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MONETARY POLICY AND THE 

STATE OF THE ECONOMY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 15, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services 

Serial No. 114–42 

( 

(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas, Chairman 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina, 

Vice Chairman 

PETER T. KING, New York 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri 

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan 

SEAN P. DUFFY, Wisconsin 

ROBERT HURT, Virginia 

STEVE STIVERS, Ohio 

STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee 

MARLIN A. STUTZMAN, Indiana 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida 

ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

ANDY BARR, Kentucky 

KEITH J. ROTHFUS, Pennsylvania 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

FRANK GUINTA, New Hampshire 

SCOTT TIPTON, Colorado 

ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas 

BRUCE POLIQUIN, Maine 

MIA LOVE, Utah 

FRENCH HILL, Arkansas 

TOM EMMER, Minnesota 

MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking 

Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

NYDIA M. VELA ́ ZQUEZ, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

AL GREEN, Texas 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

JOHN C. CARNEY, JR., Delaware 

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

DANIEL T. KILDEE, Michigan 

PATRICK MURPHY, Florida 

JOHN K. DELANEY, Maryland 

KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona 

JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio 

DENNY HECK, Washington 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

SHANNON MCGAHN, Staff Director 

JAMES H. CLINGER, Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on: 

July 15, 2015 ..................................................................................................... 1 

Appendix: 

July 15, 2015 ..................................................................................................... 55 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 15, 2015 

Yellen, Hon. Janet L., Chair, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 

System ................................................................................................................... 5 

APPENDIX 

Prepared statements: 

Yellen, Hon. Janet L. ....................................................................................... 56 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Rothfus, Hon. Keith: 

Two charts: ‘‘Progress Made Since Wall Street Reform;’’ and ‘‘Quarterto-Quarter Growth in Real GDP’’ ................................................................ 64 

Waters, Hon. Maxine: 

Letter from the Office of Inspector General, Board of Governors of the 

Federal Reserve System and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, dated May 29, 2015 ............................................................................. 66 

Yellen, Hon. Janet L.: 

Monetary Policy Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 

System to the Congress, dated July 15, 2015 ............................................. 69 

Written responses to questions for the record submitted by Representative Heck ........................................................................................................ 124 

Written responses to questions for the record submitted by Representative Hinojosa .................................................................................................. 126 

Written responses to questions for the record submitted by Representative Hultgren ................................................................................................. 132 

Written responses to questions for the record submitted by Representative McHenry ................................................................................................. 135 

Written responses to questions for the record submitted by Representative Mulvaney ................................................................................................ 137 

Written responses to questions for the record submitted by Representative Pearce ..................................................................................................... 148 

Written responses to questions for the record submitted by Representative Rothfus ................................................................................................... 152 

Written responses to questions for the record submitted by Representative Schweikert .............................................................................................. 154 

Written responses to questions for the record submitted by Representative Westmoreland ........................................................................................ 155 

(1) 

MONETARY POLICY AND THE 

STATE OF THE ECONOMY 

Wednesday, July 15, 2015 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, Washington, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jeb Hensarling [chairman of the committee] presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Hensarling, Royce, Lucas, 

Garrett, Pearce, Posey, Fitzpatrick, Westmoreland, Luetkemeyer, 

Huizenga, Duffy, Hurt, Stivers, Fincher, Mulvaney, Hultgren, Ross, 

Pittenger, Wagner, Barr, Rothfus, Schweikert, Guinta, Tipton, Williams, Poliquin, Love, Hill, Emmer; Waters, Maloney, Sherman, 

Capuano, Hinojosa, Clay, Green, Cleaver, Moore, Ellison, Perlmutter, Himes, Carney, Sewell, Foster, Kildee, Murphy, Delaney, 

Sinema, Beatty, Heck, and Vargas. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Financial Services Committee will 

come to order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare 

a recess of the committee at any time. 

Today’s hearing is for the purpose of receiving the semiannual 

testimony of the Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on monetary policy and the state of the economy. 

I now recognize myself for 3 minutes to give an opening statement. 

Last week, this committee began a series of hearings examining 

the Dodd-Frank Act on its 5th anniversary, an Act which vastly expanded the powers and reach of the Federal Reserve beyond its traditional monetary policy role in historically unprecedented ways. 

The evidence continues to mount that since the passage of DoddFrank, our Nation is less stable, less prosperous, and less free. We 

continue to be mired in lackluster, halting economic growth. Middle-income paychecks are nearly $12,000 less compared to 

the average post-war recovery, and as Ranking Member Waters 

told us just a few months ago, ‘‘The brutal truth is that millions 

continue to teeter on the brink of poverty and collapse.’’ 

One way that our economy could be healthier is for our Federal 

Reserve to be more predictable in the conduct of monetary policy. 

During periods of expanded economic growth, like the great moderation of 1987 to 2003, the Fed followed a more clearly communicated, understandable, and predictable conventional rule, and 

America prospered. 

Today, we are left with so-called forward guidance, which unfortunately remains somewhat amorphous, opaque, and 

2 

improvisational. Too often, this leads to investors and consumers 

being lost in a rather hazy mist as they attempt to plan their economic futures and create a healthier economy for themselves and 

for us all. As one former Fed President has written, ‘‘Monetary policy uncertainty creates inefficiency in the capital market. The 

FOMC gives lip service to policy predictability but its statements 

are vague. The FOMC preaches that they are data dependent, but 

will not tell us what data and how.’’ 

Following a monetary policy convention or rule of the Fed’s own 

choosing, with the power to amend it or deviate from it at the Fed’s 

own choosing, in no way interferes with the Fed’s monetary policy 

independence. Accountability and independence are not mutually 

exclusive concepts. 

We in Congress would be grossly negligent if we did not engage 

in greater oversight of the Federal Reserve System. 

Again, Dodd-Frank confers sweeping new powers on the Fed to 

regulate and control virtually every corner of the financial services 

sector of our economy, completely separate and apart from its traditional monetary policy role. Yet too often, the Fed appears to 

shield these activities from public view, improperly cloaking them 

behind monetary policy independence. 

Second, the Fed has now employed historically unprecedented 

methods, from intervening to prop up select credit markets, to paying interest on excess reserves, to keeping interest rates near zero 

for almost 7 years. By doing so, the Fed has certainly blurred the 

lines between fiscal and monetary policy. 

Finally, the Fed has recently crossed the line by willfully ignoring a lawful congressional subpoena for documents. This is inexcusable and unsupported by legal precedent. It cannot be allowed to 

stand. 

The Fed’s refusal to cooperate in a congressional investigation 

threatens both its reputation and its credibility. The Fed is not 

above the law. It is a very serious matter and must be resolved. 

The Chair now yields to the ranking member for 3 minutes for 

an opening statement. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome back, 

Chair Yellen. I am pleased you are here this month as we commemorate the 5-year anniversary of the enactment of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform Act. 

Dodd-Frank was signed into law just as we had emerged from 

the worst economic collapse in a generation, one which destroyed 

nearly $16 trillion in household wealth and 9 million jobs, displaced 11 million Americans from their homes, and doubled the unemployment rate. 

But since those dark days, we have seen improvement. DoddFrank made significant progress correcting the practices that 

helped lead us to the crisis. It has delivered billions to victimized 

consumers, brought greater transparency to the once-opaque banking practices that have caused the crisis, and put in place clear 

rules of the road that foster stability in our financial system. 

That stability, along with the help of extraordinary monetary policy accommodation, has led to growth, including the creation of 

nearly 13 million private sector jobs, unemployment falling to its 

3 

lowest rate since September 2008, a recovering housing market, 

and significant increases in 401(k) balances and the S&P 500. 

But these improvements do not paint a picture of an economy 

that has fully recovered. The gap between communities of color and 

women versus their white male counterparts remains dramatic. A 

lackluster first quarter and a strong dollar, coupled with economic 

instability and slowing growth abroad, have sapped momentum for 

job creation and economic expansion here at home. 

As such, I hope the Board of Governors will consider its slow and 

cautious approach to raising interest rates. Chair Yellen, as you 

know, raising interest rates does not in itself create a strong economy; it is a strong economy that must be the impetus for raising 

rates. 

With inflation continuing to hover near zero and numerous indicators of slack in the labor market, it is my hope that the Federal 

Reserve will fully consider the impact of any potential interest rate 

increase on the middle class and those communities that have yet 

to benefit from the economic recovery. 

So I thank you again, Chair Yellen, and I look forward to your 

testimony here today. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The gentlelady yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. 

Huizenga, chairman of our Monetary Policy and Trade Subcommittee, for 2 minutes. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. Chair Yellen, up here. Sorry. It feels like you are 

kind of down closer to the Botanic Garden than you are here in 

Rayburn, with our new hearing room configuration. 

But welcome. It is good to see you again, and thank you for honoring my request to meet last month. 

Today’s hearing provides us with another opportunity to examine 

how the Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy and why the development of these policies are in desperate need of transparency, 

I believe. 

Needless to say, the Fed’s recent high degree of discretion and 

its lack of transparency in how it conducts policy suggests that reforms are needed. 

I have continued to encourage the Federal Reserve, as you well 

know from that conversation, to adopt a rules-based approach to 

monetary policy and to communicate that rule to the public. The 

Fed must be accountable to the people’s representatives as well as, 

more importantly, to the hardworking taxpayers themselves. 

Last Congress, Professor Allan Meltzer of Carnegie Mellon University testified that over the first 100 years of the Federal Reserve’s history, monetary policies operated more effectively if they 

followed simple and clearly understood rules. 

And I quote from him, ‘‘There are only two periods in Federal Reserve history where they came close to operating under a rule. That 

happened to be the best two periods in Fed history in 1923–1928 

and in 1985–2003. 

‘‘In the first case, they operated under some form of the gold 

standard; in the second, under the Taylor Rule, more or less; not 

slavishly, but more or less. And those were the two and the only 

two periods in Federal history that have low inflation, relatively 

stable growth, small recessions, and quick recoveries.’’ 

4 

That was Allan Meltzer. 

Well, Chair Yellen, I ask that you work with me and this committee to develop a foundation for a rules-based monetary policy 

that will properly, not slavishly—to borrow a phrase—constrain the 

Fed’s discretion without sacrificing the proper independence that 

the Fed has while also allowing the Fed to be more transparent in 

formulating and communicating monetary policy to not only market participants but also to the American people. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Wisconsin, Ms. 

Moore, the ranking member of our Monetary Policy and Trade Subcommittee, for 2 minutes. 

Ms. MOORE. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Chair, I am so happy to welcome you back, and I look 

forward to your testimony, to the Q&A period, and I think this 

committee will benefit from your strong background in economics. 

We are, of course, in the midst of a strong 2-year job growth of 

15 years adding 5.6 million jobs, but I have some concerns. You 

talk about slack in the labor market. And it seems to me that slack 

is disproportionately borne by African-Americans and Latinos. 

This brings me to the critical importance of the full employment 

part of your dual mandate. And so while we are plodding upwards, 

there are still many storm clouds. I want to see growth which will 

create jobs and decrease the national debt. 

Now I cringe at the austerity policies of this Republican Congress 

because I think it works at cross-purposes with your pro-growth 

policies. And I want to hear you talk about that. 

Your predecessor, Ben Bernanke, came to Congress and told us 

that the sequester and the shutdown were examples of counterproductivity. We want to get this slack, as you call it, out of the 

labor market, but Congress needs to embrace growth policies that 

will help working people. Wall Street is doing just fine. But we 

need to invest in education and infrastructure, increase the minimum wage so that we can get more consumers spending money. 

And I read in your testimony here that U.S. exports are slumping, but yet this committee has refused to reauthorize the ExportImport Bank. These are unforced errors and I thank you and I look 

forward to hearing your testimony. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The gentlelady yields back. 

Today, we welcome the testimony of the Honorable Janet Yellen. 

Chair Yellen has previously testified before our committee, so I believe she needs no further introduction. 

At the request of Chair Yellen, I wish to inform all Members that 

I intend to adjourn the hearing at 1:00 p.m. this afternoon. 

Chair Yellen, without objection, your complete written statement 

will be made a part of the record, and you are now recognized for 

5 minutes to give an oral presentation of your testimony. Thank 

you for being here. 

5 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JANET L. YELLEN, CHAIR, 

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 

Mrs. YELLEN. Thank you. 

Chairman Hensarling, Ranking Member Waters, and members of 

the committee, I am pleased to present the Federal Reserve’s semiannual monetary policy report to the Congress. In my remarks 

today I will discuss the current economic situation and outlook before turning to monetary policy. 

Since my appearance before this committee in February, the 

economy has made further progress toward the Federal Reserve’s 

objective of maximum employment. While inflation has continued 

to run below the level that the Federal Open Market Committee 

(FOMC) judges to be most consistent over the longer run with the 

Federal Reserve’s statutory mandate to promote maximum employment and price stability. 

In the labor market, the unemployment rate now stands at 5.3 

percent, slightly below its level at the end of last year and down 

more than 4.5 percentage points from its 10 percent peak in late 

2009. 

Meanwhile, monthly gains in nonfarm payroll employment averaged about 210,000 over the first half of this year, somewhat less 

than the robust 260,000 average seen in 2014. It is still sufficient 

to bring the total increase in employment since its trough to more 

than 12 million jobs. 

Other measures of job market health are also trending in the 

right direction with noticeable declines over the past year in the 

number of people suffering long-term unemployment and in the 

numbers working part-time who would prefer full-time employment. 

However, these measures as well as the unemployment rate continue to indicate that there is still some slack in labor markets. For 

example, too many people are not searching for a job but would 

likely do so if the labor market was stronger. 

And although there are tentative signs that wage growth has 

picked up, it continues to be relatively subdued, consistent with 

other indicators of slack. Thus while labor market conditions have 

improved substantially, they are, in the FOMC’s judgment, not yet 

consistent with maximum employment. 

Even as the labor market was improving, domestic spending and 

production softened notably during the first half of this year. Real 

GDP is now estimated to have been little changed in the first quarter after having risen at an average annual rate of 3.5 percent over 

the second half of last year. And industrial production has declined 

a bit on balance since the turn of the year. 

While these developments bear watching, some of this sluggishness seems to be the result of transitory factors, including unusually severe winter weather, labor disruptions at West Coast ports, 

and statistical noise. 

The available data suggest a moderate pace of GDP growth in 

the second quarter as these influences dissipate. Notably, consumer 

spending has picked up, and sales of motor vehicles in May and 

June were strong, suggesting that many households have both the 

wherewithal and the confidence to purchase big ticket items. 

6 

In addition, homebuilding has picked up somewhat lately, although the demand for housing is still being restrained by limited 

availability of mortgage loans to many potential home buyers. 

Business investment has been soft this year, partly reflecting the 

plunge in oil drilling and the fact that exports are being held down 

by weak economic growth in several of our major trading partners 

and the appreciation of the dollar. 

Looking forward, prospects are favorable for further improvement in the U.S. labor market and the economy more broadly. Low 

oil prices and ongoing employment gains should continue to bolster 

consumer spending. Financial conditions generally remain supportive of growth. 

And the highly accommodative monetary policies abroad should 

work to strengthen global growth. In addition, some of the 

headwinds restraining economic growth, including the effects of 

dollar appreciation on net exports and the effective lower oil prices 

on capital spending, should diminish over time. 

As a result, the FOMC expects U.S. GDP growth to strengthen 

over the remainder of this year and the unemployment rate to decline gradually. 

As always, however, there are some uncertainties in the economic outlook. Foreign developments in particular pose some risks 

to U.S. growth, most notably, although the recovery in the euro 

area appears to have gained a firmer footing, the situation in 

Greece remains difficult. 

And China continues to grapple with the challenges posed by 

high debt, weak property markets, and volatile financial conditions. 

But economic growth abroad could also pick up more quickly than 

observers generally anticipate, providing additional support for 

U.S. economic activity. 

The U.S. economy also might snap back more quickly as the 

transitory influences holding down first half growth fade and the 

boost to consumer spending from oil prices shows through more definitively. 

As I noted earlier, inflation continues to run below the committee’s 2 percent objective, with the personal consumption expenditures or PCE price index up only a quarter of a percent over the 

12 months ending in May. And the quarter index which excludes 

the volatile food and energy components, up only one and a quarter 

percent over the same period. 

