U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

i 

95–318 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–43] 

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN THE 

21ST CENTURY 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JUNE 25, 2015 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

DREW WALTER, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

ERIC SMITH, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Sherwood-Randall, Hon. Elizabeth, Deputy Secretary of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy ..................................................................................................... 4 

Winnefeld, ADM James A., Jr., USN, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense ................................................................. 7 

Work, Hon. Robert O., Deputy Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of 

Defense .................................................................................................................. 2 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Sherwood-Randall, Hon. Elizabeth ................................................................. 48 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ..................................................................... 36 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ ............................................................... 35 

Work, Hon. Robert O., joint with ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr. ................. 38 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 63 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 63 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 71 

Mrs. Davis ......................................................................................................... 67 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 69 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 73 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 82 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 67 

Mr. Walz ............................................................................................................ 84 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 68 

(1) 

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, June 25, 2015. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. 

The committee meets today to have a hearing on nuclear deterrence in the 21st century. 

I ask unanimous consent that my complete opening statement be 

made part of the record. I am afraid we are going to have votes 

here in a few minutes. 

Let me just say that in my view, our nuclear deterrent is the 

cornerstone of all our defense efforts as well as a source of stability 

around the world. And in my opinion, for too long, we have taken 

it for granted, neglecting the systems, the infrastructure, and the 

people involved in making all of those complex machines safe, reliable, and effective. 

Unfortunately, the investment that we have made in delivery 

systems and weapons in the past are all aging out about the same 

time, and that presents us with a substantial challenge, especially 

when we merge that with what other nations are doing. 

The committee has had a series of events over the course of the 

past week or so, classified and unclassified, looking at various aspects of this problem. I understand the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee will have a further hearing on this matter this 

afternoon. 

So I think it is very appropriate that we have our witnesses with 

us today to examine some of these issues. I will look forward to introducing them in just a moment, but Mr. Smith has been detained 

for a brief period, and in his absence, I would yield to the distinguished gentleman from Rhode Island for any comments he would 

like to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the 

Appendix on page 35.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
2 

I want to, on behalf of Ranking Member Smith and the committee, welcome our witnesses here today. Look forward to your 

testimony. Mr. Smith is at his physical therapy appointment and 

will be here shortly once that concludes, but he welcomes you. 

And in the interest of time, Mr. Chairman, given the fact that 

votes are going to be called, without objection, I will submit Mr. 

Smith’s full statement for the record, and I will yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 36.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Without objection, it is 

so ordered. 

Again, let me welcome our distinguished witnesses today. I think 

your presence is evidence of the seriousness with which the administration takes this issue. 

We are pleased to welcome the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 

Robert Work; the Deputy Secretary of Energy, Elizabeth SherwoodRandall; and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral James ‘‘Sandy’’ Winnefeld. 

And let me also say, Admiral, that the odds are this may be your 

last hearing in front of the House Armed Services Committee. And 

my memory is something like 37 years of service to our Nation, and 

may I say thank you for all of those years, not only in your current 

job, where we have been able to work with you on a number of 

issues, but an incredible history of service. 

And so thank you and congratulations. 

Secretary Work, you are recognized for any comments you would 

like to make. And without objection, all of your written statements 

will be made part of the record. 

Mr. Secretary, you may have to punch the button and get the 

microphone right in front of you. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT O. WORK, DEPUTY SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary WORK. Thank you, sir. 

I want to thank you and the members of the committee for the 

support that you continue to show for our men and women in uniform, our Department of Defense [DOD] civilians, and their families. Secretary Carter and I and everyone in the Department greatly appreciate it. We simply couldn’t maintain the finest fighting 

force in the world without your help and without everything that 

you have provided us. 

I am really delighted to be here this morning with Dr. Liz Sherwood-Randall from the Department of Energy and, as you said, the 

vice chairman, to talk about this very important subject, nuclear 

policy, forces, and modernization. 

I would just like to touch briefly on three points: the critical role 

that our nuclear forces continue to play in our national security; 

the continuing importance of nuclear deterrent forces given recent 

changes in the security environment; and the actions the Department is taking to make sure that we maintain a safe, reliable, and 

effective nuclear force. 

As the chairman and the vice chairman say constantly, the survival of our Nation is our most important national security interest. The fundamental role of the U.S. nuclear force is to deter an 
3 

attack on the United States, which is the only existential threat to 

our Nation. Extended deterrence provides protection to our allies 

and partners, enhances alliance cohesion, and serves our nonproliferation goals. 

Now, while we seek a world without nuclear weapons, we face 

the hard reality that Russia and China are rapidly modernizing 

their already capable nuclear arsenals, and North Korea continues 

to develop nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them against 

the continental United States. So a strong nuclear deterrent force 

will remain critical to our national security for the foreseeable future. 

I would like to address Russia’s provocations. As members of this 

committee well know, senior Russian officials continue to make irresponsible statements regarding Russia’s nuclear forces and we 

assess that they are doing it to intimidate our allies and us. 

These have failed. If anything, they have really strengthened the 

NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] alliance solidarity. 

Moscow continues to violate the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty, in our estimation, and our goal is to return 

them to compliance to preserve the viability of that treaty. Under 

any circumstances, however, we will not allow them to gain significant military advantage through INF violations. We are developing 

and analyzing response options for the President and we are consulting with our allies on the best way forward here. 

Now, let me just say this about Russian military doctrine that 

sometimes is described as ‘‘escalate to deescalate.’’ Anyone who 

thinks that they can control escalation through the use of nuclear 

weapons is literally playing with fire. Escalation is escalation, and 

nuclear use would be the ultimate escalation. 

As Secretary Carter recently said, ‘‘Moscow’s nuclear saber rattling raises questions about Russia’s commitment to strategic stability and the profound caution and respect that world leaders in 

the nuclear age have shown towards the brandishing of these 

weapons.’’ 

China is also doing nuclear upgrades. They are placing multiple 

warheads on their ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles]. They 

are expanding their mobile ICBM force. They continue to pursue a 

sea-based element for their nuclear forces. However, we assess that 

this modernization program is designed to ensure they have a second-strike capability, and not to seek a quantitative nuclear parity 

with the United States or Russia. 

North Korea, they continue to expand their nuclear weapons and 

missile programs. And in response, we continue to improve our national missile defenses and conventional counterforce options, and 

our current plans will keep us ahead of North Korean capabilities, 

in our estimation. 

So given the importance of nuclear weapons, as well as this volatile 21st century national security environment, the President has 

directed that we maintain a safe, secure, and reliable triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems, while adjusting the force levels to 

the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty. This is the 

highest priority for the Department of Defense. 

We have developed a plan to transition our aging systems. As the 

chairman said, they all are becoming—reaching the time where 
4 

they will age out. Carrying out this plan is going to be a very expensive proposition and we recognize that. It is projected to cost 

DOD an average of $18 billion a year from 2021 through 2035 in 

fiscal year 2016 dollars. 

Without additional funding dedicated to strategic force modernization, sustaining this level of spending will require very, very 

hard choices and will impact the other parts of the defense portfolio, particularly our conventional mission capability. 

Now, this modernization we have delayed and we cannot do further any delays without putting the safety, security, and effectiveness of our forces at risk. So the choice that we are facing, quite 

frankly, Mr. Chairman and members, is that keeping the existing 

force or modernizing the force, the choice right now is modernizing 

or losing deterrent capability in the 2020s and 2030s. That’s the 

stark choice that we are faced with. 

We appreciate that this committee has recognized this problem, 

including legislation to establish a strategic deterrent fund. We 

now believe we have to decide how to resource the fund and the 

challenge we think we need to talk about on how we solve this, because it is a very pressing issue. 

So I look forward to discussing this issue with you and the other 

defense oversight committees, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Work and Admiral 

Winnefeld can be found in the Appendix on page 38.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

Secretary Sherwood-Randall, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ELIZABETH SHERWOOD–RANDALL, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF ENERGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the committee— 

Mr. Rogers as well, who I had the privilege of traveling with to our 

Idaho National Lab. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the 

Department of Energy’s role in supporting U.S. nuclear deterrence 

in the 21st century. 

Secretary of Energy Moniz and I appreciate the priority that this 

committee places on nuclear matters, given their significance to our 

national security and the emphasis that President Obama has 

placed on ensuring the safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear weapons as we seek to reduce global nuclear dangers. 

Today’s hearing is an important step in our ongoing effort to 

build a strong national consensus on the role for and management 

of the United States nuclear deterrent. I am honored to testify 

alongside my two close colleagues from the Department of Defense. 

The Departments of Energy and Defense share a solemn responsibility for delivering the nuclear deterrent, and we work on this in 

tandem, with DOE providing the weapons and DOD providing the 

delivery systems. 

Our two agencies collaborate through the Nuclear Weapons 

Council to improve communication and to increase coordination 

throughout the budget cycle. Our cooperation is strong and deliberate, as you will hear today. 

This cooperation depends upon the leadership of experienced 

members of our military, like Admiral Sandy Winnefeld who, as 
5 

the chairman noted, will be retiring after 4 years as Vice Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs at the end of July. 

It has been a privilege to work closely with Admiral Winnefeld 

throughout the administration, and we have joined forces frequently on issues of direct relevance to this hearing. 

I would like to take this opportunity to publicly thank Sandy for 

his many years of extraordinary and dedicated service to our Nation. 

We are all aware that the United States and our allies and partners face grave and growing nuclear dangers. As President Obama 

said in his April 2009 Prague speech, the threat of nuclear war has 

gone down, but the risk of nuclear attack has gone up. 

With these dangers in mind, the Obama administration has set 

forth a clear two-pronged nuclear strategy. First, we must reduce 

the threat of nuclear proliferation, and second, we must maintain 

a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. 

At DOE, we are charged with playing a significant role in implementing both elements of the President’s nuclear strategy. This is 

a no-fail mission in which we must provide a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent without explosive nuclear testing while 

also preventing, countering, and responding to proliferation and 

nuclear terrorism around the world. 

Indeed, as the United States reduces its nuclear arsenal, DOE’s 

responsibility for maintaining the arsenal’s safety, security, and effectiveness becomes all the more important. 

Infrastructure modernization and the ongoing Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, undergirded by sound science and 

advanced technology, are necessary to ensure the ability of the 

United States to meet 21st century threats. 

The Stockpile Stewardship Program is one of DOE’s most remarkable achievements of the past two decades. 

Every year, DOE has enabled the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, together with the directors of Livermore, Los Alamos, and 

Sandia National Laboratories, the Nuclear Weapons Council, and 

the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, to certify to the 

President that our nuclear stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable. 

And for the past 20 years, DOE’s scientific and technological expertise has achieved this without explosive nuclear testing. In fact, 

our labs now know more about the physics of the inner workings 

of the stockpile than they ever did during the days of explosive nuclear testing. 

Our life extension programs and alterations refurbish, reuse, and 

replace nuclear components to extend the lifespan of our existing 

nuclear arsenal and to ensure their continued safety and effectiveness. 

To maintain confidence in our nuclear arsenal, we must continue 

to invest in the uniquely skilled nuclear security workforce, as well 

as the science and infrastructure essential to stockpile stewardship. 

DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration [NNSA] is responsible for the Nuclear Security Enterprise infrastructure necessary to sustain the stockpile and execute all of our nuclear missions. 

Some of the physical infrastructure dates back to the days of the 

Manhattan Project. As many of you have seen with your own eyes, 
6 

much of it degrading, has exceeded its useful life and is in need of 

substantial maintenance or replacement. 

Equally important, more than 50 percent of the NNSA Federal 

workforce will be eligible to retire in the next 5 to 7 years. This 

wave of retirements requires us to recapitalize our workforce with 

a successor generation of outstanding talent that is able to carry 

forward our nuclear mission in this century. 

Building a responsive infrastructure requires investing in our 

people as well as in our new facilities, especially for plutonium and 

uranium, as well as high explosives, nonnuclear component production, and requisite laboratory and office workspace. 

Secretary Moniz and I have made reducing the maintenance 

backlog a key element of the Department’s overall infrastructure 

strategy, and we seek your support for this as well as for the new 

construction that we need. 

Your recognition of our critical mission and your support for the 

life extension programs and a modernized infrastructure are critical to American national security and to the security of our allies 

and partners around the world. 

More broadly, the Secretary and I see the implementation of recommendations of the Congressional Advisory Panel on NNSA Governance, also known as the Mies-Augustine report, as a top priority 

and one that will enhance our efforts across the Nuclear Security 

Enterprise. 

Under Secretary Moniz’ leadership, DOE and NNSA have already taken several significant steps to improve the operation and 

management of the Nuclear Security Enterprise. 

One of the report’s significant findings was the need to rebuild 

national leadership focus on nuclear security with a particular emphasis on strengthening regular communications with relevant congressional leaders on policy elements that make up the nuclear security mission. 

I, along with the NNSA administrator, will lead the implementation group, and I look forward to working with you on this important issue. Your support for our governance agenda will be absolutely critical to our success. 

As I have already observed, DOE also plays a central role within 

the U.S. Government in implementing nuclear threat reduction activities. Our portfolio of work, aimed at preventing, countering, and 

responding to global nuclear threats, is rooted in our capabilities 

to develop and sustain the U.S. nuclear stockpile and enables us 

to implement this important dimension of the Prague Agenda. 

These activities are defense by other means. When we take fissile 

material off the global playing field or work discreetly to help countries to do a better job of protecting the fissile material that they 

retain, we defend ourselves and those who share our values from 

those who would do us harm. 

For example, NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 

has safely and securely removed or confirmed the disposition of 

over 5,359 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and plutonium 

around the world, which is enough material for more than 200 nuclear weapons. 
7 

In conclusion, as Deputy Secretary Work has already noted, our 

Nation faces numerous strategic challenges, including the continuous expansion of the Russian and Chinese nuclear programs. 

In the wake of several difficult years of constrained budgets and 

fiscal uncertainty, we cannot afford to delay the investments we 

need to make in our Nuclear Security Enterprise. With your support, we can sustain nuclear deterrence in the 21st century. 

I thank you for the opportunity to testify today on this vitally important national security issue, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Sherwood-Randall can be 

found in the Appendix on page 48.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Admiral. 

STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN, VICE 

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Chairman Thornberry and distinguished 

members of the committee—I just missed Ranking Member Smith, 

but thank you, Mr. Langevin—thank you for the opportunity to 

share my perspective on nuclear deterrence. And sir, thank you for 

your kind words earlier; very much appreciate it. 

Chairman Dempsey and I view national security decision making, whether it is the use of force, resource allocation or assignment 

of risk, through the lens of a set of prioritized national security interests. 

It goes without saying, as Deputy Secretary Work alluded, that 

the survival of our Nation ranks first among those interests, followed closely by the need to prevent catastrophic attacks on our 

Nation. 

Additionally, our extended deterrence commitments help cover 

our interest in assuring our nonnuclear allies that their security interests will be protected without developing their own nuclear capabilities. 

It follows that tending to the health of our nuclear deterrent 

force is the most important thing that we do, representing, as it 

does, our only way to deter an existential attack from a major nation-state and one of several ways of deterring a smaller attack 

from a lesser state and also to assure our allies. 

We principally accomplish this through our long-proven triad and 

a combination of forward-deployed weapons and delivery platforms 

in Europe and the ability to rapidly do the same in the Pacific. 

However, while our deterrent is healthy today, three factors are 

contributing to our concern for its future health. 

First, at the end of the Cold War, many felt that the international system had evolved to the point where a nuclear deterrent 

was obsolete. However, recent events remind us of the necessity of 

maintaining a reliable and capable deterrent, including a triad, for 

as long as nuclear weapons exist. 

We still believe that any reductions in weapons must be done in 

concert with our potential antagonists, because unilateral gestures 

of good will have little standing with authoritarian regimes. 
8 

Second, all three legs of our deterrent, their supporting command-and-control structure and many of the weapons they employ 

are coming due for recapitalization within a natural cycle. 

The fact is that systems age and need to be refreshed, modernized, or replaced. Russia is going through this exact same experience right now. But the unfortunate, coincident timing for us, also 

alluded to by Deputy Secretary Work, in the coming years presents 

a large bill over a relatively short period of time. 

And third, this is all happening at a time when our resources are 

actually decreasing. 

As it stands, any remaining margin we have for investing in our 

nuclear deterrent has been steadily whittled away as we have 

pushed investments further and further into the future. 

The fact is there is no slack left in the system. We will need stable, long-term funding to recapitalize this most important element 

of what we do. We can no longer adjust priorities inside the nuclear 

portfolio to make things work, to string it along. 

That implies that absent some other form of relief, because this 

is our highest security interest, we are going to have to reach into 

the other things we do to protect other national security interests. 

That is going to make many people, both inside and outside DOD, 

unhappy. 

For our part, we have been and will continue to exercise the best 

possible stewardship we can over our resources, and we will continue working closely with our DOE partners to ensure the viability and affordability of warhead life extension programs and stockpile stewardship. I hope Congress will do its part to help us. 

Before I conclude, I would like to thank the members of this committee for your strong support for our Nation’s men and women in 

uniform during my tenure as vice chairman. And thank you again 

for the opportunity to appear alongside my colleagues today, and 

I do look forward to your questions. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Winnefeld and Secretary Work can be found in the Appendix on page 38.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

As feared, we have votes on the floor, and so we are going to 

have to recess, and then we will return as soon as those votes are 

concluded. 

And so if the witnesses want to make their way to the anteroom, 

we will buy you a cup of coffee. I am not promising how good it 

is. 

But with that, the committee will stand in recess. I would encourage members to come back right after votes. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order again. Thank 

you all for your patience. 

Let me ask a couple of things as other members are making their 

way back from the floor. 

Secretary Work, last November, then-Secretary Hagel issued a 

message to the force on nuclear deterrence. And let me read a 

quote from that message. It said, ‘‘Our nuclear deterrent plays a 

critical role in assuring U.S. national security and it is DOD’s high-
9 

est priority mission. No other capability we have is more important.’’ 

