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DEEP SPACE EXPLORATION: 

EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF 

THE PRESIDENT’S BUDGET 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

October 9, 2015 

Serial No. 114–42 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

RANDY K. WEBER, Texas 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

JOHN R. MOOLENAAR, Michigan 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

GARY PALMER, Alabama 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

DRAIN LAHOOD, Illinois 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts 

DONALD S. BEYER, JR., Virginia 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

MARK TAKANO, California 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE

HON. BRIAN BABIN, Texas, Chair 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama, 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

STEVE KNIGHT, California 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

AMI BERA, California 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

DONALD S. BEYER, JR., Virginia 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

October 9, 2015 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Brian Babin, Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................................................................... 12 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 13 

Statement by Representative Donna F. Edwards, Ranking Minority Member, 

Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 

U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................................ 14 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 16 

Statement by Representative Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ..................... 16 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 18 

Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .... 19 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 20 

Witnesses: 

Mr. Doug Cooke, Owner, Cooke Concepts and Solutions; Former Associate 

Administrator, Exploration Systems, NASA 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 21 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 23 

Mr. Dan Dumbacher, Professor of Engineering Practice, Purdue University; 

Former Deputy Associate Administrator, Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, NASA 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 32 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 34 

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 41 

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

Mr. Doug Cooke, Owner, Cooke Concepts and Solutions; Former Associate 

Administrator, Exploration Systems, NASA ...................................................... 56 

Mr. Dan Dumbacher, Professor of Engineering Practice, Purdue University; 

Former Deputy Associate Administrator, Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, NASA ...................................................................... 77 

(1) 

DEEP SPACE EXPLORATION: 

EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF 

THE PRESIDENT’S BUDGET 

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 9, 2015 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:17 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brian Babin 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 
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Chairman BABIN. The Subcommittee on Space and will come to 

order, please. 

Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare recesses of 

the Committee at any time. 

Good morning. Welcome to today’s hearing entitled ‘‘Deep Space 

Exploration: Examining the Impact of the President’s Budget.’’ I 

recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement. 

Last week was an amazing time for the space community. A 

major Hollywood film about the exploration of Mars debuted within 

days of NASA announcing a significant scientific discovery: liquid 

water on Mars. The coincidence of these two events garnered the 

public’s attention, and rightly so. Rarely does popular culture and 

science align in such a serendipitous fashion. 

The attention also prompted obvious questions from the public 

such as ‘‘how will discovering water on Mars impact future exploration,’’ ‘‘are we really going to Mars,’’ and ‘‘how and when are we 

going to get there?’’ These are all questions that the general public 

may not have the answers to, but thankfully NASA does. 

Because of bipartisan direction and investments made by Congress, we are well on our way to Mars. We are building the most 

powerful rocket ever built, the Space Launch System, so we can 

launch large payloads to beyond-Earth orbit with decreased risk to 

overall missions. We are building the Orion crew capsule so that 

our astronauts can travel farther into deep space than ever before, 

and we are upgrading our Ground Systems to support 21st century 

operations. NASA has already tested the RS–25 engines and five 

segment boosters that will power the SLS; they’ve already 

launched an uncrewed version of Orion; and the Kennedy Space 

Center is undergoing revolutionary upgrades. 

But there is much more that needs to be done if the United 

States plans on launching a mission to Mars. We need to build a 

habitat module, advanced in-space propulsion, and a lander and ascent vehicle to name a few components. 

Fortunately, we don’t have to develop all of these capabilities at 

once. We can develop them incrementally over time. There are also 

potential opportunities for international and commercial partnerships that could be leveraged as well. The first step on the journey 

to Mars, however, begins with the development of SLS, Orion, and 

the related Ground Systems. 

Unfortunately, Congress’s support has not been matched by the 

Administration. In 2010, the President signed the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 into law, thereby directing NASA to develop the 

SLS and Orion systems. This piece of legislation was the product 

of a democratically controlled House and Senate that passed with 

185 Democrats and 119 Republicans, demonstrating overwhelming 

bipartisanship. These programs are critical for the journey to Mars, 

and yet since 2010, the Administration has attempted to cut their 

funding every year. 

This year alone, the President’s budget request contains a cut of 

$343.5 million for SLS and a cut of $104 million for Orion. All told, 

the President’s budget has requested nearly half a billion dollars 

in cuts to these programs this fiscal year. This Committee’s NASA 

Authorization Act for 2016 and 2017 fully rejects these proposed 
13 

cuts, and both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees 

have approved bills to do the same. 

Even though Congress consistently rejects the Administration’s 

proposed cuts year after year, the proposed cuts still have a negative impact on the programs. The annual budget uncertainty that 

the Administration perpetuates impairs NASA’s ability to manage 

the program efficiently on behalf of the taxpayer. 

At the same time that the Administration has been strangling 

these programs, the NASA workforce has been diligently trying to 

keep the programs moving by setting up alternative cost and 

schedule commitments called Management Agreements. The agreements are separate from the official commitments in the KDP–C. 

While it is promising that NASA is trying to make the best out of 

a poor situation, having multiple plans could potentially lead to 

confusion and inefficiencies. 

Fortunately, SLS and Orion have been successful in spite of the 

external challenges placed on the programs. This is largely thanks 

to the supremely professional workforce at NASA and the contractors. To all the hardworking men and women who are advancing 

the development of these programs, please know that your hard 

work is very much appreciated. Your work on these programs will 

inspire the next generation of explorers, maintain U.S. leadership 

globally, and chart new courses for humanity. Thank you for all 

that you do. You are the best this nation has to offer. My hope is 

that folks across the Administration will reverse course and begin 

to support the SLS and Orion programs, and the workforce that 

makes them possible, with the funding necessary to continue their 

success. SLS and Orion are crucial for deep space exploration, and 

the first steps to Mars. 

We have two steely-eyed missile men before us today who were 

directly involved in the management of the human exploration program while they were at NASA. I look forward to hearing about 

how we can all ensure the success of our nation’s human exploration program. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Babin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE

CHAIRMAN BRIAN BABIN

Last week was an amazing time for the space community. A major Hollywood film 

about the exploration of Mars debuted within days of NASA announcing a significant scientific discovery—liquid water on Mars. The coincidence of these two events 

garnered the public’s attention, and rightly so. Rarely does popular culture and 

science align in such a serendipitous fashion. The attention also prompted obvious 

questions from the public such as ‘‘how will discovering water on Mars impact future exploration,’’ ‘‘are we really going to Mars,’’ and ‘‘how and when are we going 

to get there?’’ 

These are all questions that the general public may not have the answers to, but 

thankfully NASA does. Because of bipartisan direction and investments made by 

Congress, we are well on our way to Mars. We are building the most powerful rocket 

ever built, the Space Launch System, so we can launch large payloads to beyond 

Earth-orbit (BEO) with decreased risk to overall missions; we are building the Orion 

crew capsule so that our astronauts can travel farther into deep space than ever 

before; and we are upgrading our ground systems to support 21st century operations. NASA has already tested the RS-25 engines and five segment boosters that 

will power the SLS; they’ve already launched an uncrewed version of Orion; and the 

Kennedy Space Center is undergoing revolutionary upgrades. 
14 

But there is more that needs to be done if the United States plans on launching 

a mission to Mars. We need to build a habitat module, advanced in-space propulsion, and a lander and ascent vehicle to name a few components. 

Fortunately, we don’t have to develop all of these capabilities at once. We can develop them incrementally over time. There are also potential opportunities for international and commercial partnerships that could be leveraged as well. 

The first step on the journey to Mars, however, begins with the development of 

SLS, Orion, and the related ground systems. Unfortunately, Congress’s support has 

not been matched by the Administration. In 2010, the President signed the NASA 

Authorization Act of 2010 into law, thereby directing NASA to develop the SLS and 

Orion systems. This piece of legislation was the product of a Democratically controlled House and Senate that passed with 185 Democrats and 119 Republicans— 

demonstrating overwhelming bipartisanship. These programs are critical for the 

journey to Mars, and yet since 2010, the Administration has attempted to cut their 

funding every year. 

This year alone, the President’s budget request contains a cut of $343.5 million 

for SLS and a cut of $104 million for Orion. All told, the President’s budget has requested nearly half a billion dollars in cuts to these programs this fiscal year. This 

Committee’s NASA Authorization Act for 2016 and 2017 fully rejects the proposed 

cuts, and both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees have approved 

bills to do the same. Even though Congress consistently rejects the Administration’s 

proposed cuts year-after-year, the proposed cuts still have a negative impact on the 

programs. The annual budget uncertainty that the Administration perpetuates impairs NASA’s ability to manage the program’s efficiently on behalf of the taxpayer. 

At the same time that the Administration has been strangling these programs, 

the NASA workforce has been diligently trying to keep the programs moving by setting up alternative cost and schedule commitments called Management Agreements. 