To a significant extent, the recent low readings on total PCE inflation reflect influences that are likely to be transitory, particularly if the early or steep declines in oil prices, and in the prices 

of non-energy imported goods. Indeed, energy prices appeared to 

have stabilized recently. 

Although monthly inflation readings have firmed lately, the 12 

month change in the PCE price index is likely to remain near it’s 

recent low level in the near-term. My colleagues and I continue to 

expect that as the effects of these transitory factories dissipate, and 

as the labor market improves further, inflation will move gradually 

back toward our 2 percent objective over the medium-term. 

Market-based measures of inflation compensation remain low although they have risen some from levels earlier this year, and survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations have reVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:37 Jul 07, 2016 Jkt 097154 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\97154.TXT TERI
7 

mained stable. The Committee continues to monitor inflation developments carefully. 

Regarding monetary policy, the FOMC conducts policy to promote maximum employment and price stability as required by our 

statutory mandate from the Congress. Given the economic situation 

that I just described, the committee is judged at a high degree of 

monetary policy accommodation remains appropriate. 

Consistent with that assessment, we have continued to maintain 

the target range for the Federal funds rate at zero to a quarter of 

a percent, and have kept the Federal Reserve’s holdings of longerterm securities at their current elevated level to help maintain accommodative financial conditions. In its most recent statement, the 

FOMC again noted that it judged it would be appropriate to raise 

the target range for the Federal funds rate when it has seen further improvement in the labor market, and is reasonably confident 

that inflation will move pack to its 2 percent objective to the medium-term. 

The Committee will determine the timing of the initial increase 

in the Federal funds rate on a meeting by meeting basis, depending 

on its assessment of realized and expected progress toward its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. If the 

economy evolves as we expect, economic conditions likely would 

make it appropriate at some point this year to raise the Federal 

funds rate target, thereby beginning to normalize the stance of 

monetary policy. 

Indeed, most participants in June projected that an increase in 

the Federal funds target range would likely become appropriate before year end. But let me emphasize again that these are projections based on the anticipated path of the economy, not statements 

of intent to raise rates at any particular time. 

The decision by the Committee to raise its target range for the 

Federal funds rate will signal how much progress the economy has 

made in healing from the trauma of the financial crisis. That said, 

the importance of the initial step to raise the funds rate target 

should not be overemphasized. What matters for financial conditions in the broader economy is the entire expected path of interest 

rates, not any particular move, including the initial increase in the 

Federal funds rate. 

Indeed, the stance of monetary policy will likely remain highly 

accommodative for quite some time after the first increase in the 

Federal funds rate, in order to support continued progress toward 

our objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. In 

the projections prepared for our June meeting, most FOMC participants anticipated that economic conditions would evolve over time 

in a way that will warrant gradual increases in the Federal funds 

rate, as the headwinds that still restrain real activity continue to 

diminish and inflation rises. 

Of course, if the expansion proves to be more vigorous than currently anticipated, and inflation moves higher than expected, then 

the appropriate path would likely follow a higher and steeper trajectory. Conversely, if conditions were to prove weaker, then the 

appropriate trajectory would be lower and less steep than currently 

projected. 

8 

As always, we will regularly reassess what level of the Federal 

funds rate is consistent with achieving and maintaining the committee’s dual mandate. 

I would also would like to note that the Federal Reserve has continued to refine its operational plans pertaining to the deployment 

of our various policy tools when the committee judges it appropriate to begin normalizing the stance of policy. 

Last fall, the Committee issued a detailed statement concerning 

its plans for policy normalization, and over the past few months we 

have announced a number of additional details regarding the approach that the committee intends to use when it decides to raise 

the target for the Federal funds rate. These statements pertaining 

to policy normalization constitute recent examples of the many 

steps the Federal Reserve has taken over the years to improve our 

public communications concerning monetary policy. 

As this committee well knows, the Board has for many years delivered an extensive report on monetary policy and economic developments at semiannual hearings like this one. And the FOMC has 

long announced its monetary policy decisions by issuing statements 

shortly after its meetings, followed by minutes with a full account 

of policy decisions, and, with an appropriate lag, complete meeting 

transcripts. 

Innovations in recent years have included quarterly press conferences and the quarterly release of FOMC participants’ projections for economic growth on employment, inflation, and the appropriate path for the Committee’s interest rate target. 

In addition, the Committee adopted a statement in 2012 concerning its longer-run goals and monetary policy strategy that included a specific 2 percent longer-run objective for inflation, and a 

commitment to follow a balanced approach in pursuing our mandated goals. 

Transparency concerning the Federal Reserve’s conduct of monetary policy is desirable, because better public understanding enhances the effectiveness of policy. More important, however, is that 

transparent communications reflect the Federal Reserve’s commitment to accountability within our Democratic system of government. 

Our various communications tools are important means of implementing monetary policy and have many technical elements. Each 

step forward in our communications practices has been taken with 

the goal of enhancing the effectiveness of monetary policy and 

avoiding unintended consequences. 

Effective communication is also crucial to ensuring that the Federal Reserve remains accountable, but measures that affect the 

ability of policymakers to make decisions about monetary policy, 

free of short-term political pressure in the name of transparency, 

should be avoided. 

The Federal Reserve ranks among the most transparent of central banks. We publish a summary of our balance sheet every 

week, and our financial statements are audited annually by an outside auditor and made public. Every security we hold is listed on 

the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and in conformance with the Dodd-Frank Act, transactions level data on all 

9 

of our lending, including the identity of borrowers and the amounts 

borrowed, are published with a 2-year lag. 

Efforts to further increase transparency, no matter how well-intentioned, must avoid unintended consequences that could undermine the Federal Reserve’s ability to make monetary policy in the 

long-run best interest of American families and businesses. 

In sum, since the February 2015 Monetary Policy report, we have 

seen, despite the soft patch of economic activity in the first quarter, 

that the labor market has continued to show progress toward our 

objective of maximum employment. 

Inflation has continued to run below our longer-run objective, but 

we believe transitory factors have played a major role. We continue 

to anticipate that it will be appropriate to raise the target range 

for the Federal funds rate when the committee has seen further 

improvement in the labor market and is reasonably confident that 

inflation will move back to its 2-percent objective over the medium 

term. 

As always, the Federal Reserve remains committed to employing 

its tools to best promote the attainment of its dual mandate. 

Thank you. I would be pleased to take your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Chair Yellen can be found on page 

56 of the appendix.] 

Chairman HENSARLING. Thank you, Chair Yellen. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. 

Chair Yellen, I hate to take up time to ask this, but it is an important matter. As we well know, Dodd-Frank vastly expanded the 

non-monetary policy role of the Fed. Through no fault of your own, 

there has not been a Vice Chair for Supervision appointed. 

My counterpart, Chairman Shelby, in the Senate has requested 

that you come on a semiannual basis until such a time as the 

President deigns to fill that position and testify on the 

macroprudential regulatory role of the Fed. 

Your written response to our request, to put it politely, was not 

responsive. So will you voluntarily honor our request? And if the 

answer is ‘‘yes,’’ I will take ‘‘yes’’ for an answer, and if the answer 

is ‘‘no,’’ I will give you a brief moment to explain. 

Mrs. YELLEN. I certainly stand ready to respond to requests of 

this committee for me to testify— 

Chairman HENSARLING. Thank you. I will take ‘‘yes’’ for an answer, and we will certainly issue those invitations. 

I want to discuss with you, Chair Yellen, the exigent powers Section 13(3) clause. There seems to be a growing consensus on both 

sides of the aisle among the right and the left that Dodd-Frank, 

notwithstanding its intentions to constrain 13(3), did not hit the 

mark. 

And in fact, Senator Elizabeth Warren has been rather outspoken on the matter and has actually introduced bipartisan legislation on the Senate side in this regard. 

Setting aside the arguments of whether or not the AIG bailout, 

specifically, was a good thing or a bad thing, post-Dodd-Frank, is 

it your interpretation that the Fed retains the power to do a similar bailout of AIG where counterparties and creditors could receive 

100 cents on the dollar, including foreign entities? 

10 

Mrs. YELLEN. Let me start by saying that the role of lender of 

last resort is a critical responsibility that central banks fulfill 

around the world, and it is why the Federal Reserve was created. 

I do believe this is a very important power. We need to address 

liquidity and credit pressures in times when there is unusual financial stress. 

However, Congress did amend Section 13(3) in Dodd-Frank to 

allow the Federal Reserve to extend emergency credit to the financial system only through facilities that have broad-based eligibility. 

Chairman HENSARLING. Chair Yellen, you know that— 

Mrs. YELLEN. So the answer is no, that we could not use those 

powers to address the needs of a single firm, like the AIG situation. 

Chairman HENSARLING. But several other firms—if an AIG-like 

bailout was made available to a specific firm, as long as it was 

made to multiple firms, there is still nothing preventing the Fed 

from ensuring counterparties and creditors get 100 cents on the 

dollar. Is that correct, or do you disagree with that statement? 

Mrs. YELLEN. Section 13(3) was amended to state specifically 

that it broadens— 

Chairman HENSARLING. No, I am familiar with the statute. I am 

just trying to figure out if you believe it constrains creditors getting 

100 cents on the dollar. 

Mrs. YELLEN. If we have failing financial firms, we would not be 

able to put in place a broad-based facility that was intended to rescue those firms. 

Chairman HENSARLING. If I could, Chair Yellen, let me ask you 

this— 

Mrs. YELLEN. But it is not allowed by Dodd-Frank. 

Chairman HENSARLING. Let me ask you this question. There obviously is a difference of opinion there. 

Federal Reserve Bank President Jeffrey Lacker recently gave a 

speech dealing with 13(3) and dealing with moral hazard. And I 

agree with you, the lender-of-last-resort function is important. But 

so is moral hazard in creating greater systemic risk. 

President Lacker said, ‘‘A final step may be required before financial stability can be assured. This would mean repealing the 

Federal Reserve’s remaining emergency lending powers and further 

restraining the Fed’s ability to lend to failing institutions.’’ 

Are you aware of President Lacker’s views on this topic? 

Mrs. YELLEN. I am aware of his views, but I disagree with him. 

Chairman HENSARLING. When do you expect— 

Mrs. YELLEN. Dodd-Frank has been amended to limit our powers, 

as I mentioned, to bail out a single firm or a failing firm or an insolvent borrower. 

Chairman HENSARLING. Chair Yellen, when do you expect that 

we will have the final rule on 13(3)? Because we know there were 

800 pages devoted to helping define ‘‘proprietary trading’’ in the 

Volcker Rule, but we see no such effort in defining the concepts of 

‘‘insolvent’’ and ‘‘broad-based’’ and presently are seeing no real constraint to your 13(3) abilities. 

So, when should we expect to see that final rule? 

Mrs. YELLEN. We put out a draft rule— 

Chairman HENSARLING. I am aware of that. 

11 

Mrs. YELLEN. —and we received a number of comments, and we 

are working hard to come out with a revision, and I expect that it 

will certainly be out in the fall. 

Chairman HENSARLING. Okay. Thank you. 

The Chair’s time has expired. The Chair now recognizes the 

ranking member for 5 minutes. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chair Yellen, this morning, I woke up to yet another story about 

discrimination against minorities. It seems Honda has been caught 

charging higher interest rates, I guess, on their loans to AfricanAmericans and Latinos. 

When I hear those kinds of stories, I am reminded about the 

predatory lending practices that took place in this country in 2008, 

et cetera, and how these predatory practices were targeted to minority communities and minorities were charged higher interest 

rates. 

And when they compared the income and the credit that Blacks 

and minorities—their credit records to the credit records of Whites, 

they could be the same, but they were paying higher interest rates 

on many of these predatory products. 

And when I look at the loss of wealth in these communities, 

based on the subprime lending, I cannot help but wonder, when is 

this going to stop? When is it going to stop? 

While we have you here today and we are talking about monetary policy and we are talking about interest rates, qualitative easing, et cetera, et cetera—I don’t know how much you can do to deal 

with this inequality. I don’t know if there is anything that perhaps 

you can do that deals with discrimination, that deals with racism, 

that deals with income inequality, that deals with the problems 

that cause this great wealth gap that is so big now that it will 

never be closed. 

We hear a lot of talk about income inequality and the wealth 

gap, et cetera, and we look at the high unemployment rates in the 

African-American and Latino communities, and sometimes you just 

think, despite the struggle, despite all of the work, despite the 

challenges, some of this stuff just will never go away in this country. 

So I guess I am asking you, because you have the responsibility 

for some of what goes on in this economy relative to some of these 

issues, what can you do about Honda? What can you do about the 

banks and the predatory practices that continue to gouge Latinos 

and African-Americans and target these products to our communities? 

What do you say about all of this? 

Mrs. YELLEN. Let me start by saying that the practices you described and the trend toward rising inequality, the impact that it 

has on African-Americans and disadvantaged groups is something 

that greatly concerns me, and I think is of tremendous concern to 

all Americans. 

In terms of what we can do, when it comes to lending we are responsible for supervision of financial institutions to make sure that 

they adhere to fair lending practices, and we test regularly in our 

consumer compliance exams to make sure that the firms that we 

supervise are abiding by Congress’ rules pertaining to the Equal 

12 

Credit Opportunity Act to make sure there are not unfair credit 

practices being directed toward minorities or toward any Americans. 

So that is an important goal. We, of course, work to make sure 

that the banks we supervise meet their CRA responsibilities which 

I think has been of benefit to low- and moderate-income communities. And more broadly, in terms of our monetary policy responsibilities, maximum employment along with price stability are the 

two major goals that Congress has assigned to us. 

The downturn that we experienced after the financial crisis, 

where unemployment rose to over 10 percent, was particularly punishing to African-Americans and to lower skilled workers, more 

broadly. 

And a strong economy, getting the economy recovering, trying to 

get it back to maximum employment, lowering the unemployment 

rate. Traditionally African-Americans and other minorities have 

had higher unemployment rates. We don’t have the tools to be able 

to address the structure of unemployment across groups, but a 

strong economy generally, I think, really does tend to be beneficial 

to all Americans. 

So that is what we are working toward, and there are other policies that I think Congress could consider that would address these 

issues. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentlelady has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. 

Huizenga, chairman of our Monetary Policy and Trade Subcommittee. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chair Yellen, I think we share a respect for rules-based monetary policy—as you put it when you served on the Fed Board in the 

mid-1990s, the Taylor Rule was ‘‘what sensible central banks do.’’ 

It looks like we are in good company. Dr. Charles Plosser, the 

immediate past president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, expressed support for a rules-based framework by setting 

monetary policy: ‘‘One of the most important ways to support credibility, and thus the effectiveness of forward guidance is to practice 

it as part of a systematic policy framework. I believe that indicating the evolution of key economic variables systematically 

shapes future and current economic policy decisions is critical to 

such a policy framework.’’ 

In testimony before this committee in December of 2013, Dr. 

Douglas Holtz-Eakin, former Director of the Congressional Budget 

Office, also endorsed a rules-based monetary policy, saying, ‘‘Certainly I would like to see a more rules-based approach by the Federal Reserve that does not rule out discretion, because they can 

pick the rule they want to operate. But if they provide it to Congress and the American people, the American people will know 

what they are up to. They themselves have said forward guidance 

is critical. We need to know what they are going to do. Rules provide that.’’ 

So, I am curious when you and your colleagues at the Fed will 

adopt a rules-based policy? 

Mrs. YELLEN. You used the term systematic policy. And I want 

to say that I strongly endorse, and the FOMC strongly endorses folVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:37 Jul 07, 2016 Jkt 097154 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\97154.TXT TERI
13 

lowing a systematic policy. And during my term as Vice Chair and 

as Chair, I have tried to promote a systematic monetary policy. 

And I believe that we do follow a systematic monetary policy. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. But not with a rule that you are willing to share, 

correct? 

Mrs. YELLEN. Not a simple rule based on two variables, but let 

me point you first to the monetary policy report: On the second 

page of the report, we have a clear statement of our longer-run 

goals and monetary policy strategy. Any systematic policy has to 

begin by articulating what the goals are very clearly, and the strategy that will be followed. And that is what we do there— 

Mr. HUIZENGA. But you agree that a rules-based policy is a better way to go? 