Is that still the case? Do you agree with that or not? 

Secretary WORK. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I absolutely do, as does 

Secretary Carter. You know, one of the issues that we found in the 

Nuclear Enterprise Review is that once the Strategic Air Command 

was disestablished in 1991, over a long period of time between 

there and about 2008, we stopped thinking of the nuclear deterrence mission as a mission, and more of a function. And that resulted in some very, very bad outcomes, which we have been working to try to overcome since 2008. 

That is why Secretary Hagel said ‘‘mission.’’ It is a mission. We 

are looking for people who are responsible for every aspect of the 

mission. And efficiencies are great for savings when you are looking for functions, but this is really about command responsibility 

and making sure. 

So I believe that that is absolutely the case, and I believe the 

vice chairman and the chairman would agree with it, too. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me ask you and Admiral Winnefeld this 

question. Because part of the reaction one gets is, okay, we have 

been dealing with this for 70 years; it has gone along pretty well; 

nothing has really changed; you know, we haven’t had nuclear testing since 1991 or whatever the date is. 

So, there is really no need to spend all this money because we 

have been making it okay; and besides, we have got enough weapons to destroy the world several times over. So, really, you are just 

asking us to waste money to put it into the warheads or delivery 

systems. 

Now, what would y’all’s reaction be to that sort of sentiment? 

Secretary WORK. As both the vice chairman and I have testified, 

and I think all of the senior leadership of the Department has said, 

the only existential threat to our Nation is a nuclear attack. And 

the only thing that is more important—I mean, the one step down 

is preventing a catastrophic attack, which we believe would be one 

or two nuclear weapons being fired at the continental United 

States or blowing up in the continental United States. 

So, anybody who looks at the way that the international environment is moving, especially the way that Russia has been describing 

its nuclear deterrent posture, has to say: Nuclear weapons remain 

the most important mission we have; this is absolutely critical. We 

can perform deterrence with a much smaller force than we did in 

the Cold War. That is true. And that is reflected in the cost of the 

replacement. 

It will—the peak of the replacement will be nowhere near the 

peak of the replacement costs that occurred in the 1960s and the 

1980s. So it is a smaller force. It performs an extremely important 

mission, no more important mission. And I would just say, just look 

at the international environment. This is not a time for us to say 

that nuclear weapons are useless. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Sir, I would add to that very good description of why the deterrent is more relevant—remains relevant, to 

the fact that it is a capital asset. It is a whole host of capital assets. And like any capital asset, it needs to be maintained. It needs 
10 

to be refurbished, refreshed, modernized. And as we’ve mentioned 

earlier, it is all coming due at the same time. 

Just as an example, I would point out that the air-launch cruise 

missile was designed to last 10 years. It has lasted two decades beyond that 10-year initial life. And we need to recapitalize that 

asset, and that is just one small slice of the need to do that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Finally, you all have all mentioned the cost of all 

of these systems aging out at the same time. I think yesterday or 

the day before yesterday, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary 

Assessment, CSBA, released at least a preliminary study entitled, 

‘‘Are U.S. Nuclear Forces Unaffordable?’’ And their analysis, looking at various budget requests from now until fiscal year 2039, was 

that at no point would the nuclear force’s share of national defense 

be more than 5 percent of the defense budget. 

Does that sound about right, based on the projections that you 

all have looked at? 

Secretary WORK. We believe that they did a credible study. The 

big difference between their estimates and ours is they only included the long-range bomber—just a small portion of the entire 

program for the nuclear mission. We would say that it would take 

7 percent of our budget. Right now, we are spending about 3 percent. So about doubling the level of effort that we are doing now 

to sustain the force, it would require about 7 percent. 

They were also correct on the time where we would peak out, 

generally around 2026 and 2027. And I would just say, Mr. Chairman, that if you look at the last two times, whereas the vice chairman said we recapitalized this force, recapitalized it, the peak is 

going to be much lower and will be spread out over a longer period 

of time. So it will average about $18 billion a year. 

The important thing that they said in the study, sir, is it is a 

matter of prioritization and in both of the previous times we have 

added money on top of the conventional force mission—so on a flat 

budget, taking that type of hit would have a major, major impact 

on the defense portfolio. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. I would just add I think we differ on the 

numbers a little bit from that report. It is about 3 to 4 percent to 

maintain what we have and around 7 percent to maintain what we 

have and modernize what we have, and I think that it is important 

to get that number out. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. And I appreciate the difference is how you 

assign the long-range bomber. 

But regardless, whether it is 5 or 7 percent for the highest priority for our national security, it seems to me like it is not completely unreasonable to say that that is in the ballpark. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Sir, if I could just add, you know, we have 

already lost about 10 percent over the last few years with BCA 

[Budget Control Act]. Stack that on top of it. 

And the one thing I do agree with the CSBA study is that if we 

don’t find some other outside relief on this, then we will have to 

take it out of somewhere else in the defense budget, as the deputy 

said, as you said, and there are going to be a lot of people who 

aren’t happy about that, because other missions that are important 

to this country are going to get pushed aside. 

The CHAIRMAN. Fair point. 
11 

Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding 

this hearing. 

And I would like to add my welcome to the witnesses. It is great 

to have such a distinguished panel before us, and it is great to hear 

this ringing affirmation for the importance of America’s nuclear deterrence, because it is our most important mission but sometimes 

a forgotten one, and I appreciate your stressing it to this committee 

and to the public at large. One of the latest estimates we got was it will take at least $355 

billion just to maintain our nuclear stockpile and all the things 

that go along with it for the next 10 years. 

And we in Congress have gotten in the bad habit of not paying 

for things. We really haven’t fully funded our military in 15 years. 

We haven’t had a fully funded highway bill in 8 years. So I am 

hopeful that my colleagues will hear this message of the importance of this deterrent and not only support it but start funding it 

and start funding it now on a regular schedule. 

I congratulate the Obama administration because they have 

taken this very seriously and have funded these priorities. I just 

hope that as we go through the conference, which I am proud that 

our chairman is chairing, on the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], we will be able to figure out better solutions for fully 

funding and not pretending that we are funding things by relying 

on the so-called OCO, or Overseas Contingency Operation, account. 

But as we deal with these important issues, there are tons of 

questions to ask. And it is a pleasure to work with Chairman Mike 

Rogers on the subcommittee, where we can focus in more detail on 

these issues. 

But whether it is the newest, freshest missileer out in one of the 

missile fields or a young sailor on one of the nuclear subs or somebody who is preparing to fly a strategic bomber that—in some 

cases, where the B–52s are older than any of us on the panel. That 

is—we have got a lot of work to do. 

But I think the hardest thing is to get the public to understand 

why we need to spend so much money and be so careful with these 

incredible weapons that we hope we will never use. That is kind 

of a paradox, or at least an anomaly that some people don’t quite 

want to wrap their heads around. 

But I am appreciative of y’all’s devoting your careers to making 

this nuclear deterrence real, and I hope that we will figure out 

ways to counter Vladimir Putin’s doctrine of, you know, nuclear 

escalatory dominance. And that is something that I see as one of 

the main threats, and I would welcome any of the panelists comments on that, the best way to counter a new and different sort of 

threat than perhaps we have seen before. 

Secretary WORK. Well, sir, it is interesting. We have been trying 

to deemphasize the role of nuclear weapons in our national strategy, whereas Russia has been trying to emphasize it. It is primarily because they believe that they are at a conventional disadvantage against us, so they emphasize that for deterrence. 

And what we have said is using that type of escalatory language 

is extremely troubling because of the dangerous implications that 

it has that you might use a nuclear weapon to deescalate a crisis. 
12 

Once you escalate, you escalate, and there is no way for us to be 

able to foresee what would happen after that. 

So we are asking the Russians to moderate their language and 

to continue to talk with us on the New START, make sure that 

they are in compliance on New START and potentially even reduce 

the number of weapons below that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this hearing, and to 

each of our witnesses, thank you for your commitment to our country. 

Secretary Work, we are very fortunate to have you with your analytical skills and your vision for national defense, and we appreciate what you do. 

And Admiral, you have brought just a wealth of experience and 

wisdom to this position, and we thank you for that. And before you 

leave, I just want to pick just a little bit of that from you. 

And, you know, part of our nuclear program is not only what we 

do but what we keep others from taking from us, perhaps, or stealing from us. And we all know that China is committed to, more or 

less, stealing our lunch every day through both traditional and 

cyber espionage. The hack of OPM [Office of Personnel Management] is just the latest example. 

Do the Chinese steal our naval technology and apply it to their 

navy? And as a corollary to that, are you aware of any evidence 

concerning China stealing U.S. civil nuclear technology and diverting it to its nuclear navy? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Sir, I am not personally aware of any 

incidences of another nation stealing our nuclear technology and 

applying it to their navy, including China. 

That may be happening. I am just not briefed on any intelligence 

that would implicate that. 

I think it is well understood that there is cyber espionage that 

occurs. We have concerns from time to time about our cleared defense contractors, for example, and their cybersecurity. And we— 

I know that Frank Kendall and AT&L [Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics] is working hard to tighten that up as best we can. 

I was reflecting on this earlier. You know, we talk about nuclear 

matters. As a sort of graduate of the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program, one of the things that has intrigued me over the years is the 

element of human performance that that program inculcates into 

its people is very applicable to protecting ourselves in the cyber 

world, and we are investigating how we can go about inculcating 

some of those principles into our workforce so that we can stop 

any—or at least minimize the amount of cyber espionage that we 

experience. 

Mr. FORBES. And for any of our witnesses, do you have any suggestions of steps we should take to ensure that China can’t take 

our technology and upgrade their ballistic missile submarines for 

their navy nuclear reactor technology? 

Secretary WORK. I think you are referring to the China 123 provision, sir. We are very concerned and we want to make sure that 

any agreement that we have in this regard is not used to allow 

them to have a quieter plant, for example. But as of this point, I 
13 

know of no Chinese espionage that is looking, you know, is trying 

to specifically on this aspect of it, but I defer to the Secretary on 

the China 123 if there is anything on there. 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. Thank you, Mr. Forbes. 

Our judgment is that the agreement protects our interest. And 

it also provides opportunity for our industry to have markets that 

are very significant for the United States and that allow us to advance the kinds of safety and performance standards that we want 

to see other countries adopt in their civil nuclear programs. Thank 

you. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you all for your service and for being here. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today. 

Admiral Winnefeld, as the chairman noted, this may be your last 

appearance before the committee. And I just want to thank you for 

your service to our Nation. You have made great contributions to 

our men and women in uniform and to our national security, and 

our Nation is greatly in your debt. 

Madam Secretary, if I could start a question with you. In the category of good-better-best, given the fact that our adversaries are 

clearly modernizing their nuclear programs, how do you assess our 

program? Is the refurbishment program adequate enough? Is it 

best? Or would we be serving our Nation better by designing a new 

nuclear warhead with all the modern safety features and surety 

features that we could build in, given how far technology has advanced? Or are we—is ‘‘best’’ doing what we are doing and just refurbishing? 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. 

We, together with the Department of Defense, through the Nuclear Weapons Council, set the requirements for modernization of 

our stockpile. And it is our judgment that what we have committed 

to doing in the ‘‘3+2’’ strategy for modernization ensures that we 

will retain the deterrent capability that we need to defend the 

United States and our allies and partners around the world. 

We are confident of this work. We believe that the requirements 

that are presented in the 3+2 strategy will enable us to deter any 

adversary. It also enables us to reduce the stockpile in a way that 

makes it safer and more secure. And therefore, we judge that this 

is the right strategy going forward and are working very hard to 

implement it. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

I would also like to ask about nonproliferation programs. Can 

you describe the importance of radiation portal monitors as a component of a larger suite of technologies designed to prevent additional states and actors from acquiring nuclear materials? 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to answer that question. 

These radiation portal monitors are part of what we have previously called a second line of defense program. And that is a critical part of our efforts to ensure that the movement of fissile material across borders does not go undetected. Because as we know, 
14 

the most important part of a country or a group’s ability to build 

a nuclear weapon is getting access to that fissile material. 

And so what we want to do is ensure that everywhere possible 

we have detection capabilities in vulnerable places to allow us to 

know in real time when something may be moving, so that it can 

be interdicted, and so that it can be secured against acquisition by 

those who would do us harm. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Secretary Work, perhaps for you, or to Madam 

Secretary, whichever would be appropriate: How would you characterize the cybersecurity measures in place to protect our nuclear 

enterprise? And how resilient are our systems? 

Secretary WORK. The threat of cyberattack on all of our systems 

we take very, very seriously, sir. And obviously on nuclear issues, 

we take that the most seriously because they are some of the most 

important—as we have said, it is the most important mission we 

have. 

We are doing a wide variety of reviews on all of our systems, all 

of our platforms. We are concerned about our cyber vulnerabilities 

everywhere, and we continue to really look at it closely. Right now, 

I would judge it to be satisfactory. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I think we need to obviously continue to pay attention to that, and something I am very concerned about in particular. So thank you, Secretary. 

Admiral Winnefeld, does the New START treaty remain in the 

U.S. national interest? And then I have some other follow-up questions if the time allows. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, sir. We believe the New START treaty 

does remain inside our national interest. We monitor continuously 

other nations and their behavior. We believe that Russia is adhering to the New START treaty as far as we can tell. 

The principal value to me of that treaty is our ability to verify 

what it is they are doing. And we would love to have complete 

transparency, but we believe the verification measures we have got 

on that treaty are adequate for us to have a better understanding 

of what they are doing. So yes, sir, we do believe that the New 

START treaty is still in our interest. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

To all witnesses, on the issue of verification, how important are 

verification detection to detect cheating? A 2014 Defense Science 

Board concluded that much work remains to be done on verification 

and detection technologies and interagency cooperation. Do you 

agree? And what gaps remain? 

And that one you may have to do for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 63.] 

The CHAIRMAN. If you all don’t mind supplying that answer for 

the record, we will try to keep moving with our limited time and 

some more votes coming up, but I appreciate the gentleman. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As we look back over the recent events that have been happening 

with Russia, there is no good news. Things keep getting worse. We 

have dangerous and aggressive nuclear threats and exercises directed against the United States, NATO allies, and its neighbors. 
15 

We have Putin himself conducting nuclear weapons exercises. 

Imagine if our President conducted a nuclear weapons exercise, 

what international criticism there would be. 

But yet they defy that criticism and go to the next step of even 

adopting and openly discuss doctrine that Russia intends to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict to, what they call, ‘‘deescalate’’ 

and get the United States to back down, which is just inconceivable 

in my mind that someone would think the use of nuclear weapons 

as a deescalation, because our doctrine, of course, is that it is an 

escalation. 

Russia continues to brazenly violate the INF Treaty as well as 

numerous other arms control obligations, without a response from 

the U.S. on the INF Treaty, not to mention the invasion and occupation and annexation of Crimea and the steadily more overt actions that they are taking for hybrid warfare in eastern Ukraine. 

So Admiral Winnefeld, what message would you want to send to 

the American public and to our allies, and in contrast directly to 

Putin, about the dangerous path that Russia is taking? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Thank you for the question. I think you 

have made a fairly good message yourself in your question. 

I would say it is very important that the Russians understand 

that far from being deescalatory, first use of nuclear weapons in a 

conflict like that, it risks uncontrolled escalation. 

The Russians are good mathematicians. They should consult 

chaos theory and things like that, that it is almost impossible to 

completely predict what the outcome would be of such a use of nuclear weapons, however small. 

So they need to understand that we are not falling for this trap, 

we are determined to protect and defend our allies within the commitments we have made to the NATO alliance and we will do that. 

And bluster and threats of nuclear weapons, as Deputy Secretary 

Work said in his opening statement, are destined to fail. We will 

not let that deter us from defending our allies. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Admiral. I appreciate the strong words. 

When you look Russia’s actions—hybrid warfare, aggressive behavior, invading Ukraine, occupying Crimea, threatening NATO 

and non-NATO nations with nuclear retaliation and military action 

if they participate in either NATO or in missile defense deployment, and then with the buzzing of ships and aircrafts and the approaching in very aggressive manner, both our allies and our 

NATO allies—what do you believe the risks are of a conflict in Europe with Russia and with Russia’s announced doctrine of seeing 

nuclear weapons as deescalatory and their practicing the use of 

those weapons? What do you see of the risk of such a conflict escalating to a nuclear exchange? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Sir, I would obviously want to defer to an 

intelligence person to really crisply assess the risk of something 

like that happening. 

So in my non-intelligence role, the risk is certainly not smaller 

than it used to be based on all the rhetoric and all the actions that 

President Putin and Russia have taken. 

But I do think they understand that we have a red line there, 

I do think they understand that we have got considerable capability to frustrate any moves that he might make in Europe, and 
16 

at the end of the day, I believe that they will take that very seriously. 

We can’t let down our guard in that regard in any way, shape, 

or form, and we are not. 

That is why we are investing more in the European Reassurance 

Initiative. Our very capable commander of European Command, 

who also happens to be SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe], is very active in reassuring our allies and taking the right 

steps, we believe, to make sure that reassurance is backed with actual capability. 

Mr. TURNER. Right. I appreciate the strong words, because I 

think that in the rhetoric from Russia, it is hybrid warfare that it 

has undertaken, it is aggressiveness, it is threats to its neighbors, 

it is deployment of new and threatening systems and in the exercises that it is undertaking, they need to hear those words from the 

United States that our military is strong and that we view our obligations to our allies as absolute. 

Thank you, Admiral. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 

witnesses for your testimony today. 

Mr. Work, I wanted to just sort of focus on your comments on 

the Ohio Replacement Program, which—again, you say all the 

right things about the fact that there is going to be this short—relatively short period of cost that is going to capsize the normal levels of the shipbuilding account. 

You know, as somebody who has been on Seapower for the last 

8 years, frankly, we have heard that testimony over and over 

again. 

