# South Sudan - United States Department of State

- South Sudan HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;South Sudan				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Sudan																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																											i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no changes in the human rights situation in South Sudan during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of:  arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; enforced disappearance; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by security forces, opposition forces, armed militias affiliated with the government and the opposition, and ethnically based groups; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners or detainees; transnational repression against individuals in other countries; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious abuses in a conflict, including unlawful civilian deaths, enforced disappearances or abductions, torture, physical abuses, and conflict-related sexual violence or punishment; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflict by the government and nongovernment armed groups; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental and civil society organizations; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; serious government restrictions on or harassment of domestic and international human rights organizations; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic or intimate partner violence, child, early, and forced marriage, female genital mutilation/cutting, and other forms of gender-based violence; trafficking in persons, including forced labor; laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, although these laws were largely not enforced; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; and existence of any of the worst forms of child labor.The government did not take credible steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses, despite isolated examples of prosecution for human rights abuses.Nongovernment armed groups, including the forces of peace-agreement signatories and other opposition armed groups alike, perpetrated serious human rights abuses, which, according to the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, included unlawful killings, abduction, rape, sexual slavery, and forced recruitment of children and adults into combat and noncombat roles.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were numerous reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year.  Security forces, opposition forces, armed militias affiliated with the government and the opposition, and ethnically based groups were responsible for widespread extrajudicial killings.  The security services sometimes investigated alleged abuses by members of their respective forces, although impunity remained endemic and prosecutions were infrequent.According to a Small Arms Survey report, the governor of Warrap State, Manhiem Bol Malek, was responsible for approximately 20 extrajudicial killings during the year.  The report stated that members of the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) extrajudicially killed a man on September 23 for a crime he allegedly committed on September 18.In January armed youth from the White Army, composed of ethnic Lou Nuer and Bor Dinka groups, assaulted Murle villages in the Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA), resulting in the abduction and deaths of Murle women and children.  The assailants reportedly targeted Gumuruk and Lekyangole in GPAA in response to intermittent raids that also included abductions at Lou Nuer and Bor Dinka villages by armed Murle youth.  The Jonglei State governor reportedly organized the rescue of some women and children, reuniting them with their families.  Health facilities, civilian property, and humanitarian warehouses were looted and destroyed.  The state and national governments had not arrested any perpetrators of the attacks by year’s end.On February 2, at least 27 persons were killed in Kajo-Keji County, Central Equatoria State, when members of a Bor Dinka clan launched a revenge attack on villages they accused of attacking cattle camps and killing humans and animals.  President Kiir condemned the raid and appointed a committee to investigate the incident.  The committee had not published its findings, and no one had been held accountable by year’s end.In January the UN Panel of Experts collected testimony of apparent extrajudicial killings in Lakes State, including the killing of a local chief.  The UN reported an increase in the number of extrajudicial killings and unlawful detentions in Lakes State under Governor Rin Tueny Mabor, whose strategy encouraged local officials to use lethal force and the death penalty to subdue violence.  Some local county commissioners considered this strategy an endorsement of extrajudicial killings.																																				b. Disappearance										There were reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.Security and opposition forces, armed militias affiliated with the government or the opposition, and ethnically based groups abducted an unknown number of persons, including women and children.In August the International Committee of the Red Cross reported it tracked more than 5,900 cases of missing persons since the conflict began.The government did not make efforts to prevent, investigate, and punish disappearances.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										Although prohibited under law, security forces mutilated, tortured, beat, and harassed political opponents, journalists, and human rights activists.  Government and opposition forces, armed militia groups affiliated with both, and fighting ethnic groups committed torture and abuses in conflict zones.According to the UN Security Council Panel of Experts and several independent human rights advocates, the National Security Service (NSS) Operations Division maintained at least three facilities where it detained, interrogated, and sometimes tortured civilians.  At least one detainee reportedly died due to injuries sustained in NSS detention.  Most NSS facilities were not publicly known.  According to the panel, there were numerous reported abuses at NSS-run sites, including gender-based violence, beating and torture of detainees, and harassment and intimidation of human rights defenders and humanitarian workers.  The Small Arms Survey documented that International Monetary Fund assistance to the transitional government went to pay NSS salaries.  Human Rights Watch, the United Nations, and other organizations documented cases of torture and other mistreatment during arrest and while in NSS custody.  Detainees described being beaten with sticks, whips, pipes, and wires; subjected to electric shocks; burned with melted plastic; raped; and subjected to other forms of sexual violence.Impunity within the security services remained a serious problem.  Although the NSS created an internal disciplinary tribunal to conduct investigations of alleged abuses by its members, neither the results of such investigations nor any disciplinary actions taken were made public.  The UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan reported the existence of police special protection units to investigate gender-based violence, operating with financial and logistical support from the United Nations.  Some members of the army and police were investigated for misconduct.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prison conditions were harsh and life threatening.  Overcrowding and inadequate medical care at times resulted in illness and death.  There were reports of abuse by prison guards.Abusive Physical Conditions:  Significant prison problems included gross overcrowding and inadequate access to food, potable water, sanitation, heating, ventilation, lighting, or medical care.  Authorities sometimes kept prisoners confined in cells for long periods without an opportunity for movement, exercise, or use of showers or sanitary facilities.Administration:  The South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS) allowed prisoners to submit complaints to judicial authorities without censorship and to request investigation of allegations of inhuman conditions.  Prison authorities sometimes investigated such allegations, although they seldom acted on complaints.Independent Monitoring:  The SSNPS and National Prison Service of South Sudan permitted visits to police and prison detention facilities by independent human rights observers.  Authorities sometimes permitted monitors to visit military detention facilities operated by the SSPDF.  International monitors were denied permission to visit facilities operated by the NSS, which held both military prisoners and civilians without legal authority.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The transitional constitution prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court.  The government did not observe these requirements.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						While the law required police to present arrested persons before a public prosecutor, magistrate, or court within 24 hours, judges assigned to statutory courts were not always present, and poor coordination with other justice officials contributed to case backlogs.  Court dockets often were overwhelmed, and cases faced long delays before coming before a judge.  Police could detain individuals for 24 hours without charge.  A public prosecutor could authorize an extension of up to one week, and a magistrate could authorize extensions of up to two weeks.  Authorities did not always inform detainees of charges against them and regularly held them past the statutory limit without explanation.  Police sometimes ignored court orders to take arrested persons before the court.  Police, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges were often unaware of the statutory requirement that detainees appear before a judge as quickly as possible.  The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) reported cases taking months or even years to be brought to court.Police commonly conducted arrests without warrants, and warrants were often irregular, handwritten documents.  Warrants were commonly drafted in the absence of investigation or evidence.  There were multiple reports of arrests, including of foreigners, in civil cases where a complainant exerted influence upon police to arrest someone as a negotiation tactic.  The government routinely failed to notify embassies when detaining citizens of other countries, even when the detainee requested a consular visit.According to Human Rights Watch, the NSS effectively operated outside the law and without proper legal authority.  Detainees were held at sites not designated as detention facilities under the law.  They did not conduct arrests based on warrants or court orders and routinely held detainees for long periods without charge and without access to lawyers or visitors.  Detention periods lasted from hours to years.The law allowed bail, but this provision was widely unknown or ignored by authorities, and they rarely informed detainees of this possibility.  Because pretrial appearances before judges often were delayed far past statutory limits, authorities rarely had the opportunity to adjudicate bail requests before trial.  Those arrested had a right to an attorney, but the country had few lawyers, and detainees were rarely informed of this right.  The transitional constitution mandated access to legal representation without charge for the indigent, but defendants rarely received legal assistance if they did not pay for it.  Authorities sometimes held detainees incommunicado.Arbitrary Arrest:  Security forces arbitrarily arrested opposition leaders, civil society activists, businesspersons, journalists, and other civilians due to possible affiliation with opposition forces.  Many citizens were arbitrarily arrested for being in the vicinity when crimes occurred, being of a certain ethnicity, or being relatives of suspects.Pretrial Detention:  Lengthy pretrial detention was a problem, due largely to the lack of lawyers and judges; the difficulty of locating witnesses; misunderstanding of constitutional and legal requirements by police, prosecutors, and judges; and the absence of a strong mechanism to compel witness attendance in court.  The length of pretrial detention commonly equaled or exceeded the sentence for the alleged crime.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The transitional constitution provided for an independent judiciary and recognized customary law.  The government did not generally respect judicial independence and impartiality.  While the law required the government to maintain courts at federal, state, and county levels, lack of infrastructure and trained personnel made this impossible, and few statutory courts existed below the state level.  The formal justice sector remained weak and concentrated in a few urban centers.In many communities, customary courts remained the principal providers of judicial services, adjudicating most criminal cases other than murder.  Customary courts could deal with certain aspects of murder cases if judges remitted the cases to them.  Government courts heard cases of violent crime and acted as appellate courts for verdicts issued by customary bodies.  Legal systems employed by customary courts varied, with most emphasizing restorative dispute resolution and some borrowing elements of sharia (Islamic law).During the year, the United Nations supported a joint special mobile court with South Sudanese professionals to adjudicate serious crimes and mitigate cattle-migration-related violence in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State.  The courts included traditional leaders and addressed compensation claims according to local customs.  During the year, the United Nations continued to support civilian and military mobile courts, trying rape, robbery, and assault cases, among others, in Upper Nile, Western Bahr el-Ghazal, and Central Equatoria States.Political pressure, corruption, discrimination toward women, and the lack of a competent investigative police service undermined both statutory and customary courts.  Patronage priorities or political allegiances of traditional elders or chiefs commonly influenced verdicts in customary courts.																Trial Procedures						The transitional constitution provided for the right to a fair and public trial, but the judiciary generally did not enforce this right.Despite protections provided under the transitional constitution, law enforcement officers and statutory and customary court authorities commonly presumed suspects’ guilt, and suspects faced serious infringements of their rights.  Free interpretation was rarely offered, and when it was, it was of low quality.  Most detainees were not promptly informed of the charges against them.  Prolonged detentions often occurred, and defendants generally did not have adequate access to facilities to prepare a defense.  While court dates were set without regard for providing adequate time to prepare a defense, long remands often meant detainees with access to a lawyer had sufficient time to prepare.  Magistrates frequently compelled defendants to testify, and the absence of lawyers at many judicial proceedings often left defendants without recourse.Public trials were the norm both in customary courts, which usually took place outdoors, and in statutory courts.  Some high-level court officials opposed media access to courts and asserted media should not comment on pending cases.  The right to be present at trial and to confront witnesses was sometimes respected, but in statutory courts, the difficulty of summoning witnesses often precluded exercise of these rights.  No government legal aid structure existed.Defendants did not necessarily have access to counsel or the right of appeal, and discrimination against women was common.Defendants accused of crimes against the state were usually denied these rights.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were reports of political prisoners and detainees held by authorities from a few hours to several weeks without access to a judge or clearly spelled out charges.  The number of political prisoners was unknown.																										f. Transnational Repression										Extraterritorial Killing, Kidnapping, Forced Returns, or Other Violence or Threats of Violence:  There were credible reports of persons killed and kidnapped in other countries, and persons forcibly returned from other countries, for purposes of politically motivated reprisal.  Individuals in other countries continued to receive threats of violence during the year.  Civil society reported South Sudanese intelligence officials were active in neighboring countries and harassed critics there.On February 4, Morris Mabior Awikjok, a South Sudanese human rights defender and government critic, reportedly was forcibly returned from his home in Nairobi, Kenya.  According to reporting by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, as well as a letter written by the UN special rapporteur on human rights defenders and other UN experts, five armed persons wearing Kenyan police uniforms and a plain-clothed South Sudanese man forcibly entered Awikjok’s home, took laptops and phones, and took him away without disclosing his next location.  He was allegedly being held without charges at an NSS detention center.Threats, Harassment, Surveillance, and Coercion:  There were credible reports the government continued to target specific individuals for politically motivated reprisal outside the country, including in Kenya and Uganda.  The UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan reported on the “ongoing pervasiveness of extra-territorial operations by State security forces,” targeting journalists, civil society members and advocates, and their family members, as well as other critics and opponents of the government.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										The government rarely provided proportionate and timely restitution for the government’s confiscation of property.  Human rights organizations documented instances of government forces systematically looting abandoned property in conflict areas where the population was perceived to be antigovernment.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The transitional constitution prohibited interference with private life, family, home, and correspondence, but the law did not provide for the right to privacy.  Authorities, however, reportedly disregarded these prohibitions.  To induce suspects to surrender, officials at times held family members in detention centers.  The law gave the NSS sweeping powers outside the constitutional mandate of arrest, detention, surveillance, search, and seizure.  The NSS utilized surveillance tools, at times requiring telecommunications companies to hand over user data that could be used to tap telephone numbers or make arrests.  The UN Panel of Experts recommended to the Security Council in April that, “In the context of threats to journalists and civil society actors, including growing cyberthreats, the Security Council consider adding the supply of digital surveillance tools and other offensive cybertools, including training in their use, to the scope of the arms embargo”; the Security Council rejected the recommendation.  The NSS monitored social media posts.  Widespread surveillance led many human rights defenders to avoid discussing sensitive topics over the telephone.  The NSS carried out physical surveillance and embedded agents in organizations and media houses and at events.  Some individuals were subject to physical and telephonic surveillance prior to arrest and detention without warrants, with such surveillance continuing after detainees were released.																																				i. Conflict-related Abuses										According to the United Nations and international NGOs, security forces, opposition forces, armed militias affiliated with the government and the opposition, and nongovernmental armed groups, including signatories and nonsignatories to the peace agreement, were responsible for a significant range of conflict-related abuses.  Government and opposition forces harassed civilians and looted and destroyed property during military operations against the National Salvation Front.Killings:  Government forces and armed militias affiliated with the government, frequently prompted by opposition ambushes of government soldiers, engaged in a pattern of collective punishment of civilians perceived to be opposition supporters, often based on ethnicity.UN agencies and international NGOs that interviewed victims reported widespread killings, mutilations, and sexual violence committed by government forces, rebel groups, and irregular militias.Remnants of war led to the killing and maiming of civilians.  Military items such as grenades were often left behind in schools used by government and opposition forces and by armed actors affiliated with both.In December a UN investigation found fighting between armed groups that split from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In-Opposition (SPLA-IO) in the Greater Upper Nile region between August and December 2022 – mainly the Kitgwang faction and Agwelek forces – led to at least 884 civilian casualties, of which 594 were killed, 290 injured, 258 abducted, and 75 women and girls subjected to sexual violence, engendering a humanitarian crisis that displaced more than 62,000 civilians and led to significant destruction of civilian property.Abductions:  The United Nations and international NGOs reported multiple accounts of government soldiers or other security service members arbitrarily detaining or arresting civilians, sometimes leading to unlawful killings.SSPDF Major General James Nando was responsible for at least 64 instances of rape and sexual slavery against civilians between June and September 2021, and he directly or through his subordinates oversaw the abduction of at least 505 women and 63 girls during attacks.  Forces under Western Equatoria Governor Alfred Futuyo, affiliated with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), carried out numerous attacks in Western Equatoria that resulted in the abduction of 887 civilians, of which at least 43 were raped or gang-raped.Between February and April 2022, government-aligned forces and allied militias under the command of Koch County Commissioner Gordon Koang Biel and Mayendit County Commissioner Gatluak Nyang Hoth used sexual slavery, including rape and gang rape, of abducted women and girls as an incentive and reward for combatants, actions often accompanied by other human rights violations perpetrated against women and girls during armed attacks in Leer County of Unity State.  Unity State Governor Joseph Mantiel Wajang appointed Biel and Hoth as county commissioners and was aware of the attacks but did not prevent, discourage, or institute any form of sanction against Biel and Hoth for their role in crimes committed.Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture:  Government forces, opposition forces, other armed groups and armed militias affiliated with the government and the opposition tortured, raped, and otherwise abused civilians in conflict areas.  Gender-based violence, including rape, gang rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriage, was a common tactic of conflict employed by all parties.  A lack of accountability continued for five officials responsible for systemic rape of women and girls during attacks in Leer County.Child Soldiers:  There were reports government and nongovernment forces continued to recruit forcibly and use child soldiers, although reports of government recruitment dropped considerably from prior years.  Since 2013 the United Nations had verified more than 13,000 serious violations that included 6,300 cases of recruitment and use of children.  During the same period, more than 3,700 children associated with armed forces and armed groups were released.The 2018 peace agreement mandated specialized international agencies work with all warring parties to demobilize and reintegrate child soldiers from the SSPDF, the SPLA-IO, elements of the South Sudan Opposition Alliance, the Nuer White Army, and other groups, usually those involved in community defense.  There were reports of child soldier recruitment associated with intercommunal and intertribal violence carried out by splinter groups and smaller factions of larger, well-established groups.The Secretary of State determined South Sudan had governmental armed forces, police, or other security forces that recruited or used child soldiers from April 2022 to March 2023.  See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.Other Conflict-related Abuse:  According to media reports, SSPDF and allied armed youth militias attacked a SPLA-IO outpost in Leer county (Unity State) in November, resulting in the alleged displacement of more than 100,000 civilians.  The late November clashes followed an outbreak of fighting in October between rival factions of the SPLA-IO (Kitgwang) and Agwelek militia, reportedly supported by SSPDF, in Tonga, Panyikang County in Upper Nile State.There were also human rights abuses reported in the Abyei Administrative Area, a region that Sudan and South Sudan both claimed.  These abuses generally stemmed from intercommunal clashes between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya Indigenous groups regarding cattle and land.  In December, the United Nations issued a statement of grave concern over retaliatory violence between Twic Dinka and Ngok Dinka groups that claimed 75 lives in southern Abyei and in Warrap State in November, and 10 lives in Abyei in early December, and which reportedly involved SSPDF elements.Throughout the year, the environment for humanitarian operations remained difficult and dangerous.  Armed actors, including government, opposition forces, and other armed groups, continued to restrict the ability of the United Nations, other international organizations, and NGOs to deliver humanitarian assistance safely and effectively to populations in need.  Access was impeded by direct denials, bureaucratic barriers, occupation of humanitarian spaces including education centers, and renewed fighting in areas of the country where humanitarian needs were highest.  Despite repeated safety assurances, armed elements harassed and killed relief workers, looted, and destroyed humanitarian assets and facilities, and government and rebel authorities imposed bureaucratic and economic impediments on relief organizations.  Government and SPLA-IO forces continued to occupy civilian structures.On multiple occasions, fighting between government and opposition forces and other violence put the safety and security of humanitarian workers at risk, prevented travel, forced the evacuation of relief workers, and jeopardized humanitarian operations, including forcing organizations to suspend lifesaving operations entirely in areas of active conflict.  