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EXAMINING THE PRESIDENT’S FY 2017 BUDGET

PROPOSAL FOR EUROPE AND EURASIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 9, 2016

Serial No. 114–167

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Ms. Alina Romanowski, Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State .. 4

Mr. Daniel Rosenblum, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Central Asia, Bureau 

of South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State ....................... 19

The Honorable Thomas Melia, Assistant Administrator, Europe and Eurasia 

Bureau, U.S. Agency for International Development ........................................ 30

Ms. Ann Marie Yastishock, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia, 

U.S. Agency for International Development ...................................................... 42

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Ms. Alina Romanowski: Prepared statement ........................................................ 7

Mr. Daniel Rosenblum: Prepared statement ......................................................... 21

The Honorable Thomas Melia: Prepared statement ............................................. 33

Ms. Ann Marie Yastishock: Prepared statement .................................................. 44

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 62

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 63

(1)

EXAMINING THE PRESIDENT’S FY 2017

BUDGET PROPOSAL FOR EUROPE AND 

EURASIA 

THURSDAY, JUNE 9, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I call to order the Europe, Eurasia, and 

Emerging Threats Subcommittee for this afternoon’s hearing on the 

administration’s budget proposal. 

For the coming fiscal year the President has asked that Congress 

appropriate $50 billion for international affairs programs. Over 

$900 million has been requested for programs in the geographic jurisdiction of this subcommittee. This amount is much greater than 

what was sought just a few years ago, and I take this increased 

level of spending as an indication of our Government’s renewed 

focus on the region, especially in Eastern Europe. 

Increasing our efforts in that part of the world to grow diplomatic links and improve prosperity is a good thing. Yet let me note 

that we are currently $19 trillion in debt, and we have added $1 

trillion to that since this same hearing was held last year. And 

every dollar we use to help people of foreign countries places that 

much more of an additional burden on the backs of the American 

taxpayers and their children. 

All the government programs should meet a high standard, but 

foreign assistance in particular, if it is to be given at all, must meet 

rigorous standards of accountability. Congress has a duty to scrutinize the President’s request to make sure that it is responsible and 

that it properly supports our Nation’s priorities. 

During my time in Congress I have participated in many hearings on assistance programs. I have always been proud of the generosity of the American people. They are willing to lend a hand to 

less fortunate people whom they have never met. That is certainly 

an admirable part of the American character. But at some point 

generosity and responsibility have to go hand in hand. I have 

grown increasingly mindful to the limits of what America can afford and of what assistance dollars can actually provide. 

2

Today, we will discuss the effects of the ongoing war in Ukraine 

and the migration crisis and other factors that play in Europe. We 

will review our efforts and how we are coordinating with other 

international donors. 

Lastly, let me note there is a grave distinction between humanitarian assistance and development aid. Of course we should be 

ready to respond to natural disasters, earthquakes, floods, and the 

like. However, development funds can’t work if recipient countries 

do not undertake sound economic reforms. The role of government 

assistance is not to replace private investment. Private investment 

has to go hand in hand or eventually we will fail to accomplish our 

goals. 

Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days to 

submit additional written questions and extraneous material for 

the record. Hearing none, I so order. 

And with that, I turn to my ranking member, Mr. Gregory 

Meeks, for his opening statement. 

Mr. MEEKS. I want to thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher. Thank 

you very much for, first of all, for holding this hearing to provide 

us an opportunity to examine the administration’s 2017 budget request and our Government’s ability to execute our strategy in the 

region. 

When discussing our fundamental strategy for a Europe whole, 

free, and at peace, my attention is immediately drawn to the ongoing war in the Ukraine and in the country’s struggle to reform its 

political economy. And while Russia continues to play a disruptive 

role in the region, I cannot stress enough the importance of the 

countries that are not in the spotlight in today’s news cycle. 

Europe and Eurasia is, after all, a diverse region in terms of levels of political and economic development and of cultural and historical background. It has been a difficult year in our subcommittee’s region as the rise of populism, migration, and acts of terror 

have put additional strain on an already limited budget. I am convinced that the work of our diplomats and aid workers in the field 

ensure that America’s interests are being protected while bringing 

peace and prosperity to the region. 

The overall budget reflects a particularly urgent demand that, 

frankly speaking, may require more resources, in my estimation, 

when 2017 arrives. I am referring to the situation in Ukraine and 

the economic tightrope the government is currently walking. Yes, 

the reform of the economy must be done by the Ukrainians themselves following successive governments’ failure to reform. But the 

new Ukrainian Government will never be able to meet the rightful 

demands of its citizens without the West’s economic and political 

support. With a closing political window, I want to make sure that 

we help a committed government get reform right. 

Not considering the Ukraine portion of the budget, however, we 

are left with a relatively small budget given the myriad of concerns. A few weeks ago, this subcommittee hosted a lively hearing 

on progress and challenges in Turkey. Since the hearing, we have 

witnessed additional turmoil within our NATO allies’ borders, not 

to mention the continuing humanitarian disaster in Syria. 

This is all related to the migration issue in Europe, which is of 

tremendous concern to me. Their path through the Balkans or 

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Mediterranean is fraught with danger. Yet integration into European society can also be very difficult. 

All of this is to say that there is plenty of urgent work to be done 

in this region in coordination with our EU partners. Yet, I ask, is 

the EU still an attractive enough goal for the Western Balkan 

countries and Turkey? 

Meanwhile, in Central Asia we face similar problems, but with 

different variables. As the Russian economy reels, citizens feel the 

combined effects of low oil prices, corruption, a nonmodernized 

economy and Western sanctions. As a result, scores of migrant laborers, many of them men, are returning home to Central Asia. 

