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98–278 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–73] 

PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE: AMERICAN 

AND FOREIGN DEVELOPMENTS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

DECEMBER 8, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

TIM MORRISON, Counsel 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

MIKE GANCIO, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

WITNESSES 

Acton, James, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment ........................................ 6 

Kehler, Gen C. Robert, USAF (Ret.), Former Commander, U.S. Strategic 

Command .............................................................................................................. 2 

Scheber, Thomas, Independent Consultant ........................................................... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Acton, James ..................................................................................................... 52 

Kehler, Gen C. Robert ...................................................................................... 25 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 23 

Scheber, Thomas ............................................................................................... 38 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Slides displayed by Mr. Rogers ....................................................................... 69 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 78 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 73 

(1) 

PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE: AMERICAN AND 

FOREIGN DEVELOPMENTS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, December 8, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:18 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROGERS. I want to call this hearing of the Armed Services 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces to order. We are going to have 

our hearing today on ‘‘Prompt Global Strike: American and Foreign 

Developments.’’ 

I want to welcome our panelists and guests with us today. 

And is Ms. Cooper here? Martha is here. I want to welcome the 

ranking member’s wife, Martha Cooper, for being with us today. I 

had a chance to travel with her recently. She is wonderful. I don’t 

know how she puts up with Jim, but she is wonderful. 

But we are happy to have our witnesses with us today. We have 

got a fine bunch. And I am happy to dispense with my opening 

statement. 

If Jim wants to do the same, so we—unless you just feel compelled or something. 

Mr. COOPER. You didn’t even say ‘‘Roll Tide’’ or anything. 

Mr. ROGERS. Don’t stir me up. 

Because of the vote series, what is happening is there is a series 

of procedural votes that have been happening, will be happening 

all day, so we will probably be interrupted. So to ensure that we 

can get to the witnesses for their statements and questions, we will 

just dispense with the reading of our opening statements and submit them for the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 23.] 

Mr. ROGERS. With that, we have testifying before us today General C. Robert Kehler, retired former commander of Strategic Command, U.S. Strategic Command; Mr. Tom Scheber, independent 

consultant; and Dr. James Acton, senior associate, Carnegie Endowment. 

I want to thank you for your time and energy that you put in 

to preparing for these hearings and for traveling up here on your 

own dime. I appreciate that. 

And, General Kehler, if I bet you money 2 years ago that we 

would be able to get you to sit in this chair again, what would the 

odds have been? Not good? 

General KEHLER. Very high. 
2 

Mr. ROGERS. Oh, really? Well, good. 

General KEHLER. Of course, of course. 

Mr. ROGERS. We appreciate you being here. 

So, with that, I will recognize General Kehler for his opening 

statement. 

STATEMENT OF GEN C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF (RET.), 

FORMER COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND 

General KEHLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Cooper, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am honored 

to join you today. 

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, what I would like to do is 

submit my full statement for the record and then provide a brief 

summary now. 

Mr. ROGERS. Without objection, so ordered. 

General KEHLER. This is the first time I have appeared before a 

congressional committee since retiring from active service in December of 2013, and I am pleased to be here to offer my personal 

perspective today on the topic of conventional prompt global strike 

[CPGS]. 

We live in challenging times, and I continue to believe that a 

strong strategic deterrent composed of effective defenses, modern 

conventional and non-kinetic capabilities, an updated nuclear triad, 

and highly trained and well-led people will be needed to underwrite 

our national security and assure the security of our allies and partners well into the future. The potential threats to our security and 

the security of our allies are diverse, can arrive at our doorsteps 

rapidly, and can range from small arms in the hands of terrorists 

to nuclear weapons in the hands of hostile state leaders. The possible intersection of violent extremism and weapons of mass destruction remains a significant concern that requires constant vigilance. State and non-state actors alike can stress our intelligence 

capabilities and contingency plans by employing highly adaptive 

hybrid combinations of strategies, tactics, and capabilities, and by 

using the speed of information to mask their activities behind a 

veil of deception and ambiguity. New capabilities, like cyber weapons and unmanned vehicles, are emerging, and familiar weapons, 

like ballistic missiles and advanced conventional capabilities, are 

more available, affordable, and lethal. 

I can’t recall a time during my professional career when potential 

threats to our homeland were more varied or pronounced than they 

are today. The tragic events in New York on 9/11 and more recently in Paris, San Bernardino, and elsewhere remind us that we 

must continue to pursue and destroy violent extremists and their 

networks while remaining constantly on guard to prevent and respond to attacks from them. 

Beyond violent extremists, state adversaries are seeking to 

change the strategic situation in their favor by improving their 

ability to threaten the U.S. and allied homelands with attack by 

long-range conventional, cyber, and, in some cases, nuclear weapons. When used in concert with capabilities designed to degrade 

our key operational advantages—things like space-based ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] and communications— 

and negate our conventional superiority, they believe a credible 
3 

threat to escalate a conflict of a strategic level against our homeland will raise the risks and costs of our intervention and to do so 

to unacceptable levels, thereby enabling more assertive foreign 

policies and aggressive actions. 

In my view, dealing with today’s varied threats from actors with 

widely different capabilities and motivations requires the flexible 

application of a range of capabilities within strategies and plans 

that are tailored to specific adversaries and scenarios. Violent extremists and nation-states are not the same, and we cannot deal 

with any of them in a one-size-fits-all manner. 

Deterrence strategies that are the preferred approaches to 

counter nation-states will likely not be effective against violent extremists, where direct action is often the only recourse. Nuclear 

weapons may not be the most credible deterrence tool against some 

targets and in some scenarios where they were once the preferred 

option. Therefore, it is increasingly clear to me that we must carefully match our strategies and plans to individual actors and deploy a range of conventional and nuclear capabilities that can either deter, if possible, or defeat them in multiple scenarios. 

The capability to hold at risk and promptly attack a subset of 

high-value targets with a long-range conventional weapon is one 

such capability. What I said when I advocated for this capability 

while still on Active Duty in 2013 remains true now. Today, the 

only prompt global strike [PGS] capability to engage potentially 

time-sensitive, fleeting targets continues to be a ballistic missile 

system armed with nuclear weapons. 

We continue to require a deployed conventional prompt strike capability to provide the President a range of flexible military options 

to address a small number of highest value targets, including in an 

anti-access and area-denial environment. In my view, such a capability would both enhance strategic deterrence and improve our 

ability to react quickly in a time-critical scenario by providing the 

President with an option to promptly deliver a nonnuclear weapon 

against a limited but vitally important target or subset of highest 

value targets at long ranges. Such targets might be presented either by violent extremists, rogue or other nation-states; could 

emerge in a day-to-day or conflict scenario; and would most likely 

be highly defended, be found in the most challenging geographic locations, or be mobile—perhaps all three. 

While it is impossible to predict with 100 percent certainty what 

these targets might be, it is likely that they would fall into several 

general categories: Those that pose an immediate threat to the U.S. 

or allied homelands; those that involve the imminent use or movement of weapons of mass destruction; those associated with key extremist leaders; or those that represent a critical node in an important system that must be eliminated early in a campaign. Such a 

conventional prompt global strike system would complement, not 

replace, other strike capabilities by filling a gap in the capabilities 

of both existing and planned systems. 

The analysis is simple. Traditional systems are insufficient if 

they cannot deliver weapons in an operationally relevant timeframe. And in many plausible scenarios, traditional conventional 

forces may not be close enough or in a position to do just that. 

While 1 hour and global range do not have to be absolute criteria 
4 

for CPGS, the need remains to provide the President with the 

means to strike certain targets quickly with a conventional weapon 

and in the face of the most challenging time and distance circumstances. 

Conventional prompt global strike is intended to prevent an adversary from using time and distance as a sanctuary. Over the last 

several years, research and development efforts on CPGS have 

highlighted both the promise and challenges of fielding such a capability. As many have pointed out, beyond the technical challenges, CPGS systems also raise policy, doctrine, and operational 

concerns that would have to be resolved prior to deployment. Additionally, important enabling capabilities, such as ISR and battle 

management and command and control, must also be addressed in 

order to field a viable operational system. 

The U.S. would also need to carefully assess the role of CPGS in 

strategic deterrence. While it is U.S. policy to reduce our reliance 

on nuclear weapons, I do not believe conventional weapons generally and CPGS specifically can serve as a large-scale replacement 

for nuclear weapons. 

Finally, I remain concerned, Mr. Chairman, about investment 

priorities. I am mindful of the difficult budget environment you are 

facing and worry that a robust CPGS effort could delay or eliminate other necessary modernization efforts. In my view, CPGS cannot and should not take the place of the vitally important nuclear 

or other strategic modernization efforts this subcommittee has 

worked hard to help craft and support. While I believe there is a 

real gap in our ability to strike promptly at long range with conventional weapons and that CPGS could definitely help close that 

gap, I would recommend caution as you consider elevating this 

need against others. 

