• Isast r on 

n amp 

.. 

\ 

, 

. 

i 

-

Disaster on Green Ramp 
" It was soldi ers saving soldi ers. Soldi ers putting out fires on 

other sold iers; soldiers dragging soldiers out of fires; resuscitating; giving soldi ers CPR; putting tourniquets on limbs 

that had been severed .... Anything they could do to care for 

their buddies that were more seriously injured they were 

doing. They can't do that without knowing how. They 

responded the way they would in combat." 

- Maj. Gen. William M. Steele 
Disaster on Green Ramp: 

The Army's Response 

by 

Mary Ellen Condon-Rall 

MILITAII.V INsnvcnoN 

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1996 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Condon-Rail, Mary Ellen, 1938-

Disaster on Green Ramp: the Army's response I by Mary Ellen 

Condon-Rail. 

p. cm. 

Include's bibliographica l references and index. 

I. Airplanes. Military- Accidents- North Carolina- Pope Air 

Force Base. 2. Disaster relief- North Carolina- Pope Air Force 

Base. 3. United States. Army- Firemen. I. United States. Army. 

II. Title. 

TL553.5.C577 1996 96- 33966 

363. 12 '465-dc20 CII' 

CMH Pub 70- 55 

First Printing 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 
... To the Heroes of Green Ramp 

Foreword 

Disaster on Green Ramp: The Army's Response is a powerful story 

of pain, terror, pride, courage, and compassion. It celebrates the magnificent spirit of the men and women who make up America's military 

community. 

This work describes the Army's exceptionally effective response to 

the tragic events on 23 March 1994 at Pope Air Force Base, North 

Carolina. On that day a large number of Army paratroopers from nearby Fort Bragg had assembled in an area adjacent to the airstrip known 

as Green Ramp, preparing to board a transport that would ca rry them 

aloft for a training parachute jump. They never made that j ump. Shortly 

after 1400 hours two aircraft attempted to land simultaneously at Pope. 

The resulti ng crash produced a massive fire that brought death or injury 

to more than a hundred paratroopers- the worst peacetime loss of life 

suffered by the 82d Airborne Division since World War II. 

You will recognize the troopers, doctors, medics, chaplai ns, volunteers, and fam ily members who triumphed over tragedy; some by name, 

but most by type. They are, in truth, much li ke you and me- essentially ordinary people cast in extraordinary roles by fate . What they shared 

was a fierce loya lty to one another. 

The Center of Military History is proud to present this study, which 

is largely based upon the first-person accounts of those invol ved. I urge 

you to read it, to reflect on the insights shared by those who made history, and to discuss it within your own unit and organization. It is a 

story worth telling agai n and aga in. 

Washington, D.C. 

I April 1996 

V II 

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE 

Brigadier General, USA 

Chief of Military History 
The Author 

Mary Ellen Condon-Ra il was born in Brooklyn, New York, where she 

received her primary and secondary education. She earned her B.A. and 

M.A. degrees respectively from Molloy College for Women and 

Fordham Un iversity, both in the New York area, and her Ph.D. degree 

from the University College of the University of London in England. 

Beginning in 1972, she started her career as a historian with The 

Historical Unit of the U.S. Army Medical Department and, in 1976, 

when The Historica l Unit was absorbed, moved to the U.S. Army Center 

of Military History, where she is a member of the Military Studies 

Branch of the Research and Analysis Division. In 1990 Dr. CondonRail was awarded a one-year Secretary of the Army Research and Study 

Fellowship. In addition to completing a monograph on host nation medical support during the Gu lf War and a chapter on the history of military anesthesia in the Anesthesia and Perioperalive Care oflhe COII/bal 

Casually volume of The Texlbook of MililGlJI Medicine, she has coauthored the forthcoming volume The Medical Deparllllent: Medical 

Service in Ihe Wt:1I" Agail/SI Japan. She also has contributed numerous 

articles on military medicine and naval history in American, British, 

and Australian journals. 

VIII 
Preface 

This is the story of the Army's response to the disaster on Green 

Ramp at Pope Air Force Base on 23 March 1994. Professionalism, 

training, and teamwork turned an essentially tragic story into a triumphant one: Twenty-four paratroopers perished, but more than a hundred were saved. A quick-reaction mission and numerous deployments 

made it possible for Fort Bragg's elite XVIII Airborne Corps and its 

82d Airborne Division and 44th Medical Brigade, as well as Womack 

Army Medical Center, to respond rapidly and effectively to the crisis. 

Training and teamwork also worked for Fort Sam Houston, Brooke 

Army Medical Center, and the U.S. Army Institute of Surgical 

Research, where the severely burned received care. The narrative focuses on the immediate response to the acc ident, medical treatment of the 

burn victims, command and control at emergency operations centers, 

family assistance, and the survivors themselves. The roles of mental 

health specialists, chaplains, public affairs officers, and Army leaders 

are also examined. 

The idea for this study originated with Army Chief of Staff General 

Gordon R. Sullivan, who, after visiting the injured paratroopers at Fort 

Bragg several days after the incident, tasked the Center of Military 

History to capture the story of the Army's response. In April and May 

1994 an Army history team, consisting of historians from the 44th 

Military History Detachment, the Office of the Surgeon General, and 

the Center of Military History, interviewed participants in the response 

at Fort Bragg and Fort Sam Houston. One year later Brig. Gen. John W. 

Mountcastle, the Center's chief of military history, gave the writing 

project a top priority, and work commenced on it in May 1995. 

Special acknowledgments must be made to many individuals for 

their unstinting support in the preparation of this book. For conducting 

the oral histories and for collecting the bulk of supporting documents 

on which this study is based, I am indebted to the Army history teamMaj. Christopher G. Clark and Sgt. Patricia Lewis of the 44th Military 

History Detachment, Col. MaryT. Sarnecky, ANC, of the Office of the 

IX 
Surgeon General, and Lt. Col. Iris J. West, ANC, the team leader and 

my fo rmer colleague at the Center, who was inval uable to me in selecting the most informative of the oral histories for my use. And to Col. 

Stephen L. Jones, MC, the former deputy commander of Womack 

Army Medica l Center, who assisted me immeasurably, I express my 

gratitude. He guided me around Fort Bragg and the Womack Army 

Medical Center; saw to it that Womack's vari ous departments wrote 

after-action reports, which he collected and gave to me; and was instrumental in my obtaining the after-action reports of Brooke Army 

Medical Center and the U.S. Army Institute of Surgica l Research. 

My understanding of the events benefited greatly from the perceptive comments and constructive suggestions of many reviewers. For 

graciously reading all or parts of my manuscript, I extend my sincere 

thanks to not only the participants in the Army's response-Colonel 

Jones, Maj . Gen. William M. Steele, Pam Steele, Col. Elisabeth 

Greenfi eld, Margaret Tippy, Joseph Hibst, and Cynthia Hayden- but 

also to my fellow historians at the Center- General Mountcastle, Dr. 

Jeffery J. Clarke, Dr. Edward J. Drea, and especially Dr. Robert K. 

Wright, the former XVIII Airborne Corps historian. Their insights were 

pivotal to the development of my narrative. 

The contributions of my talented coll eagues at the Center are 

deserving of praise. Maj. Curtis E. Croom collected data on the twenty-four deceased paratroopers, located photographs, and prepared initial sketches. Sherry L. Dowdy used her cartographic ski lls to create the 

map; John Birmingham, his creative talents to design the cover; Arthur 

S. Hardyman and Beth F. MacKenzie, their desktop publishing art to 

craft the book; and W. Scott Janes, his eagle eyes to proofread the text. 

Finally, Joanne M. Brignolo edited the volume. Her literary skills, 

meticulousness, and hard work have made this a better study. By 

putting her heart and soul into this project, she helped me to improve 

the narrative flow and to meet the short deadline. 

Many other individuals also merit specia l recognition: M. Sgt. 

Vickie L. Freed and S. Sgt. Marjorie A. Bottila of the U.S. Army 

Reserve Personnel Center, in St. Louis, Missouri , Linda Bowman and 

Charl otte R. Guy of the Army Reference Branch, Nati onal Personnel 

Records Center, National Archives and Records Administration, in St. 

Louis, Missouri, and Joyce Dabbs of the Separati on Records Branch, 

U.S. Army Enlisted Records, at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indi ana, for 

verifying the information in the Appendix; Pete Peterson of the Officer 

x 
Records Branch, Personnel Information Management Division, U.S. 

Tota l Army Personnel Command, for making it possible to locate two 

of the parti cipants; Lt. Col. Jane Boyd, a Signal Corps offi cer on the 

Army Staff, for explaining the satellite communications system used by 

th e 82d Airborne Division lia ison team; and Hope Rami rez, 

Christopher 1. Burson, Jacob T. Naeyaert, Jr., Spc. Michael P. Fletcher, 

C. Crai g Corey, William F. McManus, Col. Elisabeth Greenfi eld, 

Margaret Tippy, Anne McChrystal, Maj . James B. Rich, and Maj. 

Gerald K. Bebber for donating their personal photographs. 

All of the people above gave generously of their time, knowledge, 

skill, and property to help me tell this compelling story. In doing so, we 

willingly became team members in the Army's response to the disaster 

on Green Ramp. I deeply regret that I could not tell everyone's story, 

but trust that this book contributes to the healing process. For any errors 

remaining in the volume, I alone am responsible. 

Washington, D.C. 

I April 1996 

XI 

MARY ELLEN CONDON-RALL 

Contents 

Chapter Page 

I . THE HEROES OF GREEN RAMP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3 

Soldiers on Fire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . 5 

Firefighters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • • .. 17 

Rescue Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . .. 19 

Reflections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . .. 20 

2. INITIAL MEDICAL RESPONSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25 

Emergency Care. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26 

II/patient Care. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • • . .. 33 

The Burn Teams. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 37 

Mental Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 39 

Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 40 

Mortumy Affilirs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . .. 43 

3. M ILJTARY AND CIVIL RESPONSE .................. 47 

Command al/d Control ............. .. .. .. . •. .. .. 

Family Support . ............. ....... . . . . ...... . . 

Minis/ly and Pastoral Care . ..................•.... 

Public AJJairs . ...................... . ......•.... 

Commul/ity Support . . ........... • .........•••.... 

47 

53 

57 

59 

62 

4. THE SEVERELY BURNED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 67 

Institute oj Surgical Research ..... . ..... . .. .... .. . . 

Soldiers Remember . ............ ... . . . ... .... .. . 

Morale . .. ... .......... . .................•..... 

Command al/d COl/trol .... . .. . .................. . 

Liaison Tealll . . ..... . ..... . . . ............ . ..... . 

Family Assistance . ........... . ... . . .. .. •....••.. 

Public AJJail"S . ................... . .. ... ...•.•• . . 

Ministl)1 and Pastoral Care .. .... .. . .• .... • .•••••... 

Mental Health . ................. .... ..... .•. ... 

XIII 

68 

78 

80 

84 

84 

88 

92 

93 

95 
Chaptel' Page 

5. SUSTAINED RESPONSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 99 

Mamie....................... . ............ 99 

Public Affairs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 

Memorial Service ......................... . 

CO II/bai Readiness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . 

COII/II/and and COl/lrol ..... . 

Menial Heallh ........ . 

Palient Care .............. . 

The Lasl Viclill/ .. 

103 

106 

108 

108 

III 

11 3 

6. ONE YEA R LATER .......... ............... ...... 119 

The Survivors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 

EJJecl on Planning . .. .. . ......................... 123 

CONCLUS ION: IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE CRISES .... 127 

APPENDIX- THE DECEASED PARATROOPERS ......... 13 1 

BIBLIOGRAPH ICAL NOTE .... ................... ... 135 

INDEX ......................... ... .... .... .... . .. 137 

Map 

Fort Bragg and Vicin ity, 1994 4 

Diagl'ams 

No. 

1. Green Ramp Staging Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 

2. Anatomical Burn Depth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 75 

Illustrations 

Wreckage ofa C- 14 1 Starlifter. . . . . . . . . . . ..... .... . . ... 2 

Sequence of events in the crash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 

Captain Bebber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 13 

Lieutenant Altfather and Sergeant Houghton. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16 

Fort Bragg and regional firefi ghters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • .. 18 

Captain Rich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . 20 

Captain Godfrey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . 2 1 

Womack Army Medica l Center, Fort Bragg. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24 

XIV 
Page 

Major Corey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26 

Major Horoho . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 27 

Colone l Eggebroten . . . . • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 

General Timboe . . . . . . . • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 29 

General Peake. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3 1 

Major Chapman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 33 

Burned hands with Si lvadene. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 35 

Rushing a casualty to the Jaycee Burn Center . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4 1 

23d Medical Squadron personnel tra nsferring a casualty. . . . .. 42 

Pam Steele and Jane Marcello. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 46 

Colonel McChrystal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • • • • • . . . . . . . . . .. 52 

Fisher I-louse at Fort Bragg . . . . . . . . . . • . • • • • • • • • • • • . . . .. 54 

Anne McChrysta l with her husband. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . .. 56 

Margaret Tippy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6 1 

Brooke Army Medical Center, Fort Sam Houston ........... 66 

Colonel Pruitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 69 

Colonel McManus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . .. 70 

Colonel Greenfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . 7 1 

Sergeant Burson. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . .. 78 

Sergeant Naeyaert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • • . • • . .. 79 

Fisher House at Fort Sam Houston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . .. 80 

General Fra nks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • . . • . • • • • • • . .. 8 1 

Generals Steele and Sull ivan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 83 

Captain Scudder. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 86 

Preparing berets for the burn victims. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 87 

Road Runner Commu ni ty Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 89 

Major Curd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . .. 94 

Honori ng the deceased paratroopers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 98 

President Clinton at the press conference ........... . . . •. .. 101 

General Steele visiting with fami lies and 

Spc. Anthony B. Davis .................. .......• .... 105 

Pa ll bearers at the Fort Bragg Cemetery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 106 

Maki ng a fist with a burn victim's hand ..............•.... 11 2 

Wrapping a burned hand . . .............•......••••.••. 113 

Specialist Lumbert ...............•.•.......•••••••.. 11 5 

Sergea nt Kell ey and his wife Lisa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • •. 11 8 

Special ist Fagan .................•••••......••••••... 122 

Private Mabi n ...............••••••.•••••••••••..... 122 

xv 
Page 

Specialist Fletcher. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 

Keeping alive the memory ..... .... ............ .. .. .. .. 126 

Illustrations courtesy of the following sources: p. 2, Department of the 

Air Force; pp. 6, 16, 18, 33,35, 46, 66, 83, 86- 87, 94,98, 105 (top and 

bottom), and 106, Fayeflevi/ie Observer-Times; p. 13, Maj. Gerald K. 

Bebber; p. 20, Maj. James B. Rich; pp. 2 1 and 122 (left and right), 

Paraglide (Fort Bragg, N.C.); pp. 24, 54, 101 , and 11 3, Womack Army 

Medical Center Public Affairs Office; p. 26, C. Craig Corey; pp. 27- 29, 

31 , 52, and 81 , Department of the Army; pp. 41-42, News & Observer 

(Raleigh, N.C.); p. 56, Anne McChrystal; p. 61 , Margaret Tippy; pp. 69 

and 7 1, Col. Elisabeth Greenfie ld; p. 70, William F. McManus; p. 78, 

Christopher J. Burson; pp. 79 and 126 (right), Jacob T. Naeyaert, Jr.; pp. 

80 and 89, Fort Sam Houston Army Community Services; pp. 112, I 18, 

and 126 (left), Army Times; p. 11 5, Hope Ramirez; and p. 123, Spc. 

Michael P. Fletcher. 

XVI 
Disaster on Green Ramp 
· . 

Wreckage of a C- 141 Starlifia Afler a midair collisioll all F- 16D 

Figliting Fa/coli plummeted /0 tlte groul/d alld subseqltelllly hil aile of 

the parked C- /41s. The resultillg fireball roared through 'he Green 

Ramp staging area, bringing death 01' il1jm)' /0 Arm)' paratroopers 

ulldelgoillg pre-julI1p exercises. NOle 'he bumed porliolls ofllie slaging 

area. 
1 

The Heroes of Green Ramp 

"Those are my brothers .... They're in trouble and we 

need to help them." 

- Capt. Dal/iel A. Godfrey 

The twenty-third of March 1994 was a fitting day for an airborne 

jump. The skies were clear, with good visibil ity; the temperature was in 

the mid-sixties; and the winds were moderate, 4 to 6 knots. The XVIII 

Airborne Corps, stationed at Fort Bragg near Fayetteville, North 

Carolina, had scheduled two parachute missions, one in the late afternoon and another in the evening, using aircraft on the adjacent Pope Air 

Force Base (see Map). Required to undergo pre-jump exercises within 

twenty-four hours of taking off, Army paratroopers had assembled at 

Pope Air Force Base for training in the early afternoon. Units on the 

day 's manifest were the 82d Airborne Division 's 504th Infantry, 505th 

In fantry, and 782d Support Battalion (Main), as well as the XVIII 

Airborne Corps' 525th Military Intell igence Brigade and 159th 

Aviation Group (Combat) (Airborne). 

The paratroopers had gathered on the staging area known as Green 

Ramp,' located west of the southern end of Pope's main runway. Green 

Ramp conta ined the jumpmaster school buildings; the jumpers assemI The tcrm Greell Ramp officially means that portion of the airfield where aircraft 

are parked and does not include the paratroopers' stagi ng area. Army lIsers, however, traditionally refer to the pre-j ump staging area- the portion beyond the official 

ramp and main runway. all the way to the fen ce on Rinc Range Road- as Green 

Ramp, which is the usage followed in the text. The chapter title is taken from 

Cameron Porter and Shannon Rasmllssen, "The Heroes of Green Ramp," Soldiers. 

May 1994. 
4 

\r 

FORT BRAGG AND VICINITY 

o 

I 

1994 

FORT BRAGG 

MILITARY RESERVATION ~ . 

/i' 

,/ 

/ 

./ 

DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

bly buildi ng, referred to as the "pax shed"; a series of CONEX containers; two Air Force buildings; trailers; a snack bar; and the jumpmaster school training area, where mock doors and C- 130 and C- 141 

mock aircraft were located in a parallel line. The paratroopers used the 

mock-ups, each positioned on a 3-foot-high platform, for rehearsing 

aircraft exits, as well as the smaller platforms interspersed among the 

mock-ups for practicing parachute landing fa lls. A pair of C- I 4 I 

Starlifters, aircraft not usually based at Pope but designated for Fort 

Bragg's airborne exercises, sat on the tarmac about 75 feet from the 
THE H EROES OF G REEN RAM I' 5 

mock doors. Vehicles lined the driveway near the pax shed and adjacent 

to the jumpmaster school. 

Soldiers on Fil'e 

The soldiers on Green Ramp were engaged in a variety of activities 

in preparation for the jump. About 1400 Capt. James B. Rich, the 525th 

Military Intelligence Brigade's S-4 (logistics officer) and a primary 

jumpmaster, had just finished rehearsing duties with the jumpmaster 

team in the mock aircraft. Cards in hand, he began to practice a briefing he was to give to the paratroopers at 1430. Another brigade officer, 

Capt. Daniel A. Godfrey, hastily spoke with Rich and then headed back 

toward the other members of his group located under the trees near the 

number 2 C- 14l mock-up.' 

A short distance away the 504th and 505th Infa ntry paratroopers 

readied themselves to practice j umps from the first set of mock doors. 

Many sat on the ground with the ir backs to the airfield, as they listened to the jumpmaster's review on stati c line injuries- " how to correctly exit and prevent getting the stati c line from the parachute 

wrapped about your arm," reca ll ed Capt. M. Lee Walters of the 

504th 's 1st Batta lion. Most had taken off their helmets and were wearing battle dress uni fo rms (BDU) and boots. The airborne troops wore 

no protective gear.' 

From a small platform in front of the trailers, S. Sgt. Michael T. 

Kelley of the 2d Batta lion, 505th Infa ntry, rehearsed parachute landing 

fa lls by repeatedly hoppi ng off the platform. He waited to move to the 

pax shed to pick up his parachute.' 

In the meantime, some paratroopers walked back from the pax 

shed, having put their chutes on. Others formed assembly lines in the 

area between the cargo shed and the nearby concrete platform, where 

the MACO (marshaling area control officer) brief is usually conducted 

before the final manifest ca ll. After their names were ca lled, the soldiers moved out to the chalk lines at the fa r end of the marshaling area.' 

l Interv, Lt Col Iris 1. West with Capls James B. Rich and Daniel A Godfrey. 14 Apr 

94 (hereafter cited as Rich and Godfrey In leTv). 

1 Jnterv, Lt Col Iris 1. West with Capl M. Lee Walters and Lt Stephanie Wallers, 13 

Apr 94 (hereafter cited as Walters Inlcrv). 

4 )nlerv, Lt Col Iris 1. West with S Sgl Michael T. Kell ey and Mrs. Lisa Kelley, 25 

May 94 (hereafter cited as Kelley Intcrv). 

J Ibid. 
6 DISASTER ON GREEN .t\~ P 

SequeJ/ce 0/ events ill lite crash. Tllis aerial view was faken 011 29 

March, ajier the wreckage had been removed. 

Close to 500 paratroopers were on Green Ramp that early afternoon. Many of them were crowded into a narrow corridor formed by 

the pax shed and the CONEX containers on one side and the snack bar 

and mock-ups on the other side. More soldiers attended airborne classes, held at the jumpmaster school. 

Around 1410 an F- 16D Fighting Falcon collided with a C- 130 

Hercules transport while both tried to land at Pope Air Force Base. The 

Hercules touched down safely. The F- 16 pilots ejected as the fighter 

plummeted to the ground, ricocheting across the tarmac and sliding into 

one of the parked C- 14 1 Starlifters. Both planes exploded in flames, 

hurling sea ring-hot metal through the air and spewing 55,000 gallons 

of fuel onto Green Ramp. The debris-fi lled fireball , "described by 

some as 75 feet in diameter," roared through the staging area where the 

paratroopers were preparing for airborne operations, stopping in the 

vicinity of the Airborne Gate on Rifle Range Road, which separated 

Fort Bragg from Pope Air Force Base (Diagram I). The " rolling blaze" 

became "a swirling ball of death.'" 

6 Jodi Enda, "Tracking Deatll's Path Along a Sunny Runway," Philadelphia Inquirer, 

27 Ma l' 94, p. I. 
THE HEROES OF GREEN RAMP 7 

DIAGRAM I- GREEN RAMP STAGING AREA 

" x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

'" x 

'" x 

0 x 

ex: x 

Q) x 

OJ 

" 

ex: '"

Q) 

-

~ 

ex: x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

1. C-141 Starlifter 8. Mock doors 

2. Air Force buildings 9. C-141 mock-ups 

3. Trailers 10. C- 130 mock-ups @ 1-----=----"'-------1 4. Snack bar ' 1, Cargo (parachute) 

5. Pax shed shed 

6. Jumpmaster school 12. Concrete ramp 

buildings 13. Airborne Gate 

Path of fireball •• I ••• - - -

Trees 0000 

Fenc e xxxxxxxx 7. CONEX containers 

Capt. Gerald K. Bebber, the 525th Military Intelligence Brigade 

chap lain, remembered that he had left the C- 14 1 mock-up and was 

about 20 feet from the pax shed when he 

heard the high pitched screech of a jet fighter airplane at open throttle 

from beyond the pack shed [sic] suddenly give way to a deep reverberating thud and massive explosion. I recognized the sound from my experience in battle in Desert Storm. As soon as I could think this, a great 

roaring rllsh of fire entered my sight above and to the left of the pack 

shed. It was at tree-top level, slanting down as it gushed into the mockup area at terri fic speed . ... The flame came though the tops of the trees 
8 DISASTER ON GIU'.EN RAMP 

that stood in a small open area beside the pack shed. In the torrent of 

flame I saw pieces of wreckage and machinery hurling along. As the torrent rushed in I could hear cries of alarm, curses, and someone yell ing 

"run" from the mock-ups. The fire blast crackled as it blasted in, and at 

its sides it curled outward as it went forward . I was standing perhaps thirty feet beside the edge of the blast, and could see eddies of the flame 

curling out toward mc. I turned and ran from the flame, to just beyond 

the right end of the pack shed, where . .. Ino longer felt the intense heat, 

so I stopped. To my left, Ollt on the aircraft ramp, now in my line of sight. 

I could see a parked C- 14 1 engulfed in fl ames. It was the left one of a 

pair ofC- 14 ls parked there.' 

Capl. Jonathan C. Gibbs "I, the 159th Aviation Group chaplain, 

had been standi ng on the chalk line after manifest call when he saw the 

huge fireball "burst through the trees." He and many others ran toward 

the fence at the end of the marshali ng area and dove behind the earth 

berm paralleling the fence. A few seconds after he "hea rd a loud 

'whoosh' from the other side of the berm," he ran around the berm and 

saw a piece offiery aircraft "the size ofa volkswagen" on the chalk line 

where he had been stand ing. He saw fl ames and wreckage farther down 

along the mock-ups, but his view was blurred because of the smoke." 

Captai n Rich, the jumpmaster, was standing about 5 feet from the 

first C- 14 1 mock door, rehearsi ng his pre-j ump briefing, when someone ye lled, " It's gonna crash." He looked in the direction of the fli ght 

line and saw an orange glow, surrounded by "smudgy black smoke." 

Rich remembered: 

Despite hearing the word run, for some reason I determined that my only 

chance of survival lay not in running but finding something solid 

between myself and the oncoming fireball .... I think one of the compelling factors in my decision to dive behind the mock door was an overwhelming understanding that there was no way in hell I could outrun the 

oncoming debris.. . I also remember . .. that whatever cover I found 

had to be within about 5 feet of where I was standi ng. The only thing I 

could find was the 12-inch high concrete slab that constituted the simulated noor of the C- 14 1 mock-up directly to my front and in between me 

1 Memo, Capl Gerald K. Bebber, Chaplain, 5251h M ilitary Intelligence Brigade, to 

Chaplain, XVI II Airborne Corps, 12 Apr 94, sub: After-Action Report, Green Ramp 

Catastrophe, 23 March 1994 (hereafter cited as Bebber Memo). The "pack shed" 

referred to in this memorandum is the pax shed. 

S Melllo, Capt Jonat han C. Gibbs III , Chaplai n, 159th Av iation Group 

(Combat)(A irborne), to Chaplain, XVII I Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg. Fort Bragg. 

N.C., 28 Mar 94, sub: Witncss Statement, Pope Air Force Base Green Ramp Accident, 

23 March 1994 (hcreafter citcd as Gibbs Mcmo). 
THE H EROES OF GItEEN RAM P 

and the oncoming firebal l. 1' l11l1ot Slife if I dove the 5 feet or stepped it 

off, but somehow ( managed to get mysclfpronc near those 12 inches. I 

then tried to get as flat against the ground and as close to the concrete as 

I could. In fact, I would go so far as to admit that I had an overwhelming desire to burrow my way into the side of that slab. 

9 

During the ordea l Rich fe lt "fully exposed," believing he was go ing to 

die. He heard chun ks of debris hitting the mock door and thought it 

sounded like " rain hitting a tin roof." He likened the sound to "heavy 

pipes clanging against each other, mi xed with a handful of steel marbles thrown aga inst a road sign." The sensation of the " intense heat of 

the fireball as it passed over ... was like being in a microwave with 

the temperature getting hotter and hotter .... It also had that weird 

low-pitched roaring sound like that of a blow torch .... At any instant 

[Rich] expected to burst into flames." Actually the captain's backside 

was on fire.

9 

Captain Godfrey, who had been talking to Rich just before the 

explosion, was heading back toward his group under the trees when he 

heard "whoosh"; as he turned and looked, he saw " fire in the air and 

debris starting to fl y." He took three strides and "got rea l small in 

behind" a tree. He was on all fours with his head ducked down, his arms 

under him and braced. He heard debris hitti ng the tree and explosions 

of 20-mm. chain gun rounds from the F_ 16'o 

Sergeant Kelley was standing with his back toward the mock doors 

and the fli ght line when he heard a noise; as he turned, he saw the 

C- 14 1 explode. He ran on an angle to the left of the explosion and 

something hi t him in the back of the head. Realizing he could not outrun the fireball, he rolled on the ground. He remembered being taught 

" in nuclear training that you lay down and let the blast roll over top of 

you." He must have caught some fuel vapor, however, for when he stood 

up he was on fire. The flames rolled around from the back of him to the 

front. He dropped and rolled again. Then somebody came to help him. 

The rescuer crawled on top of Kelley and started hitting him with "a 

wrap of some kind," and another person started pouring water over him, 

and they called for a third person. "These people saved my life," 

recalled Kelley. The rescuers put him in the back of a truck and kept 

talking to him to keep him conscious. Kelley suffered burns on 70 percent of his body, including the area from his chin to his nose. He wor9 Rich and Godfrey Intcfv, 14 Apr 94. 

10 Ibid. 
10 D ISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

ried about his burned lips. He fe ll unconscious as he approached 

Womack Army Medical Center at Fort Bragg. The last th ing he saw was 

the flagpole on the Womack lawn." 

Sgt. Jacob " Jake" T. Naeyaert, Jr. , of the 2d Battal ion, 505th 

Infa ntry, was wa lking back from the pax shed when the explosion 

occurred. He was at the level of the second mock door when he started running. He and a fri end were trying to get behind the third mock 

door but did not make it. Something hit Naeyaert on the back of the 

head and threw him against the mock door; he fe ll unconscious. After 

the fireba ll had passed, he woke up but could not move. His ankle was 

broken, and his legs were on fire. Other soldiers, who had taken the 

Army's two-week combat lifesaving course, were there to jump and 

had their med ical bags with them. They ran to Naeyaert, put the fires 

out on his legs, and gave him intravenous fluids to prevent shock. He 

went unconscious aga in. He woke up as soldiers were loading him 

onto a 2.5-ton truck for evacuation to the hospital. His friend was 

badly burned but still alive. " 

Soldiers of the 2d Battalion, 504th Infantry, who were listeni ng to 

the jumpmaster's review while sitting on the ground in front of the 

mock doors, stood up and scattered in several directions after the ex plosion. Some of them ran toward the jumpmaster school training area, 

where the CONEX containers offered protection; others bolted toward 

the snack bar and fence; and still others tried to race behind the mock 

doors. Some found safety. Most did not. Green Ramp was a confined 

area, with limited space for running. The soldiers who hit the ground 

and rolled fared better than the troopers who ran. Some were too slow, 

or tripped over equipment, or had no place to go. Those who escaped 

injury went to the aid of the less fortunate, who were usually on fire . 

Smoking tree branches and tree trun ks and pieces of aircraft covered 

the 2/504th's mock-up, wh ich had received the full blast of the fireba ll 

and debris. " 

Sgt. Gregory Cowper of the 2d Battalion, 505th Infantry, started 

rolling when the fire ca ught up with him. "Ammuniti on was going off. 

I couldn 't tell where it was. I looked to my left and there was a man on 

fire. I looked to my right and there was a man on fire." Cowper helped 

about five or six people before reali zing that he had a broken leg. 

II Kell ey [nler", 25 May 94. 

12 Inter", Lt Col Iris 1. West with Sgt Jacob T. Naeyacrt, Jr. , 25 May 94. 

Il Walters Interv, 13 Apr 94; Bebber Memo, 12 Apr 94. 
TH E H EROES OF GREEN ~H\' P 11 

Someone helped him out the gate and into a high mobility multipurpose 

wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), re ferred to as a " Humvee" or "Hummer," 

for transportation to Womack. Cowper considered himself lucky." 

S. Sgt. Timothy J. Gavaghan of the 82d Airborne Division's 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3d Brigade, had a similar 

story. He was sitting outside the jumpmaster school when he heard the 

ex plosion. As the fireball came toward him, he lay on the asphalt with 

his hands over his face. After feeling the intense heat pass over him, he 

got up and for the next twenty minutes "operated on auto pilot." He 

"dragged people to safety, patted out fires, carried litters, whatever was 

needed." His " training took over," Gavaghan sa id. The "mere process of 

repetition" kept him "going." Gavaghan was one of many heroes. IS 

Sgt. Waddington "Doc" Sanchez, a combat medic with the 2d 

Battalion, 505th Infantry, "was .. . one of the first to see the explosion 

come his way .. . . " He yelled for everyone to get down or out of the way. 

[n taking time to warn others, he perished in the fireball 's wake. "He 

gave the ultimate sacrifice, his own life," said Lt. Ronald D. Walker, 

Sanchez' medical platoon leader. The father of five had planned to 

make a career in the Army. " 

Spc. Michael J. Fournier of the 2d Batta li on, 504th Infa ntry, saved 

his life by lying on the ground inside the mock aircraft. After the fire -

ball passed, he stood up and saw chaos: "medics running around ta king care of soldi ers, and people running around yelling for water to 

put the flames out on casualties." And this, he recalled, " happened 

within a matter of five or ten minutes." Throughout the ordeal 

Fournier heard the sounds of ammunition from the fi ghter aircraft 

exploding in the heat. " 

Pfc. Michael P. Fletcher of the 2d Battalion, 504th In fantry, 

remembered that at the time of the explosion he was sitti ng on the 

ground about 20 feet from the first mock door with his back to the 

fli ght line. Whil e listening to a sa fety review by the jumpmaster, 

Fletcher heard peopl e screaming. He immediately j umped up and, 

with his back still to the flight line, started running to the left toward 

14 As quoted in Pat Reese, "'A 1·luge Fireball Rolled at Us,'" Fayelleville Observer· 

Times, 24 Mar 94, p. lA. See also p. l3A. 

IS "They Helped Victims When No One Else Could," Fayetleville Observer· Times, 

26 Mar 94, p. 7 A. 

16 As quoted in Marc Barnes, '''Doc' Was the Best He Could Be-and Proved It," 

Fayelleville Observer· Times, 29 Mar 94, p. 3B. 

17 Interv, Sgt Patricia Lewis with $pc Michael 1. Fournier, 12 Apr 94. 
12 DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

the volleyball court between the pax shed and the jumpmaster school, 

only to trip and fall on his face. Within seconds the fireball passed 

over his head. He stood up and saw thick black smoke, soldiers on 

fire , and people racing toward the accident scene "from everywhere." 

He moved forward to help a burning soldier, and when they touched, 

Fl etcher "j ust lit up." His BDU had been soaked with airplane fuel. 

While he hit the ground and roll ed, others came to him and put the 

flames out. His rescuers moved him to the side of a nearby building 

and then asked him ifhe could sit in a Humvee, which had just arrived 

to transport casua lti es. Fully aware of what was going on, though suffering burns on over 35 percent of his body, Fletcher climbed into the 

vehicle for evacuation to Womack. " 

From his position just beyond the right end of the pax shed, 

Chaplain Bebber, having escaped the fireball , turned to face the training area and saw "a scene from hell." To his right side were two 

crushed food vendor trucks, one in flames. One of the vendors was on 

fire, and a soldi er standing over him was trying to put out the flames. 

The row of mock-ups a lso was in flames, and burning debris and hot 

metal were everywhere. In an effort to return to his own unit's mockup, Bebber moved 25 feet and came across his first victims, two soldiers on fire . While two other rescuers smothered the flames on one 

soldier, he took off his BDU top and knelt down beside the other 

casualty to extinguish the flames. But the soldier's uniform top was 

soaked with fuel , which kept reigniting the fire . Finally, Bebber shoveled sand and gravel from the path that ran a long the mock-ups onto 

the soldier's back and successfully quenched the flames. He tried not 

to get sand on the soldi er's left leg, which fl ying wreckage had virtua lly cut off. Bebber remembered hoping that the doctors could reattach the severed leg." 

All around the brigade chaplain "people were doing the same 

thing": rescuing soldiers, using their bare hands and canteens of water 

to " put out the last smoldering places." Meanwhile, ammunition 

exploded, and people shouted to get away. But no one paid attention. " It 

seemed irrelevant," Bebber sa id. Soldiers were responding the way they 

were trained to do in combat. Bebber became aware of the dead around 

II Interv. Mary Ellen Cond ll Rall with Sgl Christopher 1. Burson, Sgt Jacob T. 

Naeyacrt, Jr. , and Spc Michae l P. Fletcher, 2 Aug 95. 

