask you whether you think the Maliki government is working hard to improve the

corruption situation so that he can unite his country?

Mr. BUTLER. A broad assessment along that line, I would prefer

to address in a closed setting, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. You would prefer, but do you feel that you

have the right to say that you won’t answer that question?

Mr. BUTLER. My experience in 31 years of dealing with the Soviet Union and dealing with Milosevic’s Yugoslavia, this is, I would

prefer to address, be able to respond to that question in appropriate circumstances, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. Do you think it would be appropriate if I

asked you whether we should approve billions more for the Iraq

War if the Maliki government is not doing its best to stop corruption?

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, clearly, corruption is a fact of life on

the ground in Iraq as it is in any of the countries in the former

Yugoslavia, and unfortunately, as we find in our own country, this

does not mean that we can give up on our efforts to root our corruption with the best of our abilities in, in this case, a sovereign

country. Iraq deserves the best.

Chairman WAXMAN. You talked about Sweden. You talked about

Yugoslavia. You talked about other countries and how they don’t

have a lot of corruption in the Nordic countries. Did you have authority to make that statement from the State Department?

Mr. BUTLER. Each foreign service officer, each government employee, who is entrusted with national security information, has

rather, is required to exercise their judgment as to what constitutes national security information.

In this particular case, it is well established and on the record

that Finland and Denmark rank one and two on Transparency

International.

Chairman WAXMAN. Where does Iraq rank?

Mr. BUTLER. Pretty close to the bottom on Transparency International’s list.

Chairman WAXMAN. Do you feel you can say that in a public

forum? You said it.

Mr. BUTLER. I can certainly quote Transparency International.

Chairman WAXMAN. Who are below them?

Mr. BUTLER. I do not know.

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, I understand it is Myanmar and Somalia. That has to be way there on the bottom, and Iraq is right

next to them.

Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know the line of questioning is one that I think it would be

inappropriate to let go of. You do publish. This is a leading question, but you do publish or do you publish, as you do with Egypt

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and other countries, an annual report on Iraq including its transparency and corruption?

Mr. BUTLER. We publish quarterly reports that we submit to the

Congress on 2207, I think.

Mr. ISSA. Have those been provided to the committee?

Mr. BUTLER. Those have been provided to the committee.

Mr. ISSA. Fully vetted, do those or do those not say, about many

countries, and I have worked the Egyptian desk, so to speak. So

I have read those every year along with all the other areas, the

Lavant.

Iraq, in that report, looks better or worse than Egypt or other

countries in the Lavant, other Arab countries?

Mr. BUTLER. The 2207 report is very specific to Iraq, and I would

not be able to draw comparisons to other countries.

Mr. ISSA. Does it look pretty bad? Does it look like, in fact, that

you have a corrupt government in that report?

Mr. BUTLER. I cannot recall. In the 2207 report, I don’t think we

get very much into the specifics of corruption.

Mr. ISSA. OK. So do you think there should be a report that talks

about a direction improvement or dropping off in the level of transparency and/or corruption in Iraq?

Mr. BUTLER. The Embassy, under the direction of Ambassador

Crocker, is focused and will continue to be focused on dealing with

the issues involving corruption in Iraq.

We have stipulated; there is corruption in Iraq. How to measure

it, I don’t know. This is a country that is undergoing violence. It

is difficult to figure out what are your definitions.

Mr. ISSA. Well, you mentioned the post-Soviet period. Does it

look a lot like Russia did?

Mr. BUTLER. It looks very similar. Many aspects of that do look

similar.

Mr. ISSA. So in a post-dictatorship period, a post-organization period, an emerging democracy with privatization, with systems that

were previously subsidized in one way that are not being subsidized the same way now, it, to you—only wanting your opinion—

is it not surprising, even if we didn’t have the violence, even if we

didn’t have the insurgency, that this is, in fact, pretty close to a

basket case as far as legitimacy of the institutions of government

and delivering services?

Mr. BUTLER. I don’t, would not. I would not associate myself with

an assessment close to a basket case.

The government of Iraq is in an ongoing process of a revolution

of creating a government in a democracy where one did not exist

before.

Mr. ISSA. Is it better than the mid-1990’s in Russia?

Mr. BUTLER. Hard to make comparisons.

Mr. ISSA. Does it look reminiscent of the mid-1990’s in Russia?

Mr. BUTLER. In some areas, there are many similarities.

Mr. ISSA. What is Maliki doing as far as you know or key ministers of his to fight corruption that you can say is being effective?

Mr. BUTLER. During the 18 months that Prime Minister Maliki

and his government have been in power, and that is, I think, a key

number to focus on. It has only been 18 months.

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He inherited the Commission on Public Integrity as well as the

Board of Supreme Audit that were established prior to him assuming power, becoming the first democratically elected Prime Minister

of Iraq subsequent to 2003.

He created the Joint Anti-Corruption Council in May 2007. The

Prime Minister has provided crucial support to the JACC’s creation

which is an Iraqi solution to an Iraqi problem.

Part of the Joint Anti-Corruption Council’s agenda is to formulate recommendations, and this is one of the areas that I know

came up earlier in the day, and this has to do with Paragraph

136(b) of the Iraqi Criminal Procedures Code. That is on their

agenda to deal with.

They are also working with the Inspector Generals to create an

association to coordinate strategic goals.

Mr. ISSA. OK. My time is going to run out, and I appreciate the

long list, but let me just ask one question.

The President has openly said that he is—I will characterize—

disappointed in this government’s movement toward passing certain almost universally agreed on need for reforms, such as carbon

sharing, such as these corruption laws. To the extent that they are

on the agenda, you get no points.

Do you see the likelihood that in a timely fashion they are going

to be passed and enforced? I want your opinion, your assessment

on that.

Mr. BUTLER. I would need to take the so-called benchmark legislation which doesn’t include anti-corruption measures specifically,

but they are all built in there. Ambassador Crocker, working with

Prime Minister Maliki, continues to work toward achieving the legislative goals.

In the meantime, two things I would like to throw out there is

that Prime Minister Maliki did something back in March which

dramatically improved one aspect where there had been corruption,

and he put the Iraqi Army around the Bayji refinery.

Mr. ISSA. He started watching the oil.

Mr. BUTLER. He started watching the refined oil, specifically,

which was literally going out the front and back gate and was ending up on the black market.

The second thing the Prime Minister did, and I think this is an

important point, was followed an IMF recommendation to, on two

occasions, increase the price of fuel in Iraq which reduced the disparity between the black market price and the street price, which

has taken a huge bite out of the black market. Some of that money

was going into criminal networks, some of it was going to feed the

insurgency. These are very important steps to drain the swamp

that insurgents and organized crime are operating.

Chairman WAXMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired, but how

can you say all those positive things about Iraq but you can’t admit

to any of the negative things?

Ambassador BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, we acknowledge there is

corruption in Iraq, and corruption, by necessity, is defined as when

government officials at every level are not discharging their jobs.

We recognize that this is a rapidly changing environment and we

have an Embassy which is rapidly changing and evolving to meet

and respond to the threat, if you would——

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Chairman WAXMAN. I am talking about what you are able to say

in this meeting. You are able to say all the things that you think

are positive that he is doing, but you are not able to talk about the

failures of the Iraqi government, even though we had a panel that

has given us very clear indication that this government is riddled

with corruption. Why can you talk about the positive things and

not the negative things? Shouldn’t we have the whole picture?

Ambassador BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, I would be very pleased to

answer those questions in an appropriate setting.

Chairman WAXMAN. An appropriate setting for positive things is

a congressional hearing, but to say anything negative has to be behind closed doors?

Ambassador BUTLER. This goes, as you know, to the very heart

of diplomatic relations and national security. This is our ability

to——

Chairman WAXMAN. No, it goes to the heart of propaganda.

Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Stuart Bowen and David Walker testified earlier today about the

lack of leadership undermining the anti-corruption efforts at the

U.S. Embassy in Iraq. Mr. Bowen and Mr. Walker are certainly not

alone in that sentiment, and as I sit here—and you know I have

been there out in the field, at a post, and any area of corruption

I reported to the Secretary of State immediately. So on my watch

I would not allow it to go on without at least making a statement

about it, and I would go any place at any time to say that American taxpayers’ money was being abused and misused. So over the

past few weeks committee staff have interviewed several Embassy

officials involved with U.S. Embassy anti-corruption efforts and

they uniformly told us that no single official has been put in charge

of U.S. efforts to combat Iraqi corruption and that there is no coordinated strategy for fighting corruption in Iraq.