They are not only to deal with the local economy’s reliance on remittances as a significant source of income, but the economies may 

not be able to absorb the influx of labor. In these countries, having 

frustrated portions of society with nothing they can do to support 

their families, people will look toward more drastic options to express their despair. 

And finally, in the Caucasus, where USAID has been active in 

various programs in the diverse region, I would like to hear how 

the 2017 budget aims to address the problems that seem increasingly difficult. I am referring to the backsliding of democracy and 

significant flare-ups in so-called frozen conflicts. 

As EU and NATO memberships become either less attractive or 

attainable goals in the medium term, our assistance there becomes 

that much more important. I realize that these conflicts are incredibly complicated and will not be solved in a day or two or even tomorrow. But I am a believer in diplomacy and would like to encourage dialogue through organizations like the OSCE. 

In conclusion, I look forward to discussing the proposed 2017 

budget with our four colleagues here from the State Department 

and USAID. It is my goal as ranking member of this subcommittee 

to challenge, nudge, and encourage you all to make sure our dollars 

are being used to their fullest potential in a diverse region that is 

so important to our economic and political interests. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Meeks. 

And today we have four people whose opinion on these issues are 

really significant. You are people we trust in your expertise enough 

to be overseeing these programs. And we are anxious to hear your 

views. And let me just note, we are not anxious to hear them more 

than 5 minutes per person. And if you could sort of put the rest 

in the record and condense it to 5 minutes, that would be very 

helpful. 

Unfortunately, there may be a vote between now and the questions and answers. Let’s hope we can get the witnesses through by 

that vote. 

First we have—and, again, with a name like Rohrabacher, I always forgive everybody for mispronouncing it, so please forgive me 

if I am mispronouncing your name—Alina Romanowski. Is that it? 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. It is actually Alina. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Kalina. 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. Alina. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Alina. Got it. 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. Romanowski was perfect. 

4

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Got it. Okay. 

And Alina is a State Department coordinator for U.S. assistance 

to Europe and Eurasia. And in that role she coordinates our assistance programs across multiple State Department bureaus and government agencies. Previously served as deputy assistance administrator to USAID’s Middle East Bureau and held senior positions in 

the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. 

Next we have Daniel Rosenblum. Got it. He is the deputy assistant secretary of state for Central Asia. From 2008 to 2014 he 

served as the coordinator for U.S. assistance to Europe and Eurasia. Before that he held numerous positions of responsibility within the State Department before joining the executive branch as a 

legislative assistant to the executive branch right here on Capitol 

Hill. All right. 

Then Ms. Ann Marie—tell me. 

Ms. YASTISHOCK. It is Yastishock. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Yastishock. Got it. The USAID assistance administrator for the Asia Bureau. She is a career senior 

foreign service officer who has worked on behalf of our Government 

around the world overseeing programs focused on building the rule 

of law, democracy, and governance. Her postings included Burma, 

Georgia, and Ukraine. Wow. That is a very tough—three tough assignments. 

Then Mr. Thomas Melia. Right. Got it. Serves as USAID assistant administrator for Europe and Eurasia. He was confirmed in 

that role just this past December. Before then he served as deputy 

assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of Democracy, Human 

Rights and Labor. Prior to joining the State Department he worked 

for Freedom House, the National Democratic Institute, as well as 

here on Capitol Hill for then-Senator Patrick Moynihan. 

Thank you all. 

And we will start at this end, and you may proceed, Ms. 

Romanowski. 

STATEMENT OF MS. ALINA ROMANOWSKI, COORDINATOR OF 

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO EUROPE AND EURASIA, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member 

Meeks, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting 

me here today and for your personal investment in supporting our 

efforts to expand a Europe whole, free, and at peace, and a safer, 

more open Central Asia. 

Since I last appeared before this subcommittee, our partners in 

Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia have made progress in key areas 

supported through our assistance. In Ukraine, Prime Minister 

Groysman raised gas prices to meet IMF requirements and passed 

critical reforms to strength judicial independence, shrink and modernize government bureaucracy, and reform the energy sector, 

which significantly limits the use of Gazprom as a political lever. 

In Moldova, we helped businesses move out from under Russia’s 

trade barriers and toward free markets in the West. 

In Georgia, our support to populations around the Administrative 

Boundary Lines has strengthened local economies and created jobs. 

5

And in Central Asia, civil society in the Kyrgyz Republic successfully pushed officials there to reject a draft foreign agent law. 

While the success of our assistance is significant, the map of a 

free, democratic, Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia remains incomplete. We continue to grapple with corruption, backsliding on democracy, suppression of media and civil society, ethnic tension, and 

protracted conflicts across the region. Given these challenges, your 

increases to the budget for this region have allowed us to meet urgent needs in countering immediate threats and helping countries 

move toward more prosperous futures. Our request for 2017 for the Europe/Eurasia region is $787 mil- lion, and for Central Asia it is $164 million. 

Today I will focus on Europe and Eurasia and my colleague Dan 

Rosenblum will cover Central Asia. 

On Europe, we align our request with four strategic objectives. 

First, we are committed to supporting the sovereign choice of countries to determine their own political and economic destinies. That 

struggle is vividly illustrated in Ukraine where Russia has sought 

to stymie its democratic rebirth at every turn. 