I~ The narrative on Chaplain Bebber in this and the following paragraph, to incl ude 

all quotations, is based on the Bebber Memo, 12 Apr 94. 
T HE H EROES O F GREEN RAMP 

him. Some were badly burned; 

others were " horribly cut and 

torn"; a few had no apparent 

injury but were just dead. About 

10 feet away one soldier was 

"already the death-color of gray," 

although someone was attempting 

to revive him with CPR (cardiopulmonary resuscitation). The 

Episcopal priest, who had entered 

the Army nine years before the 

tragedy, moved from group to 

group, speaking to the inj ured and 

helping to lift the wounded into 

the tactical and personal vehicles 

that began arriving to evacuate 

them to Womack. Other chapla ins Cap/aill Bebber 

joined Bebber in pray ing and listening to the accounts of those who felt like ta lking. 

13 

The group chaplain, Captain Gibbs, had narrowly escaped death. 

He recalled staring in horror at the piece of fi ery aircraft that had landed on the chalk line where he had been standing one minute before the 

explosion. After hearing ammunition go off in the vehicle park area, he 

ran around the back of the distressed cargo shed and into the training 

sector," where he saw injured soldiers. One man, badly burned on his 

head, face, and hands, walked toward Gibbs screaming. The chaplain 

and two other rescuers poured water from canteens on the soldier and 

pulled off his smoldering BDU. Gibbs also helped move the injured to 

the guard shed, designated as a casualty evacuation center. He joined an 

Air Force chaplain in calming the wounded and preventing them from 

going into shock." 

S. Sgt. Daniel E. Price of the 2d Battalion, 505th Infantry, sacrificed his life to save a female soldier he had never met before. Spc. 

Estella Wingfi eld, an information systems operator with Headquarters 

and Headquarters Detachment, 525th Military Intelligence Brigade, 

remembered: 

20 The distressed cargo shed is used 10 store damaged equipment. 

11 Gibbs Memo, 28 Mar 94. 
14 DISASTER ON GREEN IU,j\'IP 

He looked me in the eye, grabbed me by the shirt, threw me several feet 

in the air and jumped 0 11 top of me . . .. An instant later, I heard the blast, 

felt the extreme heat from the explosion and the debris fa lling on us . ... 

After the explosion and the rounds stopped going off, he whispered il1111Y 

ear, "Crawl out from underneath me." I did and took off running. 

Wingfield thought that Price was running behind her. When she realized he was not, she ran back to the spot where he had protected her 

from the explosion. He was dead. "He saved my li fe," she said." 

Captain Rich, who had taken refuge behind a mock door, knew his 

backside was on fire. It was the only part of his body sticking up over 

the concrete. Rolling on the ground to put the flames out, he noticed the 

fireball had gone. Near him was a man " burning like a human torch." 

Rich lunged at the soldier and knocked him to the ground. With his bare 

hands he tried to extinguish the fl ames, but the soldier's fuel-soaked 

clothing kept reigniting. "No matter how hard you patted you couldn't 

get the fire out." He ripped off the man 's SDU and quenched the 

flames. A few feet away Rich helped another soldier put out spots of 

fire on the back of a female soldier lying on the ground. He decided to 

look for others who might need he lp. It was then that the sheer devastation on Green Ramp hit him: 

The number of wounded was almost overwhelming. Everywhere there 

were groups gathered around the injured trying to help them. Trying to 

put Ollt fires on them, check ing to see iflhcy were sti ll ali ve, comforting 

them. Others were running around in half panic, half dazed, looking for 

someone to help or something to do. Things were happening but there 

was utter chaos and pandemonium in the area. 

Upon seeing a man on fire from head to toe, lying in the middl e of the 

road trying to quench his own fl ames, Rich pull ed off the man's fueldrenched clothing and also tried to remove a hot metal belt buckle but 

burned his fingertips. He then used a penknife to remove the buckle, as 

well as to cut off the soldier's smoldering boots. The man was consc ious 

and wanted to know how badly burned he was. Rich told him he was 

goi ng to make it. A trooper from the airborne course helped Rich stabilize the soldier and to place a helmet under his head to make him 

more comfortable." 

l! As quoted in Porter and Rasmussen, "Heroes of Green Ramp," p. 4. 

uThe narrative on Captain Rich in this and the following two paragraphs, to include 

all quotations, is based on the Rich and Godfrey Interv, 14 Apr 94. 
T I-IE H EROES OF GREEN RAMP 15 

While the other rescuer stayed with the badly burned soldier, Rich 

walked through the carnage to check on others. He assisted in moving 

an unconscious man from a burning post in order to put his fires out. 

While the rescuers tried to revive the man with CPR, Rich shifted to 

another area to offer help. He saw an apparently strong soldier with a 

nearly severed leg, who was thrashing his limbs about. The captain 

helped others to hold down the man and tie the two leg pi eces together 

to prevent further injury. Rescuers continued to struggle to control the 

injured man. When a Humvee arrived, they lifted the casualty onto a 

plywood stretcher and into the back of the vehicle. Rich was aware of 

live ammunition, while he was helping the wounded. But for him " it 

was not an issue .... [t was not a concern." He focused on a 2-foot area. 

The only thing that mattered to him was the soldier he was standing 

over at the moment, or the rescuers he was helping. That was important. 

Combat training instilled a supportive attitude. 

During the thirty minutes in which Rich was helping casualties, all 

of the severely injured were evacuated to Womack. As a symbolic gesture, he carried some "TA- 50"- individual equipment- issued items, 

helmets, rucksacks-off the tarmac. He had suffered a gash in his 

ankle during the initial explosion and by now was limping. Ri ch and 

the other walking wounded climbed into a truck, which brought them 

to the hospital. 

When Captain Godfrey looked up from behind the tree where he 

had sought protection, he saw a lot of people on fire. He helped a soldier extinguish the fl ames on his arm and then assisted an inj ured husband and wife team who were scheduled to jump that day. Lt. Kenneth 

Altfather, the 525th Military Intelligence Brigade 's assistant S- 3 

(operations officer), had saved his wife's life by pushing her to the 

grou nd and placing himself on top of her when he saw the fireball 

approaching. Both were miraculously saved, though the legs of 

Altfather's wife, Sgt. Lorell ei Houghton of the 5 I 9th Military 

Intelligence Battalion, kept burning because of her fue l-soaked uniform. After much effort, and with Godfrey's help, Altfather put out the 

fl ames on his wife and burned his hands in the process. The capta in 

moved on from soldi er to soldier after that. He burned his hands whil e 

knocking to the ground a soldier whose back and legs were on fire. 

Then Godfrey used his BDU top to extinguish the fl ames. He he lped 

Captain Rich and other rescuers li ft another injured soldier onto a 

makeshift plywood stretcher and into the back of a Humvee. He 
16 D ISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

Liel/lenant Altfalher and his \\life Sergeant HOl/ghloll, recovering at 

Womtlck 

cl imbed into the passenger side of the vehicle and, en route to the hospital, held the injured soldi er's fractured leg immobile." 

Many people not involved in the accident had rushed onto Green 

Ramp to offer assistance. They included instructors from the jumpmaster school; medics from the Special Forces, who were in the jumpmaster school that day; members of Fort Bragg'S 44th Medica l Brigade, 

who were training nearby; and others who happened to be in the parking lot. The fireball never reached them, but they saw what happened 

and instinctively went to help. 

To transport wounded to the Womack Army Medical Center on Fort 

Bragg, troops had commandeered a ll sorts of vehicles- trucks, 

Humvees, military vehicles, and privately owned cars belonging to 

jumpmaster school students. In structors, students, Joint Specia l 

Operations Command medics, tra ined medical personnel from nonmedical units, and Air Force personnel, who either had witnessed the 

explosion or were nearby, tore up the j umpmaster school to make litters 

N Ibid. 
THE H EROES OF GREEN RAM I' 17 

of plywood, doors, and metal strips for the victims. " I f you could put 

someone on it, they used it," said T. Sgt. Ricardo A. Gonzales, an 

aeromedical technician with the 23d Medi cal Squadron. Rescuers then 

drove the casualties to the hospita1." 

Spc. Brian Powell , an emergency medica l technician, described the 

Humvees he saw taking injured sold iers to Womack under escort of 

military police: "The back of the hummer was fu ll of bodies .... They 

were piled on top of each other and one of the guys was keepi ng them 

down, trying to keep them ca lm. They were black, covered with soot. 

Some were hurt really bad. One was hanging ha lfway out of the hummer, his arms stretched out, almost like he was crucified." All casua lties who were still alive had been evacuated to Womack's main hospita l within forty-five minutes of the accident." 

Fireftghtcn 

Contingency planning had made it possible for firefighters to 

respond effectively to the accident. When the ala rm sounded, Pope Air 

Force Base firefighters were at the crash within two minutes and were 

battl ing fires within three. Fort Bragg and Cumberl and County firefighters arrived at Pope 's fire station within six to fifteen min utes. A 

new mutual aid program, devised by the mi li tary and civi lian fire 

chi efs, helped the fire departments to respond qu ickly and competently. After th e Pope dispatcher ca lled the county dispatcher, requesting 

uni ts from five specific fire departments and their equipment, the latter, "with the fli ck of a few switches, . .. sent out the five ca lls. It really cut down on the time the dispatcher needs to spend on the phone 

with us, which makes the whole process go fa ster," recalled Capt. 

Chris Dowless of the Cumberland County Emergency Operations 

Center. The Fort Bragg garrison also had the same type of pl an with 

the county fire departments." 

U As quoted in Kimberly N. Mason, "Medics Take Care of Wounded Soldi ers," Tiger 

Times (Pope Air Force Base, N.C.), I Apr 94, p. 12. See also Walters Inter\" 14 Apr 94; 

Interv, Col Mary T. Sarnecky with Capt James Mingus, 8 Apr 94. Mingus served in the 

2e1 Battalion, 5051h Infantry. 

26 As quoted in Michael Adams, "Debris Rips Para troopers," Fayeffevi!fe Observe/"-

Tillles, 26 Mar 94, p. 4A. See also Carol D. Leonnig, "Quick Wa rning. Training Saved 

Lives," Char/olfe Observer, 25 Mar 94, p. lOA. 

n Stephanie Banchero, "Plan Bought Preciolls Time for Fire Crews," Charlotte 

Observer, 25 Mar 94, p. lOA. 
18 D ISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

ForI Bragg {lnd regiollolfirefigltlers extillgllis/tingjlames 011 tile C- /41 

Since military and civilian firefighters used similar appl iances, the 

firemen could hook up to each other's systems and work together. Fort 

Bragg's Ladder 10 linked hoses with a fire truck from Spring Lake Fire 

Department; together they poured foam and water on the C- 141 to keep 

its fuselage from igniting. Within twenty minutes the aircraft was under 

control. To prevent the second C- 141 from catching on fire, maintenance crews rapidly towed the Sta rlifter about 300 ya rds away. Other 

fire engines put out spot fires on trees, the ground, rucksacks, equipment, debris, buildings, a food vendor truck, and even casualties. The 

combined efforts of five fire trucks succeeded in exti nguishing the 

flames within fifty minutes of the crash." 

When the fires were out, the firefighters searched for the F- 16's 

tank of hydrazine, a chemical used for emergency engine restarting, 

"because even a wh iff of it [was] fata l." A small amount of hydrazine 

had leaked from the fighter's emergency power unit, whi ch later was 

fou nd near the center of the disaster site." 

21 Inlcrv, Lt Col Iris 1. West with Firefighters No. I , Fort Bragg, 4 Apr 94. 

29 Memo, Col (USAF) Lawrence R. Whitehurst, Me, Cdr, 23£1 Medical Squadron, 

to Medical Readiness COlllmittee, 23d Medical Squadron, and Cdr, 23d Wing, 3 1 Mar 

94, sub: Medical After-Action Report for A ircraft Accident, 23 March 1994 (hereafter 

cited as Whitehurst Memo). 
THE HEROES OF GREEN RAM P 19 

Rescue Teams 

Contingency planning also helped medical rescue teams respond 

with alacrity. Within minutes of notification, medica l rescue teams 

from Pope Air Force Base and from Fort Bragg reached the accident 

scene. Four ambul ances from the 23d Med ical Sq uadron , which supported the 23d Wi ng on Pope Air Force Base, answered the ca ll from 

various locations. Three of the ambul ances and crews were on the road 

and had witnessed the collision. One of those ambul ances rescued the 

two 1'- 16 pil ots and took them to the Pope Air Force Base clini c. The 

23d Medical Squadron 's uni t control center, activated because of the 

crash, sent a fifth ambul ance, medicines, and supplies to Green Ramp. 

The 44th Medica l Brigade, fortuitously train ing nearby, also arrived 

with ambulances withi n minutes. In response to a 9 11 alert, Womack 

Army Medical Center activated its disaster plan and sent ambu lances to 

Green Ramp." 

Two UH- 60 medevac helicopters had landed near Green Ramp as 

well. The a ircraft belonged to the 57th Medica l Company (Air 

Ambulance) of the 56th Medical Battalion (Evacuation), which was 

part of the 55th Medical Group of the 44th Medica l Brigade. The" I st 

up" aircraft arri ved at Pope Air Force Base at 1438, eight minutes after 

notification, and departed for Womack with two litter cases at 1448. 

The "2d up" aircraft touched down at 1440 but did not evacuate any 

casua lti es. Six other medevac helicopters, belonging to the 57th 

Med ica l Company, stood by at Womack and at nearby Simmons Army 

Airfi eld fo r transfer of casualties from Womack to other facilities." 

Just outside the Airborne Gate on Rifle Range Road, eight civi lian 

ambu lances from Cumberland, Moore, Hoke, and Harnett Counties 

stood by to move casualties, but all of the injured had been evacuated. 

Immediate ly after the explosion the security police secured the gate to 

keep vehicles from entering the area ." 

Limited triage occurred at the crash site because of the fi res and 

exploding ammunition (500 rounds of 20-mm. ammunition from the 

JO Ibid. 

JI Interv, Lt Col Iri s 1. West wi th Crew Members, 57th M edical Company (A ir 

Ambulance), 14 Apr 94 (hereafter cited as 57th Medical Co Interv); Memo, Col 

Stephen L. Jones, Dep Cdr ror Clinical Services, WAMC, to U.S. Army Center of 

Military History, 3 Apr 95, sub: Medical Response to the F- 16 Cmsh at Pope Air Force 

Base, 23 March 1994. 

n 57th Medical Co Interv, 14 Apr 94. 
20 DISASTER ON GREEN R AI\'IP 

fighter), the numerous medical 

personnel and vehicles available 

for evacuation, and the qui ck 

transport of casualties to Womack 

nearby. Six burn patients were 

taken to the Pope Air Force Base 

clinic and later transported to 

Womack. The nine pronounced 

dead at the scene were placed in a 

temporary morgue in a small 

building near the crash site and 

then moved to the morgue at 

Womack." 

R eflections 

Cap/aill Rich Once the impact of the accident had sunk in, survivors reflected on their actions. Both Captains Rich and GodlTey believed that basic 

training in how to react to live artillery helped them to survive. Artillery 

drills taught them to "hit the ground and find cover .... Your best chance 

of survival lay in the first 12 inches of air from the ground up." Both dug 

themselves into the earth behind cover, and both survived. They were fortunate that protection was with in a few feet of where they were standing." 

Military instruction also helped Rich and Godfrey to behave like 

heroes. Combat training taught them that a soldier's responsibility is to 

help other soldiers in time of need: "Those are my brothers, or however 

that feeli ng is; they're in trouble and we need to help them." Rich and 

Godfrey gained fa ith in their fellow soldiers that they would " not be left" 

and would "be taken care of." As a result, "a camaraderie ... developed 

... an unspoken understanding."" 

Capt. B. Keith Poole, the commander of Headq uarters and 

Headquarters Detachment, 525th MilitalY Intelligence Brigade, added: 

" It was a tough situation, but they were never overcome by it." Soldiers 

ran in to take care of injured comrades. They did not wait for someone 

to take charge. They did this on their own initiative. Poole echoed both 

II Whitehurst Memo, 31 Mar 94. 

J~ Rich and Godfrey Interv, 14 Apr 94. 

JJ Ibid. 
THE H EROES OF GREEN RAMI' 

Rich's and Godfrey's belief that 

their military training had enabled 

them to save many soldiers' lives." 

Similarly, Spc. Gus Siettas of 

the 2d Battalion, 504th Infantry, 

sa id: "If this type of accident had 

occurred in a civilian airport, it's 

likely that people would not have 

known what to do .... Common 

Task Training, battle drills and 

conditioning definitely saved lives 

out there:

m 

Spc. Gregory R. Norrid of the 

I st Battalion, 58th Aviation, who 

ran back into the accident area 

after the explosion to help the 

injured, also attributed his actions Captaill Godfi-ey 

to combat lifesaving and common 

21 

task training that stressed splinting and control of bleeding. After 

putting out the flames on one soldier, he heard another cry for a tourniquet. Norrid picked up a piece of wood to app ly pressure and, while 

tending to the soldier, took an ammunition round fragment in his left 

arm. He continued to aid the injured despite his own wound. " In this 

situation there were a lot of other people who did what I did," he said. 

" It shows us that training (such as common task, basic first aid and 

combat lifesaving) is there for a reason. People th ink it's mundane, 

repeating it year after year, but ... the training kicks in and you just 

do what you hope another soldier would do for you."" 

Lt. Gen. Henry H. Shelton, the commanding general of the XVIII 

Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, praised the quick and impromptu 

response of the soldiers and rescue teams after the explosion. "When 

fear sets in, training takes over," Shelton said. "No one shied away .. .. 

It's that kind of phenomenal response that allowed us to get all the 

injured to the hospitals within 40 to 45 minutes."" 

J6 As quoted Porter and Rasmussen, "Heroes of Green Ramp," p. 5. 

)1 As quoted in ibid. 

)8 As quoted in Kent Kisselbrack,"Soldicr's Medal: Army Specialist Honored for 

Heroism During Pope AFB Tragedy Last Year," Kol'Ifs MomMy, May 1995, p. 10. 

J, As quoted in Leonnig, "Quick Warning," p. IDA. 
22 DISASTER ON GREEN RAh'IP 

One month before the accident the 2d Battalion, 504th In fa ntry, had 

to simulate evacuating dead and wounded during maneuvers at the Joint 

Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. Lessons learned 

during those exercises helped the battalion to evacuate soldiers and 

account for fallen comrades on Green Ramp. "Most of the things ... 

[at the crash site) were exactly what we had trained there," sa id Lt. Col. 

Stanley A. McChrystal, the battalion commander who had served with 

a special operations unit during the Gulf War. "We had to figure out 

who we had, and that's much harder than you think beca use of the confusion at the site.".jo 

Proud of the heroes of Green Ramp, the commanding general of 

the 82d Airborne Division, Maj. Gen. William M. Steele, sa id: 

It was soldiers saving soldiers. Soldiers putting out fires on other soldiers; soldiers dragging soldiers out of fires; resuscitating; giving soldiers CPR; putting tourniquets on limbs that had been severed; putting 

out fires on their bodies, sometimes with their own hands. Anything they 

could do to care for their buddies that were more seriously injured they 

were doing. They can't do that withollt knowing how. They responded 

the way they wou ld in combat:" 

The immediate response to the disaster on Green Ramp produced 

numerous heroes, wh ile demonstrating the benefits of readiness, training, and contingency planning. Combat lifesaving courses, common 

task training, and qu ick evacuati on undoubted ly saved li ves. 

Firefighters, ambulance crews, and medevac teams answered the alerts 

with professionalism and dispatch, reflecting, in most respects, wellplanned schemes. The esprit de corps of the 82d Airborne Division, 

which had already been good, reached new heights of camaraderie and 

understanding because of the accident. 

..0 As quoted in Henry CUllingham, "Battalion Remains Ready To Fight Despite 

Crash Losses, Leader Says," Fayetteville Observer-Times, 3 1 Mar 94, p. 4A. 

~I Intel'\', Lt Col Iris 1. West with Maj Gen William M . Steele, 20 Apr 94. 

Womack Army Medical Cel/lel; Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 01/ the day 

oj rhe Green Ramp disaster Womack provided initialtreatmellt to all oj 

the accidellt victims, admiffed .fifty-jive casualties, treated and released 

.fifty-one, and trallsferred another tllirteen to regional hospitals. Th e 

hospital became a hub oj emergency operatiolls and Jamily assistance 

centers. 
2 

Initial Medical Response 

"Medics showed up from all different units. They 

heard what had happened, put on gloves and went to 

work." 

- MclIgarel Tippy 

In response to the 9 11 alert of the acc ident at Pope Air Force 

Base Maj. C. Craig Corey, MC, the emergency medicine department 

chief at Womack, acti vated Code Yell ow, the mass casualty (MASCAL) plan. Assuming the worst scenario, he cal led additiona l emergency room physicians, nurses, and medi ca l technicians into the 

hospital. At the same time, a member of his staff alerted the hospita l chaplai ns and the anesthesia, surgery, respiratory, radi ology, and 

nursing departments. Each department activated its own MASCAL 

pl an. Corey 's staff then cleared the emergency room of patients not 

warranting immediate attention, made someone responsible for logging in the MASCAL patients, brought stretchers into the emergency room, and retrieved MASCAL carts from storage in the 

deco ntamination shower room. Corey was known as an exce ll ent 

emergency room physician, capable of perfo rming at high leve ls 

under stress. By 1425 the magnitude of the accident was appa rent as 

the first group of casualti es arrived in a potpourri of tactica l and 

persona l vehi cles. ' 

I Memo, Col Stephen L. Jones, Dcp Cdr for Clinical Servi ces, WAMC, to U.S. Army 

Cent er of Military History. 3 Apr 95, sub: Medical Response to th e F- 16 Crash at Pope 

Air Force Base, 23 March 1994 (hereafter cited as Jones Memo); Intcrv, Lt Col Iris 1. 

West with Maj Patricia D. I-Iol"oho, 12 Apr 94 (hereafter ciled as I-Ioroho 111Icrv). 

Horoho was Womack's emergency rool11 chief nurse. 
26 D ISASTER ON GREEN R A I\ l!' 

Major Corey (righ,) practicing emergency medicine al fh e 5th Surgical 

Hospi/al (Mobile Army) all ForI Bragg 

The first victims to enter the emergency room were two food vendors with minor burns. Corey steered them to the outpatient clinic. The 

next patient arrived on a plywood stretcher. He had a leg amputated and 

a tourniquet held in place by a crowbar. He was conscious and alert, 

and Corey directed him to the trauma area. Another soldi er suffered 

burns on 100 percent of his body. Emergency room staff cared for him, 

while hospita l administrators arranged for the victim 's transfer to a 

regional burn fac ility.' 

Outside the emergency room, vehicles wi th casualti es on board 

arrived in great numbers. A 2.5-ton truck held as many as ten victims, 

thrown into the back in a "scoop and run method," one pati ent on top 

of another. A 5-ton truck and Humvees had injured soldiers "on backboards across the radi o hump." Burns covered 80 to 90 percent of their 

bodi es. Some had head injuri es, bone fractures, and shrapnel wounds.' 

l Inlerv, Lt Col Iri s J. West with Maj C. Craig Corey, 12 Apr 94 (hereafter cited as 

Corey tlllerv). 

J l-Iorol1o Interv, 12 Apr 94. 
I N ITIAL J\11EDI CAL RESPONSE 

Maj. Patricia D. Horoho, the 

competent chi ef nurse of the 

emergency room, and other hospital staff ran out to meet the casualti es. "We tried to reassure . . . 

[them] and asked them to hold 

on," recalled Horoho. Because the 

elJlergency room could not hold 

the great numbers of casualties, its 

staff, now augmented by anesthesia personnel, surgeons, nurses, 

family medici ne physicians, pharmacists, and medics, began triaging in the driveway, a place designated in MASCAL strategy as a 

triage area. The sunny day and 

mild weather made it possible to 

examine the victims outside. 

27 

i\4ajor 110rollo 

Physicians pronou nced dead two who had suffered cardi ac arrest and 

escorted three who were ambulatory to the outpatient clinic. As medica l personnel began treating the severely injured, Major Horoho 

remembered: " Ri ght after about the third scream, this hush just kind of 

came across the whole area and people just were cli cking and doing 

exactly what they needed to do." An Army req uirement for two exercises each year of the MASCAL plan was payi ng off.' 

The triage area spill ed over into an oval of g rass, about 80 feet by 

150 feet, situated inside a horseshoe drive that ran up to and away 

from the emerge ncy room. Within half an hour every inch of lawn was 

covered with injured soldiers from Pope Air Force Base. Casualties 

lay on plastic sheets, procured from the hospital, or on temporary li tter sta nds. Steril e covers protected the burned paratroopers, who 

accounted for most of the victims. Medical staff appli ed sa line solu -

tion to burns and gave intravenous (IV) fluids to prevent shock. 

Volu nteer soldiers held sheets tied together to form a perimeter 

around the ova l and protect the patients' privacy from the reporters, 

who had begun to gather across the street from the hospital. 

According to Margaret Tippy, Womack's publi c affa irs officer, the 

4 Ibid. 
28 DISASTER ON GREEN "tA~ 11' 

soldiers "were willing to stand 

there for hours on end if that's 

what they needed to do.'" 

Inside the hosp ital, pati ents 

filled the twenty-two emergency 

room beds. People lay on stretchers on the floor between the beds 

and on every space ava ilable in 

the waiting room and the hallway 

outside the emergency room.' 

To coordinate the med ica l 

response, Col. Will iam E. 

Eggebroten, MC, acting commander of Womack Army 

Medi ca l Center at the time of the 

accident, but normally chief of 

Colollel £ggebrolell the surgery department, established an emergency operations 

center (EOC) in the Emerson Room on the first floor of the hospital 

an d directed activities until Col. Harold L. Timboe, MC, the commander, returned from temporary duty at Fort Sam Houston , San 

Antoni o, Texas, late in the evening of the twenty-third. Colonel 

Eggebroten was the point of contact fo r the hospital and arranged 

help from reg iona l med ica l faci li ties. He notified the Cape Fear 

Valley Medical Center, the Highsmith-Rainey Memoria l Hospital, 

and the Veterans Admin istration Hospital, a ll in Fayetteville, of the 

crash. He also contacted the burn centers at the University of North 

Ca rolina in Chapel Hill and at Duke University Medical Center in 

Durham, as we ll as the Army burn unit colocated at Brooke Army 

Medical Center in Sa n Anton io. Col. Jerry Palmer, MC, the commander of the 55th Medical Group, 44th Medical Brigade, worked at 

Womack with the hospita l EOC to coordinate the support of other 

military medi cal units. Representatives of the 32d Medica l Batta lion 

(Logistical)(Forward) a lso maintained a communi cations cell in the 

same room. Colonel Eggebroten kept in touch with other operations 

' As quoted in Shannon RasmLlssen and Michele R. Hammonds, "Com1l1llllity Acts 

Bravely During Crisis at Pope," Pamglide (Fort Bragg. N.C.), 24 Mar 94, p. I A. See 

atso p. 3A. 

o Corey Interv, 12 Apr 94. 
INITIAL N1 EDICAL RESPONSE 

centers established on base for 

the emergency.' 

About 1445 Captain Ri ch 

walked into the hospita l. "The 

bulk of the critica lly injured had 

arrived and fl ooded the emergency room," he remembered, 

while "medical personnel were 

running around everywhere." 

Considering his injuri es to be 

minor, he he lped to prepare IV 

solutions in anticipation of more 

casualties. After several medevac 

a ircraft landed with no injured on 

board, he wa lked to the front of 

the hospita l to have his foot 

examined. En route to the examin ing room, Rich telep honed his 

Gel1 eral Till/hoe 

(Rallk as of I Jllly 1995) 

29 

wife to let her know that he was all ri ght. An X-ray revea led that his 

foot was not broken but was badly bruised. His boot had absorbed the 

bulk of the impact.' 

To care for the injured, Colonel Eggebroten had assigned each treatment team an emergency room physician, one or two nurses, two medical technicians, and sometimes a physician's assistant. According to 

MASCAL plann ing, "each team was responsible for resuscitating two 

patients, pcrform ing lifesaving procedures, starting two intravenous 

lines, inserting Foley [urinary] catheters, giving morphine .' [and] 

antibiotics and dressing burns." Often team members had not worked 

together before or had never worked in an emergency room. But "all had 

done [the] basics li ke Foleys and IVs, and they were just told what basics 

needed to be done," sa id Major Corey. The timing of the accident, near 

the change of shift for Womack, meant that the hospita l was doublestaffed. Extra hands increased team encrgy, wh ich the emergency room 

chi ef called "an incredible come together effort" that he doubted "could 

7 Jones Memo, 3 Apr 95; Interv, Lt Col Iris J. West with Col Wi lliam E. Eggcbroten 

and Lt Col George W. Weightman, 12 Apr 94 (hereaftcr ciled as Eggebrolen and 

Weightman Intcrv); Interv, Lt Col Iris J. West with Brig Gen James Peake, 2 1 Apr 94 

(herea fter cited as Peake Interv). 

I James 13. Rich, "Memories," 29 Mar 94, an essay written on his recollections or 

the accidenl. 
30 DISASTER ON GREEN R.A~IP 

be reproduced." Eggebroten's Gulf War experience as commander of a 

combat support hospital, which cared for fifty to sixty casualties simultaneously, and his calm in the midst of chaos undoubtedly helped him to 

respond effectively to the Pope Air Force Base tragedy.' 

Maj. Dawn Light, MC, a famil y practice physician, was asked to 

help triage victims on the lawn. She had taught the advanced trauma life 

support course for the Joint Read iness Training Command, but had 

never experienced a mass casualty. Light tried to sort the worst cases 

from the minor. She looked first for fac ial injuries and then for troubled 

breathing. She gave trauma casualties cervica l collars to provide support 

and ca lled on anesthesia specialists to manage ai rways. Because burns 

cause lung damage and throat injury, intubation became necessary on 

more than thirty patients. Most of the injured needed some form of burn 

care. Major Light was gratefu l that the accident had happened in the 

midafternoon, when there was plenty of daylight. She also was thankful 

fo r the many helpers who "made things easier." Light triaged about sixty 

patients, staying until all the casualties were stabilized and transported 

to the next level of care. She then went to the surgica l intensive care unit 

and helped manage the most critica l patients through the night. " 

In response to the emergency "medics showed up from all different 

units," which greatly enhanced patient care. Marga ret Tippy recalled: 

"They heard what had happened, put on gloves and went to work." Fort 

Bragg's 44th Med ica l Brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. James Peake, 

MC, who was also the XVI II Airborne Corps surgeon, came out in fu ll 

force, sending the staff of its on-site 28th Combat Support Hospital and 

5th Surgical Hospita l (Mobile Army) to help. Brigade and battalion surgeons o f the 82d Airborne Division volunteered their services, as did the 

medica l personnel of all troop medical clinics, which had closed down 

for the emergency. Spec ial Forces medics, who were trained to operate 

independently in smaller operations, assisted treatment teams by starting 

central lines and intubati ng patients. Also treating casualties were 

medics from Fort Bragg's Joint Special Operations Command, located 

on Pope Air Force Base; those from Pope 's surgeon's office; and those 

from Seymour Johnson Air Force Base hospital. Even Army nursing students took off their student tags and started helping. The teamwork was 

"First quotation rrom Jones Memo, 3 Apr 95, p. 2; remaining quotations from Corey 

Interv, 12 Apr 94. 

10 Inter", LI Col Iris 1. West with Maj Dawn Light, 2 1 Apr 94 (hcreafier cited as Light 

Interv). 
l NITIAL N i ED ICAL RESPONSE 

a testament to Genera l Peake's 

One AMEDD (Army Medi ca l 

Department) Team, consisting of 

field and Womack personnel who 

trained together, and his resource 

sharing committee, made up of 

representatives from all medica l 

units on Fort Bragg and chaired by 

Col. Stephen L. Jones, MC, 

Womack's deputy commander for 

c li nica l services, wh ich met 

monthly to discuss Fort Bragg's 

medical needs and assets. About 

300 volunteers made their way to 

Womack to offer assistance. II 

"Everybody was doing what 

they're trained to do in a wartime 

situation," said Major Corey, 

31 

Gel1 eral Peake 

"whi ch is to be a resuscitative physician basica lly." The situation was 

chaotic. But it was controlled chaos. Major Horoho remembered: 

People just worked together and everybody saw the seriollsness of it. It 

was probably the most wonderful feeling in the world . .. to know that 

people responded the way they needed to without ever having been told 

to. Nobody argued; nobody cared if someollc ranked who; nobody cared 

what your MOS was or whatever. There wasn't ajob too small or too littl e for everybody there. 

However, key medica l personnel were difficult to identi fy, and hav ing 

them wear color-coded vests or hats to mark their position and specialty during the mass casualty would have helped." 

Teamwork notwithstanding, the absence of two-way radios in the 

triage or emergency room areas made communicating with other parts 

II Quotations as given in Rasmllssen and Hammonds, "Community Acts Bravely," 

24 Mar 94, p. IA. See also Horoho Interv, 12 Apr 94; Inter", Lt Col Iris J. West with 

Maj Gen William M . Steele, 20 Apr 94; Peake Interv, 21 Apr 94; After-Action Review, 

XVIII Airborne Corps, 12 Apr 94, sub: Pope A ir Force Base Crash, p. 16 (hereafter 

cited as XVIII Abn Corps AA R), which recolllmended that support from other Fort 

Bragg medical units be incorporated into MASCAL plans. 

11 First quotation rrom Corey Interv, 12 Apr 94; second quotat ion rrom 1-1 0 1'0 11 0 

Interv, 12 Apr 94. Sec also After-Action Review, Womack Army Medical Center, 29 

Apr 94, p. 22 (hereafier cited as WAMC AA R). 
32 DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

of the hospital difficult. To offset this handicap, supervisors, including 

Colonel Eggebroten, Lt. Col. George W. Weightman, MC, the assista nt 

deputy commander for clinica l services, and Col. Linda Freeman, the 

nursing department chief, visited the emergency room often. EOC and 

pharmacy personnel were stationed in the emergency area as well. 

Emergency room staff relied on verbal contact to obtain supplies or to 

let the operating rooms or intensive care units know that patients were 

on the way to them. Later, an after-action report pointed out that a radio 

system compatible with air and ground ambulances used at Fort Bragg 

wou ld have helped. " 

Despite the lack of radios, supplies for the most palt were plentiful 

and arrived within minutes of the initial request. The pharmacy also stationed teams in intensive care units, operating rooms, and wards. The 

teams "anticipated the requirements for medications, preparing them in 

advance so they would be immediately available." After Major Corey told 

the pharmacy that he needed a few items, morphine came "in a bucketful" 

and IV equipment and Foley catheters "by the truckload witllin 15 minutes." S. Sgt. Benjamin R. Waring, in charge of Troop Medical Clinic No. 

9 of the 82d Airborne Division, backed his truck up to the "supply room 

and anything that was burn or trauma-related went into the back of the 

truck." Volunteers unloaded the trucks. As remembered by Major Corey, 

"Nobody said it is not my job .... Everyone pitched in .... We were just getting equipment left and right for what was going on. It was incredible."" 

Nevertheless, "searching and finding" occurred for vital supplies, 

such as thoracotomy trays and debridement sets, which were not easily 

accessible or properly labeled. The avai labili ty of these supplies would 

have lessened the confusion in the emergency room, according to Maj. 

William H. H. Chapman Ill, MC, the highly competent chief of general surgery who oversaw triage in the emergency room. Medical logistics shifted approx imately $37,000 worth of medical supplies from the 

warehouse to the hospital in response to the accident. " 

Ij I-Ioroho Intcrv, 12 Apr 94; Eggebroten and Weightman Interv, 12 Apr 94; XVIII 

Abn Corps AAR, 12 Apr 94, p. 17. 

14 First quotation from Jones Memo, 3 Apr 95; second, third, and fifth quotations from 

Corey Interv, 12 Apr 94; fourth quotation as given in Margaret Tippy. "Sullivan Praises 

Womack Efforts," Pamglide (Fort Bragg, N.C.), 31 Mar 94, pp. I A, 3A. 

IS Quotation from Memo, Maj Wi ll iam H. 1-1. Chapman III, Chief, General Surgery 

Service, WAMC, 10 Dep Cdr for Clini cal Services, WAMC. 4 Apr 94, sub: Pope Mass 

Casualty After-Action Review (hereafter cited as Chapman Memo). See also WAMC 

AAR, 29 Apr 94, p. 16; Peake Interv, 2 1 Apr 94. 
INITIAL IVIEDICAL RESPONSE 

The triage and emergency 

room areas were cleared of patients 

within two hours, a testament to 

teamwork in getti ng casualti es 

admitted to the next level of care. 