Judge Arthur Brennan, who served as the Director of the Office

of Accountability and Transparency for part of 2007 was asked

whether there was an overall U.S. strategy for combating Iraqi corruption, and let me read an excerpt from his transcript: ‘‘During

the time you were there, were you aware of any coordinated U.S.

strategy to fight corruption in Iraq?’’ The answer was ‘‘No.’’

James Santelle, Rule of Law Coordinator at the U.S. Embassy,

told committee staff the following: ‘‘The Embassy, over time, developed what are called stovepipe institutions. There is not coordination, as I have said before. You have a system where the coordination is lacking.’’

Anti-corruption efforts are supposed to be a cornerstone of the

U.S.’ effort to bring political reconciliation in Iraq. How is it possible that these efforts can be in such disarray?

Ambassador BUTLER. Ambassador, to take a moment and describe Embassy Baghdad and the environment it is in, and to pay

tribute to the men and women of the United States, as well as

their counterparts in the Iraqi government who have stood up to

tackle the very real challenges presented to the development of a

market-based economy and a real democracy, Embassy Baghdad is

an Embassy where it endures nearly 100 percent turnover every

year and in a rapidly changing external environment——

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Ms. WATSON. May I stop you there, Ambassador Butler? Because

our time runs out. But we have a fundamental responsibility to do

something about the corruption. We were told in the beginning—

of course, I didn’t support this war, but we were told that the moneys from oil would support the war. We are waiting—and not

breathlessly, because I intend to vote against it—for another supplemental to put billions of dollars of money in there. I don’t see

even a light at the end of the tunnel, and I know how long it has

been going on. I know how long this government has been set up.

But I don’t see the effort on the part of the—I think we are at the

point now it is going to take politics and diplomacy, not guns and

bullets. We can’t kill everybody. We don’t know what the enemy or

the insurgents look like, so we are going to kill everybody that we

think looks like or supposedly is. I think it is time for diplomacy,

and we can’t get from you on the ground, you know, what is going

on. Is there a coordinated effort? How are you going after?

And I know we have a relationship. It is a puppet government,

as far as I am concerned, but we ought to model the right way to—

at least that is the way I was trained in the State Department. I

am very proud of it. We had to model the right thing to do, and

I spent my time going from island to island out there in Micronesia, trying to get them to do the right thing because they were

using our dollars. And I don’t hear from the State Department

what I am expecting to hear. We have a fine tradition there. So

what are these people, who are new, coming in and doing? Are we

going after corruption? Are we pointing it out to Maliki? Are we

saying, you know, you have to show us that you are going after this

corruption. These are taxpayers’ dollars. And if we want support

for the——

Anyway, can you respond? I am really disappointed in what I am

hearing.

Ambassador BUTLER. Ambassador, I would like to say I agree

with what you just said. Both the GAO nor SIGIR have found any

evidence of corruption in the expenditure of U.S. taxpayer moneys

in Iraq, for which I derive a certain amount of satisfaction, and

also——

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, that is not an accurate statement.

Ms. WATSON. $9 billion to Haliburton was missing. Bremer was

sitting right there at the table and he didn’t know where the

money went.

Ambassador BUTLER. The SIGIR reports that I have looked at

have in the last couple of years that I went through show that we

have pretty good marks on our programs. Regarding——

Chairman WAXMAN. We have contracted——

Ambassador BUTLER. Ambassador Crocker takes fighting corruption very seriously. He has, as we do on a regular basis——

Ms. WATSON. Excuse me, Ambassador. Ambassador Bremer sat

there and said he did not know where that $9 billion went. So for

you to say that you did accounting, there was no accounting. That

money went in one way and there was no accounting. There was

testimony on the record. We would be happy to send that. And that

was Ambassador at the time Bremer, and he certainly didn’t oversee that we had an accounting. $9 billion would do a lot in this

country for our children.

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Chairman WAXMAN. Time has expired.

Ms. WATSON. Excuse me. I know my time is up.

Chairman WAXMAN. Unless you want to say something, we are

going to move to Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you. Yes, I heard something different in the

testimony. I remember Ambassador Bremer saying that we gave it

to people who gave it out. There weren’t accounting systems further on down the line, but we gave it to the appropriate authorities. As you know, it was an emergency situation at the time; you

had to start paying people and the like.

I gather that is your testimony.

Ambassador BUTLER. These were CPA days, yes?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes.

Ambassador BUTLER. With accountable taxpayer money—and if

I am wrong on that one, sir, I do apologize—IIRF money and

others——

Mr. DAVIS. This was Iraqi money, I think is what she is talking

about.

Ambassador BUTLER. I believe that is correct. And it was CPA

time, as opposed to U.S. taxpayer money. We take our responsibility to look after taxpayers’ money very carefully, very seriously. I

just wanted to take a moment——

Mr. DAVIS. Well, let me do this, because I have 5 minutes, and

I don’t want you answering her questions in my 5 minutes, I am

sorry.

Ambassador BUTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. Page 1 of the strategy says that the basis of the problem of corruption in Iraq is market distortions, cultural tolerance,

intimidation militias, undeveloped civic culture, lack of government

capacity. What market distortions enable or foster corruption?

Ambassador BUTLER. First and foremost, when you are selling

subsidized or under-market priced fuel. We saw gasoline and diesel

fuel being diverted all over the place into the hands of militias and

organized crime networks who were selling it on the black market

and pocketing the difference. And that has been taken care of.

Mr. DAVIS. OK, so we have fixed that problem?

Ambassador BUTLER. It is being fixed.

Mr. DAVIS. Describe an example of cultural tolerance of corruption.

Ambassador BUTLER. For 35 years, the people in Iraq lived under

a system where you had to play by the rules of the Bathist party

and Saddam Hussein. That would be the cultural. If you wanted

to survive, you paid whatever you had to to the boss on top of you

and do things that were for the regime and not for the benefit of

the broad public.

Mr. DAVIS. So it was like a little tip to get things.

Ambassador BUTLER. And something we see in the former Soviet

Union and in the former Yugoslavia.

Mr. DAVIS. Well, it is not uncommon, in fact, around the world,

is it?

Ambassador BUTLER. No.

Mr. DAVIS. What are some elements of civic culture that would

reduce corruption?

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Ambassador BUTLER. The lack of NGO’s, civic associations, societies that serve as public watchdogs who are able to come in and

say money has been wasted on this particular project and effectively become whistleblowers and can lobby in Baghdad or in the

provincial governments.

Mr. DAVIS. What would you say is the key government capacity

that is most important in establishing fighting corruption, would it

be the IGs, the CPI, the BSA? And how do we prioritize?

Ambassador BUTLER. I wish I could point to one thing that fights

corruption. Corruption is a lot like a football game, you have to

play defense with the IGs and the other investigative bodies, but

you also have to play offense, and that means you put in place the

mechanisms, the technical capacity to reduce the ability of people

to put money in their pockets or steer contracts to cronies or family.

Mr. DAVIS. We have heard a lot of questions about the classification of documents. I guess really what I want to know is allow you

to say what steps the U.S. Embassy is taking to assist the Iraqi

government’s counter-corruption. How are the anti-corruption offices organized? What is the strategic plan to assist in countering

corruption? How many people do we have involved with that and

how much funding are we allocating?

Ambassador BUTLER. Over the last 4 years we have dedicated

significant Iraq reconstruction rehabilitation funds to support Iraq

anti-corruption——

Mr. DAVIS. What is significant? Can you give me an idea, what

is significant?

Ambassador BUTLER. I don’t think I have a number for you.

Mr. DAVIS. To me, $1,000 is significant, but in a case like this,

what is—for some in government salary. What is a significant

amount, ball park, is it tens of millions?

Ambassador BUTLER. I would have to come back to you on that

one in writing, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. OK, I think we need to know that. OK.

Ambassador BUTLER. I will come back for the record, please.

Mr. DAVIS. OK. Keep going.

Ambassador BUTLER. That was to support both the CPI and the

board of the supreme auditors. As a result of the USG assistance

to the Commission on Public Integrity, the CPIs conducted over

4,000 investigations and made several high profile arrests, including the former minister of electricity and minister of labor and a

number of officials of the ministry of oil, and referred more than

2,000 cases for prosecution to the Central Criminal Court. INL also

funds Department of Justice resident legal advisors. These are U.S.

prosecutors who advise and mentor criminal court justices in all

manners of serious cases. We have also funded Department of Justice ISITAP advisors and specialists to train and mentor the investigators from the Commission on Public Integrity. There were 11

of these investigators who came back with Judge Radhi to learn

how to do polygraphs. Every one of those investigators went back

to Iraq to get back to work with their new skills. IRF also works

to enhance investigative capacity of the CPI, as well as provide

equipment for their investigators.