The agreements are separate from the official commitments in the KDP-C. While 

it is promising that NASA is trying to make the best out of a poor situation, having 

multiple plans could potentially lead to confusion and inefficiencies. Fortunately, 

SLS and Orion have been successful in spite of the external challenges placed on 

the programs. This is largely thanks to the supremely professional workforce at 

NASA and the contractors. To all the hardworking men and women who are advancing the development of these programs, know that your work is appreciated. Your 

work on these programs will inspire the next generation of explorers, maintain U.S. 

leadership globally, and chart new courses for humanity.Thank you for all that you 

do. You are the best this nation has to offer. 

My hope is that folks across the Administration will reverse course and begin to 

support the SLS and Orion programs, and the workforce that makes them possible, 

with the funding necessary to continue their success. SLS and Orion are crucial for 

deep space exploration, and the first steps to Mars. 

We have two steely-eyed missile men before us today who were directly involved 

in the management of the human exploration program while at NASA. I look forward to hearing about how we can all ensure the success of our nation’s human exploration program. 

Chairman BABIN. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the gentlewoman from Maryland, for an opening statement. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Good morning, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 

I want to welcome back our two witnesses, Mr. Dumbacher and Mr. 

Cooke, today, and I say ‘‘back’’ because both of you have appeared 

before our Subcommittee previously, as former leaders of NASA’s 

human exploration programs. I appreciate your past public service 

as well as your willingness to testify here today. 

Mr. Chairman, last December, millions of people in America and 

around the world tasted the future when NASA conducted the Exploration Flight Test-EFT–1 in which the Orion crew vehicle traveled farther into space than any human spaceflight vehicle since 

the Apollo era. That future is an exciting one that includes sending 

humans to the surface of Mars. And Mars is the goal that we established in our bipartisan House-passed, overwhelmingly Housepassed, NASA Authorization Act of 2015. We sent it over to the 

Senate. And it’s the consensus goal for human space exploration of 
15 

a distinguished National Academies panel that recently examined 

U.S. human space exploration. 

So, it’s quite fitting, Mr. Chairman, that we follow up on our 

Subcommittee’s review of the Space Launch System and Orion 

crew vehicle programs that was held last December, just after the 

EFT–1 flight test, and see where these programs stand now. By 

any measure, the progress on SLS and Orion is visible and tangible. NASA and its contractors deserve credit for the many accomplishments achieved to date. Tests of the SLS solid rocket booster 

engines and the RS–25 main engine are reviving and modernizing 

the propulsion activities that brought us through the successful 

Shuttle era. Elements of the Orion crew vehicle that will return 

American astronauts to deep space are being fabricated even as I 

speak. And just a few weeks ago, the Orion program was approved 

to transition from formulation into development, a major milestone 

known as Key Decision Point C or KDP–C. 

This hearing should provide an opportunity to discuss the outcomes of the Orion KDP–C review and clarify any questions, including the perception, by some, of a two-year ‘‘slip’’ to the first 

crewed flight test known as Exploration Mission-2, or EM–2. However, I would note that the members of the panel were not involved 

in this recent Orion KDP–C review. Only NASA can address questions regarding the KDP–C milestone, discuss the breadth of accomplishments achieved to date, and inform us of the challenges 

going forward. Only NASA can do that. 

That’s why, Mr. Chairman, I’m actually quite puzzled that NASA 

was not initially invited to testify, and why I extended an invitation to the Associate Administrator of NASA’s Human Exploration 

and Operations Mission Directorate to serve as a witness. Unfortunately, the Associate Administrator’s international travel schedule 

precluded his ability to appear this morning. So, I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we’ll give NASA the opportunity in another hearing to 

provide the details on the SLS and Orion programs that this Subcommittee needs to hear. 

The fact is that ensuring that SLS and Orion make maximum 

progress, especially in this environment of budgetary uncertainty, 

is a job for both the Administration and for Congress. And just as 

a side note, I would say that the budget caps known as the sequester give rise to the inability for us to get a multiyear bipartisan authorization and appropriation to the President’s desk as the evidence of our support for SLS and Orion and for the journey to 

Mars. We have to lift those budget caps in order to accomplish the 

goals that we’ve set out for the agency and for its contractors. Ensuring that SLS and Orion make maximum progress, especially in 

this environment of budget uncertainty, is a job both for the Administration and for Congress. And as the National Academies report reminds us, achieving the goals for sending humans to deep 

space requires a joint commitment on the part of Congress and on 

the part of the Administration. 

Mars is a goal that’s worthy of this great nation, and I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, to enable NASA’s continued progress toward that goal. 

And before I yield, I want to welcome an intern for a month in 

my office, Salil Maddy, who is at the Madeira School. We share in-
16 

terns with them every year, and two of them here today are very 

interested in space, and so we welcome them. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of 

my time. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Edwards follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE

RANKING MEMBER DONNA F. EDWARDS

Good morning. I’d like to welcome back our two witnesses, Mr. Dumbacher and 

Mr. Cooke. I say ‘‘back’’ because both of you have appeared before our Subcommittee 

previously, as former leaders of NASA’s human exploration programs. I appreciate 

your past public service as well as your willingness to testify today. 

Mr. Chairman, last December, millions of people in America and around the world 

tasted the future when NASA conducted the Exploration Flight Test—EFT-1—in 

which the Orion crew vehicle traveled farther into space than any human 

spaceflight vehicle since the Apollo era. That future is an exciting one that includes 

sending humans to the surface of Mars. 

Mars is the goal that we established in our bipartisan House-passed NASA Authorization Act of 2015. And it’s the consensus goal for human space exploration of 

a distinguished National Academies panel that recently examined U.S. human space 

exploration. So, it’s fitting, Mr. Chairman, that we follow-up on our Subcommittee’s 

review of the Space Launch System and Orion crew vehicle programs that was held 

last December, just after the EFT-1 flight test, and see where these programs stand 

now. 

By any measure, the progress on SLS and Orion is visible and tangible. NASA 

and its contractors deserve credit for the many accomplishments achieved to date. 

Tests of the SLS solid rocket booster engines and the RS-25 main engine are reviving and modernizing the propulsion activities that brought us through the successful 

Shuttle era. Elements of the Orion crew vehicle that will return American astronauts to deep space are being fabricated as I speak. And just a few weeks ago, the 

Orion program was approved to transition from formulation into development, a 

major milestone known as Key Decision Point C or KDP-C. 

This hearing should provide an opportunity to discuss the outcomes of the Orion 

KDP-C review and clarify any questions, including the perception, by some, of a 

two-year ‘‘slip’’ to the first crewed flight test known as Exploration Mission-2 or EM2. 

However, I would note that the members of the panel were not involved in this 

recent Orion KDP-C review. Only NASA can address questions regarding the KDPC milestone, discuss the breadth of accomplishments achieved to date, and inform 

us of the challenges going forward. That is why I was puzzled, Mr. Chairman, that 

NASA was not initially invited to testify, and why I extended an invitation to the 

Associate Administrator of NASA’s Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate to serve as a witness. Unfortunately, the 

Associate Administrator’s international travel schedule precluded his ability to appear this morning. 

So, I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we will give NASA the opportunity in another 

hearing to provide the details on the SLS and Orion programs that this Subcommittee needs to hear. Because ensuring that SLS and Orion make maximum 

progress, especially in this environment of budgetary uncertainty, is a job for both 

the Administration and Congress. And as the National Academies report reminds 

us, achieving the goals for sending humans to deep space requires a joint commitment on the part of Congress and the Administration. 

Mars is a goal worthy of this great nation and I look forward to working with 

you, Mr. Chairman, to enable NASA’s continued progress toward that goal. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you, Ms. Edwards. 

I now recognize the Chairman of the full Committee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

At a fundamental level, space exploration—the mission of 

NASA—is about inspiration. This inspiration fuels our desire to 
17 

push the boundaries of what is possible and to reach beyond our 

own planet. 

The American people are fascinated with space exploration. Just 

last week, the discovery that water sometimes flows on Mars’ surface made headlines across the world. And the latest space film, 

The Martian, has sparked questions about when NASA will send 

astronauts to Mars. Today’s hearing seeks to answer those questions and examine the effect of the President’s budget on our exploration programs. In its fiscal year 2016 budget proposal, the 

Obama Administration proposed a cut of over $440 million from 

the programs that will take us to Mars: the Space Launch System 

and Orion crew vehicle. This isn’t new; the President has tried to 

cut SLS and Orion every year since he took office. 

But there should be no misunderstanding: there is bipartisan 

support within Congress for SLS and the Orion crew vehicle. This 

Committee restored the proposed cuts in our authorization bill, and 

the House and the Senate Appropriations Committees restored 

these funds and supported SLS and Orion at the levels necessary 

to keep their development on track. Yet the Administration continues to try to strangle these programs. 

NASA recently announced that the first crewed mission for SLS 

and Orion was delayed by two years because the Administration 

would not allow NASA to budget for the programs. The Administration regularly cuts SLS and Orion, and Congress continues to 

restore its cuts. The budget instability caused by the Administration makes it hard for NASA to plan and execute these critical programs. The fact that NASA can still maintain these earlier dates 

in the face of Administration opposition is a testament to the ingenuity, resolve, and professionalism of the NASA workforce. 

The Obama Administration cannot continue to claim that it 

prioritizes Mars exploration if it refuses to prioritize and support 

the programs that will get us there. 