Dming those two hours the hospital initially treated and admitted 

forty-five casualties; transported 

burned and traumatized patients to 

operating rooms; moved burned 

but not traumatized soldiers to 

intensive care units; sent moderately injured persons to Ward 6A, 

Ward 9A, and the ambulatory 

surgery unit; and triaged minimally injured patients to orthopedic, 

surgical, and outpatient clinics for Major Chapman 

treatment. 16 

33 

Triaging went well considering the numbers, but the large vol ume 

of patients slowed down the process of se lecting people for air evacuation to burn centers or for retention at Womack for further stabilization. 

As a result, the departure of severely burned patients to the University 

of North Carolina's Jaycee Burn Center at Chapel Hill was delayed. 

This did not delay treatment, however, as each casua lty was followed 

closely by a team of physicians, nurses, and medica l technicians." 

Inpatient Care 

Nonemergency room providers prepared to receive and treat casualties as well. In organizing the response to the accident, Colonel 

Eggebroten placed a physician in charge of each critica l area- a surgeon became the ward doctor for each intensive care unit, the ward doctor for minor burns, and so forth . When numbers of general surgeons 

proved insufficient to staff all critical areas, he appointed nonsurgical 

physicians to assist. These doctors became points of contact for receiving information on the status of patients, bed space, nursing issues, and 

other concerns, which were normally the responsibility of the nursing 

1(0 Jones Memo, 3 Apr 95. 

11 Chapman Memo, 4 Apr 94. 
34 DlSASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

department. Colonel Eggebroten assigned Major Chapman the task of 

selecting patients for surgery and coordinating the proced ure with the 

operating rooms. He and another fl oating surgeon, the on-ca ll general 

surgeon, Maj. Kim Ma rley, Me, oversaw reslIscitations, intubations, 

surgical procedures, and movement of pati ents to the next leve l of care. 

Co lonels Eggebroten, Weightman, and Freeman supervised the hospita l's response by making rounds through the criti ca l care areas. Colonel 

Freeman, who had served in Honduras and the Persian Gu l f, provided 

a calming in fluence. III 

After lea rning of the acc ident, Womack surgeons comp leted fou r 

ongo ing operations within fifteen minutes and ca nce led scheduled 

operations not yet started. As a result, four operating tables were available by 1430, and all operating rooms were ready by 1500. At the time 

of the accident the 28th Combat Support Hospital was setti ng up in the 

parking lot next to Womack to provide overfl ow operating room space 

because Womack's operating rooms were being renovated. I-Ience, combat support hospita l staff, who routine ly rotated through Womack and 

knew the procedures, were available to assist in the operating rooms. 

Only a few casualties required immediate surgery, and they were quickly and easily handled. To manage all who would need surgery later, 

Major Chapman opened additional operating rooms on the labor and 

delivery wards. Duri ng the night and into the next morning surgeons 

performed thirty-e ight procedures on sixteen patients in the operating 

rooms and more surgery on thirteen patients in the wards. " 

Immediately after the declaration of Code Ye ll ow, Womack's inpatient wards prepared to receive casualties as we ll. Ward staff discharged 

or transferred patients to make room for the accident victims. A heart 

patient was moved to the Duke Un iversity Medica l Center. The surgica l intensive care unit increased its bed capacity from fou r to eleven 

beds, and the medica l intensive care unit prepared to rece ive eleven 

patients on ventilators and another ten in its stepdown unit, usually 

reserved for patients removed from medical intensive care. The ambulatory surgica l unit became the recovery room. The staff organized 

Wa rd 6A to ca re for thirty burn patients and Ward 9A to treat another 

twenty. Maximum staffing (the result of a change in shift forty-five 

minutes before the accident), volunteer staff from other medical uni ts, 

and borrowed equipment (monitors, pulse ox imeters, and ventilators) 

II Ibid.; Eggebrotcll l.llld Weightman Interv, 12 Apr 94. 

19 Jones Memo, 3 Apr 95. 
I N ITIAL M EDICAL RESPONSE 35 

BlImed lIands lVilll Si/vadene 

from the 44th Medica l Brigade all made it possible to convert wards 

into temporary intensive care units.20 

Intensive care un its provided continuous reevaluation and addi tiona l ca re. Approx imately forty casualties were intubated and pl aced on 

ventilators at some time during their treatment to assist breathing. 

Because twenty-eight patients needed ventil ation simultaneously, the 

hospital obta ined additi onal ventilators from the 28th Combat Support 

and 5th Surgical Hosp itals. The staff gave all casualti es IV fl uids and 

medi cation. Most patients also received initial burn treatment, that is, 

applicati ons of ice, sa line, and Sil vadene to burned areas, fo llowed by 

escharotomy- Hsurgical incisions of circumfere ntia l burns required to 

restore bl ood fl ow to the involved limbs." Competent staff, with limited burn training, did an adequate job under di fficult circumstances, 

reported Army burn teams later sent to Womack." 

Casualties were being triaged to intensive ca re uni ts within ten 

min utes of the accident. Following his exam ination in the emergency 

room, Capt. James Mingus of the 2d Batta li on, 505th Infantry, was 

10 Ibid.; Chapman Mcmo, 4 Apr 94. 

11 Quotation from Aflcr-Actiol1 Report, U.S. Army Institute of Surgic;:11 Research, 

n.d., sub: Response to Ilope AFB Accident, p. 4 (herea fler cited as USAISR AA R). See 

also Jones Memo, 3 Apr 95. 
36 D ISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

directed to the second floor intensive care unit. To treat his burns, the 

staff "cut away the dead skin and put the initial bandages on [his] 

hands and face and the back of [his] head." After receiving pain medication, he was assigned to a room on the ninth floor. M inglis remained 

there fo r two days be fore being moved to the sixth floor, where the 

hospita l was consolidating the remaining patients not transferred to 

other hospitals." 

Othe r pati ents had simi lar experi ences. Captain Wa lters remembered be ing escorted from the emergency room to the seco nd fl oor 

intensive ca re un it, where the staff set his burned hands in a washbasin with saline and ice and placed some cold compacts on the back 

of his burned neck. He rece ived pain medication and was admitted to 

the ninth floor ward. Later that ni ght- around 2 100- he had an 

escharotomy done on his le ft hand. [-Ie rema ined at Womack unti l 30 

March, when he was transferred to the Army burn unit in San 

Antonio.2J 

Private Fletcher, who had been soaked with fuel oil and suffered 

burns over 35 percent of his body, was able to wa lk from the Humvee 

into the recovery room, from where he was sent to the second fl oor 

intensive care unit. He immediately received an IV and medication but 

soon fell unconscious. The staff moved him to Ward 9A, pl aced him on 

a ventilator, treated his injuri es, and stabili zed him for a fli ght the followi ng day (24 Ma rch) to San Antoni o." 

Sergeant Naeyaert remembered mass co nfusion at Womack, but 

fe ll unconscious immediate ly after receiving an IV He was tra nsfen'ed to the Cape Fear Va lley Med ical Center, where his broken 

ankl e was set and his ruptured spleen taken out to help heal interna l 

injuri es. Because of his burned hands and back, he was moved to the 

Jaycee Burn Center at Chape l Hill. He stayed there for five days, 

go ing in and out of consciousness, before being evacuated to the 

Army burn lInit. 2S 

By 2200 Womack Army Medical Center had prov ided initial management to all of the acc ident victi ms. The 9 killed at the site and the 2 

1] Interv, Col Mary T. Sarnccky with Capt James Mingus, 8 Apr 94. 

lJ Interv, LI Col Iris 1. West with Capt M. Lee Wal ters and Lt Stephanie \Valters. 13 

Apr 94. 

1~ Inter", Mary Ellen Condon-Rail with Sgt Christopher J. Burson, Sgl J;lcob T. 

Naeyacrl, Jr., and Spc Michael P. Fletcher, 2 Aug 95. 

u Interv, Lt Col Iris J. Wesl with Sgt Jacob T. Naeyaert, Jr., 25 May 94. 
INITIAL NIEDICAL H...ESPONSE 37 

who died en route to the hospital were taken to the morgue. The hospita l treated and released 5 1 casualties, their fo llow-up care to be on an 

outpatient basis, and admitted 55-25 to intensive care units and 30 to 

inpatient wards. Another 13 casua lties were transferred to regiona l hospitals- 7 to the Jaycee Burn Center, 5 to Cape Fear Valley Medi ca l 

Center, and I to Highsmith-Rainey Memoria l Hospital. The Green 

Ramp disaster had produced 130 casualties." 

Hospital personnel rea lized that even their best efforts coul d not 

save some patients. At Womack one died about thirty minutes after the 

acc ident. Another death occurred at the hospital about twelve hours 

later. By 26 March the Green Ramp disaster had claimed 10 more lives, 

5 at Womack and 5 at Jaycee, for a tota l of 23 dead. This total would 

increase to 24 ten months later (see Appel/dix), when the last victim 

passed away" 

Major Chapma n, who wa nted the best care possible for his patients, 

be lieved that the initial management o f casua lties could have been 

coordinated better. As in any MASCAL, patient overload caused "general chaos," and each wa rd chief had his own plan for dea ling with 

casualties, making it initially "difficult to get everyone working from 

the same sheet of music." After a shaky start, however, patient management by physicians not trained in trauma or burn ca re "was excellent," declared Chapman. They genera lly paid attention to detail, performed necessary resusc itations, and changed plans after consultation 

with more experienced staff. Chapma n suggested that for fut ure emergencies a single person be placed in charge from the outset to implement the MASCAL plan with the department chiefs, who then would 

distribute the scheme to the staff within their wards." 

The Burn Teal1"s 

At the time of the accident a burn team from the Army burn un it, 

the U.S. Army In stitute of Surgical Research (USAISR), was in North 

Carol ina preparing to move a marine, injured in a gasoline explosion 

at Camp Lejeune, from the Jaycee Burn Center to the USAISR burn 

!~ Jones Memo, 3 Apr 95; WAMC AAR, 29 Apr 94, pp. 2-4. 

21 Eggcbrotcn and \Veightman Interv, 12 Apr 94; WAMC AAR, 29 Apr 94, p. 4; 

Casualty List, 82d Airborne Division, 26 Mar 94. On the last victim, Spc. Martin R. 

Lumbert, Jr., see Chaptcr 5 or this volume. 

25 Chapman Mcmo, 4 Apr 94. 
38 DISASTER ON GREEN 1'\.t\MP 

unit. A UH- 60 medevac helicopter from the 57th Medical Company 

(A ir Ambulance) fl ew up to Chape l Hil l and brought back the fourmember burn team, arri ving at Womack at 1930 on 23 March. The 

general surgeon on the team joined the Womack surgeons as they eva luated and prepared the Green Ramp casualties for transfer to other 

faci li ties. A second USA ISR burn team, with additiona l physicians, 

nurses, and respiratory therap ists, arrived from Fort Sam Houston at 

23 15. This team brought the cardiac monitors, venti lators, IV in fusion 

pumps, and other equipment needed to transport the casualties to San 

Antonio. Womack's commander, Colonel Timboe, who was at Fort 

Sam Houston when he learned of the accident, accompanied the burn 

team to Fort Bragg." 

Following a briefing by Colonel Timboe, the USA ISR burn teams 

eva luated the fifty-five casualties admitted to Womack for the purpose 

of selecting the most severely injured for transportation on two separate 

aircraft to the USAISR burn unit. They eliminated those already transfen·ed to the Jaycee Burn Center and those too un stable to survive 

aeromedica l evacuation to San Antonio. The twenty sold iers se lected 

had burns in the range of 6- 88 percent of their total body surface; some 

had traumatic amputations and others inhalati on injuries." 

Coordination of efforts coul d have been better. A fte r arriving at 

Womack, the USA ISR burn teams disrega rded the Womack plan for 

triaging patients to burn centers and devised their own plan. The first 

burn team removed from evacuation helicopters patients whom the 

Womack staff had a lready prepared for transport to the Duke University 

Medical Center. The second burn team reeva luated and retriaged 

patients, rather than ca rry out the evacuation plan already developed. 

Although those actions resulted in de lay ing the transport of severely 

burned patients to burn centers, thus stressing the system at Womack 

and losing an a ircraft to crew rest, the essenti al ca re of the casua lti es 

was not affected. Minor differences on the initial management of casualties included the amount and type of IV fluids administered to casualties; reliance on the Park land formul a, taught at most medi cal 

schools, by the Womack staff and the USAISR formula by the burn 

29 Jones Memo, 3 Apr 95; Memo, Maj Wayne W. Clark to edrs, 56th Medical 

Battalion, 55th Medical Group. 44th Medical Brigade, 28 Mar 94, sub: Evacuation of 

Sotd iers From the PopeAFB Mishap, 23 March 1994; USA ISRAAR, pp. 1- 2. 

JO USAISR AA R, PI'. 2- 3; Emergency Operations Center Log, Womack Army 

Medical Center, 24 Mar 94, entry 30 (hereafter cited as WAMC EOC Log). 
INITIt\t JVl ED1Ct\ t R ESPONSE 39 

teams; the use of diuretics to prevent kidney damage; and the siting and 

depth of some escharotomies." 

The Womack staff later recommended that the USA ISR burn unit 

deve lop a standa rd plan fo r the treatment of mass casua lties at "facilities that do not take ca re of burns frequently." The distribution of this 

plan to military hospitals would provide for more sta ndard management 

and efficient transfer of burn patients. A second recommendation 

called for a burn team member to remai n behind to assist with the management of those too unstable to be transfe rred and those tri aged to a 

later night. The USA ISR staff also proposed more standard ma nagement of burn patients, recommending that each military resident rotate 

through the institute "where princip les of burn patient management 

adaptable to mass casualty situations are taught and practiced on a daily 

basis." Techni ques emphasized woul d incl ude evaluating burn areas 

and perfo rming escharotomies." 

Mental H ealth 

Consistent with mass casualty planning, psychologists, psychiatrists, 

cl inical nurses, and social workers met in the expectant care area and 

physical therapy clinic to await patients in need of counseling. When no 

one arrived within one to two hours of the accident, these professionals 

focused on treating the emotional needs of families, hospital staff, and 

units involved in the disaster. Mental hea lth personnel joined Army chaplains and family support group members in comforting the victims' families who had begun to gather in Womack's Weaver Conference Room. 

Psychiatric professiona ls also rotated through hospita l wards supporting 

physicians, nurses, and other clinicians, many of whom had never seen 

injuries li ke those produced by the fireball. The 91 C mental hea lth technicians provided emotiona l support to the morgue personnel who had the 

difficult job of identifyi ng and processing the remains of the deceased 

soldiers, many of whom were horribly burned or disfigured." 

JI Chapman Memo, 4 Apr 94; USAISR AAR, PI'. 2-4. 

J.l First quotation from Chapman Mcmo, 4 Apr 94; sccond quotation from USAISR 

AA R, p. 5. 

JJ Joncs Memo, 3 Apr 95; Interv, Lt Col Iris 1. West with Lt Col John W. Plcwcs, Maj 

Steve Knorr, and Maj Michael L. Russell, 13 Apr 94 (herea fter cited as Plcwes, Knorr, 

and Russell Intcrv). Plewcs was Womack 's psychiatry and neurology chief; Knorr, a 

psych iatrist with the 82d Airborne Division; and Russell, Womack's psychological services chief. 
40 DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

According to Army practice, mental health personnel form teams in 

response to any disaster or combat. They are drawn from combat stress 

control detachments and companies and from the neuropsychi atric 

wards and consultation services of both active and reserve components. 

Fort Bragg's mental health professionals organized into teams to handle the mass casualty on Green Ramp. Army , psychiatrists later promoted the idea that psychiatric teams be designated in advance." 

Lt. Col. John W. Plewes, MC, Womack's psychiatry and neurology 

department chief and the 44th Medica l Brigade's staff psychiatrist, 

organized the mental hea lth effort. Because soldiers with burns to their 

heads or faces " inevitably will suffer emotional or psychological trauma," Plewes summoned psychiatric specialists from the 82d Airborne 

Division, the XVIII Airborne Corps, and Womack itself to plan critical 

incident stress debriefings for the purpose of minimizing posttra umatic stress syndrome among airborne units, the hospita l staff, and the 

patients. For "anyone invo lved in this accident, their lives have significantly changed." At a businessli ke meeting, which began about 2 1 00 on 

the night of the accident, division, corps, and Womack personnel divided up the work load and shared resources. The 82d Airborne Division 

became responsible for debriefing its own units, which suffered most of 

the casualties; the 528th Medical Detachment (Combat Stress), 44th 

Medical Brigade, was to take care of corps units involved in the accident; and Womack mental health specialists were to handle patients and 

staff, many of whom had friends hurt in the accident, and to perform 

outreach programs for the community. Mental health workers were to 

form teams and be ready to augment each other's staffs during critical 

incident stress debriefings. The first debriefings were scheduled for 

twenty-four hours after the accident." 

Evacuation 

When numbers of mass casualties proved too la rge for Womack to 

handle, MASCAL strategy ca ll ed for the transfer of patients to regionj.I Franklin D. Jones, Pinehas Harris, Rona ld J. Koshes, and Ycng Hoi Fong. "Military 

Psychiatry and Disasters," in Russ Zajlchuk, ed., Mililm)' Psychiall)': Preparing ill 

Peace for IVaI' (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the 

Army, 1994), PI'. 239-49. 

JS As quoted in Ruth Sheehan, "Many Crash Survivors SufTer Severe, LifeThreatening Burns," News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), 25 Mar 94, p. 16A. See also 

Plewes, Knorr, and Russell interv, 13 Apr 94. 
I N ITIAL M EDICAL RESPONSE 41 

Rl/shillg a casualty/rom a helicopter 10 the Jaycee Burll eel/IeI' 

a l hospita ls. After Code Yell ow was activated, Colonel Eggebroten 

contacted local medical fac ilities to determine the number of casualti es the lo.ca l hospitals could take. He then coordinated the transfer of 

casua lties to those hospita ls through the 55th Medical Group, 44th 

Medi ca l Brigade, and the hospital EOC. Med ical authorities accomplished the major portion of the transfers to regiona l hospita ls within 

two hours of the accident. " 

In the grassy area outside the emergency room, a sheet marked 

AIREVAC designated the place where patients were being readied for 

transfer by helicopter to regional hospitals. The 57th Medical Company, 

whi ch was on a field exercise nearby when the accident occurred, had 

five helicopters on the pad at Womack and three at nearby Simmons 

Army Airfield "ready to go." Major Corey arranged for four UH- 60s to 

take seven soldiers who required immediate burn treatment to the 

Jaycee Burn Center at Chapel Hill ; a physician and a respiratory therapist accompanied each patient. At 2330 a helicopter transferred a sol-

}6 Jones Memo, 3 Apr 95. 
42 D ISASTER ON GREEN .A~ P 

23d Medical Squadroll persollnel /raus/erring a casllallY to '"e medevac 

aircraji jo,. the flight 10 Sail Anlonio 

di er with an open spina l wound to the Nava l Med ica l Center, 

Portsmouth, Virginia. 37 

Womack ambulances carried five patients who required surgery to 

the Cape Fear Va lley Medi cal Center and one to the Highsmith-Rainey 

Memorial Hospital, because the hospital operating rooms were full. 

Although a hotline between the emergency rooms of the regional hospitals and Womack would have eased communications problems during 

the initia l response to the crash, the transfers, in genera l, went smoothly, largely because Womack rehearsed mass casualty planni ng with the 

regional hospitals several times a year." 

At 0400 on 24 March the Womack staff bega n the ca re fu l process 

of loadi ng the burned pati ents on fi eld ambulances of the 26 1 st 

17 Quota tion rrom I-Ioroho Intcrv, 12 Apr 94. Sec also Jones Memo, 3 Apr 95. 

n 1-10roho Inlcrv, 12 Apr 94; Eggebrolcn and Weightman [nlerv, 12 Apr 94; XVII I 

Abn Corps AA R, 12 Apr 94, p. 15. 
I NITIAL !VI EDICAL R ESPONSE 43 

Medica l Battalion (Area Support) for transportation to Pope Air Force 

Base. The first medevac C- 9 N ighti ngal e, with eleven of the twenty 

on board, departed the air base at 0720 for San Antoni o. About 1000 

the other nine left Womack for the air base, departing on the second 

C- 9 at 1250. The 23d Medi ca l Squad ron from Pope Air Force Base 

prov ided many of the personnel used to load the two groups onto the 

aircra ft, and its unit co ntrol center coordinated the evacuation with 

Womack and with Scott Air Force Base, in Be llevill e, Il linois, whi ch 

provided the medevac aircraft and crew. With the transfer of th ree 

more critica lly burned patients to the Jaycee Burn Center that a fternoon, the Womack staff could concentrate its efforts on the rema ini ng 

casualties. 39 

On the day o f the acc ident, as fami lies were descend ing on Fort 

Bragg, a dec ision was made to identi fy the dead sold iers at Womack 

and not send them to Dover Air Force Base in Delaware, where verification of deceased military personne l often takes place after mass casualty inc idents. Members of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology 

(AFIP), in Washington, D.C., traveled to Fort Bragg and took charge of 

the identification process. They worked with personnel from Womack's 

pathology department and denta l activity (DENTAC), as well as from 

Fort Bragg's Office of the Adjutant General. Again, teamwork helped 

in the medica l response." 

The identification process invo lved a comparison of antemortem 

dental records with postmortem dental records, techn iques that denta l 

residents learned in the AFIP forensic dentistry course, conducted at 

Fort Bragg once every two years. Accord ing to Col. Gary W. Allen, DC, 

Fort Bragg's dental activity chief, the DENTAC team took rad iographs 

and did a denta l charti ng to discover " identifying features, either morphologic ... or manmade . . . , such as a filling or some ty pe of treatment or prosthesis." The team did not release a body to the medica l 

)9 Memo, Col (USAF) Lawrence R. Whitehurst, MC, Cdr, 23d Medical Squadron, 

to Medical Readiness Committee, 23d Medical Squadron, and Cdr, 23d Wi ng, 31 Mar 

94, sub: Medical ft ~Ac ll Report for Aircran Accident, 23 M arch 1994 ; WAMC 

EOC Log, 24 Mar 94, entries 48- 56. 

oM) Interv, Lt Col Iris 1. West with Col Gary W. Allen and Lt Col Esther Chi lders, 15 

Apr 94. Allen was Fort Bragg's dental activity chief and Chi lders an oral pathologist. 
44 DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

examiner until it was sure the X-rays turned out accurately. The civi lians and enlisted soldiers, who assisted the dentists in the mass casualty, had not taken the AFIP course and were unfamiliar with some of the 

procedures. This lack of knowledge, as well as the limited space in the 

hospital morgue, lengthened the identification process. The team finished the last body about 1430 on 27 March." 

Based on this ex perience, Colonel Allen hoped that enlisted soldiers would be required to take the AFIP forensic dentistry course in the 

futu re. General Peake beli eved that a "more clearly written SOP [standard operating procedure] to know what has to be done ... [to] move 

on it quickly" would have helped execute the tough job of casualty 

identification." 

While terrible misfortune sometimes just happens, a professional 

response to crisis is no accident. Training, hard work, esprit, and dedication- the everyday routine of soldiers-payoff in emergencies. Such 

was the case at Fort Bragg, where Womack medical personnel, with the 

help of volunteers, triaged the Green Ramp casualties, gave them lifesupporting treatment, and advanced them to the next level of care within two hours. The timing of the accident, coming at a change in hospital shifts, allowed for maximum staffing, and the presence of other 

medical units on post provided additional people and equipment. 

Womack's Colonel Timboe believed that the experience ga ined by his 

medics in Panama, the Persian Gu lf, Honduras, and Somalia as well as 

the training received at Womack's December 1993 mass casualty seminar- when department chiefs discussed responsibilities and preparations for the upcoming Haiti contingency operation-enabled the hospital to respond with confi dence to the disaster. Colonel Weightman, 

who agreed with Timboe, also credited the usefulness of the advanced 

trauma life support and combat casualty care courses, taught at Fort 

Sam Houston, and recent mass casualty exercises in Honduras and at 

Fort Bragg. Teamwork was possible because the 44th Medical Brigade 

41 Ibid. Twent y~o e out of the twenty-three soldiers killed had DNA collection 

records, which made identification certain. However, it was easy to see how body pariS 

and ambiguous denIal detail could cause misidentifica tion or failure to identi fy. The 

XVIII Ai rborne Corps subsequently recommended that commanders stress the DNA 

collection program. See XVIII Abn Corps AA R, 12 Apr 94, p. 26. 

2 Peake Inlerv, 21 Apr 94. 
I NITIAL Iv l wlCAL RESPONSE 45 

" had built up the lin ks" that ensured an organized and e fficient 

response. As stated by General Peake, " It's one Army Med ica l 

Department, not multiple chunks that never talk."" 

J Quotations rrom ibid. See also Inlerv, Mary Ellen Condon-Ra il with Brig Gen 

Harold L. Timboe, 3 Aug 95. 
Pam Steele (rigllt) and Jalle jl;/arcel/o at the 82d Airbome Dillisioll 

Family Resource Cel/lel: The divisioll commander:s and chief of staff's 

spouses led the family support group, a nue/eus of militmy lVives who 

came together at Womack s Weaver Conferellce Room to assist filfllilies 

during the crisis. The group \\Iorked ill partnership \\lith civilian relief 

agencies. 
3 

Military and Civil Response 

"Everyone got involved and pitched in. No one shi ed 

away." 

- L/. Cell. Hem)' H. Shelloll 

Whil e medical personnel responded to the Green Ramp disaster, 

Fort Bragg's military and ci vilian community provided leadership and 

essenti al services. Individuals tracked casualti es, communi cating 

timely info rmation about them; they assisted both the victims and 

their families, tending to their physica l, emotional, and financia l 

needs, as we ll as promoting spiritual healing; and they performed 

publi c affairs fun ction s, coordinating with the news media and 

preparing news releases. 

mma d and Control 

After hearing of the crash, Fort Bragg's corps, div ision, and 

installation commanders used the procedures and techniques of a 

combat system, the emergency operation s center (EOC), to respond 

to the crisis. Accustomed to executing missions on short noti ce, the 

XVIII Airborne Corps' G- 3 (operati ons officer) immediately acti vated the corps EOC at corps headquarters and sent a liaison to the operations center at Pope Air Force Base and that at Womack Army 

Medi ca l Center. The 82d Airborne Di vision establ ished the di vision 

EOC at Womack and the Fort Bragg garrison the install ation EOC at 

garrison headquarters. The next day, 24 March, the corps EOC passed 

control to the installation EOC, which fun ctioned until the twentyninth, as the installati on commander ultimately had overall responsi-
48 DISASTER ON GREEN .A~ tP 

bility for Fort Bragg's response. The division EOC, however, 

remained active for severa l weeks since Illost casua lties were from 

the 82d. ' 

Based on guidance from General Steele, the di vision commander, 

Col. John 1. Marcell o, the chief of staff, set up the di vision EOC in 

Womack's Patient Administration Division (PAD). The G- I (personne l 

officer), Lt. Col. Randy Stansfield, manned the EOC with G- 3 people. 

They built a data base on a ll the casualti es and became the central 

point of contact fo r soldi ers in the hospita l and for family support. 

Colonel Jones, Womack's deputy commander, believed that the presence of division and corps representatives at the hospital helped in the 

tracking of casualti es.' 

The division EOC had to provide the commander with critica l 

in formation "just as you do in war," Marcell o recalled. Important data 

included the status and changes in status of every soldier. "We were trying to get a grasp on what was happening to our soldi ers," General 

Steele said. By 1600 the 82d Airborne Division also had established a 

tactical EOC on Green Ramp to help verify the names of all the casualties, their status, and their evacuation destination. Because the crash 

produced many victims simultaneously, some were tagged inappropriately. Womack's chi ef of surgery, Colonel Eggebroten, recalled: "We 

spent a long time in the afternoon and evening trying to figu re out who 

we had and the numbers of pati ents that we had. We probably need to 

put more PAD people in our MASCAL plan."The division fo und it easier to track down the casualties in units that had accurate jump manifests. By midni ght the division EOC had uncovered the names and status of all the soldi ers injured in the crash. In coordination with Womack 

PAD personnel, the 82d discovered that its I st and 3d Brigades and 

Division Support Command were involved in the accident. Most of the 

casualties, however, were in the 2d Battal ion, 504th lnfantry, and the 2d 

Batta lion, 505th In fantry. Other injured soldiers belonged to corps 

un its, such as the 525th Mi li tary Intelligence Brigade.' 

I After-Action Review, XVIII Airborne Corps, 12 Apr 94, sub: Pope Air Force Base 

Crash. p. 2 (hereafter cited as XVIII Abn Corps AAR). 

1 Intcrv, Lt Col Iris J. West with Maj Gen William M. Steele. 20 Apr 94 (hereafter 

cited as W. Steele Intcrv); Interv, Maj Christopher G. Clark with Col John J. Marcello, 

11 Apr 94 (hereafter cited as Marcello Intcrv); Intcrv, Lt Col Iris 1. West with Lt Col 

Randy Stansfi eld, 12 Apr 94 (hereafter ciled as Stansfield Interv). 

1 First quotation frolll Marcello Interv, 11 Apr 94; second quotation from W. Steele 

Interv, 20 Apr 94; third quotation from Interv, Lt Col Iris J. West with Col William E. 
MILITARY AND CIVIL RESPONSE 49 

To check on the status of pati ents and to provide family support, 

the division EOC created communications outposts at each regional 

hospita l. Portable tactica l satellite terminals, FM radios, and cellular 

telephones were used to communi cate with the detail ed li aison officer on duty at the nurses station of each hospital's intensive care unit. 

Each casualty's family was assisted by another division representative, who met the family at the airport, arranged for transportation, 

and helped in any way. The EOC also used a contracting officer to 

reserve lodging at local hotels fo r famili es who did not stay on post. 

Final ly, the 82d Airborne Division sent a li aison team to Fort Sam 

Houston in San Antonio to check on the severely burned casua lties 

transferred to the U.S. Army In stitute of Surgical Research 

(USAISR), colocated at Brooke Army Medical Center, and to take 

care of their fami li es' needs. By this time "the fam il ies were starting 

to roll in," reca lled General Stee le.' 

General Steele was known as a compassionate and caring commander, possessing a strong moral character. He and his subordinate, 

Command Sgt. Maj. Steven R. Slocum, saw what needed to be done for 

the soldiers and did not hesitate to make it happen. Other casualti es, not 

from the 82d Airborne Division, benefited from Steele's and Slocum's 

determination to do everything that possibly could be done to help the 

accident victims and their famili es. According to Steele, Slocum "did 

yeoman's work" in the aftermath of the tragedy.' 

Because of the accident General Steele required that officers and 

noncommissioned officers from the 82d's I st and 3d Brigades receive 

casualty assistance training. Col. John P. Abizaid, the commander of the 

I st Brigade, and Col. John Schmader, the commander of the 3d 

Brigade, were on the casualty notifi cation teams and usua lly informed 

the fam ilies of their loss. Within twenty-four hours of the crash the 

teams had tracked down and apprised the fami ly or fri ends of each soldier who had perished (see Appendix). Steele believed that the immed iate tra ining of casualty assistance officers "enabled them to notify 

quickly the ones who lost loved ones and ease the anxieties of wives 

and fami ly members."· 

Eggcbroten and Lt Col George W. Weightman, 12 Apr 94 (hereaOcr cited as Eggebroten 

and Weightman Interv). Sec also Stansfield Inlcrv, 12 Apr 94. 

4 Quotation from W. Steele Inlerv, 20 Apr 94. See also Marcello Interv. 11 Apr 94. 

S W. Steele Interv, 20 Apr 94. 

6 Quotation from ibid . See also Marce llo Interv, II Apr 94; Stansfield Interv, 12 

Apr 94. 
50 DISASTER ON GREEN lVu\lp 

In additi on to notification, the casua lty assistance officers discussed survivor needs and benefits with the victims' fami lies. They 

arranged for medical eva luation boards to provide early retirement for 

the soldiers who were near death in order to increase their dependents' 

benefits; the widow would receive the retirement and the child the 

death indemnity compensation, about $750 a month. The division EOC 

had to ascertain who was married, who had children, who was critically injured, and who should be processed first among the casualties. 

Because of this effort, only one soldier with children died before the 

division was able to retire him early. "Retiring people was a focused 

effort, day and night," recalled Colonel Stansfield, who coordinated the 

work with the XVIII Airborne Corps casua lty assistance personnel. 

General Steele recalled that "Corps, Department of the Army, all of 

them just opened the door and sa id: 'Call. We have the board ready; we 

can do this procedure in a matter of minutes.' Things that would take a 

year when it's not a crisis were happening in a matter of minutes over 

the phone." Later, the corps recommended cla rification of Army policy 

to allow posthumous medical retirement for all casua lti es.' 

"To lend some form to the process," the 82d Airborne Division created a crisis action committee. The committee functioned like the 

Targeting Board, which synchronized the division's wartime activ ities. 

Representatives of the groups involved in the response- division, 

corps, the Red Cross chapter, military wives, family support, Army 

Emergency Relief, and public affairs- served on the committee, which 

held its first meeting on the afternoon of the twenty-fou rth "to get 

everybody together," then twice a day for about a week, and every 

twenty-four hours thereafter. "That first meeti ng went for several 

hours," General Steele remembered. "We were trying to work our way 

through all the issues and how we should solve them.'" 

The first meeting produced a crisis action plan, in which taskings 

and responsibilities were defined. The committee tasked the 82d 

Airborne Division to arrange for Air Force transportation of the accident 

victims' fami lies and friends; ensure financial support for family members; organize funerals; prepare a memorandum of information with 

details on the memorial service; activate a division hub at Fort Sam 

1 First quotation frol11 Stansfield Inlerv, 12 Apr 94; second quotation from W. Steele 

Inlerv, 20 Apr 94. See also XVIII Abn Corps AAR, 12 Apr 94, p. 14. 

8 First quotation from Marcello Illterv, J I A pr 94; remaining quotations from W. 

Steele Interv, 12 Apr 94. 
MILITARY AND C IV IL H.ESPONSE 51 

Houston, to include dedicated telephone lines; organize support at the 

Naval Medica l Center, Portsmouth, Virginia; coordinate equipment 

accountability; improve information fl ow to and from the family support 

group; coordinate press coverage; and request community assistance, 

such as food for hospitals. General Steele told Colonel Marcello that he 

considered the work of the crisis action committee to be "one of the 

major lessons we learned from the whole process.'~ 

As chief of staff, Colonel Marcello used the redline message system to send subordinate headquarters current information about the 

accident, such as up-to-date casualty lists, hospital visiting hours, data 

about the memorial serv ice, and so forth. Jane Marcello and Pam 

Steele, in heading the family support group, received the messages and 

informed the brigade, battalion, and company commanders' wives; the 

latter, in turn, ca lled more wives in the telephone organization. Within 

a short time the distaffside of the division was receiving accurate information on a timely basis. General Steele believed that the redline system enabled people to receive information privately, without havi ng to 

request it, and helped to quell rumors." 

Thinking about unit performance, Colonel Stansfie ld credited the 

recent Warfighter exercise, in which commanders and their staffs had 

learned about crisis handling, including mass casualties, with helping 

the division to respond effectively to the disaster. "For a wh ile, it was 

almost surrealistic," he said; " it was almost like we are just doing 

Warfighter," wh ich had ended the second week of March 1994. "So we 

were ready .... If this had happened ... nine months ago ... things 

would not have gone so well," thought Stansfield. He surmised, however, that if he had to respond again to a similar situation, he would try 

to retrieve more quickly the corps' personnel records because they were 

critica l for processing retirements. " 

At the battalion level, command and control of the accident's aftermath rested squarely on the shoulders of the unit commanders- Lt. Col. 

Ll oyd Austin of the 2d Battalion, 505th Infantry, and Colonel 

McChrystal of the 2d Battalion, 504th In fantry. For McChrystal, "the 

9 Memo, Col John J. Marcello, Chief of StafT, 82d Airborne Division, to Crisis 

Action Committee, 24 Mar 94, sub: Action Plan for 82d Airborne Division Crisis 

Response. 

10 W. Steele Interv, 20 Apr 94. The redline message system involves information 

printed on rcd-bordered paper, used for visual impact. 