Since the crisis began, the U.S. Government has committed over $1 billion in assistance for Ukraine. This includes over $600 million 

in security assistance, over $111 million for humanitarian efforts, 

and about $10 million for U.S. advisers. We have also provided the 

Ukrainian Government with two $1-billion loan guarantees and 

signed a third agreement on June 3. To keep Ukraine’s positive 

progress on track, we have requested $295 million for Ukraine, 

which will support the next phase of its anticorruption reforms. 

Like Ukraine, we are also assisting Georgia and Moldova to pursue clean, democratic governance and closer ties with the European 

Union. Funding for Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine makes up 56 

percent of our Fiscal Year 2017 request. 

Of course, Europe as a whole remains susceptible to malign Russian influence and its dependence on Russian energy leaves it particularly exposed. Energy diversification continues to be a key component of our strategy. In the Baltics and Central Europe, for example, critical projects have reduced energy vulnerability, including the opening of new LNG terminals in Lithuania and Poland. 

Our request for the Balkans includes about $154 million to help 

these countries complete their democratic journeys, integrate with 

Europe, and reduce their vulnerabilities to external pressures. 

With respect to our second objective, to combat corruption and 

build rule of law and accountable governance, our request will support independent judiciaries, increase government transparency, 

promote e-governance, and empower civil society. 

Toward our third objective, we are working to reverse the backsliding on democracy and attempts to close the space for political 

pluralism and public discourse throughout the region. Our request 

includes about $232 million for democracy programs. 

Regarding our fourth objective, U.S. assistance is playing an important role in addressing serious challenges to peace and stability 

across this region and within our own country. Our request includes $15 million for the European Security Assistance Fund to 

help increase the defense capacity of key allies and partners, including $3 million for countering violent extremism in the Balkans. 

6

We must not forget, however, the importance of building bridges 

between people. In Russia in particular, we will continue to support 

direct engagement between Russians and Americans. 

For 25 years our assistance to this region has been leading the 

way in tearing down walls, building lasting connections between 

peoples, and improving the lives of millions. Our request has been 

designed with today’s tough budget climate in mind. We are committed to working diligently and effectively with the resources provided by the American people in the service of our values and our 

national interest throughout the region. 

I will now turn to my colleague Dan Rosenblum to detail our 

Central Asia request. I look forward to your questions, and thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Romanowski follows:]

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STATEMENT OF MR. DANIEL ROSENBLUM, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR CENTRAL ASIA, BUREAU OF SOUTH AND 

CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Meeks, Mr. 

Weber, thank you very much for the invitation to testify today. And 

I ask that the full text of my statement be included in the record. 

The U.S. has two fundamental national security interests in Central Asia. The first goes back to the breakup of the Soviet Union 

when the U.S. set out to support the effort by the peoples of Central Asia to establish independent sovereign states free from undue 

external interference or intimidation. 

Our second primary interest is the stability of these sovereign 

and independent nations. We seek to prevent violence and the 

emergence of conditions that could result in states becoming havens for terrorist groups hostile to the United States. 

Those two key national security interests can best be achieved, 

we believe, by promoting security, prosperity, and good governance. 

That is the best recipe for long-term stability and for maintaining 

independence. And that is exactly the recipe supported by this 

budget request. 

Let me briefly review what we are doing in each of those three 

areas. 

Our security efforts focus on improving border security and 

strengthening the capacity of local security forces to counter terrorist threats. Our partners in Central Asia share our goal of disrupting the finance and recruitment efforts of Daesh and other 

international terrorist groups. 

Of course our trainings and other security-related engagements 

always emphasize that violent extremism must be distinguished 

from peaceful acts of expression, assembly, association and religious practice. We stress that stronger protections for basic rights 

and freedoms will make the countries of Central Asia safer and 

more secure and, by extension, make us safer and more secure. 

Our economic efforts are focused on promoting internal marketoriented reforms and economic diversification, as well as better 

connectivity among the Central Asian states and with their neighbors. 

Central Asia remains one of the least economically integrated regions in the world. What is more, the region’s economy has been 

deeply affected over the past 2 years by Russia’s negative economic 

growth and by low global commodity prices, leading to currency depreciation and a greatly decreased flow of remittances being sent 

home by migrant workers in Russia. 

These trends make the economic programming in this request 

more important than ever. We are promoting good governance in 

Central Asia through a variety of programs, including technical assistance to support internal reforms, and the strengthening of independent media and civil society. 

We also know it is essential to address the deeply rooted problem 

of corruption, which not only contributes to potential radicalization, 

but also harms the vitality of the private sector. 

The recent creation of the so-called C5+1 diplomatic platform following Secretary Kerry’s historic trip to all five states in Central 

Asia last fall could allow for unprecedented regional cooperation on 

20

issues of common concern. Secretary Kerry and the five Central 

Asian foreign ministers agreed to form working groups to address 

economic connectivity, environmental challenges, and security concerns, especially the threat of violent extremism. We are grateful 

that Congress provided explicit funding in its Fiscal Year 2016 appropriation to support this platform with concrete regional projects. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to say with respect to Central Asia’s relations with its neighbors that we do not see political and economic 

developments in Central Asia through the prism of a zero-sum 

game. This is a region where everyone can benefit from smarter security and trade that is inclusive, multidirectional, and rules based. 

We think that when the countries of Central Asia look around for 

partners, they can and should choose as many as they wish. 

Finally, we think it is very important to recall that these are relatively young countries that are celebrating this year only their 

first quarter century of independence. The U.S. was one of the first 

countries to recognize the new states of Central Asia, and since 

then our support for their sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity has been and will continue to be ironclad. 

If these governments can make a greater commitment to accountable, transparent, and inclusive governance, the dynamic nations of Central Asia stand to make tremendous gains in the coming decades, gains that will not only contribute to security and 

prosperity in the region, but also to our United States security and 

prosperity. 