Sir, I remain an advocate for CPGS as a complementary capability to enhance both deterrence and contingency response in the 

21st century, but in this budget environment, I personally do so 

with a caveat. There are many important investment priorities that 

contribute to sustaining and enhancing our deterrence posture and 

ensuring our military people and civilian partners remain the envy 

of the world. A prudent CPGS investment profile seems to me to 

be a sensible way to preserve future decision space while respecting 

budget realities. 

Thank you again for inviting me to appear, and I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Kehler can be found in the 

Appendix on page 25.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you, General. I think that is a reasonable 

and prudent caveat, by the way. 

You are having microphone problems. I am having microphone 

problems. We have got somebody working on that. I just wanted 

the people to realize that we are trying to get it fixed. 

So, with that, Mr. Scheber, we recognize you for a summary of 

your opening statement. And we hope your microphone works. 
5 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS SCHEBER, INDEPENDENT 

CONSULTANT 

Mr. SCHEBER. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and 

distinguished members of the House Subcommittee on Strategic 

Forces, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today. 

As many of the committee members are aware, over the past 15 

years, the thinking about the roles served by strategic weapons and 

the collection of capabilities needed has undergone a significant 

transformation. This transformation in conceptualizing strategic 

force needs—plus newly available technology—has provided the 

catalyst for prompt global strike. 

Strategic capabilities are more than destroying the adversary 

forces; they are, in general, capabilities that can affect the decision 

calculus of leaders of other countries in peacetime and can become 

game changers if used in wartime. 

General Kehler has certainly outlined the complex security environment we face and for which CPGS would be, in many cases, an 

important contribution. 

Longstanding national security goals remain important, and 

these goals include four, which I will address very briefly: One, deterring adversaries from specific actions; two, assuring U.S. allies 

and friends; three, discouraging further military competition; and 

four, should deterrence fail, limiting damage and defeating an adversary. PGS can provide unique benefits in each of these four policy goals. 

Of specific interest to this hearing today is a proposal to develop 

long-range nonnuclear strike capabilities as a supplement to—not 

a replacement for—nuclear strike. The potential scenarios requiring use of such a weapon are often the primary focus of inquiries 

such as the discussion we will have today. However, if the late 

James Schlesinger were among us today and on the panel, he 

would insist on commenting that PGS would be used every day 

during peacetime and then only if needed in wartime. Let me explain briefly. 

Of the four policy goals, PGS could be helpful in deterring adversaries. In some situations, advanced conventional strike, such as 

PGS, could pose a more credible offensive threat to adversaries 

than a nuclear threat. Uncertainty over just how the United States 

might respond to an immediate provocation without resorting to 

nuclear weapons would enhance overall U.S. capabilities for deterrence. PGS would also help assure allies. Allies in high-threat regions have expressed concerns about U.S. nuclear reductions and 

other military cutbacks, while at the same time they see their adversaries modernizing or developing nuclear and other WMD 

[weapon of mass destruction] capabilities. From the perspective of 

allies, threats to them are increasing, and allies want to know how 

the United States will carry out its extended deterrence commitments to them, to deter and defeat adversaries while limiting damage. Some allies may be reassured by the knowledge that the 

United States has a prompt nonnuclear strike capability should the 

need arise. 

And, third, PGS can help discourage strategic force competition. 

Developing and deploying a global or near global precision strike 

capability would demonstrate to potential adversaries the technical 
6 

prowess and resolve of the United States. Some potential adversaries could be dissuaded from competing militarily because of the 

tangible display of U.S. technical superiority as well as the cost 

and challenge of military competition. 

And, finally, should deterrence fail, to help and defend the 

United States and its allies, PGS can play a useful role. A PGS capability would provide one additional option for the President’s consideration, a unique strategic capability that we do not have today. 

One or more PGS weapons could be employed promptly to degrade, 

disrupt, or destroy adversaries’ capabilities, which need to be neutralized promptly and for which other options would not be timely 

and effective. Those who argue against developing prompt global 

strike would foreclose such an option from those available to a future President. 

In my written statement, I have addressed these issues in greater detail. With your permission, I ask that it be made part of the 

record, and hope that this material is of use to the subcommittee 

as it considers the need for prompt global strike. Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Scheber can be found in the Appendix on page 38.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Without objection, that full statement will be submitted for the record. 

Dr. Acton, you are recognized for 5 minutes to summarize your 

statement. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES ACTON, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, 

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT 

Dr. ACTON. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cooper, members of 

the committee, it is a genuine honor to testify before you today, 

and thank you for the opportunity. I hope I can be of help to the 

committee both today on this issue and in the future. With your 

permission, I would like to submit my full statement for the record. 

Mr. ROGERS. Without objection, so ordered. 

Dr. ACTON. While I will focus my testimony on the U.S. conventional prompt global strike program, I would be very pleased to answer questions about both Russian and particularly Chinese developments in this area too. 

Let me emphasize from the start that I am genuinely undecided 

about whether the United States should acquire CPGS weapons. 

The capability would unquestionably convey potential benefits, but 

it would also carry potential risks. Today, in my opinion, the relative magnitudes of those benefits and risks are unclear. 

The difficulty of reaching a definitive conclusion about whether 

to acquire CPGS weapons stems in part from technological immaturity. The underlying technology is extremely challenging, and 

further research and development, including flight testing, is required prior to any procurement decision. However, it also stems 

from what I believe are flaws in the Department of Defense’s approach to CPGS development. Most importantly, the Pentagon has 

no official policy that sets out the specific military missions for 

which CPGS weapons might be acquired. 

The frequently repeated statement that the program’s purpose is 

to develop high-precision conventional weapons, capable of reaching 

targets anywhere on Earth within an hour, is not only an increas-
7 

ingly inaccurate description of the technology that is actually being 

developed, but it does not speak to the specific military missions 

for which CPGS weapons might be acquired. Until the Department 

of Defense specifies these missions, there can be no yardstick 

against which to judge the likely effectiveness of different potential 

CPGS technologies. The tradeoffs associated with acquiring other 

weapons for the same purposes also cannot be properly assessed. 

To compound the problem, I believe there is evidence that the 

Department of Defense has failed to properly consider the enabling 

capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and 

battle damage assessment, needed to ensure the effectiveness of 

CPGS weapons as well as the full range of escalation risks. 

Not only do these flaws make it impossible at this time to reach 

a conclusion about the ultimate desirability of CPGS weapons, but 

they also create three real risks. They are that the United States 

will develop weapons that, first, are not optimized from a military 

perspective for the missions for which they might be employed; second, are not the most cost-effective way of prosecuting those missions; and, thirdly, unnecessarily exacerbate escalation risks with 

Russia and China. 

Fortunately, I believe there is still time for a course correction 

by the Department of Defense, and in my written testimony, I suggest how the Department might proceed. 

Thank you for your attention, and I yield the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Acton can be found in the Appendix on page 52.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank all the witnesses for their opening statements. 

We have been called for another vote. So, again, it is just one 

procedural vote, so we will recess for about 15 minutes to go and 

cast that vote and come right back. I apologize, but I am not running the trains around here. 

With that, we are in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I call this hearing back to order. I don’t know how 

this process is going to work as far as votes, but I will start the 

questioning while we wait on Mr. Cooper to get back. 

General Kehler, in your opening statements, you talked about, 

while in the service, that you supported prompt global strike, and 

you offered a caveat. Could you walk us through the capability gap 

that you thought—that you believe exists that caused you to have 

that support? 

General KEHLER. Mr. Chairman, one of the things that Strategic 

Command [STRATCOM] was responsible for, of course, was for 

planning for global strike, and so it was our job to look at various 

scenarios and to assess those scenarios for targeting and for the 

kind of capabilities we could match against those scenarios and 

those sorts of targets. The obvious ones that STRATCOM has been 

planning for years and years involved nuclear weapons and nuclear 

deterrence. We were very supportive of the notion that we should 

be looking to employ conventional weapons in times and places 

where we would once have used nuclear weapons as much as was 

feasible. We also were—so we picked up a responsibility for conventional global strike as well. That also forced us to take a hard look 
8 

at the kinds of issues that the regional combatant commanders 

have and that we had at STRATCOM, the kinds of targets that 

were defined by being time urgent and at such distances that we 

could not quickly get a traditional conventional weapon there. 

Those scenarios are typically as I outlined in my opening comments. Those scenarios exist when there is an immediate threat to 

the homeland, for example, or the homeland of our allies, and we 

are talking about WMD, those kinds of things, terrorist-related 

threats that can pop up quickly, be identified and need to be addressed. So we had nothing that was nonnuclear in order to go 

after those kinds of targets. 

Once U.S. forces are in place or when U.S. forces are in place, 

this gap doesn’t look the same at all. It is when they are not in 

place or when the timing—even with the in-place forces, when the 

timing is such that they just can’t get there in an operationally 

necessary or relevant time. Is that 1 hour? Is that global distance? 

I think those are—are good benchmarks for the start of this conversation. I don’t think they are absolutes. So is 2 hours sufficient? 

I think in some cases it is. You know, the shorter, the better, I 

would say. The best we can do, the better the capability. 

