alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### James Lee COOPER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. MM-307.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Nov. 9, 1979.

*478Randolph Murrell, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

In this prosecution for grand theft and passing a worthless bank check, Cooper testified that he gave the automobile salesman, in exchange for a car simultaneously delivered, a check to be held by the salesman until Cooper returned with cash, which Cooper said he did. In support of this defense theory Cooper’s counsel argued to the jury in closing that the salesman’s failure to telephone the bank to verify the check, before depositing it, was consistent with the salesman’s purpose to convert Cooper’s cash, which the salesman denied receiving, to the salesman’s own use. Whether that was a sensible defense theory was, of course, for the jury. After the jury deliberated a short time, the jurors returned with a question by one of them to the court. The following colloquy occurred:

> JUROR: I actually had the question. It was about the responsibility of Courtesy to hold on to your own property. Like, the man gave him a check and he kind of, like, pushed him off the lot or whatever, you know, with the car, saying I made my money, goodbye. Right. That’s the way I feel about it. I mean, when I went down and bought my car, I had to wait until the check cleared the bank before I was given that car.

> THE COURT: And your question is what, Mr. Dressel (phonetic)?

> JUROR: Does Courtesy have some responsibility for the okaying of letting people off the lot with their car?

> THE COURT: I would answer that, no, because it would be unreasonable to require any merchant to check the bank before they accepted any check. It would impair and impede and slow down all merchandise and all sales or transactions by check.

> JUROR: That’s fair enough. That’s all I wanted to know.

Defense counsel objected to the court’s answer to the question and on this appeal contends that the court improperly commented on an evidentiary question which was pertinent to the defense. We agree. *Lee v. State,*324 So.2d 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); *Tanner v. State,*197 So.2d 842 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967); *Ferber v. State,*353 So.2d 1256 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). There was no error in admitting the testimony of Joy Adams. There was no objection to the business records offered through the witness Hutchinson on the ground that the predicate required by Section 92.36, Florida Statutes (1977) was not laid; therefore, we do not reach that question.

REVERSED for a new trial.

ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., Acting C. J., and ERVIN, J., concur.

BOOTH, J., dissents.

*479BOOTH, Judge,

dissenting.

The trial court’s statement can be fairly construed as a statement of the law, i. e., that the law does not require a merchant to call the bank before accepting a check, and not a comment on the evidence.

I would affirm the judgment below.
# C_2006154EN.01001406.xml

| 1.7.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 154/14 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.7.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 154/14

---

Order of the President of the Court of 16 February 2006 — Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic

(Case C-413/05) (1)

1

(2006/C 154/39)

Language of the case: Italian

Language of the case: Italian

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 22, 28.01.2006.

1

---
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 97-2415WM

_____________

Mary Anne Poores, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Western

* District of Missouri.

Robert Rubin, in his capacity as *

Secretary of the Treasury for the * [UNPUBLISHED]

United States of America, *

*

Appellee. *

_____________

 Submitted: November 5, 1997

Filed: November 26, 1997

_____________

Before FAGG, BOWMAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

_____________

PER CURIAM.

Mary Anne Poores appeals the district court's order dismissing Poores's

employment discrimination action on res judicata grounds. Having reviewed the

record, we conclude the district court's ruling was clearly correct. Contrary to Poores's

view, the dismissal of Poores's earlier action for failure to comply with the district

court's scheduling order was a disposition on the merits, the district court correctly

dismissed the same claims that Poores presented in her earlier action, and res judicata

also bars Poores's newly asserted claims because these claims could have been litigated
-2-

in her earlier action. We thus affirm the judgment of the district court. See 8th Cir. R.

47B.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
###### Editorial Note on Part 422

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 422 appear at 70 FR 4741, Jan. 28, 2005.

#### § 422.402 Federal preemption of State law.

The standards established under this part supersede any State law or regulation (other than State licensing laws or State laws relating to plan solvency) with respect to the MA plans that are offered by MA organizations.