I look forward to answering any questions members of the subcommittee might have about specific countries or specific programs, 

and I thank you again for the opportunity to testify. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rosenblum follows:]

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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS MELIA, ASSISTANT 

ADMINISTRATOR, EUROPE AND EURASIA BUREAU, U.S. 

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. MELIA. Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, 

Representative Weber, on behalf of the U.S. Agency for International Development, I thank you for this opportunity to testify 

today in support of the President’s Fiscal Year 2017 request for Europe and Eurasia. I would ask that the full text of my testimony 

be inserted in the record and I will just touch on a few high points. 

The Europe and Eurasia region is in part a tremendous success 

story about U.S. assistance, providing case studies of targeted aid 

that helped countries transition quickly to free markets and democratic systems. Twelve countries have transitioned from receiving 

U.S. assistance and are now important U.S. partners and allies in 

the region and around the world. Yet the region’s transformation 

remains incomplete. Progress is uneven in key areas, important 

achievements are at risk, and in a few cases we are seeing regression. 

In the Western Balkans, while there are key points of progress—

Croatia and Slovenia have entered the EU, Montenegro and Serbia 

are in EU accession negotiations, and a Stabilization and Association Agreement with Kosovo entered into force on April 1—other 

countries struggle. 

In addition, a troublingly high number of Western Balkan citizens have joined radical violent Islamic extremist groups and traveled to conflict areas to join the fight. While the numbers have decreased in recent months, Bosnia and Kosovo remain among the 

top contributors, on a per capita basis, of foreign fighters traveling 

from Europe to Syria and Iraq. Stagnant economic conditions and 

high levels of youth unemployment, as well as Kosovo’s continued 

isolation on the world stage, provide ripe conditions for 

radicalization. Through programs that help improve the economic 

prosperity of these countries and promote good governance, USAID 

seeks to address these drivers of violent extremism. 

The President’s combined State and USAID request for the Balkans reflects a broad number of U.S. foreign policy objectives. Collaboration with host governments is real and significant in the 

Western Balkans, and U.S. aid and technical advice is highly valued. 

In Albania, our bilateral assistance strengthens the country’s justice sector, improves local governance, and helps civil society serve 

as a watchdog. 

In Bosnia and Herzegovina our diverse program addresses the 

issue of radicalization. USAID initiated a 3-year program in 2015 

that pilots new approaches to address youth disenfranchisement 

and enhance opportunities for young people to participate in community initiatives. This effort will be implemented in six at-risk 

communities where there is evidence that young people are being 

recruited as foreign fighters for Syria and Iraq. This project provides psychosocial support to youth deemed vulnerable to 

radicalization through trained and experienced teams of psychologists. 

In Kosovo, in addition to major efforts in energy security and economic growth, USAID will continue to seek to move the country 

31

closer to membership in the EU and to normalize relations with 

Serbia. Our work in inter-ethnic dialogue focuses at the grassroots 

community level by helping people come together to recognize that 

their futures are intertwined. 

In Serbia, our assistance focuses on strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law, reducing corruption, enhancing 

democratic and economic inclusion, supporting civil society, and increasing access to independent information. With $2 million in 

Complex Crises Funds, USAID in Serbia also launched a program 

to mitigate the impact of migrants on local communities, which at 

its peak in 2015 was seeing upwards of 5,000 migrants per day 

transiting through Serbian municipalities. Just last month, I visited one such refugee facility outside Belgrade run by the Vlade 

Divac Foundation, where our assistance helps improve crisis response coordination between the government and civil society service providers. 

The President’s State/USAID request for Armenia, Azerbaijan, 

and Georgia will address urgent issues in a fraught region. In Armenia, our assistance will help alleviate disproportionate economic 

dependence on Russia, integrate Armenia into regional energy systems, and promote local governance initiatives. In Azerbaijan, we 

continue to look for opportunities to advance democratic and economic reforms and support civil society despite significant restrictions on our partners. In Georgia, we continue to work with the 

government and independent actors in civil society and the media 

to ensure that Georgia continues on a path to democracy and that 

the gains achieved to date are sustained. 

Finally, supporting Ukraine’s comprehensive reform effort remains one of the agency’s top priorities and the President’s Fiscal 

Year 2017 State/USAID request will allow us to continue that 

work. We will be building that out in partnership with Prime Minister Groysman who is visiting Washington next week, meeting 

with USAID Administrator Gayle Smith and other senior administration officials. 

Ukraine is fighting a war on two fronts. Externally, Ukraine continues to combat Russia’s aggressive actions. Our support also requires that Ukraine continue to battle against corruption, the internal enemy that has held Ukraine back for well over two decades. 

The U.S. has provided more than $1.1 billion in foreign assistance 

to Ukraine since the crisis began, and now also a third sovereign 

loan guarantee that was signed on June 3. To support 

anticorruption efforts, USAID has also deployed U.S. advisers and 

experts within several Ukrainian ministries. We have also been active in providing humanitarian assistance and addressing some of 

the mounting public health crises in Ukraine. 

In conclusion, I would just say that we must not forget that the 

countries of Southeast Europe and the former Soviet Union are still 

young states working to build political institutions, regulatory and 

market frameworks, and institutional competencies required to access the capital and energy technology markets that will secure 

their futures. U.S. assistance, mostly technical or advisory, is critical to continued integration into the European and world systems. 

We must recognize that Europe is being tested by the continued 

flow of migrants and refugees, Russia’s continued actions, and the 

32

growing potential of violent extremism gaining traction in the region. U.S. national security interests require sustained engagement 

in this region now more than ever. 