And there are many times I sympathize with the administration 

coming up here and talking about sequestration, because, you 

know, that is our job to fix that. 

But in this case, you know, I would like to just sort of observe 

that, you know, what we have done on this side in terms of Ohio 

is actually set up a mechanism to try and provide a positive solution to the problem. 

And so we set up the account last year. This year, we are actually talking about activating the account and also empowering the 

Navy through incremental, you know, purchasing authority, 

multiyear purchasing authority, to really give them the tools to 

deal with this, you know, very challenging cost issue, which everybody, again, says the right things, that it is, you know, the highest 

priority for our Nation. 

And again, if we don’t do it, we are going to drain, you know, the 

other conventional forces. This morning, in fact, General Dunford 

spoke to the Shipbuilding Caucus and spent a large portion of his 

remarks about the fact that we need to deal with this. 

We had a surface combatant hearing last week, where Admiral 

Mercado came over. Same thing. You know, the conversation just 

always, like, migrates to this issue. 

And so there are two high-profile amendments on the floor of the 

House. Mr. Forbes, who is not here, and myself and others, you 

know, on a bipartisan basis, led the charge to protect this upgrade 
17 

of the fund—321 to 111, 74 percent in the House Republican Caucus, 74 percent in the House Democratic Caucus. 

So people are actually starting to get to the point where we—as 

you are—your comments are we need to think about this. I mean, 

we are past that, very frankly. We are ready to act. 

And what I am asking you is that, you know, when—if you don’t 

like the Sea-Based Deterrence Fund, fine, you know, then—you 

know, but come back to us with something. You know, you just get 

the impression that the budget planners at the Pentagon and the 

administration are just spectators here in terms of us trying to 

come up with a fix to this that will avoid all of the negative fallout, 

which, again, you described very powerfully here this morning. 

So I was just wondering if you could, you know, just share your 

thoughts in terms of our work that we are doing on this in terms 

of whether, you know, at some point, you guys are prepared to embrace it and help us advance what I think is a solution that has 

precedent in the past in terms of the [National Defense] Sealift 

Fund and ground-based missile defense. 

Secretary WORK. Thank you, sir. 

This is our number one mission. We are going to pay for it no 

matter what. 

In the past, Congress has added money for strategic modernization during periods of these times where we are starting to recapitalize, and we hope that is going to happen again, and we would 

very much appreciate the theory of the case behind this fund. We 

believe that there is going to have to be something like that to help 

us through. 

As I said, up until this time, it has been theoretical. In 2021, as 

you know, sir, the Ohio replacement—the first Ohio replacement, 

we pay for. If we paid for it all in that single year, it would be a 

$7 billion add to the Navy, and they average only about $15 billion 

to $16 billion a year in their entire shipbuilding account. It would 

be enormously destructive to the Navy to have to fit that in within 

their topline. 

So it is—we want to work with you, and we are anxious to work 

with you on figuring out how to do this. 

But I just wanted to foot-stomp what—something that the vice 

chairman said. It is one thing saying that we would eat it within 

a fixed topline. That would cause enormous disruption to our program not just in the Navy but across all of our services. 

So we are anxious to work with you, sir, and we need to do it. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, I would like to tease out a little more from 

you, because again, what we have done is create a mechanism 

within the budget process, again, giving, I think, the incremental 

authority, you know, all the tools that we know worked with Virginia and carriers and—you know, I hope at some point, you know, 

the powers that be are going to kind of spit it out here in terms 

of whether or not they are willing to use this fund, which obviously 

the huge vote in Congress shows that, you know, we are ready and, 

in fact, we are moving forward. 

And we—you know, we hope that the, you know, administration 

is going to help us solve this problem. 

With that, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 
18 

Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank all the witnesses. And Admiral Winnefeld, thank you 

very much for your service. Congratulations on retirement—upcoming retirement. 

Two weeks ago, this committee received the State Department’s 

second straight noncompliance report about Russia’s violation of 

the INF Treaty. And for many years prior to these last 2 years’ official reports, we had had evidence of their noncompliance. 

And it is against that backdrop that I want to ask this. The committee learned in December that the Joint Staff was conducting an 

assessment of possible military responses to Russia’s noncompliance. And my understanding is that that assessment—and you 

briefed us on that assessment, by the way, in March and we appreciate that. It is my understanding that Chairman Dempsey has forwarded proposed responses to the President. 

Admiral Winnefeld, do you have a timeframe that you can suggest to us that you will get some direction from the White House 

as to military responses to Russia’s continued INF violations? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Sir, I don’t have a specific timeline for you. 

I know it is something that the interagency policy committees and 

so on are looking at, consulting with allies on. I don’t think that 

we want to necessarily rush into a definitive move because we 

would like to bring Russia back into this treaty. 

But there is no question, as you point out, that we have got options at hand that I can’t really discuss in an unclassified hearing, 

but those options are available for use. Some of them are expensive. None of them contribute to Russia’s security and they need to 

understand that. They need to come back inside this treaty. 

Mr. ROGERS. In all deference, we are not rushing into anything. 

This has been going on for years. It is just the last 2 years that 

the administration has officially recognized it. He is playing us 

along and we are just letting him. And I just don’t understand why 

it continues to go on. I know you are not the President and you 

can’t tell him what to do, but we need to be making some decisions 

and doing something proactively. 

Which leads me to my next question. I am really worried about, 

you know, Secretary Work talked about the provocative statements, 

and I think you made reference to it, that the Russian military 

leadership’s made toward our NATO allies, trying to jar their resolve. And I am worried about them fracturing NATO. 

So I guess my question is: What is the U.S. doing to alert our 

NATO allies to the seriousness of Russia’s violation and the threat 

that they pose? And then what are we doing to reassure them that 

we are going to be there and everything is going to be okay? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Sir, we have had very close consultations 

with our NATO partners on the nature of the Russian violation of 

the INF Treaty. They are well aware of the fact of and that we 

are—we still remain deeply committed to our Article 5 obligations 

with NATO. 

Secretary Carter is over there today with the NATO ministerial. 

I am sure he is discussing this with them both in the major forums 

and also on his pull-asides that he has with various NATO leaders. 

But the NATO leadership there of the various partners and of the 
19 

NATO command structure are very well aware of this and very 

well aware that we are determined to not permit the violation of 

the INF Treaty to create a greater threat to NATO than currently 

exists. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you believe—because, you know, I was just 

there. I have been there twice in Eastern Europe in the last 6 

months, most recently with the full committee chairman. They are 

very concerned about our resolve. Do you believe that we are being 

muscular enough in our military posture in the region to reassure 

them? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. I would be—I would challenge their concerns about our resolve. We are trying to help buttress their resolve. We are one of the very few nations in NATO that has met 

the 2 percent investment obligation of GDP [gross domestic product]. Secretary Carter is over there right now encouraging the rest 

of them. And in fact, that is quite a topic of discussion right now 

in Brussels in terms of getting the rest of the alliance to reach its 

commitment of 2 percent of GDP funding for defense. 

So, we are reassuring them. They should be well aware of our 

firm commitment based on what we have done lately with the European Reassurance Initiative [ERI], thankfully with the support of 

Congress, and all of the actions that we have been taking. 

Mr. ROGERS. They see that very inadequate. And we met with 

defense ministers and presidents of four different Eastern European countries—allies—and they see that as a limp-wristed reassurance, the ERI. 

But anyway, my time is expired. I look forward to my next series 

of questions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me take this in a little different direction, and my questions 

will go to Secretary Sherwood-Randall. 

The deal with the new pit facilities, and if you could explain the 

rationale behind the need for 50 to 80 capacity, the costs associated 

with that, and then a discussion of the need—well, let’s go there, 

and then another question after that. 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. Thank you, Mr. Garamendi. 

I will begin by noting that in the questions that have recently 

been asked, for example by Chairman Rogers, we understand the 

need for a fully responsive nuclear infrastructure, given the dynamic threat environment that we face. And one aspect of that, approved by the Nuclear Weapons Council, is the plutonium strategy, 

which requires us to meet certain targets in terms of production of 

plutonium pits over the coming decades. 

That strategy will enable us to move out of an old facility built 

in 1952 by 2019 at Los Alamos, and produce up to 30 plutonium 

pits per year by 2026, which will be necessary to ensure that we 

can continue our life extension programs, and construct and operate additional capabilities to produce up to 50 to 80 pits by 2030. 

Again, giving us the flexibility should we need it, given the dynamic threat environment, to utilize those pits. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And the cost? 
20 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. And the cost associated with 

those pits, with that strategy, I will have to come back to you with 

an answer for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 63.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. It would seem to me that you would want to 

know that at the outset. There seems to be some shortage of money 

for all of this. So what is the cost? 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. So, as you have heard, we face 

very significant budgetary challenges on this front. And the requirement for investment to enable us to have a responsive infrastructure is significant. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Have you—has the committee considered revamping, updating the existing facility? 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. We did consider that and the 

scrutiny that the Secretary and I and the National Nuclear Security Administration leadership have applied to the planning for 

major infrastructure projects has been very significant. And what 

we have done is set up a whole new process for examining the 

kinds of buildings that we need to build to recapitalize that infrastructure, to ensure that we do it in the most effective way from 

a taxpayer perspective. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. It seems to me that the starting point of this 

is somebody decided you need a capacity of 50, and now it is 80 

pits a year, if I just heard you correctly. And then you backed from 

there into a facility to accomplish that. But you have not yet told 

me why you need 50 to 80 new pits a year. 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. Thank you for seeking clarification on this. 

The objective is to give us the flexibility to produce additional 

plutonium pits—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Why should we need flexibility? 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. Because we cannot predict the 

threat environment that we will face as a nation 10, 20, or 30 years 

from now. We want to make sure that we have the infrastructure 

necessary to respond should a President of the future need to pursue the modernization of our nuclear capabilities in light of those 

threats. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Oh, some day we might want it, and therefore 

we are going to build it now and we don’t have the money to do 

so. 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. We can’t snap our fingers and 

produce the infrastructure and the human talent required to support this program. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What is the capacity of the current pit production facility in Los Alamos? 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. It is much lower. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And it is what number? 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. And I will have to get back to 

you—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. It is somewhere between 10 and 20. 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. But I want to confirm it precisely. 
21 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And that is one shift a day; multiple shifts, upgrade of the existing facility could produce far more than the 10 or 

so today. Check it out and get back to me, please. 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. I promise to do that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 64.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

I think I am out of time, but there is a whole series of other 

questions having to do with the MOX [Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication] Facility, and specifically on the question of the September report. Is it online? Is it moving forward? And can we expect to see 

it in September? 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. Would you like me to get back to 

you for the record on that? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. No, I would like an answer now. You ought to 

know. 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. Okay. I am sorry. I thought you 

said you were out of time. May we continue? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Yes, you have 22 seconds. 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. Okay. I will try to speak quickly, 

then. 

So as you know, both the Senate and the House have asked us 

to do additional review of the costs of the MOX Facility. And we 

are going to conduct a red team review with the director of our Oak 

Ridge National Lab to evaluate the Aerospace report findings and 

other findings about the costs associated with this facility to determine the best way forward. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay, so that is due in September. 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. It is, correct. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

And finally, yes, I will take for the record the costs. 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. I will get them to you. Thank 

you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 64.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Bridenstine. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to discuss the Open Skies Treaty. We had a hearing 

not too long ago called ‘‘Worldwide Threats.’’ And it was on February 3rd. Lieutenant General Stewart, the director of the Defense 

Intelligence Agency [DIA], was asked about the Open Skies Treaty. 

The general said this—he said, ‘‘The Open Skies construct was designed for a different era. I am very concerned about how it is applied today and I would love to talk about it in a closed hearing.’’ 

We had the chairman of my subcommittee, Mr. Rogers, send a 

request for information to Admiral Haney, commander of U.S. 

STRATCOM [Strategic Command]. And his letter came back and it 

said, ‘‘I agree with Lieutenant General Stewart, director of DIA, in 

his assertion that the Open Skies construct was designed for a different era.’’ 

He goes on to say that Russia’s application today has gone beyond the original intent of the treaty. He said the United States 
22 

in concert with our allies continues to address these concerns. He 

says, ‘‘I am concerned the treaty has become a critical component 

of Russia’s intelligence collection capability directed at the United 

States. In addition to overflying military installations, Russia’s 

Open Skies flights can overfly and collect on DOD and national 

critical infrastructure.’’ 

Deputy Secretary Work, are you aware that the most recent compliance report from the Department of State indicates Russia is not 

in compliance with this treaty? 

Secretary WORK. I am, sir. 

And this is something that we would really like to talk about in 

a closed hearing, but we are concerned about what Russia is doing 

as well as all of their other intelligence activities that are focused 

on our nuclear mission. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Do you have any reason to believe the Russians are using the treaty for reasons beyond what it was ratified 

for? 

Secretary WORK. We are concerned on the way they are operating, as Admiral Haney said. We think that they are going beyond 

the original intent of the treaty and we continue to look at this 

very, very closely. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So, the Russians have requested that we continue this treaty and that they are able to use even more advanced 

sensors. Do you believe it is prudent to accede to Russian proposals 

to fly increasingly advanced sensors over the United States? 

Secretary WORK. That is in discussion right now sir, inside the 

Department. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So would you say that you don’t have an opinion on that at this point, or—— 

Secretary WORK. Not until we look at all of the different aspects. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. This is an issue that is going to continue to be of high interest, I know, to me, and of course to the 

chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Mr. Rogers, whose 

committee I am honored to serve on. 

Also for you, Deputy Secretary Work, is Russia modernizing its 

nuclear forces to include developing and deploying new types of 

ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBMs]? 

Secretary WORK. Yes, they are undergoing, as the vice chairman 

said, a wide-ranging modernization of their entire nuclear force. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Is China modernizing, including new types— 

again, new types of ICBMs and SLBMs? 

Secretary WORK. Yes, they are modernizing both the warheads 

that are on their silo-based missiles, as well as deploying roadmobile missiles. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Are we, as the United States, modernizing to 

include new types of ICBMs and SLBMs? 

Secretary WORK. Right now, our modernization plan is to replace 

the Minuteman III with a ground-based strategic deterrent to replace our Trident force with the Ohio replacement platforms, to replace our bombers with the long-range bomber, and to replace our 

air-launch cruise missile with the long-range—new long-range—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So we are maintaining our current strategic 

deterrent while they are creating new and more advanced strategic 

deterrent capabilities. Do you agree with that? 
23 

Secretary WORK. Well, it is just on their timeline. The Russian 

timeline. Their system started to age out before ours, so they are 

in the midst of their modernization cycle, as the vice chairman 

said. 

Our cycle is coming up in the 2020s and early 2030s. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. But remember, they are advancing beyond 

where they currently are, and we are staying stagnant. Is that correct? 

I mean, I understand we are modernizing what we currently 

have, but we are not creating any new technologies. 

Secretary WORK. They are—again, they are replacing old systems 

with new systems. That is correct, Congressman. But they are 

staying within the New START in our estimation. So they are not 

increasing the size of their force. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I have just got a few seconds left. I heard you 

earlier. You mentioned that there was—we will just—we will take 

it offline. We will ask questions later. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Appreciate it. If the gentleman wishes to ask— 

submit questions in writing—of course, I am sure the witness is— 

will be able to respond. 

Ranking Member. 

Mr. SMITH. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I apologize for being absent earlier. I had a physical this 

morning that went on, and on, and on, took forever. 

So I want to be sure and be here for one thing, to thank Admiral 

Winnefeld for his service. And you know, we have joked with General Dempsey, we have had numerous last hearings for him. So, we 

dare not make a prediction. You may be back. Who knows. 

But if this is your last hearing, just want to thank you very 

much for a great working relationship and for your service. You 

have done a fantastic job. 

And following up on the last point there, Russia may be modernizing, but a nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon. It is pretty powerful. We have, you know, we have I think 4,800 and some-odd of 

them. And you know, submarine-based, ICBM-based, bomberbased, it is not like the Russians are building something that gives 

them some new technical advantage, correct? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. I think the only exception to that that 

would concern me is that the greater shift towards mobile missiles 

in their ICBM force; their submarine-launched ballistic missile 

force, even with their improvements, is not as good as ours. 

Mr. SMITH. Sure. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Their bomber leg is not as good as ours. 

But I think the mobile missiles is probably of a greater—— 

Mr. SMITH. But the advantage of the mobile thing is it is—it 

would be hard for us to hit it in a first strike. But with 4,800 nuclear weapons, we could hit them pretty hard, even if we couldn’t 

necessarily hit the mobile nuclear missiles, correct? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. They are not invulnerable. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. And so I think that the larger point, and we get 

bogged down in this modernization debate, and I think the more 

important debate is what is our deterrence strategy? 
24 

Because look, if it comes to it, A, bad, all bad no matter what. 

B, we got plenty of firepower under just about any scenario that 

you are going to see, to basically destroy the planet in combination, 

you know, with whatever the Russians do. 

Now, we have to make sure that we maintain—that we upgrade 

systems that are failing, falling offline and all that. I understand 

all of that. But I think obsessing over you know, oh my gosh, they 

are a little bit more mobile, it is a nuclear weapon, which I forget 

the number, but it is like thousands of times more powerful than 

either of the bombs we dropped on Japan in World War II. 

So, it is a pretty significant deterrent. I think the larger, more 

difficult question is, what is our deterrence policy, and how well do 

we understand that within the Pentagon? 

And you know, we had a deterrence policy during the Cold War, 

which was basically, we felt that the Soviets had us, you know, outmanned in Europe conventionally. And so part of our deterrence 

policy was you go too far in Western Europe and we will nuke you. 

And it worked. I mean, they went into Czechoslovakia, they went 

into Hungary, they pushed the envelope a little bit. 

But what is our policy on you know, when we would do first use? 

What if they go into a NATO country and start messing with them? 