[70 FR 4733, Jan. 28, 2005]
# C_2006143EN.01001002.xml

| 17.6.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 143/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.6.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 143/10

---

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 6 April 2006 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Finanzgericht Hamburg) — ED & F Man Sugar Ltd v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas

(Case C-274/04) (1)

1

(Agriculture - Regulation (EEC) No 3665/87 - Export refunds - Sanction applied following a decision to recover a refund that has become final - Possibility of re-examining the decision imposing a sanction)

(2006/C 143/19)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Finanzgericht Hamburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: ED & F Man Sugar Ltd

Applicant

Defendant: Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas

Defendant:

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Finanzgericht Hamburg (Finance Court) Hamburg — Interpretation of Article 11(1) and (3) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3665/87 of 27 November 1987 laying down common detailed rules for the application of the system of export refunds on agricultural products (OJ 1987 L 351, p. 1), as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 2945/94 of 2 December 1994 (OJ 1994 L 310, p. 57) — Sanctions for requesting a refund in excess of that applicable — Whether national authorities or courts may re-examine, in the context of an action brought by an exporter against a decision imposing a sanction on him, the final decision ordering repayment of amounts wrongly received — Misinterpretation of Community law

Operative part of the judgment

The first subparagraph of Article 11(1) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3665/87 of 27 November 1987 laying down common detailed rules for the application of the system of export refunds on agricultural products, as amended by Commission Regulation No 2945/94 of 2 December 1994, must be interpreted as meaning that, in an appeal against a decision imposing a sanction on the basis of that provision, the national authorities and courts are entitled to examine whether the exporter requested a refund in excess of that applicable within the meaning of that provision, notwithstanding the fact that a reimbursement decision provided for in the first subparagraph of Article 11(3) of that Regulation has become final before the decision imposing a sanction was issued.

---

(1)  OJ C 228, 11.9.2004

1

---
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. William E. HUTSON v. Hayden J. DEES, Warden.

No. 65020.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 4, 1979.

In re William E. Hutson applying for remedial writ. Parish of West Feliciana. No. W — 78-10-1037.

Denied. This application is to be returned to applicant to file in U. S. District Court for Middle District of Louisiana.
#### Bruce EVERETT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 78-1406.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 11, 1980.

Bruce Everett, in pro. per.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and BASKIN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This court, proceeding in the manner outlined and recommended by the Supreme Court of the United States in *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), having deferred ruling on a motion of the public defender to withdraw as counsel for the indigent defendant-appellant, and having furnished appellant with a copy of the public defender’s memorandum brief, and having allowed the appellant a reasonable specified time within which to raise any points that he chose in support of this appeal, and the appellant having failed to respond thereto, on consideration thereof upon full examination of the proceedings we conclude that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Whereupon, the piublic defender’s said motion to withdraw is granted, and the order or judgment appealed is hereby affirmed.
Date: May 2012

Subject: Teleconference with American Chemistry Council on January 11, 2012

Nitric Acid NSPS Review

EPA Contract No. EP-D-11-084; Work Assignment No. 0-01 

RTI Project No. 0213199.000.001

From: Melissa Icenhour

To: Nathan Topham

OAQPS/SPPD/MICG (D243-02)

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

A conference call was held on January 11, 2012 to discuss monopressure nitric 

acid plants and how they differ from the dual pressure plants used in EPA’s review of the 

New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) for Nitric Acid plants (40 CFR Part 60, 

Subpart G). The meeting attendees included:

EPA

Chuck French, EPA, OAQPS, SPPD, Metals and Inorganic Chemicals Group

Nathan Topham, EPA, OAQPS, SPPD, Metals and Inorganic Chemicals Group

Bill Neuffer, EPA, OAQPS, SPPD, Metals and Inorganic Chemicals Group

Nathan Frank, EPA, Region V

American Chemistry Council (ACC)

Lorraine Gershman, ACC

Larry Fitzwater, LSB Industries

David Emerson, Air Products

Desi Chari, Dow

Rick Vickery, DuPont

EPA Support Contractor:

Melissa Icenhour, RTI International
Purpose: 

The purpose of the meeting was to listen to concerns from ACC representatives as 

to whether the proposed standard is achievable by monopressure plants and discuss the 

data that ACC voluntarily offered to supply. 

Discussion:

According to the ACC members, monopressure plants are smaller than dual 

pressure plants and are not usually controlled. The nitric acid from monopressure plants 

is usually used as intermediaries for other chemical processes instead of being used to 

manufacture fertilizer.