Thank you for your attention, and I will be glad to take your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Melia follows:]

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STATEMENT OF MS. ANN MARIE YASTISHOCK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR ASIA, U.S. AGENCY FOR 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Ms. YASTISHOCK. Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member 

Meeks, and distinguished subcommittee members, thank you for 

the opportunity to testify today on USAID’s role in advancing U.S. 

foreign policy goals in Central Asia. Before I begin, I ask that my 

full statement also be entered into the record. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So ordered. 

Ms. YASTISHOCK. Thank you. The Fiscal Year 2017 budget request of $164.1 million for foreign 

assistance in Central Asia reflects an increased commitment to 

American engagement in this strategically important region and is 

crucial to its success. Central Asia is continually challenged by the 

influence of neighbors, broader regional threats—such as the violent extremism that exerts an increasing pull over a growing number of labor migrants—and pressing development needs. 

Our request furthers USAID’s mission to end extreme poverty 

and promote resilient democratic societies while also countering 

Russian pressure in Central Asia through increased funding to reduce dependence on Russia’s economy and increased access to objective local news. Our request supports efforts to counter violent 

extremism by addressing its drivers with an emphasis on assistance to labor migrants. 

And the request supports USAID’s efforts to address pressing development challenges in three main areas. First, increasing economic connectivity to create jobs and stronger country-to-country 

ties; second, meeting urgent human needs of global consequence; 

and, third, promoting stability through accountable and inclusive 

governance. 

First, on economic connectivity, offering little economic opportunity at home, the countries of Central Asia are some of the 

world’s most dependent on remittances from abroad. To reduce this 

massive flow of migrant labor and contribute to a more stable, 

prosperous region, our assistance is encouraging domestic economic 

policy reforms that promote trade, attract investment, and create 

jobs. Under the New Silk Road and C5+1 initiatives, we are promoting connectivity on energy and trade. 

Second, we are meeting urgent health, food security, and environmental needs. On health, the region has come a long way with 

our assistance. Yet Central Asia battles some of the highest rates 

of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis in the world. USAID is working 

on multiple fronts to help the region reverse this trend, including 

with rapid testing technology from California. 

On food security, we are working through the Feed the Future 

Initiative in Tajikistan to reduce poverty, undernutrition and 

stunting, and we are helping the region’s wheat growers adapt to 

more frequent droughts, in addition to encouraging regional cooperation on water management. 

Third, we are promoting stability through accountable and inclusive governance. USAID support is wide-ranging and tailored to 

each unique country context from a robust array of democratic systems strengthening programs in the Kyrgyz Republic, civil society 

and rule of law support for targeted groups in Tajikistan, and court 

43

system strengthening that is opening the door to greater rule of 

law exposure in Uzbekistan. 

I will highlight key assistance areas in the five countries. 

In Kazakhstan, we partner to encourage further democratic reforms, improve health services and food security. USAID support 

contributed to the passage of ‘‘access to information’’ legislation last 

year that for the first time allows independent media to report on 

government activities. 

In the Kyrgyz Republic—the only democracy in Central Asia—

our support contributed to parliamentary elections in October 2015 

that international observers widely declared as credible, transparent, and accountable. USAID focuses on sustaining and 

strengthening the country’s democratic processes heading into next 

year’s Presidential election. 

In Tajikistan, the poorest of the Central Asian countries, boosting agricultural productivity is essential to improving lives. Fiscal 

Year 2017 funding will enable us to continue targeting a 20-percent 

increase in household farm income and a 20-percent reduction in 

childhood stunting. 

In Turkmenistan—one of the most isolated countries in the 

world—USAID supports Turkmenistan in participating more fully 

in the global economy through reforms and the introduction of 

international financial standards. We have provided training and 

study tour opportunities to Turkmen officials and civil society 

members to enhance their understanding of good governance principles. 

And finally, in Uzbekistan we are expanding agricultural opportunities and promoting more responsive governance. Our request 

enables us to support Uzbekistan’s limited number of NGOs, which 

are operating in a challenging environment. 

Mr. Chairman, the countries of Central Asia face ever-more complex challenges in charting their own course, making USAID engagement as vital today as it was 25 years ago at independence. 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and look forward to 

your counsel and questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Yastishock follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you to all of you. And just a few 

questions. 

Let’s look at Kosovo, because you spent considerable time talking 

about Kosovo. It has been over 20 years now, and we have played 

a dominant role in their government and in advising them and 

making them a priority for us in that part. Now you tell me that 

Kosovo is the number one country where foreign fighters for ISIL 

are being recruited. What does that say about our development system in that part of the world? 

Mr. MELIA. Well, I would say a couple things in response to that, 

Mr. Chairman. One is that Kosovo ranks high on a per capita 

basis. It is a small country with a small population. So it is on a 

per capita basis that they rank relatively high, at the top of the 

scale in Europe, but of course there are countries in the Middle 

East and elsewhere that provide larger numbers and on a per capita basis as well. But it is a significant problem nonetheless. It may 

be small in absolute numbers, but it is a problem anywhere that 

foreign fighters are being recruited. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Any guesstimate over the last 20 years what 

we have spent in Kosovo? 

Mr. MELIA. I don’t have that with me today. I would be glad to 

provide that to you later. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But it is a considerable amount of money, 

and it is probably more than, as you say, for any other country its 

size, it is probably one of the highest level. Wouldn’t you say? 