Delayed flight safety assurances, insecurity, and movement restrictions often prevented relief workers from traveling to conflict and nonconflict areas.  Humanitarian personnel, independently or through the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Access Working Group, negotiated with government and SPLA-IO forces as well as other armed groups to address access problems; however, these negotiations were often protracted and caused significant delays in the delivery of assistance.The humanitarian operating environment remained volatile despite improvements in some areas of the country, and the country remained very dangerous for aid workers.  The most common forms of violence against humanitarian workers included robbery and looting, harassment, armed attacks, commandeering of vehicles, and physical detention.  On multiple occasions, insecurity prevented travel and jeopardized relief operations.  In almost all cases, investigations were limited, and perpetrators were not held accountable.  A Small Arms Survey report highlighted, “In 2023, 120 metric tons of food aid were taken in only three incidents (though around 30 metric tons were recovered by the government).  These attacks often use dozens of motorbikes and rapidly remove the looted items from the area of the attack.”  The same report emphasized that, “At every opportunity the government attempts to divert funds into its patrimonial system.”  On September 23, two trucks contracted by UNICEF were attacked while returning to Juba after delivering aid supplies for children and their families in need in Yei, Central Equatoria State.  Two contracted drivers were killed and another injured.  Both empty trucks were burned and destroyed.  A total of 143 humanitarian workers were killed since 2013.The United Nations reported, “South Sudan continues to be the deadliest place for aid workers, with in total 24 aid workers killed since the beginning of 2023.”Restrictions on humanitarian operations took other forms as well.  Authorities operating at Juba International Airport arbitrarily denied humanitarian workers permission to travel for a constantly changing variety of reasons, including for lack of work permits, permission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, travel approval from the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, or failure to have at least six blank pages in their passports.  Staff at Juba International Airport harassed and solicited bribes from humanitarian workers.  Interference in recruitment and hiring by local labor officials was reported by international NGOs.  Security forces and irregular armed groups routinely solicited payments from aid workers for safe passage on land and river routes using official and unofficial checkpoints.  These restrictions were implemented inconsistently, without notice or consultation, prompting confusion regarding the required travel procedures.Humanitarian organizations experienced delays, some up to six months or longer, and denials of tax exemptions, and were forced to purchase relief supplies on the local market, raising quality concerns.  Government authorities required international NGO staff members to pay income taxes and threatened national staff members into paying income tax at the state level.Continuing conflict and denial of access to humanitarian actors contributed to households facing acute food insecurity.  It was difficult to accurately gather information and assess some conflict-affected areas due to insecurity and lack of access.The UN Conduct and Discipline portal listed four instances of sexual exploitation and abuse by UNMISS personnel as of September.  Of the four cases, two investigations were underway while two were being substantiated.  From 2021 to 2022, UNMISS investigated six allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, determining one allegation to be substantiated, two as unsubstantiated; three cases were in progress.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The transitional constitution provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media.  The government and its agents, however, frequently violated these rights in the name of national security.  In a report published during the year, a UN Commission found the transitional government “treats journalists and civil society members who voice critique as enemies of the ruling political party, reflecting its extreme intolerance of all forms of public scrutiny and critical views.”Freedom of Expression:  The government regularly attempted to impede criticism by monitoring, intimidating, harassing, arresting, or detaining members of civil society who criticized the government.Violence and Harassment:  Security forces routinely intimidated or detained journalists whose reporting they perceived was unfavorable to the military or government.  Security forces confiscated or damaged journalists’ equipment and restricted their movements.  During the year, security forces threatened with death, interrogated, harassed, detained, and imprisoned journalists, forcing some to go into hiding.  NSS representatives frequently harassed journalists by detaining them at NSS headquarters or local police stations without formal charges.  Journalists and media agencies that reported on news of the opposition could expect questioning, arrest, and possible closures.  Journalists in Juba frequently experienced threats and intimidation and routinely practiced self-censorship.  On several occasions, high-level officials used intimidating language directed toward media outlets and representatives.On January 3-4, six journalists employed by state-owned South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation Television were detained for allegedly circulating video of President Kiir apparently urinating on himself.  The journalists spent up to 3.5 months in detention without charges and were later released.  According to the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, Garang John, the last journalist to be released, appeared to have been subjected to mistreatment and possibly torture.  There were reports that he later fled the country.In May political reporter Woja Emmanuel announced he had left journalism.  In 2022 the NSS had abducted him at gunpoint and interrogated him, and reportedly threatened him with death.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media:  The government maintained strict control of media, both print and electronic.  The government suppressed dissenting voices, forcing some journalists to flee the country.  Government officials or individuals close to the government regularly interfered in the publication of articles and broadcasting of programs, and high-level government officials stated press freedom should not extend to criticism of the government or soliciting views of opposition leaders.  Nonetheless, some print and radio media regularly reported on international and domestic criticism of the transitional government.Although approval was not required under the Media Authority Act, the Media Authority instituted a requirement for organizers to obtain a letter of clearance prior to any media-related event, including press conferences.  The accepted practice was for organizers to obtain a letter of clearance and NSS stamp prior to a media event.  Journalists were also required to obtain prior approval from the Media Authority to cover events hosted by the government.  It was common practice that only journalists who had registered with the Media Authority would be granted access to government-hosted media events.  The Media Authority mandated accreditation for freelance journalists, requiring the provision of a work identification card, educational certifications, a curriculum vitae, and recommendation letters from an employer or professional organization.Most organizations practiced self-censorship to ensure their safety.  Authorities directly reprimanded publishers and removed articles deemed critical of the government.  The minister of information divulged to media that the government regularly censored articles it deemed harmful to security in order to protect journalists from costly legal action.  Many print media outlets reported NSS officers forced the removal of articles at the printing company where all newspapers were printed, often inserting a government announcement, advertisement, or recycled or international news where the article was originally meant to appear.The Media Authority continued to advise international journalists not to describe clashes in the country in tribal terms and deemed such references as “hate speech.”  The NSS regularly harassed, intimidated, and summoned journalists for questioning.  The environment for media workers remained precarious throughout the year.																Internet Freedom						The government’s South Sudan National Communication Authority at times blocked access to certain websites, such as two popular news websites, Radio Tamazuj and Sudans Post, as well as social media personalities and other online news generators.  There were credible reports the government monitored private online communications without appropriate legal authority.  The government also targeted and intimidated individuals, especially those outside of Juba, who were critical of the government in open online forums and social media.																										b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The government increasingly restricted freedom of peaceful assembly and restricted freedom of association.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The transitional constitution provided for freedom of peaceful assembly, but the government in many cases did not respect this right.  Many citizens did not gather for planned demonstrations due to fear of targeted violence.  Security officials lacked nonviolent crowd control capabilities and at times fired live ammunition into the air to disperse crowds.						Freedom of Association						The transitional constitution provided for freedom of association, but the government did not respect this right for those suspected of associating with or having sympathies for opposition figures.  Some civil society leaders interpreted a 2012 law as an attempt to suppress opposition to the SPLM.The NSS and other security actors widely enforced a 2016 law strictly regulating the activity and operations of civil society.  The law focused particularly on NGOs working in the governance, anticorruption, and human rights fields.  The law imposed a range of legal barriers, including limitations on the types of activities in which organizations could engage, onerous registration requirements, and heavy fines for noncompliance.  Human rights groups and civil society representatives reported NSS officials continued intimidation, surveillance, and threats against civil society organizations.  Civil society organizations reported extensive NSS scrutiny of proposed public events; the NSS reviewed every proposed event and sometimes denied permission, rejected proposed speakers, or disrupted events.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The transitional constitution provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, and repatriation.  The transitional constitution did not address emigration.In-country Movement:  There were sporadic reports of county commissioners from one party being detained by persons from another political party despite the lack of provision in law for this.  Despite multiple pledges from the government to dismantle checkpoints, they remained a common problem.  Security forces manning these checkpoints routinely used them as opportunities to charge illegal fees.Internally displaced persons (IDPs) remained in IDP camps and the remaining UNMISS POC site in Malakal due to Shilluk-Nuer ethnic tensions and related fear of retaliatory or ethnically targeted violence by government- and opposition-affiliated armed groups.  Subnational violence and persistent flooding pushed many of the camps beyond capacity.  The government often obstructed travel of members of humanitarian organizations seeking to provide protection and assistance to IDPs and refugees.  Continuing conflict between government and opposition forces and subnational violence restricted the movement of UN personnel and the delivery of humanitarian aid.Foreign Travel:  Individuals, due to arbitrary restrictions, were sometimes prevented from leaving the country.  On April 19, officials confiscated the passport of People’s Coalition for Civic Action member Kuel Aguer Kuel as he sought to leave the country.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government cooperated with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, and asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern.  Overall, coordination with the government continued across all sectors, including with the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, and Relief and Rehabilitation Commission.  According to UNHCR, there were more than 330,000 registered refugees and asylum-seekers in the country as of September, most of whom were from neighboring Sudan.Access to Asylum:  The law provided for protection of refugees as well as the granting of asylum and refugee status.  The government allowed individuals to access asylum processes, allowed refugees from neighboring countries to settle, and generally did not treat refugees differently from other foreigners.  While most refugees in the country were from Sudan, the government also granted asylum to refugees from Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, the Central African Republic, Burundi, and Somalia.  Credible reports indicated the transitional government charged as much as $1,420 in May to non-South Sudanese citizens at the Sudanese border who sought to enter the country after fleeing violence in Sudan.Abuse of Refugees and Asylum Seekers:  While UNHCR could not confirm recruitment by armed groups in refugee camps, UNHCR remained concerned regarding the civilian character of certain elements in camps, particularly those close to the Sudanese border.On June 7, clashes broke out between members of the Nuer and Chollo tribes at the UN Protection of Civilians (POC) site in Malakal, Upper Nile State, resulting in the deaths of at least 27 persons.Access to Basic Services:  While refugees sometimes lacked basic services, this generally reflected a lack of capacity in the country to manage refugee issues and lack of sufficient funding rather than government practices of discrimination against refugees.  Refugee children had access to elementary education in refugee camps through programs managed by international NGOs and the United Nations.  Some schools were shared with children from the host community.  In principle, refugees had access to judiciary services, although a lack of infrastructure and staff meant these resources were often unavailable.Due to continuing conflict and scarcity of resources, tension existed between refugees and host communities in some areas regarding access to resources.Durable Solutions:  According to UNHCR, between 2018 and 2022, more than 600,000 South Sudanese had returned to the country since the signing of the revitalized peace agreement.  Following the beginning of the Sudan conflict in April, UNHCR reported the country hosted an aggregate total of more than 1.2 million newly arrived refugees, asylum seekers, and returnees as of August.  Of the 1.2 million, UNHCR counted more than 365,000 total new arrivals who had crossed the border from Sudan since the outset of the conflict.  Of these, UNHCR reported that 314,000 were refugee returnees, i.e., South Sudanese who had been residing in Sudan.  The government accepted refugees and returnees for reintegration.  No national procedures were in place to facilitate the provision of identity documents for returnees or the naturalization of refugees beyond procedures that were in place for all citizens and other applicants.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										Significant levels of subnational violence continued, particularly in Upper Nile, Unity, and Warrap States, and the Greater Equatoria region.  The result was sustained mass population displacement, both within the country and into neighboring countries, and high levels of humanitarian and protection needs, which strained the ability of UN and international humanitarian personnel to provide protection and assistance.  According to UNHCR, there were more than 1.6 million IDPs spread across all 10 states.  The increased violence, historic flooding, and food insecurity forced relief actors to delay plans for the safe return and relocation of some IDP populations.UNMISS continued to provide physical protection to IDPs in the POC site in Malakal.According to the UNMISS Human Rights Division and other organizations, violence and simmering ethnic conflict in areas such as Upper Nile, Jonglei, and Warrap States continued to result in dire humanitarian consequences, including significant displacement and serious and systematic human rights abuses, such as the killing of civilians, torture, arbitrary arrests, detentions, looting and destruction of civilian property, forced recruitment, and gender-based violence.The government promoted the return and resettlement of IDPs but did not provide a safe environment for returns and often denied humanitarian NGOs or international organizations access to IDPs.																																				g. Stateless Persons										Citizenship was derived through the right of blood (jus sanguinis) if a person had a South Sudanese parent, grandparent, or great-grandparent on either parent’s side, or if a person was a member of one of the country’s indigenous ethnic communities.  Individuals also could derive citizenship through naturalization.  Birth in the country was not sufficient to claim citizenship.  While the country had a Nationality Act in place since independence, fewer than 10 percent of South Sudanese were believed to have obtained national identity documents.  There were no official statistics or estimates on statelessness; however, a UNCHR survey estimated half a million persons were at risk of statelessness.  The Nationality Act did not include specific provisions for stateless persons, children whose parents were without nationality, or children born in the country who otherwise would be stateless.According to a 2018 report from the National Dialogue, a government-sponsored initiative, it was more difficult for those from the southern region of Equatoria to rightfully claim citizenship due to discrimination from other ethnicities, which suspected them of being Ugandans or Congolese.  According to UNHCR, certain nomadic pastoralist groups had difficulty accessing application procedures for nationality certification and experienced discrimination according to ethnic group or appearance that required UNHCR’s intervention to address matters with the Directorate of Nationality, Passports, and Immigration.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The transitional constitution provided that every citizen had the right to participate in elections in accordance with the constitution and the law.  Since the 2011 referendum on South Sudanese self-determination, no elections had been held.  Elected officials were arbitrarily removed and others appointed to take their places.																										Elections and Political Participation										Recent Elections:  Due a lack of political will to address intense violence and insecurity starting in 2013, the government postponed elections several times.  Since independence, the president fired and appointed local government officials and parliamentarians by decree.  In 2015 and again in 2018, the legislature passed amendments to the transitional constitution extending the terms of the president, national legislature, and state assemblies for three years.  The peace agreement signed in 2018 allowed for the extension of all terms for a three-year transitional period from February 2020 until February 2023, with elections slated for December 2022.  In 2022, however, the government proposed an extension of the 2018 peace agreement by 24 months to February 2025.  Members of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission voted to approve the government’s proposed extension, effectively postponing elections until December 2024.  As of the end of the year, UNMISS reported to the UN Security Council that “conditions for holding free, fair and credible elections are not yet in place.”  A separate report submitted by UNMISS to the Security Council in October described continuing delays to the implementation of the peace agreement as, “principally rooted in the lack of political will, especially among the conventional parties to the Revitalized Agreement.”Political Parties and Political Participation:  The SPLM enjoyed a near monopoly of power in the government and continued to be the most broadly recognized political entity since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005.  SPLM membership conferred political and financial advantages, and there was great reluctance by opposition parties to shed the SPLM name.  For example, the main opposition party was referred to as the SPLM-IO, and most other political parties either were offshoots of the SPLM or affiliated with it.  Members of the reconstituted parliament were appointed by presidential decree, and the parliament opened in 2021.  Parliament continued to meet regularly and discuss legislation.Opposition parties complained the government periodically harassed party members.  An unfavorable environment for media and citizen expression hampered participation in political processes.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups:  Women remained poorly represented in the judiciary, local governments, and among traditional leaders.  Representation was particularly poor at the local level, where there was little to no implementation of the 2018 peace agreement provision mandating 35 percent of political leadership positions be reserved for women.  The system also devolved substantial candidate selection power to political party leaders, very few of whom were women.  The government also failed to meet the 35 percent women quota in appointing members to the National Election Commission.An entrenched culture of discrimination presented a major obstacle to women’s political participation.  Women tended to be discouraged from assuming leadership positions because of the belief that such activities conflicted with their domestic duties.  Basic safety and security concerns, including high rates of gender-based violence, also limited women’s ability to participate in government.Several ethnic groups remained underrepresented or unrepresented in government.  Intercommunal and political violence exacerbated ethnic tensions and the imbalance in national- and state-level political institutions.The absence of translations of the constitution in Arabic or local languages limited the ability of minority populations to engage meaningfully in political dialogue.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The transitional constitution provided for criminal penalties for acts of corruption by officials, but the government did not implement the law.  There were numerous reports of government corruption.  Poor recordkeeping, lax accounting procedures, absence of adherence to procurement laws, and a lack of accountability and corrective legislation compounded the problem.Corruption:  Corruption was endemic in all branches of government.  The UN Panel of Experts and independent analysis by, among others, Small Arms Survey, reported government security forces, including the National Security Service, maintained control of public and natural resources to generate off-budget sources of revenue.  The UN Panel of Experts further noted pervasive corruption in the country’s critical petroleum industry, findings supported by a detailed study by The Sentry, an investigative NGO.  According to a report by Small Arms Survey, “at every opportunity the government attempts to divert funds into its patrimonial system.”In October independent audits revealed fraud in the construction of the Juba-Rumbek Road connecting the capital city Juba and Bahr El Ghazal region.  Reports found the construction of the highway, which began in 2019 and was financed by allocating 10,000 barrels of crude oil per day for infrastructure development to China Exim Bank, was only 16 percent complete as of February.For additional information about corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						A variety of domestic and international human rights groups monitored and investigated human rights conditions and cases and published their findings, often while facing considerable government resistance.  Government officials were rarely cooperative and responsive to the views of these groups and were often actively hostile.  Reports outlining atrocities exacerbated tensions between the government and international organizations and NGOs.  Government and opposition forces often blamed each other or pointed toward militia groups or “criminal” actors.The United Nations or Other International Bodies:  The government sometimes cooperated with representatives of the United Nations and other international organizations.  A planned visit by UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons Paula Gaviria was abruptly canceled in October in protest of the release of a UN report detailing systematic repression of civil society and independent media.  A lack of security guarantees from the government and opposition on many occasions, as well as frequent government violations of the status of forces agreement, including the restriction of movement of UNMISS personnel, constrained UNMISS’s ability to carry out its mandate, which included human rights monitoring and investigations.  Security forces generally regarded international organizations with suspicion.UNMISS and its staff faced harassment and intimidation by the government, threats against UNMISS premises and POC sites, unlawful arrest and detention, abduction, and restrictions on the importation of goods and equipment.  The SSPDF regularly prevented UNMISS from accessing areas of suspected human rights abuses in violation of the status of forces agreement that allowed UNMISS access to the entire country.  The government did not formally inform UNMISS regarding arrest and detention incidents as required under the agreement.There were credible reports the government harassed and intimidated civil society members cooperating with UN bodies, as well as those who sought to lobby foreign missions to pressure the government to respect civil liberties.Government Human Rights Bodies:  The president appointed members of the South Sudan Human Rights Commission, whose mandate included education, research, monitoring, and investigation of human rights abuses, either on its own initiative or upon request by victims.  