The ACC reiterated the comments of ACC and some of its individual member 

companies on a number of topics, including the achievability of the standard for small 

monopressure plants and the potential problems associated with hydrogen peroxide 

injection. The ACC member companies stated that they would provide the EPA with data 

from small, monopressure nitric acid facilities. The ACC member companies indicated 

that they would attempt to provide those data by January 16, 2012.
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF  THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

          In connection with the Annual Report of Avatar Systems, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-KSB for the year ended  December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Robert C. Shreve, Jr., President, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge: 

          (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

          (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

|                      | AVATAR SYSTEMS, INC. |
|---------------------------|----------------------|
|                      |                 |   |
| **Dated: March 30, 2006** | By:                  | /s/  ROBERT   C. SHREVE, JR. |
|                      |                 |  |
|                      |                 | Robert C. Shreve, Jr. |
|                      |                 | Chief Executive Officer |
|                      |                 | Chief Financial Officer |

          A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. 

----
#### Roy PINKSTON v. SCOTT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION.

No. 51832.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

April 30, 1980.

Walker, Brookins & Walker, William Walker, Jr., Phillip J. Brookins, Jackson, for appellant.

O. B. Triplett, Jr., Forest, for appellee.

Appeal from Chancery Court, Scott County; Osborn Guyton Idom, Chancellor.

Before PATTERSON, C. J., and SUGG and WALKER, JJ.

AFFIRMED.
NASA LogoNTRSNTRS - NASA Technical Reports ServerSearchmore_vertCollectionsAboutNewsHelpLogin Back to ResultsCalculation of three-dimensional unsteady transonic flows past helicopter bladesA finite difference code for predicting the high speed flow over the advancing helicopter rotor is presented. The code solves the low frequency, transonic small disturbance equation and is suitable for modeling the effects of advancing blade unsteadiness on blades of nearly arbitrary planform. The method employs a quasi-conservative mixed differencing scheme and solves the resulting difference equations by an alternating direction scheme. Computed results showed good agreement with experimental blade pressure data and illustrate some of the effects of varying the rotor planform. The flow unsteadiness is shown to be an indispensible part of a transonic solution. Close to the tip at high advance ratio, cross flow effects can significantly affect the solution.Document ID19800024848Acquisition SourceLegacy CDMSDocument TypeTechnical Publication (TP)AuthorsChattot, J. J.*(NASA Ames Research Center Moffett Field, CA, United States)*Date AcquiredSeptember 4, 2013Publication DateOctober 1, 1980Subject CategoryAerodynamicsReport/Patent NumberA-8024NASA-TP-1721Accession Number80N33356Funding Number(s)PROJECT: RTOP 505-42-21Distribution LimitsPublicCopyrightWork of the US Gov. Public Use Permitted.Available DownloadsNameType19800024848.pdfSTIcloud_downloadcontent_copyvisibilityRelated RecordsThere are no records associated with this record.visibility_offNo Preview Available
 No Fear Act | Freedom of Information Act | Office of the Inspector General | Agency Financial ReportsNASA Web Privacy Policy and Important Notices | NASA Guidelines for Quality of InformationDisclaimers, Copyright, Terms of Use | Accessibility | NASA OCIO | USA.gov | NASA.govContact Us | Site MapSTI LogoNASA Official: JoAnne R. Calhoun Site Curator: STI Compliance and Distribution Services Last Modified: September 12, 2024
§ 423.360 Reporting and returning of overpayments. ( a ) *Definitions.* For the purposes of this section the following definitions are applicable: *Applicable reconciliation* means the later of either the annual deadline for submitting— ( i ) PDE data for the annual Part D payment reconciliations referred to in § 423.343(c) and (d); or
( ii ) Direct and indirect remuneration data.
*Funds* for purposes of this section, means any payment that a Part D sponsor has received that is based on data submitted by the Part D sponsor to CMS for payment purposes, including data submitted under § 423.329(b)(3), § 423.336(c)(1), § 423.343, and data provided for purposes of supporting allowable costs as defined in § 423.308 which includes data submitted to CMS regarding direct or indirect remuneration.
*Overpayment* means funds that a Part D sponsor has received or retained under title XVIII of the Act to which the Part D sponsor, after applicable reconciliation, is not entitled under such title.
( b ) *General rule.* If a Part D sponsor has identified that it has received an overpayment, the Part D sponsor must report and return that overpayment in the form and manner set forth in this section.
( c ) *Identified overpayment.* The Part D sponsor has identified an overpayment when the Part D sponsor has determined, or should have determined through the exercise of reasonable diligence, that the Part D sponsor has received an overpayment.
( d ) *Reporting and returning of an overpayment.* A Part D sponsor must report and return any overpayment it received no later than 60 days after the date on which it identified it received an overpayment. ( 1 ) *Reporting.* A Part D sponsor must notify CMS of the amount and reason for the overpayment, using the notification process determined by CMS.
( 2 ) *Returning.* A Part D sponsor must return identified overpayments in a manner specified by CMS.
( e ) *Enforcement.* Any overpayment retained by a Part D sponsor is an obligation under 31 U.S.C. 3729(b)(3) if not reported and returned in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section.
( f ) *Look-back period.* A Part D sponsor must report and return any overpayment identified within the 6 most recent completed payment years.
[79 FR 29963, May 23, 2014]
# C_2006143EN.01002803.xml

| 17.6.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 143/28 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.6.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 143/28