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And, most recently, we have just signed a grant with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development for, I think,

about $1.3 million to complement efforts on the international compact for Iraq—I am sorry, $1.6 million—to do the business side of

anti-corruption efforts, and this is precisely our efforts to multilateralize a problem that we have been attacking just by ourselves.

Mr. DAVIS. OK. Thank you.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Davis.

Mr. Lynch.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the witness for coming forward. Look, I know

you said we get high marks for our job, but I am trying to find evidence of that in the record here. We have an assessment that currently there is no single office that has the authority or responsibility for oversight, and to assure that all anti-corruption efforts are

focused on a common goal or that efforts are being performed in

an efficient manner. We have evidence here that the Office of Accountability and Transparency has been hampered from the beginning by a lack of support and leadership. The office has only had

one permanent director, Judge Brennan, and he lasted a month. I

heard he was doing a good job, but, again, he was only there for

a month.

Now, I know that the Inspector General, Stuart Bowen, had recommended that you appoint a senior leader from the Department

of State to run the office, and yet we have evidence that, actually,

by default, the acting head over there was actually a paralegal

doing administrative work. So instead of an experienced senior Department person, you have an inexperienced paralegal. Hey, some

paralegals are great, not to run this critical agency.

There is a lot of testimony here that you are not getting high

marks, to be honest with you. And then when we ask you about

the level of corruption here, we are getting answers like we don’t

want to talk about any broad statements or assessments to judge

the level of corruption in Iraq, and yet I think we have sent over

$450 billion over there so far. How does that square with your constitutional responsibility and ours?

Ambassador BUTLER. The Embassy, the U.S. Government has invested heavily in the last couple of years in broad-based anti-corruption efforts. In the first instance this was the playing offense

side of it, to develop capacities in ministries, and more recently,

through the provincial reconstruction teams, to develop capacities

at the provincial and municipal levels, which are showing very

promising early days.

Mr. LYNCH. Well, let’s talk about that. You tell me. You tell me.

You have this refusal here to testify in any detail about the level

of corruption in Iraq that we know is going on. How do you reassure us in Congress, representing the American people? They are

looking for more money over there and, yet, you won’t even tell us

about what you have found in terms of the level of corruption and

whether things are getting better or worse over there. You won’t

get into any of the details that the first panel talked about. How

does that square? We have a problem here. We have a problem of

constitutional dimensions here.

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Now, I respect the job that you do, we all do, but it appears that

you don’t have the same respect for the job that Congress must do.

We have an oversight responsibility. Not to sign a blank check, but

to find out how progress is being made in terms of the resources

that we have committed to this.

Ambassador BUTLER. Congressman, two things. One, we have

provided to the committee all the documents from the Embassy

that we were able to find related to corruption. Second, we have

made it clear that we are prepared to answer your questions in an

appropriate setting. We are prepared to do that at any moment.

Mr. LYNCH. Look, I will leave it at this. This is a matter of transparency. Do you see the irony here? You are saying you have actually established a Committee on Accountability and Transparency

for the benefit of the Iraqi people, and yet, here, when we ask you

to exercise the same transparency with respect to your responsibility to the American people, you are claiming that there is a level

of confidentiality that is required, that we can’t actually tell the

American people, the American taxpayer what we are doing with

their money. It is just ironic that you are standing there.

And I know it is not your decision, sir; this decision was made

at the secretariat level. Let’s be frank. And I know you are just

here doing your job, but it is totally disrespectful to the American

people.

Ambassador BUTLER. Mr. Congressman, the issues and the aspects that are involved in the fight against corruption in Iraq risks

people’s lives. You heard that from Judge Radhi earlier today, what

has happened to him and to his colleagues. It potentially endangers

the lives of fellow Americans who are on——

Mr. LYNCH. But, sir, if it wasn’t for his testimony, we would

never hear about it, because you have a gag order on at the State

Department. It is his testimony that we are discussing today. But

the State Department has offered no clear assessment. You haven’t

really fulfilled your responsibility to the American people, in my

opinion.

Ambassador BUTLER. We have provided the documents as requested. We have also provided the witnesses, the individuals that

have been deposed in the last week, and we are prepared, in a classified setting, to answer questions to our best ability in detail.

Mr. LYNCH. Very disappointed.

I yield back.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. I am not disappointed with your testimony. In my

judgment, you are being asked to say that individuals in Iraq are

corrupt, and then we have to work with those individuals, and I

don’t see how that helps our soldiers win in Iraq; I don’t see how

it makes us safer in Iraq. I am accused sometimes of being a pretty

naive person. I don’t think I am, but I am accused of it. But the

one thing I am willing to say is Iraq is corrupt. We knew it under

Saddam and we knew just because we invaded them they wouldn’t,

all of a sudden, become pure and uncorrupt. So I am not amazed

by it, and I would be pretty horrified if you started depicting every

leader in Iraq that we thought was corrupt.

105

I would also like to correct for the record if it is $415 billion or

$600 billion. Those dollars are not what we are talking about. We

are talking about Iraqi government officials ripping off their fellow

constituency with their dollars, to which we do not have control.

And I love how we ask people in Congress to let them have their

autonomy and respect their autonomy, and then when we don’t like

what they are doing, then we say we have to step in and criticize

them. So this is where I think there is valid reason for this hearing. It is an absolute waste of our time if we are, all of a sudden,

discovering that the Iraqis have a corrupt government. That would

be foolish.

The real issue is what are the things we can do to make it less

corrupt. That is the issue. And I think it was valid for both the Inspector General and the head of GAO to say there should be one

person in the Embassy totally focused on that issue. And I want

to be on record as saying I hope that the State Department will

consider that recommendation. I think it is constructive and I

think it would be helpful.

I would like to ask you about your reaction to Judge al-Radhi

and his testimony. What I know of him is that he is an incredibly

honest and dedicated Iraqi who happens to be a Shia, and that he

has met the point where he doesn’t feel that he can continue. But

I also heard him say that he was happy the United States came

in and removed Saddam. I heard him say that it would be a huge

mistake for the United States to leave. Is his leaving Iraq—first,

what is your impression of the job he did, his testimony, and can

you speak to that?

Ambassador BUTLER. Congressman, thank you. I can only offer

tribute to the courage and the tenacity of the judge, and his departure from the scene is a blow. It may be a while before somebody

with his capacity and willingness steps in to replace him.

Mr. SHAYS. Will it make it harder for Iraq to deal with corruption when you lose someone who is so brave and so talented?

Ambassador BUTLER. It depends. It depends on how the system

responds. It is possible this serves as a shock to the system, but

certainly Ambassador Crocker, this week, has ordered a review of

how the Embassy attacks anti-corruption. One branch of it is how

we develop capacity, and this is the offensive side; creating systems

where it is harder to be corrupt, at the same time as continuing

well-established track record on developing Iraq’s own sovereign

ability to deal with corruption. This is going to take time; there is

no hiding that.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, it is his testimony, I think, that he didn’t feel

he got the help from the Maliki government that he felt he deserved. Was that your reading of his testimony? I am not asking

you what you think; I am asking you what you heard.

Ambassador BUTLER. I didn’t listen to all of his testimony, Mr.

Congressman.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Well, the testimony was fairly clear that he felt

that he was taking a tough stand and was not getting the support

of the government.

Chairman WAXMAN. Since they offered to kill him, I would say

that is an understatement that they didn’t offer to support him.

They threatened his life.

106

Mr. SHAYS. His testimony was he was not getting the support

and he felt his life was threatened. And I have met other people

like him, people like Fal al-Alusi, who has done very brave things

and his life is threatened. That is nothing new for the folks that

are trying to work on this government. So I appreciate that he was

here. He thinks it would be helpful if there was someone within the

Embassy that could be more focused on this issue. I think it is a

constructive part of this hearing to which, Mr. Waxman, I thank

you for helping to focus attention on that issue. But if it is to say

that people in Iraq, the government is corrupt, given 35 years

under Saddam, there would be nothing that would tell me it would

be different now that you have a government, to which I might add

is concerned that we might pull the rug out from under them and

that they may not even exist.

Chairman WAXMAN. May I ask, Mr. Shays, do you think this is

an appropriate question? Has Prime Minister Maliki or his associates obstructed any anti-corruption investigations in Iraq to protect

his political allies? Do you think that is an appropriate question?

Mr. SHAYS. Of course. Is there anything that you would think

that I would think it wasn’t appropriate?

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, Ambassador Butler refused to answer

it.

Ambassador BUTLER. Ambassador Butler offered to answer that

in a closed setting, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. In a closed forum. So I would answer your point. I

think things about the prime minister should be done behind closed

doors and let Congress decide and listen to the testimony. I don’t

think we should have government officials be exposing people in

those leadership positions.