And I would also—permission to answer that question, and I 

would suggest that communication between us and the Russians 

and us and the Chinese, the Russians being far more important, 

whatever our differences may be on a wide range of other subjects, 

a robust communication to make sure that those differences don’t 

lead to us destroying the planet is something that I think should 

be a huge part of our deterrent strategy. 

That is why I don’t have a problem, even with the differences 

that we have with China, that we do a joint—would do some joint 

military exercises. 

You know, we worked with Russia on Afghanistan. We worked 

with Russia—we are doing the P5+1 [China, France, Russia, the 

United Kingdom, and the United States, plus Germany] negotiations on Iran. Anything that can make sure that we communicate 

and don’t, you know, inadvertently start Armageddon because of a 

lack of communications, I think should be a huge part of our deterrence policy. 

But what is our deterrence policy in terms of use of nuclear 

weapons, and what is our understanding of Russia’s deterrence policy? 

Secretary WORK. Well, right now our policy is to achieve nuclear 

parity with Russia, and that is established under the New START 

treaty. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Secretary WORK. We do not assess that China is trying to 

achieve parity with either of us. The primary role of our nuclear 

mission, our nuclear forces, is to deter an attack on the continental 

United States, our allies, and our partners. 

We state very clearly that the use of nuclear weapons will cross 

an escalatory red line. We do not make explicit what our reactions 

would be, but we do say that we have the full force of our nuclear 

arsenal behind us to respond as needed, and as the President directs. 
25 

So our policy is to deter an attack on the United States and try 

to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our normal national security strategy around the world. 

Mr. SMITH. Because Russia now has the conventional disadvantage that we at least perceived ourselves to have during portions 

of the Cold War. So one of the concerns is that if they feel that they 

are conventionally outgunned, they might go the nuclear route. 

And we communicate clearly to them that that will receive a proportional response, regardless of how they—you know, they view 

the conventional situation, that is part of our deterrence strategy. 

If you use a nuke against anybody, then you have got at least 

one coming back at you. 

Secretary WORK. It is a very important point sir. Whenever your 

conventional and your nuclear deterrence capabilities get out of 

whack, you tend to rely on one or the other. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. And the Russians believe that we have a 

significant conventional force advantage, and therefore they rely 

more on their nuclear weapons as a deterrent. What we are concerned about is the way they explain their escalatory posture. 

We believe that is extremely problematic, and something that I 

agree with you that we need to be constantly talking with the leaders of Russia to say we do not want this to lead to a miscalculation. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Stefanik. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to our witnesses for your thoughtful remarks 

today. My question is related to—I want to turn to North Korea 

and Iran. 

North Korea is continuing to grow a small arsenal of nuclear and 

advanced missiles. Recently, North Korea claimed that it has tested a new type of missile from a submarine, and that they had built 

a nuclear warhead small enough to be mounted on a long-range 

missile. 

Then you have Iran’s proliferation of nuclear weapons capability. 

And as we are on the precipice of a potential deal with the Obama 

administration which would allow Iranian production of nuclear 

fuel to continue. These are very real threats we have today, and 

it is my belief that we need all possible capabilities available to 

deter and protect our own national security and our allies. 

Just this week, Admiral Haney reaffirmed his commitment to 

strong deterrence against potential threats by North Korea, so I am 

wondering, at this point when some of our most important strategic 

weapon systems are aging, what do you think this says about our 

priorities? 

Secretary WORK. Well we believe, as we have said over and over, 

that nuclear deterrence is our number one mission. We take it very 

seriously. We believe that we do have a strong nuclear deterrent. 

Our force today is, we believe, the best nuclear force on the planet, 

period. 

The modernization recycle that is coming up in the 2020s is 

something that we need to face together to make sure that it stays 

at that point. We are absolutely confident that we can stay ahead 
26 

of the capabilities that the North Koreans, and as the President 

said, we are absolutely committed to preventing them from acquiring a nuclear weapon. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you. My next question, I wanted to ask 

about the President’s decision to reject dealerting the U.S. ICBM 

forces. President Obama’s nuclear employment guidance rejects the 

notion of dealerting U.S. nuclear forces, while continuing to examine options to reduce the role of ‘‘launch under attack’’ in U.S. planning. 

Can you explain why the President made this decision? 

Secretary WORK. It is very simple that when every one dealerts, 

the race to alert, it becomes escalatory, and provides incentives for 

another side to try to preempt before you can raise your alert level. 

Therefore, it was decided that a dealert posture would actually 

raise the possibility of a miscalculation, and we decided against 

that. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Are there any other comments from the other witnesses? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. I would just say there is an awful lot of 

folklore out there regarding the alert piece of this, that it puts our 

nuclear weapons on a hair trigger. And the fact of the matter is 

that they are not on a hair trigger, they are—the system is designed such that there is exquisite control over the employment of 

a nuclear weapon. The President is the only person who can actually authorize that. And it is not possible to launch one unless he 

does that. You can’t have a rogue actor down there somewhere in 

a silo actually launching a weapon. 

So, the benefits of dealerting in terms of preventing an accidental 

launch are very small, where the drawbacks that Deputy Secretary 

Work pointed out are substantial. 

Secretary WORK. We do do open-ocean targeting of our submarine-launch ballistic missiles, and we have dealerted our bombers. 

So we do believe we have taken the prudent steps to make sure 

that we are—you know, we are deemphasizing a hair-trigger response, as the vice chairman said, but we thought that dealerting 

ICBMs would actually cause us more problems than it would solve. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you very much. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Admiral Winnefeld, thank you very much for your 

service, all your contributions to our national security. I am going 

to go back to my colleague Mr. Langevin’s question about 

verification and detection and the importance of that. He had 

quoted the 2014 Defense Science Board [DSB], which concluded 

that much work does remain to be done on verification and detection technologies, and interagency cooperation, and we are talking 

about our own country, not working with our allies at this time. 

Do you agree with that? Do you think that there is much? And 

what are those specific gaps that we need to be sure that we are 

doing so that we are picking up the problems that exist in the technology and sensors, all that we are using in verification? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Ma’am, I am going to have to review the 

DSB study. We are very confident that our verification measures 
27 

for the New START treaty are quite good. And as you know, as we 

are dealing with Iran, being transparent and verifiable are the absolute two key pillars of what we are trying to do. So I am not certain of what the DSB said, but I will be happy to review it and get 

back with you. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Any other comments on that? Are you familiar? Okay. 

And then we have talked a lot about the modernizing recapitalization. I think people have had some, you know, different thoughts 

about that. But I think one of the concerns, at least on the surface, 

would be that the NNSA submits a 25-year plan for how we are 

going to deal with these issues, and yet the Department of Defense 

does not. 

So, I think the concern, you know, how is the DOD planning beyond 2025? What is it that we are doing even to think about reducing cost? Because we know that in many situations, we have costs 

that go far out of the realm of what initially was planned. 

How are we going to manage peak spending? And we may see 

some of these programs converging as well. Where are we in that? 

And is that a criticism that is justified in terms of the Department 

of Defense in not doing that planning that far out, knowing that 

we are looking at an awfully lot of money here? 

Secretary WORK. Congresswoman, we do have a good understanding of what we need to do over the course of the next 20 

years. The Ohio Replacement Program starts first. We will start replacing our Trident boats first. Then will come the LRSO [LongRange Standoff weapon], along with the bomber in the mid-2020s. 

And then will come the ground-based strategic deterrent, which we 

have to—Minuteman starts to age out in 2030. 

We also have a dual, I mean a nuclear capability for the F–35 

which is planned for a future flight. 

So we understand the general costs of all these. We understand 

the—how they will unfold. Twenty-year cost estimates are uncertain, but we can provide you with our estimates over this period. 

We are quite confident we understand what we have to replace, 

the timing we have to replace, and the rough costs that will require 

us now. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Is there—do you think that in terms of working 

along the same lines of NNSA that you are meeting those requirements? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Ma’am, we have a very good discussion 

through the avenue of the Nuclear Weapons Council with NNSA. 

And we, I think, do a pretty good job of trying to synchronize our 

programs. And the LRSO is a classic example of trying to make 

sure that the life extension program for the W80 warhead would 

be synchronized well with the introduction of that new weapon system. 

So—and we submit a 5-year Future Year’s Defense Plan, which 

is a detailed program. But we plan well beyond that. The program 

managers, the services, and the like have very detailed understanding of how those programs propagate out through decades to 

include life-cycle costs and the whole piece. 

And we would be happy to come brief you on that if you would 

like. 
28 

Mrs. DAVIS. All right. Great. Thank you very much. Thanks 

again for your service. 

The CHAIRMAN. I had just a handful of follow-ups. 

Mr. Secretary, editorial comment. Saying something is a red line 

doesn’t quite have the punch it once did. And I think that is part 

of Mr. Rogers’ point about allies who are concerned about our reliability. And so that is at least what we hear as we travel, not just 

in Eastern Europe, but in other places. 

Admiral, I want to take advantage of 37 years on a question. Obviously, at one point, this subject of nuclear deterrence received a 

tremendous amount of attention, intellectual energy, planning, and 

then it didn’t. 

And while understandably we have been focused so much on terrorism and other challenges, now we are having to kind of reinvent, not reinvent, but to develop those skills again, to put that 

emphasis, I think, on nuclear deterrence and its credibility, which 

is really, to me, the key characteristic in all of this. 

So I would be interested in your view. Are we there, where we 

need to as far as especially the intellectual planning and firepower 

on nuclear deterrence? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. I think that is an excellent question. Point 

well taken. 

And the way I would approach the answer is that across the 

broad intellectual base of the military, let’s say especially in the 

senior officers’ corridor, I would say you know, O–5 and above, how 

steeped have we educated our broad workforce in nuclear deterrence matters? 

When they attend war colleges, they get a good dose of it. And 

they may, you know, hear about it, see—read particular articles 

and the like on their own. But I would tend to agree with you that 

over the last 15 years or so, particularly since the—we have been 

in the post-9/11 era, that a substantial share of our intellectual 

bandwidth has been shifted over towards counterterrorism and the 

like. 

I would also say though that in the niche that is the nuclear 

business, and I have a wonderful Air Force officer with me, Major 

General Tom Bussiere, who has grown up in that business. They 

are still doing pretty well. The Strategic Command folks, the Air 

Force, Navy, nuclear deterrence community has retained its interest and focus on this particular mission. 

So, I think we are doing okay in that stovepipe, but I think your 

point is well taken that we need to make sure that we are emerging from this last 15 years that we have been in, and make sure 

that the broader force has a robust understanding of this question. 

It is a good point. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, especially as the Russians seem to broaden 

the circumstances under which at least they threaten to use nuclear weapons. I want to ask one other question here, about this 

idea that a nuke is a nuke is a nuke. 

I am old enough to remember a debate in the 1970s about a neutron bomb, which is a nuke, but it has very different characteristics 

than the existing weapons that we have. And my understanding is 

a variety of actors around the world are developing new weapons 

in the sense that it is not just replacing what they had, but it is 
29 

adding weapons with some different characteristics, which gets in 

my mind back to this credibility issue. 

And as you know, the argument has been that our very large nuclear weapons that were designed for a Cold War exchange are not 

as credible as other weapons might be in a different strategic landscape. 

Would you care to comment on that? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, sir. 

Two things. One, I would say we do have a range of—for a lack 

of a better word, dialability in some of our weapons. So that we do 

have low-yield weapons that we can call upon to—for the President 

to use if he sees fit. 

So, we don’t have a lot of work going on in vastly different weapons, like a neutron weapon or something like that. But in terms of 

the scale—scalability of a nuclear detonation, we can cover that 

fairly well. 

What I spend more of my time worrying about is the delivery 

systems; making sure that they are modern in the sense of reliable. 

They are not old. But also that they are also incorporating new 

technology. 

And I would contend that the systems that we are developing 

new to deliver these weapons, should it be necessary, and hopefully 

it won’t be, are very advanced. The LRSB [Long-Range Strike 

Bomber] is going to be a very advanced bomber. 

The Ohio replacement submarine is going to be very quiet. It is 

going to be a very capable boat. 

And the ground-based strategic deterrent will of course be better 

than what we have now. 

So we are making more than just incremental but less than, you 

know, major changes in how we deliver these things. But I also 

think we have the array of scalability on our nuclear weapons 

where we need it to be. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I just think, as Mrs. Davis said, I think 

there gets to be a little confusion. We talk about modernizing. Well, 

it is one thing to replace something with something that is just like 

it, but as you point out, whether we are talking delivery systems 

or the warheads themselves, our adversaries are not—the Russians 

for example, are not replacing a system with this exact same system just made newer. It has different characteristics. And I think 

we have to keep that in mind. 

Madam Secretary, I want to get back to responsive infrastructure 

right quick. 

A lot of what we have under New START is a lot fewer weapons 

but part of the agreement was we would have a more responsive 

infrastructure and ability to respond quickly to ensure that this deterrent remains credible. 

Now, we—you would not say that we have a responsive infrastructure today, right? 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. I believe we do have a responsive 

infrastructure today, but we must make the investments that I described in my statement that I submitted as well as my opening 

remarks. We need to ensure that we retain the capabilities that 

Admiral Winnefeld and you have just had an exchange about this 

on the delivery system side. Similarly, on the weapons production 
30 

side, we need to retain the workforce and we need the infrastructure to support them. 

And that is the intellectual workforce that we are discussing. The 

people who are doing the work right now on stockpile stewardship 

and on modernization are the very people we need to invest in. We 

need to recruit the next generation of people who will do that work 

in the future to ensure that we have that responsive infrastructure 

for decades to come. And so I would say now we have what we 

need, but we have put forward to you an historic budget on this 

front in this 2016 request to ensure that we are making the investments we need going forward to retain that responsive infrastructure. Because we did suffer, unfortunately, following the New 

START agreement, from a cutback in the kind of investment that 

we anticipated in advancing that agreement. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I certainly do not want to diminish the importance of the budget request the administration sent up this 

year, because I do think it has turned things around. 

But I am not sure that I am with you that our response—that 

our infrastructure is as responsive as it needs to be today, because 

I just see too much evidence, not only of the people retiring, other 

people choosing other lines of work, and a variety of problems, 

some of which we have kind of touched on today, but others of 

which we haven’t. 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, I think together 

we need to signal to people that this matters. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. We are doing that by virtue of 

holding this hearing. My colleagues and I do it by the work we do 

every day. And I look forward to working together with you to ensure that we continue to send that signal across our Nation. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think that is a very important point, and 

maybe that is a good point to end on, because I do think whether 

we are talking about the intellectual bandwidth for nuclear deterrence, whether we are talking about attracting the best scientists 

to work in our nuclear weapons labs and plants. 

People need to know that this is the most important element of 

our Nation’s security, and it will continue to be and it will receive 

the investment that is deserving of that. And so if there is one 

point I think we hopefully all agree on, it is that we need to continue to attract the best and the brightest. And have facilities that 

can meet the unexpected. 

Because as these machines age, there will be more unexpected. 

Thank you all for being here. I very much appreciate your testimony and look forward to working with you all, at least for a 

month or longer. 

So, thank you. 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. Thank you, so much. 

The CHAIRMAN. With that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

JUNE 25, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JUNE 25, 2015 

(35) 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JUNE 25, 2015 

(63) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Secretary WORK. The dependence on, and use of, verification measures in arms 

control agreements has been the hallmark of the United States’ ability to monitor 

the compliance of other Parties and to detect violations of the terms of the agreements. 

More comprehensive verification measures lead to greater confidence in the 

United States’ ability to verify that other Parties are abiding by the terms of treaties and agreements, which provides a strong deterrent against violations, and the 

warning required for us to counter violations if they occur. 

The Department of Defense reviewed the recommendations of the Defense Science 

Board’s (DSB) 2014 Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies 

and subsequently participated in several months of study and policy review in concert with other departments and agencies to address findings from the report. Work 

on this issue went beyond verifying treaty compliance; it explored interagency structure and processes to enable departments and agencies to more effectively detect 

and provide early warning of nuclear proliferation by State and non-state actors. We 

believe the work conducted in this regard will have an enduring positive effect on 

the ability to monitor treaty compliance and detect nuclear proliferation outside formal treaties and agreements. 