The SLS and Orion programs represent what is most impressive 

about the American spirit: our desire to explore. The technologies 

that are developed for these programs exemplify our greatest 

breakthroughs and demonstrate American ingenuity. 

The Apollo program 50 years ago demonstrated that we could 

reach the Moon. Orion and SLS will take us beyond that and rekindle the American spirit of discovery and advance humanity farther 

in space than ever before. Congress will continue to ensure that 

these national priorities receive the funding they need to stay on 

schedule and on budget. 

Great nations do great things, and fortune favors the bold. The 

next several years will determine whether American astronauts 

will be the first to plant a flag on Mars. We want them to have 

arrived there onboard an Orion crew vehicle, propelled by the 

Space Launch System. 

Mr. Chairman, I also just want to comment on the recent handout that we have all seen by the Administration called ‘‘NASA’s 

Journey to Mars.’’ Regrettably, however, this proposal contains no 

budget, it contains no schedule, no deadlines. It’s just some real 

pretty photographs and some nice words. That is not going to do 

it. That is not going to get us to Mars. This sounds good, but it’s 

actually a journey to nowhere until we have that budget and we 
18 

have the schedule and we have the deadlines. And I hope the Administration will change its posture and decide in the future that 

it is actually going to support SLS and Orion and keep them on 

schedule because their proposals to cut SLS and Orion every single 

year is not helping us achieve the great goals that most Americans 

want to achieve in space. 

And I’ll yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Smith follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FULL COMMITTEE

CHAIRMAN LAMAR S. SMITH

At a fundamental level, space exploration—the mission of NASA—is about inspiration. This inspiration fuels our desire to push the boundaries of what is possible 

and to reach beyond our own planet. 

The American people are fascinated with space exploration. Just last week, the 

discovery that water sometimes flows on Mars’ surface made headlines across the 

world. And the latest space film, The Martian, has sparked questions about when 

NASA will send astronauts to Mars. 

Today’s hearing seeks to answer those questions and examine the effect of the 

president’s budget on our exploration programs. 

In its Fiscal Year 2016 budget proposal, the Obama administration proposed a cut of over $440 million from the programs that will take us to Mars: the Space Launch 

System (SLS) and Orion crew vehicle. This isn’t new; the president has tried to cut 

SLS and Orion every year since he took office. 

But there should be no misunderstanding: there is bipartisan support within Congress for SLS and the Orion crew vehicle. This Committee restored the proposed 

cuts in our Authorization bill. And the House and the Senate Appropriations Committees restored these funds and supported SLS and Orion at the levels necessary 

to keep their development on track. 

Yet the administration continues to try to strangle these programs. 

NASA recently announced that the first crewed mission for SLS and Orion was 

delayed by two years because the administration would not allow NASA to budget 

for the programs. 

The administration regularly cuts SLS and Orion and Congress continues to restore its cuts. The budget instability caused by the administration makes it hard 

for NASA to plan and execute these critical programs. 

The fact that NASA can still maintain these earlier dates in the face of administration opposition is a testament to the ingenuity, resolve, and professionalism of 

the NASA workforce. 

The Obama administration cannot continue to claim that it prioritizes Mars exploration if it refuses to prioritize and support the programs that will get us there. 

The SLS and Orion programs represent what is most impressive about the American spirit—our desire to explore. The technologies that are developed for these programs exemplify our greatest breakthroughs and demonstrate American ingenuity. 

The Apollo program fifty years ago demonstrated that we could reach the moon. 

Orion and SLS will take us beyond that and rekindle the American spirit of discovery and advance humanity farther in space than ever before. 

Congress will continue to ensure that these national priorities receive the funding 

they need to stay on schedule and on budget. 

Great nations do great things. And fortune favors the bold. The next several years 

will determine whether American astronauts will be the first to plant a flag on 

Mars. We want them to have arrived there onboard an Orion crew vehicle, propelled 

by the Space Launch System. 

Mr. Chairman, I also just want to comment on the recent handout that we have 

all seen by the administration called ‘‘NASA’s Journey to Mars.’’ Regrettably, however, this proposal contains no budget; it contains no schedule, no deadlines. It’s just 

some real pretty photographs and some nice words. That is not going to do it. That 

is not going to get us to Mars. This sounds good, but it is actually a journey to nowhere until we have that budget and we have the schedule and we have the deadlines. 

And I hope the administration will change its posture and decide in the future 

that it is actually going to support SLS and Orion and keep them on schedule because their proposals to cut SLS and Orion every single year is not helping us 

achieve the great goals that most Americans want to achieve in space. 
19 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I now recognize the Ranking Member of the full Committee, the 

gentlewoman from Texas. 

Ms. JOHNSON OF TEXAS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 

and good morning. Let me welcome our witnesses. I look forward 

to your testimony. 

In view of the uncertainties in today’s schedule, I will be brief 

in my remarks so that we can have enough time for a good discussion with our witnesses. 

This Committee has long supported a strong human spaceflight 

and exploration program for the nation. I’m excited about the prospect of America leading an international team to the surface of 

Mars not too many years from now. And I hope that our two witnesses, who have significant previous experience in NASA’s human 

exploration program, will help us better understand the challenges 

NASA faces in realizing the goal. 

NASA has just released its updated ‘‘Journey to Mars’’ report, 

and I hope that we will invite NASA to come before this Committee 

to discuss it. As Ms. Edwards has noted, NASA should really be at 

the table today for this hearing. 

Getting to Mars will be very challenging. We all know that. And 

we know that it will take adequate funding if we are to get there 

efficiently and safely. 

I have made no secret of my willingness to invest more in NASA, 

and this Committee has that authority. All we have to do is authorize it and its human exploration, aeronautics, science, and technology programs because it is an investment, not just spending, an 

investment that will pay long-lasting dividends to this nation as it 

has in the past. 

But it’s not just a question of more money. It’s giving NASA 

more predictability as to when that money will actually show up. 

If this Congress is looking for reasons why NASA’s exploration program faces potential delays, we need to look no further than ourselves right here on this Committee. Too many times in recent 

years, NASA has had no idea when it would actually get an appropriation, whether it would actually be reauthorized, whether that 

appropriation would be for more than a few months, or whether 

they may even have to suspend their work due to a government 

shutdown. That is no way that a government should treat a premier program and a premier R&D enterprise and its dedicated 

workforce to have it to operate. 

If we are going to ask NASA and its contractors to carry out the 

extremely challenging job of getting America to Mars, this Congress is going to have do its job as well. 

So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back, and I wait to 

hear what you are going to authorize for this mission. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson of Texas follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FULL COMMITTEE

RANKING MEMBER EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON

Good morning, and welcome to our witnesses. I look forward to your testimony. 

In view of the uncertainties in today’s schedule, I will be brief in my remarks so 

that we can have enough time for a good discussion with our witnesses. 
20 

This Committee has long supported a strong human space flight and exploration 

program for the nation. I am excited about the prospect of America leading an international team to the surface of Mars not too many years from now. And I hope that 

our two witnesses, who have significant previous experience in NASA’s human exploration program, will help us better understand the challenges NASA faces in realizing that goal. 

NASA has just released its updated ‘‘Journey to Mars’’ report, and I hope that 

we will invite NASA to come before this Committee to discuss it. As Ms. Edwards 

has noted, NASA should really be at today’s hearing too. 

Getting to Mars will be very challenging. We all know that. And we know that 

it will take adequate funding if we are to get there efficiently and safely. I have 

made no secret of my willingness to invest more in NASA—in its human exploration, aeronautics, science, and technology programs. Because it is an investment— 

not just spending—an investment that will pay long-lasting dividends to this nation. 

But it’s not just a question of more money—it’s giving NASA some predictability 

as to when that money will actually show up. If this Congress is looking for reasons 

why NASA’s exploration program faces potential delays, we need look no further 

than ourselves. 

Too many times in recent years, NASA has had no idea when it would actually 

get an appropriation, whether that appropriation would be for more than a few 

months, or whether they might even have to suspend their work due to a government shutdown. That is no way for America’s premier R&D enterprise and its dedicated workforce to have to operate. 

If we are going to ask NASA and its contractors to carry out the extremely challenging job of getting America to Mars, this Congress is going to have do its job 

too.Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you, Mrs. Johnson. 

Let me introduce our witnesses now. First we have Mr. Douglas 

Cooke who will be testifying, the Owner of Cooke Concepts and Solutions, and a former Associate Administrator of Exploration Systems at NASA. This division is responsible for building Orion and 

the SLS, the two vehicles that will take humans to deep space destinations including Mars. Mr. Cooke is the recipient of several 

awards including the Presidential Distinguished Rank Award and 

Presidential Meritorious Rank Award. He has over 40 years of experience in human spaceflight. He received his bachelor’s in Aerospace Engineering from Texas A&M University, and we’re very 

happy to have him here today. Thank you, Mr. Cooke. 

Our second witness today is Mr. Daniel Dumbacher. Mr. 