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, how about this question. Do you believe that the government of Iraq currently has the political will or

the capability to route out corruption within its government? Do

you think that is a legitimate question to get an answer to?

Mr. SHAYS. I would hope that the Ambassador would share with

us his sense of that, yes.

Chairman WAXMAN. Would you like to?

Ambassador BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Congressman, we have

provided an assessment of the concrete examples of the Maliki government’s efforts on anti-corruption, as well as a general overview

of the Embassy’s anti-corruption efforts, which is a very appropriate subject for this hearing And the questions, the messages intended to transmit back to Ambassador Crocker an overall assessment of the Maliki government——

Chairman WAXMAN. How about an answer to that question?

Ambassador BUTLER. I would prefer——

Chairman WAXMAN. The question is do you believe that the government of Iraq currently has the political will or the capability to

route out corruption within its government.

Mr. SHAYS. That is really a two-part question.

Ambassador BUTLER. It is an assessment. Again, I would prefer,

because of the nuance involved in it, to do that in a classified setting, sir.

Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr .Chairman.

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Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. During this hearing today, we have

seen a pretty stark contrast. We saw, on the first panel, Judge

Radhi, who is risking his life to tell us the truth, and here you are

in the position of not being willing to risk your career to tell us the

truth. Now, I am not faulting you, most people wouldn’t want to

risk their career, but we have the responsibility of raising money

from the American people to pay for this war, and Judge Radhi

told us, in his testimony that, ‘‘The cost of corruption that my commission has uncovered so far across all the ministries in Iraq has

been estimated to be as high as $18 billion.’’

Now, maybe that is Iraqi money. My friend, Mr. Shays, tried to

make that point, but money is fungible. I think total U.S. appropriations for reconstruction in Iraq has been about $20 billion. And

if money is fungible and they can swap Iraqi money for dollars, we

may have been party to taxing American citizens to pay for massive new levels of corruption heretofore unseen in Iraq. We have

been in the country for 4 or 5 years now; they haven’t exactly

pulled out of the bottom of the ratings on the corruption index.

The dispute we have had over what is an open testimony and

what is classified, the viewers should understand that it is not

what we hear in a classified session—we would like to learn as

much as we possibly can—but by hearing it in that session, then

we are unable to talk about it, so the taxpayers don’t get any new

information. If you can’t tell us here, they will not learn a thing,

and here, sir, the people rule. And after 4 or 5 years than this, a

longer engagement than World War II, they are kind of wondering

what we should do, and we need to supply them with answers, and

it shouldn’t be an ideological dispute.

Let me ask you. I talked about the Jones Commission before, an

excellent independent, bipartisan commission that reported last

month, led by Marine Corps General James Jones, and he said sectarianism and corruption are pervasive in the Ministry of Interior

and cripple the Ministry’s ability to accomplish its mission to provide internal security to Iraqi citizens. He said basically it is so bad

we have to disband the whole thing.

What is your opinion of General Jones’ view of the Ministry of

Interior’s behavior? Is he right or wrong?

Ambassador BUTLER. Mr. Congressman, in 2004, the U.N. restored sovereignty to the Iraqi government. The recommendation

as to what happens with the Ministry of Interior and the police

forces would be a decision for the Iraqi people, the Iraqi Council

of Representatives, and the Iraqi government.

Your first comment, my job here is to protect the lives and the

interests of the people that are in Baghdad and throughout the

country, from Irbil down to Basra. Some of the details that have

been alluded to would have the potential of compromising their relationships and operations. I am sure you will appreciate that. The

military calls it operational security, OPSEC. And the second part

is our ability to have influence and be able to maintain trust with

our interlocutors in Iraq is something which is very much covered

by national security information. It is a judgment call and I have

an obligation to them; not to my career, but to the people who can’t

be here to answer your questions, but have a very hard job to do.

Judge Radhi and his colleagues risked their lives, some lost their

108

lives. He has left his country and his homeland and done a courageous thing by coming before the committee. There are folks still

there who have to finish the job, and the job will take as long as

the job takes. I can’t predict when it will end.

I have never seen corruption entirely routed out or defeated anywhere, but the Iraqis, because it is their country, have to develop

the capacities, and your oversight is more than appropriate, it is

very welcome to make sure that we in the executive branch are

doing what we are supposed to do, what we can do to support Iraq

develop the institutions and the capability to reduce corruption to

the point where it doesn’t affect economic development, where it

doesn’t fuel sectarian tensions, and helps this country become a

strong and vibrant democracy.

Mr. COOPER. Marine Corps General Jones is as patriotic as you

are. Mr. Bowen, the SIGIR Inspector General of Iraq, is as patriotic

as you are. They are telling us what sounds more like the truth

than what you are, at least in an open setting.

A final point. I see my time is running out. Secretary Rice said,

in October 2006, ‘‘They, the Iraqis, need to do more of the kind of

thing that apparently the interior ministry is trying to do.’’ So here

she is in a public forum complimenting the same ministry that

General Jones tells us is so sectarian, so corrupt, basically, the

Iraqi police need to be disbanded. Why is our Secretary of State

saying things that are so directly at odds with the Jones Commission?

Ambassador BUTLER. General Jones and his very distinguished

panel, who spent considerable time in Iraq in August and September, did so as private citizens with considerable extraordinary service in uniform to the country and the police service as well. Chief

Ramsey was a member of that Commission. Certainly respected

professional judgments based on what they saw and heard out

there, and we are looking very hard at it. The Department of Defense, as you know, has primary responsibility for the Ministry of

Interior and the Ministry of Defense.

Mr. COOPER. I see that my time has expired, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t think the American people would sit by idly and quietly if we were having secret

discussions about $18 billion worth of taxpayer money going out

the door through corruption, and I don’t know of any situation

where corruption has ever been defeated or diminished with secret

meetings, as opposed to shining light on it and bringing it out into

the public light and the public coming forward, whether Iraqi citizens or American citizens, demanding something be done. I mean,

these hearings are about finding out who is corrupt, how that corruption is playing out, what should be done to stop the corruption,

and to the extent our government is, what are we doing about it

and how is it going.

We are not doing very much, when Judge Brennan, the former

Director of the Office of Accountability over there says he is not

aware of any coordinated U.S. strategy to fight corruption in Iraq;

when James Santelle, who supervises the activities of that OAT organization and is the Rule of law coordinator for the Embassy, told

us you have a system where the coordination is lacking; and MiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:52 Sep 03, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00112 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\43601.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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chael Richards, the Executive Secretary of the Anti-Corruption

Work Group, says basically he would like to be able to say that

they have done quite a bit in this area, but, unfortunately, they

have not.

Vincent Foulk, a senior consultant in the Office of Accountability

and Transparency, was the primary drafter of two reports issued

by the OAT, in December 2006 and another in July 2007. Those reports assessed the anti-corruption efforts of the Iraqi government,

something you feel now would be a real high security risk to divulge. According to him, these reports were not classified when

they were drafted, they were not classified when they were issued.

They were, instead, marked sensitive but unclassified.

Now, both Christopher Griffith, Senior Advisor to OAT, Judge

Arthur Brennan, the former Director of OAT, as I have said, confirmed that those reports were not classified when they were issued

and they were not classified when they were drawn. Are you aware

of those reports?

Ambassador BUTLER. Mr. Congressman——

Mr. TIERNEY. Are you aware of those reports, sir? I have only got

5 minutes, and I really want answers more than talk.

Ambassador BUTLER. I have, in the last couple weeks, become

aware of working documents prepared by OAT.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK. Were you aware that those reports were not

classified when they were drafted and issued by the Office of Accountability and Transparency?

Ambassador BUTLER. We only found out 3 weeks ago these documents, working documents, even existed.

Mr. TIERNEY. All right. And did you become aware that those reports have been widely distributed, both within the Embassy and

with other relevant agencies, by e-mail?

Ambassador BUTLER. They were not widely distributed within

the U.S. Government.

Mr. TIERNEY. You say they were not?

Ambassador BUTLER. Well, if we would have been, we would

have known about it in my office.

Mr. TIERNEY. Did you know that they were apparently distributed to others, although maybe not your office, surprisingly so?

Ambassador BUTLER. I am unaware of the distribution of these

internal working documents of the OAT.

Mr. TIERNEY. Interesting. Well, Scott Winne, the Acting Rule of

Law Coordinator for the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, told the committee

staff that he was asked to do a classification review of those reports

shortly after this committee went and asked for those reports to be

given to the committee for this investigation. Mr. Winne then told

the committee he had never even done a classification review before. So why is it that when we asked for these documents, Mr.