The Administration will be submitting a report to Congress later this year regarding efforts to address findings in the DSB Report. [See page 14.] 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. Detecting material production and movement are 

essential to monitoring activities of interest and verifying compliance. In line with 

the recommendations of the January 2014 Defense Science Board (DSB) Report, Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies, the Department of 

Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) continues the development of U.S. capabilities that address current and projected threats to national 

security posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and diversion of special nuclear material by investing in near- and long-term efforts in the DOE National Laboratories, academia, and industry. In its August 2014 Report to Congress on the 

Progress on the National Research Agenda for Nuclear Nonproliferation & Arms 

Control Verification Technologies, DOE/NNSA describes the national research agenda to create technologies to detect state and non-state efforts to develop or acquire 

nuclear devices or weapons-usable nuclear materials. This Report addresses DOE/ 

NNSA’s progress and plans for such research and development and describes DOE/ 

NNSA’s general concurrence with the DSB report’s key findings. [See page 14.] 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Verification is an important concern for any treaty or agreement and is a key factor when deciding whether to sign and ratify a treaty. Yes, 

I agree with the 2014 Defense Science Board conclusion that additional work remains to be done. The United States continually seeks to improve verification methods and technologies and the Department of Defense actively participates in interagency efforts to improve coordination of research and development (R&D) that are 

focused on both current and emerging nuclear proliferation threats. [See page 14.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. The near-term goal of the Plutonium Strategy is 

to provide the infrastructure and resources that will sustain critical plutonium capabilities necessary to meet pit production requirements. This involves maintaining 

and maximizing the use of existing facilities at the Los Alamos National Laboratory 

(LANL): the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building (RLUOB), and Plutonium Facility (PF)-4. The preliminary cost range of efforts to further equip the 

RLUOB and re-purpose space in PF–4 to support a production capacity of 30 pits 

per year by 2026 is $1.5 billion to $2.15 billion. Additionally, annual funding for programmatic equipment and critical skills that support pit production are funded 

through the Plutonium Sustainment Program, which requested $174.7 million in 

Fiscal Year (FY) 2016. We anticipate that additional infrastructure is needed to support production beyond 30 pits per year and are refining the costs associated with 

that scope. [See page 20.] 
64 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. Current planning efforts call for the production of 

four to five developmental pits per year in the FY 2016–2018 timeframe, as part 

of the lead-up to war-reserve pit production and as we continue to execute infrastructure investments in existing facilities. Once these infrastructure investment activities are completed, the current plutonium facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory will support up to a 30 war-reserve pits per year production capacity by 

2026. [See page 21.] 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. The Department has an ongoing independent 

study being conducted by Aerospace, a Federally Funded Research and Development 

Center (FFRDC) to assess the options for disposing of 34 metric tons of weapongrade plutonium. This report was delivered to Congress in August 2015. In addition, 

a Red Team led by Thomas Mason (Director of Oak Ridge National Laboratory) completed its assessment of plutonium disposition options. The red team report has 

been sent to the House Armed Services Committee and Dr. Mason briefed members 

and staff on the team’s findings. Both the Aerospace study and the Red Team review include assessments of the costs of each plutonium disposition option. [See 

page 21.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JUNE 25, 2015 

(67) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Mr. SMITH. What confidence do you have that the United States could reliably 

control a nuclear war? How could we improve communications and clear signaling 

to avoid miscalculation? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter 

nuclear attack on the U.S., our allies, and partners. Our nuclear posture has successfully achieved this goal for over half a century. However, should deterrence fail 

at some point in the future, we are confident U.S. nuclear forces could be deployed 

or employed, if authorized by the President, in such a manner that would enhance 

the probability of ending the conflict on terms favorable to the United States, our 

allies, and partners. We believe one of the most challenging aspects of such control 

is potential nuclear escalation in Europe should conventional deterrence fail and crisis erupt into conflict. In particular, the need to coordinate with allies amidst the 

gravity of nuclear escalation will inject some amount of entropy into the decisionmaking process. 

The clearest form of communication we can make regarding our determination to 

control this type of warfare is to be well prepared for it. This requires a healthy 

Triad, a robust and survivable nuclear command and control system, and a wellstructured, resourced, and coordinated extended deterrence capability. Meanwhile, 

we should continue to explore opportunities to enhance our strategic communications through exercises and political and military engagements with our partners. 

Through these engagements, we are improving our understanding of other countries’ 

views and perspectives on matters related to maintaining stability and avoiding 

miscalculation in crisis. 

Mr. SMITH. Would you support reducing alert levels of ICBMs, if verifiably negotiated with Russia? Understanding the risks in a crisis, are there benefits of potentially giving the President more decision time before launching ICBM warheads? 

How would elevating the alert levels of ICBMs be different than elevating alert levels for nuclear bombers? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. We support future negotiated nuclear weapons alert reductions if such a regime were verifiable with both Russia and China, and if the problem of re-alerting instability can be solved. However, creating a verifiable regime 

for alert ICBMs is extremely problematic, and is unlikely in the near-term. This, 

combined with the exceptional mitigations we have in place against an accidental 

launch, makes me very hesitant at this time to pursue such a course of action. 

There are always benefits to maximizing Presidential decision time in a crisis. 

This can be accomplished either by quickening the nuclear decision process or by 

increasing the President’s survivability and relying more on non-ICBM legs of the 

deterrent. Both of these methods are very challenging given day-to-day realities and 

safeguard requirements for control of nuclear weapons launches. 

The ability to elevate alert levels between ICBMs and nuclear-capable bombers 

is mostly about timing and visibility. The longer timeline associated with elevating 

the bomber alert level is acceptable because our ballistic missile force ensures a 

prompt response capability. In a crisis, there would be much greater pressure to 

rapidly re-alert a non-alert ICBM force, because of the possibility the adversary 

would otherwise perceive a window of opportunity and U.S. vulnerability. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS 

Mrs. DAVIS. As a follow-up to my question during the hearing, how important are 

verification and detection to detect cheating? A 2014 Defense Science Board concluded that much work remains to be done on verification and detection technologies 

and interagency cooperation. Do you agree? What gaps remain? 

Secretary WORK. The dependence on, and use of, verification measures in arms 

control agreements has been the hallmark of the United States’ ability to monitor 

the compliance of other Parties and to detect violations of the terms of the agreements. 

More comprehensive verification measures lead to greater confidence in the 

United States’ ability to verify that other Parties are abiding by the terms of trea-
68 

ties and agreements, which provides a strong deterrent against violations, and the 

warning required for us to counter violations if they occur. 

The Department of Defense reviewed the recommendations of the Defense Science 

Board’s (DSB) 2014 Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies, and subsequently participated in several months of study and policy review 

in concert with other departments and agencies to address findings from the report. 

Work on this issue went beyond verifying treaty compliance; it explored interagency 

structure and processes to enable departments and agencies to more effectively detect and provide early warning of nuclear proliferation by State and non-state actors. We believe the work conducted in this regard will have an enduring positive 

effect on the ability to monitor treaty compliance and detect nuclear proliferation 

outside formal treaties and agreements. 

The Administration will be submitting a report to Congress later this year regarding efforts to address findings in the DSB Report. 

Mrs. DAVIS. As a follow-up to my question during the hearing, how important are 

verification and detection to detect cheating? A 2014 Defense Science Board concluded that much work remains to be done on verification and detection technologies 

and interagency cooperation. Do you agree? What gaps remain? 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. Detecting material production and movement are 

essential to monitoring activities of interest and verifying compliance. In line with 

the recommendations of the January 2014 Defense Science Board (DSB) Report, Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies, the Department of 

Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) continues the development of U.S. capabilities that address current and projected threats to national 

security posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and diversion of special nuclear material by investing in near- and long-term efforts in the DOE National Laboratories, academia, and industry. In its August 2014 Report to Congress on the 

Progress on the National Research Agenda for Nuclear Nonproliferation & Arms 

Control Verification Technologies, DOE/NNSA describes the national research agenda to create technologies to detect state and non-state efforts to develop or acquire 

nuclear devices or weapons-usable nuclear materials. This Report addresses DOE/ 

NNSA’s progress and plans for such research and development and describes DOE/ 

NNSA’s general concurrence with the DSB report’s key findings. 

Mrs. DAVIS. As a follow-up to my question during the hearing, how important are 

verification and detection to detect cheating? A 2014 Defense Science Board concluded that much work remains to be done on verification and detection technologies 

and interagency cooperation. Do you agree? What gaps remain? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Verification measures are a vital component of arms control 

agreements. More comprehensive verification measures lead to greater confidence in 

our ability to verify whether other Parties to the agreement are abiding with the 

agreed-upon terms, which in turn provides a strong deterrent against violations. 

The Department of Defense reviewed the recommendations of the Defense Science 

Board’s 2014 Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies and 

subsequently participated in several months of study and policy review in concert 

with other departments and agencies to address findings from the report. Work on 

this issue went beyond verifying treaty compliance; it explored interagency structure 

and processes to better enable departments and agencies to detect and provide early 

warning of nuclear proliferation by state and non-state actors. We believe the work 

conducted in this regard will have an enduring positive effect on the ability to monitor treaty compliance and detect nuclear proliferation outside formal treaties. 

The administration will be submitting a report to Congress later this year regarding efforts to address findings in the DSB Report. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. Nuclear deterrence is an effort that relies on many of the DOE National labs including non-NNSA labs and sites. How does DOE plan to maintain 

long term infrastructure in non-NNSA labs and sites (such as H-Canyon and K Area 

at the Savannah River Site) that also support deterrence and non-proliferation efforts such as securing of vulnerable nuclear materials, a key part of this administration’s strategy? 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. The Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Labs 

and sites are safely and securely maintained and operated to support the Department’s nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation missions. DOE has repeatedly acknowledged the need for and has initiated efforts to assess critical infrastructure requirements and reduce the deferred maintenance. Currently these efforts focus on 

ensuring the effective and efficient conduct of long-term infrastructure maintenance 
69 

at DOE National Labs and sites. The results of these efforts will provide greater 

insights into infrastructure conditions. DOE’s goal is to ensure that each of our facilities is maintained to ensure the safe accomplishment of our multiple missions. 

Mr. WILSON. Please comment on the Department’s strategy to ensure we maintain 

an adequate supply of tritium in the future to meet our nuclear deterrence needs. 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. The National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) teams with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to produce the required 

amounts of new tritium. Tritium is produced when tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) are irradiated in the TVA’s Watts Bar Unit 1 reactor. The 

tritium is extracted from the TPBARs at the Savannah River site. To meet future 

requirements, the number of irradiated TPBARs must increase from the 704 currently in place in the Watts Bar reactor to approximately 3,000 in the FY 2025 

timeframe. The ramp-up to higher TPBAR numbers has begun. To support this 

ramp-up, NNSA updated the environmental impact statement, and TVA submitted 

a license amendment request to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission covering the 

increased number of TPBARs and the insertion of TPBARs in a second reactor. The 

two reactor plan is considered the most reliable scenario to ensure that tritium production meets the demand because it mitigates both operational and production 

risks and increases the likelihood that tritium requirements will be met. Under the 

two reactor plan, potential variations in demand can be handled with relatively 

small changes in fresh fuel requirements. Tritium production will remain at the 

maximum level in both reactors until an adequate tritium inventory is attained, at 

which time the loading may be reduced slightly in each reactor. The updated Tritium Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) addressed the higher 

environmental releases from higher observed TPBAR permeation in nominally two 

reactors. The complete and approved results showed the environmental releases are 

safe and still well below drinking water standards. We expect the SEIS Federal 

Register notification to be as early as February, with publication to occur towards 

the end of February 2016. 

Mr. WILSON. Nuclear deterrence is important to our country. However, we have 

an obligation to deal with legacy Cold War radioactive waste that sits in waste 

tanks before we can start adding more waste into the mix. Without a well-reasoned 

waste disposal strategy, DOE can end up shutting down material making facilities 

because we will be exacerbating the waste problem. In my district at the Savannah 

River Site, radioactive liquid waste removal is a key gear that allows the Site to 

operate effectively. We need to accelerate removing this waste and not slow it down 

with budget cuts or reprogrammed money from the liquid waste program. What will 

you commit to do to increase removing harmful radioactive legacy waste from the 

Savannah River aging waste tanks? 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. The Department has made considerable progress 

in completing the tank waste cleanup program at the Savannah River Site (SRS). 

To date, over 3,850 vitrified high level waste (HLW) canisters have been poured, 

over five million gallons of salt waste have been processed in its interim salt processing facilities, and six HLW tanks have been closed. In addition, two more tanks 

are in the process of being closed with completion planned for May 2016. 

However, the delay in the construction and startup of the Salt Waste Processing 

Facility has slowed the treatment of liquid tank waste, which has extended the 

schedule for completing the tank waste cleanup program, including tank closure. In 

spite of these challenges, the Department remains fully committed to making 

progress in the cleanup of the SRS tank waste. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. How important are verification and detection to detect cheating? 

A 2014 Defense Science Board report concluded that much work remains to be done 

on verification and detection technologies and interagency cooperation. Do you 

agree? What gaps remain? 

Secretary WORK. The dependence on, and use of, verification measures in arms 

control agreements has been the hallmark of the United States’ ability to monitor 

the compliance of other Parties and to detect violations of the terms of the agreements. 

More comprehensive verification measures lead to greater confidence in the 

United States’ ability to verify that other Parties are abiding by the terms of treaties and agreements, which provides a strong deterrent against violations, and the 

warning required for us to counter violations if they occur. 

The Department of Defense reviewed the recommendations of the Defense Science 

Board’s (DSB) 2014 Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Tech-
70 

nologies, and subsequently participated in several months of study and policy review 

in concert with other departments and agencies to address findings from the report. 

Work on this issue went beyond verifying treaty compliance; it explored interagency 

structure and processes to enable departments and agencies to more effectively detect and provide early warning of nuclear proliferation by State and non-state actors. We believe the work conducted in this regard will have an enduring positive 

effect on the ability to monitor treaty compliance and detect nuclear proliferation 

outside formal treaties and agreements. 

The Administration will be submitting a report to Congress later this year regarding efforts to address findings in the DSB Report. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. How important are verification and detection to detect cheating? 

A 2014 Defense Science Board report concluded that much work remains to be done 

on verification and detection technologies and interagency cooperation. Do you 

agree? What gaps remain? 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. Detecting material production and movement are 

essential to monitoring activities of interest and verifying compliance. In line with 

the recommendations of the January 2014 Defense Science Board (DSB) Report, Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies, the Department of 

Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) continues the development of U.S. capabilities that address current and projected threats to national 

security posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and diversion of special nuclear material by investing in near- and long-term efforts in the labs, academia, and 

industry. 

In its August 2014 Report to Congress on the Progress on the National Research 

Agenda for Nuclear Nonproliferation & Arms Control Verification Technologies, 

DOE/NNSA describes the national research agenda to create technologies to detect 

state and non-state efforts to develop or acquire nuclear devices or weapons-usable 

nuclear materials. This Report addresses DOE/NNSA’s progress and plans for such 

research and development and describes DOE/NNSA’s general concurrence with the 

DSB report’s key findings. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit will be the fourth Summit 

since the process began in 2010, and the second time that the United States has 

hosted. What is the point of the Nuclear Security Summit process and what has it 

accomplished? 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. The Nuclear Security Summit process has successfully elevated the discussion of global nuclear security issues to the highest 

international leadership levels. At the three previous Summits, Heads of State and 

governments and senior leaders from more than 50 countries and organizations reinforced their shared commitment to strengthening international nuclear security 

norms and to taking tangible actions to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. The 

Summits have also encouraged nuclear experts, non-governmental organizations, 

and nuclear industry representatives to engage with each other on the important 

roles they each can play in improving and sustaining nuclear security. The Summits 

have recorded many tangible results that have enhanced global nuclear security. 

Since the first Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010, more than 2.5 metric tons 

of vulnerable highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium material have been removed or disposed of; nine countries—Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, 

Serbia, Switzerland, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam—have become HEU-free; 

physical security upgrades have been completed at 32 buildings storing weapons-usable fissile materials; and radiation detection equipment has been installed at more 

than 250 international border crossings, airports, and seaports to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Several countries have pledged to establish Centers of 

Excellence to provide international, regional, and domestic training on nuclear security, safeguards, and export control fundamentals and best practices. A number of 

countries have ratified the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection 

of Nuclear Material (CPPNM/A) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), and the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) hosted a Ministerial-level International Conference on Nuclear Security in July 2013. 

Through individual state actions and collective action, the 2016 Summit will reaffirm and build upon the commitments of the previous Summits and will take steps 

to maintain the forward momentum for securing vulnerable nuclear materials 

worldwide. The 2016 Summit aims to produce a concise consensus Communique ́ and 

five ‘‘action plans’’ that commit Summit participants to actions that will strengthen 

the nuclear security activities of key institutions and initiatives that support the 

international nuclear security architecture. These action plans will focus on the 

United Nations, IAEA, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, G7 Global 

Partnership, and INTERPOL. 
71 

Mr. LANGEVIN. How important are verification and detection to detect cheating? 

A 2014 Defense Science Board report concluded that much work remains to be done 

on verification and detection technologies and interagency cooperation. Do you 

agree? What gaps remain? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Verification measures are a vital component of arms control 

agreements. More comprehensive verification measures lead to greater confidence in 

our ability to verify whether other Parties to the agreement are abiding with the 

agreed-upon terms, which in turn provides a strong deterrent against violations. 

The Department of Defense reviewed the recommendations of the Defense Science 

Board’s 2014 Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies and 

subsequently participated in several months of study and policy review in concert 

with other departments and agencies to address findings from the report. Work on 

this issue went beyond verifying treaty compliance; it explored interagency structure 

and processes to better enable departments and agencies to detect and provide early 

warning of nuclear proliferation by state and non-state actors. We believe the work 

conducted in this regard will have an enduring positive effect on the ability to monitor treaty compliance and detect nuclear proliferation outside formal treaties. 

The administration will be submitting a report to Congress later this year regarding efforts to address findings in the DSB Report. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. Please describe Russia’s doctrine on using nuclear weapons to ‘‘deescalate’’ a conflict. How does it impact the risks of a conflict in Europe escalating 

to a nuclear war? What is our policy to limit and deter the use of nuclear weapons 

in this context? Has this changed the risks and scenarios since the days of the Cold 

War? 

Secretary WORK. Russia’s 2014 military doctrine describes the potential use of 

limited nuclear strikes intended to de-escalate a conventional conflict on its periphery. In its new doctrine, Russia clearly describes The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the main military danger and reserves the right for ‘‘first use’’ 

of nuclear weapons in certain circumstances. This doctrine must be viewed in light 

of recent aggressive Russian actions, military exercises, investments in nuclear modernization, and irresponsible nuclear rhetoric by Russian officials. 

It would be a serious miscalculation for any potential nuclear-armed adversary of 

the United States or its Allies and partners to see nuclear escalation as a viable 

option for achieving its objectives and, in particular, to believe that it could escalate 

its way out of failed conventional conflict. In addition to the U.S. commitment to 

the security of our Allies and partners, we have a core interest in deterring nuclear 

use and ensuring that no aggressor succeeds by crossing the nuclear threshold. The 

Department works to maintain a deterrent capability that is robust and stable. With 

your help, the Department will be able to provide the President with a range of effective options for imposing profound costs on any nuclear aggressor and denying 

the objectives that it may hope to achieve through the threat or use of nuclear 

weapons. 

Mr. COOPER. What are the current and projected challenges to strategic stability 

with Russia and what are your recommendations to best preserve strategic stability? 