So this was a matter of looking at a set of needs that we described as niche needs where other forces are not available, where 

the use of a nuclear weapon is inappropriate. And when I sat back 

and looked at what options I would present to the President in 

those kinds of scenarios, I didn’t have anything in our quiver that 

we could immediately offer. 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. Thank you. When you think about that, 

compare where we are to Russia and China, particularly China has 

tested hypersonic glide vehicles six times already this year. And I 

know in conversation I had earlier with Mr. Scheber, he had talked 

to me about China’s more aggressive schedule. Do you see them 

confronting this gap in a more aggressive fashion than the United 

States did? Tell me more about it, if you can. 

General KEHLER. Sir, I will just offer a quick comment and then 

defer to my colleagues here if that is okay. 

Mr. ROGERS. Sure. 

General KEHLER. I don’t have—since my retirement, I don’t have 

in-depth knowledge of what the Chinese and the Russians are both 

doing. I will say this: I do believe that they are both interested in 

pursuing a long-range prompt conventional strike means as part of 

their strategies. It is a strategy, in the case of the Chinese, to enhance what we call their anti-access, area-denial capabilities, their 

capabilities against ships and other conventional platforms where 

we have an advantage. 

I think in both of their cases, it is also a means for them to hold 

targets in our homeland and those of our allies at risk, and I think 

they do that strategically in order to cause us to assess the risk of 

our intervention in a crisis or a conflict in a different way. So I 

know they are pursuing those kinds of capabilities. It isn’t quite 

clear to me, and I know you are receiving a briefing a little bit 

later, a classified briefing, that will get into that more deeply, but 

I do believe they are both interested in those kinds of capabilities, 

and I think that they are pursuing R&D [research and develop-
9 

ment] efforts to try to bring those capabilities to some level of decision point where they can decide on deployment. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Scheber, I know you and I talked about this a 

little bit earlier. Do you want to add something to what General 

Kehler just offered? 

Mr. SCHEBER. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Most of—my research has been focused on open sources, so it is all unclassified research, what is available in the press, what the Chinese wish to 

have revealed to us, and as well as unclassified DOD [Department 

of Defense] reports. 

Regarding China, as General Kehler has outlined, the Chinese 

appear to be developing prompt nuclear and nonnuclear strike capabilities that fit with their anti-access and area-denial strategies 

out to the second island chain. Just specifically regarding conventionally armed ballistic missiles, they have over 1,200 short-range 

missiles that are ballistic, the DFs 11 and 15 that are deployed opposite Taiwan; they have medium-range missiles, such as the DF– 

21 family, which includes an anti-ship version; they have a DF–16, 

which can target Okinawa, which we have our forces deployed 

there; and they are in the process, at least according to open-source 

reports, of developing a longer range, classified as an intermediaterange missile, the DF–26, which Chinese reports refer to as the 

‘‘Guam killer.’’ The name is pretty self-explanatory. 

So if we look at what we know of the Chinese strategy to dominate the western Pacific and deny the United States access to that 

area, these capabilities look like they are pretty well designed to 

help them with that strategy, and as far as we know, at least at 

the unclassified level, those missiles have the capability to be either nuclear or conventionally armed. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. My final question before I turn it over to the 

ranking member is for General Kehler. You and I have talked 

about this before, but I wanted to visit the subject. The disarmament advocates believe that we should get rid of one leg of the 

triad. They say we don’t need the ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic 

missiles] anymore, so we shouldn’t pursue the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent program, or that we don’t need air-launched cruise 

missiles, so we shouldn’t pursue the long-range standoff weapon. In 

fact, these people say that these systems are dangerous and destabilizing. 

What are your thoughts about the suggestions that we hear from 

these advocates? 

General KEHLER. Mr. Chairman, I remain a supporter of the 

triad, and I remain a supporter because I think the triad does some 

very important things for us. Number one, it gives to any President 

a range of options. It is very difficult, I think, post-Cold War to envision the scenarios we are going to find ourselves in, in the future. 

We typically get that wrong, as a matter of fact. 

And so I think that one thing the triad does for us is it gives us 

a range of options to present to any President to deal with a crisis 

or a conflict. The second thing it does is it provides insurmountable 

problems for an adversary, either attack problems to try to eliminate our forces or defense problems. And it forces them to invest 

in all kinds of ways that, when you start to eliminate legs of the 
10 

triad, I think they don’t have to invest any longer. By the way, I 

think it diminishes our deterrent value as well. 

The third thing it does, the triad does, is it provides the United 

States with a hedge—a hedge against technical failure or a hedge 

against geopolitical change. Again, it is an uncertain world, and if 

we had, for example, let’s say we decided to do away with the 

ICBM leg of the triad—I am a fan of the ballistic missile submarine force. Ballistic missile submarine force—and by the way, 

when New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] is finally 

brought into full force, most of our deployed weapons will be 

aboard submarines. That works this issue about survivability of 

the land-based ICBM force and whether or not we are in a use-orlose kind of scenario. We have taken steps to avoid that. 

But having said that, without the ICBMs, we are one potential 

technical failure, in either a ballistic missile system or a warhead, 

away from having no ballistic missiles. And while we would still 

have nuclear capable aircraft, those are not on alert on a day-today basis. We would be putting a future President in a position of 

having to make that decision as well. I think for hedge purposes, 

it makes sense to retain all three legs. 

Finally, I think it has been cost-effective. 

So, yes, we need to be mindful, I believe, of the concerns about 

stability and ambiguity and those kind of things, but I believe that 

the concerns that have been raised about ICBMs, that they are on 

a hair trigger, that—because of use or lose, I believe you have to 

remember that there is one finger on the trigger, and that finger 

belongs to the President and only the President. 

The second thing I think you have to remember is the use-or-lose 

issue is not the same issue today as it was during the Cold War. 

There are additional nuclear adversaries beyond—potential adversaries beyond the Russians. Only the Russians can threaten the 

ICBM force in total. So I think the use-or-lose problem looks different today, and I think that the world situation puts a different 

light on that as well. 

Finally, the idea about unauthorized or—you know, accidental 

launch, I think for ICBMs there are layers of safeguards, and 

while, yes, it is important for us to continue to focus on that and 

make sure that we constantly get better in that regard, I believe 

that we work that problem pretty well. 

Cruise missiles. You know, cruise missiles have proven their 

value. At least from my perspective and certainly my last job’s perspective, they prove their value both in deterrence value, that you 

can arm a bomber, whether that bomber is penetrating, in the case 

of LRSB [long-range strike bomber] in the future, or whether it is 

standoff, what you are doing is you are increasing the effectiveness 

of the bomber. And to me, there is tremendous value in being able 

to do that. When you look at the land masses that are potentially 

involved here, even a penetrating platform benefits from having a 

longer range missile, that it doesn’t have to get close to the target 

area if it doesn’t want to, or it can hold multiple targets at risk at 

varying ranges while it is penetrating. I think there is tremendous 

value there for deterrence, and there is no question the value—the 

combat value we have gotten out of using hundreds of conventional 

cruise missiles. 
11 

So I don’t understand some of the argument here about why we 

shouldn’t go ahead with a replacement for the ALCM [air-launched 

cruise missile]. To me, it makes all the sense in the world. It 

makes even more sense if that replacement for ALCM eventually 

becomes dual-capable, and then I think we have done exactly what 

we have done with the air-launch cruise missile. I do not believe 

that we are changing either the stability or the ambiguity issues 

here. These are issues—you know, when we use B–52s today—I am 

taking too much time—but when we use B–52s today, we use B– 

2s today, and we have only ever operationally used them, thank 

heaven, in conventional modes. And we have been able to work the 

ambiguity issue when a cruise missile lifts off a surface ship, or 

when it drops out of a B–52 bomb bay, or if it comes out of an 

SSGN [guided missile submarine], no one believes that we have 

just launched a nuclear weapon. 

Now, we need to be careful with that. I agree that that is an 

issue that we have to be mindful of and continue to work to reduce 

that risk and continue to reduce the risk as much as we possibly 

can, but I do not believe that we are changing the game here with 

LRSO [long-range standoff weapon]. I think what we are doing is 

continuing our—both our deterrence and our conventional warfighting capability. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the ranking member for any questions 

he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am most interested in that netherworld between nuclear and 

conventional, and we probably can’t call it conventional anymore 

since hypersonic weapons are stretching the limits of conventionality, so maybe we should say ‘‘nuclear, nonnuclear.’’ 

I think everyone agrees that due to the speed and precision of 

these conventional warheads, they can have a devastating impact 

on the target. I think we can also all agree that many poorer nations are encouraged to turn nuclear because that is a more affordable way to get devastating capabilities because they have less 

hope of achieving a hypersonic capability. 

So I was interested in Mr. Acton’s book ‘‘Silver Bullet’’ when he 

talked about how even our bunker buster bomb, the massive ordnance penetrator, can go a certain depth, but these things can go 

probably twice as deep, due to the speed and precision. So it seems 

to me to be an interesting inflection point for the world. Several 

leading nations are pursuing these weapons, but we don’t know 

quite how to classify them. And the chairman has pointed out that 

we have been kind of slow developing them, given the lead time, 

and I hope we can get to the bottom of that in the Pentagon, but 

to me, it is a fascinating category because they are not nuclear, but 

yet they have super capabilities, and they tempt other nations to 

do some extreme reactions. 