Dumbacher is a Professor of Engineering Practice at Purdue University. Mr. Dumbacher served as Deputy Associate Administrator 

in the Exploration Systems Development Division at NASA. He has 

received the Presidential Rank Award for Meritorious Service and 

the NASA Exceptional Achievement Medal. Prior to this 35-year 

career with NASA, Mr. Dumbacher earned his bachelor’s degree in 

Mechanical Engineering from Purdue University and a master’s in 

Business Administration from the University of Alabama. He is 

also a graduate of the Senior Managers and Government Study 

Program at Harvard University. 

I now recognize Mr. Cooke for five minutes to present his testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. DOUG COOKE, OWNER, 

COOKE CONCEPTS AND SOLUTIONS; 

FORMER ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, 

EXPLORATION SYSTEMS, NASA 

Mr. COOKE. Thank you, Chairman Babin—— 
21 

Chairman BABIN. Mr. Cooke, if you could start over and turn on 

your mic. 

Mr. COOKE. I apologize. 

I want to thank Chairman Babin, Ranking Member Edwards, 

and from the full Committee, Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Johnson, and Members of this Committee for this opportunity. 

My interest in human exploration of space has been a primary 

focus of my life and career since the flights of Yuri Gagarin and 

the Mercury astronauts. The success of programs to send people to 

the Moon and Mars is of paramount importance to me, and I believe to everyone. 

I applaud your bipartisan support and the people at NASA and 

in industry who work diligently every day to make these and other 

NASA programs successful. 

The important questions you’re asking specifically address deep 

space exploration, so that is the part of the budget I’ll address. 

The most challenging aspect of managing these programs is due 

to constrained budgets and unplanned changes to operating budgets, whether real or contrived. The technical challenges are fun in 

comparison. The disparity between the President’s budget request, 

or PBR, and budgets passed by Congress for exploration vehicles— 

the Space Launch System, Orion, and Ground Systems—causes 

problems in managing and executing these programs. It also causes 

issues in perceptions of program health. 

To advance these programs Congress has consistently passed 

budgets each year that are significantly greater than the PBR. It 

has been clear Congress intends to follow through with this necessary funding, yet the Administration asks for less. 

NASA managers are required to plan the complex development 

schedules to the PBR over the five-year runout. NASA fixed cost 

are included, and are a higher percentage of a lower PBR budget. 

This leaves less money for SLS and Orion progress. Constrained 

budgets limit what work can be accomplished more efficiently in 

parallel. It moves stated flight dates later than if they planned to 

Congressional budget runouts. Contracts are negotiated with companies for content and schedule, flight dates and expectations are 

set. When there are major policy or priority shifts or disruptions 

to the budget process on funding, these detailed plans and their 

interdependencies have to be changed, schedules and contracts are 

renegotiated at additional cost, adding to the problem. 

As an example, the 2016 President’s request for SLS, Orion, and 

Ground Systems is 2.86 billion. Under current spending under the 

Continuing Resolution, NASA should be spending at a rate commensurate with the 2015 level of 3.25 billion, or 382 million more. 

In fact, the current 2015 spending level is 118 million more than 

the President’s budget proposes for the year 2020 in their five-year 

runout. 

On the other hand, for 2016 alone, this year’s House bill is 546 

million over the President’s 2016 request and the Senate’s bill is 

647 million more. If a budget bill is passed for NASA this year at 

these higher levels, the programs will adjust spending upward. 

Programs will make the most of these funds in advancing progress, 

but changing spending rates creates inefficiencies. They will still 

plan to the budget’s reduced level for 2017 and beyond. I do advo-
22 

cate for the higher levels. If the Administration would propose at 

needed values within small percentage points of consistent Congressional levels, spending rates would be much more stable and 

planning more reliable. I believe this disparity in policy priorities 

has remained since the cancellation of the Constellation program. 

I was asked to comment on the use of the Joint Confidence Levels, an analysis used in the KDP–C milestones for SLS last year 

and the same milestone for Orion this year. These milestones led 

to NASA announcements of delays for SLS of a one-year and up to 

a two-year slip of the first crewed flight. Theoretically, the JCL is 

a good statistical analysis for evaluation of the uncertainties in programs that affect budget and schedule. An accurate JCL calculation requires meticulous collection of extremely detailed tasks, 

costs and schedules; costing program resources. 

The JCL provides a valuable function for rigorous inspection of 

a program. However, from my direct experience in implementing it, 

I believe it has little utility for predicting schedule milestones in 

this budget environment when planning to the President’s budget 

request rather than actual Congressional appropriated budgets. 

JCL outcomes become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Because actual 

budgets are actually higher year-to-year, NASA tries to maintain 

earlier planning dates and is trying to mitigate this confusion but 

could be more efficient if the source of confusion were not there. 

There are significant differences in budget and oversight practices between the Commercial Cargo and Crew and the traditional 

exploration programs. With the experience gained thus far, best 

practices should be established for both while preserving safety and 

accountability. 

SLS and Orion are first critical developments in our human exploration of the solar system. They are making great progress in 

spite of these burdens. 

I want to thank the Committee and your staff again for your continued support of NASA and human spaceflight. I have submitted 

further detail in my written testimony, and welcome your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooke follows:] 
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Chairman BABIN. Thank you, Mr. Cooke. We appreciate it. 

I now recognize Mr. Dumbacher for five minutes to present his 

testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. DAN DUMBACHER, 

PROFESSOR OF ENGINEERING PRACTICE, 

PURDUE UNIVERSITY; 

FORMER DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, 

HUMAN EXPLORATION AND 

OPERATIONS MISSION DIRECTORATE, NASA 

Mr. DUMBACHER. Chairman Babin and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss NASA’s deep space 

exploration efforts on this, the 31st anniversary of Astronaut Kathy 

Sullivan’s spacewalk. On this day in 1984, Dr. Sullivan, current 

NOAA Administrator, became the first U.S. woman ever to see the 

Earth from that unique vantage point. 

I thank you also for your support of our nation’s space exploration efforts. It is an honor for me to represent Purdue, a public 

land-grant university, educating the next generation of explorers. 

I find the students of today to be part of a curious, passionate, and 

dedicated generation. These young voters are ready to build and 

create a better future for all of us. 

And, as a former NASA team member, I want to express my utmost respect for the NASA/industry team’s accomplishments in the 

current environment. This team is working on a scale larger than 

Apollo with a constrained budget. Much like today’s students, their 

enthusiasm and dedication to the mission is evident every day and 

sets the leadership example. 

The NASA 2010 Authorization Act and the 2014 Pathways to Exploration Report from the National Research Council provide a 

sound, inclusive basis for space exploration goals and objectives 

that should be adequately funded. 

I believe we are at a critical juncture in our exploration efforts. 

As we continue missions to extend our presence further into the 

solar system, we must build the foundational capabilities for humans to go onward: the Space Launch System and Orion. We must 

effectively utilize humanity’s principal technological achievement, 

the International Space Station, as an exploration test bed and valuable research facility, and we must seed the initial phases of commercial space travel. 

Given the budget instability and continuous policy debates, the 

NASA/industry team is making great progress. The team is dedicated to building all systems as safely as possible, as soon as possible, and as cost-efficiently as possible. The Space Launch System 

has successfully passed its Critical Design Review along with engine tests, booster tests, and structures that were flight-tested last 

December. The Orion capsule completed its first flight test last December, and is proceeding to systems testing. Orion’s European 

Service Module is on track for the first flight and launch infrastructure is on schedule. 

Keeping these critical programs on schedule is essential for two 

reasons. One, the United States needs to continue to maintain our 

global leadership in space. We must leave this legacy of leadership 
33 

for the next generation. Two, schedule equals cost. Maintaining 

funding stability, and therefore schedule, is essential to minimizing 

the cost of these programs. NASA’s leadership, plans, and management implementation reflects the need for cost efficiency with reduced insight/oversight, reduced management and integration overhead, all while carefully maintaining and improving crew safety 

over previous systems. 

Budget stability is the major issue in executing these programs. 

All players in the appropriations process have a stake in maintaining this budget stability. This budget stability has two basic components. First the annual debate between the Executive Branch request and Congressional appropriations is an important factor that 

drives inefficiency. The second aspect of budget stability is the recent history at the national budget level of continuing resolutions 

and government shutdowns. Both components lead to cost and 

schedule impacts to the programs via continuous re-planning, confusion across the entire team, and loss of team focus. 

NASA diligently manages risk, cost, and schedule through daily, 

direct contractor interaction, periodic element program reviews 

with detailed discussions of technical and programmatic progress, 

issues, and risks. The Joint Confidence Level is a model risk-based 

approach to assess potential technical and programmatic uncertainties and their possible sensitivities and impacts to the cost and 

schedule of a program. This has proven to be successful in robotic 

mission programs but is much more difficult for the large, longer 

term programs such as the Space Launch System and Orion. 

In summary, the biggest challenge in developing the Space 

Launch System, Orion, the launch support infrastructure, and 

Commercial Crew is budget stability, not the eventual technical 

issues. Managing these programs efficiently and effectively is the 

result of the dedicated NASA/industry team across this country, 

and the international partners. 