II Stansfield Interv. 12 Apr 94. The Warfighter series is part of Fort Leavenworth's 

ba ttle cOlllmand training program. 
52 

Colollef McC/lI),stal, sh01ll1/ as 

cOlI/mander of lite 2d Baltalioll, 

75,h Ranger Regimenl 

DISASTER ON GREEN RAI\'IP 

accident was an organizational 

management challenge." He established the battalion EOC at battalion headquarters under the command sergeant major and the S- 3 

(operations olficer). He also set up 

a sma ll command post at Womack 

and, for three hours on the twentythird, on the airfi eld. The battalion 

EOC did its own casualty accountability, hospita l liaison, and family 

support, coordinating all with the 

division EOC. McChrystal ordered 

the two units on training to return 

to Fort Bragg, prohibited early dissemination of information about 

casualties, and tried to bring the 

wives of his inj ured paratroopers 

into the company areas to ensure 

that they received the ca re and support they required. He stayed at the 

hospital command post until 0500 on the twenty-fourth, creating master 

lists of tasks and the people to perform them. He sent soldiers from each 

company to Womack to serve "almost as reaction type guys," to take care 

of " the thousand little things that would come up." He appointed liaison 

people to be with the famili es of casualties, whether dead or alive, and 

soldiers to participate in the next-of-kinnotification process. He coordinated everything with corps, division, and brigade personnel and "got 

tremendous support from them."" 

Although the various emergency operations centers were central to 

the military and civil response, confusion and duplicati on of effort, not 

unusual after a disaster, were apparent. Several after-action reports 

recommended consolidation and streamlining of functions. The XV III 

Airborne Corps suggested that its adjutant general 's office, working in 

conjunction with Womack's Patient Administration Di vision, " be the 

offi cial voice of patient tracking for dissemination to command g roup, 

units, and PAO [public affairs office J," since patient tracking was a 

medical and adjuta nt general mission. The 16th Military Police 

11 Interv, Lt Col Iris J. West with Lt Col Stanley A. McChrystal. 22 Apr 94 (hereafter 

cited as S. McChrystal Intcrv). 
MI LITARY AN I) CIVIL RESPONSE 53 

Brigade (Airborne) compl ained that its military police (MP) details to 

multiple operations centers- the corps EOC, the installation EOC, 

and the division's tacti cal EOC- had left the unit understaffed and 

"confused," and thus proposed having only one operations center in 

future mass casualty situations. The installation EOC reported that 

because the corps EOC was functioning simultaneously, "connlsion" 

resulted about where the incoming reports were to go. The install ati on 

commander recommended formali zing the install ation EOC and 

establishing " lines of responsibility" for each. Only one center could 

be the lead or operational EOC in handling the specifi c crisis. In fact, 

the corps beli eved that a generi c response plan that defined responsibilities would have improved coordination of acti vities during the mass 

casualty. Perhaps, however, some confusion and duplication of effort 

were inevitabl e on a post whose organi zations were structured and 

whose personnel were trained to respond to multi ple contingencies, 

rather than to specific situations." 

Family SUPP01't 

The Weaver Conference Room on the second fl oor of Womack 

became a center for family support. Here hospita l soc ial workers, 

psychiatrists, chaplains, and famil y support group members took care 

of the emotional and materi al needs of the victims' famili es and 

fri ends. The hospital staff identifi ed and greeted family members, 

participated in the death and casualty notifi cati on process, accompanied the families during their visits to he lp with the ir emotional reacti ons, and scheduled spec ial counseling for children and adolescents 

at their schools or at the Rumbaugh Child and Ado lescent Mental 

Hea lth Clin ic nearby the insta llation. The family support center organi zed various types of assistance-food; lodging, usua lly at Moon 

and Hardy Halls and the Fisher House, all on Fort Bragg; transportation; baby sitting; and legal advice, ensuring that adjutant genera l 

offi cers were present. The loca l chapter of the Ameri can Red Cross, 

Army Community Services, and Army Emergency Relie f stationed 

representatives in the Weaver Conference Room to offer the ir services 

as well. In additi on, Sharon Thompson operated a family assistance 

activity at the Fort Bragg Community Center and was the point of 

U XV iii Abn Corps AA R, 12 Apr 94, PI'. 8, 19. See also PI'. 3- 5, 9- 11 , 18, 20, 

28. 
54 DISASTER ON GREEN RAM P 

Fisher /-Iollse al For! Bragg 

contact fo r people around the nation who were inquiring about their 

loved ones. " 

The fam ily support group concept, as institutionali zed in the Army 

Family Action Plan, binds Army spouses to assist fami lies on a regular 

basis but even more so during a unit deployment or a crisis. Military 

wives demonstrate their adeptness at handling the emotional needs of 

fam ilies, especia lly the spouses of injured or dead soldiers. Pam Steele, 

Jane Marce llo, Kathy Abizaid, Anne McCh rystal, and Charlene Austin 

were key players in the support group. The "Trauma in the Unit" disclissions, whi ch most commanders' wives take with their husbands as 

part of the one-week command team seminar at Fort Leavenworth 's 

Command and General Staff College (CGSC), guided the support 

group in handling the families' concerns and helping them after the 

tragedy. The commanders' wives could be seen carrying their "Trauma 

~ M emo, Col Stephen L. Jones, DcI' Cdr for Clinical Services, WAMC, to U.S. 

Army Center of Military History, 3 Apr 95, slIb: Medical Response to the F- 16 Cra sh 

al Pope Air Force Base, 23 March 1994 (hereafter cit ed as S. Jones Memo); Int erv, Lt 

Col Iris 1. West with Pam Sleele, 22 Apr 94 (hereafter cited as P. Steele Intcrv); Interv, 

Sgt Patricia Lewis with Anne McChrystal . 12 Apr 94 (hereafter cited as A. McChrystal 

Interv). The Fisher I-Iollse was one of twenty hOllses donated by the Zachary and 

Elizabeth M. Fisher Medical Foundation, to hOllse fami ly members of sick servicemen 

on U.S. military bases. 
M .ILlTARY AND C IV IL R ESPONSE 55 

in the Unit" guides with them into the Weaver Conference Room. 

Although the family support group was not a formal organization, formal instruction at CGSC about such matters aga in paid dividends. " 

The fami ly support group embraced the same tone of empathy 

and kindness as set by the division commander. Shortly after the accident, Colonel McChrysta l remembered Steele's words: "We will take 

care offamili es. We will do this. I don 't care what it costs .... This is 

what we are going to do. This is my intent." The general's statement 

provided direction for his officers and their wives; they worked as 

partners in the aftermath of the tragedy and facilitated the tasks of the 

family support group. " 

A nucleus of military wives arrived at Womack shortly after the 

accident and stayed until the early hours of the morning, providing support to the famil ies that gathered there. They gave hugs, held hands, listened, obtained food, made contacts for plane tickets, and did what was 

necessary to organize assistance. According to Pam Steele, the wives 

dealt with the emotions by keeping a sense of levity, a sense of humor; 

by talking about the acc ident; and by " feeling the sorrow." The division 

commander's wife was there for them as well as for the families." 

Anne McChrystal had been responsible for family support within the 

2d Battalion, 504th Infantry, since shortly after her husband had assumed 

command eleven months before the accident. Believing that it was easier for a company "to grow closer," she ran fami Iy support at the company level, seeing to it that there were company Christmas and Halloween 

parties. However, the Pope Air Force Base crash, in which her husband's 

battalion had suffered the most casualties, was her first experience with 

a tragedy "of this magnitude," and she relied on Pam Steele and other 

wives for guidance. The cohesiveness of her husband's battalion eased 

her task. "If you have a close knit unit family, support will kick in," Anne 

McChrystal remarked. "Some young wives made a bond that will never 

be broken with wives of the injured and dead, baby sitting for them and 

just staying with them." With Mrs. Steele and Mrs. Abizaid, Ailile 

McChrystal visited the casualties and their families on the wards of 

Womack and the regional hospitals during the first twenty-four hours 

IS P. Steele Interv, 22 Apr 94; S. McChrystal lnterv, 22 Apr 94; A. M cChrystal lntcrv, 

12 Apr 94. 

16 Quotation rrom S. McChrystal Interv, 22 Apr 94. Sec also W. Steele Interv, 20 

Apr 94. 

11 P. Steele Inlerv, 22 Apr 94. 
56 

Alllle A1cCIlIJistai lVilh her 

husballd 

DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

after the accident. Later, they 

accompanied their husbands to 

San Antonio, continuing their support of those undergoing burn therapy at the USAISR burn unit. " 

The fami ly support group 

found the Weaver Conference 

Room to have a hospitable environment for helping famil ies. The 

room was large, with chairs and a 

hallway where people could ta lk 

privately. Within twenty-four 

hours Sprint Telephone Services 

had donated cellular phones for 

use by the sta ff and families. The 

Red Cross planned meals, and 

loca l restaurants donated food. 

The hospital EOC, one fl oor 

below the conference room, provided copies of casualty updates. Unit 

representatives in the division EOC became the link between the conference room and the division casualties on the sixth fl oor. They escorted fami li es into the conference room and introduced them to the fami ly 

support group. "They would let us know that a family member was coming in, and we would let them know where the fami ly member was going 

to stay or what needed to be done," Anne McChrystal reca lled. Since the 

family support group coordinated all assistance through militmy channels, she believed that the establishment of a division EOC at the hospital shortly after the accident helped the group carry out its mission. " 

It was symptomatic of the closeness and cohesiveness of the units 

of the 82d Airborne Division that the response to the Green Ramp disaster went so well. A good, closely knit unit will succeed where a poor 

unit will not. " If someone wanted to be very bureaucratic, [he] could 

have made this a nightmare," said Colonel McChrystal. But the division 

commander set the right tone right away." 

Famil ies also rece ived support from casualty assistance centers on 

post. One center, the adjutant general's Emergency Casualty Assistance 

.. A. McChrystallnterv, 12 Apr 94. 

19 Ibid. 

20 S. McChrystal Interv, 22 Apr 94. 
MILITARY AN D C IVIL RESPONSE 57 

Center, which had never been tested, was highly successful. Casualty 

assistance officers and families were able to process government 

agency benefit documents and complete the affairs of the deceased at 

one location. The center also coordinated housing, transportation, and 

other services fo r the families while they were in the Fort Bragg area." 

Although family support went well, a generic response plan would 

have improved Fort Bragg's crisis management. Some duplication of 

effort existed. Seven or eight assistance centers- each with a different 

mission, providing some unique form of support- were involved in the 

disaster; however, they seemed to be unawa re not only of each other's 

presence, location, or mission, but also of the ki nds of support they 

could receive from the public. The director of casualty assistance 

believed that a number of the Fort Bragg agencies should have been 

eliminated or integrated with traditional assistance centers, such as the 

emergency operations center and the family assistance center. If this 

were not feasible, he recommended that each assistance center should 

at least " provide clear written guidance" about its role and its "relationship to other supporting agencies," as well as develop a "needs" list 

fo r coordinating in advance with each other and sharing with the public "on an as-required basis" during an emergency." 

Ministry and Pastoral Care 

Like family support groups, military chapl ains comforted and 

aided those involved in the accident on Green Ramp. After hearing 

about the mass casualty, the Womack chaplai ns went to the emergency 

room, arriving before the first victims came in. The chaplains assisted 

in litter carries of the injured soldiers, offering them consolation and 

prayer. They moved from patient to patient in an attempt to calm the 

"frightened injured" and the "frantic caregiver."" 

Installation chaplains arrived at the hospital within fifteen minutes of 

the emergency. Maj. Keith I. Jones, Womack's chief of ministry and pastoral care, assigned duties to his subordinates. Army chaplains were to 

minister to family members at hospital entrances, including the regional 

facilities; help establish the Weaver Conference Room as the family sup-

" XVIll Abn Corps AAR, 12 Apr 94, p. 2 1. 

12 Jbid. 

lJ Memo, Maj Keith I. Jones, Chaplain, WAMC, to Chaplain, U.S. Army Medical 

Conmland, Fort Sam Houston, Tex., 6 Apr 94, sub: WAMC MASCAL AAR. 
58 DISASTER ON GREEN .A.~ tI) 

port center; and provide spiritual and emotional comfort to patients and 

staff on Wards 6A, 7 A, and 9A. Because of the "quickly evolving situation" and the possibility of "early morning deaths," Womack chaplains 

instituted a duty roster to ensure continued pastoral care. In the end, more 

than eighty chaplains helped soldiers, families, and friends to deal with 

spiritual needs as well as unseen emotiona l scars." 

Chaplain Bebber drove to Womack, after his experiences on Green 

Ramp. His accessibility to wards and rooms enabled him to locate patients 

faster than the record-keeping personnel at the hospital EOC. When he 

found injured soldiers from his brigade, he notified his command. He 

checked on the condition of the soldier he had rescued on Green Ramp, 

having noticed the victim's dog tags at the time of the incident. Seeking 

rest and support, Bebber entered the Weaver Conference Room, where 

chaplains had begun round-the-clock manning, and "debriefed [himself] 

with other survivors and those who needed to know what had happened." 

After midnight he went home. Before entering the house, Bebber removed 

his uniform so, in his words, "I wou ld not take its smell and sight into the 

house. I did not want my family, especially my children, to see it. Its horror remains clear in my mind and senses even now."2S 

Immediately after the accident Lt. Ronald L. Owens, chaplain of 

the 2d Battalion, 504th Infantry, which suffered eighteen soldiers 

killed, ca lled his unit together for counseling. Recently, Owens had participated in an exercise at Fort Polk's Joint Readiness Training Center, 

where he had experienced a mass casua lty drill. He credited that exercise and his time spent working in a trauma unit and on the USA ISR 

burn wards with helping him to perform his pastoral duties after the 

crash. On the evening of the twenty-third Owens helped mental hea lth 

specialists plan formal critical incident stress debriefings and began to 

prepare for funerals and memorial services." 

Although the Air Force suffered no fatalities, Pope Air Force Base 

was profoundly affected by the accident. Air Force personne l witnessed 

"things [they] should not have to experience [in life]," stated Maj. Larry 

E. Towne, an Air Force chaplain. They encountered one "of life 's ugliest 

N Quotations from ibid. See also "And Now They Turn to God," Fayelleviffe 

Observer-Tillles, 25 Mar 94. p. ISA. 

~, Memo, Capt Gerald K. Bebber, Chaplain, 5251h Military Intelligence Brigade, to 

Chapl<lin, XVIII A irborne Corps, 12 Apr 94, sub: After-Action Report, Green Ramp 

Catastrophe, 23 March 1994. 

16 (nlerv, Sgt Palrici ... Lewis with Lt Ronald L. Owens, II Apr 94. 
MI LITARY AND CIVIL RESPONSE 59 

moments." Air Force chaplains were there to help them assess who they 

were and what they believed about God and the universe in which they 

lived, as well as to tTy to make some sense out of what had happened." 

Chaplain Towne "provided a listening ear for many who needed to 

release their emotions, ... obviously shaken" after the accident. He 

talked to survivors who gathered near the road; in particular, he worked 

with the graves registration personnel, who prepared the bodies. Seeing 

and handling the victims- some violently dismembered, others burned 

beyond recognition---{;reated unbelievable stress. People under stress 

need to talk, and the chaplains were trained to listen. They spent the 

next few weeks helping many through the healing process." 

Pttblic Affai!"S 

Whil e chaplains ministered to the spiritual and emotional needs of 

those involved in the accident, Fort Bragg's public affairs officers interacted with the news media and prepared press releases. Immediately 

after the emergency the XVIII Airborne Corps publ ic affairs office 

(PAO), which had primary responsibility for press relations, received 

calls from local, national, and international news media outlets. All 

requested information on the crash, numbers of dead and injured, interviews with casualties, and access to the accident site. The corps PAO 

coordinated with the Fort Bragg military police to all ow reporters to 

meet corps public affairs officers at a specified location near the scene 

of the accident and at other sites on post." 

To handle phone calls from local citizens, fami lies, and fri ends 

about casualties, the XVIII Airborne Corps set up a toll-free hotline at 

the family assistance activity at the Fort Bragg Community Center. 

Volunteers and employees of the center manned the switchboard. Social 

workers, chaplains, and psychiatrists worked the phones too " in order 

to comfort the families," said Margaret Tippy, Womack's publi c affairs 

n Quotations from Larry E. Towne, "Why Did It Happen?," TIger TImes (Pope Air 

Force Base, N.C.), I Apr 94, p. 14. Sec also Ruth Sheehan, "Many Crash Survivors Suffer 

Severe, Li fe-Threatening Burns," News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), 25 Mar 94, p. 16A. 

!S Quotations from Kimberly N. Mason, "Ministers Console Victims," Tigel" TImes 

(Pope Air Force Base, N.C.), 1 Apr 94, p. 14. See also Towne, "Why Did It Happen?," 

p. 14. The Air Force offered counseling to the two pilots who ej ected from the F- 16 that 

crashed into the C- 141. 

l'1 After-Action Report, XVIII Airborne Corps Public Affairs Office, n.d., p. I (hereafte r cited as XV lIt Abn Corps PAD AA R). 
60 DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

officer. She provided reporters with the hotline number, which the news 

media publicized." 

After learning of the accident, Margaret Tippy visited the hospital 

EOC to obtain information about the collision. She immediately updated Fort Bragg's other public affa irs offices about the crash and began 

working closely with them in communicating with the news media and 

local communities. The XVllI Airborne Corps' director of community 

relations, Lisa Johnson, arrived around 1445 to help Tippy; Johnson had 

been media relations chief during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and 

was experienced in dealing with the public during a crisis. The 82d 

Airborne Division PAO and the 22d Public Affairs Detachment (Mobile) 

also sent representatives, increasing Womack's publi c affairs officers to 

four. The Womack PAO had no communication network with public 

affairs offices outside of Fort Bragg; hence, Tippy could not coordinate 

activities with her counterparts at the regional hospitals." 

The corps PAO authori zed coverage of Womack but only at a distance, thus preventing the appearance of a cover-up whi le mainta ining 

privacy. Reporters began to gather at the hospital around 1445, but by 

darkness they were accosting patients and familie s in the parking lot. 

Tippy then relocated them to a designated area not fa r from the hospital. She felt that by corralling them in one place she could retain better control. About every half hou r Tippy visited the emergency room 

or the hospital EOC to obta in information. Then, one of the four publi c affairs officers went on camera every hour with an update. The 

news media, "by and large, were compassionate," Tippy remembered, 

"and helped to get the word out to the commu nity"- publicizing the 

hotline number; broadcasting Colonel Eggebroten's request that anyone who did not need to be at Womack stay away; organizing food 

campaigns; directing people to drive with their lights on and to wear 

red, wh ite, and blue ribbons in honor of the casualties; and squelching 

a rumor that Womack needed blood donors. In these respects, the press 

was of great help in the Army's response to the disaster. 12 

30 Quotation from Interv, Lt Col Iris J. West with Margaret Tippy. 14 Apr 94 (hereafter ciled as Tippy l!lterv). Sec also XVIII Abn Corps PAD AAR, p. I . 

11 Tippy (nlerv, 14 Apr 94; S. Jones Memo, 3 Apr 95. 

Jl Quotations Crom Tippy Interv, 14 Apr 94. See also S. Jones Memo, 3 Apr 95; 

Margaret Tippy, Information Paper to Health Services Command PAO and Army PAD, 

29 Mar 94, sub: After-Action Report 011 Womack Army Medical Center Public Affairs 

Activities Involving Injured Soldiers From Aircraft Crash, pp. 1- 2 (hereafter ciled as 

Tippy Info Paper); XVIII Abn Corps PAO AAR, p. I. 
MILITARY AND C IVl L RESPONSE 

Scores of radio, print, and 

television reporters had descended 

on Fort Bragg to cover the Pope 

Air Force Base crash. They "could 

have filled an over-strength combat company." ABC, CBS, NBC, 

and CNN television crews shuttled 

in caravans between Fort Bragg 

and Pope Air Force Base, in search 

of "live" interviews for their 

morning and evening news shows. 

At least onC'tired and harried public affairs officer went with them. 

Sometimes, the reporters' requests 

fo r information caused a logistical 

nightmare for the Fort Bragg public affairs officers. Phones rang Margarel Tippy 

continuollsly.)) 

61 

From the start Margaret Tippy, the organized and businesslike but 

compassionate publi c affairs officer, was concerned about media 

scrutiny and protecting the privacy of patients and famili es. To ensure 

that the news media were " not so close that a zoom camera could pick 

up someone's face," she proposed that a media center be established 

away from the hospita l. The corps PAO, however, denied this request, 

because of manning problems; uncertainties about location and its usefldness to the media; disrupting activities of the officers club, normally the media site for any large-sca le crisis; operational costs; and a 

desire not to prolong the crisis story. The corps believed that a media 

center was necessary only for long-term events. A media center 

notwithstanding, no photographs of injured soldiers were allowed during the initial phases of the mass casualty, and the reporters were kept 

out of the hospital for three days." 

To provide the public with information about the Green Ramp disaster, Fort Bragg held three press conferences on the twenty-fourth. The 

corps PAO arranged a joint press conference at 0645 for the install ation 

Jl "1-IOI"de of Reporters Descends on Btlses for Cra sh Story," Fayefleville Observe/,-

Times, 25 Mar 94, p. 14A. 

J.I Quotation frol11 Tippy Interv, 12 Apr 94. See also Tippy Info Paper, 26 Mar 94, p. 

2; S. Jones Memo, 3 Apr 95; XVIII Abn Corps PAO AA R, p. 1. 
62 DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

and corps commander, General Shelton, and Pope's 23d Wing COIllmander, Brig. Gen. Bobby O. Floyd; survivors and clini cal specialists 

spoke as well. The Womack PAO held the second press conference at 

1300 outside the hospital. A general surgeon defined burn treatment; a 

psychiatrist, a chaplain, a social worker, and a medical supply officer 

explained their respective roles in the disaster response; and Colonel 

Timboe, the hospital commander, shared his insights. Later in the 

evening the division PAO hosted the third press conference in front of 

Womack. Secretary of the Army Togo West, who had visited many 

casualties that day, praised their morale and high spirits. "To a man and 

woman, they said they were ready to get back to what they signed up to 

do," reported West when interviewed. Fort Bragg's public affairs officers coordinated media events and press releases with the corps PAO, 

to ensure that all involved at Fort Bragg spoke with one voice. The 

corps commander, in turn, had direct responsibility to the commu nity." 

Community SUPP01't 

The Fayetteville and Fort Bragg communities have traditi ona lly 

come together in times of trouble. But the magnitude of the tragedy 

on Pope Air Force Base resulted in a new leve l of community 

response. The community shared the enormous grief and offered 

untold practical assistance. " 

Immediately following the accident, the Fayetteville community 

began ca lling Fort Bragg to offer support. After Womack Army Medica l 

Center requested food to feed its increased staff, Pizza Hut delivered 

free pizzas to the hospital and to soldi ers of the 16th Military Police 

Brigade. A fonner paratrooper worked for the pizza company. Ira 

I-Iamm remembered delivering two pizzas to the MPs controlling traffic near the emergency room entrance. " I did it because I've been in 

their shoes. I know what it is like," he sa id. The gesture was appreciated. " It's nice to know that there are people out there who care about soldiers," commented one MP. The press publicized the show of compassion, and gifts of food began pouring into the hospital from 

McDonald 's, Taco Bell, I-Iardees, Papa John 's, Domino's Pizza, and 

)$ Quotation rrom Henry Cuningham, "Army Secretary West Touched by Disaster," 

Fayelle vil!e Observer-Times, 25 Mar 94, p. 21. See also S. Jones M emo, J Apr 95 ; 

Tippy Interv, 12 Apr 94; Tippy Inro Paper, 29 Mar 94, p. 1. 

M "A Shared Calamity," F'ayelleville Observe/"-Times, 26 Mar 94, p. 16A. 
MILITARY AND C IVIL R ESPONSE 63 

Kentucky Fried Chicken. "A gentleman showed up from Krispy Kreme 

and delivered box after box of doughnuts- I have no idea how many," 

said Margaret Tippy. "The outpouring of help [was] just tremendous."" 

The community extended other forms of assistance. Housewives 

baked brownies and cookies and delivered them to the post. People 

donated money that the family support group set aside for the famili es. 

Bags of food and toiletries showed up in the foyer of the Fisher House, 

where families of sick soldiers stayed. Hundreds of volunteers offered 

their time and energy. The Fayetteville Regional Airport reserved two 

runways for military use. "It was good for those not directly involved 

to be helping .... [It was] good for them emotionally," stated Pam 

Steele. The mayor of Fayetteville spent much time with General Steele 

during the aftermath of the accident." 

The Pope Air Force Base disaster helped Fayettevi lle and Fort 

Bragg to "turn a corner" in their relationship. Relations between Fort 

Bragg and its surrounding civilian communities were strained during 

the Vietnam War, but the communities became closer again during 

DESERT STORM. The tragedy on Green Ramp strengthened the bond 

between the civilian and military communities that the Gulf War had 

established and enhanced "the resources that military people ca n 

always be depended upon to muster" in time of need." 

Fort Bragg's military and civilian communities came together in the 

immediate aftermath of the Green Ramp disaster to support the casualties and their families. Emergency operations centers, assistance hubs, 

famil y support groups, chaplai ncies, and public affairs offices, each 

with a unique mission and service- timely information, casualty 

accountab ility, famil y subsistence, counseling, and publi c newsresponded to the crisis. Because these organizations were designed to 

handle several contingency operations at a time, some confusion and 

overlapping of duties almost certa inly resulted. Nevertheless, the myriad resources that these multiple agencies threw into the response ul ti11 As quoted in Shannon Rasmussen and Michele R. Hammonds, "Community Acts 

Bravely During Crisis at Pope," Parag lide (Fort Bragg, N.C.), 24 Mar 94, p. I A. 

JS Quotat ion from P. Steele Interv, 22 Apr 94. See also W. Steele Interv, 20 Apr 94; 

Kathryn Quigley, "Community Reaches Out To Comfort, Aid Families," Fayelleville 

Observer-Times, 25 Mal' 94, Pl'. 15- 16. 

)9 First quotation from Interv, Lt Col Iris J. West with Maj Patricia D. Horoho, 12 Apr 

94; second quotation from "A Shared Calamity," p. 16A. 
64 DISASTER ON GREEN RAM I) 

mately led to success. While Fort Bragg and Womack Army Medical 

Center officially prepared to mourn their losses, Fort Sam Houston, 

Brooke Army Medical Center, and the Institute of Surgical Research in 

San Antonio organi zed to receive the severely burned soldier patients 

and their fami lies. 

Brooke Army Medical eel/tel; Fort Sam HOllstOJ!, Texas. Brooke hOllsed 

the burn wards of Ihe us. Army Inslitllle of Surgical Research, kllolVn 

and recognized fo r excellence in Ih e field of bum management. As Ihe 

Army bum UJ!it treated ForI Bragg's severely burned paratroopers, 

Brooke and the garrison mgauized assistallce for their families alld 

ji·iends. 
4 

The Severely Burned 

" How incredible it was to witness a post located in one 

state and a Jlost located in another state li terally come 

together and take care of an immediate need." 

- Lil/da Thomas 

On 23 March, when disaster struck at Pope Air Force Base, Brig. 

Gen. Robert G. Claypool, MC, the commander of Brooke Army 

Medical Center, was attendi ng a video teleconference at the U.S. Army 

Health Services Command at Fort Sam Houston. Also present in San 

Antonio were Brig. Gen. John J. Cuddy, MC, the deputy commander of 

the Hea lth Services Command and the commander of the U.S. Army 

Medical Department Center and School; Maj . Gen. Edgar Anderson, 

Jr., MC, the commander of Wilford Hall Air Force Medical Center and 

the chairman of the San Antonio Health Care Coordinating Council; 

and Brig. Gen. Paul K. Carlton, MC, the director of medical services 

and training at the U.S. Air Force Education and Training Command. At 

the opposite end of the video teleconference, in Alexandria, Virginia, 

were Lt. Gen. A1cide M. LaNoue, MC, surgeon general of the Army; 

Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Sloan, MC, surgeon general of the Air Force; 

and members of their staffs.' 

Following interruption of the conference with news of the crash, 

General Ca rlton alerted the U.S. Army Institute of Surgica l Research 

(USAISR) at Fort Sam Houston of the masses of severely burned soldiers and then contacted General Ronald R. Fogelman, the air mobility 

commander at Scott Air Force Base in Illinois, who arranged for air 

I Inlerv, Col Mary T. S.arnccky with Brig Gen Robert G. Claypool, 8 Apr 94 (hcreancr cited as Claypool lnterv). 
68 DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

transport of Air Force venti lators directly to Fort Bragg and ofUSA ISR 

burn teams to Womack Army Medi ca l Center. Carlton also made sure 

that airframes were ava ilable for patient transport. According to 

General Claypool, General Carlton's actions "probably saved fi ve or six 

hours of flying time . ... And that was just one of the ad hoc things that 

I thin k made this a more efficient and more effective exercise." 

Claypoo l began to organize Brooke 's response and Lt. Gen. Marc A. 

Cisneros, the commander of Fort Sam Houston and the Fifth U.S. 

Army, the garrison's response. 2 

As chairman of the San Antoni o Hea lth Care Coordinating 

Council, Genera l Anderson dec ided not to activate the San Antoni o 

area casualty reception plan, whereby loca l fac ilities received incoming 

patients. Instead, the USAISR burn unit ex panded suffic iently to 

receive casualties arriving at Fort Sam Houston from Fort Bragg.' 

Institute of S~wgical R eseal'c!? 

The U.S. Army Institute of Surgica l Research, originally known as 

the Surgical Research Unit, was fo rmed in 1943 at the Halloran 

General Hospita l, on Staten Island, New York, to evaluate the role of 

antib iotics in the treatment of war wou nds. In 1947 the unit was moved 

to Fort Sam Houston, taki ng up quarters in what was then Brooke 

General Hospital, and, two years later, was tasked with the add itional 

mission of studyi ng thermal inj uries, a concern of increasing importance during the nuclear age. In May 1953 it was officially organ ized 

as an activity of the Office of the Surgeon General and in October 

1958, as the previously redesignated U.S. Army Surgica l Research 

Unit, assigned to the U.S. Army Med ical Research and Development 

Command, in Washington, D.C., but attached to the then Brooke Army 

Hospita l. In 1970 the unit received its present name, refl ecting the concept " that the burn patient is the universa l trauma model with the multisystem effects of therma l injury representing an exaggerated form of 

the stereotyped response to all forms of trauma.'" 

l Quotation from ibid. See also Memo, Lt Cot Gerald Nolan, Chief, Plans, Tm ining, 

Mobil ization, and Security Division, BAMe, to Chairman, Emergency Preparedness 

Committee, 25 May 94, sub: Arter-Action Review for SAMe Mass Casualt y (MASCA L), 23 March 1994 (hcrcaOcr cited as Nolan Memo). 

l Nolan Memo, 25 May 94. 

4 U.S. Army Institute of Surgical Research Fact Sheet, p. I . 
THE SEVEItELY B U RNED 

In 1994 the In stitute of 

Surgica l Research was divided 

into three divisions. The Clinical 

Division operated the burn wards, 

located in two wings of the main 

hospital's fou rth fl oor, and was 

directly invol ved in burn care and 

clinical studies. The Laboratory 

Division, composed of resea rch 

scientists and physic ians, conducted laboratory resea rch on 

burn care and the support of the 

burn patient. This division was 

located on post, about I mile away 

from the main hospital. The 

Support Division provided administrative and logistica l support to 

the other two divisions. At the 

time of the accident Col. Basil A. 

commander and director.' 

69 

Colollel PrlIifl 

Pruitt, Jr., MC, was the USA ISR 

Besides being the only military burn unit in the Uni ted States, the 

Institute of Surgical Research had become a role model for other burn 

centers both here and abroad. It treated annuall y between 250 and 400 

patients. The typica l patient had life-threatening second- and thirddegree burns on 35-40 percent of his or her body surface. Innovative 

concepts and techniq ues about burn care originated at the institute, 

whi ch became known and recogni zed for excellence in the fie ld of 

burn mallagement.6 

Once notified of the accident, Col. William F. McManus, MC, the 

Cli nical Division chief, diverted a USAISR burn team, already in North 

Carolina, to Fort Bragg for triage and assessment of casualties. After consulti ng with Maj. David Lawlor, MC, a general surgeon on the burn team, 

McManus decided to send three more teams and add itional ventilators to 

Womack. Burn teams, each consisting of a physician, nurse, respiratory 

therapist, and a 9 1 C licensed practica l nurse, were to assess the degree of 

care required by the accident victims and their ability to survive the fli ght 

, Ibid., pp. 1- 2. 

, Ibid., pp. 2-4; Phil Reidinger, " Injured Bragg Soldiers Arrive I-Iere," ForI Sam 

H OIIS/OII News Leader, 25 Mar 94, p. I . 
70 

Colollel McManus 

DISASTER ON GREEN .A~ IP 

to San Antonio. The institute followed up with the Globa l Patient 

Movement Requirements Center at 

Scott Air Force Base, which 

General Carlton had already alerted, on the aeromedical evacuation 

of the patients and the attending 

burn teams. 7 

Before the three burn teams 

cou ld leave Sa n Antonio, the 

Institute of Surgica l Research had 

to obtain supplies and equipment 

for the in-fl ight treatment of forty 

to sixty casualties. "There was a 

mad flurry of scrounging arou nd 

trying to get sufficient quantities 

and specific types to meet Air 

Force requirements," recalled Col. 

Elisabeth Greenfield, the USA ISR chief nurse. Fortunately, Lt. Col. 

Charles Stetz, a clinical nurse specialist at the institute who had experienced a number of mass casualty situations, had some " institutional 

memory, understood what was going to be needed, [and] knew some of 

the resources that were available .... " For the next twenty-four hours 

Stetz worked with the fl ight teams to determine their requ irements for 

fluids, medications, equipment, and other necessities, and, together 

with Sfc. David C. Loresch, the Clini cal Division's noncommissioned 

officer in charge, assembled supplies- to include "23 cardiac monitors, 

60 intravenous infusion pumps, 8 cases of central venous catheters, 120 

liters of lactated Ringer's solution, 15 bed rolls with 36 insulated space 

blankets, 26 [Bird] pressure-controlled transport ventilators, and 20 

standard Bear ventilators"- and obtained airframes to ferry patients. It 

was a tribute to their ingenuity and efficiency that they were able to do 

so much in so short a time' 

1 Memo, LI Col Gerald Nolan, Chief, Plans, Training, Mobilization, and Security 

Division, BAMe, to CG, 82d Airborne Division, 18 Apr 94, sub: After-Action 

Review of Support for 82d Airborne Division Soldiers (hercane r cited as Nolan 

Memo); Interv, LI Col Iris 1. West with Maj David Law lor, 26 May 94 (hereafter ciled 

as Lawlor Inlerv). 

I First quotation from Nolan Memo, 25 May 94; second quotation from Interv, Col 

Mary T. Sarneeky with Col Elisabeth Greenfield, 8 Apr 94 (hereafter eited as 
THE SEVERELY B URN ED 71 

Colol/el Greel/field 

Several hours passed while USA ISR personnel located a pump that 

was compatible with Air Force flig ht regulations, rented additional venti lators, and procured bottles of human serum Albumin, the chief protein of human blood plasma, to be used intravenously in the treatment 

of shock. Some 1,300 bottles of Albumin were requested, but Brooke 's 

pharmacy was unable to obta in that many, even through the Health Care 

Coa li tion, an organization of loca l hea lth care providers in San 

Antonio. It seemed, according to Lt. Col. Gera ld Nolan, Brooke's Plans, 

Training, Mobilization, and Security Division chief, that " industry [did 

notl stock sufficient quantities of Albumi n to meet MASCAL conditions." The USAISR burn teams were able to cope with insufficient 

amounts of Albumin du ri ng this tragedy without any adverse affect on 

the patients, although the pharmacy remained concerned about future 

mass casualty situations. To transport the large quantity of supplies and 

Greenfield Interv); third quotation frolll Interv, Col Mary T. Sarnecky with Lt Col 

Charles Stetz, 8 Apr 94 (herea fier cited as Stetz Interv); fOllrth quotation frolll fi ~ 

Action Report, U.S. ArlllY Institute of Surgical Research, n.d., sub: Response 10 Pope 

Air Force Base Accident, p. 2 (herea fter cited as USA ISR AA R). 
72 

equipment, they traveled to the airport by truck, rather than van, their 

normal conveyance. The first USAISR burn team departed Ra ndolph 

Air Force Base, nea r San Antonio, for Fort Bragg at 1925 central sta ndard time, or six hours after the accident.' 