Mrs. YELLEN. I don’t agree that a rules-based policy is a better 

way to go. There is not a single central bank in the world that follows a rule that would rely on only two variables. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. So, as you well know— 

Mrs. YELLEN. What we do is take into account a wealth of information, informing our judgments about the economic outlook. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. Sure. 

Mrs. YELLEN. And the way that we make policies systematic is 

we provide and you can see this in section three, in part three of 

the monetary policy report, each individual, each participant, 

writes down their own forecast for the economy and the appropriate policy that goes along with that, and from that, you can get 

a clear sense of how we expect to conduct policy, if the economy 

evolves in line with our forecast. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. I am not convinced that is clear, because others 

in the market don’t believe that is clear. Other economists don’t believe that is clear. We are not trying to handcuff you, but we are 

asking that you write a rule within descriptive parameters to use 

as a reference point, purely use it as a reference point. I know you 

expressed that if we had a rule, we may find ourselves in negative 

interest rates. 

Simply solve that by writing a rule that says, once we do that, 

we are going to zero and no lower, or maybe .25, as you have indication—we won’t call it the ‘‘Taylor Rule,’’ we will call it the 

‘‘Yellen Rule.’’ 

We can have some of those things that are going to give us predictability. So I think that whether it is Douglas Holtz-Eakin or 

others who have been within the Federal Bank Reserve who have 

said so, predictability and transparency is the way to go. So I know 

you know that we have a discussion draft floating around that has 

some of that information in there. And just so I am clear, you don’t 

believe that there is a time it will be right to, again, go towards 

a rules-based policy? 

Mrs. YELLEN. I think we need a systematic policy, but I would 

strongly resist agreeing to follow any rule where the stance of monetary policy depends on only the current readings of two economic 

variables, which is what your reference rule relies on. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. Okay. That is what the reference rule does, but 

it doesn’t say that is the rule you have to follow. And we have a 

lot of confusion out there; the IMF is saying you shouldn’t be raising interest rates for international settlements, which is the central 

14 

bank—of central banks, as you well know. Claudie Arborio had 

said lower rates beget lower rates, and we have a lot of confusion 

out there as to the direction we are going, and that is what we are 

asking for as clarity. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mrs. YELLEN. I strongly believe in the systematic policy. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Wisconsin, Ms. 

Moore, ranking member of our Monetary Policy and Trade Subcommittee. 

Ms. MOORE. Thank you so much, Madam Chair. My colleague, 

the chairman of our Monetary Policy and Trade Subcommittee, has 

been discussing with you the Taylor Rule, so I would like to pursue 

that a little bit more. 

The IMF is warning that if Greece leaves the Eurozone, it might 

slow growth internationally, and impact the United States much 

harder than expected. 

I guess I would like you to just sort of speculate about, if you 

were handcuffed about the terms used here earlier, the Taylor 

Rule, how would that impede your response to such a crisis? 

Mrs. YELLEN. The Taylor Rule would tell us that the current setting of monetary policy should depend on only two variables. The 

current level of real GDP or the output gap, and the current level 

of inflation. So it obviously wouldn’t take into account in any way 

our judgments about the likely growth in the global economy, how 

we expected that the European economy would be affected or global 

financial markets by these—by such developments. 

So in that sense, it really restricts any simple rule, restricts the 

setting of monetary policy to a very short list of variables and typically their current values. That is one of the reasons—we spend a 

great deal of time and—the forecasts that we include in our monetary policy report that the participants write down, we present to 

the public every 3 months, incorporate all of that kind of information. What we think is going to happen in the global economy and 

other economic developments, those factor into our economic forecasts and our view as to the appropriate role of policy. 

We are providing a great deal of information to the public by providing these participants forecasts, because participants are telling 

the public how, in light of their economic forecast, concretely with 

numbers, they think monetary policy should be set. 

So that is information about the so-called reaction function, 

namely the relationship between the economy and monetary policy 

that is incorporated in something like the Taylor Rule. 

Ms. MOORE. Thank you so much. 

Can you provide us with a quick update of the Fed’s implementation of the so-called Collins fix governing insurance capital standards? 

Mrs. YELLEN. We appreciate Congress passing the Collins fix, 

and in light of that, we have a great deal of flexibility now to design capital standards that we think will be appropriate for the 

firms that we supervise, including the insurance-based savings and 

loan-holding companies and the insurance SIFIs, and we are working hard. We will put in the public domain either orders or a proposed rule— 

15 

Ms. MOORE. Thank you. 

Mrs. YELLEN. —when we have figured that out. 

Ms. MOORE. Thank you so much. 

We are at the 5-year lookback of Dodd-Frank. Our colleagues 

again say that we have enshrined too-big-to-fail. I wonder if you 

could just set the record straight about whether or not Dodd-Frank 

enshrined too-big-to-fail. 

Mrs. YELLEN. I don’t believe that Dodd-Frank enshrined too-bigto-fail. 

First of all, it directed us to increase the safety and soundness 

of financial institutions and particularly those that are most systemic. 

So it gave us tools to raise capital and liquidity, to impose capital 

surcharges on those firms that we deem most systemic, to use 

stress testing as a methodology, to make these firms much less 

likely to fail, and the amount of capital and liquidity has increased 

massively since the crisis. 

In addition, Dodd-Frank gave us Title II orderly liquidation authority, which would be a new tool to resolve the systemic firm in 

Title I. 

Ms. MOORE. I have 10 seconds left, so I think you have covered 

that. 

Back to my idea about the labor market, do you think ending the 

sequester and raising the minimum wage would be good strategies 

for getting our labor markets together? 

Mrs. YELLEN. These, I think, are matters for Congress to debate. 

Ms. MOORE. I knew you would say that, so I saved it for last. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentlelady has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. 

Garrett, chairman of our Capital Markets Subcommittee. 

Mr. GARRETT. Good morning. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Last night, I read through what is called the ‘‘Joint Staff Report: 

The U.S. Treasury Market,’’ dated October 15, 2014. It is the staff 

report that looked at what happened in the markets back in midOctober. 

Are you familiar with that report? And do you adopt that report, 

even though I see the name of it is the ‘‘Joint Staff Report?’’ Just 

as a technical matter, does that mean that this is just the staffs’ 

opinion, or is this also your opinion? Just so I understand that. 

Mrs. YELLEN. I am certainly aware of the intensive work done by 

staff and a number of agencies— 

Mr. GARRETT. But do you adopt— 

Mrs. YELLEN. —and I think it is a good report. I certainly support the report. 

Mr. GARRETT. Okay, great. I assumed so. 

I thought there was one seminal question, but I guess maybe 

there are two seminal questions, and I read that. And I also read 

your testimony and the addendums to your testimony this morning, 

since it only came in this morning. 

First of all, is there a problem, and second, what was the cause? 

I thought that we would all have to conclude that there was a problem, but that is not clear from looking at the addendum to your report that came out—as far as your testimony, where it says at the 

bottom, ‘‘Despite the increased market discussions in talking about 

16 

the disruptions, a variety in metric liquidity in the nominal Treasury markets do not indicate notable deteriorations.’’ 

And then you go on to say elsewhere that there really weren’t 

many problems in the liquidity of the market. And you talk about 

that. 

I think there is a problem. Other people think there is a problem. 

We had hearings on this, and Rick Ketchum, the CEO and chairman of FINRA, told this committee that there have been dramatic 

changes with respect to the fixed-income market in recent years. 

So the question is, is Rick Ketchum right, that there have been 

dramatic changes to it, and there is a problem in the marketplace, 

or is your staff, and you are right that there is not a problem in 

the liquidity and the deterioration in that marketplace? 

Let’s find out whether there is a problem, first of all. 

Mrs. YELLEN. I think it is not clear what is happening in these 

markets and what is causing what. 

Mr. GARRETT. True, but is there a problem, before we get to— 

Mrs. YELLEN. The report that you mentioned that was just released looked carefully at a 12-minute window, in which— 

Mr. GARRETT. But overall, Mr. Ketchum is saying that there has 

been a deterioration and that there is a problem overall. 

He is saying there is a problem. Other panelists have said there 

is a problem overall on the market. You are saying, and your staff 

is saying that there isn’t any problem? 

Mrs. YELLEN. It is not clear whether there is or there is not a 

problem here. 

Mr. GARRETT. Okay. 

Mrs. YELLEN. By some metrics, liquidity looks adequate by bidask spread and— 

Mr. GARRETT. But I think that is— 

Mrs. YELLEN. —trading volumes. We don’t see a problem— 

Mr. GARRETT. Let me just interrupt, because we only have— 

Mrs. YELLEN. —but there are metrics that suggest there is a 

problem. So this is something we need to study further. 

Mr. GARRETT. So you studied it so far, you have an 80-page report that looked at it, and I find it troubling that it really doesn’t 

come to much of a conclusion. 

What I was looking for was the second seminal question that the 

chairman and I have asked Secretary Lew and others: What was 

the cause of this? And this report still fails to come up with any 

particular explanation. It runs through about half a dozen explanations saying, these are not the problem. 

Some of them that it does refer to is it says, ‘‘the growth in electronic trading, competitive pressures, other factors, and regulation.’’ That word ‘‘regulation’’ only appears twice, but your staff actually says regulation is an indicator to the changes in the volatility and the liquidity out in the marketplace. 

So it says that regulation is part of the problem. Right? 

Mrs. YELLEN. We just don’t have a conclusion about what happened in the Treasury market at this point. 

Mr. GARRETT. No, but you don’t have— 

Mrs. YELLEN. Regulation could have contributed in some way to 

that, but there are many other things going on as well. 

17 

Mr. GARRETT. But it doesn’t say that in your addendum at all. 

It says that in the staff report. Nowhere did I see that it looks to 

regulation as being the factor. 

It looks at all of the other factors that are talked about here, 

whether it is the size, order trade size, whether it is the electronic 

trades, whether it is competitive pressures. It doesn’t say that in 

here. We never heard that from—we can never get that answer 

from Secretary Lew or anyone else from the Administration. 

So are you saying today that, yes, regulations such as the 

Volcker Rule, Basel, and capital requirements are potential problems in this area? 

Mrs. YELLEN. They are things to look at. We have no evidence 

that those things that you mentioned are problems. 

During this window— 

Mr. GARRETT. Let me ask you this. 

Mrs. YELLEN. —broker dealers continued to— 

Mr. GARRETT. May I ask you a question? 

Did you direct your staff to look to see whether that was a potentiality? Because they don’t say it once in their report that they 

looked into regulation as a causation. They looked at all the metric 

datas on these other areas. 

Did you direct them to look at that as a factor, and will you in 

the future? 

Mrs. YELLEN. We asked them to take a look at what caused this 

very unusual movement in Treasury yields— 

Mr. GARRETT. They didn’t. 

Mrs. YELLEN. —and to study what possible causes of it were, and 

they were unable to find any single cause. 

And they pointed to a number of factors that could have been at 

play, and it needs further study, and it is right for regulation to 

be on that list of things that we look at. But there is no evidence 

at this point— 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Mrs. 

Maloney, ranking member of our Capital Markets Subcommittee. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Welcome, Chair Yellen. I know that some of my 

colleagues have been critical of your performance, but I, for one, 

think you have done a tremendous job, and I want to publicly 

thank you. 

You have been very responsive to Congress, and you have also 

managed to wind down the quantitative easing program very 

smoothly and right on schedule without causing any major disruptions in the financial markets, so thank you. 

And I would like to ask you some questions about monetary policy. 

In your testimony today, you said that foreign developments, including the turmoil in Greece and China, in your words, ‘‘pose some 

risk to United States growth.’’ 

Has the turmoil in China and Greece changed your view about 

the appropriate timing for the first interest rate hike? 

Mrs. YELLEN. We look at international developments very carefully in developing our forecast. We have been closely tracking developments in Greece and China and other parts of the world. 

18 

The issues that exist are not new. For example, in June the committee was aware of these developments, and in June when the 

participants wrote down their views of the economy and appropriate policy, taking into account these developments and the risks 

they pose, they still thought that the overall risk to the U.S. economic outlook were balanced and they judged that it would be appropriate sometime this year to begin raising our target range for 

the Federal funds rate. 

Of course, we continue to watch these developments, these global 

developments unfold, and we will in the coming months. Were we 

to judge that these developments did create substantial risks, or 

were changing the outlook in some notable way, then a change in 

the outlook is something that would affect monetary policy. As we 

have said all along, we have no judgment about—at this point 

about the appropriate date to raise the Federal funds rate. Our 

judgment about that will depend on unfolding economic developments and how they affect our forecasts. 

Mrs. MALONEY. You stressed in your testimony that the pace of 

rate increases is more important than the timing of the first rate 

hike, and many economists, including the IMF, have argued that 

the Fed should wait longer to start raising rates, possibly waiting 

until next year, but should then follow a slightly steeper path of 

subsequent rate increases. 

So my question is, if the Fed waits longer than current forecasts 

to start raising rates, will that mean a steeper path of rate increases? 

Mrs. YELLEN. If we wait longer, it certainly could mean that 

when we begin to raise rates, we might have to do so more rapidly, 

so an advantage to beginning a little bit earlier is that we might 

have a more gradual path of rate increases. 

As I indicated, the entire path of rate increases does matter. 

There are many reasons why the committee judges, in effect, that 

an appropriate path of rate increases is likely to be gradual, but 

given that we have been at zero for over 6 years, it has been a long 

time since we have raised rates. Doing so when we finally begin 

in a deliberate and gradual way, looking at what the impact of 

those decisions are on the economy, strikes me as a prudent approach to take. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Okay. And as you know, the markets have been 

anticipating a rate increase for quite some time, and that it will 

follow one of the FOMC meetings that has a press conference afterwards. Currently, there is a press conference after every other 

FOMC meeting, and as a result, in the market’s view, the Fed only 

has two more chances to raise rates this year in September or December, even though there is an FMOC meeting later this month 

and one in October. 

My question is, would the Fed feel comfortable raising rates for 

the first time at an FOMC meeting without a press conference 

scheduled afterwards? In other words, are the July and October 

meetings on the table, so to speak, for rate increases? 

Mrs. YELLEN. I have tried to emphasize that every meeting is a 

live meeting. We could make decisions at any meeting of the 

FOMC, and we have emphasized that if we were to make such a 

decision, we would likely have a press briefing afterwards. And we 

19 

recently conducted a test to make sure that members of the media, 

of the press, understand how technically they would participate in 

such a press briefing. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentlelady has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. 

Luetkemeyer, chairman of our Housing and Insurance Subcommittee. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Over here, Madam Chair. Thank you. 

A few weeks ago we met, and we had a long discussion about a 

number of different topics, and one of them was Operation 

Chokepoint. And I asked you at that time or made mention of the 

fact that I was very concerned from the standpoint that the Oversight and Government Reform Committee had this report that they 

put out with regard to the internal e-mails and memos, which 

showed that the FDIC was going well beyond their statutory authority and duties in trying to limit the ability of certain legal businesses to do legal business, and was impacting a lot of banks in 

a very negative way. 

And the fact that you oversee some of the banks as well, I felt 

that you should be pushing back and have a meeting with Chairman Gruenberg, and I asked you to do that. 

Have you have done that at this point? 

Mrs. YELLEN. Yes, I have done that. I have discussed Operation 

Chokepoint with Chairman Gruenberg, and our views on what 

proper policy is on the part of the banking agencies with respect 

to how our examiners deal with banks and the services they offer. 

We both certainly agree on the importance of making sure that 

examiners and our policies don’t discourage banks from offering 

services to any business that is operating within State and Federal 

law. He and I agree that is appropriate policy and— 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Did he indicate to you, though, how he is 

going to stop Operation Chokepoint within his own agency? 

Mrs. YELLEN. I don’t want to speak about his policies— 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. I think it is important that you make the 

point to him that he has to stop. In this report, this report of his 

own e-mails, within his agency, he is implicated as being part of 

the problem. And therefore it is important, I believe, that you have 

a discussion and say that he has to cease and desist those kinds 

of activities, and get assurance from him that he will make sure 

that is done. 

Mrs. YELLEN. He explained to me a number of policies that he 

has put in place to be absolutely certain that his examiners are 

abiding by the policy that I indicated, which is the banks we supervise—that examiners in examining them do not— 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. If at some point you find that this is still continuing, will you confront him about that? If it is continuing in the 

banks you oversee, will you confront him and say, we find this 

operational, and therefore you need to stop it. Will you stop him 

from doing that, if you see it? 