Winne is suddenly asked to review the documents for classification,

when he has no experience in that field at all?

Ambassador BUTLER. I am reminded of the very first security infraction and almost the last one I had in the Foreign Service was

as a junior officer. I wrote a message back to Washington that I

marked unclassified, and when it went to my superior, he upgraded

it to confidential. I didn’t spot it, tossed it in my wastebasket when

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I finished with it, and got a pink slip from the Marine the next

day.

This is the responsibility of classification authority. These documents were not properly classified and, according to the Embassy,

have subsequently been appropriately classified given the sensitive

nature of the information contained therein.

Mr. TIERNEY. This report, the one you thought wasn’t circulated,

was first given to Ambassador Saloom and his chief of staff. Five

days later it was given to the Anti-Corruption Working Group, the

entire group; and then it was given to the Rule of Law Coordinator

and others. So apparently you were out of the loop, but it was distributed broadly within that group on that basis.

Ambassador BUTLER. Congressman, every person you have mentioned is inside the Embassy.

Mr. TIERNEY. It also went to the GAO and the Special Inspector

General.

Ambassador BUTLER. It did not come back to Washington. We

were unaware of the existence of that report.

Mr. TIERNEY. So that is the key, as long as it doesn’t come back

to Washington, it can be disseminated around the Embassy, to the

GAO and to the SIGIR?

Ambassador BUTLER. My understanding is this was an internal

draft working document which had not been blessed as an Embassy

document.

Mr. TIERNEY. And you thought it was important not to share it

with this committee, to have it accepted as a classified document?

Ambassador BUTLER. We provided it. Your committee staff was

able to review it upon us finding out about it, and we provided

hard copies shortly thereafter, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. Can you see at all or appreciate at all the fact that

this committee, and probably the public, finds it bizarre that something gets retroactively classified on a public hearing about corruption which weighs on the safety of our men and women over there?

The testimony today is some $18 billion—that is without looking at

the oil ministry, without looking at the interior ministry—of money

that, according to testimony today, is going in the hands of militia,

those same militia that are shooting at our troops, and your story

is, well, we can’t talk about that publicly, it is embarrassing to us

and it might get the Iraqi government upset when the public

knows that they are engaged in it as well.

Ambassador BUTLER. Congressman, you phrased that well. The

safety of our men and women in the Embassy and those who are

working on the anti-corruption deserve the protection of the proper

classification of that document.

Mr. TIERNEY. What they deserve, sir, is a full investigation so

that we understand the depth and breadth of it so that we can do

something about it, instead of having people say that it is a disorganized department, a system where the coordination is lacking,

where there is no awareness on the part of the director of OAT of

any coordinated U.S. strategy to fight corruption, and where that

money that is being corruptly taken out of circulation is given to

militias who are shooting at our people. That is why we are having

the hearing and that is why maybe we will wake you all up so that

you have a coordinated effort at OAT and the working group and

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start doing something about it, and we will find out who is involved

with it and get it done so that our people aren’t being shot with

weapons bought from money as a result of corruption.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Tierney.

Ambassador Butler, Stuart Bowen and David Walker testified

earlier today that there is a lack of leadership undermining the

anti-corruption efforts at the U.S. Embassy in Iraq. Mr. Bowen and

Mr. Walker are certainly not alone in that sentiment. We have also

heard in other interviews from several Embassy officials that there

is no coordinated strategy for fighting corruption in Iraq. Now,

maybe you don’t want to talk about this issue because the U.S.

Embassy is not doing its job. How do you respond to that?

Ambassador BUTLER. The SIGIR report of July did a couple of

things, and the previous year. One, that there should be a consolidated anti-corruption strategy, which was prepared in 2006; and

then, subsequent to this year’s SIGIR report, Ambassador Crocker

has convened and designated a person to conduct a full anti-corruption internal organization review.

Chairman WAXMAN. So you are doing better.

Ambassador BUTLER. We are attacking the problem when we

find the problem, sir.

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, we learned, a couple days ago, when

we looked at Blackwater, which works for the State Department,

that there was no real oversight that the State Department was

providing with regard to Blackwater troops, and they are a private

military. Now I am wondering what kind of job the State Department is really doing, with this conflicting testimony, in oversight

in terms of anti-corruption efforts, and I think this is going to be

a serious matter that we are going to have to review.

I also want to just end by saying that I think your position is

absolutely absurd that you cannot answer questions in an open

forum that the American people are entitled to have answered before we appropriate more money to put into this war effort in Iraq.

I just cannot understand it. So when I say we are going to have

a confrontation with the Secretary, we want to know whether the

State Department is doing its job of oversight with the private military that they have employed; whether they are doing their job of

oversight with regard to anti-corruption efforts, which our Embassy

should be supporting more strenuously; and we want to know why

the State Department is refusing to talk to Congress and give us

answers to questions that ought to be given in a public forum.

So I put that out there not to have you address it, but I just want

to put you on notice and the State Department on notice that we

are going to have to resolve these matters.

Mr. Davis, anything further before we move on?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, let me just ask what is the long-term hope over

there? We are spending over half a trillion dollars to try to bring

democracy and the rule of law to this country, and the question I

think a lot of us face is are we giving birth to a democracy or are

we babysitting a civil war.

Ambassador BUTLER. Mr. Davis, that really is the fundamental

question, and my faith is in the people that are working on this,

both in the men and women in uniform under General Patraeus’

command and the men and women who work for Ambassador

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Crocker. Democracy is not easy; it is hard. It takes time, it takes

imagination. We have a phenomenal team out there.

And I very much, Mr. Chairman, value your candor and appreciate the committee’s attention to these issues because corruption

is something that I have had to deal with in just about every assignment I have had in the last decade. This is hard. I have never

seen anything as complicated as presents itself in Iraq, with a combat zone going on, the influence of the neighbors, and add to it the

oil resources. I am confident that Ambassador Crocker is the right

leader. He will, together with Jim Santelle, the head of the Rule

of Law Department, get that part of it organized.

At the same time, what we haven’t really emphasized this very

much, Mr. Davis, but the efforts to develop the capacity of the

Iraqis themselves, invest in people, invest in sort of help us, bureaucracies. They are able to deliver services and support the

democratic institutions that are accountable to the people and that

the Iraqis themselves can be proud of and not afraid of. I think we

share that goal.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you for your testimony. Just for the

record, total funding for ongoing and planned anti-corruption activities through June 15, 2006 was approximately $65 million, or

less than .003 percent of the total Iraqi IIRF funding to date. That

is just so we have a perspective of how much we are doing financially in that area.

We are now being called for a vote. We will respond to the vote

and then come back and here the last witness.

[Recess.]

Chairman WAXMAN. For our last witness, we are pleased to welcome Claudia Rosett, a journalist in residence at the Foundation

for the Defense of Democracies. We are pleased to have you with

us today. It is the custom of this committee to ask all witnesses to

answer questions under oath, so if you would please stand.

[Witness sworn.]

Chairman WAXMAN. Thanks. Your prepared statement will be

made part of the record in full. We would like to ask, if you would,

to present your oral statement in around 5 minutes. The button on

the base of the mic you need to push.

STATEMENT OF CLAUDIA ROSETT, JOURNALIST IN RESIDENCE, FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES

Ms. ROSETT. Good afternoon, Chairman Waxman, Ranking Member Davis, and members of the committee, wherever you are.

Thank you very much for the chance to testify here today. I hope

I can be of some help in providing some background and context

for what you have been discussing. These are extremely important

matters.

Is the mic at a good distance here? OK.

In listening to it, there are a few things I want to mention because I think they may be important, and I could not agree more

with you that corruption is a huge problem, and it is one that

should concern people, whatever side of the aisle, whatever. A brief

story I want to tell you.

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I worked in Russia in the mid-1990’s; I was the Moscow bureau

chief for the Wall Street Journal, a reporter there before that. And

there were no rules at that point; the Soviet Union had just collapsed and it was very hard to know what applied anywhere, except corruption was the way. Anything that worked worked by corruption. And there came this horrible cold day and the Iranians

down the hall were trying to make the fuse box work again, and

I had to file a story and I couldn’t get anywhere. Finally, in misery

and desperation—it was freezing—I called a man who won a Nobel

prize in economics for looking at the interaction between political

institutions and economies, exactly the nexus where corruption

takes place. His name is Douglass North, back in the States. And

I said, how long is it going to take for them to sort out the institutions so that this place works. And he said, oh, about 50 years. I

thought, oh my God.