International organizations and civil society organizations considered the commission’s operations to be generally independent of government influence.  The commission cooperated with international human rights advocates and submitted reports and recommendations to the government.While observers generally regarded the commission to have committed and competent leadership, severe resource constraints prevented it from effectively fulfilling its human rights protection mandate.  Salaries and office management accounted for the bulk of its funding, leaving little for monitoring or investigation.  The commission had not produced any substantive reporting since 2015.The National Committee for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide remained largely inactive.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence:  Conviction of rape was punishable by up to 14 years’ imprisonment and a fine.  The government did not effectively enforce the law, and rape and other forms of sexual violence were widespread.  The law defined forced or nonconsensual sexual intercourse within marriage as “not rape.”  No information was available on the number of persons prosecuted, convicted, or punished for rape, and convictions of rape seldom were publicized.  According to observers, sentences for persons convicted of rape were often less than the maximum.  Women and girls also faced the threat of rape while living in UN POC sites and IDP camps.Although few statistics were available, the UN Commission on Human Rights [in South Sudan] reported in March 2022 that conflict-related sexual violence against women and girls was widespread and systematic throughout the country, with one recent study finding that 65 percent of women and girls in conflict areas had experienced some form of gender-based violence.The law did not prohibit domestic violence.  Intimate partner violence against women, including spousal abuse, was common, although there were no reliable statistics on its prevalence.  According to NGOs, some women reported police tried to charge them when they attempted to file criminal complaints of rape or abuse.  While not mandatory, police often told women they needed to complete an official report prior to receiving medical treatment.  Families of rape survivors encouraged marriage to the rapist to avoid public shaming.In April a father, who served as a police officer, gouged the eyes of his daughter, age 17, when she married a man without his consent.  Police arrested the accused, charging him for violating provisions of laws that criminalized gender-based violence and protected the rights of children.  In August the defense counsel argued that Western-based laws undercut customary law and practice, violating the defendant’s rights.  The court denied the defense motion to transfer the case to a customary court.Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C):  FGM/C was a criminal offense under the law, but few data existed to determine its prevalence, and enforcement was largely nonexistent.  The law prohibited subjecting children to negative and harmful practices that affected their health, welfare, and dignity.  UNICEF estimated the prevalence of FGM/C at 1 percent among girls and women between the ages of 15 and 49.  FGM/C was practiced in both Christian and Muslim communities in the northern regions of the country, including Bahr el-Ghazal and Upper Nile.  Several NGOs worked to end FGM/C, and the Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Welfare raised awareness of the dangers of FGM/C through local radio broadcasts.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment:  Instances of girl compensation – compensating the family of a crime victim with a girl from the perpetrator’s family – occurred.  Survivors were generally between ages 11 and 15, did not attend school, and often were physically and sexually abused and used as servants by their captors.  Local officials complained the absence of security and rule of law in many areas impeded efforts to curb the practice.  Harmful dowry practices were also common.  NGOs reported fathers often forced daughters, generally minors, to marry older men in exchange for cattle or money.Conviction of sexual harassment was punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment and a fine.  The government rarely enforced the law, and NGOs reported most women were unaware it was a punishable offense or feared retribution for reporting it, since women were often blamed for its occurrence.  Observers noted sexual harassment, particularly by military and police, was a serious problem throughout the country.Discrimination:  While the transitional constitution provided for gender equality and equal rights for women, including in labor markets and property inheritance, deep cultural prejudices resulted in widespread discrimination against women.  High illiteracy rates also impeded women’s ability to understand and defend their rights.  Communities often followed customary laws and traditional practices that discriminated against women.  For example, authorities arrested and detained women for adultery.Despite statutory law to the contrary, under customary law a divorce was not final until the wife and her family returned the full dowry to the husband’s family.  As a result, families often dissuaded women from divorce.  One NGO reported that husbands’ families occasionally accused married women of adultery to recoup the dowry in times of hardship or due to interpersonal conflict.  Traditional courts usually ruled in favor of the husband’s family in most cases of child custody unless children were between ages three and seven.Women also experienced discrimination in employment, pay, credit, education, inheritance, housing, and ownership and management of businesses or land.  Although women had the right to own property and land under the transitional constitution, community elders often sought to prevent women from exercising these rights because they contravened customary practice.Reproductive Rights:  There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.Cultural practices and economic barriers limited reproductive choices.  Men who paid dowries often believed they had the right to make reproductive health decisions for their wives and daughters.  High illiteracy rates among women limited their access to accurate information concerning the right to control their fertility.  Many individuals did not have access to accurate information, modern contraceptive methods, or family planning services.  For persons younger than age 18, permission from family was not required to access nonsurgical reproductive health services, including for contraception.  Cultural practices and social stigma, however, often prevented minors from exercising their rights.  Women needed to obtain their husbands’ consent to access sexual and reproductive health services, such as antenatal care, facility delivery, and family planning, while also facing the threat of domestic violence for seeking medical care without the consent of their husbands.An acute shortage of skilled professionals and nonpayment of staff salaries were the biggest deficiencies in the provision of quality health care.  The country faced severe shortages in all categories of trained health professionals.  Maternal health services were often provided by less-skilled health workers.  On average, there was only one health facility per 10,000 inhabitants, and an estimated 72 percent of the population lived more than three miles from the closest clinic.  Many of these facilities were not capable of providing specialized care, and there were not enough qualified doctors, nurses, or midwives to treat survivors of sexual violence.The maternal mortality rate was estimated to be between 789 and 1,150 deaths per 100,000 live births.  The high maternal mortality rate was largely due to limited and low-quality medical care, as well as an extremely low rate of skilled birth attendants.  More than 80 percent of women delivered at home, assisted by untrained attendants.  The lack of access to skilled medical care during pregnancy and childbirth also resulted in maternal death and disability from treatable conditions such as infection, hemorrhage, and obstructed birth.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										Inter- and intra-ethnic fighting and violence by government, opposition forces, and armed militias affiliated with the government and the opposition targeting specific ethnic groups resulted in human rights.  The country had at least 64 ethnic groups and a long history of interethnic conflict.  Ethnic groups were broadly categorized into the Nilotic (Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk ethnic groups), Nilo-Hamitic, and Southwestern Sudanic groups.  For all ethnic groups, cattle represented wealth and status.  Competition for resources to maintain large cattle herds often resulted in violent clashes.  Violence at the subnational level was often driven by political leaders and other actors in the capital.Discrimination in employment based on ethnic groups was widespread.Inter- and intra-ethnic clashes occurred throughout the year.  Movements of Bor Dinka pastoralists from Jonglei State caused widespread dislocation and intercommunal clashes in Central and Western Equatoria States.  There were numerous, corroborated reports of killings, abductions, cattle theft, cattle poisoning, and destruction of fixed and moveable property across communal lines.  As a result of the inflow of refugees and returnee South Sudanese following the start of hostilities in Sudan in April, humanitarian workers reported heightened tensions within resettlement camps and reported self-segregation along ethnic lines.																																				Children										Birth Registration:  Citizenship was derived through birth if a person had any South Sudanese parent, grandparent, or great-grandparent on either the mother’s or the father’s side, or if a person was a member of one of the country’s Indigenous ethnic communities.  Individuals could also derive citizenship through naturalization.  Birth in the country was not sufficient to claim citizenship.  The government did not register all births immediately.Education:  Girls often did not have equal access to education.  Many girls did not attend school or dropped out of school due to early and forced child marriage, domestic duties, and fear of gender-based violence at school.Child Abuse:  The law prohibited child abuse.  Child abuse, including sexual abuse, was reportedly widespread.  Child rape occurred frequently in the context of child, early, and forced marriage, and armed groups also perpetrated it.  Authorities seldom prosecuted child rape due to fear among survivors and their families of stigmatization and retaliation.  Child abduction also was a problem.  Rural communities often abducted women and children during cattle raids.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage:  The law provided that every child had the right to protection from early marriage but did not explicitly prohibit marriage before age 18.  The government did not enforce the law effectively.  Child marriage remained common.  According to the Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Welfare, nearly half of all girls and young women between ages 15 and 19 were married, and some brides were as young as 12.  According to UNICEF, 9 percent of girls were married by age 15 and 52 percent by age 18.  NGOs reported fathers often forced daughters, generally minors, to marry older men in exchange for cattle or money.  Early marriage sometimes reflected efforts by men to avoid rape charges, which a married woman could not file against her husband.  In other cases, families of rape survivors encouraged marriage to the rapist to avoid public shaming.  Many abducted girls were often repeatedly subjected to rape or sexual slavery, or they were forced into marriage.Sexual Exploitation of Children:  The law designated 18 as the minimum age for consensual sex, although commercial sexual exploitation of children occurred.  The law criminalized buying or selling a child for the purpose of prostitution and prescribed a punishment of up to 14 years’ imprisonment and a fine.  The law also criminalized the procurement of a child for commercial sexual exploitation and the facilitation of commercial sexual exploitation of a child by the child’s parent or guardian and prescribed penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine.  The government (enforced/did not enforce) the law effectively.  Child sex trafficking was prevalent throughout the country, especially of young girls, who were bartered for cattle and other goods in some communities.																																				Antisemitism										There were no official figures regarding the number of Jewish persons in the country.  There were no reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization:  The law criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct.  It prohibited “unnatural offenses,” defined as “carnal intercourse against the order of nature,” with punishment up to 10 years’ imprisonment.  There were no reports that authorities enforced the law.  The law also criminalized “any male person who dresses or is attired in the fashion of a woman” in public, with a punishment of up to three months’ imprisonment.Violence and Harassment:  Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) persons reported security forces routinely harassed and sometimes arrested, detained, tortured, and beat them.  LGBTQI+ community leaders reported state actors incited harassment and physical abuses of LGBTQI+ persons, including posting public flyers in resettlement camps seeking the location of LGBTQI+ persons.  Because of overtly hostile government rhetoric and actions, most openly LGBTQI+ citizens fled the country.Discrimination:  The law did not prohibit discrimination by state or nonstate actors based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics.  Anti-LGBTQI+ sentiment was pervasive throughout the country, affecting all aspects of life for openly LGBTQI+ persons.  Human rights and LGBTQI+ activists reported no instances of official action to investigate or punish those complicit in discrimination, harassment, or abuse of LGBTQI+ persons.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition:  Legal gender recognition was not available.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices:  There were no reports of involuntary or coercive medical or psychological practices targeting LGBTQI+ persons.  There were no official reports of medically unnecessary and irreversible “normalization” surgeries performed on children or nonconsenting adult intersex persons.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly:  Human rights groups reported LGTBQI+ persons faced restrictions of freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly due to fear of violence, harassment, or other forms of retribution from state and nonstate actors.																																				Persons with Disabilities										The law did not specifically prohibit discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, and mental disabilities in employment, education, air travel and other transportation, access to health care, or the provision of other government services.  NGOs reported community and family members routinely subjected persons with disabilities to discrimination.  The government did not enact or implement programs to provide access to buildings, information, or communications public services.The transitional constitution and the law stipulated that primary education be provided to children with disabilities without discrimination.  Very few teachers, however, were trained to address the needs of children with disabilities, and very few schools were able to provide a safe, accessible learning environment for children with disabilities.  There were no legal restrictions on the right of persons with disabilities to vote and otherwise participate in civic affairs, although lack of physical accessibility constituted a barrier to effective participation.  There were no mental-health hospitals or institutions, and persons with mental disabilities were often held in prisons.  Limited mental-health services were available at Juba Teaching Hospital.There were no reports of official action taken to investigate or punish those responsible for violence against persons with disabilities.  Awareness of disability matters was low, negative social attitudes prevailed, and persons with disabilities had limited access to services and employment.Persons with disabilities also faced disproportional hardship under conditions of crisis-level food insecurity and continuing violence.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Historical clashes intensified between cattle keepers and farmers, and between cattle keepers and persons attempting to raid and steal their herds.  The level, scale, and sophistication of these attacks were significantly higher when compared with past clashes.  Hundreds of individuals were killed and injured, and thousands were forced to flee their homes.Civilian casualties and forced displacements occurred in many parts of the country when raiders stole cattle, which defined power and wealth in many traditional communities.  Land disputes often erupted when stolen cattle were moved into other areas, also causing civilian casualties and displacement.  The SSPDF, NSS, and police sometimes engaged in revenge killings between and within ethnic groups.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for the rights of every employee to form and join unions, bargain collectively, and strike with restrictions.  The law prohibited antiunion discrimination.  The law excluded from these protections military and police but also included a broader list of civil service occupations, including prison service, fire service and wildlife forces, than the international standard.  While labor courts adjudicated labor disputes, the minister of labor could refer them to compulsory arbitration.The law provided a regulatory framework to govern worker trade unions, but it restricted workers’ rights to form and join organizations of their own choosing, allowing only one union per sector or geographical area, and restricted trade unions’ rights to organize their own administration.  The largest union, the South Sudan Workers’ Trade Union Federation, had approximately 65,000 members, working mainly in the public sector.  Unions were nominally independent of the governing political party, but there were reports of government interference in labor union activities.  In September worker organizations reported that armed police and the acting mayor of Juba city assaulted a woman street vendor and used violent means to remove vendors from public spaces.  Following a widely circulated video of the incident, the governor of Central Equatoria State removed the acting mayor from his position.  The government did not effectively enforce the law.  Administrative and judicial procedures were subject to lengthy delays and appeals, and penalties were not commensurate with those for other laws involving denials of civil rights.  Workers across the country were vulnerable to exploitation.  Years of conflict, political turmoil, climate shocks, and crime disrupted livelihoods and basic infrastructure in every sector.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/&nbsp;.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws:  The law specified the Ministry of Labor could establish and publish a minimum wage, or wages, for different categories of employees.  There was no public information that this occurred.  Few workers were engaged in formal wage employment, with more than 80 percent of the population engaged in nonwage work, including subsistence or small-scale agriculture not covered by labor law.  The law specified normal working hours should not exceed eight hours per day and 40 hours per week and should provide premium pay for overtime.Inspectors had the authority to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions.  Violations were common in all sectors.  Most employees, including public school teachers, earned less than the World Bank global poverty income level equivalent to two dollars per day.  In August, the government dismissed more than 300 civil servants, mostly teachers, for failure to report to their assigned workplaces.  The dismissed workers reported the government failed to follow notification procedures; some workers also stated they abandoned their positions because of low pay.Occupational Safety and Health:  There were no occupational safety and health (OSH) standards.  Workers could not remove themselves from situations that endangered their health or safety without jeopardy to their employment.  The Ministry of Labor had an Occupational Safety Branch, which consisted of an office director and no staff.A civil service provisional order applied to the public sector and outlined the rights and obligations of public-sector workers, including benefits, salaries, and overtime.  The law provided the Ministry of Labor with authority to issue the schedule of salary rates, according to which all civil servants, officials, and employees were to be paid.  This pay scale had not been adjusted for several years, and due to recent inflation and the rapid depreciation of the South Sudanese pound, most civil servants did not receive enough income to support themselves, even when their salaries were delivered on time and in full, which was infrequent.  Under the law only unskilled workers were eligible for overtime pay for work more than 40 hours per week.  Civil servants, officials, and employees working at higher pay grades were expected to work necessary hours beyond the standard workweek without overtime pay.  When exceptional additional hours were demanded, the department head could grant time off in lieu of reimbursement.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement:  The government did not effectively enforce minimum wage, overtime, and OSH laws.  The government neither investigated nor prosecuted wage and hour violations.  Violations of wage and hour laws were common.Widespread oil spillages and other chemical pollution, exacerbated by sustained, multiyear flooding that damaged oil producing infrastructure, negatively affected the health of workers and others who lived nearby.More than 66 percent of workers were in the informal sector in 2019, according to African Futures research from the Institute for Security Studies.  Labor laws did not apply to informal and part-time workers.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																						i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																						g. Stateless Persons																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								South Sudan
- UN Secretary-General Guterres’ April 8 Negative Assessment of Preconditions for Elections in South Sudan  HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;UN Secretary-General Guterres’ April 8 Negative Assessment of Preconditions for Elections in South Sudan 				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										UN Secretary-General Guterres’ April 8 Negative Assessment of Preconditions for Elections in South Sudan 																																		Press Statement																														April 16, 2024																																							UN Secretary-General Guterres’ April 8 letter, in which he enumerated over a dozen critical preconditions necessary to hold genuine and peaceful elections that the South Sudan transitional government has yet to meet, is a clear message to the Security Council.  Despite significant international support, including identification of key election issues by the United Nations, African Union, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the letter demonstrates that President Salva Kiir, First Vice President Riek Machar, and other South Sudanese political leaders have thus far collectively failed to meet the standards necessary for genuine and peaceful elections to take place in December.The United States&nbsp;remains&nbsp;concerned about&nbsp;ongoing&nbsp;reports of&nbsp;human rights violations, as&nbsp;well as inadequate investment in key&nbsp;democratic&nbsp;institutions.&nbsp;&nbsp;Transitional government leaders should act with urgency to&nbsp;address these&nbsp;deficiencies&nbsp;and&nbsp;create the necessary&nbsp;preconditions for a&nbsp;genuine&nbsp;and peaceful&nbsp;electoral process, including by protecting civic space,&nbsp;standing up&nbsp;politically neutral security forces,&nbsp;strengthening&nbsp;electoral institutions, and&nbsp;holding&nbsp;dialogue among leaders&nbsp;to resolve outstanding election decisions.&nbsp;&nbsp;UN electoral support should focus on&nbsp;establishing&nbsp;these preconditions.&nbsp;&nbsp;The longer South Sudan’s leaders avoid taking these steps, the greater the risk of&nbsp;additional&nbsp;violence.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;An estimated 75 percent of the country’s population will require humanitarian&nbsp;assistance&nbsp;this year&nbsp;alone&nbsp;as a result of&nbsp;ongoing violence.U.S. engagement with&nbsp;the people of&nbsp;South Sudan, which began decades before&nbsp;the country’s independence, remains focused on&nbsp;shared&nbsp;values of&nbsp;peace, democracy, human rights, and government’s duty to respond to the needs of its people.&nbsp;&nbsp;Strong&nbsp;U.S. advocacy for the necessary&nbsp;preconditions for a genuine&nbsp;and peaceful&nbsp;electoral process is designed to&nbsp;avoid a return to civil war.						Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																																Elections																																																					Human Rights and Democracy																															Office of the Spokesperson																								South Sudan
- Renewing the Call for the South Sudan Transitional Government to Conduct a Credible Investigation Into Journalist Christopher Allen’s Death Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonSouth Sudan’s transitional government recently announced the outcome of a long overdue investigation into the August 26, 2017 death of journalist Christopher Allen, a dual U.S. and UK citizen who was shot and killed while covering the conflict in South Sudan. The subsequently released report does not address in a comprehensive manner all the factors that led to Mr. Allen’s death or the disrespectful treatment of his remains. We renew our call on the transitional government to conduct a credible investigation into Mr. Allen’s death and to demonstrate the political will to take accountability seriously.