Mrs. YELLEN. I will continue to discuss with him this issue and 

to make sure that our policies— 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Okay. With regard to another issue that we 

discussed, with regard to SIFI designation, one of the concerns that 

20 

I have, especially with insurers and asset managers, is that as they 

are designated, there doesn’t seem to be a way for them to become 

de-designated, and there is no path written out, there is—obviously, you can say, well, they need to change their business model. 

But I would think it would be helpful whenever they are designated to be able to say if you do this, this and this, these are the 

problems that have caused you to become designated. If you change 

these things, do these things differently, it would allow us to dedesignate you. And I really don’t see a path to de-designate. 

Can you elaborate on that? 

Mrs. YELLEN. Yes, well, FSOC reviews every single year the designations of firms and considers whether or not they are appropriate or no longer appropriate, and firms that are designated are 

given very detailed— 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Okay. 

Mrs. YELLEN. —material to enable them to understand the basis 

for the designation— 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. I would just encourage you every year to be 

sure you put something like that in there so there is some certainty 

on the part of those folks who are designated. I have 30 seconds 

left, so let me get one quick question in here. 

With regard to the Board’s charge of adopting capital standards 

for federally-supervised insurers, these capital standards are of 

concern from the standpoint that this is the first time the Fed ever 

got involved in domestic capital standards for insurance companies, 

and I know you—through FIO, you are looking at international 

capital standards. 

My question is, would you commit to us that prioritizing domestic capital standards will take priority over international capital 

standards? 

Mrs. YELLEN. Any international capital standards would not become effective in the United States unless a regulation or rule were 

proposed— 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. That is my concern. 

Mrs. YELLEN. —and went through a full debate. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. That is my concern. We want to make sure 

that domestic insurance industry is protected. 

I yield back. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. 

Clay, ranking member of our Financial Institutions Subcommittee. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And welcome back, Chair Yellen. 

You were quoted in a June 17th American Banker’s article as 

stating that the Federal Reserve was examining ways to improve 

its implementation of the Community Reinvestment Act amid concerns that regulators are letting too many poor communities go 

unserved by banks. 

How would the Federal Reserve’s effort in seeking to improve implementation of the Community Reinvestment Act encourage investments in places like the ones that I represent, such as Ferguson, Missouri, and other communities throughout this country 

that are mired in poverty? 

21 

Mrs. YELLEN. We have been working to improve implementation 

of the CRA regulations with other banking regulators, and we have 

been doing that in part by trying to improve our guidance, adding 

to a set of interagency questions and answers on the community reinvestment. We came out with additional Q&A in 2013, and we are 

working toward further additions. 

And so what this guidance does is try to clarify the ways in 

which basic banking services can help to meet the credit needs of 

low- and moderate-income people in the context of CRA. And by 

doing that, I hope what we will be doing is encouraging banks to 

consider providing the kinds of banking services that people in 

these communities need to be an important part of their CRA program. 

Mr. CLAY. Okay. And along those same lines of questioning, you 

stated in your testimony your concerns about the limited availability of mortgage loans. As a supporter of Dodd-Frank, has the 

law given us unintended consequences and tamped down banks’ 

ability to lend money in order for people to get mortgage loans? 

Mrs. YELLEN. It is hard to say. Certainly, lending standards are 

much tighter than they were in the run-up to the financial crisis, 

and I think most of us think appropriately so; we don’t want to go 

back to lax lending standards. But it may be that the steps we 

have taken are having some unintended consequences, and that we 

need to work on that to make sure that credit is available. 

Mr. CLAY. So do we need to tweak the law in order to allow 

banks to really get money out into our economy and allow people 

to realize the American dream and purchase homes? 

Mrs. YELLEN. There are a number of obstacles that banks see to 

lending. Some have to do with put-back risk, which are matters 

that the FHFA is working on with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 

And, there remains uncertainty about securitization and the rules 

around securitization, so we have not really seen an active market 

come back for private residential mortgage-backed securities. And 

that could be part of what is happening. 

Mr. CLAY. Well, okay. The Federal Reserve released a report entitled, ‘‘Strategies for Improving the U.S. Payment System,’’ a follow-up to a 2013 consultation paper that signaled its intention to 

expand its presence in electronic payments. 

Why has the Fed embarked on this faster payments initiative? 

What does it hope to achieve? And what is the Federal Reserve’s 

plan? 

Mrs. YELLEN. Our basic plan is that we want to see a faster and 

safer payment system in the United States. We think that many 

steps can be taken to make that possible, and the main role we expect to play is that of a convener, to bring a lot of private sector 

participants to the table to talk through these issues. And for 

them, we have set up task forces on faster payments and safer payments. 

Hundreds of private sector participants are discussing what they 

can do in order to bring this about, so we are trying to play the 

role of facilitator, of bringing people to the table. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you. My time— 

22 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. 

Duffy, chairman of our Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee. 

Mr. DUFFY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Chair Yellen. 

As you know, I chair the Oversight Subcommittee of the Financial 

Services Committee, and along with Chairman Hensarling, we 

have been doing an investigation into the 2012 FOMC leak. 

We kindly asked you to produce documents in regard to the leak 

and you failed to comply. The chairman then issued a subpoena for 

the documents, with which you failed to comply. So I would ask, 

what is your legal authority? Give me case law or statute that allows you to not comply with a congressional subpoena? 

Mrs. YELLEN. First, let me say that we have cooperated with the 

committee, and— 

Mr. DUFFY. No, no, no, listen. I have limited time. So I want to 

know—give me the legal authority which says that you do not have 

to comply with a subpoena. We have asked for specific documents 

and you haven’t given them to us. 

Mrs. YELLEN. We indicated that we fully intend to cooperate with 

you to provide the documents that you have requested— 

Mr. DUFFY. Madam Chair— 

Mrs. YELLEN. —but that we are not going to provide them now 

because this matter is the subject of an open criminal investigation 

by the Board’s Inspector General and by the Department of Justice. 

They have indicated to us that it will compromise—it will likely 

compromise their investigation. 

Mr. DUFFY. You are the Chair. Give me the legal authority—you 

can read the statement all day long, but I would like to know the 

legal authority that you have. Basically, what you said in a letter 

to Chairman Hensarling and myself is that the OIG in essence requested that you don’t give it to us. 

You are not bound by the IG, and you are not bound by the DOJ. 

Mrs. YELLEN. We have indicated— 

Mr. DUFFY. We have asked for the documents, and you have said 

you are not going to give them to us. Is it fair to say you don’t have 

any legal authority, because you can’t give me case law or statute 

that says you have an exemption— 

Mrs. YELLEN. No, we have said that we plan to give them to 

you— 

Mr. DUFFY. Just not now. 

Mrs. YELLEN. —as soon as we are able to do so and not compromise an open criminal investigation. 

Mr. DUFFY. Compromising an open— 

Mrs. YELLEN. We want to see this investigation succeed. 

Mr. DUFFY. You do? Let’s talk about that. You want to see it succeed. So let’s talk about the timeline. This happened in October of 

2012. You didn’t follow your policy. The General Counsel did an extensive 6-month investigation. After that investigation, the General 

Counsel was supposed to make a referral to the IG. That didn’t 

happen. 

The General Counsel gave a report to the committee, right? And 

when you got that report, because you were so concerned about justice, you were so concerned about bringing the leaker to the forefront, what did you do? Nothing. You didn’t make a referral to the 

23 

IG. You didn’t make a referral to the FBI, the SEC, the CFTC, or 

the DOJ. You did absolutely nothing. Zero. 

And so you are trying to say that Congress is going to obstruct 

your investigation? When you had information, you did nothing to 

perpetuate an investigation that would lead us to the truth. 

Eventually, the IG did their own investigation and then they 

closed it. And guess what? Congress stood forward and said, listen, 

this is important stuff. We just—as Elizabeth Warren would say, 

we don’t want those who are well-connected to get information 

through the leaks; we should know who the leaker is. 

And so it was because we pressured the IG—it was a closed investigation and we pressured you that all of a sudden, there is a 

second investigation, and they say no, no, we can’t give you that 

documentation because it is a pending investigation and we are 

concerned about you jeopardizing it. 

Madam Chair, it appears that you are the one who is jeopardizing, or the Fed is the one who is jeopardizing this investigation. 

Am I wrong? 

Mrs. YELLEN. The FOMC has in place a clear set of rules that 

are to be followed when there are allegations of a leak. 

Mr. DUFFY. You didn’t follow them. 

Mrs. YELLEN. They called for a review of the incident by the General Counsel and the FOMC Secretary. We have described to you 

how that review took place. It took place before the review was 

complete. The Inspector General— 

Mr. DUFFY. Did the General Counsel—I am reclaiming my time. 

Did the General Counsel, per your guidelines, talk to the FOMC 

Board or did he make a recommendation to the IG? Because the 

requirement is that they make—that they do an initial review and 

solely determine whether they make a referral to the IG They 

didn’t do that, right? Mr. Alvarez didn’t do that. 

Mrs. YELLEN. Before his review was complete, he was informed 

by the IG that the IG had undertaken his own investigation and 

therefore the IG was already looking at it before it was necessary 

for him to make a decision to refer it to the IG. 

The IG was already involved. 

Mr. DUFFY. Madam Chair—my time is almost up. I reclaim my 

time. If anyone is trying to sweep this under the rug, it is the Fed. 

It is Congress that is trying to bring light to this. I sent you a letter in response to your denial with Chairman Hensarling on the 

17th of June, and we have almost a full page of footnotes where 

Congress has done oversight during an open pending DOJ prosecution. 

We have the right to the documents, and you have the duty to 

provide them to us, and you have cited no legal authority to deny 

that request. We are entitled to do oversight, and you are required 

to give us the documents, and I hope you reconsider your denial. 

I yield back. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Alabama, Ms. Sewell. 

Ms. SEWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Chair Yellen, for being here today. 

24 

I wanted to bring your attention to the wages and what I see is 

income inequities going on, and really get your take on what we 

can do as far as monetary policies to close that gap. 

Since the height of the financial crisis, the U.S. economy has 

made remarkable progress, particularly compared to other parts of 

the world. Here in the United States, the unemployment rate fell 

from 10 percent to 5.3 percent in June, and the President has 

pointed out in his budget over the past 4 years that we put more 

people back to work here in the United States than Europe has, 

and Japan, and other nations. 

However despite the overall employment gains, there are still 

some districts, mine included, that have folks who want to work 

who haven’t been able to find work. The hourly labor compensation 

has been tending to lag behind the growth, in particular, and the 

President’s budget projects the share of national income going to 

labor rather than to capital will remain at historic lows for years 

to come. 

What, in your view, can and should be done to reverse this trend 

and ensure that the workers reap more of the rewards and gains 

from our growing economy. I am particularly interested in the disparity that exists among minority unemployment. I can tell you 

that in my own district in Alabama, while the overall Nation has 

5.3 percent unemployment, our median average unemployment in 

a district that is disproportionately African-American is right at 9 

to 10 percent, which is vastly different. 

I would love to know how you think our monetary policies can 

go about changing that trend. 

Mrs. YELLEN. Monetary policy has been aimed at trying to 

achieve a strong recovery in the job market, and while we are not 

there yet, I believe we have made substantial progress. As the 

economy improves and the labor market gets stronger, I would expect to see the growth of wages pick up over time, and at this point 

I think we are seeing at least some first tentative signs that wage 

growth is increasing. It has been running at a very slow pace. 

There are often lags between improvement in the labor market and 

a pickup in wage growth. 

Ms. SEWELL. Do you think unemployment rates—is it more because of structural changes or cyclical factors with respect to— 

Mrs. YELLEN. Both cyclical and structural factors matter. So 

cyclically as the labor market picks up, I think the pace of aggregate wage growth will pick up. But structural factors are also very 

important; productivity growth matters over time to real wage increases, and productivity growth in recent years has frankly been 

very disappointing. That may be holding wages down. 

But across gaps, differences in wage trends across different 

groups in the labor market, I think, reflect a deeper set of longer 

term structural influences and go way back to the late 1970s or 

mid-1970s, where we have seen growing gaps by education. We 

have seen a persistent increase in the returns to high-skilled workers, and stagnation at the middle and at the bottom. 

Ms. SEWELL. Do you think any changes in our tax or spending 

policies could help close that gap quicker? I get that systemic problems and persistent poverty cause lots of segments of the population to have their unemployment lag behind, sort of overall unVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:37 Jul 07, 2016 Jkt 097154 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\97154.TXT TERI
25 

employment, but I really want to know if there are substantive 

things we can do as far as our tax policies or our spending policies 

that would hasten the closure of that gap, that unemployment gap? 

Mrs. YELLEN. Well, there is a large literature on this, and many 

economists have made suggestions about things that Congress 

could consider that would address inequality. I am certain with a 

high return to education and skills being a very important factor 

in determining wage outcomes, policies that address education at 

different levels would be relevant to that. 

Ms. SEWELL. Are there any policies that—or outreach efforts that 

the Fed has made in order to really understand the difference in 

communities of color with respect to the wage and the income inequality? 

Mrs. YELLEN. We do have surveys. We are trying to collect information. Household surveys enable us to gain better insight into 

this, and we have community development efforts that are addressed to low- and moderate-income communities to try to see 

what could be done. 

Ms. SEWELL. Thank you for your efforts, and I hope you will continue them. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentlelady has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. 

Fincher. 

Mr. FINCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Chair 

Yellen. 

I appreciate you being here today, and I am going to get right 

to the point. I am going to talk a little bit—a couple of lines of 

questions, cost-benefit analysis, and then about raising interest 

rates and what kind of impact that will have on national debt 

versus personal debt, and the committee room being remodeled, I 

also have been watching the TVs, which are very informative. 

And the charts that I think are being shown by my colleagues 

on the other side of the aisle, if we would just change the top to 

progress since Republicans took the House in 2011, then I think 

the charts are great. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Yes! 

[laughter] 

Mr. FINCHER. So I appreciate my buddies on the other side of the 

aisle; I get a big kick out of that. Back to costs-benefit analysis, the 

small and medium-sized banks, lending institutions all over the 

country, the impacts of Dodd-Frank being burdensome, over-burdensome. Just two or three questions, and you can answer and we 

will move on. 

Does the Fed’s independence in setting monetary policy mean 

that financial regulations are above the law, one, and has anyone 

at the Federal Reserve does an analysis of the cumulative impact 

of Dodd-Frank regulation on broader economic variables, such as 

credit availability, economic growth, capital formation, and perhaps 

most importantly, job creation? 

Now, the CFTC and the SEC do this. Why aren’t you doing this, 

and can you shed light on why you are not, and would you be open 

to doing it? 

Mrs. YELLEN. We do a great deal of analysis to try and understand the costs of regulations that we put in place, and their beneVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:37 Jul 07, 2016 Jkt 097154 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\97154.TXT TERI
26 

fits. For example, with respect to the Basal III capital requirements, we participated along with other countries in a very detailed cost-benefit study of the likely impact of raising capital 

standards. 

We came to the conclusion that even though there might be a 

very modest burden on raising spreads and the cost of capital to 

the economy, that the costs of financial crises had been so dramatic 

and so large that the impact that we would have of reducing the 

odds of a financial crisis passed the cost-benefit test easily. We regularly make sure we comply with the— 

Mr. FINCHER. So, are you—not to interrupt, but my time is slipping away. Would you be open to doing a specific cost-benefit analysis for every big decision? Because, what you are saying there— 

I get what you are saying and I know it is very complicated, but 

you are saying that in order to make sure that we hurt this one 

over here, we are doing this one here, but we are not going to give 

you the information that you—it is not cut and dried, which we 

need more than you are getting. Would you be open to doing a costbenefit analysis, yes or no? 

Mrs. YELLEN. We do follow the analysis required by current law, 

and in some cases I think it would be difficult to do that, after all— 

Mr. FINCHER. So, no? 

Mrs. YELLEN. —Congress has, for example, in Dodd-Frank, already made a judgment that they want to see us put certain requirements into place based on Congress’ judgment that it would 

make the financial system safer and sounder. We put out proposed 

regulations for comment to try to accomplish an objective that Congress has already assigned to us, because they have determined 

that it would be beneficial. 