The government-funded Lewis and Clark expedition helped open 

the frontier for the commercial development of rail transportation 

and other opportunities to the West Coast. Today, NASA is opening 

the frontier of space and helping to build the space economy. 

Thank you for your time and attention. I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dumbacher follows:] 
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41 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you, Mr. Dumbacher. We appreciate 

your testimony. 

I now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning. I presume 

these will be for both of you guys, if that’s okay. 

When the Administration slipped the recent Orion launch schedule, NASA was very quick to point out that they were still planning 

the original launch date. If NASA program managers believe that 

the earlier launch readiness date could be kept on track with historical Congressional appropriations, then why doesn’t the agency 

commit to those earlier dates to begin with? 

Mr. Cooke, how about you first? 

Mr. COOKE. I understand what you’re asking. Within the agency 

and within the Administration, NASA plans to the President’s 

budget request, which is the Administration policy, and that’s 

where the confusion comes in when the Congressional budgets are 

higher. Naturally, people in these programs are wanting to 

progress, they are wanting to plan as much work into the funding 

they get, and so the appropriated budgets are utilized, and they 

make as much progress as they can. However, if planning in out 

years to the President’s budget request, if they’re doing that, then 

at some point it becomes self-fulfilling as the long lead items can’t 

be planned on or bought or paid down, and so gradually the advanced planning overtakes what the schedule that they might have 

held. 

Chairman BABIN. Okay. And how about you, Mr. Dumbacher? 

Mr. DUMBACHER. Congressman Babin, I agree with everything 

that Mr. Cooke just said. I think it’s clear from a program implementation perspective that when we try to put the best plan together that we can and we are continuously working—in my tenure 

at NASA, we were continuously dealing with a plan against the 

President’s budget request as necessary by policy within the Administration, and also having to recognize that the appropriations 

process was probably going to change that number and increase it, 

that we also had to develop another set of plans to be prepared for 

the appropriations process. That was standard operating procedure. 

We did it annually because of the policy debates that were ongoing, 

and we did the best we could with the planning and with the execution given that uncertainty that we were working with each year. 

Chairman BABIN. Okay, sir. Thank you. 

My second question would be, if NASA reverted to the manner 

in which it applied termination liability to contractors under the 

Constellation program as well as how it treats the ISS program 

and JPL, how much more money would that allow the scientists 

and engineers to devote to development work and how would that 

impact the schedule? 

Mr. COOKE. In terms of the past, for instance, for the International Space Station, there were actually words in legislation 

that helped that situation so that termination liability was less of 

a burden to the programs. Currently, or early in—actually as post 

termination of Constellation program, the programs—each program 

has to set aside, and each project has to set aside funding to protect for termination liability. As I understand it, the number for 

SLS and Orion right now is on the order of 420 million, and that— 

if that is held back, then that’s money that’s not going to execution. 
42 

I think there may be some relaxing of how that’s done currently 

but the contractors are actually, as I understand it, responsible for 

maintaining the termination liability. So in any event, any help 

that they could have in not having to hold back funding would be 

beneficial, in my view. 

Chairman BABIN. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Dumbacher? 

Mr. DUMBACHER. Chairman Babin, I agree with Mr. Cooke just 

said. There—during our execution of SLS and Orion up until I left 

the agency, termination liability, having to withhold that work or 

having to hold that money back each year meant that it was that 

amount of work that we were not making progress with across SLS 

and Orion. It was an impact to the program. It was an impact to 

our schedule. And it became—and it was an annual issue that we 

had to deal with both from a government policy implementation 

perspective as well as a corporate risk management strategy perspective. 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you, and I’ll recognize the gentlewoman 

from Maryland. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you again 

to the witnesses. 

Mr. Dumbacher, in your prepared statement, you referred to the 

National Academies’ Pathways to Exploration report and note that 

its recommendations ‘‘should serve as the basis for an overall strategy and plan for human exploration.’’ This Subcommittee and the 

House have similar views and called for a human exploration roadmap in the House-passed 2015 NASA authorization bill. 

I just wonder what your views are on the key thrusts that are 

made by the Pathways report and whether NASA’s strategy of 

Earth-reliant proving ground and Earth-independence satisfy the 

National Academies’ recommendation, and if they don’t, why not? 

And then what should Congress expect to see in a solid strategy? 

What are the key elements for a roadmap that we should be looking at that have a little bit more precision? 

Mr. DUMBACHER. Congresswoman Edwards, I think the 2014 

NRC report that—and I will be honest, I am speaking from my 

own, not the fact that the chairman of that committee is now the 

president of my university—— 

Ms. EDWARDS. That’s not a conflict. 

Mr. DUMBACHER. That’s the way the faculty look at it. 

That report lays out a very sound approach. It lays out an approach and should be, in my opinion, used as a touchstone along 

with the 2010 Authorization Act to put a strategy together. I think 

your question about the Earth-reliant proving ground, Earth independent, that’s the first level of it. It’s not—it needs to be fleshed 

out in greater detail with more strategy along the way. I think the 

key elements of that strategy need to recognize that this is exploration—we will be learning each step of the way—and it has to be 

flexible and we have to have the ability to modify the strategy 

based on what we learn because, in essence, what we are doing 

with exploration is, we are expanding our neighborhood from low 

Earth orbit out to cislunar space and then eventually to Mars, and 

I hope beyond that. 
43 

So I think those elements are essential to build upon the plan, 

and I think the NRC report gives us a good methodology by which 

to think about it, a good starting point, and also some good indication frankly from a funding perspective in terms of what kind of 

funding would be reasonable along with an inflation growth to be 

able to implement such a strategy. 

Ms. EDWARDS. So let me just ask you, Mr. Cooke, then about 

funding because we’ve heard talk already on this Committee about 

the debates and the push and pull that have gone back and forth 

between Congress and the Administration, but do you have some 

thoughts about the constraints that this uncertain environment 

with the sequester caps in place and basically living at level funding in what Mr. Dumbacher has described as an exploration environment, what kind of constraints that puts on our ability to fully 

explore and develop this program? 

And then lastly, I mean, I have often thought that it might make 

more sense for Congress to simply put a date certain, an endpoint. 

NASA is saying maybe in the 2030s. Well, what if Congress came 

back and said, well, how about 2020, and then we develop a budget 

and a program around something that’s more certain than just continuing to expand it into the future, and I’ll leave you with the balance of my time. 

Mr. COOKE. I believe that the flat budget is one—well, it’s a fact 

that with inflation, a flat budget has less buying power over time, 

so to explore and move beyond where we are, move to the next 

steps after SLS and Orion, it will require increased funding. There 

was at some level, and not terribly high, I think, but funding does 

need to be restored over time to exploration in order to make these 

goals, and I think it is a good question to ask if we are to get to, 

say, the Moon, by a date, to Mars at some date, what does it take 

to do that and I think that’s your question. I think it’s a great 

question. It’s one that deserves an answer. It’s—that’s really the 

way it should be done. 

And then of course, you can decide, and then it gets into debate 

of deciding whether or not it can be afforded, but certainly that’s 

the way a program should be laid out, in a way that has development funding that is more efficient than what’s being done currently under caps and flat-lined budgets. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you. 

Now we recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Brooks. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is a question for both of you. How should NASA pick a 

human exploration mission end timeline? 

Mr. COOKE. I believe—and I have been able to briefly read the 

report that was put out yesterday by NASA. I think there are a lot 

of good elements in it. But I think in laying out a program, one 

thing that is missing from it and one thing I’ve stated before, in 

fact, I testified on it in May of 2013 in this Committee, I believe 

that we need to start with a discussion in the community, whether 

it is science or the exploration committee including our international partners, those who are interested in developing resources 

on the Moon, we need to have a conversation up front to lay out 

objectives for what we will achieve on these missions. It’s not just 
44 

a matter of well, we’re going to build this rocket to go to this place. 

It’s important to understand what we want to achieve, and I think 

laying that out helps guide the steps involved. And personally, I believe those steps include going to the Moon, to going potentially to 

the moons of Mars and to Mars itself. 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Dumbacher, do you have anything to add? 

Mr. DUMBACHER. Congressman Brooks, yes, I do. A couple of 

points to add to Mr. Cooke is that as it’s necessary to bring the 

stakeholders along, it’s also—I think we need to be very careful 

recognizing the funding constraints that we operate within that we 

need to make sure that the elements that we build for exploration 

don’t just become one-offs or just be able to used once, that they 

have a continuous applicability through the rest of the exploration 

strategy. I think that’s a key element that we need to do, and we 

also frankly need to be very careful about making sure we live 

within the funding constraints that are in the appropriations levels 

that are provided by the Congress. So those are the two key elements I would add to what Mr. Cooke had. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you. This is again a question for both of you, 

and Mr. Cooke, I’ve already heard your comments about going to 

the moon, Mars’s moons and perhaps Mars, but if you have any additions, please offer that. 

What do you recommend as NASA’s SLS and Orion missions? 

Mr. COOKE. I believe that the SLS and Orion represent the first 

critical steps in any exploration activity beyond Earth orbit. You 

need the lift capacity of the Space Launch System. You need the 

volume if its payload—— 

Mr. BROOKS. I understand that, but do you want our missions to 

be? 