- FY 2024 Notice of Funding Opportunity for NGO Programs in South Sudan Responding to the Ongoing Sudan Crisis Bureau of Population, Refugees, and MigrationFunding Opportunity Number: DFOP0010737Assistance Listings (CFDA) number: 19.517 &#8211; Overseas Refugee Assistance Programs for AfricaAnnouncement issuance date: March 26, 2024Announcement type: Cooperative AgreementProposal application submission deadline: May 10, 2024 at 11:59:59 p.m. EDT (23:59:59). Proposals submitted after this deadline will not be considered.Anticipated timeframe to award for selected proposals: Pending the availability of funds, PRM anticipates, but makes no guarantee, that awards will be made less than five months from the proposal submission deadline.Advisory: All applicants must submit proposal application packages through the website Grants.gov. PRM strongly recommends submitting your application packages early to allow time to address any technical difficulties that may arise on the Grants.gov website.If you are new to PRM funding, the Grants.gov registration process can be complicated. We urge you to refer to PRM’s General NGO Guidelines “Application Process” section for information and resources to help ensure that the application process runs smoothly. PRM also strongly encourages organizations that have received funding from PRM in the past to read this section as a refresher.PRM strongly recommends application narratives be submitted in Adobe PDF, as Microsoft Word documents may sometimes produce different page lengths based on software versions and configurations when transmitted. Tables and budget documents should be submitted as Excel documents. Page limits are strictly adhered to, and PRM will not review pages of the narrative beyond the stated limit, which may negatively impact the concept note score. All documents must be in English and should avoid the use of jargon and should spell out all acronyms upon first use.Organizations can retrieve PRM’s-recommended templates and NGO guidelines on PRM’s website and in this opportunity’s grants.gov page.Program DescriptionSummaryThis announcement is designed to accompany PRM’s General NGO Guidelines, which contain additional information on PRM’s priorities and NGO funding strategy with which selected organizations must comply. Please use both the General NGO Guidelines and this announcement to ensure that your submission is in full compliance with PRM requirements and that the proposed activities are in line with PRM’s priorities. Submissions that do not reflect the requirements outlined in these guidelines will not be considered.Geographic Regions / PopulationsProposed activities must be undertaken in South Sudan in response to the ongoing emergency in Sudan, to include support for emergency response operations for new arrivals at the border in reception and transit centers, and in official refugee sites in South Sudan. (Note: PRM will not fund projects in Yida). Because of PRM&#8217;s mandate to provide protection, assistance, and sustainable solutions for refugees and victims of conflict, PRM will consider funding only those programs that include a target program participant base of at least 50 percent refugees or refugee returnees. PRM will not consider activities outside of South Sudan for this funding opportunity.Program area (For PRM Use)Proposals must align with one or more of the following program areas.Humanitarian Protection and AssistanceInterim and Durable SolutionsProgram Sectors and ModalitiesProposals must focus on one or more of the following programmatic sectors (see PRM’s General NGO Guidelines for sector descriptions). Multi-sectoral proposals are encouraged and should include PRM’s required indicator for each sector or sub sector included in the proposal.Health, may include but is not limited to any of the following:Primary HealthSexual and Reproductive HealthMaternal and Child HealthMental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS)NutritionProtection, may include but is not limited to any of the following:LegalChild ProtectionGBVSocio-cultural Inclusion and Social CohesionNote: In order to ensure greater accountability for protection outcomes in all overseas assistance program proposals, three indicators are required for all programs regardless of design or sector. If the proposed program will not contribute to one or several of these mandatory indicators, the indicator must still be included in the proposal indicator table but with a target of zero.PRM-1. Number of individuals directly reached through PRM funding.PRM-2. Amount of humanitarian funding distributed to local, national, or refugee-led organizations (in USD) – This amount should include any sub-awards or contracts with local, national, or refugee-led organizations. If the prime applicant is a local, national, or refugee-led organization, they should put the full proposal budget total as the target value. Refer to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) working definition of “local” and “national” organizations. Applicants should put a target of zero for this indicator if it does not apply to them; it will not affect their eligibility.PRM-3. Percentage of participants who report that humanitarian assistance is delivered in a safe, accessible, accountable, and participatory manner – This is a protection mainstreaming indicator developed by the Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) and adopted by the Grand Bargain. Research or coordination awards that don’t involve community implementation are exempt from this indicator. Please refer to the PRM Performance Indicator Reference &amp; Definition Sheets (PIRS) for a sample questionnaire and analysis guidance.Note: Cash and Voucher Assistance programs must include the relevant indicator(s) from the selection contained in the NGO Guidelines Appendix D.Number of Proposal ApplicationsOrganizations may submit a maximum of one application only. Any subsequent submissions received will be disqualified. (Note: Submissions by organizations as a sub-awardee do not count toward an individual organization’s submission limit.) Applications may cover multiple sites and multiple sectors.Country-specific GuidelinesSouth Sudan Country-Specific GuidanceGeneral GuidanceProposed activities in South Sudan must be in response to the ongoing Sudan emergency and aim to assist refugee or South Sudanese refugee returnee populations located in South Sudan affected by the Sudan crisis. Activities can include support for emergency response operations for new arrivals at the border in reception and transit centers, and in official refugee sites. (Note: PRM will not fund projects in Yida). In established refugee sites PRM will only review proposals for a target population base of at least 50 percent refugees. For proposed activities focused on border response, including assistance in transit and reception centers, PRM will only consider proposals for a target population that is combined at least 50 percent refugee or refugee returnees. Programs should, whenever possible, pursue a community-based approach that also benefits host communities. It is strongly encouraged that programs mainstream protection activities, including gender-based violence (GBV) risk mitigation, inclusion of marginalized groups, mental health and psychosocial support, and prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual harassment measures (i.e., continuous training for all staff, volunteers, and program participants), across proposed sectors and activities. Two or more NGOs working in complementary sectors may choose to submit joint proposals with a prime applicant and one or more sub-awardees. Organizations may also consider project designs that allow activities to be scaled up or scaled down based upon funding availabilities.Duration of ActivityProgram plans for one year will be considered.Period of PerformancePrograms period of performance of 12 months will be considered.Funding limitsProgram proposals must not be less than the funding floor and not more than the funding ceiling or they will be disqualified.Funding floor (lowest $ value): $300,000Funding ceiling (highest $ value): $2,000,000Anticipated Number of AwardsThe amount of funding available per award for this NOFO will be determined once final FY 2024 appropriations have been made. This NOFO will be cancelled if FY 2024 appropriations are insufficient to support new awards.Anticipated Amount to be Awarded TotalThe amount of funding available per award for this NOFO will be determined as part of the application review process based on applications received and funding made available through appropriations.Federal Award InformationProposed program start dates: September 1, 2024Duration of Activity: See country-specific guidelines above.Eligibility InformationEligible Applicants:Nonprofits having a 501(c)(3) status with the IRS, other than institutions of higher education (U.S.-based NGOs must be able to demonstrate proof of non-profit tax status).Nonprofits without 501(c)(3) status with the IRS, other than institutions of higher education (overseas-based NGOs must be able to demonstrate proof of registration in country of domicile); andInternational Organizations. International multilateral organizations, such as United Nations agencies, should not submit proposals through Grants.gov in response to this NOFO. Multilateral organizations that are seeking funding for programs relevant to this announcement should contact the PRM Program Officer (as listed below) on or before the closing date of the funding announcement.Cost Sharing or Matching: Cost sharing, matching, or cost participation is not a requirement of an application in response to this funding announcement.Proposals for consideration should describe the sources and amounts of additional funding that may be utilized to complement PRM funding, and meet the following criteria:Are not paid by the Federal Government under another Federal award.Are verifiable from the non-Federal entity&#8217;s records.Are not included as contributions for any other Federal award; andAre necessary and reasonable for accomplishment of project or program objectives.Please include this information in the Budget Summary, Budget Detail, and Budget Narrative of the proposal, and separated from the PRM share of the proposed budget.Note: Though favorably looked upon, inclusion will not result in a competitive ranking increase when evaluated.OtherProposals must have a concrete implementation plan with well-conceived objectives and indicators that are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and reliable, time-bound, and trackable (SMART), and have established baselines; objectives should be clearly linked to the sectors.Proposals must adhere to relevant international standards for humanitarian assistance, especially Sphere Standards. See PRM’s General NGO Guidelines for a complete list of sector-specific standards including guidance on proposals for programs in urban areas.PRM strongly encourages programs that target the needs of vulnerable and underserved groups among the program participant population (such groups may include women; children; adolescents; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex (LGBTQI+) individuals; older persons; the sick; persons with disabilities; and members of minority communities) and can demonstrate what steps have been taken to meet the specific and unique protection and assistance needs of these vulnerable groups effectively.PRM will accept proposals from any NGO working in the above-mentioned sectors although, given budgetary constraints, priority will be given to proposals from organizations that can demonstrate:a working relationship with UNHCR.a proven track record in providing proposed assistance both in the sector and specified location.evidence of coordination with international organizations (IOs) and other NGOs working in the same area or sector as well as – where possible – local authorities.an emphasis on the outcome or impact of program activities.a strong sustainability plan, involving local capacity building, where feasible.where applicable, adherence to PRM’s Principles for Refugee Protection in Urban Areas; andan understanding of and sensitivity to conflict dynamics in the program location.Application and Submission InstructionsWhere to Request Application Package: Application packages may be downloaded from the website www.Grants.gov.Content and Form of Application: PRM strongly recommends using the proposal and budget templates that are available on PRM’s website.Single-Year Proposals:Single-year program proposal page limitsSingle-year proposals using PRM’s templates must not exceed 15 pages in length (Times New Roman or Calibri 12-point font, letter sized paper, one-inch margins on all sides). If the applicant does not use PRM’s recommended templates, proposals must not exceed 10 pages in length. Organizations may choose to attach work plans, activity calendars, and/or logical frameworks as addendums/appendices to the proposal but are not required to do so. These attachments do not count toward the page limit total; however, annexes cannot be relied upon as a key source of program information. The proposal narrative must be able to stand on its own in the application process.PRM strongly recommends application narrative be submitted in Adobe PDF, as Microsoft Word documents may sometimes produce different page lengths based on software versions and configurations. Tables and budget documents should be submitted as Excel documents.Page limits are strictly adhered to, and PRM will not review pages of the narrative beyond the stated limit, which may negatively impact the proposal’s score.All documents must be in English and should avoid the use of jargon and should spell out all acronyms upon first use.Application PackageTo be considered for PRM funding, organizations must submit a complete application package, including:Proposal Narrative not exceeding stated page limits.Indicator Table: Including all required PRM indicators and targets for each year (if multi-year).Cash and voucher assistances (CVA) modality must report on CVA indicatorsCompleted Budget table including summary and detail tabsdisaggregated by year and for each year of the program period (for multi-year proposals).Include total costs by objective and estimated costs by sector,Total costs divided by country (if applicable)Budget Narrative disaggregated by year and for each year of the program period.Completed and signed SF-424 andSF-424A. PRM requires that Box 21 of the SF-424 be checked.If the applicant organization has an active registration in SAM.gov that was either created or updated on or after February 2, 2019, then the applicant does NOT need to submit the SF-424B as they will be prompted to complete the representations and certifications in SAM.gov.Risk Assessment and Security Plan.Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) Code of Conduct and a country or regional implementation plan specific to the country of region of the applicationNote: Codes of Conduct must be consistent with the updated 2019 IASC Task Force’s Six Core Principles. The country/regional implementation plan should outline how employees are trained and otherwise made aware of the Code of Conduct, how violations of the Code of Conduct against program participants are reported and followed up on in a safe and confidential manner, how program participants are made aware of the Code of Conduct and a mechanism to report any violations, and whether there is a focal point in the country or regional office for the Code of Conduct.Key Personnel for award applicant and sub-recipient(s)Applicants must furnish names, titles, and brief biographical information on the education and experience of key personnel in implementing the program and key supervisory personnel; (i.e., the members of the professional staff in a program supervisory position engaged for or assigned to duties under the award).A Market Analysis and a Participant Competency/Capacity Assessment for all proposals that include at least one livelihoods sector objective (or will be disqualified), if applicable. Please see the General NGO Guidelines for more details.Most recent Negotiated Indirect Cost Rate Agreement (NICRA), if applicable, or a de minimis rate calculation of Modified Total Direct Costs (MTDC) if the applicant is eligible and elects to use the de minimis rate.Most recent external audit report is required prior to issuance of an award, if proposal is chosen for implementation.Information in support of any cost-sharing/cost-matching arrangements, if applicable.Information detailing the source of any in-kind contributions, if applicable.Details on any sub-agreements associated with the program including the budget detail (must be part of the budget submission as noted above), if applicable.Organizational Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) Framework (is required prior to issuance of an award, if proposal is chosen for implementation)Additionally, organizations must consider the following as part of their proposal package:To be considered a competitive proposal, the Proposal Narrative, Indicator Table, and Budget Detail should include the following information:Focus on outcome or impact indicators as much as possible. At a minimum, each objective should have one outcome or impact indicator.Include specific information on locations of programs and participants (GPS coordinates highly recommended) to increase PRM’s ability to track the impact of PRM funding.Outline how the NGO will acknowledge PRM funding. If an organization believes that publicly acknowledging the receipt of USG funding for a particular PRM-funded program could potentially endanger the lives of the program participants and/or the organization staff, invite suspicion about the organization&#8217;s motives, or alienate the organization from the population it is trying to help, it must provide a brief explanation in its proposal as to why it should be exempted from this requirement.PRM expects each proposal, regardless of sector, to demonstrate protection mainstreaming, including by identifying potential protection risks associated with the program and how they will be mitigated. Assistance activities should mainstream protection by analyzing the protection risks in relation to each specific programming sector. An analysis of the risks should inform how assistance is designed to minimize them and maximize protection of program participants. Applicants may introduce gender-specific risks in this section but should provide a full analysis in the gender analysis.PRM partners must complete a gender analysis in the proposal narrative that briefly explainsexperiences of men, women, boys, and girls with a focus on the different familial roles, community privileges, and gender dynamics within the target population;associated risks and threats experienced by women, girls, and other vulnerable populations based on their gender;power imbalances and needs that arise based on gender inequalities that exist within the family or community; andproposed responses that will address the above and mitigate any gender differences in access, participation, or decision-making that may be experienced by at-risk groups, particularly women and girls. The gender analysis should aim to specify and target specific at-risk sub-populations of women and girls, such as women and girl heads of households, out-of-school girls, women and girls with disabilities, women and girl survivors of violence, married girls, adolescent mothers, as well as people who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex (LGBTQI+), and those who are often unaware of and excluded from programs and services and who may be the hardest to reach based on their gender.The budget should include a specific breakdown of funds being provided by UNHCR, other USG agencies, other donors, and your own organization.Applicants whose proposals address gender-based violence (GBV) through their programs must estimate the total cost of these activities as a separate line item in their proposed budgets (see PRM’s budget template). Proposals and budgets must include details of any sub-agreements associated with the programs.For consortia only, a description of how the partnership will be organized and how lines of authority and decision-making will be managed across all team members and between the lead applicant and associate awardees should be included in the proposal.Unique Entity Identifier (UEI) and System for Award Management (SAM)Note: On April 4, 2022, the formerly used DUNS Number was replaced by the System for Award Management (SAM.gov) UEI. For more information on the process, visit GSA&#8217;s website on the UEI transition.Each applicant is required to:be registered in SAM before submitting its application.provide a valid UEI number in its application; andcontinue to always maintain an active SAM registration with current information during which it has an active PRM award or an application or plan under consideration by PRM.No federal award may be made to an applicant until the applicant has complied with all applicable UEI and SAM requirements and, if an applicant has not fully complied with the requirements by the time the PRM award is ready to be made, PRM may determine that the applicant is not qualified to receive a PRM award and use that determination as a basis for making a PRM award to another applicant.Applications must be submitted via Grants.gov. Grants.gov registration requires a UEI number and active SAM.gov registration. If you are new to PRM funding, the Grants.gov registration process can be complicated. We urge you to refer to PRM’s General NGO Guidelines “Application Process” section for information and resources to help ensure that the application process runs smoothly. PRM also strongly encourages organizations that have received funding from PRM in the past to read this section as a refresher. Applicants may also refer to the “For Applicants” page on Grants.gov for complete details on requirements.Do not wait until the deadline to attempt to submit your application on Grants.gov. Organizations not registered with Grants.gov should register well in advance of the deadline as it can take several weeks to finalize registration (sometimes longer for non-U.S. based NGOs to receive required registration numbers). We also recommend that organizations, particularly first-time applicants, submit applications via Grants.gov no later than one week before the deadline to avoid last-minute