That is, I think, the real time horizon. And if I could just suggest—what I want to get to is Iraq was immensely corrupt before

the period that you have been discussing, in the time when Saddam was there, and it is terribly important in understanding how

to address this. I don’t think anybody here who praised the Judge

and understands some of the problems there, wants to simply leave

it, but to understand it matters greatly there are different kinds

of corruption, and it is something that is extremely complicated to

clean up. I have seen it in countries in the Far East, in the former

Soviet Union, and I have spent the past 5 years looking at how it

worked when Saddam Hussein was in Iraq, because it was intimately entwined with the United Nations Oil for Food Program,

which I have reported on and reported on.

Corruption is something that tends to sort of improve as a place

becomes more democratic, but it is an organic process; it is not

something where you can sort of do it step by step. It is also not

all about fighting it with agencies. There is a tremendously important component that comes with simply getting rid of bad rules. It

is the difference between, say, a Bangladesh with very high tariffs,

where trading in just normal goods like soap and socks can be illegal and corrupt, and Hong Kong, where it is a free market and it

is legitimate trade, and there is not such reason for officials to have

their hand out. Any time you see these levels of corruption as you

do in Iraq, and have for a long time, that is a big part of the problem.

A further item that I think just needs consideration. This can be

discussed and explained in many ways, but corruption does not

necessarily bring down governments. That may be unfortunate, but

I did in fact print out the Transparency International latest list

just out, and in my written testimony mention that Iraq is third

from the bottom. But they are bunched up, a great, great many

countries, way down near the bottom on the scale of 1 to 9, and

if you look, you will also see that Iran is not so different. Would

that it were the case that enormous corruption would just hollow

out and bring down a regime. It doesn’t necessarily follow in that

way. One can deplore it and, yet, countries on this list, sort of very

close to this level of corruption, include some like Russia, Syria,

Azerbaijan, Belarus—where the dictator has been in power for

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years—Venezuela, and so forth. So just to say this is a complex

scene.

And in the short time here, something important to understand

in Iraq, under Saddam Hussein it was immensely institutionalized.

Corruption was so much part of the government that one of the fascinating scenes in a Federal trial that just concluded with a guilty

plea in New York on Monday was an Iraqi witness who ran the corruption data base for the oil ministry. In the hundreds of millions

of dollars of kickbacks that poured in when Saddam began collecting kickbacks on Oil for Food contracts, they actually set up, officially, inside their state marketing organization, an entire section

data base, cabinets, employees, who did nothing but track graft.

And this really was graft; it had to come through front companies,

it was something that violated the agreements that Iraq had struck

with the United Nations. It was also graft in the sense that it was

skimmed away from money that was supposed to go for the relief

of the Iraqi people. It went, instead, as we know, for palaces, weapons, convention, but still deadly, and all the other things that Saddam Hussein liked to do with it.

When his government fell, in a sense, the same kind of thing as

happened in the former Soviet Union. This corruption was, in a

sense, privatized. It was no longer sort of the state. The state

under Saddam was Saddam, so when he decided to have a collection for kickbacks, as the Judge said, oil was for Saddam and his

family. That oil was the main source of—that was almost the only

source of foreign exchange for Iraq.

Mr. WAXMAN. Is it fair to say that what happened is that, under

Saddam Hussein, corruption was centralized, and then when he

was gone, it was like the head cutoff and corruption spread much

further, to others who could be corrupt independently?

Ms. ROSETT. It was spread, even at that point, in the sense that

oil was for Saddam, but there is huge evidence, documentary evidence that I have looked at and is publicly available from many of

the investigations into the U.N. Oil for Food Program, that the

ministries, some of the ones that you are also concerned with, the

Ministry for Sports—if you run through the list—the ministries,

many of them which were involved in the humanitarian contracts,

also had kickback deals. So it was institutionalized there as well.

What has been inherited by the Iraqis, by everyone who is dealing with this right now, the Americans, anybody, is a system in

which, really, every part of the system—these were fractals—had

something like this going on. The evidence I have seen suggests

that Saddam had a very, very organized way of raking in all the

oil graft, of the money. The rest of it was more difficult for him to

control. In fact, in my written testimony I mention the best report

put out on the subject in 2002, even before his fall, by the Coalition

for International Justice, which talks about the Uday-Qusay—remember them—Hussein rackets, and they were jockeying sort of

like, you know, the Sopranos of Iraq, for who would control the

turf, who would have the cigarettes, the——

Mr. WAXMAN. Do you think that the fact that the corruption that

we are seeing now is making it harder for the Iraqi government to

reconcile the different ethnic groups—the Shiites, the Sunnis, the

Kurds—and do you think that the corruption that is going on now

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is making it more difficult for the Maliki government to have the

legitimacy with the people of Iraq?

Ms. ROSETT. I think that it would be a wonderful thing if the

connections were that linear. I am trying to think how to explain

it because it is a more complex set of interactions that go on.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, do you think this is one of the factors that

works against the goals of reconciliation in Iraq and legitimacy for

the government?

Ms. ROSETT. Oh, corruption is terrible in any setting, absolutely.

Oh, and there is one other thing I meant to say to you. I fully

agree that it would be a highly useful thing were the State Department to be far more open. I would, if anything, suggest taking it

back some years. I think, at this point, there may be less ability

to influence things that way than there was. On the other hand,

what is the point? We go forward. I think one should go forward.

But I share the frustration of trying to see documents that I think

should be publicly available. My own experience was it took 5 years

from the time I called someone at the U.S. Mission in early 2003

to say I see generic signs that, in this debate over whether or not

the United States should go into Iraq, the members of the Security

Council have been bribed by Saddam Hussein, because his graft

also radiated out, you know, it affected everything that came close.

When Charles Duelfer said, in testimony 2 years ago, it poisoned

everything it touched, that was the system that Saddam set up.

And I think there was a moment when we first went in—I am

giving my own view—sort of like the first day on a new job, when

you have a chance to do things, where bringing out what was, at

that point, clear and yet very hard to document might have helped.

It might have said, you know, we won’t put up with this while

there was a chance to set some terms. That didn’t happen. It took

until the following year, 2004, when an Iraqi newspaper, Al-Mada,

published what we now know as the Al Mada list, a long list of

people on the take simply on the oil side of the graft, in that program that had become the Iraqi economy, basically.

Mr. WAXMAN. Isn’t there a problem in Iraq in trying to figure out

how to deal with the sharing of the oil revenues because it is so

much a major part of their economy?

Ms. ROSETT. That actually——

Mr. WAXMAN. Because I know our government has tried to push

them to adopt legislation for greater sharing of those revenues so

people could all feel they have a stake in the future of the country.

Ms. ROSETT. I will give you again my own prescription, and one

I wrote in 2002, but many people wrote many things. I think they

will have this problem, I would actually say I think part of the

problem, corruption is a symptom. Let me back up and try just an

economic slant on this.

Corruption is basically, what is a corrupt deal? There are many

ways and levels in which you can engage in it, but basically it is

putting a price on a transaction. It is saying you want something

done? OK, but I can get that done for you; I have discretionary

power, but there is a price. It is a pricing mechanism for things

that, in a society with integrity, ought to just happen; the government should do the things for you, not make you pay for it. And

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in that sense the oil is one of the things that makes for immense

corruption, as long as it is in the public domain.

My own recommendation actually has been, from the beginning,

unless it is privatized, I mean, the way it really should be dealt

with is sell it off to private companies and distribute the revenues,

whatever is raised by that to the people of Iraq. What that does

is it removes from the public domain that endless tempting pot,

which I actually think explains a great deal of the war that is

going on there right now.

Chairman WAXMAN. That is a very interesting point. I see my

red light is on, so I am going to call on Mr. Davis to ask you questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Rosett follows:]

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Mr. DAVIS. Well, thank you very much for your experience and

insights on this. Iraq, right now, is a fledgling democracy in the

middle of war. How do wartime circumstances exacerbate the corruption?

Ms. ROSETT. Well, in a normal economy they would tend to make

it worse because the government would put on regulations and rationing. But Iraq hasn’t had a normal economy in decades.

Mr. DAVIS. They never did, did they, really?

Ms. ROSETT. I think the problem of how are people choosing to

spend their money—this may sound odd, but, again, I am sort of

thinking of the economic view of this. And could I just suggest we

have heard a lot from the State Department today and from bureaucrats who use phrases like capacity building. I don’t think anyone who uses the phrase capacity building is going to be able to

think past that jargon to figure out what really needs to be done.

Mr. DAVIS. Well, do you think the State Department is doing

enough?

Ms. ROSETT. Sorry?

Mr. DAVIS. Do you think the State Department is doing enough?

Ms. ROSETT. Actually, I think they are doing the wrong things.