Secretary WORK. There are presently a number of challenges to strategic stability 

with Russia. 

Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling is underwritten by its ongoing nuclear modernization program that covers most Russian strategic systems; evolving nuclear doctrine 

that appears to have lowered the Russian threshold for nuclear use by contemplating ‘‘first use’’ in conventional conflicts in certain circumstances; and a robust 

military exercise program that involves simulated limited nuclear strikes. This rhetoric and activity are unhelpful and potentially destabilizing and have no place in 

today’s security environment. The United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies have no interest in a conflict with Russia, but the Alliance 

maintains a credible, effective nuclear deterrent. It would be a serious miscalculation for any nuclear-armed adversary of the United States or its Allies to see nuclear escalation as a viable option for achieving its objectives. 

Russian objections to U.S. and NATO missile defense is another challenge to strategic stability with Russia. U.S. and NATO missile defense efforts are in no way 

focused on Russia and pose no threat to Russia’s strategic forces. U.S. and NATO 

missile defense efforts will continue to move forward under the European Phased 

Adaptive Approach as long as there is a ballistic missile threat emanating from the 

Middle East. 
72 

Finally, Russia’s continued violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 

(INF) Treaty represents another acute challenge to strategic stability with Russia. 

The INF Treaty has helped to maintain security and stability in Europe for more 

than 20 years. The Department believes the Treaty provides as much security to 

Russia as it does to the United States and our NATO Allies. Although the Department will continue to make the case to Russia that it is in its own interest to return 

to compliance with the Treaty, the Department will ensure that Russia gains no significant military advantage through its violation of the Treaty. 

Mr. COOPER. On June 5th, the State Department released its arms control compliance report covering calendar year 2014. It found that Russia remains in violation 

of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. What actions is the U.S. 

taking as a result of Russia’s violation of this treaty? Does this violation have any 

impact on the U.S. nuclear deterrent capacity? Should we continue to press Russia 

to return to the treaty or would you suggest the U.S. withdrawing from the treaty? 

Secretary WORK. The Administration is pursuing a three-pronged approach, including continued diplomatic efforts, economic countermeasures, and military countermeasures. The Department is considering a wide range of potential military response options. 

All the military options under consideration are designed to ensure that Russia 

gains no significant military advantage from its violation of the Intermediate-range 

Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. In terms of military responses, the Department is currently considering those options that are compliant with U.S. obligations under the 

INF Treaty. The United States will not take any action that is inconsistent with 

its obligations under the INF Treaty and international law, as long as such obligations remain in force. Even so, the INF Treaty is a two-way street. As Secretary 

Carter has said repeatedly, the Department will not allow the Russian Federation 

to gain a significant military advantage through its violation of an arms control 

treaty. 

Although Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty is a serious challenge to the security of the United States, along with our Allies and partners, the U.S. nuclear deterrent capacity remains credible and effective. I continue to believe that the INF Treaty serves our interests, as well as those of our Allies, partners, and Russia. For that 

reason, I continue to urge Russia to return to compliance with its obligations under 

the INF Treaty. 

Mr. COOPER. What are the current and projected challenges to strategic stability 

with Russia and what are your recommendations to best preserve strategic stability? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. There are presently a number of challenges to strategic stability with Russia. 

Evolving Russian nuclear doctrine appears to have lowered the Russian threshold 

for nuclear use by contemplating ‘‘first use’’ in conventional conflicts in certain circumstances. Moreover, a robust Russian military exercise program has emerged 

that involves simulated limited nuclear strikes. This rhetoric and activity is 

unhelpful and potentially destabilizing and has no place in today’s security environment. The United States and its NATO Allies have no interest in a conflict with 

Russia, but the Alliance maintains a credible, effective nuclear deterrent. It would 

be a serious miscalculation for any nuclear-armed potential adversary of the United 

States or its Allies to see nuclear escalation as a viable option for achieving its objectives. 

Russian objections to U.S. and NATO missile defense, which is in no way focused 

on Russia and poses no threat to Russia’s strategic forces, is another problematic 

area. We will continue to go forward with NATO missile defense under the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) as long as there is a ballistic missile threat 

emanating from the Middle East. 

Finally, Russia’s continued violation of the intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 

(INF) Treaty represents another acute challenge to strategic stability with Russia. 

The INF Treaty has maintained security and stability in Europe for over 20 years. 

We believe the Treaty provides as much security to Russia as it does to the United 

States and our NATO Allies. While we will continue to make the case to Russia that 

it is in its own interest to return to compliance with the Treaty, we will ensure that 

Russia gains no significant military advantage through its violation of the Treaty. 

Mr. COOPER. On June 5th, the State Department released its arms control compliance report covering calendar year 2014. It found that Russia remains in violation 

of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. What actions is the U.S. 

taking as a result of Russia’s violation of this treaty? Does this violation have any 

impact on the U.S. nuclear deterrent capacity? Should we continue to press Russia 

to return to the treaty or would you suggest the U.S. withdrawing from the treaty? 
73 

Admiral WINNEFELD. The U.S. believes returning to compliance with the INF 

Treaty is in the best interest of the United States, Russia, and our allies. At the 

same time, we are conducting an assessment of a variety of options to ensure Russia 

does not gain significant military advantage from their violation of the Treaty. 

When this process is complete we look forward to working with Congress and our 

allies to discuss and implement these decisions. And while we view these new Russian intermediate-range systems with concern, we are also fully confident in the 

continued viability of U.S. and NATO deterrent capabilities 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. Deputy Secretary Work, please describe your views of Russia’s recent 

and repeated nuclear threats towards its neighbors, NATO, and the United States. 

Given Russia’s threats, its openly discussed doctrine to use nuclear weapons early 

in a conflict to ‘‘de-escalate’’ and get the United States to back down, its use of ‘‘hybrid warfare’’ against neighbors and potentially against NATO member states-what 

are the risks of a conflict in Europe and of such a conflict escalating to nuclear 

weapons? 

Secretary WORK. Russia’s use of hybrid warfare and Russia’s evolving nuclear doctrine and attendant modernization program are both, in part, a response to much 

stronger U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military capabilities. 

Russian rhetoric and destabilizing activities that are meant to showcase Russian resolve do not actually make Russia more secure. The United States and NATO have 

shown their own resolve to secure and defend the Alliance from potential threats. 

Aggressive Russian actions have already led to active conflict in Europe and increased the threat of further conflict. It would be a serious miscalculation for any 

potential adversary to assume the U.S. or our allies are vulnerable, or to think that 

it is possible to use nuclear weapons as a means to escalate out of a failed conventional conflict. Although we cannot reduce risk to zero, the United States and NATO 

can and do mitigate this risk through our own credible deterrent. 

Mr. ROGERS. Deputy Secretary Work and Deputy Secretary Sherwood-Randall, 

please describe the changes made to the U.S. nuclear deterrent and its supporting 

enterprise in both DOD and NNSA since the Cold War. How have our nuclear forces 

and capabilities changed, how has the NNSA enterprise changed, and how has our 

approach for sustaining the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile changed since the Cold 

War? 

Secretary WORK. The Administration is modernizing U.S. nuclear forces consistent with the President’s commitment to retain a safe, secure, and effective deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons exist. The sustainment and modernization plans 

focus on modernizing the platforms, delivery systems, and weapons of our current 

nuclear forces to preserve military capabilities while adjusting our nuclear forces to 

the levels required by the New START central limits. The current nuclear triad continues to provide the flexibility and range of capabilities needed for effective deterrence at a reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical problems or 

vulnerabilities. Additionally, it provides a range of options for this President and future Presidents in the event that deterrence fails. The plans also outline efforts to 

modernize nuclear command and control systems and extend the life of nuclear warheads through Life Extension Programs (LEPs) to ensure reliability and enhance 

surety. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan will prudently sustain the nuclear stockpile, including 

LEPs, while revitalizing the physical nuclear infrastructure and expert workforce 

required to sustain the nuclear stockpile, without returning to Cold War levels, capacities, and footprint. The long-term stockpile plan will leverage existing designs 

to maintain the weapons required for an effective nuclear force without underground testing. The plan addresses stockpile obsolescence and meets the policy objectives of sustaining deterrence through a smaller stockpile with fewer weapon 

types and a modernized, responsive nuclear infrastructure capable of addressing the 

potential for technological failure and geopolitical surprise. 

Mr. ROGERS. Deputy Secretary Work, over the course of its six years in office, has 

the Administration examined in detail various options for the structure of U.S. nuclear forces, including a dyad or a monad? Subsequent to these reviews, why did 

President Obama ultimately decide to retain the triad, rather than eliminate one 

or more legs? What did these analyses show about the risks of moving away from 

the triad? 

Secretary WORK. The Administration analyzed a variety of nuclear force structures prior to publication of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR); as part of the 

NPR implementation study that informed Presidential strategic guidance; and prior 
74 

to a determination on the central limits under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 

(New START). The Administration concluded that a nuclear Triad composed of 

heavy bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic 

missiles should be retained in order to maintain strategic stability while hedging 

against potential technical problems, vulnerabilities, or geopolitical uncertainties. 

The nuclear triad, and nuclear-capable fighter/bombers based in Europe, provides a 

responsive, flexible, and secure force. These attributes are reinforced across the 

triad, and eliminating one leg of the triad would necessarily degrade these qualities, 

reducing the flexibility and the credibility of our deterrent and our ability to hedge 

against technical or geopolitical risks. 

Mr. ROGERS. Deputy Secretary Work, what developments in foreign nuclear weapon programs or actions of foreign nations concern you, and how does that factor into 

your planning and programs for the U.S. nuclear deterrent? 

Secretary WORK. Russia is in the midst of a comprehensive nuclear modernization 

program that includes replacing Cold-War era land- and sea-based ballistic and 

cruise missiles of various ranges with new systems. Nuclear weapons remain the 

highest priority in Russia’s military modernization plan through 2020 and constitute 

one of the largest portion of Russia’s defense budget. Russia’s nuclear modernization 

program is a cause of concern in the context of Russian behavior in Ukraine, the 

aggressive nature of recent Russian military exercises, and irresponsible rhetoric 

suggesting nuclear threats against the United States and its Allies and partners. 

China is enhancing its silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and continues 

to invest in building a more survivable nuclear force with the addition of mobile delivery systems, including a nascent sea-based nuclear deterrent capability. We have 

engaged China to urge that it exhibit greater transparency with respect to its nuclear arsenal and doctrine; however, this dialogue has not yet matured. 

North Korea’s nuclear program is a serious concern given North Korea’s belligerence and its efforts to develop long-range missiles and ballistic missile submarines. We are working closely with allies in the region to mitigate or counter this 

threat, including with missile defense capabilities. 

In light of these foreign nuclear weapon programs and developments, it is imperative that the United States visibly sustain an effective nuclear deterrent capability 

as the supreme guarantee of our own security, and that of our Allies and partners, 

for as long as nuclear weapons exist. The Department is working to maintain an 

effective nuclear deterrent that is robust and stable. The Department must ensure 

capabilities that provide the President with a range of effective options for imposing 

unacceptable costs on any aggressor that may hope to achieve its objectives through 

the threat or use of nuclear weapons. This will require strong and consistent congressional support for the nuclear modernization program. 

Mr. ROGERS. Deputy Secretary Work, we have a lot of very old systems in our 

nuclear deterrent. How old is the B–52? How old it will the B–52 be when we plan 

to retire it? How old are B–2s and how old will they be when we retire them? As 

you manage risk from aging weapon systems, how important is it to remain on track 

with their replacements, like the long-range strike bomber? a. How old will OHIOclass submarines be when they are retired? Is it unusual for submarines to be operational this long? What risks does this bring? b. How old is Minuteman III? How 

old will it be when it is retired around 2030? c. What is the average age of our nuclear warheads? 

Secretary WORK. The average age of the B–52 fleet is approximately 54 years. The 

newest B–52 bomber is 53 years old (delivered in 1961–62). The average age of the 

B–2 fleet is approximately 21 years. Both bombers have undergone and continue to 

undergo sustainment and modernization efforts to keep them viable into the future. 

There is currently no set retirement date for either system, and we expect several 

more decades of operational use. The Minuteman III weapon system was first deployed in April 1970. The system has been and continues to be modified and its 

service life extended to ensure safe, secure, and reliable operations until replaced 

by the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD). The system (rather than its component elements, some of which have been replaced or modernized) will be 66 yearsold when the GBSD completes its currently planned fielding in 2036. 

The OHIO-class submarines were designed in 1970 and commissioned between 

1984 and 1997. Their operational life has been extended from 30 years to 42 years. 

Current OHIO-class submarines are reaching the end of their operational life and 

will begin to retire in 2027. This service life is unprecedented; the oldest submarine 

we have had in service to date retired after 36 years. There are risks and uncertainties associated with the operational sustainment of these platforms as they age beyond their planned lifetimes. 

The warheads in the present stockpile were designed and manufactured during 

the Cold War. The average age of the entire U.S. nuclear stockpile is approximately 
75 

28 years. Today’s nuclear weapons have remained in service beyond their originally 

planned lifetimes. 

Managing risk is challenging; sustainment costs rise and the margin of uncertainty increases as our nuclear weapon systems and platforms age past their 

planned lifetimes. Delays in programs such as the long-range strike bomber, the 

long-range stand-off cruise missile, the GBSD, and the OHIO-replacement submarine will further increase our risk in providing a credible and responsive nuclear 

deterrent to meet new and emerging adversary threats. It is very important that 

we remain on schedule with our plans to modernize these delivery platforms. 

Mr. ROGERS. Deputy Secretary Work, you have led efforts to implement actions 

resulting from the Nuclear Enterprise Review. What are you doing to ensure these 

efforts continue after you depart the Pentagon? How is DOD institutionalizing the 

focus, attention, and improvements you have begun? 

Secretary WORK. The Nuclear Enterprise Reviews (NERs) concluded that although our nuclear forces are currently meeting operational requirements, owing in 

part to the dedication of our service men and women, significant changes are required to ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the force in the future. 

I am holding senior leaders accountable for addressing issues identified in the 

NERs. The Department is working to implement an enduring system of continuous 

self-evaluation, honest reporting of problems up the chain-of-command, and detailed 

tracking of corrective actions designed to address root causes. 

The Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group (NDERG), which consists of the 

leaders responsible for training, funding, and implementing the nuclear mission, 

will continue reviewing the NER recommendations and the progress being made to 

improve the health of our nuclear enterprise. The Office of the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) will continue tracking and assessing implementation of the NER recommendations and will conduct analysis to determine 

if corrective actions are having the desired effect. The Military Departments and 

U.S. Strategic Command will continue performing the nuclear force readiness reviews focused on critical resources—including infrastructure, sustainment programs, 

and nuclear command, control, and communications—required to perform the mission. 

I am giving the enterprise care and attention commensurate with its high priority. I believe the system put in place to enable these efforts will continue after 

I leave the Department of Defense. 

Mr. ROGERS. Deputy Secretary Work, you are currently developing a ‘‘third offset’’ 

strategy for DOD. Can you tell me how you think land- or sea-based hypersonic 

weapons could complicate China’s anti-access area-denial (so-called A2AD) strategy 

against the U.S.? In your opinion, is this technology being properly resourced by the 

Department? 

Secretary WORK. Hypersonic weapons, along with other capabilities, can generate 

speed and range effects that can complicate China’s anti-access area-denial strategy 

against the United States. This technology is being properly resourced. Such technologies are being examined as part of the Third Offset Strategy, a Departmentwide initiative to pursue innovative ways to sustain and advance our military superiority for the 21st century and to improve business operations throughout the Department. 

Mr. ROGERS. Deputy Secretary Work and Admiral Winnefeld, our national security demands that our military be responsive and agile to new or emerging threats 

as they appear. This includes our ability to respond to technical surprise or unforeseen international developments. Creating a responsive nuclear weapons enterprise 

has been a centerpiece of the Administration’s nuclear policy since its 2010 Nuclear 

Posture Review. a. How would you define this term, ‘‘responsive infrastructure’’ with 

respect to our nuclear enterprise? b. Do you believe we currently have a ‘‘responsive 

infrastructure’’ in NNSA’s nuclear security enterprise? When will it be achieved? c. 

If given an urgent requirement to create a new nuclear weapon and delivery system, 

how quickly could our DOE and DOD nuclear enterprise respond and deliver an 

operational capability? 

Secretary WORK. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review states that, as long as nuclear 

weapons exist, the United States will maintain safe, secure, and effective nuclear 

forces, including deployed and stockpiled nuclear weapons, highly capable nuclear 

delivery systems and command and control capabilities, and the physical infrastructure with the expert personnel needed to sustain them. Today, the stockpile relies 

on a hedge of non-deployed warheads to ensure that we have a responsive deterrent. 

A responsive infrastructure can be defined as having the technical expertise and 

the underlying experimental and production infrastructure to: maintain the existing 

stockpile (e.g., surveillance of the stockpile and execution of life-extension programs 

and alterations); address problems uncovered in the stockpile (e.g., identify and di-
76 

agnose the issue, then design, develop, implement, and certify the fix); and respond 

to geopolitical changes (e.g., design, develop, and produce a new nuclear warhead 

or more warheads of an existing type). In practice, a responsive infrastructure must 

sustain and extend the life of the current and anticipated stockpile and provide a 

‘‘surge’’ production capacity for technical stockpile issues or geopolitical changes. 

The specific numerical production capacities that would constitute a responsive infrastructure are the result of the interplay over time between policy, military requirements, the effects of aging on the existing stockpile, and the cost of infrastructure. 

The United States does not yet have a fully responsive infrastructure and relies 

on a stockpile of hedge weapons to be responsive to world events or technology failures. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is working hard to 

manage the technical expertise required for a responsive infrastructure. NNSA has 

also made significant progress in building and exercising experimental facilities, and 

it is on a multi-year path to achieving the needed production capabilities (e.g., for 

plutonium, uranium, and tritium production). An urgent requirement to create a 

new nuclear weapon and delivery system would be a significant challenge for both 

the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense nuclear enterprise. However, given sufficient fiscal resources and national priority, I am confident that our 

dedicated personnel would meet that challenge within the required timelines, if 

called upon to do so. 