Mr. MELIA. I believe it is relatively high. Certainly on a per capital basis. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So let’s just note that where we have been involved the most, we now have the highest recruiting level for those 

people who are getting involved in terrorism. Something is wrong. 

Something is wrong with that. 

I know Kosovo also has been the country which has been the 

wonderful recipient of mosques provided by Saudi Arabia. Isn’t that 

the case? So we are providing assistance and money and something 

to help them develop, which has not seemed to work, and the 

Saudis provide mosques in order to train these people in radical 

Islam. 

There is something very, very wrong with that whole formula. I 

would think that, number one, again, it comes down to should our 

aid be involved with humanitarian emergency aid or should it be 

involved with development aid. And, quite frankly, it doesn’t sound, 

from what I have seen over the years, the development part of it 

is not a very successful element. Helping people whose lives are in 

danger because of Ebola or an earthquake or a tsunami, that we 

have gone good at. But this development doesn’t seem to have 

worked. 

By the way, in terms of the refugees, how much are we now putting in? Can someone answer? How much are we putting into the 

refugees in Europe? How many billions of dollars or hundreds of 

millions or what are we talking about? 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. Actually, Mr. Chairman, if I could also add, go 

back just briefly, if you would permit me to Kosovo and specifically 

our support. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Sure. 

53

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. I will say that we are making progress, and 

many of the Balkan countries that do have foreign fighter challenges are building countering violent extremist strategies, and 

they have started to take and enact some legislation. They have developed national security CVE strategies, with our help they have, 

and in our budget for 2017 we do have about $3 million that we 

are going to put to help them support tackling that problem. They 

recognize they have a problem, and they want our assistance in 

helping it. So we are doing that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I guess spending all that money on 

strategies means that strategists get a lot of money. That is great. 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. And they are also going ahead and undertaking legislation that will allow them to go after the foreign fighter. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me ask you this. Have we given money 

to, I guess in Europe it is the Interpol, specifically added to their 

money so they can track down terrorist organizations? 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. I will have to get back to you with the answer 

to that question about whether we specifically support Interpol. 

But I know that we do share information. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yeah. It would seem to me that the development strategies that we have had in Kosovo, if you look at that, 

have not worked. We visited Kosovo last year. Young people continue to be unemployed with no hope of new jobs. And we end up 

with all of these mosques. But, again, in terms of how much are 

we providing for humanitarian emergency assistance to the refugees in Europe, Western Europe. 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. If you may, we have at this point provided to 

UNHCR for humanitarian assistance to Greece, western Turkey, 

and the Balkans, in 2015 we provided about $26.6 million. And this 

year, in 2016, about $41 million. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. $41 million. And that is going to what countries again? 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. It is going to UNHCR, the United Nations humanitarian organization. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. What countries do they provide money 

to? 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. In this particular case, they are supporting 

Greece, western Turkey, and the Balkans, as well as the rest of the 

world in humanitarian assistance. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. And let’s just note, in this humanitarian crisis that is now being faced in Europe, that these are basically Muslim people who are going into different cultures and there 

are a number of Muslim countries who perhaps could be doing 

more for them. It is beyond me how this thingis all going to play 

out in the end. But we do see with Kosovo that we have got a serious problem if people who are not in the Middle East are being recruited into these terrorist organization. That is really worrisome. 

I will yield now to Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank all four of you for your dedicated work, 

USAID, State Department. I think the American public really 

doesn’t understand the significance and the importance of the work 

that you do and how it integrates and helps us all move forward. 

54

So I just want to thank you for your service, number one. It is 

very, very important. And we have got to figure out a way that we 

can let the American people know how important it is, because oftentimes, I guess, because they don’t understand when they hear 

about funding to the State Department and to foreign affairs, et 

cetera, they think that it is wasted money. I don’t know of a better 

investment. 

We need to have these dialogues so that we can understand and 

try to make sure that we break it down so that they understand 

why certain dollars go where and the significance of it. So, for example, I know when we talk about the OCO account, why we would 

want money to go there as opposed to the general budget and/or 

money that may be set aside for the DRG. 

In fact, when I was looking at the State Department’s budget in 

2015 for Europe and Eurasia budget, only 20 percent of that at the 

time was placed in the OCO account and it looks like now that that 

figurehas grown to about 60 percent. So I am just trying to understand why would we move and go from 20 to 60. 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. If I can address that question. Our level of 

commitment to each of our countries should be judged, I think, by 

the overall level of resources dedicated to supporting our strategy 

and not necessarily specifically the breakdown of OCO versus base 

funding. 

This question of OCO and base funding was something that the 

Department—it was part of a larger conversation between the Congress and the administration within the context of the 2016 budget. 

And in coordination, I think, we have an agreement that our OCO 

funding will be targeted to areas impacted by the manmade crises 

as well or natural disasters. 

So for our region in Europe, this means allocating OCO to the 

frontline countries in crisis or are continuing in crisis, such as 

Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, which are not progressing as 

quickly and still need a lot of our support for the reforms they need 

to undertake. And for Central Asia, it meant allocating OCO to the 

Central Asia regional program, which does address the regional integration of Afghanistan and countering Russian pressure. 

So we understand the difference and we have an understanding 

that at the end of the day our assistance will go to those countries 

that need it and that we believe continue to need our assistance 

and also are making progress. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. And I think the other thing, again, when 

we talk about assistance and working together, maybe I will ask 

Mr. Melia this, do we, and if we do, how do we coordinate with our 

European Union allies on assistance to countries in Europe and 

Eurasia so that we can make sure we are getting the best bang for 

our buck and we are working collectively together? 

Mr. MELIA. Sure. Thank you for the question, Congressman 

Meeks. 