They are doing too much of what they shouldn’t and not enough

of what they should, and I think what they ought to be doing is,

first of all, to whatever extent they can, looking for ways to reduce

all these mechanisms that make it possible for people to collect

graft. What is it that people are selling when they collect graft,

when corruption happens in Iraq? Oil is one of the things that fuels

it. That is what I was going to say. I think, flip it around. As long

as there is oil in the public domain, it will be extremely difficult

to deal with corruption. That is the reason, if you look at the OPEC

lineup, with the exception, basically, of Norway, they are enormously corrupt states.

Mr. DAVIS. Well, that is because the democracies there have

never had to face the contract between being taxed for services and

getting the buy-in because the money has come too easily, basically, right?

Ms. ROSETT. That is exactly right. And when you have to haggle

out with the people you are collecting the taxes from, you have a

great deal more—you know, take a country—I lived in India years

ago, and corruption was——

Mr. DAVIS. So, basically, the oil exacerbates that corruption.

Ms. ROSETT. Yes. It has done it in Russia; it has done it in Venezuela; it has done it—where is that transparency list? It is no accident, yes. I mean——

Mr. DAVIS. So you were explaining what the State Department

ought to do differently. You were saying they are doing the wrong

things.

Ms. ROSETT. I am going to say something that probably will

sound crazy, but let’s put it on the record.

Mr. DAVIS. That is all right.

Ms. ROSETT. The biggest favor anyone could do to actually help

end corruption in Iraq would be destroy their oil wells. Leave them

like the people in Hong Kong, who sat on a rock and thought what

can we do with ourselves, or the people in Taiwan, who ended up

there, too many of them on an island, and had to figure out ways

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to earn a living, where there wasn’t somebody doling it out or people fighting for this immense source of wealth. However, I understand the State Department probably isn’t going to go bomb the oil

wells of Iraq.

Mr. DAVIS. No, but that is a good observation. You know, the

fastest growing Arab economy in the Middle East is Jordan, and

they have no oil.

Ms. ROSETT. Exactly. And that is no accident.

Mr. DAVIS. Correct.

Ms. ROSETT. It is the great curse. In fact, it is the same thing—

some of the most perceptive Russians said to me when I was working there, and that is one of the problems here. In other words, it

is so tempting to talk about fighting corruption in terms of set up

an agency, do a study. There are things that, if we had privatized

that oil when we first went in there—and you could see the complications. There would be an outcry: oh my God, is that trying to

steal it? It would have been terribly important. If there is ever any

political way to do it—I don’t see really how you would, but you are

the politicians, I am not.

What I can see is if there were any way to do it, the money

should go to the people of Iraq. That is the patrimony that right

now, in theory, they own, but in practice what they get for it is

wars. And it is looking for some way to deal with things like that

can actually help. As I mentioned, I am not familiar enough, right

now, with what are the nest of rules of claims of things that Iraqis

have to bribe for. I am much more familiar with what it was when

Saddam Hussein was doing business. That was quite obvious.

Mr. DAVIS. Do you know how this operated under the British

mandate? I mean, you know the level of corruption? The British

usually ran a pretty clean area.

Ms. ROSETT. Yes. Well, one of the things that was much harder

to buy under the British was any semblance of law. I mean, any

system will have some corruption, but part of—I saw it at work in

Russia. It is frustrating, it is heartbreaking. You can see what is

needed and it is extremely hard to bring into being. Thus, that answer of 50 years, when Douglass North—he wasn’t kidding. But

back up for a minute. Look at what was going on in Europe just

after World War II. Germany was a disaster. I mean, Graham

Greene wrote wonderful novels about how corrupt things were in

those times. That was the third man, Orson Wells selling tainted

penicillin, you know, laming children so he could live well, the sort

of symbol at the time. You know, it takes a long time.

And I realize the question you have been asking at the hearing

today is, is there a sign of hope. I would suggest there is in the

following sense. Under Saddam Hussein there was no hope; it was

built into the system in ways where, as long as he and his circle

were there, nothing could change. Now there is some hope and

there are some signs that I think matter. That Al Mada list I mentioned earlier, a Baghdad newspaper at least could print a list of

the corrupt people; they can discuss it to a degree they could not.

Chairman WAXMAN. I am going to ask you to hold that and recognize Mr. Van Hollen. He may be pursuing the same lines of questions.

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Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, let me just thank our witness. I am

going to leave, but thank you for being patient and thank you for

adding your observations.

Ms. ROSETT. Oh, thank you.

Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Van Hollen, do you have questions of

the witness?

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I just want to thank the witness. I caught

some of your testimony actually on the internal monitors, as you

started off your testimony. I think we can all agree this is not a

partisan issue in terms of the desire to fight corruption, that Republicans and Democrats alike would like to join in that effort. And

having been a journalist, I would assume that you think that publicizing or exposing corruption is one way to fight it. Wouldn’t you

agree?

Ms. ROSETT. It is a pretty good way, yes.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I mean, we have a saying around that sunlight

is often the best disinfectant, meaning if you allow the public to

watch what is going on——

Ms. ROSETT. I usually call it daylight, but I like that, yes.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Daylight, OK. But, I mean, you would agree

with that general proposition, would you not?

Ms. ROSETT. Yes, I would.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. So I find it very curious that the State Department has taken the position that even talking about corruption in

Iraq in open is somehow a bad thing, because you would think one

of the best tools we could use to try and clean it up and make sure

that funds were better used would be to expose the problem in public. Wouldn’t you agree?

Ms. ROSETT. I would. I think they are making a mistake. Could

I back up, though, and just say one thing I think is terribly important to put in context, and it is that they should have been doing

it for years. Again, it is what I was saying before. This thing has

deep roots, long legs, and has morphed as it has gone along. I am

not convinced, from the tangible signs one can see, that there is

more corruption in Iraq than there was, say, during the final years

under Saddam, because I think you need to ask the further question corruption of what kind. What is it buying, what is it doing?

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. If I could just——

Ms. ROSETT. But basically what I am saying is, oh, yes, I think

they should have exposed the documentation they had on corruption under the U.N. Oil for Food Program. I think they should have

spilled out documents as soon as they went into Baghdad and

began finding them. And, yes, I do think they should be producing

more today.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Right. I mean, obviously, the regime of Saddam Hussein was a terrible regime. It was a regime we did criticize

openly in many, many different ways, for lots of their actions,

but——

Ms. ROSETT. No, no, you have no idea. The frustrations that you

have been experiencing I found in trying to get documentation.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I understand. But we did invade Iraq with the

government of Saddam Hussein and now, of course, we are there.

We had the interim government and we had the coalition authority, and the fact of the matter is we are now, wouldn’t you agree,

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in a much better position, if we chose to, to affect the problem of

corruption in Iraq than we were under the regime of Saddam Hussein? You would agree with that, would you not?

Ms. ROSETT. Yes.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. OK. So I guess the question is why we have

spent such a measly amount of money in terms of fighting corruption.

Ms. ROSETT. Wait, no. Actually, no, wait. Can I back up? I think

we would have been—no, I think it would have had, actually, an

extremely salutary effect if we had been—we, who is we? If the

U.S. State Department, if the U.S. Government had been—I am

not with the government, I am a journalist—if the U.S. Government had been forthcoming at the time, had been open, had said

here are the documents showing what is going on, who is doing

these deals. I think that would have actually possibly even headed

off this war, OK? That is how important I think it was. But I agree

it should happen now.

I would link that to something very important. I think, as an argument for saying let’s abandon Iraq, to me, it doesn’t hold up because what is it we are trying to achieve there? You know, would

it be, then, less corrupt if we left? I don’t think so. I think, again,

the Judge put it very well; I think predatory neighbors would move

in and it would be hell, beyond anything they are seeing now.

Should America care about that? That is a subject for another

hearing, I think.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. But you would agree, would you not, that the

failure of the State Department to sort of publicly address this

issue makes it easier for it to continue. In other words, if you were

to shine a light on this problem and publicly address the problem,

you are more likely to be able to solve and confront the problem,

isn’t that the case?

Ms. ROSETT. Yes, I agree. I can see a case for hiving off what is

probably the 2 or 3 percent of whatever the actual documentation

or evidence is that does in fact involve mortal danger to somebody.

I am all for that. But the other 80 or 90 percent, yes, put it out

there. I think—over and over again we see, with diplomatic institutions—I see this all the time. My main focus in recent years has

been the United Nations, but the State Department is in some way

akin to that kind of thing. We see the argument that we can’t rock

the boat; you mustn’t shake people up; we don’t want to disturb

anything. Very often people are not fools. You know, Iraqis know

if there is corruption. It has real effects. It is better to say here is

the problem. And if that needs to be accompanied, for purposes of

U.S. politics or security, by the argument that it is terribly important that we be able to sustain a government in Iraq one way or

another, fine, but, yes, better to tell the truth.