Mr. ROGERS. Deputy Secretary Work, when NATO published its Deterrence and 

Defense Posture Review (DDPR) in 2012, NATO explicitly saw Russia as a cooperative partner for peace in Europe and the wider world. Since 2012, Russia has illegally annexed Crimea, is actively sending troops and supporting rebels in other 

parts of Ukraine, has totally withdrawn from the Treaty on Conventional Forces in 

Europe, and is now openly declared in violation of the INF Treaty that undergirds 

security in Europe. Is NATO going to revisit the basic assumption of the DDPR that 

Russia is partner? When? Because Russia is actively calling NATO a threat. Is it 

time to rewrite the DDPR, which also called for NATO-Russia cooperation on missile 

defenses? 

Secretary WORK. Russia’s aggressive actions have fundamentally challenged the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) vision of a Europe whole, free, and at 

peace. Although the NATO Alliance does not seek confrontation and poses no threat 

to Russia, the DDPR recognizes that NATO will continue to adjust its strategy in 

line with trends in the security environment. To this end, NATO has suspended all 

practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia, and has taken steps to deter 

Russia’s malign and destabilizing influence, coercion, and aggression by, for example, doubling the number of its military exercises in just one year; setting up new 

command centers; reorganizing the NATO Response Force; and establishing the 

Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. 

Mr. ROGERS. Deputy Secretary Work, last year Secretary Hagel provided a report 

assessing the requirements for plutonium pit manufacturing. This report reaffirmed 

the requirement for a pit production capacity of 50–80 pits per year, correct? This 

report is about a year old—has its conclusion that we need a capacity of 50–80 pits 

per year changed? a. Should pit production capacity be tied solely to the needs of 

the life extension programs, or should the requirement for a responsive infrastructure also influence when we achieve a pit production capacity of 50–80 per year? 

Secretary WORK. Then-Secretary Hagel’s ‘‘Assessment of Nuclear Weapon Pit Production Requirements’’ report concluded that the United States requires a pit production capacity of 50–80 pits per year. That conclusion has not changed. The report 

explains that pit production capacity is tied to four factors: 1) policy objectives for 

the nuclear deterrent; 2) stockpile aging (including pit age and plutonium aging); 

3) military requirements; and 4) infrastructure and capacity costs. The requirement 

for a pit production capacity of 50–80 pits per year is not solely tied to the needs 

of life-extension programs, and having such capacity is part of a responsive infrastructure. The National Nuclear Security Administration plan is to achieve 30 plutonium pits per year by FY 2026 and 50–80 pits per year by 2030, as detailed in the 

FY 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. 

Mr. ROGERS. Deputy Secretary Work and Deputy Secretary Sherwood-Randall, for 

the past several years, DOD has transferred between $1 to 2 billion a year in topline budget authority to NNSA to fund military priorities within NNSA. What is the 

long-term plan for this transfer—will it continue indefinitely? Has this mechanism 

given DOD enhanced visibility into NNSA’s programs? Is this the optimal structure 

to strengthen transparency and accountability? 

Secretary WORK. Starting with Fiscal Year 2011, the Department has transferred 

to the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) $8.7 

billion to facilitate the financing of critical nuclear enterprise costs, which the Nu-
77 

clear Weapons Council (NWC) believed was critical to national security requirements. These activities include various projects and tasks, for which the Department of Defense is driving the overall requirement. These activities include: 

• the modernization of infrastructure in support of scientific and weapon manufacturing activities; 

• changes to the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile as a result of implementing the 

Nuclear Posture Review (NPR); 

• support of the Naval Reactors program, which includes the design of the Ohio 

Replacement Program (ORP) power plant, and; 

• ongoing Life Extension Program (LEP) for the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. 

The Department has allocated in the Future Year Defense Program sufficient 

funding to continue these activities. The amount to be transferred to the NNSA is 

reviewed annually by the NWC, to ensure that these supplemental funds are targeted towards specific programs and projects, which require additional funding to 

accommodate weapon requirement changes, technical issues, and other programmatic matters. 

Through the NWC, both Departments have collaborated in prioritizing tasks to 

ensure that resources are applied in an effective and efficient manner, focusing on 

the overall nuclear weapons enterprise requirements and deficiencies. The collaboration between the two Departments, though the NWC, has improved transparency, 

and has greatly assisted in synchronizing the NNSA capabilities with military strategic requirements. 

These transfers will continue to be reviewed by the NWC as part of the Department’s program budget review, prior to submission of the President’s budget, and 

will persist until it is determined that they are no longer necessary. 

Mr. ROGERS. Deputy Secretary Work and Deputy Secretary Sherwood-Randall, 

how does DOE and DOD manage risk to the nuclear deterrent-particularly as warheads, delivery systems, and command and control systems age and are replaced? 

In particular, how do you consider and manage the balance between sustaining nuclear weapons through life extension programs, and enhancing the scientific base 

through stockpile stewardship. 

Secretary WORK. Risk to the nuclear deterrent is managed through the deployment of multiple delivery systems in the nuclear triad, deployment of more than one 

type of warhead on submarine launched and intercontinental missile platforms, an 

upload capability in the intercontinental and air legs of the Triad, and a reserve 

of hedge weapons. This allows the United States to manage risk to the nuclear deterrent by hedging both within and across legs of the triad. The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for managing the risk associated with aging and replacement of nuclear weapons delivery systems and command and control systems. The 

Department regularly exercises these systems to identify potential issues and executes repair, refurbishment, and replacement programs as needed. With the support 

of Congress, acquisition of replacement systems is timed to allow DOD to manage 

the risk associated with the transition between older and replacement systems. 

Similarly, DOD and the Department of Energy (DOE) jointly manage the risk associated with aging and replacement of nuclear warheads. Through the National 

Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), DOE executes an ongoing surveillance 

program that includes both destructive and non-destructive testing. This surveillance program is designed to collect data that enables us to understand how nuclear 

weapons systems are aging, to recognize what the likely failure modes are, and to 

prioritize investments in modifications, alterations, and life-extension programs. 

The balance between investing in sustainment of nuclear weapons and nurturing 

and enhancing the underlying scientific and engineering base is managed by DOE 

and the NNSA in coordination with DOD through the Nuclear Weapons Council 

(NWC). The NWC establishes a stockpile plan that includes schedules for specific 

life-extension programs and key infrastructure recapitalization projects. The NNSA 

plans and executes scientific campaigns and initiatives to support this plan and to 

maintain the strong scientific and engineering base necessary to achieve a responsive infrastructure. 

Mr. ROGERS. How many LRSO missiles does DOD plan to procure? How many 

will be for tests/spares as opposed to for the active stockpile? 

Secretary WORK. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Deputy Secretary Work and Deputy Secretary Sherwood-Randall, 

please describe the changes made to the U.S. nuclear deterrent and its supporting 

enterprise in both DOD and NNSA since the Cold War. How have our nuclear forces 

and capabilities changed, how has the NNSA enterprise changed, and how has our 

approach for sustaining the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile changed since the Cold 

War? 
78 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. The size and composition of the nuclear stockpile 

and infrastructure have evolved as a consequence of the global security environment 

and U.S. national security needs. As we have reduced the size of the nuclear stockpile we have also ensured that our nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective. As of September 2014, the active nuclear stockpile (which includes strategic, 

non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed weapons) consisted of 4,717 weapons. 

When the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) is fully implemented, the number of operationally deployed, strategic nuclear weapons will be reduced to 1,550. In addition, no new nuclear weapons have been developed since the 

end of the Cold War, and the U.S. has not conducted underground nuclear explosive 

testing since 1992. Our confidence in the existing stockpile and the effectiveness of 

the deterrent has been sustained by the successes of the DOE-led Science-Based 

Stockpile Stewardship Program. This program has provided new tools and in-depth 

understanding of the warheads, and it has supported and enabled the warhead life 

extension programs. However, continued success in stockpile stewardship cannot be 

assured without the requisite investment. As the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review 

noted, a modernized infrastructure will allow the U.S. to begin to shift away from 

retaining large numbers of non-deployed weapons as a technical hedge, allowing additional reductions in the stockpile of non-deployed weapons over time. It also noted 

the need for strengthening the science, technology, and engineering base. For these 

reasons, there is a clear requirement to modernize the stockpile through life extension programs and major alterations; to recapitalize the aging infrastructure that 

supports the nuclear enterprise; to assess the stockpile through a surveillance program focused on detecting aging issues; and to invest in the science and engineering 

programs that underpin the capability to certify that the U.S. nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective as long as nuclear weapons exist. For these vital 

actions, sustained funding will be required. 

Mr. ROGERS. Deputy Secretary Sherwood-Randall, I understand that the National 

Nuclear Security Administration, which runs the nation’s nuclear security complex, 

has a backlog of over $3.6 billion in deferred infrastructure maintenance and another $1.4 billion in deferred recapitalization of physical security equipment. This 

is a huge bill and deeply concerning. There are some alarming statistics and anecdotes associated with this including that 30% of our buildings in the nuclear weapons complex are more than 60 years old. Last year, a huge chunk of concrete fell 

from a ceiling into operational work areas at our key uranium production plant. a. 

What are the risks to safety and to NNSA’s mission of continuing to operate in 

these facilities? b. What is DOE’s plan for actually buying-down this very large 

backlog of deferred maintenance? 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, as you observe, much of the National Nuclear Security enterprise is well beyond its intended lifespan and is in less 

than adequate condition. In addition, more than 10 percent of the facilities in the 

Nuclear Security Enterprise are now considered to be excess to National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) needs and are awaiting disposition. As a result, infrastructure failures are increasing in frequency, severity and unpredictability. These 

conditions have the potential to pose risks to our workers, the public, the environment, and to the execution of our vital mission. While we work proactively to identify and mitigate these risks through repair, replacement, and compensatory measures, we know that more needs to be done. 

Our plan to reduce deferred maintenance and arrest the declining state of infrastructure builds on the Energy Secretary’s recent initiatives to improve the quality 

of data to support risk-informed investment decisions and stronger accountability 

for cost effective execution of infrastructure work. Regarding improved data, NNSA 

is replacing traditional analytical methods with new, innovative infrastructure management tools. 

One example is deployment of the BUILDER system to provide systematic assessments of the conditions at the building component level. Regarding cost effectiveness, NNSA is expanding its award-winning Roof Asset Management Program to include other building systems that are common across the enterprise (e.g., heating, 

ventilation, and air conditioning). This strategic purchasing allows NNSA to acquire 

more equipment and to make repairs faster than if each site contracted separately. 

We will continue to identify opportunities to increase efficiencies and minimize 

costs. However, additional investments are also needed. Therefore, NNSA’s Fiscal 

Year (FY) 2016 budget request for general purpose infrastructure Recapitalization 

and Line-Item Construction was 76 percent higher than FY 2015 ($300.6M versus 

$170.8M). 

Mr. ROGERS. Deputy Secretary Work and Deputy Secretary Sherwood-Randall, for 

the past several years, DOD has transferred between $1 to 2 billion a year in topline budget authority to NNSA to fund military priorities within NNSA. What is the 
79 

long-term plan for this transfer—will it continue indefinitely? Has this mechanism 

given DOD enhanced visibility into NNSA’s programs? Is this the optimal structure 

to strengthen transparency and accountability? 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. NNSA receives all of its funding from direct appropriations from Congress. These appropriations are scored against the national security (budget function 050) cap that also applies to the Department of Defense 

(DOD) and several other national security agencies and programs. NNSA does not 

receive Congressional appropriations indirectly from monies appropriated to DOD. 

The practice of the so-called ‘‘topline transfers’’ is an administrative budget planning 

activity that began as part of the Administration’s planning for implementation of 

the New START Agreement. The amount referred to as the ‘‘topline transfer’’ has 

been included within the DOD out-year budget projections and is not transferred to 

DOE by DOD. Instead, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) allocates the 

funds in the budget year from DOD to DOE. Thus, the funds are requested from 

Congress by DOE in its budget request and appropriated directly to DOE/NNSA. 

Mr. ROGERS. Deputy Secretary Work and Deputy Secretary Sherwood-Randall, 

how does DOE and DOD manage risk to the nuclear deterrent-particularly as warheads, delivery systems, and command and control systems age and are replaced? 

In particular, how do you consider and manage the balance between sustaining nuclear weapons through life extension programs, and enhancing the scientific base 

through stockpile stewardship. 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. Modernization planning for the nuclear enterprise 

is a joint DOE/NNSA and DOD process that balances multiple goals, objectives, and 

constraints. Through this process we seek to prevent operational gaps in the Nation’s nuclear deterrent while enhancing the safety, security, use control, and reliability of the stockpile. In the current constrained fiscal environment, balancing the 

many near-term needs of managing the stockpile drives difficult choices. These 

needs include: investment in the maturation of evolving technologies and manufacturing capabilities that support both the current stockpile and future life extension 

programs (e.g., additive manufacturing); sustainment and recapitalization of aging 

infrastructure; investment in research, development, test, and evaluation to address 

future stockpile challenges (e.g., certification readiness exercises); and maintaining 

a highly skilled workforce responsive to national security needs. The choices are informed by an enterprise risk management approach that is detailed in the FY 2016 

Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, which is our 25-year strategic program of record to maintain and extend the life of the nuclear stockpile and modernize the supporting infrastructure. 

Mr. ROGERS. Deputy Secretary Sherwood-Randall, the B61–12 and W76–1 life extension programs are both well underway, and the W88 alteration and the W80– 

4 cruise missile warhead are ramping up. Please give us a status update on these 

programs. Are you confident they will finish on time and on budget? What are the 

major risks to these programs executing successfully? 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. The B61–12 life extension program (LEP) is in the 

fourth year of Development Engineering (Phase 6.3) and is on track to enter Production Engineering (Phase 6.4) in June 2016. The B61 LEP is on schedule and recently 

completed two development flight tests that demonstrate the successful integration 

of the NNSA bomb assembly with the U.S. Air Force tail kit assembly. The W76– 

1 LEP is in the fourth year of full-scale production and is on track to complete production by FY 2019. 

The W88 ALT 370 is completing its third year of development engineering and 

has completed baseline design reviews on over half (eight of thirteen) of the components making up the program scope. In November 2014, the Nuclear Weapons 

Council approved the refresh of the conventional high explosive (CHE–R) within the 

W88 warhead. In February 2015, NNSA formally included that scope in the W88 

ALT 370 program. NNSA is accelerating the CHE–R to align and integrate development and qualification activities with the original ALT 370 scope. NNSA will generate a Baseline Cost Report to baseline the entire ALT 370 program, including 

CHE–R, in FY 2016 to support an NWC Phase 6.4 milestone in FY 2017. The program is currently on schedule for a December 2019 first production unit (FPU). 

Funding challenges with the addition of the CHE–R, require the program to coordinate with its DOD partners to examine the additional scope and cost increases to 

identify solutions to mitigate against any impacts to the current FPU. The W80– 

4 LEP entered Feasibility Study and Down Select (Phase 6.2) in July 2015, and is 

on schedule to meet a FPU date of 2025, which supports U.S. Air Force and Strategic Command requirements. 

The major risks to successful execution of any of these LEPs or major alterations 

are a combination of technical and funding risks. These include continuing resolutions, sequestration, and government shutdowns, all of which adversely affect the 
80 

execution of weapons design and engineering, warhead production, and delivery 

schedules. In addition, other risks of primary concern to the W76–1 and B61–12 

LEPs are single-point failures associated with aging infrastructure (facilities and 

production equipment) within the nuclear weapons complex. NNSA continues to reduce these risks by replacing aging infrastructure and by maintaining margin-todelivery requirements. Funding requested for these two programs in the FY 2016 

Future Years Nuclear Security Program continues their current progress. 

Mr. ROGERS. Deputy Secretary Sherwood-Randall, DOE and NNSA face an array 

of longstanding problems with governance and management, as documented by 

many studies (including the recent advisory panel led by Norm Augustine and Rich 

Mies). What is DOE doing to address these problems? If many of the challenges are 

cultural, how is DOE leadership going to change the culture over the long-term? 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. The Deputy Secretary and the NNSA Administrator are jointly responsible to the Secretary for managing governance and management reform activities in the Department to address recommendations from the Augustine-Mies advisory panel and other external reports. A description of these corrective actions and their status will be presented in the congressionally mandated 

NNSA Governance and Management Reform Implementation Plan by March 31, 

2016. 

Mr. ROGERS. Admiral Winnefeld, you recently spoke at a CSIS event about the 

cruise missile threat to the United States. Would you please share your thoughts 

on this? What is DOD doing to defend us, particularly the continental United 

States, against that threat—what should we actions should we expect to see taken 

or proposed in the near-term? a. Should we be focused on Russia’s new air-launched 

and sea-launched cruise missiles that can target the United States homeland? b. 

Are you concerned with Russia’s new Club-K cruise missile—which they are selling 

and hides inside a normal shipping container? Is this anything other than a Russian 

first strike weapon? What’s our military strategy to counter this system? i. What 

are we to make of all of these Russian programs that seem to be aimed at creating 

first-strike capabilities against the United States? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. The DOD is enhancing U.S. homeland defense capabilities 

by developing more effective cruise-missile defenses, while operating within the current fiscal environment of limited defense resources and competing priorities. As 

Russia continues its military modernization efforts, including working on longerrange, conventionally-armed cruise missiles such as the Kh-101, the DOD will continue to monitor and to address, as appropriate, these and other potential threats. 