In the 10 locations in the wider Eastern European region where 

we have offices or missions, we have regular consultation with 

other donors in country. We do that jointly with State Department 

colleagues at the Embassies in those countries, and we work very 

closely to make sure that we are working in tandem with them. 

55

In those places where we have a very small presence, like in 

Macedonia and in Albania in particular I am thinking of, we have 

struck interesting partnerships with European donors where they 

are putting money into some of the programs that we have designed and are implementing to enlarge them, to make them last 

longer or cover a wider swath of the country, in enhancing agricultural production techniques or in supporting judicial sector reform 

in particular, I am recalling. 

Just a few weeks ago, we signed a memorandum of understanding with the Government of Romania to work together in assistance programs. For them that means largely in Moldova, one of 

the weakest countries out of the former Soviet Union, joining Romania. Today we signed a specific agreement where they are joining us in an agricultural production project together. 

So we look for opportunities to leverage our small presence to enlarge it with others’ contributions. I would say that our people in 

the field are very entrepreneurial that way in looking for ways to 

maximize the American investment. 

Mr. MEEKS. Can you tell me, are there any countries within our 

subcommittee’s jurisdiction that are being provided migration and/

or refugee assistance and why those countries as opposed to others 

directly? 

Mr. MELIA. Well, the principal places that have been the focus 

of our limited efforts on helping communities and countries deal 

with the migration crisis were Serbia and Macedonia, which were 

facing the brunt of it. 

Macedonia, last year we had a $3.5 million bilateral program as 

the foundation of our presence there. It is a very small presence. 

So in order to be able to deal with a sudden crisis like the migrant 

tide that washed in last year, we drew money from Washington, 

and this $2 million investment that went to Serbia, and a smaller 

amount that went to Macedonia, enabled us to finance local groups’ 

efforts to provide social services to the migrants that were coming 

through, advising them on their rights, helping provide shelter. 

But the larger American investment in helping this has gone 

through our colleagues at the State Department’s PRM Bureau, 

which has put money through U.N. agencies. I saw those U.N. 

agencies on the ground in Macedonia and in Serbia providing those 

kinds of services with ‘‘Blue Jackets’’ and under the multinational 

flag. 

But the U.S. is providing about a third, as I understand, about 

a third of the money that has gone into the UNHCR efforts in the 

Balkans in the last year or two. 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. Congressman, if I could also add, we do have 

also ongoing programs that deal with border security and border 

control. And at the peak of the flow of the migrants where those 

countries had no clue how to deal with it, our presence of our INL 

and border collaboration was able to actually help those countries 

think differently on how they would have to address the flow and 

get a handle on it. So we have been very involved in providing the 

kinds of technical advice, technical assistance, and also just simply 

best practices that some of these countries desperately needed at 

the time of the crisis. 

56

At this point there are also some refugees who are left in some 

of those countries now that the borders are somewhat closed and 

we will continue to respond to their interests in sort of how do we 

manage those migrants and refugees who are there who are sitting 

there waiting for going back or moving on. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Just a few questions 

for the record my staff would like to ask, and then a couple of my 

own points. 

Could you give us an update on U.S. participation in Expo 2017 

in Kazakhstan? Someone have any information on that for us? Will 

the U.S. and the U.S. companies be able to fully participate in that 

expo. 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. Mr. Chairman, I can respond to that. 

So, as you may know, under current law the Department of State 

can’t spend appropriated funds on U.S. pavilions or major exhibits 

at international expos, unless funds are expressly appropriated by 

Congress for that purpose. And as a result, as part of a longer-term 

effort to address this, in the 2017 budget request the State Department is actually proposing language to address that. To allow for 

funds to be spent toward international expos. 

But in the meantime, with respect to the Kazakhstan expo, we 

are in a bit of a bind, I would say. You know that the last expo, 

which was in Milan, Italy, was a big success as a representational 

event. It got, I think, 6.1 million visitors came to the U.S. pavilion. 

But as a financial matter it was not such a great success. The private sector partner who raised money for that expo didn’t raise the 

necessary amount. And we are now working with that private sector partner to find a solution to the debt. 

But in the meantime, even though the Astana expo will cost less 

than the Milan one did, without having strong financial commitments from the private sector the Department of State can’t confidently proceed to give the formal U.S. blessing to the pavilion. 

So we are still working with the Government of Kazakhstan, also 

with the Departments of Commerce and Energy, to find a creative 

solution to this and find some way that we can, under existing 

legal authorities, have a presence there. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Dan. Thank you very much. My 

staff wanted that question answered. So there you go. 

And has the United States been able to sign a new bilateral assistance agreement with Kyrgyzstan to replace the one that was 

abrogated last year? 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. I can address that as well. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let’s hear. 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. So as you probably know, last summer, our bilateral assistance agreement with Kyrgyzstan was unilaterally canceled by the Government of Kyrgyzstan. It is important that we 

have this because without it our assistance is subject to local taxation, which is against all U.S. policy. And so it provides us a basis 

for helping Kyrgyzstan in a variety of ways that we are not able 

to do right now. 

Secretary Kerry’s visit there in the fall helped to—was sort of a 

turning point, and I think our relationship is in a much better 

place today, and much——

57

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Headed in the right direction, would you say, 

now? 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. Yeah, it is headed in the right direction and we 

are talking intensively about getting a new agreement in place and 

we hope to have it. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. I just noted that we have 15 minutes 

before the vote is over, and I will finish up my questioning here. 