With the burn teams en route to North Carolina, the Institute of 

Surgical Research prepared to receive the Fort Bragg casua lties. The 

USAISR burn unit, which expected more than forty from North Carolina, 

already had a patient census of twenty-six. Following emergency preparedness planning, Maj. David 1. Barillo, MC, a general surgeon on the 

USAISR staff, coordinated the transfer of all but eleven patients from the 

institute to regional medical facilities and a veterans hospital. Colonels 

McManus and Greenfield expanded the burn unit's Wards 14A and 14B 

onto Ward 15A, located one floor above; extended shifts to twelve hours; 

and obtai ned additional nurses from the staffi ng agency under contract 

with Brooke, from the Air Force medical community, and from other Fort 

Sam Houston organizations. Colonels Greenfield and Stetz used their 

personal contacts to find fonner USAISR employees who could assist 

during the crisis; they also asked USAISR al umni, practicing in the San 

Antonio area, to register with the staffing agency. Those professionals 

were on board within seventy-two hours. To augment the USAISR staff, 

anesthesiologists, respiratory therapists, physical and occupational therapists, psychiatric nurse specia lists, and social workers came from various 

facilities-other Brooke departments, the Army Medica l Department 

Center and School; the Joint Military Medical Readiness Command, also 

at Fort Sam Houston; and Wilford Hall Air Force Medical Center. Three 

Brooke residents in general surgery, who had rotated through the burn 

unit, temporarily joined the surgical team." 

The USAISR staff was grateful for the additional help. "God 

knows, at a time like this, with the numbers of showers and dressing 

changes, just extra pairs of hands and legs to fetch and to do" were welcome, recalled Colonel Greenfield. The institute readily understood the 

cost to the patients should the staff become emotionally and physically 

drained. The temporary workers stayed about thirty days." 

On 24 March the twenty Fort Bragg soldier patients selected for 

burn treatment arrived at Brooke. Eleven came on the first medevac 

9 Nolan Memo, 25 May 94. 

" Ibid.; Claypool Interv, 8 Apr 94; USA ISR AA R, pp. 6- 8; Greenfi eld Interv, 8 

Apr 94. 

II Greenrield Interv, 8 Apr 94. 
THE SEVERELY BURNED 73 

fli ght in the morning, and nine landed in the afternoon. The burn victims 

were wrapped in aluminum-lined blankets to keep their bodies warm. 

Nine of the eleven and four of the nine casualties were on ventilators. " 

Because of a miscommunication with Scott Air Force Base, the 

twenty Bear ventilators sent directly to Fort Bragg proved to be incompatible with the electri cal system of the C- 9. Fortunately, the twentysix Bird ventilators, which had been obtained in San Antonio for 

ground transport of patients to the aircraft, were hand driven and did 

not require electricity. The employment of mechanica l ventilators, however, demanded a greater supply of oxygen than conventional breathing 

apparatus. The relatively short duration of the flight to San Antonio permitted the mechanical ventilation of the patients on board without 

depleting the oxygen supply." 

During the flight the burn teams, many of whom had treated burn 

wounds in Vietnam before acquiring add itional expertise at the USAISR 

burn unit, managed the Green Ramp victims as if they were in an intensive care unit. The teams maintained ailways, used ventilators to facilitate breathing, and provided intravenous resuscitation during the journey. 

Major Lawlor, who was on the first C- 9, reported that the Fort Bragg soldier patients remained stable, with no bleeding problems during the less 

than tllree-hour flight. The transfer from Womack and the aeromedical 

evacuation went smoothly because of the burn training Army professionals had received at the Institute of Surgica l Research. According to 

Lawlor, burn teams " learned how to transport patients by aircraft and, in 

particular, patients with burns who had special needs." Maj . David 

Mozingo, MC, a general surgeon with the USAISR burn unit, credited 

"the continuity of [a] staff ... [that] knew exactly what to do." During 

DESEIU SI·II ELD/DESERT STORM the USAISR burn un it had put together 

concepts of how to send out burn teams and return them, and that experience paid off during the aftermath of the Pope Air Force Base disaster. 

Buses, escorted by San Antonio pol ice, took the Fort Bragg casualties 

from Kelley Air Force Base in San Antonio to the institute. " 

The USAISR burn unit was ready, even though eleven institute 

patients, six of whom were children, were still undergoing treatment. 

" USAISR AAR, pp. 5- 6. 

" Lawlor In.erv, 26 May 94; USA ISR AAR, PI'. 5- 6. 

~ First quotation from Lawlor (ntcrv, 26 May 94; second quotation from In!crv, 

Col Mary T. Sarnecky with Maj David Mozingo, 8 Apr 94. See also Nolan Memo, 25 

May 94. 
74 DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

Ward 14A was divided into two intensive care units, each with eight 

beds and two assigned physicians; Ward 14B became an ac ute care 

unit, with twenty-four beds; and Ward 15A was for the more stable 

patients. As the first Green Ramp casualties arrived on the ward, 

everybody teamed- nurses, medics, respiratory therapists, surgeons, 

and so forth. Their adrenalin was high, a usual occurrence during a 

mass casualty. "People were pumped," reca ll ed Colonel Stetz. "They 

had their adrenal in rushing. There was teamwork . . . but some degree 

of fear. [They wondered:] Am I going to be ab le to get through this? 

Am I not going to hurt anybody?" Stetz believed that the physicians 

and nurses were very coordinated. " It looked like a we ll-choreographed dance. There was no panic. There was no confusion," he said. 

The USAISR staff had rehearsed mass casualty exercises regularly. 

" Intensive training ... [and] teamwork," according to Colonel 

Greenfield, helped the staff to handle the twenty patients that came in 

on two fli ghts only two hou rs apart. Everybody had a job to do and did 

it. Colonel Stetz confessed that his adrenalin "pumped non-stop for 

about a week."lS 

The soldier patients were admitted, cultured, bathed, and dressed; 

had labs drawn and vital statistics taken; and were in their beds in less 

than five hours. Between nineteen and twenty-n ine years old, they had 

second- and third-degree burns on 6- 88 percent of their total body surface (DiagrallJ 2). The team of USAISR doctors, nurses, and technicia ns treated the patients, checked their status constantly, and eva luated their condition every eight hours." 

Besides the psychological stress of dea ling with a mass casualty, 

the USAISR staff had to endure the physical stress of working in an 

environment of high heat (85- 87 degrees Fahrenheit) and high humidity, which was necessary to keep the burn patients warm since their own 

natu ral mechanism to regulate body temperature had been destroyed. In 

this uncomfortable heat and humidity staff members had to wear sterile gowns, masks, and gloves- sa feguards against infection. They also 

worked overtime, including long periods without rest, to ca re for the 

overload of badly injured soldiers. " 

IS First, second, third, and firth quotations from Stetz Inter\!, 8 Apr 94; fourth quotation frolll Greenfield lnterv, 8 Apr 94. 

16 Greenfield Interv, 8 Apr 94; "Accident at Pope Has San Antonio COllnection," ForI 

Sam /-Iolfsroll News Leader, I Apr 94, p. 5. 

11 Greenfield Interv, 8 Apr 94. 
THE SEVERELY B URNED 75 

DIAGRAM 2- ANATOMICAL BURN DEPTH 

hair loUicies 

For the USAISR staff, dehydration and emotional ex haustion were 

constant concerns. During the first four days of the mass casualty 

Colonel Greenfield arranged for box lunches to be delivered. She also 

ensured that liquid refreshments were provided three times a day. Later, 

a five-ga ll on vat of lemonade was brought to the USAISR burn unit, 

and personnel were ordered to take thirty-minute breaks. " 

On 28 March a USA ISR burn team returned to the University of 

North Carolina 's Jaycee Burn Center to evacuate three more injured 

soldiers and the marine who was originally schedul ed for transfer on 

the morning of the tragic accident. The team also visited Womack Army 

Medical Center to evaluate an additional fifty soldiers with "fu nctionally significant burns," to include those on outpatient status. Twenty of 

the fifty patients required specialty care at the USAISR burn unit and 

were transferred on two medevac aircraft two days later. " 

IS Jbid . 

.. USA tSR AAR, p. 6. 
76 DISASTER ON GREEN RJ\MP 

When the USAISR burn unit census peaked at fifty-three patients 

on 4 April, every conceivable space-even rooms in the inner cube, 

which had limited visibil ity and, therefore, were norma lly used for storage-contained a bed and a patient. The staff relocated those in the 

inner cube as soon as it was medically feasible. 20 

Two weeks after the Green Ramp disaster Colonel Stetz stated that 

he found his work during the mass casualty to have been remarkably 

satisfying. " It is [as if] we are doing what we are supposed to do, and I 

think that was the most rewarding part of it," he said. "From [the] start 

to the present (April 8, 1994), it is goi ng very very smoothly. I have 

been incredibly impressed with the way everyone has reacted." Stetz 

gave credit for the success of the mass casualty to Colonel McManus, 

who directed everythi ng and " knew instinctively what to do."" 

Surgica l treatment of the Green Ramp victims began about three 

days after their arriva l at the Institute of Surgical Research. "Every 

burned soldier can expect about 2 hours of surgery for every 10 percent 

of his body burned," said Colonel McManus. Following resuscitation of 

patients, burns were incised and skin grafts performed "to ach ieve 

timely and definitive closure of the wounds." Orthopedic and soft tissue injuries were treated as necessary. The institute's one operating 

room and Brooke's two operating rooms were in continuous use for the 

first two weeks; thereafter, two of them functioned for another ten days. 

By 7 June surgeons had performed ni nety-three operations to treat the 

injuries sustained by the Fort Bragg soldiers. In support of those surgica l procedures, USAISR occupationa l therapists made " 187 splints, 72 

positioning devices, and 40 compression devices required for post 

operative antideformity positioning and rehabilitation." Sufficient supplies of whole blood were on hand for transfusions because of the blood 

donor program at Fort Sam Houston and other installations." 

The cost of the medical items needed to treat the injured soldiers 

during the first two weeks following the accident tota led over 

$200,000. The Health Services Command "quickly and with a minimum of processing time" transferred the capital from a catastrophi c 

fund, which fac ilitated the ability of the Institute of Surgical Research 

to obtain the additional equipment and supplies. Funding could not be 

20 Greenfield Interv, 8 Apr 94. 

Zl Stetz Interv, 8 Apr 94. 

12 First quotation as given in "Accident at Pope," p. 5; second and third quotations 

from USAISR AA R, p. 10. See also Nolan Memo, 25 May 94. 
T H E SEVERELY B URNED 77 

made directly to the institute "because ISR allocations are designated 

for research."2J 

Although preparati ons to receive the Green Ramp casualties went 

well, the Institute of Surgica l Research lacked a " formal [written] plan 

to manage an influx of burn patients that exceed[ed] the ISR bed 

capac ity and/or ability of the sta ff to manage patient ca re requirements." Duplication of e ffort and cumbersome procedures to obtain 

additional staff resulted from this lack of planning. Identify ing supplementa l staff fo r the institute to use during future mass casualty situations was paramount. Colonel Nolan later recommended that "an 

annual review shoul d be made of ISR trained personnel registered with 

loca l agencies, other area volunteers, and Ind ividual Mobilization 

Augmentees .... Resources would normally be needed over a 2-month 

period. MEDCOM [U.S. Army Medica l Command] tracking could 

also identify tra ined personnel who coul d be brought into the region 

after the local lists are exhausted."" 

The bu rn management of the fo rty-three Fort Bragg soldiers represented the largest mass casualty response in the history of the Institute 

of Surgica l Research. Its 

unparalleled ability to sa fely transport large numbers of critica lly ill 

patients was fully va lidated. Only th rough the constant state of readiness, 

ensured by the day-la-day clinical and aeromedical transfer activities of 

the burn center and its corrclHtive laboratory activities dedicated to further improvement in burn care by the conduct of military relevant 

research, can the low morbid ity no morta lity results achieved in these 

patients be achieved in the future. 

These results notwithstandi ng, Colonel Nolan, not content to rest on the 

successes, called for "a review of current casualty reception plans in 

light of lessons learned." In his opin ion, having to prepare reports and to 

answer incomi ng phone ca lls meant that the USAISR staff had less time 

to spend with patients. To improve operations in the future, Nolan recolllmended that the regular da ily patient report be accepted by all commands-{)r, as an alternative, tasking an administrative branch with 

reformatting the reports- and that the post operator and admin istrative 

offi cer refer inquiries about mass casualties to the public affairs office" 

1) Quotations from Nolan Memo, 18 Apr 94. See also USAISR AA R, p. 9. 

24 Nolan Memo, 18 Apr 94. 

2' First quotation from USAISR AA R. pp. 11- 12; second quotation from Nolan 

Memo, 18 Apr 94. 
78 DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

So/die1"s Remembe1" 

One of the first casualties from 

the 2d Battalion, 505th In fa ntry, to 

be airlifted to San Antonio on 24 

March was Sgt. Christopher 

"Chris" J Burson. Burson remembered nothing that had happened to 

him on Green Ramp, in the emergency room at Womack, or on the 

fli ght to San Antonio. With burns 

on his feet, legs, hips, and hands 

and with part of his le ft ear missing, he woke up delirious in the 

USAISR burn unit. He experienced more mental anguish than 

Sergeant Burson physical pain because, in his 

words, "all the nerve endings in my 

legs were burned and dead." He endured painful scrubs and undelwent 

three skin grafts and six surgeries. Three weeks after the accident his spirit soared on the day he took his first few steps; " it was like being a baby 

again learning to walk." To his delight, Burson discovered that he enjoyed 

occupational therapy. He practiced stepping on and offa 4-inch block and 

picking marbles out of play dough with his stiff left hand. Before the acc ident Burson had aspired to a career as a sergeant major, a lifelong dream; 

but now, as soon as he was sufficiently recovered, he wanted to become 

an occupati onal therapist. "God makes things happen for a reason," the 

young soldier said.'" 

On the same plane as Burson were Sergeant Kelley and Private 

Fletcher. Kelley, with burns on 70 percent of his body, and Fletcher, with 

burns on over 35 percent of his body, underwent many surgeries and skin 

grafts. Kelley found the burn treatment painful, "but the staff is right 

there beside you to help you." Fletcher had nothing but pra ise for the 

family support system, which " treated my family and friends exceptionally well ," providing the support and perspective they needed to deal 

16 As quoted in Larry Bingham and Kim Oriole, "A Battle To Survive," Fayeflelll'lIe 

Observer-Times, 29 Jan 95, p. 7A . See also [nlerv, Mary Ellen Condon-Rail with Sgt 

Christopher J. Burson, Sgt Jacob T. Naeyacrt, Jr. , and Spc Michael P. Fletcher, 2 Aug 

95 (hereafter cited as Burson, Naeyacrt, and Fletcher Interv). 
THE SEVERELY B Ulli"iED 

emotionally with his injuries; he 

also found great comfort in the 

handmade get-well cards that he 

rece ived from schoolchildren 

around the country, especially the 

one that enclosed Band-Aids for 

his speedy recovery. Both soldiers 

appreciated the visits from unit 

members of their respective battalions, which raised their spirits and 

was a tribute to unit cohesiveness.

27 

Four days later, on the twentyeighth, a USA lSR burn team 

picked up Sergea nt Naeyaert from 

the Jaycee Burn Center at Chapel 

Hill and evacuated him, as well as 

two other paratroopers and a Sergeant Naeyaerl 

marine, to San Antonio. Naeyaert's 

79 

broken ankle and abdominal wound, where his spleen had been 

removed, were beginning to heal; however, the burns on his legs, back, 

and hands needed skin grafts. Family visits lifted his morale, he 

reca lled, as he was on the critical list for about two months. He was 

indebted to the Red Cross for pay ing for his family's travel expenses. 

While recuperating, Naeyaert had the distinction of marrying his girlfri end, Amy, a member of the XVlll Airborne Corps' Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company, in the hospital chapel. Everything for the 

reception, held at the Fisher House on post, was donated, including the 

food and wedding cake." 

One of the battali on's unit commanders, Captain Mingus, reached 

Brooke on 30 March, together with nineteen other evacuees. Before 

going up to the burn ward, they were showered and scrubbed to eliminate any bacteria they might have picked up on the fli ght from North 

Carolina . Medi cati on eased some of their pain." 

21 First quotation from Interv, LI Col Iris 1. West wilh S Sgt Michael T. Kelley and 

Mrs. Li sa Kelley, 25 May 94; second quotation from Burson, Naeyaert, and Fletcher 

Interv, 2 Aug 95. 

13 Inlerv, Lt Col Iris J. West with Sgt Jacob T. Naeyaert, Jr. , 25 May 94. 

!9 lnterv, Col MaryT. Sarnecky with Capt James Mingus, 8 Apr 94. The risk of in feclion in burn patients is high because broken ski n allows bacteria to enter the body. 
80 DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

Fisher /-louse 01 ForI Sam H OllstOIl 

Mingus suffered burns on his hands and face. He had already 

received some stabilizing burn care and physica l therapy at Womack. 

His subsequent treatment included surgery to incise the wounds, as 

swelling from burned tissue impedes blood flow to arms and legs, and 

skin grafts on his hands. During his ordeal the captain bonded with his 

fellow patients, especially the eleven soldiers from his company, with 

whom he developed a tighter and warmer fri endship than before. He 

also became closer to his family, whom the Army fl ew to San Antonio 

so that they could be with him. For Mingus, tragedy produced the personal good of closer relationships with famil y and friends." 

Captain Walters, Mingus' counterpart in the I st Battalion, 504th 

Infantry, arrived at Brooke at the same time. Walters was impressed 

with the way the competent USAISR staff explained every burn treatment to him and the reason for it. His witnessi ng the staff's compassion 

and commitment, working twelve-hour shifts, made him "appreciate 

the medica l side of the Army a lot more .... " He went into surgery on 4 

April to treat the second-degree burns on his hands and ears." 

MOI"ale 

Soldier and family morale was bolstered by the many distinguished visitors who called on the injured paratroopers at the USA1SR 

burn unit. Between 25 March and 20 May more than twenty di gniJO Ibid . 

.II Interv, LI Col Iris 1. West with Capt M. Lee Wa1t7rs and Lt Stephanie Walters, 13 

Apr 94 (herea fter cited as Walters Intcrv). 
THE SEVERELY BUR.i'oSED 

taries, including the Army chief 

of staff, Fort Bragg commanders, 

Co ngressma n Frank Tejeda of 

Texas, and philanthropist Ya le 

King, journeyed to San Antonio 

to see the Fort Bragg soldi er 

patients. Genera l Steele made the 

trip three times to be with his 

troops, and General Frederick M. 

Franks, Jr., the commander of the 

U.S. Army Tra ining and Doctrine 

Command, visited twice. The visits of notable persons to the Green 

Ramp cas ualti es demonstrated, 

more than anything e lse, an 

apprec iation of the sacrifi ces soldiers make for their country." 

General Stee le 's first visit was 

81 

General Franks 

on 26 March. To boost morale, he brought soldiers from the units that 

suffered the most casualties and a lso some of his subordinatesSergeant Major Slocum; Colonels Schmader, Abizaid, and McChrystal; 

the division chaplain, Lt. Col. Jerome Haberek; and the division surgeon, Maj. Jeffrey B. Clark, MC. They all wore their battle dress uniforms and maroon berets. Pam Steele, Kathy Ab izaid, and Anne 

McChrystal also accompan ied the group. The commanding general felt 

that " it was important to take the ladies with us," since women have the 

fac ility to comfort and console. During the visit General Steele showed 

how much he cared about his troops: He cried with them, he held their 

hands, and he prayed with them. Later, he would say that he " learned 

from the whole process that there is nothing wrong with showing your 

emotions." He and his entourage were on the ground at Fort Sam 

Houston for about fo ur hours before return ing to Fort Bragg on an 

Army C- 20 aircraft, which the secretary of the Army had provided for 

their journey." 

32 Tab L (Brooke Army Medical Center VIP Visits) ill Capt M ichael Scudder, 82d 

Airborne Division (FWO) Liaison Team Smart Book (hereafter cited as Scudder Smart 

Book). 

JJ Quotations from Interv, Lt Col Iris J. West with Maj Gen William M. Steele, 20 

Apr 94. See also Tab L in Scudder Smart Book. 
82 DISASTER ON G IUmN RAMP 

The following day Army Chief of Staff Genera l Gordon R. Sullivan 

called on the twenty burn victims. He was accompanied by Generals 

LaNoue and Cisneros. Sull ivan greeted the soldiers with " Hoo-ahs!," 

an expression that shows camaraderie. After speaking to every soldier, 

except one whose medica l situation made it impossible, the chief of 

staff visited with fam ily members. He praised the efforts of the Fort 

Sam Houston Family Assistance Center in helping the families of the 

burned paratroopers and thanked the San Antoni o community for the 

donations of food and other assistance." 

The visits of General Franks on 29 March and II May "increased 

everyone's optimism" and had a "mercurial and superb" impact, 

according to General Steele. Franks had lost a leg in Vietnam and 

rema ined in the Army. Burson, Fletcher, and Naeyaert recalled that 

General Franks' visit had inspired them to move beyond the tragedy and 

get on with their lives." 

The USAISR staff members were impressed by the Army commanders' "extreme concern and devotion" fo r the soldiers and their families. 

They worried, however, about the increased infection risks "posed by 

multiple visitors" and the interference those visits made "with the necessary activities of patient care." Distinguished visitors were not restricted to normal visiting hours. Colonel Greenfield, the sharp no-nonsense 

chief nurse, wondered why their visits were not coordinated so that they 

could have come "at the same time." Colonel No lan later recommended 

restricting VIP visits "to general officers directly in the pati ents' chain 

of command. I f such a policy were established, it would promote patient 

morale while effecting infection control."J6 

Although aspects of visitor traffic should be addressed in mass 

casualty planning, the overwhelming advantages of VI P visits on soldier morale could not be denied. For some soldiers, for example, 

Capta in Walters, "the entire chain of command comi ng out really 

made a difference." While recovering from his burns, Walters had to 

cope with the loss of his good friend and jumping buddy in the acci-

~ "Army Chief of Staff Visits Burned Paratroopers," San Antonio Express News, 

28 Mar 94, p. GA. One patient was medically incapable of exchanging I-Ioo-ahs!, 

recalled Phil Reidinger, a Fort Sam Houston publ ic affairs officer who wa s present 

during the visit. 

lS Quotations from Steele Inlerv, 20 Apr 94. See also Tab L in Scudder Smart Book; 

Burson, NaeYHerl, and Fletcher Interv, 2 Aug 95. 

J(j First three quotations from USAISRAAR, p. II ; fourth quotation from Greenfield 

Inlcrv, 8 Apr 94; fifth quotation from Nolan Memo, 18 Apr 94. 
THE SEVERELY B URN ED 83 

Generals Steele alld Sullivall 

dent. He found that the VIP visits bolstered his morale during his time 

of grief. Even that of his wife, Lt. Stephanie Walters, improved. She 

learned from the accident " how wonderful the Army community is," 

especially the medi cs' "willingness to go an extra shift, or an extra 

day, or another case .... " Lieutenant Walters saw firsthand " how 

committed the Army is in taking ca re of its own." For her, the experience "really reinforced [the notion] that people are the most precious 

commodity in the Army."" 

H Walters Interv, 13 Apr 94. 
84 DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

C01·mnand and Control 

At 1600 on the day of the disaster Genera l Claypool established an 

emergency operations center (EOC) at Brooke and placed Colonel 

No lan in cha rge. The EOC staff provided information to the Health 

Services Command, exchanged data with Fort Bragg during the emergency, and sent three soldiers to meet the arriving casua lties at the airport. General Claypool also provided personnel from Brooke 's Patient 

Administration Division (PAD) to work with the USA ISR burn unit and 

with the fami lies. During the initial stages of the mass casualty PAD 

representatives staffed the Fort Sam Houston Fami ly Assistance Center, 

acted with the 82d Airborne Division li aison team in helping family 

members receive accurate and timely information, and faci litated the 

issuance of invitational orders to next of kin.lS 

Despite best efforts, some problems became appa rent during the 

mass casua lty response. At first the information on when and how 

many patients were coming into the burn unit was not always reliable, 

a problem that lasted until about 0630 on 24 March. Colonel Nolan 

subsequently recommended that a PAD representative be sent with the 

forward team to provide accurate information about numbers of victims 

and times of flight arrivals and to expedite the admission process. 

Another weak area was that activities often were not properly coordinated through the Brooke EOC, which was supposed to be the source 

of all information. Although "communications exceeded expectations," 

the radios being used by support personne l were incompatible with 

those at the operations center. The EOC staff sometimes could not 

respond or lacked the appropriate details." 

Nevertheless, information flowed more smoothly during the mass 

casua lty response at Fort Sam Houston, with its one emergency operations center, than at Fort Bragg, with its multip le emergency operations 

centers providing conflicting materia l. 

Liaison Team 

Whi le Genera l Claypoo l establ ished a Brooke EOC to deal with the 

mass casua lty, General Steele organized an effort to ensure that his 

injured pa ratroopers and their fami li es would be well taken care of at 

)8 Nolan Memo, 25 May 94; Claypool Inter\" 8 Apr 94. 

39 Nolan Memo, 25 May 94. 
THE SEVERELY BU RNED 85 

Fort Sam Houston. At 0300, on the twenty-fourth, Steele sent a nineman liaison team to San Antonio to assess the situation and provide the 

82d Airborne Division with information about the soldier patients at the 

USAISR burn unit and the handli ng and care of their fami ly members. 

He placed Capt. Michae l Scudder, an Adjutant General Corps officer 

known to be intense and mission oriented, in charge of eight men- one 

each from the I st and 3d Brigades, three for administrative funct ions, 

two fo r tactical communications, and a chaplain. Captain Scudder's 

previous deployment for disaster reli ef duri ng Hurrica ne Andrew, on 

only seven hours' notice, helped prepare him for his new assignment." 

During the fli ght to San Antonio Scudder and his team developed a 

list of eighty things they needed " to accompl ish to make business happen for us." Like other well-trained soldiers, who go to combat and figure out how to make the mission a Sllccess, the liaison team "just converted what we normally do every day in the Army to this pa rticul ar situation," said the you ng capta in. To max imize efficiency, Scudder divided responsibi lities into eight or nine tasks per individual. Arriving at 

Fort Sam Houston at 1400, the team members agreed on a time and 

place to meet and then went their separate ways to perform their individual assignments:

1I 

The liaison team received working space at the Fort Sam Houston 

Fami ly Assistance Center, where Scudder and his team actua lly lived 

unti l other accommodati ons could be fo und for them. There was little 

time to enjoy comfo rtable quarters, however, for they worked twentyfo ur hours a day supporting patients and fami lies. By the fourth day 

Scudder had enlarged his team to fourteen to assist what eventually 

would be 43 patients and 120 fami ly members." 

Captain Scudder coordinated with Colonel Nolan at the Brooke 

EOC. He also met with key insta llation offic ials- Edward K. Mill er, 

director of the Plans, Traini ng, Mobilization, and Security Division, who 

was Nolan's counterpart, and with James "Jim" R. Evetts, director of 

Fort Sam Houston's personnel and community activities. They and representatives of the fi ve different commands at Fort Sam Houston attended daily emergency operations meetings invo lving the post commander, 

which gave Scudder a direct link to the post leadership. This leadership 

.;0 Inter\" Col Mary T. Sarnecky with Capt Michael Scudder, 7 Apr 94 (hereafter cited 

as Scudder Intent). 

~I Quotations rrom Scudder Intent, 7 Apr 94. See also Nolan Memo, 25 May 94. 

42 Nolan Memo, 18 Apr 94. 
86 DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

put their employees to work to 

sol ve problems for Scudder" 

Problems included securing 

guest rooms and transportation 

for family members; work ing out 

financia l arra ngements for stepparents and girlfriends, who did 

not meet the standard requirements for assistance; making certain that donation and foundation 

monies were directed toward 

financial support of famil ies, once 

the brigades' normal fami ly support money had run out; and protecting fami li es from media 

scrutiny by keeping reporters outCaplail/ SClIdder side the fam ily assistance center 

and the hospital. "There is no 

need the families have that we cannot provide them," Scudder said." 

The liaison team ensured that mothers and fat hers rested enough 

and ate regular meals. Israel Tamez and his wife, Ramona , of 

Victoria , Texas, stayed at a guesthouse about 150 feet from the hospital. They visited their son, Pvt. Willy Leos of the 2d Batta li on, 

504th Infantry, as often as possible, which usua lly meant two daily 

visits, each limited to a li ttle over two hours- a preca utionary measure due to the concern about infection. Sleepless nights made the 

parents tired, but they were thankful that their son's hospital stay 

wou ld be only about three weeks." 

Importantly, the li aison team boosted the morale of the famil ies. 

Capt. Michael Guthrie, a team member, realized immediately how it 

helped them "to see a beret li ke their son's and recogni ze the shoulder 

patch. They see a beret and they feel more comfortable," he said. " It's 

li ke we 're their second family."" 

4 ) Scudder Intcrv, 7 Apr 94 . 

.u Ibid. 

s Larry Bingham, "Burned Soldier, Father Relish Life," Fayelle vifle Observe/,-

nilleS, 28 Mar 94, p. lA; "Army Liaison Team Helps F<lI11ilies of Burn Victims," News 

& Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), 29 Mar 94, p. 3A. 

46 As quoted in Larry Bingham, "Pope Famil ies Comforted," Fayellevifle Observe/,-

Times, 28 Mar 94, p. 78. 
THE SEVERELY BU RNED 87 

Preparing berets for the burl1 victims 

On 30 March Brig. Gen. Michael Canavan, the 82d Airborne 

Division's assistant commander for operations, delivered maroon berets 

in sterile plastic bags- another precautionary measure aga inst in fection- to the injured paratroopers at the USA ISR burn unit. The berets, 

donated by the U.S. Cava lry Store in Fayettevill e, were reminders of the 

support that came "from hundreds of mi les away."" 

1 As quoted in ibid. 
88 D ISASTER ON GREEN RA t'vIP 

A member of the li aison team was a lways at the hospi ta l, either in 

the family assistance room or on the burn ward. "These patients are 

sti ll my soldiers, and I have responsibilities to them," sa id Captain 

Scudder. The ex tra su pport from the li aison team in taking care of the 

Green Ramp casualties and their famili es "made our job easier," 

reported Major Lawlor. Colonel Stetz echoed Major Lawlor's sentiments: " I have to ta ke my hat off to the 82d .... I think Ca ptain 

Scudder and the liaison team here have done an extraordinary job, not 

only in supporting the family members that are there ... [but] coming up to he lp support the soldiers .... " The presence of "their own 

people," added Stetz, meant more to the burned paratroopers than 

anyone else's.4S 

The liaison team helped the burn unit staff to explain the operation 

of the hospital to the families. Colonels Greenfield and Stetz met with 

the families as a group to interpret the restrictive visiting hours and the 

concern about infection. Despite their explanations, about 10 percent of 

families complai ned about being kept from visiting their loved ones. 

" Dealing with the fami lies is a big issue," Stetz sa id, so Scudder's group 

"ran interference." Lieutenant Walters remembered that the liaison team 

ex pl ained "what the staff ... [members were] li ke and how they 

worked." Colonel Greenfield believed that the team was "probably the 

single biggest godsend in this entire operation .... We have a total of 

fourteen people over there that are basica lly deali ng with the families," 

she sa id. Colonel Stetz remarked: "The success of this whole operation 

has to lie equally with the 82d Airborne Division, not only the Institute 

of Surgica l Research." The presence of Scudder's liaison team at Fort 

Sam Houston proved to be a mass casualty strategy boon." 

Family Assistance 

Unl ike Fort Bragg, Fort Sam Houston had a plan for managing 

large numbers of casualties. Following that plan, devised initia lly for 

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the garriso n'S permanent Army 

Community Services office, which was housed in the Road Runner 

Communi ty Center, an old recreational building on post that had out4~ First quotation from Scudder Interv, 7 Apr 94; second quotation from Lawlor 

Interv, 26 M;:IY 94; third quotation from Stetz lnterv, 8 Apr 94. 

4q First, sec oll(~ and fifth quotations from Stetz Inlcr\', 8 Apr 94; third qLlol;:lIion from 

Walters Intcrv, 13 Apr 94; fourth quotation from Greenfield Intcrv, 8 Apr 94. 
THE SEVERELY B URNED 89 

Road RUI/uer COlllmuuity Cenler at Fort Sam HOllslon 

lived its usefulness, would become the Fort Sam Houston Family 

Assistance Center. The Army Communi ty Services staff already knew 

how to tap into loca l community resources to benefit the Army, having 

established a committee for that purpose." 

At 1830, on the day of the accident, the garrison commander, 

Genera l Cisneros, instructed Jim Evetts to activate the fami ly assistance center to handle the influx of casualties and families and to provide support. Evetts immediately established his office at the Road 

Runner Community Center. Also to help the familie s of victims, 

Cisneros opened a military travel assistance section at the San 

Antonio airport. SI 

Evetts relied upon Rita Dalton, the Army Community Services 

chief, and her staff. Army Community Services normally operated on 

an eight-hour basis, Monday to Friday, and provided a vari ety of assistance, to include relocation, famil y advocacy, emergency rel ief, and 

volunteer support. During an emergency the office was manned twenty-four hours a day. Once notified of the accident, Wilson Apkarian, the 

director for community and family activ ities at Fort Sam Houston, and 

Kathleen Curd, his assistant, joined Evetts, and they worked through 

~ Nolan Memo, 18 Apr 94. 

SI Inlerv, Col Mary T. Sarnecky with Jim Evetts, 7 Apr 94 (hereafter cited as Evetts 

Inlcrv); Nolan Memo, 18 Apr 94. 
90 DISASTER ON GREEN RA~ P 

the night getting the assistance center ready to receive the fam ilies of 

the injured soldiers" 

Fo llowing a we ll-planned and well-rehea rsed guide, used whenever the USA ISR burn unit received an infl ux of burn casualties, Evetts, 

Apkari an, and Curd hooked up extra phone lines for the use of the famil ies and, in the Road Runner auditorium, set up workstations for the 

various services. They placed signposts, with directions for family 

members, at strategic locations and had an 800 line install ed for relatives to use to inquire about patients. They also initiated a fl ow of in formation from the Womack EOC, compiled phone lists, and began bringing in extra staff." 

Staffing the family assistance center was a team effort. The garrison commander prov ided a duty officer, two paid civilians, chapl ains, 

family advocates, and Army Emergency Reliefand PAD personnel. The 

American Red Cross sent its representatives, and space was set aside 

for the 82d Airborne Division liaison team. Civili an and mi litary volunteers manned every shift at the center. "So we were all co-located. It 

really expedited communication," remembered Kathleen Curd." 

Vo lunteers offered their services from day one. Jim Evetts remembered "over 100 phone ca lls" the first night from peopl e donating lodging, transportati on, and time. The family assistance center staff kept a 

master list of those indi viduals who offered assistance "so that we could 

ca ll on them when we needed their help," recalled Linda Thomas, 

install ation volunteer coordinator and community programs manager 

for Army Community Services. Volunteering was on a rotational basis, 

so anyone who offered support was "given the opportunity to do so," 

she sa id. Vo lunteers arra nged transportation, manned telephones, 

offered chi ld care, brought in food, and assisted in the center's kitchen. 

They even provided a listening ear. "We . . . [were] very careful to 

match our vo lunteers' experiences and skills to specific needs of the 

fami lies so that we best use[d] the vol unteer support to meet the famili es' needs," said Thomas. More than 200 volunteers, many of them 

Army wives or retired military (San Antonio's retired military popul a-

'1 Evetts Interv, 7 Apr 94; Interv, Col Mary T. Sarnecky with Rita Dalton, 7 Apr 94 

(herca fier cited as Dalton Interv); Interv, Col Mary T. Sarnecky with Kathleen Curd, 7 

Apr 94 (hereafier ciled as K. Curd Interv). 

H NoJan Memo, 25 May 94; Evetts Interv, 7 Apr 94. 

S4 Quotation rrom K. Curd Interv, 7 Apr 94. Sec also Tab K ("Fori Sam HOllston and 

San Antonio Open Arms to Injured Soldiers and Their Families," Fort Sam Houston 

News Release, 25 Mar 94) in Scudder Smart Book; Evetts Interv, 7 Apr 94. 
TI-IE SEVERELY B UR.l'lED 91 

tion is the second largest, next to San Diego, in the United States) 

worked at the center during the emergency." 

The Road Runner auditorium also became a home away from home 

for the families. They gathered for tea, shared emotions only they could 

understand, received Red Cross comfort packages, and brought in children for day ca re. They marked their names and hometowns on a map 

on the wall; two fami lies discovered they lived only 15 miles apart. 