Mr. FINCHER. Okay. Reclaiming my time, it just seems like a 

common-sense approach. I know it is very complicated, but again, 

the SEC, the CFTC, and other agencies are doing this—that we 

have a common-sense approach, cost-benefit analysis. 

And you are—I think you are saying that you are in favor of 

doing it this time. Maybe Congress needs to do something else— 

let me move on—but you are not in favor of it. 

Raising interest rates, nationally, the debt that we owe, we see 

the current national debt, personally, the debt that every—many 

Americans owe in this country. When we start down this path of 

raising rates, I am afraid—there is a whole generation of people 

now who think that zero percent is the standard interest rate, because they don’t know what the interest rates—back when I was 

a kid, when interest rates were 18 or 20 percent under the Carter 

Administration. 

But when you start down this path of raising rates, my theory 

is we go into another recession, then you can’t raise rates again, 

because rates are already low, because you haven’t raised them 

much anyway. And then the only answer is more quantitative easing, more dumping money into the economy, and that gets very serious very quickly. 

What is your—do you fear that raising rates is going to do this? 

I know my time is— 

Mrs. YELLEN. We are not going to raise rates if we think it is 

going to tip the economy into a recession. We will raise rates beVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:37 Jul 07, 2016 Jkt 097154 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\97154.TXT TERI
27 

cause we believe the economy is strong enough that it is appropriate to have higher rates to meet the objectives we have been assigned by Congress and— 

Mr. FINCHER. This is a concern for you as well? 

Mrs. YELLEN. We wouldn’t do something that would threaten a 

recession— 

Mr. FINCHER. I yield back. 

Mrs. YELLEN. —unless inflation were at risk with— 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Foster. 

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Chair Yellen, for appearing today. 

On page 12 of your report, you note that exports, that is to say, 

trade imbalance, has been a substantial drag on GDP growth. 

The House and Senate will soon go to conference on a customs 

bill that was part of a trade package that was mostly passed into 

law last month. 

So my concern is and continues to be around the potential for our 

trade partners to undermine the value that free-trade agreements 

can have without strong, enforceable prohibitions on currency manipulation. 

During the trade debates, the Administration put forth the position—they basically insisted that it was impossible to define currency manipulation in any way—for example, with the IMF definition of currency manipulation, in any way that would not have significantly impinged on your ability to have accommodative monetary policy, including quantitative easing, in response to the downturn. 

So my question to you is, do you agree with that? Specifically, 

in what ways would, for example, the IMF definition of currency 

manipulation, have prevented you from accommodative monetary 

policy? 

Mrs. YELLEN. I do agree with the concerns that were expressed 

about currency manipulation. First, let me make clear that I am 

opposed, and the G-7 and G-20 have weighed in, that intervention 

in currency markets by governments for the sake of changing the 

competitive landscape and purposely trying to— 

Mr. FOSTER. Agreed. 

Mrs. YELLEN. —convert trade to a country is wrong. It is inappropriate behavior. Our Treasury Department is deeply engaged 

with other countries— 

Mr. FOSTER. I understand. 

Mrs. YELLEN. —when they think they see that. 

Mr. FOSTER. The question is, is it possible to make actionable objective criteria, defining currency manipulation, which would not 

have impinged on what we had to do in response to the crisis? 

Mrs. YELLEN. I believe it is difficult because many factors influence the value of currencies that are traded in markets. 

Mr. FOSTER. You are aware the IMF definition does not talk 

about the value of currencies; it talks about action. 

It has three indicia: you have to be running a persistent trade 

surplus; you have to be accumulating additional foreign-exchange 

28 

reserves; and you have to be holding excess foreign exchange reserves. 

It is my belief that none of those three would have been triggered 

by our response. 

And the question is, in so that the Administration’s position was 

just fundamentally wrong, that IMF definition would have prevented us from the accommodative monetary policy that was so important to rescuing our economy? 

Mrs. YELLEN. My concern with this is that I think it is important 

for countries to be able to conduct monetary policies that best pursue domestic objectives. Those policies are not intended to impact 

currencies, but because they do affect interest rates, and interest 

rates affect global capital flows, they have impacts on currency values. 

All I have said about this topic is that I would worry about any 

type of legislation that could cripple monetary policy from achieving the objectives that Congress has assigned to us. 

Mr. FOSTER. I understand you are worried about it. The question, 

the precise question is, is there anything you did that would have 

triggered the IMF definition of currency— 

Mrs. YELLEN. I am not sure. I haven’t studied that carefully 

enough. 

Mr. FOSTER. Would you be able to get back to us? Would it be 

possible to get back with an answer for the record— 

Mrs. YELLEN. We will try to look at that. 

Mr. FOSTER. —of that precise question? Thank you. I really appreciate that. 

Let’s see. I have a little bit of time left, so I guess—are you familiar with—I am a physicist, are you familiar with Albert Einstein’s 

quote that any theory of the universe should be made as simple as 

possible but not simpler? And are you ever reminded of that quote 

when you talk about these—things like the Taylor Rule, where you 

imagine that the entire universe can be reserved—reduced to a linear relation between a handful of variables? 

Mrs. YELLEN. I think that is a very good point, and I think it is 

apropos of the Taylor Rule. It would be nice to be able to reduce 

appropriate policy to the current values of two simple variables, 

but I think the world is more complicated than that. We can’t take 

everything into account, but there are important things that need 

to be considered, and that is why we have an FOMC that has been 

asked to bring a great deal of information to the table. 

Mr. FOSTER. Right. And the last thing is sort of a mathematical 

corollary of that, which is that if you have something that is really 

a function of many, many variables, and it is changing over a period of time in response to a single one of those variables, that obviously does not mean that the real response function is a single 

variable—single function of the single variable, which is— 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Royce, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chair Yellen, in your first 

appearance as Fed Chair before this committee, you commented on 

the need to move forward with housing finance reform. Do you continue to believe the current state of our secondary mortgage marVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:37 Jul 07, 2016 Jkt 097154 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\97154.TXT TERI
29 

ket poses a systemic risk, and should Congress and the FHFA be 

taking steps to share that public risk backed by taxpayers with the 

private sector? Secretary Lew suggested that such an approach 

would have his support. 

Mrs. YELLEN. I have long said, and my predecessors have as 

well, that we think it would be desirable to see Congress address 

GSE reform to decide explicitly, self-consciously what is the appropriate role of the government in the mortgage market, and to try 

to bring private capital back into the mortgage market. 

There are a number of different ways, different strategies Congress could take to accomplish that, but I do think it is important 

for Congress to try to resolve those issues. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. Chair Yellen, last year, I, along with 

other members of the House Financial Services Committee, wrote 

to Treasury Secretary Lew and copied you regarding our concerns 

about FSOC’s lack of a formalized process for reviewing non-bank 

financial institutions facing designation, and we shared concerns 

about the FSOC’s need to conduct a thoughtful review of the insurance industry before moving to designate individual insurers. 

Since sending that letter, the FSOC has taken additional steps 

to understand the asset management industry which was clearly 

needed after the flawed Office of Financial Research report. 

Specifically, Federal Reserve Governor Tarullo has endorsed an 

in-depth marketwide analysis and an activities-based systemic risk 

review, but the FSOC has still not taken steps to study and better 

understand the insurance industry. 

So, do you think it would be appropriate to conduct a thorough 

study and analysis of the insurance industry as well? Shouldn’t all 

non-bank financial institutions face a similar process for review? 

Mrs. YELLEN. The asset management industry is one where 

FSOC thought it appropriate to focus on activities and to look at 

whether or not there are systemic risks associated with some asset 

management activities. Examples would include liquidity and redemption risk and use of off-balance-sheet leverage. 

With respect to insurance, this is not a matter of going from reviews of individual companies to the activities type of approach— 

it is not something that FSOC, to the best of my knowledge, has 

discussed. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me go then to my last question. In February of 

2014, I asked you about the deepening economic crisis in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. You said then that the Federal Reserve 

was monitoring developments and would continue to analyze the 

potential consequences for financial stability for these events. You 

also said that it would be best to not have the Federal Reserve step 

in as a creditor of a State or municipality. In fact, you said it was 

more appropriate for Congress and not the Federal Reserve to address financial issues faced by States and municipalities. 

Do you believe that the best outcome would be that the Puerto 

Rico Electric Power Authority and its creditors would come to an 

agreement without any government intervention with respect to 

this issue? 

Mrs. YELLEN. Without what intervention? 

Mr. ROYCE. Without government intervention, and instead work 

it out between the Power Authority and the creditors? 

30 

Mrs. YELLEN. This is not a matter in which I have an opinion. 

It is something the Federal Reserve can’t and shouldn’t be involved 

in. I think it is important for Congress to consider what is best to 

do in this case. And it is not a question on which I have an informed judgment. 

What we have been doing is obviously monitoring developments 

in Puerto Rico, which economically, are very, very difficult. We are 

looking to see if there are risks that are being transmitted to the 

broader municipal debt market, and we are not seeing signs of contagion. That is another topic that is obviously important, but exactly what should be done in this situation, I think, is a matter for 

Congress to consider. 

Mr. ROYCE. In the past, you have said it is best not to have the 

Federal Reserve step in as a creditor of a State or municipality. 

Mrs. YELLEN. And I continue to believe that very strongly. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Ohio, Mrs. Beatty. 

Mrs. BEATTY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Ranking Member Waters. 

Chair Yellen, thank you for being here today, and let me just say 

that we were very proud to have you last week in the great State 

of Ohio. 

Mrs. YELLEN. Thank you. 

Mrs. BEATTY. Although it was not Columbus, the capital, we 

would look forward to having you come just a few miles south to 

visit us. 

My first question is a follow-up on Congresswoman Waters’ question, when she asked about discrimination and the loss of wealth 

based on subprime lending, and in part of your answer, which I am 

not sure you got to finish, when you said there were other policies 

that Congress could pursue to address discrimination and inequality. 

Can you elaborate on what those policies are? 

Mrs. YELLEN. I meant more broadly in terms of inequality among 

households, in terms of wealth and income. There are many factors 

that affect inequality. They tend to be deeper structural forces, including technological change that has increasingly upped the skill 

demands for our workforce and raised the return to skilled workers 

relative to those who are less skilled. 

Certainly, education and training are matters that are within 

Congress’ domain to consider how to make sure that individuals 

have access to a world-class education that is going to enable them 

to earn a higher wage; policies affecting infrastructure and capital 

formation, entrepreneurship, other things also affect trends and inequality. And I was referring to all of those factors where Congress 

could potentially play a role. 

Mrs. BEATTY. Okay, thank you. 

When you testified before this committee in February, January’s 

unemployment rate was about 6.6 percent overall. About 4 months 

later, the rate decreased to about 5.3 percent. However, in AfricanAmerican communities, while it declined, it went from 12.1 percent 

to 9.5 percent over that same period. 

31 

And while African-Americans’ unemployment rate did decrease, 

the number is still too high. In fact, it is double the national unemployment rate, and I think most people—you included—would 

agree that is unacceptably high. 

So my question is, as you assess the health of the labor market, 

to what extent are you taking into account the fact that minority 

communities still face unacceptably high rates of unemployment, 

and is there any outreach or anything that the Federal Reserve has 

engaged in to understand the extent in communities such as the 

one I represent? 

Mrs. YELLEN. There really isn’t anything directly that the Federal Reserve can do to affect the structure of unemployment across 

groups. And unfortunately, it has long been the case that AfricanAmerican unemployment rates tend to be higher than those on average among those in the Nation as a whole. It reflects a number 

of different sources of disadvantage that are operative there. 

In our national monetary policy, we are trying to achieve a situation where jobs are broadly available in the economy to those who 

want to work. But we seek the maximum sustainable level of employment or we have to be careful not to try to push the economy 

to a point we have to worry about inflation remaining under control. And given our focus on inflation, there are certainly limits on 

what we can do for any particular group. 

Mrs. BEATTY. Okay. Thank you. 

I have a few seconds left. Let me continue on this theme on the 

other side as I talk about the Office of Minority and Women Inclusion (OMWI). Certainly, you know that Section 342 of Dodd-Frank 

created that office. Part of what we have struggled with is the 

whole reporting authority and the standards for reporting back 

what the Federal regulation offices are doing. 

Do you have any insight on that? 

Mrs. YELLEN. We make each of the Federal agencies or entities 

that are covered by this make annual reports to the Congress. So 

the Board is reported annually on our efforts, and we are very committed to doing what we can to facilitate inclusion of minorities 

and women. And we have many programs and have tried to detail 

them in those reports— 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentlelady has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Missouri, Mrs. 

Wagner. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chair Yellen, thank you for joining us today. I want to touch on 

some issues that some of my colleagues have also brought up. But 

keeping in that vein, and particularly with the news coming out of 

Greece for the past few weeks, I think it is important for countries 

to take a hard look at their own debt. It is time for us to look in 

the mirror and address our own problems, including the over $18 

trillion in debt that we have accumulated. 

Now, the Federal Reserve has employed an, I will say exceptionally accommodating, monetary policy since the financial crisis to 

spur economic growth. However we are now nearly 7 years, ma’am 

out with the Federal funds rate still at the lower zero bound. The 

quantitative easing and low interest rates have made financing of 

32 

the Nation’s deficits much easier, and certainly has relieved pressure through fiscal reforms to solve our long-term debt problem. 

Chair Yellen, both you and your predecessor, Chair Bernanke, 

have argued that fiscal reform is important over the long term. 

However, you have also stated that fiscal prudence can be ignored 

in the short term to not hamper the economic recovery. 

Chair Yellen, it has now been 7 years. We can no longer say we 

are looking at the short term when we are dealing with our country’s debt problem, can we? 

Mrs. YELLEN. I, like my predecessor, believe the Nation faces a 

very serious debt problem in the years ahead. 

At the moment our deficit, mainly because of congressional actions and those by the Administration, have succeeded in lowering 

deficits to the point where for the next several years, the debt-toGDP ratio is stable. 

But over time, under CBO projections, as the population ages, 

and especially if health care costs rise above trends, the country 

will face an unsustainable debt path, in which debt to GDP ratio 

rises and that requires further action. 

That is mainly related to retirement programs, to Social Security 

and even more important, to Medicare and health care cost trends. 

And so, we have known about this for decades, and there remains 

a need for action on this front. 

Mrs. WAGNER. There does remain a need for action. And citing 

those latest CBO long-term budget outlook reports on some of the 

consequences of large and growing Federal debt, this comes again 

from the CBO’s long-term budget outlook, it cites things like less 

national savings, lower income, pressure for larger tax increases or 

spending cuts, reduced ability to respond to domestic and international problems, and a greater chance of a fiscal crisis. 

Are these things that you all consider at the Federal Reserve 

with regard to monetary policy? 

Mrs. YELLEN. I agree with the set of consequences that you just 

read to me. And ultimately, when we see those things being manifest, those consequences. So in the years ahead, if deficits aren’t 

addressed and become very large, they will put pressure on the 

economy that—not right now, but in future years, likely will cause 

us to have higher levels of interest rates than we otherwise would 

have, diminished levels of investment and productivity growth in 

this economy. We would have to offset those forces by having a 

tighter monetary policy. But we are not in that situation now. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Particularly relating to long-term debt leading to 

a greater chance of fiscal crisis, as they say, is this something you 

discuss as part of FSOC when you are looking at systemic risk? 

Mrs. YELLEN. I have not been part of an FSOC discussion of this, 

but it obviously is a significant issue for the long term. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I only have a short amount of time. When do we 

get to the long term, Chair Yellen? When are we there after 7 

years and adding $8 trillion in debt over the last handful of years? 

When do we get to the long term? 

Mrs. YELLEN. The economy is recovering. I am pleased by its 

progress. As I indicated, my colleagues and I think if the economy 

progresses as we expect, we probably will begin to raise interest 

rates some time this year, and that takes us toward the long term. 

33 

Mrs. WAGNER. How does that affect our current debt, Chair 

Yellen? 

Mrs. YELLEN. Well, two ways. Higher interest rates will raise the 

cost of servicing the debt, but a stronger economy, which is what 

will cause us to raise interest rates, boosts tax receipts and is favorable for the Federal budget. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you. I appreciate you being here. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentlelady has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Kildee. 