Mr. COOKE. I think personally, there’s discussion about cislunar 

space. That is definitely a possibility. It could be a very good intermediate point in Mars, a place to send Mars missions from, but I 

do believe in going to the Moon. 

The Moon that we know now based on spacecraft that have gone 

there since Apollo has opened up a different Moon than we’ve seen 

before that’s much more dramatic and landscaped. We’ve mapped 

resources. I think there’s a lot to learn if we sent people there. So 

I think that the Moon is still an important place to go on the way 

to Mars eventually. 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Dumbacher, do you have anything to add? 

Mr. DUMBACHER. Yes, Congressman. A couple of things I would 

add are, again, everything we do needs to be buildable towards 

Mars. It needs to help take us towards Mars and be usable along 

the way. We need to do the testing necessary to make sure that 

we learn how to operate in environments where we are further 

away from home than we’ve ever been in the distant retrograde 

orbit cislunar space area. We’ll be nine days away from home as 

compared to three days away from home during Apollo. 

Another aspect I would add is an increase in mission frequency. 

I think it’s important that we shorten up the time between missions. That means additional funding, but it is—I believe it’s important that we increase the mission frequency to maintain our 

skills, build our skills and then be able to learn as quickly and provide the benefits back as quickly as possible. 
45 

Mr. BROOKS. I’m almost out of time, but this is a short question. 

Since Orion is running behind schedule, what can be flown on 

the Space Launch System in its place from a test standpoint? 

Mr. DUMBACHER. Congressman, that’s a—I’ll take that first. 

We—that’s a good question. I think the two programs have been 

integrally linked from the beginning in that the first flight test 

EM–1 needed to have an uncrewed version of Orion, and I believe 

that they are on schedule for that flight, and with NASA continuing to work to the management agreement of 2021, assuming 

the Congressional appropriations levels, they’re still working to the 

existing plan. What other cargo missions there might be would remain to be seen but I think we would have to have—NASA would 

need to take a look at possible cargo missions, other possible payloads, other possible science missions. 

Mr. COOKE. And I would agree that there are possibilities. I 

agree with what Mr. Dumbacher said, and the plan is for Orion to 

fly. But in the future, SLS will provide a unique capability for larger telescopes with larger apertures potentially. There has been discussion on a Europa mission at some point. 

There are potentially uses in defense space as well. It has unique 

capabilities that could provide other very good opportunities. 

Chairman BABIN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Thank you. 

Now I call on the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Beyer. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’ll begin with Mr. Dumbacher. You talked about budget stability. 

You mention in your testimony that the NRC report and the 2010 

Authorization Act should be followed to ensure adequate funding 

for SLS and Orion. Could you please explain what you mean by 

that, and especially in light of the fact that the last time humans 

left low Earth orbit was 1972 with Apollo 17? What would this do 

to increase our confidence that the EM–2 launch will actually be 

carried out in 2021? 

Mr. DUMBACHER. I think, Congressman, first of all, at the Congressional appropriations level and NASA continuing to work towards the 2021 date for the Orion first crewed flight, I think the 

Congressional appropriations levels and accounting for inflation 

over this time period, recognizing the loss of purchasing power that 

that infuses into the system, can help—Congressional appropriations can maintain the 2021 date, and I think that’s important. 

For the overall exploration, I think the thoughts put together as 

part of the NRC report that talk about a level of funding that basically starts out similar to the Congressional appropriations level, 

grows at about two to three percent per year in real growth plus 

inflation on top of that, I think provides a good, sound basis, and 

importantly, if NASA knows that that’s going to be the plan over 

the long term, they can plan to that, and that’s the important part 

is if you know what you’re working to over a longer horizon and 

you can plan to that, that is a key part. 

One of the things we struggled with in my time at NASA was 

the budget request that came out as a one-year budget request and 

the budget horizon from then on was labeled as ‘‘notional.’’ As a 

program manager, I struggle with, how do I plan to a notional 

budget? So the key point is, knowing what the numbers are, having 

some feel for what those numbers are going to be over a five-, ten- 
46 

year budget horizon and then you can put a reasonable program together. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Cooke, Chairman Babin talked in his opening statement 

about the Administration’s strangling NASA with the budget cuts. 

I along with many of our colleagues on both sides offered amendments in Committee to increase the NASA authorization, only to 

be told that our Committee hands were tied by the Budget Control 

Act and by the bicameral budget passed in the House and the Senate with Republican majorities. 

How much of these budget cuts are driven by sequester, by the 

Budget Control Act? 

Mr. COOKE. I honestly can’t answer that specifically on the Budget Control Act. My experience has been primarily between Congressionally passed budgets and President’s budget, and I would say as 

an example right now of what I think could be done, if NASA were 

to be able to count on the Congressionally approved levels, is make 

a decision to go to a larger upper stage than the first—than the one 

flown on the first test flight. We’re flying an interim upper stage 

based on Delta upper stage for this test flight, and if NASA could 

count on the Congressional levels, it could probably make a decision to go to the upper stage it needs for exploration. That would 

keep NASA from having to human-rate this interim upper stage for 

the first crew flight, which would save a significant amount of 

money. So just the efficiencies gained in a higher budget in terms 

of the development, in developing the right answer instead of interim steps would be of great benefit. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you, Mr. Cooke. 

Mr. Dumbacher, again, budget stability. We just avoided a government shutdown at the end of September. We’re now looking at 

hitting the debt ceilings in the next couple of weeks. We’ve postponed the budget and the government shutdown debate until December 11th. What would—what was the impact on Orion and SLS 

when we shut down the government for 16 days in 2013? What 

would be the impact if we shut it down for 10 days later this year? 

Mr. DUMBACHER. Well, I cannot speak to the exact details of 

what a potential impact would be for 10 days down the road from 

here, but back two years ago when we did have that 16-day shutdown, there was a significant impact to the program, particularly 

because at that point we were— particularly Orion was coming up 

on the hardware and the integration, a year away from the exploration flight test. And so having to stand down the team for 16 

days and then restart it, when you consider the level of budgets 

that we’re talking here and the burn rate that we had at that time, 

which I recall, if I do my math correctly, was on the order of $60 

million a week, that’s a significant impact to the program because 

it’s not just the 16 days, it’s the planning that the team had to go 

through to prepare for that, it’s the phasing down to get to that 

shutdown, and then it’s the restart to come up after the shutdown. 

So that was a significant impact to Orion and to SLs as well as 

Ground Systems across the board just for a 16-day impact. 

Mr. COOKE. I’d like to add to that just briefly. NASA is in a 

unique situation on something like a shutdown. It is not like most 

agencies. It’s developing something. It’s developing hardware. It’s— 
47 

they’re programs that are underway. So it’s a lot of people with a 

lot of interrelated tasks and jobs that most agencies don’t deal 

with. So a shutdown does have an impact in development. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you. I would remind the gentleman 

from Virginia that in our budgeting and authorization and issues 

of exploration, we fully funded—this Committee always fully funded that, and what you were referring to was not exploration with 

some of those issues. 

I now would like to recognize Mr. Rohrabacher, the gentleman 

from California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

It’s good to see you fellows again and again over the years. 

How much is the Mars initiative going to cost when it’s completed? When we get the person on Mars and back, how much will 

we have spent? 

Mr. COOKE. I think at this point, since we don’t have a specific 

roadmap with missions laid out, we really don’t know the cost. I 

will say that if you take any program—if you take the Shuttle program, if you take the Space Station program and if you put the full 

cost at the front end of it and said this is what it was going to cost, 

it would be a big number, and—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Well, let me ask you this then. Has— 

you mean there’s no document that you’ve read that NASA—and 

we’ve all signed on that says this is how much is going to be spent 

to achieve this goal? What did we agree to? Congress hasn’t—we 

don’t even have a budget so we don’t even know how much it’s 

going to cost for the biggest project in NASA to achieve its goal? 

I mean, this is insane. How much have we already spent on the 

Mars project? 

Mr. DUMBACHER. Well, Congressman, let me—first of all, this 

has been a long-term investment from the initial vision for space 

exploration days and going into the Constellation program. I cannot give you off the top of my head specific numbers, but I can tell 

you—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Hold on. Do you think NASA knows? So what 

I’m getting here is that we don’t even know how much—there is 

no figure as to how much is going to be spent and we don’t know 

how much has already been spent, which means we don’t know 

how much more will be necessary to be spent from now to achieve 

the goal, but we’re talking about, you know, tens of billions of dollars here. The NASA budget altogether is 17 billion. Let me just 

note, when we started off down this road, some of us suggested 

that we were going to have to drain money from every other NASA 

program or it wasn’t going to work, and it’s not working, and it’s 

because we don’t have the money, and right now just from the testimony, you’re saying we’re not being responsible at this level, 

they’re not being responsible at NASA either. 