They picked up free passes to Sea World, the Alamo, and other ventures 

offered by businesses in town, as we ll as signed up for the activiti es 

they wished to undertake. Easter dinner was also held in the auditorium. "The most incredibl e thing to see is how the families in the auditorium have come from being individual fa milies to one collective family. They're tru ly a family unit. And that's what the auditorium was 

designed to be," sa id Li nda Thomas." 

General Claypool took additional steps to help the fami lies of the 

Fort Bragg soldier patients. He authori zed a thirty-day exemption from 

the surcharge for eati ng at Brooke's dining faci lities, and he prov ided 

free supplies of prescription medicines until other arrangements could 

be made. According to General Stee le, Claypool " bent the rules" in the 

interest of the bu rn victims and their next of kin.51 

Helping the fami lies was a San Anton io community effort as well. 

As the fam ilies started arriving, local and area businesses and volunteer 

agencies provided food and other supplies to the Fort Sam Houston 

Family Assistance Center. Coca-Cola Bottling Company of the 

Southwest contributed beverages; Pace Foods, salsa; Frito-Lay, chips; 

Albertson's, cookies, as well as more drinks and chips; D un kin Donuts, 

a variety of donuts; and the United Services Organization, luncheon 

meat. H-E-B Grocery offered gift certificates for food, and Texas Copy 

donated a fax machine. The fami ly assistance center received frolll the 

garrison exchange overnight guest packets and from the library over 

three boxes of books plus more than $300 worth of books-oF-choice 

coupons, redeemable at a local bookstore. Finally, the San Antonio 

Mi litary Family Service Board, whi ch was instrumental in getting the 

)j First quotation from Evetts Interv, 7 Apr 94; remaining quotations from Interv, 

Col Mary T. Sarnecky with Linda Thomas, 8 Apr 94 (hereafler cited as Thomas 

Inlerv). Sec also Larry Bingham, "They Arc Family," Fayelleville Observer-Times, 30 

Mar 94, p. t B. 

S(i Thomas Interv. 8 Apr 94. 

SJ Quotat ion from W. Steele Interv, 20 Apr 94. See also Nolan Memo, 18 Apr 94; 

Claypool Interv. 8 Apr 94. 
92 D ISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

Chamber of Commerce involved, helped the San Antonio retired military community rally around the acc ident victims." 

By 25 March the Fort Sam Houston Family Assistance Ce nter was 

assisting nineteen fami lies. Lisa Ke lley, who had joined her husband, 

Sergeant Ke lley, on the evening of the twenty-fourth, was in a state of 

shock after learning about the severity of her husband's condition. She 

was surprised at how well the Army took care of her, but most thankfu l. As she later reca lled, " I've had everything provided for me that 

I've needed, down to toothpaste .... There was always someone there 

wi lli ng to help- the people at the community center, the Red Cross 

vo lunteers, the chaplains, the ACS [Army Community Services] volunteers, ... the Army liaison team." Linda Thomas remarked on " how 

incredibl e it was to witness a post located in one state and a post located in another state litera lly come together and take ca re of an immediate need." Fort Bragg also was pleased with the way in which Fort Sam 

Houston took care of the paratroopers' fam ilies." 

Public Affail'S 

Once alerted, the public affairs offices (PAO) of Brooke Army 

Medica l Center, Health Services Command, and Fort Sam Houston 

joined forces in executing the publi c affairs annex to the Fort Sam 

Houston mass casualty pl an. They shared information with their operations centers and maintained contact with the public affairs offices of 

the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Womack Army 

Medica l Center, the 82d Airborne Division, and the XVIII Airborne 

Corps. The Fort Sam Houston public affairs officers met at 0430 on 24 

March to coordinate assignments and responsi bilities in preparation for 

the arrival of the burn patients. Their goa l was to contain the press 

whil e provid ing amp le opportunity for coverage." 

According to policy, photographs of the pati ents' arriva l were permitted; however, zooming in on their faces was prohibited, to protect 

n Tab K and Tab V (Update for 82d Airborne Division From BAMC- 82d Lia ison 

Team, 4 Apr 94) in Scudder Smart Book; Dalton Interv, 7 Apr 94; K. Curd Interv, 7 

Apr 94. 

'9 First quotation from Kelley Interv, 25 May 94; second quotation from Thomas 

Interv, 8 Apr 94. 

tiO Nolan Memo, 18 Apr 94; Interv, Col Mary T. Sarnecky with Cindy Vaughan, 7 Apr 

94 (hcrea fier cited as Vaughan Interv). Vaughan was the chief of media relations in the 

U.S. Army Medica l COlllmand Public Affai rs Office. 
TH E SEVERELY B URNED 93 

their privacy and that of their families. By and large, the news medi a 

cooperated, and the public affairs officers disseminated timely in formation, in the form of patient updates and press releases, and arranged 

additional photo opportuni ties. The different public affairs offi ces coordinated all news acti vities. The reporters were allowed to talk to volunteers from the families, interview physicians and operations officers, 

attend press conferences in one of Brooke's wa iting rooms, and cover 

the visits of dignitaries." 

In general, the mili tary got along well with the reporters, who were 

mainly from the San Antonio area. Because San Antoni o was a military 

town, most understood the soldier mentality and accepted the ground 

rules and restrictions invo lved in public affa irs. They also knew that 

patients came first and news came second. As a result, the military and 

the press worked as a team on the coverage of the mass casua lty at Fort 

Sam I-I ouston." 

Despite the positive relationship, some di ffic ulties were evident. 

The Brooke PAO was understaffed, considering the volume o f public 

interest in the disaster. Clerical and office support were needed, yet 

unavailable. Public affairs officers not employed by Brooke occasionally spoke for the hospital, but without the knowledge of the Brooke 

PAO. Finally, reporters had a tendency to gather outside the family 

assistance center, whi ch caused traffic jams. Because of the traffi c 

problem, Colonel Nolan later recommended that a medi a center be 

established "at the Offi cer's Club or some other area that would permit 

more controlled access and alleviate the need fo r extra military police 

for traffic control."63 

Ministl,), and Pastoral Care 

A fter learning of the accident, Brooke 's chief of ministry and pastoral care, Col. Pau l W. Dodd, placed all chaplains on alert in anticipation of an influx of burn casualties from Fort Bragg. To oversee 

Brooke's ministry and pastoral response, Dodd appointed Maj. Michael 

T. Curd, the senior chaplai n clinician, as Team Alpha leader. Curd, who 

was married to Kath leen Curd of the family assistance center, reviewed 

the chaplains annex to the hospital's emergency preparedness plan and 

M Vaughan Interv, 7 Apr 94. 

~z Ibid. 

4J Quotation from Nolan Memo, 18 Apr 94. See also ibid., 25 May 94. 
94 DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

worked out individual assignments and responsibilities. Each 

chaplain was to support four or 

five casualties and their families, 

as well as be on hand at assigned 

locations to comfort not only the 

soldier patients as they arrived but 

also the staff. Chaplains were to 

perform informal debriefings and 

spiritua l healing whenever and 

wherever possibl e." 

The ten chaplains of Team 

Alpha received their assignments 

from Major Curd at a meeting 

held at 0745 on 24 March in the 

Brooke EOC. At 1830 they 

Major ClIrd attended a fami ly support conference in the Fort Sam Houston 

Fami ly Assistance Center. At the session Lt. Col. Anne Schwartz, the 

USA ISR psychiatric nurse clinician, discussed how to prepare fam ily 

members for what they were going to see and how to provide them with 

emotional support." 

Fifteen minutes before the arriva l of the fi rst C- 9, Team Alpha 

members went to their assigned locations- two in the emergency 

room and eight in the USA ISR burn unit. The casualties were brought 

to the main hospital, where a chaplain greeted and ta lked to each 

injured soldier and the accompanying medical staff. As soon as the 

patients were li ttered upstairs, another chaplain debriefed the litterbearers, "who had never seen people so injured, so burned before," and 

as each casua lty entered a room on the burn ward, another chaplain 

was there to reassure him and the medi cs with him. Within one hour 

every patient had been visited by a chaplain, and the Catholic patients 

had received the sacrament of the sick. The chaplain s conti nued to 

visit their assigned patients until they were settled and their arri va l 

"" Nolan Memo, 25 May 94; Interv, Lt Col Iris J. West with Maj Michllci T. Curd, 26 

May 94 (hereaft er cited as M. Curd Interv); After-Action Review, Maj Michael T. Curd, 

Department of M inistry and Pastoral Care, n.d., sub: Institute of Surgical Research 

Mass Casualty Operation, 23- 3 1 March 1994, p. I (hereafter ciled as Curd AAR). 

6S Curd AAR, pp. 1- 2. 
THE SEVERELY B URNED 95 

procedures were completed. The same strategy was foll owed for the 

casua lties that arrived in the foll owing days." 

A chaplain always talked with fam ily members fi rst and then 

accompanied them to the patient's side. Family members, who wore 

gowns, masks, and shower caps, were told to touch the casualty and to 

act normally and positively, if possible, for burn patients "feel ugly, ... 

fee l totally alone." "They're alienated from the world as they knew it," 

said Chap lain Curd. Fami ly members were advised not to show their 

emotions unti l they had left the patient's room. Once outside, they experienced a considerable emotiona l release, and the chaplai ns were there 

to help them. Curd and other Team Alpha chapla ins had been trained to 

deal with the special problems of burn victims and their families. 

Military chaplains remai ned available to fami ly members on return visits to the USAISR burn unit." 

Brooke's chap lains attempted to debri ef the Fort Bragg soldier 

patients as soon as possible and attended family debriefings held at the 

main hospita l. Garrison and unit chapla ins staffed the Fort Sam 

Houston Family Assista nce Center around the clock on a rotating basis. 

Also helping were twenty-eight chaplains temporarily at Fort Sam 

Houston for the trauma and crisis response team training course, whi ch 

Chaplain Curd was teaching. Ultimately, a network of coordinated pastoral care took place at Fort Sam Houston , with chap lains from the Fifth 

U.S. Army, the garrison, the Army Med ical Department, Fort Bragg, 

and the 82d Airborne Division parti cipating.'· 

Mental Health 

Initial eval uations of the Fort Bragg soldier patients were made difficu lt by a lack of psychiatric support. The USAISR burn unit had only 

"one psychiatric nurse," Colonel Schwartz, who "could not handl e it all," 

according to the outspoken Colonel Greenfi eld. As chi ef nurse, she made 

arrangements to have two psychiatric nurses from the Army Medical 

Department Center and School to help Schwartz in the afternoons and 

relied on the staffi ng agency under contract with Brooke to fi nd a third 

nurse to come in for a few hours in the evenings. Greenfield believed that 

(,I, Quotation from M. Curd Inter\', 26 May 94. Sec also Curd AA R, PI' . 1- 2. 

~J As quoted in LHlTy Bingham, "Chaplain Aids Victims and Families," F'oyellel'ille 

Observer-Times, 3 1 Mar 94. p. 3A. Sec also M . Curd Inlerv, 26 May 94. 

t'4 Nolan Memo, 25 May 94; M. Curd Inlerv, 26 May 94; Curd AA R, p. 2. 
96 DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

a mechanism for handling psychiatric eva luations of patients needed to 

be written into the hospital's emergency preparedness plan." 

The combined response of the U.S. Army Institute of Surgica l 

Research, Brooke Army Medi ca l Center, and Fort Sam Houston 

demonstrated the effectiveness of training, experience, and pl anning. 

The highly capable USAISR burn teams and staff members successfully managed the Green Ramp casualties during their medevac fli ghts 

and during their stay in the burn unit. Although the increased risk of 

infecti on due to multiple visitors was a matter of concern, the visits of 

dignitaries and the presence of the 82d Airborne Division li aison team 

boosted the morale of both the burn victims and their families. Mass 

casua lty pla nning guided Brooke's departme nts and Fort Sam 

Houston's agencies in responding effective ly to the crisis. Chaplains 

and medica l and family support staffs dispensed essential services to 

the Fort Bragg soldier patients and their families, and publi c affairs 

officers afforded opportunities for coverage by the press. Brooke 's 

emergency operations center provided not only accu rate and timely 

information but also coordinated activities with ga rrison agencies. The 

survivors bene fited from the teamwork in San Antonio, and this kind of 

dedication marked the sustained treatment ongoing at Fort Bragg and 

Womack Army Medical Center. 

6'1 Greenfield [nlerv, 8 Apr 94. 

Honoring the deceased paratroopers. The 82d Airborne Division, as 

part of its stlstained response, held a memorial service on 29 March 

1994 at Fort Bragg's Rilz-Epps Fitness Centel; where twenty-three he/-

mets, (wenty-three inverled rifles, alld twenty-three pairs of boots stood 

at allelltioll 011 the stage ill hOl1ol' of the fallen soldiers. The emotional 

ceremollY was a time of hert/ing alld remembrance for mally. as \\las the 

divisiol1~· blflJ'illg of its 0\111/ illthefollolVing days. 
5 

Sustained Response 

"This is about the entire communi ty. Adaption to catastrophic events comes in stages over time." 

- L/. Col. Sheny COllller 

Within days of the Green Ramp disaster Womack Army Medica l 

Center and Fort Bragg began the sustained response. Fort Bragg 

received visiting dignitaries, kept the press informed, honored the dead, 

and maintained combat readiness. The multiple emergency operations 

centers worked around the clock to meet the needs of the severely 

burned paratroopers and their fami lies. Everyone involved in the accident received some form of counseling. Once their speciali zed burn 

therapy was completed, the Fort Bragg soldier patients, but for one, 

returned to Womack for long-term care. 

MOl'ale 

Two days after the tragic accident, and sti ll reeling from the shock, 

Fort Bragg hosted a visit from President Bill Clinton, who toured the 

crash site and ca lled on the Green Ramp casua lties at Womack. Secret 

Service agents, a White House photographer, and ten White HOllse 

media personnel accompanied the president on his visit to the hospital 

wards. Clin ton talked to the injured paratroopers for about one hour 

and then mingled with the crowd that gathered outside the hospital. At 

a press conference in front of Womack the president spoke of the soldiers' courage and spirit: " I wish everyone in America could see the 

faces and the eyes and the spirit of these people. They wou ld rea li ze 
100 DISASTER ON GREEN RAM P 

how fortunate we are to be served by men and women like them. They 

are so brave and selfless.'" 

Clinton was impressed with the number of soldiers who had 

received their injuries whi le helping others. He was touched particularly by the story of the husband and wife team of Lieutenant Altfather 

and Sergeant Houghton. Presidential attention boosted the morale of 

everyone- patients, families, and staff. They "were deeply moved by 

his visit," reported public affairs officer Margaret Tippy. The emergency room chief nurse, Major I-Ioroho, believed that the president's 

visit had helped members of her staff fee l recognized for the important 

job they had done. The presidential visit also emphasized the fact that 

the disaster "was a nationally publicized event, and that the Fort Bragg 

community truly belong[ed] to the America n commu nity.'" 

The XVIII Airborne Corps chain of command visited the injured 

paratroopers and their fami lies as well. General Stee le, as the 82d 

Airborne Division commander, involved himself with his wou nded 

troops, calling on them frequently. He spoke of the phenomena l spirit 

of American soldiers. They 

wi ll not lie down and quit . .. even when the Lord dea ls them a blow like 

thi s . ... They do not give lip. Soldiers, with their eyes swollen shut and 

their hands burned and bandaged so you could not touch them, would 

say to you when you visited: "Airborne all the way, Sir!,,3 

Despite broken legs, a crushed pelvis, and body burns, S. Sgt. 

Roland A. Souza of the 2d Battalion, 504th In fantry, came to attention 

in bed when Genera l Steele pinned master parachutist wings on him. To 

qualify for the wings, Souza was scheduled to make the last of the 

req uired sixty-five jumps on the day of the accident. After the tragic 

incident the Army waived the requirement for the final jump and 

awarded him his coveted "Master Blaster" wings. Referring to Souza 

and the other burned paratroopers, Stee le said: "That's the spirit of the 

I As quoted in Henry Cuningham, "Clinton Visits Crash Survivors," Fayelfeville 

Observer· Times, 26 Mar 94, p. A7. 

Z First quotation from Margaret Tippy, Information Paper to Health Services 

Command PAO and Army PAO, 29 Mar 94, sub: After- Action Report 0 11 Womack Army 

Medical Center Public Affairs Activities Involving Injured Soldiers From Aircraft 

Crash (herea fter cited as Tippy Info Paper); second quotation from John Valceanll, 

"Presidcnt Visits Injured Soldicrs," Paraglide (Fori Bragg, N.C.), 3 1 Mar 94, p. 3A. See 

also Intcr", Lt Col Iris J. West with Maj Patricia D. Horoho, 12 Apr 94. 

j Inlcrv, Lt Col Iris J. West with Maj Gcn William M . Steele, 20 Apr 94 (herea fter 

cited as Steele Interv). 
SUSTAINED R ESPONSE 101 

President Clinton speaking at the press conference 

people. They're young; they're committed, and they have unique inner 

strength. Because of the ir spirit, a lot of them are alive today.'" 

Department of Defense and Department of the Army leaders also 

visited the disaster victims. On 26 March Secretary of Defense William 

J. Perry and Army Chief of Staff Sulliva n called on the three at Cape 

Fear Vall ey Medica l Center and the twenty at Womack. They shared 

words of comfort, which boosted morale. The strong morale of the soldiers, many of whom were anxious to get back to work, impressed Perry. 

"The kind of spirit they have is incredible. I can't believe how tough they 

are and how they are bouncing back," he sa id. The visits of General 

Dennis J. Reimer of the U.S. Army Forces Command and General 

Franks of the Training and Doctrine Command, who had lost his leg in 

Vietnam, also raised the paratroopers' spirit. Fort Bragg public affairs 

officers arra nged press conferences for the distinguished visitors.' 

~ Ibid. 

5 As quoted in Scott Yates, "Defense Chief ' lmpressed' by Mora le of the Injured," 

Fayetteville Observer-Tillles, 30 Mar 94, p. 4A. See also Interv, Lt Col Iris J. West 

with Margaret Tippy, 14 A pr 94 (hereafter cited as Tippy Interv); Steele Interv, 20 

Apr 94. 
[02 DISASTER ON GIU~EN RJUvlP 

Public Affairs 

Fort Bragg's public affairs offices (PAO) continued to keep the 

press informed. On 26 March the 82d Airborne Division's public affairs 

officer visited each patient at Womack to learn who would be willing 

to be interviewed. Three injured soldiers, two male and one female, volunteered. The med ia event, held in Colonel Timboe's office, "was a 

very moving experience," said Margaret Tippy. On the same day Tippy 

arranged fo r a press conference at the triage site, with the emergency 

room staff who handled the mass casualty in attendance, and another at 

the Fisher House, the home away from home for families of the casualties. Two days later the public affairs officer set up an interview for a 

local newspaper with Altfather and Houghton. Soon after the arriva l of 

the first twenty Fort Bragg soldier patients at the U.S. Army Institute of 

Surgical Research (USAISR), the Womack PAO received numerous 

phone ca lls from the San Antonio media to obtain in formation on them. 

Within a week's time, however, the number of phone ca lls dropped to 

about fifty a day' 

As coverage of the Pope Air Force Base disaster subsided, Fort 

Bragg's public affairs officers concluded that, by and large, they were 

successful in their efforts to disseminate timely information to the 

press and the community. Some issues, however, remained a question 

mark, and they hoped that the emergency preparedness committee 

wou ld consider them at its next meeting. Tippy recommended that in 

future mass casualty exercises public affairs officers assume the role 

of reporters to "have an opportunity to see how [the process) works." 

For example, she sensed frustration in others in trying to obtain an 

accurate account of patient numbers, but explained that "patient 

accountab ility is not a priority when people need to be tri aged and 

treated." Tippy also believed that the hospital staff, "from the newest 

soldiers to the most seasoned civi li ans," should know how to handle 

the news media. 7 

During the crisis Margaret Tippy did not talk with the publi c affa irs 

officers at Pope Air Force Base, Cape Fear Valley Medical Center, and 

Highsmith-Rainey Memorial Hospita l until 25 March, two days after 

the accident. "Their lines were always busy," she said. Hence, she suggested the establishment ofa communications network among all of the 

6 Quotation from Tippy Interv. 14 Apr 94. See also Tippy Info Paper, 29 Mar 94. 

1 Tippy Info Paper, 29 Mar 94. 
SUSTAI N ED R.E.SPONSE 103 

public affairs offices, both civilian and military. "All the major publi c 

affairs offices have to dedicate one line as the PAO [internal communications] line," she said.' 

Despite the shortcomings, the efforts of the Fort Bragg public 

affairs offices greatly contributed to the success of the entire mass 

casualty effort, permitting coverage while protecting the pri vacy of the 

soldier patients and their families. 

Memorial Se1"1,ice 

The last major event that the news media covered was the memorial service, held on 29 March at Fort Bragg's Ritz-Epps Fitness Center 

to honor the twenty-three deceased paratroopers (see Appendix). The 

82d Airborne Division had wanted to hold the service at its memorial 

near the division museum, but inclement weather forced the ceremony 

inside. The gym also was preferable since the injured paratroopers, 

some on hospital gurneys, would be in attendance. The deputy G- 2 

(intelligence officer), Maj. Thomas Gordon, had designed the inside 

service carefully, making sure it was a success.' 

Twenty-three helmets, twenty-three inverted rifles, and twentythree pairs of boots stood at attention on the Ritz-Epps Fitness Center 

stage in honor of the fallen soldiers, a trad itional Army commemoration for the dead. As each name was ca ll ed, a paratrooper marched up 

to the stage; halted in front of a helmet, ri fl e, and pair of boots; slowly saluted; and marched off. The helmets and boots were given to the 

famili es after the ceremony. The rifl es were returned to the Fort Bragg 

arms room.1O 

Among the more than 3,500 people crowded into the Ritz-Epps 

Fitness Center to honor those who had perished were the wounded survivors of the acc ident. Some wa lked in, white gauze covering their 

burned hands and legs. One hobbled in on crutches. A number were in 

wheelcha irs. Several came on hospital beds or gurneys, pushed forward 

by nurses, family, or friends. The crowd parted to allow them a better 

view closer to the front. " 

, Ibid. 

' Steele Inlcrv, 20 Apr 94. 

10 Henry Cliningham, "Fallen Soldiers Saluted," Fayelleville Observer-Times, 30 

Mar 94, p. 4A; Marlha Quillin, "Fort Bragg Service I-Ionors 23 Dend." News & 

Observer (Ra teigh, N.C.), 30 Ma l' 94, p. 3A. 

11 Quillin, "Fort Bragg Service Honors 23 Dead." p. 3A. 
104 DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

Civilian and military dignitaries attended the ceremony, includi ng 

Secretary of Defense Perry; General Sullivan; General Merrill A. 

McPeak, the Air Force chief of staff; and General Wayne A. Downing, 

commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operati ons Command. The 

speakers were General Steele, Colonels McChrysta l and Austin, and 

Perry. " 

The orators praised the deceased paratroopers' courage and patriotism. Defense Secretary Perry said he came to the ceremony to show 

the country's appreciati on for the sacrifices soldi ers were asked to 

make every day in serving their country. The Green Ramp disaster, he 

said, " is a harsh reminder of the danger of military service, even in 

peacetime .... America doesn't ask if the All Americans are trained. It 

doesn't ask if they're ready. It expects them to be. [The soldiers of the 

82d] were doing what America expected of them."" 

The deceased pa ratroopers were from fifteen states, ranged in age 

from nineteen to thirty-five, and held ranks from private to capta in. 

Most were veteran j umpers; one was jumping with his unit for the first 

time. Some gave their lives to save others." 

Military offi cials shared the stage with the 82d Airborne Division 

chorus, which sang "Last Full Measure of Devotion" and "Hard To Say 

Goodbye," among other numbers. From opposite corners of the gym 

two buglers played a particularly sorrowful renditi on of taps, one echoing the other's notes. The emoti onal ceremony honored the worst peacetime loss of life suffe red by the division since World War JI ." 

The memorial service provided closure for many of the 13,500 soldiers of the 82d Airborne Division, but not for the subordi nate units that 

suffe red casualties. General Steele had decided that the division, and 

particul arly Colonel McChrystal 's 2d Battali on, 504th Infantry, should 

bury its own dead. 

It was unusual military procedure to have a battalion bury its own 

dead in peacetime. But General Steele and his subordinates knew that 

it was important to give the troops "time to grieve," even though "it was 

going to take the focus of the battali on for a couple of weeks," sa id 

U "They Came To Honor Their Dead," Fayellevil/e Observer-Times, 3 1 Mar 94, 

p. 3E. 

U As quoted in Quillin, "ForI Bragg Service Honors 23 Dead," p. 3A. The 82d 

Airborne Division's otTicialnicknamc is the All Americans, which derives frolll lhe fact 

that during World War I soldiers of the 82d came fr0111 all of the Stales. 

I~ Ibid.; Cuningham, "Fallen Soldiers Saillled," p. 4A. 

15 Quillin, "Fort Bragg Service Honors 23 Dead," p. 3A. 
Gel/eral Steele visitil/g with/amities al/d with Spc. Anthony B. Davis alld 

his father after the memorial service 
106 DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

Pallbearers al the ForI Bragg CemetelY 

Colonel McChrystal. Hence, the division tried to have the deceased soldier's own platoon or at least company bury him. The burial detail 

included a firing party, bugler, escort, and pallbearers. McChrystal 

attended every funera l in his battalion. A squad leader handed the battalion commander the flag from the casket, and he handed it to the parents. Escorting bodies around the country to their final resting place 

occupied the division until 9 April. " 

Combat lteadirtess 

Even with its forty-four casualties, the 2d Battalion, 504th 

In fantry, never lost its combat readiness. "We 're trying to dea l with it 

in a very logical sequence," Colonel McChrystal sa id the day of the 

accident. "We're a combat unit. We have a mission. Everybody keep 

your eye on the ball, and we will conti nue to go forward ." The unit 

was one of the 82d Airborne Division's nine infantry batta li ons "that 

rotate responsibility to be first in line for rapid deployment." 

16 As quoted in SC(l 1l D. Naylor, "Driving On: Baltalion I-Ionors Its Dead, Braces for 

Action," Army Times, 11 Apr 94, p. 14. See also Steele Intcrv, 20 Apr 94. 
SUSTAINED RESPONSE 107 

According to McCh rysta l, the batta li on, despite its losses, co uld 

deploy withi n six hours." 

Part of being ready to deploy was knowing how to reorgan ize at 

short noti ce. Soldiers were able to step forward to fill leadership positions at a hi gher level. "You are always one more deep tha n you think. 

Behind every team leader, there's a specialist that can step in," sa id 

Colonel Schmader, the 3d Brigade commander. On 24 March replacements started to arrive from the 82d Replacement Detachment, rather 

than from other division units. Four days later the 2d Battalion, 504th 

In fantry, was redesignated DRF- 2 (Division Ready Force- 2), the 

Army's second battalion to deploy in an emergency. Despite its losses 

the battalion was placed on a hi gh alert status, "a testament, say its 

leaders, to their soldiers' indomitable will to ' drive on' in the wa ke of 

the tragedy." " 

Colonel McChrysta l credited his batta lion's abi lity to recover in 

the face of tragedy to the support his sold iers received from the chain 

of command, fami ly groups, and the commun ity, but especially to 

excellent tra ining. Training had been made as rea listic as possible. 

"The things you learn in training are what you do in war, and that is 

exactly what happened in the tragedy," said Command Sgt. Maj. 

Stevenson Cuffee, the battalion 's seni or enlisted soldi er. Sold iers were 

trai ned to continue in their mission after combat. The batta li on's command and staff group experienced "remarkably little· turbulence." 

According to McChrysta l, "this stability was absolutely a fa ctor in the 

battalion's ability to cope with the tragedy." Most casualties were from 

the enl isted and noncommissioned officer ranks and included many 

sergeants. Despite losses, the battalion retained its unit cohesiveness 

and teamwork .

'9 

On 6 April, two weeks after the accident, McChrystal 's and Austin 's 

battalions were the first two units to jump in an emergency deployment 

readiness exercise (EDRE), a large, complex maneuver that involved 

thirty-five Air Force aircraft and sixty helicopters. According to 

General Steele, the batta lions were "right back into what they are here 

17 As quoted in Henry Cuningham, "Battalion Remains Ready To Fight Despite 

Crash Losses, Leader Says," Fayelleville Observer-Times, 31 Mar 94, pp. lA, 4A. 

" First quotation as given in ibid., p. 4A ; second quotation from Naylor, "Driving 

On," p. 12. See also Interv, Maj Christopher G. Clark with Col John J. Marcello, II 

Apr 94. 

19 As quoted in Naylor, "Driving On," p. 12. 
108 DISASTER ON GIU £N RAMP 

for- what they are in the Army for." Participating in the exercise helped 

the soldi ers to move beyond the tragedy." 

Command and Control 

The installation EOC and Womack EOC rema ined open for nearly 

a week fo llowing the Green Ramp disaster. They shut down on 29 

March, the day of the memoria l service. The division EOC at Womack 

continued to operate twenty-four hours a day for about five days. After 

the pati ents were consolidated and moved up to Ward 6A, the center 

relocated to the ward and stayed there until about 8 April. From then on, 

Colonel Stansfield coordi nated assista nce to families and monitored 

the status of patients from his office at division headquarters." 

Mental Health 

To heal emotional wounds, Fort Bragg's menta l health professionals conducted forma l debriefi ngs. Strong emotiona l reactions to 

abnormal situations, psychiatrists believed, were best handled by people ta lking about their experiences with others who had gone through 

the same thing. The 1985 air crash at Gander, Newfou ndland, in which 

236 members of the 10 I st Airborne Division (Air Assault) perished, 

had taught the Army that " it doesn't work to have people with different uni forms, with di fferent patches, with ... not knowing what's 

go ing on," conduct the debriefings, said Colone l Plewes, Womack's 

psychi atry and neurology chief. Hence, Fort Bragg used its own menta l health resources, which were considerable. They incl uded the 82d 

Airborne Division's mental hea lth section; the 44th Medica l Brigade 's 

528th Medical Detachment (Combat Stress); the U.S. Army Specia l 

Forces Command; Womack's Department of Psychiatry and 

Neurology; and the 26 1 st Medica l Battalion (Area Support), with 

about six 9 1 C mental hea lth techni cians. Although the 82d was primarily responsibl e for debriefing troops, other Fort Bragg mental 

hea lth specialists and chaplains assisted. Womack's soc ial workers and 

chap la ins dea lt primari ly with fam il y issues, and the nearby 

:ro Steele Intcrv, 20 Apr 94. The EDREs arc pari or the XVIII Airborne Corps' o~ 

ing training program 10 maintain its abil ity to deploy an airborne task force into COIllbat without prior notice. 

21 Inlcrv, Lt Col Iris J. West with Lt Col Randy lal1 fi l(~ 12 Apr 94. 
SUSTAINED RESPONSE 109 

Rumbaugh Chil d and Ado lescent Menta l Health Clini c took care of 

the emotional needs of adolescents and children." 

Formal critica l incident stress debriefings began on the afternoon 

of 24 March. Four teams, consisting of two individua ls each, met with 

the soldiers of the 2d and 4th Battalions, 504th Infantry, divided into 

small groups. The debriefings lasted between thirty and sixty minutes. 

Within seventy-two hours every soldi er invo lved in the accident had 

attended at least one session. Debriefings continued on a da ily basis for 

about a week. By then, the mental health spec ialists had debriefed 

forty-nine separate units and about 500 troops." 

The debriefings were cathartic experiences, where the soldi ers 

shared in formation about their location at the time of the crash, what 

they saw, and what they fe lt. Psychiatrists were able to differentiate 

between norma l and abnormal reactions to trauma and identify those 

who were not coping well. The latter often were individuals who had 

experienced an earlier trauma but had never been debriefed, and thus 

the Green Ramp episode rekindled their pain. Psychiatrists also offered 

special counseling to soldiers who witnessed the accident and were not 

hurt, but who fe lt guilty for having been spared N 

Therapy for the soldiers came in other forms as well. Colonel Plewes 

believed that the memorial service "shore[ed] up their mores, as it were." 

Ceremony and ritual also provided closure. Colonel McChrystal's personal therapy was to focus on the nearly 620 paratroopers in his battalion who were not killed and who needed a commander." 

The psychiatrists decided to take the sold iers back to the crash site 

as therapy, especially since many ex pressed interest in returning to 

Green Ramp. Unit commanders and hospital nurses worked together to 

organi ze the effort. One week after the accident, the soldiers retu rned 

21 Quotation from Interv, Lt Col Iris J. West with Lt Col John W. Plewes, Maj Steve 

Knorr, and Maj Michael L. Russell, 13 Apr 94 (hereafter cited as Plewes, Knorr, and 

Russellinterv). Knorr was a psychiatrist in the 82d Airborne Division, and Russell was 

Womack's psychological services chier. See also Michael L. Russell, "Psychological 

Response to the Green Ramp Incident," n.d., Pl'. 3-4. The U.S. Army Center orMilitary 

History has in its custody a collection of documents on the Gander crash. 

2.1 Plewes, Knorr, and Russellinterv, 13 Apr 94; Russell, "Psychological Response," 

p. 16. 

N Plewes, Knorr, and Russell Interv, 13 Apr 94; Ruth Sheehan, "Many Crash 

Survivors Suffer Severe, Li e~Th ea en in g Burns," NelliS & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), 

25 Mar 94, p. 16A. 

lS Naylor, "Driving On," p. 13; Plewes, Knorr, and Russell Interv, 13 Apr 94; Interv, 

Lt Col Iris J. West with Lt Col Stanley A. McChrystal, 22 Apr 94. 
110 DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

to Green Ramp. As far as Colonel Plewes could tell , no one was retraumati zed. The paratroopers were supportive of one another and seemed 

to hand le well the visit to the crash location." 

Womack's mental hea lth specialists took care of hospital staff. 

Colonel Plewes gave top priority to debri efing emergency room and 

operating room personnel, followed by nurses on the wards that 

rece ived the injured. Formal criti ca l incident stress debriefings for 

hospital staff began two days after the accident. Psychologists emphasized the normalcy of the painful fee lings and responses to a tragedy 

like Green Ramp. After attending a session, Major Light, who helped 

to -triage the casua lties, shed her initial skepticism and reported, 

"Talking about what happened is crucial." Psychiatrists and hospital 

chaplains contacted pathologists conducting autopsies in the morgue 

to offer encouragement. Hospital custodial staff, who had clea ned up 

an excess of blood and debris after emergency treatment, also received 

debriefings one week after the incident." 

The families of the victims received formal debriefings and individual counseling from chaplains and social workers at Womack's 

Weaver Conference Room or the fam ily assistance activity in the Fort 

Bragg ConuTIunity Center. Major Clark, the surgeon of the 82d, coordinated with the Rumbaugh Clinic on debriefin gs for ado lescents and 

children because, according to Colonel Plewes, the division "likes to 

take care of its own." Counselors also visited the Fayetteville schools 

and allowed the youth to tell their classmates how they felt. Lt. Col. 

Sherry Conner, a social worker, understood the healing process, stating 

that "adaption to catastrophic events comes in stages over time." Colonel 

Plewes reported that with each patient and family he tried to show that 

the accident, "while tragic, [was] just one event in the person's life."" 

Womack kept its outpatient psychiatric clinic opened on the weekend to conduct individual debriefings or perform crisis intervention. 

Handouts on stress and trauma were ava ilabl e. Formal debriefings 

2~ Plewes, Knorr, and Russell Interv, 13 Apr 94. 

17 lnterv, Lt Col Iris J. West with Maj Dawll Light, 2 1 Apr 94 (hereafter cited as Light 

Inlerv); Plewes, Knorr, and Russell Intefv, 13 Apr 94; Memo, Maj Keith I. Jones, 

Chaplain, WAMC, to Chaplain, U.S. Army Medical COlllmand, Fort Sam Houston, Tex., 

6 Apr 94, sub: WAMC MASCA L AA R. 

l8 First quotation rrom Plewes, Knorr, and Russell Interv, 13 Apr 94; second and 

third quotations as given in Sheehan, "Many Cra sh Survivors," p. 16A. See also Light 

Interv, 2 1 Apr 94; Interv, Lt Col Iris J. West with S Sgt Michael T. Kelley and Mrs. Lisa 

Kell ey, 25 May 94. 
SUSTA INED RESPONSE III 

ended about one week after the accident, although counselors continued to be available for anyone who still needed to talk." 

Chaplains directly immersed in the response were debriefed with 

those immediately invo lved on Green Ramp. Mental health spec ialists 

and chaplains in a support role talked to each other about their experiences during debriefing sessions, which was itself a form of debriefing. 