The DOD is cognizant of Russia’s potential to use these systems and capabilities to 

augment Russia’s flexible-deterrence options, short of the nuclear threshold. Some 

U.S. means to counter these potential threats involve F–15 and F–16 fighter aircraft, while other means, such as the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS), will utilize sensor-laden aerostat balloons as well as surface-based 

sensors. Still other counter-means could include new radar sensors for F–16s, and 

the Joint Land-Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor (JLENS) aerostat to detect and to defeat Russian and other cruise-missile threats. 

Mr. ROGERS. Admiral Winnefeld, General Dunford and General Selva both recently said they believe Russia should be at the top of the list for threats to the 

United States. Do you agree? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Admiral Winnefeld, please describe your views of Russia’s recent and 

repeated nuclear threats towards its neighbors, NATO, and the United States. 

Given Russia’s threats, its openly discussed doctrine to use nuclear weapons early 

in a conflict to ‘‘de-escalate’’ and get the United States to back down, its use of ‘‘hybrid warfare’’ against neighbors and potentially against NATO member states-what 

are the risks of a conflict in Europe and of such a conflict escalating to nuclear 

weapons? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. The Kremlin has consistently mischaracterized the U.S. and 

NATO as having belligerent designs against Russia. Regardless of Russian nuclear 

forces and doctrinal developments, the U.S. commitment to the defense of its allies 

remains a constant and enduring principle, as codified within NATO Treaty Article 

5. Russia has no reason to doubt the seriousness of this commitment, and we have 

pointed out publicly that we will not be intimidated by an ‘‘escalate to de-escalate’’ 

doctrine. We are also, in conjunction with our NATO allies and U.S. European Command, updating our planning and posture to account for Russian use of hybrid warfare. It should be clear neither the U.S. nor our NATO allies maintain any aggressive intent against Russia, so there is no cause for alarm over defensive threats by 

Russia. However, Russia is also well aware NATO’s capacity to defend itself against 

any source of military aggression remains indisputable. The strength of the NATO 

Alliance will continue to underpin European security and stability. 
81 

Mr. ROGERS. Admiral Winnefeld, should we retain the nuclear triad? Why? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes—indeed, maintaining a nuclear triad is consistent with 

current Presidential policy. The Triad offers enhanced flexible deterrence options for 

the President in time of crisis, while also providing assurance to our allies and partners. It also provides redundancy should, for some reason, the viability of one of the 

legs come into question. 

Mr. ROGERS. Admiral Winnefeld, President Obama has announced he believes we 

can make a 1/3 reduction to the number of nuclear weapons the United States deploys. In your professional military judgment, should the United States carry out 

such a reduction unilaterally? Or should it be done bilaterally, through a treaty, 

with Russia? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. In June 2013 in Berlin, President Obama stated U.S. willingness to negotiate a reduction of up to one-third of our deployed strategic warheads from the level established in the New Start Treaty. The United States has 

made clear we are prepared to engage Russia on a full range of issues affecting strategic stability, including prudent, mutual reductions in deployed nuclear weapons. 

However, stability is not necessarily enhanced by unilateral reductions, and we believe we should maintain the position that we will only reduce in concert with Russia and, if and when appropriate, China. 

Mr. ROGERS. Admiral Winnefeld, would you please compare and contrast the U.S. 

stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons vs. that of Russia? In general, unclassified terms would you describe our respective stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear 

weapons as equal in size and capabilities? a. During a Strategic Forces subcommittee hearing in October of 2013, General Bob Kehler, then the commander of 

U.S. Strategic Command, responded to a question on whether he thinks B61 nuclear 

bombs serve a military purpose in Europe. General Kehler said: ‘‘I do. Nuclear deterrence is a military mission, and we would offer . . . military options in extreme 

circumstances that would be available for the President. I believe all of that is a 

military mission.’’ Do you agree with General Kehler’s assessment? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Numerous assessments have concluded the Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons inventory is considerably larger than the U.S. non-strategic nuclear stockpile. We do believe, however, our non-strategic force, while smaller than that of Russia, contributes to effective deterrence of Russian aggression. We 

agree with General Kehler that our non-strategic force provides valuable options to 

the President, both in Europe and the Pacific. 

Mr. ROGERS. Admiral Winnefeld, what developments in foreign nuclear weapon 

programs or actions of foreign nations concern you, and how does that factor into 

your planning and programs for the U.S. nuclear deterrent? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. The intelligence community has been actively following developments in foreign nuclear weapons programs. Most of the details are highly 

classified. Our concerns would regard development of deliverable weapons that could 

threaten the United States. Our second concern is regional competition (for example, 

between India and Pakistan) that could lead to strategic instability or proliferation. 

While on active duty, the information and analysis provided certainly factored into 

our perspective as we develop plans to modernize the U.S. nuclear deterrent over 

the next several decades. With the support of Congress, we are confident our plans 

today ensure our nuclear deterrent will remain viable and effective against the 

range of foreign threats we face today and anticipate in the future. 

Mr. ROGERS. Admiral Winnefeld, in your professional military opinion, why does 

the United States need the long-range standoff (LRSO) weapon (the follow-on to the 

current air-launched cruise missile)? What is the short, elevator speech we can 

bring to our fellow Members on the floor and constituents back home—why is this 

capability important? a. Why do we need a nuclear-armed cruise missile if we’ll 

have a penetrating bomber and the B61 nuclear gravity bomb? Are these capabilities duplicative or complementary? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. The Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) nuclear-armed cruise missile will preserve the President’s flexibility to sustain effective deterrence, as well 

as the credibility of strike options available to the President should deterrence fail. 

In short, when paired with a penetrating bomber, the LRSO will dramatically enhance the survivability of the bomber leg of the Triad, while the B61 should be retained for additional flexibility and for use in conjunction with our NATO allies on 

dual capable aircraft based in Europe. LRSO will replace the air-launched cruise 

missile (ALCM) as the Nation’s only air-launched, long-range nuclear standoff capability. The ALCM’s service lifetime has already been extended more than two decades beyond its planned 10-year service life, and the ALCM’s reliability in the next 

decade is not assured, particularly as our potential adversaries improve their antiaccess and area denial capabilities. Without LRSO, our only air-delivered response 
82 

option after ALCM is retired would be B61 nuclear gravity bombs, which could put 

manned air crews at risk by forcing them to fly over their targets. 

That is not to say LRSO can fully substitute for the B61. Gravity bombs maximize 

the President’s flexibility by providing a strike option that can be redirected or recalled up to the moment of weapon release above a target—an attribute LRSO will 

not have. More importantly, the B61 will sustain our ability to forward-deploy nuclear weapons with tactical aircraft. In this capacity, the B61 is an essential component of our commitment to extended deterrence and assurance, particularly in 

NATO. Similarly, LRSO and penetrating bombers are complementary rather than 

duplicative capabilities. Together, they significantly complicate our potential adversaries’ defenses by multiplying the number of penetrating targets each bomber presents and by expanding the accessible space of targets that can be held at risk. In 

doing so, LRSO carried on a penetrating bomber ensures our credibility in challenging adversary defenses, not just as they exist today but as they evolve into the 

future. 

Mr. ROGERS. Admiral Winnefeld, are you aware that China has recently claimed 

to have successfully completed its fourth successful test of a hypersonic weapon? a. 

How many successful tests has the U.S. conducted? b. How many different 

hypersonic programs does China have underway at present? How about Russia? 

How does the level of resources they are investing in this technology compare to us? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. The Joint Staff can provide a response to this question in 

a classified forum. 

Mr. ROGERS. Deputy Secretary Work and Admiral Winnefeld, our national security demands that our military be responsive and agile to new or emerging threats 

as they appear. This includes our ability to respond to technical surprise or unforeseen international developments. Creating a responsive nuclear weapons enterprise 

has been a centerpiece of the Administration’s nuclear policy since its 2010 Nuclear 

Posture Review. a. How would you define this term, ‘‘responsive infrastructure’’ with 

respect to our nuclear enterprise? b. Do you believe we currently have a ‘‘responsive 

infrastructure’’ in NNSA’s nuclear security enterprise? When will it be achieved? c. 

If given an urgent requirement to create a new nuclear weapon and delivery system, 

how quickly could our DOE and DOD nuclear enterprise respond and deliver an 

operational capability? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. We believe a responsive infrastructure consists of the suite 

of nuclear warhead design and production capabilities required to execute current 

stockpile plans, and to respond, in a timely manner, to stockpile technical issues or 

geopolitical developments without interruption to sustainment and modernization 

activities. We do not believe the Nation has a fully responsive infrastructure at this 

time. However, NNSA is working hard to manage its current physical infrastructure, some of which dates back to the Manhattan Project, while it implements a 

long-term plan to sustain critical design and production capabilities, including the 

construction of new facilities to process plutonium and uranium. With sustained 

support from Congress and continued collaboration with DOD, we are optimistic 

NNSA can make significant progress towards a fully responsive infrastructure over 

the next 15 years. 

While this transition to a responsive infrastructure takes place, an urgent requirement to create a new nuclear weapon and delivery system would be a significant 

challenge for both the DOE and DOD nuclear enterprise. However, given sufficient 

fiscal resources and national priority, we are confident our dedicated personnel 

would meet that challenge within the required timelines if called upon. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. The June 5th State Department made public in its arms control 

compliance report that it had evidence demonstrating that Russia has committed 

violations of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This coupled with 

military action against Ukraine and posturing against our European allies signals 

a larger surge in Russian aggression, which is deeply troubling. How is the United 

States responding to these treaty violations, and how does this impact our own obligations to a treaty, which is no longer being followed by one of the signatories? Does 

this adversely impact our ability to protect against Russian nuclear action? 

Secretary WORK. The Administration is pursuing a three-pronged approach, including continuing diplomatic efforts, economic countermeasures, and military countermeasures. The Department is considering a wide range of potential military response options. 

All the military options under consideration are designed to ensure that Russia 

gains no significant military advantage from its violation of the Intermediate-Range 
83 

Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. In terms of military responses, we are currently considering those options that are compliant with U.S. obligations under the INF Treaty and international law, and the United States will not take any action inconsistent 

with such obligations under the INF Treaty, as long as such obligations remain in 

force. 

Even so, the INF Treaty is a two-way street. As Secretary Carter has said repeatedly, we will not allow the Russian Federation to gain a significant military advantage through its violation of an arms control treaty. Although Russia’s violation of 

the INF Treaty is a serious challenge to the security of the United States, along 

with our Allies and partners, the U.S. nuclear deterrent capacity remains credible 

and effective. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Given the increasingly bold action of the Russian military and the 

increasing tempo of threats being made, do you believe Russia is more likely now 

to utilize nuclear weapons than they have been in the past decade? 

Secretary WORK. Recent Russian rhetoric and evolving Russian doctrine, as we 

understand it, are certainly cause for concern regarding Russian willingness to use 

nuclear weapons, even during the early stages of a conflict. In part owing to weakness in its conventional forces, Russia appears to have lowered its nuclear threshold. Current Russian doctrine, which must be viewed in light of recent rhetoric, conduct, and Russia’s ongoing nuclear modernization, reserves the right for ‘‘first use’’ 

of nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, including the defeat of its conventional 

forces. 

Although Russian doctrine and rhetoric are certainly unhelpful and potentially destabilizing, neither the United States nor its NATO allies are without means to respond; our conventional and nuclear forces constitute a credible and powerful deterrent. It would be a serious miscalculation for any potential nuclear-armed adversary 

of the United States or its allies to see nuclear escalation as a viable option for 

achieving its objectives and, in particular, to believe it could escalate its way out 

of failed conventional conflict. 

Mr. SHUSTER. The June 5th State Department made public in its arms control 

compliance report that it had evidence demonstrating that Russia has committed 

violations of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This coupled with 

military action against Ukraine and posturing against our European allies signals 

a larger surge in Russian aggression, which is deeply troubling. How is the United 

States responding to these treaty violations, and how does this impact our own obligations to a treaty, which is no longer being followed by one of the signatories? Does 

this adversely impact our ability to protect against Russian nuclear action? 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. Since 2013, the United States has on many occasions raised its serious concerns with Russia regarding its actions that the United 

States concluded were in violation of the INF Treaty. The United States has held 

senior-level and expert-level bilateral discussions with the goal of securing Russia’s 

return to verifiable compliance with its Treaty obligations, and has engaged with 

allies on this matter throughout this process. Engaging primarily elements of the 

Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, the United States continues to consult 

with allies on potential diplomatic, economic, and military measures to protect U.S. 

and allied interests and ensure that Russia does not gain a significant military advantage as a result of its violation, while at the same time working to bring Russia 

back into compliance with the Treaty. The Department of Energy (DOE) refers you 

to the Department of State and the Department of Defense for further information 

on this topic. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Given the increasingly bold action of the Russian military and the 

increasing tempo of threats being made, do you believe Russia is more likely now 

to utilize nuclear weapons than they have been in the past decade? 

Secretary SHERWOOD-RANDALL. The role of the DOE remains consistent regardless 

of Russian behavior. We are responsible for ensuring that the United States’ nuclear 

weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and effective to deter any adversary and assure 

U.S. allies and security partners that they can count on America’s security commitments. After twenty years of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, the Department 

has ever-increasing confidence that we can sustain a safe, secure, and effective deterrent for the United States without testing. 

Mr. SHUSTER. The June 5th State Department made public in its arms control 

compliance report that it had evidence demonstrating that Russia has committed 

violations of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This coupled with 

military action against Ukraine and posturing against our European allies signals 

a larger surge in Russian aggression, which is deeply troubling. How is the United 

States responding to these treaty violations, and how does this impact our own obligations to a treaty, which is no longer being followed by one of the signatories? Does 

this adversely impact our ability to protect against Russian nuclear action? 
84 

Admiral WINNEFELD. We are very concerned about Russian violations of their 

arms control commitments, including the INF Treaty. We are pursuing an approach 

designed first to seek to bring Russia back into compliance with the Treaty, but at 

the same time are developing a range of military responses. All the options under 

consideration are designed to ensure that Russia gains no significant military advantage from their violation. Some of those options are compliant with the INF 

Treaty. Options that are not treaty compliant would not be implemented as long as 

the United States remains subject to the Treaty’s provisions. 

No decisions have been made at this time, and military options will involve close 

coordination and discussion with allies moving forward. We will abide by our INF 

Treaty obligations so long as they are in force. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Given the increasingly bold action of the Russian military and the 

increasing tempo of threats being made, do you believe Russia is more likely now 

to utilize nuclear weapons than they have been in the past decade? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Recent Russian rhetoric and evolving Russian doctrine, as 

we understand it, are certainly cause for concern regarding Russian willingness to 

use nuclear weapons, even during the early stages of a conflict. In part owing to 

weakness in its conventional forces, Russia appears to have lowered its nuclear 

threshold. Current Russian doctrine, which must be viewed in light of recent rhetoric, supported by Russia’s ongoing nuclear modernization, reserves the right for 

‘‘first use’’ of nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, including to prevent impending defeat of its conventional forces. 

While Russian doctrine and rhetoric are certainly unhelpful and potentially destabilizing, neither the United States nor its NATO allies are defenseless; our conventional and nuclear forces constitute a credible and powerful deterrent. It would be 

a serious miscalculation for any potential nuclear-armed adversary of the United 

States or its Allies to see nuclear escalation as a viable option for achieving its objectives or to escalate its way out of failed conventional conflict. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALZ 

Mr. WALZ. Secretary Work, how important is verification in nuclear arms control 

treaties? Do we have sufficient verification capabilities given the increasing threat 

of proliferation and recent treaty violations? 

Secretary WORK. The dependence on, and use of, verification measures in arms 

control agreements has been the hallmark of the United States’ ability to monitor 

the compliance of other Parties and to detect violations of the terms of the agreements. 

More comprehensive verification measures lead to greater confidence in the 

United States’ ability to verify other Parties are abiding to the terms of treaties and 

agreements, which in turn provides a strong deterrent against violations, and the 

warning required for us to counter violations if they occur. 

For those nuclear arms control treaties currently being implemented, we believe 

we have sufficient monitoring capability to verify compliance. For example, the New 

START Treaty’s verification measures provide the ability to discover violations and 

ensure that the other Party does not gain a significant military advantage from violations. This aids in deterring any violations as it minimizes any advantages that 

could be achieved. Russia seems to have underestimated our ability to monitor its 

compliance with the INF Treaty. Russia attempted to covertly build and test a nuclear-capable cruise missile system in violation of the INF Treaty, and the U.S. 

verification capability allowed us to detect that activity before Russia could gain any 

significant military advantage from it actions. 

Looking toward the future, the Department of Defense reviewed the recommendations of the Defense Science Board’s 2014 Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and 

Verification Technologies, and subsequently participated in several months of study 

and policy review in concert with other departments and agencies to address findings from the report. The work conducted in this regard will have an enduring positive effect on the ability to monitor treaty compliance and detect nuclear proliferation outside formal treaties and agreements. 

Mr. WALZ. Admiral Winnefeld, the current administration indicated it would be 

willing to further reduce U.S deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one third, 

to near 1,000 warheads. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have indicated that it would support these reductions if they are bilateral and verifiable. Do such reductions therefore have to take place via a treaty? Do you believe we could pursue such reductions 

while Russia is in violation of the INF treaty and other arms-control obligations? 

At what point should the U.S require that further reductions in our nuclear arsenal 
85 

address non-strategic nuclear weapons that Russia is in possession of thousands, 

while the U.S. has very few? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. The current situation has significantly undermined trust in 

our relationship with the Russian Federation. Russia has rejected our proposals for 

negotiations regarding further reductions, which we believe should only be conducted bilaterally. We are very concerned about Russian violations of the INF Treaty and are pursuing an approach that seeks to bring Russia back into compliance 

with its obligations while maintaining or strengthening strategic stability and enhancing U.S. security. Reductions of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons will be 

problematic due to Russian dependence on those weapons and a lack of U.S. negotiating leverage. 

The Department of Defense continues to believe mutual compliance with nuclear 

arms control agreements can provide benefit and stability to the United States, its 

allies and partners, and the Russian Federation. 

Æ