We have a huge asteroid that’s going to come by the Earth or at 

least not right by the Earth but closer to the Earth than usual in 

the next few days, and we have no plan that if something happened that we recognized something was coming and that five 

years from now it was going to hit the Earth and destroy it. We 

don’t even have in place a plan to actually deflect an asteroid yet. 
48 

We’ve got—and let me just note, people are complaining about the 

budget, we’re not giving NASA the money that it needs for the development of this huge rocket that’s necessary for Mars. Well, if we 

were going to—if people really believed that having a man on the 

Moon planting our flag as compared to just having robots is worth 

all of these billions, well, they’ve got to put their money where 

their mouth is, but nobody does that. We have—nobody’s willing to 

prioritize. 

NASA spends a billion dollars a year proving global warming, 

just to prove it, a billion dollars a year. Well, maybe if someone on 

that side of the aisle might be willing to give up that money and 

put it—if they really believe in going to Mars, putting it into the 

big rocket that we need to take us to Mars, well, then maybe we’d 

have some hope that we can be successful in something, but nobody’s that responsible here. 

By the way, of the billions of dollars our government spends, we 

are borrowing 20 percent of it from our children who will repay the 

Chinese or the Japanese or whoever is buying up our debt. We 

aren’t even—and people are complaining. That’s why we have the 

sequester in place because no one was willing to make a choice. 

What I’m seeing here, and again—look, my father was a pilot. 

My dad—and we have this great aviation technology that we put 

to use for humankind now. That happened because people were actually responsible. They made responsible decisions about development of technology. 

And Mr. Chairman, I’ll just end my little tirade by saying that 

I think that we are not being responsible. I think Elon Musk will 

be on Mars before NASA is and not him spending any government 

money as well. Thank you. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. [Presiding] The gentleman yields back. 

I recognize the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Perlmutter, for five 

minutes. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Gentlemen, thank you for being here. Thank 

you for your service to the country. Thank you for your service to 

the future because that’s what this is about. And I just feel very 

fortunate that I got a place on this Committee to talk about things 

like this, and had an astronaut in my office not long ago, a guy 

named Terry Virts, and my guess is, both of you have worked with 

him, where he said this is not rocket science, this is political 

science, and the part that we’re dealing with right now is political 

science, and Mr. Rohrabacher and I, you know, may have some differences but generally this Committee—and I have been on a lot 

of committees in this Congress. This Committee gets along and 

agrees more than almost all the other ones. 

And so looking at this, you know, we’re the authorizing committee so you got the Budget Committee, the authorizing committee and the Appropriations Committee. I on this Committee 

would like to be able to give you something that says you are authorized to get us to Mars as quickly as possible. You know, I’d like 

to be able to say something in an authorizing language—ten years 

from now, we’re going to have our astronauts on Mars for the future, for science, for discovery, for whatever. And so for us, if 

there’s a goal of something like that, then we’ve got to find a way 

to do it so that you can provide a ten-year plan, knowing under the 
49 

Constitution from year to year, no Congress can bind the next Congress—that’s just the way the Constitution is—but to give you 

some real guidance in setting a plan over a period of time to get 

us there. 

And so for me, I just suggest to my friends on this Committee, 

you know, say this is a national interest, it’s a huge investment, 

either we raise taxes to make that investment, which, you know, 

will give some people, you know, heartache, or we say we’re going 

to prioritize this against the whole other budget, all the other appropriations. Or we can do a public-private partnership and get 

some additional investment, or we could do a joint venture with 

some other countries as we’ve done with the Space Station. And I’m 

a Star Trek guy and I look at the bridge of the Enterprise and I 

see every nationality possible and then people from other planets 

too. But we can do those kinds of things or maybe fee-based, but 

that’s our problem. That the political science piece of this thing. 

Now, the two of you have had to deal with Congress, you’ve had 

to deal with the White House. What would you suggest that we do 

to give you a ten-year plan? Mr. Cooke? 

Mr. COOKE. I can tell you from experience that the Authorization 

Acts have been very beneficial to laying out our future, and the 

2010 Act was very important to us. I encouraged development of 

plans because they represent—in the end, they’re obviously a compromise in the end when they all get passed, and having a consensus on a direction is very important. The 2005 Act was important to us, the 2010 Act was. 

So those do have an impact, and we—they actually—the 2010 

Act actually set the motion forward to announce in 2011 the Orion 

and SLS programs. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Mr. Dumbacher? 

Mr. DUMBACHER. Congressman, as I stated in my testimony, I 

think that as Doug has said, that the 2010 Authorization Act provides the good starting point. It laid out three years. worth of funding levels. We-recognizing the constitutional appropriations process, NASA can do a better job of planning when it has some idea 

of what budget level to plan to, recognizing that that cannot be 

passed in an appropriations perspective because of the Constitution 

but having some concept of a plan so that if, for example, someone—this body were to come back and say use something like the 

2014 NRC report as a planning basis, then NASA could go forward 

and use that. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. So just a last question. If we said we want to 

be on Mars in 2025 in an authorizing bill, could you give us a 

budget for that? 

Mr. DUMBACHER. Then the question would go to NASA to put 

that plan together and then they would need to put a budget requirement to meet that plan and they would need to come back and 

show that to this body for funding purposes. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. The gentleman yields back. 

I have taken the gavel here so I’m going to recognize myself for 

five minutes before we go to Mr. Posey here for the next question. 

What I’d like to share, I heard Mr. Beyer earlier talk about the 

C.R. and shutdown and want to know the impact on NASA explo-
50 

ration and all that’s critically important. I would like to highlight 

the fact that under a Continuing Resolution, NASA exploration actually gets more funding than if we went forward with the President’s budget request, which—and I’m not saying that because I’m 

advocating for a Continuing Resolution. I just want to make sure 

people understand the President’s funding priorities. 

Now, my friend, Mr. Rohrabacher, earlier was talking about SLS 

and Orion and how much money it’s going to cost, and I don’t share 

his sentiment that maybe those programs are ill-advised. What I 

do believe is that if you’re going to have those programs like what 

Mr. Perlmutter was talking about, we need to fund them. If we’re 

going to have these programs, we need to fund them, and it’s pretty 

simple. 

So we have seen the Administration repeatedly underfund the 

program in its fiscal requests every year. The inadequate funding 

requests coupled with delays in program announcement, arguments 

over destinations, and the use of accounting tools such as termination liability have caused further delays in SLS and Orion. When 

I see this back and forth between Congress and the Administration, 

I am left wondering a number of things. Since the President is not 

committed to this or at least it wouldn’t appear that he has been, 

is this political? Are we setting ourselves up for political failure? 

And if I could get—maybe because he wasn’t committed to it from 

the beginning. Could I get your opinion on that, both of you? 

Mr. COOKE. I don’t think we’re going toward failure. The programs, SLS and Orion, are moving forward and making great 

progress. It’s definitely true that under these circumstances where 

the budgets are different and the President’s budget request is less 

than what’s appropriated, it does cause problems in programs. Decisions have to be made that are not optimum. So it ends up being 

inefficient and costs more in the end. However, even so, you have 

dedicated people at NASA that make them work, and they’re making great progress. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Mr. Dumbacher? 

Mr. DUMBACHER. I totally agree with everything Mr. Cooke just 

said. I have nothing fundamentally to add to that. I think I would 

like to reiterate that I do not believe we are working towards failure either. I think you see success out there. It’s going to be hard 

at times because we are doing technical things that no one has 

done before in terms of manufacturing technology, manufacturing 

requirements, bringing in new technologies and taking humans further than we’ve ever gone before. It will be hard, but it’s not failure. 

This dedicated team across NASA and industry is making it happen in spite of the political budget debate, and I think they should 

be commended for the progress that they are making to date. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And just so everybody here understands, I just 

want to make sure that we’re going forward and actually accomplishing what we’re setting out to do, and I think people on both 

sides of the aisle want to make sure that what we are funding is 

not in vain, and I think that’s Mr. Rohrabacher’s frustration, you 

know, people on both sides of the aisle, and it seems to me that 

if we continue to hit the president’s budget request and in many 

case go beyond the President’s budget request and yet we still have 
51 

delay after delay and we don’t have the launch frequencies necessary maybe to maintain the safety that is perfectly appropriate 

for this kind of program, the question is, are we adequately funding 

this program, and how do we go forward in a way that is appropriate, given that this is very serious business and lives ultimately 

will be at stake. 

Last question for you guys. As we move forward for deeper and 

deeper space exploration, do you see an environment where commercial habitats would be used maybe as, you know, something to, 

you know, orbiting the Moon for the long term, for example, if you 

guys could answer that? 

Mr. COOKE. I think that’s potential. I encourage commercial development. Actually in the directorate that I managed when I was 

at NASA, we had the Commercial Cargo and Crew, and those are 

being developed and are needed at this point, and I certainly think 

that’s a possibility. If the business case is there to support it, I 

think that’s certainly in the realm of what could happen. 

Mr. DUMBACHER. And Congressman, if I may, I would like to add 

to what Mr. Cooke just said in that in my view, it’s critical that 

we continue to perform this exploration initiative and help build 

commercial opportunities because that is the future for the next 

generation, and it’s going to be hard. We have the real-life things 

that we have to work through in terms of business plans and commercial markets and technical issues and all of that, but this country has a long history of pushing forward and working to solve 

those kinds of problems, and I think we need to continue doing 

that, not just for our own benefit but for the benefit of the next 

generations coming behind us. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. Johnson from Ohio is recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. JOHNSON OF OHIO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 

and gentlemen, thank you for being here. 