Colonel Plewes found it difficult to erase the memories of the casualties screaming when he tried to administer intravenous fluids into their 

burned skin. Talking about it helped him to process the experi ence." 

Fort Bragg's mental hea lth professionals, chaplains, and social 

workers had come together to help the Army community deal with the 

Green Ramp disaster. At "businesslike meetings" they divided up the 

work load and shared resources. Formal critical incident stress debriefings became "cooperative and multidisciplinary" undertakings, providing opportuniti es for psychiatric, social, and spiritual hea ling. Margaret 

Tippy remembered Colonel Plewes saying: "Everybody worked together," handling the emotional needs of people involved in the acc ident. 

Tippy added: " It wasn't personality driven. It wasn't ego driven. It was 

mission oriented and mission focused and that was wonderful."JI 

Patiertt Cal-e 

The Green Ramp casualties who remained at Womack received 

medica l care commensurate with their injuri es, with most requiring 

physical therapy that usually commenced about twenty-four to thirtysix hours after injury. Col. Jack W. Briley, Womack 's physical therapy 

chief, therefore, had a day to organi ze his response. He reviewed his 

burn slides from his burn lectures and had an in-service seminar on 

burn care, as well as a review of procedures and precautions, bloodtype transmission, and other techniques. With forty to sixty patients 

requiring hydrotherapy, wound cleaning, and wound hea ling, the physical therapy chi ef increased his burn teams from two to four and then 

to five, making use of enlisted assistants; obtained debriding instruments, Silvadene, wrappings, gloves, gowns, goggles, and other supplies; and later expanded two occupational therapy stations to four, 

!9 Plewes, Knorr, and Russell Interv, 13 Apr 94, 

)(I Ibid, 

)1 First two quotations from Russell, "Psychological Response," p. 10; third and 

fOllrt h quotations from Tippy Intcrv, 14'Apr 94. 
112 D ISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

Making ajis' lIIilh a burll victim 's hand 

with occupationa l therapists and technicians on loan from the 28th 

Combat Support Hospital. Seeing inpatients in the morn ings and outpatients in the afternoons, the therapists remained busy for several 

weeks and the ir suppli es adequate. Colonel Bril ey, wondering whether 

a civilian medical facility could have handled the numbers he saw, 

re fl ected on his successful response: 

I think the experience of people being in the mi litary and the mi litary 

type of environment just tcaches LIS how to react to these type of situations. Everybody pulled together. Everybody learned and the experience 

validated that we could do it. Our 110rmal physical therapy load was very 

supportive of our dcm3nds. 32 

By early April the Fort Bragg soldier patients, having compl eted a 

series of skin grafts and surgeries, started to return to Womack. The 

Department of Physical Medicine and Rehabi litation at Womack provided fo llow-up care to the injured paratroopers on an outpatient basis, 

coordinating the results of their visits with Major Mozingo at the 

USAISR burn uni t or Dr. Peter Peterson at the Jaycee Burn Center. The 

rehabilitation staff made sure that the gra fts rema ined complicationfree, without infections at the graft site or the donor site. To mainta in 

j! Interv, Maj Christopher G. Clark with Col J<lck W. Bri ley, 14 Apr 94. 
SUSTAINED RESPONSE 

range-of-motion and functional 

use of wrists and hands, patients 

rece ived daily one-on-one therapy 

for one to two hours, but sometimes for only thi rty to sixty minutes because of staff shortages, 

and also periodic remeasuring and 

fitting of compression garments 

to control swe lling and fac ilitate 

the healing process. The department held an interdiscipli nary 

bu rn clinic on Friday mornings in 

the basement of the clin ical wing 

of the main hospital and consulted 

with surgery, orthopedi cs, occupational therapy, and other services 

on an indi vidual patient basis." 

Burned soldi ers, except those 

with small superfic ia l bu rns, Wrapping a bllmed balld 

"could expect to be on some type 

11 3 

of physica l profi le for a min imum of one year," said Colonel Jones, 

Womack's deputy commander at the time of the acc ident. Most 

received health profiles authorizing limited duty obligations on a oneto three-month basis. Those with severe sca rring and restricted motion 

might rece ive permanent duty limitations, depending on the results of 

the healing process." 

The Last Victim 

Unit cohesiveness had helped the Fort Bragg soldier patients to 

endure surgery, pain, and depression while undergoing treatment at the 

USA ISR burn unit in San Antonio. They cheered each other up, refusJJ Ibid.; Memo, Maj James R. Brown, Chief, Occupational Therapy, WAMC, to Oep 

Cdr for Clinical Services, WAMC, 4 May 94, sub: Pope Air Force Base Mass Casualty; 

Memo, Carolyn Ma Oo \c~ Chief, Physical Medicine and Rehabilitat ion, WAMC, to 

Oep Cdr for Clini cal Services, WAM C, 12 May 94, sub: Occupational Therapy Support 

of MASCAL Pat ients; Memo, Maj James R. Brown to Dep Cdr for Clinical Services, 

WAM C, 10 Jun 94, sub: PArS Mass Casualt y Patients. 

~ Memo, Col Stephen L. Jones, Oep Cdr for Clinical Services, WAMC, to Unit 

Cdrs, 9 Jun 94, sub: Medical Care for MASCA L Burn Patients. 
114 DISASTER ON GREEN RJu.."IP 

ing to let anyone succumb to self-pity. Their efforts probably were 

instrumenta l in keeping alive one particular burn victim. 

Spc. Marti n "Marty" R. Lumbert, Jr. , of the 2d Battalion, 504th 

Infantry, was sta nding next to a short cement wall, topped by a chain 

link fence, when the crash occurred. Unable to outrun the fireball as 

it ro lled through the stag ing area , he crouched down by the wa ll, 

instinctive ly assuming a fetal position and covering his face with his 

hands. Within minutes he was on fire, with his back, legs, and hands 

burned severely." 

Lumbert arrived in San Antonio on 30 March with the last group of 

Fort Bragg soldiers to leave Womack Army Medical Center. During the 

almost seven months he was at the USA ISR burn unit, he received 

twenty-eight graftings, each one taking four to six hours to complete. 

Because of the extent of his injuries on 88 percent of his body, his head 

was the on ly donor ski n site. Add itional suffering included amputations 

of both legs and all fingers; only part of his left thumb remained intact. 

Nevertheless, he learned to write and to feed himself, for his fellow soldier patients would not let him give up." 

Hope Ramirez, Lumbert's mother and a registered nurse, was dissatisfied with the cleanli ness of her son 's room and the medica l attention he 

received during the first few weeks. Concerned about infection, she complained to the USAISR staff about the cleanliness of his bed and its surroundings and the procedures used for treatment. Mrs. Ramirez liked the 

young doctor who treated her son, but was disappointed that he was not 

receiving one-on-one care from a more experienced burn specialist, considering his extensive injuries. She tried unsuccessfully to have him 

transferred to a private burn center in Ca lifornia, believing that he cou ld 

receive the special medica l attention warranted by his condition at a facility employing more modern techn iques and having more up-to-date and 

sanitary wards than at the institute. Colonel Pruitt, the USAISR commander, refused to transfer Lumbert on the basis that he would not be 

able to grant the same request to other soldiers at the burn un it." 

Ten percent of the burn victims' fami lies complained about the procedures or the environment at the USAISR burn unit. They may have 

}S Telephone Illtcrv, Mary Ell en Con ll with Hope Rami rez, 26 Oct 95 cre~ 

after cited as Ramirez Inlerv). Ram irez is the mother of Specialist Lumbert. 

l 6 Ibid.; Intcrv, Mary Ellen Condon-RaIl with Sgt Christopher J. Burson, Sgt Jacob 

1. Nacyacrt, Jr., and Spc Michael P. Fl etcher, 2 Aug 95. 

31 Ramirez Inlerv, 26 Oct 95. 
S USTAINED RESPONSE 

been angry and frustrated because 

their sons were so badly injured, 

and they coul d do li ttle to help 

them-other than to complai n- a 

way to handle stress, especially 

when a loved one is near death. 

Although 90 percent of the fam ilies seemed satisfied with the 

USA ISR response, the compl aints 

of Mrs. Ramirez and the other 

fami lies became a matter of record 

in the treatment of the Green 

Ramp casualties. 

The magn itude of th is task 

cannot be overlooked. Pruitt's staff 

had to ca re for forty-three Fort 

Bragg soldier patients with sec' Specialist Lilli/bert 

ond- and third-degree burns. The 

115 

majority suffered bu rn s on more tha n 15-45 percent of their bod ies, one 

on 70 percent, and Lumbert on 88 percent of his body. Several also had 

traumatic body injuries, such as amputated limbs. The USA ISR burn 

unit was understa ffed and overworked during most of the treatment period. Staff members generally be li eved that their burn care was successful and that their procedu res were consistent with accepted practice. As 

in 1110st tense situations, explanations- when time permitted- might 

have he lped to clarify perceptions on both sides." 

Despite her criticism of the USA ISR burn un it, I-lope Ramirez was 

thank ful to the Army fo r providing her with a place to live and fo r paying the first three months of rent until her husba nd, who had moved to 

San Anton io to be nea r his wife and stepson, fou nd employment. She 

was pl eased with the fam ily support system at Fort Sam Houston, even 

though she remai ned displeased with some of the USAISR procedures." 

The first Fort Bragg soldier pati ent was discharged from the 

USA ISR burn uni t on 4 Apri l. By late June all but Lumbert had leftthirty-four returni ng to duty, four transferring to rehabilitation facilities, and fo ur going on convalescent leave. The Brooke Army Medica l 

l 8 Casualty List, Palient Administration Division, BAMe, I Apr 94, sub: Status of 

Fort Bragg Burn Patient s. 

)9 Ramirez Intcrv, 26 Oct 95. 
116 DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

Center's emergency operations center closed down, and the Fort Sam 

Houston Family Assistance Center reverted to Army Community 

Services. In mid-July the USAISR plastic surgeons and occupational 

therapists visited Womack to evaluate the soldier patients and consult 

with specialists about reconstructive surgery. After this visit USAISR 

occupational and physical therapists continued to exchange information with their counterparts at Womack regarding the rehabilitation of 

the Fort Bragg paratroopers." 

Specialist Lumbert remained at the USAISR burn unit until 

October, when he was transferred to a private rehabilitation center in 

San Antonio. He died on 3 January 1995 at a Methodist hospital near 

Fort Sam Houston. Lumbert's death brought to twenty-four the number 

of soldiers fatally injured in the disaster on Green Ramp." 

.;0 Afte ~Actioll Report, U.S. Army Institute of Surgical Research, n.d., sub: 

Response to Pope AFB Accident, p. II . 

I Ramirez Intcrv, 26 Oct 95. 

Sergeant Kelley and his wife Lisa. One year later Kelley, the most 

severely bUrl/ed survivor oflhe Green Ramp disaslel; and his wife decided 10 fil ce Ihe future lVilhoul billem ess or regret, believing Ihal life slill 

had l1Iuch to o.ffer them. 
6 

One Year Later 

"Life goes on, but no one forgets the crash at Pope." 

- Kim Oriole 

The Green Ramp survivors found themselves on an emotional 

roller coaster over the twelve months since the accident. In attempting 

to reconcile their lives, they fa ced difficult periods o f mental and physical adjustment. A few marriages had not weathered the crisis, and 

those who thought they would return to a military career had to accept 

the fact that they would not. Some felt angry about what had happened 

to them, consumed by their emotions and their physical pain. And compounding their pain was the grie f they experienced when they thought 

about their friends who had perished.' 

Many of the victims, however, were stronger since the acc ident. 

They had discovered previously untapped inner reso urces. 

Determination and resilience abounded. Some who had been told they 

would never walk again now were on the ir feet and back at work. No 

longer able to be infantrymen, they assumed new military occupational specialties or new ca reers in the private sector. They established fresh 

prioriti es. Families and fri endships became more important. 

Paratrooper support of one another, which had always been good, 

reached a new high. The Green Ramp disaster had proved that the 

troops could count on one another in time of need' 

1 Katherine Mcintire Peters, "Surviving: Herc's I-low It's Done," Al'my Times, 27 Mar 

95, PI'. 10- 12. 

2 "Crash Survivors Carry On With Lives A fter Pope Tragedy/' Pamglide (Fort 

Bragg, N.C.), 23 Ma r 95, p. IA. 
120 DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

The Survivol'S 

In March 1995 the Green Ramp survivors could be seen around 

Fort Bragg in their battle dress uniforms, going to work. They wore specia l burn dressings, gloves, and other protective garments. Some awaited follow-up surgeries or attended occupational therapy sessions to get 

scarred joints and muscles moving aga in. Twenty-two were still in need 

of medical treatment.' 

Lt. Judson "Jay" P. Nelson, Jr., of the 2d Battalion, 504th Infantry, 

was one of those soldiers. With burns on his back, legs, and hands, he 

had undergone five skin grafts and ten other surgeries, enduring nearly unbearable pain. The key to his survival was his refusa l to quit. " I 

just grit my teeth and ... just try to gut it out," recalled Nelson, hoping each time to be able to "just hold on a little bit longer." At age 

twenty-four, Nelson had to lea rn again how to walk and how to feed 

himself. A year later he needed more surgery. "Scar tissue pull[ ed] his 

left thumb back to a strange angle." Cold weather brought on stabbing 

pains in his hands, and his back and legs itched. No longer able to be 

a foot soldier, Jay planned to enter law school in the fall and become 

an Army lawyer. Meanwhile, he volunteered to counsel burn victims 

in the Fayettevi lle area: 

Spc. Anthony "Tony" B. Davis of the 2d Battalion, 505th Infantry, 

had lost a left leg and shattered a kneecap as a result of the explosion. 

He considered himself luckier than the soldiers who were burned. 

"They're the ones who were really bad," he sa id. Some of the dead and 

severely burned troops had been sitting next to him on Green Ramp. 

Therapists at Walter Reed Army Medical Center taught him how to 

walk with a prosthesis. Four or five months passed before he could 

walk well. Nearly a year after the accident Davis, with his maroon beret 

cocked to one side, was observed jauntily striding across Fort Bragg 

with no probl em.' 

Like Davis, Pfc. Jason A. Savell of the 2d Battalion, 504th 

Infantry, who was burned on over 43 percent of his body, had lost a 

leg. But his spunk and determination never waned. Twelve months 

later Savell was active in sports-basketball, racketball, skydiving, 

j Ibid. 

~ First two quotations as given in Peters, "Surviving," p. 10; third quotation from 

Larry Bingham and Kim Oriole, "A Battle To Survive," Fayetteville Observer-Times, 

29 Jan 95, p. 7A. 

} As quoted in Bingham and Oriole, "Battle To Survive," p. 7A . 
O NE YEAR LATER 121 

and rappelling- and had earned his second Green Belt in Tae Kwon 

Do. He pl anned to attend Midwestern State University in Texas in the 

fa ll. The accident made him realize that he was not "invincible" and 

that " life [was] precious." He had been the last injured soldier to leave 

the hospital alive' 

Near the one-year anniversary of the crash Spc. Juan C. Fender 

of the 2d Battalion, 159th Aviation, who suffered burns on his back 

and hands, underwent surgery "to have tissue ex panders placed in his 

back, whi ch [would] hopefully stretch his skin enough to the point 

where the extra skin [would] be used to cosmetica lly repa ir his back." 

He continued to receive occupati ona l therapy to increase the strength 

and movement in his hands. Fender chose to leave the Army, retu rn 

to his native town of Lex ington, Kentucky, and become an occupational therapist. 7 

Sergeant Burson during his recovery had decided to pursue what he 

deemed would be a satisfying ca reer as an occupational therapist. His 

rehabilitation was steady but slow. He wa lked with great stiffness, and 

" his joints ' Iock[ed] up ' in cold weather." Burson continued with therapy at Womack several mornings a week to exercise and strengthen his 

burned legs and hands, trying to adjust "to his new body." This "new 

body," he j udged, would impede his ability to perform effectively as a 

unit leader. I f he could not do what his troops could do, he would not 

stay in the Army.' 

Because of their hospital experience, three 2d Batta lion, 504th 

Infantry, soldi ers were similarly inspired as Fender and Burson to enter 

the medical field after leaving the Army. Spc. John R. Fagan, who 

underwent a number of major operations during his six-month stay at 

the Naval Medical Center, Portsmouth, Virginia, was making plans to 

attend veterinary school; Pfc. Jimmie L. Mabin, a survivor of secondand third-degree burns on his body, especially his face and hands, 

hoped to study nursing; and Spc. Michael P. Fletcher, because of his 

newly found admiration and respect for the many medics who had 

6 As quoted in Kim Oriole, "Life Goes On," Fayeueville Observer-Times, 23 Mar 95, 

p. IA. 

7 "One Year Later Four Paratroopers Tell About Survival," Paraglide (Fort Bragg, 

N.C.), 23 Ma r 95, p. 6B. 

S As quoted in Peters, "Surviving," Army Times, 27 Mar 95, p. II. See also Inlerv, 

Mary Ell en Condon-Rail with Sgt Christopher 1. Burson, Sgt Jacob T. Naeyaert, Jr., and 

Spc Michae l P. Fletcher, 2 Aug 95 (hereaOer cited as Burson, Naeyaert, and Fletcher 

InlcTv). 
122 DISASTER ON GIU EN RAI\'IP 

Specialist Fagall Private lV/obil1 

helped him to cope, wanted to be a medical professional but was still 

undecided as to whi ch fie ld ' 

"The one thi ng that truly amazed me was that as damaged as all 

these soldiers were, they recuperated well and bounced back," sa id Lisa 

Kelley. " I think that has to do with their mindset and the training 

they've rece ived." One year after the accident Lisa's husband, Sergeant 

Kelley, the most severely burned survivor, whom doctors had classified 

as "wheelchair-bound," was on his feet and wal king. He was receiving 

physica l therapy at Womack to improve movement in his legs and was 

preparing for the future. No longer able to have a career in the Army, 

Kelley planned to return to coll ege and become a history teacher." 

Twel ve months after the tragedy the Green Ramp surv ivors were 

copi ng with their mental and physica l scars. Although it was difficult to 

put the crash behind them, they found that they thought about it less 

and less as time passed. They became more philosophica l, be lieving 

they had been given a second chance to do something else with their 

lives. Some casualties retired from the military; some returned to 

9 "One Year Later," p. 68; Burson, NaeYilcrt, and Fletcher Interv, 2 Aug 95. Fletcher 

was promoted in September 1994. 

10 As quoted in Jeanine M. Dubnicka, "Soldier Dcreals Death," Paraglide (Fort 

Bragg, N.C.), 23 Ma r 95, pp. 1 B- 2B. 
ONE YEAR LATER 123 

Speciaiisl Flelcller (leJi) ",illl iJis]i'ielld Cpl. Overloll R. Hall III 

school. Most of the injured, however, stayed in the Army and the 82d 

Airborne Division.

11 

Effect on Planning 

All organizations affected by the Green Ramp tragedy tried to learn 

from the incident. " A review of current mass casualty (MASCAL) 

reception pl ans at Fort Bragg and Fort Sam Houston show that 

improvements were made as a direct result of the Pope Ai r Force Base 

II "Crash Survivors Carry On," p. I A. 

12 The Air Force conductcd its own investigation into the causes of thc Pope Air 

Force Base crash. The study identified "multiple causes for the midair coll ision," faulting air traffic control for the "majority of errors." Although the pilot was partly to blame 

because he did not "see and avoid and stay well clear of the mishap C- 130," as required 

by Air Force regulations, there were extelllltlling circumstances. The pilot testified that 

he did Ilot see the C- 130; however, after the control tower had made him aware of its 

presence, hc began executing a low approach, when the collision occurred. Two Air 

Force ofi'icers involved in the cra sh were relieved of duty and transferred to olher jobs. 

Three en listed men also wcre disciplined. See Rpt, Col (USAF) Vincent J. Santillo, Jr., 

n.d., sub: Aircraft Accident Investigation. 
124 DISASTER ON GREEN R Aj'vlP 

accident. Womack's emergency preparedness plan calls for the establishment of a news media site at Fort Bragg's officers club, a crisis 

intervention/de-stress and discharge area in the Department of 

Psychiatry and Neurology, and new critical care pre- and postoperative 

stations in to-be-determined hospita l space, as wel l as for assistance 

from other installation medical units. Womack and Cape Fear medica l 

authorities, responding to one of many recommendations, had a dedicated line between their respective emergency rooms installed. During 

the October 1995 sniper incident, in which eighteen soldiers were 

injured, three fatally, Womack and Cape Fear medics used the dedicated line to coordinate their emergency response. " 

Recommendations from Womack's public affairs officer, Margaret 

Tippy, made shortly after the Pope Ai r Force Base crash, were also 

implemented. Public affa irs "players" from other Fort Bragg public 

affa irs offices participated in a MASCAL exercise during the summer 

of 1995- to learn how to handl e the news media better. In addition, 

military and civilian public affairs officers in the Fayetteville area created a communications network, using e-mail and fixed and mobi le 

telephones and holding periodic meetings. Improvements in public 

affa irs activities proved hi ghly effective during both the 1995 MASCAL exercise and the sniper incident, reported Tippy." 

As a direct result of the disaster on Green Ramp, Fort Bragg produced a response plan for handling mass casualties, which the garrison 

used during the MASCAL exercise and the sniper incident. The ga rrison set aside a room for a family assistance center at Gav in Hall, the 

headquarters of the 82d Airborne Division. Also, the plan calls for the 

establishment of an insta llation operati ons center as the chief command-and-control center, with ultimate responsibility for information 

flow. The XVIII Airborne Corps emergency operations center wou ld 

continue to be involved in any crisis. IS 

After the mass casualty Fort Sam Houston 's and Brooke Army 

Medical Center's plans, training, mobili zation, and security staffs met 

lJ Womack Army Medical Center, Contingency Operations Planning and Execlition 

System (COPES), vol. 3, Emergency Preparedness Plan (Fori Bragg, N.C., 1996), pp. 

C-I-I to C- I-3. 

t4 Te lephone Interv, Mary Ellen Condon-Ra1l with Margaret Tippy, 27 Nov 95. 

IS Telephone Intervs, Mary Ellen Condon-Ra il with Col Stephen L. Jones, 27 Nov 

95, and with Joseph Hibst, 29 Nov 95. Colonel Jones was rormerly Womack 's deputy 

commander for clinical services. 1-1 ibst was Fort Bragg's deputy director of plans, training, mobiliza tion, and security. 
ONE YEAlt LATER 125 

several times to review the San Antonio area casualty reception plan 

and Brooke's emergency preparedness plan. At these meetings the 

issues and concerns identified in various after-acti on reports were discussed so that the garrison and hospital could fi ne-tune the ir standard 

operating procedures and increase their abilities to manage future disasters. Subsequently, the San Antonio Joint Medical Readiness 

Committee utili zed lessons learned from the Pope Air Force Base crash 

during the national disaster medical system exercises held in September 

of 1994 and 1995. The committee also incorporated the lessons learned 

in a revised casualty reception plan." 

Genera l Stee le's 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg was already 

fine-tu ning its procedures. Because of the Green Ramp disaster, the 

di vision strongly supported the development of its own crisis action 

plan. The plan would provide for periodic crisis action exercises and 

the formation of a crisis action team, composed of chaplains, judge 

advocates, public affairs officers, medical personnel, and administrati ve specialists, as well as nongovernmental representatives from, for 

example, the Red Cross or Army Community Services on an on-ca ll 

basis. In addition, the plan would formali ze sta ndards for memori al 

serv ices; buria l parties, to include unit representation; wi lls and beneficiaries; panographic denta l records; and insurance coverage. The 

di vision commander and his cri sis action team would train both casualty and survivor assistance officers to be ready to execute their duti es 

during a crisis. These officers must be prepared to answer three key 

questions asked by nearly all casua lties: How are my friends, comrades, buddi es, and so forth? Is anyone looking out for my fam ily? 

How do I commu ni cate with God? " 

One year after the disaster on Green Ramp the surv ivors were getting on with the ir lives. Their memories sti ll stirred strong emotions, 

though the weight of the tragedy and the fee ling of shock had lessened. 

I~ Telephone Interv, Mary Ellen Co do ll Ra ll with Lt Col Gerald Nolan, 28 Nov 95. 

Nolan, Brooke's inspector general, was formerly the Plans, Training, Mobilization, and 

Security Division chief. 

HTeicphonc Inter\" Brig GCIl John W. Mountcastle with Maj Gen William M. Sleele, 

10 Jan 96. In February 1996 the defense authorization bi ll provided for increased coverage of the servicemen's group li fe insurance to the maximum of $200,000. Soldiers 

would have to request less coverage in wri ting. See Bernard Adelsberger, "Coverage 

With SGLI Is Hiked," ArlllY Tillles, [2 Feb 96. 
126 DISASTER ON GREEN A~ P 

Keeping alive the lIIelllOl J' wilh a display allhe 2/505/h's headquarters 

(Iud a wreatlt 0 11 Green Ramp 

General Shelton, the XYlll Airborne Corps commander, and Maj . Gen. 

George Crocker, General Steele's successor, jointly decided not to hold 

a memorial serv ice each year on 23 March. Although the corps, division, and garrison wou ld never forget the tragedy, Shelton and Crocker 

believed that the best way to honor both victims and survivors was to 

incorporate the lessons learned from the disaster and the Army's 

response to it into standard operating procedures and find ways to 

reduce risks as the All Ameri cans train for and execute their demanding, often perilous missions. IS 

II Telephone [Illerv, Brig Gen John W. Mountcastle with Maj. Gen. George Crocker, 

5 Sep 95. 
Conclusion 

Implications for Future Crises 

"The issues and concerns identified represent opportuniti es to fine tune our SOPs and increase our abi liti es 

to manage future real world disasters/accidents." . 

- Lt. Col. Gerald Nolall 

The Army's response to the disaster on Green Ramp at Pope Air 

Force Base underscored the importance of not only readiness, resulting 

from training, planning, and experience, but also unit cohesiveness and 

teamwork, the outgrowths ofleadership. Found more readily in the military community than in the private sector, these factors were the keys 

that turned an essentially tragic story into a victorious one. 

The bravery of the heroes of Green Ramp emanated from an inner 

strength that was fortified by unit cohesiveness and regu lar training. Unit 

cohesiveness, which moves soldiers to fight for each other, rather than for 

money, the flag, or abstract idea ls, propelled the paratroopers on Green 

Ramp to sacrifice life or limb to save their comrades. They applied the 

principles of regular training-especially in the areas of tactics, lifesaving, and medical evacuation- in responding to the mass casualty. They 

performed the way they were trained to perform in combat. 

Leadership was evident throughout the response. Officers and noncommissioned officers, commanders, and command sergeants major, 

supported by their spouses, became persona lly involved in the welfare 

of the 130 Green Ramp casualties and their families, as well as those 

who were not injured but affected by the crash. By taking charge of the 

response, unit leaders decisively influenced the process. 

Be ing ready for the unexpected was part of Army life. Contingency 

planning, mass casualty exercises, and the experience ga ined in 
128 DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somal ia, and Honduras enabled Womack 

Army Medical Center at Fort Bragg to respond effectively to the disaster. It was fortuitous that the timing of the accident, occurring at a 

change in hospital shifts, provided double staffing. Hospita l personnel 

triaged the Green Ramp casualties, gave them li fe-suppo rting treatment, and sent them on to the next level of care withi n two hours. 

Medical evacuation crews subsequently transferred thirteen of the burn 

victims to regional hospitals. Although better labeling and access to 

crucial supplies wou ld have speeded up emergency room care and the 

presence of cellular phones would have improved commun ications, 

Fort Bragg's medical professionals were essentially prepared to handle 

the crisis. Genera l Peake's One AMEDD Team- Womack and field 

personnel who had trai ned together- made it possible fo r the garrison 

to apply vast medica l resources. 

Fort Bragg's immediate establishment of command and control 

fac il itated timely information flow, casualty accountability, and casualty and family assistance. The presence of XVIII Airborne Corps and 

82d Airborne Division personnel at Womack's emergency operations 

center avo ided duplication in tracking casualties. Confusion and parallel efforts in other instances, however, were inevitable because Fort 

Bragg's organizations- unli ke, for example, Fort Sam Houston's burn 

center- were structured and their personnel trained to respond to multiple contingencies, rather than to specific situations, in peacetime and 

in war. A generic response plan, with clearly defined responsibilities 

for the garrison's emergency operations centers and casualty assistance 

hubs, might have helped a garrison that was crisis instead of mass casualty oriented. But Fort Bragg's agencies threw so many resources into 

the operation that their efforts, although perhaps less smooth than Fort 

Sam Houston's response, were ultimately successful. 

The family support center at Womack was operating within one hour 

of the crash. The center, augmented by volunteer workers, arranged for 

food, housing, transportation, and counseling of the victims' fam ily 

members and fri ends. Fort Bragg's various public affairs officers established a cooperative relationship with the press to provide, as one voice, 

accurate and timely information about the tragedy and, at the same time, 

to protect the privacy of the Fort Bragg soldier patients and their families. 

The ovelwhelming community response to the Green Ramp disaster 

strengthened the ties between Fort Bragg and Fayetteville, magnify ing a 

powerful resource that the military might utilize in future emergencies. 
I MPLICATIONS FOR F UTURE CruSES 129 

Tra ining, experience, and pla nnin g undergirded the important 

response of the U.S. Army Institute of Surgica l Research, Brooke 

Army Medica l Center, and Fo rt Sam Houston, all of whi ch were mass 

casua lty oriented. The aeromedica l evacuation of the forty-th ree burn 

victims from Fort Bragg and Chapel Hill to San Antonio went 

smoothly under the watchful care of the expertly trained USA ISR 

burn teams. Intensive training and teamwork enabled the USA ISR 

staff to successfully manage the Fort Bragg soldier patients. Two 

months a fter the accident only one paratrooper remained critica l, 

whil e the ot hers were either in satisfactory cond ition or convalescing 

at home. 

The visits of hi gh-ranking dignitaries boosted the morale of the 

Fort Bragg soldier patients, but the interruption of patient care and the 

increased risk of infection due to multiple visitors must be addressed in 

future mass casualty planning. The presence and assistance of the 82d 

Airborne Division liaison team, under the leadership of Captain 

Scudder, improved the morale of not only the injured paratroopers but 

also their families, thus greatly easing the burden of the USA ISR staff. 

Further, a better mechanism to relieve the staff of the added responsibility of obtaining temporary personnel would have he lped. 

The Army's commitment to fund and maintai n the USAISR burn 

unit must be credited with lessening the fata lity rate of the Pope Air 

Force Base crash. More importantly, the burn unit continues to provide 

the expert assistance needed in future contingencies for dea ling with 

large numbers of severely burned casualties. 

Brooke's emergency preparedness plan empowered its medica l, 

chaplain, family support, and public affa irs staffs to respond quickly 

and forcefu lly to the crisis, and Fort Sam Houston's strategy for managing large numbers of casualties guided its agencies, working out of 

the Fort Sam Houston Family Assistance Center, to provide essential 

services and to interact with the local community to meet the needs of 

the burn victims and their families. By supporting and advising everyone involved in the accident, chaplains contributed to emotiona l and 

spiritual healing. The public affairs officers' teamwork and cooperative 

relationship with the press protected the privacy of the Fort Bragg soldier patients and their families while affording opportunities for coverage. Despite the absence of compatibl e radio systems, information 

fl owed more smoothly from Fort Sam Houston's one emergency operations center than from Fort Bragg's multiple centers. 
130 DISASTER ON GREEN H..AMP 

All to ld, the response to the Pope Air Force Base accident proved 

immensely successful, demonstrating the effectiveness of the USA ISR's 

burn management and Brooke's emergency preparedness planning executed in conjunction with Fort Sam Houston's mass casualty strategy. 

More than a year after the disaster on Green Ramp, the Army ca n 

look with pride on its compassionate, thoroughly professional, and ultimately triumphant response to the worst mass casualty situation in the 

history of Fort Bragg and Fort Sam Houston. Everyone pull ed together 

and did their best, as people tend to do in a crisis invo lving mass casualties. The tragedy truly became a triumph of the spirit. But it also confirmed the importance of unit cohesiveness, training, experience, planning, and leadership. Those attributes kicked in and paid off, when 

most needed. The Army continues to criti ca lly examine the issues and 

concern s that have surfaced in the aftermath of the Pope Air Force Base 

accident, with the goa l of fin e-tuning procedures and improving skills 

to meet future challenges. 
Appendix 

The Deceased Paratroopers 

"To our fa llen comrades, we salute you and vow to 

ca rryon in the spirit of your memory." 

- Lt. Col. Lloyd Allstill 

Sgt. Alexander P. Bolz, from Karlsruhe, Germany, was born on 2 1 

October 1970. He entered the Army on 5 September J 989. In March 

1994, shortly before the accident, he was assigned to the 2d Batta lion, 

504th Infantry, where he served as a rifle team leader. He is survived by 

his parents. 

Pfe. Tommy J. Caldwell, from Senath, Missouri, was born on 20 

March 1972. He entered the Army on 2 September 1993. He was a 

member of 2d Battalion, 504th In fa ntry. On the day of the disaster he 

was to make his first jump with the 82d Airborne Division. He is survived by his wife and two children. 

S. Sgt. Da niel Cama rgo, from Colorado Springs, Colorado, was born 

on 6 April 1962. He entered the Army on 16 April 1984. A Gulf War 

veteran, he was a member of the 2d Battalion, 504th Infantry, where he 

served as a company supply sergeant. He is survived by his wife and 

five children. 

Spe. Bee Jay Cearley, from Bacli ff, Texas, was born on 2 May 1966. 

He entered the Army on 23 May 1990. A Gulf War veteran, he was a 

member of the 2d Battalion, 504th In fa ntry. He is survived by his wife 

and two children. 

Spe. Sean M. Dixon, from Montrose, Colorado, was born on 7 August 

1973. He entered the Army on 26 August 199 1. As a paratrooper 

assigned to the 2d Battalion, 504th Infa ntry, he had fo llowed in the 
132 DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

footsteps of his older brother, an airborne soldier stationed in Italy. He 

is survi ved by his mother and brother. 

Capt. Christopher D. Dunaway, from Mena, Arkansas, was born on 

I I April 1967. He received a bachelor's degree in communi cati ons 

from Ouachi ta Baptist University in 1989. He entered the Army on 16 

July 1989. A Gulf War veteran, he was a member of the 2d Baltalion, 

504th Infantry, where he served as the S- I (personnel officer) and 

adjutant. He is survived by his wife. 

S. Sgt. Cha rles W. Elliott, from Hempstead, New York, was born on 9 

September 1966. He entered the Army on 30 September 1987. He was 

a member of the 2d Battal ion, 504th Infantry. He is survived by his wife 

and two children. 

Pfc. Paul B. Finnegan, from Bozeman, Montana, was born on 10 

February 1974. He entered the Army on 6 July 1992. He was a member 

of the 2d Battlion, 504th Infantry. He was planning to attend Montana 

State University fo ll owing completion of his military service in August 

1995. He is survived by his parents. 

Pvt. Mark E. Fritsch, from Honesda le, Pennsylvania, was born on 13 

February 1975. He entered the Army on 10 August 1993. He was a 

member of the 2d Batta lion, 504th Infantry. He is surv ived by his parents and two siblings. 

Sgt. Gustavo E. Gallardo, from San Diego, Californi a, was born on 7 

November 197 1. He entered the Army on 18 July 1990. He was a member of the 2d Battal ion, 504th In fantry, where he served as a squad 

leader. He is survived by his mother and sister. 

Sgt. Mark G. Gibson, from Eagle River, Alaska, was born on 14 

December 1964. I-I e entered the Army on 2 May 1984, completing his 

first tour with an airborne unit at Fort Richardson, Alaska. I-I e rejoined 

the Army 0 11 3 February 1993, at which time he became a squad leader 

in the 2d Batta lion, 505th Infantry. He is survived by his wife and child. 

Capt. Kenneth J. Golla, from Champaign, Illinois, was born on II 

January 1965. He received a bachelor's degree in business economics 

from the Universily of Illinois. He entered the Army on 9 March 1989. 

He was a member of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st 

Brigade. He is survived by his wife and chi ld. 
nlE D ECEASED PARATROOPERS 133 

Pvt. Phillip J. Ha .. vey, from Lorain, Ohio, was born on 20 February 

1974. He entered the Army on 24 August 1993. He was a member of 

the 2d Battalion, 504th Infantry. He is survived by his parents. 