Mr. Meeks will have his. We will see if whatever we can squeeze 

out, but this hearing will be adjourned at 5 minutes till the time 

that we have to go over and vote. So there you go. 

I am a little concerned about when I keep—what role did we play 

in making sure that the Lithuanians have their LNG facility? Did 

we have any government money involved in that? 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. Mr. Chairman, I would like to get you a response for the record, but my understanding is that we did not 

have any resources for that. It was so—but I will get you——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Let me just note that——

Ms. ROMANOWSKI [continuing]. An answer for the record. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. When we are talking about, and 

we have people here as representatives of our Government, talking 

about how we are involved with—or we are in some way promoting 

these things, at some point I would hope that we start trying to 

improve relations with Russia rather than trying to hit them in the 

face. I mean, I just—over and over and over again part of the testimony today, and it is a policy of our Government, which you reflect, which is a hostility toward Russia that is driving us away 

from each other. 

And every time there is something we can do that will undercut 

them economically or undercut them in some way in their relationship with people around them, it would be as if some—Russia 

would come in and do something with Mexico to try to make sure 

that we couldn’t work with Mexico or something. These are hostile 

acts, as far as I am concerned, and I know my colleagues disagree 

with me on that. 

Mr. Meeks may or may not disagree with me on that, but I 

think—what are we doing? Do we still fund these people-to-people 

exchanges with Russia? Are we at least doing some of that? 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. Mr. Chairman, yes, we are. And in fact, we 

are planning on continuing and I have requested funds in our 2017 

budget to be able to continue to engage with people-to-people exchanges and programs between Americans and Russians who 

would like to engage. And it is—we have been very open about our 

engagement with Russia. We have consistently pointed out that the 

United States and Russia should continue to work together on a 

range of issues that affect our national security concerns. 

We are also frank when we disagree, as I am sure you know, 

whether it is on Ukraine or on the treatment within Russia of civilian—their civil society, political opposition, or journalists. But we 

do believe that it is important that we maintain the people-to-people contacts. They have been invaluable. And we have requested resources. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me note, I was the head of a codel. This 

is, you know, our committee overseas relations with Russia, as well 

as Europe and Central Asia. We recently headed a codel to Russia. 

58

It was like a few months ago, and we were the first codel there in 

the last 3 years. People got to know, there are incredible implications to this continued role toward making things more hostile and 

more hostile and more hostile. 

You have pictures of Russian planes buzzing our ships. Of 

course, no one noted, when they said that, where that ship was located, which was 26 miles from St. Petersburg and, yeah, it was 

international waters, but that would be the equivalent of sending 

a missile delivery system boat of Russia off of Catalina Island, 

which is 26 miles off of my shoreline. I think we need to really pay 

attention to try to be peacemakers where we can rather than this 

incredible hostility that could lead us to war, which would be a catastrophe for the world. 

And with that said, Mr. Meeks, I give you the last word on that 

and then we will adjourn. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. Let me just say, one of the things I do 

agree with you on is that people-to-people contact is tremendously 

important. I think that we need to fund it and I think that that 

is important. 

But let me just then defer with you when you talk about aggression on our side. It wasn’t the United States that invaded Eastern 

Ukraine. It wasn’t the United States that, you know, when they 

talk about Georgia and other countries in the region. So when you 

talk about aggression, it seems to me that the aggression is coming 

from the other side. It takes two to tango. 

And I know that this President and this administration was 

doing everything it could to try to improve those relationships. And 

we have talked about, you know, against, quite frankly, some of my 

colleagues, not Mr. Rohrabacher, but on the other side, he was 

being criticized for doing it early on in his administration. And so 

we—but it takes two to tango. And clearly, if I look at the aggressive part, especially the military aggression, that is not on us. That 

is on them. 

The question that I wanted to—I guess the final question that 

I want to ask is the current and the future shape of the European 

Reassurance Initiative. I know that the President is asking or is 

going to be asking to quadruple the ERI this year. But I just want 

to know, do we know how that money will be distributed? You 

know, because there has become some issue on the distribution or 

how the money will be distributed and if we are going to increase 

it. I, just for my edification, would like to know if there is a plan 

on how that will operate. 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. Congressman Meeks, I will have to get back 

to you on the exact details, because as you know, the European Reassurance Initiative is also a very large Defense Department program. And how it will all break down are the things that still are 

under a lot of discussion, and we can get back to you with the details on that. 

Mr. MEEKS. That would be great. Because I think that would 

help, you know, especially as we are reviewing on our side, we 

know how the money is being spent and why. And I think it helps 

us when we want to explain it to the American people also and how 

it is to our advantage and, you know, especially when you are talking about the increase therein. 

59

So with that, I know that we have votes, Mr. Chairman, and I 

don’t want to miss these votes that we have got coming up. So I 

will yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. My ranking member 

is right. When Russia was involved in those, we weren’t involved 

in that with them. We were too busy in the Dominican Republic, 

Panama, Grenada, and helping Somoza and all of these other dictators that we have been helping and invading their country when 

they were overthrown. Reagan did it. Listen, I was there with 

Reagan too. 

But the bottom line is, this is not their—we do some of the same 

things that we are condemning the Russians for and I do not have 

a double standard on that. And I think communism was the greatest evil in my lifetime and I am proud that we defeated it. But that 

Russia is no longer the Soviet Union, and we should be trying to 

aim at peace with them rather than—and reconciliation rather 

than beating them down every time we have a chance. 

So with that said, this hearing—and thank you for your work, 

and my door and the ranking member’s door is always open. If you 

have some things you would like to talk over with us, I am open 

to you. So please take advantage of that offer. 

And with that said, this hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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