Chairman WAXMAN. Is it safe to say that if the State Department

won’t talk in an open forum about corruption in Iraq, the people

in Iraq are still going to know whether there is corruption in Iraq?

Ms. ROSETT. Of course. They will not know it in the same way.

Chairman WAXMAN. That was a rhetorical question.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Let me just close. I think that also raises the

question about why they won’t talk about it. People in Iraq know

why they won’t talk about it in an open forum here, I think, frankVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:52 Sep 03, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00128 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\43601.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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ly, is an attempt to hide a very real problem going on in Iraq from

the American people.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. From the American people, not the Iraqi

people.

Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having this

hearing and thank you for the witnesses that you have asked to

step forward.

One of the advantages of missing your testimony, which you

summarized, is I actually read your whole testimony, and it is pretty stunning, because what you basically say is that Iraq has been

a corrupt country for any number of years, but it had a unique

kind of corruption because it was using the apparatus of government under Saddam to become even more corrupt——

Ms. ROSETT. That is right.

Mr. SHAYS [continuing]. And that the Oil for Food Program,

which, by the way, our committee exposed, we led the charge on

and you were a witness, and a wonderful witness, the Oil for Food

Program institutionalized the corruption in a very public way within Iraq.

Where I might disagree with Mr. Van Hollen and my very distinguished and sincere chairman is that I believe that the Iraq government is thoroughly corrupt based on what it has been, and I believe in part it is corrupt because there are some in the government

who, if they thought it would be a government that would last and

so on, that they would be more willing to invest and say, OK, I will

make money in the long run through a less corrupt way, but if they

think that we are going to pull the rug out from under them, some

are just going to cash in on a government they think is going to

fall.

And I will say parenthetically one of the reasons why I think we

need a time line to tell those who think we are going to pull the

rug out from under them we are not, and to tell those who think

we are going to stay forever that we are not going to stay forever

in the way that we are now. That is an editorial comment.

What I would like you to comment on is just explain in your

words how the Oil for Food Program has created almost a unique

form of corruptness within a government.

Ms. ROSETT. Sure. What it did was where, as you heard the

Judge say, Saddam had sort of taken all oil for himself and his

sons and his immediate cronies, this made it an internationally approved system in which basically he was handed all rights to dispose of all the oil, to conclude all deals, and this was under U.N.

sanctions. It was a truly poisonous mix, in other words. Iraq was

enormously corrupt, from what one can read, before sanctions were

imposed——

Mr. SHAYS. So what he did is he undersold his oil and got

kickbacks——

Ms. ROSETT. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS [continuing]. And he overpaid for commodities and got

kickbacks——

Ms. ROSETT. Yes.

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Mr. SHAYS [continuing]. And anyone who did business with him

was doing business with the government, which they knew was corrupt.

Ms. ROSETT. Yes. And what happened was—you need to understand the U.N. Oil for Food Program. Let me just, in very brief——

Mr. SHAYS. No, you need to be short because I only have 3 minutes left here. So give us the short version.

Ms. ROSETT. OK. Basically, any money he could skim out of these

oil flows, which were meant to buy relief for people in Iraq, was

his to do whatever he wanted with, and this produced enormous incentives to, in every way possible, set up clandestine channels,

front companies. This created a pool of talent the same way in Afghanistan.

Mr. SHAYS. So he couldn’t do it by himself; he had to engage his

citizens in this effort.

Ms. ROSETT. He had an entire bureaucracy, and that was this

Iraqi who was brought over as a witness for the prosecution——

Mr. SHAYS. So rather than teaching a government to be honest,

he was basically, you were getting an education under his government how to work of the state and be corrupt.

Ms. ROSETT. That is exactly right.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So I am at this point. I go to Iraq a lot and I

meet a lot of people, some who I think are trying to make it a better place; some who I think are trying to make it a better place and

skim money off of it. If in fact a particular leader or a number of

leaders are corrupt, what is the value in the State Department,

let’s just say Maliki. What would be the value and how would it

help us work with Maliki to say that he is in fact corrupt? How

is that going to make our troops safer and how is that going to

make us ultimately help change Iraq?

Ms. ROSETT. I am not sure that we need to pronounce him corrupt. I am speaking as a journalist here. I think that documentation speaks. I mean, it is not necessarily the job of the United

States; it is the job of Iraqis.

Mr. SHAYS. Have you met anyone who thinks Iraq isn’t corrupt?

Ms. ROSETT. No.

Mr. SHAYS. Everyone knows Iraq is corrupt, so we know it. So

really the issue is what do we do to make it less corrupt. That

should be our goal. I know it is the goal of the chairman. The question is how do we do that. Is exposing every leader that we think

is corrupt going to make it less corrupt is my question.

Ms. ROSETT. I don’t——

Mr. SHAYS. Bottom line is we don’t know.

Ms. ROSETT. Yes. You know what I think? I think that it does

matter to actually see when, the danger here is that you can start

selectively targeting people, who do you want to pick off——

Mr. SHAYS. OK, let me——

Ms. ROSETT. I think it is not necessarily—I am not going to make

policy——

Mr. SHAYS. OK, here is the answer that I would have given, and

tell me how you react.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me run over here.

What it seems to me is when we see a corrupt act, when we see

a payoff, when we see this, we expose the act and then let people

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go to see who performed the act. And it would seem to me that

should be our emphasis, where do we identify a specific action of

corruption.

And I do agree, Mr. Chairman, with this point. I totally agree

with it. If we have a witness that says Mr. Maliki or someone

else—and he was under oath, I believe?

Chairman WAXMAN. Yes, all witnesses before the committee are.

Mr. SHAYS. Is under oath, is saying to us that a specific person

basically told me if I did this my life would be in danger. Now, if

he is saying that someone else is going to make your life in danger,

that is one thing, but if he is saying I am going to make sure your

life is in danger, I think that needs to be exposed. I do totally agree

with that.

Chairman WAXMAN. Would the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. SHAYS. Absolutely.

Chairman WAXMAN. I asked Judge Radhi do you think that

Prime Minister Maliki is corrupt, and he said to me I am a judge,

I can’t make a decision on a point like that; I can’t say that. But

he said what I do know is that he stopped investigations of corruption of some of his relatives.

Mr. SHAYS. And if I could, and that, I think, is the key point. It

is kind of what I am learning from this. The way he said it is the

way I think we ultimately get at it, because he is basically stating

fact and action, to which we then can respond——

Ms. ROSETT. Which is the basis of law, actually, which I think

ultimately is what is needed here, is what Iraq is desperately missing.

Chairman WAXMAN. I think you both made very good points.

Do you want to summarize, Mr. Shays?

Mr. SHAYS. Well, just to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having

this hearing.

I thought your statement was excellent because the one thing it

has done for me is it has made me realize that there have been corruptions in lots of governments, but what is unique about this is,

under Saddam, he was actually teaching his citizens to be corrupt

so that he could have the power he needed, and that was quite enlightening.

Ms. ROSETT. May I just share with you for a second a vision——

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, we have been here all day and we

have a short business meeting we have to attend to.

Ms. ROSETT. Sure.

Chairman WAXMAN. So maybe you can get together with Mr.

Shays after the official meeting.

Mr. SHAYS. But anything you want to put on the record in writing we could submit.

Chairman WAXMAN. Yes, we would certainly receive it.

Ms. ROSETT. This is one scene from a New York courtroom. It

was simply the silver laptop. I wrote an article about it in the Wall

Street Journal yesterday; you can read it. But the silver laptop on

which the entire kickback data base for the Iraqi oil ministry under

Oil for Food had been downloaded, this data base, and this Iraqi

on the witness stand, brought in by Federal prosecutors to show

the jury how it worked, typing in a name and up would come the

whole list of itemized kickbacks and connected front companies.

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And I have followed these documents for years at this point. I have

never understood quite that viscerally until I saw this, how thoroughly institutionalized it was. It was the way——

Chairman WAXMAN. You are talking about in the Oil for Food

Program——

Ms. ROSETT. Yes.

Chairman WAXMAN [continuing]. Or today?

Ms. ROSETT. No. This was the Oil for Food Program. But this

was——

Chairman WAXMAN. OK, well, I think people learned some lessons from that. Thank you very much.

Ms. ROSETT. Thank you.

Chairman WAXMAN. I appreciate that story.

That concludes our hearing for today, so we stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statements of Hon. Patrick McHenry, Hon. Diane

E. Watson, and Hon. Bill Sali follow:]

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