Mr. Acton also noted that Putin comments five times in recent 

years. He seems to pay particular attention to these. The potential 

for these weapons is remarkable. So I am hopeful that we can develop the capability and do so in a sensible way that does not exacerbate the difficulties in the world that we have already. 
12 

I would welcome comments from any of the witnesses on this. 

Am I off base in classifying the weapons these ways, as not really 

conventional but certainly not nuclear? 

Dr. ACTON. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. 

And these are certainly weapons that have significantly greater 

potential to destroy certain kinds of targets than existing conventional weapons. Unclassified figures put the depth that the massive 

ordnance penetrator can go to at about 20 meters of reinforced concrete. My calculations suggest that hypersonic weapons might be 

able to go to 40 meters. With nuclear weapons, you are talking 

about weapons that can potentially destroy targets hundreds of meters in hard rock. So there [is] still, as you absolutely rightly point 

out, quite a big difference there between even these penetrating 

weapons and nuclear weapons. 

I think one of the important questions that this raises, and this 

is a question that is impossible to answer at the unclassified level, 

that is, how many additional targets are there that are out of the 

reach of existing conventional weapons but would be in the reach 

of hypersonic weapons. I just don’t know the answer to that question, but that is, I think, the type of thing that needs to be considered at the classified level, and as you say, sir, thinking about how 

to do this sensibly. 

I would just raise a couple of points about some of the escalation 

risks involved with these weapons. So much of the debate so far 

has been swallowed up by the so-called problem of warhead ambiguity, which when the administration of President George W. Bush 

had a plan to take nuclear warheads off some Trident missiles and 

replace them with conventional warheads, Congress was concerned 

that an observing state, most likely Russia, would see the launch 

of one of those weapons and misinterpret a conventional for a nuclear weapon. 

I think we have placed far too much emphasis on the warhead 

ambiguity problem. There are other escalation risks with conventional prompt global strike weapons that I think haven’t had adequate attention. So to give you one, the Department of Defense is 

interested in these boost-glide weapons precisely because they don’t 

fly in ballistic trajectories, and so DOD argues that an observing 

state could tell this was nonnuclear because it was in a different 

trajectory, and I think that is exactly right. However, these weapons are also highly maneuverable, and if one fires them, say, in the 

direction of Iran, Russia might not know whether that weapon was 

heading for Russia or Iran, or if one fired them at North Korea, 

then Russia or China, for that matter, might not know whether the 

target was Russia or China. This is what is termed destination ambiguity. 

So there are real tradeoffs here in terms of risk reduction in that 

technologies that exacerbate one risk can reduce another. These escalation risks are risks to be considered. I don’t necessarily argue 

that they are by any means the only factor that needs to be considered, but from everything I have seen, DOD is very largely focused 

on the warhead ambiguity problem and hasn’t given adequate attention to those other kinds of risks. 

Mr. COOPER. How would you classify a weapon that had in its 

glide phase only 48 percent? 
13 

Dr. ACTON. Well—— 

Mr. COOPER. That seems to be a pretty arbitrary distinction between 50 percent glide phase. 

Dr. ACTON. I would make two points there. I mean, the distinction comes from arms control definitions where the—if a weapon is 

ballistic over the majority of its trajectory, then it is deemed to be 

a ballistic missile. And that, I think, is unquestionably the correct 

interpretation of the existing arms control treaties we have. The 

extent to which that mitigates ambiguity problems, though, I think 

is more of an open question, but what I would say is another issue 

with DOD’s argument is that if you are Russia, you would see the 

launch of a boost-glide weapon if you had a satellite in the right 

place looking. You wouldn’t, then, see a weapon flying in a nonballistic trajectory. What you would actually see is nothing at all after 

the launch because boost-glide weapons fly at too low an altitude 

to be detected by early warning radar. 

So DOD’s argument is that Russia could see that the weapon 

was flying in a nonballistic trajectory; whereas, in fact, I think 

Russia would see nothing at all after the launch. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In view of the shortness of time, I yield to other members. 

Mr. LAMBORN [presiding]. Okay. Thank you. I will ask a question 

or two and then turn it over to my colleague from California, depending on when we have to go vote here. 

General Kehler, there is a letter that I saw that one of the Senators is circulating urging the administration to stop any thought 

about developing a nuclear-tipped air-launched cruise missile. And 

I know that that is not the subject of our conversation here today, 

but it is related, but I realize it is on the other side of the bright 

line between conventional PGS, and this is on the other side. This 

is nuclear air cruise missile. But it is important, because that letter’s circulating, and yet when I see what the President certified 

when he addressed the Senate on the New START treaty back in 

the year 2011, among other things, he certified under point 3 that 

he intended to modernize or replace the triad of strategic nuclear 

delivery systems, which is a heavy bomber, an ICBM, et cetera, et 

cetera, add an air-launched cruise missile. So the President in the 

past is on record saying that a nuclear-tipped air-launched cruise 

missile is part of our strategic deterrence. 

In light of that, would you agree or disagree with a letter urging 

the administration to drop any development of a nuclear-tipped airlaunched cruise missile, long-range standoff, let’s say. 

General KEHLER. Sir, I continue to support the need to have a 

nuclear-capable, air-launched cruise missile that would be a replacement for today’s ALCM. As I mentioned to the chairman, I 

think we have—there is great deterrent value. It not only provides 

the ability to stand off with a bomber, depending on the scenario 

here, but it also allows the bomber to penetrate and still extend the 

range and effectiveness of the bomber, the penetrating bomber. So 

I think it still provides us with deterrent value. And, as I also mentioned, I think we have seen in combat the value of a dual-capable 

cruise missile, a cruise missile that can also be used in a conventional sense. 
14 

The letter—I have seen the letter that you are mentioning. There 

are a number of issues that are raised. Some of these are ambiguity issues. I know that there have been some op-eds and other 

things written that I have read here over the last several months 

about raising the ambiguity concern. And, again, while I believe 

that you always have to be mindful of those concerns, I think those 

are workable, and we have worked those with the cruise missiles 

that we have today and the bombers as well, that I don’t think 

those are insurmountable issues. 

I do think that the value we get out of an air-launched cruise 

missile and a gravity weapon also is greater than the risks that are 

raised here because specifically I believe that those risks are all— 

either have been worked or are workable. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And in response to that, one of you, maybe it was 

you, General Kehler, had said that every time we launch a Tomahawk cruise missile from the Persian or Arabian Sea or something 

like that, the Russians or Chinese don’t have any confusion about 

what is going on, you know, that that is strictly a conventional 

armed cruise missile. Why do we have that situation today? 

General KEHLER. Well, number one, I think it is scenario dependent. I mean, they don’t believe that we are shooting at them, one. 

So I take Dr. Acton’s point here that if a conflict involves Russia 

or China, I think you would have to be mindful of those concerns. 

I think you work those in advance. I think you work those with the 

way you deploy these weapons. I think you work them with the 

way you test them. I think you work them in a lot of ways because 

I believe that you would have this issue in multiple ways. You will 

have this issue with the B–2, by the way. If we are involved in a 

fight with either Russia or China, I think today we would use the 

B–2 in that kind of a conflict, but the B–2 is dual-capable. I think 

those issues have been around for a long time about a stealthy 

platform and whether or not it would be carrying nuclear weapons, 

whether they would know it, et cetera, but I think that our operational behavior with B–2s has done something to help alleviate 

those concerns, and I think you would have to work those concerns 

here as well. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. I am going to turn the gavel back over to 

the chairman. But, lastly, General Kehler, so you would disagree 

with the letter I read earlier? 

General KEHLER. I do disagree. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. And I yield to the chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS [presiding]. Great. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Garamendi, for any questions he may have. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I noticed the bell 

rang, and I decided that I didn’t want to prove that Pavlov was 

quite right about ringing bells and dogs salivating. So I think that 

this is probably far more important than voting on another motion 

to adjourn, so let me go ahead and have at this. 

General, your point about ambiguity and the cruise missile thus 

far and the B–2 bomber thus far not creating a problem, in that 

Russia or China previously understood that it wasn’t coming at 

them, but we have not been involved in a conflict with either of 

those two countries. 
15 

Now, in a conflict, and you were getting to this with your—at the 

end of your last comments, in a conflict with those countries, when 

their doctrine is one—at least Russia’s doctrine—is one of escalate 

to de-escalate, I think we have a completely different situation, in 

which the ambiguity level significantly increases. So if we are 

launching a cruise missile, as was just discussed a moment ago, 

from the Persian Gulf to, I don’t know, some place in Iraq, or Russia is launching a cruise missile from the Caspian Sea into Syria, 

we understood what was going on. We were not engaged in a war 

with Russia. So I think we have got a very, very different situation, 

and I think it is Mr. Perry’s letter, former Secretary Perry’s letter 

that is being discussed here, and the question of ambiguity really 

arises to its highest state of uncertainty in a conflict with a nuclear 

country such as Russia or China. 