technical difficulties that could result in an application not being considered. PRM has extremely limited ability to correct or facilitate rapid resolution to technical difficulties associated with Grants.gov, SAM.gov or UEI number issues. PRM partners must maintain an active SAM.gov registration with current and correct information at all times during which they have an active federal award or an application under consideration by PRM or any federal agency.When registering with Grants.gov, organizations must designate points of contact and Authorized Organization Representatives (AORs). Please note that as of December 2022, organizations based outside of the United States that do not intend to apply for U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) awards are no longer required to have a NATO CAGE (NCAGE) code to apply for non-DoD foreign assistance funding opportunities. If an applicant organization is mid-registration and wishes to remove an NCAGE code from their sam.gov registration, the applicant should submit a help desk ticket (“incident”) with the Federal Service Desk (FSD) online to seek guidance on how to do so. Applicants experiencing technical difficulties with the SAM.gov registration process should contact the Federal Service Desk online or at 1&#8211;866-606-8220 (U.S.) and 1-334-206-7828 (International).Applications must be submitted under the authority of the Authorized Organization Representative at the applicant organization. Having proposals submitted by agency headquarters helps to avoid possible technical problems.If you encounter technical difficulties with Grants.gov please contact the Grants.gov Help Desk at support@grants.gov or by calling 1-800-518-4726.Applicants who are unable to submit applications via Grants.gov due to Grants.gov technical difficulties and.who have reported the problem to the Grants.gov help desk.received a case number.have completed UEI and SAM.gov registrations.and had a documented service request opened to research the problem.Applicants may contact the PRM NGO Coordinator before the submission deadline to determine whether an alternative method of submission is appropriate. However, PRM makes no guarantee to accept an application outside of the grants.gov system.It is the responsibility of each applicant to ensure the appropriate registrations are in place and active. Failure to have the appropriate organizational registrations in place or are experiencing issues resulting from discrepancies across registration platforms is not considered a technical difficulty and is not justification for an alternate means of submission.In accordance with 2 CFR §200.113, Mandatory disclosures, the non-Federal entity or applicant for a federal award must disclose, in a timely manner, in writing to the Federal awarding agency or pass-through entity all violations of Federal criminal law involving fraud, bribery, or gratuity violations potentially affecting the Federal award. Non-Federal entities that have received a federal award including the term and condition outlined in Appendix XII—Award Term and Condition for Recipient Integrity and Performance Matters are required to report certain civil, criminal, or administrative proceedings to SAM. Failure to make required disclosures can result in any of the remedies described in 2 CFR §200.338 Remedies for noncompliance, including suspension or debarment. (See also 2 CFR part 180, 31 U.S.C. 3321, and 41 U.S.C. 2313.)Submission Dates and TimesAnnouncement issuance date: March 26, 2024Proposal submission deadline: Friday, May 3, 2024 at 11:59:59 p.m. EDT (23:59:59) Applications submitted after this deadline will not be considered.Intergovernmental Review: Not ApplicableFunding Restrictions: Federal awards will not allow reimbursement of Federal Award costs without prior authorization by PRM.Other Submission RequirementsBranding and Marking StrategyThe following provisions will be included whenever assistance is awarded:The Recipient shall recognize the U.S. Government’s funding for activities specified under this award at the project site with a graphic of the U.S. flag accompanied by one of the following two phrases based on the level of funding for the award:Fully funded by the award: “Gift of the United States Government”Partially funded by the award: “Funding provided by the United States Government”PRM highly encourages recognition of U.S. Government funding on social media and website platforms to be included in proposals branding and marking strategy. Recipients should tag PRM’s Twitter account @StatePRM and/or Facebook account @State.PRM (rather than using hashtags). Additionally, the applicable U.S. Embassy should be tagged as well. Updates of actions taken to fulfill this requirement must be included in quarterly program reports to PRM.All programs, projects, assistance, activities, and public communications to foreign audiences, partially or fully funded by the Department, must be marked appropriately overseas with the standard U.S. flag in a size and prominence equal to (or greater than) any other logo or identity. The requirement does not apply to the Recipient’s own corporate communications or in the United States.The Recipient must appropriately ensure that all publicity and promotional materials underscore the sponsorship by or partnership with the U.S. Government or the U.S. Embassy. The Recipient may continue to use existing logos or project materials; however, a standard rectangular U.S. flag must be used in conjunction with such logos.Do not use the Department of State seal without the express written approval from PRM.Sub non-Federal entities (sub-awardees) and subsequent tier sub-award agreements are subject to the marking requirements and the non-Federal entity shall include a provision in the sub non-Federal entity agreement indicating that the standard, rectangular U.S. flag is a requirement. Exemptions from this requirement may be allowable but must be agreed to in writing by the Grants Officer. (Note: An exemption refers to the complete or partial cessation of branding, not use of alternative branding). Requests should be initiated with the Grants Officer and Grants Officer Representative. Waivers issued are applied only to the exemptions requested through the Recipient’s proposal for funding and any subsequent negotiated revisions.In the event the non-Federal entity does not comply with the marking requirements as established in the approved assistance agreement, the Grants Officer Representative and the Grants Officer must initiate corrective action with the non-Federal entity.PRM Standardized Indicators: Partners must refer to PRM’s indicator list in Appendix D of the NGO Guidelines and include any mandatory and required indicators as part of the application. PRM has two categories of indicators:Required: Indicators marked as “required” in Appendix D must be included in the proposal as applicable. Each sector and sub-sector has at least one required PRM indicator; these must be included in the indicator table if the partner is proposing any activities or budget for that sector/sub-sector. In addition, three indicators are required for all programs regardless of design or sector. If the proposed program will not contribute to one or several of these mandatory indicators, the indicator must still be included in the proposal indicator table but with a target of zero.PRM-1. Number of individuals directly reached through PRM funding.PRM-2. Amount of humanitarian funding distributed to local, national, or refugee-led organizations (in USD) – This amount should include any sub-awards or contracts with local, national, or refugee-led organizations. If the prime applicant is a local, national, or refugee-led organization, they should put the full proposal budget total as the target value. Refer to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) working definition of “local” and “national” organizations. Applicants should put a target of zero for this indicator if it does not apply to them; it will not affect their eligibility.PRM-3. Percentage of participants who report that humanitarian assistance is delivered in a safe, accessible, accountable, and participatory manner – This is a protection mainstreaming indicator developed by the Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) and adopted by the Grand Bargain. Research or coordination awards that don’t involve community implementation are exempt from this indicator. Please refer to the PRM Performance Indicator Reference &amp; Definition Sheets (PIRS) for a sample questionnaire and analysis guidance.Recommended if applicable: Partners may consider using these indicators to monitor any related activities as they are aligned with humanitarian standards and best practices. However, inclusion of recommended indicators is not mandatory and will not affect the proposal scoring. Please note that in rare cases PRM may request for a partner to use a particular recommended indicator if there is a strong technical/thematic need to track information on that indicator, or if a similar custom indicator was proposed by the partner.Application Review InformationPRM will conduct a formal competitive review of all proposals submitted in response to this funding announcement. A review panel of at least three people will evaluate submissions based on the above-referenced programmatic criteria and PRM priorities in the context of available funding.Department of State review panels may provide conditions and recommendations on applications to enhance the proposed program, which must be addressed by the applicant before further consideration of the award. To ensure effective use of limited PRM funds, conditions or recommendations may include requests to increase, decrease, clarify, and/or justify costs and program activities.Eligible submissions will be those that comply with the criteria and requirements included in this announcement. In addition, the review panel will evaluate the proposals based on the following criteria:Gap/Analysis (10)Profile of Target Population (5)Program Description (25)Objectives &amp; Indicators (10)Monitoring &amp; Evaluation Plan (10)Accountability to Affected Populations (5)(Note: The AAP section of a NOFO proposal narrative is specific to the program being proposed, is the criterion listed above being evaluated, and is distinct from the organization-level AAP framework.)Coordination (5)Sustainability and Capacity-Building (5)Management and Past Performance (5)Risk Management (10)Budget/Budget Narrative (10 points)Prior to making a Federal award with a total amount of Federal share greater than the simplified acquisition threshold, PRM is required to review and consider any information about the applicant that is in the U.S. government designated integrity and performance system accessible through SAM.gov (see 41 U.S.C. 2313);An applicant, at its option, may review and comment on any information about itself that a Federal awarding agency previously entered. Currently, federal agencies create integrity records in the integrity module of the Contractor Performance Assessment and Reporting System (CPARS) and these records are visible as responsibility/qualification records in SAM.gov;The Federal awarding agency will consider any comments by the applicant, in addition to the other information in the designated integrity and performance system, in making a judgment about the applicant&#8217;s integrity, business ethics, and record of performance under Federal awards when completing the review of risk posed by applicants as described in §200.206 Federal awarding agency review of risk posed by applicants.Federal Award Administration InformationFederal Award Administration.A successful applicant can expect to receive a separate notice from PRM stating that an application has been selected before PRM actually makes the federal award. That notice is not an authorization to begin performance. Only the notice of award signed by the Grants Officer is the authorizing document. Unsuccessful applicants will be notified following completion of the selection and award process.Administrative and National Policy Requirements.PRM awards are made consistent with the following provisions in the following order of precedence:applicable laws and statutes of the United States, including any specific legislative provisions mandated in the statutory authority for the award;Code of Federal Regulations (CFR);Department of State Standard Terms and Conditions of the award;the award’s specific requirements; andother documents and attachments to the award.ReportingSuccessful applicants will be required to submit:Program Reports: PRM requires program reports describing and analyzing the results of activities undertaken during the validity period of the agreement. A program report is required within thirty (30) days following the end of each three-month period of performance during the validity period of the agreement. The final program report is due one hundred and twenty (120) days following the end of the agreement. The submission dates for program reports will be written into the cooperative agreement. Partners receiving multi-year awards should follow this same reporting schedule and should still submit a final program report at the end of each year that summarizes the NGO’s performance during the previous year.The Bureau suggests that NGOs receiving PRM funding use the PRM recommended quarterly program report template and annual/final report template. The suggested PRM NGO reporting templates are designed to ease the reporting requirements while ensuring that all required elements are addressed.Financial Reports: Financial reports are required within thirty (30) days following the end of each calendar year quarter during the validity period of the agreement (January 30th, April 30th, July 30th, October 30th). The final financial report covering the entire period of the agreement is required within one hundred and twenty (120) days after the expiration date of the agreement. For agreements containing indirect costs, final financial reports are due within sixty (60) days of the finalization of the applicable negotiated indirect cost rate agreement (NICRA).Reports reflecting expenditures for the recipient’s overseas and United States offices should be completed in accordance with the Federal Financial Report (FFR SF-425) and submitted electronically in the Department of Health and Human Services’ Payment Management System (HHS/PMS) and in accordance with other award specific requirements. Detailed information pertaining to the Federal Financial Report including due dates, instruction manuals and access forms, is provided on the HHS/PMS website.Audit Reports: When a recipient-contracted audit is not required because the Federal award amount is less than the $750,000 threshold, the Department may determine that an audit must be performed, and the audit report must be submitted to the responsible grants office(r) for review, dissemination, and resolution as appropriate. The cost of audits required under this policy may be charged either as an allowable direct cost to the award or included in the organizations established indirect costs in the award’s detailed budget.PRM Points of ContactApplicants with technical questions related to this announcement should contact the PRM staff listed below prior to submission. Please note that responses to technical questions from PRM do not indicate a commitment to fund the program discussed.PRM Program Officer: Mellisa Nelson NelsonML@state.gov, Washington, D.C.Regional Refugee Coordinator: Andrew Ellis EllisAJ@state.gov, U.S. Embassy Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.DisclaimerExternal websites linked above may not be supported or accessible by all web browsers. If you are unable to link to a referenced website, please try using a different browser or update to a more recent one. If you continue to experience difficulties to reach external resources, please contact PRM NGO Coordinator.Section 508Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794d), as amended by the Workforce Investment Act of 1998, charges the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (US Access Board) with developing and promulgating standards address that access to information and communication technology (ICT) Accessibility Standards (36 CFR part 1194). Section 508 requires that when Federal agencies develop, procure, maintain, or use ICT. Federal employees with disabilities have access to and use of information and data that is comparable to the access and use by Federal employees who are not individuals with disabilities, unless an undue burden would be imposed on the agency. Section 508 also requires that individuals with disabilities, who are members of the public seeking information or services from a Federal agency, have access to and use of information and data that is comparable to that provided to the public who are not individuals with disabilities, unless an undue burden would be imposed on the agency. These standards are part of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. The complete text of the Section 508 Final Provisions can be accessed at https://www.access-board.gov/ict/.The Section 508 accessibility standards applicable to this contract or order are identified in the following paragraph. If it is determined by the Government that ICT supplies and services provided by the Contractor do not conform to the described accessibility standards in the contract, remediation of the supplies or services to the level of conformance specified in the contract will be the responsibility of the Contractor at its own expense.The Section 508 standards applicable to this contract are: 1194.205 WCAG 2.0 Level A &amp; AA Success Criteria302 Functional Performance Criteria502 Inoperability with Assistive Technology504 Authoring Tools602 Support Documentation603 Support ServicesIn the event of a modification(s) to this contract or order, which adds new ICT supplies or services or revises the type of, or specifications for, supplies or services, the Contracting Officer may require that the contractor submit a completed Voluntary Product Accessibility Template (VPAT) 2.4 or greater, 508 revision (Rev 508) or another format approved by the Department, and any other additional information necessary to assist the Government in determining that the ICT supplies or services conform to Section 508 accessibility standards. If it is determined by the Government that ICT supplies and services provided by the Contractor do not conform to the described accessibility standards in the contract, remediation of the supplies or services to the level of conformance specified in the contract will be the responsibility of the Contractor at its own expense. Information about VPAT can be accessed at https://www.itic.org/policy/accessibility/vpat.If this is an Indefinite Delivery contract, a Blanket Purchase Agreement or a Basic Ordering Agreement, the task/delivery order requests that include ICT supplies or services will define the specifications and accessibility standards for the order. In those cases, the Contractor may be required to provide a completed VPAT and any other additional information necessary to assist the Government in determining that the ICT supplies or services conform to Section 508 accessibility standards.
- Joint Statement on South Sudan Office of the SpokespersonThe text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the United States, Norway, and the United Kingdom on South Sudan.Begin Text:Following recent senior-level visits from our capitals to Juba, the Governments of Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaffirm our call for South Sudan’s leaders urgently to take steps necessary to ensure genuine and peaceful elections in December. This process should address the ten questions posed by the trilateral mechanism (UN, AU and IGAD). Not taking these critical steps and so not allowing elections would be a collective failure on the part of South Sudan’s leaders.We further urge the transitional government to use public revenue in a transparent manner to address public needs, including funding and operationalization of electoral institutions.Our relationship with South Sudan remains based on our conviction that the South Sudanese people deserve peace, human rights, democracy, and a government that is responsive to the needs of its citizens. We look to South Sudan’s leaders to demonstrate that they share these values by honoring their own commitments to their people.End Text.
- Promoting Accountability for Corruption that Fuels South Sudan’s Conflict Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonNearly thirteen years after declaring its independence, South Sudan remains a precariously fragile state beset by insecurity and poverty.  The nation’s leaders continually fail to exhibit the political will necessary to create the conditions for sustainable peace, democratic governance, the rule of law, and prosperity for the South Sudanese people.  They have yet to demonstrate the political will to establish an environment conducive to free and fair elections taking place, as scheduled, in December 2024.  Leaders of all parties share responsibility for this failure and for the elite capture of the nation’s riches, at the expense of the country’s peace and the general wellbeing.  Widespread corruption perpetuates the suffering and, directly and indirectly, supports conflict, thereby undermining the progress South Sudanese envisioned when they declared statehood.  The United States remains committed to supporting the South Sudanese peoples’ long unmet expectations for peace, democracy, human rights, and a government that uses public resources for the common good.Today, we are announcing steps to impose visa restrictions on multiple individuals in South Sudan for undermining or impeding a sustainable peace by engaging in corruption that fuels conflict in South Sudan.Under Section 212(a)(3)C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, these individuals will be generally ineligible for visas to the United States.  Certain family members of such persons may also be subject to these restrictions.These visa restrictions are specific to certain individuals and are not directed at the South Sudanese people or the Government of South Sudan.  The decision to pursue visa restrictions reflects the commitment of the United States to support South Sudanese aspirations to combat corruption, strengthen democracy and the rule of law, and live in peace.