---

Order of the President of the Court of 1 December 2005 — Commission of the European Communities v Ireland

(Case C-294/03) (1)

1

(2006/C 143/54)

Language of the case: English

Language of the case: English

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 213, 06.09.2003.

1

---
§ 802.801 Obligation of parties to provide information. ( a ) Parties to a transaction that is notified or declared under subpart D or E, or a transaction for which no notice or declaration has been submitted and for which the Staff Chairperson has requested information to assess whether the transaction is a covered real estate transaction, shall provide information to the Staff Chairperson that will enable the Committee to conduct a full assessment, review, and/or investigation of the transaction. Parties to a transaction that have filed information with the Committee shall promptly advise the Staff Chairperson of any material changes to such information. If deemed necessary by the Committee, information may be obtained from parties to a transaction or other persons through subpoena or otherwise, under the Defense Production Act Reauthorization of 2003, as amended (50 U.S.C. 4555(a)).
( b ) Documentary materials or information required or requested to be filed with the Committee under this part shall be submitted in English. Supplementary materials written in a foreign language shall be submitted in certified English translation.
( c ) Any information filed with the Committee in connection with any action for which a report is required under section 721(l)(6)(B) with respect to the implementation of a mitigation agreement or condition described in section 721(l)(3)(A) shall be accompanied by a certification that complies with the requirements of section 721(n) and § 802.202. A sample certification may be found at the Committee's section of the Department of the Treasury website.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                         149,307
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                           1,293
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    273,391
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         553,401
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                           558,335
<LOANS>                                      1,326,840
<ALLOWANCE>                                     21,529
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,450,921
<DEPOSITS>                                   1,740,481
<SHORT-TERM>                                   327,540
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                             32,580
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       350,320
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               2,450,921
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                132,336
<INTEREST-INVEST>                               56,073
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   847
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               189,256
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              50,413
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              68,709
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                          120,547
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                   (3,100)
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                              (3,832)
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 94,688
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 62,951
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                      62,951
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    41,280
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     5.18
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     5.18
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    5.70
<LOANS-NON>                                      2,073
<LOANS-PAST>                                     5,459
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                   336
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                 17,082
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                19,226
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                    4,544
<RECOVERIES>                                     9,947
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                               21,529
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             4,107
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                         17,422
        

</TABLE>
#### In re NATIONAL SECURITY FIRE & CASUALTY CO. v. David BRANNON, as in invitum or de facto guardian of Lonnie Groves, as the same is revived in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of Lonnie Groves, Deceased. Ex parte National Security Fire and Casualty Co., a corp.

SC 762.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 6, 1974.

Charles D. Rosser, Tuscumbia, for petitioner.

Robert M. Hill, Jr., Florence, for ap-pellee.

PER CURIAM.

Petition of National Security Fire and Casualty Company, a Corp. for Certiorari to the Court of Civil Appeals to review and revise the judgment and decision of that Court in National Security Fire & Casualty Co. v. Brannon, as In Invitum Or DeFacto Guardian of Lonnie Groves, As The Same is Revived In His Capacity As Adminis*176trator of The Estate of Lonnie Groves, Deceased. 52 Ala.App. 576, 296 So.2d 170.

Writ denied.

MERRILL, COLEMAN, HARWOOD, BLOODWORTH, MADDOX, McCALL, FAULKNER and JONES, JJ., concur.

HEFLIN, C. J., recuses self.
#### § 405.1138 Case remanded by a Federal district court.

When a Federal district court remands a case to the Secretary for further consideration, unless the court order specifies otherwise, the Council, acting on behalf of the Secretary, may make a decision, or it may remand the case to an ALJ or attorney adjudicator with instructions to take action and either issue a decision, take other action, or return the case to the Council with a recommended decision. If the Council remands a case, the procedures specified in § 405.1140 will be followed.

[70 FR 11472, Mar. 8, 2005, as amended at 82 FR 5124, Jan. 17, 2017]