So I will just make that comment to come back at what you were 

saying. I think ambiguity can be a very, very serious problem 

under those circumstances, and hopefully, we never find ourselves 

under those circumstances, but that is why we have the triad, is 

it not? It is not to deal with Iraq or Syria. 

Dr. Acton, in what way might the CPGS undermine strategic stability, and what should we do to mitigate this risk? 

Dr. ACTON. Well, thank you for the question, sir. As I suggested 

already, I think that—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Acton, is your microphone working? 

Dr. ACTON. Ah. I am sorry. Sorry, Mr. Chairman. 

As I suggested already, there is a series of different escalatory 

risks that I am concerned about. There has been a lot of focus on 

warhead ambiguity, which is not my major concern unless, as you 

rightly point out, we are in a conflict with Russia or China. There 

is destination ambiguity, uncertainty about where a CPGS weapon 

will land. One has—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Excuse me. And that is because it can be redirected in flight? 

Dr. ACTON. Because it is inherently maneuverable. Because with 

a ballistic missile, from the moment the motor burns out, you can 

predict where it is going to land. With a CPGS weapon, because it 

is maneuverable and can be redirected in flight, you don’t know 

where it is going to land. 

You have crisis instability. So the—Russia, I think, incorrectly 

believes that the United States wants conventional weapons in 

order to attack Russia’s nuclear weapons, but I believe that belief 

is genuine. And on Russia’s part, the belief that the United States 

might preemptively attack its nuclear forces could lead Russia to 

use nuclear forces first. 

I have two suggestions about how to proceed. The first one is I 

very strongly agree with General Kehler that this is a problem that 

needs to be worked. The Department of Defense is only focused on 

warhead ambiguity to date, and I think that the first thing it 

should do is focus on the full range of instabilities. It should red 

team those instabilities, create models of how those instabilities 

could arise, and factor those instabilities into planning decisions. 

Secondly, if the U.S. does decide to go forward with conventional 

prompt global strike, I think cooperative confidence-building measures, things such as launch notifications, mutual inspections, are 
16 

likely to be much more effective than the unilateral measures that 

DOD has placed a focus on to date. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. General Kehler and Mr. Scheber. 

Mr. Scheber, you seem to want to have at it, so why don’t you 

go first. 

Mr. SCHEBER. Thank you. The issue of strategic stability is certainly a serious issue. I think I am the only one old enough in this 

room to remember the debate in the 1980s that went on at the time 

when all of our cruise missiles were nuclear armed and the consideration was in developing a conventionally armed missile for just 

that reason. Today, if we saw cruise missiles launched in most situations, as you pointed out, people would have assumed that they 

are conventional in nature because those are how the weapons 

have been used. We have demonstrated them, informed people, and 

so there was a whole different context. And so I think it is instructive to see how the world views changed as the arsenal changed 

and other countries were made aware of it. 

Regarding strategic stability and the potential for misunderstanding, it is certainly a topic that is serious. And the National 

Academy study report that reported out in 2008 found conclusions 

similar to other studies that have been conducted by the Department of Defense, that while a serious issue, there are a variety of 

measures, and Dr. Acton mentioned confidence-building measures, 

which I wholly agree with, of briefing the Russians and the Chinese as to what we are doing, having hotlines available. We have 

a variety of hotlines already available, so if questions arise, the 

phone communication can be prompt and straightforward and clear 

up any uncertainty. And both the National Academy study and a 

variety of DOD studies concluded that they believe that these series of measures would be sufficient to keep the risk of any misunderstanding very low. 

Now, certainly you can never totally eliminate that risk—given 

that humans are involved, but there is a variety of material on 

which we can already draw and then build upon to resolve the nuclear ambiguity strategic stability issue. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. I am out of time. Thank you very 

much. 

Mr. ROGERS. If you need a few more minutes, go ahead. You and 

I are it right now. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Very good. General—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, now the ranking member came back, but go 

ahead. 

Mr. COOPER. Go ahead, John. 

Mr. ROGERS. Go ahead, John. 

General KEHLER. I agree with what has been said. I agree with 

your point as well that this is an issue that you have to work. And 

the point about Russia and China not believing that we are launching a nuclear-armed cruise missile today if we use one in combat 

is situationally dependent. I concede that point as well, but what 

I also know is that now for—I can’t tell you the first time we used 

a conventional cruise missile in combat. Certainly in Desert Storm, 

we used them. So let’s just say for 20 years or 20-plus years, we 

have used them, what that does is it changes the situation in these 

other more dire scenarios where I don’t believe that Russia, Chi-
17 

nese, or American leaders would knee jerk a reaction in a conflict 

that was at that kind of a level. 

So, having said that, again, I go back to I think you have to work 

this issue, and you have to be mindful of it, and I think it has to 

shape your behavior in a given scenario as well. So I am agreeing. 

And, by the way, I have tremendous respect for Dr. Perry, and 

when Dr. Perry says we ought to be concerned about something, I 

would agree with that. We ought to be concerned about it, but I 

do think it is workable. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Yeah. I will take just another, maybe a minute 

here. The principal problem that I perceive here is that we are developing weapons that are by their nature very, very difficult to observe. They are stealthy and extremely dangerous in that they can 

carry nuclear weapons or very dangerous conventional weapons as 

we are discussing here. And an adversary, given the uncertainty, 

the hair trigger becomes much more finely tuned, and that is a concern, particularly given the Russian doctrine at the moment, which 

may change in the future. We are headed down a path that is, I 

think, increasing the danger and creating a new paradigm for 

which we are, by the conversation here, not prepared for. The previous paradigm was one in which we spent 30—almost 50 years developing an understanding and a communication process. 

The new weapons, however, by their nature will require a different paradigm, which we do not presently have. Could we develop 

it? If I recall the height of the Cold War, we were very lucky. And 

perhaps we were very good, but I suspect more so we were lucky, 

and that is my concern. 

Thank you very much for the time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

General Kehler, you and I have talked about this before, but I 

am real concerned about the saber-rattling from Russia, and this 

couple—this recent disclosure of an autonomous underwater giant 

nuclear weapon is deeply troubling to me. And this weapon, according to Russia, would provide a new capability that, quote, ‘‘the important components of the adversary’s economy in coastal areas 

and inflicting unacceptable damage to the country’s territory by 

creating areas of wide radioactive contamination that would be 

unsustainable for military, economic, or other activities for a long 

period of time,’’ close quote. 

You put this together with their public—what we know publicly 

about their military doctrine, it is of concern to me. What do you 

make of this, and what does it tell you about their mindset, Russia’s mindset? Or do you have an opinion? 

General KEHLER. Well, my opinion now, Mr. Chairman, is sort of 

shaped from being on the outside looking in, but I think—and I 

haven’t spoken with any senior Russians lately, so I can’t speak for 

them. It looks to me as though they have got two objectives here: 

One is to remind us and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], and the world really, that we have to take their concerns into 

account. And I think the second is, as part of a broader strategy 

to try to change the strategic game here, I think that they want 

to make sure that they can remind us that they are holding us at 

risk and that they can do so with conventional weapons, now longrange conventional weapons. You know that in Syria they launched 
18 

long-range cruise missiles off of surface ships and off of Tu-95s 

here not so long ago. So I think they are reminding us that they 

can hold our homeland at risk in a variety of ways and, as a result, 

are reminding us that us getting involved in things or acting with 

impunity, the risk is too high. But what troubles me about this is 

I think it smacks of returning to a Cold War kind of an approach 

here that maybe I naively had thought we were past all of that. 

So while I can understand why they would do this, what concerns me is if this is real security concern on their part that they 

are vulnerable somehow, then I do think you begin to get stability 

concerns. And so I think that is what troubles me as much as anything else, is that if—someone said once, and I don’t know who said 

this or I would give them credit for it—I didn’t, but someone said 

this, and it stuck with me—that insecurity begets instability, and 

so the flip is security begets stability. And so if they are insecure, 

fundamentally insecure here, then I think that that is a concern to 

me in trying to come up with strategies for how we deal with all 

of that. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thanks. 

And, General, we have talked about hypersonic boost-glide programs. I want to call your attention to the monitors, the TV monitor that we have up there. This is an unclassified slide that we 

have been provided that shows French cooperation with a Russian 

arms manufacturer to develop hypersonic boost-glide capability. 

[The slides referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning 

on page 69.] 

Mr. ROGERS. If you were still at STRATCOM, what would you be 

urging the Department of Defense and the Department of State to 

say to our French allies about their cooperation with Russia to develop what could be a new nuclear weapon delivery system? 

General KEHLER. Well, I think as with any tech transfer kind of 

an issue, I would hope that the United States would express its 

concerns to anyone out there where technology transfer is an issue. 

We have some pretty strict technology transfer laws and processes 

and procedures, and I would be hopeful that we would express our 

concerns as well. 

