*

 After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 22, 2005*

Decided November 30, 2005

Before

Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

 Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 05-1408

TIM L. GAMBLIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DANNY GROVES, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of

Indiana, Indianapolis Division

No. 1:04-cv-0094-DFH-TAB

David F. Hamilton, 

Judge.

O R D E R 

Pretrial detainee Tim Gamblin was injured in a fight with Lee LeMaster,

another pretrial detainee, and sued four jail employees claiming they violated his

rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by placing him

in a cell block with LeMaster. The defendants moved for summary judgment and,

pursuant to Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1982), admonished Gamblin

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-1408 Page 2

that the district court would accept as true the factual statements in their supporting

memorandum unless he offered contradictory evidence. Gamblin instead obtained

one extension of the response deadline, and then submitted a “Request for Entery

[sic]” asking for additional time to contact witnesses. Gamblin explained that he had

neglected to contact his proposed witnesses because he assumed the district court

would subpoena them for him and “find[] the truth in court.” In unsworn “notes”

attached to this submission, Gamblin detailed his recollection of the fight with

LeMasters. 

The district court understood Gamblin to be asking again in his Request for

Entery for more time to respond to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment,

and refused to allow another extension. The court reminded Gamblin that he still

would be required to file his response by the stated deadline (then about a month

away), and when that deadline passed with no submission from Gamblin, the court

granted summary judgment for the defendants. After noting that the motion would

be resolved on the defendants’ evidence because Gamblin never responded, the court

concluded that the undisputed evidence established that none of the defendants

knew in advance that LeMaster posed a threat to Gamblin, and that none of them

stood by and allowed the fight to continue as Gamblin alleged in his complaint. 

On appeal Gamblin argues that the factual allegations in his complaint and

Request for Entery created a genuine issue of material fact and should have been

considered at summary judgment because he submitted both documents under the

penalty of perjury. True, a complaint or other submission made under penalty of

perjury can sometimes substitute for a formal affidavit in rebutting a motion for

summary judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1746; Ford v. Wilson, 90 F.3d 245, 247 (7th Cir.

1996). But not here. Gamblin knew that the district court had viewed his Request

for Entery as a motion for more time to respond to the motion for summary

judgment, not as the response itself. Gamblin had ample time to correct the district

court if he thought the submission was misunderstood but he stood silent. We cannot

fault the district court, then, for deeming the defendants’ motion unopposed. See

Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir.

1990) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to construe

litigant’s statement that court should “enlarge the issues to be considered” as a

motion for leave to amend the complaint where statement was included in motion to

reconsider adverse ruling as summary judgment and litigant did not otherwise

comply with requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15). 

Moreover, even if characterized as a response to the motion for summary

judgment, the Request for Entery does not direct the district court to any specific

allegations in the complaint, and district courts are not required to search the record
No. 05-1408 Page 3

for evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See RuffinThompkins v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2005);

Doe v. Cunningham, 30 F.3d 879, 885 (7th Cir. 1994). Neither does the submission

itself include the evidence necessary to establish the existence of a material issue of

fact; all the Request for Entery tells us is that Gamblin made no attempt to contact

his witnesses. And though the attached “notes” do supply some detail, they are

unsworn. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Steinle v. Warren, 765 F.2d 95, 100 (7th Cir.

1985). Without the facts stated in Gamblin’s complaint or “notes,” he has not

presented any evidence to defeat the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); Black Agents & Brokers

Agency, Inc. v. Near North Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 409 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2005). 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment for the defendants.