- Department Press Briefing – March 6, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – March 6, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – March 6, 2024																																																					March 6, 2024																																																								1:14 p.m. ESTMR MILLER: All right, everyone. I don’t have anything for the top, so &#8212;QUESTION: Really?MR MILLER: &#8212; Matt, you want to &#8212;QUESTION: You don’t have anything at the top?MR MILLER: You have – I have – calling on you counts as something. So &#8212;QUESTION: There’s a lot going on. Well, yeah, not much. All right. I &#8212;MR MILLER: That’s your assessment, not mine. I don’t share that assessment.QUESTION: I got several – I have several brief ones, in alphabetical order, but – and my colleagues should feel free to interrupt if they have anything on these. My alphabetical order are Haiti, Houthis, and Gaza.MR MILLER: Okay.QUESTION: Starting with Haiti, what is the situation with Prime Minister Henry. There – the report that you guys wanted – you guys want him out, is that correct? I understand that your ambassador to the UN spoke to this earlier, but wondering what you have to say about it.MR MILLER: So let me start by just saying generally the United States has long worked with CARICOM and Haitian leaders on the path to restoring democratic order in Haiti through free and fair elections, inclusive governance, and power sharing, which will give them the opportunity to democratically elect a prime minister. And as the situation on the ground grows increasingly dire, we and CARICOM have continued to call on stakeholders, including the prime minister, to make concessions in the interest of the Haitian people.So we are not calling on him or pushing for him to resign, but we are urging him to expedite the transition to an empowered and inclusive governance structure that will move with urgency to help the country prepare for a multinational security support mission to address the security situation and pave the way for free and fair elections.QUESTION: Okay. So what’s your understanding of where he is now and his efforts to get back to the country?MR MILLER: So I will let him speak to his travel plans and his location.QUESTION: All right. Well, look, the U.S. has a long and very difficult history with Haiti and going back long before you or I were born, decades, and decades, and decades. But also in my time at the State Department, I was there when you guys organized the, quote/unquote, “evacuation” of the prime minister. So how far are you guys prepared to go in pushing or telling Prime Minister Henry that he needs to either start the transition or get out of the way so that the transition can start?MR MILLER: So we are going to continue to work with CARICOM, because I think it’s important to make clear that it’s not the United States acting alone in this – with this regard. It’s the United States in consultation with partners in the region are having these conversations. And what we are saying to the prime minister is that he needs to expedite the transition to an empowered and inclusive governance, including the appointment of a transition council. So that’s what we’ll continue to discuss with him.QUESTION: All right. If anyone else has anything on Haiti &#8212;QUESTION: Can I ask a couple things on &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: I know you’re not confirming his whereabouts, but is he welcome in the United States? I mean, can Prime Minister Henry stay in the United States and U.S. territory?MR MILLER: I’m just – I am just not going to speak to his travel plans at all. I think it’s appropriate for him to make those announcements.QUESTION: Sure. And also, I mean, the – can you flesh it out a little bit more? To a new governance structure – is that something – is there something concrete that’s in mind? I mean, there’s obviously ideas from CARICOM and elsewhere, but is there some sort of a concrete plan or this more just generally speaking that something needs to change?MR MILLER: I don&#8217;t want to speak to it in detail from here, because it’s something we’re in conversation with partners in the region about at this time. But we have always been clear that there needs to be a transition to free and fair elections in Haiti, and we have been clear that we need to see the deployment of a multinational security support mission to address the dire security situation on the ground. So we are continuing to work through both of those things. We are making progress on deploying the MSS; we want to see that happen as soon as possible. And we’re also in – as I said, in conversation with partners in the region about how to transition back to the path to democracy.QUESTION: And just one more. The new governance structure – is that – and the elections, I mean this – the call for elections – is that – do those go in tandem? Is there an idea that you need to have elections to have this new governance structure? Is there any idea that there needs to be something that changes right now even before &#8212;MR MILLER: I just don’t want to get into details. But of course we are looking to get to – on – back on the path to elections in the country, as well as to security.QUESTION: Go ahead.QUESTION: There’s no more on Haiti? I just want to go to the Houthis.MR MILLER: The Houthis?QUESTION: And you’ve seen that there’s been – CENTCOM has put out a statement about fatalities. These are apparently the first fatalities. Do you have anything to say about this incident?MR MILLER: So I think that it was, sadly, inevitable. The Houthis have continued to launch these reckless attacks with no regard for the well-being of innocent civilians who are transiting through the Red Sea. And now they have, unfortunately and tragically, killed innocent civilians. And so the United States will continue to hold the Houthis accountable for their attacks, which have not just disrupted international commerce, not just disrupted the freedom of navigation in international waters, and not just endangered seafarers, but now, tragically, killed a number of them. So we will continue to hold them accountable, and we call on governments around the world to do the same.Anything else?QUESTION: No. I’ll let other people go on Gaza.MR MILLER: Okay.QUESTION: Do you want to step in or &#8212;QUESTION: Just a little bit.QUESTION: Go ahead.MR MILLER: It’s just so &#8212;QUESTION: Just one more thing on the Houthis.MR MILLER: I’m sort of – it’s so weird.QUESTION: So cooperative.MR MILLER: Like, the two of you guys, like, collaborating or maybe conspiring. (Laughter.)QUESTION: Well, why not? Great. When you say we’ll continue to hold the Houthis accountable for their attacks, should we expect, like, a new wave of U.S. retaliatory attacks from here in a way that we’ve saw – we’ve seen three weeks ago, or what is that that you’re referring to?MR MILLER: I am just – I am not going to preview actions that we will take from this podium, as is always the case.QUESTION: Okay. I’ll go to Gaza in that case.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Just &#8212;QUESTION: Oh, sure. Go ahead.QUESTION: Just briefly one more.MR MILLER: Comity.QUESTION: We’re being very polite. I mean, just the flipside of what Humeyra asked – I mean, does this show a failure, for lack of another term, of deterrence? I mean, there have been these strikes from the U.S. and the UK and others on Houthi targets. Does this show it’s not working and that there needs to be a new strategy?MR MILLER: Look, we have always made clear that this is going to be a long-term process, both to deter the Houthi attacks and to degrade their capabilities to carry them out, and that’s a process that is continuing. At the same time, we continue to talk to partners in the region about how they ought to make clear to the Houthis that these attacks are irresponsible, that they endanger international commerce, and that they hurt the economies of countries in the region as well as countries around the world. So it’s something that we will continue to push, not just on behalf of the United States but on behalf of the coalition that we have assembled to oppose the Houthis’ actions, and again, to collaborate with other countries in the world who share those interests.QUESTION: Go ahead.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Okay. On Gaza ceasefire, Matt, yesterday you said that U.S. believes that the obstacles at the moment are not insurmountable. How would you describe the talks today, given that there’s still no breakthrough, and it’s day three and it’s at a very critical week?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to give a day-by-day assessment of the talks, but the over &#8212;QUESTION: Gazans live day by day.MR MILLER: But the overall assessment that I offered yesterday has not – we still – we continue to believe that the obstacles are not insurmountable and that a deal can be reached and a deal is in the interest of Israel, it’s in the interest of the Palestinian people, and it’s in the interest of the broader region. So we’re going to continue to push for one, but I’m not going to offer an assessment of where things stand today.QUESTION: So you wouldn’t describe the talks as they’re at an impasse?MR MILLER: They are ongoing. No.QUESTION: Right. And what is the U.S. understanding that the biggest sticking point is at the moment?MR MILLER: Nice try, but you know I’m not going to answer that one. (Laughter.)QUESTION: And would you say that it is right now up to Hamas or Israel or both of them – which one – to basically accept the deal? Or is – it’s not like that; it is something that they have to &#8212;MR MILLER: So it is a negotiation. It’s an ongoing process. But the point that you have heard me make and that you have heard the Secretary and other leaders of the administration make over the past few days is that Israel put a serious proposal on the table, and it’s for Hamas to accept it; it’s also for Hamas to engage in good faith and show that they actually want to get a deal, and we’re going to continue to engage on good faith on our behalf and continue to try to get a deal over the finish line.QUESTION: Have you seen in recent days that Hamas is not engaging in good faith &#8212;MR MILLER: So &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; and they actually don’t want a deal?MR MILLER: So I think that I – it’s hard to ever offer an assessment that a terrorist organization that attacks innocent civilians is acting &#8212;QUESTION: Sure, but they’re &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; is acting wholly in good faith, but it is a negotiation, and I don’t want to comment on the underlying negotiation.Go ahead, Tom, and then I’ll come to you next, Said.QUESTION: The World Health Organization said yesterday that its officials had visited Shifa Hospital, where there were treatment – there was the treatment of 50 children suffering from severe acute malnutrition. In Kamal Adwan Hospital, 10 children had reportedly died from hunger and dehydration in recent days, and that it was overwhelmed by patients. They say the current rate of 15 percent of wasting among children under the age of two in northern Gaza suggests a serious and rapid decline. Such a decline in a population’s nutritional status in three months is unprecedented globally. I mean, you know about this situation, so what is being done to alleviate this?MR MILLER: So first of all, let me say that those reports, which we saw and reviewed, are obviously heartbreaking, and it confirms what you heard the Secretary say yesterday – that not only is the situation on the ground right now in Gaza unacceptable, but it’s unsustainable. It cannot continue this way. And so you have seen the United States take action to air drop food supplies in. You have seen us take action to fund the delivery of humanitarian assistance. You have seen us announce that we are exploring a maritime option to deliver humanitarian assistance through new routes. But it still is incumbent upon the Government of Israel to do more as well.Now, we did see an increase in the number of trucks that went into Israel yesterday – around 250, 260 trucks made it in through Rafah and Kerem Shalom. That’s an improvement over where we have been. We have seen some improvement in the distribution, but we need to see dramatically more go in. We need to see it go in not just through Rafah and Kerem Shalom, but we need to see it go in through a crossing in the north. And we have made very clear to the Government of Israel that’s what we expect and that we expect to see improvement, and as the President said, there can be no excuses.QUESTION: And he said that on Friday. The Vice President’s repeated it. We heard from the Secretary of State yesterday a similar message, insisting that Israel facilitate some more aid, and yet yesterday 14 World Food Programme trucks were blocked by the Israelis going to the north of Gaza. So they’re not listening.MR MILLER: So I can’t speak to that specific report of trucks being blocked. Sometimes trucks are blocked for legitimate reasons; sometimes they’re blocked for less than legitimate reasons. We want to see trucks move all around, and there needs to be a security situation that allows them to move, and that’s one of the difficult things that we have tried to work through.So what I’ll say is the messages that you ticked through that you heard the President, and the Vice President, and the Secretary deliver publicly, I can assure you that we are delivering those messages every bit as clearly privately with Israel as well, and we expect to see action.Said.QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you, Matt. Just to follow up on Tom’s referencing of the hospitals. I mean, of Gaza’s 33 hospitals before that were fully operational before October 7th, there are now three that are semi-functional and so on. That’s creating a really horrific situation. And we talk about the food and the starvation and so on, but is there any way – I don’t have any ideas, but – is there any way to actually make these hospitals more functional and able to care for more people, especially children?MR MILLER: So the best way to achieve that goal, which is very much a goal that we have, would be to reach a deal for an immediate ceasefire that would last for at least six weeks and would allow for a cessation in hostilities, would allow for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, would allow for people inside Gaza to move around, both doctors and patients and those who just need to seek medical care. That would be the best route to reach that objective, and it’s one that we are continuing to pursue.QUESTION: So six weeks would probably be a nice respite for the people and for everybody involved, but it also presumes that the fighting will continue thereafter for whatever reason after the end of the six weeks, especially in light of what you alluded to yesterday, that you support Israel in its pursuit of the defeat of Hamas and so on. And what we see 150 days after this war began, we see that the fighting is still going, Hamas is not defeated; by the best analysis, it has been degraded somewhat, maybe 30 percent, 20 percent, whatever it is. So conceivably this war can go on for another year.MR MILLER: So we have always said that we want to see this conflict end as soon as possible. We want to get a temporary ceasefire to alleviate the humanitarian situation and get the hostages home, but it is our goal to end the conflict completely, and to end it as soon as possible, and, as you have heard me say before, Hamas bears a lot of responsibility for the conflict continuing to be waged. Hamas could come forward and surrender, they could come forward and swear off violence, they could put their arms down. And one of the things that we would very much try to pursue in the event of a humanitarian ceasefire would be the demilitarization of Gaza and the demilitarization of Hamas. And we are – it’s something that we will consult with – that we have been consulting and will continue to consult with partners in the region about. Because for all that – for all that Israel has done in this conflict, and the – and all it has done to bring Hamas terrorists to justice, Hamas does bear a lot of responsibility for the conflict ongoing. So if we are able to get a ceasefire, it is very much something that we will pursue.QUESTION: I understand, but you’re saying that you want Hamas to surrender – that is, I mean, is there really serious thinking that this is actually going to happen? I mean, considering that the Palestinians have been waging some sort of an armed struggle against Israel for the past 75 years. I mean, they take – they go from Beirut to (inaudible) to Jordan to places like this, but it goes on in the West Bank and so on. Is there really expectation that the Palestinians will give up the notion of getting their rights or – getting their rights; in the absence of the world doing anything about granting them their rights, that they have to do it on their own?MR MILLER: So we do not want the Palestinians to give up their rights. In fact, you have seen the Secretary and the President pushing very hard for a two-state solution that would create an independent Palestinian state, and would answer the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people.But to this question about Hamas, when you’ve seen 30,000 Palestinians killed, why wouldn’t they lay down their arms and stop that bloodshed? Why wouldn’t they lay down their arms and stop the war? If they truly care about the thousands and thousands of civilians who have been killed in a war that Hamas started – so remember who started this war – if that was in their real interest, the well-being of the Palestinian people, I’m hard-pressed to answer why they wouldn’t lay down their arms and pursue a demilitarization option when you have the United States and other countries in the region saying we are prepared to step forward and work on a legitimate political path forward for the Palestinian people – not one that’s brought about by terrorism, not one that’s brought about by violence, but a legitimate political path that leads to an independent Palestinian state.QUESTION: And lastly – I’m sorry, but just to push this point a bit further – the Palestinians basically said okay, we lay down our arms; they’ve done it time and time again. They recognize Israel. They sign treaties and so on with them &#8212;MR MILLER: Hamas has not done it.QUESTION: Hamas said they will abide by the – I mean, let’s not – it’s a very complex issue.MR MILLER: Hamas won’t even sign up to the principles of the PLO, so.QUESTION: But I’m saying that – what we’re saying is there has been a Palestinian effort that has failed. I mean, people look – whether it’s Hamas or somebody else – they look at 30 years of efforts to arrive at the resolution that the United States has signed to and in fact sponsored in 1993. No? And it has gone nowhere. We see the settlements expand. We see the occupation become more violent against the Palestinians. People are more imprisoned and so on.MR MILLER: So if people continue to look at the past and only the past that has happened for decades and decades without being willing to sign on to a positive vision of the future, we will never have a peaceful way out of this conflict – not just the current conflict in Gaza, but an actual resolution to the longstanding conflict between Israel and Palestinians.QUESTION: Well – but the problem with that, Matt, is that you have called for in every single conflict around the world there to be accountability for things that have happened in the past, and now you’re saying, oh, well, just forget about it.MR MILLER: No. That’s not – my point is there has to be at some point a political reconciliation. And so I think Said’s point was why would Hamas agree to lay down arms when we have seen grievance after gradience go on for decades. And the point that we have made – and you’ve heard this – the Secretary speak to this a number of times &#8212;QUESTION: Fair enough, but &#8212;MR MILLER: Ultimately there are two paths. There is – you can continue down this path where we talk about what happened decades and decades ago and try to address that with – through violent activities, or we can have a peaceful resolution to this. And of course you &#8212;QUESTION: But &#8212;MR MILLER: Of course, there’s a process for addressing legitimate grievances through that process. But what I am saying, and the point that we have made, is continuing to carry out violence as the solution to decades-old grievances &#8212;QUESTION: Legitimate gradiences.MR MILLER: &#8212; is a path – is a path to continued conflict and a never-ending cycle that does not advance the interests of the Palestinian people.QUESTION: But you’re talking about addressing legitimate grievances from the past, right?MR MILLER: Yes. And my point is through violence will just lead you in this never-ending cycle that we – that the region has been in for decades.QUESTION: Okay.QUESTION: Can I follow up on Said’s point?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: I mean, because you said that why wouldn’t Hamas look at the numbers of dead – 30,000 – and effectively surrender, but that almost suggests or implies that the numbers killed creates a political or military pressure on Hamas to do so. But you’ve always said that any civilian death is unacceptable.MR MILLER: That’s – that is not – that’s not my implication. That’s not my implication at all. Any civilian death is unacceptable.QUESTION: But you connected those two issues &#8212;MR MILLER: No, I &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; that if Hamas surrender – Hamas looking at the number of dead, why would they not surrender?MR MILLER: This – any – hold on. It is not – it is – it is not the implication. I don’t think that’s a fair reading of what I’m saying. My – every civilian death is unacceptable. The point is that Hamas surrendering would end the conflict, and would end the civilian causalities that have unfortunately happened since October 7th.Go ahead. I’m sorry, Jenny. Go.QUESTION: So I just want to clarify: The Israeli Government has told you that if Sinwar was to purely surrender, that would be sufficient to end the war?MR MILLER: I – so I’m not going to get into our – the conversations that we’ve had, but obviously if Hamas surrendered and laid down its arms that would be an end to the conflict.QUESTION: Including Sinwar?MR MILLER: That – he is the leader of Hamas in Gaza.QUESTION: So it’s sufficient for them.MR MILLER: So I am not – I am not going to speak on behalf of the Israeli Government, but obviously when you have one side of a conflict stop fighting and lay down its arms, that brings about an end to the conflict.QUESTION: Okay. And I want to push you on some of the many things the U.S. Government has called on Israel to investigate. Do you have any updates on the convoy shooting into the air, into the crowd, that &#8212;MR MILLER: That investigation is ongoing, is our understanding. They have announced preliminary results. I know they’ve announced those publicly, and they’ve briefed them to us privately as well. But the fuller investigation is still ongoing.QUESTION: And then on the investigations into the two American teenagers who were killed in the West Bank? What is the &#8212;MR MILLER: Those investigations are also going – ongoing. But we should be clear, only one of those is an Israeli-conducted investigation. The other is being conducted by Palestinian law enforcement authorities because of where that killing took place in the West Bank.QUESTION: And the CHIRG process, have there been any conclusions there?MR MILLER: It’s ongoing. Yeah.QUESTION: Please follow up &#8212;QUESTION: I – just &#8212;MR MILLER: Sorry, Humeyra.QUESTION: Just on the investigations &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Just two others specifically. The one – the implosion of the university in Gaza?MR MILLER: I don’t – I don’t have any new information to report from the Israeli Government.QUESTION: And what about the incident that happened a couple months ago in which the – Israeli agents went into the hospital, went room by room and &#8212;MR MILLER: I’ll have – I’ll have to check to see if we have any updates on it.QUESTION: &#8212; basically killed people?MR MILLER: I’ll have to check and get back to you and see if we have any updates.QUESTION: So &#8212;MR MILLER: Oh, sorry. Humeyra and then &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; just one further – on this – on these investigations, when was the first time that State Department or the administration has launched one of these investigations in an incident like this?MR MILLER: Do you mean &#8212;QUESTION: Do you remember?MR MILLER: Are you speaking with respect to the CHIRG process which is not something I would describe as an investigation?QUESTION: Not necessarily CHIRG, but like all of these investigations: the university, the hospital, West Bank.MR MILLER: So a little bit of conflation. Those are investigations that are being conducted either by Israeli authorities, or in one of these cases, by the Palestinian law enforcement authorities.QUESTION: Right. So I’m just trying to get a sense of what U.S.’s expectation of how long those investigations will last, and what is your mechanism to really follow up on the result of the investigation. And &#8212;MR MILLER: So it depends on the circumstances. There are things that the Israeli Government has looked into at our request where they have come back and reported to us either that – I’ve talked about this some before. Like, we’ve gone and asked them about specific strikes, and they have come back to us and said we were targeting this specific strike where there were reports of civilian casualties because there was a legitimate military target. And sometimes they’re able to tell us who – the name of that legitimate military target who is there. At other times, they have come back to us and told us that this strike that you asked us to look into, we were targeting one facility, and we mistakenly hit another facility. So we have gotten answers on a number of things that we have raised questions for.With respect to other investigations, it’s different depending on the circumstance – for example, the killing of two American citizens in the West Bank, one of which is being conducted by the Israeli police, one of which is being conducted by Palestinian law enforcement. I can’t possibly give you a timetable on how long a police investigation takes, just as we can’t – local law enforcement in the United States can’t usually give you a timetable on how long an investigation is going to take because it depends on how they turn up leads and how they’re followed through and if they get breakthroughs.What we do is ask for those investigations to be carried out as quickly as possible. We ask to be briefed on the results when it’s appropriate for us to be briefed on those results, and we ask that when there’s appropriate there be accountability.QUESTION: Right. Can you then