Mr. KILDEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chair Yellen, thank you 

for being here. 

The work that I did before I came to Congress and a lot of the 

work that I have been focused on since I have been here relates 

to the economic health of America’s cities and towns. And I know 

that a lot of the regional banks, most notably Boston, Cleveland, 

Chicago, and in some ways Philadelphia, have been focusing some 

attention on this issue of the fiscal health of communities within 

their supervisory area. And I have raised this with your predecessor and again with you. 

I am curious as to whether the Board of Governors might in the 

near future take up this question. What we have, and I have talked 

about this before, I know other Members have heard me go on 

about it, is we have looming a pending institutional failure in this 

country. There is often a tendency to think about cities facing significant municipal stress as being anomalies, or having that problem as a result of significant mismanagement, or an episodic sort 

of fiscal stress situation. 

But what we are seeing, and what the data shows us, is there 

is a structural problem. Municipal governments of all types are facing enormous stress. Hundreds of millions of dollars in general 

fund revenues and expenditures in many, many dozens of these 

municipal institutions that are facing potential failure. 

While I know the Fed has involved itself most recently in the 

question of municipal bonds, potentially as a source of liquidity for 

banks, looking at the municipal financial situation from the investor side is only one-half of the equation. 

And I think it is overdue that the Fed, with its strong voice and 

its dual mandate, particularly its mandate related to employment, 

take a look at the potential employment impacts of the failure of 

dozens, potentially, of American cities that are really central to our 

economy. 

I wonder if you might comment on the problem and offer any 

thoughts as to whether you think the Board of Governors might 

take this question up. I think it would be an important issue to 

take up. 

Mrs. YELLEN. That is something I am happy to raise with my colleagues. I am well aware of the work that has gone on in a number 

of Reserve banks. Reserve banks all have active community development functions, and many of them have been very focused on 

older cities or cities that have suffered declines, in some cases because of the decline of manufacturing, and trying to help them 

work toward strategies that would lead to their revitalization. 

34 

And a number of them have done some very creative work. So 

I can discuss with my colleagues what we might do in that space. 

I am pleased to see the efforts and the good work that many of the 

Reserve banks have undertaken. I think it has been helpful to community leaders as they try to devise strategies for revitalization. 

Mr. KILDEE. Thank you. I would just encourage you to look at 

this as potentially a part of the work of the Board of Governors 

itself and looking at the role that the banks, regional banks have 

done. It is important. 

But I think often what happens is, when it is looked at from a 

perspective of a region, it is seen as an anomaly. And I think if the 

Fed would be willing to use its research capacity to help elucidate 

to many policymakers that not only does this problem have a potential negative impact on employment, but it is a structural and 

pervasive problem that goes beyond what normally had been seen 

as an anomaly, or as an episode based on management failure or 

some unforeseen circumstance. It is a structural problem, and I 

really do think it fits within the responsibility of the Fed. 

Mrs. YELLEN. I appreciate your suggestion. I know a number of 

years ago the Reserve banks collaborated to initiate work on this 

topic. They chose a number of communities around the country, cities that were hard pressed, and tried to work on understanding 

what strategies worked to revitalize these different kinds of communities. And it could be collaborative work the Reserve banks undertake together. 

Mr. KILDEE. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. 

Barr. 

Mr. BARR. Chair Yellen, welcome back to the committee. And I 

wanted to talk to you a little bit about the low rate policy, effectively, it is almost a zero short-term interest rate policy, that the 

Federal Reserve has pursued now for 6 years. One of the original 

targets the Fed set to begin raising rates was when unemployment 

reached 6.5 percent. 

We are well below that target now; as you testify today, we are 

at about 5.3 percent unemployment. And I appreciate your testimony that you expect to raise the target Federal funds rate gradually by the end of this year, but what I want to explore are the reasons why the Fed has delayed normalizing monetary policy beyond 

the point that you originally targeted for increasing rates and what 

that says about a few issues. 

First of all, what does it say about the unpredictability of Fed 

policy? And I appreciate in your testimony that effective communication is critical, that transparency is desirable. 

But doesn’t the fact that we have been below 6.5 percent unemployment now for almost a year-and-a-half, and you still haven’t 

raised rates, undermine the commitment to transparency and the 

commitment to communication? 

Mrs. YELLEN. I want to make clear that we never said that we 

intended to raise rates when unemployment fell to 6.5 percent. 

Instead, we said it was a threshold and if unemployment was 

above that level and inflation was well under control, we would not 

35 

raise rates; that once unemployment fell below that level, we would 

then begin to consider whether it was appropriate to raise rates. 

And we have followed that policy, and we never said that it was 

a target— 

Mr. BARR. I understand that. 

Mrs. YELLEN. —at which we would begin to raise rates. 

Mr. BARR. I understand that, and I appreciate the caveats, and 

I appreciate the fact— 

Mrs. YELLEN. Well, it is more than a caveat. It is— 

Mr. BARR. You are very good at caveats. I appreciate that. 

But I think that brings me to my second point, which is that a 

full 61⁄2 years after the recovery, even though we have seen a decline in unemployment, as you acknowledge, there is slack in the 

labor market, and there are significant, significant weaknesses in 

the labor market, in the overall economy. 

In fact, a recent ‘‘Investor’s Business Daily’’ article said that the 

overall growth in the 23 quarters of the Obama recovery has been 

13.3 percent. That is less than half the average growth rate 

achieved at this point in the previous 10 recoveries since World 

War II. 

Looked at another way, had the Obama recovery been merely average, GDP would be $1.9 trillion larger than today. That translates into $6,000 per household. 

And I think you recognize this in your report, saying that the 

measure of labor under-utilization remains elevated relative to the 

unemployment rate, and that would explain why you have invoked 

that caveat and haven’t raised the rates, even though you came 

below that 6.5 percent. So I understand that analysis. 

But let’s talk about the cause of that underlying weakness. It is 

clearly not monetary policy from your standpoint, because you have 

engaged in these extraordinary measures—6 years of zero rates, 

very accommodative policy, bond buying, quantitative easing. 

Shouldn’t we start looking at fiscal policy: Obamacare, which 

CBO says is contracting employment by 2.5 million jobs; the 30- 

hour work week, which is forcing people to go part-time; the EPA’s 

rationing of energy; 8,000 lost coal miners in my State and we are 

losing employment by the day. 

The American Action Forum says that over the next 10 years, 

Dodd-Frank will reduce GDP output by almost a trillion dollars. 

And just last week, one of your colleagues on the Federal Reserve, Board Governor Lael Brainard, acknowledged that regulations may be a factor in diminished fixed-income liquidity in the 

capital markets. 

The Federal Reserve has gone to extraordinary lengths to 

produce robust economic growth, and yet we see this lag and this 

slack, as you say. 

Shouldn’t we start diagnosing the problem differently, that this 

is a fiscal policy disaster? 

Mrs. YELLEN. Of course, it is appropriate to look at why we have 

had such a slow recovery. It really has been painstakingly slow getting the economy to the point where unemployment is 5.3 percent. 

Remember, we had a devastating financial crisis. It took a huge 

toll on households, left many of them struggling with debt, with 

36 

massive losses in wealth, underwater on their mortgages. They 

have been trying to get that debt under control. 

Businesses have been very cautious about investing. We are— 

Mr. BARR. And I have 15 seconds left. 

Mrs. YELLEN. —partly living with the headwinds from that crisis. But— 

Mr. BARR. Just one final point. I think you know that low rates 

are not the problem. And in fact, what I am concerned about now 

is that because we have delayed raising rates below that 6.5 percent unemployment rate, now we have no tools left. 

And what is your response now? If we go back into recession 

with a $4.5 trillion balance sheet and zero rates, we have no tools 

to address the next recession. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member 

Waters. Chair Yellen, thank you for being here. 

One of the biggest problems we have in our country is the disappearing middle class, and one of the factors that isn’t addressed 

in that conversation is often housing. 

And in my home State of Florida, in areas like Miami, and Coral 

Gables, there is a lot of growth. In fact, a lot of the numbers there 

for growth are through the roof, way better than ever expected. 

But unfortunately, that is for folks who have the 700-plus credit 

scores, while the middle- to lower-middle-income families, especially a lot of the minority communities, are neither experiencing 

this bounce-back, nor building the equity that I think is important 

to get into the middle class. 

My question relates to regulatory relief for banks lending to 

these families. When does the Federal Reserve intend to finalize its 

list of domestic systemically important banks so that this committee can have an idea, better than just the $50 billion line, which 

American banks are vanilla, making 30-year fixed-rate mortgages 

and small business loans important in our communities, versus the 

ones that carry systemic risk. 

Mrs. YELLEN. I am not sure exactly what your— 

Mr. MURPHY. When do you intend to finalize the list of domestic 

systemically important banks? 

Mrs. YELLEN. We have eight domestic banks that have been designated globally as global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). 

They are among the banks that are over $50 billion and subject to 

the enhanced prudential standards in Dodd-Frank. 

And those banks we have, for example, subjected to a higher leverage requirement than other banks. We supervise them in a different process, and we will be proposing enhanced capital standards or surcharges for those eight systemically important banks. 

But others that are not in that group also are important and 

have systemic significance and are subject to enhanced prudential 

standards and supervision. 

Mr. MURPHY. And will you be putting that list out? 

Mrs. YELLEN. The list exists. 

Mr. MURPHY. Other than the G-SIBs. 

Mrs. YELLEN. I am not sure—what list? 

37 

Mr. MURPHY. For what I just said. For the domestic systemically 

important banks. And there has been a lot of conversation here in 

the committee as to whether it is just a $50 billion, what I would 

say, arbitrary line that is being considered instead of qualitative 

measures like interconnectedness, derivatives, substitutability, et 

cetera, and if that is going to be taken into consideration. 

Mrs. YELLEN. We give special attention to all banks that are over 

that threshold. But they differ in terms of their characteristics. 

And we have tried throughout to tailor supervision and regulation 

to the systemic footprint of the bank. 

So there is no list of banks that meet this criteria. And there are, 

of course, several that have been designated for supervision by 

FSOC that—or also subject to enhanced supervision. 

Mr. MURPHY. Switching gears a little bit, and we have already 

had some discussion related to employment, most economists say 

that 5 percent is full employment. Right now, U3 is at, what, 5.3 

percent? So we are pretty close. 

Why do you think we haven’t had wage growth yet, and what do 

you think needs to be done to begin to feel that? 

Mrs. YELLEN. First of all, I think there is more slack in the labor 

market than you would think by the 5.3 percent measure, somewhat more. And I have pointed to the very high levels, unusually 

high, and we detailed this in the Monetary Policy Report. The fact 

that involuntary part-time employment is unusually high given the 

unemployment rate. So that is one factor. 

In addition, I think that labor force participation, while it has 

mainly declined for demographic reasons, there remains some component of depressed labor force participation that does reflect a 

weak economy, a weak labor market that more people would rejoin 

the labor market if it were stronger. 

So to my mind, the U3, the 5.3, somewhat overstates just how 

strong the labor market is. But there are also lags in the time the 

labor market strengthens and wage growth picks up. 

Mr. MURPHY. What rate do you think we as policymakers should 

use as full employment? 

Mrs. YELLEN. The—what? 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 

Rothfus. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Chair Yellen. 

Last week, the Federal Reserve Board approved the merger of a 

$188 billion bank with an $18 billion bank. This will put the new 

entity above $200 billion. In the Federal Reserve’s final order approving the merger, it analyzed the financial stability implications 

of the merger. The Federal Reserve noted that the merger did not 

present a meaningful, greater risk to the stability of the United 

States financial sector. In analyzing the stability implications, the 

Federal Reserve used a factor-based model. 

Chair Yellen, based on the analysis in the final order, should we 

consider this analysis an endorsement by the Federal Reserve of a 

factor-based approach to measuring systemic importance and financial sustainability? 

Mrs. YELLEN. The staff looked at the detailed circumstances surrounding the characteristics of this particular merger and tried to 

38 

arrive at a reasoned judgment, taking many different factors into 

account of whether or not this would create a financial stability 

threat. And they didn’t use just a formulaic approach but they 

looked at the details of situation— 

Mr. ROTHFUS. So the factor-based model worked in this case? 

Mrs. YELLEN. They listed a number of factors they took into consideration, and that is a useful list, but then they did a detailed 

analysis— 

Mr. ROTHFUS. Thank you. Chair Yellen, as you know, this month 

marks 5 years since the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. At the 

signing ceremony, President Obama proclaimed that the law would 

help lift our economy and lead all of us to a stronger, more prosperous future. 

Yet since that time, the law has resulted in some 400 new government mandates, which research has shown will reduce gross domestic product by $895 billion over the next decade, or $3,346 for 

each working-age person. These costs are a large reason why more 

than 17 million Americans are still unemployed or underemployed 

today. Why the percentage of adults who are employed is just 62 

percent, the lowest in 37 years. And why even Bernie Sanders has 

admitted that an honest assessment of real unemployment in the 

United States is 10.5 percent. 

In your speech to the City Club in Cleveland last week you said, 

‘‘Growth in real GDP has averaged only 2.25 percent per year since 

2009; about 1 percent less than the average rate seen over the 25 

years preceding the great recession.’’ I would note that by comparison, the GDP growth rate for a comparable period after the Reagan 

recovery was 4.8 percent. That was a recovery marked by less regulation, lower taxes compared to higher taxes, and a higher regulation environment than we have here. 

Considering that average 2.25 percent per year since 2009, that 

number hides quarters where we actually contracted. For example, 

in both the first quarter in 2014 and in the first quarter in 2015, 

the economy actually shrank. Is that correct? 

Mrs. YELLEN. According to the statistics we have, yes. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. In light of the negative growth in those quarters, 

I would like to draw your attention to the slide that has been 

shown by my colleagues from across the aisle. I don’t see any negative growth quarters in that. 

Do you think this slide is an accurate reflection of the economy’s 

GDP growth? 

Mrs. YELLEN. It looks like the numbers you have on this chart 

are year over year numbers rather than quarterly numbers. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. Counting the bars between 2011 and 2015, I see 

more than 4 bars there; I see quite a few bars. It is hard to see 

what is represented here. What I don’t see are the negative quarters we have had in there. 

Mrs. YELLEN. I don’t know, this isn’t my chart, but— 

Mr. ROTHFUS. Would you agree the chart does not show the negative quarters? 

Mrs. YELLEN. I don’t see the negative quarters. I see your label 

says year over year. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. But you do see more than 4 or 5 years there between 2010 and 2015—more bars that would represent— 

39 

Mrs. YELLEN. Year over year often means the fourth quarter of 

one year over the fourth quarter of the previous year, or the third 

quarter over the third quarter of the previous year. And because 

negative quarters are infrequent, typically in a four quarter year 

over year— 

Mr. ROTHFUS. Negative quarters and near zero quarters, which 

we also missed in that chart. I would be interested in your perspective given these anemic GDP numbers when you compare a 2.25 

percent growth since 2009, and your own acknowledgment that is 

a percentage less than the 25 years proceeding the great—this is 

the more accurate slide, by the way, which does show the negative 

or near zero growth in some of the quarters. 

Mrs. YELLEN. Okay. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. Given that anemic growth, 2.25 percent, and you 

compare the deregulatory, lower tax environment in the 1980s 

where we had 4.8 percent growth, do you think Dodd-Frank has 

lifted the economy? 

Mrs. YELLEN. I think Dodd-Frank has led to a stronger and more 

resilient financial system, and the years that you showed on your 

previous graph that were negative and year over year negatives, 

that was what we suffered in the financial crisis—a huge loss in 

output and in jobs. And to have a stronger, more resilient financial 

system means the odds of such a devastating episode is dramatically reduced. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. I yield back my time. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Washington, Mr. 

Heck. 

Mr. HECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Madam Chair, thank 

you so much for being here. 

I am aware that there is an accumulating amount of research 

and scholarship, as a matter of fact, kind of tracking the decline 

of entrepreneurship and business formation. Fewer businesses are 

being started and fewer are surviving past the first year. And as 

we all know, there is a declining number of community banks in 

this country. 

So my question to you is, what can you do, and what can we do 

to help community banks serve their local economies? 