S. Sgt. James C. Howa .. d, from San Antonio, Texas, was born on 18 

April 1966. He entered the Army on 6 May 1986. I-Ie was a member of 

the 2d Battalion, 504th In fantry. He had nearly completed the requirements fo r his associate's degree when he was killed. He is survived by 

his wife and two children. 

Pfc. Andrew J. Jones, from Vallejo, Ca lifornia, was born on 15 

August 1974. He entered the Army on 19 November 1992. He was a 

member of the 2d Battalion, 504th In fa ntry. He is survived by his wife 

and child. 

Spc. Ma .. tin "Ma .. ty" R. Lumbe .. t, J ... , from San Antonio, Texas, was 

born on 29 September 1972. He entered the Army on 6 June 1991. He 

was a member of the 2d Battalion, 504th In fantry, where he served in 

the Headquarters and Headquarters Company. He was the last soldi er 

to succumb from wounds received in the acc ident. He is surv ived by his 

mother. 

S. Sgt. Alan D. MilicI', from Stockbridge, Georgia, was born on 9 

March 1964. He entered the Army on 22 July 1987. He received his 

associate's degree from the Uni versity of Maryland. He was a member 

of the 2d Battal ion, 504th In fa ntry. He is survived by his parents. 

Sgt. Ha .... y L. Momoa, J ... , from Waianae, Hawa ii, was born 28 

November 1967. He entered the Army on 3 September 1987. A Gu lf 

War vetera n, he was a member of the 2d Batta lion, 505th In fantry. He 

is survived by his wife and three children. 

Sgt. G .. ego .. y D. Nunes, from Centerburg, Ohi o, was born on 22 

January 197 1. He entered the Army on 8 August 1989. He was a member o f the 2d Battali on, 504th Infantry. He is survived by his parents. 

S. Sgt. Daniel E. Price, from Albany, Georg ia, was born on II August 

1968. He entered the Army on 30 July 1986. A Gul f War veteran, he 

was a member of the 2d Battal ion, 505th In fa ntry. He is survived by 

his wife. 
134 DISASTER ON GREEN RAM P 

Sgt. Waddington " Doc" Sanchez, from Paterson, New Jersey, was 

born on 14 August 1955. He entered the Army on 8 November 1983. 

He was a member of the 2d Battalion, 505th In fa ntry, where he served 

as a medic. He is survived by his wife and five children. 

Sgt. Vincent S. Strayhorn, from Pollocksville, North Carol ina, was 

born on 6 February 1966. He entered the Army on 30 October 1986. A 

Panama and Gul f War veteran, he was a member of the 2d Battalion, 

504th In fa ntry. On the day of the disaster he was to make his fina ljump 

with the 82d Airborne Division prior to be ing reassigned to Hawa ii . He 

is survived by his wi fe . 

Sgt. James M. Walters, Jr., from National City, Cali forn ia, was born 

on 30 November 1968. He entered the Army on 9 May 1988. A Gulf 

War veteran, he was a member of the 2d Battalion, 5041h In fa ntry, 

where he served as a chemi cal warfare trainer. He is surv ived by his 

mother. 

Pfc. Matthew J. Zegan, from Toms River, New Jersey, was born on 8 

December 1972. He entered the Army on I April 1993. He was a member of the 2d Battalion, 504th In fa ntry. He is survived by his wife. 
Bibliographical Note 

DisaSler on Creen Ralllp: The A rilly ,. Response is based largely on 

oral histories and primary documents obtained by the Army history 

team and myse l f during research trips to Fort Bragg and Fort Sam 

Houston in 1994 and 1995. I also conducted several more interviews, 

in person and by telephone, with parti cipants in the Army's response. 

The emergency preparedness plans of Womack and Brooke Army 

Medical Centers and the San Antoni o area casualty recepti on plan 

he lped me to understand mass casua lty strategy. The 82d Airborne 

Di vision 's casualty status reports and misce ll aneous casua lty information documents were inva luable in providi ng statistics on the medical 

status, extent of burns and injuries, and dates of hospital admissions 

and departures for each casualty. The sequence of events in the 

response, includi ng the decision-making process, and recommendations for future crises were best glea ned from the division's redline 

messages, its crisis action committee minutes, and G- I historical log, 

as well as from the after-action reports and briefing slides of participating organi zations. The most noteworthy after-action reports came 

from the XV III Airborne Corps, Womack Army Med ica l Center, 57th 

Medical Company (Air Ambul ance), Fort Bragg garrison, 23d Medi ca l 

Squadron, Brooke Army Med ical Center, and U.S. Army Institute of 

Surgica l Research. Capt. James B. Ri ch's essay, entitled "Memories," 

and Capt. Gerald K. Bebber's memorandum, together with the numerous oral histories and printed articles, provided vivid accounts of personal actions on Green Ramp and of individual experiences during 

treatment and recovery. 

Printed articles also contributed ri ch stories of the Army's response 

at Fort Bragg and Fort Sam Houston. The most frequently cited newspapers were Arllly Tilll es, Char/aile Observer, Fayelleville ObserverTilll es, ForI Salll Houslon NelliS Leader, KOrtls Monlhly, NelliS & 

Observer (Ra leigh, N.C.), Pair/glide (Fort Bragg, N.C.), Philadelphia 

fn quirer, San Anlonio Express-NelVs, and Tiger Tillles (Pope Air Force 

Base, N.C.). I also used Soldiers magazine. 
136 D ISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

The ora l histories are part of the coll ection of the U.S. Army Center 

of Military History, and the copi es of the primary documents and newspaper and magazine articles are also housed here at the Center. 

Footnotes, therefore, do not include any repository. Each source is cited 

in full at fi rst mention in each chapter, and subsequent references in the 

same chapter are shortened. 
Index 

Abizaid, Col. John P. , 49, 8 1 

Abizaid, Kalhy, 54, 55, 8 1 

Air evacuation, 33, 4 1-43 

Aircrafi 

C- 9, 43 , 73, 94 

C- 20,8 1 

C- 130,6, 12311 

C- 141 , 4, 6, 8, 18,5911 

F- 16, 6, 9, I I, 18, 19- 20,5911 

Allen, Col. Ga ry W, DC, 43-44 

Altfa ther, LI. Kenneth, 15, 100, 102 

American Red Cross, 50, 53, 56, 79, 90, 

91 ,92, 125 

Anderson, Maj. Gen. Edga r, Jr., Me, 67, 

68 

Apkarian, Wilson, 89, 90 

Armed Forces Institute of Pathology 

(A FIP), 43 

Army, Fifth U.S., 68, 95 

Army Comlllunity Services, 53, 90, 92, 

116, 125 

Army COllllllunity Services office, Fort 

Sam Houston, 88- 89 

Army Emergency Relief, 50, 53, 90 

Army Family Action Plan, 54 

Austin, Charl ene, 54 

Alistin , Lt. Col. Lloyd, 5 1, 104, 107, 

13 t 

Barilla, Maj. David 1., Me, 72 

Battalions 

1st Battalion, 58th Avia tion, 2 1 

151 Battalion, 5041h Infantry, 5 

2d Battalion, 1591h Aviation, 12 1 

2d Batta lion, 5041h Infantry,S, 10, II , 

2 1,5 1, 55,86, 100, 104, 114, 120, 

12 1, 131, 132,133, 134 

casualties, 106 

effect on readiness, 106- 07 

mass casualty dri ll, 22, 58 

stress debriefings, 109 

Battalions- Continued 

2d Battalion, 505th Infantry, 5, 10, II, 

13, 35, 48, 5 1, 78, 120, 132, 133, 134 

4th Battalion, 504th Infantry, 109 

32d Medica l Battalion (Logistica l) 

(Forwa rd),28 

56th Medical Battalion (EV<lCualion), 

19 

26 1 sl Med ical Battalion (Area 

Slipport), 42-43, 108 

5 19th Mi litary Intell igence Battalion, 15 

782d Support Batta lion (Main), 3 

Bebber, Capt. Gera ld K., 58 

describes fireball, 7- 8 

response to acc ident, 12- 13 

Berets, 86- 87 

Bolz, Sgt. Alexander P., 13 1 

Brigades 

I sl Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, 48, 

49, 85 

3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, II, 

48,49, 85, 107 

16th Military Police Brigade 

(Airborne), 52- 53, 62 

44th Medical Brigade, 16, 19, 28, 30, 

35, 40,41, 108 

5251h Military Intelligence Brigade, 3, 

5,7, 13, 15,20, 48 

Briley, Col. Jack w., III, 11 2 

Brooke Army Medical Center, Fort Sam 

Houston, Texas, 28, 49, 64, 67, 68, 

7 1,72,95 

emergency operations center (EOC), 

84, 94, 115- 16, 129 

publi c affairs oITice, 92, 93 

Burial services. See Funerals and memorial services. 

Burn unit, Army or USAISR. See U.S. 

Army Institute of Surgical Research 

(USA ISR), Fort Sam Houston, Texas. 

Burson, Sgt. Christopher "Chris" J. , 78, 

82, 121 
138 

Caldwell, pre. TOlllmy 1., 13 1 

Camargo, S. Sgl. Dani el, 13 1 

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, 37 

Canavan, Brig. Gen. Michael, 87 

Cape Fea r Valley Medi ca l Center, 

Fayetteville, North Ca ro li na, 28, 36, 

37,42,101 , 102, 124 

Ca rlton, Bri g. Gen. Paul K., Me, 67- 68, 

70 

Casualties 

burn management of, 37- 39, 69- 77 

continued mcdical trcatrnent, 120 

dead at scene, 20 

demographics of, 104 

discharge and recovery, 115 

emergency care, 26- 33, 69- 70 

evacuation of, 19- 20, 26, 33, 4 1-43, 

129 

extent of burn injuries, 74, 11 5 

identificat ion of. 43--44 

inpatient care, 33- 37, 111- 13 

list o f deceased p,u atroopcrs, 13 1- 34 

memorial se rvice for deceasc(l 103- 04 

number treated initially, 33 

\olal deceased, 116 

tota l dead and injured, 36- 37, 127 

treated on scene, 10- 17 

triage area, 27 

Casualty assistancc centers, 56 

Casualty assistance officers, 49- 50, 57, 

125 

Casua lty notificat ion teams, 49 

Cearley, Spc. Bce Jay, 13 1 

Chaplains, 90, 92, 96, 108, 110. See also 

Bebber, Capt. Ge rald K.; Curd, Maj. 

Michael T.; Dodd, Col. Pau l W. ; 

Gibbs, Capl. Jonatl1.111 C. III; Jones, 

Maj. Keith I.; Owcns, Lt. Ronald L.; 

Towne, Maj . Larry E., USAF. 

contributions of, 129 

dea ling with stress, 59 

debrie fed on experiences, II I 

family support groups, 39 

initial response to accident, 57- 59 

Chapman, Maj. William H. 1-1 . II I, MC, 

32 

asscssmcnt o f initial casualty management, 37 

coord inated opera ting rooms, 34 

Cisneros, Lt. Gen. Ma rc A., 68, 82, 89 

Civilian ambulance assistance, 19 

DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP 

Cla rk, Maj . Je ffrey B., MC, 8 1, 11 0 

Claypool , Brig. Gen. Robert G., MC, 67, 

68, 84,9 1 

Clinton, Bi ll, 99- 100 

Code Ycllow, 25, 34, 41. See also Mass 

casualty (MASCAL) response. 

Cotnbat lifesaving course, 10, 2 1- 22,44 

Command and General Siaff College 

(CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 

54, 55 

Community support, 62- 63, 9 1. See also 

Vo lun teers. 

Company, 57th Medica l (Air 

Ambulance), 19, 38, 4 1, 135 

Conner, Lt. Col. Sherry, 99, 110 

Cont ingency planning, 17, 19, 127. See 

also Mass casualty (MASCAL) 

response. 

mass casua lty rehearsa ls, 42, 74, 124 

value of, 22, 58 

Corcy, Maj. C. Craig, MC, 25, 29, 3 1, 

32, 4 1 

Corps, XVI II Airborne, 3, 30, 40, 79, 92, 

100, 126, 128 

casually assistance personnel, 50 

emergency operations center (EOC), 

47-48,53, 124 

need for generic response plan, 53 

pat ient tracking, 52 

public affa irs office, 59- 60, 61 , 62, 92 

Cowper, Sgt. Gregory, 10- 11 

Crocker, Maj. Gen. Georgc, 126 

Cuddy, Brig. Gen. John 1. , MC, 67 

Cuffee, Command Sgt. Maj . Stevenson, 

107 

Cumberland Count y Eme rgency 

Operations Centcr, 17 

Curd, Kath leen, 89, 90, 93 

Curd, Maj . Michael T., 93- 94, 95 

Dalton, Rita, 89 

Davis, Spc. Anthony "Tony" 8., 120 

Dental Act ivity (DENTAC), Womack 

Army Medical Center, 43- 44 

D ESERT SHIELD/ D ESERT SrORf..I, 60, 63, 

73, 88 

DCl<l chments 

22d Public A !fa irs Delachment 

(Mobile), 60 

82d Replacement Detachmcnt, 107 
INDEX 

Detachments- Continued 

5281h Medica l Detachment (Combat 

Slress), 40, 108 

Distinguished visitors, 80- 8 1, 99, 101 

effect on morale, 82- 83 

need to coordinate visits, 82 

potential problems of, 129 

Divisions 

82e! Airborne Division, 3, 11 ,32, 40,56, 

92, 95, 102, 106, 123, 124, 128, 13 1. 

See also Steele, Maj. Gen. William M. 

burial services. 104, 106 

casualt y assistance, 50 

casualty identification, 48 

crisis action committee, 50- 5 \ 

Division Support COJl1man(~ 48 

emergency operations centers 

(EOC), 47-48, 52, 53, 56, 108 

esprit de corps, 22 

family support, 49 

liaison team, 49, 84-88, 92, 96, 129 

medical volunteers, 30 

memorial service, 103- 04 

menial health sect ion, 108 

public affairs office, 60, 62, 92, 102 

slipports own cri sis action pian, 125 

10 I sl Airborne Division (Air Assault), 

108 

Dixon, Spc. Se;m M. , 13 1- 32 

DNA coll ection records, 4411 

Dod(~ Col. raul w., 93 

Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, 43 

Dowless, Capt. Chris, 17 

Downing, General Wayne A., 104 

Duke Unive rsity Medical Cent er, 

Durham, North Carolina, 28, 34 

Dunaway, Capt. Christopher D., 132 

Eggebroten, Col. Wi ll iam E., MC, 30, 

32,34,60 

coordinates initial medical assista nce, 

28- 29 

coordinates with local hospitals, 42 

establishes treatment team, 29 

organizes physicians for patient care, 

33 

patient identificat ion, 48 

Ell iott, S. Sgt. Charl es w., 132 

Emergency Casualty Assistance Center, 

Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 56-57 

139 

Emergency operatiolls centers (EOC), 

32.57.58,60,85 

assessment of multipl e EOCs, 53, 129 

Brooke Army Med ical Center, 84, 94, 

115- 16,129 

casualty assista nce, 50 

dup licat ion ofelTort, 52- 53, 84, 128 

XV II I Airborne Corps. 47-48, 53, 124 

82d Airborne Division, 47-48, 52, 53, 

56, 108 

Fort Bragg, 47- 48, 53, 108, 128, 129 

Fort Sam J-I ouston, 84, 94, 115- 16, 129 

Pope Air Force Base, 47 

transfer of casualti es, 4 1 

Wornack Army Medical Center, 28, 47, 

56,60, 99, 108, 128 

Evetts, James "Jim" R., 85, 89, 90 

Fagan, Spc. John R., 12 1 

Family assistance, 59, 124 

provided by 82d Airborne Division liaison leam, 84- 88 

provided at Fort Bragg, 53- 57 

provided at Fort Sam Houston, 88- 92 

Family Assistance Cente r. See Fort 

Sall1 Houston, Texas. 

Family issues, 108. See a/so Family 

assistance; Fami ly support groups. 

coullsel ing, 110- 11 

USA ISR raeilities, 11 4- 15 

visiting loved ones, 88 

Family Slipport center. See Weave r 

Conference Roolll, Womack Army 

Medical Center, Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina. 

Family support groups, 53- 57 

communica ti ons flow, 5 1 

concept, 54 

82d Airborne Division responsibilities, 

50- 5 1 

meeting casualties' families, 49 

role of military wives, 51, 54 

lIsefulness,55 

Fayellcville, North Caroliml, 3, 28, 62, 

63,87, 11 0, 120, 124, 128 

Fender, Spc. Juan c., 121 

Finnegan, Pfc. Pau l 8., 132 

Fisher House, 5411 

Fori Bragg, 53, 63, 102 

Fort Sam Houston, 79 
140 

Fletcher, Spc. Michael P., 11 - 12, 

12 1- 22, 12211 

trea ted at USAISR, 78- 79 

treated at Womack, 36 

Floyd, Brig. Gen. Bobby 0., USAF, 

62 

Fogelman, General Rona ld R., USAF, 

67- 68 

Fort Bragg. North Ca rolina, 3, 4, 17, 19, 

3 1, 43,44,52,53,57, 59,60,6 1,62, 

64, 68,69,72,73, 81,88,92, 93,95, 

96, 99 

community relations, 63 

emergency opera tions center (EOC), 

47-48,53, 108, 128, 129 

mass casualty planning. 123 

menial health professiona ls, 108, I I I 

multiple EOCs, 53, 84, 99 

sniper incident (October 1995), 124 

Fort Bragg Comlllunity Center, 53, 59, 

110 

Fort Polk, Louisiana, 22, 58 

Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 28, 38, 49,50, 

51, 64, 67,68,76, 96, 130 

casualty management plan, 88 

emergency operations center (EOC), 

84, 94, 115- 16, 129 

Family Assistance Center, 82, 84, 85, 

89,9 1, 92,94,95, 116, 129 

mass casualty planning, 92, 123, 125 

public affa irs office, 92 

Fournier, Spc. Michael J. , I I 

Franks, General Frederick M., Jr., 8 1, 82, 

101 

Freeman, Col. Linda, 32, 34 

Fritsch, Pvl. Mark E., 132 

Funerals and memorial scrvices, 58, 125 

burial se rvices, 104, 106 

decision not to hold one-year memorial 

service, 126 

memorial service at Fort Bragg, 

103- 04 

Ga llardo, Sgl. Gustavo E., 132 

Gande r, Newfoundl and, Ca nada, air 

crash, 108 

Gavaghan, S. Sgt. Timothy J. , I I 

Gavin Hall, 124 

Gibbs, Capl. Jonathan C. 111 ,8, 13 

Gibson, Sgl. Mark G., 132 

Godfrey, Capt. Daniel A., 5, 9, 15,20, 2 1 

Dt SASTER ON GREEN R AM P 

Golla, Capt. Kenneth J. , 132 

Gonzales, T. Sgt. Ricardo A., 17 

Gordon, Maj. Thomas, 103 

Green Ramp 

Army's ma ss casualty response, SUIlll11ari ze(~ 127- 30 

assistance from others, 16 

casualties, 20, 36- 37, 74, 116, 127 

described, 31/, 3-4 

description of accident, 6, 14 

emoti onal aftermath, 11 9- 22, 126 

firefighters, 17- 18 

fuel on, 6 

rescue teams, 19- 20 

survivors renlfll to, 109- 10 

Greenfiel<\ Col. Elisabeth, 70, 72, 74, 

75,82,88, 95- 96 

Groups 

55th Medical Group, 19,28, 4 1 

159th Aviation Group (Combat) 

(Airborne), 3, 8 

Guth rie, Capt. Michael, 86 

Haberek, LI. Col. Jerome, 81 

Hamill, Ira, 62 

Hardy Hall, 53 

Harvey, Pvt. Phillip J. , 133 

Hea lth Care Coalition, San Antonio, 

Texas, 7 1 

Highsmith-Rainey Memoria l Hospital, 

Fayetteville, North Carolina, 28, 37, 

42, 102 

Horoho, Maj . Patricia D., 27, 3 1, 100 

Hospitals 

5th Surgical Hospital (Mobile Army), 

30,35 

28th Combat Support Hospital, 30, 34, 

35, 11 2 

Houghton, Sgl. Lorell ei, 15, 100, 102 

Howa rd, S. Sgl. James C., 133 

Infantry units. See also Battalions. 

504th Infantry, 3, 5 

505th Infantry, 3, 5 

Jaycee Burn Center, University of North 

Carolina, Chapel Hill, North 

Caroli na , 28, 33, 36, 37, 38, 4 1, 43, 

75,79, 112 
INDEX 

Joint Mi litary Medical Readiness 

Command, 72 

Joint Readiness Training Ccnter, 22, 30, 

58 

Joint Special Operations COlllmand, 16, 

30 

Johnson, Lisa, 60 

Jones, Pfe. Andrew J. , 133 

Jones, Maj. Keith 1.,57 

Jones, Col. Stephen L., MC, 3 1, 48, 113 

Ke lley, Lisa, 92, 122 

Ke lley, S. Sgl. Michae l T., 5, 9- 10, 78, 

92, 122 

Kelley Air Force Base, Texas, 73 

King, Yal e, 81 

Ladder 1 D, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 

18 

LaNoue, LI. Gen. Alcide M., Me, 67, 82 

Lawlor, Maj. Davi ~ Me, 69, 73, 88 

Leadershi p, 20- 2 1, 127. 130 

Leos, PVI. Willy, 87 

Lessons learned, 126, 127- 30 

casualty identifica tion, 44 

communications shortfa lls, 3 1- 32 

distinguished visitors, 82 

dupli cation ofefTort, 52- 53, 57, 77, 84, 

128 

generic response phms, 39, 53, 57 

key medi cal personnel, 3 1, 77 

mass casualty plans and procedures, 

37, 44-45,77, 123- 25 

personne l records, 5 1 

posthumous medi cal retirements, 50 

psychi atric evaluations, 96 

psychi atric teams, 40 

public affairs, 93, 102- 03, 124, 128 

vital items, 32 

Light, Maj. Dawn, Me , 30, 11 0 

Loresch, Sfc. David c., 70 

Lumbert, Spc. Ma rtin "Marty" R., Jr., 

3711 , 133 

death, 116 

medi cal treatment, 11 4-15 

Mabin, Pfc. Jimmie L., 12 1 

MeChrysta l, Anne, 54, 55- 56, 8 1 

14 1 

MeChrystal, Lt. Col. Stanley A., 55, 56, 

8 1, 104, 109 

batta lion response, 5 1- 52 

sensitivity to fami ly issues, 52 

unit readiness, 106- 07 

training, va lue of, 22 

McManus, Col. Will iam E, MC, 69, 72, 

76 

McPeak, General Merrill A., USAF, 

104 

Marcello, Jane, 51, 54 

Marcello, Col. John 1., 48, 5 1 

Marley, Maj. Kim, MC, 34 

Mass casualty (MASCAL) response. See 

a/so Contingency planning. 

appli cation of lessons learned, 37,48, 

123- 25 

assessment, 37, 44-45, 84, 96, 127- 30 

burn management, 37- 39, 69-77 

casualty identification, 43--45 

command and contro l, 47-53, 84, 108, 

128 

coordination, 17, 19- 20, 28, 4 1,59, 62, 

67- 68, 72,92 

counseling and debri efin gs, 39-40, 

57- 59,5911 , 94-96 emergency care, 26-33, 69- 70 

inpatient care, 33- 37, 111 - 13 

plan activated, 19,25 

support for vict ims and families, 

53- 57, 80- 83, 84-92 

training and rehea rsals, va lue of, 22, 

27, 42, 44,5 1, 58, 74, 129 

transfer of patients, 40-4 1, 43, 72- 73 

Media. See News media. 

Memorial service. See Funerals and 

memorial services. 

Ment al health personnel, 39--40, 108- 11 

Military wives, 56, 8 1, 90 

dea ling with emotions, 55 

role in crisis, 55 

"Trauma in the Unit" course, 54, 55 

Miller, S. Sgt. Alan D., 133 

Miller, Edward K., 85 

Mingus, Capt. James 

treated at USA ISR, 79- 80 

treated at Womack, 35- 36 

Momoa, Sgt. I-larry L., Jr., 133 

Moon I-I all, 53 

Mortuary affairs, 39, 43--44 

Mozingo, Maj. David, Me, 73, 11 2 
142 

Naeyacrt, Amy. 79 

Naeyaert, Sgl. Jaeob "Jake" T , Jr., 10, 82 

treated at USA ISR, 79 

treated at Womack, 36 

Nava l Medi ca l Cenl er, Portsmouth, 

Virgi ni a, 42, 5 1, 121 

Ne lson, Lt. Judson "Jay" P, Jr. , 120 

News media, 47, 59 

application of lessons lea rned, 124 

coverage of Pope Air Force Base crash, 

6 1, 92- 93 

evaluat ion, 60- 61 

press conferences, 62, 93 

pri vacy issues, 92- 93, 129 

problems, 93 

working with, 59- 62, 92- 93 

Nolan, LI. Col. GeraJc~ 7 1, 77, 82, 85, 

127 

emergency operat ions center, 84 

medi a center, 93 

Norri(~ Spc. Gregory R., 2 1 

Nunes, Sgt. Gregory D., 133 

Office of the Adjutant General, Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina, 43, 56 

Office of the Surgeon General, 68 

Olle AMEDD (A rmy Medical 

Depa rtment) Team, 3 1, 128 

Oriole, Kim, 11 9 

Owens, Lt. Rona ld L., 58 

P;:lImcr, Col. Jerry, Me, 28 

Patient Administrat ion Division (PA D). 

See Womack Army Medical Center, 

Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 

Patient counse li ng, 39-40, 57- 59 

Peake, Brig. Gen. James, MC, 30 

casualty identification, 44 

One AM EDD Team concept, 3 1, 128 

teamwork, 45 

Perry, William J. , 101 , 104 

Peterson, Peter, Dr., 112 

Pharmacy teams, 32 

Plewes, Lt. Col. John w., MC, 40, 108, 

109, 110, I I I 

Poole, Capt. B. Keith, 20- 2 1 

Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, 3, 

4, 25,27, 43,58,62 

aircraO crash, 6 

DISASTER ON GREEN R AM P 

Pope Air Force Base, North CarolinaContinued 

clinic, 20 

community relat ions. 63 

emergency opera tions center, 47 

fircfightcrs, 17 

mcdical rescue teams, 10 

press covc rage, 61 , 102 

surgeon's offi cc, 30 

Powell , Spc. Bri:'1I1 , 17 

Prcsidcnt of thc Uni tcd States. See 

Clinton, Bil l. 

Pri ce, S. Sgt. Daniel E., 13- 14, 133 

Pru itt, Col. Basil A., Me, 69, 11 4, [ 15 

Public affairs, 47, 59- 62, 77, 92- 93, 96, 

128, 129. See also Public afTairs 

officcs; News medi a; Tippy, Marga ret . 

Public a ffairs offices, 52. See also News 

medi a; Tippy, Margaret. 

Brooke Army Medi cal Centcr, 92, 93 

Department of the Army, 92 

Dcpartment of De fcnse, 92 

XVl ll Airborne Corps, 59- 60, 6 1, 62, 

92 

82d Airborne Division, 60, 62, 92, 102 

Fort Sam Houston, 92 

lessons learned, 93, 102- 03, 124, 128 

mcdia center, 61 

prcss con ferences, 6 1- 62, 99, 101 

problems, 93 

Womack Army Mcdical Centc r, 92, 

102 

press conferences, 62 

privacy issues, 6 1, 129 

working with news media , 60 

U.S. Army Hea lth Services COlllmand, 

92 

Ramirez, "I ope, dissa tisfi ed with 

USA ISR fac ilities, 11 4-15 

Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, 72 

Redlinc message system, 5 1, Sill 

Reimer, Gencral Dennis J., 10 1 

Rich, Capt. James 8., 5 

describes accident, 8- 9 

describes devastat ion, 14- 15 

describes hospita l, 29 

training, importance of, 20, 2 1 

Ritz-Epps Fitness Center, Fort Bragg, 

North Carolina, 103 
INDEX 

Road Runner Community Cenler, Fori 

Sam Houston, Texas, 88- 89, 90, 91 

Rumbaugh Child and Adolescent Menial 

Health Clinic, 53, 109, 110 

San Antonio Health Ca re Coordinating 

Council, 67, 68 

San Antonio Joint Medical Readiness 

Committee, 125 

San Antonio Mi litary Family Service 

Board, 9 1- 92 

Sanchez, Sgl. Waddington " Doc," II , 

134 

Savell, Pre. Jason A" 120- 2 1 

Schmader, Col. John, 49. 81, 107 

Schwartz, Lt. Col. Anne, 94, 95 

Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, 43, 67, 70, 

73 

Scudder, Capt. Michael, 85- 86, 88, 129 

Secreta ry of the Army. See West, Togo. 

Secretary of Defense. See Perry, William 

J 

Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, 

Missouri, 30 

Shelton, Lt. Gen. Henry 1-1 .,2 1,47,62, 

126 

Siettas, Spc. Gus, 21 

Simmons Army Airfield, North Carolina, 

19, 41 

Sloan, LI. Gen. Alexander M., Me , 

USAF, 67 

Slocum, Command Sgt. Maj. Steven R., 

49,8 1 

Sni per incident (October 1995), 124 

Special Forces medics, 16, 30 

Spri ng Lnkc Fire DCp;.1rlment. 18 

Souza, S. Sgt. Roland A., 100 

Squadron, 23d Medical, USAF, 17, 19, 

43 

St an fie1(~ Lt. Col. Randy, 48, 108 

credits exercises for response, 5 1 

early medi cal retirement of soldiers 

ncar death, 50 

Steelc, Pam, 51, 54, 81 

comlllunity support, 63 

deali ng with emotions, 5S 

Steele, Maj. Gen. William M., 48, 82, 91 , 

125, 126 

crisis action committee, 51 

determination to he lp, 49, 55 

143 

Steele, Maj . Gen. William M.-

Continued 

early medical retirement of soldiers 

nea r death, 50 

memorial service, 104 

organizes liaison team, 84- 85 

post-accident exercise, 107- 08 

spirit of Ameri can soldier, 100- 10 I 

teamwork, 22 

unit buries own dea ~ 104-05 

visits USA ISR burn lInit, 8 1, 100 

Stetz, Lt. Col. Charies, 70, 72, 74, 76, 88 

Strayhorn, Sgt. Vi ncent S., 134 

Stress debriefings, 39-40, 108- 11 

Sullivan, General Gordon R., 82, 104 

Survivor assistance ofTieers, 125 

Tamez, Israe l, 86 

Tamez, Ramona, 86 

Team Alpha, 93- 94, 95 

Teamwork, 20- 2 1, 22, 30- 3 1, 32, 33, 40, 

43, 44-45 , 47,74, 107, 127 

Tejeda, Frank, 8 1 

Thomas, Linda, 67, 90, 91 

Thompson, Sharon, 53 

Timboe, Col. Harold L., MC, 28, 38 

news mcdia, 62, 102 

training, va lue of, 44 

Tippy, Margaret, 25, 27- 28, 30, 59, 60, 

63, 111 

news media, 100, 102- 03 

privacy issues, 6 1 

recommendations implemented, 124 

Towne, Maj. Larry E., USAF, 58- 59 

Training, 31 , 127 

burn, 73 

casualty assistance, 49, 125 

common task, 2 1, 51 , 130 

emergcncy deployment readiness exercise (EDRE), 107, 10811 

emphasized, 11, 15, 20- 2 1, 45 

expected quality, 104 

importance to reconstitution, 107- 08 

mass casualty, 22, 42, 44, 58, 74, 85, 124 

pat ient treatment, 74 

relat ion to patient recuperation, 122 

ro le in response to disaster, 12- 22, 44, 

129 

trauma and crisis response, 95 

Warrighler exercise, 51, 5111 
144 

"Trauma in the Unit" course, 54, 55 

Tri age and emergency areas, 27. 32, 

33 

Troop Medical Clinic No.9, 32 

University of North Carolina, Chapel 

Hill, North Carolina. See Jaycee Burn 

Center. 

U.S. Air Force Educa tion and Trai ning 

Command,67 

U.S. Army Forces CO llll11all(~ 101 

U.S. Army Hea lth Services Command, 

67, 76,84,92 

U.S. Army Institute of Surgical Research 

(USAISR), Fori Sam Houston, Texas, 

28,64,82,94, 95, 96, 102, 130 

ale rted, 67 

burn teams, 37- 39, 69- 71 

casualty evaluation, 38, 75, 129 

complaints about fac ilities, 114-15 

distingu ished visitors, 80- 83 

82d Airborne Division liaison team at, 

49,84-88,92,96, 129 

history of, 68- 69 

military wives at, 81, 90 

peak patient load, 76 

problems 

administrative versus patient 

requi rements, 77 

lack of coorditmtion delays evacua -

tion,38 

overcapac ity, 77 

psychological and physical stress, 

74-75 

recommendations, 39, 77 

resources for more suppli es and equip. 

ment, 76- 77 

staffing, 72 

transfer of patients, 36, 72- 73 

trea tment of patients, 73- 74, 76- 77, 

78,1 13- 14 

US. Army Medical Command, 77 

US. Army Medica l Department Center 

and School, 67, 72, 95 

U S. Army Medi cal Resea rch and 

Development Command, 68 

US. Army Speciai Forces Command, 

108 

U.S. Army Trai ning and Doctrine 

Command, 8 1, 10 1 

DISASTER ON G REEN RAMP 

US. Cavalry Store, Fayettevill e, North 

Caroli na , 87 

Veterans Administr:.nion Hospita l, 

Fayetteville, Nort h Carolina, 28 

Vo lunteers, 30, 3 1, 32, 34, 44, 59, 90, 

128 

civili an community support, 62- 63 

medical profeSS ionals, 72 

privacy of soldiers, 27 

Wa lker, Lt. Ronaid D., II 

Wa lte r Reed Army Medi ca l Center, 

Washington, D.C., 120 

Wa iters, Sgt. James M., Jr., 134 

Wa lters, Capt. M. Lee, 5, 82 

treated at USA ISR, 80 

treated at Womack, 36 

Waiters, Lt. Stephani e, 83, 88 

Waring, S. Sgt. Benjamin R., 32 

Wea ver Conference Room, Womac k 

Army Medical Center, Fort Bragg, 

Nort h Carolina , 55, 56, 57, 58, 128 

counse ling for family members, 110 

fa mi ly support center, 39, 53 

services avai lable , 53 

Weightman, Lt. Col. George w., MC, 32, 

34, 44 

West, Togo, 62, 8 1 

Wilford I-I all Air Force Medi ca l Center, 

San Antonio, Texas, 67, 72 

Wing, 23d, USAF, 19 

Wingfield, Spc. Estella, 13- 14 

Womack Army Medi ca l Center, Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina, 52, 53, 64, 

78, 96, 99, 10 1 

applicat ion of lessons lea rned, 124 

casualt y evacuation to, 10- l i , 12, i3, 

15, 16, 17,20 

casualty identification, 43, 44 

counse ling and debrie fings, 39-40, 

110 

disaster plan activated, 19,25 

emergency operations center, 28, 47, 

56, 60,99, 108, 128 

eVaCl13tes patients, 4 1, 42-43, 73, 75, 

114 

inpatient treatment, 33- 36, 111- 13 

liaison with XV II I Ai rborne Corps, 47 
INDEX 

Womack Army Medical Center. Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina-Continued 

liaison with Fort Sam Houston Family 

Assistance Center. 90 

management of casualties, 36-37 

medical support, 30-3 1 

military wives at, 55- 56 

Patient Administration Division (PAD). 

48.52.84.90 

public affairs office. 60-62. 92. 102 

receiving injured, 27- 28 

145 

Womack Army Med ical Center, Fort 

Bragg. North Carolina- Continued 

rehabilitation therapy, 11 2- 13, 116, 

121 . 122 

response to disaster, 128 

response of surgeons, 34 

staffing, 29 

and USA ISR bnrn teams. 38. 39. 68 

Zegan, Pre. Matthew J. , 134 




" It was soldie rs savin g soldi ers. Soldi ers purring o ur tires o n 

o the r soldie rs; soldie rs draggin g soldie rs o ut of tires; 

resuscitating ; giving so ldi e rs CPR; puttin g tourniqu ets on 

limbs that had been severed .... An ything the), eould do 

to ca re to r their buddies that we re more se riously injlll"ed 

they we re doing . T hey ea n 't do that witho ut knowin g how. 

T hey respo nded the way the), wo uld in combat." 

- Maj. Gen. William M. Steele 

074656- 000