Two reasons that I appreciate this hearing. I’m a big fan of space 

exploration. I grew up in the age of the Apollo Moon race. I remember vividly sitting in front of my television so many times listening 

to Walter Cronkite as he called the play by play, and everybody in 

our country was captivated by everything that was going on because each mission we were learning something newer and newer 

and newer about the tasks that lay before us, and it’s amazing to 

me to think that we were able to accomplish that. In 1903, we flew 

the first airplane off the sands of Kitty Hawk, and 66 years later 

Neil Armstrong stepped out on the surface of the Moon. That’s 

what we’re capable of in America, and so much technology and 

marvels that we enjoy today came out of that effort, and so I applaud it. 

I’m also a program manager by trade, having spent 30-plus years 

in information technology. I’ve managed large programs. So from 

the perspective of a NASA program manager, gentlemen, what is 

the difference between a target date and a commitment date, and 

why might it be useful to have a target date that is earlier than 

the commitment date? 

Mr. DUMBACHER. First of all, Congressman, the difference between a commitment date and a target date is the commitment 

date is the agency is legislatively held to reporting requirements on 
52 

programs’ progress. They—when we were—when I was in the agency, we purposely had to work through the commitments, recognizing that I believe it’s the Nunn-McCurdy Act that required that 

we had to put a commitment there. If we were 15 percent over 

schedule or cost, then it was subject to a cancellation conversation. 

So the agency had to worry about that commitment, not just from 

a legislative perspective but also from an integrity/trust perspective 

to demonstrate it can do what it says it’s going to. 

The target date is the date that I used, my team used, to try to 

keep the appropriate amount of schedule pressure on getting the 

work done as cost-efficiently as possible, as technically correct as 

we could, and maintaining the safety. It is the art of project management that says I used the schedule to help make sure I keep 

driving the work forward, recognizing that I don’t want to do that 

at the expense of poor technical decisions, poor safety decisions, but 

I still keep enough work going on because that way I keep—I get 

it done as efficiently as I can. 

Mr. JOHNSON OF OHIO. I liken this to an analogy of a student 

in college, even in high school. You handle the tough subjects first. 

You get those things done early in the semester. That way you’re 

not sitting there with two weeks left to go before grade reports 

come out and you’re behind. You don’t want to get to that commitment date and find out that you’ve got that 15 percent overage in 

budget or schedule and have to face a Congressional mandate to 

come back and worry about cancellation. So I get it. I just wanted 

you guys to explain. 

A target date is the discipline to make sure that you don’t miss 

the commitment date. 

Mr. DUMBACHER. Right, and the difference between the target 

date and the commitment date is the program manager’s schedule 

margin. 

Mr. JOHNSON OF OHIO. Yeah. Got it. 

How might additional funding during the period—let’s talk about 

budget for a second. How might additional funding—during the period fiscal year 2012 and 2013, how much additional funding during that period have changed the planning and management of the 

SLS and the Orion programs in ways other than schedule? Am I 

clear? Does that make any sense? How might additional funding 

during that period—other than schedule, how would it have affected those programs? 

Mr. COOKE. The additional funding at that time as well as now, 

I believe, helps you to get work done in parallel that you otherwise 

have to phase out if you have a limit to your funding. So you can 

plan things in a normal sense, things that are better integrated because you’re developing them in parallel, you know the interfaces, 

you know how to pull them together, and if you’re constrained 

where you can’t do that, then you phase things out and you start 

this task, you stop that one. In some cases we’ve had a test, had 

a flight test on Orion back in 2010. We ended up laying off people 

who were critical to the success of the task because the next priorities were somewhere else. 

Mr. JOHNSON OF OHIO. Right. 
53 

Mr. COOKE. We achieved that. We still need it. But we had to 

make decisions so we could address the next priorities, and those 

things don’t necessarily have to happen. 

Mr. JOHNSON OF OHIO. Now, Mr. Chairman, this is a great example of how only a program manager can know how critically important the certainty around funding to keeping a project on schedule 

and not winding up in that conflict with a commitment date and 

ultimately see everything wasted if it’s cancelled very, very important. 

Gentlemen, thanks for sharing your perspective this morning. 

I yield back. 

Chairman BABIN. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

Now I recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Posey. 

Mr. POSEY. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let’s dash 

back to reality just for a second. 

Every year, NASA’s requests for Orion are lower than what’s 

needed. Do you both agree with that statement? 

Mr. DUMBACHER. I would agree with that statement. There is a 

prat of that statement, Congressman, that I’m trying to figure out 

how to answer you better in that the request is really the President’s budget request. 

Mr. POSEY. Yes. NASA’s request—the President’s request is 

NASA’s request, and vice versa, and it’s always lower than the program needs. Congress always comes back and pays more. The question is, why doesn’t NASA, the Administration request the amount 

of money they think they need? 

Mr. DUMBACHER. Well, I think that would be a question directly 

to the Office of Management and Budget because it’s in that budget 

process that the agency goes through as we build the budget from 

the bottom up, from the programs and then they get submitted and 

they work within the agency priorities and then go over to the 

higher national-level priorities, it’s in that last step where at least 

from my perspective, I saw here the numbers change. 

Mr. POSEY. Well, the fact is, they request less year after year 

than they know that they need to keep the project on schedule. It’s 

a fact. I mean, it’s not a political statement and it’s not a scientific 

statement. It’s a fact. And Congress does in fact always pay more. 

Several Members were a little bit concerned about a budget, how 

much it will cost to Mars and what the total costs will be, and I 

think that’s almost a laughable question at this point because they 

don’t even have a plan yet. You know, in the last several NASA authorizations, Congress has mandated that NASA come up with a 

detailed roadmap for Mars, a steppingstone approach to exploration, if you will. I believe many on this Committee feel we’ve 

never seen a detailed plan, and I’d like for both of you to comment 

on what you see as essential steps in getting human to Mars and 

your thoughts on why NASA has not submitted a detailed plan to 

Congress as requested? 

Mr. COOKE. I have actually got written testimony from 2013 that 

addresses that specific—that question specifically, but I’ll go ahead. 

I believe the front end of it is laying out your objectives for what 

you want to achieve in your exploration program by destination, 

what is it we want to learn, how is it we want to prepare from one 

step to the next, and have a rational approach to—— 
54 

Mr. POSEY. I agree with you. That’s what should be done. The 

question is, why haven’t they done it? 

Mr. COOKE. I can’t say—I can’t say why since I have left it has 

not been done. Actually when—— 

Mr. POSEY. Why wasn’t it done while you were there? 

Mr. COOKE. Well, when I was there—I left at the end of September in 2011—we had just gotten through the period after the 

2010 Authorization Act where we worked very diligently within exploration to answer that, what was asked for in the Authorization 

Act, and we announced SLS design and program the same month 

I retired. That was the first step. Our immediate concern was getting the front end of this started. We actually had a plan that we 

talked about that after we get the first steps on the way, we’re 

going to come back and develop the plan, and—— 

Mr. POSEY. All right. I got that. I got it. 

Would you care to respond? 

Mr. DUMBACHER. Congressman, I think I—agree with what Doug 

said. I think part of what needs to happen is a more public discussion about some of the planning and some of the strategies that 

need to be implemented to go to Mars and making sure we are all 

clear, that the stakeholders are all clear on what the goals and objectives are, and then allow NASA to go put a plan together. 

Mr. POSEY. You know, every Member on this Committee, bar 

none, both sides of the aisle, want NASA to be successful. I can 

give you just so many instances, though, when at least from this 

perspective, they’re their own worst enemy. If they can’t come up 

with a plan, they want somebody else to do it, if it takes more 

funding for a plan, but you know, you have to have a plan actually 

before you do a budget. I mean, you can see, I hope, the negative 

effects of building a development schedule around a budget rather 

than letting the most logical schedule dictate the financial needs, 

and it appears that is what’s happening, and Mr. Chairman, I don’t 

know how we reel this thing in but it’s just not something that I’m 

proud of the way it’s being done, and I see I’m over my time. Thank 

you. 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you, Mr. Posey. 

You know, I would also add that, you were asking the question 

of what is the cost of going to Mars, and I would ask what is the 

cost of not going to Mars. 

In our—we had a meeting of some industry specialists in space 

the other day, and I was told that there was a Chinese program 

planning a permanently crewed space station for 2020, and I think 

everybody in this room is aware of who holds the high ground, has 

the great advantage. So I would say that we can’t afford not to try 

to get organized and get this planned and funded adequately. 

I want to thank the witnesses for being here, both of you folks 

today, and thank the Members for your questions, and the record 

will remain open for two weeks for additional written comments 

and written questions from Members. 

So this meeting is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(55) 

Appendix I 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
56 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Mr. Doug Cooke 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 

Responses by Mr. Dan Dumbacher 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 

Æ