Mrs. YELLEN. Community banks are really vital to local economies. I saw this firsthand when I was in San Francisco as President of the Reserve bank there. It is something we are very focused 

on at the Federal Reserve. We want to see community banks 

thrive, and we know that for many different reasons, this is a very 

difficult environment for community banks: the slow pace of economic growth and recovery that we have had; the low interest environment is squeezing their margins; and the regulatory burdens 

that they face have been really quite high and they are struggling 

with it. 

For our part, we are looking at the way that we supervise community banks to do everything within our power to reduce the regulatory burden. And I could give you a list of things that we are 

trying to do to minimize the burden: more off-site exams; more special tailoring of our exams to the risk profile of the bank. 

Mr. HECK. If I could reclaim my time, thank you. 

40 

Mrs. YELLEN. Yes, sure. 

Mr. HECK. Kind of in the spirit of this, Congresswoman Beatty 

asked you about what you could do specifically to help communities 

of color who have disproportionately high unemployment rates. 

And you indicated that you don’t have specialized tools. I am going 

to respectfully disagree. 

And I would encourage you and others at the Fed to take note 

of some recent research done by a graduate student at MIT named 

Mr. Nguyen, who indicates that when community banks branches 

leave census tracks where there is a concentration of either low-income or communities of color, that local business lending declines 

precipitously, even when there are other national or international 

bank branches retained in that community. 

He tracks that it is not true with mortgage lending, but it is true 

with small business lending. And with all due respect, Madam 

Chair, you have merger approval authority oftentimes when community banks are purchased, and you could make conditional the 

continuing presence of branches in those census tracks or in those 

neighborhoods where we have begun to document a decline. 

So with the little amount of time I have left, I am always interested in your opinion about what you see as the threats to our continuing recovery. And I will use this opportunity to suggest that I 

don’t think it is as robust as it can be. You and I have had the conversation about the output gap and the dire need for the Fed to 

begin to think of itself differently as it relates to investment and 

infrastructure. But I am not going to go there today with you. 

What do you see as the threats that could induce—or the factors 

that could contribute to another downturn in the economy? What 

are you worried about? What keeps you up at night? 

Mrs. YELLEN. Let me first start by saying that I do think the 

economy has improved a great deal. And in a way, I am focused 

on the economy’s strength and its good performance, rather than 

mainly lying awake at night and worrying about a further downturn. I think we are doing pretty well. 

Mr. HECK. The Fed has reduced the projected growth rate of the 

GDP by 20 percent in just the last few years, from 2.5 to 2.8 to 

2.3 percent. That is a material downward projection. 

Mrs. YELLEN. It is— 

Mr. HECK. But the question still is, what is out there that worries you? 

Mrs. YELLEN. Okay, let me just say that the writing down for our 

projections on growth in part reflects the fact that productivity 

growth has consistently disappointed now for a number of years. 

So our unemployment projections have proven more accurate 

than our output projections. In essence, we have had decent job 

growth and better job growth than you would have anticipated, or 

we would have anticipated with weaker growth. In part, it is a reflection of quite disappointing productivity growth. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Schweikert. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Thank you, Chairman Hensarling. 

Madam Chair, first, on a personal basis, you have always been 

very kind to me, particularly on some of the more abstract questions I have thrown at you. But in a couple of the conversations 

41 

here, there has been the discussion of interest rate policy, ultimately what it does to us and our fiscal policy. In an FOMC meeting, does it ever reach the level of conversation of, as interest rates 

go back to some level of normalization, what it actually means to 

our debt and deficit and the projection of our financing costs? 

Mrs. YELLEN. That is something our staff looks at and I have 

looked at. Congress should expect, and this is embodied in CBO 

projections that as the economy recovers, short-term interest rates 

will rise. Long-term interest rates already reflect that, and as the 

years go by, if short-term interest rates do indeed rise with the recovering economy, long rates will move up further and this will affect the interest burden of the debt, and other things equal will add 

to deficit. 

So that is clear. But it is also true that a strengthening economy 

means stronger tax receipts. So this will have an effect. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. You and I see that as somewhat obvious. But 

I see many discussions around here when we are looking at an environment where reports are telling us that just in a few years, interest is going to equal our entire defense budget. And that is actually the new normal—we will call it the new normal interest rate 

models we are heading towards. 

My great fear is current monetary policy ultimately emboldens 

us to engage in bad fiscal policy. And we are going to pay a price 

for that. I think that in the future, particularly if we keep seeing 

the revisions on our GDP growth, we may have to deal with this 

much sooner than later. 

Mrs. YELLEN. You should be aware that interest rates are likely 

to rise and that will raise the interest cost of the debt. That should 

be part of the calculation that you are making. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. I have sort of a one-off type question, and you 

and I touched on this earlier; you were very kind to engage in conversation with me. I have an interest in the distortion of the price 

of money. And more than just what the Fed does in its liquidity 

and claim on bank reserves and the purchase. It is what we do tax 

policy-wise on what interest is deductible and what isn’t, and what 

is guaranteed. 

We sat down with some Richmond Fed folks a while back, and 

they told us that the majority, the vast majority of total debt, not 

including student loans in this country, has full faith or implied 

credit. Are we in the time of an absolute distortion of the price of 

money, and does that make your job much more difficult to use 

money as a communication of activity in the markets? 

Mrs. YELLEN. It is absolutely true that when—whether it is a 

student or a business or a household, considers what the relevant 

cost of borrowing or debt is to them, they look not only at the interest rate they have to pay, but what the other terms are of that borrowing. And if, for example, it is tax advantage, that has an impact 

on what the relevant cost of money is to them. So, of course, it is 

true that many things other than just the headline interest rate 

matters in the incentives facing borrowers. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Well, my thesis on that is that ultimately hits 

to your concern of our savings rates. We have created so much distortion over here on the price of money that we have 

42 

disincentivized proper savings and frugality, you now, particularly 

in our part of Congress. 

You have been asked a couple of questions, and you have always 

been very good at bringing up entrepreneurship. One of the things 

that seems to be working in the economy is some of the alternate 

access to capital platforms, whether they be crowd-sourced lending 

or crowd-sourced equity. 

Much of the regulatory environment is about the systemic risk 

and a cascade effect to the banking financial systems. But these, 

when they are crowd-sourced, actually have almost no cascade effect. 

Do you believe the Fed will take a light regulatory touch to sort 

of the alternative financing models out there that are much more 

egalitarian, reaching into some of our smaller communities, but actually in many ways are much safer? 

Mrs. YELLEN. I am so happy to see innovation in the financial 

sector that makes new forms of financing available. I am not aware 

of regulatory issues at this point that affects those vehicles. But I 

can get back to you if we do have concerns. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Chair, I have 5 minutes to try to convince you not to 

raise interest rates until the spring. Spring is when things naturally are risen. It is when plants come out of the ground. It is a 

better time than winter to do so. 

And there are some reasons that I think you are already aware 

of. The IMF study, for example, argues that things should be delayed until early next year. 

You have more economic experience than all of us in this room, 

of course. But on the political side, you should not underestimate 

the ability of politicians in Europe to screw things up. 

You should not underestimate the ability of politicians in Washington to screw things up. You need to price in the prospect that 

we do not pass all the appropriations bills, that we do not raise the 

debt limit. 

I am sure you factored in China, but it is not just Beijing and 

Washington that you need to worry about. You need to worry about 

Norwalk, Connecticut. 

I mentioned this to you when you were here a few months ago. 

And I am hoping that you can get your staff to do a study on this 

for two purposes: one, to let the country know how important this 

is and what its economic effect will be; and two, to inform your own 

decision so that if this prospective terrible decision does occur, you 

factor in the fact that it is going to shave half a point away from 

our economic growth at least. 

I am referring, of course, as you know, to the argument that we 

are going to capitalize all leases. This would add $2 trillion to the 

corporate balance sheets liabilities of America—a $2 trillion increase in liabilities. 

43 

Not because anything has happened in the economy, but just because as a matter of theological esoteric accounting thinking that 

I have to confess I actually understand and no one should. But for 

no benefit to our economy, we may add $2 trillion. 

When you do that, you throw all the balance sheet ratios out of 

whack. You force companies to try to retrench and make their balance sheets look better. And you strongly disincentivize entering 

into long-term leases. 

Companies will say well gee, yes, you could open that shopping 

center. Why don’t we sign a 1-year lease for the anchor store? And 

oh, we will renew it later, but we can’t sign more than a 1-year 

lease because our balance sheet will look terrible. 

So, if you factor all those reasons in, maybe that will push you 

in the right direction. But there are more. 

The reason to raise interest rates, well the one other that you are 

already aware of is that our unemployment rate doesn’t capture all 

those who have dropped out of the labor market. We have an alltime low labor participation rate. When you adjust for that, the unemployment rate does not just define increase. 

The reason given to raise interest rates is to deal with the prospect of inflation. Inflation is already very low. You have a 2 percent 

target and you are not hitting it. You have to keep interest rates 

low to hit that target. 

But by the way, that is too low a target. Laurence Ball, another 

economist, has argued for even a 4 percent rate. 

And it is in real business where things stick, where you may 

have an employee who gets fired who might not get fired if there 

was an easy way to reduce their costs by 2 or 3 percent. 

And then finally, you have all the Baby Boomer retirees. And I 

will point—it is not in your mandate, but it is in the Declaration 

of Independence, a desire for happiness. 

There are economists and CPAs for whom a 1 percent real interest rate is always a 1 percent real interest rate. That is way less 

than 1 percent of the people. 

For everyone else, they live in a nominal world. And if you are 

a retiree in a zero inflation rate, 1 percent real interest rate world, 

you are living on 1 percent because you psychologically cannot invade principal. 

If instead you are in a 3 percent inflation, 4 percent interest rate, 

1 percent real rate of return world, you are deliriously happy. You 

are earning 4 percent, and nominally you are not invading principal. And this works for everybody except economists and CPAs, 

which means just about everybody. 

So please, wait until spring. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Tipton. 

Mr. TIPTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Chair Yellen, for taking the time to be here 

today. 

We have heard comments from our colleagues across the aisle in 

terms of the disparate impact that we are seeing in the failed economy for minority communities. And I would like to be able to expand that actually for what we are seeing in rural America as well, 

44 

where the economy simply isn’t moving. And one of the key components for that is obviously access to capital for our community 

banks. 

You just stated a few moments ago that it has been a difficult 

period for community banks. Regulatory burdens have been high. 

And I guess what my question is, as follows up on comments that 

you made earlier in the year, which were then supplemented by 

FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair as well, that we have an overzealous 

regulatory burden which is impacting some of the community 

banks that are going. And what assurances, what policies are you 

going to be putting forward? 

Because it seems to be that through Dodd-Frank, it is a matter 

of shoot, then aim. And now we are trying to be reactive. But at 

home our people are feeling the pain of bad policy that has come 

out of Dodd-Frank. And what we are feeling—and what are you 

going to be doing at the Fed to be able to alleviate this? 

Mrs. YELLEN. We are very focused on community banks. We 

want to— 

Mr. TIPTON. That is what they are worried about, by the way. 

[laughter] 

Mrs. YELLEN. We formed a council called the Community Depository Institutions Advisory Council (CDIAC), that consists of community bankers. And they come to see us twice a year. The entire 

Board meets with them. 

There are also in each of the 12 Federal Reserve districts, 

versions of, on a regional scale, a council to advise the Reserve 

banks on factors affecting community banks. 

So we are listening. We are taking seriously the complaints that 

we hear, and the specifics about our supervision, and trying to be 

responsive— 

Mr. TIPTON. I appreciate that, but if I can put a little exclamation point on this. I sat down with community banks in my district. They feel that they are no longer working as a banker, but 

they are working for the Federal Government. They are working 

just for—to be able to comply with regulations that are currently 

in place. 

And while we may have hearings, they don’t feel that anyone is 

actually listening, because this is stagnating that growth in those 

community banks. 

Mrs. YELLEN. We are listening and we are taking a series of 

steps that I believe are meaningful to reduce burden, including reducing the amount of time we spend in these banks, disrupting 

other activities that they want to be doing, by reducing our demands for documentation, taking a more risk-focused approach to 

reduce the burdens of exams. 

We are trying to make clear to the community banks what is relevant to them. And so many of the regulations under Dodd-Frank 

we have put in effect only affect larger banks, and particularly the 

most systemically important banks— 

Mr. TIPTON. But you do recognize that a lot of our community 

banks de facto feel they still have to be able to comply with those 

Dodd-Frank regulations. Even though you are saying, ‘‘We are 

going to look the other way, it doesn’t really apply to you,’’ they are 

still feeling the impacts that are coming out of Dodd-Frank. 

45 

Mrs. YELLEN. There are some things that Dodd-Frank imposed 

on all firms. For example, the Volcker Rule could envision their 

community banks being exempt from Volcker. Now, we are trying 

to tailor our implementation of Volcker to utterly minimize the burden on community banks, but they are subject to it. There may be 

some steps that could be taken. 

Mr. TIPTON. We just introduced legislation for tailoring bank regulations. We have 55 banking organizations that have endorsed the 

legislation, and we hope you will, too, because we have to be able 

to get the economies moving in rural America and our minority 

communities. 

Because when we are looking at that 5.3 percent, and we are 

talking about, as Mr. Rothfus had pointed out, a real unemployment level that is 10.5 percent, part of the problem is that when 

you aren’t raising interest rates right now, what you are really saying is, our economy stinks right now. We are just not seeing real 

movement and what tools do you have left in the toolbox to be able 

to stimulate this? 

Mrs. YELLEN. I would say our economy is in a much better state. 

Low interest rates have facilitated it, and a decision on our part 

to raise rates won’t say, no, the economy doesn’t stink. We are close 

to where we want to be, and we now think the economy cannot 

only tolerate, but needs higher rates. So, there have been head 

winds and we have tried to use monetary policy to overcome them. 

But I want you to know that we share the goal of minimizing 

burden on community banks and will remain very focused on it. We 

have the Agrippa process that is in play at the moment, and it is 

focusing particularly on burdens in community banks. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Ellison. 

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I also thank you, 

Chair Yellen, for being here. 

Is it regulation from Dodd-Frank that is keeping our economy— 

for the people who haven’t been able to benefit from the economy 

in the recovery, is it regulation that is causing the problem? 

Mrs. YELLEN. To my mind, there has been an increase in regulatory burden on banks. What we are doing is trying to create a 

healthier, safer, sounder financial system that will keep credit 

flowing to the economy and particularly, if we ever experience a 

stress situation where in this financial crisis, we saw banks just 

withdraw credit for the economy, which took a huge toll on economic activity by having more capital and liquidity and a safer and 

sounder financial system. 

We hope we are preventing future episodes like the devastating 

one we just lived in. And if there is some burden that is associated 

with that and some cost, the benefit is a far reduced chance of a 

financial crisis that will take the kind of toll you have just described. 

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you. So it has been pointed out that we have 

a low labor participation rate. Is it because of Dodd-Frank? 

Mrs. YELLEN. No. And also there are very—we are going to have 

over time a declining labor force participation rate, first and foreVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:37 Jul 07, 2016 Jkt 097154 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\97154.TXT TERI
46 

most because we have an aging population, more individuals in the 

retirement years. This is going to continue. 

Now, I have said, and my colleagues have said, that over and 

above that, we think there is something holding labor force participation back that reflects weakness in the economy and that as 

things strengthen, we would expect some people who have been too 

discouraged to look for work to move back into employment. 

But the major reason that we are seeing a trend downward in 

labor force participation is because of demographics, and it will 

continue. 

Mr. ELLISON. Has the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 

(CFPB) been harmful to the U.S. economy in the recovery? 

Mrs. YELLEN. Congress created the CFPB to enhance consumer 

protection, and they have been very focused on doing that. 

Mr. ELLISON. I just ask because some of my good friends complain about it a lot, and I am just trying to get an expert opinion 

on whether it is a good thing or a bad thing for our economy. 

Mrs. YELLEN. It is addressing potential consumer abuses and trying to enhance consumer protection. 

Mr. ELLISON. Does addressing consumer issues like say, the 

problems that the mortgage issues that we saw in the 2008 period 

and before that, help the overall economy? Does that strengthen— 

does that help markets operate more accurately? Does it help employment? 