I am not overly familiar with this. I see the chart. I am not overly familiar with this, and so I would hate to make a blatant statement about it, but I would just say in general terms, I would be 

concerned about technology transfer to any potential adversary. 

And whether Russia is an enemy, I think, is open for some conversation, but I would be very concerned about technology transfer 

to any of the potential adversaries. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is all the questions I have. 

The Chair now recognizes the ranking member for any questions 

he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. Well, it looks like we have reached the 

end. And I thank the witnesses very much for their patience and 

for their contributions. It is very helpful to this committee. 

And, with that, we stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

DECEMBER 8, 2015 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. In your opening statement you stated, ‘‘we continue to require a deployed conventional prompt strike capability to provide the President a range of 

flexible military options to address a small number of highest value targets, including in an anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) environment.’’ Do you believe a CPGS 

system could enhance our power projection capacity in a manner that is unique to 

and entirely outside the capabilities of other conventional systems 

General KEHLER. CPGS is envisioned to be unique from other conventional weapons both in range and time to effect and would definitely enhance U.S. power projection capacity as a precursor to other systems. Existing conventional systems could 

address the highest value targets in an A2/AD environment if they can respond in 

an operationally relevant timeframe, have sufficient range, and can penetrate sophisticated defenses. However, existing systems typically lack one or more of these 

attributes against the type of targets and scenarios envisioned for CPGS. 

Mr. ROGERS. Considering the growing risk upon our conventional forces when it 

comes to projecting power in an A2/AD environment: (1) how might the availability 

of a CPGS system mitigate or overcome such risks and (2) in your judgment, are 

there potential force-multiplier benefits from integrating a CPGS capability from a 

platform based in the continental U.S. (or far from the area in question) with the 

capabilities of an expeditionary force operating in an A2/AD environment? 

General KEHLER. In my view, the A2/AD strategy can be defeated through a combination of strong alliances and coalitions, updated operational concepts, improvements in the resilience of U.S. forces (especially cyber networks and space-based 

ISR and communications), and enhancements to our power projection capabilities 

(increased range and penetration capabilities). CPGS could contribute to this by providing commanders with a conventional strike capability that addresses high value 

targets early in a campaign and from outside the range of enemy kinetic forces. Before a conflict such a capability could contribute to deterrence by eliminating enemy 

sanctuaries. When used in coordination with other kinetic and non-kinetic strike capabilities early in a conflict, CPGS could help enable and enhance the effectiveness 

of subsequent U.S. power projection forces. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you believe the U.S. should prioritize the development and acquisition of a specific type of CPGS with specific attributes? If so, which type and with 

what attributes? 

General KEHLER. At this point I would not prioritize a specific type of CPGS with 

specific attributes. I believe the most effective way to proceed is to develop a variety 

of potential CPGS approaches and allow performance to determine the way ahead. 

In my view there is value in continuing research into high-tech means to bring 

prompt, long-range strike into ‘‘third wave’’ consideration. 

Mr. ROGERS. What security challenges do you foresee potentially arising if China 

successfully fields a CPGS system before the U.S.? 

General KEHLER. We cannot allow our qualitative military advantages to decline 

or disappear. At the strategic level, virtually the entire U.S. defense strategy (to include the reduced role for U.S. nuclear weapons in non-nuclear scenarios) is based 

on the presumption of continued U.S. conventional superiority. Such superiority is 

based on a significant qualitative vice quantitative edge. Allowing any country to 

assume a position of qualitative military superiority over the U.S. would erode the 

credibility of our strategic deterrent and extended deterrent and threaten our freedom of action in a crisis or conflict. At the operational and tactical levels, a Chinese 

CPGS could threaten critical targets in the U.S. and allied homelands as well as 

critical targets associated directly with military operations in the Pacific region. 

Mr. ROGERS. In Mr. Acton’s opening statement, he raised the concern that, ‘‘the 

Pentagon has no official policy that sets out the specific military missions for which 

CPGS weapons might be acquired.’’ Is that correct? Regardless, what specific mission or missions would you consider a reasonable justification for the acquisition of 

a CPGS system? 

General KEHLER. As I mentioned in my prepared remarks, CPGS would be valuable in missions against targets that might be presented either by violent extremists 

or nation-states, that could emerge in day-to-day or conflict scenarios, and would 
74 

most likely be highly defended, be found in the most challenging geographic locations, or be mobile (perhaps all three). While it is impossible to predict with 100% 

certainty what these targets might be, it is likely that they would fall into several 

general categories: those that pose an immediate threat to the U.S. or allied homelands; those that involve the imminent use or movement of weapons of mass destruction; those associated with key extremist leaders; or those that represent a critical node in an important system that must be eliminated early in a campaign. 

Mr. ROGERS. Some have suggested we seek to negotiate arms control to limit 

hypersonic weapons, including their testing. What do you think of these suggestions 

as national security policy? Do you foresee challenges in undertaking such a policy 

and what are they? 

General KEHLER. I don’t favor placing arbitrary ‘‘speed limits’’ on our military capabilities. We have hypersonic weapons today in the form of ballistic missiles. 

Hypersonic speed presents both opportunities and challenges for us and our potential adversaries and I fully understand the desire to avoid an ‘‘arms race’’ competition in this type of weapon. However, I would be very concerned about the difficulty 

of establishing transparency and sustaining high-confidence verification in a treatytype approach. 

Mr. ROGERS. How do you characterize and assess foreign development—primarily 

Russian and Chinese—of CPGS capability compared to our own? 

General KEHLER. I am not current on the classified details of Russian and Chinese activities in this area. While still on active duty I was interested in their 

progress and concerned about the general inadequacy of U.S. intelligence priorities 

and resources associated with adversary hypersonic activities (as well as with many 

other intelligence areas). Again, while still in my active duty capacity I had some 

concern that Russia and China were seemingly moving faster than the U.S. in this 

area but had yet to see any material change in military capabilities as a result. 

Mr. ROGERS. What does foreign—Russian and Chinese—development of this capability mean to the U.S.? Put another way, does it matter if China and/or Russia 

have this capability and we do not? 

General KEHLER. In my view, having a unique military capability does not automatically translate into a military advantage. I would be very concerned if China 

or Russia had a hypersonic or CPGS capability that the U.S. was unable to counter. 

While it isn’t necessary in my view for the U.S. to equal China or Russia in individual military capabilities or size, deterrence and crisis stability depend on those 

countries not achieving an overall military advantage over the U.S. 

Mr. ROGERS. You were a military planner. How would you plan for dealing with 

such a non-nuclear or nuclear capability and would you want to have a defensive 

capability to deal with it? 

General KEHLER. I would first plan to deter it. Deterring conflict remains the preferred approach and is the number one objective of the combatant commands. Deterrence is based on an adversary’s belief that the U.S. has both the capability (forces, 

plans, command and control) and resolve (policy, declaratory statements, visible 

demonstrations) to deny their objectives or cause unacceptable costs if they try to 

achieve them. In my view, deterrence will remain credible in the Twenty-first Century if the U.S. tailors its plans and operations to the specific objectives and motivations of individual adversaries and brings a complementary set of offensive (conventional kinetic, non-kinetic, nuclear) and defensive tools to the equation. 

Mr. ROGERS. Does it matter if Russia and/or China have this capability with a 

nuclear warhead as opposed to a conventional warhead? 

General KEHLER. I think it does matter. Regarding Russia, nuclear arms are controlled by various treaties that, so long as the parties abide by those treaties, provide a mechanism to address nuclear CPGS matters. We do not have similar arrangements with China; in my view a potential cause for concern if U.S. nuclear 

arms are further reduced. In effect, all long-range nuclear ballistic missiles are 

CPGS weapons. Hypersonic nuclear cruise missiles present additional challenges. 

Mr. ROGERS. We have been hearing a lot about left-of-launch capability and shooting the archer in addition to the arrows, which is to say, focus on destroying ballistic missile launchers in addition to the ballistic missiles themselves. Does CPGS 

have a role to play in such a military capability space? Is that role unique, or is 

it a role that could easily be served by another military capability at less cost? 

General KEHLER. I believe CPGS could serve a particularly important role in holding a small number of rogue-state ballistic missile launchers at risk. When combined with missile defenses, such a capability would provide the President with options below the nuclear threshold, even if the enemy ballistic missiles are nucleartipped. In my view, CPGS would be ideally suited for this mission since it would 

meet the following criteria: imminent use of a weapon of mass destruction that 

posed on immediate threat to the U.S. or allied homelands; located in a challenging 
75 

geographic place that is likely to be highly defended; and will move soon. This is 

not a role easily served by other military capabilities at less cost. Of course, this 

approach will not work with larger, near-peer or peer nations where the scope and 

scale of their ballistic threat cannot be held at risk or negated by CPGS and limited 

defenses. 

Mr. ROGERS. What security challenges do you foresee potentially arising if China 

successfully fields a CPGS system before the U.S.? 