commit that U.S. will somehow follow up with the results of all of those investigations and ensure accountability? And can you think of one example that the situation has moved to that level since the beginning &#8212;MR MILLER: There have been absolutely cases that we have raised with the Israeli Government about incidents targeting civilians in Gaza where they have come back to us and said that they made a mistake, and there have been times where they have talked about accountability for IDF forces. And I know at times they’ve talked publicly about accountability for members of the IDF who have done things that are inappropriate.QUESTION: And let me just ask a question that we’ve asked before: Is there any process of atrocity determination or anything similar to that from this building looking into Israel – its military conduct?MR MILLER: Again, we continue to collect information, monitor information. We collect information about specific incidents and examine that through the CHIRG process that we set up last year, but I don’t have any updates on that.QUESTION: One last thing, sorry. On the ceasefire talks, you don’t agree that there at an impasse or you just don’t want to use that word, but what is the U.S. alternative if – because, I mean, the President talked about March the 4th a week ago. Ramadan, the start of Ramadan is fast approaching. If the talks are really at an impasse and they go south, does the U.S. have like an alternative plan and specifically regarding the aid situation? Because you’re relying so much on the establishment of this truce to get in more aid.MR MILLER: So – yeah. So I disagree a little bit – or disagree with that quite a bit. So first of all, I don’t want to talk – speculate about a hypothetical. We are pushing for – I mean – and I mean not with respect to aid, but overall I don’t want to speculate about a hypothetical. We are pushing for a successful conclusion to these talks. We believe that’s possible and we’re going to continue to push for it.Now, that said, we are not waiting for the outcome of these talks to push for an improvement in the humanitarian assistance – the humanitarian situation on the ground, and that’s why you’ve seen us take our own action already by launching air drops, which will continue. It’s why you see us exploring a maritime option that we are very much engaged in. And it’s why you see us pushing the Israeli Government at the seniormost levels. We are not waiting for the outcome of a hostage deal, and I think you heard this – the Secretary say this yesterday, that notwithstanding what happens with a hostage deal, the improvement in the humanitarian situation is something that needs to happen immediately.QUESTION: Sorry, can you just – when you say that sometimes they’ve gotten back to you and said we were going for one target and hit the wrong one and we made a mistake, can you give one or two or three or – examples?MR MILLER: I do not have them off the top of my head. This has been something that we’ve been in conversation with them back to the earliest days of this war.QUESTION: Are you aware of any situation where they’ve come back to you and said we screwed this up?MR MILLER: Of course. Yeah, of course.QUESTION: And people have been held accountable?MR MILLER: We have seen examples where they have come back to us and said people made a mistake &#8212;QUESTION: Okay. Can you give me one or two?MR MILLER: I don’t – I – no &#8212;QUESTION: No, no, no. Not a mistake, like this was bad, this was something &#8212;MR MILLER: We have seen examples where they have come to us and said they are holding members of the IDF accountable.QUESTION: Can you give an example of one?MR MILLER: I don’t have them off the top of my head, but you can also look, Matt. They have announced some of these publicly as well, and so it’s publicly available, but they have disciplined IDF members.QUESTION: Yeah, but – okay, but I’m not talking – I’m talking about when they get back to you, because you guys are their prime supplier of weaponry and money. And so when you guys ask or demand an explanation for something, it should be – you should get an answer, right?MR MILLER: We do get an answer now. It’s not always perfect, but we do get answers, and sometimes we want more information about those answers.QUESTION: But if you can’t give – if you can’t give a single example of either &#8212;MR MILLER: So I can’t – so Matt, this is something that’s been going on for five months, but I can say – remember, as I – so I’m not going &#8212;QUESTION: Well, I understand that, but I’m not &#8212;MR MILLER: Hold on. I’m not going to remember &#8212;QUESTION: But I’m not looking for an exhaustive list.MR MILLER: Hold on. I’m not going to remember every example.QUESTION: I’m just asking – I’m asking for one example of either.MR MILLER: And I’m telling you I can’t give you every example off the top of my head, but as I said, you can look publicly and find examples of this.QUESTION: All right. All right.MR MILLER: So you don’t have to take my word for it. They have announced publicly where they have disciplined IDF members for acting – for inappropriate actions that they have taken inside Gaza.QUESTION: All right.MR MILLER: Camilla, finally. Sorry. (Laughter.)QUESTION: Staying on this question, sorry.MR MILLER: Don’t blame me, blame them.QUESTION: You said to Jenny that the investigation’s still ongoing with the convoy. Last week it was notable that you topped the briefing with the incident of the convoy. I asked you yesterday about the apparent sticking point of a list – Israel wanting a list of names, Hamas saying they can’t get a list of names. Was the incident – the convoy incident last week, was that a significant reason for derailing the talks this time around?MR MILLER: I’m just not going to – I am not going to speak at all to the status of the talks and how they’re going, but the talks have – are ongoing, so to the extent that they have been derailed or anything, I wouldn’t describe them as been – as having been derailed. They are ongoing and we continue to think a deal is possible.QUESTION: And with the questions you’ve been getting about what happens if a deal is not reached soon and not enough aid gets in – if there are more incidents like what happened last week with the convoy being stormed, if that happens again and again, is there a concern that, again, this deal is getting further and further away from being achievable?MR MILLER: So again, I don’t want to speak to hypotheticals, but the desperation of the Palestinian people continues, and people still are desperate for food and water and medicine. They’re desperate to feed their families. So the situation that we saw last week is something that we are concerned could be repeated, which is why we are continuing to push to get as much aid in as possible through as many channels as possible so, one, people have the food to feed their families; and two, as I said yesterday – I think it was yesterday – that when they see a convoy coming through, they don’t believe it’s the last chance they’re going to have to feed their families for a week or two weeks or a month.Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. A couple of separate topics. Russian missile strike appeared to target President Zelenskyy today in Odesa and while he was meeting with Greek prime minister. This – let me get a reaction first. Also, did anyone reach out to Ukrainians or Greek side to discuss this?MR MILLER: We are in constant contact with both of those countries. I don’t have any specific conversations to read out. I think the strike is yet another reminder of how Russia continues to strike Ukraine every single day, and it’s a reminder of Ukraine’s need for air defense interceptors, and it’s a reminder that the United States Congress needs to take action, as we have called on them to do, to support Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression.QUESTION: Thank you. And while this was happening in Odesa, back in Sochi we saw the IAEA chief met with President Putin today. The pictures of him shaking hand with indicted war criminal is all over the place. Do you approve that meeting? Did he reach out to the U.S. side prior to the meeting? Is there any message that he’s conveying on behalf of &#8212;MR MILLER: I just don’t have any comment on that meeting at all.QUESTION: And may I move to Azerbaijan, please?MR MILLER: Sure.QUESTION: There’s a police raid against independent news outlet called Toplum TV. Let me get your reaction. And this, as you know, is part of the ongoing media crackdown in the country.MR MILLER: So we are deeply troubled by the reports that Azerbaijani police raided the office of independent media outlet Toplum TV and by the reported arrests of multiple independent journalists and civil society activists in Azerbaijan today. We must express our strong objections to continued attempts to intimidate, repress, and punish journalists, civil society voices, and opposition figures. We call on Azerbaijan to end the harassment of those exercising their fundamental freedoms and urge the release of all individuals being unjustly held in politically motivated cases. No one should face incarceration or other retribution for exercising freedom of expression.QUESTION: Thank you for that. Let me press you a little bit on that, because strong objections have been expressed during previous raid against Abzas TV as well. That did not stop them; they arrested reporters. Why do you think they should draw a different conclusion this time?MR MILLER: I think they should draw a different – so I will not speak to drawing different conclusions. What I will say is that they should stop these actions that crack down on free expression because it – doing so would be in the interest of their own people. So we will continue to make that clear. And I can assure you that when we have private diplomatic conversations with Azerbaijani officials, as the Secretary had occasion to do just last month, we make those same points privately.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Willy, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. The two Americans detained in Gaza now a month ago and the woman in the West Bank – any further consular visits with them? The Israelis are saying it was on suspicious – suspicion of collaborating with Hamas. The family completely refutes that. Do you guys have any sense of where the truth is?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to an ongoing legal process. But with respect to the two who are detained in Gaza, we have had consular access to those two American citizens, and with respect to the American citizen that was arrested in the West Bank, we had consular access to her and she has now been released on bail.Jenny, go ahead.QUESTION: Matt, tomorrow Chairman McCaul has threatened to mark up a bill to keep – or put Blinken in contempt of Congress. Has there been any update on trying to appease his demands?MR MILLER: So we have been in close, repeated consultation with the committee about this matter. As I’ve said before, we have done everything that we can to try and address their legitimate oversight needs. We have made 15 department officials or former department officials available for lengthy interviews about – throughout this process. We have turned over somewhere in the neighborhood of 15,000 pages of documents. So we have a – the need to protect legitimate Executive Branch equities. We recognize that Congress has a need to conduct legitimate oversight authorities, and so we’re in conversation with them. We are trying to resolve this amicably, as we have been successful in doing at previous points in the past year. And so we’ll continue to do that today and tomorrow.QUESTION: Are you confident this will be resolved before tomorrow?MR MILLER: All I will say is that we are hopeful it can be resolved, we’re doing everything we can to try to resolve it, and we’ll continue to do that.QUESTION: And then on Afghanistan, are there any updates on the number of SIVs you guys have been able to get out now more than two years &#8212;MR MILLER: So as you know, we invested a good deal of resources to ramp up our ability to grant SIV visas. In fact, in the last fiscal year, we were able to issue more than 39,000 SIVs. It was the record number of visas for principal applicants and their eligible family members. We’ve now given out a hundred – 117,000 SIVs since the passage of the Afghan Allies Protection Act in 2009, and more than 30 percent of that number came in just the past 28 months.But we are at this point where because we made these investments in our ability to more quickly process these visas, that we have been issuing them at this record number – somewhere around now over 1,000 a month – and we are nearing the annual cap. So we’re going to hit the cap; we have somewhere around 8,000 left that we can process this fiscal year. We are clearly going to hit this cap, and we need statutory approval to raise the cap. We have urged Congress to raise the cap and allow us to meet our obligation to those Afghans who put their lives on the line for the United States, make sure that they are not forgotten. Congress has not acted yet, so we are urging them to do so, because we are going to hit that cap and we want to make sure that we can continue to grant as many of these visas as is appropriate and is possible.Shaun.QUESTION: Could I just revisit a question I asked yesterday about Maldives, whether you have a reply to – basically I asked – the Maldives after kicking out Indian forces – if there’s any concern about a defense deal with China.MR MILLER: So we are tracking reports that the Government of Maldives has reached a military assistance agreement with the PRC. Maldives is a valued partner of the United States. Our countries share almost 60 years of partnership and a commitment to an Indo-Pacific region that is connected, secure, resilient, and prosperous, and we remain committed to strengthening our partnership with the Maldives across many spheres, including economic development, education, security cooperation, and climate change response.QUESTION: And specifically on the Chinese defense deal, that’s all you’re going to say?MR MILLER: So I would defer to the Government of Maldives for details or on the specific agreement. We see them as a valued partner and look forward to continuing to work with them.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. Two questions on Middle East. First, on humanitarian aid, yesterday you said that Israeli ministers are preventing aid deliveries, and this raises questions about the legality of U.S. military assistance to Israel. So I’m going to ask again: Is the U.S. still in the position of not considering cutting off military assistance to Israel?MR MILLER: So while – what I meant in my comments yesterday: We have seen actions by specific ministers of the Israeli Government to try and block aid, but ultimately we’ve seen the Government of Israel take decisions to allow aid to go in. And so when we saw protesters blocking Kerem Shalom and preventing aid to go in, we saw the ministry of defense step in and declare that a military security area and send in military police to ensure that aid could reach. So while we’ve seen actions taken by members of the government that don’t support the provision of aid, ultimately the decisions of the government have been to allow aid in.Now, that doesn’t – that doesn’t mean that it’s enough aid. There’s not enough aid, and Israel needs to do more, and so that’s why we continue to press them to do that.QUESTION: So you don’t think Israel is deliberately preventing humanitarian aid entering to Gaza?MR MILLER: So they have – they have made clear – they have said that they want to allow aid in, and they have allowed aid in. Now, that aid is not enough, and there needs to be more. There needs to be &#8212;QUESTION: And is &#8212;MR MILLER: There need to be additional crossings open, and there needs to be additional improvement and distribution. So that’s – those are the conversations we’ll continue to have with them.QUESTION: And is there any further steps that the U.S. is planning to take in order to force Israeli Government to allow more aid in?MR MILLER: So we are going to continue to have the – very frank and candid conversations with them about this matter.QUESTION: Just a quick one.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Do you have anything to say on Israeli Government approving plans for more than 3,400 new settlements in the occupied West Bank, since you view these last settlements illegal?MR MILLER: Only that settlements continue to be a barrier to peace. These settlements continue to be inconsistent with international law. And so the point that we will make to the Government of Israel is that these settlements don’t just harm the Palestinian people, but that they ultimately weaken Israel’s security and weaken the prospects for a lasting agreement that would provide real peace and real security for the Israeli people.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir. Indian Prime Minister Modi greeted Shehbaz Sharif for his election as the new prime minister of Pakistan. How do you see this gesture of Indian prime minister as there are too many tensions between the two countries on several issues?MR MILLER: So we of course welcome the prime minister’s statement. The United States values its relationship with both India and Pakistan, and we want to see them have a productive and peaceful relationship.QUESTION: So would the U.S. welcome future talks between India and Pakistan on all issues, including Kashmir?MR MILLER: Of course we would welcome productive and peaceful talks between India and Pakistan, but the pace, scope, and character of any dialogue is a matter for India and Pakistan to determine.QUESTION: Sir, one last question. Sir, any updates from India on assassination attempt on Sikh activist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun? You told us a month ago that State Department is waiting for the internal investigations of Indian Government on this. Any updates?MR MILLER: My understanding is that investigation is ongoing.Go ahead.QUESTION: First question on Iran. Based on today’s report by Iranian judiciary, Iran seizes a U.S. cargo and oil tanker, which valued more than $50 million, over sanction. What’s your reaction on that?MR MILLER: So the Iranian Government should immediately release the Advantage Sweet, the old tanker to which you refer. Iran has unlawfully seized a number of commercial vehicles sailing in the Middle East in recent years. Iran’s continued harassment of vessels and interference with navigational rights and freedoms in the region’s vital waterways is a threat to maritime security, regional stability, and the global economy.QUESTION: Another question on Afghanistan. The new academic year in Afghanistan begin in two weeks, and for third years millions of women and girls are banned from school. And this meanwhile U.S. and UN are trying to engage with Taliban, regardless of their policy against human rights and educational rights. Is there any hope for Afghan girls to – back to school? Do you – can you estimate a time for that?MR MILLER: So I cannot, unfortunately. We’re of course aware that this sad anniversary is coming up, and we have made it clear that girls should never have been blocked from going to school in the first place. Advancing respect for the rights of Afghan women and girls is critical to our efforts in Afghanistan. At every opportunity we urge the Taliban to allow girls to return to school, respect the rights of all Afghans, and reverse their discriminatory decrees on women and girls.Go ahead, and then we’ll – oh, and then Guita, and then we’ll wrap.QUESTION: Thank you very much, Matt. Just two questions, please. One question is, I want to give you an opportunity – you had again called Maryam Nawaz a milestone, and in 48 hours half a million people in Pakistan have said that Matt should take this milestone statement back because her father was corrupt – came out his name in Panama Papers; she has been accused of corruptions, and you are calling her milestone. So, I mean, I do not get half a million &#8212;MR MILLER: I do not have any update on my comments &#8212;QUESTION: Okay. Second question.QUESTION: &#8212; from a couple of days ago.QUESTION: Is today Mr. Javed Hashmi, who has been in politics for 56 years – and again, he was the president of the ruling party which Benazir – I mean Maryam Nawaz that you called milestone – he used to be president. Today he said that the situation in Pakistan has reached a point where the whole nation is in catastrophic situation. I mean, for the last one year, I personally have been – raised issues with you regarding human rights, women – mothers are dragged from the houses. Journalists are put in jail on likely ridiculous charges. It’s been one year. Why doesn’t the Secretary just pick up the phone and call the Pakistani establishment and the people to just settle on some things? Nobody is accepting this corrupt government.MR MILLER: So we – let me go ahead and answer. So we have made clear publicly – you’ve heard me say from this podium many times, and we have made clear from – we have made clear in our private conversations that we want to see Pakistan respect the human rights of all of its citizens.Guita, go ahead.QUESTION: Matt, in answer to the question about Iran intending to unload the crude oil in the tanker that belonged to Chevron, an American company, you said that Iran should release the tanker and it has seized unlawfully. Hasn’t the United States itself seized tankers or marine vessels that are – have been carrying Iranian goods and commodities in the past?MR MILLER: So our sanctions have always had carveout for humanitarian purchases: food, medicine, medical devices, agricultural products. That has been our sanctions policy, not just in this administration but back across multiple administrations, and we have never prevented medicine from reaching the Iranian people.QUESTION: Can I just ask &#8212;QUESTION: But &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, let Guita – you &#8212;QUESTION: Go ahead. Different subject. It is very brief.MR MILLER: Yeah, yeah. Go – Guita, you finish.QUESTION: Well, all right. That was about U.S. sanctions, which Iran claims that it’s going to truse the proceeds from the sale of that oil for certain patients there which it claims the U.S. sanctions have prevented from getting the necessary medicine from overseas. But what about the U.S. seizing ships carrying Iranian commodities?MR MILLER: So with respect to – so with respect to commodities that are exempt from our sanctions policy that has never been our target. Now, with respect to the seizures that we have done, we have done those consistent with the rule of law.So Matt, go ahead and then &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah, I just wanted to ask you if – I know you expressed your concern on multiple occasions about the situation between China and the Philippines. But I just wanted to see if there was anything you had to add since the statement of &#8212;MR MILLER: No, I don’t have anything.QUESTION: &#8212; 6:51 p.m. last night?MR MILLER: No, I do not.QUESTION: Oh, okay.MR MILLER: I do not.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Humeyra, and then we’ll wrap.QUESTION: Sorry, I have two small things. On China, they released their defense budget, and it looks like their – the growth of their defense budget outstrips their economic growth. I’m just wondering if U.S. has, like, any concerns or any comment about that particular &#8212;MR MILLER: So we have for a long time expressed concerns about their rapid and opaque modernization efforts as well as their efforts to acquire dual-use technologies and know-how under their Military-Civil Fusion strategy.QUESTION: All right. And the report also seems to highlight that they officially adopted tougher language against Taiwan, dropping the mention of peaceful reunification. Is that also a particular reason of concern for you guys?MR MILLER: So we oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side. We don’t support Taiwan independence. We support cross-strait dialogue and expect cross-strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means, free from coercion, and in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the strait.QUESTION: Final thing on South Sudan. U.S. prosecutors have charged a prominent South Sudanese economist conspiring to export Stinger missile systems. Do you have any particular comment on that?MR MILLER: So I would refer to DOJ on specific questions about that matter. But just to be clear, the United States does not support violent or undemocratic changes in government in Africa or elsewhere; and all violations of U.S. export regulations will be punished to the full extent of the law.With that, wrap for the day.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Thank you.QUESTION: Wait a second. The United States does not support violence or undemocratic changes to government in Africa or elsewhere?MR MILLER: We do not.QUESTION: Come on.MR MILLER: We’ll wrap up – wrap for the day.(The briefing was concluded at 2:00 p.m.)# # #Gaza ↑						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Azerbaijan																								China																								Haiti																								India																								Iran																								Israel																								Maldives																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								South Sudan																								Taiwan																								Ukraine																								Yemen
- Promoting Accountability for Transnational Repression Against South Sudanese Nationals Abroad Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonThe Department of State is taking steps to impose visa restrictions on multiple South Sudanese nationals directly responsible for the kidnappings of South Sudanese activists abroad and for their involvement in transnational repression.  Today’s actions are being taken under the “Khashoggi Ban,” a visa restriction policy pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.These visa restrictions address the ongoing threat the South Sudan Transitional Government poses to South Sudanese activists and dissidents, no matter where they are located.  The United States remains concerned about the multiple credible reports of South Sudanese nationals who have been threatened, killed, or kidnapped in neighboring countries, as well as persons who have been forcibly returned to South Sudan to face politically motivated reprisals.We call on the Government of South Sudan to create an environment conducive to free and fair elections in December, including by ending its targeting and harassment of overseas citizens and by expanding civic space within its borders. We support the people of South Sudan at home and abroad, including those brave individuals working to promote transparency, fight corruption, and advocate for democracy and human rights at such a critical juncture in their country’s history.