Mrs. YELLEN. We certainly saw that the subprime crisis where 

there was irresponsible lending had a very harmful effect on the 

economy and on low-income communities, and that burden continues to exist. So we are going through a period in which we are 

trying to address all of the issues, including improper securitization 

and mortgage underwriting practices, that led to that devastating 

experience. 

It is difficult to get the balance right and to figure out what the 

best way is to design regulations. There are always consequences 

in terms of unintended effects of regulation. We need to be vigilant 

about trying to address that. 

Mr. ELLISON. What about student debt? You know how big it is. 

Is it a drag on the overall functioning of the economy? 

Mrs. YELLEN. It has increased enormously. I am worried about 

the high levels of student debt, and it is debt that if an individual 

can’t repay, it never goes away. It can’t be written off in bankruptcy. But on the other hand, education is really critical to succeeding in this economy. And it is critically important to make sure 

that students have access to quality education so they can get 

ahead. They need good information about programs and their success rates in order to avoid mistakes. 

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Williams. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Thank you Mr. Chairman, and Chair Yellen, 

thank you for being here today. 

I am a small business owner from Texas. I am a Main Street 

guy. I am a car dealer, one of your favorites. And I can tell you 

small business is hurting. Main Street America is hurting, and it 

47 

is hurting because regulations, which you have talked about today, 

are literally choking the heart out of small business. And I think, 

too, that we talked earlier about inequalities. And I would say that 

competition is the key. 

Competition in business takes care of inequalities, not the Federal Government. And my colleague here just was asking for an expert opinion on whether Dodd-Frank and the CFPB are good for 

the economy. I can tell you as an expert opinion that they are bad 

for the economy, the worst. 

With that being said, in 2014, in comments before the Joint Economic Committee, and I will be somewhat repetitious here, but I 

think it is important that we remind you where we need to head 

our economy, you stated in questioning from Senator Coats that, 

‘‘In my own discussions with businesses, I hear exactly the same 

things that you are citing. Concerns with regulations, about taxation, about uncertainty about fiscal policy.’’ You went on to say, 

‘‘There is more work to do to put fiscal policy on a sustainable 

course.’’ That, ‘‘progress has been made over the last several years 

in bringing down deficits in the short term, but that a combination 

of demographics, the structure of entitlement programs and historic trends in health care costs, we can see that over the long 

term, deficits will rise to unsustainable levels relative to the economy.’’ 

Now, my constituents back home in Texas are very concerned 

about the health of our economy, because it is not good. And in 

Texas, we are the—we have great things going but it can still be 

better. In Texas, a State that has somewhat recovered since 2008, 

you have 115 fewer community banks and you have 105 fewer credit unions. Tons of consolidation and a lot of uncertainty about 

where the economy is headed. 

So, my question, Chair Yellen, is what do you say to those community-based institutions that former Fed Chair Bernanke characterized as saying, we are being penalized, and you touched on this 

today, by your policies, particularly when these policies have at the 

same time, failed to produce meaningful economic growth in the 

communities those institutions serve, which further erodes their 

profitability? 

Mrs. YELLEN. What I have said is we are trying to do everything 

we possibly can to relieve burdens on community banks. They have 

been through very difficult times. First of all, a period that has 

been very rough for the economy, and a slow recovery. And that 

has taken a toll on their profitability and that of the businesses, 

as you noted. And in a low interest rate environment, net margins 

tend to be low. 

I think that the low interest rate environment we have had and 

accommodative monetary policies have served to help our economy 

overall and get it moving and moving back to full employment. If 

you compare the Unites States with any number of other economies 

that also suffered in the aftermath of the crisis, we are among the 

leaders in terms of how we are doing economically. 

And other countries are now pursuing the same kinds of monetary policies that we put into place earlier, which in a way is an 

endorsement of their effectiveness. 

48 

Mr. WILLIAMS. It still is very hard to borrow money for small 

businesses. And I can tell you that banks, and you probably heard 

this too, are having to hire more compliance officers than loan officers. That takes money out of the system, money which could be 

loaned to people like me to hire people and create jobs. 

We had CFPB Director Cordray here before us and I asked him 

if he would slow down this Dodd-Frank legislation because a lot of 

it is not completed, and because we are losing so many banks and 

credit unions. And he said, no, we are going to go 100 percent and 

take a look at it. That is a bad policy. 

You stated that the community banks shouldn’t face the same 

scrutiny as the bigger banks. You said that today, and I agree. And 

if the Fed will tailor its supervision to reduce regulatory burden. 

I heard you say in 2014, I heard you say—you said, I had community bankers in my office just yesterday, from what you said, and 

I heard today from community bankers asking me, ‘‘What do I do?’’ 

We say the right thing, but what do we do? They are fearful of 

things that can happen of what they may not do. They don’t know 

what to do. What would you tell these people? We talk a good game 

but we don’t come through. 

Mrs. YELLEN. We are trying to make clear our supervisory expectations and work carefully with them to let them know what rules 

and regulations apply and how and what don’t and to try to shield 

them from many of the things with which larger banks have to 

comply. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. It is very vague. I hope you will understand that. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Maine, Mr. 

Poliquin. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Chair 

Yellen, for being here. I appreciate it very much. You know, everybody wants the same thing. We want more jobs, we want higherpaying jobs. I am a business owner like Mr. Williams and other 

folks in this room. I love talking to other business owners because 

they grow our economy and create opportunities for our kids. 

Now if you are in my district, and you are talking to the owners 

of a paper mill or convenience store, they say the same thing, that 

they are spending so much time and so much money to comply 

with government regulations that they can’t afford to grow their 

business and hire more workers. 

The Competitive Enterprise Institute calculates that the cost of 

businesses in America in one year to comply with just Federal Government regulations is $1.9 trillion—$1.9 trillion. Now, these businesses pass on the cost of these regulations in the price of their 

products. So, our families are spending about $15,000 a year for 

businesses to comply with government regulation. 

I am sure we can agree, Chair Yellen, that businesses need to 

be fairly regulated, and predictably regulated, but when those regulations are killing jobs, it is just not right. 

Several years ago, in a highly partisan vote with very little Republican support, the 2,300-page Dodd-Frank bill was passed. Since 

then, there have been mountains and mountains of regulations and 

rules that are starting to smother our financial services industry. 

49 

And one part of Dodd-Frank that is a great concern of mine is the 

too-big-to-fail regulations, the SIFI designation. 

When FSOC is trying to determine what banks and other nonfinancial institutions, like asset managers, should be designated as 

too-big-to-fail, it means that if they fail, the taxpayers will have to 

step in and bail them out. We all know that there is a huge difference, Chair Yellen, between large money center banks with all 

kinds of tentacles running through our economy and asset managers, mutual funds, and pension fund managers that handle the 

retirement savings for millions of Americans, with no systemic risk 

to the economy. 

The former director of a nonpartisan congressional office calibrates that if asset managers have to comply with these too-big-tofail regulations, with no systemic risk imposed to the market, it 

will drive up the cost of their operation to the extent where the 

long-term rates return that they can generate for millions of Americans in this country while saving for their retirements will be 

dinged by about 25 percent. 

I don’t know about you, but where I come from, 25 percent is a 

lot of money. Can’t we agree, Chair Yellen, right now, that it just 

doesn’t make any sense for non-bank financial institutions that 

pose no systemic risk to the market, like asset managers—they 

should escape this Dodd-Frank regulation that penalizes our savers? 

Mrs. YELLEN. The FSOC is charged with attempting to identify 

threats to the financial stability of our country. And they issued a 

public notice indicating what they are going to do is to look at particular activities— 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Okay. So they are still looking at it. 

Mrs. YELLEN. —not firms but asset management activities that 

could pose risks. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. I appreciate that. 

Mrs. YELLEN. That is the focus. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. You are still looking at it. 

Okay, I would like to switch gears if I can in my remaining 

minute. You stated on a number of occasions that you are very concerned about unstable deficit spending in this country, how it 

might impact economic growth and job creation, and I agree. 

Everybody who is on a family budget or a small business budget 

knows that you can’t spend more than you take in for long periods 

of time and borrow to make up the difference without getting into 

trouble. But that is exactly what Congress has done. That is why 

we have an $18 trillion national debt. 

Now, we have some folks who come before our committee, Mrs. 

Yellen, including the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Lew, who was 

here a few weeks ago and said, ‘‘You know, a $500 billion annual 

deficit is no big deal. It is only 3 percent of our GDP.’’ I disagree 

with that, and I bet you do, too. I was a State treasurer in Maine 

and I can tell you that high levels of public debt caused by long 

periods of deficit spending can do great damage to our economy because we need to pay the interest on that rising debt, therefore, we 

are not able to spend it to build roads and bridges, and to educate 

our kids. 

50 

This year, Chair Yellen, we are spending about $230 billion in 

interest payments on that debt. And in 10 years, it is projected to 

be $800 billion, more than we pay to defend our country. Can’t we 

agree that it is about time you help us, and Congress gets its act 

together, when it come to our deficit spending and our debt? 

Mrs. YELLEN. I did indicate my concern with the sustainability 

of the debt path that the Unites States is on. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. I hope you use your influence in this town, Chair 

Yellen, to make sure you talk with the— 

Chairman HENSARLING. Time. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. —Administration to make sure— 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair wishes to inform the remaining Members that the Chair anticipates clearing two more Members in the queue, the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Hill, and the 

gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Lucas. At that point, I anticipate 

adjourning the hearing. 

The gentlemen from Arkansas, Mr. Hill, is recognized. 

Mr. HILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Chair Yellen, thank 

you very much for being here today. 

There are a couple of items I want to bring up. Mr. Heck talked 

about banking availability and the Harvard Study that everyone 

has read the last few months, you see that one out of five counties, 

particularly rural counties, now no longer have a physical presence 

of a bank. So not a branch of a national bank, but not even a presence of a commercial bank. I think that is concerning, and speaks 

to his point. 

There are two things on that item I want to call to your attention 

that relate to merger approval issues at the Fed. One is the 

Herfindahl-Hirschman index. I think the Herfindahl-Hirschman 

index, which was adopted back in the 1960s as bank mergers became subject to the anti-trust rule, discriminates against rural 

areas. 

I think the idea of using county designations and using deposits 

as the sole indicia for what business is in trade area is incorrect. 

And I can give you many examples of this. But I would invite the 

Board staff to reconsider how to do bank mergers, not base them 

on deposits only, not base them on the Herfindahl-Hirschman 

index, particularly in the rural counties. 

Second, is the issue of comment letters on mergers. Mergers for 

a bank—between bank holding companies, if there is no comment, 

you have a 56-day approval process. If they get one comment letter, 

that extends to 206 days for approval, which reduces efficiency and 

reduces productivity of that. 

And I would like to see the Board adopt a new approach on comment letters and distinguish between real comment letters from 

the geographies connected to the merger and just promotional fishing expedition comment letters, and let the Reserve banks have 

more power and not force a Board of Governors approval of mergers. I am going to write you about this, you don’t need to comment 

on it today. 

I would like you to comment on the labor force participation rate, 

because my reading of the cohorts that you referenced a minute 

51 

ago, actually is that younger people are who have dropped out of 

the labor force. In fact, people over 55 are working more than ever 

before, and I really take issue with your point that those of us in 

the Baby Boom generation are retiring. I think if you go back and 

look at those numbers, you will find that it is actually young people 

being forced out—or not having the opportunity to participate in 

the labor force. 

Mrs. YELLEN. I agree with you, that younger cohorts of retirees 

are working more than their parents and grandparents did. That 

is absolutely true. It is just that there is such a substantial dropoff in labor force participation when people retire that, when you 

look at the joint effect of an aging population, more people in age 

brackets where they do retire, that the working more is only an offset. It is not the same order of magnitude as the demographic effect of the aging. I don’t disagree with what you have said about 

that. 

Mr. HILL. Let me change subjects and go back to liquidity. Secretary Lew, when he was here, talked in his testimony about the 

factors including technology, regulation, and competition, that have 

reduced liquidity in the market . He said, ‘‘The business models 

and risk appetite of traditional broker-dealers have changed, with 

some broker-dealers reducing their securities’ inventories, and in 

certain cases, exiting certain markets.’’ Notwithstanding the October study, Chairman Neugebauer also had a roundtable last week 

in which a participant, JPMorgan, I believe, stated that in the 

Treasury market it used—you could be able to do a $500 million 

trade and not have a bid ask spread move. The market would not 

move. 

Now her estimate is, it is down to $292 million. There is an indication of—even in the Treasury, the most liquid market, we have 

significantly reduced liquidity. 

In the FSOC report, on page 68, the primary securities dealings, 

shows since the crash and since the implementation of Dodd-Frank, 

Treasury holdings have gone up to high levels and all other categories, corporates and even agency securities have dropped, which 

implies to me that people are holding Treasuries, holding liquidity, 

and not making a market in that. 

And I really think regulation is being shortchanged in its impact. 

I would like you to comment on Basel, the liquidity rules all working together that are causing a lack of liquidity. 

Mrs. YELLEN. I am not ruling out the possibility that regulations 

could play a role here, it is simply we have not been able to understand through a lot of different factors and we need to look at it 

more to sort out just what is going on and what the different influences are, but I am not ruling that out. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman 

from Oklahoma, Mr. Lucas. 

Mr. LUCAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate your indulgence at the end of the hearing, and Chair Yellen, I will try to 

move in an expeditious sort of a fashion. 

First, an observation. As we discussed before, my part of the 

country is very economically dependent on the oil and gas industry. 

And I am hearing from those involved in energy lending about regulatory pressure on the treatment of energy loans. Reserve-based 

52 

loans, crude oil in the ground, proven reserves during this current 

period of low prices. 

I am concerned that if banks have less flexibility in dealing with 

lending to these companies in this sector, that an accumulative impact of all the factors as we move towards the end of the year could 

result in loans potentially being defaulted on or bankruptcy filings. 

It would be devastatingly destructive to the domestic energy industry. 

So, I just ask that we be understanding of the nature of those 

proven barrels in the ground. Second question, or second observation of the question, the last time we were together before this committee we discussed the Basel III leverage ratio rule as it relates 

to the treatment of segregated margin. 

And I appreciated your response in addressing the matter of onbalance sheet accounting treatment. But I would like to go just a 

little further today and specifically talk about the Basel leverage 

ratio now extending to off-balance-sheet exposures that are not 

driven by accounting rules. And in this off-balance-sheet context, 

why is customer margin collected by a bank-affiliated member of 

a clearinghouse being treated as something the bank can leverage, 

when Congress very explicitly required that such margin be segregated away from the bank’s own resources? 

And for the benefit of my colleagues, I suspect on any given day we are probably talking a couple hundred—$200 million, oh, these 

big numbers here, $200 billion in resources on any given day. 

Could you enlighten us a little bit on that, Chair Yellen, please? 

Mrs. YELLEN. The leverage ratio was meant to be a very simple 

non-risk-based measure that pertains to all assets that are carried 

on a bank’s balance sheet and that includes derivative transactions. 

It is not clear that for many companies the leverage ratio is what 

is binding rather than risk-based capital standards in many cases, 

but this is something we are having a look at. I recognize it is a 

concern. It is something that the Basel committee is discussing, 

and trying to gather additional information on what impact it is 

having. And it is something that is very useful to put on the agenda that we will have a close look at. 

Mr. LUCAS. And that is all I can ask, Chair Yellen, that you work 

with our friends at the CFTC here, and our foreign regulator 

friends to come up with a sensible approach. Two hundred billion 

dollars that can’t be touched by the banks, but yet they have to 

have extra resources to cover. It just seems like the net effect 

would be more cost and more strain on those trying to use these 

resources. 

So, I appreciate your comments. With that, Mr. Chairman, and 

out of character, I yield back. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The gentleman yields back. 

Chair Yellen, I want to thank you for your testimony today before the committee. Pursuant to our earlier discussion, we look forward to having you back soon, separate and apart from your Humphrey Hawkins appearances. 

The Chair notes that some Members may have additional questions for this witness, which they may wish to submit in writing. 

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 legisVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:37 Jul 07, 2016 Jkt 097154 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\97154.TXT TERI
53 

lative days for Members to submit written questions to this witness 

and to place her responses in the record. Also, without objection, 

Members will have 5 legislative days to submit extraneous materials to the Chair for inclusion in the record. 

This hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:03 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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