Mr. SCHEBER. China is currently developing several versions of precision, prompt 

strike weapons to support its military strategy which calls for being able to control 

the western Pacific region out to ‘‘the second island chain.’’ If China deploys effective prompt strike weapons and the United States does not, the potential implications for the United States and its allies could be far reaching. Such a capability 

could strengthen China’s anti-access/area denial capabilities and increase the challenge for the United States to defend its allies and protect free access to maritime 

trade routes in the Pacific. In particular, a Chinese CPGS capability, without an appropriate U.S. response, could weaken the ability of the United States to deter Chinese aggression, to assure U.S. allies in the region, and to limit damage in the event 

deterrence fails. 

Deterrence weakened: Without an effective and appropriate U.S. response, Chinese leaders could be emboldened to continue their ‘‘coercive diplomacy’’ and threaten U.S. allies with non-nuclear strikes from PGS-type systems if they resist China’s 

policies. A U.S. CPGS capability, if available, would provide a capability—a non-nuclear capability—to promptly preempt China’s offensive command and control capabilities and could increase the uncertainty of success for China’s military leaders. 

This would likely have the effect of strengthening deterrence. 

Assurance weakened: Allies would likely feel threatened by Chinese CPGS capabilities if the United States cannot provide assurances that it can meet its obligations as specified in U.S. mutual defense treaties with western Pacific allies such 

as Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia. China would possess the capability 

to launch prompt, non-nuclear strikes to degrade U.S. and allied military capabilities in the region, thereby making more difficult for the United States the task of 

defending U.S. allies and projecting military force in the western Pacific. Effective 

U.S. counters would include U.S. prompt conventional strike capabilities to degrade 

Chinese ISR and command and control capabilities. In addition, additional U.S. missile defenses would be needed to intercept any Chinese PGS missiles that are 

launched and threaten allied assets, on land and at sea. A U.S. CPGS capability 

would help assure allies that the United States is not falling behind in twenty-first 

century military technology and that the United States has the competence and capabilities to meet its mutual defense commitments to allies in the face of a hostile 

China. 

If Deterrence fails: Should military conflict erupt between China and the United 

States and its allies, the United States would be disadvantaged by the asymmetry 

in which China possessed CPGS-type weapons and the United States did not. China 

could use these weapons in support of its anti-access/area denial strategy and degrade U.S. military capabilities as far away as Guam, and in the future perhaps 

farther. U.S. CPGS capabilities, if developed and deployed, could, in combination 

with cyber and other capabilities, help degrade the Chinese strategy by damaging 

key elements of its surveillance and command and control capabilities, damaging offensive missile capabilities, and improving the survivability of U.S. and allied military forces being brought to bear on China. This could help to convince its leaders 

to cease China’s aggressive military actions. 

Mr. ROGERS. In Mr. Acton’s opening statement, he raised the concern that, ‘‘the 

Pentagon has no official policy that sets out the specific military missions for which 

CPGS weapons might be acquired.’’ Is that correct? Regardless, what specific mission or missions would you consider a reasonable justification for the acquisition of 

a CPGS system? 

Mr. SCHEBER. Skeptics of certain military capabilities sometimes use such assertions to try to refute DOD statements that the military capabilities in question are 

needed and well conceived. Then, after DOD officials describe a potential scenario 

in which a capability, such as CPGS, might be of value, the skeptics then try to explain why such a hypothetical situation is unlikely and the proposed capability unnecessary. This type of debating tactic is ill conceived when applied to CPGS. 

First, while Dr. Acton often raises valid questions that should be addressed regarding CPGS, he errs in asserting that the DOD has not documented the potential 

missions for which CPGS would provide a unique and valuable capability. The most 

recent Congressional Research Service report on Prompt Global Strike summarizes 

the DOD documents which discuss the rationale for and potential uses of CPGS. For 

example, the CRS report states, ‘‘The need for prompt long-range, or global, strike 
76 

1 Amy F. Woolf, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, CRS Report R–41464, October 2, 2015, p. 3. 2For example, Keith Payne, et al., Russian Strategy, Crisis and Conflict (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2016), pp. 83–102. http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/FINAL 

-FOR-WEB-1.12.16.pdf 

capabilities has been addressed in general defense policy studies, such as the 2001, 

2006, and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Reports.’’ 1 In addition, DOD 

has submitted several reports to the Congress on the need for and programs 

planned to develop a CPGS capability. And finally, in 2006 the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

validated the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) Initial Capabilities Document (ICD). This 

requirements document was reviewed again in 2013 and revalidated. The mission 

need for CPGS is well documented. Second, secretary of Defense Ashton Carter and 

other senior DOD officials have recently stressed the important attributes of flexibility and adaptability. This is because war is often accompanied by surprises—surprises in an adversary’s technology, tactics, and decisions—and military plans must 

be rapidly modified. Military history is replete with examples. And, as recently articulated by the congressional testimony of the Director of National Intelligence and 

the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the global threat assessment is extremely complex, diverse, and the future uncertain. The concept of developing 

prompt, non-nuclear strike capabilities that are global, or near global, in range is 

to fill a gap in existing U.S. offensive strike capabilities and, thereby, increase the 

flexibility of U.S. strategic strike capabilities. U.S. CPGS capabilities could prove of 

immense value against a variety of serious threats. 

Mr. ROGERS. Some have suggested we seek to negotiate arms control to limit 

hypersonic weapons, including their testing. What do you think of these suggestions 

as national security policy? Do you foresee challenges in undertaking such a policy 

and what are they? 

Mr. SCHEBER. In my opinion, calls for the United States to negotiate limits on 

hypersonic weapons, such as current U.S. concepts for CPGS, are ill conceived and 

should not be pursued. 

First, the countries with which the United States would seek to negotiate such 

an agreement, Russia and China, are unlikely to negotiate in good faith or to abide 

by signed arms control agreements. China is actively developing several types of 

prompt strike capabilities that employ hypersonic delivery vehicles. These weapons 

appear to provide important capabilities for China’s anti-access/area denial strategy. 

In addition, China has never shown an inclination to enter into a negotiation with 

the United States on limiting strategic capabilities. Indeed, China appears to be 

working hard to narrow the gap and neutralize several areas of U.S. military superiority. Russia, on the other hand, has been willing to negotiate strategic arms control agreements with the United States but has not proven to be a good-faith partner in complying with such treaties once they are signed. Arms Control Compliance 

Reports from the Department of State have documented Russia’s poor record of compliance. And, nongovernmental organizations have documented the consistent pattern of Russian violations of arms control agreements.2 Therefore, the prospect a negotiation on such weapons being concluded successfully and with lasting. positive 

security benefits for the United States and its allies is, in my opinion, extremely 

remote. 

Second, any effort to initiate negotiations limiting the development, testing, and 

deployment of hypersonic weapons and other prompt strike capabilities is likely to 

cause U.S. development activities for CPGS capabilities to be slowed further or curtailed entirely. Given the importance of developing U.S. CPGS capabilities to 

strengthen deterrence and assurance and to provide unique capabilities in the event 

deterrence fails, the United States should increase, not decrease its efforts to develop CPGS capabilities. 

As a matter of policy, I recommend that the United States not seek to initiate 

an arms limitation negotiation that includes limitations on hypersonic or other nonnuclear prompt strike weapons. 

Mr. ROGERS. How do you characterize and assess foreign development—primarily 

Russian and Chinese—of CPGS capability compared to our own? 

Mr. SCHEBER. In a word, I would characterize the United States CPGS development efforts as anemic when compared to similar development programs of China 

and Russia. After more than a decade of research and a general concept for CPGS 

capabilities endorsed by both Republican and Democratic administrations, DOD 

does not yet have a plan for deploying such a capability. In contrast, both China 

and Russia have claimed to have deployed conventional prompt strike concepts and 

are continuing to develop improved concepts. 
77 

3Mikhail Fomitchev, ‘‘Russia to Develop Precision Conventional ICBM Option,’’ RIA Novosti, 

December 14, 2012. 4See http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/06/summary_of_the_project_4202_de.shtml. Also, Bill 

Gertz, ‘‘Russia Tested hypersonic Glide Vehicle in February,’’ The Washington Free Beacon, 

June 25, 2015, http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-tested-hypersonic-glide-vehicle-infebruary/ 5 ‘‘US Missile Shield Unable to Repel Massive Russian ICBM Attack—Chief of Strategic Missile Forces,’’ Russia Today news, December 16, 2015. https://www.rt.com/news/326121-us-missileshield-russian-icbm/ 

China: China’s leaders appear to be pursuing multiple applications for conventional prompt strike weapons for its military strategy in the western Pacific. According to one China analyst, the PLA’s conventional prompt ballistic missile inventory 

includes about 1,200 short-range missiles (DF–11/CSS–7 and DF–15/CSS–6), medium-range missiles such as the DF–21/CSS–5 family which includes an anti-ship 

version and the DF–16/CSS–11 which can target Okinawa, and development of an 

intermediate-range missile, the DF–26, to be able to target U.S. capabilities as distant as Guam. In fact, one Chinese Communist Party newspaper has reportedly referred to the DF–26 as the ‘‘Guam killer.’’ These missiles do not need to be of global 

reach to support China’s anti-access/area denial strategy in the western Pacific. In 

addition, in November 2015, China reportedly conducted its sixth flight test of a 

hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), designed to be launched from an ICBM missile 

booster. In general, China appears to have a very active collection of programs to 

develop and deploy advanced prompt strike weapons—both conventional and nuclear. 