- Promoting Accountability in Support of the 75th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Office of the SpokespersonOn Human Rights Day and the 75th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Department of State, in coordination with the Departments of the Treasury and Homeland Security, is taking actions to promote accountability for perpetrators of human rights abuses.  State is taking steps to impose visa restrictions on four individuals pursuant to Section 7031(c) of the Annual Appropriations Act, 11 individuals pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, designating one People’s Republic of China (PRC) individual pursuant to the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act (UHRPA), and designating two ISIS-DRC leaders pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended. On Human Rights Day and the 75th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Department of State, in coordination with the Departments of the Treasury and Homeland Security, is taking actions to promote accountability for perpetrators of human rights abuses.  State is taking steps to impose visa restrictions on four individuals pursuant to Section 7031(c) of the Annual Appropriations Act, 11 individuals pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, designating one People’s Republic of China (PRC) individual pursuant to the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act (UHRPA), and designating two ISIS-DRC leaders pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended.  Treasury is designating 20 individuals pursuant to E.O. 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, as well as E.O. 13667, E.O. 13413 as amended by E.O. 13671, and E.O. 13664.  These actions also implement the Presidential Memorandum on Promoting Accountability for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence.  Homeland Security is also adding three PRC-based companies to the Uyghur Forced Labor Protection Act (UFLPA) Entity list.AfghanistanTreasury is designating two individuals for serious human rights abuse related to the restriction of access to secondary education for women and girls in Afghanistan, pursuant to E.O. 13818.Fariduddin Mahmood is a member of the Taliban’s so-called “cabinet” that made decisions to close education centers and schools to women and girls after the sixth grade. Mahmood serves as the so-called “head of the Afghanistan Academy of Sciences” and supported the education-related bans on women and girls.Khalid Hanafi serves as the so-called “Minister” for the so-called “Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice” (MPVPV). Since August 2021, members of the MPVPV have engaged in serious human rights abuse, including abductions, whippings, and beatings.  Members of the MPVPV have assaulted people protesting the restrictions on women’s activity, including access to education. Central African Republic (CAR)Treasury is designating three individuals contributing to ongoing instability in the CAR pursuant to E.O. 13667.Jean-Francis Bozize Jr., a CAR national and son of former CAR President Francois Bozize, has moved weapons and ammunition from neighboring countries into CAR for the Coalition for the Patriots of Change (CPC), a rebel group that has recruited child soldiers and perpetrated sexual violence.Mahamat Salleh (Salleh), a CAR national, is a CPC commander and a former zone commander for the CPC-affiliated group, the Popular Front for the Rebirth of CAR, who has raped girls and forced them into sexual slavery.Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)State is designating two ISIS-DRC (aka Allied Democratic Forces) leaders pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for their leadership roles.  ISIS-DRC, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist, has committed numerous abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law against women and children, including involving killing, maiming, and sexual violence.Mohamed Ali Nkalubo (aka Meddie Nkalubo), a Ugandan national, is an ISIS-DRC senior advisor and deputy to ISIS-DRC&#8217;s overall leader, Musa Baluku. Nkalubo served as a communication conduit to ISIS-Core senior leaders and is responsible for disseminating ISIS propaganda in central Africa.  Nkalubo oversees ISIS-DRC attack planning and training and has personally participated in numerous attack operations, such as training the suicide bomber that conducted the April 7, 2022, attack at a bar in the Katindo military camp in Goma, North Kivu, DRC; building an explosive device that was detonated on February 5, 2022, in a market in Beni, North Kivu, killing and injuring several people; and directing the October 23, 2021, attack of a restaurant in Kampala, Uganda.Ahmed Mahamud Hassan Aliyani, a Tanzanian national, is an ISIS-DRC commander. Hassan Aliyani oversees the facilitation of foreign fighters traveling into the DRC to join the group.  Hassan Aliyani has also led attack planning for ISIS-DRC, including the June 16, 2023, attack on the Lhubiriha Secondary School in Uganda and the January 15, 2023, attack on a Pentecostal church in Kasindi, DRC.Treasury is designating three individuals contributing to ongoing instability in the DRC pursuant to E.O. 13413 as amended by E.O. 13671.William Yakutumba, a DRC national, is the founder, military commander, and political leader of the Mai-Mai Yakutumba militia and the National Coalition of the People for the Sovereignty of Congo (CNPSC), a coalition of several armed groups in South Kivu province, DRC, that has attacked civilians and humanitarian actors. Through his role as leader of the Mai-Mai Yakutumba militia and CNPSC, Yakutumba has been involved in the commission of rape, mass rape, and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence.Willy Ngoma is the military spokesperson for the March 23 Movement (M23), an armed group that has perpetrated human rights abuses, including killings, attacks, and sexual violence against civilians. On November 29, 2022, M23 conducted a series of killings in the town of Kisheshe in North Kivu province, DRC, where M23 combatants systematically looted civilian property and raped several women.Michel Rukunda, a DRC national, is the commander and overall military leader of the armed group Twirwaneho. Under Rukunda’s leadership, Twirwaneho has recruited children as young as 12 years of age to guard military positions, carry out patrols, gather intelligence, participate in combat operations, act as personal escorts, or work as domestic aids in military camps.  Twirwaneho has conducted attacks against civilians, including at an internally displaced person camp, and has looted and burned several houses and a medical facility.On December 4, the United States also nominated these individuals for designation at the United Nations (UN) pursuant to resolution 1807 (2008) concerning the DRC.   HaitiTreasury is designating four individuals for each being a foreign person who is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly engaged in serious human rights abuse, pursuant to E.O. 13818.Johnson “Izo” André, leader of criminal gang “5 Segond,” is wanted by the Haitian National Police for assassination, kidnapping for ransom, illegal possession of firearms, hijacking of freight trucks, and criminal conspiracy. André and his gang have been identified by survivors as being directly responsible for 1,035 documented cases of sexual violence in 2022 alone.Renel Destina, leader of criminal gang “Grand Ravine,” is a key ally of André, and has committed kidnappings as well as killings, robberies, rapes, looting and burning of residences, and continuous attacks against Haitian police officers. Destina has been indicted on charges of hostage taking by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for kidnapping U.S. citizens for ransom in February 2021.Vitel’homme Innocent, leader of criminal gang “Kraze Baryé,” has been indicted by the DOJ for his role in the armed kidnapping of U.S. citizens in Haiti in October 2022. The Department of State has a reward offer of up to $2 million under the Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program for information leading to his arrest and/or conviction when he was added to the FBI’s 10 Most Wanted Fugitives List  November 7, 2023.Wilson Joseph, leader of criminal gang “400 Mawozo,” has been indicted by the DOJ for his role in the armed kidnapping of U.S. citizens in Haiti in October 2022. State has a reward offer of up $1 million for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of Wilson Joseph.On December 1, the United States also nominated these individuals for designation at the UN under Security Council resolution 2653 (2022) concerning Haiti.IndonesiaState is designating two individuals pursuant to Section 7031(c).Terbit Rencana Pergangin-Angin, Former Regent of Langkat, Indonesia. He is being designated for his involvement in gross violations of human rights, namely the forced labor of boys and men.Hartomo, Former Official of the Indonesian National Armed Forces. He is being designated for his involvement in gross violations of human rights, namely extrajudicial killing.IranTreasury is designating two Iranian intelligence officers for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security, pursuant to E.O. 13553.Majid Dastjani FarahaniMohammad Mahdi Khanpour ArdestaniBoth Farahani and Ardestani have recruited individuals for various operations in the United States, to include lethal targeting of current and former U.S. Government officials as revenge for the death of IRGC-QF Commander Qasem Soleimani. Farahani and Ardestani also recruited individuals for surveillance activities focused on religious sites, businesses, and other facilities in the U.S.LiberiaTreasury is designating one individual in connection to serious human rights abuse and corruption, pursuant to E.O. 13818.Jefferson Koijee, the mayor of Monrovia and a senior leader in the Congress for Democratic Change (CDC) political party. Koijee has a reputation for stoking violence and has a powerful grip on Monrovia’s youth.  Koijee controls paramilitary-like groups associated with the CDC which allegedly recruit former combatants and recently released prisoners.  Koijee and his supporters have been involved in violence in connection with an opposition rally in July 2022, a memorial service for former Liberian president Amos Sawyer in March 2022 attended by students, an anti-rape protest in August 2020, a student graduation ceremony in December 2019, and an opposition rally in November 2018.  Koijee also engaged in corrupt acts, including bribery and misappropriation of state assets for use by private political movements and pressuring anti-corruption investigators to halt all corruption investigations.People’s Republic of China (PRC)State submitted the “Report to Congress on the Imposition of Sanctions Pursuant to Section 6(a) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020, P.L. 116-145,” which identified two PRC government officials responsible for their connection to ongoing serious human rights abuses in Xinjiang.  Treasury is concurrently sanctioning the two PRC government officials identified in the report.  Gao Qi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13818 and UHRPA.  Hu Lianhe is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13818, in support of UHRPA objectives.Gao Qi formerly served as the leader of the Yili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture (Yili Prefecture) Public Security Bureau, an organization subordinate to the previously designated Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB), and as Yili Prefecture’s vice governor. Since June 2018, public security officials in Yili Prefecture have engaged in a range of serious human rights abuses.  State is concurrently designating Gao under Section 7031(c) for his involvement in a gross violation of human rights, namely the arbitrary detention of Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.Hu Lianhe has served as the Deputy Office Director for the Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group of the Central Committee (XWCSG), which has been instrumental in shaping and implementing Xinjiang policies. As a part of its core role in setting policy in Xinjiang, the XWCSG engaged in direct and close involvement in the PRC’s March 2017 “XUAR De-Extremification Regulation,” and its October 2018 revision, which provided the framework for Xinjiang’s “de-extremification” through re-education campaign.  The regulation created a presumptive legal basis for Xinjiang’s re-education internment campaign in the eyes of the PRC government.  Hu was designated under Section 7031(c) in 2021 for his involvement in a gross violation of human rights, namely the arbitrary detention of Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.The Department of Homeland Security-led interagency task force Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force determined that the following entities meet the criteria of Section 2(d)(2)(B)(ii) of the UFLPA.  Specifically, they are working with the government of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region to recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, or receive forced labor or Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or members of other persecuted groups out of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.COFCO Sugar Holding Co., LtdSichuan Jingweida Technology Group Co., LtdAnhui Xinya New Materials Co., LtdRussiaState is designating one individual pursuant to Section 7031(c).Ivan A. Ryabov is a police officer at Brateyevo Police Station in Moscow. Ryabov is being designated for his involvement in gross violations of human rights, namely torture and/or the cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment of Russian anti-war demonstrators who marched in opposition to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.South SudanTreasury is designating three individuals for being responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of South Sudan pursuant to E.O. 13664.Gordon Koang Biel, the Koch County Commissioner.Gatluak Nyang Hoth, the Mayendit County Commissioner.Joseph Mantiel Wajang, the Unity State Governor.Between February and April 2022, government-aligned forces and allied militias under Biel and Hoth’s command committed rape, often accompanied by other human rights abuses, against women and girls during armed attacks in Leer County of Unity State.  Wajang, appointed Biel and Hoth as county commissioners, and was aware of the attacks by their forces.SudanOn December 6, the Secretary of State announced his determination that members of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have committed war crimes, that members of the RSF and allied militias have committed crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing in Darfur, and that members of the Sudanese Armed Forces have committed war crimes.  The ongoing atrocities in Sudan are reminiscent of the Darfur genocide almost 20 years ago, and it is imperative the world’s attention remain focused on the unfolding human rights calamity in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan.SyriaPursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, State is issuing an expanded visa restriction policy for current or former Syrian government officials or other individuals who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in:The repression of Syrians, especially through violence, including serious human rights abuses in Syria; arbitrary expropriation of property or other abuses related to housing, land, and property rights in Syria; obstruction, disruption, or prevention of efforts to promote a political solution to the conflict in Syria; and forcible repatriation of refugees or other persons to Syria.The production or trafficking of the amphetamine-type stimulant captagon from Syria.The immediate family of such persons may also be subject to visa restrictions under this policy.State is pursuing visa restrictions against 11 Syrian officials and other individuals pursuant to this policy.UgandaTreasury is designating one individual for having been a leader of an entity that has engaged in serious human rights abuses, pursuant to E.O. 13818.Johnson Byabashaija has served as the Commissioner General of the Uganda Prisons Service (UPS) since 2005. During that period, members of the UPS have engaged in torture, including of government critics and LGBTQI+ persons, held within UPS facilities.On December 4, State also announced an expanded visa restriction policy, pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, that can be used to restrict visa issuance to current or former Ugandan government officials or other individuals who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, undermining the democratic process in Uganda or for policies or actions aimed at repressing members of marginalized or vulnerable populations.  Those vulnerable populations include, but are not limited to, environmental activists, human rights defenders, journalists, LGBTQI+ persons, and civil society organizers.ZimbabweOn December 4, State announced a visa restriction policy, pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, that can be used to restrict visa issuance to individuals who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, undermining the democratic process in Zimbabwe.  Such acts may include manipulating or rigging the electoral process; disenfranchising voters or preventing individuals from exercising their right to vote; excluding members of the political opposition from electoral processes; restricting the ability of civil society organizations (CSOs) to operate and engage in democratic, governance, or human rights related activities; or intimidation of voters, election observers, or CSOs through threats or acts of physical violence.  They may also include engaging in corrupt acts, including bribery, that undermine the electoral process; interfering with the independent operation of the judiciary during its adjudication of electoral cases; or abusing or violating human rights in Zimbabwe.Financial Sanctions ImplicationsAs a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above, pursuant to E.O. 13224, E.O. 13818, E.O. 13667, E.O. 13413 as amended by E.O. 13671, E.O. 13664, and UHRPA that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.In addition, all entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.  Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or otherwise exempt, all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited.  The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
- U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Meeting on Women’s Economic Empowerment Office of the SpokespersonThe United States hosted Japan and the Republic of Korea in Seattle, Washington on Friday, August 18, on the margins of the APEC Women and the Economy Forum.  Assistant to the President and Director of the Gender Policy Council Jennifer Klein led the U.S. delegation, which also included U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women’s Issues Geeta Rao Gupta, in discussion with Minister in charge of Women’s Empowerment Ogura Masanobu and Consul General of the Republic of Korea in Seattle Seo Eun-ji on shared priorities and efforts related to advancing women’s economic empowerment.The officials specifically addressed their joint commitment to advancing women’s economic participation; strengthening care infrastructure; and supporting women’s leadership in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) fields.  This meeting builds on previous trilateral engagements in 2016 and 2020 on women’s political and economic empowerment and women’s leadership in STEM fields, respectively, and supports the U.S. Strategy on Global Women’s Economic Security.  The three sides agreed to continue to work together to reduce barriers to women’s full and meaningful participation in the economy, including at a 2024 conference in Washington, D.C.