Russia: For the twenty-first century, Russian military strategists appear to be increasing reliance on nuclear forces and, in particular, new types of low-yield nuclear 

weapons, as well as precision conventional weapons, that can be delivered by ballistic or hypersonic glide vehicles. For example, press reports from Russia state that 

Russia is capable of outfitting its newer submarine-launched ballistic missiles with 

either low-yield nuclear warheads or conventional warheads with precision delivery. 

In December 2012, the Commander of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces, ColonelGeneral Sergei Karakayev said that Russia was also considering developing a conventional payload for its new powerful, liquid-fueled ICBM.3 Finally, Russian news 

reports state that Russia has been working with China, France, and India on developing hypersonic missiles. And, a new type of hypersonic delivery vehicle, referred 

to as the Yu-71 and carried by ICBMs, has reportedly been tested at least four times 

since late 2011 with mixed results.4

In summary, a decade ago the United States appeared to be the clear leader in 

military technology for CPGS-type capabilities. Based on open source reports on 

Chinese and Russian development activities, that no longer seems to be the case. 

Mr. ROGERS. What does foreign—Russian and Chinese—development of this capability mean to the U.S.? Put another way, does it matter if China and/or Russia 

have this capability and we do not? 

Mr. SCHEBER. In short, Russian and Chinese development of prompt strike capabilities, such as hypersonic glide vehicles, and the absence of such capabilities from 

the U.S. military force, would have significant negative implications for the United 

States and its allies. 

First, the ability of Russian and Chinese missiles to deliver offensive payloads at 

hypersonic speeds and delivery vehicles that can rapidly change course would complicate U.S. efforts to defend against such incoming missiles. In fact, senior Russian 

military officers have said that new Russian missiles were being designed to be able 

to counter U.S. missile defenses.5

Second, modern guidance technology for hypersonic reentry vehicles can significantly improve the delivery accuracy of long-range missiles and makes feasible the 

potential military employment of low-yield nuclear and even conventional warheads. 

Such weapons could be launched at U.S. or allied capabilities with little warning 

or time to respond. If the United States does not have its own CPGS capabilities, 

this would cede an asymmetric military advantage to Russia and China. Such adversary weapons could be used to degrade U.S. or allied capabilities, support China’s area denial plans, intimidate U.S. allies in the region, and accomplish a fait 

accompli to the ultimate benefit of the country employing such weapons. Adversary 

leaders could well be willing to gamble that their U.S. counterparts would be unwilling to escalate the conflict by responding with U.S. ballistic missiles which currently 

carry only high-yield nuclear warheads. 

As mentioned in my response to question #5, this asymmetry could disadvantage 

the United States in ways that would weaken deterrence vis-a-vis Russia and China 

and also cause allies to question the ability of the United States to meet its security 

commitments. 
78 

Mr. ROGERS. Does it matter if Russia and/or China have this capability with a 

nuclear warhead as opposed to a conventional warhead? 

Mr. SCHEBER. Russia and/or China may decide to use hypersonic glide vehicles 

and long-range missiles to deliver nuclear warheads. Both already have a prompt 

global strike nuclear capability inherent in their nuclear-armed intercontinentalrange ballistic missiles. Development of maneuvering, hypersonic glide vehicles 

could be motivated to increase the probability of penetrating U.S. missile defenses. 

In addition, if these newly developed weapons also provide significantly improved 

accuracy when compared to existing ballistic missiles, these countries may perceive 

a military advantage to deploying some delivery vehicles with lower-yield nuclear 

warheads. Deploying more accurate, prompt weapons with low-yield warheads could 

be used to threaten the United States and its allies with escalation during a conventional conflict. Adversary leaders may even be willing to launch some low-yield nuclear weapons to degrade U.S. capabilities and, with no similar U.S. response capability, gamble that U.S. leaders would be unwilling to escalate a conflict and respond with U.S. missiles armed with high-yield warheads. This would certainly put 

the United States at a disadvantage. Effective U.S. capabilities to counter such Russian and Chinese threats and negate the effectiveness of these weapons would appear to be a high priority for the United States. Development of a U.S. CPGS capability would contribute significantly toward that goal. 

Mr. ROGERS. We have been hearing a lot about left-of-launch capability and shooting the archer in addition to the arrows, which is to say, focus on destroying ballistic missile launchers in addition to the ballistic missiles themselves. Does CPGS 

have a role to play in such a military capability space? Is that role unique, or is 

it a role that could easily be served by another military capability at less cost? 

Mr. SCHEBER. CPGS capabilities could prove extremely valuable in executing a 

‘‘left-of-launch’’ strike against an imminent threat. For example, countries possessing WMD and/or the ability to launch one or more missiles against the United 

States and/or its allies would likely have key enabling capabilities that would be exposed and vulnerable to a limited non-nuclear strike by the United States. U.S. 

CPGS capabilities could perform such a mission with little warning for an adversary 

and with high probability of successful penetration of enemy defenses. If follow-on 

strikes are needed, CPGS weapons in combination with cyber and other capabilities 

might be employed to degrade enemy defenses and enable heavier and more sustained follow-on strikes with a decreased risk of loss to enemy defenses. For such 

a tactic, CPGS weapons could be targeted against ground-based downlink nodes that 

distribute information to and from space-based assets. This would likely be coordinated with cyber and space defense capabilities. 

It is my opinion that by raising the uncertainty in the minds of adversary leaders 

over whether or not they might be able to successfully execute a surprise attack, 

the probability of deterring these leaders from attempting such a strike would be 

improved. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. The three hearing witnesses agreed that pursuing cooperative measures (or confidence building measures) would be helpful to reduce the risk of 

misperception or miscalculation. Specifically what kind of measures would be helpful, and should these be considered as the CPGS technologies are developed? 

General KEHLER. I believe any steps (diplomatic or military-to-military) we can 

take with adversaries or potential adversaries that allow us to better understand 

intentions, motivations, capabilities and decision-making processes will help build 

confidence. Regarding CPGS specifically, I believe it is important to build confidence 

around capabilities, numbers, and the attributes that would clearly separate these 

weapons from nuclear weapons. 

Mr. COOPER. The three hearing witnesses agreed that pursuing cooperative measures (or confidence building measures) would be helpful to reduce the risk of 

misperception or miscalculation. Specifically what kind of measures would be helpful, and should these be considered as the CPGS technologies are developed? 

Dr. ACTON. The first-order task is for the United States to engage Russia and 

China in dialogues with the goal of reaching a shared understanding about which 

escalation risks need to be addressed. At the moment, these three states have quite 

different perceptions. For example, U.S. officials and analysts tend to worry about 

the possibility of Russia’s or China’s misidentifying a conventionally armed missile 

as nuclear armed (warhead ambiguity). By contrast, their Russian and Chinese 

counterparts have tended to stress concerns about the survivability of their nuclear 
79 

forces. Realistically, such a dialogue is likely to be both difficult to start and difficult 

to conclude, but it is a necessary pre-requisite to confidence building. 

The following are examples of confidence-building measures that could help to address concerns about warhead ambiguity: 

• The United States could notify Russia and China of the launch of a CPGS 

weapon. (If such notifications also included the approximate location of the target, they could help reduce the likelihood of Moscow’s or Beijing’s reaching a 

mistaken conclusion that they were under attack from highly maneuverable 

CPGS weapons). 

• The United States could permit inspections of CPGS weapons (almost certainly 

by Russia) to verify that their warheads were nonnuclear. Naturally, such 

measures could be reciprocal either in the sense that Russia and/or China 

agreed to provide similar notifications or permit similar inspections, or in the 

sense that Russia and/or China took asymmetric steps to ease U.S. concerns 

about their strategic modernization programs. 

To address concerns about the survivability of Russian and Chinese nuclear 

forces, confidence-building measures such as the following could be useful: 

• Joint studies (possibly conducted by national academies of science) into the extent to which high-precision conventional weapons can undermine the survivability of nuclear forces. 

• Data exchanges about plans for acquiring specified types of long-range, 

hypersonic, conventional weapons. 

• The accountability of specified types of long-range, hypersonic, conventional 

weapons under the central limits of future nuclear arms control treaties. 

It is extremely important that the possibility of cooperative confidence-building be 

considered at the same time that CPGS technologies are developed. If they are not, 

certain confidence-building measures may be foreclosed, or at least made much more 

difficult. For example, Congress has previously expressed understandable concern 

about basing CPGS weapons on SSBNs because it would lead to the colocation of 

nuclear and conventional weapons. However, since SSBNs are already subject to 

arms control inspections, it would be straightforward to permit inspections to verify 

that any CPGS weapons they carried were indeed nonnuclear. By contrast, such inspections would be much more difficult to orchestrate if CPGS weapons were based 

on SSNs, which are not subject to any arms control verification regime. 

Æ